7 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 539

BANARASI DEVI v.

INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CALCUTTA

[K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. Snau, JJ.J

Income-tax Act, (11 of 1922), as amended by Income-tax (Amendment) Act (1 of 1959) s. 4-Fiscal enactments-Interpretation of-"lssued" in s. 4 of the Amending Act-Meaning of.

For the assessment year 1947-48 the appellant in the fust case field a return of her income and the assessment was completed sometime in 1948 as a result whereof it was found that no tax was payable by her. On April 2,1956, the appellant was ,; erved with a notice dated March 19, 1956, under s. 34(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, on the ground of escaped assessment.

The date of the notice fell within' 8 years from the end of the relevant assessment year i.e. March 31, 1948, but it was served beyond 8 years from the date and therefore was clearly out of time under the provisions of the said section. In the second case, the appellant was assessed for the assessment year 1947-48 and the tax thereon was deposited on his behalf. On April 2, 1956, the appellant was also served with a similar notice as aforesaid. The appellants filed two petitions under Art. 22~ for .quashing the said notices and the learned Judge of th• High Court issued rules nisi to the Income-tax Officer, the

Commissioner of Income-tax and the Union of India. On September 11, 1958, the rules were made absolute. The respondents then preferred appeals to a Division Bench of that Court

Pending the appeals, on March 12. 1959, s. 34 of the Act wa,; amended by s. 2 of the Amending Act, 1959. After the said amendment the appeals were heard and relying uPOn the said amendment the learned judges held that the. said notices, though served on the appellants after the prescribed time, w<ere served under s. 4 of the . Amending Act. On appeal by Special Leave it was urged on behalf of the appellants that s. 4 of the Amending Act only saved a notice issued after the prescribed time, but did not apply to a situation where notice was issued within but served out of time. The respondents contended that the expression "issued" means "served" and that, in any view, it was comprehensive enough to take in the entire process of giving and serving of notice.

Held: To the present case the general rule of construction of fiscal Acts would apply, and not the exception engrafted on the rule; for, s. 4 of the Amending Act, cannot he described as a provision laying down the machinery for the calculation of tax. In substance it enables the Income-tax Officer to reassess a person's income which has escaped assessment, though the time within which he could have so assessed had expired under the Act before the amendmei!t of 1959. It resuscitates barred claims. Therefore, the same stringent . rules of construction appropriate to a chargilig section shill! also apply to such a provision.

Case law discussed.

On a true construction of s. 4 of the Amending Act, it must be held that the clear intention of the legislature was to save the validity of the notice as well as the assessment from an

lgf4

Jlarcli.31

1964 attack on the ground that the notice was given beyond the . . prescribed period. That intention would be effectuated if the Banara.ti. DevJ wider meaning is given to the expression "issued".

The die-· lncotRe-,:; Offictr, tionary meaning of the expression "issued" takes in the entire Caktitta 'process of sending the notice as well as the service thereof.

The said word used in s. 34(1) of the Act itself was interpreted by courts to mean 'served". The limited meaning, namely, "sent" will exclude from the operation of the provision a class cl cases and introduce anomalies. In the circumstances, by interpretation, the wider meaning of the word "issued" must be accepted. In this view, though the notices were served beyond the prescribed time, they were saved under s. 4 of the Amending Act.

Case law referred to

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 142 and 143 of 1963. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 13, 1961, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeals from Original Orders No. 41 and 69 of 1959.

S. Chaudhury and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 142/63).

M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. R.

Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 143/1963) ..

K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent (in b, oth the appeals).

March 31, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

JMba Rae, J, SUBBA RAo, J.-These two appeals filed by special leave raise the question of the true construction of the provisions of s. 4 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959 (Act No. I of 1959), hereinafter called the Amending Act.

The material facts lie in a small compass and they are as follows.

For the asseSGment year 1947-48 the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 142 of 1963 filed a return of her income before the Income-tax Officer, District IV, Calcutta, and the assessment was completed sometime in 1948 as a result whereof it was found that no tax was payable by her. On April 2, 1956, the Income-tax Officer served on her a notice dated March 19, 1956, under s. 34(7) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922. hereinafter called tire Act, on the ground of escaped assessment. The date of the notice fell within 8 years from the end of the relevant assessment year i.e., March 31, 1948; but it was served beyond'8 years from that date and. therefore, was clearly out of time under the provisions of the said section.

In Civil Appeal No. 143 of 1963, for the assessment year 1947-48 the appellant was asessed on a total .income

-- ---

of Rs. 28,993 /- on December 30, 1948, by the Income-tax 1964

Officer and the tax thereon amounting to Rs. 4,747-13-0 was Bat1a,...i Deri deposited on behalf of the appellant in the Reserve Bank of 1 ..,._,;,; OJli India. On April 2, 1956, the appellant was served with a ., aa1e11ua "'• notice dated March 19, 1956, by the Income-tax Officer purporting to be under s. 34 of the Act on the ground of escaped Svllba Rao, J assessment. The date of the notice fell within 8 years from the end of the relevant asses1iment year, i.e., March 31, 1956; but it was served beyond 8 years from that date and was, therefore, clearly out of time under the provisions of the said section.

The appellants in the two appeals filed two petitions in the High Court of Calcutta under Aft. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the said notices and for_ other appropriate reliefE. On March 20, 1957, Sinha, J., of that Court issued rules nisi on the said two applications to the Income-tax ' Officer, the Commissioner of Income-tax and the Union of India. On September 11. 1958, the said Judge made the rules absolute. The respondents to the applications preferred appeals from the judgment of Sinha, J., to a Division Bench of that Court. Pending the appeals, on March 12. 1959, s. 34 of the Act was amended bys. 2 of the Amending Act. After the said amendment the appeals were heard by a ..

Division Bench of the High Court, consisting of Bose, C. J ., and G. K. Mitter. J. Relying upon the said amendment the learned Judges held that the said notices, though served on the appellants after the prescribed time, were saved unc!cr s. 4 of the Amending Act In that view they set aside the orders of Sinha, J ., and dismislled the writ petitions. Hence the appeals.

Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the notices under s. 34(1) of the Act were served on the appellants beyond 8 years from the end of the assessment year and, therefore, were barred and that on a true construction of the provisions of s. 4 of the Amending Act, the said notices were not saved thereunder. To appreciate the contention il is necessary to read the relevant provisions of the Act, before and after the amendment.

Section 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, before it was amended by the Finance Act No. XVIII of 1956: If-

(a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of hirl income under Section 22 for any year or to disclose fully

Banarcui Devi v . .Income-tax Officer, OalcuUn

S11bba Rao, J.

(b)

SUPRE"'IE COURT REPORTS (1964]

and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the year, income, profit or gairi chargeable to incon1e-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a rate or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act or exce"ivc loss or depreciation allowance has been comp1l<r.l. or

he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time within eight years .................. serve on the assessee ............... a notice containing all or any of the requiretrients which may be included in a notice under sub-section 2 of Section 22 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or re-compute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be applied accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub- Seclion . • • • • Provided that where a notice under sub-Sectio11 (]) has been issued within the time therein limited, the assessment or re-assessment to b~ made in pursuance of such notice may be made before the expiry of one year from the date of the service of the notice even if such period exceeds the period of eight years or four years, ari the case may be.

Section 4 of the Amending Act, (Act l of 1959) No notice issued under clause (a) of sub-section (]) of section 34 of the principal Act at any time before the commencement of this Act and no assessment, re-assessment or settlement made or other proceedings taken in consequence of such notice shall be called in question in any Court. tribunal or other authority merely on the ground that at the time the notice was issued or at the time the assessment or re-assessment was made, the time within which such notice should have been issued or the assessment or re-assessment should have been made under that section as in force before its amendment by clause (a) of section 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, and expired.

Section 34(1) (a) of the Act empowered the Incomtax 'Officer to assess concealed income which escaped asse>sment by serving a notice on the assessee at any time within 8 years

of the end of the assessment year in respect whereof the said 1964 income has escaped assessment.

Section 4 of the Amending Banam•i Devi Act debars the court from questioning the validity of notice v. issued or the assessment or re-assessment made under sub-s.

1""(J~:':'//!"'· (!) (a) of s. 34 of the Act on the ground that the time for the u issue of such notice or the making of such assessment or Bubba Rao, J •. re-assessment had expired under the said sub-section before it was amended by s. 18 of the Finance Act of 1956.

Learned counsel for the appellants contends that s. 4 of the Amending Act only saves a notice issued after the prescribed time, but does not apply to a situation where notice is issued within but served out of time.

Learned counsel for the respondents argues that the expression "isued" means "served" and that, in any view, it is comprehensive enough to take in the entire process of giving and serving of notice.

Before constrnng the section it will be useful to notice the relevant rules of construction of a fiscal statute.

Jn Oriental Bank v. Wright(') the Judicial Committee held that if a statute professed to impose a charge, the intention to impose a charge upon a subject must be shown by clear and unambiguous language.

In Canadian Eagle Oil Co. v. R.,(') Viscount Si:non L. C. observed:

"In the words of Rowlatt J ................................ . in a taxing Act one has to look at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There , is no equity about a tax.

There is no presumption as to a tax.

Nothing is to be read in. nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." In other words, a taxing statute must be couched in express and unambiguous language. The same rule of construction has been accepted by this Court in Gursahai Saigal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab ("), wherein it was stated:

"It is well recognized that the rule of construction that if a case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of a taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering wltat was the substance of the matter applies only to a taxing provision has no application to all provisions -in a taxing statute. It does not apply to a provision not creating a charge for the tax but laying down the machinery for im calculation or procedure-

(') (1880) 5 A.C. 842, 856.

(') [1946] A.C. 119, 140. (') 1868 Punj. Rec. Cr!. Case No. 6.

Banaraa' Devi

•• ,.,,,,,.,.t<u Ofli-,

Calc., Ua

Sabha Rao, J.

544 SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS (1964]

for its collection. The provisions in a taxing statute dealing with machinery for assessment have to be construed by the ordinary rules of construction, that is to. say, in accordance with the clear intention of the legislature, which is to make a charge levied effective.

In that case, the court was called upon to constru.e the provisions of s. ISA of the Income-tax Act, 1922, which laid down the machinery for assessing the amount of interest and, therefore, this court did not apply the stringent rule of construction. Apart from the emphasis on the letter of the law, the fundamental rule of construction of a taxing statute is not different from that of any other statute and that rule is stated by Lord Russell of Killowen C. J. in Attorney-General

v. Calton Ban('), thus:

"The duty of the court is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . to give effect to the intention of the legislature, as that ' intention is to be gathered from the language employed, having regard to the context in connection with which it is employed."

To the present case the general rule of construction of fiscal Acts would apply, and not the e:tception engrafted on that rule; for, s. 4 of the Amending Act cannot be described as a provision laying down the machinery for the calculation of tax. In substance it enables the Income-tax Officer to reassess a peraon's income which has escaped assessment, though the time within which he, could have so assessed had expired under the Act before the amendment of 1959. It resuscitates barred claims. Therefore, the same stringent rules of construction appropriate to a charging section Shall also apply to such a provi6ion.

Before the Amending Act of 1959 was passed, lncometax Officers issued notices before April l, 1956, and also after that date for reopening assessments made beyond !!

years from the issue of such notices. The validity of such notices was questioned. To save the validity of such notices the Amending Act was passed. This Court in S. C. Prashar v.

Vasantsen Dwarkadas(') held, on a construction of s. 4 of the Amending Act. that it operated and validated the notices issued under s. 34(1) (a) of the Act, as amended in 1948, even earlier than April l, 1956. In other words, notices issued under s. 34(1) (a) of the Act before or after April l, 1956, could not be challenged on the ground that they were issued beyond the time limit of 8 years from the respective assessment years prescribed by the 1948 amendment Act. Section

( ') (1899] 2. Q.B. 158, 164.

(') [1964] 1 S.C.R. 29.

4 of the Amending Act of 1959, therefore, was enacted for 1964 the sole purpose of saving the validity of such notices in Banamsi D<oi respect of all escaped incomes relating to any year commenc- T. ing from the year ending on March 31, 1941, though theyln'°"O.%':uta Offer.er, were issued beyond the prescribed time. If the construction sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the appellants Sll1Jba Rao, J. be accepted, it would defeat the purpose of the amendment in some cases. If the words were clear and exclude the class of cases where the notices wee sent before 8 years from the date of assessment, but served thereafter, this Court has to give them the said meaning.

This bring us to the question of onstruction of the provisions of s. 4 of the Amending Act: The crucial word in the said section is "i&5ued".

The section says that though a notice was issued beyond the time within" which such notice should have been issued, its validity could not be questioned.

If the word 'issued" means "sent", we find that there is no prov1>ion in the Act prescribing a time limit for sending a notice, for, under s. 34( !)(a) of the Act a notice could be served only within 8 years from the relevant assessment year ..

It does not provide any period for sending of the notice.

Obviously, therefore, the expression "issued" is not used in the narrow sense of "sent". Further, the said expression has received, before the amendment, a clear judicial interpretation. Under s. 34(l)(a) of the Act the Income-tax Officer may in cases falling under cl. (a) at any time within 8 years serve on the assessee a notice. The proviso to that section says that where the notice under s. 34(l)(a) is within time therein limited, the assessment or re-assessment to be made in pursuance of such notice may be made before the expiry of one year from the date of the service of the notice even if such period exceeds the period of 8 years or 4 years, as the case may be. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South v.

D. V. Ghurve('), it was argued that a notice sent before 8 years though served beyond 8 years was in compliance with the section; and in support of that argument the expression "issued" in the proviso was relied upon to limit the meaning of the word "served" in the substantive part of the section.

Rejecting that argument, Chagla, C. J., speaking for the Court, observed:

"In other words, the attempt is to equate the expression "served" used in section 34 with the expression "issued" used in the proviso to sub-section (3). Now we must frankly confess that we find it difficult to understand why the Legislature has used in the proviso the expression "where a notice under sub-section (!) has been issued within the

(') (1957) 31 I.T.R. 683, 686.

LP(ll)ISCJ-18

I964

Banarasi Devi v. l11<om<.taz Ojjker,

time therein limited".

In sub-section (1) no time is limited for the issue of the notice: time i;; only limited for the service of the notice; and therefore it is more appropriate that the expression "issued" used in the proviso to sub-section (3) should be equated with the expression "served" rather than that the expression "served" used in sub-section (1) should be equated with the expression "issued" used iu the proviso to sub-section

Oakutta

Bubba Rao J.

(3)." ' .

This decision equated the expression "issued" with expression "served". The Allahabad High Court in Sri Niwas v.

Income-tax Officer(') has also interpreted the word "issued" to mean "served". The rele.vant rule of construction is clearly stated by Viscount Buckmaster in Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd.(') thus:

"It has long been a well established principle to be applied in the consideration of Act of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar cQntext, must be corntrued so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously assigned to it."

Section 4 of the Amending Act was enacted for saving the validity of notices issued under s. 34 (I) of the Act. When that section used a word interpreted by courts in the context of such notices, it would be reasonable to assume that the expression was designedly used in the same sense. That apart, the expressions "issued" and "served" are used as interchangeable terms both in dictionaries and in other statutes. The dictionary meaning of the word "issue" is "the act of sending out, put into circulation, delivery with authority or delivery". Section 27 of the General Clauses Act (Act X of 1897) reads th us :

"Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" or either of the expression, "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting

(') (1956) 30 I.T.R. 381.

(') [1933) A.C. 402, 411.

by registered post, a letter containing the docu- 1964 ment, and unless the contrary is proved, to have B•narasi Devi been effected at the time at which the letter v. would be delivered in the ordinary course of Income0:_'f" Officer• post." iMC'Utfa

It would be seen from this provL>ion that Parliament used the words "serve", "give" and "send" as interchangeable words. So too, in ss. 553, 554 and 555 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, the two expressions "issued to" or

"served upon" are used as equivalent expresiions.

In the legislative practice of our country the said two expressions are sometimes used to convey the same idea .. In other words, the expression "issued" is used in a limited as well as in a wider sense.

We must, therefore, give the expression "issued" in s. 4 of the Amending Act that meaning which carries out the intention of the Legislature in preference to that which defeats it.

By doing so we will not be departing from the accepted meaning of the expression, but only giving it one of its meanings accepted, which fits into the context or setting in which it appears.

With this background let us give a closer look to the provisions of s. 4 of the Amending Act. The object of the section is to save the validity of a notice issued beyond the prescribed time. Though the time within which such notice should have been issued under s. 34(1) of the Act, as it stood before its amendment by s. 18 of the Finance Act of 1956, had expired, the said notice would be valid. Under s. 34(1) of the Act, as we have already pointed out, the time prescribed was only for service of the notice. As the notice mentioned in s. 4 of the Amending Act is linked with the time prescribed under the Act, the section becomes unworkable if the narrow meaning is given to the exprer, sion "issued". On the other hand, if we give wider meaning to the word, the section would be consistent with the provisions' of s. 34(1) of the Act. Moreover, . the narrow meaning would introduce anomalies in the section: while the notice, assessment or re-assessment were saved, the intermediate stage of service would be avoided. To put it in other words, if the proceedings were only at the stage of issue of notice, the notice could not be questioned, but if it was served, it could be questioned; though it was served beyond time, if the assessment was completed, its validity could not be questioned. The result would be that the validity of an assessment proceeding would depend upon the stage at which the assessee seeks to question it. That could not have been the intention of the Legi>lature. All these anomalies would disappear if the expression was given the wider meaning.

L!'(D)I<CI-!S{•)

Subba Rao, .J.

1964 To summarize: the clear intention of the Legislature is B<111orari DtfJi to save the validity of the notice as well as the assessment ... from an attack on the ground that the notice was given be- J~ OJ!iar, yond the prescribed period. That intention would be effec- - tuated if the wider meaning is given to the expression S.bbo Boo, J. "issued" takes in the entire process of sending the notice as well as the service thereof. The said word used in s. 34(1) of the Act itself was interpreted by courts to mean "served".

The limited meaning, namely. "sent" will exclude from the operation of the provision a class of cases and introduce an<>- malies.

In the circumstances, by interpretation, we accept the wider meaning the word "issued" bears.

In this view, though the notices were served beyond the prescribed time, they were served under s. 4 of the Amending Act. No other point was raised before us.

Iii the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee. ·

Appeals dismissed.

539

BANARASI DEVI

INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CALCUTTA

K. SUBBA RAO, J.

C. SHAH

Income-tax Act

s. 4

s. 4

March 19, 1956

s. 34(1)

Income-tax Act, 1922

April 2, 1956

Art. 22

Union of India

September 11, 1958

March 12. 1959

s. 34

s. 2

Amending Act, 1959

s. 4

s. 4

s. 4

s. 4

s. 34(1)

s. 4

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Calcutta High Court

S. Chaudhury

K. R. Chaudhuri

M. Rajagopalan

K. Rajendra Chowdhary

K. R.

Chaudhuri

K. N. Rajagopal Sastri

R. N. Sachthey

JMba Rae

SUBBA RAo

s. 4

s. 34(7)

Indian Incometax Act, 1922

March 31, 1948

s. 34

Svllba Rao

March 31, 1956

High Court of Calcutta

March 20, 1957

Sinha

September 11. 1958

s. 34

Bose

G. K. Mitter

s. 4

s. 34(1)

s. 4

Section 34(1)

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

Section 22

section 2

Section 22

Section 4

section 34

section 18

Finance Act, 1956

Section 34(1)

Section 4

s.

1

s. 34

Bubba Rao

s. 18

s. 4

Rowlatt

Banaraa' Devi

Sabha Rao

ISA of the Income-tax Act, 1922

Russell of Killowen

s. 4

Before the Amending Act

s. 4

s. 34(1)

April l, 1956

s. 34(1)

[1964] 1 S.C.R. 29

March 31, 1941

s. 4

s. 34( !)(a)

s. 34(l)(a)

s. 34(l)(a)

Chagla

section 34

Allahabad High Court

Viscount Buckmaster

Parliament

Section 4

s. 34

Section 27

General Clauses Act

B•narasi Devi

ss. 553, 554 and 555

Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951

s. 4

s. 4

s. 34(1)

s. 18

s. 34(1)

s. 4

s. 34(1)

Subba Rao

S.bbo Boo

s. 34(1)

s. 4


7 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 549

N .. RAGHA VENDRA RAO

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER. SOUTH KANARA,

MAN GALORE

[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH, N.

RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.)

Fundamental Rights-Conditions of se-rvice changed by the State Government without the previous approval of the Central Government-Loss of benefit of service and increments-"Previous approval"-Meaning of-Mysore Generat Services Recruitment Rules, 1959----States Reorganisation Act 1956 (37 of 1956), s. 115(7)-Constitution of India, Arts. 16 and 311(2).

The petitioner was selected as a Lower Division Clerk under the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in 1949, and was posted in South Kanara District. He was promoted as upper division clerk on April 2, 1956 and according to him, he should have. teen promoted much earlier. According to the State, the petitioner was considered for inclusion in the eligibility list from 1955 onwards, but was not selected as he was not considered fit. The State admitted that he was promoted as Upper Division clerk w>ith effect from April 2, 1956, but alleged that this was on a temporary basis. He was later reverted and then again posted as temporary Upper Division clerk. In August, 1957, the petitioner was considered and included in the eligibility list at serial No. 14. This list was regularised on December 12, 1957, in accordance with Madras State and Subordinate Service Rules, with effect from October 19, 1957.

According to the petitioner this resulted in the loss of benefit of service and increments.

In the meantime, reorganisation of States took place under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and S-Outh Kanara District went to the new Myoore and the petitioner was allotted to it. On May 11, 1957, the Government of India addressed a memorandum to all State Governments and in respect of departmental promotion it said that "the question whether any protection should be given in respect of rules and conditions applicable to Government Servants affected by reorganisation immediately before the date of reorganisation in the matter of tra'/elling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion was also . considered. The Government of India agree with the view expressed on behalf of the State respresentatives that it would not be ap"ropriate to provide for any protection in the matter of these conditions. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner (i) that the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959, were not made with the previous approval of the Central Government under s. 115(7) of the States Re-organisation Act, and, therefore, do not govern the petitioner in so far as the conditions of. service have teen varied to his disadvantage and (ii) that the Madras Government had, prior to November 1, 1956, by varoius orders, reduced the petitioner in rank in violation of Art. 311(2) of the Constitutii>n and Art. 16.

Mareh31

1964 He!d: (i) In the setting in which the proviso to s. 115(7) of N R h d R the Act is placed, the expression "previous approval" would in- • ag a; en ra ao elude a general approval to the variation in the conditions of Deputy oo:nmisioner service ~Nithin certain limits, indicated by the Union Govern- Bouth Kanara Man'. ment. Art. 309 of the Constitution gives, subject to the provigalore ' sions of the Constitution, full powers to a State Government to make rules. The proviso to s.115(7) of the Act limits that power, but that limitation is removable by the Central Government by giving its previous approval. The broad purpose :mderlying the proviso to s. 115(7) of the Act was to ensure that the conditions of service. should not be changed except with the prior approval of the Central Government. In the memorandum, the Central Government, after examining various aspects, came to the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to provide for any protection in the matter of travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion. This amounted to previous approval within the proviso to s.115(7). By this memorandum the State Governments were required to send copies of all new rules to the Central Government for it' information. Therefore, it must be held that the rul.es were validly made.

Bikri, J.

In re Bosworth and COTporation of Gravesend, [1905] 2 K.B. 426 and C. K. Appamna v. State of Mysore, W.P. No. 88 of 1962, held inapplicable.

(ii) The petitioner failed to show how Art. 16 was infringed before he was allotted to !he new Mysore State. The State in its reply had asserted that all the orders complained against were passed ty competent authorities, after considering the merits of the petitioner on each occasion. It was for the competent authorities to judge the merits of the petitioner.

Therefore, it must be held that infringement of Art. 16 was not estal;>lished.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 211 of 1963. , Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights.

R. K. Garg, for the petitioner.

C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents.

March 31, 1964,, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SIKRI. J.-This is a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for enforcing the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Arts. 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution. Although the petition raises various points, before us only two points have been argued by Mr. Garg, on behalf of the petitioner. We are grateful to Mr. Garg, who has argued as amicus curiae, for the assistance he has given. The two points may be formulated as follows:

(I) That the Mysore General Services (Revenue Subordinate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1959, were not made with the previous approval of the Central Government under s. 115(7) of the State

Re-organisation Act, and, therefore, do not 1964 govern the petitioner insofar as the conditions of -- service have been varied to his disadvantage N. Raghavendra Rao • v.

(2) That the Madras-Government had prior to Deput11 Oommi8Sioner ' SouthKanara, Man November 1, 1956, by various orders, reduced galore the petitioner in rank in violation of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and Art. 16.

In order to appreciate the arguments addressed to us, it is necessary to give a few facts. The petitioner was selected by the Madras Public Service Commission as a Lower Division Clerk under the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in 1949, and was allotted to the Revenue Department and posted in South Kanara District. He was promoted as Upper Division Clerk on April 2, 1956. According to the petitioner, he should have been promoted much earlier as he had rendered outstanding and meritorious service. According to the State, the petitioner was considered for inclusion in the eligibility list from 1955 onwards, but was not selected as he was not considered fit.

The State admits .that he was promoted as Upper Division Clerk with effect from April 2, 1956, but alleges that this was on a temporary bais. He was later reverted and then again posted as a temporary Upper Division Clerk. In August 1957, the petitioner was considered and included in the eligibility list at Serial No. 14. This list was regularised on December 12, 1957, in accordance with Rules 39(e) and 35 of the Madras State and Subordinate Service Rules. with effect from October 19, 1957. According to the petitioner this remlted in the loss of benefit of service and increments.

In the meantime, reorganisation of States took place under the State Reorganisation Act (XXXVII of 1956) South Kanara District, except Kasaragod Taluk, went to the new Mysore State and the petitioner was allotted to it. On May 11, 1957, the Government of India addressed a memorandum (No.

S.O. SRDI-1. APM-57) to all State Governments.

Broadly speaking, the Central Government said that some conditions of service :ihould be protected, e.g., substantive pay of permanent employees, certain type of special pay, kave rules unless the Government servant opts for new leave rules, etc. But in respect of departmental promotion it said that "the question whether any protection should be given in respect of rules and conditions applicable to Government servant;; affected by reorganisation immediately before the date of reorganisation in the matter of travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion was also considered. The, Government of India agree with the view expressed on behalf of the State representatives that it would not be appropriate

Sikri, J.

1964 to provide for any protection in the matter of these condi- . N. Raghvenilra Rao tions." Therefore, it is evident from this memorandum that

v. . . the Central Government had told the State Government that DeputgComm18"oner th ht "f th d h . .

Somh Kanara, Maney m1g , I ey so esrre, c ange service rules as mdigalore cated in the memorandum. But Mr. Garg argues that even so this does not amount to previous approval within s. 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act to the making of the Bikri, J.

Mysore General Services (Revenue Subordinate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1959. What then is the true meaning of the expression "previous approval" in the proviso to s~ Il5(7).

Sub-section (7) of s. 115 provides that:

"(7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect after the appointed day the operation of the provisions of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation io determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State; Provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in sub-section (]) of subsection (2) shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval bf the Central Government." The effect of this sub-section is, inter alia, to preserve the power of the State to make rules under Art. 309 of the Constitution, but the proviso imposes a limitation on the exercise of this power, and the limitation is that the State cannot vary the conditions of service applicable immediately before November I, 1956, to the disadvantage of persons mentio'ned in sub-ss (1) and (2) of s. 115. It is not disputed that the petitioner is one of those persons.

Mr. Garg has submitted that the very fact that the Mysore General Services (Revenue Subordinate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1959, as framed, were not sent to the Central Government for a, pproval before being promulgated shows that previous approval has not been obtained. The memorandum, he says, is not approval but an abdication of the powers of the Central Government. In this connection he relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of In re Bosworth and Corporation of Gravesend('), but this, decision has no bearing on the point under discussion.

An Order in Council had been made under the provisions of the Burial Act, 1853, whereby it was ordered that no new burial ground shall be opened in (amongst other places) Gravesend, without the previous approval of one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State. Permission was sought of the Secretary of State to add additional land to an existing cemeter~

(') [1905] 2 K.B. 426.

The Secretary of State replied that his sanction to the pro- posed addition was not required. It is thi~ reply. wc~ as N. Riigha•nl raRao

characterised by Collins, M. R., as renouncmg of 1unsd1cl!on. 0 •· . . . th' . . . t' th Deputy omm•"'""'' We cannot appreciate how 1s assists us m mterpre mg e SO'Uth Kanara Ma•· proviso to s. 115(7). He further relied on the unreported galore' judgment of the High Court of Mysore in C. K. Appanna v.

Sikri, J.

State of Mysore('), but this proceeds on a concession made by the Government Pleader and does not advance petitioner's case. In our opinion, in the setting in which the proviso to s. 115(7) is placed, the expression "previous approval" would include a general approval to the variation in the conditions of service within certain limits, indicated by the Union Government. It has to be remembered that Art. 309 of the Constitution gives, subject to the provisions of the Constitu ti on, full powers to a State Government to make rules. The proviso to s. 115(7) limits that power, but that limitation is removable by the Central Government by giving its previous approval. In this context, we think that it could not have been the intention of Parliament that Service Rules made by States would be scrutinised in the minutest detail by the Central Government. Conditions vary from State to State and the details must be filled by each State according to its requirements.

The broad purpose underlying the proviso. to s. 115(7) of the Act was to ensure that the conditions of ser vice should not be changed except with the prior approval of the Central Government. In other words, before embark

ing on varying the conditions of service, the State Govern ments should obtain the concurrence of the Central Government.

In the memorandum mentioned above, the Central Government, after examining various aspects, came to the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to provide for any protection in the matter of travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion. In our opinion, this amounted to previous approval within the proviso to s. 115(7). It may be mentioned that by this memorandum the State Governments were required to send copies of all new rules to the Central Government for its information. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no force in the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, and we hold that the rules were validly made.

There are two preliminary hurdles in the way of the petitioner regarding the second point taken on his behalf. Firstly, the State of Madras has not been made a party to this petition. Secondly, he never raised these points while he was serving under the State of Madras.

It is difficult at this stage to challenge orders, which if quashed, would affect the rights of other civil servants who are not

(') W.P. No 88 of 1962; judgement dated January 13, 1964.

parties to this petition. At any rate, the petitioner has not 1964 been able to show how Art. 16 was infringed before he Wall N R h::°-d R allotted to the new Mysore State. The State in its reply has • ag :'." '" ao asserted that all the orders complained against were pa8sed ll•puty Oommi88ioner by competent authorities, after considering the merits of the

South K;;:;"· Man petitioner on each occasion. It was for the competent authorities to judge the merits of the petitioner. We find no force llikri, J. in this contention and hold that no infringement of Art. 16 has been established.

Accordingly, in the result, the petition fails. In the circumstances of the case we order that the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.

Petition dismissed.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SOUTH KANARA, MANGALORE

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

c. SHAH

RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

S. M. SIKRI, JJ.

States Reorganisation Act 1956

s. 115(7)

Constitution of India

Arts. 16 and 311(2)

Kanara District

April 2, 1956

December 12, 1957

October 19, 1957

Outh Kanara District

May 11, 1957

Government of India

Central Government

s. 115(7)

Madras Government

November 1, 1956

Art. 311(2)

Art. 16

s. 115(7)

Art. 309

s. 115(7)

Bikri

Art. 16

Art. 16

Art. 32

Constitution of India

R. K. Garg

C. K. Daphtary

B. R. L. Iyengar

B. R. G. K. Achar

SIKRI

Art. 32

Arts. 14, 16 and 19

Garg

Recruitment Rules, 1959

s. 115(7)

Madras-Government

Art. 311(2)

Art. 16

Madras Public Service Commission

Kasaragod Taluk

Sikri

N. Raghvenilra Rao

Central Government

Somh Kanara

s. 115(7)

States Reorganisation Act

Recruitment Rules, 1959

s. 115

Art. 309

November I, 1956

s. 115

Recruitment Rules, 1959

N. Riigha•nl raRao

Collins

s. 115(7)

High Court of Mysore

s. 115(7)

Art. 309

s. 115(7)

Parliament that Service Rules

s. 115(7)

s. 115(7)

State of Madras

January 13, 1964

Art. 16

Art. 16


7S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 555

TATA OIL MILLS CO. LTD. v.

ITS WORKMEN

IP B. GAJl!M>RAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO AND K. c.

DAS GUPTA, JJ.]

IndustTiaL Dispute-Assault on co-employee-Whether Standing Order 22(viii) attracted-Domestic enquiry-Findings binding unless shown to be Perverse or enidence lacking- Crimina! Trial also'pending-Failure to stay enquiry, if vitiates

enquiTj/-Standing Order 22(viii).

On a report that R and M, both timployees of the appellant waylaid A, another employee and assaulted him outside the factory, the appellant held an enquiry ang sought approval for the dismissal of R and M from the Industrial Tribunal, before which an industrial dispute was pending. The Tribunal approved the dismissal of R but not that of M. Thereupon R was di,:- missed. The respondent raised an industrial dispute in rEgard to the propriety and validity of the said dismissal. On refen. ence of this dispute, the Industrial Tribunal held that the assault could be treated as a private matter between R and A with which the appellant was not concerned and as a result Standing Order 22(viii) could not be invoked against R, and it ordered the reinstatement of R. On appeal by special !€ave:

Held: (i) that It would be unreasonable to include within Standing Order 22(viii) any riotous behaviour without the factory which was the result of purely private and individual dispute and in course of which tempers of both the contestants become hot. In order that standin!ll order 22(viii) may be attracted, the appellant should be able to show that the disorderly or riotous behaviour had some rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim.

(ii) In the present case the assault by R on A was not a purely private or individual matter but was referable to the difference of opinion between the two in regard to the introduction of incentive bonus scheme and that cannot be said to be outside the purview of standing order 22(viii).

(iii) The Tribunal was in error in coming< to the conclusion that the enquiry suffered from the infirmity that it wa~

conducted contrary to the principles of natural justice.

It is true that if it appears that by refusing to adjourn the hearing at lhe instance of charge-sheeted workmen, the Enquiry Officer failed to give the said workmen a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence, that may in a proper case, be considered to introduce an element of infirmity in the enquiry; but in the circumstances of this case, it would not be pos!rlble to draw such an inference.

(iv) The finding of the Tribunal that the dismissal was malafide, cannot possibly be sustained.

The Tribunal has completely overlooked an elementary principle of judicial approach that even if a judge or Tribunal may reach an erroneous conclusion either 0£ fact or of law; the mere error of the conclusion does not make the conclusion malafide.

March 81

Tata Oil MilZ. Oo.

Ltd. v.

Its WOl'kmen

(v) Since the domestic enquiry had been fairly conducted, and the findings recorded therein were based on Evidence which was believed, there was no justification for the Industrial Tribunal to consider the same facts f0r itself. Findings properly recorded at such enquiries are binding on parties, unless, of course, it is shown that such findings are perverse or are not based on any evidence.

Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, [1960] t S.C.R. 32, referred to.

(vi) Th<! Industrial Tribunal was in error when it characterised the esult' of the domestic enquiry as malafide partly because the enquiry was not stayed pending criminal proceedings against R.

It is desirable that i~ the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal case. lt would be particularly appropriate to adopt such a course when the charge is of a grave character because it would be untalr to compel the workman to disclose the defence which he may t'1ke oefore the criminal court. But to say that domestlc enquiries may be stayed pending criminal trial is very different from saying that if an employer proceeds with the domestic enquiry inspite of the fact that the cniminal trial is pending, the enquiry for that reason alone is vitiated and the conclusion arrived at in such an enquiry is either bad in law or malafide.

Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Kishan Bhan [1960] 3 S.C.R. 227, Ieferred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 517 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the Award dated September 28, 1960 of the Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam, in Industrial Dispute No. 81 of 1958.

G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.

P. Govinda Menon, M. S. K. Iyengar and M. R. K.

Pillai, for respondent No. 1.

March 31, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Gajeni.lragadkar o.J GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-This appeal by special leave ' 'raises a short question about the validity of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam, directing the appellant, the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., to reinstate its workman K. K. Raghavan whom it had dismissed with effect from the

14th of November, 1955. The appellant is a public limited concern engaged in the industry of soaps and toilet articles. It owns three factories in addition to 12 sales offices. One of these factories is located at Tatapuram, Emakulam, in the State of Kerala. Mr. Raghavan was working with the appellant at its factory at Tatapuram. It was reported to the appellant that on the 12th November, 1955, Mr. Raghavan and another employee of the appellant, Mr. Mathews by name, waylaid Mr. C. A. Augustine, the Chargeman of the

Soap Plant of the company's factory at Tatapuram while he 1964

was returning home after his duty in the second shift and Tala Oil MiU. Oo. assaulted hiin. That is why charge-sheets were issued against Lltj, ... both Messrs Raghavan and Mathews on the 14th November, It• Workmeto.

1955. Pursuant to the service of the clurge-sheets, two offi- . - cers were appointed by the appellant to hold an enquiry, but Ga3endragall.1'ar, CJ.

the respondent Union represented to the appellant that justice would not be done to Raghavan and Mathews unless somebody outside Tatapuram was invited to hold the enquiry. Thereupon, the General Mauager of the appellant appointed Mr. Y. D. Joshi, who is a Law Officer of the appellant in the Head Office, to hold the enquiry. Mr. Joshi held the enquiry from the 27th to 30th December, 1955, and subsequently, he made his report to the General Manager of the appellant on the 7th January, 1956. At that time, an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and its employees, and so, the appellant applied to the Industrial Tribunal for approval of the dismissal of Mei; srs Raghavan and Mathews. The Tribunal approved of the dismissal of Raghavan, but did not accord its approval of the dismissal of Mathews. Acting in pursuance of the approval accorded by the Tribunal, the appellant dismissed Raghavan with effect from the 14th November, 1955. Not satisfied with the order of dismissal, the respondent raised an industrial dispute in regard to the propriety and validity of the said dismissal of Raghavan and that has become the subject-matter of the present reference which was ordered on the 3rd of December,

1958. It is on this reference that the Industrial Tribunal has held that the appellant was not justified in dismissing Raghavan, and so, has ordered his reinstatement. This is the order which has given rise to the present appeal by special leave.

The first pbint which calls for our decision in this appeal is whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the fac~ proved against Raghavan did not attract the provisions of Standing Order 22( viii) of the Certified Standing Orders of the appellant. The said standing order provides that without prejudice to the general meaning of the term "misconduct", it shall be deemed to mean and incltide, inter alia, drunkenness, fighting, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour within or without the factory .. It is common ground that the alleged assault took place outside the factory, and; in fact, at a considerable distance from it. The Tribunal has held that the assault in question can be treated as a purely private matter between Raghav:an and Augustine with which the appellant was not concerned and as a result of which stand ing order 22(viii) cannot be 'invoked against Raghavan. Mr • Menon \Vho has appeared for the respondent before us, has

1964 contended that in construing standing orders of this charac- Toto Oil ]fals Co. ter, we must take care to see that disputes of a purely private

Ltd. or individual type are not brought within their scope. He

11, 1;~, b"'n argues that on many occasions, individual employees may have to deal with private disputes and sometimes, as a result Gajeodrogadk", a.J. of these private disputes, assault may be committed. Such an assault may attract the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but it does not fall under standing order 22(viii). l n our opinion. this contention is well-founded. It would, we think. be unreasonable to include within standing order 22(viii) any riotous behaviour without the factory which was the result of purely private and individual dispute and in course of which tempers of both the contestants became hot.

In order that standing order 22(viii) may be attracted. the appellant should be able to show that the disorderly or riotous behaviour had some rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim.

In the present case, l10wever, it is quite clear that the assault committed by Raghavan on Augustine was not a purely private or individual matter. What the occasion for this assault was and what motive actuated it, have been considered by the domestic Tribunal and the findings of the domestic Tribunal on these points must be accepted in the present proceedings. unless they are shown to be based on no evidence or are otherwise perverse. Now. when we look at the report of the Enquiry Officer, it is clear that on the evidence given by Mr. M. M. Augustine and K. T. Joseph it appeared that the assault was committed by Raghavan on C. A.

Augustine, because he was in favour of the introduction of the Incentive Bonus Scheme. It appears that the introduction of this incentive bonus scheme was approved by one set of workmen and was opposed by another, with the result that the two rival unions belonging to these two sets respectively were arrayed against each other on that question. The evidence of the two witnesses to whom we have just referred clearly shows that when Raghavan assaulted C. A. Augustine, he expressly stated that Augustine was a black-leg IK.arinkali) who was interested in increased production in the company with a view to obtain bonus; and the report further shows that the Enquiry Officer believed this evidence and came to the conclusion that the assault was motivated by this hostility between Raghavan and C. A. Augustine. In [act, the charge framed clearly suggested that the assault was made for that motive. It was alleged in the charge that Augustine was assaulted to terrorise the workmen who had been responsible for givin~ 'ncreasrr. production under the incentive bonus scheme. f.-· .ord;'.lg to the charge, such acts were highly subversive of disciplinP. The Enquiry Officer has held that in the light of the evidence given by M. M. Augustine and

1964 K. T. Joseph, the charge as framed had been proved. This finding clearly means that the assault was not the result of Tata Oil Mills Oo. a purely individual or private quarrel between the assailant Lid. and his victim, but it was referable to the difference of opi 1,, w:; kme,. nion between the two in regard to the introduction of the - incentive bonus scheme on which the two unions were sharpGajenclragadkar, o.J. ly divided. Therefore, if Raghavan assaulted Augustine wlely for the reason that Augustine was supporting the plea for more production, that cannot be said to be outside the purview of standing order 22(viii).

The next point which needs to be considered arises out of a plea which has been strenuously urged before us by Mr.

Menon that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Enquiry Otlicer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and so, the Tribunal was entitled to go into the evidence itself and decide whether Ragha van "s disillissal was justified or not. The legal position in this matter is not in doubt. If it appears that the domestic enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the principles of the natural justice and a reasonable opportunity was not, for instance. given to Raghavan to lead evidence in support of his defence. that would be a valid ground on which the Tribunal can discard the finding of the domestic enquiry and consider the matter on the merits uninfluenced by the said finding. Unfortunately for the respondent, however, on the material on record it is very difficult to sustain the finding'. of the Tribunal that the Enquiry Officer jid not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

The whole of this contention is based on the fact that Raghavan wanted to examine two witresses, Messrs M. P.

Menon and Chalakudi. It appears that Raghavan told the Enquiry Officer that he wanted to examine these two witnesses and he requested him to invite the said two witnesses to give evidence.

The Enquiry Officer told Raghavan that it was really not a part of his duty to call the said two witnesses and that Raghavan should in fact have kept them ready himself.

Even so, in order to assist Raghavan, the Enquiry Officer wrote letters to the two witnesses. Mr. Menon replied expressing his inability to be present before the Enquiry Officer. and the Enquiry Officer communicated this reply to Raghavan. so that for Raghavan's failure to examine Menon no blame can be attributed to the enquiry officer at all. In regard to Chalakudi. it appears tha.t he sent one letter addressed to the Enquiry Officer and it reached him on the 31st December. 1955, the day on which he wa~ leaving for Bombay. This letter was not signed, and so, the Enquiry Officer took no action on it and gave no time to Chalakudi to appear three or four days later as had been

1964 suggested in that unsigned letter. The Tribunal thought Tata Oil Mill• oo. that this attitude on the part of the Enquiry Officer

Ltd. was unsympathetic and that introduced an element of

118 W:;.kme,. unfairness in the enquiry itself. We are unable to appreciate how such a conclusion can follow on facts which are Gajew1ragadkar, O.J. admitted. We do not think the Enquiry Officer was called upon to accept an unsigned letter and act upon it. Besides, the Enquiry Officer had gone to Ernakulam from Bombay for holding this enquiry, because the respondent Union itself wanted that the enquiry should be held by some other officer outside the local station and it was known that the Bombay Officer would go back as soon as the enquiry was over. In such a case, if Raghavan did not take steps to produce his witnesses before the Enquiry Officer, how can it be said that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice? Mr. Menon has suggested that the Enquiry Officer should have taken steps to get the witnesses M. P. Menon and Chalakudi brought before him for giving evidence. This suggestion is clearl} untenable. In a domestic enquiry, the officer holding the enquiry can take no valid or effective steps to compel the attendance of any witness; just as the appellant produced its witnesses bebre the officer, Raghavan should have taken steps to produce his witnesses. His witness Menon probably took the view that it was beneath his dignity to appear in a domestic enquiry, and Chalakudi was content to send an unsigned letter and that too so as to reach the Enquiry Officer on the day when he was leaving Ernakulam for Bombay.

It would be unreasonable to suggest that in a domestic enquiry, it is the right of the charge-sheeted employee to ask for as many adjournments as he likes. It is true that if it appears that by refusing to adjourn the hearing at the instance of the charge-sheeted workman, the Enquiry Officer failed to give the said workman a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence, that may, in a proper case, be considered to intrtJ.. duse an element of infirmity in the enquiry; but in the circumstances of this case, we do not think it would be possible to draw such an inference. The record shows that the Enquiry Officer went out of his way to assist Raghavan; and if the witnesses did not turn up to give evidence in time, it was not his fault. We must accordingly hold that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry suffered from the infirmity that it was conducted contrary to the principles of natural justice.

Let us then consider whether the dismissal of Ragbavan is actuated by malafides, or amounts to victimisation. In regard to the plea of victimisation, the Tribunal has definitoly found against the respondent. "I do not for a moment believe", says the Tribunal, "that the management foisted a

case against the ex-worker. Regarding the allegation of victi- 1961 misation, there is no sufficient evidence in the case that the Tata Oil Mills oo. management or its Manager Mr. John was motivated with Ltd. victimisation or unfair labour practice". This finding is quite v.

Its Workmen clearly in favour of the appellant. The Tribunal, however, thought that because the Enquiry Officer did not give an Gnjcndragadka~, o:J . . adjournment to Raghavan to examine his witnesses, that introduced an element of malafides. It has also observed that since the case against Raghavan did not fall within the purview of standing order 22(viii) and yet, the appellant framed a charge against Raghavan under that standing order, that introduced another element of malatides. It is on thce grounds that the conclusion as to malafides recorded by the Tribunal seems to rest.

In regard to the first ground, we have already held that the Tribunal was not justified in blaming the Enquiry Officer for not adjourning the case beyond 31st December, 1955. In regard to the second ground, we are surprised that the Tribunal should have taken the view that since in its opinion, standing order 22(viii) did not apply to the facts of this case, the framing of-the charge under the said standing order and the finding of the domestic Tribunal in favour of the appellant on that ground showed malafides. It seems to us that the Tribunal has completely overlooked an elementary principle of judicial approach that even if a judge or Tribunal may reach an erroneous conclusion either of fact or of law, the mere error of the conclusion does not make the conclusion malafiedes. Besides, as we have just indicated, on the merits we are satisfied that the Tribunal was in error in holding that standing order 22(viii) did not apply.

Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that the dismissal of Raghavan was

malafiqe, cannot possibly be sustained.

There isone more point which has been pressed before us by Mr. Menon. In Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen,(') this Court has held that even if a domestic enquiry is found to be defective, the employer may seek to justify the dismissal of his employee by leading evidence before the Tribunal to which an industrial dispute arising out of the impugned dismissal has been referred for adjudication. Mr. Menon contends that by parity of reasoning, in cases where the employee is unable to lead his evidence before the domestic Tribunal for no fault of his own, a similar opportunity should be given to him to prove his case in proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal.

In our opinion, this contention is not well-founded. The decision in the case of Phulbari Tea Estate

(supra) proceeds on. the basis which is of basic importance in industrial adjudication that findings properly recorded in

(') [1960] I S.C.R. 32.

1964 domestic enquiries which are conducted fairly, cannot be re- Taia Oil Milla co, examined by Industrial adjudication unless the said findings Ltd. are either perverse, or are not supported by any evidence, or v. some other valid reason of that character. In such a case, Its TYorkmen the fact that the finding is not accepted by the Industrial (lajendrag•dknr, C.J. Tribunal would not necessarily preclude the employee from justifying the dismissal of his employee on the merits, provided, of course, he leads evidence before the Industrial Tribunal and persuades the Tribunal to accept his case. That, however. is very different from a case like the present. In the case before us, the enquiry has been fair, the Enquiry Officer gave Raghavan ample opportunity to lead his evidence. If a reasonable opportunity had been denied to the employee, that would have made the enquiry itself bad and then. the employer would have been required to prove his case before the Industrial Tribunal, and in dealing with the dispute, the Industrial Tribunal would have been justified in completely ignoring the findings of the domestic enquiry. But if the enquiry has been fairly conducted, it means that all reasonable opportunity has been given to the employee to prove his case by leading evidence. In such a case, how can the court hold that merely because the witnesses did not appear to give evidence in. support of the employee's case, he should be allowed to lead such evidence before the Industrial Tribunal.

If this plea is upheld, no domestic enquiry would be effective and in every case, the matter would have to be tried afresh by the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are not prepared to accede to Mr. Menon's argument that the Tribunal was justified in considering the merits of the dispute for itself in the present reference proceedings.

Since the enquiry has been fairly conducted, and the findings recorded therein are based on evidence which is believed, there would be no justification for the Industrial Tribunal to consider the same facts for itself. Findings properly recorded at such enquiries are binding on the parties, unless, of course, it is known that the said findings are perverse, or are not based on any evidence.

Th.ere is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been stayed pending the final disp0sal of the said criminal proceedings.

As this Court has held in the Delhi Cloth and General Mills

Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan,(') it is desirable that if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal ourt, the employer, should stay the domestic enquiry pending the fini!l disposal of 'the criminal case. It would be particularly appropriate to

. .

adopt such a course where the charge against the workman is 1964 of a grave character, because in such a case, it would be un- Tt1ta Oil Mms Co. fair to compel the workman to disclose the defence which he Ltd. may take before the criminal court. But to say that domestic 11, 11~;, kmrn enquiries may be stayed pending criminal trial is very differ- - ent from saying that if an employer proceeds with the domes-Gajr-ndmaadka' , C.J.

tic enquiry in spite of the fact that the criminal trial is pending, the enquiry for that reason alone is vitiated and the conclusion reached in such an enquiry is either bad in law or malafide. In fairness, we ought to add that Mr.

Menon did not seek to justify this extreme position. Therefore, we must hold that the Industrial Tribunal was in error when it characterised the result of the domestic enquiry as malafide partly because the enquiry was not stayed pending the criminal proceedings against Raghavan. We accordingly hold that the domestic enquiry in this case was properly held and fairly conducted and the conclusions of fact reached by the Enquiry Officer are based on evidence which he accepted as true. That being so, it was not open to the Industrial Tribunal to reconsider the same questions of fact and come to a contrary conclusion.

The result is, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Industrial Tribunal is set aside and the reference made to it is answered in favour of the appellant. Before we part with this appeal, we ought to add that Mr. Pai for the appellant has fairly offered to pay ex gratia Rs. 1,000 /- to Raghavan in addition to the amount which has already been paid to him by the appellant in pursuance of the order of this Court granting stay to the appellant pending the final disposal of the present appeal. There would be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed .

555

TATA OIL MILLS CO. LTD

ITS WORKMEN

K. N. WANCHOO

DAS GUPTA, JJ.

[1960] 3 S.C.R. 227

G. B. Pai

B. Dadachanji

C. Mathur

Ravinder Narain

P. Govinda Menon

M. S. K. Iyengar

M. R. K.

Pillai

GAJENDRAGADKAR

Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam

Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd.

K. K. Raghavan

14th of November, 1955

Emakulam

Kerala

Raghavan

Tatapuram

12th November, 1955

Mathews

C. A. Augustine

Tala Oil

Y. D. Joshi

Joshi

27th to 30th December, 1955

7th January, 1956

Mei

14th November, 1955

3rd of December,

1958

Raghav

Augustine

Menon \Vho has

Gajeodrogadk

Indian Penal Code

M. M. Augustine

K. T. Joseph

C. A.

Augustine

Tata Oil Mills

Menon

Ragha van

M. P.

Menon

Chalakudi

31st December. 1955

Bombay

Tata Oil Mill•

Ernakulam

M. P. Menon

Chalakudi

Raghavan

Menon

Ragbavan

John

31st December, 1955

Phulbari Tea Estate

Pai


7 S.C.R.

SUPRE:IIE COURT REPORTS 55

NAROTIAM KISHORE DEV VARMA AND ORS.

. v.

UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

IP. B. GAJi:NDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,

N. RAJAGOPALA AY\'ANGAR AND s. M. SIKRI, JJ.I

Suit against Former Ruler-Requirement of consent of Central Gov'ernment-Constitutional validity-£:ode of Civil Pro cedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), ss. 87B, 86-Constitution of India, Arts. 14. 19(1)(f).

The petitioners applied for the consent of the Central Government under 3. 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure to sue the Maharaja of Tripura, Ruler of a former Indian State, which has merged with India. They wanted to implead the Union of India as \\'ell, as party to the suit as their case '\Vas that they were entitled, as members of a joint Hindu family to receive either from the said Ruler or from the Union appropriate maintenance allowance under the custom of the Ruling family. Consent having been refused, they applied to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Their case was that s. 87B of the Code in granting exemption to Rulern of former Indian Sta.tes from being sued except with the consent of the Central Government contravened Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

Held, that in view of the previous decision of this Court s. 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure was no longer open to challenge under Art. 14 of the Constitution.

Mohan Lal Jain v. His Highness Maharaja Shri Sawai Man Singhji (1962] 1 •S.C.R. 702, referred to.

Regard being had to the legislative and historical background of s. 87B of the COde, it could not be said that, that section in giv.ing special treatment to ex-Rulers had imposed

a~ unreasonable restriction on th~ petitioner's fundamental rights. !Vlotivated as iit was by the sole object of bringing the entire country including the former Indian States under one Central Government, it must be held to be reasonable and in the mterest of the general public.

But conidered in the light of the basic principle of equality before law It would be odd to allow the section to continue prospectively for al! time to come. It would therefore. be for the Central Government to consider whether it should not be confined to dealings and transactions previous to January 26 19fil ,

Nor should the section be used to stifle claims except such as are ~!early far-fetched or frivolous and consent should ordinarily If i::ot as ma.ter of course, be granted in the case of a genume dispute which prima facie appears to be triable by a court of law such as the present one.

.Marrh 6

1964 ORIGINAL JuRISDJCTION:Writ Petition No. 87 of 1962.

N arottamkiskore Deo Verma and

Others

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

\'.

Union of India. and

An-0tiler N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 1.

S. S. Shukla, for the petitioner.

Gajendragadkar, O.J.

M. C. Setalvad and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 2.

March 6, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

GAJENDRAGADKAR C. J.-This is a writ petition filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution by which the eight petitioners challenged the validity of section 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure. These petitioners claim that they and respondent No. 2, His Highness Maharaja Kirit Vikram Kishore Deb Yarman, are members O'f a joint Hindu family governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. Under a family custom which, it is alleged, has prevailed in this family for centuries, the Raj as well as the Zamindari properties belonging to the family are held by a single individual and the other members of the family are entitled to maintenance according to the status of the family with the right to succession to the Raj as well as the Zamindari properties under the general rule of succession which prevails and which is not inconsistent with the family custom. The head of the family was, by family custom, called the Chief and he was chosen from among the members of the Ruling Deb Barman family and used to be installed on !he Gaddi or Throne. The petitioners further alleged that llje Ruler when so chosen and installed hdd the State and Zarnindari as life tenant subject to the usual charges for maintenance of the members of the Ruling Family.

In course of time. the maintenance allowance of the members of the Ruling family came to be fixed arbitra'rily by the Rulers without any regard to their status and their legitimate needs, and that led to discontent among them which resulted in a serious agitation raised by them during the lifetime of the late Maharaja Bir Bikram. In consequence, at the time of Regency of Her Highness Rajmata during the minority of the last Ruler Maharaja Kirit Bikram, a Committee was appointed on the 20th June, 1949, to consider the question of allowances payable to the members of the Ruling family.

However, before the Committee could submit its report, the State of Tripura merged with and became part of India and was constituted into a separate Province under the Chief Commissioner.

After merger, the then Chief Commissioner Mr. Hazra submitted a proposal to the Ministry of States on the 12th April, 1951, recommending a revision of allowance paid to the

7 S.C.R.

SUPRE:VIE COURT REPORTS 57

maintenance-holders. The Ministry of States did not accept 1964 this proposal and refused to make any increase in the total Narouamkisluwe expenditure on the allowances to the maintenance-holders.

Dev Verma and This order was passed on the 23rd May, 1951. Later, the then Other• officiating Chief Commissioner Mai. Chatterjee stopped the u . / 1' ,. _, . nion oJ nu.1a anu. maintenance allowances paid to some of the mamtenance- Another holders without justification and that led to the appointment . of another Committee to go into the matter, but the Cornmit-Ga3endragadkar, O.J. tee could never function ith the result that the condition of the majority of the maintenance-holders grew wor.se day by dav. That is why the present eight petitioners destre to file a suft against respondent No. 2 for appropriate reliefs. They want to implead the Union of India also to that suit, because it is their case that either the R u!er or the Union of India is responsible to pay them appropriate and adequate maintenance allowance.

Before filing a suit in a competent court of law against respondent No. 2, the petitioners are required to obtain the sanction of the Union Government under s. 87B C.P.C., as respondent No. 2 is a Ruler of a former Indian State within the meaning of the said section. A request made by the petitioners for such sanction was rejected by the Central Government. That is how the present petition has been filed challenging the validity of the said section. The petitioners contend that the said section is ultra vires, because it contravenes Arts. 14 and 19(1 )(f) of the Constitution and as such, the condition precedent prescribed by it which requires the previous sanction of the Central Government before filing a suit against the Ruier of an Indian State therein mentioned, is invalid and inoperative. That is the genesis of the present writ petition.

At the hearing of this writ petition, Mr. Shukla for the petitioners fairly conceded that the challenge to the validity of s. 87B, C.P.C., on the ground that it contravenes Art. J 4 has been repelled by a recent decision of this Court in Mohan Lal Jain v. His Highness Maharaja Shri Sawai Man Singhji(').

He, however, attempted to argue that some aspects of the problem had not been pressed before the Court when it decided the case of Mohan Lal Jain ('). and so, he wanted us to reconsider that question. We have not allowed Mr.

Shukla to raise this contention, because we are satisfied that the decision in Mohan Lal Jain's case concludes the point and _it would not be reasonable to reconsider it as suggested by him. We ought to add that we are dealing with Mr. Shukla's argument that s. 87B. C.P.C., is invalid because it contravenes Art. 19(1)(fl, on the basis that the case of Mohan Lal Jain(') has correctly repelled the challenge against the said sction under Art. 14. ·

(') [1962] 1 S.C.R. 702.

1964 That leaves the challenge under Art. 19(1)(f) to be consi- Naro1tamki<Twre dered. In dealing with this point, it will be necessary to examine Dev Verma and the background, both historical and legislative, of s. 87B. Sec-

Otlter• tion 87B(l) provides that the provisions of s. 85 and of sub-ss.

Union of ndia and (I) and (3) of s. 86 shall apply in relation to the Rulers of any Another former Indian 'State as they apply in relation to the Ruler of a

0 . d adk 0 J foreign State. Section 87B(2) defines a 'former Indian State' •Jen rag ar, and a "Ruler". It is not'necessary to refer to these provisions, because it is common ground that respondent No. 2 is a Ruler of a former Indian State within the meaning of s. 878(2).

In appreciating the effect of s. 87B(l), it is necessary to consider s. 86. Section 86 deals with suits against foreign Rulers, Ambassadcrs and Envoys. Section 86(1) provides that no Ruler of a foreign State may be sued in any court otherwise competent to try the suit, except with the consent of the

Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government to that effect. The proviso excepts frcm the application of s. 86(1) cases where tenants of immovable property seek to sue such a Ruler. Section 86(2) lays down that the consent prescribed bys. 86(1) may be given either with respect to specified suits or to several specified suits, or with respect to all suits of any specified class or classes .. and it requires that the sanction should specify in the case of any suit or class of suits the court in which the Ruler may be used. It then adds that such consent shall not be given unless it appears to the Central Government that the Ruler satisfies one or the other of the four conditions prescribed by clauses (a) to (d). Section 86(3) prohibits the arrest of any Ruler of a foreign state under the Code and provides that except with the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government, no decree shall be executed against the property of any such Ruler. Section 86(4) extends the application of s. 86 to the persons specified in clauses (a) to (c) of

tht sub-section. The result of the extension of s. 86(1) and

(3) to the cases falling under s. 87B(J) is that the sanction of the Central Government is a condition precedent to the institution of a suit against the Ruler of any former Indian State.

It is this requirement which the petitioners have not been able to comply with in respect of the suit which they intend to file against respondent No. 2, because the Central Government Jias refused to accord sanction to the said intended suit.

Now, the legislative background of the provisions contained ins. 86 and s. 87B is well known. Prior to the present Constitution, Part IV of the Code of Civil Procedure contained provisions in respect of suits in specified cases. These cases were divided into three parts. Section 79 to 82 covered cases of suits by or against the Crown or Public Oflicers in their official capacity. Sections 83 to 87 dealt with suits by aliens and by or against foreign Rulers and Rulers of Indian States; and

• 1 ,

s. 88 had reference to interpleader suits. After the Constitution 196' crune into force, the President made certain adaptations by the Adaptations of Laws Order, 1950. As a result of Art. 372, ~~; 01~=:!%: the protection afforded to Foreign Rulers and Rulers of Indian Other• States continued, and that is how s. 87B came to be enacted in v. the statute-book. It is in the light of this legislative background Union of India and that the plea raised by the petitioners in the present proceed- Another ings has to be examined.

GajendragadkM. O.J.

The legislative background to which we have referred cannot be divorced from the historical background which is to be found for instance, in Art. 362. This Article provides that in the exercise of the power of Parliament or of any legislature of any State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (!) of Art. 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of a Ruler of an Indian State. This has reference to the covenants and agreements which had been entered into between the Central Government and the Indian Princes, before all the Indian States were politically completely assimilated with the rest of India. The privilege conferred on the Rulers of former Indian States has its origin in these agreements and wvenants. One of the privileges is that of extra territoriality • and exemption from civil.jurisdiction except with the sanction of the Central Government. It was thought that the privilege which was claimed by foreign Rulers and Rulers of Indian States prior to the independence of the country should be continued even after independence was attained and the States had become part of India, and that is how in 1951. the Civil Procedure Code was amended and the present sections 86, 87, 87A and 87B came to be enacted in the present form.

Considered in the light of this background, it is difficult to see how the petitioners can successfully challenge the validity of the provisions contained in s. 87B. In the "case of Mohan Lal Jain(') this Court has held that the ex-Rulers of Indian States form a class by themselves and the special treatment given to them by the impugned provisions cannot be said to be based on unconstitutional discrimination. There is, of course, discrimination between the ex-Rulers and the rest of the citizens of India, but that discrimination is justified having regard to the historical and legislative background to which we have just referred. If that be so, it would follow that the restriction imposed on the petitioners' fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(f) cannot be said to be unreasonable.

The restriction in question is the result of the necessity to treat the agreements entered into between the Central Government and the ex-Rulers of Indian States as valid and the desirability of giving effect to the assurances given to them during the

1984 course of negotiations between the Indian Z.tates and the

NaroUamki8h<>re Central Government prior to the merger of the States with Dev Verma and India. We have to take into account the events which occurred

Othm with unprecedented swiftness after the 15th August, 1947, and Union of "jndia and we have to bear in mind the fact that the relevant negotiations

Another carried on by the Central Government were inspired by the . nd -· sole object of . bringing pilder one Central Government the Gaje r<VJ<ldkar, c .. J. whole of this country including the former Indian States. Considered in the context of these events, we do not think it would be possible to hold that the specific provision made by s. 87B granting exemption to the Rulers of former Indian States from being sued except with the sanction of the Central Government, is not reasonable and is not in the interests of the general

public. It is irue that the restriction works a hardship so far as the petitioners are concerned; but balancing the said hardship against the other considerations to which we have just referred, it would be difficult to sustain the agrument that the section itself should be treated as unconstitutional.

Before we part with this matter. however, we would like to invite the Centra! Government to consider seriously whether it is necessary to allow s. 87B to operate prospectively for all time. The agreements made with the Rulers of Indian States may, no doubt, have to be accepted and the assurances given to them may have to be observed. But considered broadly in th<- light of the basic principle of the equality before law, it seems somewhat odd that s. 87B should continue to operate for all time. For past dealings and transactions, protection may justifiably be given to Rulers of former Indian States; but the Central Government may examine the question as to whether for transactions subsequent to the 26th of January 1950, this protection need or should be continued. If under the Constitution all citizens are equal. it may be desirable to confine the operation of s. 87B to past transactions and not to perpetuate the anomaly of the distinction between the rest of the citizens and Rulers of former Indian States. With the passage of time. the validity of historical considerations on which s. 87B is founded will wear out and the continuance of the said section in the Code of Civil Procedure may later be open to serious challenge.

There is also another aspect of the matter to which we must refer in this ccnnection. In considering the question as to whether sanction should be granted to a person who intends to sue a Ruler of a former Indian State, it is advisable that the authority concerned should ordinarily, if not as a matter of course, allow such sanction, because in the present set-up it does not appear very satisfactory that an intended action against the Ruler of a former Indian State should be stifled by refusing to grant the litigant sanction under s. 87B. Where frivolous claims are set up by intending litigants, refusal to

give sanction may be justified; but where genuine disputes arise 1964 between a citizen and a Ruler of a former Indian State and Naroflamkialwre these disputes, prima facie, appear to be triable in a court of D-. foma ant law, it would not be fair or just that the said citizen should Othe" be prevented frcrn inviting a court of competent jurisdiction Union ofindia and to deal with his dispute. If the power to grant sanction is exer- Another cised in a sensible way ai:id is not used for stifling claims which Gajendragadkar, o.J. are not far-fetched or fnvolous, that may prevent the growth of discontent in the minds of litigants against the artificial provision prescribed by s. 87B. In the present proceedings, it does appear, prima facie, that the petitioners have a genuine grievance against the Central Government's refusal to accord sanction to them to get a judicial decision on the dispute between them and respondent No. 2. That, naturally is a matter for the Central Government to consider. However, since it is not possible to accede to the petitioner's argument that s. 87B is invalid, we see no alternative but to dismiss the writ petition.

In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs.

Petition dismissed .

. ,

55

NAROTIAM KISHORE DEV VARMA AND ORS

UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

c. SHAH

s. M. SIKRI, JJ

Suit against Former Rule

ss. 87B, 86

Constitution of India

Arts. 14

the Code of Civil Procedure

India

Union of India

Art. 32

s. 87B

Central Government

Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f)

s. 87B

the Code of Civil Procedure

Art. 14

s. 87B

N arottamkiskore Deo Verma

Art. 32

Constitution of India

Union of India

N. S. Bindra

R. H. Dhebar

S. S. Shukla

Gajendragadkar

M. C. Setalvad

D. N. Mukherjee

GAJENDRAGADKAR

Art. 32

section 87B

the Code of Civil Procedure

Zarnindari

Maharaja Bir Bikram

Maharaja Kirit Bikram

20th June, 1949

State of Tripura

Hazra

12th April, 1951

Dev Verma

23rd May, 1951

Mai. Chatterjee

s. 87B

C.P.C

Arts. 14 and 19(1 )(f)

Ruier

Shukla

s. 87B

C.P.C

Mohan Lal Jain

s. 87B

C.P.C

Art. 14

[1962] 1 S.C.R. 702

Art. 19(1)(f)

s. 87B

s. 85

s. 86

Section 87B(2)

s. 878(2)

s. 87B(l)

s. 86

Section 86

Section 86(1)

s. 86(1)

Section 86(2)

Section 86(3)

Section 86(4)

s. 86

s. 86(1)

s. 87B(J)

Central Government Jias

s. 87B

Part IV of the Code

Section 79 to 82

Sections 83 to 87

s. 88

Art. 372

Foreign Rulers and Rule

s. 87B

GajendragadkM.

Art. 362

Parliament

Art. 291

sections 86, 87, 87A and 87B

s. 87B

Art. 19(l)(f)

15th August, 1947

s. 87B

Centra! Government

s. 87B

s. 87B

26th of January 1950

s. 87B

s. 87B

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 87B

Naroflamkialwre

Union ofindia

s. 87B

s. 87B