7 S.C.R.

SUPREJ\lE COURT REPORTS 185

EPARI CHINNA KRISHNA MOORTHY. PROPRIETOR,

EPARI CHINNA MOORTHY AND SONS,

BERHAMPUR. ORISSA

STATE OF ORISSA

(With Connected Petition)

[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c J,, K N. WANCHOO, J, c. SHAH,

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S, M. S!KRI, JJJ Fundamental Rights-Notification by Government exempting certain articles from sales tax-Petitioner claiming exemption under the notification-Validation Ac.t coming into force- Retrospective operation-Validity-Enactment, if unconstitutional-Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, (14 of 1947), s. 6-Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961 (7 of 1961) s, 2-Cor.s:titution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1)(g).

The petitioner, a merchant, carrying on business in. "bullion and specie'' and gold and silver ornaments was a registered 'dealer' under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, The Government purporting to exercise its authority under s. 6 of the said Act issued a notification on July 1, 1949 exempting certain articles from the operation of the charging section of that Act. Under the notification gold ornaments were ordered to be exempted from sales tax when the manufacturer selling them charges separately for the value of gold and the cost of manufacture.

The petitioner filed his returns before the Sales-tax Officer and claimed exemption of sales-tax under the said notification, Up to June 1952, the claim for exemption was upheld. Subsequently, however, these assessments were reopened under s. 12(7) of the Act and it was claimed tha.t the deductions made on certain sale transactions of gold ornaments were not justified and the petitioner had escaped assessment. The petitioner pleaded that he was entitled to exemption, because he belonged to the class of manufacturers to which the notification referred. The Sales-tax Officer disallowed the petitioner's contention, The petitioner then challenged the said decision by preferring appeals, but the said appeals were also dismissed.

Pending these appeals, similar assessments made in respect of other dealers including the petitioner were challenged by writ petitions before the High Court, The High Court upheld the petitioner's case and issued writs directing the Sales-tax Officer to allow the petitioners' claim for exemption, After this judgement was pronounced, the impugned Act was passed by the legislature on August 1, 1961 and was published on September 18, 1961, containing one operative provision in s, 2, It provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgement, decree or order of any court, the word 'manufacturer' occuring against item 33 in the schedule . to the notification of the Government dated July 28, 1947 as amended by another notification of the 1st July, 1949 shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant a person who by his own Jabour works up materials into suita.ble forms and a person who owns or runs a manufactory for the PUI1lose of business with respect to the articles manufactured therem, The validity cf this section was challenged m the present writ petition,

Jlard. n

1964 It was urged (i) that since the \xemption was granted by the State Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it Epari Ohinna by s. 6, it was not open to the legislature to take away that Kriakna Moorthy, h Proprietor, Epari exemption retrospectively; (ii) t at the provision in s. 2 of the <Jhinna Jfoorthy .i. impugned Act was discriminatory and as such contravened the

SOM, B"hampur, equallty before the law guaranteed by Art. 14 and (iii) that

Oris.a the retrospective operation of the impugned section sh6uld be v. struck down as unconstitutional, because it imposes an unreason- Sta!e- 01 Orissa able restriction on the petitioner's fundamental right under Art. <Jajendragadkar, O.J.19 (1) (g) ·

He!d: (i) What the legislature had purported to do. by s. 2 of the impugned Act, was to make the intention of the notification clear. And, if the State Government was given the power either to grant or withdraw the exemption, that could not possibly affect the legislature's competence to make any provision in that behalf either prospectively or retrospectively.

(ii) The notification as interpreted by s. 2 of the impugned Act benefits the artisans who produce ornaments thems., lves and who run manufactories. That is why the main object of granting exemption can be said to be achieved by holding that 'manufacturer' means either a manufacturer properly so called or one who engages artisans to manufacture gold ornamnts. In the present case the petitioners were not directly concerned with the production of ornaments, and admittedly, they did not produce the said ornaments themselves. Therefore, the persons who get the benefit of the exemption notification as a result of the provisions of s. 2 of the impugned Act cannot be said to belong to the same class as that of the petitioners. The two categories are distinct and there is no sameness or similarity between them, and if that is so, the main argument on the basis of Art. 14 does not subs'st.

(ii) It would be difficult to accept the argument that because the retrospective operation may operate harshly in some cases, therefore, the legislation itself is invalid. In the circumstances of the present case it would not be possible to hold that by making the provision of s. 2 of the impugned Act retrospective the legisla.ture has imposed a restriction on the petitioner's fundamental rights under Art. 19.(1) (g) which is not reasonable and is not in the interest of the general public.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 125--135. and 233 of 1963.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, T. A. Ramachandran, B. Parthasarathy, 0. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioner (in W. P. Nos. 125-135; 1963).

H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. N.

Sachthey, for the respondents (in W. P. Nos. 125_:135 / 63).

0. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioner (in W. P. No. 233/ 1963).

R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in W.P. No. 233 I 63).

7 S.C.R.

SUPREl\'IE COURT REPORTS 187

March 12, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was deliver- 1964 ed by- Epa1i Ohinna GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-This group of 12 writ peti- Kiishn:• J.foorlh~. . b h J"d"t f th P1opmlor, EpaN tions raises a common queshon a out t e. va t I Y o e Ohinno Moorthy "' Orissa Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961 (Act No. 7 of 1961) Sons, B'; hampv.r,

(hereinafter referred to as the Act). The facts on which the Onssa v, petitioners rely are similar, and so, we shall mention the facts s:ote of 01issa in the first group consisting of writ petitions Nos. 125-135 . d ad OJ of 1963. The petitioner in this group is Shri Epari Chinna GaJen rO{J kar, • • Krishna Moorthy, Proprietor, Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy & Sons, Berhampur, Orissa. He is a merchant who carries on business in "bullion and specie" and gold and silver ornaments at Berhampur and as such merchant, he has been registered as 'dea, ler' under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Act No. 14 of 1947). After the said Act came into force, the Government of Orissa purporting to exercise its authority under s. 6 of the 'said Sales Tax Act issued a notification exempting certain articles from the operation of the charging section of that Act. Under this notification, gold ornaments were ordered to be exempted from sales-tax 'when the manufacturer selling them charges separately for the value of gold and the cost of manufacture.' This notification was issued on July !, 1949 During the course of his business. the petitioner manufactures gold ornaments by supplying the gold to the artisans and getting ornaments prepared by them under his supervision and when the ornaments are so prepared, he sells them in his shop and has been showing the value of gold and the cost of manufacture separately. That is why the petitioner alleges that he is entitled to claim the benefit of the exemption notification.

Consistently with this plea, the petitioner filed his returns before the Sales-tax Officer at Berhampur and had been claiming exemption of Sales-tax on the sales as being entitled to exemption under the said notification. Upto June. 1952, the claim for exemption made by him was upheld and the amount represented by sales of the said gold ornaments was deducted from the taxable turnover shown by the peti: tioner in his returns. Subsequently, however, these assessments were re-opened under s. 12(7) of the Act and it was claimed that the deductions ad~ on certain sales transactions of gold ornaments were not 1ustified and to that extent, the petitioner had escaped assessment. The petitioner resisted this attempt to re-open the assessment and he pleaded that he was entitled to claim exemption under the notification, because he belonged to the class of manufacturers to which the notification referred. ·

'.fh~ Sales-tax Officer; .however, disallowed the petitioner's c_onten_t10n an~ proceeded to levy tax on the sales transac• hons m question.

The petitioner then challenged the said

188 SUPREME COURT lll~PORTS [1964]

1964 decisien by preferring appea]s, but the said appeals were also

Ep<"i Chinna dismissed. While the appeals were '?endin_g similar asess KrishM .lloortk11, ments made m respect of other dealers mcludmg the pellt1oner

Prp'""10' Epari were challenged by them by writ petitions before the High

~:~;~~;!~;;;';,~;;,,~ Cort of Orissa. (Nos. 151, 161, 162, 204-209 and 110 of Oris·• 1957 respectively\. v.

State of Ori."a The Division Bench of the Orissa HigJ; i Court which Gajwd.;;0-;;.,,, c.J. heard the writ petitions upheld the petitioner's case and issued

 ' appropriate writs directing the Sales-tax Officer lo allow the petitioner's claim for .exemption under the notification in question. The main controversy before the High Court was about the precise denotation of the word 'manufacturer' used in the notification. The High Court held that the expression 'manufacturer' meant the first owner of the finished products fer whom it was made either by his paid employee or even by independent artisans on receipt of raw materials and labour charges from him. According to this view, the petitioners before the High Court were found to be manufacturers and as such entitled to claim exemption in respect of snle of gold ornaments made by them. This judgement was pronounced en March 13, 1959. Against this judgement the State of Orissa has filed appeals to this Court and they are numbereJ as Civil Appeals Nos. 92 to 94 of 1963. These appeals are till pending disposal.

After the Orissa High Court pronounced its judgement in the writ petitions to which reference has been made, the i, mpugned Act was passed by the Orissa Legislature on August 1, 1961. This Act received the assent of the Governor on September 10. 1961, and was published en September 18,

1961. It contains one operative provision in s. 2. Section 2 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, the word 'manufacturer' occurring against item 33 in the schedule to the notification of the Government of Orissa dated July 28, 1947 as amended by another notification of the I st July, 1949 shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant a person who by his own Jabor works up materials into suitable forms and a person who owns or runs a manufactory for the purpese of business with respect to the articles manufaetured therein.

It is the va]idity of this section which is challenged before us by the petitioners in the present writ petitions.

It is clear that the object of s. 2 of the impugned Act is lo make it clear that the legislature's intention was not, as the High Court had held, tc i11clude within the notification all persons who are first owners of the finished product of gold.

Section 2 shows that the legislative intention was to give benefit of the said exemption only to persons who themselves work and prcduce gold ornaments or who run or own a manufactory for the purpose of business with respect to the articles

1 s.c.R.

RUPREME COURT REPORTS 189

manufactured therein. In other words, the intention of the 1964 Government in issuing the notification was not to give the Epari Ghinna benefit of the exemption to traders or shop-keepers who were Krisha Moorthy •. no more than commission agents and who did not personally f,,;~~~'';:x:ffy'l

work for making gold ornaments or who did not own a manu- SoM, Berhampur, factory employing artisans for that purpose. If this section is Orwsa valid, it is common ground that the petitioners are not entitled State ,"j 0 ,;,, a to claim the exemption. On the other hand, if this section is - invalid, the petitioners would be the first owners of gold orna- Gajendragadkar, O.J. ments and may be entitled to claim exemption.

The first argument which has been urged before us by Mr. Sastri is that since the exemption was granted by the State Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it by s. 6, it was not open to the legislature to take away that exemption retrospectively. Section 4 of the parent Sales-tax Act is the charging section and s. 6 is the section which confers on the State Government power to issue a notification exempting from the tax the sale of any. goods or class of goods and likewise withdraw any such exemption subject to such conditions and exceptions as it may deem fit. The argument is, the power to grant exemption having been conferred on the State

Government, it was validly exercised by the State Government and though the legislature may withdraw such exemption, it cannot do ss retrospectively. It is obvious that if the State Government which is the delegate of the legislature can withdraw the exemption granted by it, the legislature cannot be denied such right. But it is urged that once exemption was validly granted, the legislature cannot withdraw it retrospectively, because that would be invalidating the notification itself. We are not impressed by this argument. What the legislature has purported to do by s. 2 of the impugned Act is to make the intention of the notification clear. Section 2 in substance declares that the intention of the delegate in issuing the notification granting exemption was to confine the benefit

of the said exemµtion only to persons who, actually produce gold ornaments or employ artisans for that purpose. We do not see how any question of legislative incompetence can come In !!le present discussion. And, if the State Government was

given the power either to grant or withdraw the exemption that cannot possibly affect the legislature's competency to make any provision in thaVbehalf either prospectively or retrospectively. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument that the retrospective operation of s. 2 of the impugned Act is invalid.

Then Mr. Sastri contends that this provision is discriminatory and as such, contravenes the equality before the law guaranteed by Art. 14. This argument is also misconceived. It is not seriously disputed that the petitioners belong to the

1664 class of traders or shopkeepers who are like commission agents.

Epari Ohinna They give gold to the artisans, paying the artisans their Kri•hna Noorth1, labour charges and when the ornaments are thus produced,

P0 hrpriet~, Epari they charge commission before they are sold to the customers.

•••• oorthy.J. I h . d d h h' l f s00,, &rhampur, n sue a case, 1t JS not easy to un erstan ow t 1s c ass o Ori"• traders can be said belong to same class of persons who produce

Stal

~; 0 . gold ornaments themselves or run manufactories where artisans e o; nssa . . _ are engaged for producmg them. The counter-affidavit filed on <Ja.iendragadkar, O.J. behalf of the respondent-State has also averred that the petitioners sometimes sell goods manufactured by firms outside the State of Orissa and in no case had they manufactured ornaments themselves. Whether the gold which they give to the artisans is their own or is supplied to them by customers is not a matter of any significance, because what is important in this connection is that they are not directly concerned with the production of ornaments, and admittedly, they do not produce the said ornaments themselves. Therefore, the persons who get the benefit of the exemption notification as a result of the provisions of s. 2 of the impugned Act cannot be said to belong to the same class as that of the petitioners. and if that is so, the main argument on the basis of Art. 14 does not subsist.

Besides, one of the objects of the impugned Act appears . to be to make it clear that the legislature intends to benefit the gold-smiths who actually make gold ornaments and that object can be carried out only if exemption is granted to persons who keep in their continuous employment artisans wh<:l' produce gold ornaments. If a person produces gold ornaments himself and if a person employs artisans to produce gold ornaments for him, they faJI within the protection of the exemption. In the case of the petitioners, however, they do not keep any artisans in their continuous employment, and so, if the legislature thought it was not necessary to give them the benefit of the exemption, it cannot be said that the classification made by the legislature has no rational connection with the object intended to be achieved by it. This argument assumes that the petitioners belong to the same class as the persons to whom the benefit of the exemption is available. But as we have already stated, these two categories are distinct and there is no sameness or similarity between them.

It was also suggested by Mr. Sastri that the result of the impugned provision is to deny the benefit of the exemption to the poorer classes of persons who are engaged in the business of manufacturing gold ornaments, and in that connection, he has commented on the fact that the notification gives the benefit of the exemption to persons who run manufactories but it denies that benefit to persons who carry on the work of producing gold ornaments on a smaller scale, and

:so, are unable to run a manufactory. This argument is fa!- 1964 lacious. The notification as interpreted by s. 2 of the impugn- Epari Ohinna ed Act benefits the artisans who produce ornaments them- Kris/•~· Moorthy, selves and that obviously covers a very large section of inde- P0 hrprietMor, ~Ph•".. . h h "fi .

I tnna oo .. y w pendent artisans engaged m t e trade. T e nott cation a so Sons, B!rhampur, benefits persons who run manufactories and that ensures the Orisaa -continuous employment of artisans. That is why it seems to State ; j orissa us that the main object of granting exemption can be said to - be achieved by holding that 'manufacturer' means either a Gajendragadkar, O.J. manufacturer properly so called or one who engages artisans to manufacture gold ornaments.

Mr. Sastri also argued that the retrospective operation vf the impugned section should bestruck down as unconstitutional, because it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' fundamental right under Art. l?(l)(g). It is true that in considering the question as to whether legislative power to pass an Act retrospectively has been reasonably exercised or not. it is relevant to enquire how the retrospective operation operates. But it would be difficult to accept the argument that because the retrospective operation may operate harshly in some cases. therefore, the legislation itself is invalid. Besides, in the present case, the retrospective opera-. tion does not spread over a very long period either. Incidentally, it is not clear from the record that the petitioners did not recover sales tax from their customers when they sold the :gold ornaments to them. The counter-affidavit filed by the respondent-State alleges that een where sales-tax has not been charged separately, the price charged included sales-tax because it was the usual practice of every registered dealer doing similar business to collect sales-tax either by showing

it as such separately and thereby claiming deduction of the :sales-tax from the gross turnover to arrive at the taxable turnover shown separately or by including it in the price and thereby collecting it as a part of the price 'charged. In any event, we do not think that in the circumstances of this case it would 'be possible to hold that by making the provision of s. 2 of the impugned Act retrospective the legislature has imposed :a restriction on the petitioners' fundamental right under Art.

19(1)(g) which is not reasonable and is not in the interest of the general public.

The result is, the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees.

Petitions dismissed.

EPARI CHINNA KRISHNA MOORTHY PROPRIETOR, EPARI CHINNA MOORTHY AND SONS, BERHAMPUR, ORISSA

STATE OF ORISSA

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K N. WANCHOO, J

c. SHAH

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947

s. 6

Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961

Arts. 14, 19(1)(g)

Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947

s. 6

July 1, 1949

s. 12(7)

August 1, 1961

September 18, 1961

July 28, 1947

1st July, 1949

s. 6

Kriakna Moorthy

s. 2

Art. 14

Jajendragadkar

s. 2

s. 2

s. 2

Art. 14

s. 2

Art. 19

Art. 32

Constitution of India

A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri

T. A. Ramachandran

B. Parthasarathy

. C. Mathur

J. B. Dadachanji

Ravinder Narain

H. N. Sanyal

N. S. Bindra

R. N.

Sachthey

C. Mathur

B. Dadachanji

R. N. Sachthey

Epa1i Ohinna GAJENDRAGADKAR

Orissa Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961

Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy

Berhampur

Orissa

Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947

Government of Orissa

s. 6

July !, 1949

s. 12(7)

State of Ori

March 13, 1959

State of Orissa

Orissa High Court

September 10. 1961

September 18,

1961

s. 2

Section 2

s. 2

Section 2

articles

1

Krisha Moorthy

Gajendragadkar

Sastri

s. 6

Section 4

s. 6

s. 2

Section 2

s. 2

Art. 14

Ja.iendragadkar

s. 2

Art. 14

s. 2

Epari Ohinna ed Act

s. 2

Art.

19(1)(g)


Jlareh 12

SUPRRME COURT REPORTS [l!Jc4 I

BIHARI LAL BATRA

THE CHIEF .SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER '& ORS

[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J.C., SHAH,

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.J

Evacuee property-Land allotted to a refugee in urban area-Allotment is invalid under the rules-Displaced Persons Compensatwn and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955, Rule 2(h).

The father of the appellant owned considerable agricultural property in Pakistan and he with the members of his family moved over to India on partition. The appellant's father had some unsatisfied claim for allotment and on December 29, 1955 he wasanotted some plots in Urban area within a certain rrunicipality. The appellant's father died in 1952 and the allotment made was actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim of his father. On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued to the appellant by the Managing Officer. When the appellant tried to take possession of these lands, disputes were raised by respondents Nos. 4 and 5. These respondents moved the Assistant

Settlement Commissioner for cancellation of the allotment on the ground that these disputed plots were within an "urban area" within the meaning of r. 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 and, therefore, the allotment to the appellant was contrary to law. The Assistant Settiement Commissioner accepted the contention of the respondents and allowed the appeal and cancelled the allotment.

The appellant then applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner in revision. He rejected the petition. Then the appellant moved a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court. This petition was also dismissed.

The High Court granted certificate of fitness under Art. 133 of the Constitution and hence the appeal.

Held:

(i) Where an order mking an allotment was set aside by the Assisfant Commissioner or Settlement Commissioner the title which was obtained on the basis of the continuance of that sanad or order also fell with it.

Shri Mithoo Shahani v. Union nf India, [1964] 7 S.C.R. 103, relied on.

(ii) The contention of the appellant that r. 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules. 1955, was unconstit~_t_ional as contravening Art. 14 of the constitution must fail.- This contention is based on the basis of the proviso to Rule 2(h). Rule 2(h} was framed under s. 40 of the Act. This rule along with other rules came into fo.rce on May 21, 1955. The allotment was made to the appellant on December 29, 1955 and the Sanad was issued two days later. In other words the allotment in favour of the appellant was after the rule came into force and was not one "already made" as stated in the proviso to r. 2(h). Therefore, if on the date of the allotment the land was in an urban area, the allotment would b~ governed by the main para of the definition and the proviso had no application.

The discrimination is said to consist in the rule having 1961 drawn a dividing line at the date when it came into force, for Bihari Lal Balra determining whether the allotment was valid or not. Such a v. contention is patently self-contradictory. Every law must have The Chief Settlem.nl a beginning or time from which it operates, and no rule which Commissioner end seeks to change the law can be held invalid for the mere reason Olhera that it effects an alternation in the law .. It is sometimes possible to plead injustice in a rule which is made to operate with retrospective effect, but to say that a rule which operates prospectively is invalid because thereby a difference is made between the past and the future, is one which cannot be accepted.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil , Appeal No. 543 of 1962! Appeal from the judgement and order dated November 26, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 678/ 1957. .

Bishan Narain and N. N. Keswani, for the appellant.

8. K. Khanna and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondent Nos. 1 to 3.

D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 4.

R. V. S. Mani and T. R. V. Sastri, for respondent No. 5.

March 12, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of fit- Ayyangar, J. ness granted under Art. 133 by the High Court of Punjab against the order of that Court dismissing the appellant's petition to it under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

The point in controversy lies within a narrow compass and hence of the voluminops facts we propose to set out only those which are relevant for appreciating the contentions urged before us.

The father of the appellant owned considerable agricultural property in Pakistan and he with the members of his family moved over to Iµdia on partition. The appellant's father was allotted a considerable extent of land in village Kharar, District Ambala, but we are not concerned with that. He had still some unsatisfied claim. for allotment and on December 29, 1955 he was allotted by the Managing

Officer on quasi-permanent tenure Khasra Nos. 880, 881 and 882 which were within the municipal area of Kharar with the regularity of which allotment alone this appeal is concerned.

It may be mentioned that the appellant's father had died in 1952 and the allotment made was actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim of his father. On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued to the appellant on December 31, 1955 by the Managing Officer. When the appellant tried to take possession of these lands, disputes were raised by respondents

L/P(D)ISCI-7

Bihari Lal Batra rh• OhiefSettlemenl Nos. 4 and 5. They wer~ not displced pers?ns but they claim-

Commissioner and ed that they had been m possession of this property from a

Others long anterior date from which they could not be disturbed Ayyanyar, J. and also that the property could not be the subject of a valid lillotment. These respondents moved the Assistant Settlement Commissioner for cancellation of the allotment and this appeal was allowed by the officer who found that the land comprised in these three khasra numbers were within an "urban area" within the meaning of r. 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 and consequently that the allotment to the appellant was contrary to law. He, therefore, cancelled the allotment. The appellant thereafter applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner in cevision and not being successful there moved the High Court by a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. As stated earlier, this petition was dismissed and it is the correctness of this dismissal that is challenged in the appeal before us.

Mr. Bishan Narain, learned Counsel for the appellant urged in the main two contentions in support of the appeal.

The first was (1) that after the Managing Officer granted a sanad on December 31, 1955 in the name of the President of India, the appellant obtained an indefeasible title to the property and that this title could not be displaced except on grounds contained in the sanad itself even in the event of the order of allotment being set aside on appeal or revision. We have considered this point in Shri Mithoo Shahani and Ors. v.

The Union of India and Ors.(') which was pronounced on March JO, 1964 and for the reasons there stated this submission has to be rejected.

The second point that he urged was, and this was in fact the main contention raised before the High Court, that rule 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 was unconstitutional as contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution and so the original allotment to the appellant must be held to be lawful. We consider that there is no substance in this argument ln fact, we are unable to appreciate the ground on which the contention is being urged.

Section 40 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 enables the Central Government by Notification in the Official Gazette to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, and in particular on an elaborately enumerated list of matters. It was not suggested that the rules of 1955 were not competently made under s. 40. These rules were published on May 21. 1955 when they came into force.

Rule 2(h) the validity of which is impugned in these proceedings is a rule containing the definitions. Rule 2(h) reads, to extract what is material:

"2. In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires- 1964

Bi/iari Lal Batra

(a) to (g)..................................

T. , b , . h" h 1. . • Tl" CMtJ Stltltm<il

(h) Ur an area means any area wit m t e 1m1ts or Commi .. iowr and

a corporation,' a municipal committee, a notified "'""' area committee, a towt;1 area committee, a mall town committee, a cantonment or any other area notified as such by the Central Government from time to time;

Provided that in the case of the quasi-permanent allotment of rural agricultural lands already made in the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union, the limits of an urban area shall be as they existed on the 15th August, 1947." The words. 'of rural agricultural lands' occurring in the proviso to this rule were replaced by an amending Notification of 1957 by the words 'in rural area', but this amendment is obviously of no significance. "Rural area" is defined by rule 2(f) to mean 'any area which is not an urban area'.

Pausing here, it would be useful to state two matters which are not in dispute: (]) that the allotment to the appellant was made on December 29, 1955, the sanad being issued two days later. It was theref9re an allotment which was made &fter May 21, 1955 when the rules came into force; (2} the other matter is that Khasra Nos. 880, 881 and 882 were included in urban limits on February 10, 1951 by the municipal

ara of Kharar being extended to cover these plots. It would, therefore, be obvious that on the date when the allotment was made, the allotted land was in an "urban area" and therefore it could not have been validly allotted.

' We must confess our inability to comprehend what orecisely was the discrimination which the rule enacted which rendered it unconstitutional as violative of Art. 14. So far as we c; mld understand the submission, the unreasonable discri miuation was said to exist because of the operation of the proviso. Under the proviso in regard to quasipermanent allotments 'already made', i.e. made before May 21, 1955 in the States of Punjab and PEPSU, the test of w?at was to be considered an "urban area" was to be determillecl on the basis of the state of circumstances which obt'lincd on 15th August, 1947. The allotment in favour of the a.,_ pellant was af~; r the rules came into force and was not o; e

, already ade . Therefore if on the date of the allotment the land was 1~ an urban area, the allotment would be governed by the am para of the definition and so could not have been validly made an<i that was the reason why it was set Ll'(D)ISCI-'(•) ..

1964 aside. The discrimination is said to consist in the rule having Bih!Jri Lal Batra drawn a dividing line at the date when it came into force, for v. determining whether the allotment was valid or not.. It is the 2'11t Of ettle~ discrimination that is said to be involved in this prospective

Comm;:;::• operation of the rule that we find it difficult to appreciate. It is possible that before the rules were framed the land now in .dwangar, J. dispute cou, ld have been allotted, but beca, use of this it is not possible to suggest that the rule altering the law in this respect which ex concessis is within the rule-making power under the Act, is invalid. Such a contention is patently self-contradi•; tory. Every law must have a beginning or time from which it operates, and no rule which seeks to change the law can be held invalid for the mere reason that it effects an alteration in tbe law. It is sometimes possible to plead injustice in a rule which is made to operate with retrospective effect, but to say that a rule which operates prospectively is invalid because thereby a difference js made between the past and the future, is one which we are unable to follow.

There are no merits in this appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

I

BIHARI LAL BATRA

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. N. WANCHOO, J

SHAH

Pakistan

Arts. 226 and 227

Art. 133

[1964] 7 S.C.R. 103

Art. 14

s. 40

May 21, 1955

December 29, 1955

Bihari Lal Balra

November 26, 1959

Punjab High Court

Bishan Narain

N. N. Keswani

K. Khanna

B. R. G. K. Achar

D. N. Mukherjee

R. V. S. Mani

T. R. V. Sastri

AYYANGAR

Ayyangar

Art. 133

Art. 226

Kharar

Ambala

December 31, 1955

Bihari Lal Batra

Ayyanyar

Arts. 226 and 227

India

March JO, 1964

Art. 14

Section 40

Central Government

s. 40

May 21. 1955

Punjab

Patiala

East Punjab

15th August, 1947

February 10, 1951

Art. 14

PEPSU

Bih!Jri Lal Batra

.dwangar


7 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 197

D. S. CHELLAMMAL ANNI

NASANAN SAMBAN

fP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SJKRI, JJ.J

Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955), JI. 3 and Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act (XXIV of 1950), s. 7-Scope of.

Practice-High Court-Revisional jurisdiction-Interference by Supreme Court under Art. 136 of Constitution.

The respondent is a cultivating renant of the appellant.

After harvesting he gathered the crops and brought the grain to the threshing floor. He measured the crops and offered 40 per cent of it to the Landlord as rent as provided by the. law but the landlord wanted 60 !J<'r cent as his share. On the failure of the landlord or his agent to take his legally due share after repeated requests and after information and complaint to the police and revenue authorities the respondent removed and sold the cropS when he found that the crops would be spoiled by rain. Thereafter he sent by money order fo the landlord the market value of the 40 !J<'r cent of the crops.

The landlord refused to receive the amount and he filed a petition under s. 3(4)(a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 for the ejectment of the respondent before the Revenue Divisional Officer. The Revenue Division.al Officer held that though the respondent was right in insisting on determining only 40 per cent of the produce he was not justified in removing the crops. He held that he should have deposited the rent in court or paid it to the landlord as provided by law. Since he had not done these he held that he was not entitled to invoke the discretionary power of the Revenue Divisional Officer to get an extension of time for the deposit of rent and the officer . therefore ordered the ejection of the respondent.

A revision petition filed by the respondent before the High Court was allowed and the order of ejectment was set aside.

The present appeal was filed on special leave granted by this Court.

The appellant contends that since the respondent has transgressed s. 7 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956 by removing the produce from the threshing floor he cannot claim the protection of that Act.

Secondly it was submitted that since the respondent did not pay the rent as contemplated by s. 3(3) of the Protection Act he was not entitled to the protection• of the Act. It was further contended that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion by the Revenue Divisional Officer.

Held: (i) S. 7 can be transgressed in two ways viz., (1) when the tenant does not bring the crop to the threshing floor or (2) having brought it to the threshing floor he removes any portion of it at such time or in such manner as to prevent the division thereof at the proper time. In the present case it is admitted that the respondent brought the crop to the threshing floor. From the proved facts of this case that the respondent

D.8. OMllGmmal

.!Mi

NGaGf&G• Sanaba•

was always prepared for the division of the crops. and that it was te insistence of the appellant for 60 per cent of the crops and his refusal to accept his due share that prevented division and that, the crops were actually measured by Revenue Inspector and it was to prevent deterioration of the crops that the respondent removed it, it is clear that the respondent has not removed the crops to prevent division. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a transgressi0n of s. 7 on the part of the respondent. '

(ii) Since the respondent did not pay the rent within the time and in the way contemplated by s. 3(3) of the Protection Act the case is covered by s. 3(2) of the Act. That gave the appellant a cause of action to apply for the ejectment of the respondent under s. 3(4} of the Protection Act. But even though the ' appellant was entitled to apply, the Revenue Divisional Officer was not bound to evict the tenant for cl. (b) of s. 3(4) gives him a discretion to give time to the tenant to Pav the arrears taking into consideration the various circumstances of the case. The Revenue Divisional Officer refused to exercise the discretion in favour of the respondent on the ground that he had not deposited the rent under s. 3(3l. The discretion under cl. (b) of s. 3(4) comes into play only when the tenant has not deposited the rent under s. 3(3) and therefore the Revenue Divisional Officer was wrong in refusing to exercise his discretion.

(iii) The Revenue Divisional Officer having been patently wrong in his view of the law if the High Court interfered in the wrong exercise of his discretionacy pOWer, this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 will not interfere with the order of the High Court which is clearly in the interest of justice.

Secondly the Revenue Divisional Officer had failed to exercise his jurisdiction and the High Court would be justified in interfering with his order even under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Proeedure.

OvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION-Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 1960 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 966 of 1960. M. C. Setalvad and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellant.

T. S. Venkataraman, for the r!!spondent.

March 13, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by-

WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Madras High Court. The appellant is a landlord in village Idaikkal, and the respondent is her tenant. The land in dispute was let by the appellant to the respondent and the rent was fixed partly in kind and partly in cash, the tenancy having been created somtimes before the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Farr Rent) Act, No. XXIV of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Fair Rent Act) came into force. The agreement as to the payment of rent in kind was that the appellant would get 60 per cent of the gross produce, the remainder going to the respondent.

The dispute out of which this appeal has arisen arose in 1959 when the crop for that year was reaped. The respondent harvested the crop and brought it to the threshing floor of the appellant for division and claimed that the appellant was only entitled to 40 per cent of the crop as provided in the Fair Rent Act. The appellant's agent however demanded 60 per cent as provided in the agreement of tenancy. The dispute went on about for ten days while the harvested crop was lying in the threshing floor. Consequently, the respon- . dent made an application to the Circle Inspector of Police

complaining that the appellant was delaying the division of the produce and preventing the removal of the respondent's share, and that there was likelihood of a breach of the peace.

Thereupon the police made inquiry into the matter and reported to the Tehsildar that the harvested crop was lying in the threshing floor and the agent of the appellant was not prepared to divide the produce in accordance with the provisions of law and was insisting on the division being made according to the agreement. It was also reported that the crop was deteriorating and the seeds had begun to germinate as the crop was exposed to rain. Thereupon the Tehsildar directed the Revenue Inspector to look into the matter° and measure the quantity of the produce and note the gross yield and report. The Revenue Inspector thereupon visited the spot on September 27, 1959 after issuing notice to the appellant's agent to be present at the spot for the purpose of measuring the quantity and determining the yield.

The appellant's agent was however absent and the Revenue Inspector made measurements in the presence of the respondent and some prominent persons of the village in spite of the absence of the appellant's agent. He then sent a report to the Tehsildar giving the result of his measurements. As however, the appellant's agent was not present, the crop could not be divided and the Revenue Inspector gave instruction to the respondent that the crop should not be removed.

It appears however that the respondent removed the crop soon after the Revenue Inspector left. Thereafter the respondent sent a money order to the appellant for the amount representing the value of the appellant's share, namely, 40 per cent. It appears that soon after the appellant filed a criminal complaint of theft against the respondent and that was dismissed. Then followed the present petitiOn under s. 3 (4)(a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, No. XXV of 1955, (hereinafter referred to as the Protection Act) for the ejectment of the respondent before the Revenue Divisional Officer.

The Revenue Divisional Officer held that though the respondent was justified in insisting that the appellant should take only 40 per cent of the produce as provided by law he

D.S. Ohellammal

Annt

Nasanan Sam.ban

Wanehoo, J.

1964 was not justified in removing the crop and that he should D.S. Olldlammal have proceeded to enforce his rights in the manner provided

.A.,...; by law. As however the respondent had not chosen to pro- N

v. Sam/J ceed in that manner, the Revenue Divisional Officer ordered -~ an his ejectment refusing to exercise the discretion which lay in WaodooiJ. him to give time to the respondent to deposit the arrears of rent in court. The respondent then went in revision to the High Court. The High Court held that in the circumstances of the case, the Revenue Divisional Officer should have exercised his discretion in favour of the respondent. The High Court therefore set aside the order of ejectment in view of the fact that the rent had been deposited in the High Court.

Thereupon the appellant applied for and obtained special leave to appeal from this Court, and that is how the matter has come up before us.

In the special leave petition the appellant raised the contention that the Fair Rent Act and the Protection Act were unconstitutional as they placed unreasonable restrictions on the appellant's fundamental rights to hold her property. But in the arguments before us, learned counsel for the appellant has abandoned the attack on the constitutionality of the two Acts and has only. contended that the High • Court had no jurisdiction under s. 6-B of the Protection Act to interfere with the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer.

Before we cmlsider the contention raised on behalf of the appellant we may briefly refer to the provisions of the two Acts, which bear on the question raised before us. The Protection Act was, as its title shows, passed for protection from eviction of cultivating tenants. It is not in dispute that the respondent was a cultivating tenant. Section 3(1) of the Protection Act lays down that "subject to the next succeeding sub-sections, no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding or any part thereof, during the continuance of this Act, by or at the instance of his landlord, whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise". The following sub-sections then lay down the conditions under which ejectment can be ordered. Sub-section (2) of s. 3 inter alia lays down that a tenant will not enjoy the protection of sub-s. (!), if he is in arrears of rent and has not paid the arrears within the time specified therein. Sub-section (3) of s. 3 provides that a cultivating tenant may deposit in court the rent or, if the rent be payable in kind, its market v; tlue on the date of the deposit, to the account of the landlord. A notice of deposit is given by the Court (in which is included the Revenue Divisional Officer), and an enquiry is then made whether the amount deposited is correct after hearing the ' landlord and the tenant. If there is any deficiency, the tenant is ordered to make good the deficiency; and if he fails to pay the sum due, the landlord is entitled to ask the court

for eviction in the manner as provided by sub-s. (4). Section 3(4)(a) lays down the procedure for evicting a tenant. Under this clause a landlord has to apply to the Revenue Divisional Officer and on receipt of such application, the Revenue Divisional Officer, after giving reasonable opportunity both to the landlord and the tenant to represent their case, holds a summary enquiry into the matter and decides whether eviction should be ordered or not. Clause (b) of sub-s. (4) of s. 3 further gives discretion to .the Revenue Divisional Offioer to allow the cultivating tenant such iime as he considers just and reasonable having regard to the relative circumstances of the landlord and the cultivatin~ tenant for depositing the arrears of rent payable under the Act, including such costs as he may direct. It is further provided_ that if the cultivating tenant deposits the sum as directed, he shall be deemed to have paid the rent. If however the cultivating tenant fails to deposit the sum as directed, the Revenue Divisional Officer shall pass an order for eviction.

Then we tum to the provisions of the Fair Rent Act, which are material for present purposes. We have already pointed out that the fair rent in the case of wet land with which we are concerned in the present appeal is 40 per nt of the normal gross produce or its value in money: (see s. 4 (!)). Then comes s. 7, which provides that "where the produce to be shared is grain the sharing shall be done at the threshing floor on which the threshing took place; and no portion of the produce shall be removed therefrom at such time or in such manner as to prevent the due division thereof at the proper time."

A combined reading of these provisions of the two Acts shows that in the case of a tenant whose rent is payable in kind, such tenant has to take the crop to the threshing floor for division and such division has to be made at the threshing floor and no portion of the produce can be removed therefrom so as to prevent the due division thereof. But it is open to a tenant under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act to deposit in court to the account of the landlord where the rent is payable in kind, its market value on the date of deposit; and this obviously postulates that though the tenant has taken the produce to the threshing floor, the landlord has not co-operated in its division. Clearly if the landlord does not co:aperate in. the division of the crop, the tenant cannot allow 1t to remam on the threshing floor to deteriorate and

tat seems to. be the reason why under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act he 1s allowed to deposit the market value of the rent payable in kind in court, and it is then for the court to see whether the rent deposited is correct or not.

D.S. Ohd!ammal A1'ni

v, N.,.11M1Samka

Wan.c:Mo, J.

I>.S. Chel./4mmal

Anni

NatJanatt. Samban

Wanchoo, J.

The first question that arises therefore is whether the respondent has acted in any manner prohibited by law; and the main contention of the appellant is that the respondent has transgressed the provisions of s. 7 of the Fair Rent Act and so cannot take advantage of the Protection Act. It is further contended that the respondent has also transgressed s. 3(2) of the Protection Act inasmuch as he did not deposit the arrears of rent within the time allowed thereunder and was therefore liable. to eviction under s. 3(4) of the Protection Act. Section 7 of the Fair Rent Act Jays down that the sharing of the crop shall be done at the threshing floor on which the threshing takes place and no portion of the produce shall be removed therefrom at such time or in such manner so as to prevent due division thereof. It is clear that s. 7 can be transgressed in bne of two ways; viz., (I) when the tenant does not bring the crop to the threshing floor at all, or (2) having brought it to the threshing floor he removes any portion of it at such time or in such manner as to prevent the due division thereof at the proper time. In the present case it is not in dispute that the respondent brought the crop to the threshing floor with the intention that it may be divided between him and the appellant and it is also not in dispute that the tenant was entitled to have the crop divided according to the Fair Rent Act and had therefore to give only 40 per cent to the appellant as provided thereunder. It was the appellant who was insisting all along through her agent that she should get 60 per cent as provided in the agreement of tenancy. What happened thereafter has been narrated by us above. The respondent approached the police, and the re" port of the Police Inspector shows that he went to the spot twice; on the first day the appellant's agent told the Police Inspector that he would settle the matter after consulting the appellant and the agent was asked to come back next day with the appellant's instructions. When the Police Inspector came the next day, no settlement could be arrived at. Later when the Revenue Inspector was sent by the Tehsildar, the agent of the appellant did not appear in spite of notice, and the Revenue Inspector took measurements of the crop and made a report thereof to the Tehsildar. It was after the crop had been measured by the Revenue Inspector that it was removed by the respondent. In these circumstances we are of opinion that it cannot be said that the crop was rei; n?ed from the threshing floor in order to prevent due d1v1S1on thereof at the proper time; the respondent was always prepared for the division of the crop as provided by law'. and the removal by him cannot in the circumstances be said to be for the purpose of preventing due division of the crop particularly when the measurements had ~Is? taken pla.ce.

Removal of crop by the tenant can fall w1thm the meamng

of the section only if it is done for the purpose therein specified; and it is plain that the removal in the present case was clearly not for that purpose. We are therefore of opbion that on the facts of this case it cannot be said that there was any transgression of s. 7 of the Fair Rent Act.

It is further urged on behalf of the appellant that even though the respondent might have been justified in removing 60 per cent of the crop which was his share, his removal of the appellant's share was a transgression of s. 7 of the Act.

We cannot accept this. Section 7 forbids removal of any portion of the crop. There is no question therefore of the share of the appellant or the respondent, eitlier the removal as a whole will transgress s. 7 or it will not; and that will depend upon the fact whether the removal was in order to prevent due division of the crop at the proper time. In the present case we have already indicated that the removal was not to prevent due division. The respondent was always prepared for due division and it was the appellant's agent who did not agree to division according to Jaw. In these circumstances, this is not a case of removal of the crop (particularly after it had been measured by the Revenue Inspector) with a view to prevent its due division. There was therefore no transgression of s. 7 of the Fair Rent Act, even if the appellant's share was removed.

Then it is urged that even if there was no transgression of s. 7 of the Fair Rent Act, the respondent was not entitled to the protection of s. 3 of the Protection Act, as he did not pay rent within the time specified therein and had taken no steps under s. 3(3) of the Act. There is no doubt that strictly speaking the case is covered by s. 3(2) of the Protection Act inasmuch as the rent was not paid within the time allowed, therein and was not even deposited in court under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act. What !he respondent did in the present case was to send a money order to the appellant instead of depositing the money in court under s. 3(3) as he should have done. Even though the appellant was not agreeing to the division of the crop, the respondent did not act under s. 3(3) as he should have and instead sent a money order.

Tht gave the appellant a cause of action to make an application under s. 3(4) o_f the Protection Act. But even though the appellant was entitled to make apolication under s. 3(4) of the Protection Act, the Revenue Divisional Officer was not _boun_d to evit the. tenant for cl. (b) of s. 3(4) gives him a d!scretmn to give tlffie to the tenant to pay the arrears havmg Tegad t_o the relative circumstances of the landlord and th~ ~':1lhvatmg tenant. This clearly means that the Revenue D1v1S1ona! Officer has to take into account the circumstances of ech ase and then exercise his discretion whether be should give hme to the tenant or riot. In the present case

D.S. ClieUammal

Anni

T, l{asanan Samba•

Wanckoo, J.

1964 the Revenue Divisional Officer did not consider that ques- D.S. Oliellammal tion as he took the view that he should not exercise the dis-

An.U cretion in favour of the respondent because he had not acted N.....,:;. Sam/Jan as he should have acted and deposited the amount under s. 3(3) in court. This view of the Revenue Divisional Officer W anclioo, J. is in our opinion patently incorrect. Now if the respondent had acted as he should have acted and made a deposit under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act, the matter would have been dealt thereunder. The court (which includes the Revenue Divisional Officer) would then have to consider whether the amount deposited was correct and if it was deficient the court was bound to give time to the tenant to make up the deficiency. It is only when the deficiency is not made good within the time allowed that the landlord would have the right to make an application under s. 3(4) for eviction. It is clear therefore that the discretion allowed under cl. (b) of s. 3(4) only comes into play where the tenant for some reason or the other has not made a deposit under s. 3(3). To hold therefore,-as the Revenue Divisional Officer seems to have held-that the discretion will not be exercised in favour of the tenant because he had failed to make a deposit under s. 3(3) of the Act is a patent violation of the provision in

cl. (b) of s. 3(4) as to the exercise of discretion.

It is however urged that even if the Revenue Divisional Offii; er had misunderstood cl. (b) of s. 3(4), the High Court could not interfere with the exercise of the discretio, Q by the Revenue Divisional Officer under s. 6-B of the Protection Act, inasmuch as this provision gives revisional jurisdiction to the High Court to the extent to which such jurisdiction is conferred on it by s. II 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

There are two answers to this contention. The first is that the Revenue Divisional Officer was patently wrong in his view of the law and therefore if the High Court interfered with the wrong exercise of discretion, this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 will not interfere with the order of the High Court, which is clearly in the interest of justice.

Secondly by taking the view that he cannot and should not exercise his discretion where a tenant has failed to take action under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act, the Revenue Divisional Officer has in our opinion failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him under the law, and the High Court would be justified in interfering with its order even under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

We are therefore of opinion that there is no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismiued.

197

D. S. CHELLAMMAL ANNI

NASANAN SAMBAN

fP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

c. SHAH

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

s. 7

Supreme Court

Art. 136

s. 3(4)(a)

s. 7

s. 3(3)

S. 7

OMllGmmal

s. 7

s. 3(3)

s. 3(2)

s. 3(4)

s. 3(3l. The discretion under cl. (b)

s. 3(4)

s. 3(3)

Art. 136

s. 115

M. C. Setalvad

R. Ganapathy Iyer

T. S. Venkataraman

WANCHOO

Idaikkal

September 27, 1959

s. 3

Nasanan Sam.ban

Wanehoo

s. 6

Section 3(1)

s. 3

s. 3

Section 3(4)(a)

s. 3

s. 4

s. 7

s. 3(3)

s. 3(3)

D.S. Ohd!ammal A1'ni

v

NatJanatt. Samban

Wanchoo

s. 7

s. 3(2)

s. 3(4)

Section 7

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

Section 7

s. 7

s. 7

s. 7

s. 3

s. 3(3)

s. 3(2)

s. 3(3)

s. 3(3)

s. 3(3)

s. 3(4)

s. 3(4)

s. 3(4)

D.S. ClieUammal

Wanckoo

s. 3(3)

s. 3(3)

s. 3(4)

s. 3(4)

s. 3(3)

s. 3(3)

s. 3(4)

s. 3(4)

s. 6

the Code of Civil Procedure

Art. 136

s. 3(3)

s. 115

the Code of Civil Procedure