2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 273

STATE OF PUNJAB

MODERN CULTIVATORS, LADWA

(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR,

JJ.)

Torts-Break in canal bank-Suit for damages-defendants' negligence-

Non-production of documents by defendant-If adverse inftreuce

can be drawn-Whether principle Re! lpsa Loqu; tur applits?- Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 18731 ss. 6, 15.

A firm called the Modern Cultivators brought a suit against the State of Punjab to recover damages for loss of crops suffered by flooding. '.Jf its Jands as a result of a break in a canal belonging to the State.

The plaintiff's case was that there was a breach in the western bank of the canal owing to the negligence of the defendants and canal water escap!!d to the fields 1.:ausing them to be flooded.

The case of Government wao;; that bre.ach did take place but it was promptly repaired and the fields were fiooded not by the canal water but by heavy rains in the monlh of sptembcr. The trial Judge passed a decree for Rs. 20,000

against Government. but it was reduced by the High Court to Rs. 14,130.

The High Cotrt held that the inundation of the fields was by water

frCtm the canal and not from the nallahCis.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant filed cross-appeals by special leave ot this Court.

Held (per Sarkar, J.): (i) That the rule of res ip_ra loquitur was applicable to the facts of this case because there would not have been a breach in the banks of the canal if those in management took proper care and tt-.e breach itself would be prin1a facie proof of negligence.

Scott v. L11ndon_Dock Co., 3 H & C 601 applied.

Bal'kway v. South Waler Transport Ca. Ltd., [19SO] 1 All. E.lt. 392, •istinguished.

(ii) An inference that the defendant was negligent in the management of the canal arises because it is clear from the record that documents cailed for had not been produced deliberately.

MurugesonJ Pillai v., Manickavasaka Pandara, L .. R. 44

I.A. 98, rtlerred to. .

(iii l Arrick 2 o! the Limitation Act does not apply to the facts of tJte case fo~ tilert> is :nothing in the Canal Act imposing any duty On the defn<lant to taie. care of the banks.

Held (per Hid.,, ati.Iiah, J,): (i) The principle of ru i1pa loquitur Manot always be safely applied where the faci.. before the court aro mot the whole facto. It ahould not . be applied u le11al rule but only

II ll.C.-11.

May, 8

lfU

811111 •f l'UN/a•

•• lltlUnc C1tltira-

IMI

u an aid to an inference when it is reasonable to think that there aro no further facts to consider. It is not a principle which dispenses wi ·~. proof of negligence. !lather it shifts onua from one party to another • It is a rule of evidence .and not of liability. A too ready reliance ot1

the maxim reinforces a fault liability and makes it into an absolute liability. If absolute liability is to giTe way to fault liabilty, some fault must be establshed by evidence .or must be capable of being reasonably inferred from the circumstances. It is not sufficient to s:t.y

Tt.8 ipJa loquitur because the danger is that facts may not alway5 tell the whole story and if there is something withheld bow can the thing be said lo speak for itself? The High Court erred in applying tloe

principle of res ipsa loqutur to the facts of this case.

In the present case there was sufficient evidence, in the absence 1f reasonable cxplanati..:.a (lticb there was not), to estabfish negligence.

Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, expla'ned.

StdltighDenfidd v. V. O'Ca//aghan and Others [1940] A.C. 880 an'd Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 59': 159 E:R. 665, referred to.

Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co. Ltd. [1950] I All. E.R. 392 H.L. 394, relied on.

(ii) The rule in Ray/ands v. Fletcher is hardly dpplicable here.

Canal Systems are essential to the life of the Nation and land that is used as canals, is subjected to an ordinary use and not to unnatural use on which the rule in Ray/ands v. Fletcher rests. 1bere is difficulty In distinguishing non-natural and natural user.

Rylands v. Flttcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 300, inapplicable.

Richards v. Lothian, [1913] A.C. 263, relied on.

(iii) Article 2 of the Limitation Act cannot apply to cases where the act or omission complained of is not alleged to be in pursu<inr.c

of statutory authority. Act or omission which can claim statutory protection or is alleged to be in pursuance of a statutory commaU may attract Art. 2 of the Limitation Act but the Act or omission must be one which can be said to be in pursuance of an enactment. In tlte present case the breach in the bank was not that kind of act or omissio•.

It could not claim to be in P1:Jtsuance of the Canal Act. Nor coullll. the opening or closing of the channel for operations, though in pursuance of the Canal Act; be the relevant act or omission because they were more than a year before the cause of action and to apply a limitatioa of 90 days to that cause of action is not only impossible but also absurtl.

Article 2, therefore does not apply. Article 3 of the Limitation Act applie:1 to the present Ca!e.

Punjab Cotton Press Co. Uti. T. SecretMy of St•te, I.LJt. IQ Lah. 1'1 P.C., inapplicable

Mohamad Sadaiit Ali Khan Y. Administrator Corpor•tion of City t1f Lahore, I.L.R. [194S] Lah. S23 F.B. and S<er.tary of Stale v. Lodna Colliery Co. Ltd., LL.It. 15 Pat. 510, referred lo.

Commissioner.t for the Port of CuJcutlii Y. Corpor"tion of Clllcutta, 64 I.A. 363, distin&uished.

Held (per Mudholkar 1.): (i) The rule in Ry/, mds v. Fl<tch<r applies only if the defe1dant brings or accumulates on his own land

soinehing that is likely to escape and do inischief, irrepective of tho question whether that wa.i t.lone by the defendant wilfu:Jy or ngligendy.

This rule has been adopted in this country in several cases anJ so call

be regarded ac: a part of the common law of the land. !n the country of its origin, thii: rule has been subjected h> cert.tin exception11.

One of the exceptions is this: that where the owner llf occupir 'lf land accumulates a deletericus substance thereon b)· virtue of an obligation imposed up-on hin1 by " statute or in exercise of st'1tt1tory authority he will not be rtn<lered li<ible for damages resulting therefrom to other persons unless it is established that he was guilty .:1f neglige.r..:c i.n

allowin~ the deleterious substance to escape.

The 1:ree11t case fa1-l1 within this exception.

The State of Punjab would not be liable for dam::tges by the operation of the rule in Rylands v. Flflcher hut is liable by rc:.ts1)n of iti

negligence.

The breach v.:<1s caused by the neglig:en;:e on th•: part of the officers of the Stale in inspecting the banks of the canal :lnd ia particular that portion of ir where the breach had been cJuscd.

Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 expJa; ned.

Gooroo Chuin \'. Riun Jlutt, (1865) Z W.R. 43. Dhanitsav v. Sitabai,

(1948) Nag. 698, and Du11ne v. North We.!otern Gns Bot1rd. (1964) 2 W.L.R. 164, referred to.

(ii) The rule of evidence rts ipsa loquitur cannot be applied to the facts of this case because all the facts for the decision of the case were not placed before the court. Jmn1ediately after the breach occurred some reports were made by the officers of the State but they were not placed before the Court despite it! order requiring their productioL Jn other words the State had deliberately suppressed evidence in iSI possession which could have established negligence.

In this view the rule of res ipi11 loquilur is not the applicable.

CJVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 416 and 417 of 1947.

Appeals from the judgment and decree d:lted May 1, 1956, of the Punjab High Court in Regular First Appeal No. 45 of 1950.

St•le a/ Pun; ob

MtJJern Cultivotor1

SlllU of Punjab

•• lllodern C11/tivaltJ11

Sorkor J.

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N.

Sachthey, for the appellants (in C, A. No. 416/1962), '1nd respondent (in C.A. No. 417/62) .

S. T. Desai, Hardayal Hardy and J. P. Agarwal, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 416 of 1962) and appellants (in C.A. No. 417 of 1962).

May 8, 1964. The following Judgments were delivered by the Court.

SARKAR J.-1 agree with the orders proposed by my brother Hidayatullah.

These appeals arise out of a suit brought by a firm called the Modern Cultivators against the State of Punjab to recover damages for loss suffered by flooding of its lands as a result of a breach in a can.al belonging to the State of Punjab.

Both the Courts below have held in favour of the plaintiff but the High Court reduced the amount of the damages awarded by the trial Court.

Both parties have appealed to this Court. The Modern Cultiv.ators contend that the High Court is in error in reducing the amount of the damages.

The State of Punjab contends that it had no liability for the loss caused by the flooding.

The breach and the flooding of the plaintiff's lands are not now denied.

In regard to the appeal by the Modern Cultivators I have nothing to add to what has been said by Hidayatullah J.

For the reasons mentioned by him I agree that the damages had been correctly assessed by the trial Court.

In its appeal the State of Punjab first contended that the plaintiff could not succeed as it had failed to prove that the breach had been caused by the defendant's negligence.

I am unable to accept this contention.

The trial Court inferred negligence against the defendant as it had failed to produce the relevant documents and with this view I agree.

The defendant had produced no documents to show how the breach was caused.

It had been asked by the trial Court to do so by an order made on May 12, 1949 but failed to produce them. The defendant had a large number of canal officers and according to Mr. Malhotra, the Execu tive Engineer in charge of the canal at the relevant time,

there was a regular office and various reports concerning the breach had been made.

None of these was produce<! at the hearing.

It is obvious that in an organisation like the canal office, reports and olher documents must have been kept to show how the breach occurred and what was <lone to stop it. If such documents are not produced, an inference can be legitimately made that if produced, they would have gone against the case of the defendant, that is, they would have proved that the defendant had been negligent: Murugesan Pillai v. Manickavasaka Pandara(').

It was suggested in this Court that the documents had been destroyed. It may be that they are now destroyed.

One of the defendant's officers called by the High Court in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the documentary evidence said that documents were destroyed after three to seven years.

The breach occurred in August 1947, the suit was filed in October 1948 and the trial was held about August 1949.

So it .would appear that at the time of the trial the relevant documents had not been destroyed.

Nor was it said that they had then been destroyea.

Furthermore, in view of the pendency of the suit the documents must have been preserved.

It is, clear that they had not been produced deliberately.

An inference that the defendant was negligent in the management of the canal arises from the non-production of the documents.

There is, therefore, evidence that the defendant was negligent.

Furth=ore it seems to me that the rule -of res ipsa loquitur applies to this case. The canal was admittedly in the management of the defendant and canal banks are not breached if those in management take proper care.

In such cases the rule would apply and the breach itself would be prima facie proof of negligence: see Scott v. London Dock Co.(2). ·· No doubt the defendant can show that the breach was due to act of God or to act of a third party or any other thing which would show that it had not been negligent, but it did not do so. It may be that the rule of res ipia

/oquitur may not apply where it is known how the thing which caused the damage happened as was held in Bm kway

v. South Wales Transport Co., Ltd.(3 ). But that is not the

(2) 3 H. & c. 6ot (3)119501 I All E.R. 392

1'64

Stat• of Prut/ab

•• Modtrn Cult/••

tori

Sarkar I.

Stai. of Punjab

Modern Cultiva-

Sarkar J.

case here.

No reason has been advanced why the rule should not apply.

Therefore I think that the first contention of the defendant that there is no evidence of negligence must be rejected.

I do not think it necessary in the present case to consider whether the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher(') applies to make the defendant liable for I have already held that it is liable as negligence has been proved.

The second point raised by the defend.ant was one of limitation.

It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the case was governed by art. 2 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act.

It is not in dispute that if that article applies, the suit would be out of time.

That article relates to a suit "for compensation for doing or omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment"'.

It was said that the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 imposed a duty on the defendant to take care of the canal banks and its failure to do so was the omission to do an act in pursuance of an enactment within the article.

I have very grave doubt if this interpretation of art. 2 is correct.

There is authority against it: see Mohammad Saadat Ali Khan v. The Administrator, Corporation of City of Lahore (2). But apart from that I find nothing in the Canal Act imposing any duty on the defendant to take care of the oanks. We ll'ere referred toss. 6 and 51 of that Act. Both are enabling sections giving power to the State Government to do certain acts.

Under s. 6 it has power to enter on any land and remove any obstruction and close any channels or do any other thing necessary for the application or use of the water to be taken into the canal.

This obviously does not impose any duty in connection with the canal bank.

Section 15 gives the power to the canal authorities in case of accident happening or being apprehended to a canal to enter upon lands of others and to do all things necessary to repair the acpident or prevent it.

This section again has nothing to do with taking care of the canal banks.

Therefore, even assuming that the defendant's interpretation of art. 2 is correct, this is not a c.ase to which it may apply.

I wish however to make it clear that nothing that I have said

(I) [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330

(2) (1945] !LR 26 Lah. 523

I I

S S.C.R

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 279 I · here is to be read as in any way approving the defendant's interpretation of .art. 2. Therefore the defendant's contentio!1 that the suit was barred by limitation also fails.

The defendant's appeal must, therefore, be diSmissed and the plaintiff's ap;:eal alJ(>wcd. Costs will naturally follow the result.

Stat• of PuniU ...

Mollcrn C11lJIP•

"'" Sorl11t 1.

HIDAYATULLAH, J.-On August 15, 1947 the Western Hidayotullah 1.

Jamna Canal at R.D. No. 138000 near Sanglpur .and.

Jandhrea villages burst its western bank. The canal water inundated the neighbouring fields where crops of sugar cane, maize, urud etc. grown by the plaintiff firm were dam.aged.

The plaintiff brought this action alleging that the breach in the bank was caused by negligence on the part of the canal authorities who were guilty of further negligence in not closing the breach without delay. The plaintiff estimated .. its loss at Rs. 60,000 in respect of the standing crnp and a further loss of Rs. 10,000 in respect of the deterioration of the land for future cultivation.·· It however, limited its claim to Rs. 20,000. The State Government denied negligence on the part of the canal authorities.

Government admitted that a breach did occur in an old inlet channel of Chhalaundi Silting Tank on August 15, 1947 and some canal water escaped through the breach which, it was said, flowed back to the canal through the outlet of the silting tank lower down the canal Government claimed that the site was immediately inspected by the Executive Engineer and no damage to the crops was discovered and that the breach was promptly closed and the bank was strengthened.

Government stated that there were henvy rains on the 8th September and again from 23rd to 28th September, 1947 causing floods in the nullahas but as the canal was running full supply, water brought by the nullahru to the silting tank could not get to the canal and over-flowed to the adjoining areas.

Shortly stated, plaintiff's case was that there was a breach in the western bank of the canal owing to the negligence of the defendants arid canal water escaped to the fields eausing

them to be flooded; while the case of the Government was that a breach did take 1>lace but it was promptly repaired

19M

 . State of Punjab v.

Modern Cultivator1

and. the fields were flooded not by the canal water but by heavy rains in the month of September. The trial judge passed a decree for Rs. 20,000 against Gove=ent, but it was reduced by the High.Court to Rs. 14,130. These two Hidayatullah . 1• cross-appeals have thus been filed by the rival parties by

__________ SJY"--cial leave of this Court. -· ·

The High Court and the court below have agreed in holding that there was a break in the canal. The size of the breach has been variously described, but it was certainly not less than 30 feet wide and the depth of the water at the breach was about 15 feet.

It is admitted that the canal was then running full supply @ 5,000 Cusecs.

As the width of the canal was 400 feet, the out-flow would be at the rate of 5,000X30/400 Cusecs if the breach was 30 feet wide.

This would mean extensive flooding of the low lying areas unless the breach was immediately closed.

Some of the witnesses say that it was as much as 70 to 80 feet wide and that would make the out-flow even greater. The High Court held that the floods were not caused by the rains.

Prior to the break in the canal there was only 1 inch of rainfall.

The heavy rains took place much later. The inundation of the fields was thus by water from the c.:rnal and not from the nullahas.

This much has already been held. It is admitted that the breach occurred at a place where there was an old nullah through which silting operations were carried out in the past and this exit was closed in the previous years and the breach was at that very site.

The breach was noticed on the morning of the 16th. No attempt was made by either side to establish the exact duration of time before the breach was repaired.

Mr.

M.:ilhotra (Executive Engineer) stated that it was repaired by the 18th but was re-opened (one does not know why) on the 20th

and again closed on the 21st.

Evidence on behalf of the plaintiff established that water continued pouring out as late as the month of October.

This was apparently an exaggeration.

There is no evidence to show that the flow of water in the canal was re.duced from the headworks when the breach occurred. It apparently continued on full supplr.

The High Court attempted to secure the documents from the Canal Office which had not been produced earlier. The

196-1 Executive Engineer, then in charge was summone<fto-bnng all the papers in his office .and he produced the telegrams received by and copies of telegrams issued from the head office between August 16, 1947 and September 5, 1947.

From these documents it is now established that. the breach was not _repaired at least upto August 27, 1947 and the evidence that it was repaired on the 18th was therefore not accurate. It has also been established that the case of the plaintiff that water continued to flow right upto October was also false. It may thus be assumed that repairs were completed by the 27th August but not earlier.

State of Pun/all

Modern Ca.lti•a-a

torr

IIidayatullah 1.

It is admitted that the area into which water flowed was used as a silting tank. The silting operations comprise the opening of the bank of the canal at a selected place to let out turbid water which passing through the silting tank drops the sediment and flows back to the canal at a lower reach - free of the silt, and closing of the bank. -It is now admitted th.at at the exact spot where the breach took place there was previously an opening for silting purposes which was recently closed.

There is no evidence to show negligence on the part of Government.

Curiously enough Goveniment said that it had, not preserved the papers connected with this mishap.

We can hardly believe - this.

Government led evidence to establish that the banks of the canal were periodically inspected and claimed that the breach was an act of God without any negligence on the part of the canal authorities.

It is an admitted fact that crops of the plaintiff were destroyed if not wholly at least substantially.

The only question, therefore, is whether Government can be held responsible for the damage caused to the plaintiff and, if so, what should be the compensation.

_Two points were urged on behalf of Government: the first was that the suit filed by the plaintiff was out of time inasmuch as Art. 2 of the Indian Limitation Act which prescribes a period of three months was applicable and not Art. 36 which prescribes a period of two years.

This was held against Government by the High Court and the court -below. The second point urgd on behalf of Government was that there was no proof of negligence whatever by the

plaintiff and the plaintiff must therefore fail.

The High

19U

tlll• Bf J!unj•~

v. lod•rn CultiYOtor1

•idayatullah J.

Court in dealing with this point held that, in the circumstances res ipsa /oquitur and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove negligence .and it must be so presumed.

The High Court differed from the court below in assessing damages.

In the appeal of the Government both these points are urged.

On behalf of the plaintiff, in the companion appeal, it is contended that the High Court omitted to give proper compensation for the loss of maize and urud crop. It is submitted that the High Court adopted the formula that in respect of sugar cane crop which needs plenty of water the damages should be assessed at 1/3 of the value of the crop and in respect of maize and urud crops at 1/2 the value.

The plaintiff contends in its appeal that the whole of the maize and urud crop was completely destroyed and the decree of the court of first instance allowing 3/ 4 of the value of the crop as compensation was unassailable.

It is pointed out that evidence disclosed that water in the fields was 4 to 5 feet deep and the maize and urud plants were less than 2 feet high.

In other words, the plants remained submerged during all the time the fields were inundated. It is obvious that the crop must have been entirely destroyed and the allowance of 1/ 4 was because the destroyed crop had some value as chari.

On the facts, as found, there was hardly any justification for reducing the amount of the decree for dam.ages passed by the court of first instance.

The High Court itself, in more than one place, stated in its judgment that the maize and urud crops were completely destroyed. It is, therefore, clear that unless Government succeeds in its appeal the decree of the court of first instance must be restored in this case.

Mr. Vishwanatha Sastri on behalf of Government asked for a remit, but in view of the slight difference and the fact that the High Court itself remarked that the maize and urud crops were completely destroyed there would not be any necessity to order a remit in case the appeal of the Government fails.

I shall now turn to that appeal.

The facts as found in .this case are that in 1946, the land which got tlooded, was used for silting operations.

An opening in the western bank was made in that year and the

1964 bank was.restored in June 1946.

Till the month of August in the following year there was no complaint.

Evidence discloses that the banks were regularly inspected.

A special Engineer and a Special Sub-Divisional Officer were in charge .and there were watchmen also.

There is no evidence of wilful con1 !uct. The plaintiff has not led evidence to establish .any particular act of negligence. There is no evidence that the breach was caused by the act of a third party or even of God.

Mr. Sastri, therefore, contends that as there was no forese.able danger against which precautions could be taken beyond making periodical inspections, and this was done, there can be no liability.

He submits that in this view of the matter the plaintiff must fail in the absence of proof of negligence.

State of Pun; alr

Modern Cultiva+

tori

Hidayatullah J !

The High Court applied to the case the rule in Donoghue

v. Stavmson( 1 ) reinforcing it with what is often described as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

This case is first of its kind in India .and needs to be carefully considered.

Before us reliance was placed upon the rule in Rylands v.

Fletcher('). That rule, shortly &tated, is: that any occupier of land who brings or keeps upon it anything likely to do damage if it escapes is bound at his peril to prevent its escape, and is liable for all the direct consequences of its escape, even if he has been guilty of no negligence: Per Salmond, Law of Torts 13th Edu. p. 574.

The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was derivatively created from the rule of strict liability applicable to the acts of animals but, in my opinion, it is hardly applicable here.

Canal systems are essential to the life of the w.ition and land that is used as canals, is subjected to an ordinary use and not to an unnatural use on which the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher rests.

The words of Lord Cairns "non .. natural use" of land and of Blackburn, J. "special use bringing with it increased danger to others" are sometimes missed.

There is difficulty in distinguishing non-natural and nai:ural user but perhaps the best test to apply is stat~ by Lord Moulton in Richards v.

Lothian (1) :

(1)[1932] A.C. 562

(2) L.R. 3 H.L. 300

(3) [1913 I A C. 263, 280

State of Punjab v. .-Modtrn Cultivator1

Hidayatullah J.

SUPREJ, IE COURT REPORTS [1g64]

"Some special use bringing with it incr iased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such .a use as is proper for the general benefit of the commutity."

lbey formed the basis of observation of Vis.; oi.nt Maugham in Sedleigh-Denfield v. V. O'Cal/aghan and Ors. ( 1). As was pointed out by Holmes in his Common Law (1963) at p. 93:

"It may even be very much for the pul:lic good that dangerous accumulations should w made .... "

Cases of breaks in canals resulting in dan, ger to neighbouring lands are rare but some are to be found in Jaw reports from the United States of America.

I need not refer to them because the following passage from American Jvrisprudence Vol. 9 page 340 para 38 gives an adequate summary of the principles on which they h.au been dealt with:

"A canal company is also liable for flooding private property where it has not acquir, ld the legal right to do so; it is answerable in damages for all loss occ!lsioned by a neglect ou its part to use reasonable care and precautiou to prevent the waters of its canal from escaping therefrom to the injury arid detriment of others.

A canal proprietor is not, however, liable for damages to adjoining lands resulting from a mere accidental break in his canal which lium1n foresight and vigilance could not have anticipated, and against which proper prudence and judgment could not be expected to provide.

Although it has been held that a canal company is not Ii.able for damages occasioned by the percolation of waters through the banks of il~ canal, in the absence of proof of nl!g!igence on its part in want of skill or care in the construction and maintenance of its canal, uch holdings are maintenance of its canal, such holdings ---·------

(1) 119401 A.c. 880 ., 888

are opposed to the weight of reason and 111thority."

Perhaps the liability is viewed strictly as an inducement to care.

Safety is best secured when it is made the responsibility of the per:; on who must not only take precautions to avoid accident hut who alone decides what those precautions should be.

In this connection the rule that is most often quoted wa~ stated by Erle C.J. in Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co. (1) thus:

"There must be reasonable evidence of negligence.

But where the :thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and '.he accident is such as in the ordinan; course of things does not happen if those who tiave the manugement use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,. that the accident arose from want of care."

In subsequent ca5-es it has been customary to regard this as a statement of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

But the principle, if it be one, cannot ~!ways be safely applied where the facts before the court are not the whole facts.

In a vast canal system constructed with great care and attention to detail it may be difficult to prove negligence but it may sometimes be equall;' difficult to explain how the defect arose.

The principle of res ipsa loquitur had its origin in the falling of a barrel of flour from a first floor window on a passerby but it has been extended to situations quite different.

It is not very much in favour and if applied it must be correctly understood.

It is not a principle which dispenses with proof of negligence. Rather it shifts onus from one party to another. It ; s rule of evidence and not of liability.

A too ready reliance on the maxim reinforces a fault liability and makes it into an absolute liability. If absolute liability is to give way to fault liability, some fault must be established by evidence or must be capable of being reasonably inferred from the circumstances.

It is not

(1) 3 H. & C. S96 : 159 E.R. 665

State of Puniab

Modern Cultlra--

tors

Hidayatuflah J.

Stall of PUJtiab

Modern Cultlva

tor.r

1Jidayatullah I.

sufficient to say res ipsa loquitur because the danger is , that facts may not always tell the whole story and if there is something withheld how can the thing be saiC: to speak for itself ? The principle which I consider reasonable to apply where fault has to be inferred from circumstances was best stated by Lord Porter and I respectfully adopt it. Speaking of res ipsa loquitur it was observed by Lord Porter ia Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co. Ltd.(') :

"The doctrine is independent on the absence of ex

planation, and, although it is the duty of the defendants, if they desire to protect themselves, to give an adequate explanation of the cause of the accident, yet, if the facts are sufilciently known, the question ceases to be one where the facts speak for themselves, and the solution is to be found by determining whether, on the facts as est1blished, negligence is to be Inferred or not."

I have made these observations so that the principle may not be applied too liberally. It must also be remembered that what is said in relation to it in one case cannot indiscriminately be appijed to another case. It should not be applied as legal rule but only as an aid to an inference when it is reasonable to think that there are ne further facts to consider.

I shall now consider the facts as they stand in this case to discover if the canal authorities can be said to be at fault.

The facts show that the water escaped into the Chillaundi Silting Tank through the nallah which had previously beea used for silting operations and had been sealed in the previous year. If the plug were sound it would have withstood the pressure of water as it did after it was repaired on the 27th August even though 28" of rainfall fell within 20 days.

There is nothing to show that the outflow was due to raillfall or a storm so exceptional that it could be regarded as an a, ct of God.

Nor was it due to any disturbance of the earth's crust or interferenc!' by a stranger.

There is thus "Sufficient evidence, in the absence of reasonable explanation

(1) (1950] 1 All. E.R. 39> ot 39"395

(which there is not), to establish negligence.

Further, there was inordinate delay and negligence in sealing the breach.

Even the flow in the canal was not reduced for repairs to be carried out quickly.

In such circumstances, the facts prove negligence and government was rightly held responsible.

Whether the defect was patent or latent is not much to the purpose.

It was not an inevitable accident, and the Government must be held liable.

It remains to consider the question of limitation.

The High Court and the court below have applied Art. 36 of the Indian Limitation Act.

Government claims that the proper Article to apply was Art. 2.

These Articles may be set down here:

Description of suit.

2. For compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any en9.ctmant in force for the time in India

36. For compensation for any mal-feasance, mis-feasance or non-feasance independent of contract and not herein specially provided for.

Period of I imitation

Ninety day•

Two years (now one year)

Time from which period bgins to run.

When the act or omission takes place.

When the malfeasance

misfeasancc or non~ feasancc talc.es -place.

It is not denied that if Art. 2 was not applicable, the proper Article would be Art. 36 and the suit would also be within time. In contending that the second article applies reliance is placed on a decision of the Privy Council in Punjab Cotton

Press Co. Ltd. v. Secretary of State(').

But that case is clearly inapplicable.

There the canal authorities cut the bank of a canal at a selected point to let the water away with a view to protecting a railway track passing close by on a high embankment and in this way flooded and injured the plaintiff's mills.

The Judicial Committee held that if the act was done, as was said, under s. 15 of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873 (8 of 1873), Art. 2 ws

applicable and not Art. 36.

The case was thus remanded

(1) I.L.R. IO Lah.'r71 P.C.

IJU

Stot1 •I Pull/flt

M.Cern C•W..

t•r6

llii., atulltrlt 1.

&tali of Punjab

•• llollern C11/tlvato11 • - Bldayatullah J.

to find the fact necessary for the application of the right article.

In relying upon this case, Mr. Viswanatha Sastri claims that s. 15 of the Canal Act covers the present facts .

Mr. Gopal Singh, who followed, also refers to s. 6.

These sections read:

"6. Powers of Canal Officer.

At any time after the day so named, any Canal Officer, acting under the orders of the State Government in this behalf, may enter on any land and remove any obstructions, and may close any channels, and do any other thing necessary for such application or use of the said water."

"15. Power to enter for repairs and to prevent accidents.

In case of any accident happening or being apprehended to a canal, any Divisional Canal Officer or any person acting under his general or special orders in this behalf may enter upon any lands adjacent to such canal, and may execute all works which may be necessary for the purpose of repairing or preventing such accidents.

Compensation for dam.age to land.

Compensation for damage to land: In every such case, such Canal Officer or person shall tender compensation to the proprietors or occupiers of the said lands for all damage done to the same. If such tender is not accepted, the Canal Officer shall refer the matter to the Collector, who shall proceed to

aw.ard :compensation for the damage as though the State Government had directed the occupation of the lands under section 43 of the La.nd Acquisition Act, 1870."

In regard to section 6 it is sufficient to say that it has no application here.

It refers to the day named in s. 5 and

that section provides for a notification to be issued declar- 1964 ing that water would be applied after a particular date for Stat• of Punjab purpose of any existing or projected canal or drainage work Modern vCultiva or for purposes of Government.

On such notification issu- 1or1 ing any Canal Officer, acting under the orders of the State Hidayatcdlah I.

Government, may enter on any land and remove obstructions or close any channels so that water may be applied to those purposes.

This is an entirely different matter and it is no wonder that Mr. Viswanatha Sastri did not rely upon s. 6.

Section 15 no doubt confers a power to enter lands and property of others to affect repairs or to prevent accidents.

One can hardly dispute that it is the normal duty of canal authorities to make repairs and execute works to prevent accidents. But Art. 2 cannot apply to omissions in following the statutory dutie3 because it cannot be suggested that they are 'in pursuance of any enactment'.

Cases of malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance may or may not have statutory protection.

Act or omission which can claim statutory protection or is alleged to be in pursuance of a statutory command may attract Art. 2 but the act or <mission must be one which can be said to be in pursuance of an enactment.

Here the suit was for compensation for damage consequent on a break in the canal on August 15, 1947. The

only act or omission could be the opening and closing of the channel for silting operations.

That was bef.:>re June

1946. The third column of Art. 2 provides the start of the limitation of 90 days-" when the act or omissiJn take.s place." The period of limitation in this case would he over even before the injury if that were the starting point.

This subject was elaborately discussed in Mohamad Sadaat Ali Khan v. Administrator Corporation of City of Lahore(') where all rulings on the subject were noticed, Mahajan J. (as he then was) pointed out that "the act or omission must be those which are honestly believed to be justified by a statute".

The same opinion was xpressed

(I) l.L.R. [1945] Lah. 523 F.B.

51 S.C.-19.

Stat• of Puniab v.

Mod., n Cultivator'

Hidayatullah J.

SUPREME COURT REPOR1S [1g64)

by Courtney Terrell CJ., in Secretary of State v. Lodna Colliery Co. Ltd. (1) in these words :-

"The object of the article is the protection of public officials, who, while bona fide purporting to act in the exercise of a statutory power, have exceeded that power and have committed a tortious act; it resembles in this respect the English Public Authorities Protection Act. If the act complained of is within the :erms of the statute, no protection is needed, for the plaintiff has suffered no legal wrong.

The protection is needed when an actionable wrong has been committed and to secure the protection there must be in the first place a bona fide belief by the official that the act compalined of was justified by the statute; secondly, the act must have been performed under colour of a statutory duty, and thirdly, the act must be in itself a tort in order to give rise to the cause of action.

It is against such actions for tort that the statute gives protection." ·

These cases have rightly decided that Art. 2 cannot apply to cases where the act or omission complained of 1s not alleged to be in pursuance of statutory authority. It is true that in Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Corporation of Calcutta(')• the Judicial Committee, while dealing with s. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act (3 of 1890) which reads:

"No suit shall be brought against any person for any done or purporting or professing to be done in pursuance of this Act, .'lfter the expiration of three months from the day on which the cause of action in such suit shall have arisen",

pointed to the presence of the words "purporting or professing to be done in pursuance of this Act" and observed that

(1) I.L.R. 15 Pat. 510

1hey regarded the words as of 'pivotal importance' and that their presence postulated "that work which is not done in pursuance of the statute may nevertheless be accorded its

protection if the work professes or purports to be done in pursuance of the statute".

But they were giving pwtectien to an act which could ligitimately claim to be in pursuance of the Port Amt.

Here the break in the bank was not that kind of act or omission. It could not claim to be in pursuance of the Canal Act.

Nor could the opening or closing of the channel for silting operations, though in pursuance of the Canal Act, be the relevant act or omission because 1hey were more than a year before the cause of action and to apply a limitation of 90 days to that cause of action is not only impossible but .also absurd.

Art. 2, therefore, does not apply here. It was not contended before us that the suit was otherwise time-barred and we accordingly confirm the finding that the suit was within time.

The result thus is that the appeal filed by the State Government fails and I would dismlss it with costs and allow 1he appial filed by the plaintiff with costs.

I would modify the judgment and decree of the High Court by altering the amount of Rs. 14,130 to Rs. 20,000 as ordered by the trial judge.

State of Pun;..•

v. '! odern Cultivator&

Hidayatullah J.

MUIJHOLKAR, J.-I agree with my brethren Sarkar and Mlldholkar J.

Hidayatullah that the appeal preferred by the defendant, the Stale of Punjab, be dismissed and the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the Modem Cultiv.ators, be allowed and the decree for damages be restored to the sum awarded by the trial court.

I also agree with the order for costs as proposed.

I wish to add nothing with regard to the plaintiff's appeal to what has been said by my brother Hidayatul\ah nor to what he or my brother Sarkar has said regarding the question of limitation raised on behalf of the defendant. They have both held that art. 2 of the Limitation Act is not attracted to a case like the present where the damages sustained by the plalntllf are not the :result of anything done by the State

1!164

St"lt o/ Pun; ab

' Modern Cu/tlvain pursuance of a statutory power exercised by it or by reason of an act which could properly be said to have been performed in the purported exercise of a statutory power.

If art. 2 is out of the way, it is not disputed on behalf of the State that the suit will be within time. tor1

Mudh41/kar J.

My: learned brother Hidayatullah has referred to the rule of common Jaw as to strict Ji.ability with respect to damages resulting from the escape of deleterious substances or cattle from the land which have been accumulated or brought on the land by its owner for his use and which were not natural there.

The rule was stated thus in Rylands v. Fletcher(') by Blackburn, J.:

"We think that the true rule of Jaw is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his Lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."

It was approved by the House of Lords, but Lord Cairns laid down a new principle distinguishing the natural from the non-natural user of land and holding that in the latter case only was the liability absolute. (see Salmond on I Torts, 13th ed. p. 579).

This rule has been adopted in this country in several cases (see Gooroo Churn v. Ram Dutt('); Dhanusao v. Sitabai(') and several other cases) and can, therefore, be regarded as a part of th~ common law of the land.

In the country of its origin, this rule has been subjected to certain exceptions.

The present case falls in one of the exceptions recognised in some, though not, all cases.

It has been held in some c1ses that where the owner or occupier of land accumulates a deleterious substance thereon by virtue of an obligation imposed upon him by a statute or in exercise of statutory authority he will not be rendered liable for damages resulting therefrom to other persons unless it is established that he was ilty

(1) (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330

(a) (1865) 2 W.R. 43

(3) I.L.R. [1948) N11. 698

of negligence in allowing the deleterious substance to escape.

In a recent decision Dunne v. Horth Western Gas Board(') the Court of Appeal has recognised this exception and the controversy may be said to have been set at rest, subject, of course, to what the House of Lords may have to say hereafter.

Indeed, the liability to pay damages to another resulting from an act of a person is laid upon him by the law of torts upon the basis that his act was wrongful and that he was a wrong-doer.

Where, therefore, the act consists of something which the Jaw enjoins upon that person to do or which the law permits him to do, it c.annot possibly be said that his mere act in doing that something was in itself wrongful and that he was a wrong-doer.

He will, however, be liable if he performed the act in a negligent manner or if the escape of the deleterious sub' stance subsequent to accumulation of th.at substance in exercise of a statutory authority was the result of his negligence.

There is nothing here to show that in constructing the canal under the powers conferred by Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 the State did anything other than what the Jaw permitted.

Therefore, by constructing the canals and allowing water to flow along it the State merely exercised its statutory authority. Further, there is nothing to show that there was any want of care in constructing the canal and so no question of negligence will arise in constructing the canal and allowing water to flow along the canal in question.

Here, what has happened is that at the point where prior to 1946 .the water from the canal was allowed to flow into the silting tank through a nallah, there w.as an opening which was plugged in that year.

Here, it is established that over a year after that opening was plugged by the State a breach of about 30 or 40 feet was caused.

This occurred on August 15, 1947.

It has not been shown th.at the breach could have been caused by an act of God or an act of third party.

The contention of the State that it was caused by heavy rains in the catchment area has not been found to be true. If, therefore, there is material from which it could be inferreJ that the breach was caused by reason of negligence on the part of the State in inspecting the banks of the canal and in

(1) [1964] 2 W.L.R. 164

Sill< of Pun;.

Modern Cu/th

tori

Mwdholkar ;

;1a11 of Punjab

•• tlodem Cultlva-

Mudholkar J.

particular that portion of it where the breach had been caused the St.ate would be liable in damages.

This would be so not by the operation of the rule in Rylands v • Fletcher(') but by reason of negligence.

The sole ground upon which the liability of the State could be established in this case would be negligence of the State in properly maintaining the banks of the canal.

For this purpose it would be relevant to consider whether there were periodic.al inspections, whether any breaches or the development of cracks were noticed along the banks of the canal and in particular at the place where the breach ultimately occurred or whether any erosion of the banks particularly at the place where one of the banks had been plugged had been noticed and no action or timely action had been taken thereon.

There is evidence to show that the canals were being regularly inspected.

That, however, is not the end of the matter.

Immediately after the breach occurred some reports were made and as pointed out by my brethren in their judgments they were not placed before the court despite its order requiring their production.

When the matter went up before the High Court it was said that the records had been destroyed in the year 1958 or so and therefore they could not be furnished.

This action on the part of the State is manifestly unreasonable and the legitimate inference that could be drawn from it is that if the documents had been produced they would have gone against the State and would establish its negligence.

In these circumstances I would hold that though the plaintiffs have been unable to adduce positive evidence of negligence it could legitimately be presumed that the State was negligent inasmuch as it had deliberately suppressed evidence in its possession which could have established negligence. In the circumstances of this case I do not think it appropriate to refer to the rule of evidence res ipsa loquitur.

Appeal No. 416 dismissed and Appeal No. 417 allowed

(1) [1858) LK. 3 H, L 330

273

STATE OF PUNJAB

MODERN CULTIVATORS, LADWA

A. K. SARKAR

M. HIDAYATULLAH

R. MUDHOLKAR,

JJ.

ss. 6, 15

Limitation Act

Iiah

Article 2

Limitation Act

Art. 2

Limitation Act

Jtsuance of the Canal Act

Article 2

Article 3

Limitation Act

Mohamad Sadaiit Ali Khan

State of Punjab

Sorkor

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri

Gopal Singh

R. N.

Sachthey

S. T. Desai

Hardayal Hardy

J. P. Agarwal

SARKAR

Hidayatullah

Hidayatullah

May 12, 1949

Malhotra

art. 2

Limitation Act

art. 2

s. 6

Section 15

art. 2

art. 2

HIDAYATULLAH

August 15, 1947

8th September and again

23rd to 28th September, 1947

M.:ilhotra

August 16, 1947

September 5, 1947

August 27, 1947

State of Pun

IIidayatullah

Art. 2

Limitation Act

Art. 36

•idayatullah

Vishwanatha Sastri

Sastri

India

Salmond

Cairns

Blackburn

Moulton

Holmes

United States of America

Erle

State of Puniab

Hidayatuflah

Porter

Art. 36

Limitation Act

Art. 2

Art. 2

Art. 36

s. 15

Art. 2

Art. 36

Bldayatullah

Viswanatha Sastri

s. 15

Gopal Singh

s. 6

section 43

Acquisition Act, 1870

section 6

s. 5

s. 6

Section 15

Art. 2

Art. 2

Art. 2

Mahajan

Courtney Terrell

Art. 2

s. 142

Art. 2

State of Pun;

odern Cultivator

MUIJHOLKAR

Mlldholkar

Hidayatul\ah

Sarkar

art. 2

Limitation Act

art. 2

kar

Mudholkar


8 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 295

BIREN DUITA AND OTHERS

CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF TR.IPURA AND ANOTHER

(P. B.

GAJENDRAGADKAR,

C.J., K. N.

WANCHOO, M.

HIDAYATULLAH, J. <;:. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA

AYYANGAR; JJ.)

Detention Order-Review-Continuation of dettntfon beyond 1iz months-Order, if must be recorded in writing and communicated to the deten,,-Defence of India Rules, 1962, RR. 30 (l)(b),

30A(8).

The Administrator of the Union Territory of Tripura passed orders detaining 68 persons, including the appellants and the petitioners, under R. 30(I)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. While gradually releasing 45 of them be purported to detain the appellants and tho petitioners under R. 30A(8) of the said Rules, The appellants moved the Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution and their case was that the decision to continue them in detention was J?Ot recorded in writing nor was it communicated to them and was, therefore, invalid in law. The Judicial Commissioner dismissed the said application!. The petitioners moved this Court under Att. 32 of the Constitution and their case was also the same. The first review held on February 1 S,

1963, in respect of all the 68 detenus was reoorded as follows.-

"On review of the detention order in respect of all the detenus

CC. decided to cailcel orders in respect of detent11 at S. Nos. l, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 13."

It was urged on behalf of the respondent that the order by implication continued the detention of the appellants and the petitioners and. such detention was confirmed by subsequent orders.

Held: (i) The order did not comply with the provisiot11 of R. 30A(8) of the Defence of India Rules and the detenus before this Court mmt be set at liberty.

Decision to continue a detenu in detention must not only be recorded in wNting but such writing must clearly and unambiguously indicate that decision.

Subsequent reviews under the Rule could not validate the illegal continuance of the detention after the expiry of six months from the date of the original order of delenlion.

Decision recorded under R. 30A(8) is in tho nature of an independent decision and further detention can be justified only if the doci1ion Is recorded u required by it

July, 23

Biren Dutta v.

Even assuming that an order passed under R. 30A(8) could in a proper case imply the decision to• continue the detention of some of the detenus, the present case could not be said to be one 1uch.

C.C. of Tripura

(ii) Assuming, though not deciding, that a decision recorded under R. 30A(8) of the Rules was not in law required to be communicated to the detenue, it was just and proper that the decision should in every case be communicated to the detenu.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 87-91 of 1964.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 18, 1964, of the Judicial Commissioner's Court for Tripura in Criminal Misc. (Habeas Corpus) Petitions Nos. )5, 20, 25, 26 and 28 of 1963, and Habeas Corpus Petitions Nos. 24 and 27 of 1963.

AND Writ Petitions Nos. 43, 42, 40, 41, 65 and 80 of 1964.

Petition Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the fundamental rights.

R. K. Garg, S. C.

Agarwala, D. P. Singh and M. K.

Ramamurthi, for the appellants and petitioners in all.

H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R. H.

Dhebar, for the respondents (Except Respondent No. 2 in W.P. 43 of 1964).

D. Goburdhun, for respondent No. 2 (in W.P. 43 of 1964).

July 23, 1964, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Gajendragadkar 'GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-These Criminal Appeals and

c. I.

Writ Petitions have been placed for hearing together in a group because they raise common questions of law.

As is well-known, after the Chinese attacked the northern border of India on the 8th September, 1962, the President issued a Proclamation under Art. 3 5 2 of the Constitution on the 26th October, 1962.

This proclamation declared that a grave emergency existed which posed a threat to the security of India.

On the same day, an Ordinance was promulgated by the President. This Ordinance was subsequently modified by Ordinance No. 6 of 1962 on the 3rd of November, 1962. The President also issued an Order under Art. 359 ( 1) suspending the rights of citizens to mow any court for the enforcement. of the rights conferred by Articles 21 and 22 during the pendency of the emergency proclamation.

On the 26th October, 1962, the Rules framed by the Central Govern:nent under the Defence of India Act (hereinafter called 'the Rules') were published. Rule 30 of the Rules as originally framed was subsequently modified on the 6th December, 1962 and Rule 30-A was added.

Later, an Act was passed on the 12th D1cember, 1962, and s. 48(1) of this Act provided for the repeal of the earlier Ordinances. Even so, s. 48 (2) provided for the continuance of the Rules framed under the Ordinall!ces, so that the relevant Rules framed under the

Ordinances have to be taken as Rules framed under the latter Act.

It appears that Mr. Mukerjee who was the Administrator of the Union Territory of Tripura at the relevant time, cons.idered the material placed before him as such Administrator and was satisfied that a group of Communists had been agitating amongst the tribals residing in the area and inciting them against the Government, and he cairu! to the conclusion that their activities were likely to endanger the security of the State. Acting on this view, he directed that 68 persons should be detained under Rule

30 (1) ( b) and passed appropriate orders in that behalf.

Later, Le was satisfied that 45 out of these 68 persons need not be detained any longer; and so, he ordered their release from, time to time.

That left 23 persons under detention and it is with the cases of .these :p persons that we are concerned in the present group of criminal appeals and writ petitions.

12 out of these 23 persons moved the Judicial Commissioner of Tripura under Art. 226 of the Constitution and prayed that the orders of detention under which they continued to be detained at the time of their petitions were illegal and .should be set aside and they should be ordered to be released forthwith.

These applications were heard

Biren Dutta v.

C.C. of Tripurt

Gajendragadkar

C.J.

Biren Dutta v. :.c. of Tripura

Gajend1agadkar

C.J.

together by the learned Judicial Commisioner and were ultimately dismissed.

Against his decision, Criminal Appeals Nos. 87-91 of 1964, and 106 and 107 of 1964 have been filed by the detenues, with special leave granted to them by this Court on petitions made by them in that behalf.

It appears that the detenues Mohan Chaudhury and Jagabrata Sen Gupta who have joined in Cr. As.

Nos. 87-91/1964, have also preferred separate criminal appeals Nos. 106 and 107/1964 indiviaually. That is how this group of appeals is concerned with the cases of 12 detenues who had moved the Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226; and their grievance is that the view taken by the Judicial Commissioner in regard to the points of law raised by them before him, is not correct,

The Writ Petitions deal with cases of 11 remaining detenues and they joined the detenues who have preferred appeals before us by special leave in contending that the continuance of their detention is invalid and that a similar plea raised by the appellants before the Judicial Commissioner should have been upheld by him.

That is how the criminal appeals and the writ petitions between them raise common questions of law.

Mr. Garg who appeared for the appellants and the petitioners, as well as the learned Solicitor-General who appeared for the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Tripura, agreed that it would not be necessary to consider the facts in each individual case for the purpose of deciding the common questions of law raised by them. It would be enough if we refer to the facts in one case, because facts in other cases are exaotly similar and there would be no point of distinction on facts as such. We would, therefore, refer to the faciS relevant to the case of the detenu Biren Dutta.

Biren Dutta was detained on the 25th. December, 1962, and an order issued in that behalf was duly served on him.

On the 26th December, 1962, he was transferred to the Hazaribagh Jail. The respondent's case is that on the 15th February, 1963, the case of Biren Duitta was reviewed under R. 30A(8) and it was decided to continue his deten-

Birtn Dutta

tion. Subsequently, his case was .reviewed on the 3rd July, 1963, 5th September, 1963, and 11th March, 1964, and on each occasion, it was decided to continue his detention.

C.C. of Tripw On the other hand, Biren Dutta's contention before the Judicial Commissioner was that an order of review had not been passect as required by R. 30A( 8) and had not been communicated to him.

It was urged on his behalf that Rule 30A ( 8) requires that the decision to continue the detention of a detenu must be reducd to writing and must be communicated to the detenu, and the argument was that since these two conditions prescried by the relevant Rule had not been complied with, the continuance of the detenu's detention was invalid in law.

The Judicial Commissioner has negatived the contentions thus raised by the detenu.

He has found that the decision to continue the detenu's detention reached by the respondent under R. 30A ( 8) had in fact been reduced to writing, and in support of this contention, he bas referred to the fact that the original file containing a record of the decision bad been produced on behalf of the respondent before the Judicial Commissioner, but since the respondent's learned Advocate was apparently not prepared to allow the lawyer of the detenu inspection of the said record, the rourt did not consider the evidence supplied by it. 'IJie argument urged by the d1ttenu that the said record may have been subsequently manufactured, was reje, cted by the Judicial Commissioner.

The Judicia1 Commissioner also considered the fact that the affidavit made on behalf of the respondent showed that when the cas, ps of the detenues were considered by him from time to time, he actually ordered the release of some of them. This fact, according to the Judicial Commissioner, showed that the respondent had applied his mind to the cases of all the detenues and since he released some of them, it followed that in regard to the rest he was satisfied that their detention should be continued. 'The Judicial Commissioner was apparently inclined to take the view that the relevant Rule did not seem clearly to require that the decision reached by the appropriate authority under R. 30A ( 8) should be reduced to writing, but he thought it unnecessary to make a definite finding

Gajendragadlu.

C.J.

Birtn Dutta

• C. of Tripura

on this issue, because he was satisfied that in the case of Biren Dutta, the decision in question had been reduced to writing.

The arg=nt that R. 3,0A ( 8) requires that the said decision should be communicated to the detenu was rejected by the learned Judicial Commissioner. It is on ---.

Ja/endragadkar

C.J. these findings that he rejected the petition filed by Biren Dutta and 11 other detenues and held that the continuance of their detention was justified in law.

When these matters were argued before this Court on the 6th May, 1964, an interim order was passed directing that the Chief Secretary to the Tripura Administration should forthwith transmit to this Court the original files in respect of the detenues concerned and that the Minister, or the Secretary or the Administrator who reviewed the cases of the detenues and had arrived at a decision that their detention should be continued, should file an affidavit in this Court on or before the 8th June, 1964, and that the affidavit should state all material facts and should indicate whether the decision arrived at was duly communicated to the detenues or not.

Accordingly, the original files have been produced before us and additional affidavits have been filed.

The learned Solicitor-General fairly conceded that he would allow Mr. Garg for the appellants an opportunity to inspect the files inasmuch as he was not going to raise any question of priVI1ege in respect of them. It is in the light of the minutes made on these files that the principal points raised before us now fall to be considered.

Mr. Garg contends that the scheme of the Rules clearly shows that the original order of detention passed under R. 30(1)(b), as well as the decision to continue the detention of the detenues reached by the appropriate authority under R. 30A(8) must be recorded in writing and must comply with the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution.

He also urges that R. 30A( 8) further requires that the relevant decision reached by the appropriate authority must be communicated to the detenu. In support of his argument that the relevant decision under R 30A(8) must comply with _Art. 166 and must be communicated to the detenu, Mr. Garg has relied on the decision of this Court in Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar

v. The State of Bombay('), and Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab('). He has also invited our attention to the observations made by Raghubar Dayal J. in S.

Partap

v. State of Punjab(").

The learned Solicitor-General has conceded that the order directing the detention of a citizen under R. 30( 1) ( b), as well as the order incorporating the decision to continue the detention under R. 30A(8) must be in writing.

He, however, challenges the correctness of Mr. Garg's contention that these orders must comply with Art. 166, and he disputes his case that the decision reached under R. 30A

( 8) must be communicated to the detenu.

In support of his case he has referred us to the decision of this Court in Mohammad Afzal Khan v. State of Jammu and Kashmir('), as well as the decision of the Bombay High Court in

Pralhad Krishna Kurne v.

The State of Bombay(') and that of the Allahabad High Court in Nandan Singh Bhist v.

State of U.P.(').

We do not think it necessary to consider the question as to whether the orders .passed under R. 30 (1 )(b) and the record of the decision reached under R.30A ( 8) should comply with Art. 166 of the Constitution or not. It also appears to us to be unnecessary to decide in the present group of cases whether the decision recorded under R. 30A(8) should be communicated to the detenu. We are satisfied that the decision to continue the detention of the detenues which, it is urged on behalf of the respondent, was reached by him under R. 30A(8), has not been recorded in writing as required by the said Rule; and there is no other evidence on record to show that such a decision had then been reached and reduced to writing. It will be recalled that in the present proceedings, it is common ground between the parties that there has to be an order in writing indicating the decision of the appropriate authority reached by him after reviewing the case of the detenu that the continuance of his detention should be ordered. Rule

30A ( 8) provides that every detention order made by an

(1) [1952] S.C.R. 612

(3) A.I.R. 1964 S .C. 72

S I.L.R. 1952 Born. 134

(2) [19621Supp.3 S.C.R. 713

(4) A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 173

(6) A.l.R. 1964 All. 327

Biren Dutta v.

C.C. of Tripurlb

Gajendragadkar-

C. J.

Binn Dutta ...

C.C. of Tripura

Gaiendragadl<ar

C.J.

officer empowered by the Administrator and confirmed by him under clause (b) of the sub-rule ( 6) and every detn tion order made by the Administrator himself shall be reviewed at intervals of not more than six months by the Administrator who shall decide upon such review whether the order should be continued or cancelled. The question which we have to decide is whether it is shown by the minutes made on the file produced before us by the respondent that he did decide that it was necessary to continue the detention of the detenues before us. The minutes made on the file are no doubt a written record of his decision, and so, the requirement that whatever is decided under R. 30A(8) should be reduced to writing is satisfied; but the question is do these minutes show that the cases of the detenues before us were considered and a decision to continue their detention was reached by the respondent on the relevant occasion, and that presents a very narrow problem for our decision in relation to the construction of the said minutes.

The first occasion on which the respondent claims to have reviewed the cases of the detenues before us was on the 15th February, 1963. On that date, he made the following order:-

"On review of the detention order in respect of all detenus CC decided to cancel detention orders in respect of detenues at S. No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 13."

It is urged by the learned Solicitor-General that this order shows that the appropriate authority considered the cases of all the detenues and decided to cancel the detention of some of them, and that, he suggests, should be construed to mean that he decided to continue the detention of detenues other than those whose release he ordered. There is no doubt that this order makes a reference to the review of all detenues and, prima facie, it would be open to the Solicitor- General to contend that this part of the order shows that the cases of all the 68 detenues must have been considered by the appropriate authority. In this connection. we would like to emphasise the fact that in exercising its power under

R. 30A ( 8), the appropriate authority should record its decision clearly and unambiguously.

After all, the libety <>f the citizen is in question and if the detention of the detenue is intended to be continued as a result of the decision reached by the appropriate authority, it should say so in clear and unambiguous terms. But assuming that an order passed by the appropriate authmity under R. 30A ( 8) can in a proper case be construed to mean his implied decision to continue the detention of some detenues, while releasing some others, we find it difficult to hold that such an implied decision can be inferred from the present order. It is relevant to remember that this order was passed on the 15th February, 1963, and the six months' period within which review had to be made under R. 30A(8) would have expired on the 25th June, 1963. It is quite likely that even before the six months' period eXpired, the authority considered the matter and came to the conclusion that any further detention of the detenues specified in the order was not justified, and so, even before thr. six months' period expired, he directed that they should be released. That undoubtedly shows that the authority was considering the question very carefully and as soon as he felt satisfied that further detention of the said detenues would be unnecessary, he ordered their release forthwith; but this very consideration suggests that he may have considered the cases of only such detenues as should be released forthwith.

Besides, there is nothing to show that after the 15th February, 1963, and before the 25th June, J 963, he considered the matter in respect of the detenues before us and held that the continuance of their detention was justified after the expiration of six months. It is necessary to emphasise that the decision recorded under R. 30A ( 8) is in the nature of an independent decision which authorises the further detention of the detenu for a period of six months. In other words. the initial order of detention is valid for siit months and the detention of the detenu thereafter can be justified only if a decision is recorded under R. 30A ( 8). That being the nature of the decision which is required to be recorded under R. 30A(8), we are unable to hold that the memorandum in question can be reasonably said to include a decision that the continuance of the detention of the

Biren. Dutla .,, C.C. of Tripura

Gajendragadkar

C.I.

1964 detenues before us was thought to be necessary by the appro- Biren Dutta priate authority after the expiry of the period of six months. "· C.C. of Tripura It is true that in the additional affidavit filed by the Gai•ndragadkar respondent it has been stated as a submission by him that

C.J. "as a result of the said review (15/2/63) the detention of Biren Dutta as well as others whose detention orders were not cancelled, continued." This undoubtedly is a matter of argument; it being the respondent's contention that since the order detaining some detenues was cancelled, logically it follows that the detention of the others was ordered to continue.

But even assuming that the respondent had stated in his additional affidavit clearly and unambiguously that he had decided on the 15th February, 1963, that the detention of the detenues before us should be continued, we would not have attached much significance to such a statement, because what we have to consider is the order passed on the 15th February, 1963. and not what the authority making the order thought it meant or intended it to mean; and so, it comes back to the question of the construction of the order itself.

We have carefully considered the arguments urged before us by the Solicitor-General, but we are unable to hold that this order can be said to satisfy the requirements of R. 30A(8) at all.

We are satisfied that this order cannot be construed to contain a written record of the decision of the respondent that the detention of the detenues before us should be continued after the expiry of six months from the date of the original order of detention.

Then as to the next order passed on the 3rd July, 1963, the position is still worse.

It appears that on ihe 15th May, 1963, the Superintendent of Police, Tripura recommended that some of the detenues should be released, because he thought there was no longer any justification for their continued detention.

This matter was discussed between the Superintendent of Police and the Chief Secretary on the 6th June, 1963, and eventually as a result of the conference held between the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner an order was passed on the 3rd July,

1963. This order shows that the cases of the persons whose release had been recommended by the Superintendent of Police were considered. These detenues were 25 in

number. During the course of the discussion between the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner, the Chief Minister appears to have suggested that instead of releasing all the aforesaid 25 detenues together it would be better if they were released in batches, but ultimately, the order passed by the Chief Minister which was assented to by the Chief Commissioner was that all of them may be released at the sarue time on the 6th July, 1963. In other words, reading the letter written by the Superinteudent of Police to the Chief Commissioner on the 15th May, 1963, and the record of the discussion that took place between the Chief Secretary, the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner on the 3rd July, 1963, it is clear that the only cases which the , authorities considered were the cases of 25 detenues whose release had been recommended by the Superintendent of Police.

It is common_ ground that the detenues before us were not included in the said list of 25 detenues, and so, there is no scope for suggesting that at this time the cases of the detenues other than thse who were released were concerned. That being so, we must hold that like the earlier order passed on the 15th February, 1963, the order passed on the 3rd July, 1963, is also of no assistance to the respondent, because neither order can be reasonably construed as containing a decision of the appropriate authority reached under R. 30A(8) to continue the detention of the detenues before us.

This conclusion necessarily means that the requirement of R. 30A(8) has not been complied with and that inevitably makes the continuance of the detention of the detenues before invalid in law.

The fact that those cases were reviewed subsequently on the 25th September, 1963 and 11th March. 1964, and the decision of the authority was in fac, t communicated to them, would not validate the illegal continuance of the detention of the detenues after six months had expired from the date of their original detention.

We have already indicated that we do not propose to consider in these proceedings the two other points ofJaw urged by Mr. Garg; but before we part with these matters, we would like to emphasise that even assuming that the decision recorded by the appropriate authority under

51 S.C.-20.

Biren Dutta

C.C. of Tripura

Gajendragadkar

C.1.

Biren Dutl'1 v.

C.C. of Tripura

R. 30A( 8) is not, as a matter of law, required to be communicated to the detenu, it is desirable and it would be fair and jusit that such a decision should in every case be communicated te> the detenu.

If the appropriate authority ronsiders the question about the continuance of the detentfon of a particular detenu and decides that such continuance is justified, we see ne> justification for failing to communicate the said decision to the detenu concerned. If the requirement as to such communication were held te> be necessary as a matter of law, ne>n-communicatie>n would render the continuance of the detention invalid; but that is a matter which we are ne>t deciding in these cases. We are only emphasising the fact that it would be fair that such a decisie>n should be communicated to the detenu.

Ga/mdragadkar

C.J.

Jaly, 24

In the result, the appeals and writ petitions are allowed and the detenues ce>ncemed ordered to be set at liberty at once.

Appeals and Writ Petitions allowed.

K. HUTCH! GOWDER

RICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL '\ND COMPANY

(K. SUBBA RAO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll., JJ.)

Madras Agriculturis's Relief Act-D!bt incurred after commencement of

Act-Final Decree-Scaling dow~Madras Agriculturists .'?elief Act, 1938 (Mad. 4 of 1938), rs. 13, 19.

The respondent, who was the assignee-mortgagee of a mortgage deed executed on February 15, 1945 by the appellant for a certain sum payable with interest, filed a suit for the recovery of the sum with Interest. The suit ended in a compromise under which a decree was passed and certain payments were made towards the decree.

In due course the respondent moved for the passing of a final decree. The appellant applied for scaling down of the debt under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The respondent, inter alia, contended in his objections filed against this application that as the debt sought to be scaled down was incurred subsequent to the date of commencement of the Act, the decree could not be scaled down under s. 19(2) of the

295

BIREN DUITA AND OTHERS

CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF TRIPURA AND ANOTHER

GAJENDRAGADKAR,

C.J.

WANCHOO

HIDAYATULLAH, J.

SHAH

AYYANGAR

Defence of India Rules, 1962

Defence of India Rules, 1962

Art. 226

February 1 S,

1963

January 18, 1964

Art. 32

Constitution of India

R. K. Garg

S. C.

Agarwala

D. P. Singh

M. K.

Ramamurthi

H. N. Sanyal

D. R. Prem

R. H.

Dhebar

D. Goburdhun

Gajendragadkar

GAJENDRAGADKAR

India

8th September, 1962

Art. 3

3rd of November, 1962

Art. 359

Articles 21 and 22

26th October, 1962

6th December, 1962

12th D1cember, 1962

s. 48(1)

s. 48

Mukerjee

Tripura

Art. 226

Mohan Chaudhury

Jagabrata Sen Gupta

Art. 226

Garg

Biren Dutta

Biren Duitta

Birtn Dutta

3rd July, 1963

11th March, 1964

Gajendragadlu

Birtn Dutta

endragadkar

Biren Dutta

6th May, 1964

Tripura Administration

8th June, 1964

Art. 166

Raghubar Dayal

Art. 166

Bombay High Court

Allahabad High Court

Art. 166

15th February, 1963

25th June, 1963

25th June, J 963

Biren. Dutla

15th May, 1963

6th June, 1963

3rd July,

1963

6th July, 1963

25th September, 1963

11th March. 1964

Biren Dutta

K. HUTCH! GOWDER

RICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL

K. SUBBA RAO

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll

15, 1945

s. 19(2)


SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]

Biren Dutl'1 v.

C.C. of Tripura

R. 30A( 8) is not, as a matter of law, required to be communicated to the detenu, it is desirable and it would be fair and jusit that such a decision should in every case be communicated te> the detenu.

If the appropriate authority ronsiders the question about the continuance of the detentfon of a particular detenu and decides that such continuance is justified, we see ne> justification for failing to communicate the said decision to the detenu concerned. If the requirement as to such communication were held te> be necessary as a matter of law, ne>n-communicatie>n would render the continuance of the detention invalid; but that is a matter which we are ne>t deciding in these cases. We are only emphasising the fact that it would be fair that such a decisie>n should be communicated to the detenu.

Ga/mdragadkar

C.J.

Jaly, 24

In the result, the appeals and writ petitions are allowed and the detenues ce>ncemed ordered to be set at liberty at once.

Appeals and Writ Petitions allowed.

K. HUTCH! GOWDER

RICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL '\ND COMPANY

(K. SUBBA RAO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll., JJ.)

Madras Agriculturis's Relief Act-D!bt incurred after commencement of

Act-Final Decree-Scaling dow~Madras Agriculturists .'?elief Act, 1938 (Mad. 4 of 1938), rs. 13, 19.

The respondent, who was the assignee-mortgagee of a mortgage deed executed on February 15, 1945 by the appellant for a certain sum payable with interest, filed a suit for the recovery of the sum with Interest. The suit ended in a compromise under which a decree was passed and certain payments were made towards the decree.

In due course the respondent moved for the passing of a final decree. The appellant applied for scaling down of the debt under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The respondent, inter alia, contended in his objections filed against this application that as the debt sought to be scaled down was incurred subsequent to the date of commencement of the Act, the decree could not be scaled down under s. 19(2) of the

Act. The Subordinate Judge overruled the objectioa and held that the 1964 debt was liable to be scaled down in tenns of s. 13 of the A1; t.

Un K. H11tchi .appc~11. the High Court held that as the statutory right to have the interest Gowder scaled dov1n was not put forVtard before the consent decree was prissed, v. the decr;!e could not be scaled down at the stage of the final decree Richobdas Fatha1

proceedings.

It further held that s. 19(2) of the Act only applied to m1tll and C.o. debts payable at the commencement of the Act and, therefore, the application for scaling down the decree was not maintainablo!.

On l\ppeal by certificate.

Held: Sections 7, 8, 9 and 13 form a group of secticms providing the principles of scaling down of debts incurred by agriculturists under different situations. A debt can be scaled down In an appropriate proceeding taken in respect of the same.

But in case of debts that have ripened into decrees, s. 19(1) and (2) prescribe a special procedure for reopening the decree only in respect of debts incurred before t11e Act.

The 1'-fadras Agriculturists Relief Act does not provide for the reopening of decrees made in respect of debts incurred after it c::une into force, and for understandable reasons the relief In respect of such decrees is specifically confined only to a concession in the n1te of interest.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 80 of 1962.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated Decem ber 19, 1957, of the Madras High Court in C.M. Appeal No. 303 of 1956.

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri. V. Ratnam and R. Ganaparhy Iyer, for the appellant.

G.S. Pathak and R. Thiagarajan, for the respondent.

July 24, 1964.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SUBBA RAO, J .-This appeal by certificate raises the Subba Rao I. question whether a decree obtained in a suit to enforce a debt incurred after the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. 1938 (Act 4 of 1938), hereinafter called the Parent Act. came into force could be scaled down under s. 13 of the Parent Act.

The facts are as follows: On February 15, 1964, the appellant and 4 others executed a mortgage deed in favour of Kaverlal Chordia for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 payable after three years with interest at 9 per cent. per annum. On I anuary 24, 1946, the mortgagee assigned the said mortgage

1964 in favour of the respondent.

Certain payments towards K. Hutchi principal and interest were made thereunder.

On Feb- Gowder ruary 28, 1950, the assignee-mortgagee i.e., the respondent, Richobd;; Fathaifiled a suit, O.S. No. 55 of 1950, in the Court of the Submull and Co. ordinate Judge, Nilgiris, Ootacamund, for the recovery of Subba Rao 1.

Rs. 1,98,487-8-0, made up of Rs. 1,50,000 for the balance of the principal and Rs. 48,487-8-0 for interest due on the mortgage.

The suit ended in a compromise dated December 21, 1950, under which a decree was passed for Rs. 1,50,000 on account of principal, with interest and further interest at 9 per cent. per annum and costs, subject to some concessions being shown in the event of payments being made in certain specified instalments.

Thereafter, certain payments were made towards the decree.

In due course the respondent filed I.A. No. 382 of 1953 for the passing of a final decree. On June 24, 1955, the appellant filed O.P. No. 24 of 1955 for scaling down the debt. The respondent, inter alia, contended in his objections filed against the said application that as the debt sought to be scaled down was incurred subsequent to March 22. 1938. which is the date of the commencement of the Parent Act. the decree could not be scaled down under s. 19(2) of the Parent Act.

The learned Subordinate Judge overruled the objection and held by his order dated August 10, 1956. that the decree was liable to be scaled down in tenns of s. 13 of the Parent Act.

He accordingly scaled down the decree debt.

On appeal, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that as the statutory right to have the interest scaled down was not put forward before the consent decree was passed, the decree could not be scaled down at the stage of the final decree proceedings.

It further held that s. 19 ( 2) of the Parent Act only applied to debts payable at the commencement of the said Act and. therefore, the application for scaling down the decree was not maintainable.

In the result it set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the petition for scaling down the debt.

Hence the present appeal.

Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri. learned counsel for the appellant, did not press the appellant's claim under s. 19(2) of the Parent Act, but put it under s. 13 of the said Act.

He tcok ms through the relevant provisions of the Parent 1964 Act, which according to him disclose theJegislative policy K. Hutchi undermining the sacrosanctity of decrees and pressed on us Cowder to hold, on 'a scrutiny of the provisions of s. 13, of the Richobd;; Farha/- Parent Act in the light of the said policy, that'the decree mull and Co. made in resp~t of a debt incurred after the Parent Act subba Rao J. came into force was liable to be scaled down thereunder.

Mr. Pathak, learned -counsel for the respondent, makes a distinction between the substantive and procedural provisions and contends that the Parent Act does not make any provision for scaling down decrees made in respectof debts incurred after the said Act came into force.

The general scheme of the Parent Act gathered therefrom may be briefly , stated thus. The main object of the Prent Act was to give -

reHef to agriculturists. - "Debt" has been defined in s. 3 (iiiJ of the Parent Act as any .liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, -due from an agriculturist, whether payable under a decree or order of a civil or revenue court or otherwise. This definition is rather comprehensive; it takes in secured, unsecured and decree debts due from an agriculturist.

Section 7 of the Parent Act declares that a debt so defined has to be scaled down in the manner prescribed by the said Act. Section 8 provides the mode of scaling down debts incurred before 1932 and s. 9, the debts incurred after 1932 but before March 22. 1938; - and s. 13 deals with the scaling down of debts incurred after the commencement_ of the Parent Act.

The relief granted under the said Act varies with the date-of the debt depending upon whether it falls under one or other of the said three periods.

While ss. 7, 8, !I and 13 give the principles for scaling down a debt, s. 19 provides the machinery for scaling down.

Section 19 of the Parent Act. as amended in 1948, reads:

" ( 1) Where before the commencement of this Act a court has passed a decree for the repayment

of a debt, it shall, on' the application of anv judgment-debtJr who is an agriculturist. .••.• apply the provisions of this Act to such decree

K. Hutchi Gowder v.

ichobdas Fathaimull and Co.

Subba Rao J.

and shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, amena the decree accordingly or enter satisfaction. as the case may be:

(2) The provisions of sub-section ( 1) shall also

apply to cases where, after the commencement of this Act, a Court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt payable at such commencement." ·

It may be mentioned that the second clause was mserted by the Amending Act of 1948.

Before the amendment there was a conflict of view on the question whether s. 19 ( 1) could be invoked in amending a decree passed after the commencement of the Parent Act in respect of a debt incurred before the said Act.

Sub-section ( 2) made the position clear and declared that it could be done. The position, therefore, is that in the case of debts other than decree-debts, the scaling down process will have to be resorted to in an appropriate proceeding taken in respect of the debt and in the case of decrees in respect of debts incurred before the Parent Act whether made before or after the said Act, by filing an application under s. 19(1) or ( 2) of the Board Act, as the case may be. But s. 19 on its express terms does . not permit the filing of an application for amending a decree by scaling down a debt incurred after the Parent Act came into force.

Doubtless, as Mr. Viswanatha Sastri contents, the Parent Act, to some extent, undermines the sanctity of decrees, but that is to implement the policy of the LegiSlature to give relief to

al(riculturists over burdened with debts.

But a Court, p; rticularly in the case of an expropriatory measure like the Act, cannot rely upon the supposed policy of the Legislature and extend the scope of the relief given to agriculturists by analogy.

The scope of the relief shall necessarily be confined to that given by the Act expressly or by necessary implication. A fair reading of sub-sections ( 1) and

(2) of s. 19 of the Parent Act disclose beyond any reasonable doubt that the Legislature does not provide thereunder any machinery for reopening a decree made in respect of a debt incurred after the Act came into force.

' Realizing this difficulty; Mr .. Viswanatha Sastri relied 1964 . . upon the provisions of s, f3 itself and contends .that the

x. Hutchi Jaid section. provides, in the case of debts incurred after Gowder "· the Parent .Act came into rorce, both for the substantive Richobdas Fathaire!ief as well as for the machinery to give the .said relief. mull and Co.

The said section re , c'.0 : Subba Rao J.

"In any proceeding for recovery of a debt, the Court shall scale down all interest due on any debt incurred by an agriculturist after the co=encement of this Act, so as not to exceed a sum calculated at 61 per cent. per annum, simple interest ..•......... "

The Government by notification reduced the rates of interest to 5! per cent. per annum with effect from.July 29, 1947. Let us scrutinize the provisions of the section !n the light of the arguments advanced.

Learned counsel asks us to read the words "decree . debt" instead of "debt" in s. 13 of the Parent Act, for "debt" is defined to take in a decree debt, and by so reading, he contends, in any proceeding, which, according to him, includes a final de.cree application, the court shall scale down all interest in the manner prescribed thereunder.· It is further argued that final decree proceedings are only proceedings in a suit and, therefore, the word wrecovery" in the sub-section is appropriate in the context of a decree debt. This argument, if accepted, disturbs the entire scheme of the Parent Act. Section 13 is one of the group of sections viz., ss. 8, 9 and 13, dealing with the principles of scaling down in a proceeding for the recovery of a debt. But where a decree is to be amended, the Act has taken care to provide expressly for the amendment of the deeree. If the Legislature intended to provide for the amendment of decrees even in cases falling under s. 13, it would. have added another appropriate clause in s. 19.

The absence of anv such clause indicates an intention that in cases of . debts comprehended . by s. 13. the Legislature gives only a limited relief expressly provided thereunder .. It is said, so far as the reopening of decrees after the Parent Act came into force is concerned, whether in respect of

312 . SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS

1964 debts incurred before or after th~ sale! Act, th"re cannot K. Hutchi possibly be a justification for a difference in the manner of Gowder their treatment. A plausible reason can be discerned for Richobd:; Fathithis legislative distinction oetween debts incurred. before the

mull and Co.. Ac( and those incurred after the Act; for, in the former Subba Rao J. when the debts were incurred the Act was not in existence and, as the debtors Could not have anticipated the provisions of the Act, they were given the summary remedy, but the agriculturists who incurred debtS after, the Parent Act, with open eyes were denied the saine; while in the former, they were allowed to reopen decrees made in respect of the said debts before or after .the Act, in the latter they could claim. relief only in an appropriate proceeding before the decree was made and that too was confined to the limited relief in regard to the rate of interest provided thereunder. The difference in the treatment of the two categories of decrees was brought about by sub-section (2) of s. 19 a oded by a later amendment. Whatever may be the reason for the difference, we cannot extend the scope of s. 13 by analogy or by stretching the meaning of the words "proceeding" and "recovery". . , Reliance is placed upon s. 13-A of the Parent Act. which reads:

"Wher~ a debt is incurred by a reason who would

be" an agriculturist as defined in section 3(ii) but for the operation of proviso (B) or proviso (C) to that section. the rate of interest applicable to the debt shall be the rate appli cable to it under the law. custom. contract or decree of Court' under which the debt arises or the rate applicable to an agriculturist under section 13, whichever rate is less."

On the basis of this section a contention is raised that

s. 13 and 13A relate to the same subject-matter with th~

difference tliat while s. 13 applies to aculturists who incurred debts after the Parent Act came into force. s. 13 A applies to persons who would be agriculturists but for th~ provisos (B) and ( C) of s. 3 (ii) in respect of debts incurred after the Act. and as a fair reading of s. 13-A indicates that it applies to decrees made in regard to debts in-

.t> S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REP01{TS 313

curred after the Act, it must be interpreted reasonably that 1964 s. 13 also applies to such decrees.

Mr. Pathak, learned K. Hutchi counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends Goll'der that s. 13-A only applies to pre-Act debts, as s. 7 which Richobd;.; Fath< declares the scheme of scaling down of debts applies only mull and Co. to pre-Act debts and the only exception to it is s. 13-A.

Subba Rao J.

Be that as it may, we cannot construe s. 13 with the aid of s. 13-A which was introduced by the Amending Act 23 of

1948. This appeal .does not call for an interpretation of s. 13-A of the Act and we shall not express any opinion thereon.

The legal position may be briefly stated thus.

Section 7, 8, 9 and 13 form a group of sections providing the principles of scaling down of debt• incurred by agriculmrists under different situations.

A debt can be scaled Clown in an appropriate proceeding taken in respect of the same.

But in the case of debts that have ripened into decrees, s. 19(1) and (2) prescribe a special procedure ror reopening the decree only in respect of debts incurred before the Parent Act. The Parent Act does not provide for the reopening of decrees made in respect of debts incurred after it came into force, and for understandable reasons the relief in respect of such decrees is specifically confined only to a concession in the rate of interest.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the order o! the High Court is correct.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed

AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR. v.

STA TE OF UTT AR PRADESH AND ORS.

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.

DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)

Sales Tax-Salts tax levied at the Ttltt of one anna pe1 rupr,._Nelv'

d•cimal coina~• introduad by Act No. 31 of 19SS-EQect on calculation of 1ales ta.r-Sales tax to be levied at the rate (If one

19M

July, 27

K. SUBBA RAO

s. 19(2)

s. 13

Richobdas Fatha1

s. 19(2)

Sections 7, 8, 9 and 13

s. 19(1)

Agriculturists Relief Act

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri. V. Ratnam

R. Ganaparhy Iyer

G.S. Pathak

R. Thiagarajan

SUBBA RAO

Subba Rao

s. 13

February 15, 1964

Kaverlal Chordia

I anuary 24, 1946

Subba Rao

December 21, 1950

June 24, 1955

March 22. 1938

s. 19(2)

August 10, 1956

s. 13

Madras High Court

s. 19

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri

s. 19(2)

s. 13

s. 13

Rao

Pathak

s. 3

Section 7

Section 8

s. 9

s. 13

ss. 7, 8

s. 19

Section 19

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

s. 19

s. 19(1)

s. 19

Viswanatha Sastri

s. 19

July 29, 1947

s. 13

Section 13

ss. 8, 9 and 13

s. 13

s. 19

s. 13

K. Hutchi

s. 19

s. 13

s. 13

section 3(ii)

section 13

s. 13 and 13A

s. 13

s. 13

s. 3

s. 13

s. 13

s. 13

s. 7

s. 13

s. 13

s. 13

s. 13

Section 7, 8, 9 and 13

s. 19(1)

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