6 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 691

SHREE BAJRANG JUTE MILLS LTD.

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS

GUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)

Sales Tax-Goods delivered to places outside State for consumption itt

those States-Liability .to tax-"Explanation Salei'-Exprtssion ''Actually delivered", meaning of-Constitu1ion of India, Art. 286(1)(a)-lndian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, r. 39.

The appellant, carrying on business as a manufacturer of jute goods with its factory at Guntur, ued to send jute bags by railway to the cement factories of the A.C.C. outside the State of Andhra. Fer securing a regular supply of jute bags, the A.C.C. entered into a contract with the appellant and under the despatch instructions. from that company, the appellant loaded the goods in th!; railway wagons, obtained railway receipts in the name of the A.C.C. as consignee and against payment of the price, delivered the receipts to the Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli, which was for the purpose of receiving the railway receipt and making payment, the agent of the A.C.C. From the amounts shown as gros~ turnover in the return for the assessment year 1954-55, the appellant claimed reductidn of certain amounts in respect of the goods supplied by rail to the A.C.C. outside the State of Andhra Pradesh under its despatch instructions. The Commercial Tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes disallowed the claim and held that as the railway receipts were delivered to the agent of the buyer within the State of Andhra, and price was also realized from the agent of the buyer within the State, goods must be deemed to have been delivered to the buyer in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and the appellant was liable to pay tax on the sales. On appeal, this order was reversed by the Appellate Tribunal. In revision the High Court restored the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.

The question for determination in this appeal was whether the sales to the A.C.C. by the appellant may be regarded as "nonExplanation sales", i.e. falling outside the Explanation to Art. 286(1).

Held: (i) If the gocxls were delivered pursuant to the contracts of sale outside the State of Andhra for the purpose of consumption in the State into which the gocxls were delivered, the State of Andhra couid have no right to tax those sales by virtue of the restriction imposed by Art. 286(l)(a) read with Explanation.

To attract the Explanation, the goods had to be actually delivered a' a direct result of the sale, for the purpose of consumption in the State in which they were delivered. The expression "actually delivered" in the context in which it occurs, can only mean physical delivery of

.964

Febru1ry 6.

1964 the goods, or such action as puts the goods in the poMOSSion of tho lllrH Ba/rang purchaser; it does not contemplate mere symbolical or notional delivery.

lut• MilLr C. Govindarajulu Naidu cl Co. v. State of Madras, A.l.R. 1953 "'* .J• Andhro Mad. 116, Mis. Capco Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, A.l.R. 1960 All. 62

Prada/I and Khaitan Minerals v. Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal for Mysor<, A.I.II. • . 1963 Mysore 141, followed.

..,, 1.

Poppat Lal Shah v. State of Madras, [1953] S.C.R. 617, Tata Iron A: Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1958] S.C.R. 1355, Tobacco Man .. facturtrs (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, [1961) 2 S.C.R. 106, Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1961} 2 S.C.R. 276 and State of Kera/a v. Cochin Coal Co. Ltd., [1961] 2 S.C.R. 219. referred to.

(ii) Section 39 of the Indian Sale o! Goods Act will not make mere delivery of -the railway receipts representing title to the goods, act'~11 delivery of goods for the purpose of Art. 286. The rule contained ;,.

s. 39(1) h~ no applicat.ion in dealing with a constitutional provi.sio• which while' imposiJ:\8 a restriction upon the legislative power of the States entrusts exclusive power to levy sales tax to the State in which the goocjs, have been ly delivered for the purpose of consumption.

CIV~L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 542 of 1962.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 7, 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tax Revision case No. 27 of 1958.

M. C. Seta/vad, K. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal, for the ap; iellant.

A. Ranganadham Chetty and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent.

February 6, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J.-With certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh this appeal is preferred by Shree Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd.

The appellant is engaged in the manufacture of jute goods, and is a registered dealer under the Madras General Sales, Tax Act.

For the assessment year 1954-55 the appellant submitted its return for sales-tax claiming a deduction of Rs. 21,80,118-1-3 from the turnover in respect

of the jute goods supplied by rail to the Associated Cement 1964 Company Ltd.-hereinafter for the sake of brevity called Shr•• Ba/Nlf6 'the A.C.C.' under despatch instructions from that Company.

Jt• MW.

The Commercial Tax Officer rejected the claim of the Stat• , J Andlft

appellant for deduction and that order was confirmed in Pradt1/i appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.

Sliah J.

In appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the order was reversed, the Tribunal holding that the appellant was entitled to exemption in respect of the turnover for the goods supplied to the A.C.C. A revision petition presented against the order to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was heard with a large number of other petitions which raised certain common questions. The High Court reversed the order of the Tribunal and restored the order gassed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.

The factory of the appellant is situated at Guntur. The A.C.C. owns cement factories at many places (including one at Tadepalli in the State of Andhra called the Krishna Cement Works) and for the purpose of marketing its products it requires jute packing bags. For securing a regular supply of jute bags, the A.C.C. entered into a contract with the appellant of which the following four cnditions are material:

"1. All the goods are sold F.O.R. Guntur unless otherwise expressly stated in this contract.

2. Goods to be packed. . . . well pressed and marked in . . . . bound bales of . . . . per each.

3. Payments to be made in cash, in exchange for Mills Delivery Order on sellers on due date or for Railway receipts or for Dock receipts, or for Mate's receipts, (which Dock receipts or Mate's receipts are to be handed by a Dock's or Ship's Officer to the seller's representative).

4. The buyers agree that the property in the goods sold shall not pass from the sellers to the buyers so long as the sellers are in possession of any bilh of lading, railway receipts, dock-warrants nr Mat..:'s re.ceipts or any other document of

19M

Slllte of Andhra

Jute Mills v. of Andhra Pradesh

Sha~ J,

title whether such documents are in the names of sellers or buyers, until payment is made in full.

(a) The buyers agree that the risk of loss, deterioration or damage in the goods during transit whether by land or canal or sea or when the goods are in the custody of the seller or any third person in a warehouse, dock or any premises shall be borne by the buyers notwithstanding that the pm; ierty in the goods does not pass to the buyers during such transit or custody."

As and when the gunny bags were needed for packing its products the A.C.C. issued despatch instructions calling upon the appellant to send jute bags by railway to the cement factories of the A.C.C. outside the State of Andhra.

Pursuant to those instructions the appellant loaded the goods in the railway wagons, obtained railway receipts in the name of the A.C.C. as consignee and against payment of the rice, delivered the receipts to the Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli-which, it is common ground, was for the purpose of receiving the railway receipts and making payment, the agent of the A.C.C. It is also common ground that the jute bags were sold to the A.C.C. for the purpose of packing cement by the factories of the A.C.C. to which they were sent and not for any other purpose.

The assessing authority and the Deputy Commissioner held that as the railway receipts were delivered to the agent of the buyer within the State of Andhra, and price was also realized from the agent of the buyer within the State, the goods must be deemed to have been delivered to the buyer in the State of Andhra, and the appellant was liable to pay sales-tax on the price of the goods sold.

With tnat view the High Court agreed.

Under the Government of India Act, 1935, the Legislatures of every Province could legislate for levying tax on sales of goods in respect of all transactions, whether the property in tile goods passed within or without the Province, provided the Province had a territorial nexus with one or more elements constituting the transaction of sale : Poppat

Lal Shah v. The State of Madras(') and The Tata Iron &: 1964 Steel Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar(2). But this resulted Shm Bo/r1111 in simultaneous levy of sales tax by many Provinces in .

Jut• MilU respect of the same transaction each fixing upon one or State of A.ndhro more element constituting the sale, with which it had a Prod., lt territorial nexus. With the dual purpose of maintaining.an Shah J. important source of revenue to the States, and simultaneously preventing imposition of an unduly heavy burden upcn the consumers by multiple taxation upon a single transaction of sale, the Constitution made a special provision imposing restrictions upcn the legislative power of the States in Art. 286 which as originally enacted ran as follows :

" (I) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place.-

(a) outside the State; or

(b) in the course of the import of the goods

into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.

Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a) a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.

{ '.l) Except in so far as Parliament may by law

otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where 1uch

sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce :

Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods whicil -----

(!) [1953] S.C.R. 677.

(2) {!9581 S.C.ll. 1355

5hree Bajranr Jute Mi/iii

State of Andnra.

Prade.h

S;1ali J.

t3)

was being lawfully levied by the Government of

any State immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day of March, 1951.

No law made by the Legislature of a State i'llposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essentiai for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent."

After the enactment of the Constitution, by a Presidential Order the Provincial Sales Tax Acts were made to accord with the restrictions imposed by Art. 286 of the Constitution.

It is manifest that by Art. 286 the legislative authority of the States to impose taxes on sales and purchases was restricted by four limitations-in respect of sales or purchases outside the State, in respect of sales or purchases in the course of imports into or exports out of India, in respect of sales or purchases which take place in the course of inter- State trade or commerce and in respect of sales and purchases of goods declared by Parliament to be essential for the life of the community. These limitations may overlap, but the power of the State to tax sale or purchase transactions may be exercised only if it is not hit by any of the limitations.

The restrictions are cumulative.

The sales in the !'"esent case are not sales, which have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.

The only point of contest is whether they are "outside the 'State" of Andhra. It is now well-settled that by Art. 286( 1)

(as it stood before it was amended by the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act, 19 5 6) sales as a direct result oi whlch goods were deliven; d in a State for consumption in SllCb State i.e. the sales falling within the Explanation to Art. 286(1) were fictionally to be regarded as inside that State for the purpose of cl. ( I ) (a) and so within the taxing

power of the State in which such delivery took place and 1964

being outside all other States exempt from sales-tax by those Shm Bairat11 other States : Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. The Jute Mills v.

Commissioner of Sales-tax, Bihar, Patna( 1 ): lndzan Copper State of A.ndhra

Corporation Ltd. "· ::1e State of Bihar and others('): and Pradesh T!te State of Kerala •d others v. The Cochin Coal Com- Shah J. pany Ltd.('). But the Explanation is not exhaustive of what may be called "inside sales". Clause (I )(a) excludes from the reach of the power of the States sales outside the State but it does not follow from the Explanation that it localises the situs of all sales. The power of the State under Entry 54 List IT of the Seventh Schedule to tax sales [not falling within els. (l)(b), (2) and (3)] which are outside the Explanation, and which may for the sake of brevity be called 'non-Explanation' sales, remains unim;>aired. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to express an opinion, whether the theory of territorial nexus of the taxing State, with one or more elements which go to make a completed sale authorises since the promulgation of the Constitution the exercise of legislative power under Entry 54, List II of the Sevent!o Schedule to tax sales, where property in goods has not passed within the taxing State.

The question which then falls to be determined is whether the sales to the A.C.C. by the a;>pellant may be regarded as "non-Explanation sales". There can be no doubt that if the goods were delivered pursuant to the contracts of sale outside the State of Andhra for the purpose of consumption in the State into which the goods were delivered, the State of Andhra could have no right to tax those sales by virtue of the restriction imposed by Art. 286 ( 1 )(a) read with the Explanation.

The facts found by the taxing authorities clearly establish that property in the goods despatched by the appellant passed to the A.C.C. within the State of Andhra when the railway receipts were handed over to ilie agent of the A.C.C. against payment of price. The question still remains : were

(2) (1961] 2 S.C.R. 276

1964 the transactions 'non-Explanation sales' i.e. falling outside Shr•• Bajrang the Explanation to Art. 286 ( 1)? To attract the Explana- /ut• Mills tion, the goods had to be actually delivered as a direct result &tote of' Andhra of the sale, for the purpose of consumption in the State in Pradesh which they were delivered. It is not disputed that the goods Shah 1. were supplied for the purpose of consumption outside the State of Andhra, and in the States in which they were supplied. It is submitted that the goods were actually delivered within the State, when the railway receipts were handed over to the agent of the buyer. But the expression

"actually delivered" in the context in which it occurs, can only mean physical delivery of the goods, or such action as rputs the goods in the possession of the purchaser : it does

not contemplate mere symbolical or notional delivery e.g. by entrusting the goods to a common carrier, or even delivery of documents of title like railway receipts. In

C. Govindaraiulu Naidu & Company v. State of Madras(1) Venkatarama Ayyar, J., dealing with the concept of actual delivery of goods, so as to attract the application of the Explanation to Art. 28 6 (1 )(a) rightly observed :

"In the context it can mean only physical delivery and not constructive delivery such as by tran~ fer of documents of title to the goods.

The whole object of the Explanation is to give a power of taxation in respect of goods actually entering the State for the purpose of use therein and it will defeat such a purpose if notional delivery of goods as by transfer of documents of title to the goods within the State is held tt>

give the State a power to tax, when the good are actually delivered in another State."

A similar view has been expressed in two otlier cases : M Is. Capco Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer and another('): and Khaitan Minerals v. Sales Tax Appeiiate Tribunal for Mysore(').

(1) A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 116.

(3) A.LR. 1963 Mysore 141.

---~

(2) A.I.R. 1960 All. i2.

Counsel for the respondent-State relied upon s. 39 of 1964

the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which provides in so Shru Ba/Tfl111 Jule Milla far as it is material, by the first sub-section that where, m v. pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorised to State of Andhra send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a Ph carrier, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, is Shah J. prima facie deemed to be delivery of the goods to the buyer.

But that provision will not make mere delivery of the railway receipts representing title to the goods, actual delivery of goods for the purpose of Art. 286. The rule contained in s. 39(1) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act raises a prima facie inference that the goods have been delivered if the conditions prescribed thereby are satisfied: it has no application in dealing with a constitutional provision which while imposing a restriction upon the legislative power of the States entrusts exclusive power to levy sales tax to the State in which the goods have been actually delivered for the purpose of consumption.

The High Court was therefore in error in inferring from the fact that •the property had passed within the State of Andhra against delivery of the railway receipts, that the goods were actually delivered within the State. If the inference raised by the High Court that the goods were actually delivered within the State of Andhra cannot be accepted, on the facts found there is no escape from the conclusion that the State of Andhra had no authority to levy tax in respect of those sale transactions in which the goods were sent under railway receipts to places outside the State of Andhra and actually delivered for the purpose of consumption i.n those States.

The appeal must therefore be allowed.

The order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Appeliate Tribunal is restored. The appellant to get its costs in this Court and the High Court from the respondent-State.

Appeal allowed.

691

SHREE BAJRANG JUTE MILLS LTD

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.

K. N. WANCHOO

GUPTA, J

C. SHAH

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.

Art. 286(1)(a)

Sale of Goods Act, 1930

A.C.C.

Krishna Cement Works

Tadepalli

Andhra Pradesh

Andhra

Art. 286(1)

Art. 286(l)(a)

[1961) 2 S.C.R. 106

[1961] 2 S.C.R. 219

Section 39

Art. 286

s. 39(1)

M. C. Seta

K. Srinivasamurthy

Naunit Lal

A. Ranganadham Chetty

B. R. G. K. Achar

SHAH

High Court of Andhra Pradesh

Shree Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd.

Sliah

Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal

Guntur

Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli

Government of India Act, 1935

Art. 286

India

Parliament

5hree Bajranr Jute

Art. 286

Art. 286

Art. 286( 1)

Art. 286(1)

State of Bihar

Cochin Coal Com- Shah J. pany Ltd.

Seventh Schedule

Art. 286

(1961] 2 S.C.R. 276

Art. 286

Venkatarama Ayyar

Art. 28

s. 39

Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930

Art. 286

s. 39(1)

Sale of Goods Act


19M

Fcbniary 7.

'700

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64]

LALJI HARIDAS

STAIB OF MAHARASIITRA AND ANOTHER

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., A. K. SARKAR, K. N.

WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA

AYYA"1GAR, JJ.)

Income Tax-False evidence in the proceedings before Incomettu OU•ccr-For the purpose of s. !95(!)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure the proceedings if proceedings in a court-whether Complaint .has to be made by the Income-tax Officer-Indian Incom~ tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 37-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 195(1)(b)-lndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), SS, 193, 228.

The appellant filed a criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 alleging that he had committed an offence under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by giving false evidence in certain proceedings before the Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

Respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objectioh that the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the proceedings in which he was alleged to have made a false statement on oath were proceedings before a court within the meaning of s. 195(1)(b) of the Coue of Criminal Procedure. 1898, and since no complaint in writing bad been made by the court of the Income-tax Officer the provision of s. 195(I)(b) created a bar against the competence of the appellant's complaint.

On the rejection of this preliminary objection respondent No. 2 preferred a criminal revision application before the Bombay High Court impleading the State of Maharashtra as respondent No. I. The High Court allowed the revision application.

Thereupon the appellant appealed to this Court on a certificate issued under Art. 134(1 )( c) of the Constitution.

The short question before this court was whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Income-tax Act can be said.to be a proceeding in any court within the meaning of s. 195(l)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held (per P. B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K. N. Wanchoo and N. Raja gopala Ayyangar JJ.)

(i) While the Income-tax Officer exercises his powers under s. 37(1), (2) and (3), tbe proceedings held by him are judicial proceedings for the purposes of ss. 193, 196 and 228 Indian Penal Code and the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent No. 2 was made in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193, Indian Penal Code.

(ii) It is not necessary to decide the general question whether the 1n,'.omc-tax Officer is a Court or not for s. 37( 4) of the Income-tax

Act makes the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer, judicial pr<>- ceedings for the purposes of s. 193 Indian Penal Code and these judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any court for the purpose of s. 195 (l)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure.

The High Court was right in allowing the revision application on the ground that the condition precedent prescribed by s. 195(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with as no complaint has been filed by the Income-tax Officer.

Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850 and Puran Chand Maneklal, in re: l.L.R. 38 Bom. 642, distinguished.

Per Sarkar and Das Gupta JI. (dissenting) (i) From the nature of functions under the various provisions of the Income-tax Act it ii clear that the Income-tax Officer is a part and parcel of the executin organ of the State. The fact that for carrying out some of th.- executive functions he will have the powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure wi11 not make him a limb of the judicial organ. Neither does the fact that he is a quasi-judicial authority make him a. court.

(ii) In Jaswant Sugar Mills v., Lakshmi Chand. [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 242 this court has held that the Income-tax Officer is not 'a ', I I ' ' Tribunal and therefore it is obvious tat he cannot be a coul1j.

(iii) To say that the legislature in providing in s. 37(4)' of the Indian Income-tax Act that a proceeding before the specified authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 Indian Penal Code intended also to say that such authority shall be deemed to be a court within the meaninv of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure would be to impute to the legislature an intention of which it itself had no knowledge.

(iv) The words used in s. 37(4) of the Income-tax Act fumishe&·- no reason--to--altei'the legal position that is inescapable on a consideration of the functions of the Income-tax Officer that he is not a court withia the meaning of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTJON: Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1962.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 30, 1962, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 1142 of 1960.

S. V. Gupte, Additiooa/ Solicitor-Genera/, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.

Lalji Haridlll ...

Stal• of MoJte. ·

riuhtro

Lalji IJ.arida.r

State of Mahata.Jhtra

Ga/endragadkar

C, I.

S. K. Kapur and R. H. Dhebar, for rndent No. 1.

S. T. Desai, J. L. Jain and V. J. Merchant, for respondent No. 2.

February 7, 1964. The Judgment of Gajendragadkar C.J., Wanchoo and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ. was delivered by Gajendragadkar C.J. The dissenting opinion of Sarkar and Das Gupta JJ. was delivered by Das Gupta J.

GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The short question of law which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer under section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (No. XI of

1922) (hereinafter called the Act) can be said to be a proceeding in any co.urt within the meaning of s. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

This question arises in this way.

The appellant Lalji Haridas and respondent No. 2 Mui.ii Manila! Kamdar are businessmen and they carry

<>n their business in Jamnagar and Bombay respectively.

They have known each other for several years past in the course of their ordinary business activities.

In the income-tax assessment proceedings of the appellant for the assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51, respondent No. 2 gave evidence on oath before the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar on the 4th December, 1958.

In his evidence he denied that he had a son named Nihal Chand and that he had done any business in the name of MI s. Nihal Chand & Co. at Jamnagar.

According to the appellant, the said statements were false to the knowledge of respondent No. 2 and were made by him to mislead the Income-tax Officer and to avoid the incidence of income-tax on himself.

As a result of the said false statements, the appellant was heavily taxed.

On the 24th November, 1959, the appellant filed a criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (No. 452/S of 1959) in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay.

At the hearing of the said complaint, respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objection that the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the

proceedings in which he was alleged to have made a false statement on oath were proceedings before a Court within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b) Cr. P.C., and since no complaint in writing had been made by the Court of the Income-tax Officer before which the said proceedings were conducted, the provisions of s. 195 ( 1) (b) created a bar against the competence of the appellant's complaint. The learned Presidency Magistrate held that the Income-tax Officer was not a Court within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b), Cr. P.C., and so, he rejected the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2.

Against the said decision of the Presidency Magistrate, respondent No. 2 preferred a Criminal Revision Application (No. 1142 of 1960) before the Bombay High Court. The State of Maharashtra was impleaded as respondent No. 1 to the said Revision Application. .A Division Bench of the

ilaid High Court reversed the conclusion of the Presidency Magistrate and held that the. Income:tax Officer as a Court within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b), Cr. P.C., and so, it upheld the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2.

In the result, the complaint filed by the appellant was ordered to be dismissed. The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the Bombay High Court under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution and it is with the said certificate that he has brought the present appeal before us. That is hoj\'_.the narrow question which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer are proceedings in any Court under s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C.

The question thus raised is undoubtedly a short one, but its decision is not easy, because the arguments urged in support of the two respective constructi9ns are fairly balanced and the task of preferring one construction to the other presents some difficulty.

The proceedings before the Income-tax Officer during which, according to the appellant, respondent No. 2 made a false statement on oath, were held by the Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Act. Section 37 ( 1) deals with the powers of Income-tax authorities and provides, inter alia, that the Income-tax Officer shall, for the purposes of th~ Act. have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (No. Vof 1908), when trying a suit in

Lalji llaridu

State of Mah•

rashtra

Gajendragadl"u

c. J.

La/ji Haridm

State of Maha

rashtra

Gajendragadkar

c. 1.

respect of the matters specified by clauses (a) to (d/.

Section 37(2) confers upon the Income-tax Officer certain additional powers which can be exercised subject to any rules made in that behalf, provided the said Officer is specially authorised by the Commissioner iri that behalf, and in exercising these powers, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 relating to searches apply.

Section 37(3) deals with the question of impounding and retaining any books of account or other documents.

That takes us to s. 37(4) which is relevant for our purpose; this section provides that any proceeding before any authority referred to in this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. It is thus clear that while the Income-tax Officer exercises his powers under s. 37(1), (2) and (3) the proceedings held by him arc judicial proceedings for the purposes of the three sections of the Indian Penal Code mentioned in sub-section (4).

There fore, the question as to whether the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent No. 2 was made by him at any stage of a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 I.P.C., must be answered in the affirmative. That is the plain effect of s. 37(4) of the Act.

Section 193 of the Indian Penal Cod~ \l!ith which we are directly concerned in the present appeal provides for punishment for intentionally giving false evidence. It consists of two parts; the first part deals, inter a/ia, with false evidence intentionally given in any stage of a judicial proceeding, and prescribes that the person found guilty of having given such false evidence in a judicial proceeding shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable :o fine; the second part deals with cases where false evidence has been intentionally given in any other case, and it prescribes the maximum sentence of three years as well as fine.

In other words, if the false evidence has been intentionally given in any judicial proceeding, the sentence awardable is higher than that where false evidence is intentionally given in proceedings which are not judicial.

There are three explanations to s. 193.

Expln. I provides that a trial before a Court-martial is a judicial proceerling; expln. 2 lays down that an invtigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice; this explanation takes in, for instance, committal proceedings.

Under expln. 3, an investigation directed by a Court of Justice according to law, and conducted under the authority of a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice.

This explanation covers enquiries before officers deputed by Courts of Justice to ascertain, for instance, on the spot the boundaries of land. It would thus be seen that having provided for a higher sentence in regard to the offence of giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, the three explanations of~. 193 include within the expression "judicial proceeding" certain proceedings which on a strict construction of the said expression may not have been included under it.

For the purpose of the present appeal, however, the only point to notice at this stage is that s. 37(4) of the Act makes a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer, held under the said section, a judicial proceeding for the purposes of s. 193, I.P.C. and that means that if an offence of giving false evidence is proved to have been committed by a person in a proeeeding before the Income-tax Officer, he would be liable for the higher sentence awardable under

th~ first part of section 193.

That takes us to section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is well-known that s. 195 provides for an exception to the ordinary rule that any person can make a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence triable under the Cr. P. C. Section 4(h) of this Code defines a "complaint" as meaning the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, thut some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does n'ot include the report of a police officer.

This definition shows that any person can make a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence.

Section 190 requires that the Magistrate to whom a complaint has been made should take cognizance of the said complaint, subject to the provisions of the said section.

Thus, the general rule is that any person can make a complaint, and s. 195 provides for an exception.

Section 195(1)

134-159 S.C.-45

Lal/I H11rid<u.

Stat• of Maha

rt11htra

Ga/•ndragadkar

c. J.

La/ji Haridas v.

State of Maharashtra

Ga/endragadkar

C. I.

<b) with which we are concerned, provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the sections therein mentioned, when such offence is alleged to ?ave been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding

m any Court, except the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate; amongst the sections mentioned are sections 193 and 228 I.P.C. The effect of these provisions is that if an offence is alleged to have been committed either under s. 193 or s. 228

I.P.C., and it appears that the said offence was committed in relation to any proceeding in any Court, it is only if the said Court, or the Court to which it is subordinate, makes a complaint in that behalf that cognizance will be taken of the said c.omplaint.

A person cannot make a complaint 'in respect of the alleged comrilission of any of the offences specified in s. 195(1)(b); that is its plain effect.

Section 195(2) which was added in 1923 when the earlier

sectin 195 was substantially amended, provides that in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term "Court" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but it does not

inclde a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.

It is unnecessary to deal with the effect of this provision. because, as will presently appear we do not propose to base our decision on the ground that the Incometax Officer is a Revenue Court under this sub-section.

The only point of interest to which we may incidentally refer is that this sub-section gives an inclusive, though not an ex haustive, definition and takes within its purview not only Civil and Criminal Courts, but also Revenue Courts, while excluding a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act.

In dealing with the question which has been raised in the present appeal what we are required to determine is whether a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer which by virtue of the operation of s.37(4) of the Act, must te held to be a judicial proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C. is a proceeding in any Court under s. 195. Cr. P. C. Section 193 makes a dis tinction between offences committed in any judicial proceed ing and those committed in proceedings other than judicial proceedings, whereas s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P. C. does not refer to judicial proceedit1gs as such, but mentions proceedings in

any Court. That is why the controversy between the parties in the present appeal lies within a very narrow compass. Can it be said that the proceeding which is a judicial proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C., must be held to be a proceeding in any Court under s. !95(1)(b), Cr. P. C.?

It is on this aspect of the dispute that the arguments on both sides are fairly balanced.

In dealing with this question, it is unnecessary to con• sider what would have been the position of the Income-tax Officer acting under s. 370), (2) and (3), and what would have been the character of the proceedings taken before him if sub-section ( 4) had not been enacted. In Jagannath Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh('), it has been held by this Court that the Sales•tax Officer functioning under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (No. 15 of 1948) was not a Court within the meaning of s. 195, Cr. P.C., and so, it was not necessary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution of any person against whom it was alleged that he had committed an offence under s. 471 I.P.C. This decision would tend to indicate that in the absence of s. 37(4) it would have become necessary to hold that the Income-tax Officer acting under s. 37(1), (2) and (3), would not be a Court under s. 195, Cr. P.C., and in that sense the provisions of s. 195 could not have been attracted.

This position is not disputed by Mr. Desai who appears for respondent No. 2.

He, however, contends that the ; provisions of s. 37 ( 4) which have been inserted in the Act in 1956 make all the difference, and according to him, this sub-section was added in order to makes. !95(J)(b), Cr. P.C., applicable to the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer. On the other hand, the Additional Solicitor-General has strenuously argued that the purpose which the legislature had in mind in inserting sub-section (4) in s. 37 was merely to make the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193, l.P.C., and not to makes. !95(l)(b), Cr. P. C. applicable to them. If the intention of the legislature had been to take the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer within the mischief of the said section of the Cr. P.C., the legislature would have expressly said so in terms. The

- UJT1953J z s.c.R. ssil

19,64

La/ii Haridiu

State of Malu>-

t08htra

Gajendragadkar

C. J.

Lal/i Harida•

State of Maha

ra1htra

Gafendragadkar

c. J.

omission to refer to the relevant provision of the Cr. P.C. in s. 37 ( 4) is not accidental, but deliberate, and so, though the proceeding before the Income-ta~ Officer may be nnd has to be regarded as 11 judicial proceeding under s. 193,

I.P.C.,)t cannot be said to be a proceding before a Court, because the Income-tax Officer is not a Court.

In support of his argument, the Additional Solicitor General has referred us to several statutes where the legis lative intention to extend the provisions of s. 195, Cr. P.C., to specific proceedings has been carried out by making an express provision in that behalf. Section 23 of the Work men's Compensation Act, 1923 (No. 8 of 1923) provides

that the Commissioner shall have all the powers of a Civil Cou.rt for µie purposes therein indicated, and by an amend inent .inade in 1929, it further lays down that the Commis sioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the pur pqses of s. 195 and Chapter 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument is that where the legislature want eel to extend the provisions of s. 195, Cr. P.C. to the proceed ings before the Commissioner held under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it thought it necessary to make a specific and express provision in that behalf. A similar provision is contained in s. 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (No. 4 of 1936). In the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947), the position is similar to that in the case of the Work men's Compensation Act; section 11 (4) confers on the autho

ritie~ therein specified powers as are vested in a Civil Court in respect of the matter mentioned therein.

In 1950, sub section (8) was added to section 11 by which it was provided that every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be Civil Court for the purposes of sec tions 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This scheme also shows, says the Additional Solicitor-General, that where the legislature wants to make any Tribunal or authority a Court, it uses express and appropriate language in that behalf. Section 45 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (No. 31 of 1950) likewise confers powers of a Civil Court on the Custodian and expressly adds that the proceedings before him shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of t.he Indian Penal Code, and the Custodian shall be deemed

to be a Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same provision is made by s. 17 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act. 1951 (Act 64 of 1951), as well as by section 26 of the Dis- . placed Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. 1954 (No. 44 of 1954).

On the other hand, s. 51 of the Administrator-General's Act, 1913 (No. 3 of 1913) provides that whoever, during any examination authorised by this Act, makes a false statement on oath knowingly, he shall be deemed to have intentionaJly given false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding.

The argument is that in this case, the legislature wanted to equate the proceedings under this Act with judicial proceedings under s. 193, I.P.C., and did not intend to make section 195, Cr. P.C., applicable to them, because it does not make the authority under this Act a Court, or does not, in terms, extend the provisions of the said section to the proceedings held before such an authority. The same comment has been made on the provisions of s. l 71A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (No. 8 of 1878).

Thus presented, the argument is no doubt attractive and cannot be rejected as without any substance.

The expression "judicial proceeding" is not defined in the Indian Penal Cude, but we have the definition of the said expression under s. 4(m) of the Cr. Procedure Code.

Section 4(m) provides that "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath.

The expression "Court" is not defined either by the Cr. P.C. or the I.P.C .. though 'Court of Justice' is defined by s. 20 of the latter Code as denoting a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judi cially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines a "Court" as including all Judges and Magistrates and aJI persons except the Arbitrators legaJiy authorised to take evidence.

Prima facie, there is some force in the contention that it would not be reasonable to predicate about every judicial proceeding that it is a proceeding before a Court, and so, it is open to the appellant to urge that though the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer may be a judicial

Ltdii Harldu

•• St•I• of Mahartuhtr•

Gajendragadkar

c. J.

Lalji Haridas v.

SUttt of Maha

ruhtra

Ga; endr"gadkar

C.J.

proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C., it would not follow that the said judicial proceeding is a proceeding in a Court as re quired by s. 195(l)(b), Cr. P.C.

It is somewhat remarkable that though section 193, I.P.C., refers to a judicial proceeding, section 195, Cr. P.C. refers to a proceeding in any Court; it does not say a judi ciai proceeding in any Court.

Mr.

Desai contends that reading section 193 l.P.C. ands. 195(1)(b) Cr. P.C., together. it would not be unreasonable to hold that proceedings which are judicial under the former, should be taken to be proceed ings in any Court under the latter. The whole basis of pro viding for a higher sentence in regard to offences committed at any stage of a judicial proceeding appears to be that the legislature took the view that the said offences were more serious in character, and so, it distinguished the said offences from similar offences committed at any stage of other pro ceedings. The argument is that while providing for a higher sentence in respect of this more serious class of offences com mitted at any stage of judicial proceedings, the legislature intended that there should be a safeguard in respect of com plaint as regards the said offences and that safeguard is provided by s. 195(l)(b), Cr.P.C. In other words, an offence which is treated as more serious by the first paragraph of s. 193, l.P.C. because it is an offence committed during the course of a judicial proceeding should be held to be an offence committed in any proceeding in any Court for the purpose of s. 195(l)(b) Cr.P.C. On this argument, it is not necessary to consider whether the Income-tax Officer is a Court or not, for, in substance, the contention is that as soon as s. 37(4) of the Act was enacted, the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer became judicial proceedings for the purpose of s. 193, l.P.C. and since they are classed under the first paragraph of the said section, they attract the pro tection of s. 195(l)(b), Cr.P.C.

In our opinion, there is considerable force in this argument, and, on the whole, we are inclined to prefer the construction suggested by Mr. Desai to that pressed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor-General.

It is true, the Additional Solicitor-General has mainly relied upon the relevant provisions of several statutes in support of his construction and in so far as it appears that.

6 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT I<EPORTS

7II

certain provisions in some of the said statutes in terms extend the application of s. 195, Cr. P.C. to the proceedings to which they relate, the argument does receive support, but we hesitate to hold that the omission to refer to s. 195 ( 1 )(b), Cr. P.C. in s. 37(4) of the Act necessarily means that the intention of the legislature in enacting s. 37(4) was merely and solely to provide for a higher sentence in regard to the offence under s. 193, I.P.C. if it was committed in proceedings before the Income-tax Officer.

It is plain that if the argument of the Additional Solicttor-General is accepted, the result would be that a complaint like the present can be made by any person and if the offence alleged is proved, the accused would be liable to receive higher penalty awardable under the first paragraph of s. 193, I.P.C. without the safeguard correspondingly provided by s. 195(l)(b), Cr. P.C.

Could it have been the intention of the legislature in mak ing the offence committed during the course of a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer more serious without affording a corresponding safeguard in respect of the complaints which can be made in that behalf? We are inclined to hold chat the answer to this question must be in the negtive. That is why after careful consideration. we have come to the conclusion that the view taken by the BorJbay High Court 5hould be upheld though for different reasons. Section 37(4) of the Act makes the proceedings before the Jncome-tax Officer judicial proceedings under s. 193 I.P.C. and these judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any Court for the purpose of s. 195(J)(b), Cr. P.C. That. we think, would really carry out the intention of the legislature in enacting s. 37(4) of the Act.

In this connection. there is another consideration which has weighed in our minds.

We have already noticed that s. 37(4) makes the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 228 !.P.C.

When we turn to the latter section, we notice that the said section deals with the offence of intentionally causing insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding. It is obvious that the offence with which s. 228 deals is an offence committed against a public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding. This section is one of the sections mentioned in s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C., and so, any complaint in

La/ji Haridas v.

Stat• of Mahartuhtra

Gajendragadkar

c. J.

Lalii Harldu ...

Stat• of Ma/uJ.

rtUhtra

GaJ•ndragadkar

c. J.

respect of the offence alleged to have been committed under s. 228, I.P.C. has to be made by the Court in question.

There can be little doubt that if a person offers an insult to a public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding, or causes interruption to him while he is so sitting at any stage of the judicial proceeding, the complaint has to proceed from the public servant himself; that is the effect of s. 195 (I )(b} Cr. P.C. Before s. 37.( 4) of the Act was enacted, an insult given to an Income-tax Officer or interruption caused to his proceedings whilst he was conducting his proceedings, would not have amounted to an offence under s. 228, I.P.C. Section 37(4) makes a proceeding before the Income-tax Officer a proceeding under s. 228 I.P.C. and thus, an interruption in his iproceedings, or an insult given to him, has now become punishable under the said section. Could it have been intended by the legislature in enacting s. 37(4) that whereas an insult offered to a public servant acting judicially, or interruption caused in his proceedings would normally be cognizable only on the complaint of the public servant himself, the same offence, if committed in respect of the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer, should be cognizable at the complaint of a private party? The anomaly which would result if the construction suggested by the Additional Solicitor-General is accepted, is, in our opinion, so glaring that the alternative contention urged by Mr. Desai and upheld by the Bombay High Court which avoids the said anomaly appears to be more reasonable and more consistent with the true intention of the legislature. That is why we are not prepared to accept the appellant's argument that the Bombay High Court was in error in dismissing his complaint on the ground that the condition precedent prescribed by s. 195(1>

(b) Cr. P.C. had not been complied with as no complaint had been filed by the Income-tax Officer.

It appears that In re: Punam Chand Maneklal(') the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court had taken the view that an Income-tax Collector is a Revenue Court within the meaning of that term as used in clauses (b) and (c) of s. 195, Cr. PC.,

1898. Scott, C. J. who spoke for the Full Bench, observed that it could not be contended that the Income-tax Collector was a Civil or Criminal Court, and so, he addressed himself

(I) I.L.R. 38 Bom. 642.

to the narrow question as to whether he was a Revenue Court. Dealing with the question on that footing, he examin- . ed the functions of the Income-tax Collector under Act II of 1886, and held that he was a Revenue Court. He rejected the contention that he could be treated as a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Registration Act, and so, he found no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that he was a Revenue Court. The Bombay High Court in the present case has substantially based itself on this decision in reversing the conclusion of the Presidency Magistrate and directing that the complaint filed by the appellant should be dismissed.

It is unnecessary to consider whether the view taken by the Full Bench in in re: P•mam Chand Maneklal(') is right, because the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act have been subsequently modified in 1922 and different considerations have now assumed importance. It is no longer possible to hold that the Income-tax Officer is a Revenue Court, and, indeed, that has not been the contention raised before us by Mr. Desai.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

DAS GUPTA, J.-Is an Income-tax Officer under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, a court within the meaning of cl. (b) in sub-section (1) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? That is the short but difficult question that arises in this appeal against a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. On November 24, 1949, the appellant filed a complaint in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, alleging that when the respondent Mulji Manila! Kamdar was examined on commission by the Income-tax Officer, Jamnagar Circle, Jamnagar, he gave answers which were false to his knowledge. He prayed for the issue of process against the said Mulji Manila! Kamdar, so that he might be dealt with according to law. An objection was raised by the accused that in the absence of a complaint by the Income-tax Officer before whom the false statement was alleged to hve been made the Magistrate was debarred from taking cognizance of the case.

This contention was based on a submission that the Income-tax Officer was a court within the meaning of s. 195 (1 )(bl.

This objection was rejected by the Presidency Magistrate. (!) I.LR. 38 Born. 642.

Lalji Haridas

State of Maharashtra

Gajendragadkar

c. J.

Du Gupta J,

196/

Lalji Haridas

State of Maharashtra

Das Gupta J.

The High Court of Bombay was moved against the Presidency Magistrate's order.

But considering itself bound by a Full Bench decision of the Court in in re: Pwzamclzand Manekla/(1) and the later decision in State v. Nemchand Peshvir(') the High Court held that an Income-tax Officer when holding proceedings under s. 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 is a Revenue Court within the meaning of cl. (b) in sub-section (1) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The correctness of the High Court's view is challenged before us by the complainant on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court under Avt. 134 ( 1 ) ( c) of the Constitution.

Section 195 ( l) (b) is one of the group of sections in the Code of Criminal Procedure which have laid down exceptions to the general rule of criminal law that criminal proceedings can be instituted in a court by any person. To this rules. 195 along with ss. 196, 196A, 197, 197A, 198, l 98A, and 199 provide exceptions. Section 195 mentions in its first sub-section a number of offences of which no coupt shall take cognizance except on the complaint in writing of the persons as indicated. Three classes of offences are dealt with in three els. (a), (b) and ( c) of this subsection. Section 195(1) (a) deals with offences punishable under ss. 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code and provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any of these except <>n the complaint in writing "of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate."

Section 195 (1 )(b) deals with offences punishable under

SS. 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228 .:md provides that when any such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any court, no court shall take cognizance of it except on the complaint in writing of such Court or some other court to which such court is subordinate. Section

195 (1 )( c) deals with offences punishable under ss. 463, 471, 475 and 476 and provides that when any such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of any document produced ---·--- ----

(I) l.L.R. 38 Born. 642. {2) 57 Born. L.R. 1056.

<>r given in evidence in such proceeding, no court shall take cognizance of the same except on the complaint in writing of such court, or some other court to which such court is subordinate.

The second sub-section of s. 195 runs thus :-

"'In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1), the term

"court" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar, or Sub-

Registrar, under the Indian Registration Act, 1877."

In this appeal we are concerned directly with cl. (b) of. s. 195 (1). The appellant's com;>laint before the Magistrate alleged the commission of an offence under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code in the course of the examination on oath by the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar . Circle, J amnagar. The examination itself took place in relation to assessment proceedings against the complainant for the years 1949-50, and 1950-51. If the Income-tax Officer is a Court it necessarily follows that the Magistrate was not entitled to take cognizance of this offence except on the complaint of the Income-tax Officer. That is how the question whether the Income-taic Officer is a Court or not falls to be considered.

Section 5 of the Income-taic Act, 1922, mentions six classes of Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act. The primary function of an Income-tax Officer is the assessment of income that is chargeable to taic under s. 3 of the Act and the determination of the tax payable on it.

He has to rperform other functions under the Act that are subsidiary and ancillary to this main function. Under s. 5(7) the Income-tax Officers are subordinate to the Director of Inspection, the Cmi:tmissioner of Income-tax and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax within whose jurisdiction they perform their functions. Under s. 5 ( 8) they have to observe and follow the orders, instructions and directions of the Central Board of Revenue.

Chapter III of the Act in its several sections state what heads of income-profits and gains shall be chargeable to incometaic and indicates the duties which the Income-tax Officer

Lalji Harida1

State of Mahorashtra

Das Gupta I.

Lalji Haridas v.

State of Maharashtra

Das G u:; ta J.

has to perform for the purpose of his main function of assessing the chargeable income.

For instance, deductions under s. 7 ( 2 )( iia) in respect of conveyance owned by the assessee or used by him for the purpose of his em; iloyment "shall be such sum as the Income-tax Officer may estimate . ..... ".

The allowances permissible under s. 10(2) (i) "shall be such sum as the Income-tax Officer may determine"; the allowances under s. 10(2) (ix) also shall be such sum in respect of loans made in the ordinary course of business as the Income-tax Officer may estimate to be irrecoverable. Again, the allowances mentioned in cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 10(4) (a) cannot be made "if in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer any such allowance is excessive or unreasonable." The proviso to s. 10 ( 5) requires the Income-tax Officer to satisfy himself in the cases dealt with there whether the main purpose of the transfer of assets was the reduction of liability to income-tax and provides that where he is so satisfied the actual cost of the assets shall be such amount as the Income-tax Officer may determine. Other sections showing the different matters in which the Income-tax Officer has to be satisfied or to form an opinion for the purpose of assessment are ss. 12 (a), 13 and 17. Chapter IV of the Act which lays down the procedure to be followed in making the assessment, imposes inter alia the duty of calling for returns of income (s. 22); of making assessment of the Income and to determine the sum payable by the assessee ( s. 23) ; the power to assess Companies to super-tax (s. 23A); the power to make provisional assessment in advance of regular assessment (s. 23B).

It is obvious however that for carrying out these several functions properly it is necessary for the Income-tax Officer to examine documents and persons. Power for this purpose are conferred on the Income-tax Officer (and certain other Income-tax Authorities) in s. 37 of the Act. The first subsection of s. 37 runs thus :-

"The Income-tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner and Appellate T ribunal shall, for the purposes of this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( 5 of 1908)

when trying a suit in respect of the following matiers, namely :-

(a) discovery and inspection.

(b) enforcing the attendance of any person, including any officer of a banking company, and examining him on oath,

( c) compelling the production of books of account and other documents; and

( d) issuing summons."

The second sub-section empowers anv Income-tax Officer specially authorised by the Commissioner to enter and search any building and seize books of account and other documents.

Under the third sub-section the Income-tax Officer may impound or retain the books of account and other documents after following certain procedure.

The fourth sub-section of this section which does not confer any powers but has been relied on strongly by the respondent will be dealt with in full detail later in this judgment.

From the brief summary of the Income-tax Officer's functions given above it is clear that he is a part and parcel Of the executive organ of the State. The fact that for carrying out some of these executive functions he will have the powersas are vested in a court under the Code of Civil

Procedure has not the effect of converting him into a limb -of the judicial organ. It has been held that he is a quasijudicial authority.

That is not sufficient however to make him a court. Before we can ca]] him a court, he must be shown to be a part of the judicial organ of the State.

Leaving out for later consideration the effect of s. 37 ( 4) it is clear that an Income-tax Officer is not a court.

We have not thought it necessary to refer to the numerous decisions of the High Courts in India, of this Court or of the Privy Council in which the question of what is a court has been considered., We have considered this unnecessary in view especially of the fact that most of these were noticed in a recent decision of this Court in Jagannath

f.nlji Haridas v.

Stale of Maharashtra

Das Gupta I.

La/ji Haridas v.

State of Maharashtra

Das Gupta J.

Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') where the question whether a Sales Tax Officer was a couvt or not within the meaning of s. 195(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code was considered.

This Court held that the Sales Tax Officer is aot a Court within the meaning of that section.

All the reasons set out in this judgment which Kapur J. delivered for the Court are apicable to the case of the Income-tax Officer and if the reasoning in that case is taken to be correct, as it must be, the Income-tax Officer also must be held to be not a court-unless any different conclusion is justified from the provisions of s. 3 7 ( 4) of the Act.

It will not be out of place to mention here what the Constitution Bench of this Court said in Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand( 2 ) as regards the nature of the functions of Income-tax Officers. The question for the court's decision in that case was whether a Conciliation Officer under cl. 29 of the Government Order under ss. 3 and 8 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was a "Tribunaf" within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution and the Court held that it was not such a tribunal. As illustrations of other authmities whose primary function is administrative even though they have the duty to act judicially, Shah J. speaking for the Court said :-

"The duty to act judicially imposed upon an authority by statute does not necessarily clothe the authority with the judicial power of the State.

Even administrative or executive authorities are .:>ften by virtue of their constitution, required to act judicially in dealing with question affecting the tights of citizens. Boards of Revenue, Customs Authorities: Motor Vehicles Authorities, Income-tax and Sales Tax Officers are illustrations prima facie of such administrative authorities, who though under a duty to act iudicially, either by the express provisions of the statutes constituting them or by the rules framed thereunder or by the implication either of the statutes or the powers conferred upon them are ---------- ---------------

(l) [1963] Supp. l S.C.R. 242.

still not delegates of the judicial power of the State. Their primary function is administrative and not judicial."

It is true that the question whether an Income-tax Officer was a ourt or a tribunal was not directly for decision in laswant Sugar Mills' case('). It is clear however that as a part of the reasoning which the court applied for coming to the condusion that the Conciliation Officer is not a Tribunal this Court was of opinion that an Income-tax 'Officer is also not a "Tribunal". Obviously, if it is not even a Tribunal it cannot be a court.

It is not seriously disputed by Mr. Desai who appeared before us for the respondent that looking at the functions of an Income-tax Officer it is not possible to say that the Income-tax Officer is a court specially after this Court's decision in Jagannath Prasad's case(2) mentioneu above.

His main contention is that even though the Income-tax Officer was not originally a 'court within the nieaning of s. 19 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the deeming provision in s. 37 ( 4) has made him a court. Section 37 ( 4) runs thus:-

"Any proceeding before any authority referred to in this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of ss. 193 and T28, and for the purposes of s. 196 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

The authorities mentioned in the section are the Jncometax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. The direct effect of sub-section 4 of s. 37 therefore is that proceedings before an Income-tax Officer "shall be deemed to be a judicial iproceeding" within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 and for the purposes of s. 196 of the Indian Penal Code. As we r;:ad the section it at once leaps to the eye that there is no mention in this of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In introducing this deeming provision. in 1956

(I) (1963 St•pp. I S.C.R. 242.

(2) [t963] 2 S.C.R. 850.

196f

La/ii Haridtu

Y, State of MalrtJ..

rashtra

Da! '.Jupta I.

Lalji Haridas v.

State of Maha

rashtra

Das fTupta. J.

Parliament did not think it necessary to extend the deeming provision for the purpose of s. 195. If Parliament intended this provision to produce the consequence that the authorities in the section should be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is reasonable to expect that Parliament would have added the words "and shall be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure'', or "shall be deemed to be a court for the purpose of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure" or some similar phraseology. The omission to use any such words is all the more remarkable when we notice that on several occasions before 1956 Parliament had in expressing an intention that a particular authority should be a court for the purpose of s. 195 added express words to give effect to that intention.

Thus, in the Payment of Wages Act, which was enacted in 1936, s. 18 after stating that every authority appointed under sub-s. ( 1) of s. 15 shall have all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure for certain r; mrposes, proceeded to say that "every such authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of s. 19 5 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1898." Again, irt s. 23 of the Workmen's Compensation Act which confers on the Commissioner for workmen's compensation all the powers oE a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the legislature added in 1929 the following words :-"and the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of s. 195 and of Chapter XXXV of , the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898".

It is worth noticing also that in several other statutes Parliament after stating that ce1!tain proceeding shall be a judicial rproceeding within <he meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code proceeded to say that for certain purposes it shall also be deemed to be a court. The Evacuee Property Act of 1950 after stating that the enquiry by the custodian shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code, goes on to say "and the Custodian shall be deemed to lie a court within the meaning of ss. 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898". Another instance of similar

legislation is to be found in s. I 7 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951, which after stating that any proceeding before the competent officer or the appellate officer shall be judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code adds "and the competent Officer or the appellate officer shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of s. 480 and s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898". The Displaced Persr, ns'

(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 uses exactly similar words in s. 26.

That section first confers on every officer appointed under the Act the same powers in respect of certain specified matter~ for the purpose of making any enquiry or hearingany <11;>peal under the Act as are vested in a Civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure and then proceeds thus "any proceeding before any such offier shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code and every such Officer shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of s. 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898." Similarly, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 after providing in sub-s'ection (3) of section 11 that every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribw1al or National Tribunal, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 22&

of the Indian Penal Code adds in sub-s. (8) of the same oection th~ provision that "every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of s. 480 and s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1892." This sub-section was added in 1950.

In clear contrast with these are the statutes which after saying that certain proceedings shall be judicial proceeding refrain from adding that the authority will be deemed to be a court.

One such statute is the Sea Customs Act, which in s. 171 A ( 4) lays down that every enquiry under that section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code and stops there.

A somewhat similar provision, though in ditferent phraseology, appears in s. 51 of the Administrator-General's Act, (III of 1913) which runs thus:-

134-159 S.C.-46

196#

Lalli Horida.s ...

Stall of Ma/ul.

ruhtra

Du Gupta J_

Wl# Bllridai ...

SfaU al Jlaluz. ,..,.,,..

Dt11 Gurta I.

"Whoever, during any examination authorised by this Act, makes upon oath a statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, s)l.all be deemed to have intentionally given ' false eYidence in a, stage of a judicial proceeding."

The learned Solicitor-General, who appeared. before us on behalf of the appellant, strongly urged that if the intention of the legislature had ever been that the Income-tax Officer or other authorities mentioned in s. 37 should be deemed to be a court for the purpose of s. 19 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it would have taken care to express that intention in clear phraseology.

In any case, argues leal'jled counsel, when in 1956 the old section 37 was wholly recast , the Parliament which at least then had before it a well established P!itlern of legislative forms in the numerous statutes mentioned above for expressing an intenion that an authority shall be deemed to be a court for the purpose of s. 195 or any other provision of the Code of Criminal Porcedure, there could be no conceivable reason for the failure to follow that pattern. In our opinion, there is considerable force in this argument.

On behalf of the accused-respondent Mr. Desai suggests that the words. actually used, viz., "that proceeding before the authority shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code" were by themselves sufficient to give effect to an intention that that authority shall also be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure According to the learned Counsel, a judicial proceeding with· in the meaning of s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code can only be before a court.

For this proposition we can find no support either in principle or authority.

It seems clear to us on the contrary :that proceedings before tribunals which are quasi judicial and not a court may well be considered to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code.

Though the words "judicial proceeding" have been used in numerous sections of the Indian

6 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURf REPORTS

Penal Code, it has not defined the words, though the words "court of justice" as also the words "a judge" have been defined.

The Code of Criminal Procedure in which also the phrase "judicial proceeding" occurs in several sections has defined it in s. 4(m) thus: "Judicial proceeding includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath''. This definition of judicial proceeding was included in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from the very beginning. The fact that for all these years since 1898 Parliament has not thought fit to give any definition of the words "judicial proceeding" in the Indian Penal Code is some justification for thinking that the words "judicial proceeding" in the Indian Penal Code may reasonably be held to have the same meaning as in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, it would be reasonable to think that i.n the Indian Penal Code also the word

'"judicial proceeding" has been used to include "any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath." That would bring within the meaning of tbe words "judicial proceeding" proceeding before many quasi-judicial authorities which are not courts, e.g., a Customs Officer or a Sales Tax Officer.

It is unnecessary for our present purpose to attempt an exact definition of the words "judicial proceeding" as used in s. 193 or in any other section of the Indian Penal Code.

Even without any such definition however it appears clear that the phrase "judicial proceeding" is wide enough to include not only proceedings before courts but proceedings before certain other tribunals. It is pertinent to point out that if a proceeding before any other authority except a court could not be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, it would not have been necessary for Parliament in the Evacuee Property Act, 1950, in the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1950, and in the Displaced Persons' (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, to add, after laying (fown that the proceedings before certain authorities shall be judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code the further words, that "the authority shall be deemed to be a civil court" for certain purposes of the Code of Criminal

1§6t

Laljl HarltJ.

"· Stat• of 11-. _,,,,.

Dtu Gup111 I.

l!ltff

£al/I Harlda1

•• ""'' of Maha ruhtra "- Gupta 1

Procedure. It is especially interesting to note in this connection the rprovisions of s. 11 ( 3) and s. 11 ( 8) of the Industrial Disputes Act to which we have already referred .

Under s. 11 ( 3) as originally enacted every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court or Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code.

When Parliament added to this section sub-section ( 8) what was enacted was that every tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of s. 480 and s. 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.

After the amendment by the Act 36 of 1956 the concluding portion of s. 11 ( 3) ran thus :-"Every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code." The same Act substituted in s. 8 the words "Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal" for the words "Tribunal".

In spite of the fact however that every enquiry or investigation by a Board has to be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indiari Penal Code Parliament refrained from saying that a Board shall also be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of s. 480 and s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This emphasises the fact that the

legislature did not think that the necessary effect of legislat ing that a rproceeding before an authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code would be that that authority shall also be deemed to be a court. To say now that the legislature in providing in s. 3 7 ( 4) of the Indian Income-tax Act that a proceeding before the specified authorities shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code, intended also to say that such authority shall be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be to impute to the legislature an intention of which it itself had no knowledge.

Learned counsel for the accused-respondent then drew our attention to the use of the words "judicial proceeding" in s. 476 and s. 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure

and argued that in these sections the words "judicial pro 1964

ceeding" have been used as equivalent to proceeding in a Lal/I Harlda court. That may well be so. Section 476 lays down proce State 0(· M,,,,._ <lure in cases mentioned in s. 195(l)(b) and (c) of riuhtra offences that appear to have been committed in or in relation Dai Gupta 1, to a proceeding in a court. It was quite correct therefore to refer to such proceeding in a later part of the section as judicial proceeding. Section 479A lays down the procedure in certain cases of offences of giving false evidence in civil, revenue or criminal courts and necessarily speaks of the proceeding before those courts as judicial proceeding.

It is difficult to see how the use of e words "judicial proceeding" in these sections support the contention that "judicial proceeding" can only be a proceeding before a court. There can be no doubt that every proceedin.g hcfcre a court is a "judicial proceeding". It does not follow however that t very judicial 'proceeding is a proceeding before a court.

Mr. Desai drew a grim picture of what would happen if the authority a proceeding before which was deemed to be a judicial iprocced'g within the meaning of s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code was not at the same time considered a court within the meaning of s. 195.

He rightly points out that one consequence will be that if any person offers any insult or causes any obstruction to a public servant when he is sitting in any such judicial proceeding and thus commits an offence under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code it will be possible for persons other than the public servants to institute a criminal case for such offence. This, says the learned counsel, would be a very undesirable thing.

We fail to see why this should be considered to be undesirable.

But assuming this is so, that is not to our mind a consideration which should compel us to give the words "judicial proceeding" a meaning which they do not bear.

It may be mentioned here, as already stated, that under s. 171A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1874, every enquiry before a Custom Officer "shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the mearung of s. 193 and s. 228 of the

1 al/l Baridas

Sof Mahanuhtro

Dta O"plo J.

Indian Pe1tal Code". In spite of this, the Constitution Bench of this Court held in its recent decision in I ndo-China SteQfTI

Nt111ftation Co. Ltd. v. The Additional C()/lector of Cu.ftoms(') that a Customs Omcer is not even a Tribunal.

After discussing several previous decisions of this Court Gajendragadkar C.J., speaking for the Court observed thua:-

"The result therefore is that it is no longer open to doubt that the Customs Officer is not a court or tribunal."

It is difficult to see how if the presence of the words "shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code" in s. 171A( 4) have not the effect of making a Customs Officer a court or a tribunal, the presence of similar words in s. 37 ( 4) in the Indian Income-tax Act, can have that effect.

ln our opm10n, the words used in s. 3 7 ( 4) of the Income-tax Act furnish no reason to alter the legal position that !s inescapable QD a consideration of the functions of the Income-tax. Officer that he is not a court within the meaning of s. 1115 of the Code of Crimi.Dal Procedure.

We would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by t!he High Court and direct that the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, should now dispose of the case in accordance with law.

ORDER

In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this appeal fails and is dismissed.

(!) (1964] 6 S.C.R. 594.

LALJI HARIDAS

STAIB OF MAHARASIITRA AND ANOTHER

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.

A. K. SARKAR

WANCHOO

K. C. DAS GUPTA

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 37

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

s. 195(1)(b)

Penal Code, 1860

s. 193

Indian Penal Code, 1860

s. 37

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 195(1)(b)

s. 195(I)(b)

Bombay High Court

State of Maharashtra

Art. 134(1 )( c)

s. 37

Income-tax Act

s. 195(l)(b)

Code of Criminal Procedure

P. B. Gajendragadkar

K. N. Wanchoo

N. Raja gopala

s. 37(1)

ss. 193, 196 and 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 193

Indian Penal Code

s. 37( 4)

s. 193

Indian Penal Code

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 195(1)(b)

Code of Criminal Procedure

[1963] 2 S.C.R. 850

Puran Chand Maneklal

Per Sarkar

Das Gupta

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 37(4)

Income-tax Act

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 37(4)

Income-tax Act

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

S. V. Gupte

J. B. Dadachanji

. C. Mathur

Ravinder Narain

Lalji Haridlll

State of Mahata.Jhtra

riuhtro

Lalji IJ.arida.r

State of Mahata.

S. K. Kapur

R. H. Dhebar

S. T. Desai

J. L. Jain

V. J. Merchant

Gajendragadkar

Wanchoo

Rajagopala Ayyangar

Sarkar

GAJENDRAGADKAR

section 37

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 195(l)(b)

Code of Criminal Procedure

Lalji Haridas

Mui.ii Manila! Kamdar

Jamnagar

Bombay

4th December, 1958

Nihal Chand

24th November, 1959

section 193

Indian Penal Code

s. 195(1)

s. 195

s. 195(1)

ilaid High Court

s. 195(1)

Art. 134(1)(c)

s. 195(1)(b)

s. 37

Section 37

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 37(2)

Code of Criminal Procedure 1898

Section 37(3)

s. 37(4)

sections 193 and 228

section 196

Indian Penal Code

s. 37(1)

Indian Penal Code

s. 193

I.P.C

s. 37(4)

Section 193

s. 193

s. 37(4)

s. 193

I.P.C

section 193

section 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 195

Section 4(h)

Section 190

s. 195

Section 195(1)

State of Maharashtra

sections 193 and 228

I.P.C

s. 193

s. 228

I.P.C

s. 195(1)(b)

Section 195(2)

s. 193

I.P.C

s. 195

Section 193

s. 195(1)(b)

s. 193

I.P.C

s. 370

Sales Tax Act, 1948

s. 195

s. 471

I.P.C

s. 37(4)

s. 37(1)

s. 195

s. 195

Desai

s. 37

s. 37

s. 193

State of Malu>-

State of Maha

s. 37

s. 193

I.P.C

s. 195

Section 23

Compensation Act, 1923

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 195

s. 18

Payment of Wages Act, 1936

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

section 11

section 11

Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 45

sections 193 and 228

Indian Penal Code

sections 480 and 482

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 17

section 26

s. 51

s. 193

I.P.C

section 195

Sea Customs Act, 1878

s. 4(m)

Section 4(m)

I.P.C

s. 20

Section 3

s. 193

I.P.C

s. 195(l)(b)

section 193

I.P.C

section 195

section 193

s. 195(l)(b)

Cr.P.C

s. 193

s. 195(l)(b)

Cr.P.C

s. 37(4)

s. 193

s. 195(l)(b)

Cr.P.C

s. 195

s. 195

s. 37(4)

s. 37(4)

s. 193

I.P.C

s. 193

I.P.C

s. 195(l)(b)

BorJbay High Court

Section 37(4)

s. 193

I.P.C

s. 195(J)(b)

s. 37(4)

s. 37(4)

s. 228

s. 228

s. 195(1)(b)

La/ji Haridas

s. 228

I.P.C

s. 195

s. 37

s. 228

I.P.C

Section 37(4)

s. 228

I.P.C

s. 37(4)

s. 195(1>

(b)

Punam Chand Maneklal

s. 195

Registration Act

P•mam Chand Maneklal

Income-tax Act

DAS GUPTA

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

High Court of Judicature at Bombay

November 24, 1949

Mulji Manila! Kamdar

s. 195

Lalji Haridas

State of Maharashtra

Gajendragadkar

Du Gupta

High Court of Bombay

Pwzamclzand Manekla/(1

s. 23

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

ss. 196, 196A, 197, 197A, 198

Section 195

Section 195(1)

ss. 172 to 188

Indian Penal Code

Section 195

Section

195

ss. 463, 471, 475 and 476

s. 195

Indian Registration Act, 1877

s. 195

s. 193

Indian Penal Code

Section 5

Income-taic Act, 1922

s. 3

s. 5(7)

s. 5

Chapter III of the Act

State of Mahorashtra

s. 7

s. 10(2)

s. 10(2)

s. 10(4)

s. 10

ss. 12

Chapter IV of the Act

s. 22

s. 23

s. 23A

s. 23B

s. 37

s. 37

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

s. 37

India

State of Uttar Pradesh

s. 195(2)

Kapur

s. 3

Constitution Bench

cl. 29

ss. 3 and 8

Industrial Disputes Act

Art. 136

Shah

Jagannath Prasad

s. 19

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 37

Section 37

ss. 193

s. 196

Indian Penal Code

section 4

s. 37

s. 193

s. 228

s. 196

Indian Penal Code

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

Das fTupta

s. 195

s. 195(2)

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 195(2)

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

Parliament

s. 195

Payment of Wages Act

s. 18

s. 15

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 19

Chapter XXXV of the Code

s. 23

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

ss. 480 and 482

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 480

s. 482

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

s. 26

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 480 and 482

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

section 11

s. 193

s. 22

Indian Penal Code

s. 480

s. 482

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1892

One such statute is the Sea Customs Act

s. 171

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 51

Gurta

s. 37

s. 19

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 37

s. 195

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 193

Indian Penal Code

s. 193

Indian Penal Code

Penal Code

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 4(m)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

Indian Penal Code

Indian Penal Code

Code of Criminal Procedure

Indian Penal Code

s. 193

Indian Penal Code

s. 193

Indian Penal Code

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

Laljl HarltJ.

s. 11

s. 11

Industrial Disputes Act

s. 11

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 480

s. 482

Criminal Procedure Code, 1898

s. 11

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 8

s. 193

s. 228

Penal Code

s. 480

s. 482

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 3

Income-tax Act

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 195

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 476

s. 479A

Code of Criminal Procedure

Section 476

s. 195(l)(b)

Gupta

Section 479A

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 195

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 171A(4)

Sea Customs Act, 1874

s. 193

s. 228

s. 193

s. 228

Indian Penal Code

s. 171A( 4)

s. 37

Income-tax Act

s. 3

Income-tax Act

s. 1115

Presidency Magistrate, Bombay

(1964] 6 S.C.R. 594