7 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 587

GURDEV SINGH SIDHU

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR. [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, M.

H!DAYATULLAH

AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.]

Public Servant-CompulsMy retirement-Constitutional validity-If and when dismis•al. or removal from service- Pepsu Services Regulations V oLume 1, as amended bu notification fasued by G<ivernor under Art. 309 of the Constitution- Constitution of India, Art. 311(2).

The petitioner was appointed as Assistant SUiperintendent of Police in 1942 in the former Patiala State. In 1948 on the formation of Patiala and East Punjab States he was integrated in Pepsu Police Service.

He was promoted to officiate as Superintendent of Police in 1950 by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu, On March 2&, 1963, respondent No. 2, the Inspector-General of Police a.'ld Joint Secretary to the Government of Punjab, issued a notice upon the petitioner under the second proviso to Art. 9.1 of the Pepsu Services Regulation as amended by the Governor by his noiifrcatlon dated January 19, 1960, to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired. The petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quas.lii!ng the said notice on the ground that the said proviso was ultra vires and inoperative by reason of contravention of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and relied on the decision of thie Court in Moti Rn.m Deka v. General Manager, North East FrOTlltier Railway, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600. The said proviso was a,; follows,-

" • • • that Government retains an absolute right to retire any Government servant after he has completed ten years qualifying service without giving any reason and to claim to special compensation on this account will be entertained.

This right will not be exercised except when it is in public interest to dispense with the further services of a Government servant such as on accOU1I1t of inefficiency, dishonesty, COITUPtion or infamous conduct * * *". Held: Artide 9.1 of the Pepsu Services Regulation in prescribing a minimum period of ten years of service for the purpose of compulsory retirement contravened Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and must be struck down.

The only two valid exceptions to the protection afforded by Art. 311 (2) -re,-

(1) where a permanent public servant was asked to retire on the ground that he had reached the age of superannuation which was reasonably fixed;

(21) that he was compulsorily retired under the Rules which prescribed the n.ormal age of superannuation and provided a reasonably long period of qualified service after which almo,:; compulsory retirement could be valid, The first would not amount to dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311(2) and the second would be justified l:y the view taken by this Court in a Joni series of decisions. '\

196l

April 1

19U It is not permissible for a State while reserving to itself .-.- . the power of compulsory retirement by framing a rule pres- Gurdev 8171gh Sidhu cribing a proper age of superannuation to frame another Stat. o/'Pm•jab giving it the power to compulsorily retire a permanent public

and A...U... servant at the end of ten years of his service, for that rule cannot fall outside Art. 311 (2) of the Conatitution.

Moti Ram .Deka etc. v. General. Manager, North East Frontier Railway etc. A.I..R. 1964 S.C. 600, applied Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. and Union of India, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 26 and State of Bombay v. Saubhag Chand M. Doshi, [1958] S.C.R. 571, referred to.

This decision should not be taken to mean that a petition like the present one was competent under Art. 32 of the Constitution.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 200 of 1963.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the fundamental rights.

K. P. Bhandari and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the petitioner.

S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, Gopa/ Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.

April 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

OajetUlmgo, Jkar, O.J.

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J .-This petition which has been filed by the petitioner S. Gurdev Singh Sidhu under Art 32 of the Constitution, challenges the validity of article 9(1) of the Pepsu Services Regulations, Volume I, as amended by the Governor of Punjab by the notification issued by him on the 19th January, 1960 in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling him in that behalf. The petitioner's contention is that the said article contravenes the constitutional right guaranteed to the persons employed in civil capacities either under the Union or the State, by Art. 311.

The petitioner was. appointed as Assistant Superintendent of Police in the erstwhile Patiala State by His Highness Maharaja Adhiraj of Patiala on the 4th of February, 1942.

The conditions of his service were governed by the Patiala State Service Regulations which had been issued by the Ruler of Patiala State who was at the relevant time the sovereign legislature of the State. Later, the petitioner was confirmed in

the rank on the occurrence of a regular vacancy after he had undergone practical district training courses in the Punjab in 1947. On the formation of Patiala and East Punjab States Union on the 20th August, 1948, the petitioner was integrated in Pepsu Police Service. In due course, he was promoted to officiate as Superintendent of Police in February,

1950 by His Highness the Rajpramukh of the erstwhile State of Pepsu.

On the 25th March, 1963, respondent No. 2 S. Gurdial 1964 Singh, Inspector General of Police & Joint Secretary to the Gurdev bi"l!h Bidk• Government of Punjab, issued a notice against the petitioner T. • purporting to act under the second proviso to article 9 .I of 1>1ai:,, i°~::tJ::., ab the Pepsu Services Regulations to show cause why he should "' _ not be compulsorily retired. The petitioner alleges that the Gajendragadkar, O.J, second proviso to article 9.1 under which the said notice has been issued against' him, is invalid, and so, he has moved this Court under Art. 32 for quashing the said notice on the ground that the article on which it is based is itself ultra vires and inoperative. Respondent No. 1, the State of Punjab, and respondent No. 2 have by their counter-affidavit denied the petitioner's contention that the impugned article 9.1 is constitutionally invalid and they have resisted his claim for quashing the notice issued by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner. That is how the only point which arises for our decision in the present petition is whether the impugned article. is shown to be constitutionally invalid.

Before dealing with this point, it is necessary to read the said article : -

"The following shall be added after the first proviso to clause (I) of ; uicle 9.1 of the said regulations:

(ii) "Provided further that Government retains an absolute right to retire any Government servant after he has completed ten years qualifying service without giving any reason and no claim to special compensation on this account will be entertained. This right will not be exercised except when it is in public interest to dispense with the further services of a. Government servant such as on account of inefficiency, dishonesty, corruption or infamous conduct. Thus the rule is intended for use:

(a) against a Government servant whose efficiency is impaired but against whom it is not desirable to make formal charges of inefficiency or who has ceased to be fully efficient, (i.e. when a Government servant's value is clearly incommensurate with the pay which he draws), but not to such a degree as to warrant his retirement on a compaS>ionate allowance. It is not the intention to use the proviso as a financial weapon, that is to say the proviso should be used only in the case of Government servants who are considered unfit for retention on personal as opposed to financial grounds;

Ourd"' 8i"9k Sidhu

(b) in cases where reputation for corruption, dishonesty or infamous conduct is clearly established even though no specific instance is likely v.

Slate of Punjah

and Another to be proved under the Punjab Civil Services

Gajendr09adkar, O.J.

Punishment and Appeal Rules) Appendix 24 of Volume I, Part II or the Public Servants (Inquiries Act XXXVII of 1850).

The word 'Government' used in this proviso should be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause the power of removing the Government servant concerned from service under the Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) 'Rules'.

(iii) Provided further that Government servant should be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action under the rule. Ne> Gazetted Government servants shall, however, be retired without the approval of the Council of Ministers. In all cases of compulsory retirement of gazetted Government servants belonging to the State Services, the Public Service Commission shall be consulted. In the case of non-gazetted Gov .. a, lillent servants the Heads of Deplr!T.ents should effect such retirement with the previous approv:il of the State Government".

This article clearly shows that the absolute right retained by respondent No. 1 to deal with public servants can be used against them if it appears to respondent No. I that the , said public servants suffer from inefficiency, dishonesty, corruption, or infamous conduct. It is also clear that one of the reasons for making the amendment in the Pepsu Services Regulations was to use the power thereby conferred on respondent No. 1 in cases where reputation for corruption, dishonesty or infamous conduct may be established to the satisfaction of respondent Nb. 1 even though no specific instance is likely to be proved under the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules.

This power was likewise intended for use in cases where the incompetence of the Government servant may not be of such an extent as to warrant his retirement on a compassionate allowance. The only safeguard provided by the amended article is that it was not contemplated to use the power conferred by it on financial grounds. Grounds on which the said power was intended to be used were all grounds personal to the Government servaul against whom the said power was exercised ..

Mr. Bhandari for the petitioner contends that the point raised by the petitoner in this petition is, in substance, eon-· eluded by a recent decision of this Court in Moti Ram Deka.

7 S.C.R.

SUl'Rl~~IE COUHT HEl'ORTS 5!)1

etc. v. The General Manager, North East Frontier Rail- 1964 way,(') etc. His argument i; i that the trend of the majority 1;,,, dev Singh s; dhu judgment in that case clearly indicates that the impugned . v, Rule is inconsistent with Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. and -''"'' 01 Punjab h b k d b . . l"d I . h f , and Another as sue . n1ust e struc own as e1ng 1nva 1 . t 1s, t ere ore. _ necessary to examine briefly the effect of the said judgment. 1:aJ.ndra9adkar, 0.1.

In that case. thi:; Court was called upon to consider the validity of Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of the Railway Rub These Rules authorised the termination of services of the railway employees concerned by serving them with a notice fnr :the requisite period or paying them their salary for the said period in lieu of notice. Dealing with the question about the

validity of the said Rules, the majority judgment ob;; crvcd that a person who substantively holds a permanent post has a right to continue in service subject to two exceptions. The .first exception was in rlation to the rule of superannuation. and the second was in regard t\) the rule as to compul:iory retirement.

The majority judgment accepted the position that a rule fixing the age of superannuation which is appli- .cable to all Government servants falling in a particular category was perfectly constitutional because it applies uniformly to the public servants who fall within its scope and it is ba;; ed .on general considerations like life-expectation, mental capacity of the civil servants having regard to the climatic conditions under which they work and the nature of the work they do. They are not fixed on any ad hoc basis and do not involve the exercise of any discretion.

The second exception was affirmed by "the majority judgment with the reservation that

ruk; of compulsory retirement would be valid if having fixed a proper age of superannuation, they permit the compulsory retirement of the public servant,' provided he has put in a minimum period of service; and while affirming this rule, an express reservation was made that in case a rule of compulsory retirement permitted the authority to retire a permanent servant at a very early stage of his career, the question as to whether ; mch a rule would be valid may have to be considered on a proper occasion.

In other words, the acceptence of the doctrine that rules for compulsory retirement were valid and constituted an exception to the general rule that the termination of the services of a permanent servant means his removal within the meaning of Art. 311 (2), was not absolute but qualified.

At this stage, it is necessary to explain why this reservation was made in the majority judgment.

The question which fell to be decided in the case of Moti Ram Deka(') had no reference to the rule of compulsory retirement; but the argument in support of the validity of the rule proceeded

----~--::-:--cc-,--,-·--------·---

'') A.T.R. 1964 S.C. 600 .

SUPRE:\!E UOURT REPORTS [1964]

1964 on the basis that the previous decisions of this Court in which Gurdev Singh SWm the validity of the rlevant rules of compulsory retirement v. had been upheld log1cally supported the contention that the State of Punja-Oimpugned Rules 148(3) and 149(3) were also valid, and thi:, and Another argument made it necessary for this Court to examine the Gajem!ragadkar, C.J. said decisions and to decide whether the observations made in the course of those dcciions supported the contention that Rules 148(3) and 149(3) were valid. Let us briefly refer to some of these decisions.

In Shyam Lal, v. The State of U.P. and the Union of India,(') the article which was examined was 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations. Note 1 to the said article gave the Government an absolute right to retire any officer after he has completed 25 years of service without giving any reasons, and provided that no claim to special compensation can be entertained from the public 8ervant who has been compulsorily retired under it; this article was held to be valid.

In the State of Bombay v. Saubhag Chand M. Dcshi,(') the rule which was considered was 165-A of the Bombay Civil Services Rules as amended by the Saurashtra Gmernment.

This rule gave the Government a :; imilar right to retire a Government servant ;1fter he has completed 25 years of qualifying service or 50 years of age, and it permitted the Government to ask the Government servant to retire compulsorily without giving any reason and without giving him the right to claim special compensation, • The rule further made it clear that the right conferred by it will not be exercised except when it is in the public interest to dispense with the further services of a Government servant such as on account of inefficiency or dishonesty. This rule was also upheld.

Reverting then to the argument which was urged in support of the validity of the Railway Rults challenged in the case of Moti Ram Deka(') the position taken by the learned Additional Solicitor-deneral was that in upholding the impugned rules. the cariier decisions had substantially pro ceeded on the basi; that the premature termination of the services of a permanent Government servant would not in every case amount to his removal within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, and that is how it became necessary to refer to the said decisions which dealt with the question of compulsory retirement. though the problem of compulsory retirement did not fall for the decision of the Court in Moti Ram Deka'sCl case.

The approach adopted by the majority decision in Moti Ram Deka's(") case indicates that the Court was not prepared

(') [1955] I.S.C.R. 26.

(') [1958] S.C.R. 571.

(") A.LR. 1964 S.C. 600.

ro examine the question as to whether the relevant Rules l964 in respect of compulsory retirement which had been upheld Gurdei Singh Bidh" were valid or not. The trend of the majority judgment shows v. . that logically, it would be consistent to hold that the prema-

8~ 1 ;:/~?aiiJ/ 6 ture termination of the services of a permanent Government servant would not amount to hL3 removal under Art. 311(2)Gajendragadkar, O.J. only where such termination is the result of the fixation of a general rule of superannuation. In all other cases where a permanent Government servant is asked to retire compulsorily whether on account of his incompetence, inefficiency, or dishonesty, it may, logically, be open to be suggested that such compuL-, ory retirement is removal within Art. 311(2).

But since 1953, when the case .of Satish Chandra Anand v.

The Union of India(') was decided by this Court there appeared to be a consistent course of decisions which had up held the validity of the rules in regard to compulsory retire ment. No ifoubt, the case of Satish Chandra Anand was one where a person had been employed by the Government of India on a five-year contract in the Reiettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour; but some observations were made in that judgment and similar observations were made in subsequent decisions dealing .with the question of compulsory retirement. The majority judgment in Moti Ram Deka's(') case took the view that it would be inappropriate and inexpedient to reopen an issue which was

covered by several prior reported decisions of the Court.

Besides, the point covered by the said decisions did not directly arise in the case of Moti Ram Deka. Even so, the majority judgment took the precaution of adding a note of caution that if a rule of compulsory retirement purported to give authority to the Government to terminate the services ""' of a permanent public servant at a very early stage of his career, the question about the validity of such a rule may have to be examined. That is how in accepting the view that a rule of compulsory retirement can be treated as valid and as constituting an exception to the general rule that the termination of the services of a permanent public servant would amount to his removal under Art. 311(2), this Court added a rider and made it perfectly clear that if the minimum period of service which was prescribed by the relevant rules upheld by the earlier decL3ions was 25 years, it could not be unreasonably reduced in that behalf. In other words, the majority judgment indicates that what influenced the deci sion was the fact that a fairly large number of years had been prescribed by the rule of compulsory retirement as constitut ing the minimum period of service after which alone the said rule could be invoked. Therefore, it seems to us that Mr. Bhandari is right when he contends that the preient

(') [1953] S.C.R. 655.

(') A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600.

J9a4 article which reduces the minimum period of service to 10 Gurdeu Singh Sidhu years, is open to challenge in the light of the majority decision v. pronounced in the case of Moti Ram Deka(').

Sl<li<' of Punjab

"'"J Another In this connection, it is hardly necessary to emphasise Gajendragadkar, o.J. that for the efficient administration of the State, it is absolutely esiential that permanent public servants should enjoy a sens~ of security of tenure.

The safeguard which Art. 311(2) affords to permanent public servants is no more than this that in case it is intended to dismiss, remove or reduce them in rank, a reasonable opportunity should be given to them of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to them. A claim for security to tenure does not mean security of tenure for dishonest, corrupt, or inefficient public servants. The claim merely insists that before they are removed, the permanent public servants should be given an opportunity to meet the charge on which they are sought to be removed. Therefore, it seems that only two exceptions can be treated as valid in dealing with the scope and effect of the protection afforded by Art. 311(?). If a permanent public servant is asked to retire on the ground that he has reached the age of superannuation which has been reasonably fixed, Art. 311(2) does not apply, because such retirement is neither dismissal nor removal of the public servant.

If a permanent public servant is compuL>orily retired under the rules which prescribe the normal age of superannuation and provide for a reasonably long period of qualified service after which alone compulsory retirement can be ordered, that again may not amount to dismissal or removal under Art. 311 (2) mainly because that is the effect of a long series of decisions of this Court. But where while reserving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public ser

vant, a rule is framed prescribing a proper age of superan nuation, and another rule is added giving the power to the

State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant at the end of 10 years of his service, that cannot, we think, be treated as falling outside Art. 311(2). The termination of the service of a permanent public servant under such a rule, though called compulsory retirement, is, in substance, removal under Art. 311(2). It is because it was apprehended that rules of compulsory retirement may purport to reduce the prescribed minimum period of service beyond which compulsory retirement can be forced against a public servant that the majority judgment in the case of Moti Ram Deka(') clearly indicated that if such a situation arose, the validity of the rule may have to be examined, and in doing so, the im

pugned rule may not be permitted to seek the protection of the earlier decisions of this Court in which the minimum

(') A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600.

qualifying period of service was prescribed as high as 25 1964 years, or the age of the public servant at 50 years. We are, c.,.dsv Singh Siiln.- therefore, satisfied that Mr. Bhandari is right in contending v. . that the effect of the majority decision in the case cf Moti s1ai:. 0~ Pr;:.b Rallr Deka(') clearly is that the impugned article 9.1 contraa no ' venes Article 311(2) of the Constitution and must be struck Gajendragadkar, C.J. dow:1 as invalid.

The result is, the petition succeeds and article 9 .I as ame'!ded by the Governor of Punjab by a notification issued on the 19th January, 1960, is struck down as invalid.

In con:>equence, the notice issued by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner on the 25th March, 1963 must be cancelled.

Before we part with this petition we ought to add that the respondents did not urge before us that the writ petition was not competent under Art. 32 and that the proper remedy available to the petitioner was a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution to the Punjab High Court; that is presumably. because the respondents were anxious to have a decision from this Court on the question about the validity of the impugned article in the Regulations in question. We would, therefore, make it clear that our decision in th~ present writ

petition should not be taken to mean that we have held that a petition like the present is competent under Art. 32 of the Con, titution.

In the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is entitled !o his costs from respondents I and 2.

Petition allowed.

(') A.I.R. 1964 s.c. 600.

587

GURDEV SINGH SIDHU

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. N. WANCHOO

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.

Pepsu Services Regulations

Art. 309

Constitution of India

Art. 311(2)

Pepsu

March 2&, 1963

Art. 9

Art. 32

Art. 311

Art. 311

Art. 311

Art. 311(2)

Art. 311

[1955] 1 S.C.R. 26

Art. 32

Art. 32

Constitution of India

K. P. Bhandari

R. Gopa/akrishnan

S. V. Gupte

R. N. Sachthey

April 1, 1964

OajetUlmgo

GAJENDRAGADKAR

S. Gurdev Singh Sidhu

Art 32

article 9(1)

Art. 309

Art. 311

Patiala

4th of February, 1942

Patiala State

Punjab

Patiala and East Punjab States Union

20th August, 1948

Pepsu Police Service

S. Gurdial 1964 Singh

article 9

Gajendragadkar

article 9

Art. 32

State of Punjab

article 9

Punishment and Appeal Rules

Inquiries Act XXXVII of 1850

Bhandari

Moti Ram Deka

Art. 311(2)

Art. 311

Gurdev Singh

Gajem!ragadkar

Art. 311(2)

Moti Ram Deka'sCl

Gurdei Singh Bidh

Art. 311(2)

Art. 311(2)

Satish Chandra Anand

Government of India

Art. 311(2)

Art. 311(2)

Art. 311(?)

Art. 311(2)

Art. 311

Art. 311(2)

Art. 311(2)

article 9

Article 311(2)

article 9

19th January, 1960

25th March, 1963

Art. 32

Art. 226

Punjab High Court

Art. 32


..Aprill

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196f)

HOCHTIEF GAMMON

INDUSTRIAL l'RIBUNAL, BHUBANESHWAR, ORISSA

AND ORS.

[P. 13. GAJENDRAGADKAR, 'C. J., K. N. WANCHOO AND K. C.

DAS, GUPTA, JJ.]

Industrial Dispute-Addition and Summoning of Partie$- Reference-Powers of Industrial Tribunal-Test and Limitation-Who$e liability to pay Workmen's claim-Who is Employer-Disputes, whether different and substantial-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Ss., 10, 18.

On reference of an Industrial Dispute between the appellants and the respondents, its workmen, the office of the Industrial Tribunal issued notice not only to the appellant and its workmen, the respondents but also to Hindustan Steel Ltd.

This was done apparently because a copy of the notification of the Government containing the order of reference had been served on the said Hindustan Steel Ltd. The Hindustan Steel Ltd. appeared .and urged that it was not concerned or interested in the dispute and should not be added a party to the reference.

The appellant contended, inter alia, that the interests of Hindustan Steel Ltd. and the appellant were common in the pending proceedings, and the material documents which may have to be proved were with the said concern. The Tribunal considered the question and held that it would decide the matter later; meanwhile it directed Hindustan Steel to be present during the hearing of the reference on merits. The appellant, who was dissatisfied with this order as it wanted a specific direction to add Hindustan Steel as a party to the reference, moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This writ petition failed as the High Court held that the petition was premature as the Tribunal had not yet passed a final order under s. 18 (3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On appeal by special Leave: Held: (i) S. 18(b) as it originally stood postulates that the Tribunal had an implied power to summon parties, other than parties to the industrial dispute to appear in the proceedings before it.

(ii) Where certain points of dispute have been referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, it may while dealing with the said points deal with matters incidental thereto, and than parties to the industrial dispute to appear in the proceedthe Tribunal feels that some persons who are not joined to the reference should be brought before it, it may be able to make an order in that behalf under s. 18 .(3)(b) as it now stands.

(iii) Section 10(5) has now conferred power on the appropriaJte Government to add to the reference other establishments, groups or classes of establishments of a similar nature, if it is satisfied that establishments are likely to be interested in, or affected by such dispute. The appropriate Government may add them to the said reference either at the time when the reference is initially made or during the pendency of the said reference proceedings; but in every case, such additions can be made before the award is submitted. Now, if su.ch

_ ..

persons are added to the reference, the Industrial Tribunal may 1964 in exercise of Hs powers under s. 18 (3)(b) summon them to HochtiifGam"'°" appear before 1t. v.

(iv) The material words in s. 18 (3)(b) are the same as they In~';:talT~;"'l, were originally included in s. 18(b), and so, the implied power Ori,.a':::z" Othd• which could be exercised by the Industrial Tribunal under s. 18(b) can now be exercised by it under s. 18(3}(b). If the Tribunal thinks that the parties who were summoned to appear before it were so summoned without proper cause, it may record its opinion to that effect and then the award which it pronounces would not be binding on them.

(v) What the Tribunal can consider in addition to the disputes specified in the order of reference, are only matters incidental to the said disputes and that naturally suggests certain obvious limitations on the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties to the reference before it, purporting to exercise its implied power under s. 18(3) (b). If it appears to the Industrial Tribunal that a party named in the order of reference does not completely or adequately represent the interest either of the employer or of the employee, it may direct the joining of other persons necessary to represent such interest. Similarly if the union specified in the reference does not represent all the employees it may be open to the Tribunal to add such other unions as it may deem necessary. The test always must be, is the addition of the party necessary to make the adjudication itself effective and enforceable? It is in the light of this test that the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties must be held to be limited.

P. G. Brooks, Receiver appointed by the Trustees for the mortgagee debenture holders of the Madras Electric Tramways

(1904) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, A.l.R. 1954 Mad. 369, Radhakrishna Mills Ltd., Peelamadu, Coimbatore Ltd. v. Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras, .A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 606 and Anil Kumar Upadhaya v. P. K. Sarkar. A.l.R., 1961 Cal. 60, referred

~ ...

(vi) The question on whom would rest the liability to pay the respondents' claim as a result of contract between the appellant and. Hindustan Steel raises an entirely different dispute and such dispute would be wholly foreign to the industrial disn.utA which has been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication.

(vii) The question s to who is the employer as betweei'I the appellant and Hmdustan Steel is a substantial dispute between them and cannot be regarded as incidental in any

snse. Where the appropriate Government desires that the quest10n as to who the employer is should be determined it generall~ makes a reference in wide enough terms and in'cludes as parties to the reference different Persons who are alleged to be the employers.

CIVIL APPELLATE .JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 611 of

1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 10, 1962, of the Orissa High Court in o J c No. 128 of 1961. ·

Hocht, ief Gammon

N. C. Chatter; ee, G. Narayanaswamy, l. B. Dadachanii,

0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.

Industrial Tribuiial,

Bliubaneshwa.-r, Ori8sa and Othtr8

Janordhan Sharma, for respondent No. 2 S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. {J. Pai and R. H. Dehbar. for respondent No. 3.

April 1. 1964 The judgment of the Court was delivered by

Gajendragadkar, C.J. GAJENURAGADKAR, C. J.-The short question which this appeal by special leave raises for our decision is in relation to the construction of s. 18 (3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

!947 (No. 14 of

1947) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). This question arises in this way. An industrial dispute in regard to the payment of bonu.s arose between the appellant Hochtief Gammon and the respondents, its workmen, represented by the Rourkela Workers Union, Rourkela. This dispute was referred for adjudication to the Indu:; trial Tribunal, Orissa by the Government of Orissa on the 14th November, 1960. After the reference was received by the Tribunal. it passed an order on the 17th November, 1960 that notice of the reference should be issued to the parties concerned. Purporting to give effect to this order, the office of the Tribunal im1ed notices not only to the appellant and the respondents, but also to the Deputy General Manager of MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. This was so done apparently because a copy of the notification of the Government of Orissa containing the order of reference had been served on the said Dy. General Manager. After the notice issued by the Tribunal was received by the Dy. Gener~!

Manager of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. he appeared before the Tribunal and urged that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. was not concerned or interested in the dispute and should not be added as a party to the. reference.

Meanwhife, the appellant made an application to the Tribunal on the 21st March, 1961 and contended that the interests of MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. and the appellant were common in the proceedings pending before the Tribunal, and so, MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd;. should be joined as a party. In this application, the appellant alleged that M /s Hindustan Steel Ltd. was a necessary party, because the material documents which may have to be proved in the proceedings were with the said concern and, in fact, the enquiry in question would not be complete without the said concern being joined as a party. The Tribunal then considered the question of joining MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. as a party and held that it would decide the mtter later. Meanwhile. the Tribunal directed that MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. which had appeared in response to the notice issued to it should remain present during the hearing of the reference on the merits.

This order did not satisfy the appellant, because it want- 1964 ed a specific direction from the Tribunal to add ~/s Hindu- Hoohti<JGamm•• stan Steel Ltd. as a party to the reference. That 1s why the v. appellant moved the Orissa High Court under Art. 226 of the Industrial Tribu11a.1.

C . . d d h h d d b h T 'b I Bhubaneshwar, onslitutmn an praye t at t e or er passe y t e n una Orissa and 0111.,, refusing to deal with the matter should be set aside and M ! s . - Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be joined as a party to theG•;•ndr09adkar, O.J. reference before it. This writ petition, however, failed, because the High Court took the view that it was premature. The High Court observed that the Industrial Tribunal had not yet passed a final order under s. 18(3)(b) of the Act, and so, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties, the High Court treated the application as incompetent because it was premature.

Against this decision, the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and on its behalf, Mr. Chatterjee has contended that the I!!dustrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to add a party to the proceedings before it and that on the merits, Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be added as a necessary party. That is how the main question which arises for our decision is to determine the scope and effect of the provisons of s. 18(3)(b) of the Act.

In dealing with this question, it is necessary to consider the provisions of s. 18(b) in the Act as it was first enacted. and then consider the provis(ons of s. 18(3)(b) as they now stand. Under the original Act, section 18 consisted of four clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d). We are concerned in the present appeal with Clause (a) and (b).

Section 18(a) and (b) read thus:-

"A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act, or an award which is declared by the appropriate Government to be binding under sub-section (2) of section 15 shall be binding on :

:(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;

(bl all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute unless the Board of Tribunal, as the case ay be records the opinion that they were so sum'. moned without proper cause".

The first q_uestion which we have to consider is, did s. !8(b), as 1t then stood, postula_te an implied power in the Tnbunal to add persons as par!ies to the proceedings who are other ban those who were parties to the industrial dispute? It w1.ll be. noticed that clause (a) refers to all parties to the !ndustrial dispute, whereas clause (b) refers to all other parties summoned to appear. The word "other" seems to suggest that the parties summoned to appear to whom clause

(b) refers are not identical with the parties to the industrial Hochtief Gamm°"' dispute specified by clause (a). Section 2(k) of the Act defines v. an 'industrial dispute', inter alia, as meaning any dispute or Industrial Tribunal, difference between employers and workmen; so that parties

Bhuban., hwcr h d I d' d J ( ) Id Orissa and Oth•s to t e m ustna 1spute un er c a use a wou mean persons - between whom the disp,µte has arisen as prescribed by s. 2(k), Gajendragadkar, O.J. and so, clause (b) contemplates persons other than those who are actually and directly involved in the dispute which is the subject-matter of reference under section 10. Thus, s. 18(b) seems io contemplate that persons other than parties to the industrial dispute may be summoned before the Tribunal.

That takes us to the question as to who can summon these parties'? Section 11(3) of the Act prescribes, inter alia, that the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, when trying a suit in respect of the matters specified in clauses (a) to (d); clause (a) refers to enforcing the a.ttendance of any person and examining him on oath; cl. (b) has reference to the power to compel the production of documents and material objects; cl. (c) is in respect of issuing commissions for thf' examination of witnesses; and clause (d) is in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. It is thus clear that the power to add a party to the proceedings pending before a Tribunal which may be exercised under the Code of Civil Procedure under 0.1 r. 10 is not included in s. 11 (3), and there is no other section which confers such a power on the Tribunal Therefore, if s. 18(b) contemplates that persons other than parties to the industrial dispute can be summoned, there is no specific provision conferring power on the Tribunal to summon them, and that inevitably suggests that the power must be read as being implicit in s. 18(b) itself. 1-

In this connection, it is necessary to refer to s. 10 as it then stood. Section lO(i) then consisted of three clauses which read thus:-

"If any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government may, by order in writmgs :-

(a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or

(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or

(c) refer the dispute to Tribunal for adjudication''.

It is significant that so far as the reference to the Tribunal is concerned, s. lO(i)(c) empowered the appropriate Government to refer the dispute to the Tribunal, and unlike clause (b), this clause did not take within its sweep any matter

• ..

appearing to be coµnected with or re!evan_t to the dipute; 1964 so that in regard to the power to refer an mdustnal dispute HochtiefGammon to the Government Tribunal for its .adjudication, the approv.

Priate Government could make a reference of the disputelndustrialTribiinal. .

Bhubanesltwar, itself and was not expressly clothed with the power to refer Orissa am!. Other• any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, . - such a dispute. The result of these relevant provisions clearly Ga1e1Ulragadkar, G.J. seems to be that if the Industrial Tribunal, while dealing with an industrial dispute, came to the conclusion that persons other than those mentioned as parties to the industrial dispute were necessary for a valid determination of the said dispute, it had the power to summon them; and if such persons were summoned to appear in the proceedings, the award that the Industrial Tribunal may ultimately pronounce would be binding on them. Since in cases where persons were added as parties to an industrial dispute were likely to raise the question as to whether the joinder of the parties was justified or not, s. l 8(b) required that the Tribunal should record its opinion as to whether these persons had been summoned without proper cause. Thus, we are inclined to take the view that Mr. Chatterjee is right in contending that s. 18(b) as it originally stood, postulates that the Tribunal had an implied power to summon parties, other than parties to the industrial dispute, to appear in the proceedings before it. That naturally raises the question about the extent of this power.

In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in mind one essential fact, and that is that the Industrial Tribunal is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is to tr;• an industrial dispute referred to it for its adjudication by the appropriate Government by an order of reference passed under s. 10. It is not open to the Triqunal to travel materially beyond the terms of reference, for it is well-settled that the terms of reference determine the scope of its power and jurisdiction from case to case. Section 10 itself has been subse quently amended from time to time. Act 18 of 1952 made substantial amendments in s. 10. One of these amendments was that s: lO(l)(d) now empowers the appropriate Governwent to refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication. In other words, under s. lO(J)(d), t]).e appropriate Government can refer to the Industrial Tribunal not only a specific industrial dispute, but can a.lso refer along with it matters appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the said dispute. In that sense. !he power of the appropriate Government has been enlan>ed m regard to the reference of industrial disputes to the Tribunal.

1964 Seeton 10(4) which was also added by the same amend- Hochtief '1ammo• ing Act provides, inter alia, that the jurisdiction of the Indus- •· trial Tribunal wouldl be confined to the points of dispute IndU81rial Tribunal, specified by the order of reference, and adds that the said

~'!::':10:~;,,., jurisdictiorr may take within its sweep matters incidental to - the said points. In other words, where certain points of dis- <Jajendrugadkar, O.J. pute have been referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudi

cation, it may, while dealing with the said points, deal with matters incidental thereto, and that means that if, while dealiug with such incidental matters, the Tribunal feels that scme persons who are not joined to the reference should be brought before it, it may be able to make an order in that behalf under s. 18(3)(b) as it now stands.

Section 10(5) has now conferred power on the appropriate Government to add to' the reference other establishments, groups or classes of establishments of a similar nature, if it is satisfied that these establishments are likely to be interested in, or affected by, such dispute. In other words, if industrial dis pute is referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, and in the area within the territorial jurisdicton of the appropriate Government there are other establishments which would be affect· ed by, or interested in, such a dispute, the appropriate Government may add them to the said reference either at the time when the reference is initially made, or during the pendency of the said reference proceedings; but in every case; such additions can be made before the award is submitted. Now, if such persons are added to the reference, the industrial Tribunal may in exercise of its powers under s. 18(3)(b) summoru them to appear before it.

Section 18(b) with which we began, has also been amended by Act 36 of 1956, and it has now been renumbered. As a result, s. 18(b) is now included in s. 18(3)(b). Section 18(3) provides, inter alia, that an award passed by an Industrial Tribunal which has becpme enforceable shall be binding on:

(a) all parties to the industrial disputes;

(b) al! other partis summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Tribunal records the opinion that they were so called without proper cause.

The material words in s. 18(3)(b) are the same as they were originally included in s.18(b), and so, the implied power which could be exercised by the 1 ndustrial Tribunal under s. 18(b) can now be exercised by it under s. 18(3)(b). If the Tribunal thinks that the parties who were summoned to appear before it were so summoned without proper cause, it may record its opinion to that effect and then tlie award which it pr; mounces would not be binding on them.

'7 S.C.R.

SUPRE!\U~ COURT REPORTS 603

Reverting then to the question as to the effec~ of the 1964 power which is implied in s. 1~(3).(b). it is clear that this PO\yer llochtiefGammon .cannot be exercised by the Tribunal so as to enlarge matenalv. • Jy the scope of the reference itself, because basically the juris-Indu•trialTribunal, . . . 1 d 1 . h . d tr" 1 d" t .

Bhuban., hwar, diction of the Tnbuna to ea wit an Ill us Ia !Spu e IS Ori.so and ou,,,78 derived solely from the order of reference passed by the ap- . - propriate Government under s. 10(1). What th~ Tribunal can GaJendragadkar, C.J. consider in addition to the disputes specified m the order of

reference, are only ma, ttern incidental to the said disputes; and that naturally suggests certain obvious limitations on the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties to the reference before it, purporting to exercise its implied power under s. 18-

(3)(b). H it appears to the Tribunal that a party to the industrial dispute named in the order of reference does not completely or adequately represent the interest either on the side of the employer, or on the side of the employee, it ma, y direct that other persons should be joined who would be necessary to represent such interest. If the employer named in a reference does not fully represent the interests of the employer as such, other persons who are interested in the undertaking of the employer may be joined. Similarly, if the unions specified in the reference do not represent all the employees of the undertaking, it may be open to the Tribunal to add such other unions as it may deem necessary. The test always must be, is the addition of the party necessary to make the adjudication itself effective and enforceable? In other words, the test well be, would the non-joinder of the party make the arbitration proceedings ineffective and unenforceable? It is in the light of this test that the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties must be held to be limited.

This question has been considered by the Madras High Court in two reported decisions .. In P. G. Brooks, Receiver appoin!ed by the Trustees for the' mortgage debenture holders of the Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Ors.,(') the .Division Bench of the said High Conrt has held that s. 18(b) by necessary implication gives power to the Tribunal to add parties. It can add necessary or proper party. He need not be the employer or the employee. In that particular case, the party added was the Receiver and it was found .that unless the Receiver was a.dded as a party to the reference proceedings, the adjudical!on. itself would become ineffective. In the words used by the Judgement, the party added was not a rank outsider or a disinterested spectator, but was a Receiver who was vitally concerned with the proceedings before the Tribunal and whose presence was necessary to make the ultimate award effective valid and enforceable. '

(') A.LR. 1954 Mad. 369.

196' In Radhakrishna Mills Ltd. Peelamedu, Coimbatore Dt.

HO<ktie/Gammon v. The Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Ors.(') a single v.

Judge of the Madras High Court followed the earlier decision, Jnd., trial Tribunal, though in this case, a party that was summoned by the Tribuo:f!;:~;::~=; nal had been added to the reference by the State Government under s. 10(5) of the Act. <Jajendragadkar, C.J.

In Anil Kuinar Upadhaya v. V. P. K. Sarkar & Ors.('),

11 learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has accepted the same view. In that case, the Trustee of the Provident Fund in question who had not been impleaded originally to the reference were summoned by the Tribunal and the Court held that in the absence of the Trustees, the award would have become nugatory. ltwould be noticed that in all these decisions. the implied power of the Tribunal to summon additional parties in the reference proceedings is confined onlyto cases where such addition appeared to be necessary for making the reference complete and the award effective and enforceable. Such a power cannot be exercised to extend the scope of the reference and to bring in matters which are not the subject-matter of the reference and which qre not incidental to the dispute which has been referred.

That takes us to the question as to whether the appellant is justified in contending that Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party fo the present proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal, and should, therefore, be. added as such.

Mr. Chatterji has raised two contentions in support of his plea that Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party. The first contention is that if it is ultimately found that the respondent's claim for bonus for the relevant year is well founded, as a result of the contract betwee.n the appellant and Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. the liability to pay the said bonus would rest with the said concern and not with the appellant. The appellant, according to Mr. Chatterjee, is a firm constituted only for a single venture for undertaking the execution of the work of construction and foundation and civil engineering works at Rourkela: it has been engaged by the said concern of M / s Hindustan Steel Ltd. as its agent and in that behalf an agreement has been executed between the parties. Mr.

Chatterjee referred us to some of the relevant clauses of. this a crreement in support of his plea that the liability for bonus. i{ established by the respondents against the appellant. would be not the appellant's but of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. We do not propose to examine the merits of this oten.tion, bcaue

we are satisfied that even if Mr. Chatterjee s contention 1s well-founded by reference to the relevant clauses of te agreement between the parties, that cannot make Ml s Hindustan

Steel Ltd. a necessary party within the meaning of s. 18(3)(b).

(') A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 606. (') A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 60.

This contention raises an entirely different dispute between ~~ the appellant and its alleged principal and such a dispute Horluie/Gammo•·

would be wholly foreign to the industrial dispute which has . v. . been referred to tile Tribunal for its adjudication.

1 "fi~':,~F,',!:',':'"· "' The next contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee is that Mis OT"1saand0thera Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party because it is the Gajendr,;; adkar, o.J. said concern which is the employer of the respondents and

not the appellant.

In either words, this contention is that though in form the appellant engaged the workmen whom the respondent union represents, the appellant was acting as the agent of its principal and for adjudicating upon the industrial dispute referred to the Tribunal by the State of Orissa, it is necessary that the principal, viz., Ml s Hindustan Steel Ltd. ought to be added as a: party. In dealing with this argument, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the appellant does not dispute the respondent Union's case that the workmen were employed by the appellant. It would have been open to the State Government to ask the Tribunal to consider who was the employer of these workmen and in that case, the ierms of reference might have been suitably framed.

Where the appropriate Government desires that the question as to who the employer is should be determined, it generally makes a reference in wide enough terms and includes as parties to the .. reference different persons who are alleged to be the employers. Such a course has not been adopted in the present proceedings, and so, it would not be possible to hold that the question as to who is the employer as between the appellant and Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a question incidental to the industrial dispute which has been referred under s. 10- (1 )(d). This dispute is a substantial dispute between the appellant and MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. and cannot be regarded as incidental in any sense. and so, we think that even this ground is not sufficient to justify the contention that M f s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party which can be added and summoned under the implied powers of the Tribunal under s. 18(3)(b).

The"result is, though we accept Mr. Chatterjee's argument that s. 18(3)(b) postulates the existence of an. implied power • in the Tribunal to add parties and summon them, in the present case that power cannot be exercised, because havino regard to the limited nature of the implied power, Ml~ Hindustan Steel Ltd. cannot be regarded as a necessary party under the provisions of s. 18(3)(b). The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

HOCHTIEF GAMMON

INDUSTRIAL lRIBUNAL, BHUBANESHWAR, ORISSA AND ORS

P. 13. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. N. WANCHOO

GUPTA, JJ.

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Hindustan Steel Ltd.

Hindustan Steel

Art. 226

s. 18

Industrial Disputes Act

S. 18(b)

s. 18

Section 10(5)

s. 18

s. 18

s. 18(b)

s. 18(b)

s. 18(3}(b)

s. 18(3)

P. G. Brooks

Hindustan Steel

Hmdustan Steel

C. Mathur

Ravinder Narain

Janordhan Sharma

S. V. Gupte

G. {J. Pai

R. H. Dehbar

Gajendragadkar

GAJENURAGADKAR

s. 18

Industrial Disputes Act

Hochtief Gammon

Rourkela Workers Union, Rourkela

Government of Orissa

14th November, 1960

17th November, 1960

MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd.

Meanwhife

21st March, 1961

Hindustan Steel Ltd

Orissa High Court

Art. 226

s. 18(3)(b)

Chatterjee

Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd.

s. 18(3)(b)

s. 18(b)

s. 18(3)(b)

section 18

Section 18(a)

section 15

Section 2(k)

Bhuban

s. 2(k)

section 10

s. 18(b)

Section 11(3)

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 11

s. 18(b)

s. 18(b)

s. 10

Bhubanesltwar

s. 18(b)

s. 10

Section 10

s. 10

Second Schedule

Third Schedule

Jajendrugadkar

s. 18(3)(b)

Section 10(5)

s. 18(3)(b)

Section 18(b)

s. 18(b)

s. 18(3)(b)

Section 18(3)

s. 18(3)(b)

s. 18(b)

s. 18(3)(b)

s. 1

s. 10(1)

GaJendragadkar

s. 18

Madras High Court

s. 18(b)

s. 10(5)

Jajendragadkar

Calcutta High Court

Chatterji

Rourkela

Chatterjee

Hindustan

Steel Ltd.

s. 18(3)(b)

Orissa

s. 10

s. 18(3)(b)

s. 18(3)(b)

s. 18(3)(b)


.Aprill

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]

RA.MACHANDRA NARASIMHA KULKARNI v .

STATE OF MYSORE

[K. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)

Post Offices Act-WilfU:lly detaining postJal articles--The meaning of the exvression "wilful"-Mere negligence or inadvertance not enougl>-Detention must be for a purpose- Post Offices Act, 1898 (VI of 1898) s. 53.

The appellant was a registration clerk in a post office. He was prosecuted on the allegation that he committed theft of a half of a ten rupee note contained in a registered letter along with a petition for exchanging it, for altering the petitic, n and for detaining the registered letter for a day with the purpose of committlng the theft and making the alteration. He was charged under Ss. 52, 53 and 54 respectively of the Post Offices Act, 1898. The Sessions Judge who tried the case found him not guilty of the offence under s. 52 but guilty under Ss. 53 and

55. On appeal to the High Court he was found not to be guilty of the offence under s. 55; the conviction under s. 53 was maintained. Thereupon he appealed to this Court.

It was contended by the appellant before this Court that assuming that he detained the envelope he cannot be said to have detained it "wilfully", unless it is shown that he had some purpose in doing it and since the purpose alleged by the .Prosecution has not been proved the appellant cannot be said to have committed the offence under s. 53.

Held: per K.

Subba Rao and K. C. Das Gupta, JJ.

A review of the case law brings out clearly the guiding principle that the meaning to be attached to the words "wilful' or

"wilfully" has to be ascertained on a close examination of the scheme and nature of the legislation in which the words appear and the context in which they are used.

Re Young and Harston, 31 Ch. D. 174 Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills, [1933] (2) K.B. 669 United States of America v.

Harry Murdock, 78 Law, Ed. 689, Hudson v. Official Liquidator, A.LR. 1929 All. -826, In re T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty, 19ol

2 S.T.C. 27 and In re Jayarama Chettiar, I.L.R. 1949, Mad. 121 referred to.

(ii) A comparison of the various sections of the Act shows that the legislature took a more serious view of the offence of wilful detention of postal articles than any of the offences in Ch. X and has, therefore, prescribed a comparatively heavy punishment. Hence it is reasonable to think that in s. 53 when the word "wilfully" was used the legislature also intended that the detention would be punishable only if made for some purpose.

(iii) The prosecution alleged in the Jlresent case that the purpose was theft of the note but the existence of that purpose has not been established and detention was not deliberate and hence the appellant cannot be said to have detained the arti- .cle wilfully.

Per Raghubar Dayal, J. (dissenting}-- The legislature where it intended to make the purpose behind an act an ingredient expressly stated so, as for example in s. 52. If the word "wilful" or "wilfully" is used in the Act as

a synonym for an act done deliberately and for some purpose, the expression wilful could have been used in the place of "for any purpose whatsoever". This the legislature did not do though it used that in s. 53.

(ii) The mere act of detaining a postal article by any person other than a postal officer is made punishable with only fine under s. 67 and a higher punishment is provided under s. 53 because the culprit is an officer of the post office who has opportunities to detain the, postal articles and who acts contrary to his duties.

(iii) The expression "wilfully" in s. 53 means "intentionally and deliberately" and not "accidently" or 'lnegligently''.

(iv) From the facts of the case it is proved that the appellant deliberately detained the registered letter. His intention and deliberation were directed towards the detaining of the registered Jetter and to the non-forwarding of it in due course with the mail that day. Every intentional and relevant act must be with some purpose or object. He, therefore obtained the letter wilfully and is guilty of the offence under s. 53.

Taylor v. Verget>te

(861) 30 L.J. Ex. 400, Reg. v. Senior

(1899) 1 Q.B 283, Tamboli v. Great India Peninsular Railway Company, L.R. 55 I.A. 67, Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills Ltd. [1933] 2 K.B. 669, Hudson v. Official Liquidator, A.LR., J.929 All. 826 and T. N. K. Govindaraju!u Chetty, 1951 S.T.C. Vol. 2, 26, referred to.

CRlMINAL APPELLATE JuR)SDICTION: Ctiminal Appeal No. 202 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated August 1, 1962, of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1961.

W. S. Bar/ingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appelbnt.

R. Gopalakrislman and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent.

April ], 1964. The Judgment of SUBBA RAO and OAS GUPTA JJ. was delivered by OAS GUPTA J. RAGHUBAR DAYAL J delivered a dissenting opinion.

Ramad1andra•

Narasimha

J[ulkarni ...

State of Mysore

DAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant, who was a registration DasGupta, J clerk in the Haveri Post Office in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53

nd s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act. The prosecution case 1s that on the 18th October 1955 a registered letter contuining half portion of a ten-rupee note and petition on behalf of one M uppayyagonda asking for the said note to be exchanged for a fresh note was received at the Haveri Post Office at 4.30 p.m. from the Branch Post Office at Kabbur. he appellant who was a, registration clerk at Haveri at the time, however, detained the registered envelope instead of

Bamachandm

Nara8imha

Kulkarni

Stare of Mg•ore

Da8 Gupta, J,

despatching it that very day as he should have done. He despatched it the next day. It was the prosecution case that the appellant removed the half portion of the ten-rupee currency note from inide the envelope and to cover up his misconduct ma.de alterations in the petition contained in the envelope and in the list of registered articles. All this was discovered, it is said; when the Reserve Bank of India, to which this envelope was addressed made enquiries in the matter on finding that no note had been enclosed with the petition. The appellant admitted that the envelope was received at the Haveri Post Office on October 18, 1955 and also that he did not despatch it on that date. His case was that it was received at about 5.30 p.m. on the 18th and so it was too late for despatch on that date but that he despatched it duly on the 19th ..

On a consideration of the evidence the Sessions Judge held that the charge under s. 52 of the Indian Post Office Act for the theft of currency note and for secreting the registered articles had not been established and acquitted him of that charge. He, however, found it proved that the appellant had fraudulently altered the lists of registered articles and thereby committed an offence under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act. He also held that the appellant had wilfully detained the envelope and thus committed an offence under s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act. He accordingly convicted the appellant of the charges under Ss. 53 and 55 of the Indian Post Office Act and sentenced him to undergo two months' imprisonment on each charg~. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.

On appeal, the High Court of Mysore set aside the appellant's conviction under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act but maintained his conviction under s. 53, being of opinion that while the wilful detention of the envelope by the appellant had been proved. the alleged alterations by him in the

lit of registered articles had not been established. Against the High Court's decision the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant, Ramchandra Narasirnha Kulkarni.

In support of the appeal it is contended by Dr. Barlingey that as the allegations of theft of the note or of alterations in the list of registered articles by the appellant have not been established, the appellant must be held not to have committed any offence under s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act. It is argued that assuming that the envelope was detained by the appellant as alleged, he cannot be said to have detained it 'wilfully" unless it is shown that he had some purpose in doing it. But, the purpose alleged by the prosecution was that he wanted to commit theft of the currency note, and to cover this up, to make alterations in the list of registered articles, these purposes have not been established. So, argues the learned Counsel, the detention of the envelope should be held

to have been made without any purpose but only through inadvertance or mere carelessness. That would not constitute, according to the learned Counsel, a. wilful detention.

The words "wilful" and "wilfully" are frequently used in many statutes and have come up for judicial consideration in the courts of this country as also elsewhere. The meaning given to these words have differed in different contexts. Sometimes, any intentional act has been held to be a wilful a.ct. (Re Young and Harston)('). Often, it has been said that the word wilful suggests bad conduct or action though it does not necessarily connote blame. (Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills)('). Not infrequently the word has been used to mean that the act had been done with a bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely. (United States of America v. Harry Murdock)(').

Some decisions stress the requirement of deliberation or reckless disregard of the fact whether the act was or was not in breach of duty in deciding whether it has been wilful. (Hudson v. Official Liquidator('); and In re T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty)('). In the last mentioned case, viz., In re T.N.K.

Govindarajulu Chetty's case, -the Madras High Coui:t held that .a submission of a false return cannot be a wilful submission unless the dealer has deliberately made the return with the knowledge that he was e)\cluding a taxable item, though in almost similar circumstances another Bench of the same High Court took a different view and held that even though when an assessee, under the impression that a particular item is not taxable and, therefore, need be excluded in the return, omits to make a mention' of it in the return which he furnished with the full knowledge of his having committed the same, he has "wilfully" omitted it. Un re Jayarama Chettiar) (').

A review of these various decisions brings out clearly the guiding principle that the meaning to be attached to the words

"wilful" or "wilfully" has to be ascertained on a close examination of the scheme and nature of the legislation in which the words appear and the context in which they are used.

Turning now, for this purpose, to the Indian Post Office Act, we notice that s. 53 which makes punishable the wilful detention or delay of a postal article by an officer of the post office in one of the several sections which create offences under this Act. There are 21 such sections, being sections 49

(') 31 Ch. D. 174.

(') 78 Law E. 389.

(') 1951 2 S.T.C. 27.

LIP(D)lSC!-20

(') 1933(2) K.B. 669.

(') A.I.R. 1929 All. 826.

(') I.L.R. 1949 Madras, 121.

196'

Ram~

Nararimha

Kolkarni

Stat.of Mg..,.

V..Gwpla, J.

Ramackandra

Naro.aimha Kull:arni

Blatt ~I Myaore

Das Gupta, J.

to 56 and 58 to 70, all in Chapter X of the Act. Some of these offences, viz., those under Ss. 49, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65. 66 and 67 are punishable only with fine. The offences under Ss. 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 68 and 69 are made punishable also with imprisonment.

Of these again, the offences under s. 53, are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven. years; offences under Ss. 53, 54, 55, 56.

60, and 68 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years; offences under Ss. 61 and 62 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year while offences under Ss. 51 and 69 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months only. An offence under s. 50 is punishable with imprisonment extending to one month or with fine extending to Rs. 50 /-.

This comparison clearly shows that the legislature took a more serious view of t!ie offence of wilful detention of a postal articles (s. 52) than of many other offences in this Chapter. Delay in the conveyance or delivery of a mail bag or other postal articles in the course of transmission by a person employed to car.y the same is made punishable with only a fine of Rs. 50 /- (s. 49). Withdrawal from duties of office without permission or without having given a month's previous notice in writing by a person employed to carry or deliver a mail bag or postal article is also made punishable only with imprisonment extending to one month or with fine extending to Rs. 50 /-. Making of a false entry in the register with intention to induce the belief that an article has been delivered is ma.de punishable with imprisonment extending to only six months or with fine extending to Rs. 100/-. But wilful detention of a postal article is made punishable with imprisonment extending to two years. Is it reasonable to think that the legislature would prescribe this heavy punishment for detention of a postal article which was not deliberate and on purpose, while prescribing lighter punishment as mentioned above for the offences under Ss. 49, 50 and 51. We do not think so. The very fact that this comparatively heavy punishment of two years' imprisonment has been prescribed for wilful detention while lighter punishment has been prescribed under Ss. 49, 50 and 51, justifies, in our opinion, the conclusion that the word "wilful" was used by the legislature to mean only such detention which was deliberate and for S•lme purpose.

It is interesting to notice in this connection that in the preceding section 52 the legislature after making punishable

the offence of theft of a postal article or of dishonest misappropriation of the same, also made punishable the secretion, destruction or throwing away any postal article if done "for any purpose whatsoever". It is, in our opinion, reasonable to think that in s. 53 when the word "wilfully" was used, the

,.., l

'7 S.C.R.

SUPRElllE COURT REPORTS 611

legislature also intended that the detention would be punishable only if made for some purpose.

Coming now to the facts of the present case, we find that the prosecution alleged a definite purpose. viz .• the purpose of theft of the contents of the envelope-as the purpose with which the postal article was detained. The existence of that

purpose has not, however, been established. Nothing was suggested before us as W what other purpose the appellant could have had in detaining the article. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the detention was not deliberate and on purpose, but as a result of either inadvertence or carelessness or negligence. So, the appellant cannot be said to have detained or delayed the article 'wilfully'.

Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court and order that the appellant be acquitted of the charge against him.

Ramachan&ra

... ~arasimha

Ktlkarni

State of .Jf ysore

/J(H Oupl.a, J.

RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The main question to determine, Raghnhar DayaJ, J, in this case, is what the expression 'wilfully detains or delays' in s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898), hereinafter called the Act, means.

I do not agree that it means such detention which was deliberate and for some purpose. I am of opinion that the detention or delay would be 'wilful' if it was intentional and. deliberate on the part of the officer of the post office, as opposed to detention or delay on account of negligence or inadvertence. The word 'wilful' or 'wilfully' used in other enactments have been construed by Court in this manner. I may refer to some of these cases.

Jn Taylor v. Vergette(') 'wilful delay' has been construed to mean 'intentional delay'.

In Reg. v. Senior(') Lord Russel said:

•• 'Wilfully' means that the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it".

In Tamboli v. Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company('> the Privy Coqncil had to construe the expression 'wilful negiect' in determining the responsibility of the railway administration or its servants and approved of what was said by Lord Russel in Reg. v. Senior(').

(') (1861) 30 L.J. Ex. 400.

(') [1889] 1. Q.B. 283, 290. ' (') L.R. 55 I.A. 67=!.L.R. 52 Born. 169.

J. P(D)I~CI-20(•)

Ramachaw:lra

Naraftmha

Kulkarni

Stale of My•ore

.la971.War Dayal, J.

In Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd.(') it was said:-

" 'Wilful act' is plain English, and I can entertain no doubt that the installing of this machine without guard or fence for use in .the factory was a wilful act by some one. It was an act, and it was intentional. It is true that though 'wilful' and 'inten- . tional' are synonymous ...... 'wilful' is more commonly used in modern speech of bad conduct or actions than of good, though it does not necessarily connote blame; but that is far from supporting the stra.nge contention that wilful act in s. 29, sub-s. 1, must be confined to something done with intent to injure".

In Hudson v. Official Liquidator(') 'wilful default' was construed and it was said at p. 930:

"The adjective 'wilful' in 'wilful acts or defaults' has

evidently been used as a description and not as a definition. The idea intended to be conveyed is that the default .is occasioned by the exercise of volition or as the result of the non-exercise of will due to supine indifference, although the defaulter knew or was in a position to know that loss or harm was likely to result. The word does not necessarily suggest the idea of moral turpitude.

We ha.ve also to eliminate the elements of accident or inadvertence or honest error of judgrment. The default must be the result of deliberation or intent or be the consequence of a reckless omission. 'Wilful default', therefore, is indicative of some misconduct in the transaction of business or in the discharge of duty by omitting to do some, thing either deliberately or by a reckless disregard of the fact whether the act or omission was tor was not a breach of duty".

This view was accepted by the Madras High Court in T.N.K. Govindaraju/u Chetty, ln reO.

The words 'wilful' and 'wilfully' have been used in th<' various provisions of the Act do not lead to any different interpretation of these words.

Section 6 of the Act provides, inter a/ia, that no officer of the Post Office shall incur any liability by reason of any loss, mis-delivery, delay or damage, unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by his wilful act or default.

(') [1933] 2 K.B. 669. (') A.I.R. 1929 All. 826.

(') 1951 2. S.T.C. 27.

Section 48(c) provides that no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against the Government or any officer of the post office in respect of the payment of any money order being refused or delayed by, or on account of, any accidental neglect, omission or mistake _by, or on the part of an Officer of the post office, or for any other cause whatsoever, other than the fraud or wilful act or default oi such officer; and brings out effectively the contradistinction between wilful act or default of an officer and an act done on account of accidental neglect, omission or mistake.

Section 49 to 70 provide for offences. Sections 49, 50 and 51 deal with offences which are committed by persons who arc employed to carry or deliver any mail bag or any postal article, in course of transmission by post. They are thus offences by carriers of postal articles. They can be committed both by the officers of the postal department and by others as well. Such of the acts contemplated by those sections which can also fall under the other sections exclusively applicable to officers of the post office, will naturally be dealt with under those sections. The persons who will be dealt with under Ss. 49 to 51 or other sections providing for lighter punishments will be those who are not officers of the postal department but are concerned in any manner with the transmission of the post.

Clause (c) of s. 49 makes punishable the loitering or making delay in the conveyance or delivery of any mail bag or postal article, and thus emphasizes the neceity of prompt transport of postal articles.

Sections 52 to 66 provide for offences by officers of a post office.

Section 52 provides punishment for committing theft or dishonestly misappropriating in respect of or, for any purpose whatsoever, secreting, destroying or throwing away any postal article in the course of transmission by post or anything contained therein. The offence is punishable with imprisonment upto seven years and also with fine. This is the most serious offence.

It is to be noted for our purpose that the secreting, destroying or throwing away of the postal article for any purpose whatsoever is an offence. An act done with a purpose must be a deliberate act and a. deliberate act must also be one done with some purpose: The legislature, where it intended to make the purpose behind an act an ingredient of the offence, expressly stated so. If the word 'wilful' or 'wilfully' is used in the Act as a synonym for an act done deliberately and for some purpose, the expression 'wilfully' could have been used in the place of 'for any purpose whatsoever' .

This, however, the legislature did not do, though it used that word in the very next section, viz., s. 53 which reads:

Eanuichandra

].; arasimha ]{ulkarni v. .State of JJf ysore

ughuhar 1Jr1y1,1.l,

ll unachrin.drri

Nara8imlia Kulkarni

Shite of My.m,,

Ragltubrir Doyal, J.

"Whoever, being an officer of the Post Office, contrary to his duty, opens. or causes or suffers to be opened, any postal article in course of transmission by post. or wilfully detains or delayed or cau.>es or suffers to be detained or delayed, any such postal article, sball be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with botb:

Provided that nothing in this section shall extend to the opening, detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of this Act or in obedience to the order i(l writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court".

Sections 54, 55 and 56 make certain acts done fraudulently, knowingly or with intent, punishable with imprisonment upto two years or fine. Section 55 makes the fraudulent altering or secreting or destroying of a document which an officer of the post office is entrusted with keeping, punishable with imprisonment upto two years and with fine. This act is considered less heinous than that of secreting, destroying or throwing away of any postal article in the course of transmission by post, for any purpose whatsoever.

Section 66(1) makes the master of a ship who, in certain circumstances, knowingly has in his baggage or in his possession or custody, any postal article within the exclusive privilege conferred on the Central Government by s. 4, punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 50/- for every such postal article. Here a certain act committed knowingly is made >- an offence. Sub-s. (2) of s. 66 makes the detention of any postal article, after a demand for it has been made by an officer of the post office, punishable. Here, the mere detention after a demand is made penal irrespective of the intention or purpose behind such detention.

Section 67 makes the detention of mails or any postal article in the course of transmission by post by anyone except under the various circumstances mentioned in the section, an offence. Here again, mere detention is made an offence irrespective of the circumstances in which it is made, excepting for reasons mentioned in the section iteself.

Section 68 reads :

"Whoever, fraudulently retains, or wilfully secretes or makes away with. or keeps or detains, or when required by an officer of the post office, neglects

.!I or refuses to deliver up, any postal article in

course of transmission by post which ought to have been delivered to any other person, or a mail bag containing a postal article, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be punishable with tine".

It is to be noticed that 'wilfully' secreting any post"! article in the course of transmission by post is an offence under this section. A comparison with the provisions of s. 52 of the Act indicates that the legislature must have used the expressions 'wilfully' and 'for any purpose whatsoever' in different senses.

Lastly, s. 69 makes certain acts committed wilfully and maliciously with intent to injure any person, offences. 'Wilfully' here is used as something distinct from 'maliciously' and is. further used in addition to the expression 'with intent to injure any person', that is to say, the particular purpose or intent is an ingreuient of the offence in addition to 'wilfully'.

Sections 6 and 48(c) provide that an o!licer of a post oftice would be liable for the loss, .misdelivery, delay or of damage to any postal article in the course of transmission or for the delay in the payment of a money order, only when this happens as a result of his wilful act or default. The person suffering from such misdelivery etc., has no claim against

the o!licer cf the post office if that thing has been the result of something which could not be said to be the wilful act or default of a postal officer. It is no concern of the addressee or recipient of an article in transit by post that the wilful act or default of the postal officer was with a certain purpose or not and whether that officer succeeded in that purpose or not.

He should be successful in his claim if the postal officer has deliberately not acted in the manner he is required to act under the Act or the rules framed thereunder or if he has deliberatelv acted in violation of the duties entrusted to him. In either case. the a.ct d the ollicer concerned would be wilful inasmuch as he would act intentionally in violation of his duty or in a manner in which he is not to act and not accidently or inadvertently.

The provisions of s. 53 of the Act require that the officer 1vilfully detains' the postal article and that the act of detention be contrary to his duty prescribed by or under the Act. Section 21 (2)(c) empowers the Central Government to make rules providing for the detention and disposal of articles in course of transmission by post in certain circumstances. Sections 22(1), 23, 26, 27B and 37(2) provide for the circumstances in which postal articles can be detained or delayed. It is not necessary to detail those circumstances. The clause 'contrary to his duty' governs both the act of opening;

Romad1andra

li, araBitnlta

Kulkarni

State of Mysore

R11{Jhubar Dayal, J ..

616 SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS [1964]

19111 of the Postal article and to the act of detaining it. The first Runarlumdra necessary ingredient of the offence under s, 53 is that

N""'';,,,1,,, the postal officer should act contrary to his duty. Such an act, K,,!k<lrni however. can take place by accident or negligence also, with-

S1<1te rrlfy, orc out the officer's knowing it or even giving any thought to it -- :rnd therefore without his exercising his will in that matter.

Raglru7.ar D"!f'11• J. The legislature. therefore, felt that accidental or negligent acts be not made offences and that/detention of the postal article, even if it be contrary to duty; be protected and that only such detention of the articles be made punishable which be

wmmitted wilfully, i.e., when the officer applied his mind towards the act and has committed it deliberately with the intention of committing it.

The mere act of detaining mails or postal articles by any person other than a postal officer is made punishable only with fine under s. 67 of the Act. This indicates that the punishment under s. 53 is severe because the culprit is an officer of the post office who has opportunities to detain the postal article and who acts contrary to his duty.

The proviso to s. 53 refers to cases which would have come within the main provisions, and provides that the main provisions do not extend to the opening. detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of the Act or in obedience to the order in writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court. Such acts would be undoubtedly deliberate and without any criminal purpose.

The use of the expression 'for any purpose whatsoever' in s. 52 is no guide to construe the word 'wilfully' in s. 53.

It appears to have been used in s. 52 in contradistinction t0 the mens rca necessary for the commission of the offence of theft or of dishonest misappropriation. Its use makes it clear that the act of secreting, destroying or throwing away of the postal article will be punishable if with a purpose, whatever that may have been.

I. therefore. construe 'wilfully' in s. 53 to mean 'intentiomilly and deliberately' and not accidently or negligently and hold that the appellant has been rightly convicted of the offence under that section.

I am further of opinion that even if the expression 'wilfully detains' in s. 53 of the Act means, a detention deliberate and for some purpose, the appel(ant is not entitled to an acquittal on the findings the Courts have arrived at.

The appellant. in ordinary course of business,.would have forwarded the registered letter by the mail on October 18, 1955 when it had been received at the usual hour and the appellant's contention that it was received after the despatClh

of the mail has not been accepted. It follows that the appel- 1964 !ant deliberately detained the registered letter. The intention Ramacltandra and deliberation was directed towards tlie detaining of the Narasimlin registered Jetter and to the non-forwarding of it in due course Kulkarni with the ma.ii that day. Every intentional and deliberate act Stale of Mysore must be with some purpose or object. It may be that in some -- cases the object be achieved by the mere doing of the act Ragliul>ar Dayal, J. intended, that is to say, the object was just the doing of that act. In other cases, an act may be done with some further object also. The appellant's purpose behind his intentional act of detaining the registered letter must ha.ve been to remove what he might have suspected the letter to contain. If he did not have any such object, he could not have any reason to depart from his duty and detain the letter instead of sending it by the next mail in the ordinary course of his duties. His act, therefore, .in detaining the letter, amounted to his detaining it wilfully.

The fail\Jre of the prosecution to establish successfully that he himself opened the letter, tempered with its contents and removed the half currency note, facts which have been proved to have been committed by someone, does not mean that his detaining the letter was not on purpose.

A person may do an act with a c.ertain purpose and yet may not succeed in his purpose. Even if he succeeds it may not be possible for any otherperson to establish tha, t he did that act for that purpose and did succeed in achieving that purpose.

I would. therefore, dismiss the appeal.

ORDER BY COURT In accordance with th~ i_najority opinion, the appeal is allowed, the order of conv1cl!on and sentence set aside and

te appellant ordered to be acquitted of the charge against him.

Appeal allowed.

RA.MACHANDRA NARASIMHA KULKARNI

STATE OF MYSORE

K. SUBBA RAO

K. C. DAS GUPTA

RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.

Post Offices Act

s. 53

Ss. 52, 53 and 54

Post Offices Act, 1898

s. 52

Ss. 53 and

55

s. 55

s. 53

s. 53

T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty

Jayarama Chettiar

s. 53

Raghubar Dayal

s. 52

s. 53

s. 67

s. 53

s. 53

s. 53

L.R. 55 I.A. 67

Mysore High Court

W. S. Bar

A. G. Ratnaparkhi

R. Gopalakrislman

B. R. G. K. Achar

SUBBA RAO

OAS GUPTA

J. RAGHUBAR DAYAL

Narasimha

J[ulkarni

State of Mysore

DAS GUPTA

DasGupta

s. 52

s. 53

s. 55

Indian Post Office Act

18th October 1955

M uppayyagonda

Haveri Post Office

Kabbur

Haveri

Da8 Gupta

Reserve Bank of India

October 18, 1955

s. 52

Indian Post Office Act

s. 55

Indian Post Office Act

s. 53

Indian Post Office Act

Ss. 53 and 55

Indian Post Office Act

High Court of Mysore

s. 55

Indian Post Office Act

s. 53

Ramchandra Narasirnha Kulkarni

Barlingey

s. 53

Indian Post Office Act

T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty

T.N.K.

Govindarajulu Chetty

Jayarama Chettiar

Indian Post Office Act

s. 53

sections 49

Nararimha

Kolkarni

Das Gupta

Chapter X of the Act

Ss. 49, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65

s. 53

Ss. 53, 54, 55, 56

Ss. 61 and 62

Ss. 51 and 69

s. 50

s. 52

s. 49

Ss. 49, 50 and 51

Ss. 49, 50 and 51

section 52

s. 53

Ramachan&ra

~arasimha

Ktlkarni

State of .Jf ysore

Raghnhar DayaJ

s. 53

Indian Post Office Act, 1898

Russel

L.R. 55 I.A. 67

s. 29

s. 1

Madras High Court

T.N.K. Govindaraju

Section 6

Section 48(c)

Section 49 to 70

Sections 49, 50 and 51

Ss. 49 to 51

s. 49

Sections 52 to 66

Section 52

s. 53

Eanuichandra

Central Government

Sections 54, 55 and 56

Section 55

Section 66(1)

s. 4

s. 66

Section 67

Section 68

s. 52

s. 69

Sections 6 and 48(c)

s. 53

Section 21

Sections 22(1), 23, 26, 27B and 37(2)

State of Mysore

R11{Jhubar Dayal

Raglru7.ar D"!f'11• J. The legislature

s. 67

s. 53

s. 53

s. 52

s. 53

s. 52

s. 53

s. 53

Kulkarni

Ragliul>ar Dayal