8 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

commencement of the amending Act. The Legislature has given to s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, only a limited retrospective operation i.e., upto April 1, 1956, only.

That provision must be read subject to the rule that in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the Legislature does not intend to attribute to the amending provision a greater retrospectivity than is exrressiy mentioned, nor to authorise the Income•tax Officer to commence proceedings which before the new Act came into force had by the expiry of the period provided, become barred.

The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW

KANPUR COAL SYNDICATE

(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)

Income Tax-Assessment on Association of persons or on members indi

vidually-Option to appropriate authority-Right of appeal, whether such assessee has--Powers of Tribunal and Appellate Assistanl Commissioner in Appeal-Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), n. 3, 14(2) (b) 30, 31 and 33.

Income-tax was assessed upon the total income in the hands of tho respondent-assessee, an association of several persons combined together for the purpose of purchase of coal and its supply to customers

for domestic purposes and other small scale industries. The assesseo claimed that it should not be assessed to tax as an association of persons, but the proportion of the income in the hands of each members of the association might be assessed to tax instead. The Income-tax Officer refused this request and an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was dismissed. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, on a further appeal. held that though the Income-tax Officer had power to assess income of the association of persons as such or in the altematiye on the individual members thereof in respect of their proportionate sharo fn the income, the tribunal had no power under the Act to direct tho Income-tax Officer to exercise his power in one way or other. On a

196'

Lal orul Co.

Y. s. s. Gadill

Sltah J.

April, 30.

Syndical•

reference, the High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal had power to set aside the Income-tax Officer's assessment against the usocia1io4 and to give consequential and ancillary 'directions to the said officer to assess individuala.

HBLD:-(i) Section 3 of the Income-tax Act impliedly gives an option to an appropriate authority to assess the total income of either the association of persons or the members of such association individually.

Commissioner of Income-tax v.

Reddy Mallaram, (1964) SI I.T.R. 285 (S.C.) followed.

(ii) 3uch an assessee has a right to appeal under s. 30 of the Act against the order of the Incom.,.tax Officer assessing the association of persons instead of the members individually.

(iii) The Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to give directions to the appropriate authority to cancel the assessment made on the associ.a lion of persons an'd to give appropriate directions to the authority concerned to make fresh assessment on the members of that associationa individually. The phraseology used both ins. 31 ands. 33 does not restrict the powers of the Appellate Ass:stant Commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal; both have the power of such direction.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 673 of 1963.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 22, 1960, of the Allahabad High Court in Income-tax Miscellaneous Case No. 188 of 1953.

S. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.

Veda Vyasa and Naunit Lal, for the respondent.

April 30, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Subba Rao 1.

SUBBA RAo, J.-The question for decision in this appeal is whether when the Income-tax Officer in his discretion assessed an association of persons to income-tax, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner iii appeal or the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in further appeal can set aside that order and direct him to assess the members of that association individually.

The facts lie in a small compass and they are .as follows: The assessee consisted of several persons combined together for the purp<ise of purchasing coal in order to supply the

same to customers for domestic purposes and other small scale industries.

For the assessment year 1948-49 the Income-tax Officer levied tax upon the total income in the hands of the said as, ociation of persons.

The assessee claimed that in th.: drcumstances of the case it should not be assessed to , ax as an association of persons, but the proportion of the income in the hands of each of the members of the association might be assessed to tax instead. As the Income-tax Officer did not comply with this request, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but it was dismissed.

On a further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal held that though the Income-tax Officer had the power to assess the income of the association of persons as such or in the alternative on the individual members thereof in respect of their proportionate share in the income, it (the Tribunal) had no power under the Act to direct the Income-tax Officer to exercise his power in one way or other.

The following question was referred to the High Court of Allahabad under s. 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922:

"If in pursuance of s. 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act the Income-tax Officer levies the income tax in respect of the total income of the previous year of an association of persons upon the said association of persons as a collective unit, whether the Tribunal is competent to direct the Income-tax Officer to levy the income tax proportionately upon the individual members of the said association of persons in respect of the proportionate income of each of the members consisting the said association of persons."

A Division Bench of the High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal had power to set aside the Income-tax Officer's assessment against the association and to give consequential and ancillary directions to the said Officer to assess the individuals.

Learned counsel for the Revenue contends that under the [ndian Income-tax Act 1922, he reinafter called the Act the Income-tax Officer h; s no option but to assess the total

Cl.T. v.

Kanpur Coal

Syndicate

Subba Rao I.

CJ.T.

Kanpur Coal

Syndicate

Subba Rao I.

income of the association of members, though the individual's share in the income may be added to his individual income for the purpose of ascertaining his total income. He further argues that even if the Income-tax Officer has the option to assess to income-tax the association of persons on its total income or the individual members thereof in respect of their proportionate share of the income, if he had exercised the option in one way or other neither the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal nor the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in further appeal has power to direct the Incometax Officer to exercise his discretion in a different way; and for this conclusion he seeks to draw strength from his further submission that no appeal lies at the instance of the association of persons when they are assessed as one unit on the ground that the Officer should have assessed the individual members of the said association.

At the outset it will be convenient to read the relevant provisions of the Act.

Section 3. Charge of Inoome-tax: Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions, of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local auority, and of every firm and other association of persons or the part;1ers of the firm or the members of the association individually.

Section 14. (2) The tax shall not be payable by an asses see--

• • • • * *"

(b) if a member of an association of persons other than a Hindu undivided family, a company or a firm, in respect of any portion of the amount which he is entitled to receive lrom the association on which the tax has already been paid by the association.

8 S.C.R

SUPREME COURT KEPORTS

Section 30. ( 1) Any assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed under section 23 ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . or the amount of tax determined under section 23 .......................... ·

................ or denying his liability to be assessed . under this Act ....................... may appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the assessment or against such refus.al or order:

Section 31. (3) In disposing of an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment,- ( a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or

(b) set aside the assessment and direct the Incornetax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making such further inquiry as the Income-tax

Officer thinks fit or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may direct, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assessment and determine where necessary the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment.

x x x x x x

( 4) Where as the result of an appeal any change is made in the assessment of a firm or association of persons or a new assessment of a firm or associations of persons is ordered to be made, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may authorise the Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made on any partner of the firm or any member of the association.

Section 3 imposes a tax upon a person in respect of his total income.

The persons on whom such tax can be imposed are particularized therein, namely, Hindu undivided family, company, local authority, firm, association of persons, partners of firm• or members of association individually.

The section, therefore, does not in terms confer any power on any particular officer to assess one of the

CJ.T. v • Kanpur Coal

Syndicate

Subba Rao J.

CJ.T. v.

Kanpur Coal

Synd(cate

Subba Rao J.

persons described therein, but is only a charging section imposing the levy of tax on the total income of an assessable entity described therein.

The section expressly treats an association of persons and the individual members of an association as two distinct and different assessable entities.

On the terms of the section the tax can be levied on either of the said two entities according to the provisions of the Act.

There is no scope for the argument that under s. 3 the assessment shall be only on the association of persons as a unit though after such assessment the share of the income of a member of that association may be added to his other income under s. 14 ( 2) of the Act.

This construction would make the last words of the section, viz., "members of the association individually" a surplusage.

This argument is also contrary to the express provisions of s. 3, which m1rk out the members of the association individually as a separate entity from the association of persons.

Income of every person whether he is a member of an association or not is liable to the charge under the head "every individual".

Section 14 ( 2 )(b) only says that if such an individual happens to be a member of an association of persons which has already been assessed, the tax would not be payable in respect of t)ie share of his income again.

That under the Act an assessment can be made on an association of persons as a unit or, alternatively, on the individual members thereof in respect of their respective shares of the income was assumed by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Raja Reddy Mallaram(').

We, therefore, hold that s. 3 impliedly gives an option to .an appropriate authority to assess the total income of either the association of persons or the members of such association individually.

The next question is whether the said option is given only to the Income-tax Officer and is denied to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appell.ate Tribunal.

Under the Act the Income-tax Officer, after following the procedure prescribed, makes the assessment under s. 23 of the Act.

Doubtless in making the assessment at the first instance he has to exercise the option whether he should assess the association of persons or the members thereof

(1) [1964] 51 I.T.R. 285 (S.C.)

individually. It is not because that any section of the Act confers an exclusive power on him to do so, but because it is part of the process of assessment; that is to say, he has to ascertain who is the person liable to be assessed for the tax.

If he seeks to assess an association of persons as an assessable entity, the said entity can object to the assessment, inter alia, on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the assessment should be made on the members of the association individually.

The Income-tax Officer may reject its contention and may assess the total income of the. association as such and impose the tax on it.

Under s. 30 an assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed . under s. 23 or the amount of tax determined under the said section or denying his liability to be assessed under the Act can prefer an appeal against the order of the Income-tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is said that an order made by the Income-tax Officer rejecting the plea of an association of persons that the members thereof shall be assessed individually does not fall under one or other of the i:hree heads mentioned above.

What is the substance of the objection of the assessee?

The assessee denies his !ability to be assessed under the Act in the circumstances of the case and pleads that the members of the association shall be assessed only individually.

The expression "denial of liability" is comprehensive enough to take in not only the total denial of liability but also the liability to tax under particular circumstances.

In either case the denial is a denial of liability to be assessed under the provisions of the Act. In one case the assessee says that he is not liable to be assessed to tax under the Act, and in the other case the assessee denies his liability to tax under the provisions of the Act if the option given to the appropriate officer under the provisions of the Act is judicially exercised.

We, therefore. hold that such an assessee has a right of appeal under s. 30 of the Act against the order of the Income-tax Officer assessing the association of members instead of the members thereof individually. If an appeal lies, s. 31 of the Act describes the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in such an appeal. Under s. 31 (3)(a) in disposing of such an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or

C.l.T.

Sylulicate

Subba Rao/.

Syndicate

Subba Rao J.

annul the assessment; under cl. (b) thereof he may set , aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment.

The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has, therefore, plenary powers in disposing of an appeal.

The scope of his power is coterminous with .that of the Income-tax Officer.

He can do what the Income-tax Officer can do and also direct him to do what he has failed to do.

If the Income-tax Officer has the option to assess Jne or other of the entities in the alternative, the Appellate As.ist ant Commissioner can direct him to do what he should have done in the circumstances of a case.

Under s. 33(1 ), an assessee objecting to an order passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under s. 28 or s. 31 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 60 days of the date on which such order is communicated to him.

Under s. 33( 4 ), "The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, and shall communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the Commissioner." Under s. 33 ( 5), "Where as the result of an appeal ny change is made in the assessment of a firm or association of persons or a new assessment of a firm or association of persons is ordered to be made, the Appellate Tribunal may authorise the Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made on any partner of the firm or any member of the association".

Under this section the Appellate Tribunal has ample power to set aside the assessment made on the associatien of persons and direct the Income-tax Officer to assess the individuals or to direct the amendment of the assessment already made on the members.

The comprehensive phraseology used both in s. 31 and s. 33 of the Act does not countenance the attempt of the Revenue to restrict the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or of the Appellate Tribunal; both of them have power to direct the appropriate authority to assess the members individually instead of the association of persons as a unit.

We, therefore, hold, agreeing with the High Court, that the Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to give directions to the appropriate authority to cancel the assessment made on the association of persons and to give appropriate directions

,--

i"'

to the authority concerned to make a fresh assessment on the members of that asociation individually.

The answer given by the High Court to the question propounded is correct.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

KETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA

(K. SuB!lA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. S1KRI, JJ.)

Income-tax-Compensation received for surrendering managing agency- ]/ capital or revenue-Test-lncome .. tax ... tct, 1922 (11 of 1922), ss. 2(6c), 10, 12.

By an agreement \vith the Fort Willi:in1 Jute Company in 1925 the appellant company becm1e its Managing Agent.

The terms, inter .ilia, were that the appellant or its successors, unless they chose to resign, were to continue as l\1anaging Agent until they ceased to hold certain shares in the capital of the company and were on that account re1noved by a resolution of the company or their tenure of office was determined by the winding U? _of the company.

On termination of the agency, the Managing Agent was to get such reasonable compensation as was agreed upon bet\'leen the !\1a0aging Agent and th~ comvany.. Besides this managing agency the appellant held five other man<iging agencies.

In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant. The appellant intimated the members of the latter company that it would be in the best interest of the share-holders to terminate the appellant's agency which would otherwise continue till 1957 and that .M/S. Mugneeratn Bengur & Co. had agreed to reimburse the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. for payment of Rs. 3,50,000 as compensation to the appeIIant.

The arrangement with M/s.

Mugneeram Bangur & Co. was accepted by the Fort William Jute Co. and the appellant tendered resignation.

M/s. Mugneeram Bangur and

C9.

Syndicate

Subba Rao }.

May I.

commencement of the amending Act

s. 18

Finance Act, 1956

April 1, 1956

KANPUR COAL SYNDICATE

K. SUBBA RAO, J.

C. SHAH

Section 3

Income-tax Act

s. 30

Allahabad High Court

S. K. Kapur

R. N. Sachthey

Veda Vyasa

Naunit Lal

Subba Rao

SUBBA RAo

Assistant Commissioner

Income-tax Appellate Tribunal

High Court of Allahabad

s. 66

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 3

Income-tax Act

Income-tax Act 1922

Section 3

Section 14

Section 30

section 23

section 23

Section 31

Section 3

s. 3

s. 14

s. 3

Section 14

s. 3

s. 23

s. 30

s. 23

s. 30

s. 31

s. 31

Subba Rao/.

s. 33(1 )

s. 28

s. 31

s. 33( 4 )

s. 33

s. 31

s. 33

KETTLEWELL BULLEN

K. SuB!lA RAo

ss. 2(6c), 10, 12

Mugneeram Bangur & Co.

Fort William Jute Co., Ltd.

Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and

Fort William Jute Company

Mugneeratn Bengur & Co.

Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.

Mugneeram Bangur & Co.

Fort William Jute Co.

Mugneeram Bangur

Subba Rao


8 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 93

to the authority concerned to make a fresh assessment on the members of that asociation individually.

The answer given by the High Court to the question propounded is correct.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

KETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA

(K. SuB!lA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. S1KRI, JJ.)

Income-tax-Compensation received for surrendering managing agency- ]/ capital or revenue-Test-lncome .. tax ... tct, 1922 (11 of 1922), ss. 2(6c), 10, 12.

By an agreement \vith the Fort Willi:in1 Jute Company in 1925 the appellant company becm1e its Managing Agent.

The terms, inter .ilia, were that the appellant or its successors, unless they chose to resign, were to continue as l\1anaging Agent until they ceased to hold certain shares in the capital of the company and were on that account re1noved by a resolution of the company or their tenure of office was determined by the winding U? _of the company.

On termination of the agency, the Managing Agent was to get such reasonable compensation as was agreed upon bet\'leen the !\1a0aging Agent and th~ comvany.. Besides this managing agency the appellant held five other man<iging agencies.

In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant. The appellant intimated the members of the latter company that it would be in the best interest of the share-holders to terminate the appellant's agency which would otherwise continue till 1957 and that .M/S. Mugneeratn Bengur & Co. had agreed to reimburse the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. for payment of Rs. 3,50,000 as compensation to the appeIIant.

The arrangement with M/s.

Mugneeram Bangur & Co. was accepted by the Fort William Jute Co. and the appellant tendered resignation.

M/s. Mugneeram Bangur and

C9.

Cl.T. v Kanpur Coal

Syndicate

Subba Rao }.

May I.

lCtttlew•ll Bun.n

and Co. ...

CJ.T.

became the Managing agent.

The appellant received the sum ol Rs. 3,50,000 and credited the sum in its profit and 1068 account as having been received from the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. on account of com pensation for loss of office and in calculating the net profit for the purpose of income-tax for the year 1953-54 did not include this amount in the return. The Income-tax Officer in assessment included the amount in the appellant's taxable income. The Assistant Appellate Com missioner on appeal modified the assessment holding that the sum received by the appellant as compensation for surrendering the managing agency, which was to enure for five years more and might have continued for another twenty years, was a capital receipt. The Appel1ate Tribunal confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.

At the instance of the Commissioner , of Income-tax the following question was referred to the High Court:

Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the sum of Rs. 3,50,000 received by the assessee to relinquish the managing agency was a revenue receipt assessable under the Indian Income-tax Act?.

The High Court answered the question in the affirmative.

HELD: that the answer should be in the negative. The transaction in question was not a trading transaction, but one in which the asses., ee parted with an asset of enduring value. The compensation received was compensation for loss of capital.

It was inconsequential whether the appellant conducted the remaining agencies after the determination of the one in question.

Where payment is made as compensation for cancellation of a contract which does not affect the trading structure of the business, nor causes 'deprivation of what in substance is c of income, and is a normal incident Gf the business, the compensation is revenue. But 'vb.ere the cancellation impairs the trading structure or results in loss of tbe source of income, the compensation paid for the cancellation of the aareement is normally rapital receipt.

Commissioner of Income-tax Na1pur v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Yalji, 35 l.T.R. 148, referred to.

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace and Co. L.1l. 59 I.A. 206, explained.

Raja Bahadur Kamakshaya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v. Co1n111i.s• aioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orism, L.R. 70 I.A. 180, Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax Madras v. South India Pictures, 29 I.T.R. 910, Peirce Leslie and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncometnx, M11dras, 3R l.T.R. -356, Commissioner of lncome•tax, Hyderabad-Deccan

v. Vazir Sultan and Sonz. 36 I.T.R. 175 and Godrej & Co. Y. Commis- •ionor of Income-tax, Bombay City, 37 I.T, R.. 381, discussed.

c, viL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 226 of 1963.

1964 Appeal from the judgment and order dated August I, i961, of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 75 of 1956.

Kri.rhna Warriar

•nd Co.

S. Chaudhuri, D. N. Mukherjee and D. N. Gupta, for the appllant.

K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.

May 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J .-The appellant is a public limited company. and has its registered office at Calcutta. By an agreement dated May l, 1925, the Fort William Jute Company Ltd. appointed the appellant its managing agent upon certain terms and conditions set out therein. Under the agreement the appellant was to receive as managing agent remuneration at the rate of Rs. 3 ,000 per month, commission at the rate of ten per cent on the profits of the company's working, additional commission at three per cent on the cost price of all new machinery and stores purchased by the managing agent outside India on account of the company, and interest on all advances made by the managing agent to the company on the security of the company's stocks, raw materials and manufactured goods.

The appellant 'and its successors in business, whether under the same or any other style or firm, unless they resigned their office were entitled to continue as managing agent until they ceased to hold shares in the capital of the company of the aggregate nominal value of Rs. 1,00,000 and were on that account removed by a special resolution of the company passed at an Extraordinary meeting of the company, or until the managing agent's tenure was determined by the winding up of the company.

In the event of termination of agency in the contingencies specified, the managing agent was to receive such reasonable compensation for deprivation of office, as may be agreed upon between the .managing agent and the company and in case of dispute, as may be determined by two arbitrators.

By cl. 8, the managing 'agent was at liberty at any time to

CJ.T.

Shah J.

1964 resign the office of managing agent by leaving at the register-

~11/ewell Bullen ed office of the company previous notice in writing of its

and Co. intention in that behalf. The agreement did not specify any

c~.T. period for which the managing agency was to enure. Since

Shah J. the successors of the appellant were also to continue as

agent~, unless they resigned or became disqualified, the duration was in a sense unlimited. But by virtue of s. 87-A(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the appointment of the appellant as managing agent would expire on January 14, 1957, i.e. on the expiry of twenty years from the date on which the Indian Companies (Amendment) Act, 1956, was brought into operation. Section 87-A(2), however, did not prevent the managing agent from being re-appointed after the expiry of that period.

Beside the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. the appellant held at all material time managing agencies of five oilier limited companies, viz., Fort Closter

Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bowreach Cotton Mills Co.

Ltd., Dunbar Mills Ltd., Mothola Co. Lld and Joonktollee Tea Co.

Ltd.

The appellant had advanced Rs. 12,50,000 to the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. on the security of the stocks, raw materials and manufactured goods of that company. The appellant held in 1952, 600 out of

14,000 ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 100 each, and 6,920 out of 10,000 preference shares also of the face value of Rs. 100 each.

On May 21, 1952, the appellant entered into an agreement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co., the principal conditions of which were:

(i) M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to purchase the entire holding of shares of the appellant in the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.-ordinary shares at Rs. 400 each and preference shares at Rs. 185 each, and to make an ofier to all holders of the company's shares-preference and ordinary-to purchase their holdings at the same rates;

(ii) M/ s Mugneeram Bangur & Co~ to procure repay

ment on or before June 30, 1952 of all loan!

8 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 97 ' made by the appellant to the principal com- 1964 pany; _- ' .. •.(.. l Kettlewell .Bullen and Co.

(iii) M/s Mugoeeram Bangur & Co. to procure that v.

C.l.T. the . principal company will compensate , the appellant for loss of office in the -sum ·. of

- Rs. 3,50,000, such sum being payable to the

 appellant. after it submitted its resignation as managing_ agent; and

(iv) M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to reimburse the company the amount payable to the appellant.

The reasons for which the appellant agreed to relinquish the managing agency were set out in a letter dated May 28, 1952, addressed by the appellant to the members of the., company intimating thar M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. were willing to purchase the shares at the same rates at which they had agreed to purchase the share-holding of the appellant. It was recited in the letter that the installation of modem machinery in the company's factory entailed heavy capital expenditure and it was necessary to obtain a loan secured by debentures charged on the company's property; that large sums were required for renewals and replacements of machinery and it was not possible to obtain additional bank accommodation; that the' appellant had made large -advances to the company -exceeding Rs. 12,50,000 and, having regard to its other commitments, it was doubtful if it would be able to make available to the company additional finance; that the arrangement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co., by acceptance of the terms offered ty them, was the most satisfactory method of solving the company's difficulties; that it was in the best interests of the shareholders to terminate the appointment of the appellant which in the normal course would not fall due for renewal until January 14, 1957; that 'lvl/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. had agreed Jo procure that the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. will pay to the appellant Rs: 3,50,000 and that M/s Mug-. neeram Bangur & Co. will reimburse the company for the payment, it being anticipated that they will in due course

De appointed managing agents of the company.

51 S.C.-7

Shah /.

SUPI~El\IE COURT REPORTS

1964 The arrangement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co.

Kettlrn-:; u- Bullen was carried out.

The appellant tendered its resignation and Co. with effect from July l, 1952, in pursuance of the terms of c".i.T. the agreement and M/s Mungneeram Bangur & Co. were Shah 1• appointed as managing agent of the company. The sum of _ __Rs. 3,50,000 received by the appellant from the companywhich it is common ground was provided by M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co.-was credited in the profit and loss account of the appellant as received from the Fort William Jute Co.

Ltd. on account of compensation for loss of office. -But in arriving at the net profit in the return for income-tax for the year 1953-54 this amount was deleted. In the proce_edings for assessment for the year 1953-54 the Incometax Officer, Companies District IV, Calcutta, included this amount in the appellant's taxable income. In -appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner modified the assessment holding that the_ sum of Rs. 3,50,000 received by the appellant as compen'sation for surrendering the managing agency; which was to enure for five years more, and which in normal course might have continued for another term of twenty years, was a capital receipt. The Appellate Tribunal confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissiciner, observing that compensation received under an agreement for "an outright sale of such an agency to a third party", not being one which a businessman enters in the normal course of business. nor being one which amounts to modification, alteration or discharge of normal incidents of such a business, was not assessable to income-tax as a revenue receipt.

At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Tribunal referred under s. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the following question to the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta:

"Whether on the fact~ 1'nd in the circumstances of the case the sum of Rs. 3,50,000 received by the assessee to relinquish the managing agency was a revenue receipt assessable under the Indian Income-tax Act?"

The High Court, for reasons which we will presently set out, answered the question in the affirmative. With certificate Kettlewell Bullla granted by the High Court, this appeal is preferred by the and Qi. v. appellant.

C.l.T.

This case raises once again 'the question whether compensation received by an agent for premature determination of the contract of agency is a capital or a revenue receipt.

The question is not capable of solution by the application of any single test: its solution must depend on a com:ct appraisal in their true perspective of all the relevant facts.

As observed in Commissioner of Income-tax Nagpur v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji(') by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.,:

"The question whe<her a receipt is capital or income has frequently come up for determination before the courts. Various rules have been enunciated as furnishing a key to the solution of the question, but as often observed by the highest authorities, it is not possible to lay down any single test as infallible or any single criterion as decisive in the determination of the question, which must ultimately depend on the facts of the particular case, and the authorities bearing on the question are valuable only as indicating the matters that hav, e to be taken into account in reaching a decision.

Vide, Van Den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark [(1935) 3 I.T.R. (Engl. Cas.) 17]. That, however is not to say that the question is one of fact, for as observed in Davies (H. M. Inspector of Taxes)

v. Shell Company of China Ltd. (1952) 22 l.T.R. (Suppl.) 1) 'these questions between capital and income, trading profit or no trading profit, are questions which, though they may depend no doubt to a very great extent on the particular facts of each case, do involve a conclusion of law to be drawn from those facts'."

(t) [I9.l9] Supp. I S.C.R. no, II3.

Shah J,

Kett/ewe// Bullen and Co. v.

C.l.T.

Shah J.

The interrelation of facts which have a bearing on the question propounded must therefore first be determined.

The managing agency was not, except in the circumstances set out in cl. 2 of the agreement, liable to be determined at the instance of the company before January 14, 1957, unless the appellant by giving notice of three weeks voluntarily resigned the agency. At the date of termination the agency had five more years to run, and the Campanies Act did not prohibit renewal of the agency in favour of the appellant, after the expiry of the initial period of twenty years.

The appellant company was formed for the object, amongst others, (vide cl. 3(2) of the Memorandum of Association of the appellant) of carrying on the business of managing agencies.

The appellant was entitled under the terms of the agreement to receive so long as the agency enured ten per cent of the profits of the company's working, three per cent on all purchases of stores and machinery abroad, and a monthly remuneration of Rs. 3,000. The appellant submitted its resignation in exercise of the power reserved under

cl. 8 of the managing agency agreement, but that resignation was it is common ground part of the arrangement with Mis Mugneeram Bangur & Co. dated May 21, 1952.

Under the terms of the managing agency agreement, the principal company was not obliged to pay any compensation to the appellant for voluntary resignation of the agency, but in consideration of the appellant parting with its shareholding and submitting resignation of the managing agency so as to facilitate the appointment of M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. as managing agent, the latter purchased the shareholding of the appellant, undertook to make available Rs. 3,50,000 for payment to the appellant and to discharge the debt due by the company to the appellant. Payment of Rs. 3,50,000 was therefore an integral part of an arrangement for transfer of the managing agency. A managing agency of a company is in the nature of a capital asset: that is not denied. It is true that 'it is not like an ordinary asset capable of being transferred from one person to another.

Theoretically the power to appoint or dismiss the managing agent may lie with the directors of the company, but in practice the power lies with the person or persons having a controlling interest in the share-holding of 1964 the company. M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. were anxious Kettlewell Bulltit

to be appointed managing agents of the principal company, and Co. v. and for the purpose the appellant had to be persuaded to

CJ.T. agree to a premature termination of its agency. This was Shah 1. secured for a triple consiqeration; sale of shares held by the appellant at an agreed price, stipulation to discharge the liability of the company to repay the loans due by the company, and payment of Rs. 3,50,000 as compensation for termination of the appellant's agency.

The High Court summarised the effect of the agreement between the appellant and M/s Mugnecram Bangur & Co. as follows: The sum of Rs. 3,50,000 described as compensation for loss of office of the managing agent was part of the whole scheme incorporated in the agreement.

Each clause of the agreement was a consideration of the other clauses and payment of compensation for the alleged loss of office did not, being part of the total scheme, stand by itelf.

Determination of the managing agency of the appellant was not compulsory cessation of business: it was a voluntary resignation for which under the agency agreement the appellant was not entitled to any compensation, but by the device of procuring a purchaser the appellant was doing "business of selling the managing agency and getting a profit and value for it which it otherwise could not have

got".

The High Court stamped this transaction with the nature and character of a "trading or a business deal", be:cause in their view the managing agency of a companyan institution peculiar to Indian business conditions-which r.reates a managing agent as an alter ego_ of the managed company with authority to utilise the existing structure of the company's organisation to carry on business, earn profits,

and in fact, virtually to trade in every possible sphere open to the company, may be regarded as circulating capital, where several managing agencies are conducted by an

m; sessee.

Therefore in the view of the High Court the c:ompensation received for surrendering the agency was remuneration received on account of conducting the business, and was income. The judgment of the High Court proceeded substantially upon the following two grounds:

1964 "ani.wen Bullen

ond Co.

(1) that on the facts of the case, the managing agency held by the appellant of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. was stock-in-trade; and v.

C.I.T.

Shah 1.

(2) that the appellant was formed with the object of acquiring managing a¥encies, and in fact held managing agencies of as many as six companies.

Earning profits by conducting the management of companies, being the business of the appellant, compensation received as consideration for surrendering the managing agency was a revenue receipt.

We are unable to agree with the High Court that the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. was an asset of the character of stock-in-trade of the company.

The appellant was formed with the object, among others, of acquiring managing agencies of companies and to carry on the business and to take part in the management, supervision or control of the business or operatiom of any other company, association, firm or person and to make profit out of it. That only authorised the appellant to acquire as a fixed asset, if a managing agency may be so described, and to exploit it for the purpose of profit. But there is no evidence that the company was formed for the purpose of acquiring and selling managing agencies and making profit by those transactions of sale and purchase. A managing agency is not an asset for which there is a market, for it depends upon the personal qualifications of the agent. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Commissioner concedes that the case that the managing agency was of the nature of stock-in-trade was not set up before the Tribunal, and he does not rely upon this part of the reasoning of the High Court in support of the plea that the compensation received by the appellant is a revenue receipt. He relies upon the alternative ground, and contends that the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. was part of the framework of the business of earning profit by working as managing agent of different companies, and in the normal course, termination of employment by the principal companies of the appellant as managing agent being a normal incident of such business, compensation received by the appellant is

not for loss of capital, but must be regarded as a trading 1964 receipi, especially when the termination of the agency does Kettlewell Bullen not impair the tructure of the business of the appellant. and Co. v.

In the present case there is a special circumstance

CJ.T. which must first be noticed.

In truth the amount of Shah J.

Rs. 3,50,000 was received by the appellant from M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. in consideration of the former agreeing to forego the agency which it held and which M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. were anxious to obtain. It was in a business sense a sale of such rights as the appellant possessed in the agency to M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. This is supported by the recitals made in cl. 2 of the agreement that if a• any time within six months after the completion of such sale, M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. were unable to exercise the voting rights attached to the shares purchased by them, the appellant will appoint any person nominated by M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to attend and vote for them at any meeting of the company or the holders of any class of shares to be held within such period in such manner as M/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. may decide. The object underlying the agreement was therefore to transfer the managing agency to M/s Mugnecram Bangur & Co. or at least to effectuate their appointment in place of the appellant as managing agent of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.

All the stipulations and the covenants of the agreement, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, do stamp the transaction as one of surrender of the rights of the appellant in the managing agency so that corresponding rights may arise in favour Qf M/s. Mugneeram Bangur & l o. It would be irrelevant in considering the true nature of 1he transaction, to project the somewhat legalistic consideration that a managing agency is not transferable. It is because it is not directly transferable, that the arrangemP.nt incorporated in the agreement was effected.

It would be difficult to regard such a transaction relating to a managing agency as a trading transaction.

(; ounsel for the assessee contended that even assuming that the form of the.transaction under which for Joss of the managiilg agency the appellant received compensation from the principal company is decisive, or has even a dominant

~ impact, and the ultimate source from which the compensa- Ke11/mel! Bul!en tion was provided is to be ignored, the compensation receivand Co. ed for loss of agency by the agent must always be regarded v.

C.l.T. under the Indian Income-tax Act as capital receipt. In sup- Shah 1. port of that contention counsel placed strong reliance upon the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace and Co.('). In the alternative, counsel pleaded that even if the extreme proposition was not found acceptable, the right of the assessee in the managing agency of the principal company was to enure fur another five years and which in the normal course would have continued for another twenty years was an enduring asset and consideration received by the appellant for extinc

tion of that asset was a capital receipt.

On behalf of the Income-tax Department it was contended that Shaw Wallace & Co's case (1) does not lay down any proposition of general application to compensation paid for determination of all agency contracts.

It was further submitted that, having regard to the nature of the agreement and the voluntary resignation submitted by the assessee, no enduring asset remained vested in the assessee, and none was attempted to be transferred: the compensation directly paid by the principal company (which compensation was under the terms of the contract not payable) was only a "measure of profit" which the appellant wonld, but for the resignation, have earned, and was therefore in the nature of revenue. It was also urged that compensation was not payable to the assessee when resignation of the managing agency was tendered under cl. 8 of the agreement, and therefore the amount sought to be brought to tax was received by the assessee in the course of a normal trading transaction of the assessee.

Finally, it was urged that in any event, by the loss of the agency the framework of the business of the assessee was not at all impaired, and therefore also the compensation received must be regarded as revenue and not capital.

Whether a particular receipt is capital or income from business, has frequently engaged the attention of the courts.

It may be broad, Iy stated that what is received for Joss of capi-

(1) L. R. 59 I. A. 206

8 S.C.R

SUPREME COURT REPOI<TS 105

ta! is a capital receipt: what is received as profit in trading ~964 transaction is taxable income.

But the difficulty arises in Ke111ewTi Bullen ascertaining whether what is received in a given case is and Co. v. compensation for loss of a source of income, or profit in a

CJ.T. trading transaction.

Cases on the borderline give rise to vexing problems.

The Act contains no real definition of income; indeed it is a term not capable of a definition in terms of a general formula.

Section 2(6C) catalogues broadly certain categories of receipts which are included in income. It need hardly be said that the form in which the transaction which gives rise to income is clothed and the name whirh is given to it are irrelevant in assessing the exigibility of receipt arising from a transaction to tax. It is again not predicated that the income must necessarily have a recurrent quality.

We are not called upon to enter upon an extensive area of enquiry as to what receipts may be regarded as income generally, but merelv to consider in this case whether receipt of compensation for surrendering the managing agency may be regarded as capital or as revenue. In the absence. of a statutory rule, payment made by an employer in consideration of the employee releasing him from his obligations under a service or agency agreement or a payment made voluntarily as compensation for determination of right to office arises not out of employment, but from cessation of employment and may not generally constitute income chargeable under ss. 10 and 12. It may be mentioned that this rule has been altered by the Legislature by the enactment of s. 10(5A) by the Pinnace Act of 1955, which provides that compensation or other payment due to or received by a managing agent of an Indian company at or in connection with the termination or modification of his managing agency agreement with the company, or by a manager of an Indian company at or in connection w!th the termination of his office or modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto, or by any person managing the whole or substantially the whole affairs of any other company in the taxable territories at or in connection with the termination of his office or the modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto, or by any person holding an agency in the taxable territories for any part of the

Sha~ ).

1964 activities relating to the business of any other person, at or Kettlewell Bullen in connection with the termination of his agency or the and Co. modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto,

CJ.T. shall be deemed to be profits and gains of a business carried

Shah /. on by the managing agent, manager or other person, as the case may be, and shall be liable to tax accordingly. But this amendment was made under the Finance Act,, 1955, with effect from April 1, 1955, and has no application to the present case.

-The Indian Income-tax Act is not in pari materia with the English Income-tax Statutes. But the authorities under the English Law which deal not with the interpretation of any specific provision, but on the concept of income, may not be regarded as proceeding upon any special principles peculiar to the English Acts' so as to render them inapplicable in considering problems arising under the Indian Income-tax Act.

It is well-settled in England that money paid to compensate for Joss caused to an assessee's trade is normally regarded as income.

In Short Bros. Ltd. v.

The Commissioner of Inland Revenue(') a sum received as compensation for loss resulting from cancellation of a contract was held to be revenue in the ordinary course of the assessee's trade, and liable to excess profits duty. Similarly in The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. The North fleet Coal and Ballast Co. Ltd. (2), compensation paid by a person who had agreed to purchase a certain quantity of chalk yearly for ten years, from a company which was the owner of a quarry, in consideration of being relieved of his liability under the contract was held chargeable to excess profits duty as trading profit in the hands of the company.

In The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Newcastle Breweries Ltd.(') compensation received under an order of the War Compensation Court, under the Indemnity Act,

1920, in addition to what was paid by the Admiralty for rum taken over in exercise of the power under the Defence of the Realm Regulations was held to be revenue.

(t) i2 T. C. 955

(3) 12 T. c. 927

(2) 12 T. c. noz

In Ensign Shipping Co. Ltd. v; The Commissioner of 1964 Inland Revenue(') an amount paid by the Government to Kettlew;;;: Bullen

a ship-owner to compensate him for loss resulting from and Co. detention of his ships during a coal-strike, and for wages

CJ.T. etc. was held liable to excess profits duty. Again as held in Burma Steam Ship Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') money received by a ship-owner from a firm of ship-builders to compensate for loss resulting from the failure by the latter to complete repairs to a ship within the stipulated period was regarded as revenue.

These cases illustrate the principle that compensation for injury to tradin~ operations, arising from breach of contract or in consequence of exercise of sovereign rights, is revenue.

These cases must, however, be distinguishe<I from another class of cases where compensation is paid as a solatium for loss of office. Such compensation may be regarded as capital or revenue: it would be regarded as capital, if it is for loss of an asset of enduring value to the assessee, but not where payment is received in settlement of loss in a trading transaction.

In Chibbet v. Joseph Robinson & Sons(') the assessees who were ship-managers employed by a steamship company under a contract which provided that they should be paid a percentage of the company's income, were paid

"" compensation for loss of office in anticipation of liquidation of tjie steamship company. It was held that payment to make up for loss resulting from cessation of profits from employment was not itself an annual profit, but was payment in respect of termination of employment and was not assessable to tax.

In Du Cros v. Ryall(') the assessee settled a claim made by his employee for damages for wrongful dismissal and paid £ 57 ,250 as compensation for wrongful dimissal.

It was held that no part could be apportioned to salary and commission and the whole escaped assessment.

In Duff v. Barlow(") the managing director of the appellant company who was employed for a period of ten

(1) 12 T. C. n69.

(3) 9 T. C. 48,

(2) 16 T. C. 67.

(4) 19 T. C. 444,

(5) 23 T. C. 633,

Slrllh J.

1964 - Kett/ewe/! Bullen

Olld Co. v.

C.I.T.

Sllah J.

years was asked by it to manage the business of one of its subsidiaries, and to receive a percentage of profits made by fue subsidiary. tThe employment was terminared by mutual agreement two years after its commencement and £ 4,000 were paid as compensation to the managing director for loss of his rights of future remuneration. This was held not taxable_. because it was a sum paid as compensation for loss of a source of income and hence a capital asset.

This case was followed in Henley v. Murray(') where the apellant employed as a managing director of a property company under a service agreement which was not determinable till March 31, 1944, was also appointed a director of a subsidiary company. At the request of the Board of directors of the property company the appellant resigned his office in the property company as well as its subsidiary and received from the property company an amount equal to the remuneration \\hich he would, under the agreement, have been entitled to, if his appointment had not been determined. It was held by the Court of Appeal tpat the use of the expression "compensation for loss of office'' was not the determining factor when the bargain itself stood cancelled, and the sum paid was in consideration of total abandonment of all contractual rights which the other party had.

The receipt was in the circumstances not taxable.

The payment was not voluntarily made; the bargain was that the appellant should resign and in consideration thereof, the company should make the payment.

In Barr, Crombie and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') the appellant company managed the ships of another company under an agreement for a period of fifteen years. The shipping company went into liquidation and a sum exceeding£ 16,000 was paid to the appellant company for the eight years which were still to run to the date of expiry of the agreement. Over a period upwards of sixteen years only two per cent of the appellant company's income was derived from other managements, and on the liquidation of the shipping company the appellant company lost its entire business except for some abnormal and temporary business. It was held by the Court of Ses-

(I) jI T. c. 351

(2) 26 T. C. 406

sion in Scotland that the sum in question was not a trading 1964 receipt of the appellant company.

Lord .President Nor- Kettl.l\ven Bullen mand observed: and Co.

"In the present case virtually the whole assets of the Appellant Company consisted in this agreement.

When the agreement was surrendered or abandoned practically nothing remained of the Company's business.

It was forced to reduce its staff and to transfer into other premises, and it really started a new trading life.

Its trading existence as practised up to that time had ceased with the liquidation of the shipping Company."

These cases establish the distinction between compensation for loss of a trading contract and solatium for loss of the source of income of the assessee.

But payment of compensation for loss of .office is not always regarded as capital receipt.

Where compensation is payable under the terms of the contract, which is determined, payment is in the nature of revenue and therefore taxable.

For instance in Henry v. Foster(') it was held that when compensation stipulated under a contract is paid for loss of office, it is taxable under Sch. 'E', and it was also held in Dale v. De Soissons( 2 ) that compensation paid under an agreement to an Assistant of the managing director for premature termination of !employment was hela to be income.

The principle on which these cases proceeded was also applied by the Court of Session in Scotland in Kessal Parsons and Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') to a case in which there was no express term for paymem of compensation on termination of employment.

The appellants in that case carried on business as agents on a commission basis for sale .in Scotland of the products of various manufacturers, and entered into agency agreements for that purpose. At the instance of the manufacturer concerned, one of the agreements which was for a period of three years was terminated at the end of the

(I) (1931) 145 L. T. R. 225

(3) 21 T. C. 608, 520

(2) [1950] 2 All E. R 460

C.l.T.

ShlJh /.

~ second year in consideration of a payment of£ 1,500. It K•ttllwel! Bullen was heid by the Court of Session that no capital asset

and Ca. of the assessee was depreciated in value, or became of less v.

C.I.T. use for the purpose of the assessee's business.

The sum Shale 1• paid was accordingly included in the calculation of the taxable profits for the year in which it was received. Lord President Normand Observed.

"We are not embarrassed here by ihc kind of difficulties which arise when, by agreement, a benefit extending over a tract of future years is renounced for a payment made once and for all.

The sum paid in this case fa really and substantially a surrogatum for 0;1e year's profits." The foundation of the distinction made in Ke/sail Parsons and Co.'s case('): Henry v. Foster( 2 ): and Dale v.

De Soissons( 3 ) is to be found in the observations made by Lord Macmillan in Van Den Berchs Ltd. v. Clark(').

In that case two companies which were manufacturers of margarine and similar products entered into an agreement with a view to end competition between them and to work in friendly alliance and to share the profits and losses in accordance with an elaborate scheme.

This arrangement was terminated by mutual agreement in consideration of the payment by the Dutch company £450,000 to the appellant company as damages.

Jt was held by the House of Lords that the amount was received by the appellant as payment for cancellation of the appellant company's future rights under the agreements, which constituted a capital asset of the company, and that it was a cnpital receipt. ford Macmillan observed.

"Now what were the Appellants giving up?

They gave up their whole rights under the agreements for thirteen years ahead.

These agreements are called in the States Case "pooling agreements", but that is a very inadequate description of them, for they did much more than

(l) 21 T.C. 6o8, 620

(3) [195012 All E.R. 46o

(2) [1931] 145 L.T.R. 225

(4) 19 T. C. 390, 431

merely embody a system of pooling and shar- 1964 ing profi, ts. iii the Appellants were merely Kettlewcll Bullen receiving in one sum down the aggregate of and Co. v. profits which they would otherwise have receiv-

CJ.T. ed o.·,~1 a se'.'ics of years, the lump sum might Shah J. be r : .·~'.:d :'.S of the same nature as the ingredients of which it was composed.

But even if a payment is meJsured by annual receipt, it is not necessarily in itself an item of income." Cases which have lately arisen before the Courts in Ille United Kingdom have elaborated this distinction.

In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Fleming and Co. (1) the Court, of Session held, following Kelsall Parsons & Cos'

case('), that compensation paid to the assessee who carried <m business as manufacturers' agent and general merchants

and had acted as the sole agents since 1903 for certain products of the manufacturers for termination in 1948 of

I he agency at the instance of the manufacturers was regard- ' :d as revenue. In the view of Lord President Cooper the cases relating to determination of agencies, broadly speaking, fell on two sides of the line drawn in the light of the varying circumstances:

(a) "the cancellation of a contract which affects the profit-making structure of the recipient of compensation and involves the loss of an enduring trading asset"; and

(b) "the cancellation of a contract which does not affect the recipient's trading structure nor deprive him of any enduring trading asset, but leaves him free to devote his energies and organisation released by the cancellation of the contract to replacing the contract which has been lost by other like contracts", and held that the case fell within the second. class, and not the first.

In Wiseburgh v.

Domville(') the appellant had entered into an "agreement in 1942 under which he acted

(I) 33 T, C. 57

(3) 36 T. C. 527

(2) 21 T.C. 608, 620

1964 as sole agent for the manufacturer.

In 1948 when this Kettlew-; n: Bullen agreement could have been determined by notice expiring and Co. in October 1949, the manufacturer dismissed him.

The v.

CJ.T. appellant received [ 4,000 as damages for breach of agrees/; i;' 1. ment.

The appellant had several agencies from time to time as agents and it was one of the incidents of ngency business that one agency may be stopped and another may come and it being a normal incident of the kind of business that the appellant was doing, that an agency should come to an end, compensation paid was regarded as income on the principle laid down in Ke/sail Parsons and Co.'s case(').

In another case which soon followed-Anglo French Exploration Co. Ltd. v. Clayson(2)-the appellant company carried on business, among others, as secretary and agent for a number of other companies. A South African Company appointed the appellant company as its secretary and agent at a remuneration of £ 1,5 00 per annum under a contract terminable at six months' notice. Under an arrangement with the purchaser of .the controlling interest of the shareholders under which the appellant company wa.;. to resign its office as secretary and agent of the South African Company, an amount of [ 20,000 received by the appellant company was held by the Court of Appeal in the nature of a trading receipt.

In Blackburn v. Close Bros. Ltd. (3) the respondent company carried on business of merchant bankers and of a finance and issuing house and derived income in the form of allowances for performing managerial and secretarial services.

Following a dispute with one 'S' for which the respondent company had agreed to provide secretarial services for three years at a remuneration of [ 8,000 per annum, the agreement was terminated with in about 2 months from the date of its commencement. [ 15,000 received by the respondent company as compensation for termination of the agreement was held to be a trading receipt. Pennycuick J., held that the contract was one of a number of ordinary commercial contracts for renderhtg

(r) 21 T.C. 608, 6; io

(3) 39 T.C. I64

(2) 36 T. C. 545

, J ,

services by the assessee in the course of carrying on its traae, 1964 and therefore the sum received on the cancellation of the Kettlelv-; n Bullen agreement was a receipt of a revenue nature.

It is manifest that the principle broadly stated in the earlier cases, that compensation for loss of office, or agency, must be regarded as a capital receipt, has not been approved in later cases.

An exception has been engrafted upon that principle that where payment even if received for termination of an agency agreement, the agency is one of many which the assessee holds, and the termination of the agency does not impair the pofit-making structure, but is within the framework of the assessee's business, it being a necessary incident of the business that existing agencies may be terminated and fresh agencies may be taken, the receipt is revenue and not capital.

A case on the other side of the line may be noticed: Sabine v. Lookers Ltd.('). Under agreements, annually renewed with the mannfacturers, the respondent company had acted for many years as their main distributors in the Manchester area of the manufacturers' products, which it bought for resale.

The respondent had sunk considerable sums ill fixtures and equipment specially designed for the trade of wholesale dealers and carried a large stock of spare parts mainly for wholesale sale. The whole of the trade of the respondent was geared to the display, sale, service and repairs of the manufacturers' products.

Upto 1952 inclusive, the manufacturers had included in its agreements with distributors a standard "continuity clause" giving the distributors, on certain conditions, the option of renewal for a further year. But in 1953, the manufacturers adopted a new standard agreement, containing a new continuity clause which the respondent company regarded as giving it less security than before.

As compensation for loss resulting from the alterations, the manufacturers paid to the respondent company, a sum calculated on sales to the trade during the contract period. It was held that this was a capital receipt, because, by the modification the framework of the respondent's business was impaired.

(I) 38 T. C. 120

51 S.C.-8

and Co.

CJ.T.

Shah J.

II4 SUPREME COPRT REPoars

Kettlewell Bullen and Co.

Elaborate arguments were presented before us on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Shaw Wallace & Co.'s Case( 1). The appellant . contended that Shaw Wallace's Case( 1 ) laid down a principle of general application appli' cable to all ces of compensation received from the principal as solatium for determination of the contract of agency. Counsel for the Revenue contended that the principle should be restricted to its special facts, and cannot be extended in view of the later decisions. It is necessary to closely examine the facts which gave rise to that case. Shaw Wallace & Company carried on business as merchants and agents of various companies and had branch offices in different parts of India. For a number of years they acted as distributing agents in India for the Burma Oil Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, but without a formal agreement with either company.

The two Oil Companies having combined dec!ded to make other arrangements for distnbuting their products.

Each Company terminated its contract with Shaw Wallace & Company and paid compensation to it, which aggregated to Rs. 15,25,000.

Thi> amount, subject to certain allowances, was sought to be assessed to income-tax under ss. 10 and 12.

The High Court of Calcutta held that the compensation received by the assessee was a capital receipt. In appeal to His Majesty in Council the decision of the High Court was affirmed.

CJ.T;·

Shah /.

The Judicial Committee declined to seek inspiration from the English decisions cited at the Bar. The Board observed that the expression "income" which is not defined in the Act connotes a periodical monetary return coming in with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity, from definite sources: the source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall. They fur ther observed that the income chargeable under head (iv) of s. 6 business" read with s. 10 is to be in respect of the profits and gains of any business carried on by the assessee, and therefore the sums which the Income-tax Department sought tn charge could only be taxable if they were the pro-

(1) L.R. 59 I.A. 206.

duce or the result of carrying on the agencies of the Oil 1964 Companies in the year in which they were received by the Kettlewcll Bullen assessee.

But when once it was admitted that they were and Co. sums received, not for carrying on this business, but as some c:i.T. sort of solatium for i's c.:imµu!sory cessation, the answer seemed fairly plain. 'J'h.' 1Jc~~-d observed that if compensation received for sale of the business or its goodwill was capital, the same reasoning ought to apply when the sum received was in the nature of a solatium for cess?.tion of a part of the business, and it was a matter of .r:0 consequence that the assessee continued to pursue its other independent commercial interests, and profits from which were taxed in the ordinary course, for the sums sought to be taxed had no connection with the continuance of the assessee's other business: the profits earned by the assessee, it was observed, were "the fruit of a different tree, the crop of a dirrerent field", and if under s. 10 the compensation was not taxable, it was not taxable under s. 12 under the head "other sources" as well.

The judgment of the Board proceeds upon the ground that compensation received not for carrying on the business, but as solatium for its compulsory cessation, would be regarded as capital receipt, and for the application of this principle, existence of other independent commercial interests out of which profits were earned by the assessee was irrelevant. Two comments may be made at this stage. It cannot be said as a general rule, that what is determinative of the nature of the receipt is extinction or compuls0ry cessation of an agency or office.

Nor can it be said that compensation received for extinction of an agency may always be equated with price received on sale of goodwill of a business.

The test, applicable to contracts for termination of agencies is: what has the assessee parted with in lieu of money or money's worth received by him which is sought to be taxed? If compensation is paid for cancellation of a contract of agency, which does not affect the trading structure of the business of the recipient, or involve loss of an enduring asset, leaving the tax-payer free to carry on his trade released from the contract which is cancelled, the receipt will be a trading receipt: where the cancellation

Shah J.

II6

SUPREME COURT REPORTS of. a contract of agency impairs the trading structure, or }wttltwen Bullen involves loss of an enduring asset, the amount paid for ""'!.co. compensating the loss is capital.

C.l.T.

Shali /.

The view expressed by the Judicial Committee has not met with •nqualified approval in later cases, Lord Wright in Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v.

Commissioner of lncome-tax. Bihar and Orissa(') observed that it is incorrect to limit the true character of income, by such picturesque similies like "fruit of a different tree, or crop of a different field". Again it cannot be said generally that compensation for every transfer or determination of a contract of agency is capital receipt: Kelsall Parsons & Co. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue(2 ): Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.

Fleming & Co.( 8 ): Wiseburgh v. Domville( 4 ) and Commisiosner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras v. South India Pictures Ltd.( 6 ). Nor is it true to say that where an assessee holds several agency contracts, each agency contract cannot without more be regarded as independent of the other con

tracts, and income received from each contract cannot always be regarded as unrelated to the rest of the business continued by the assessee. The decision in Shaw W a/lace Co.'s case( 6 ) cannot therefore be read to yield the principle that compensation for loss of an agency may in all cases be regarded as capital receipt. Nor does it Jay down that where the assessee has several lines of business each line must in ascertaining the character of compensation for less of a line of business be deemed an independent source. This view is exemplied by decisions of this Court and a decision of the Madras High Court.

In the South India Pictures Ltd.'s case(') compensation received for determination of the distribution rights of films was held taxable.

After the assessee had exploited partially its right of distribution of cinematographic films to which it was entitled under the terms of agreement under which he had advanced money to the producers, the agreements were cancelled and the producers paid an aggregate sum of Rs. 26,000 to the assessee towards commission.

It was held by Das C. J.,

(1) L. R, 70 I. A. 180

13) 33 T.C. 57

(5) 29 I. T. R. 910

(2) 21 T.C. 6o8, 620

(4) 36 T.C. 527

(6) L.R. 59 I.A. zo6

and Venkaterama Aiyar, J., (Bhagwati J., dissenting) that the sum paid to the assessee was not compensation for not Kettlewen Bull•• carrying on its business, but was a sum paid in the ordinary and Co. v. course of business to ad just the relations between the C.l.T. assessee and the producersi, and was taxable.

Similarly Shah 1. in Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji's case(') a contract for the supply of limestone and dolomite was terminated when the purchaser the Bengal Iron Company Ltd. found the rates . uneconomical.

A suit was then filed by the respondent for specific performance of the contract and for an injunction restraining the company from purchasing limestone 1md dolomite from any other person. A fresh agreement made between the respondent and the company fell through because of circumstances over which the parties to the agreement had no control.

The company then agreed to pay Rs. 2,50,000 to the respondent as solatium, besides the monthly instalments of Rs. 4,000 remaining unpaid under the contract of 1940. The Income-tax Department sought to bring to tax the amount of Rs. 2,50,000 and the balance due towards the monthly instalments of Rs. 4,000.

It was held by this Court that the sum of Rs. 2,50,000 was not paid to the respondent as compensation for expenses laid out for works at the quarry of a capital nature and could not be held to be a capital , receipt on that account, the agreements were merely adjustments made in the ordinary course of business.

There was in the view ot the Court no profit-making apparatus set up by the agreement of 1941, apart from the business which was to be carried on under it and there was at no time any agreement which operated as a bar to the carrying of the business of the respondent and therefore the receipt of Rs. 2,50,000 was chargeable to tax. Venkatarama Aiyar, J., observed, in an agency contract the actual business consi.:s of dealings between the principal and his customers, and the work of the agent is only to bring about the business: what he does is not the business itself, but something which is intimately and directly linked up with it. The agency may, therefore, be viewed as the apparatus which leads to the business rather than the business itself. r.';,, nsidered in this light the

(1) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. !IO

1964 agency right can be held to be of the nature of a capital Kettkwell Bullen asset invested in business.

But this cannot be said of a and Cc. contract entered into in the ordinary course of business.

c~.T.

Such a contract is part of the business itself, not some thing outside it, and any receipt on account of such a contract can only be a trading receipt. Because compensation paid on the cancellation of a trading contract differs in character from compensation paid for cancellation of an agency contract, it should not be understood that the latter is always, and as a matter of law, to be held to be a capital receipt.

An "agency contract which has the character of a capital asset in the hands of one person may assume the character of a trading receipt asset in the hands of another, as for example, when the agent is found to make a trade of acquiring agencies and dealing with them." Therefore, when the question arises whether te payment of compensation for termination of an agency is a capital or a revenue receipt, it must be considered whether the agency was in the nature of a capital asset in the hands of the agent, •Or whether it was only part of his stock-in-trade.

The learned Judge also observed that payments made in settlement of rights under a trading contract are trading receipts and are assessable to revenue, but where a trader is prevented from doing so by external authority in exercise of a paramount power and is awarded compensation therefor, whether the receipt is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt will depend upon whether it is compensation for injury inflicted on a capital asset or on stock-in-trade.

Shah J.

In Pairce Lelie and Co. Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras(') the assessee company took up managing agencies of several plantation companies.

The managing agencies were liable to termination, but the assessee was entitled to compensation by the terms of th!' agreement. The Talliar Estates Ltd. was one of the companies managed by the assessee.

The agreement was a composite agreement about the managing agency rights and certain other rights.

When the Talliar Estates Ltd. went into liquidation the assessee received Rs. 60,000 by way of compensation for loss of office and the question arose

(1 ) J. T• R 356

whether that amount was income in the hands of the asses- 1964 see. The Madras High Court held that the loss of one of KtttlewTi Bullen

several managing agencies had little effect on the strucand Co. v. ture of the assessee's business even in tea or on its profit

CJ.T. earning apparatus as a whole and the termination of the Shah J. agreement with the Talliar Estates could well be said to have been brought about in the ordinary course of business of the assessee and therefore the amount received was a trading receipt.

In the South India Picture Ltd.'s case(').: Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji's case(2 ) and Peirce Leslia Company's case(') it was held that the receipt of compensation for loss of agency was in the nature of revenue.

In the South India Pictures Ltd.'s case(') the amount received was not compensation for not carrying on its business, but was a sum paid in the ordinary course of business to adjust the relations between the assessee and the producers; the termination of the agreements did not radically or at all affect or alter the structure of the assessee's business, and the amount received by the assessee was only so received towards commission i.e. as compensation for the loss of commission which it would have earned, had the agreements not been terminated. Therefore, the amount was not received by the assessee as the price of any capital assets sold or surrendered or destroyed, but the amount was simply received by the assessee in the course of its going distributing agency business and therefore it was an income receipt.

In that case the majority of the Court held on three distinct grounds, viz., (i) that the assessee did not part with any capital asset; (ii) that the amount was received in the course of the distributing agency business which was continued, and (iii) that the termination of the agreements did not radically or at all affect or alter the structure of the assessee's business, that the sum received was revenue. Rai Bahadur Jairam Va/ji's case(') was one of compensation received for termination of a trading contract. In Peirce Leslie .and

Company's case(') there was termination of office, but it was held to be brought about in the ordinary course of the trading operations of the assessee.

(1) 29 I.T.R. 910

(i) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. no

(3 38 I.T.R, 3S6

1964 On the other side of the line are cases of Commissioner

~11/ewell Bullen of Income-tax, Hyderabad-Deccan v. Vazir Sultan and and Co.

Sons(') and Godrej and Co. v. Commissioner of lncomec"i.T. tax, Bombay City ('). In Vazir Sultan and Son's case(')

Shah J. the majority of the Court held that compensation paid for restricting the area in which a previous agency agreement operated was a capital receipt, not assessable to incometax.

It was held that the agency agreements were not entered into by the assessee in the carrying on of their business, but formed the capital asset of the assessee's business which was exploited by the assessee by entering into contracts with various customers and dealers in the respective terri•ories; it formed part of the fixed capital of tile assesssee's business and was not circulating capital or stockin-trade of their business and therefore payment made by the company for determination of the contract ot cancellation of the agreement was a capital receip~ in the hands of the assessee.

In Godrej lNld Co.'s case(') the managing agency agreement in favour of the assessee of a limited company which was originally for a period of thirty years and under which the assessee was entitled to a commission at certain rates was modified and remuneration payable to the managing agents was reduced. As compensation for agreeing to this reduction, the assessee received Rs. 7,50,000 which was sought to be taxed as income in the hands of the assessee.

This Court held, having regard to all the attending circumstances, that the amount was paid not to make up the differeuce between the higher remuneration and the reduced remuneration, but in truth as compensation for releasing the company from the onerous terms as to remuneration as it was in terms expressed to be; so far as the assessee firm was concerned it was received as compensation for the deterioration or injury to the managing agency by reason of the release of its rights to get higher remuneration and, therefore, a capital receipt.

On an analysis of these cases which fall on two sides of the dividing line, a satisfactory measure of consistency

(I) 36 I. T. R. ~75

(3) 36 I.T.R. 175

(2) 37 I.T.R. 381

in principle is disclosed. Where on a consideration of the 196'# circumstances, payment is made to compensate a person Kettlew-; u-Bullen

for cancellation of a contract which does not affect the and Co. v. trading structure of his business, nor deprive him of what

CJ.T. in substance is his source of income, termillation of the Shah 1• -contract being a normal incident of the business, and such

cancellation leaves him free to carry on his trade (freed from tbe contract terminated) the receipt is revenue: Where by the cancellation of an agency the trac! ing structure of the assessee is impaired, or such cancellation results in loss -Of what may be regarded as the source of the assessee's income, tbe payment made to compensate for cancellation of the agency agreement is normally a oapital receipt.

In the present case, on a review of all the circumsc:mces, we have no doubt that what the assessee was paid was to compensate him for loss of a capital asset. It matters little whether the assessee did continue after the determination of its agency with tbe Fort William Jute Co. Lid to conduct the remaining agencies.

The transaction was not in the nature of a trading transaction, but was one in which the. assessee parted with an asset of an enduring value.

We are, therefore, unable to agree with the High Court that the amount received by the appellant was in the nature of a revenue receipt.

We accordingly record the answer on the question submitted by the Tribunal in the negative.

The appellant would be entitled to its costs in this Court.

GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD. v.

THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA

(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)

Income Tax-Capital or revenue-Termination of agencY-Compensa~ tion-Business of several agencies-Cancellation of single agency-

Nature of compensation.

The appellant company was carrying on business in diverse Jines as managing agents of some concerns, distributing agents of others and u secretaries of still other class of concerns. It also dealt as an ex-

May I.

KETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA

K. SuB!lA RAo, J.

C. SHAH

ss. 2(6c), 10, 12

Fort William Jute Co., Ltd.

~1ugneeram Bangur and Co.

Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny

Fort William Jute Company

Mugneeratn Bengur & Co.

Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.

Income-tax Act

L.R. 70 I.A. 180

D. N. Mukherjee

D. N. Gupta

K. N. Rajagopal Sastri

R. N. Sachthey

SHAH

Calcutta

May l, 1925

Fort William Jute Company Ltd.

India

cl. 8

Shah

s. 87

Indian Companies Act, 1913

Section 87

Bowreach Cotton Mills Co.

Ltd.

Dunbar Mills Ltd.

Mothola Co. Lld

Joonktollee Tea Co.

Ltd.

May 21, 1952

Mugneeram Bangur & Co.

Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.-ordinary

Mugneeram Bangur & Co~

May 28, 1952

January 14, 1957

Mug-. neeram Bangur & Co.

Mungneeram Bangur & Co.

Mugneeram Bangur & Co.-was

Fort William Jute Co.

Ltd.

s. 66(1)

Income-tax Act, 1922

High Court of Judicature at Calcutta

Income-tax Act

Venkatarama Aiyar

cl. 2

cl. 3(2)

cl. 8

Mis Mugneeram Bangur & Co.

Kettlewell Bulltit

Mugnecram Bangur & Co.

Kettlewell Bullen

cl. 2

Mugneeram Bangur

Income-tax Act

Shaw Wallace & Co

cl. 8

L. R. 59 I. A. 206

Ke111ewTi Bullen

Section 2(6C)

ss. 10 and 12

s. 10(5A)

April 1, 1955

Income-tax Act

Income-tax Act

England

Indemnity Act

Kettlew

Bullen

March 31, 1944

Scotland

Nor- Kettl.l\ven Bullen

Normand

Macmillan

United Kingdom

Kelsall Parsons & Cos

Cooper

Ke/sail Parsons and Co.

South African Company

Pennycuick

Manchester

Shaw Wallace & Co.

Shaw Wallace

Shaw Wallace & Company

Burma Oil Company

Anglo-Persian Oil Company

ss. 10 and 12

High Court of Calcutta

Shah

s. 6

s. 10

L.R. 59 I.A. 206

s. 10

s. 12

Wright

Shaw W a/lace Co.

Madras High Court

South India Pictures Ltd.

Das

and Venkaterama Aiyar

Bhagwati

Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji

Bengal Iron Company Ltd.

Talliar Estates Ltd.

KtttlewTi Bullen

Talliar Estates

South India Picture Ltd.

Peirce Leslia Company

Rai Bahadur Jairam Va

Peirce Leslie

Vazir Sultan

Godrej lNld Co.

Fort William Jute Co. Lid

GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA

K. SUBBA RAO

S. M. S!KRI