V. N. Vasudeva

Kirorimal Luharlwala

Hldayatullah J.

January, 13

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

truth of the plea that a large sum had been spent on repairs, an order to deposit the entire arrears of rent ought not tohave been made. It is quite clear that the facts there were entirely different. Payment by the landlord for repairs was a part of the tenancy agreement and rent under that tenancy could not be calculated without advertence to every term of the agreement of tenancy.

Here the special agreement which is pleaded is outside the tenancy agreement and the allegation about the special agreement has been held to be an after-thought and false.

It is therefore diffici1\t to apply the ruling to the present circumstances.

The appeal is wholly devoid of merit and it is dismissed with costs.

By the consent of parties, a period of two months from the date of hearing (20-12-1963) was granted to the appellant to deposit the arrears of rnt from 1st April, 1958, in the Court of the Rent Controller.

Appeal dismissed ..

SURAJ RATAN THIRANI & ORS.

THE AZAMABAD TEA CO. & ORS.

(B. P. SINHA, C.J., J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA

AYYANGAR JJ.)

Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), O. IX, r. 9-Scope oflrow11 Grants Act, s. 3-Lease by Government-Effect of-Applica .. bility of s. 41 of Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882).

The property covered by the Tea Estate was granted by the Govern ment by way of lease in 1898 for 30 years.

In 1913 it was purchased' by Azam Ali. When he died in 1917, he left behind 8 sons, 9 daughters and 3 widows. The name of Ismail, his el(iest son. was entered in the official records as next in succession.

Ismail borrowed considerable sums from National Agency Co. Ltd., and for securing the same, depo- sited the title deeds of the Tea Estate on the footing that he was its full owner.

As the amonnt under the mortgage was not paid, a suitr was filed for realisation of the amount by sale of mortgage property ..

•rhe suit was decreed and in execution the property was auctioned and -saJe was confirmed in 1931 in favour of the decreeholder who sold the same to Azarnabad Tea Estate, the principal respondent in this case.

The heirs of Azam Ali brought suit No. 58 of 1931 to set aside <the decree and sale in favour of the National Agency Co. Ltd.1 on -various grounds but that suit. was dismissed for default. -

The suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed subse~ -quently.

The plaintiffs.appellants who claimed title under purchasers for the heirs of Azam Ali .challenged the validity of the transactions by which the National Agency Co. Ltd. claimed to have purchased the entire 16 annas inlerest in the property at the court sale in pursuance .of a decree obtained by them against Ismail. The trial Court held 1hat

the purchase made by the National Agency Co. Ltd. was valid and extended to the entire interest in the property and hence the venders of .the plaintiffs had no title -to convey to them any interests in the pro- ; perty.

The High Court in appeal disagreed with this finding but di"lmissed the appeal on other grounds except to the extent of an 8 pies share in the property.

The appellants came to this Court on a ccrtifi- Cate of fitness granted by the High Court.

The points raised before this Court were whether the High Court l\Vas right in holding that\ the present suit was barred by 0. IX, r. 9 on the :ground that when suit No. 58 of 1931 was dismissed in default, no ..action was taken to get it restored, this was raised by the respondent anJ whether in any event their claims to the 2 .as 13 odd gundas share of Ashfaq, son of Ismail, should not have been decreed.

HELD (i) that the suit was substantially barred by 0. IX, r. 9. !he essential bundle of facts on which the plaintiffs based their title

; and their right to relief were identical in the two suits the property sought to be recovered in the two suits was the same. The title of the persons from whom the plaintiffs claimed title by purchase was based -0n the same facts.

The additional allegation about possession in Octo- ber 1934 did not rea11y destroy the basic and substantial identity of the <auses of action in the two suits.

The ban imposed by 0. IX, r. 9 does not create merely a personal bar or estoppel against the particular plaintiff suing on the sa1ne cause of action and does not ltave the matter at large for those claiming under '.him.

The word "plaintiff" .in the .rule Jncludes his assigns and legal representatives.

(ii) that When the Government granted the lease in 1928, the

lease was granted not only in favour of Ismail but also in favour of the other co-sharers although the name of Ismail alone was mentioned in . -the lease deed.

The provisjons of s. 3 of the Crown Grants Act did ·.not affect the beneficial interest in the lease.

Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act did not belp the respon •dent as there was no evidence to show that Ismail .was put forward by

il.34-139 S.C.-U

1964'

Sura/ RatOll Thiranl v.

Azamabad

T•a Co.

19~

Sura/ Ratan Thirani

Azamabad

Tea Co.

the other cowsharers as the ostensible owner of the property.

Tue con-- duct of the cowsbarers in permitting Ismail to manage the common pro-- perty did not by itself raise any estoppel precluding them from asscr-- ting their rights.

Even a cursory enquiry by the mortgagee would have disclosed that Ismail was not the full owner.

As regards the contention of the appellants that they should have been granted a decree to the extent of 2 As. 13 odd gundas share of Ashfaq in additio'n to the 8 pies share decreed to them by the High Court, the case was ordered to be remitted to the trial Court for giving its finding_regarding the reality of the sale by Asbfaq.

Gopi Ram v. Jagannath Singh, l.L.R. 9 Pat. 447, Mohanunad Khalil Khan v. Muhbub Ali Mian, 15 I.A. 121 and Soorijomonee Dasee

v. Suddanund, (1873) 12 Ben. L.R. 304, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 330 of 1960.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 18, 1954, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 80 of 1947.

S. T. Desai and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants.

B. Sen, N. R. Ghosh, Salil K. Datt and P. K. Ghosh, for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

January 13, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

AyyangM J, A YY ANGAR J .-This is an appeal .preferred, by virtue of a certificate of fitness granted by the Calcutta High Court, against its judgment, by which the decne passed by the Subordinate Judge of Darjeeling was substantially affirmed.

The plaintiffs are the appellants before this Court. The suit out of which the appeal arises wa> brought by the appellants claiming title to and the recovery of possession of a property known as the Azambad Tea Estate whieh comprised about 378 acres of land in Touzi No. 911 of the Darjeeling Collectorate.

This property was set out in Schedule A to the plaint and besides a claim was also made to certain other items of the movables and certain other tenures. but this appeal is not concerned with these others which were set out in Schs. B and C to the plaint.

One Kazi Azam Ali was admittedly a full owner of this entire property and the proceedings giving rise to the appeal are concerned with the rights of his heirs to it.

The plaintiffs claim their title on the basis of various purchases from the heirs of this Azam Ali.

The contesting defendants were the Azamabad Tea Co. who also claim the entire property as transferees from the National Agency Co. Ltd., who too have been impleaded as defendants.

The. National Agency Co. Ltd. claim to have purchased the entire 16 as. interest in the property at a Court sale in pursuance of a decree obtained by them against Kazi Mohammed Ismail, the eldest son of Azam Ali.

Various contentions were raised by the plaintiffs in challenge of the validity of the transactions by which the defendants claimed their title.

But the learned Subordinate Judge repelled the plaintiffs' claim and held that the purchase by the National Agency Co. Ltd. was valid and extended to the entire interest in the property and that in consequence the plaintiffs' vendors had no title to convey to them any interest in. the property. The plaintiffs' claim of the property in respect of Sch. A was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court and the learned Judges upheld the title of the plaintiffs to an 8 pies share in the property mentioned in Sch. A to the plaint but confirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge as regards the rest.

The learned Judges however granted a certificate Of fitness to the plaintiffs on the strength of which the present appeal has been filed.

The history of the transactions before the suit occupies a period of over 20 years and the facts in relation thereto are at once long, voluminous and complicated.

But. for the disposal of the appeal and the points urged before us it is wholly unnecessary to set these out and we shall therefore confine ourselves to a narration of the bare outlines of the case along with those facts which are necessary to appreciate the contentions raised in support of the appeal.

The property covered by the Tea Estate was granted by Government by way of lease to one Mudir and another for 30 years, the term to start on the 1st of April 1898.

The grantees effected transfers of their lease-hold and after several successive transfers the property was purchased in

Sura/ Ratan Thirani v.

Azamabad

Tea Co.

Ayyangar J.

Sura; Ratan Thiram

Azamabad

Tea Co.

Ayyangar J.

1913 by one Kazi Azam Ali who got his name registered as a proprietor. It was Azam Ali who started the tea garden, constructed the requisite factories as accessories thereto and named it the Azamabad Tea Estate Azam Ali had several children and among them 8 daughters and in consideration of gifts made to them. these daughters by a registered deed executed in 1909 relinquished their rights of succession to Azam Ali.

They thus faded away from the picture and no more notice need be taken of them.

Besides these 8 daughters, Azam Ali had 8 sons who survived him and were among his heirs, when he died on June 8, 1917. Mohammed Ismail was the eldest of these sons.

Azam Ali also left behind him a daughter who was born after the relinquishment of 1909 and three widows.

Admittedly the sons of Azam Ali, his widows and his last daughters were all his heirs entitled to his estate in the shares as prescribed by Muslim Law.

On Azam Ali's death his eldest son-I mail-had his name entered in the Government records a, the next in succession and at the time the thirty years term of the lease expired, the lease continued to remain in the name of Ismail alone.

We now proceed to the transactions as a result of which the contesting defendants claim to have obtained the full title to the Tea Estate.

Ismail made large borrowings and among them were some from the National Agency Co. Ltd. and for securing the loan he deposited with them the title -Oeeds of the Tea Estate.

It may be mentioned that the deposit was on the footing that he was the full owner of the 16 as. share of the property mortgaged.

The amount due under the mortgage was not paid in time and the mortgagee filed a suit for the enforcement of its mortgage and pravrd for the sale of the property for the realisation of the mortgage money.

The suit was decreed as prayed for and the property was sold in execution of the final decree and was purchased by the mortgage-decree holder on September 24, 1931. The sale was confirmed on November 13. 1931. l'his decree-holder purchaser sold the property to the . Azamabad Tea Estate-the principal respondent hefNe •1s.

There was some little controversy as regards the re.ality and effectiveness of the transfer of the property from the National Agency Co. Ltd. to the Azamabad Tea Estate,

but nothing turns on this, for even if that transfer was not effective that would not help the plaintiffs so long as they could not displace the iitle of the National Agency Co. Ltd. under the latter's court auction purchase.

The case of the plaintiffs rested on the fact that Ismail who got himself registered as if he were a fu]J proprietor of the lease-hold interest in Touzi 911 was merely one of several co-sharers of Azam Ali's estate to whom it passed on his death.

The lease-hold which was his property was according to them inherited by all his heirs including Ismail, the seven other sons, the three widows and the daughter born after 1909.

The term of the lease granted by the Government expired in 1928 and a renewed lease was granted in the name of Ismail alone.

Rival contentions were urged as regards the effect of this circumstance on the right of Ismail. It was the case of the contesting respondents that the lease granted in 1923 in favour of Ismail was his sole and individual property and even if for any reason the other heirs of Azam Ali had an interest in the previous lease-hold, they did not have any such interest in the property covered by the fresh lease.

On the other hand, the case of the plaintiffs was. that by -the renewal of the lease, Ismail obtained qua his co-heirs the same interest as he formerly had in the lease of.1828 .. The renewal, they stated, was for the benefit not merely of Ismail but for everyone of his co-heirs who still retained his or her interest in Azam Ali's estate.

On this basis the plaintiffs. raised the contentions that when by the sale in execution of the mortgage decree obtained by the National Agency Co. they purchased the property mortgaged, it was only the interest of Ismail that passed to them and not those of his co-sharers who were no parties to the mortgage.

There is one further transaction to which we . must advert before passing on to the next stage of the proceedings.

After the mortgage by deposit of title deeds in favour of the National Agency Co., Ismail transferred his entire intrest in the mortgaged property, that is, in the equity of redemption, to his wife Mst. Nazifannessa, by a deed dated May 6, 193.0.

Notwithstdnding this deed and this transfer of the equity of redemption Mst. Nazifannessa was not made a party to the'

Surai Rata,.

Thirani v.

Azamabad Tea Co,

Ayyangar }..

Sura; Ratan Thirani v.

Azamabad Tea Co.

Ayyangar J.

mortgage suit by the Na ti on al Agency Co.

The plaintiffs who claim to have acquired Mst. Nazifannessa's interest contended that by reason of the failure to implead N azifannessa in the mortgage action, her right to redeem the mortgage was still in tact in spite of the mortgage decree and the sale in pursuance thereof, and on this footing made a claim in the alternative to redeem the mortgage in favour of the National Agency Co. and obtain possession after re demption.

To complete the narrative of the relevant facts, very soon after the purchase in Court auction in execution of the mortgage decree, the heirs of Azam Ali brought a suit ( 58 of 1931 ) to set aside the decree and the sale in favour of the National Agency Co. Ltd. on various grounds--collusion, fraud, the circumstance that Ismail was merely a co-sharer entitled to about 2! as. share in the property and so could not mortgage more than that share, and that the decree could not bind a larger interest nor the sale convey anything more , than that share, even if it conveyed any title to the property.

This suit however did not proceed to trial, but was dismissed for default, in that the plaintiffs did not appear in Court on the date fixed for trial.

The only other matter to be mentioned is that the plaintiffs have, by their purchases, acqufred from the several co-heirs, directly or mediately. the entire 16 as. share in the property assuming that their vendors had any such right.

Armed with these purchases the plaintiffs filed this suit for the reliefs already indicated.

The defences raised to the suit were three-fold:

(1) That Ismail was the sole proprietor of the Tea Estate at the date of the mortgage and conse quently the entire interest was the subject of mortgage and so passed at the court sale.

This was based on the provisions of the Crown Grants Act, now the Government Grants Act.

It would be recollected that the thirty years lease of Touza 911 was renewed in 1928 and this renewal was made in the name of Ismail alone.

Based on this feature a contention was raised that the grant of the lease created a new title in the grantee since the original !case in

which alone the heirs of Azam Ali might have had a share was extinguished by the termination of that lease by efflux of time

(2) The second line of defence was th.it Ismail, even if in fact or law was not the full owner, was an ostensible owner of the entire interest in the property and that the co-heirs were estopped from questioning the validity of the mortgage of the entire interest effected by him under s. 41 cf the Transfer of Property Act and that in consequence the sale in execution passed the entire 16 as. share to the purchaser. '

(3) Lastly, it was urged that the plaintiffs' suit was liable to be dismissed by reason of the provisions of 0. IX, r. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code as the earlier Original Suit 58 of 1931 brought by the co-heirs to set aside the sale under the mortgage decree had been allowed to be dismissed for default.

The learned Judges of the High Court rejected the first two of the defences but held that except to the extent of an eight pies share which represented the interest of a co-heir which was not affected by the proceeding in Suit 58 of 1931, the plaintiffs were precluded by 0. IX. r. 9, Civil Procedurt'

Code from disputing the sale in execution of mortgage decree by reason of the dismissal for default of Suit 58 of 1931.

Before proceeding to set out the arguments addressed to us by Mr. Desai, learned counsel for the appellants, it might

e convenient to dispose of the submissions made to us by Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the respondents, seeking to sustain the first two defences which were repelled by the High Court.

The first of them was that by reason of the renewal of the lease in 1928 in the name of Ismail and the entry of his name as sole lessee in the revenue records, the leasehold became his sole property.

Apart from the arguments about Ismail being the ostensible owner of the entire 16 as. share in the lease-hold under the lease of 1898-v.nich we

shall consider a little later-Mr. Sen did not dispute that

Sura; Ratan Thirani v.

Azamabad Tea Co.

Ayyangar J.

Sura; Rat1J11 Thir1J11i

v. ..4zamabad

Tea Co.

..4; yyangar /,

Ismail's co-heirs were entitled to their fractional shares in. the property under the original lease.

The acceptability of this argument regarding the renewed lease has to be determined on the basis of two factors-first the intention of the

parties, and here primarily of the grantor, as to the nature.

and quantum of the title intended to be conferred on or obtained by Ismail and, second, the provisions of the Crown.

Grants Act which governed the grant on which reliance was. placed as leading to that result. First, as to the intention of the parties. The original lease of 1898 was due to expire on March 31, 1928. On July 20, 1928 Mohd, Ismail made

a petition to the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling by which after drawing the latter's attention to the date on which the lease was to expire, he "respectfully solicited the favour of kindly granting a further lease of the said Estate for a. further period of 30 years." The Deputy Commissioner replied by letter dated August 10, 1928 sending Ismail the draft of the renewed lease for his approval and return adding: "in'tl\e record of rights thy following names have been record, ed: ·

1. Kazi Mohammed Ismail 2 as.;

2. Kazi Isahaque 2 as_.;

3. Kazi Yakub 2 as.;

4. Kazi Samoddoha 2 as.;

5. Kazi Nurul Ruda 2 as.;

6. Kazi Badarudduza 2 as.;

7. Kazi Insaf Ali 2 as.;

8. Kazi Asfaque 2 as.;

Please mention the name in whose favour the lease wilt! have to be issued." Ismail returned the draft lease with his approval but desired that the lease should be issued' according to the name in the land register.

We are unable to read this request as meaning that Ismail; con tr a dieting what the Government said, wanted that the leasehold interest

should be his sole property in which his co-heirs who had interest in the earlier lease were to be denied all beneficial' interest.

It was thereafter that the lease was executed on February 1, 1929 in the name of Ismail to be operative from.

April 1, 1928 and was in terms in renewal of the previous,:

lease.

In the circumstance, we are satisfied that the Government intended to grant a lease in favour of hi~ co-sharers

as well, though the ]ease deed was in the name of Ismail alone. If Ismail intended to benefit himself at the expense of his co-sharers and as we have said, we do not read his reply to the Deputy Commissioner as disclosing such an intention, the same was not made known to the Government.

We are therefore unable to accept Mr. Sen's submission based on the intention of the parties.

He, however, submitted that whatever be the intention of the parties, by reason of s. 3 of the Crown Grants Act Ismail's title to the full

16 as. share in the leasehold could no_t be disputed.

This section reads:

"3. All provisions. restrictions, conditions and limitations over contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take effect according to itheir tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding."

If, as we have held. it was the intention of the Government in granting the renewal that the co-heirs too should have the benefit of the lease we do not see how these provisions affect their beneficial interest in the lease.

Nor are there any clauses in the lease which preclude the existence of a beneficial interest in persons other than the lessee named.

This point i~ tb.~.nfore without substance and is rejected.

The next point urged was based on s. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act It was said that Ismail was by reason of the entry in the revenue registers, which the co-heirs did nothing to correct, ostensibly the full owner of the property and hence the mortgage by him as full owner and the sale in court auction in execution of the decree by the National Agency Co. Ltd. passed the full title to the Tea Estate and that the co-heirs were consequently estopped from disputing the defendant's right to the full 16 as. share in the property.

In order that s. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act could ' be attracted, the respondents should prove that Ismail was the ostensible owner of the property with the consent of his co-sharers and besides that they took reasonable care

1964"

Suraj Ralan• Thirani v.

Azamabad Tea Co.

Ayyn11ga1 } ..

Suraj Ratan Thiranl v.

Azamabad

Tea Co.

Ayyangur J.

to ascertain whether Ismail had the power to make a transfer of the full 16 as. interest. Now, the facts however were that except the property being entered in the revenue records in Ismail's name, and that the management of the property was left by the co-sharers with Ismail, there is not an iota of evidence to establish that Ismail was put forward by them as the ostensible owner of the property. It is manifest that the conduct of co-sharers in permitting one of them to manage the common property does not by itself raise any estoppel precluding them from asserting their rights.

The learned Judges have also pointed out that even the least" enquiry by the mortgagee would have disclosed that Ismail was not the full owner and this finding was not seriously challenged before us.

In this view it is unnecessary for us to consider the submissions made to us by Mr. Desai that s. 41 was inapplicable to cases of sales in court auctions for the reason that what the court is capable of selling and what is sold in execution of a decree is only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor and nothing more.

We, therefore, hold that the learned Judges of the High Court rightly held that s. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act afforded no defence to the respondents.

The next and the only point remaining for consideration is whether the appellants' suit is barred under the provisions of 0. IX. r. 9, Civil Procedure Code.

The part of this provision material for our purpose runs:-

"Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action."

Th.e learned Judges of the High Court have held that this provision barred the plaintiffs' claim in the present suit except to the extent of an 8 pies share in the estate which belonged to Azifunnessa and Najifennessa, two of the daughters of Azam Ali, who on the death of their mother became entitled to that share.

These two were. not the parties to suit No. 58 of 1931 and hence the learned Judges held that their share (which was purchased by the plaintiffs) was unaffected by the dismissal of that suit.

The decision of the High Court in regard to this 8 pies share has become final and thus is outside controversy.

The .only question is whether the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to anything beyond this share.

Suraj Ratan Thirani v.

Azamabad Tea Co.

The suit, 5 8 of 1931, was instituted by 7 plaintiffs- Ayyangar /.

Ashfaq, Shamsuzzoha, Nurul Huda, Mohd. Yakub, these four being the sons of Azam Ali, two of his daughters- Mahbuba Khatun and Habiba Khatun and one of his widows Bibi Marium.

There were two defendants-Ille National Agency Co. Ltd. the purchaser in court sale of the property under the mortgage decree, whose title was challenged and against whom reliefs were claimed and Mohd. Ismail who was a pro forma defendant. Ashfaq, 1 he first plaintiff, died after the institution of the suit and

certain of the parties already on record were recorded as his legal representatives .. The allegations in the plaint briefly were that the 2nd d6fendant Mohd. Ismail was not the sole proprietor or owner. of the 'Azamabad , Tea Estate and that for that reason, the mortgage in favour 0f the 1st defendant, the mortgage-decree obtained by it and the sale thereunder passed to it no title except to the extent at 2t as. share belonging to Mohd. Ismail. The plaintiffs therefore prayed for a decree declaring-

( 1) that Mohd. Ismail had only 2t as. share in the . property and the remaining 13t as. share

belor.ged to the plaintiffs;

(2) that only 2!- as. share was sold under the mortgage decree and purchased by the Na ti on al Agency Co. Ltd. at the court sale.

The suit was instituted on 28th November, 1931 and after the issues were settled, the suit was posted for trial on 22nd August, 1932. on which date the plaintiffs were absent, no witnesses on their behalf were present, and their pleader reported no instructions.

The suit was therefore directed to be dilrnissed with costs in favour of the Nation:jl Agency Co. Ltd. who was the only party present in Court.

It may be mentioned that Mohd. Ismail never appeared during the ltearing of the suit.

Suraj Ratan Thirani v.

Azamahad Tea Co.

A7yansar J,

204 SUPREl\iE COURT REPORTS

Before taking up for consideration certain points urged. before us by Mr. Desai regarding the construction of 0. IX r. 9 C.P.C. we might dispose of a contention raised by him that Suit No. 58 of 1931 was filed fraudulently and collusively and the dismissal was the result of a settlement brought about collusively in order to defeat the plaintiffs' rights. We consider that there is no factual basis to sustain this plea for he could point to no definite proof in support, and the most he could do was to refer us to certain suspicious circumstances.

We cannot obviously base any decision or rest any finding, on mere suspicion and we have no hesitation in saying that the submission does not deserve serious consideration.

The next submission was that even the 2t as. share of Ismail did not pass under the sale in execution of the mortgage decree, because it was said Ismail had been adjudicated an insolvent in Insolvency Case 38 of 1931 by the Dist. Judge Purnia, as a result of which the properties which were the subject of the court-sale. had vested in the official receiver before the relevant date.

Though, no doubt, an allegation regarding this matter was made in the plaint and this was denied by the plaintiffs there is nothing in the judgments of the courts below or in the evidence to indicate that the necessary facts were proved or that this point was urged with any seriousness at any stage of the proceedings until in this Court. We have therefore nothing beyond the bare allegations and denials and as the foll facts in relation to this matter were not placed before the Court we hold that this plea is devoid of merits and does not merit consideration.

It was next said that two of th~ plaintiffs in suit No. 58 of 1931, Nurul Huda and Habiba Khatun, a son and a daughter of Azam Ali were really adults but were shown in the cause titie as minors represented by their respective natural guardians as their next friends and that as these adults could not in law he represented by persons purporting to act as their guardians they could not be held to be parties tol the suit and hence their interests could not be affected by the dismissal of the suit. This also is one of the matters in respect of which the plaintiffs beyond a mere pleading which was denied, made no grievance in the courts

below and the facts in relation 10 this issue, namely, the age of the two plaintiffs at the date of the plaint not having been clearly proved, we do not find it possible to entertain the plea at this stage.

Mr. Desai, then submitted that Ashfaq who had figured as the first plaintiff in suit No. 58 of 1931 had already on April 18, 1931 transferred his 2 as. 13 gandas and odd share in Touzi No. 911 to one Pir Baksh from whom the plaintiff obtained a conveyance by a deed dated September 2, 1943 of what he had purchased from Ashfaq.

For this reason he urged that on the findings on the merits of the title in favour of the plaintiffs on the first two defences we have dealt with earlier the plaintiffs should have been granted a decree to this share of Ashfaq in addition to the 8 pies share decreed to them by the High Court. No doubt, if this

transaction were made out and was real, it would stand on the same footing as the 8 pies share in regard to which a decree was granted in favour of the plaintiffs by the judgment now under appeal.

We shall however consider this matter after dealing with the point urged as regards the construction of 0. IX. r. 9, Civil Procedure Code, which was his main submission and which, if upheld, would entirely eliminate the bar under this provision of law.

On this the first submission was that the rule which spoke of the "plaintiff" being precluded from bringing a fresh suit created merely a personal bar against the plaintiff in the first suit and that in the absence of words referring to the representatives of the plaintiff or those claiming under the plaintiff as in s. 11 or s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, the bar was not attracted to cases where the subsequent suit was by the heirs and assigns of that plaintiff.

In support df this submission Mr. Desai invited -our antention to the observations of Das J. in GoJ'l Ram

v. Jagannath Singh(') where this argument was characterised as a weighty one and examined elaborately.

Though the learned Judge decided this matter on quite a -different line of _reasoning, he referred to various . earlier -Oecisions which appeared to him to favour the view sub 11nitted to us by Mr. Desai and expressed his hesitation in

(I) l.L.R. 9 Pat. 447 at p. 454.

Sura; Ratan Thirani v.

Azamabad Tea Co.

Ayyangar }.

Surdj Ratan Thirani v. .Azamabad

Tea Co.

Ayyangar /.

rejecting that construction.

We are not however impressed: by the argument that the ban imposed by 0. IX. r. 9 creates merely a personal bar or estoppel against the particular plaintiff suing on the same cause of action and leaves the matter at large for those claiming under him.

Beyond the absence in 0. IX. r. 9 of the words referring "to those claiming under the plaintiff" there is nothing to warrant this argument. It has neither principle, nor logic to commend it. It is not easy to comprehend how A who had no right to bring a suit or rather who was debarred from bringing a suit for the recovery of property could effect a transfer of his rights to that property and confer on the transferee a right which he was precluded by law from asserting.

There are, no doubt, situations where a person could confer more rights on a transferee than what he posses.sed but those are clearly defined exceptions which would not include the case now O.Jl hand. This argument was addressed to the High Court and the learned Judges characterised it as startling, a view which we share.

The rule would obviously have no value and the bar imposed by it would be rendered meaningless if the plaintiff whose suit was dismissed for default had only to transfer the property to another and the latter was able to agitate rights which his vendor was precluded by law from putting forward.

Again to say that an heir of the plaintiff is in a better position than himself and that the bar lapses on a plaintiff's death, does not appeal to us as capable of being justified by any principle or line of reasoning. In our opinion, the word '.Plaintiff' in the rule should obviously, in order that the bar may be effective. include his assigns and legal representatives.

It was next urged that 0. IX. r. 9 precluded a second suit in respect of "the same cause of action" and that the cause of action on which Suit 58 of 1931 was laid and the present suit-Title suit 18 of 1943 was not the same and so the bar was not attracted.

In view of this argument it is necessary to examine the cause of action on which the present suit has been filed and compare and contrast with that in Suit 58 of 1931.

Closely analysed the material allegations to found the causeo of action on which reliefs were claimed in the present suit

were (i) That the Tea Estate was originally the property of Azam Ali. When he died his estate was inherited by his 8 sons, his widows and a daughter.

That the registration of the estate in the .name of Md. Ismail was as a co-sharer, the property belonging beneficially to all the heirs.

This position was not altered by the termination of the lirst lease and its renewal jn 1928 for a further period of 30 years.

All 1the co-heirs lived as a joint family with a common mess and hence there was no question of any adverse possession by Md. Ismail whose possession was not as sole proprietor or exclusive.

The suit on the mortgage was fraudulent and collusive, by Ismail colluding with the mortgagee to defraud his co-heirs. Details were mentioned as evidence of the fraud and collusion.

The sale in pursuance of the decree which was passed ex-parte was also fraudulent.

On the date of the auction Ismail had no title even to the 2t as. share because of his adjudication as an insolvent earlier. The manner in which the 8 pies share of the daughters was obtained by the plaintiff was set out, and similarly the purchase by them through Pir Baksh of the share of Ashfaq.

The other purchases by the plaintiffs whereby they claimed to have obtained the 16 as. share in the Tea Estate were set out.

The plaint then went on to refer to suit 58 of 1931 and set out their case as regards the nature of that litigation and its effect.

Lastly, they pleaded that they had obtained possession of the Tea gardens on October 10, 1934 and that on the next day the defendants moved the Magistrate for an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code and that the Magistrate had made an order against the plaintiffs restraining them from interfering with the possession of the defendants which necessitated their bringing the suit for the reliefs we have set out earlier.

We have already summarised the material allegations wnich were made in Suit 5 8 of 1931. The material difference between the cause of activn alleged in the present suit consists only in the addition of the allegations about the possession and dispossession in October, 1934.

This suit is based on the title of the plaintiffs by reason of their . purchas.!s and admittedly their vendors would have nothing to convey if the court sale conveyed, as it purported t~

Suraj Ratan' Thirani v.

A.zamabad

Tea Co.

Ayyangar J.-

.Suraj Rutan

:J. hirant

Azamabad

lea <...o.

ST JPREME COURT REPORTS

convey, the full 16 as. interest in the Tea garden to the National Agency Co. Ltd.

It was because of this that allegations were made to sustain their title and this could be done only if they established want of title to the extent of 16 as. share in Ismail, the consequent ineffectiveness of the mortgage effected by Ismail and of the decree obtained in pursuance thereof and of the court sale in execution of that decree, being confined at the most to 2! as. share belonging to Ismail.

These allegations which were fundamental to the plaintiffs' case were identical with those which had been made in suit No. 58 of 1931.

Bearing these features in mind, the proposition that Mr. Desai submitted for our acceptance was briefly this.

A cause of action is a bundle of facts on the basis of which relief is claimed. If in addition to the facts alleged in the first suit, further facts are alleged and relief sought on their basis also, and he explained the additional facts to be the allegations about possession and dispossession in October, 1934, then the position in law was that the entire complexion of the suit is changed with the result that the words of 0. IX. r. 9 "in respect of the same cause of .action" are not satisfied and. the plaintiff is entitled to te- . agitate the entire cause of action in the second suit.

In Support of this submission, learned counsel invited our attention to certain observation in a few decisions to which we do not consider it necessary to refer as we do not see any substance in the argument.

We consider that the test adopted by the Judicial Committee for determining the identity of the cause of action in the two suits in Mohammed Khalil Khan and Ors. v. Mahbub Ali Mian and Ors.(') is sound and expresses correctly the proper interpretation of the provision.

In that case Sir Madhavan Nair, after an exhaustive dis- . cussion of the meaning of the expression "same cause of

action" which occurs in a similar context in para ( 1) of

0. II r. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, observed:

"In considering whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit 1r. the same or not, as the cause of action in the previous suit, the test

(') 75 !. A. I2r.

to be applied is: are the causes of action in the two suits in substance-not technicallyidentical?" The learned Judge thereafter referred to an earlier decision of the Privy Council in Soorijomonee Dasee v. Suddt:>- nund(') and extracted the following passage as laying down the approach to the question :

"Their Lordships are of opinion that the term 'cause of action' is to be construed with reference rather to the substance than to tho form of action ........ ".

Applying this test we consider that the essential bundle ol facts on which the plaintiffs based their title and their right to relief were identical in the two suits.

The property sought to be recovered in the two suits was the same. The title of the persons from whom the plaintiffs claimed title by purchase, was based on the same facts viz., the position of Md. Ismail quoad his co-heirs and the beneficial interests of the latter not being affected or involved in th& mortgages, the mortgage-decree and the sale in execution thereof.

No doubt, the plaintiff set up his purchases as the source of his title to sue, but if as we have held the bar under Q. IX. r. 9 applies equally to the plaintiff in the first suit and those claiming under him, the allegations regarding the transmission of title to the plaintiffs in the present suit ceases to be material. The only new allegation was about the plaintiffs getting into possession by virtue of purchase and their dissession. Their addition, however, does not wipe out the identity otherwise of the cause of action.

It would, of course, have made a difference if, without reference to the antecedent want of full

title in Ismail which was common to the case set up in the two plaints in Suit 58 of 1931 and Suit 18 of 1943, the plaintiffs could, on the strength of the possession and dispossession or the sessory title that they alleged, have obtained any relief.

It is, however, admitted that without alleging and proving want of full title in Md. Ismail the plaintiffs could be granted no relief in their present sutt.

(1 : (18731 I2 B<ng. L.R 304, 315.

134- SP S.C-14

!uraj R.ataft Thil'flloi ...

AV1mabad

TIG c ..

A.yyan1<1r I.

Sura/ Raton Tlllranl ...

Aiamabad

Tta Co.

The question is whether the further allegations about possession in October, 1934 have reajly destroyed tke basic and substantial identity of the causes of action in the two suits. This can be answered only in the negative. The learned Judges of the High Court therefore correctly held that the suit was substantially barred by 0. IX. r. 9.

It now remains to consider the claim of the plaintiffs to the 2 annas 13 odd gundas share of Ashfaq. In paragraph 52 of their plaint the plaintiffs stated that by a registered sale-deed executed on April 18, 1931 Ashfaq, the t0n of Azam Ali sold the entire interest which he. possessed in the Azamabad Tea Estate to Pir Baksh in pursuance of a Bainama dated April 7, 1930 and put him in possession, and in the succeeding paragraph they set out their purehases of this share by a Kabala dated September 2, 1943.

In the joint written statement filed on behalf of the defendlmts 1 and 2 these allegations were controverted.

The execution of the sale-deed in favour of Pir Baksh was de!)jed and it was further stated that even if the sale-deed were proved to have been executed it was a sham and nominal transaction and threfore inoperative to pass title.

Though no specific issue in relation to this sale to Pir Baksh was raised, there was a: general issue (Issue No. 8) which elated to the plaintiff's acquiring dtle to the Tea Estate.

The sale deed by Ashfaq was filed and marked as Ex. 12(i)

ud the sale in favour of the plaintiffs by Pir Baksh as Ex.

12 ( c). The effect however of this sale to Pir Baksh on the :rights of the plainti, ffs to relief does not appear to have been rai, sed before the learned trial Judge.

It may be pointed out that the learned trial Judge held that Ismail was the full owner of the property under the lease granted in 1928, by reason of the provisions of the Crown Grants Act and even if this were not so, he held that his co-heirs had consented to put him forward as the ostensible owner of the property with the result that they were estopped from imptiaching the mortgage and the sale of the property in execution of the mortgage decree.

It is therefore possible that because of the view which the learned trial Judge wa~ inclined to take of the title of Md. Ismail, the plaintiffs did not seriously put forward their rights under their purchase from Pir Baksh, because if the learned trial Judge was right, the sale by Ashfaq to Pir Baksh even if real

wpuld riot have helJ>ed thi:i plaintiffs to obtain any relief.

In this connection it may be pointed that the plainti& claim

to the 8 pies share which WI!$ allowed in their f<tvour bx the High Court, was not pressed in the trial court.

Even in the High Court, however, the point arising from the sale by Ashfaq to Pir Baksh does not seem to have been pressed.

We shall presently advert to and examine th!' submis- &ions made to us by Mr. Sen as regards the merits of this claim to the share of Ashfaq, but before doing so we must refer to a point raised by Mr. Sen which necessitated. a prolonged adjournment of the appeal after the main arguments were heard.

After pointing out that the plaintiffs did not agitate or press before the courts below any special right based on the purchase of Ashfaq's share through Pir Baksh, he submitted that this might possibly have been because the property covered by the sale deed Ex. 12(i) did not coo, iprise Touza ])lo. 911-the Azamabad Tea Estate.

There was scope for this submission because in the record as printed for the use of this Court, the Schedule annexed to the sale deed Ex. 12 ( i) was not printed but only the portion containing the description of the parties and the words of conveyance, with the result that Mr. Desai was unable to make out whether as a fact Ashfaq's interest in the suit property was sold under Ex. 12(i). To make matters worse the Schedule to the sale deed of 1943 executed by Pir Baksh was also not translated and printed in the record prei;>ared for the appeal.

In view, however, of the categorical statement in the plaint as regards the indentity of the property conveyed under F.x. 12 (i) with Ashfaq's share in the Azamabad Tea, Es tat~, we considered that the appellant's submission could not be rejected as frivolous.

We therefore acceded to the request of Mr. Desai and called for the original of Ex. 12 (i) from the High Court so that counsel might make submissions to \is as regards the identity of the property conveyed,.

The document was accordingly obtained and traQ.slated for the

use of the Court and when the appeal was again placed before us Mr. Sen admitted that the property conveyed by

Ex. 12(i) was Ashfaq's 2 as. 13 gundas odd interest in rouza No. 9ll. .

1964 -

Sura; Rat111t T}lir•iil

'f.

Azamabad r.a Co.

Ayyangar I,

JP64

Swaj Rot1J11 Tltiranl ...

Azamabad

Tea Co.

Ayyan1ar J,

Coming now to the merits of the plaintiff's claim, it is common ground that if the sale by Ashfaq were real and intended to pass title to Pir Baksh, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a decree for a declaration that in addition to the 8 pies share granted to them by the High Court, they would be entitled to a further 2 as. 13 gundas share of Ashfaq in the plaint A Schedule property.

Mr.

Sen's submission, however, was that we should not entertain or give effect to this claim, because several circumstances throw grave suspicion on the reality of the transaotion, and that in any event the claim could not be accepted without careful scrutiny of the facts.

Having regard to the definite case raised in the pleadi.itgs, we are not disposed to reject the claim merely because the same was not pressed in the courts below. Besides we cannot ignore the circumstance that the sale deeds Ex. 12(i) and 12(c) on which the claim was based were filed in the trial court, and Pir Baksh was examined to formally prove these deeds as the 31st witness for the plaintiff.

Moreover, even though as regards certain other transfers, the trial Judge recorded findings that they were nominal, there was no such finding as regards the sale by Ashfaq.

In view of these features, we have decided not to reject the claim of the plaintiffs based on this ground.

There are, however, certain features which throw some suspicion on the reality of the transaction which Mr. Sen

pressed before us which have led us to desist from ourselves passing a decree for this additional share in their favour.

The circumstances to which Mr. Sen drew our attention were these; (i) though Ashfaq executed the sale deed Ex. 12(i) on April 18, 1931, he figured as the first plaintiff in Suit 58 of 1931 which was filed on 28th November,

1931, without adverting to the sale, a piece of conduct certainly not consistent with the sale being real and intended to pass title; ( 2) though in the plaint the necessary averments were made regarding their obtaining the share of Ashfaq through Pir Baksh, the claim under this head waa not pressed before the trial court; ( 3) when the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court from the total dismissal of the suit, they did not raise any specific ground touching their right to this share, nor were any argument&

addresed to the High Court on this point; and ( 4) there had been no mutation in the revenue records when this sale was effected and Pir Baksh who was examined as a witness admitted this fact.

These circumstances are certainly capable of explanation, but they show that the claim of the plaintiffs cannot be accepted by us straightaway and a decree passed in their favour.

In these circumstances, we consider that the proper order to pass would be to remit the matter to the trial Court for recording a finding as regards the reality of the sale on the evidence already on the record and to pass an appropriate decree in the suit, that is, if the sale under Ex. 12(i) were held to be real, the plaintiffs would be entitled in addition to the 8 pies share decreed to them by the High Court, to a further 2 as 13 gondas odd share belonging to Ashfaq which they obtained under Ex. 12 ( c) through Pir Baksh, and in the event of the sale not being held to be real to no more than what the High Court has decreed.

With this modification, the appeal is dismissed with

COlill.

Appeal dismissed.

CH. SUBBARAO

MEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD

(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLl:AR JJ.)

R1pre1tntation of th• P•ople Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), 11. 80, 31 (3),

90(3),-.f'ttction Petition-No attutation in the copit1 oj thl petition that they •re true copit1-Whlth1r lhtr1 hod bt1n 1ub11turl comp/U.nct.

The third respondent was declared elected to the Lesislalive •11 of Andhra Pradesh in the general election held in 1962. Tho appo- ••t, a •oter of tbo constituency ftlcd an election petitioa challeqina

Swa/

R•IM Ihirani

•• Atamabiul

Tta Co.

AYY•Tllfll". I.

1•nW"'"J, IJ

SURAJ RATAN THIRANI & ORS

THE AZAMABAD TEA CO. & ORS

B. P. SINHA, C.J.

C. SHAH

AYYANGAR JJ.

Code of Civil Procedure

s. 3

s. 41

Transfer of Property Act

Ismail

National Agency Co. Ltd.

Azarnabad Tea Estate

Azam Ali

National Agency Co. Ltd.1

Ashfaq

s. 3

Section 41

Transfer of Property Act

Calcutta High Court

S. T. Desai

P. Maheshwari

B. Sen

N. R. Ghosh

Salil K. Datt

P. K. Ghosh

AyyangM

A YY ANGAR

Kazi Azam Ali

Azamabad Tea Co.

National Agency Co. Ltd.

Kazi Mohammed Ismail

1st of April 1898

Ayyangar

June 8, 1917

Mohammed Ismail

September 24, 1931

November 13. 1931

Azamabad Tea Estate

Ismail

Nazifannessa

May 6, 193.0

Surai Rata

s. 41

Transfer of Property Act

Desai

Sen

4zamabad

Tea Co.

July 20, 1928

Mohd

Darjeeling

August 10, 1928

Kazi Mohammed Ismail

Kazi Isahaque

Kazi Yakub

Kazi Samoddoha

Kazi Nurul Ruda

Kazi Badarudduza

Kazi Insaf Ali

Kazi Asfaque

February 1, 1929

April 1, 1928

s. 3

s. 41

Transfer of Property Act

s. 41

Transfer of Property Act

Desai

s. 41

s. 41

Transfer of Property Act

Civil Procedure Code

Azifunnessa

Najifennessa

Ayyangar

Ashfaq

Shamsuzzoha

Nurul Huda

Mohd. Yakub

Mahbuba Khatun

Habiba Khatun

Bibi Marium

Ille National Agency Co. Ltd.

Mohd. Ismail

Mohd. Ismail

Azamabad , Tea Estate

28th November, 1931

22nd August, 1932

jl Agency Co. Ltd.

C.P.C

Purnia

Habiba Khatun

April 18, 1931

Pir Baksh

September 2, 1943

Civil Procedure Code

s. 11

s. 47

Das

Md. Ismail

October 10, 1934

s. 144

Criminal Procedure Code

.Suraj Rutan

Madhavan Nair

!uraj R.ataft Thil'flloi

April 7, 1930

s 2

Pir Baksh

28th November,

1931

SUBBARAO

K. SUBBA RAO

RAGHUBAR DAYAL

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

J. R. MUDHOLl

R•IM Ihirani


6 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 213

addresed to the High Court on this point; and ( 4) there had been no mutation in the revenue records when this sale was effected and Pir Baksh who was examined as a witness admitted this fact.

These circumstances are certainly capable of explanation, but they show that the claim of the plaintiffs cannot be accepted by us straightaway and a decree passed in their favour.

In these circumstances, we consider that the proper order to pass would be to remit the matter to the trial Court for recording a finding as regards the reality of the sale on the evidence already on the record and to pass an appropriate decree in the suit, that is, if the sale under Ex. 12(i) were held to be real, the plaintiffs would be entitled in addition to the 8 pies share decreed to them by the High Court, to a further 2 as 13 gondas odd share belonging to Ashfaq which they obtained under Ex. 12 ( c) through Pir Baksh, and in the event of the sale not being held to be real to no more than what the High Court has decreed.

With this modification, the appeal is dismissed with

COlill.

Appeal dismissed.

CH. SUBBARAO

MEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD

(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLl:AR JJ.)

R1pre1tntation of th• P•ople Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), 11. 80, 31 (3),

90(3),-.f'ttction Petition-No attutation in the copit1 oj thl petition that they •re true copit1-Whlth1r lhtr1 hod bt1n 1ub11turl comp/U.nct.

The third respondent was declared elected to the Lesislalive •11 of Andhra Pradesh in the general election held in 1962. Tho appo- ••t, a •oter of tbo constituency ftlcd an election petitioa challeqina

Swa/

R•IM Ihirani

•• Atamabiul

Tta Co.

AYY•Tllfll". I.

1•nW"'"J, IJ

1964 the election of the third respondent on several grounds inclµding corrupt C& Subbarao practices.

The petition was acCompanied by the requisite nwnber of y.. copies which wre true copies and each of them bore the signature of &limber. Election the petitioner. But there was no attestation at the foot of the coPies that frllnutal Hyderathey were true copies.

The third respondent raised various preliminary ktl objections and the Election Tribunal rejected all of them.

Thereupon he filed writ petition in the High Court praying for the issue of a writ quashing the Tribunal's order.

His main contention was that since the copies of the petition did not contain an attestation stating that the copies were true copies there has been a violation of the mandatory provision of s. 80(3) of the Representaion of the People Act, 1951. Tho High Court accepted the contention and issued a writ as prayed for.

The present appeal was filed with special leave granted by this Court.

HELD:

(i) If there is a total or complete non compliance with the provisions of s. 81(3) the election petition might not be ••aa election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of the part" within

1. 80 of the Act.

(ii) By the expression ''copy" ins. 81(3) it was meant not an exact copy but only one so true that nobody by any possibility misunderstands it not being the same as the original.

Murarka v. Roop Singh [1964] 3 S.C.R. 573, referred lo

Noseworthy v. Overseers Buckland etc., L.R. 9 C. P. 233 ancl

Spic~ v. Bacon, L.R. 2 Ex. D. 463, distinguished.

(iii) In the present case the signatures on the copies cannot be held to have been merely intended to be a copy of those on the original, since a signature in original was not needed on the copy and writing or copying out the name of the signatory would suffice. The absence of a writing in the copy indicating the signature in the original would not detract the copy from being a true copy.

The facts and circumstance of the case show that there has been a substantial compliance with the requirement of s. 81(3). The wider question whether s. 81(3) or as part thereof is mandatory or directory is left open.

The appeal is allowed.

Xunjer Thevar, [1959] S.C.R. 583. followed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 971 of 1963.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 15, 1963 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 1096 of 1962.

P. A. Choudhury and T. V. R. TaJaclwi, for the appellant.

H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General and P. Ram Reddy, for respondent No. 3.

Ch.

Sub,,_ ...

January 13, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was MT bmber

1 •. E!~ • _ t1 una 'llJ~ delivered bybad

AYYANGAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave Ayyangar /. against a judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which a Writ Petition filed by the 3rd Respondent-K.

Brahmananda Reddy-was allowed and an Election Petition filed by the appellant was directed to be dismissed.

The facts giving rise to, the proceedings with which the appeal is concerned are briefly as follows: At the Genl!ral Elections held in the month of February 1962 for the 'Legislative Assembly-Constituency of Phirangipuram in Guntur District in Andhra Pradesh-the third respondent Brahamananda Reddy and one Chandramouli, the 2nd respondent before us, were the contesting candidates.

The polling at the Election took place on the 26th 'February 1962 and the Returning Officer declared Brahmananda Reddy, elected as

having obtained the majority of valid votes.

Thereafter, ihe appellant who is a voter on the rolls of the said Constituency filed an Election Petition before the Election Commission on April 11, 1962 under s. 81 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, which we shall refer to as the Act.

There was no formal defect in the petition, it was accompanied by the requisite number of copies provided for by the Act and also by the treasury receipt evidencing the deposit of the requisite sum for security as provided by a. 117 of the Act.

The grounds on which the election was sought to be set aside were various and included inter alia allegations of corrupt practices against the returned candidate as well as his election agent, as also several irregularities in the polling by having the votes of dead voters recorded as well as by double voting. The petition was tcteived by the Commission, who after satisfying itself that it was in conformity with the Act had a copy of the petition published in the Official Gazette on May 17, 1962 as provided by s.

86 of the Act.

Jn due course, an Election Tribunal was constituted and the petition was referred to the Tribunal for trial.

The returned candidate-Brahmananda Reddy-filed

191~ his Written Statement on September 15, 1962 in which the Ch.

Suhhara• allegations of fact made in the petition were denied. Be- •• b Y.EI 1. sides what might be termed the merits of the allegations in -•m tt, • ec ion h l . . .

B .

Tribunal Hydtta t e e ectlon petll!on, rahmanda Reddy raised by his Wntba ten Statement several technical objections pointing out //4yyani• J. certain defects in the petition. This appeal is not concerned either with these technical defects in the election petition or with the defence raised on the merits to the charges that were formulated in it.

The merits have yet to be tried, and as regards the technical objections to the petition raised in the Written Statement dated Se; itember 15, 1962, they have been disposed of by the High Court and the same are not before us.

A few days later on September 24, 1962, Brahmananda Reddy filed a further Statement of objections to the petition raising mostly objections of a technical nature and of these the only objections which is the subject matter of the present appeal is that contained in paragraph 2 which reads, and we quote the material words:

"It is further submitted on behalf of the 1st respondent that the above petition filed u/s 81 of the Act is not an Election Petition ...........• As the requirements of s. 81 (3) of the Act are not com;>lied with, the petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed u/s 90(3) of the Act as it does not comply with the provisions of sec. lt 1 of the Act. ............. "

This second statement contained a prayer that in view of the technical objections, the maintainability of the petition might be decided as a preliminary issue as the objections went into the root of the matter.

Paragraph (2) extracted earlier is somewhat vague but in the arguments before the Tribunal it was explained as

indicating an objection alleging non-compliance with s. 11(3) of the Act which runs:

"Every election petition shall be accompained by as

many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and one more copy for the use of the Election Commission,

Ch.

Subbtno

and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petitioa. • Member, B,..,,,_.

Tribunal ll)'U..

We shall refer later to the precise defect which was relied bad on in support of the case that there was a non-compliance A.yyangor 1. with this provision.

The Tribunal acceded to this request and by its order dated November 7, 1962, it decided the preliminary objections including the one just now mentioned in favour of the election ipetitioner and fixed a date for the trial of the petition on the merits.

Brahmananda Reddy thereupon moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and prayed for the issue of the Writ quashing this decision of the Tribunal and sought the dismissal of the election petition for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act.

The learned Judges of the High Court disallowed the other technical objections raised, but held that the petition did not comply with the requirements of s. 81 ( 3) of the Act and for this reason they directed the dismissal of the Election Petition.

The appellant thereafter has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.

The subject of controversy in this appeal lies in a very narrow compass.

But before we deal with it, it will be convenient to specify the precise defect which the learned Judges have held to be fatal to the maintainability of the Election Petition.

As stated earlier, the Election Petition filed was accompanied by the number of copies required to accompany the petition under s. 8 l (3).

The Election Petition was type-written and the CQ?ies which accompanied the petition were carbon copies of the type-script, so there was no question of the copies being other than 'true' copies.

The copies bore two signature in original of the Election Petitioner authenticating both the contents of the petition as well as the verification thereof.

The Petitioner did not however insert the words 'true copy' before or above his signa tures.

The learned Judges of the High Court considered that this rendered the petition one not in accordance with s.

11 ( 3) of the Act and it is on this ground that the Election•

1964 Petition filed by the ap;:iellant has been dismissed and it is Ci.

Subb11No the correctness of this decision that is convassed in the appeal llart11n."· J:•ction before us.

l'illlldtal 6ad 1~•ra In view of the arguments addressed to us it would be necessary to set out a few of the relevant provisions of the A.7yttngar 1 Act which bear upon ihe points urged, but before doing so we shall refer to Art. 329 of the Constitution which pro Vides:

329(b) no election to either House of Parliament or I

to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the ap; iropriate Leplature."

In accordance with this. we have the provisions of the Act and particularly those contained in Part 'VI commencing with s. 79.

Section 80 repeats the provision in the Constitution already extracted and enacts :

"No election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part."

:Section 81 deals with the presenta.tion of petitions. It runs:

"81. I'rosntation cf peli ions. ( 1) An election petition ca!ling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (i) of seetion 100 and section 10 I to the Election Commission by any candidate at such eleetion or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier tlwn, the date of election of the returned cam!idate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election

are different, the later of those two dates.

Explanation.-In this sub-section, 'elector' means a

JJU person who was entitled to vote at the election Ch.

Subb•r•o to which the election petiion relates, whether Member,•· Electio" he has voted at such elec!ion or not.

Tribulllll Hyder ...

( 2) An election petition shall be deemed to have been presented to the Election Commission:-

( a) when it is delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or to such other officer as may be appointed by the Election Commission in this behalf-

( i) by the person making the petition, or

(ii) by a person authorised in writing in this behalf by the person making the petition; or

(b) when it is sent by registered post and is delivered to the Secretary to the Commissi"~ or the officer so appointed.

( 3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and one more copy for the use of the Election Commission, and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition."

Before proceeding further it is necessary to advert to the history of the provision in sub-section (3) for learned counsel for the respondents laid some store by the object with which the provision was introduced.

As enacted in 1951, s. 81 contained only two sub-sections, the first dealing with the time within which a petition had to be filed and the second with the person or authority and the manner in which the petition had to be presented in order to constitute the presentation one to the Election Commission. At that date the Election Commission, after scrutinizing the petitions to ascertain whether there were any formal defects, had itself to make copies for being served on the respon- _dents.

To avoid this trouble and inconvenience to the Commission and the delay which the making of such copies

bti4

AyyallfOr /.

19H necessarily involved, sub-section ( 3) which we have set out Ch.

Subbarao earlier was introduced into s. 81 by an amendment affected Member, v. Election by Act XL of 1961.

The point made, based on this fea- Tribunal Hyd.rature, we shall reserve for later discussion.

bad

Section 82 deals with the parties who are to be impleaded in the petition and s. 83 with the contents of the petition.

Section 8 3 (1 )( c) enacts:

"An election petition shall be signed .by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings."

Sub-section ( 2) requires a similar signature and verification of ichedules or annexures to the petition.

Section 85 empowers the Election Commission to dismiss a petition in certain contingencies.

It reads:

"85. If the provisions of section 81 or section 82 or section 117 have not been complied with, the Election Commission shall dismiss the petition:

Provided that the petition shall not be dismissed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard."

The succeeding sections deal with the trial of Election Petitions, after making provision for the 8(?pointment of an Election Tribunal by s. 86 but what is relevant in the present context is s. 90 and it is enough to quote the material wordi:

"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908, to the trial of iUits:

Svb-scction ( 3 ) reads:

''The Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which docs not comply with the provision1 of

section 81, notwithstanding that it has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under s. 85."

Ch.

Subbarao

Member, Electitnl The reasoning on which the learned Judges have based Tribunaiod Hyd.,.. their decision shortly stated is this.

It is the requirement of s. 81 (3) of the Act that an election petition should be A.yyangar 1 accompanied by the number of copies specified there, and equally so that the copies so accompanying "shall be attest ed by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition".

There was, of course, the signature of the petitioner on tl!ie copies, but there was no attestation by him that "it was a true copy".

This constituted a noncompliance with the requirements of s. 81 which brought into play the terms df s. 90 (3) of the Act which required the Tribunal to dismiss a petition which did not com?IY with the provisions of s. 81.

Though the learned counsel for the appellant made several submissions, we propose to deal with only one, as the same is sufficient for the disposal of this appeal.

This was that in the circumstances of the case there had been a substantial compliance with the requirements of s. 81(3).

Before, however, dealing with it, it will be convenient tn refer to some of the submissions made to us by the learned Solicitor-General appearing for the contesting :es;>ondent!.

He submitted to us certain propositions which however we consider really unexceptionable.

He said that an election petition was not to be equated to an action at law or in equity, but that as the rights were purely the creature of statute, if the statute rendered any particular requirement mandatory, the courts possessed and could exercise no dispensing power to waive non-compliance.

We consider these i;:iropositions are sound and it is in the light of these basic positions that we shall proceed to consider whether the omission to add the words "true copy" in the copies which were idmittedly exact copies of the petition, constituted a non-compliance with s. 81 (3) as to render the petition liable to be rejected under s. 90 ( 3) of the Act.

Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under s. 90(3) to dismiss 'an elec-

19M. tion petition which does not comply with the <;>rovisions of Clo.

Su6baroo s. 81' was attracted only if there was a defect in the petilf•mb.,,.. Election ion itself ~~ that a defect merely in the copy accompany- Tilbunar ll1d11amg the petition would not be a case of a "petition not """ complying with the provisions of s. 81" so as to require A1Jon1ar 1. or even permit the Tribunal to dismiss the petition. In support of this submission, the difference in the language employed in s. 85 and s. 90(3) of the Act in !he matter of making rference to the requirements of s. 81 w.a5 adverted to.

Besides, it was pointed out that both s. 90(3) and before it s. 90 ( 4) were in their present form making reference to s. 81 when the latter section did not contain the third sub-section relating to copies accompanying the petition, and that the content of s. 90 ( 3) should not be held enlarged because in 1961 sub-section ( 3) was added to s. 81 particularly because the language of s. 90(3) was not altered to reflect the change.

We are not impressed by this argument.

When s. 81 ( 3) requires an election petition to be accompanied by the requisite number of copies, it became a requirement for the presentation of the election petition to the Commission, and therefore a condition precedent for the proper presentation of an election petition. If that is a requirement of s. 81, no distinction can be drawn between the requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) and of sub-section (3).

We might add that if there is a total and complete non-compliance with the provisions of s. 81 ( 3), the election petition might not be "an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part" within s, 80 of the Act.

We are therefore inclined to consider that if there had been such a non-com; iliance with the requirement of sub-section (3) not merely the Election Commission under s. 85 but the Election Tribunal under s. 90 ( 3) would prima facie not merely be justified but would be required to dismiss the election petition.

This takes us to the point as to whether the requirement of s. 81 ( 3) has been complied with or not.

The principal submission of the learned Solicitor-General was based on the language employed in s. 81(3) of the Act read in

the light of the direction contained in s. 90(3) which cast

J!M4 on the Tribunal the duty to dismiss an election petition Ch. Si4'6which did not conform to the requirements of the former. M b "· E'..- In particular, he laid stress on the use of the imperative r,1:::,:1. H~

'shall' in s. 81 (3) when denoting the requirement of "attes- """ tation" "under the petitioner's signature" of the copy bearing Ayyangqr 1. the signature being a "true co;:>y''. It was in this connection that he pointed out that the provision for properly attested copies of the petition accompanying the petition was introduced by the amendment effected in 1961, and the object of Parliament was two-fold; first to save the time and inconvenience which the previous procedure cast on the Election Commission, of itself having to make copies for service on the respondents, and secondly by this means to exq>edite the conclusion of the trial of an election petition.

He submitted that the attainment of these objects would be entirely frustrated if the respondents on whom these copies were served had still to make enquiries to satisfy themselves whether the oopies were true copies, without the same being asserted to be so on their face.

In support he referred us to the decisions in Noseworthy v. Overseers of Buckland etc.(') and in Spice v. Bacon( 2 ) as illustrating the degree of strictness and literal compliance which was insisted on by courts in regard to provisions of like character.

The first of these cases was a registration appeal and the Act provided that a iperson who objected to a voter's qualification might be heard in support of his objection if he had given notice to the voter and the manner of giving notice was by sending it by post addressed to his place of abode "as described".

It was held that a notice by post addressed correctly but not to the address "as described" was not a compliance with the requirement and that in consequence the objector could not be heard.

We do not consider that this dec.ision lays down any hard and fast rule or principle of construction which is attracted to every case where a statute calls for interpretation.

In ultimate analysis the question is one of the construction of the relevant provision of the particular statutes which iproceeds on the basis

of the words used understood in the context of the statute.

(1) L.R. 9 C. P. 233. (') L.R. 2 Bx. D. 463.

1964 The second case raised a question as to the meaning Ch.

Subbarao of the word "true copy" in the Inn-keepers' Liability Act .!M•mhtr v.Election 1863, which required that in order to obtain the benefit of

Iribu11ai Hyderathe limitation of liability conferred by the Act, a "copy" of

bad the Act had to be exhibited at the Inn.

The copy which Ayyangar J. was exhibited omitted some material words of the section which was required to be exhibited.

The Court held that when a claim was made on the inn-keeper for loss sustained by a guest, he could not claim the benefit of the statute. We are unable to appreciate the relevance of this decision. It turned on what was meant by the word 'copy' in the Act and the portion which was omitted in the copy exhibited was a material portion.

There is no doubt that such a 'copy' which differs in material particular from the original is not a 'copy' within the Act. In this connection we might make a reference to the decision of this Court in Murarka v. Roop Singh ( 1) where the question as to what is a "copy" is elaborately discussed and some of the English decisions touching this matter have been set out.

We shall have occasion to refer to Murarka's case later, but for the present we need only add that the decision relied on by the Solicitor-General is not at variance with what this Court has laid down in Murarka's case.

The next matter to be considered stems from the submission as regards the object of Parliament in enacting subsection ( 3) of s. 81 and that expeditious dispClsal of election petitions which was the object would be frustrated if substantial compliance with the provision was held sufficient.

We are not im; iressed with this argument.

While we are conscious of the need for expeditious disposal of election petitions, and for the strict enforcement of provisions designed to achieve this purpose, we cannot be oblivious to the circumstance that to read every requirement literally might equally defeat the purpose for which Part VI is intended, viz., that elections are conducted in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions framed to ensure purity and orderliness and that the candidate who has not obtained a majority of valid votes or has obtained it in flagrant

(t) [1964]3 S.C.R. 573

breach of the statutory provisions in not held entitled to 1964 represent the constituency.

Ch.

SubbllNIO

The Conrt had to deal with a similar question of inter- Memb.,, Electio• Tribunal Hydm1r pretation of words which appeared mandatory in Kamara; bad

Nadar~• .• Kunju Thevar(1). One of the points which arose Ayyaniar 1• for consideration was whether the requirement of s. 117 of the Act which then required the petitioner to enclose with the petition a Government treasury receipt of Rs. 100 in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission had been complied with by the election petitioner and s. 90( 4) of the Act which corresponded substantially to the present s. 90(3) required the Election Tribunal to dismiss a petition which did not comply with the provision, inter alia, of s. 117.

The petitioner in that case had made the deposit of the requisite amount i11 the institutions named in the section but the deposit was made in favour of the Election Commission and not in favour of the Secretary to the Commission as required by statute.

It was contended that the petition did not conform to the provisions of s. 117 and had therefore to be dismissed by the Tribunal. This Court rejected this submis>ion .and after adverting to the purpose of the provisions, held that this was fulfilled by the deposit made and that though the requirement as to deposit was mandatory, the same was complied with by the deposit made.

We consider that this reasoning is not irrelevant to the construction of s. 81(3) of the Act either.

In this connection we might refer to the decision of this Court in Murarka v. Roop Singh( 2 ) in which this Court had to consider a question closely related to that now under debate.

That case was also concerned with certain

defect~ similar to what we have in the appeal before us.

The defects which were there relied on by the returned candidate as justifying or requiring the dismissal of the Election Petition fell into several categories whiCh includ

ed non-compliance with the requirements of s. 81 (3 ).

There, as here, the petition was accompanied with the re-

(') (1959] S.C.R. 583.

134-159 SC-15

<'> [1964] 3 s.c.R. 573.

1964 quisite number of copies as specified in s. 81 (3) but what Ch.

Subharao was urged was as regards certain defects in the copies filed . ., b v.El .

These defects fell into two types.

First there were two mat- ... m .r, ect1on h' . ed ed . fil J'rlbunal Hyd.raters w 1ch 1t was stat render the copies ed not 'true bad copies'. If the exipressions 'copy' or 'true copy' wre read Ayyangar J. as exact copies of the original, the copies filed did not satisfy that test.

The two defects were: ( 1) The original petition contained the signature of the petitioner at the foot of the petition as required by s. 83(1)(c) of the Act. In the copy filed there was no copy of this signature.

To that extent therefore the copy was not an exact copy.

The second matter under this head was that the verification in the copy served on the appellant did not exactly correspond to that in the original in that in the latter one of the paragraphs was stated to be true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner while in the former that paragraph was omitted from this group.

The other type of defect which was claimed to constitute non-compliance with s. 81 ( 3) was that the words 'true copy' with the signature of the petitioner underneath were not put down in one of the annexures to the petition, copies

of which were annexed to the copies of the petition filed.

The order of the Returning Officer rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner was filed with the original petition as an annexure to it, and certified copies of that order were annexed to the copies of the petition.

But this certified copy did not contain an endorsement stating that it was a 'true copy' with the signature of the petitioner.

The High Court had held that so far as the defect in not reproducing the signature in the petition was concerned, it was cured by the fact that every page of the copy of the petition was attested to be a true copy and therefore it would not matter if the last page did not contain the signature. As rega•ds the second, the High Court held that the failure to include the paragraph in the verification was only a clerical defect which had crept in through oversight and as regards the other that it was no defect at all.

This decision was upheld by this Court holding that the word 'co;>y' in s. 81 ( 3) meant a copy which was substantially sc and which did not

contain any material or substantial variation.

By 'copy' 1964 in s. 81 ( 3) was meant not an exact copy but only one so Ch.

Sub/Hno true that nobody by any possibility misunderstand! it not M be ": Elecltoa being the same as the original.

Applying this test, this Trlb~ B1"1" Court came to the conclusion that there was no failure to ~.., comply with the last part of s. 81 ( 3), with the re1ult that AY1•n1• 1. s. 90 ( 3) of the Act was not attracted.

This Court besides left open the question as to whether any part of s. 81 ( 3) was directory or whether any portion of it was mandatory. In the present case also, we do not propose to deal with the larger question as to whether 1.

81(3) or any portion of it is merely directory. In view of the decis.ion of this Court it would be clear that if there ia

a substantial compliance with the requirement of s. S 1 ( 3), the election petition cannot be dismissed by the Tribunal under s. 90 ( 3). The question then is whether on the facts

above-stated, there is or is not a sufficient and substantial compliance with s. 81 (3).

We have already pointed out that the appellant has complied with the following requir&- ments:

( 1) The petition has been accompanied by the requilite number of copies.

(2) The copies that accompanied the petition were true copies. ·

( 3) Each of those copies bore the signatures of the petitioner.

If the signature of the petitioner whose name is set oqt in the body of the petition is appended at the end, surely it authenticates the contents of the document. Now in regard to this the learned Judges of the High Court themselves observed after referring to the terms of s. 81 ( 3) : ·

"No doubt, what is necessary is a substantial com{i-'

liance with the requirement of attestation.

For instance, if it is proved that" the eleetion petitioner has signed animo atttstendi, and omitted the words 'true copy' by mistake or inadvertently, there i5 a substantial requirement of the compliance of s. 81 (3).

The

Ch.

s., bbarao ...

II.ember, Election

same may be said if the relative positions of the words 'true copy' and of the signature one below the other are not correct."

Tribunal Hyd1ra- 1. h h Id h h d f h bad hey owever e t at as t ere was no cv1 ence o t e sig-

<4.yyangar J. nature having been appended animo attestendi, there was non-compliance with s. 81 (3). The learned Solicitor-General while not disputing the correctness of the observations of the learned Judges just extracted pressed upon us that the signature at the end of the copy was meant only as a ca:; iY of that in the original petition and could not satisfy the requirement as to attestation of the copy. He also submitted that the position would have been different if there were two signatures instead of one at the end of the copy, even if the words 'true copy' were omitted to be put down. In that case, he said, one signature could be treated as representing the copy of the signature on the original and the other mii:ht be taken to have been made animo attestendi.

We do not however consider that there is really need for so much refinement when one has to look at whether there is a substantial compliance withs. 81(3), seeing that a signature in origisignatures now found on the copies were intended to authenticate the document to which it is appended, viz .. the copy, it would only mean that the copy did not reproduce the signature in the original.

There is no compelling necessity to hold that the signatures were merely intended to be a copy of those on the original in order to spell out a noncompliance with the requirement of this provision. If the nal was not needed on the copy and a writing copying out the name of the signatory would suffice.

The decision of this Court in Murarka's case(') is authority for the position that the absence of a writing in the copy indicating the signature in the original would not detract the copy from being a true copy.

Jn the circumstances, we consider that there has been substantial compliance with the requirement d. s. 81 (3) in the petition that was filed by the appellant and the learned Judges were in error in directing the dismissal o! the petition.

The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court dismissing the petition is set ru; ide.

As owing

(') [I964J 3 S.C.R. 573 -;

.;,.

10 the filing of the Writ Petition there has been a considerable delay in the trial of the Election Petition, we express the hope that the petition would be heard and disposed of at an early a date as is conveniently possible.

The appellant will be entitled to his costs here and in the High Court which will be paid by the contesting third respondent.

Appeal Allowed.

IN re: LILY ISABEL THOMAS

(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,

N. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR

AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)

Supreme Court Rules-''Right to practise" if include! "right to act" -

Rule making power-If conflicts with legislative power of Parliament-Supreme Court Rules, 1950 (as amended in 1962). 0. IV. rr. 16, 17-Validity of-Constitution of .India, Art. 145-Advocates Act, 1961 (25 vf 1961) •s. 52, 58(3).

The petitioner was enrolled in the Madras High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, and later admitted to the rolls of this Court under the Supreme Court Rules.

In this petition, it was contended that under s. 58(3) of the Advocates Act, the petitioner was entitled "as of right to practise" in this Court. and the "right to practise" included not merely the right to plead hut also to act; that the rules mad~. N rr. 16 & 17 of the Supreme Court Rules are invalid; and that that by a rule made under Art. 145 (l)(a) this Court could neither entitle a person to practise nor impose qualifications as to tho right to practise, these matters being entirely within entry 77 and therefore exclusively for parliamentary legislation.

HELD: (i) The words "right to practise" would in itt normal conaotation take in not merely right to plead but the right to act as well and if no rules had been made by the Supreme Court restricting the right to act, the petitioner could undoutedly have had a right both to plead es well as to act

Ashwani Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, [1953) S.C.R. 1, referred lo.

(ii) Under s. 58(3) of the Advocates Act, the right conferred on Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act to practise in the Sup- Rme Court is made subject to any rules made by thia Oourt. SectiOD

Ch. Subbarao v.

Tribunal Hydera

Tribunal Hydera bad

Ayyanz"1' 1,

January, 14

Pir Baksh

Ashfaq

Pir Baksh

CH. SUBBARAO

MEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD

B. P. SINHA, C.J.

K. SUBBA RAO

RAGHUBAR DAYAL

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

s. 80(3)

Representaion of the People Act, 1951

s. 81(3)

[1964] 3 S.C.R. 573

s. 81(3)

s. 81(3)

Xunjer Thevar

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Andhra Pradesh High Court

T. V. R. TaJaclwi

H. N. Sanyal

P. Ram Reddy

AYYANGAR

K.

Brahmananda Reddy

Brahamananda Reddy

Chandramouli

Brahmananda Reddy

April 11, 1962

s. 81

Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951

s.

86

Brahmananda Reddy

itember 15, 1962

September 24, 1962

s 81

s. 81

s 90(3)

s. 11(3)

November 7, 1962

Article 226

s. 81

s. 8

s.

11

Art. 329

s. 79

Section 80

Section 81

section 10

Election Commission

s. 81

s. 81

Section 82

s. 83

Section 8

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 85

section 81

section 82

section 117

s. 86

s. 90

Code of Civil Procedure

section 81

s. 85

Subbarao

s. 81

s. 81

s. 90

s. 81

s. 81(3)

s. 81

s. 90

s. 90(3)

s. 81

s. 81

s. 85

s. 90(3)

s. 81

s. 90(3)

s. 90

s. 81

s. 90

s. 81

s. 90(3)

s. 81

s. 81

s. 81

s. 85

s. 90

s. 81

s. 81(3)

s. 90(3)

s. 81

Parliament

Ayyangar

Murarka

s. 81

Kunju Thevar(1)

s. 117

s. 90( 4)

s. 90(3)

s. 117

s. 117

s. 81(3)

s. 81

s. 81

s. 83(1)(c)

s. 81

s. 81

s. 81

s. 81

s. 90

s. 81

S 1

s. 90

s. 81

s. 81

s. 81

s. 81

s. 81

LILY ISABEL THOMAS

K. SUBBA RAo

N. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR

J. R. MUDHOLKAR

Supreme Court Rules

Art. 145

Advocates Act, 1961

s. 52, 58(3)

Madras High Court

Indian Bar Councils Act

Court under the Supreme Court Rules

s. 58(3)

Advocates Act

Supreme Court Rules

Art. 145

Supreme Court

s. 58(3)

Advocates Act