...

THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS

B. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU . v • .

STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL & ORS. [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J.,. K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH.

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. S!KRI JJ.J

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), s. 43A (as inserted by Madras Amending Act 20 of 1948} Madras G.O. No. 1298, elated April 28, 1956-Government order prescribing the aware! of marks-If direction to Regional Transport Authority in the discharge of its quasi-judicial function-Section 43A-Scope ofif authorises only administrative directions. - --, - ·-~~.

The appellant is a bus operator in the State of Madras. On an invitation. for applications for the grant of two stage. carriage permits he submitted his applications along with many others.

The State Transport Authority considered the merits of the application a.warding marks in accordance with the principles prescribed by Madras G.O. No. 1298, dated April 28, 1956 issued under s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act,,1939 inserted by the Madras Amending Act 20 of 1948. The Transport Authority on this basis granted the two permits to the appellant. Against this crder a number of appeals were filed by some of the unsuccessful 2pplicants including respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in the present apl""al. The Appellate Tribunal re-allotted marks in accordznce v.rith the above G.0.- and respondents 2 and 3 having secured the maximum number of marks were granted the permits. On the rejection of a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and after appealing without success to a Division Bench the appellant applied for a certificate to appeal to this Court wh'ch rejected. The present appeal was filed on special leave granted by this Court. ' It was contended on behalf of the appellant.before this Court that since Madras G.O. No. 1298, dated April 28, 1956, purports to issue direction to the Transport Authority in the discharge of its quasi-judicial functions it is beyond the powers conferred by s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act which authorises only the issue of directions to the said authority in the discharge of its administrative functions and therefore it is bad.

Held, (i) Section 43A confers power on the State Government to issue orders and directions to the State Transport Authority only in relation to its administrative functions.

M/s. Raman and Raman v. The State of Madras [1959] 2 S.C.R. 227, relied on. _

(ii) It is well settled that ss. 47, 48, 57, 60, 64 and 64A deal with quasi-judicial functions and when the transport authorities are dealing with applications for permits and evaluating the respective claims of the parties, the transport authorities are discharging quasi-judicial functions and their orders are quasijudicial orders subject to the jurisdiction of the High court under Art. 226. ·-

L/P(D) ISCI-1

Marc; IJ 5"

State TV.:..nspvrt port Appellate Tribunal, Madras, A.LR. 1959, S.C. 896, relied Appellate Tribunal on.

and Otlters

(iii) In interpreting s. 43A it is legitimate to assume that the legislature intended to respect the basic and elementary postulate of the rule of law that in exercising their authority and discharging their quasi-judicial functions, the tribunals constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgement. It is of Jhe essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of judges or tribunals must be absolutely unfettered by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State.

(iv) The impugned order is outside the purview of s. 43A inasmuch as it purports to give directions in respect of matters which have been entrusted to the tribunals constituted '411 under the Act and which have to be dealt with by them in quasijudicial manner.

(v) The decision of the appellate Tribl!nal is solely based on the provisions of the impugned order and since the said order is invalid, the decision is also bad.

aVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1964.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order da, ted October 29, 1963, of the Madras 'High Court in Writ Appeal No. 214 of 1962.

S. Mohan Kumaramagalam, M. N. Rangachari, R. K.

Garg, M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant.

R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3.

A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No. 4.

M. C. Seta/vad, N. C. Krishna Iyengar and O. C.

Mathur, for Intervener.

March 5, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by-

Gaj-1..agadkar, C.J.

GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .-The short but important point of law which has been raistd for our decision in this appeal by special leave is whether G.O. No. 1298 issued by the Government of Madras on April 28, 1956 in exercise of its powers conferred bys. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of I 939) (hereinafter called the Act) inserted by the Madras Amending Act 20 af 1948, is valid. Mr . . Mohan Kumaramangalam who appears for the appellant' contends that the impugned Government order is invalid for the simple reason that it is outside the purview of s. 43A. The impugned order was issued as early as 1956 and since then, its validity

has never been impeachedi in judicial proceedings. Litiga- 1964 tion in rea_rd to the grant of permits under. the rel~- n. Rajagopala Naidu vant prov1S1ons of, the Act has figured prommently m v. the Madras High Court in the form of writ petitions invoking }1atl1aTr~••g:,!, i the said High Court's jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Cons- PP~.J'o1£:rs titution and several aspects of the impugned order have come . - to be examined. The echoes of such litigation have frequently G"J"14ragadkar, O.J. been heard in this Court and this Court has had occasion to deal with the impugned order, its character, its scope and its effect; but on no occasion in the past, the validity of the order appears to have been questioned. The legislative and judicial background of the order and the course of judicial decisions in regards to the points raised in the enforcement of this order would prima facie and at the first blush suggest that the attack against the validity of the order may not be wellfounded and that would tend to make the initial judicial response to the said challenge more hesitant and reluctant. But Mr. Kumaramangalam contends tha.t s. 43A under which the order purports to have been passed would clearly show that the said order is outside the purview of the authority conferred on the State Government and is therefore invalid. It is obvious that if this contention is upheld, its impact on the administration of the system adopted in the State of Madras for granting permits under the Act would be very great and so though the question lies within a narrow compass, it needs to be very carefully examined. The facts which lead to the present appeal conform to the usual pattern of the permit litigation in which the grant or refusal to grant a permit is challenged under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226.

The appellant B. Rajagopala Naidu is a bus operator in the State of Madras and he runs a number of buses on various route5. On June 26, 1956, the State Transport Authority by a notification invited applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits on the route Madras to Krishnagiri. The buses on this route were to be run as express service. The appellant and 117 bus operators including respondents 2 and 3 D. Rajabahar Mudaliar, proprietor of Sri Sambandamoorthy Bus Service and K. H. Hanumantha Rao, proprietor of Jeevajyoti Bus Service respectively, submitted applications for th~ two permits in question. The State Transport Authority considered the said applications on the merits. In doing so, it proceeded to award marks in accordance with the principles prescribed by the impugned order and came to the conclusion that the appellant satisfied the requirements enunciated by the State Transport Authority for running an efficient bus service on this long route, and so, it granted the two permits to the appellant on May 8, 1958.

LIP(D)tllCI-1(•)

1964 Against this decision, 18 appeals were preferred by the B. Rai6f!o-pala Naidu unsuccessful applicants incluqing respondents 2 and 3. All v. these appeals were heard together by the State Transport Ap-

S'4kf'~~F' 1 pellate Tribunal, Madras in June 1959. It appears that before Ap~~ Oth::a una the appeals were thus heard, the State Government had super- - seded the principles enunciated in the order in so far as they Gajenaragadkar, O.J.related to the grant of stage carriage permits and had issued another direction under s. 43A known as G.O. 2265 on August 9, 1958. Incidentally, it may be added that by this order, different criteria had been prescribed for selection and a different marking system had been devised. The Appellate Tribunal considered the claims of the rival bus operators ant! allotted marks in accordance with the principles laid down by the earlier order. As a result, respondents 2 and 3 secured the highest marks and their appeals were allowed, the order under appeal was set aside and two permits were granted to them. This order was passed on July 4, 1959.

The appellant then invoked the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution by his writ petition No. 692 of 1959. In his writ petition the appellant challenged the validity of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal on several grounds. One of them was that the impugned order on which the decision of the Appellate Tribunal was based. was invalid. This plea along with the other contentions raised by the appellant failed and the learned Single Judge who heard his writ petition dismissed the petition, on October 18, 1962. The appellant then challenged the correctness of this decision by a Letters Patent Appeal No.· 214 of 1962 before a Division Bench of the said High Court. The Division Bench, however, agreed with the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed the Letters Patent

Appeal preferred by the appellant. The appellant then moved the said High Court for leave, but failed to secure it, and that brought him here with an application for special leave which was granted on November 14, 1963. It is with this special leave that the appellant has brought this appeal before us for final disposal.

Before dealing with the points raised by the appellant, it is necessary to consider the background of the impugned order, and that takes us to the aecision of the Madras High Court in Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd. v. The Road Traffic Board, Madras, by its Secretary('). In that case. the appellant had challenged the validity of a Government order No. 3898 which had been issued by the Madras Government on December 9, 1946. This order purported to direct the transport authorities to issue only temporary permits as the Government intended to nationalise motor transport. Accordingly, instruction No. 2 in the said order had provided that when

(1) (1948) 1 M.L.J. 85.

applications were made for new routes or new timings in 1964 existing routes, then small units should be preferred to _old B. Rajagopala Naidu

ones. In accordance with this instruction, when the apphcav. tion for permit made by the appellant, Sri Rma Vilas A~';!11J;~';"lr:.!, i Service was rejected, the order stated that it so reand Othera jected in the interests of the public generally under . - s. 47(l)(a) of the Act. The appellant preferred :ln GaJendragadkar, G.J. appeal against the order to the Central Board namelr th~ Provincial Transport Authority which had been constituted

by the Government under s. 44 of the Act. His appeal failed and so, he moved the Madras High Court under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act for an order directing the respondent-the Road Traffic Board, Madras-to consider the application of the appellant in accordance with the prnvisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder for renewal of the permit for plying buses. The High Court held that G. 0. No. 3898 was in direct conflict with the proviso to s. 58 sub-s. (2) of the Act, and so, was invalid. This decision showed that there was no authority or right in the State Government to issue instructions such as were contained in the said Government order.

In reaching this decision, the High Court emphasised the fact that the Central Transport Board and the Regional Transport Board were completely independent of the Government except that they must observe the notifications made pursuant to s. 43 of the Act. It was conceded that if and when the Government acted as an Appellate Tribunal, it had judicial functions to discharge. But these functions did not include the power to give orders to any Board which was seized of an application for renewal of permits. That is how it was established by this decision that as the Act stood, the State Government had no authority to issue directions as to how applications for permits or their renewal should be dealt with by the Tribunals constituted under the Act. This judgment was pronounced on November 19, 1947.

As a result of this judgment, the Madras Legislature amended the Central Act by Act XX of 1948 which came into force on December 19, 1948. Amongst the amendments made by this Act was the insertion of s. 43A with which we are concerned in the present appeal.. This section clothed the State Government with powers to issue certain directions and orders. As we have already indicated, the point which we are considering in the present appeal is whether the impugned order falls within the purview of the power and authority conferred on the State Government by this section. We will read this section later when we address ourselves to the question of its construction. The amendment of the Central Act led to the next round of controversy between the bus operators and the State Government and that resulted in the decision of the Madras High

1961 Court in C.S.S. Motor Service Tenkasi v. The State of Madras B.Ra; agopa1a Naidu and another('). In that case, the validity of several provisions

. v. of the Act including the provisions introduced by the Madras ~- Trapr!b'' 1Amendment Act were challenged. It will be recalled that at

"!'~he,'.; una the time when this challenge was made, the Constitution had . come into force and the appellant C.S.S. Motor Service urged Oajendmgadkar, O.J. before the High Court that under Art. 19(i)(g) it had a fundamental right to ply motor vehicles on the public pathways and the impugned provisions of the Act invaded its aforesaid fundamental right and were not justified by Art. 19(6).

The High Court elaborately considered the first part of the contention and it took the view, and we think rightly, that a citizen has a fundamental right to ply motor vehicles on the public pathways for hire or otherwise and that if any statutory provision purports or has the effect of abridging sµch fundamental right, its validity would have to be judged under the relevant clause of Art. 19. Proceeding to deal with the dispute on this basis, the High Court examined the validity of the several impugned provisions of the Act. In regard to s. 43A, the High Court came to the conclusion that the said section was valid thou_gh it took the precaution of adding that the orders passed thereunder might be open to challenge as unconstitutional. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that the main reason which weighed with the High Court in upholding the validity of this section was tha( the High Court was satisfied that the said section was "intended to clothe the Government with authority to issue directions of an administrative character." Thus, s. 43A was held to be valid in this case and the correctness of this conclusion is not disputed before us. In other words, we are dealing with the appellant's challenge against the validity of the impugned order on the basis that s. 43A itself is valid. This judgment was pronounced on April 25, 1952.

Some years after this judgment was pronounced, the impugned Government order was issued on April 28, 1956.

This order purported to issue instructions or directions for the guidance of the Tribunals constituted under the Act. In fact, it rclers to the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case cf C.S.S. Motor Service. It would appear that the Madras Government wanted to give effect to the said decision by issuing appropriate directions under its authority derived from s. 43A which was held to be valid. The impugned order deals with five topics. The first topic has relation to the instructions which had to be borne in mind whilst screning the applicants who ask for permits. This part of the order provides that the applicanis may be screened and disqualified on one or more of the principles enunciated in els. I to 4 in that part.

The second part deals with the system of assigning marks to

(') A.L.R. (1953) Mad. 304.

the several claimants, under four columns. In laying down these 1961 principles, the impugned order intended to secure precision inn. RajagopalaNaidu the disposal of claims for permits and to enable quick consiv. deration of the merits of such claimants. This part of the order, ASta1e 11 •• TrTanspbl h d .l h" h h f kppeeriu,- owever, ma e 1t c ear t at m cases w ere t e system o mar' and Othtrs ing worked unfairly the Regional Transport Authority may . -

0 J ignore the marks obtained for reasons to be stated. It is this GaJendragadkar, • • part of the order which has introduced the marking system whic!J has been the special feature of adjudication of claims for permits in the State of Madras. These two parts are described as "A" in the Government order. Part 3 deals with the variation or extension of routes granted under the permits.

Part 4 deals with the revision of timings and Part 5 bas reference to suspension or cancellation of permits. That in brief is the nature of the directions issued by the impugned order.

After this order was issued and the Tribunals constituted under the Act began to deal with applications for permits in accordance with the principles prescribed by it, the decisiom of the said Tribunals came to be frequently challenged before the Madras High Court and these disputes have, often been brought before this court as well. In these cases, the character of the order passed by the Tribunal was examined, the nature of the instructions issued by the impugned order was considered and the rights of the parties aggrieved by the quasi-judicial decisions of the tribunals also fell for discussion and decision. A question which was often raised was whether . it was open to a party aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal to contend that the said decision was based either on a misconstrui:tion of the impugned order or in contravention of it. and the consensus of judicial opinion on this part of the co:itroversy appears to be that the proceedings before the Tribunals constituted under the Act are quasijudicial proceedings and as such liable to be corrected under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It also appears to be well established that the impugned order is not a statutory rule and has therefore no force of law. It is an administrative or execu• tive direction and it is binding on the tribunals; it does not, however, confer any right on the citizen and that means, that a citizen cannot be allowed to contend that a misconstruction of the order or its contravention by any decision of the Tri bunal functioning under the Act should be corrected under Art. 226.

In M Is Raman and Rainan Ltd. v. The State of Madras and others('), this Court by a majority decision held thats. 43A -0f the Act as amended by the Madras Amendment Act, 1948 must be given a restricted meaning and the jurisdicti0n it conferred on the State Government to issue orders alld directions must be confined to administrative functions.

An order or

1964 direction made thereunder by the State Government was con- R • --,;; N 'd sequently denied the status of law regulating rights of parties.

aJlllJi "' "and was treated as partaking of the character of an adminis- Btate Pra••porl trative order., Similarly, in R. Abdulla Rowther v. The State. .it~bunal Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and others(') this Court - . held by a majority decision that the orders and directions OaJ•ndrlllJadkar, O.J. issued under s. 43A were merely executive or administrative in character and their breach, even if patent, would not justify the issue of a. writ of certiorari.

It was also observed that though the orders were executive and did not amount to statutory rules, they were rules binding on the transport authorities for whose guidance they have been issued, but that did not confer any right on the citizen and so a plea that a contravention of the orders should be corrected by the issue of an appropriate writ was rejected. Such contravention, it was held, might expose the Tribunal to the risk of disciplinary or other appropriate action, but cannot entitle a citizen to make a complaint under Art. 226. It is necessary to emphasise that in both these cases, no argument was urged that the impugned order was itse!Vinvalid and should have been ignored by the Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial authority under the relevant provisions of the Act. The Court was no doubt called upon to consider the character of the impugned order and some of the reasons given in support of the conclusion that the impugned order is administrative or executive seem to suggest that the said order would. prima faeie, be inconsistent with the provisions of s. 43A which received a narrow and limited construction from the court. Nevertheless, since the point about the validity of the impugned order was not raised before the court, this aspect of the question was not examined and the discussion and decision proceeded on the basis that the impugned order was valid. Now that the question has been raised before us, it has become necessary to examine the validity of the impugned order.

Before proceeding to examine the scope and effect of the provisions of s. 43A, it is necessary to bear in mind two general considerations. The first broad consideration which is relevant has relation to the scheme of the Act in general and the scheme of Ch. IV in particular. The Act consists of 10 chapters and deals mainly with administrative problems in relation to motor vehicles. Chapter II deals with licensing of drivers of motor vehicles. Chapter IIA deals with licensing of conductors of State carriages and Chapter 111 with registration of motor vehicles. Chapter IV fs concerned with the control of transport vehicles and in this chapter are included the relevant provisions for the applications for grant of permits, the consideration of those applications and other allied topics. Chapter IV A includes the provisions relating to

(') A.I.R. (1959) S.C. 896.

State Transport Undertakings. Chapter V addresses itself t? 19e4 the construction, l!quipment and maintenance of motor veh1 B. RajagapaU. Naidu

cles, Chapter VI deals with the control of traffic, Chapter v.

VII has reference to motor vehicles temporarily leaving or State Transport Appellate Tribunal visiting India, Chapter VIII with the question of insurance and Othera of motor vehicles against third party risks, Chapter IX pres- , .

0 J cribes offences, penalties and procedures to try the offences Ga1endragadkar, • and Chapter X contains miscellaneous provisions .

This scheme shows that the hierarchy of transport a.uthorities contemplated by the relevant provisions of the Act is dothed both with administrative and quasi-judicial functions and powers. It is well settled that ss. 47, 48, 57, 60,

64 and 64A deal with quasi-judicial powers and functions. In -0ther words, when applications are made for permits under the relevant provisions of the Act and they are considered on the merits, particularly in the light of the evaluation of the claims of the respective parties, the transport authorities are exercising quasi-judicial powers and are discharging quasijudicial functions, and so, orders passed by them in exercise of those powers and in discharging those functions a, re quasijudicial orders which are subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226, vide New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd.

v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd.(') and MI s Raman and Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras and others(') and R.

Abdulla Rowther v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal Madras and others(') so that when we examine the question about the validity of the impugned order, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the impugned order is concerned with matters which fall to be determined by the appropriate transport authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial powers and in discharge of their quasi-judicial functions.

The other broad consideration relevant in dealing with the present controversy is that there are three sets of provisions under the Act which confer legislative, judicial and administrative powers respectively on the State Government.

Section 67 which confers on the State Government power to make rules as to stage carriages and contract carriages and s. 68 which confers power on the State Government to make rules for the purposes of Ch.

IV are obviously legislative powers, and in exercise of these powers, when the rules are framed, they become statutory rules which have the force of law: Naturally, the exercise of these legislative powers is controlled by the safeguard provided by s. 133 of the Act. This latter section requires that when power is exercised by the State Government to make rules, it is subject to the condition that the rules must be previously published before they are

(') f1957] S.C.R. 98 p. 118. (') (1959] 2 S.C.R. p. 227.

(') A.LR. (1959) S.C. 896.

196' made. That is the effect of s. 133(i). Sub-cl. (2) of s. 133 pro- B R . opala Naidu vides that all rules made under this Act shall be published in

• aJ•U v. the Offici<tl Gazette after they are made and shall, unless some State Tr.n'1""t 1 later date is appointed, come into force on the date of such

.11ppe1:; a1e0~,;:::•• publication. Clause 3 is important. It provides that all rules.

" made under the Act shall be laid for not less than fourteen GaJ•n<iragadkar, O.J. days before the appropriate Legislature as soon as possible 4 after they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications: as the appropriate Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid. So that if statutory rules are made by the Government in.exercise of legislative powers conferred on it by ss. 67 and 68, they are subject to the control of the appropriate legislature which can make changes or modifications in the said rules if it is thought necessary or expedient to do so. Publication before the rules are made and publication after they are made also afford another statutory safeguard in that behalf. That is the nature of the legislative power conferred on the State Government.

Section 64A confers judicial power on the State Transport Authority, because the said authority is given revisionaI jurisdiction to deal with orders therein specified, subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed by the two provisos. to the said section. This is a clear provision conferring judicial power on the State Transport Authority.

Along with the legislative and judicial powers. which have thus been conferred, there is the administrative' power conferred on the State Government by s. 43A. Section 43A readsthus:

"The State Government may issue such orders ancf directions of a general character as it may consider necessary, in respect of any matter relating to road transport, to the State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority; and such Transport Authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions".

It is the construction of this section which is the basis: of the challenge to the validity of the impugned rules in the present appeal. It may be conceded that there are some words in the section which are against the construction for which Mr. Kumaramangalam contends. The words "in respect of any matter relating to road transport" are undoubtedly wide enough to take in not merely administrative matters but also matters which form the area of the exercise of quasi-judicial authority by the Tribunals constituted under the Act.

Prima facie, there are no words of limitation irl this clause and it would, therefore, be possible to take the view that these are matters which are scrutinised by the appropriate authorities in exercising their quasi-judicial jurisdiction. Similarly, the State Transport Authority and the Regional Transport

7 S.C.R.

HUPREME COURT REPORTS 11

Authority to which reference is made in this section are cloth- 1964 ed not only with administrative power but also with q~si- B. RajQ{Jopola Naitlv

judicial jurisdiction so that reference to the two authontles v. . and reference to any matter relating to road transport would la1ii:i:'T':l""na1.

indica.te that both administrative and quasi-judicial matters Pi.;'nd IJIMr•" <:ome within the sweep of s. 43A. .

1 th "d . h. h Gajendragadkar, O.J.

But there are. severa o er cons1 eratlons w 1c support Mr. Kumaramangalam's construction. The first is the setting and the context of the section. As we have already seen, this section has been introduced by the Legislature in response to the decision of the Madras High Court in C.S.S. Motor Service case(') and that would indicate that the Madras Legislature intended to confer on the State Government power to issue administrative orders or directions of a general character. Besides, the two preceding sections s. 42 and s. 43 and s. 44 which follows support the argument that the field covered by s. 43A like that covered by ss. 42, 43 and 44 is administrative and does not include the area which is the subjectmatter of the exercise of quasi-judicial authority by the relevant Tribunals.

Then again, the use of the words 'orders and directions' would not be appropriate in regard to matters which fall to be considered by authorities exercising quasi-judicial powers; These words would be appropriate if they have reference to executive matters.

And lastly, the provision that the relevant transport authority shall give effect to all orders and directions issued under s. 43A would be clearly inappropriate if the instructions issued under the said section are meant for the guidance of quasi-judicial bodies. If the direction is issued by the appropriate Government in exercise of its powers under s. 43A and it is intended for the guidance of a tribunal discharging its quasi-jwlicial functians, it is hardly necessary to say that the authority shall give effect to such directions. Section 43A being valid, if the orders and directions of a general character having the force of law can be issued within the scope of the said section, then such orders tit directions would by ' them,-

selves be binding on the transport authorities for whose guidace they are made; and it would be superfluous to make a speciJi<: provision that they are so binding. On the other hand, if the orders and directions are in the nature of adminiStrative orders and directions, they do not have the force of statutory rules and cannot partake of the character of provisions of law, and so, it may not be inappropriate to provide that the said orders and directions shall be followed by the appropriate tribunals. Therefore. it seems to us that on a fair and reasonable construction of s. 43A; it ought to be l>eld that the saia section authorises the State Government

( 1) IL.R. [1953] Mad. 304.

:!!!_ to issue orders and directions of a general character only B. RajagopalaNaidu in respect of administrative matters which fall to be dealt with

S v. by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport taie Trans]JOrt h d h 1 · f h A h ' Appellate Tribunal Aut. o'.1ty 1;1n er t e. re evant prov1s10ns o t e ct m t err and 011,,,., admm1strat1ve capacity.

Gajendraga.dk<ir, C.J.

In reaching this conclusion, we have been influenced by certain other considerations which are both relevant and material. In interpreting s. 43A, we think, it would be legitimate to assume that the legislature intended to respect the basic and elementary postulate of the rule of law, that in exercising their authority and in discharging their quasi-judicial function, the tribunals constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgment. It is of the essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of the Judge or the Tribunal must be 'absolutely unfettered by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State. If the exercise of discretion conferred on a quasi-judicial tribunal is controlled by any such direction, that forges fetters on the exercise of quasi-judicial authority and the presence of such fetters would make the exercise of such authority completely inconsistent with the well-accepted notion of judicial process. It is true that law can regulate the exercise of judicial powers. It may indicate by specific provisions on what matters the tribunals constituted by it should adjudicate. It may by specific provisions lay down the principles which have to be followed by the Tribunals in dealing with the said matters.

The scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals constituted by statute can well be reglilated by the statute and principles for guidance of the said tribunals may also be prescribed subject of course to the inevitable requirement that these provisions do not contravene the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. But what law and the provisions of law may legitimately do cannot be permitted to be done by administrative or executive orders. This position is so well established that we are reluctant to hold that in enacting s. 43A the Madras Legislature intended to confer power on the State Government to invade the domain of the exercise of judicial power. In fact. if such had been the intention of the Madras Legislature and had been the true effect of the provisions of s. 43A, s. 43A itself would amount to an unreasonable con-· travention of fundamental rights of citizens and may have to be struck down as unconstitutional. That is why the Madras High Court in dealing with the validity of s. 43A had expressly observed that what s. 43A purported to do wa~ to clothe the Government with authority to issue directions of an ad ministrative character and nothing more. It is somewhat unfortunate that though judicial decisions have always emphasised this aspect of the matter, occasion did not arise so long

I ..

to consider the validity of the Government order which on the ~~ construction suggested by the respondent would clearly invade B. Rajagopafa Naidu the domain of quasi-judicial administration.

State ;,.~,., pori Appellate Tribu•al There is another consideration which is also important. and Oth•rs If s. 43A authorises the State Government to issue directions Gajendragadkar, G.J. or orders in that wide sense. s. 68 would become redundant and safeguards so elaborately provided by s. 133 while the State Government purports to exercise its authority under s. 68, would be meaningless. If orders and directions can be issued by the State Government which are not distinguishable from statutory rules, it is difficult to see why s. 68 would have dealt with that topic separately and should have provided safeguards controlling the exercise of that power by s. 133.

It is likewise significant that the directions and orders issued under s. 43A are not required to be published nor are they required to be communicated to the parties whose claims are affected by them. Proceedings before the Tribunals which deal with the applications for permits are in the nature of quasijudicial proceedings and it would, indeed, be very strange if the Tribunals are required to act upon executive orders or directions issued under s. 43A without conferring on the citi-. zens a right to know what those orders are and to see that they are properly enforced. The very fact that these orders and directiom; have been consistently considerc; d by judicial decisions as administrative or executive orders which do not confer any right on the citizens emphatically brings out the true position that these orders and directions are not statutory rules and cannot therefore seek to fetter the exercise of quasi-judicial powers conferred on the Tribunals which deal with applicaions for permits and other cognate matters.

It is, however, urged that the principles laid down in the impugned order are sound principles and no challenge can be made to the validity of the order when it is conceded that the order enunciates very healthy and sound principles. This order, it is argued, can be considered as expert opinion the assistance of which is afforded by the State Government to the Tribunals dealing with the question of granting permits. We are not impressed by this argument. It is not the function of

te eecut.ive to assit quasi-judicial Tribunals. by issuing drrechons m the exercise of its powers c!onferred under s. 43A.

Besides, if s. 43A is valid and an order which is issued under it does not fall outside its purview, it would beopen to the State Government to issue a direction and require the Tribunal to foll.ow that direction unqestionably, in every case. It is true that m regard to the markmg system evolved by the impugned rule, liberty is left to the Tribunal not to adopt that system for reasons to be recorded by it. This liberty in pr.ictice

1964 may not mean much; but even theoretically, if the impugned B. Rajagopala Naidu order is valid, nothing can prevent the State Government from

Sta•• ;;.,..'!!"" issuing another order requiring that the marking system pres- Appellai. Tnbuoal cribed by it shall always be followed. We have already seen

anti Others that s. 43A itself provides that effect shall be given to the

Gajentlr<J{J(Ulkar o.J. orders issued under it, and so, if an order issued under s. 43A ' itself were to prescribe that it shall be followed, it will have ' to be followed by the Tribunal and no exception can be made . in that behalf. Therefore, we cannot accept the argument strongly pressed before us by Mr. Ganapathy Iyer on behalf of respondent No. 1 that the validity of the order cannot be challenged on the ground that the principles laid down by it are sound and healthy. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the impugned order is outside the purview of s. 43A inasmuch as it purports to give directions in respect of matters which have been entrusted to the Tribunals constituted under the Act and which have to be dealt with by these Tribunals in a quasi-judicial manner. We cannot overlook the fact that the validity of the Act particularly in reference to its provisions prescribing the grant and refusal of permits, has been sustained substantially because this important function has been left to the decision of the Tribunals constituted by the Act and these Tribunals are required to function fairly and objectively with a view to -exercise their powers quasijudicially. and so, any attempt to trespass on the jurisdiction of these Tribunals must be held to be outside the purview of

8. 43A.

We are conscious of the fact that the impugned order was issued after and presumably in response to the decision of 1he Madras High Court in the case of C.S.S. Motor Service(') though it would appear qiat what the High Court had suggested was presumably the making of the rulesunder s. 68 of the Act. It cannot also be disputed that the main object of the State Government in issuing this order was to avoid vagaries, and introduce an element of certainty and objectivity, in the decision of rival claims made by applicants in respect of their applications for permits. It may have been thought by the State Government that if the Tribunals are allowed to exercise their discretion without any guidance, it may lead to inconsistent decisions in different areas and that may create dissatisfaction in the public mind. It does appear, however, that in some other States the problem of granting permits has been resolved without recourse to the marking system. But apart from that, even if it is assumed that the marking system, if properly applied, may make the decisions in regard to the grant of permits more objective, fair and con- . , sistent. we do not see how that consideration . can assist the decision of the problem raised before us If the State Government thinks that the application of some kind of marking {') I.L.R. [1953] Mad. 304.

1964 system is essential for a fair administration of the Act, it may _ adopt such course as may be permissible under the law. Sec-B. Rajagopala Said• tion 47(l)(a} requires inter alia that the interests of the public s Tv. b · d b h R ·

1 T tole ran<port generally have to be orne m mm y t e eg1ona rans- App'1/a1' 7', ibmial port Authority in considering applications for stage carriage aod Otl"'" permits. The said section refers to other. matters which have GajewlrMadlar, C.J. to be borne m mmd. It 1s unnecessary to indicate them for our present purpose. The Legislature may amend s. 47 by indicating additional considerations which the Transport Authority has to bear in mind; c•r the Legislature may amend s. 47 by conferring on the State Government expressly and specifically a power to make rules in that behalf or the State Government may proceed to make rules under s. 68 without amending s.

47. These are all possible steps which may be taken if it is thought that some directions in the nature of the provisions made by the impugned order must be issued. That, however, is a matter with which we are not concerned and on which we wish to express no opinion. As this court has often emphasised, in constitutional matters it is of utmost importance that the court should not make any obiter observations on points not directly raised before it for its decision. Therefore, in indicating the possible alternatives which may be adopted if the Stat~ .Government thinks that the marking system helps the administration of the Act, we should not be taken to have expressed any opinion on the validity of any of the courses specified.

That leaves only one point to be considered. Mr. Ganapathy Iyer urged that even though the impugned order may be valid. that is no reason why the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal which has been confirmed by the High Court in the present writ proceedins should be reversed. He ;.rgues that what the Appellate Tribunal has done is to act upon the principles which are sound and .the fact that these prindples have been enunciated by an invalid order should not nullify the decision of the Appellate Tribunal itself. Thus presented. the argument is no doubt plausible; but a closer examination of the argument reveals the fallacy under-lying it. If the Appellate Trunsport Authority had considered these matters on its own without the compulsive force of the impugned order. it would have been another matter; but the order pronounced by the Appellate Alllhority clearly and unambiguously indicates that it held and in a sense rightly, that it was bound to follow the impugned order unless in the exercise of its option it decided to depart from it and was prepared to record its reasons for adopting that course. It would, we think. be idle tri suggest that any Transport Authority

functionin~ in the State would normally refuse to comply with the order 1SSued by the State Government itself. Therefore,

1964 we have no hesitation in holding that the decision of the Ap- B. Rajogopala Naidu pellate Tribunal is based solely on the provisions of the imsl •• T v. 1 pugned order and since the said order is invalid, the decision •ra., por 'If b db h' f . f ..

Appllate TribWtal 1tse must e correcte y t e issue o a wnt o certwran. and Others . - In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order Ga; eadragadkar, O.J. passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 692 of 1959 and direct that the said Writ Petition be allowed. There would be no order as to costs throughout. In accordance with this decision a writ of certiorari shall be issued setting aside the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal and remanding the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for disposal in accordance with law.

A ppea/ allowed

SUPREME COURT

B. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

c. SHAH

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

s. 43A

Madras Amending Act

Section 43A

Madras

s. 43A

Motor Vehicles Act

Art. 226

April 28, 1956

s. 43A

Motor Vehicles Act

Section 43A

[1959] 2 S.C.R. 227

ss. 47, 48, 57, 60, 64 and 64A

Art. 226

State

s. 43A

s. 43A

S. Mohan Kumaramagalam

M. N. Rangachari

R. K.

Garg

M. K. Ramamurthi

R. Ganapathy Iyer

A. Ranganadham Chetty

A. V. Rangam

M. C. Seta

N. C. Krishna Iyengar

O. C.

Mathur

agadkar

GAJENDRAGADKAR

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

Mohan Kumaramangalam

s. 43A

Art. 226

Kumaramangalam

s. 43A

Art. 226

B. Rajagopala Naidu

June 26, 1956

Krishnagiri

D. Rajabahar Mudaliar

Sambandamoorthy Bus Service

H. Hanumantha Rao

Jeevajyoti Bus Service

May 8, 1958

Gajenaragadkar

s. 43A

August 9, 1958

July 4, 1959

Madras High Court

Art. 226

October 18, 1962

November 14, 1963

Madras Government

December 9, 1946

Rma Vilas

s. 47(l)(a)

GaJendragadkar

s. 44

s. 45

Specific Relief Act

s. 58

Central Transport Board

s. 43

November 19, 1947

Madras Legislature

December 19, 1948

s. 43A

Madras High

1961 Court

C.S.S. Motor Service

Oajendmgadkar

Art. 19(i)(g)

Art. 19(6)

Art. 19

s. 43A

s. 43A

s. 43A

April 25, 1952

C.S.S. Motor Service

s. 43A

Art. 226

Art. 226

s. 43A

Art. 226

s. 43A

s. 43A

State Transport Undertakings

ss. 47, 48, 57, 60,

64 and 64A

Art. 226

Section 67

s. 68

s. 133

s. 133(i)

s. 133

Clause 3

iragadkar

ss. 67 and 68

Section 64A

s. 43A

Section 43A

State Transport Authority

B. RajQ{Jopola Naitlv

s. 43A

Gajendragadkar

s. 42

s. 43

s. 44

s. 43A

ss. 42, 43 and 44

s. 43A

s. 43A

Section 43A

s. 43A

B. RajagopalaNaidu

Gajendraga.dk<ir

s. 43A

s. 43A

s. 43A

s. 43A

s. 43A

s. 43A

B. Rajagopafa Naidu

s. 43A

s. 68

s. 133

s. 68

s. 68

s. 133

s. 43A

s. 43A

s. 43A

s. 43A

B. Rajagopala Naidu

s. 43A

s. 43A

Ganapathy Iyer

s. 43A

s. 68

GajewlrMadlar

s. 47

s. 47

s. 68

s.

47


7 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 205

GULRAJ SINGH

MOTA SINGH

[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR. c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,

N. RA.IAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.J

DeCTee-Pre-emption suit by illegitimate son and daughter of a female vendor-Whether the words "son or daughter of

such female" used in Punjab Pre-emption Act, as amended, inc!ude an illegitimate son or daughter of such femalie-Puniab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (1 of 1913), as amended by Act X of 1960, s. 15(2)(b).

The appellants-illegitimate son and daughter of one Sardarni-filed a suit to pre-empt the sale made by her of agricultural land to the respondents. Both the trial court as well

as the District Court on appeal granted to the appellants a decree for pre-emption, though to a limited extent. On second appeal by the respondents, the High Court directed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the appellants were not comprehended within the class of persons who were entitled to pre-emption under s. 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act as amended by Act X of 1960. On appeal by Special Leave the appellants contended that the provision in s. 15 of the Preemption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which made provision for the devolution of property belonging to a female owner and that as under the latter enactment illegitimate children of the Hindu female were entitled to succeed to her property, it must be held that when the Punjab legislature used in 1960 the expression 'son or daughter' it meant a son or a daughter who would be entitled to succeed as an heir of a Hindu female.

Held: The normal rule of construction of the words "child" "son" or udaughter" in a statute would include only legitimate children. No doubt, there might be express provision iri the statute itself to give these words a more extende<' meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of tl Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a goo<. illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate lhat the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy. Section 15 contains no ""Press provision and the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words

"Son or daughter" occur more than once in that section. It was fairly conceded on behalf of the appellant that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15(1) the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If

so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2}(a)(i) to the brother's son of such vendor. It could hardly be argued that a brother's illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. Therefore, it must be held that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words "son or daughter" it meant only a legitimate son and legitimate daughter of the female vendor.

March 18

Gult-aj Singh

v. .Mota Sin1h

A!!Y"ngar, J.

CIVIL . APPELLATE JURISDICTION-Civil Appeal No. 467 of 1963.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated February 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 837 of 1960.

Bishan Narain and Naunit Lal, for the appellants.

Yashpa/ Gandhi and S. D. Goswami, for the respondents.

March 13, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by

AYYANGAR, J.-Do the words "son or daughter of such female" occurring in s., 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 as amended by Act X of 1960 include an illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter of such female is the only question that arises in this appeal by special leave.

The appellants are the illegitimate son and daughter of one Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur. By a registered deed of sale dated December 1, 1956 the said lady sold 18 bighas, ·

1 biswas and 5! biswansis of agricultural land for a sum of Rs. I 0,000 /- to the respondents. The appellants filed a suit to pre-empt this sale. There was some dispute about the consideration actually paid but we are not now concerned with it. Both the trial court as well as the District Court on appeal granted to the appellants a decree for pre-emption, though to a limited extent. The respondents filed a second appeal to the High Court and the learned Judges, by the judgment now under appeal, directed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the appellants were not comprehended within the class of persons who were entitled to pre-emption under s. 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act as it now stands under the amendment effected by Act X of 1960. It is from this judgment that, by special leave, the present appeal has been brought.

Mr. Bishan Narainlearned Cmmsel for the appellants submitted to us that the provision in s. 15 of the Pre-emption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which made provision for the devolution of property belonging to a female owner and that as under the latter enactment illegitimate children of a Hindu female were entitled to succeed to her property, it must be held that when the Punjab legislature used in 1960 the expression 'son or daughter' it meant a son or a daughter who would be entitled to sucteed as an heir of a Hindu female. We are unable to accept this submission of learned Counsel.

Section 15 whose construction calls for consideration reads as follows:

"15. Persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in respect of sales of agricultural land and village

immovable property.-(1) The right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and village immovable property shall vest-

(a) where the sale is by a sole owner: - First, in the son or daughter or son's son or daughter's son of the vendor; Secondly, in the brother or brother's son of the vendor; Thirdly, in the father's brother or father's brother's son of the vendor; Fourthly, in the tenant who holds under tenancy of the vendor the land or property, sold or a part thereof;

(b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land or property and is not made by all the cosharers jointly: - First, in the sons or daughters or son's sons or daughter's sons of the vendor or vendors; Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; Thirdly, in the father's brothers or. father's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; Fourthly, in the other co-sharers; Fifthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy _ of the vendor or vendors the land or property sold or a part thereof;

(c) where the sale is of land or property owned jointly and is made by all the co-sharers jointly: - First, in the sons or daughters or son's sons or daughter's sons of the vendors; Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the vendors; Thirdly, in the father's brothers or father's brother's sons of the vendors; Fourthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendors or any one of them the land or property sold or a part thereof.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-seotion (1)-

(a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her father or brother or the sale in respect of such

Gulraj Sin.gh

Mota Singh _,, Ayyongar, J,

Gtdraj Singh

Mota Singh

Awangar, J.

208 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [196!l]

land or property is by the son or daughter of such female after inheritance, the right of preemption shall vest: -

(j) if the sale is by such female, in her brother or brother's son;

(ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such female, in the mother's brothers or the mother's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; {bl where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her husband, or through her son in case the son has inherited the land or property sold from his father, the right of pre-emption shall vest:- First, in the son or daughter of such female; Secondly, in the husband's brother or husband's brother's son of such female." The submission of learned Counsel virtually amounts to this that in order to construe the words used .in s. 15 one ; should travel beyond the enactment and ascertain the class of persons who are entitled under the Hindu Succession Act to succeed as heirs of the intestate vendor. Even a. cursory examination would show that this construction is untenable and that the framers of the Act did not proceed on any such theory. Take, for instance, the case where a female succeeds to property through her father or brother dealt with in s. 15(2)(a) of the Pre-emption Act Her heirs under the Hindu Succession Act would be, if the property was inherited from her father; her son or daughter (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and in their absencethe heirs of the father. If, however, the property was inherit- ed from her brother, the devolution is different (vide s. 15(1) and (2)). The devolution provided by s. 15(2)(a)(i) of the Pre-emption Act is different and confers the right to pre-emot on her brother or her brother's son. The theory, therefore, that we should resort to the line of heirs as in an intestate succession under the Hindu Succession Act or, for the matter of that, to any other system of Common Law or statute applicable to the vendor is obviously untenable. Pursuing this line of reasoning a little, it was not disputed that if the female vendor were a Christian by religion, only her legitimate issue would be denoted by these words. As it is common ground that the statutory right.of pre-emption conferred by s. 15 is as much applicable to a Christian owner of property as to a Hindu, it would be seen that the construction -of the words of this statute of general application would be

made to depend on the religion to which the vendor belonged, and in fact would vary with any change made by statute in the law of intestate succession as applicable to different communities. The .position that would arise on a conversion of the vendor to a different faith, with a different personal law as to succession would bring out in bold relief the unsustainability of the submission based on the peculiarities of the personal law as to intestate succession applicable to the vendor.

We have, therefore, to ascertain whether by the expression 'son or daughter' only the legitimate issue of such female is comprehended or whether the words are wide enough to include illegitimate children also. That the normal rule of construction of the words "child'', "son" or

"daughter" occurring in a statute would include only legitimate children i.e., born in wedlock, is too elementary to require authority. No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these words a more extend ed meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a good illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate that the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy .. Section 15 wit1J which we are concerned contains no express provision and the coritext,

so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words "son or daughter" occur more than . once in that section. It was fairly conceded by Mr. Bishan Narain that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15(1), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2)(a)(i) to the brother's son of such vendor. It could hardly be open to argument that a brother's illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. The matter appears to us to be too clear for argument that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words "son or daughter" it meant only a legitimate son and a legitimate daughter of the female vendor.

The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

Golraj 8ing1'

Mota Singh

Ayyangar, J.

205

GULRAJ SINGH

MOTA SINGH

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

c. SHAH

N. RA.IAGOPALA AYYANGAR

S. M. SIKRI, JJ

Punjab Pre-emption Act

Puniab Pre-emption Act, 1913

s. 15(2)(b)

s. 15(2)(b)

s. 15

s. 3(j)

Hindu Succession Act

Section 15

s. 15(1)

s. 15(2}(a)(i)

s. 15(2)(b)(i)

Gult-aj Singh

.Mota Sin1h

Naunit Lal

S. D. Goswami

AYYANGAR

Punjab Preemption Act, 1913

Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur

December 1, 1956

s. 15(2)(b)

Bishan Narainlearned Cmmsel

s. 15

Section 15

Gulraj Sin.gh

Mota Singh

Ayyongar

Gtdraj Singh

Awangar

s. 15

Hindu Succession Act

s. 15(2)(a)

Hindu Succession Act

s. 15(1)

s. 15(2)(a)(i)

Hindu Succession Act

s. 15

s. 3(j)

Hindu Succession Act

Section 15

Bishan Narain

s. 15(1)

s. 15(2)(a)(i)

s. 15(2)(b)(i)

Ayyangar