7 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 471

STATE OF MYSORE

M. H. BELLARY

IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR. C.J .• K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.J

Bombay Civil Service Rules-Government Servant of one department sent on deputation to another department-On reversion entitled to the promotions based on merit-cum seniority basis in the parent department-Breach of Statutory Rule under Art. 309 gives rise to cause of action-Constituticn of India, Art. 309, 313-Bombay Civil Service Rules, R. 50(b).

The respondent was a Government servant in one of the departments of the Bombay Go\'ernment. He was sent on , eoutation to another department and after serving there for a long period and getting a number of promotions he was reverted back to his parent department and ordered to be posted at. > considerably lower grade, while another Government servant who was below his rank was promoted as Assistant

Secretary. Thereupon the respondent file".! a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of his posting. A preliminary objection was raised by the appellant that the petition was not maintainable. But the High Court held that the respondent was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court when there is a violation of a statutory rule and on merits it held that the respondent was entitled to the relief claimed. The present appeal was filed on a certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution.

Before this Court in view of the decision State of UP. v.

Babu Ram Upadhya. [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679 it was not disputed that if there was a breach of a statutory rule framed under Art. 309 or continued under Art. 313 in relation to the condition of service the aggrieved GoV'ernment servant could have recourse to the Court.

The main contention on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent was not entitled to be appointed to any higher post than as a Senior Assistant or to receive a salary higher than that which had been granted to him bv the impugned order. ·

Held: (i) Assuming that this was a case where the respondent had a lien and his lien had not been suspended it was not possible to interpret Rule 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules as providing different criteria to cases where a Government servant had a lien and where his lien has been suspended.

The Rule and the circular make it abundantly clear that an officer on deputation in another department shall be restored to the position he would have occupied in his parent department had he not been deputed.

(ii\. Where promotions are based on seniority-cum-merit basis an officer on deputation has a legal right to claim promotion to a higher post in his parent department provided his service in the department to which he is lent is satisfactory.

This may not be the case in regard to selection posts.

March25

State of My801't

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 677 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 31, 1961 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 283 of 1959. v.

M.H. Bellary

B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant S. V. Venkataranga Iyengar, M. Rama Jois and A. G.

Ratnaparkhi, for the respondent.

March 25, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by

.AyyafllJM, J.

AYYANGAR, J.-A very short question regarding the proper construction of Rule 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Ruks is involved in this appeal which comes before us by a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Mysore

undr Art. 133 of the Constitution. '

The facts giving rise to this appeal which are necessary to be narrated to appreciate the only point urged before us weri: these: The resporn; lent was recruited as an Upper Division Clerk by the Government of Bombay , in .1931 and was later appointed substantively as a Junior Assistant in the Political Department. While so, on September 17, .1943 his services were transferred on deputation to the office of the Controller of Rationing,. Bombay to work as a Senior Assistant in the newly started Rationing department which was a temporary department. He obtained successive promotions in this department and by March, 1954 he was drawing a pay of Rs. 460/- p.m. in the grade Rs. 350-30-650 as Rationing Officer. That department was abolished in March, 1954 and thereafter he was reverted to his parent department. Though his parent department was the Political Department, the respondent wa:;, after he ceased to be a Rationing Officer, posted first to the Labour Department and then to the Public Works Department. When this reversion took place his pay was fixed at Rs. 120/- p.m. The petitioner protested against this reversion and this Joss of his emoluments on the ground that this fixation of pay was contrary to the Rules framed by Government in regard to the service Conditions of a Government servant who was appointed on deputation in another department. He also pointed out that the officer next below him in his parent department had been appointed as an Assistant Secretary by virtue of normal and

reular promotion. Before. however. final orders were passed. on his representation by the Government of Bombay, the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 came into force and the respondent was allotted to the State of Mysore. On November 27, 1958 the Government of Mysore informed the respondent through an official memorandum that in view of

certain communications received by that Government from the Government of Bombay in answer to his representations he should be considered to have held the post of Senior Assistant on June 1, 1954 on a salary of Rs. 225/- in the grade Rs. 210-15-300. The petitioner's complaint, however, was that even this order was in violation of the conditions of his service and he claimed that when he was reverted to the parent department he was entitled to be posted as an Assistant Secretary-a post which according to him, he would have held on that date had he not been deputed to the department of Civil Supplies on September 17, 1943.

There was no dispute that subject to an argument to which we shall refer presently, the respondent would have held the post of Assistant Secretary because the person next below him-one Nadkarni-actually held that post on that day. The respondent claimed that on the basis of the Service Rules to which we shall immediately make reference he should, on his return to the parent department, have been posted as an Assistant Secretary and been allowed the scale of emoluments applicable to that post. As the Government of Mysore refused to accede to his demand the respondent filed a petition under Art. 226 for inter alia a writ of mandamus directing the appellant-State to include the petitioner in the grade-pay of an Assistant Secretary and fix him above Nadkarni.

The appellant raised a preliminary objection to the writ petition, the objection being that the complaint of the peti tioner was not justiciable. This was primarily based upon thefact that the respondent relied upon a circular of the Government of Bombay dated October- 31, 1950 in support of his plea that he was entitled to the benefit that he claimed on reversion to the parent department from his service on deputation.

The material part of that circular ran:

"It has come to the notice of Government that Government ervants when deputed to o.ther Departments or offices often draw pay in time scales which are identical with the timescales in their parent Departments. The question therefore, arises on their reversion to their parent Department whether the service rendered in an identical time scale in the Department to which their service had been lent, should be allowed to count for increments in the parent Depart~ ment under' Note 4 below Bombay Civil .Service Rule 4 I. Government is pleased to direct that all such cases should be regulated under Bombay Civil Service Rule 51 and that only that portion

Btatt of Myaore

M.H. Bellarg

Ayyangar, J.

Suite of ... lf ysore

M.H.

Bellary

Ayyangar, J.

of service in the foreign Department or office should be allowed to count for increments in the parent Department during which 'the person concerned would have drawn pay in the time scale applicable to the post he holds on reversion, but for his deputation to another Department or office, i.e., the case should be so regulated as to restore the position the person concerned would have occupied in his parent Department had he not been deputed."

The question as to whether this circular which was treated as an administrative instruction could confer rights enforceable in a court on a Government servant was referred to a Full Bench for its opinion. Before the learned Judges of the Full Bench the learned Advocate-General, however, brought to the notice of the Court that this circular merely gave effect to a statutory rule framed by the Government. of Bombay. The relevant rule in this respect was rule 50(b)' of the Bombay Civil Services Rules which ran:

"50(b) Service in another post, other than a post carrying less pay referred to in clause (a) of rule 22 whether in a substantive or officiating capacity, service on deputation and leave other than extraordinary leave counts for increments in the time scale applicable to the post on which the Government servant holds a lien as well as in time scale applicable to the post or posts. if any, on which he would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended:

Provided that Government may, in any case in which they are satisfied that the leave was taken on account of illness or for any other came beyond the Government servant's control, direct that extraordinary leave shall be counted for increment under this clause."

The position, therefore, that emerged after this was whether an infraction of a statutory rule could give rise to a cause of action to an aggrieved Government servant. The learned Judges answered this question in the affirmative and thereafter the Division Bench which heard the petition allowed the writ and granted the respondent the relief that he sought.

It might be mentioned that even by the date of the pendency of these proceedings in the High Court the respond.en! had retired on account of superannuation and the only question, therefore, was whether he would be entitled to the remuneration to which he would have been entitled under the rule in question. The appellant-State applied to the High Court

for a certificate to enable an appeal to be filed to this Court. and on this having been granted the appeal is now before us.

In view of the decisions of this Court of which it is sufficient to refer to State of U.P. v. Babu Ram U padhya(') it was not disputed that if there was a breach of a statutory rule framed under Art. 309 or which was continued under Art. 313 in relation to the clonditions of service the aggrieved Government servant could have recourse to the Court for redress.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant, however, urged two contentions in support of the stand that the respondent was not entitled to be appointed to any higher post than as a Senior Assistant or to receive a salary higher than Rs. 225 /- . in the scale Rs. 210-15-300 which had been granted to him by the impugned order of November, 1958. The first was that on a proper construction of Rule 50(b), an officer who after serving on deputation in another department is revert' ed to his parent department is entitl.ed to nothing more than the increments allowable in the time scale applicable to the substantive appointment which he held at the time of the transfer. In this connection stress was laid on the words "increments in the time scale applicable to the post on which the Government servant holds a lien" occurring in the subrule. We are unable to accept this contention. In the first place, it is not clear whether the case of the respondent was one where he held a lien or one where the lien was suspended, and no material was placed before the Court in this regard, the point .in this form not being urged in the High Court. But even assuming that it was a case where the respondent had a lien and his lien had not been suspended it is difficult to see what logic there could be in interpreting the rule as providing different criteria in the two cases.

Where the lien is suspended the rule speaks of the "post or posts, if any he would !).ave held if his lien had not been 1'Uspended". By the use of the plural, it is clear that the rule <:ontemplated the suspended lien being transferred from one post to another-in other words, to a promotion from one post to another during the period of the service in another department. If there was any ambiguity in what the rule meant it is wholly dispelled by reference to the circular which ensures to the officer on deputation in another department that he shall be restored to the position he "would have occupied in his parent department had he not been deputed". It was not suggested that there was any ambiguity in the wording of this circular which, in our opinion, gives proper effect to the provisions of Rule 50(b) ..

State of My-ore •.

M. H. Bellary

Ayya'tll}ar, J,

. 1964

Stale of JrJy.sore

M. H. Bella1y

Ayyan3ar, J.

The other submission of learned Counsel was tnat a Government servant though he had a right to increments in a time scale applicable to the post that he held on the date of his transfer on deputation and on which he had a lien, had no legal right to be promoted to a higher post and that the construction adopted by the High Court virtually conceded or guaranteed to officers on deputation a right to an automatic promotion which they would not have had if they had not been posted on deputation. We see no force in this cont,!ntion either. Learned Counsel is right only in so far as the promotion involved relates to a selection post. But where it is based on seniority-cum-merit, those considerations are not relevant. The servir, e of an officer on deputation in another department is treated by the rule as equivalent to service in the parent department and it is this equation between the services in the two departments that forms the basis of Rule 50(b). So long therefore as the service of the employee in the new department is satisfactory and he is obtaining the increments and promotions in that department. it sl:ands to reason that that satisfactory service and the manner of '.ts discharge in the post he actually fills, should be deemed to be rendered in the parent. department also so as to entitle him to promotions, which are often on seniority-cummerit basis. What is indicated here is precisely what is termed in official language the "next below rule" under which an officer on deputation is given a paper-promotion and shown as holding a higher post in the parent department if the officer next below him there is being promoted. If there are adverse remarks against him in the new department or punishm!nts inflicted on him there, different considera.tions would. arise and these adverse remarks etc. would and could certainly be taken into account in the parent department also, but that is not the position here. In view. of the facts of the cast.> ii is not necessary to discuss this aspect in any detail or any further.

The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

471

STATE OF MYSORE

M. H. BELLARY

IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

c. SHAH

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

S. M. SIKRI, JJ

Art. 309

Art. 309, 313

Bombay Civil Service Rules

Art. 226

Art. 133

[1961] 2 S.C.R. 679

Art. 309

Art. 313

State of My801't

Mysore High Court

B. R. L. Iyengar

B. R. G. K. Achar

S. V. Venkataranga Iyengar

M. Rama Jois

A. G.

Ratnaparkhi

.AyyafllJM

AYYANGAR

High Court of Mysore

Art. 133

Government of Bombay

September 17, .1943

Bombay

States Reorganisation Act, 1956

State of Mysore

November 27, 1958

Government of Mysore

June 1, 1954

September 17, 1943

Nadkarni

Art. 226

Nadkarni

October- 31, 1950

M.H. Bellarg

Ayyangar

M.H.

Bellary

Ayyangar

Government. of Bombay

Art. 309

Art. 313

M. H. Bellary

M. H. Bella1y


7S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 477

MANAGEMENT OF BOMBAY CO. LTD. v.

WORKMEN

[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO AND K. C.

DAS GUPTA, JJ.]

Industrial Dispute-Christmas bonus-Implied agreement-Test.

An industrial dispute arose between the appellant and its workmen as to payment of bonus for the years 1957-58 and 1958-59. The dispute was referred for adjudication to the tribunal. The respondents claimed bonus on the basis that payment of some bonus at Christmas had become an implied con<lition of service between the appellant and its workmen. The workmen claimed H months' wages for each year on the basis of

an implied term of service. On these facts the tribunal held on the basis of the decision of this Court in MI s. Ispahani Ltd. v. Ispahani Employees Union that payment of bouns at' the rate of 1l: months' salary as an implied condition of service had been established. It is this award of the tribunal which has been challenged before this Court.

Held: (i) Where the payment of bonus is connected with a festival it is possible to infor that there is an implied condition to pay something at the time of the festival. even though the payment has not been made at a uniform rate in previous years. In the present case, the payment has not been uniform over the years and before an implied term of service to pay bonus can be inferred it must be shown that the payment was connected with some festival. Therefore the tribunal was not right in holding that there could be an implied condition of service as to payment of bonus unconnected with any festival.

In the present case, though the amount paid in December was originally called an advance, at least one month's salary out of the so-called advance always remairned with the workmen and was treated as bonus connected with Chi:istmas festival. On the facts of this case it was held that there was an implied condition of service between the appellant and its workmen that something would be paid every year about Christmas time as festival bonus.

MI s. Ispahani Ltd. v. Ispahani Employees' Union, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 24, relied on.

(ii) In a case of payment which is made at different term and is not at a uniform rate the duty of the court is to~ connect the payment with a festival (in this case Christmas). On the evidence in this case it is clear that the minimum is only one ll)onth's salary payable about Christmas time and this was actually paid in 1951-52 and 1953-54. Therefore the payment of one month's salary as Christmas bonus is proved as an implied condition of service between the appellant and ita workmen on the admitted facts of this case.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 583 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the Award dated June 18, 196-2 of the Industrial Tribunal, Ernalrulam, in Industrial Dispute No. 38 of 1960.

.Jfarch 2/Y

1964 G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravin- Management of der Narain, for the appellant.

Bombay Co. Ltd.

Workmen

J anardan Sharma, for the respondents.

March 25, 1964. The judgment of the livered by Court was de-

Wanchoo, J. W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam. A dispute arose between the appellant and its workmen as to payment of bonus for the years 1957-58 and 1958-59, and was referred for adjudication to the tribunal. The respondents claimed bonus on two grounds: (i) on the basis of profits earned by the appellant, and (ii) on the basis that payment of some bonus at Christmas had become an implied condition of service between the appellant and its workmen. It may be mentioned that the .claim was for four months' wages for each year on the basis of profit bonus. The alternative claim was for 1 t months' wages for each year on the basis 0La11 implied term of service. We may also mention that the appellant had paid two months' basic salary as bonus for the year 1957-58, and one month's basic pay as bonus for the ye21r 1958-59. The appellant contended that there was no surplus available on the basis of the Full Bench formula applied in such cases and therefore no profit bonus could be paid. It also contended that no bonus was .payable as an implied term of service.

The tribunal found on an application of the Full Bench formula that there was no available surplus in either of the two years and therefore no bonus was payable as profit bonus. It then went into the question whether any bonus was payable as an implied condition of service and relying on the decision of this Court in Messrs. Ispahani Lid. v. lspahani Employees' Union(') held that payment of bonus at the rate of 1 t months' salary as an implied condition of service had been established. It therefore ordered the appellant to pay that amount after taking into account one month's salary already paid by it. It is this award of the tribunal which has been brought before us by special leave.

The main contention on behalf of the appellant are two-fold:

(I) It is urged that the tribunal erred in holding that payment of bonus as an implied condition of service need not be attached to any festival;

(2) On the undisputed facts of this case, the tribunal was not right in holding that a case had been made out for

payment of some bonus as an implied condition of service, and in any case, even if a case had been made out for payment of some bonus, it could not be at the rate of 1 ! months' salary.

Turning to the first contention raised on behalf of the . appellant, we are of opinion that the tribunal was not right in holding that there could be an implied condition of service as to payment of bonus unconnected with any festival. In lspahani's case(') the question raised was whether there was an implied condition of service for payment of some bonus at the time of puja festival in Bengal. In that connection this Court laid down the tests for holding when it could be said that there was an implied condition of service for payment of some bonus in connection with some festival. This Court also pointed out that it was not necessary in order to establish an implied condition of service as to payment of some bonus at the time of a festival like puja in Bengal that the amount paid in connection with the festival should be uniform, and that in the absence of a uniform rate an implied agreement to pay something could be inferred. Now where the payment is connected with a festival it is possible to infer that there is an implied condition to pay something at the time of the festival, even though the evidence discloses that in previous years payment has not been made at a uniform rate. But it is difficult to see how the principle which applies to a case of payment at the time of a festival can be extended to infer an implied term of payment where the payment has been made entirely unconnected with any festival and at rates which have varied from year to year. We are therefore of opirtion that when this Court laid down that there was an implied condition of service to pay something about the time of puja festival in lspahani's case('), it was clear that such implied condition of service could be inferred where the rate of payment was not uniform only when such payment was obviously connected with some festival. In the present case also, the paymeµt has not been uniform over the years and therefore before an implied term of service to pay bonus can be inferred it must be shown that the payment was connected with some festival. It would in our opinion be impossible to lrlfet an implied condition of service where payment has nc1t been uniform in the past, unless sucb payment can be connected with some festival. We are therefore of opinion that the tribunal was wrong in holding that an inference could be drawn for payment of bonus as an implied condition of service in the circumstances of the present case wheli the payment was not uniform iii the past even though it was not connected with any festival . (') [11i6o] 1 S.C.R./ 24.

Management of Bombay Co. LjiJ.

Workmen

Wanchoo, J.

M a:nagement o.f .Bomboy Co. Ltd.

Workmen

Wanchoo~J,

But that in our opinion does not dispose of the matter.

The evidence shows that payment of some bom.; s began to be made from the year 1945·46 in which year bonus varying from one month to 3! months' salary was paid in this branch. It may be added that the appellant has a number of other branches in other parts of the country. What we are saying in this case is only concerned with the Cochin branch and may not necessarily be applicable to other branches of the appellant, the facts of which are not before us. From 1946-47 to 1949-50, it appears that some lumpsum was paid, though the amount is not exactly known. It is also not clear whether during the years 1945-46 to 1949-50 paymen_t was made about Christmas time, as there is no evidence •either way. In 1950-51 it appears that It months' salary was paid as bonus. No payment appears to have been made in that year about Christmas time, though it is said that 1 t months' salary was paid as bonus sometime afterwards. From 1951-52 right upto 1958-59, payment was made at the rate of one month's salary to two months' salary about Christmas time. It is clear therefore that at any rate since 1951-52 payment is connected with Christmas festival, though there is no clear evidence as to the earlier payments being connected with Christmas. At the same time there is no clear evidence that those payments were not connected with Christmas even though payment\ for the year 1950-51 might have been made sometime, after Christmas.

On the whole therefore it seems to us that it is possible to infer that the payments which began from 1945-46 and have been made throughout upto 1958-59 were in all probability connected with Christmas festival. This inference in our opinion is strengthened by the fact that from 1951-52 undoubtedly payments were connected with Christmas and were always made about Christmas time, even though there was adjustment on some occasions later on by payment of more amount or by reduction of the amount already paid by deducting some part of it from la.1er salary. We are therefJre of opinion that we can infer from the evidence on the record that the payment in the present case is connected with Christmas festival. Therefore even though the tribunal was wrong in holding that the payment need not be connected with any festival in a case like the present where the

rate has not been uniform, the respondents have made out a case of payment of some bonus as an implied condition of service C'6nnected with a festival subject to what we say on the second contention raised on behalf of the appellant.

The appellant however contends that it has not been proved that the paylnent of bonus was in connection with the Christmas festival on the undisputed evidence in this

I '

~\.

case. Now the evidence is that something used to be invariably paid at least from 1951-52 about Christmas time. Later on something mote was paid in some years. In one year nothing more was paid and in three years the appellant took back part of the payment which had been made. The appellant's contention is that the payment before Christmas which has been established in this case was only an advance in connection with the festival which was later adjustable from the salary of the workmen. It is true that when the payment was made it was designated as an advance. For example, when payment was made in December 1953, it was designated as an advance and it was stated in the notice that it would be treated as advance against any bonus and in the event of no bonus as advance against salary. Even so, the evidence shows that the so-called advance was never recovered in full. Sometimes more was paid in addition to what had been paid in December.

Once nothing more was paid but the amount already paid in December was not recovered. Three times something was recovered from what was paid in December; even so a minimum of one month's .salary out of the so-called advance in December was always left with the workmen. So though the amount paid in December was originally called an advance, at least one month's salary out of the so-called advance :always remained with the workmen and was treated as bonus connected with Christmas festival. The fact that the payment was originally called advance would not detrad -from the conclusion that some amount was really paid as bonus in connection with Christmas festival.

There is no evidence to show that this amount was paid

x-gratia. In this connection our attention is drawn to what happened in April 1954. Then a notice was given about payment of additional bonus which was called ex-gratia. The evidence however shows that in 1953-54 one month's salary was paid in December and in addition half a month's salary was paid later on and it was this additional half month's salary which was designated as ex-gratia payment. There is nothing to show that the payment made in December was ever designated as ex-gratia payment. It could hardly be so designated for it was usually called an advance which was claimed as recoverable though the whole of it was never recovered. In spite of the payment made in December being called an advance, we are of opinion that on the evidence in this case it is clear that part of the advance was made as

a bonus in connection with Christmas festival. It is therefore established on the evidence that there was an implied condition of service between the appellant and its workmea that something would be paid every year about Christmas time as festival bonus.

L.'P(D)!SCI-16

Ma._.,.e of Boml>ay Oo. LIL v.

Workmen

Wanclwo, I.

1964 The next question to which we turn is the mmmmm Jl•tlf1!1•;;;;;;; of amount which has to be paid as an implied condition of ser- BomJJay Oo. Ltd. vice. Here again the evidence shows that the minimum that w v;. has been paid, at any rate since 1951-52, is one month'& or men salary. Sometimes more has been paid, but one month's Wanchoo, J. i; alary seems to have been paid in connection with Christmas for an unbroken period of time, which is long enough to

permit an inference that there is an implied condition of service for payment of one month's salary as festival bonu& connected with Christmas in this branch of the appellant.

We cannot agree with the tribunal that the evidence shows a minimum payment of It months' salary at the time of .Christmas. It is true that if we take into account what wai;

p:aid later also over the entire period from 1950-51, the minimum is l! months' salary; but in a case of payment which is not at a uniform rate we have to connect the payment with a festival (in this case Christmas). We can therefore only look at the payment made in December to decide what is the minimum which may be treated as a condition of service. Once it is proved that there was an implied condition of service, some amount has to oe paid under the said implied term; what the minimum would be in that behalf must be decided as a question of fact. On the evidence in this case it is clear that the minimum is only one month's. salary payable about Christmas time and this w.as actually paid in 1951-52 and 1953-54, though in other years more was paid which was later liable to adjustment. We therefore hold that there is an implied condition of service between the appellant and its workmen that one month's salary as the minimum would be paid as Christmas bonus to the work-· men about Christmas tiine. The decision of the tribunal therefore allowing 1 ! months' salary as the minimum must be modified and we hold that payment of one month's. salary as Christmas bonus is proved as an implied conditio11 of service between the appellant and its workmen on the admitted facts of the case. The minimum of one month's basic salary has to be paid even if there is loss in any give11 year. We may add that though this is the minimum, it would be open to the appeUant to pay more if its profit position justifies the payment of more. But we cannot agree with the tribunal that in the year 1958-59, the profit position of the appellant justifies payment of more than the minimum. It has been found t)lat in .that year there was actually a small loss of Rs. 8,000 /- suffered by the appellant. Therefore even though the tribunal may be justified in awarding a reasonable amount as festival bonus once it is proved that somethinghas to be paid as an implied condition of servioe towards such bonus, it cannot be said in this case that the tribunal was justified in giving anything beyond the minimum for

"1 S.C.R.

SUPREllE COURT REPORTS 483

this was a year of loss. We are therefore of opinion that 196,

the amount awlllded as festival bonus for the year 1958-59 Managem'111 •! should be reduced to one month's salary and order accord- Bombay Oo. IM.

mnlv v. ~,.

Wr.rlme11

Before we part with this appeal we should like to add Wanclwo, 1. that there was no stay order by this Court in this case. The i:xtra am\)Ullt of 15 days' salary awarded by the tribunal has already been paid to the workmen. Mr. Pai has assured us that he would advise his client that the additional amount S> paid may not be recovered back in the circumstances.

We therefore partly allow the appeal in the manner indicated above. In the lircumstances we pass no order as to Clllllb..

Appeal partly allowed.

477

MANAGEMENT OF BOMBAY CO. LTD

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.

K. N. WANCHOO

DAS GUPTA, JJ.

its workmen

[1960] 1 S.C.R. 24

June 18, 196-2

Industrial Tribunal, Ernalrulam

G. B. Pai

J anardan Sharma

Wanchoo

lspahani

Bengal

Management of Bombay Co. LjiJ.

Cochin

Wanclwo

Wanclwo

Pai


M...U.26

/ '

.'": \-,.J-,~:.-:' :>.:, \\, { /' '\'

.i', _ .. ;'~- ' ";.~'-~-:.... /,\) --....,,.,··

_-~:;-\"' ',

.. \ ·.

:SUPREJUE COURT REPORTS [1964}.

LABOUR COMMISSIONER, MADHYA PRADESH

.· v.

BURHANPUR TAPTI MILLS AND OTHERS

[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. W ANCHOO AND K. C. DAS

GUPTA, JJ.)

Industrial Disputtrike-Legality-Whether employer can decide and take action-Jurisdiction of Labour Co1n1nissioner- "Rendered i!!egal" in s. 42(l)(g) if means "held illegal" Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947 (C. P. and Berar Act 33 of 1947), ss. 16, 41 and 42(1)(g).

An employee was summarily dismissed by the respondentemployer after holding an enquiry on the allegation that he had instigated workers to go on an illegal strike. The employee applied under s. 16 of Central Provinces and Berar Industrial . Disputes Settlement Act to the Labour Commissioner, who held that authority to decide the legality of a strike had been entrusted by s. 41 of the Act to the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court and that before a strike had been held by either of these authorities to be illegal the employer had no right to take any action against his workmen on his own view that a strike was illegal and ordered the reinstatement of the employee with full wages. The revision application by the respondentempl.oyer to the State Industrial Court proved unsuccessful tl:ough it disagreed with the Labour Court's view that the employer could not take action before a decision from the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court declaring the strike to be illegal had been obtained. Thereafter, the employer moved the High Court under Art. 226. The High Court was of the view that though the Labour Commissioner may not have the jurisdiction to decide the question of illegality of a strike, it may decide the question incidentally for the purposes mentioned in s. 16 if in an enquiry such a question is raised, :.ind quashed the orders of the Labour Commissioner and the State Industrial Court. On appeal preferred by the Labour Commissioner in this Court.

Held: (i) The employer is free to take action against the employee as soon as he thinks that the strike in which he has participated comes within the provisions of s. 40 of the Act. The phrase ''rendered illegal" in s. 42(1)(g) has been deliberately used in contradistinction to the words ''held illegal" used in ss. 43, 44 and 45.

It would be an impossible position for industri3l management if after notice has been given of a strike or a strike has started-- which the employer considers to be illegal within the meaning of s. 40 he should be compelled to stay his hands and wait till a State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has given a declaration on the question.

The use of the word "shall" in s. 41 in connection with the action to be taken on a reference by the State Government and "may" in connection with the action on an application by others in the same section compels the conclusion that on an application .. by anybody other than the State Government, the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court may also refuse to, take action.

7 S.C.R.

SUPRE1\1E COURT REPORTS 485

(ii) For performing its functions under s. 16(3) of the Act tl::e Labour Commissioner has jurisdiction to c'ecide the question of legality or illegality of a strike when that question is raised before it. ' CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 529 of

1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 24, 1958, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 82 of 1958.

I. N. Shroff, for the appellant.

M. C. Setalvad, B. Narayanaswamy, !. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and 0. C. Mathur, for respondent No. 1.

M .S.K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No. 2.

March 25, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by

DAS GUPTA, J.-Two main questions arise in this appeal.

The first is whether s. 42(1)(g) of the Central Provinces and Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947 prohibits an employer from taking action against a workman for participation in an illegal strike before it is so declared under s. 41 of the Act The second question is whether in an application made under s. 16(3) of the Act the Labour Commissioner has jurisdiction to decide the legality or illegality of the strike.

On September 21, 1956 the first respondent in this appeal, the Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd .. served a charge-sheet on one of the employees Sulemankhan Mullaji, who is the second respondent in the appeal alleging that he had instigated workers of the Weaving Department to go on an illegal strike earlier that day. After holding an enquiry into the matter the Manager came to the conclusion that the charge had been established being of opinion that this constituted misconduct under cl. 25(b) of the Standing Orders. Thereafter, the Manager ordered Sulemankhan to be summarily dismissed without notke and without compensation in lieu of notice. Sulemank:han made an application against this order to the Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh under s. I 6 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. The Labour Commissioner was of opinion that the authority to decide the legality of a strike had been entrusted by s. 41 of the Act by the legislature to the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court. He also held that before a strike had been held by either of these authorities to be illegal the employer had no right to take any action against his workmen on his own view that a strike was illegal. The Labour Commissioner further held that there was no legal evidence to prove the allegations against Sulemank:han and that in inflicting the pun; shment of dismissal the Manager had not paid due regard to suJ>.

cl. 4 of cl. 26 of the Standing Orders. Accordingly, he ordered

LaOO..r Oommil- "'°"", M adliya

Praduh

Burhanpur Ta, it M ill8 and Other•

Daa Gvpta, J.

1964 the reinstatement of Sulemankh:m with full wages from the Labou; c..,,,.;.. date of dismissal to the date of reinstatemenL

aioner, MadAya Pradeah The revision application by the first respondent proved nn- Burha;;,,,, Tapli successful. The State Industrial Court. which is the revisional Mills and ou,,,.authority, disagreed with the Labour Court's view that the employer could not take action before a decision from the Ila" Gup•a, J State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court declaring

the strike to he illegal had been obtained. Being however of opinion that the enquiry had nlOt been held in 3CCO(dance with the Standing Order in cl. 26(2) and also that in awarding the punishment the Manager had not taken into consideration the matters mentioned in the Standing Orders in cl. 26(4), the Industrial Court conclnded that the Labonr Commissioner was justified in examining the evidence or itself. It further held that the finding of fact given by the Labour Commissioner could not he challenged in revision. The final conclusion of the State Industrial Court. as already indicated, was that the order of reinstatement made by the Labour Commissioner was fully justified

Against this order the employer ltbe l:iJllt respondent) moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under ArL 226 of the Constitution. The High Court indicated its view that though the Labour Commissioner may not haYC the jurisdication to decide the question of illegality of a strike. it may decide the question incidentally for the purposes mentioned in s. J 6 of the Act if in an enquiry under s. 16 a question is raised that the dismissal was wrongful as there was no incitement of an illegal strike under cl. 2S(b) of the Standing O(ders. After expressing this view the High Court. howew:r, added the wools: "That aspect of the matter need not be considered hecanse the strike instigated here was not held to he a legal strike." The High Court was of opinion that the Indnstrial Court had fallen into an error in thinking that the charge sheet saved on the workmen was defective. It also held that neither the I abom: Commissioner nor the State Indnstrial Court had any jurisdiction to examine the findings of the domestic tribunal as an appellate authority and to come to a contrary conclusion on the same evidence. Accordingly. the High Court quashed the orders of the Labour Commissioner and the State Industrial CourL

The present appeal has been preferred by the Labour Commissioner. Madhya PradeSh. No appeal bas been prefened by the workman himself. It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider in this appeal the correctness or otherwise of the High Conrt's decision on the merits of the case. What WI: haYC to decide. as already indicated is whether sec. 42 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act. 1947

stood in the way of the employer taking action against a work- 1964 man for participation in an illegal strike before it had beenLabourCommiaaioner declared to be so under s. 41; and secondly, whether when there Madhya Praduh has been no such decision the Labour Commissioner has juris- Burhanp=~ Tapti diction to decide the question of legality or illegality of the Mills and Other•

strike in an application made to him under s. 16 of the Act.

The relevant provisions of s. 42 which require consideration for a decision of the first question are that: "No employer shall dismiss, discharge, suspend or reduce any employee or punish him in any other manner solely by reason of the circumstance that the employee has participated in a strike which is not "rendered illegal" under any provision of this Act." The provisions of the Act rendering a strike illegal are set out in s. 40. Prima facie it appears that it is only where the strike in which an employee has participated does not come within any of the provisions of s. 40 that the employer is prohibited from taking action against him. The prohibition operates only when a strike is not "rendered illegal" under any provisions of the Act. That, it is urged by the respondent-employer, is the same thing as saying that the prohibition operates only where the strike is not illegal within the meaning of the provisions of s. 40 of the Act

The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the words "rendered illegal" in s. 4Z (l)(g) should properly be construed as "held illegal". It has to be noticed in this connection that s. 41 of the Act provides a machinery under which not only the State Government but any employer or employee can approach the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court for a decision whether a strike or a lockout of which notice has been given or which has taken place is illegal. According to the appellant, it is only after on such an application the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has decided that a strike is illegal, that the employer can take action. We are unable to see any justification for such a construction. It is clear to us that the phrase "rendered illegal" in s. 42(1)(g) has been deliberately used in contradistinction to the words "held illegal" used in ss. 43, 44 and 45. Section 43 provides penalty on an employer who " declares a lockout which is held by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court to be illegal". Section 44 provides penalty against an employee "who goes on a strike or who joins a strike which is held by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court to be illegal".

Section 45 provides penalty for instigation or incitement to or participation or acting in furtherance of a strike or lockout "which is held to be illegal by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court". When the legislature used the words "held illegal" by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court in ss. 43, 44 and 45 but used different phraseology,

Daa Gupta, J.

1964 viz .• "rendered illegal" ins. 42(l)(g) the conclusion is irresistible

LaOOi<i:Oommi.!sione•, that this was done deliberately. The reason for this is not Madhya Pradesh far to seek. However, quickly the State Industrial Court or the

B&rhan;, r Tapti District. Idustrial Court 1?ay act on a~ application un_der s. 41

Milla and Diners the dec1s1on on the legahty or otherwise of a strike 1s bound to take a considerable time. It would be an impossible position Das Gupta, J. for industrial management if after notice has been given of a strike or a strike has started which the employer considers to be illegal within the meaning of s. 40 he should be compelled to stay his hand and wait till a State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has given a declaration on the question. It also appears clear that these authorities are not bound to give a decision on an application by the employer.

The Section runs thus: --

"The State Industrial Court pr a District Industrial Court shall, on a reference made by the State Government, and may, on an application by any employer or employee concerned or by a representative of the employees concerned or by the Labour Officer, decide whether any strike or lockout or any change of which notice has been given or which has taken place is illegal." It has to be noticed that while on a reference by the State Government the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court "shall" decide the question of legality of the strike or lockout, it "may" decide the question on an application by the employer or employee or any other person mentioned in the section. The use of the word "shall" in connection with the action to be taken on a reference by the State Government and "may" in connection with the action on an application by others in the same section compels the conclusion that on 3n application by anybody other than the State Government, the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court may also refuse to take action. The suggested construction of the words "rendered illegal" as "held illegal" might therefore have the curious result that even though the strike is in fact illegal within the meaning of s. 40 of the Act no action can at any time be taken against an employee for participation in it. We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the words "rendered illegal" does not mean "held illegal" and the employer is free to take action against the employee as soon as he thinks that the strike in which he has participated comes within the provisions of s. 40 of the Act.

When the employer takes such action against the employee by dismissing, discharging, removing or suspending him, it will be open to the employee to apply to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment of compensation for loss of

wages. This is provided in s. 16(2) o~ th.e Act. Section 16(3) 1964 provides that if on receipt c_:if such apphcat10n th~ Labour Com- Labour commumissioner after such enqmry as may be prescnbed finds that 8'aner, Madhya the dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension was in contra- P"'!uh vention of any of the provisions of this Act or in contravention Burlulnpr Tap1i of a Standing Order made or sanctioned under this Act or was Mills Other• for a fault or misconduct committed by the employee more than Das Gupta, J. six months prior to the date of such dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, he may direct reinstatement of the employee or other relief. The question has been raised whether when the order of dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension purports to have been made for participation in or instigation to an illegal strike it is open to the Labour Commissioner to decide the question of illegality of a strike. On behalf of the appellant it has been suggested that exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question of legality or illegality of a strike has been given by the Act to the two authorities, viz .• the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court, as mentioned in s. 41. There is no doubt that s. 41 which has been set out above empowers the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court to decide the question of legality of a strike on a reference by the Government, or application by employer or employee or others mentioned in the section. Mr. Shroff argues that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to have two parallel bodies-the Labour Commissioner as well as the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court-having jurisdiction to decide such a matter. For, as he points out, it may well be that while on an application under s. 16(3) the Labour C:ommissioner holds that the strike was not illegal the contrary view may be taken by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court on an application under s. 41 or vice versa.

This argument is plausible at first sight. There is however one

grat difficulty in accepting it. Tha.t consists in the fact, alrady P?mted out: that the State Industnal Court or a District Jndust~1al Court is not bound to give any decision at all on applica- !ion by any party other than .te State Government. There being thus cses where the authont1e~ mentioned in s. 41 may refuse to dec1d~ the quest10n of legality or illegality of a strike, it is not possible to .sy that el'.clusive jurisdiction is given by s. 41 t? these aut.hon!ie~ to decide the question of legality or illegality <'.f a. strike. t 1s reasonable to held therefore that for perfom.mg its funtI<?ns_ uder s. 16(3) of the Act the Labour Comi; n1ss10er has 3ur_1sd1chon to d.ecide the question of legality or tllegahty of a stnke when that question is raised before it.

-:- The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.

LABOUR COMMISSIONER, MADHYA PRADESH

BURHANPUR TAPTI MILLS AND OTHERS

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

GUPTA, JJ.

s. 42(l)(g)

ss. 16, 41 and 42(1)(g)

s. 16

Disputes Settlement Act

s. 41

Art. 226

s. 16

s. 40

s. 42(1)(g)

ss. 43, 44 and 45

s. 40

s. 41

s. 16(3)

I. N. Shroff

M. C. Setalvad

B. Narayanaswamy

B. Dadachanji

Ravinder Narain

0. C. Mathur

M .S.K. Sastri

M. S. Narasimhan

DAS GUPTA

s. 42(1)(g)

s. 41

s. 16(3)

September 21, 1956

Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd

Sulemankhan Mullaji

cl. 25(b)

Sulemankhan

Sulemank

han

Madhya Pradesh

s. 41

District Industrial Court

cl. 4

cl. 26

Daa Gvpta

cl. 26(2)

cl. 26(4)

High Court of Madhya Pradesh

s. 16

cl. 2S(b)

Madhya PradeSh

sec. 42

s. 41

Madhya Praduh

s. 16

s. 42

s. 40

s. 40

s. 40

s. 4Z

s. 41

s. 42(1)(g)

ss. 43, 44 and 45

Section 43

Section 44

Section 45

ss. 43, 44 and 45

Daa Gupta

s. 41

Das Gupta

s. 40

s. 40

s. 40

s. 16(2)

Section 16(3)

s. 41

s. 41

Shroff

s. 16(3)

s. 41

s. 41

s. 41

s. 16(3)


Jlarch26

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964)

K. V. NARAYANASWAMI IYER v.

K. V. RAMAKRISHNA IYER AND ORS.

[K. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.J

Hindu Law-Property acquired in the name of a member of ioin't family-Joint family having sufficient nucleus on that date-Presumption that property is acquired from joint family funds-If rebuttable-Past transactions-Manager when accountable.

There were three brothers who continued as members of a joint family with the eldest of them, the first respondent as the karta. Certain properties were acquired thereafter for the joint family. Certain properties were also acquired in the name of thPfirst respondenfs son his wife and grandson. The two other brothers of respondent no. 1 acquired properties for themselves out of their own earnings. Relations became strained between the brothers and the second brother the present appellant filed suit for partition claiming not only the original properties of the joint

family and the properties acquired for the joint family by the Karta, the present respondent but also the properties acquired by the respondent no. 1 in the name of his \Vife, son and grandson as joint family properties. He also called on the first respondent to account for the past years. The third brother was impleaded as second defendant. Respondent no. l's contention was teat the last mentioned properties were bought by him from his own savings and therefore were not part of the joint family property and consequently not liable to partition. The learned trial Judge held that those properties were joint family property and were liable to be partitioned. Respondent No. 1 thereupon appealed to the High Court and the High Court allowed the appeal regarding substantial part of the schedule properties. Thereupon the appellant filed the present appeal.

Held: (i) Where properties were acquired in the name of a joint family member, if at the date of' such acquisition the joint family had sufficient nucleus for acquiring it, the property should be presumed to have been acquired from out of family funds and so to form part of the joint family property, unless the contrary is shown. In the present case on a consideration of the evidence it is found th~ the joint family had at the date of the acquisition of the properties in question sufficient nucleus from which these properties could be acquired.

Amritlal Sen & Ors. v. Surath Lal Sen, A.LR. 1942 Cal. 553 and Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurthy, I.L.R. [1948] Mad (P.C.) 440, referred to.

(ii) In the absence of any evidence of fraud or misrepresentation the Karta of a joint family cannot be called upoJl to account for the past transactions, but this does n"t mean that the parties were bound to accept the statement of the Karla as to what the property consisted of and an enquiry should be directed by the court in a manner usually adopted to disover that in fact the property consisted of at the date of the partit10n. In what anner this principle can be applied depends on the facts and c:rcumstances of each case. Where as m the present case the evidence on record shows prima facie that the Karta could not reasonably

be expected to have in his hands at the date of the suit any ac- 1964 cumulaties found on evidence to have been acquired by the fami- K. v. Narayana. ly, there can be no justification for calling the Karta to account """mi Jy" foc his past dealing with the joint family property and its income. v.

K.V.Ramakrialona Pammchwar Dube v. Govind Dube, IL.R., 53 Cal. 459, Iyer and Ollur,_ explained.. ..

Qvn. APPEU.ATE JURISDICTIO~: Civil Appeal No. 589 of 1960. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 28. 1953, of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 69S of 1949.

K.N. Rajagopal Sastri, K. Jayram and R. Ganapthy Iyer. foc the appellanL

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T.V.R. Tatachari, for re~ pondent nos. I, 3, 4 and 6 to 8.

B. Kalyona Sumlaram, M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chaudhry. M. R. Krishna Pillai for K. R. Chaudhuri, for res pondent no. 2.

March 26. 1964. The Judgment of the Court was deli vered by

DAS CiuPTA, J.-Three brothers, Ramakrishna, Naraya- DaaGupta, J. naswamy and Mahadeva, who are eighty-three, seventy nine and sixty nine years of age respectively, are the main figures in this litig; ltion.. After their father's death in 1908 the three brothers cxmtinued as members of a joint family. The eldest brother, Ramakrishna became under the law the Karta of the family. When the father died the family was possessed of about 10 acres of land. But he had left some debts and one of the first acts which Ramakrishna had to do as the Manager was the repayment of those debts. Ramakrishna had become the Kamam in Narasingampettai in 1902 and even during hi~ father's life time started acquiring property. Property to the extent of aboot 2S acres was acquired for the joint family between the years 1911 to 1931. In 1927 Ramakrishna had

been transferred to the bigger village of V epatthur and continued to be there till 1930. On his retirement in that year his son Venkalar.una succeeded him as the Kamam of Vepattbur. Betwa:n 1931 to 1946 properties in Vepa.tthur and other

villages were acquired in the name of Ramaki1ishna's son Vanbtarama, his wife Mangalathammal, his grandon (Venbfar:1ma's soo) Mahalingam. Some property was acquired aJso m the name of Mangalathammal's brother Raja Ayyar.

Monies were also invested in loans in the names of Rama hislma's wife, Mangalathammal, his son Venkatarama and Jaa gnt•wlsoo, Mahalingam.

1964 The second brother Narayanaswami became a Vakil's K. V. Nrayana. clerk in Kumbakonam in 1910. The third brother Mahadeva

•wam~ Iyer who was a boy of thirteen at the time of his father's death was K. v. Ra;,..kri.ohna put into the medical school and qualified as a doctor. He was Iyer and Ot/,.rs in servie as a' Sub: Assistant Surgeon at the time when the pre- Daa Gupta, J. iient smt was mstttuted by Narayanaswamy. Both of them earned well and have admittedly acquired properties for themselves out of their own earnings.

As early as the thirties feelings became strained betv.een Ramakrishna, the eldest brother and Narayanaswami the second brother. Mahadeva who had to remain away at different places in connection with his service demanded partition of the joint family properties and in this Narayanaswami also seems to have joined him. The extreme action of going to courts was however not taken so long as mother was alive.

She died early in 1945 at the age of 90 years. In December, (]2th December) 1946 Narayanaswami sent a lawyer's notice to Ramakrishna in which he claimed that not only the 25 acres acquired between 1911 and 1931 but also the properties acquired in the name of Ramakrishna's wife. his son and brotherin-law had been acquired with the income of the family and formed part of the joint family properties. He claimed also in this notice that family funds of about Rs. 25.000 {- was in the hands of Ramakrishna in the shape of cash and Benami investments. He demanded a partition of all these properties and of the cattle and other movable properties owned by the family. He also called upon Ramakrishna to account for the income derived from the family properties "for the last three years at least". In all these he claimed a one-third share.

To this Ramakrishna.replied on December 31, 1946. He stated that the joint family properties consisted only of l 0 acres left by their father and about 25 acres acquired later on and denied that the other properties belonged to the family.

Soon after this, on the !st February 1947. Narayanaswami brought this suit for partition and accounts in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam. The eldest brother Ramakrishna was impleaded as the first defendant; Mahadeva. the third brother, was the second defendant. Ramakrishna's son Venkatarama, his wife Mangalathammal and his brother-inlaw Raja Iyer were impleaded as the third, fourth and the fifth defendants respectively. Mahalingam was impleaded as the sixth defendant Two other minor sons of Venkatarama were also impleaded. They are the seventh and the eighth defendants in the case.

The plaintiff's case was short and simple. He claimed that Ramakrishna as the Karta of the joint family managed the family properties and acquired properties with the family funds from 1911 to 1946. He thus claimed that not only the 34

acres and 58 cents of land in the village Kumarakshi (men- 1961 tioned in the A Schedule) which the first defendant Ramax. v. Narayanakrishna's wife or son or grandson or brother-in-law were joint swami Iyer ties mentioned in the Scheduk-s B, Bl and B2, and C, Cl and v

v. kriBh C2 and D for which the sale deeds stood in the name of Rama- K[y;, a;: 0ta..':

krishna's wife or son or grandsc'!l or brother-in-law were joint family properties. He claimed also that between 1931 and 1946 Das Gupta, J.

Ramakrishna, the Karta. had invested family funds in the name of his wife. his son and his l!fandson and these were also joint family properties. The movable properties claimed to be joint family properties were mentioned in Schedule A2, while the house in Thiagarajapuram, also claimed to be joint family property was mentioned in Al Schedule. The plaintiff prayed for allotment to him of one third share of these properties by division in metes and bounds into three equal shares. He further prayed for a direction on the first defendant to account for the management of the family properties for three years and for payment to the plaintiff of his share in the amount that may be found due.

The second defendant Mahadeva generally supported the plaintiff though as regards the years, 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943 his case in the written statement was that it was the plaintiff Narayanaswamy and not the first defendant who collected the income frqm the joint family properties. For these four years, he pleaded that the plaintiff was liable to render an account while for the remaining period the first defendant was said to be liable. In a Schedule to his written statement he mentioned several other items of properties which he claimed belonged to the joint family though one of the sale deeds stood in the name of the sixth defendant Mahalingam and the other in the name of the fifth defendant Raja Ayjar. The other defendants contested the suit.

The first defendant's case was that though on his father's death he became in law the Karta of the joint Hindu family the actual management was carried on by the mother till 1940 and from 1940 till the mother's death in 1945 by the plaintiff Narayanaswami. It was only after the mother's death that he has taken up the , management of the properties. He pleaded that of the properties mentioned in the plaint only 34.58 acres mentioned in the A Schedule formed the joint family property. (In addition to some of the movable properties mentioned in A2 Schedule). He further pleaded that a house in Kumbakonam town which was acquired by the plaintiff in his own name as also some lands in Manalur village in Kumbakonam and Rs. 8,000 /- in casji which the plaintiff had obtained on sale of certain lands also formed part of the joint family property.

His wife Mangalathammal, the fourth defendant also pleade<; l that the properties and the investments standing in her

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[IDMJ

1964 name were made by her on her own account with the monies K. v. Narayanawhic_h her husband Ramakrishna gave to her from his own

..,,.,,., Iy" earmngs. These therefore were not part of the joint family pro- K. V. llah ... perty and consequently not liable to partition.

Iyu and Otha-• The third defendant (Venkatarama's) case was that the

Daaa<Ju:p14, J. purchases of land and investments of money srandjng in his name were all with his own earnings since he became Qamam and did not form part of the joint family property. As reganls what stood in the name of his son Mahalingam the thinl defendant pleaded that these were with his own eanings. The fifth defendant also pleaded that whatever stood in his name was acquired by him with Iris own money 2.nd did not form part of the joint family of the plaintiff and his brothers.

The learned Subordinate Judge held Gll a considetation of the evidence that the plaintiff's case that the Lldest b!Uthe£ Ramakrishna managed the family property zs the Karta from and after their father's death in 1908 till the date cf the suit had been established. He also came to the conclusion that in about 1931 Ramakrishna had with him an aa:umulaled income of about Rs. 14,000/- belonging to the family and but very little money of his own. From these findings it was an easy step to hold, as the learned Judge did,. that the immovable properties mentioned in Schedules A, Al, B, Bl, C. Cl, C2 and D as also Item 5 in Schedule B2 were all properties belonging to the joint family. Out of these he found that the properties in Schedule Al, that is, a house in Thiagarajapuram had been given away to the sister Rukmaniammal and was no kmgt:r a joint family property and therefore not liable to divisioi:L. The rest of the properties, he held, was liable to be divided amoog: the three brothers, the plaintiff and the defendants I and 2 The Court also held that the mortgages and notes on whlch money had been lent in the names of defeOOants 3 to 5 belonged to the joint family with the exception of a few standing in the name of the thlrd defendant (Venbtarama). which was held to be the third defendant's personal property.

A preliminary decree was made by the Court in accordana:-

with these findings with a direction that an account be taken with reference to income of the properties in Schedules A, Al~ B, Bl, C, Cl and D and Item 5 in Sch. B2 and 1he house at Kumbakonam mentioned in the Schedule to the first dant's written statement, for three years priO£ to the date of the suit and from the date of the suit till the passing of the final decree. As regards the properties in Scbednle A it was directed that the accounting will cease from the date en whiclr the parties took possession of their share in aaxxdance with: the interim decree.

Against this decision the first defendant to the Hi&h Court of Judicature at Madras. The plainlitf also fikd

an appeal challenging the decision of the Subordinate Judge 1964 that the house in Kumbakonam was a joint family property. K.V. Nara1JCVA4- The High Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal holding that the awami Jy.,.

Kumbakonam house was a separate self acquisition of the K.v.~ plaintiff. Against this decision of the High Court no appeal has Iyer allll Ollltr• been preferred and we are no longer concerned with the question whether this house was plaintiff's property or not.

Daa Gupla, J.

In the appeal preferred by the first defendant the High Court came to the conclusion, disagreeing with the Trial Court, that the first defendant Ramakrishna had saved enough from his separate earnings from which it was quite possible for him to make all the acquisitions and investments in the name of his son, wife and grandson subsequent to 1930. In the opinion of the High Court the view of the Subordinate Judge that by 1930 the first defendant had in his hands a sum of Rs. 14,000 I accumulated from the income of the joint family lands was "surprising and untenable". It did not disturb the Trial Court's findings that Schedule D land acquired in the name of the 3rd defendant was joint family property, ap . parently because no appeal had been filed as regards this property. Taking these 14 acres to be acquisitions for the family the High Court recorded its conclusion thus: -

"When we consider that the joint family nucleus has been more than quadrupled, it is difficult to see what grievance the younger coparceners really have, particularly the second defendant, who after keeping for himself his earnings as a Doctor in Government Service finds himself entitled to a share in a greatly increased ancestral patrimony." Fina:lly the High Court concluded "that the plaintiff bas not shown that any of the acquisitions or investments in the names of defendants 3, 4 and 6 were made from joint family funds." Accordingly, it allowed also the appeal preferred by the first defendant, holding that the only items liable for parti tion as joint property assets were those in Schedules A and D.

It also ordered that the first defendant would account for the income from 12th December 1946, the date on which notice demanding partition was sent to him by the plaintiff. The present appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff against this deci sion of the High Court.

Two main arguments were advanced before us by Mr.

Rajagopala Sastri in support of the appeal. The first is as regards the properties purchase~ in the name of the first" defendant's wife, his son, and hiS grandson. Learned Counsel subn:iitted tha.t the High Court did not record any clear conclut?n that .at the date of the cquisition of these properties the JOmt family had not a sufficient nucleus for acquiring these.

1964 He argued that the acquisitions in the name of the first defen- K.V. Narayanadant's wife was admittedly with funds advanced by the first

swami Iyer defendant himself; and if at the date of the acquisition in her K. v. Ra;;.lcrishna name the joint famHy had sufficient nucleus for acquiring

Iyer and Others them, the presumption would be that they were acquired with joint family funds notwithstanding the fact that the first defen- Daa Gupta, J. dant may have sufficient funds of his own for the same purpose. It was rightly argued that in such a case the property should be held to be joint family property unless the presump tion of the acquired property also being joint family property was re-butted by the first defendant. It was also argued that acquisitions in the name of the third defendant and the sixth defendant should also be held to have been made with funds advanced by the first defendant himself and so these also should be presumed to have been acquired with joint family funds if it is shown that the joint family had sufficient nucleus for acquiring these at the date of the acquisitions and the first defendant does not show positively that the funds with which they were acquired did not belong to the joint family.

The legal position is well settled that if in fact at the date of acquisition of a particular property the joint family had sufficient nucleus for acquiring it, the property in the name of any member of the joint family should be presumed to be acquired from out of family funds and so to form part of the joint family property, unless the contrary is shown. (Vide Amritlal Sen & ors., v. Surath Lal Sen & others(') Appalaswam; v. Suryanarayanamurthy & others(').

In the case before us, it is not disputed that the acquisitions in the name of the first defendant's wife were made with funds advanced by him. As regards the acquisitions in the name of the third defendant and his minor son the sixth defendant also we find it reasonable to hold from the evidence, as regards the earnings of the third defendant and other circumstances, that for these acquisitions also money was paid by the first defendant. The question whether the joint family had at the time of each of these acquisitions sufficient nucleus from which the acquisitions could have been made is therefore of great importance.

On a consideration ot the evidence, as discussed below, we have come to the conclusion that it does not appear that the joint family had at the date of tile acquisitions made in the names of the first-defendant's.wife, his son, and his grandson sufficient nucleus from which these properties could be acquired. In coming to this conclusion we have taken into consideration the fact that family funds were spent in pUJchasing 14 acres of land mentioned in the name of the 5th defendant.

(') A.I.R. 1942 Cal. 553. (') LL.R. [1948] Mad. (P.C.) 440.

The period during which acquisitions admittedly for the 196# joint family were made came to an end in about l 931. At that x. v. Karayanatime the first defendant had, according to his own evidence, su-ami Iyer about Rs. 15,000/- in his hand. His case is that this entire K.V. Ra;,; akrishno amount was what he had accumulated out of his own earn- Iyer and Oters ings. The Subordinate Judge held that a little more than Da• Gupta, J.

Rs. 14,000 /- out of this amount was ihe savings from the family funds. We agree with the High Court that thi~ conclus!on is not justified by the evidence on the record. As rightly pomt- ' ed out by the High Court properties worth about Rs. 20,000 /- had been purchased out of the family income during this period. During part of this period at least monies had to be spent for other requirements of the family including the expenses on the education of the third brother Mahadeva. The several documents produced in the case show that at the time of more than one purchase the first liefendant had to borrow money on promissory notes to pay the consideration mentioned in the documents. It is worth mentioning that even the plaintiff: was not prepared to say that the family in.coll!e was sufficient to pay for these purchases. In cross-exammat10n a question was put to him in these words : -

"Q. From 1911 out of the family income Rs. 20,000 I -

worth of lands had been purchased? Can there have been more income from the family lands?" The answer is significant. It was in these words:·-

"A. From the family income. the joint income of myself and Defendant I certainly exceeded Rs. 20,000 I-. The income of myself and Defendant I which went in the purchase of lands may have come to Rs. 10.000/-".

In other words. the plaintiff: himself seem to concede that only Rs. 10.0001of the family income was available during this period for purchase of lands. The claim made here that he also contributed to the purchase is clearly inconsistent with his own written statement and with other parts of his evidence and cannot be accepted.

The learned Subordinate Judge appears to have been convinced that Ramakrishna's personal earnings were very little.

He thought also that what little Ramakrishna earned was required for the expenses of his own branch of the family. The learned Judge concluded that he could not have saved out of these earn\ngs. This view appears to have been mainly responsible for this conclusion that almost the whole of Rs. l 5,000 /. which the defendant No. I admitted to have with him in about l _931 came out of the family funds. In our opinion, the matenals on the record do not justify the Trial Court's view that Ramakrishna could not have accumulated a sum of

1961 Rs. 15,000/- out of his own income. The mamools which he K. v. Xarayanareceived as Karnam of Narasingampettai and later on of the •wami Iyer bigger village Vepatthur amounted to a considerable quan- K v R "· k . h tity of paddy and must have fetched him a goodly income. 1; er ~':/ <fthr:a There was apart from this, his income from the banana plantations which he had at Narasingampettai. One of the lease Das Gupta, J. deeds shows a receipt of Rs. 450 /- for one season. Taking good years with bad, it would not be unreasonable to think that this also brought him a few thousands of rupees. we are convincerl also on a consideration of his evidence, t<.ken with the entries in the account book of Appaswamy Iyer !Ex. B 101) that he received a sum of Rs. 2,500 /- as reward for successfully maintaining the litigation on Appalaswamy's behalf. ihere can be little doubt that he received a good sum also as fees for writing documents. One of his witnesses, Narayanaswami Reddiar, DW 7, has given evidence that he paid the defendant Rs. LOOO /- as fees for the documents written for him. Even if this be considered an exaggeration, 1t is quite clear from the evidence of this witness that Ram3krishna who, it may be noted, was' a man of some education, did a flourishing side business as a writer of documents, saved two or three thousand rupees, earned by him by this work during the entire period he served as a Karnam. It is more than probable that he had other sources of income which he did not think it prudent to mention in the witness box.

On a consideration of the circumstances we are convinced that this story that he had Rs. 15,000/- in his hands in about 1931 as accumulated out of his own earnings is substantially true.

Mr. Rajagopala Sastri has however rightly pointed out that a finding that in 1931 very little remained out of the family income would not be sufficient to show that there was no sufficient nucleus for the acquisition of the different properties in the name of the defendant's wife, his son nd his grandson after 1931. For a proper decision of this question it is necessary to consider roughly the income and expenditure out of the admittedly family properties during this period.

We shall first consider the period, 1931 to 1939, as it is clear from the evidence that during this period the defendant No. I carried on the actual management of the joint family properties. It is common case of both the parties that the paddy yield in 1931 was 856 kalams; during 1932 1,000 kalams and during 1933 1,118 kalams. For the next five years paddy yield was, according to the respondent's counsel, J,058, 1,058, 958, 958, and 958 kalams. The appellant's counsel puts his estimates and l,160 kalams respectively. These differences in the estimates for these years at the higher figures of 1,360, 1,360, 1,160, 1,160 seem to be mainly due to the fact that while,

...

according to the respondent, the family was in possession of 1964 only six acres of mortgaged land in addition to the 35 acres, K.V . .NarayaM

the appellant's case was that an additional area of six acres swami Iyer of mortgaged land was also in the_ family's possessir.n during K.V.Ra;,;,, krishno

these years. Mr. Ra jagopala Sastn was not however able to Iyer and Other• Point out anything on the record in support of this claim.

II Da8 Gupta, J.

We think it reasonable therefore to accept as substantia y correct the estimate of paddy yield as mentioned before us on behalf of the respondent for these years. For the year 1939 the yield may be taken as 1,153 kalams roughly as in that year the D Schedule lands now found to be the property of the joint family had also been acquired.

On an examination of the evidence on the record we accept the price for each kalam of paddy to be Rs. 2.50 nP for each of the years 1931 and 1932 an\! 1.19, l.25, 1.37, 1.40, 1.50, 1.56 and 1.62 for the years 1933 to 1939 respectively, as contended before us on behalf of the respondent. '.fhe total income received from paddy in these nine years thus appears to be about Rs. 14,976/·. To this has to be added the receipts from the dry crops like black grams and green grams grown on some of the lands. We accept the evidence given by the defendant that dry crops were not grown in every year and also not en all the lands. The sale proceeds of black grams and green grams amounted to Rs. 72 I - for the year 1935 according to the account book Ex. A 98. Taking this to be the average receipt per year from the dry crops the receipts from these crops during the nine years under consideration ''amounted to about Rs. 648 I-. The total income from the crops grown on the joint family lands during the years 1931 to 1939 thus works out approximately to be about Rs. 15,624 I. Adding to this the sum of Rs. 1,100/- received on repayment of the mortgage loan on Ex. 187 the joint family earnings during these nine years appears to have amounted to about Rs. 16,724/-.

It is now necessary to have some idea of the expenditure incurred during these years. The claim of expenditure of Rs. 5,172/ during these years made before us on behalf of the respondent is not disputed by the appellant. We think also that the respondent's claim that Rs. 1,100/- advanced on the mortgage bond <Ex. 187) was paid from family funds should be accepted. We have next to add the sum of Rs. 6,500/- that was

pai~ for the purchase of the D. Scedule lands, Rs. 4,030 /. paid as k1sts and Rs. 2.000 I as cultivation expenses including Kariasthan's pay. The total expenditure during the nine years-1931 to 1939-amounted thus to more than Rs. 18,000/-.

Proceed_ing therefore on the basis on which there is no longer any_ dispute, t?at the D Schedule lands were acquired out of the family _funds, 1t appears clear that the jomt family did not possess sufficient nucleus for making any of the other purchases .

i964 made during this period. viz~. the properties mentioned in Schex. v. N .... _ dules Band Bl purchased by the document Ex. 125. the pro- ...,,.; Iyer perties mentioned in Schedule Cl purchased by the document

x. v. Raba Ex. B 124. the properties mentioned in Schedule C purchased

Iyeraai.IOU-• by Ex. 129. the.properties mentioned in the Schedule to the written statement of the second defendant purchased by docu- Daa Gvpta, J. ments Exhibits B 134 and B 135. The Hi!!h Court's conclusion as regards these properties that they did ot form part of the joint family properties and are not liable to partition in the present suit is therefore clearly correct_

The properties mentioned in Schedule C2 were purchased on the 24th April 1941 by Ex. 136 in the name of the 4th defendant while properties mentioned in Item l of B2 Schedule were purchased on the 19th August 1942 by Ex. 126 in the name of the sixth defendant. Though it was the first defendant's case that he had nothing to do with these purchases we are convinced on a consideration of the evidence that the monies for these purchases were also advanced by him. To decide whether these properties or the properties mentioned in Item 5 of Schedule 82, a house in Vepatthur. of which mortgage \>as taken in the name of the first defendant himself bv Ex. B 1929 on the 10th May 1942, formed part of the joint family property, it is necessary to examine what funds, if any, belonging to the joint family were with the first defendant during these years. The first defendant's case, as already indicated, is that from 1940 till the mother's death in 1945 the plaintiff and not he managed the joint family properties so that he did not receive any portion of the joint family earnings during the period. The plaintiff has strenuously denied the truth of this statement. There are several circumstances however which make us think that the first defendant's version is true. The most important of these is the fact that the youngest brother Mahadeva, who is clearly siding with the plaintiff in this family quarrel, made a definite assertion in his written statement in these words: "Similarly the plaintiff has been collecting the income from the joint family properties during the years 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943." He also stated there that the plaintiff had assured him that he would maintain proper accounts for the collection and expenditure of the income joint family for his period of management and made the definite claim that the plaintiff was liable to render an account for the period of his management. It is true that at the trial Mahadeva tried to explam away this assertion in the written statement by saying that this was based on information given to him by the defendant No. I. In the very next sentence, however, he again said that this view that the plaintiff was exclusively managing for <:.!rtain years was his conclusion. It is important to notice in this connection tat at the bottom of Ex. H 190 dated the 13th March 1941 which Mahadeva

.. .

7 S.C.R. SUPRElE.COURT.REPORTS 501

. received. from Ramakrishna, Mahadeva'made in his own hand 1961 an entry in red ink to the followinj): effect:.-, ·, · "1939-Kuruvai (paddy}-sold by Nam 1<;;39-Semba

Mudal (harvest}-by Nana, sold in 1940."

K.V.1taraya1UJswami Iyer

It is true that there are some ktters '\', bich indiate that even during 1941 and thereafter Ramakrishna was issuing some instructions to the Kariasthan. But, considering the facts mentioned above along with the letters E thibits B 177 and B 72 in which detailed instructions about the cultivation were being given by the plaintiff to the Kariasthan, we have come to the conclusion that from about 1940 till the mother's death early in 1945 the plaintiff displaced the first _defendant from the management of the family lands and took away all the family lands in K; umarakshi and took away all the income from them.

The only income from joint family properties that appears . to have come into the hands of the lirst defendant during this period was that from D Schedule lands. The yield from these lands may roughly be estimated at about 300 kalams for each year. The price per kalam in 1941 appears from Ex. 100 to have been Rs. 2/6/-. The net income, after payment of the kist and debiting the expenses of cultivation etc.; may be placed therefore at about Rs. 500 /-. It is undoubtedly a very rough estimate.

But in the absence of anything more specific on the record we think it proper to accept this as a reasonable basis for ascertaining the nucleus available in the first defendant's hands from the D. Schedule property. On this calculation the first defendant appears to have had in his hands about Rs .. 1.500/- during the years 1940 to 1942. There was already however a deficit of more than this amount on his management of the properties during the previous period 1931 to 1939. It is reasonable therefore to think that there was no nucleus from the joint family properties which the first defendant could have possibly t:sed in making the acquisitions during 1941 and 1942. The conclusion of the High Court that these properties did not belong to the joint family and are therefore not liable to partition cannot therefore be disturbed.

K. V. Ramakrishna Iyer a11-d Others

Daa Gupta, J.

Some of the properties mentioned in Schedule B2 to the plaint were purchased in 1945 and 1946 by Ex.: B 127 and.B~.

128 in the name of. the third defendant, Venkatarama. At the time of these acquisitions the third defendant had been karnam of Vepatthur for over 15 years. It is not unlikely he would have saved some portion of his own earnings during this period so as to be able to pay for these purchases out of his own earnings. It cannot therefore be said reasonably that these purchases were made from funds advanced by the first defendant. Apart from this, it appears that the plaintiff has not been able to show that at the time of these acquisitions the first defendant had

. , / - ·,~.~~~;~~· ·:~\ \~~~,-~~ :. \ ~":'>

J \:.:~, ', • ' , 't '\ ',

\, . I

SUPRE~IE. COURT REPORTS

[19G4}

1964 with him sufficient income out of the joint family properties for K. v. Narayanapurchasing all these lands. We have already found that the first awami Iyer . defendant resumed management of the joint family properties Ky R v. k . h on his mother's death in 1945. On the question about the in- 1;,; •• 'd'"o; l:,.na come and expenses during this period there is hardly any evi- . dence worth the name on the record:" On a consideration of all D .. Gupta, J. these circumstances, we are of opinion that the High Court's conclusion as regards these properties also that they did not form part of the joint family property is correct.

This brings us to Mr. Rajagopala Sastri's second argument.· While admitting the legal position that in the absence of any evidence of fraud or misappropriation the Karta cannot be called upon to account for the past transactions, learned Counsel stresses the responsibility of the Karta to establish what are the assets available for partition. In support of this, the learned Counsel drew our attention to the decision in Parmeshwar Dube v. Gobind Dube('). That case laid down the rule that in the absence of fraud or other improper conduct the only ac- . count the Karta of a joint family is liable for is to the existing state of the property divisible; but that this did not mean that the parties were bound to accept the statement of the Karta as to what the property consisted of and an enquiry should be directed by the court in a manner usually adopted to discover what in fact the property consisted of at the date of the partition. About the correctness of this proposition there is no dispute. In what manner this principle can be applied depends however on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, as in the present case, the evidence aiready adduced before the court shows prima facie that the Karta could not reasonably be expected to have in his hands at the date of the suit any accumulation worth the name in addition to the irr.movable properties found on evidence to have been acquired for the family. there can be no justification for calling the Karta to account for his past dealings with the joint family property and its income. In the circumstances of this case therefore the order of the High Court that there was no liability on the first defendant as managing member to render any account of any kind prior to the 12th December 1946, on which notice demanding partition was issued, does not call for any modification.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

(') I.L.R. 53 CaL 459.

K. V. NARAYANASWAMI IYER

K. V. RAMAKRISHNA IYER AND ORS

K. SUBBA RAO

K. C. DAS GUPTA

RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ

APPEU.ATE JURISDICTIO~

K.N. Rajagopal Sastri

K. Jayram

R. Ganapthy Iyer

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri

T.V.R. Tatachari

B. Kalyona Sumlaram

M. Rajagopalan

K. Rajendra Chaudhry

M. R. Krishna Pillai

K. R. Chaudhuri

DAS CiuPTA

Ramakrishna

Mahadeva

Ramakrishna

Narasingampettai

V epatthur

Venkalar.una

Vepattbur

Vepa.tthur and

Mangalathammal

Raja Ayyar

Rama hislma

Venkatarama

Narayanaswami

Kumbakonam

Mahadeva

•wam~ Iyer

Daa Gupta

Narayanaswamy

Mahadeva

2th December) 1946

Ramakrishna.replied

December 31, 1946

st February 1947

Raja Iyer

Mahalingam

Kumarakshi

krishna

Das Gupta

Ramakrishna

Thiagarajapuram

Mahadeva

Narayanaswamy

Mahalingam

Raja Ayjar

Narayanaswami

Kumbakonam town

Manalur village

Iyu

Rukmaniammal

Venbtarama

Court of Judicature at Madras

K.V. Nara1JCVA4-

Daa Gupla

Schedule D

12th December 1946

Rajagopala Sastri

K.V. Narayanadant

swami Iyer

Da• Gupta

Vepatthur

Appaswamy Iyer

Appalaswamy

Narayanaswami Reddiar

Ra jagopala Sastn

Da8 Gupta

Kariasthan

Schedule C

Schedule C

Daa Gvpta

Schedule C

19th August 1942

Schedule 82

10th May 1942

Mahadeva'made

K.V.1taraya1UJswami Iyer

K. V. Ramakrishna

Venkatarama

D .. Gupta