6 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 947

without taking into consideration the value of non-agricultural improvements made after that date, must be regarded as invalid.

We are not called upon to express any opinion on the question whether the power reserved under s. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by s. 2 of Madras Act XI of . 1953 to take possession of lands under the emergency clause for the purpose of working lignite mines in the areas to which the Madras Lignite (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1953, extends is invalid.

No argument has been advanced by either side before us on this question.

Nor was the High Court called upon to consider the validity of that provision.

The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed.

The respondents in this group of appeals, except in appeal No. 11 of 1963. have not appeared in this Court.

Therefore in appeal No. I 1 of 1963 alone, the State of Madras will pay the costs of the respondent. There will be no order as to costs in other appeals.

Appeals dismissed.

THE TOWN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRAVATI

I'.

RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND

ANOTHER

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADICAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS

GUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)

Terminal Tax-Imposition of ttrminal tax by Municipality on silver ond

•ilvtr i•w•ll•ry, gold and told i•w•ll•ry and pr.cioiu llon.. In 1960-Th•" tax" not l<vi•d b•for. by Municipality-Wh•lhtr 1aved by Art. 277 of the COMtitution-''Continut to bt levied and to b• applitd to th• 111m• purposd'-Mtaning of--C.P. and Btrar Municipalititt Act, 1922, •· 55-Gov•rnmtnt of InJia Act, 1935, 1. 143(2)--ColUlitutlon of India, Art. 277.

' 196#

St•l1 of Madra3

"· D. Nam°'iwrfo

Mudaliar

Shah J.

196#

March 3

IfM

Town Mu..tn,.I

COlflMltltt'

v. . a-cfNllllN

A terminal tu oa 1ood1 imported by road or rail w11 imposed by the AmraTati Municipality by virtue of a notification dated August 10,

1916. This notification exempted silver, bullion and coins from th• operation of this tax. When terminal taxes on 1oods imported by rail

were assigned exclusively lo the Federal Centre under the Government of India Act. 1935. the municipality was authorised by s. 143 to con~ tinue lo levy the terminal taxeo which were actually levied before the enforcement of the Act. Likewise, the terminal taxes imposed by the pre-Constitution notification were allowed to be lnied and collected even after the Constitution came into force by virtue of Art. 277 of the Constitution. In 1960, the Municipality levied terminal taxes on three new items, v; z., sill'er and silver jewellery, gold and' gold jewellery and precious stonea.

In a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the newly imposed terminal tax was challengell by the respondent who was carrying on business, within the limits of the Municipality, in gold, silYer and precious stones on the ground of legislative incompetence.

The writ petition was granted by the High CofJrt and the appellant came to this court after obtainina a certificate of fitness from the Hiah Court.

Dismissing . the appeal:

Held: The newly imposed terminal taxes on silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery and precious stones had never been imposed

by the Municipality and hence it could not be said that those were "being lawfully levied" by the Municipality and "•pplied to the same purposes" before the commencement of the Constitution a! required by Art. 277 of the Constitution. Ari. 277 was not intended to confer an

unlimited legislative power to impose what in effect were new taxes, though of the same type or nature as existed before the Constitution.

Rama Krishna Ramanath v. The Janpad Sabha, Gandia, f1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 70 and Chutti/al v. Bagmal and Ba/wantrai, l.L.R. [1956) M.B. 339. referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 598 of 1962.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 18, 1961 of the Maharashtra High Court (Nagpur Bench) at Nagpur in Special Civil Application No. 30 of 1960.

WITH

Civil Appeals Nos. 695 and 700 of 1962.

Appeals from the judgment and orders dated October 12, 1961 and March 18, 1961 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petitions Nos. 122 of 1961 and 319 of t 960 , respectively,

1961 M. C. Setalvad and S. Shaukat Hussain, for the appellant _ (in C.A. No. 598/62).

Terrn MunlcitMI J Committn W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 598 of 1962).

S. G. Patwardhan, Udai Pratap Singh and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 695/62). ·

A. N. Goyal, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 695/ 62).

I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 695/ 62).

M. C. Setalvad and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 700/62).

G. S. Pathak, I. B. Dadachan1i, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 9 (in C.A. No. 700/62).

I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 10 (in C.A. No. 700/ 62).

March 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A YYANGAR, J.-These three appeals which are on A11•nftll 1. certificates of fitness granted by the High Courts-the first by the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur and the two others by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh-raise a common question as regards the construction of Art. 277 of the Constitution and the validity of certain terminal taxes imposed by the respective appellant-municipal authorities under notifications issued under Ch. IX of the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, subsequent to the coming into force of the Constitution, and so have been heard together.

Civil Appeal 598 of 1962 is an appeal from the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur and has been filed by the Municipal Committee of Amravati against a decision of the High Court allowing the 1st respondent's petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Municipal Committee of Amravati has been established under the

19fl C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (C.P. & Berar Act Il r ... 11 -; j,; nlclpal of 1922) hc:reinafter referred to as the Act.

Chapter IX c_,.,,,., of the Acf deals with the imposition, assessment and 111...eh'..- collection of 'taxes which might be imposed by the Municipal Committee. ' Section 66 specifies the taxes which, subject Ayy.,,..r /, to the provjsions of the Chapter, the Committee may from time to tinie impose.

Its first sub-section specifies in its several clauses 15 varieties of taxes and among them is

cl. ( o) which reads :

''The terminal tax on goods or animals imported into or exported from the limits of tho municipality provided that terminal tax under this clause and an octroi under cl. ( e) shall not be in force in any municipality at the same time;"

The other sub-clauses which are relevant for the consider&• tion of the question arising in the appeal are sub-els. (2),

(3) and ( 4) of s. 66 and they read :

(2) The State Government may, by rules made under this Act, regulate the imposition of taxes under this section, and impose maximum amounts of rates for any tax.

( 3) The first imposition of any tax specified in subsection ( 1) shall be subject to the previmL' sanction of the State Government.

( 4 J Subject to the control of the State Government, a committee may abolish any tax already imposed and specified in sub-section ( 1) clauses

(a) to (m) inclusive, or may, within the limits imposed under sub-section ( 2), vary the amount or rate of any such tax :

Provided that in the case of any municipality indebted to the Government, the abolition of anv tax or a reduction in the amount or rate thereof shall be subject to the previous sanction of. the

State Government."

Section 67 lays down the procedure for the imposition of "" taxes and it provides : Tn11 MIUlid,.,

Commiltu "67. (l) A committee may, at a special meeting, •· pass a resolution to propose the imposition of Riunclrandta any tax under section 66. "'".,,,,.,. 1.

(2) When such a resolution has been passed, the

committee shall publish, in accordance with rules made under this Act, a notice defining the class of persons or description of property proposed to be taxed, the amount or rate of the tax to be imposed and the system of assessment to be adopted.

(3) ................... . (4) (5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

....................

The State Government, on receiving sue~ proposals, may sanction or refuse to sanction the same, or sanction them subject to such modifications as it may think fit, or return them to the committee for further consideration.

No modification affecting the substance shall be made under sub-section ( S), unless and until the modification has been accepted by the committee at a special meeting.

A notification of the imposition of a tax under this section shall be conclusive evidence that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

The procedure for the variation of the taxes is to be found in s. (18 and it reads :

"68. (1) A committee may, at a special meeting, pass a resolution to propose the abolition of any tax already imposed, or a variation in tho amount or rate thereof.

(2) .......•........

T "rn ,14uniclpal

Gomtnitue

v. ' l!umchandra

Ayyan1ar J.

( 3) If the proposal is to increase the amount or rate of any tax, the committee shall pttblish, in the manner prescribed by rules made under this Act, a notice showing in detail the effects

(4)

(5)

( 6)

(7) (8) (9)

of the proposal.

Any inhabitant of the municipality objecting to the proposed increase may, within thirty days from the publication of the notice, submit his objection in writing to the committee.

The committee shall take the proposal and all objections received thereto Jinto consideration at a special meeting, and may modify the proposals as it may think fit, and may pass a final resolution on the proposal.

If the proposal requires the previous sanction of the State Government under the provisions of section 66, sub-section ( 4) or sub-section (5), the committee shall forward it to the State Government and it shall be dealt whh in the manner provided in section 67, sub-sections (4), (5) and (6).

The publication in the manner prescribed of the abolition or variation of any tax under this section shall be conclusive proof that such abolition or variation has been made in accordance with the provisions of this Act." From even before the constitution of the municipality under the Act and at a time when the municipal committ~ was governed by the Berar Municipal Law of 1886 which wa; in force prior to the Act and whose taxation provisions were continued by the Act of 1922, a terminal tax on goods imported by road or rail had been !ffiposed by the Municipality by virtue of a notification dated August 10, 1916 on several specified kinds of goods. This notification exempted silver, bullion and coin from the operation of this tax. This was superseded by a notification of June 2, 1921 under which the Schedules were modified and the terminal tax

19M imposed was confined to goods imported into or exported out of the Municipal area by rail. The notification of June 1921 was amended from ume to time by other items being added and the rates being mcreased but no change was effected in the taxes imposed after 1936. Under the scheme of the distribution of taxing powers between the provinces and rhe Central Government under the Government of India Act, 1935 terminal taxes on goods carried by rail were assigned i; xdusively to the Federal Centre under item 53 of List 1 to Sch. VII, but the validity of the levy and coilect10n of the terminal tax in force, before the 1st April, 1937 was continued by s. 14J of the Government of India Act, 1935 and it was by virtue of this continuance that the; e taxes were continued to be levied after April 1, 1937.

Their continuance after January 26, 1950 when after the

repe; ii oi the Government of India Act, 1935, the Constitution c3me into force with the same scheme of distribution of taxing power on the relevant item identical with that under the Government of India Act, was by reason of Art. 277 which was practically in .!he same terms as s. 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935.

The taxes imposed by the pre-Constitution notification could, therefore, be legaLy levied and collected even after the Constitution came into force.

Town Municia!·

Com11'11tte~

Subsequent to January 26, 1950 there was a notification on December 1, 1959, under which to the list of goods liable to terminal tax imported into or exported out of the Municipal area, not merely by rail, but also by road were added three new items-silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery, and precious stones, and these three specified items were subjected to the tax at the same rates as had been imposed on other articles by the notifications which were in force from before the Constitution.

Before the notification was issued the procedure indicated by s. 67 was gone through and the Government accorded their sanction to the rules made by the Municipal Committee for the imposition of the tax on the newly added articles.

The validity of the tax imposed by this notification was challenged by the 1st respondent who was carrying on business within Amravati municipality in gold, silver and precious stones

Y. 1lwn•cha11dra

Anangar J,

1961 on the ground of legislative incompetency which had not row• M_u"'"""1 been saved by Article 277 of the Constitution, in a petition Commllt•• under Article 226. The learned Judges of the High Court '¥ ,, Y. b Rt.mchandrt1 y a majority accepted the contention raised by the respond- Ayyonpr J. ent and allowed the petition but granted a certificate of fitness and hence this appeal. The facts of the other two appeals are nearly similar but we shall refer to them after dealing with the. common question which arises in these appeals.

It is common ground that the right to levy a terminal tax is now vested in the Union Parliament under Entry 89 of the Union List which reads :

"Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights",

so that if the levy by the appellant of the terminal tax on the newly added items, and the same principle would apply to an increase in the rate of the duty, had to rest on the independent taxing power of the State, the same would have to be struck down for want of legislative competence.

Besides it is necessary to add that whereas under the notifications in force prior to 1st April 1937-when Part III of the Government of India Act was brought into force, articles importeg into or exported out of the municipal area by road were not subject to the tax, and that state of affairs continued till long after the Constitution came into force, a terminal tax was imposed by the impugned notification of December 1959 on goods imported or exported by roada tax which it was not open to the State to impose even with the aid of Art. 277. But ignoring this feature of the impugned notification, insofar as it brought in goods carried by road within the scope of the terminal tax, it is admitted that the validity of the imposition cannot be justified if it was a fresh imposition. What is, however, urged in support of the validity of the imposition is that the same is saved by Art. 277 which mos:

"277. Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which. immediately before tl>e commencement of this Constitution, were being lawfully levied by the

Government of any State or by any municipality or other local authority or body for the TawN MuNfl'i,.I

purposes of the State, municipality, district or Calltlft111u other local area may, notwithstanding that those bM<'tlldra taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Union List. continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law." If learned Counsel for the appellant is right in his contention that the impugned tax which he is now seeking to sustain, was the tax which "was being lawfully levied" by the municipality before the commencement of the Constitution he would certainly be well-founded in the submission that the fact that the terminal taxes are under the distribution <>f taxing powers under the Constitution assigned to the

Union would make no difference for the valid continuance of the levy.

The question, therefore, is whether this was 1he tax which was being levied by the municipal authority before the Constitution and for whose continuance the Article provides.

The first submission of Mr. Setalvad for the appellants was that this condition would be satisfied whenever a terminal tax (without reference either to the article on which it was Iev'ed or the rate) was being lawfully levied by the municipality prior to the commencement of the Constitution and as in this case admittedly a terminal tax was being levied on certain articles that condition was satisfied.

His argument was that the words 'tax or duty' in the opening part of Art. 277 should be read as meaning a tax or duty under a' specified legislative Entry, and if such a tax or duty was being levied before the commencement of the Constitution other duties of the same type or falling within the same category might be imposed after the Constitution notwithstanding that such duties or taxes were mentioned in the Union Li<t by reason of the words "shall

continue to be levied".

Secondly, he said that the word 'levy' meant not merely the ascertainment, i.e., assessment \ and collection of the tax hut included its imposition, i.e., also the charging a,11d i{ that exllression were understood in that wide sense it would comprehend a case where other

196'

Town M11nuip4il

Comm1tt1•

•• Rmnchandra

Ayyang4r 1.

items than those originally specified were brought into the fold of the taxing provision.

The learned Attorney-General who appeared for the State and supported Mr. Setalvad, however, went a step further and submitted that it was not even necessary that a terminal tax should be actually imposed and was being collected prior to the Constitution, but that it was sufficient if the State enactment had vested in the municipality a power to levy such a tax. The argument of the learned Attorney-General has to be rejected as lacking any substance, for on no construction, wide or narrow, of the expression 'levy' in the rphrase 'continue to be levied' can such a case be comprehended.

From the mere fact that a State enactment has authorised a municipa:ity to levy a tax it cannot be said that a tax which had never been imposed was "being lawfully levied" by the municipality, not to speak of the tax etc. collected being "applied to the same purposes" before the commencement of the Constitution as contemplated by the concluding portion of the Article.

Coming next to what one might term the narrower submission of Mr. Setalvad we do not find it possible to agree with it either. His first submission may be expanded thus : The expression "taxes, duties, cesses" with which Art. 277 opens, ha-s to be read in the context of Part XU in which the Article occurs and so read has to be understood as referring to the class or category of taxes which were levied and collected by the State, municipality etc. before the commencement of the Constitution.

In other words, the reference here is to the entries in the legislative lists which permit such taxes to be levied, and so read and taken in conjunction with the circumstance that the Article is one designed to prevent the dislocation of the finances of the State or other local authorities, the terms of the Article would be satisfied and the legislative power to continue to levy the tax would be conferred "notwithstanding that the tax, etc. are mentioned in the Union List". This argument, in our opinion, proceeds on ignoring the terms

.....

of Art. 277.

If, as is admitted, the sole object sought to I be achieved by this provision for "continuance" is to avoid dislocation of the finances of the State and local authorities,

by depriving them of the revenues which they were deriving at the commencement of the Constitution, it would mean that the intention was to permit the existing range of taxes to be continued, not that the Article conferred on them authority to expand the range of their taxation by subjecting new items to taxation or by increasing the rates of duty.

This consideration apart, it is not possible to read the words "notwithstanding that the taxes etc. are mentioned in the Union List" as conferring an unlimited legislative power to impose what in effect the argument involves new taxes, thougl1 of the same type or nature as existed before the Constitution.

The question of the proper construction of s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which is for all practical purposes identical with Art. 277 came up for consideration before this Court in Rama Krishna RamanaJh v. The Janpad Sabha, Gandia('). There it was submitted on behalf of the respondent-local authority that by virtue of s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act the Provincial Legislature was vested with a plenary power to legislate in respect of every tax which was being lawfully levied by local authorities prior to the commencement of the Government of J ndia Act.

This Court rejected that contention and observed :

"Section 143 ( 2) which is a saving clause and obviously designed to prevent a dislocation of the finances of Local Governments and of local authorities by reason of the coming into force of the provisions of the Government of India Act distributing heads of taxation on lines different from those which prevailed before that date, cannot be construed as one conferring a plenary power to legislate on those topics till such time as the Central Legislature intervened.

Such a construction would necessarily involve a power in the Provincial Legislature to enhance the rates of taxation-a result we must say from which Mr. Sanyal did not shrink, but having regard to the language of the section

(I) [1962) Supp. 3 S.C.R. 70,

Tow• Municipal Committee

"· Ramc/candra

A.yyan1u I.

Town Municip4d

Committte

Rmnchandra

.Ayyangar /,

providing for a mere continuity and its manifest purpose this construction must be rejected."

No doubt, even the words "continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes" might import and imply a limited legislative power i!1 the State. The scope of this limited power was also examined by this Court in the same case and it was stated :

"In the context the relevant words of the sub-section could only mean 'may continue to be levied if so desired by the Provincial Legislature• which is indicated by or is implicit in the use of the expression 'may' in the clause 'mav be continued until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature.' This would therefore ipOsit a limited legislative power n the Province to indicate or express a desire to continue or not to continue the levy. If in the exercise of this limited power the Province desires to discontinue the tax and effects a repeal of the relevant statute the repeal would be effective.

Of course, in the absence of legislation indicating a desire to discontinue the tax, the effect of the provision of the Constitution would be to enable the continuance of the power to levy the tax but this does not alter the fact that the provision by its implication confers a limited legislative power to desire or not to desire the continuance of the levy subject to the overriding power of the Central Legislature to, put an end to its continuance and it is on the basis of the existence of this limited legislative power that the right of the Provincial Legislature to repeal the taxation provision under the Act of 1920 could be rested.

Suppose for instance, a Provincial Legislature desires the continuance of the tax but considers the rate too high and wishes it to be reduced and passes an enactment for that purpose, it cannot be that the legislation is incompetent and. that the State Government

. .

must permit the local authority to levy tax at the same rate as prevailed on April 1, 1937 if the latter desired the continuance of the tax.

If such a legislation were enacted to achieve a reduction of the rate of the duty, its legis lative competence must obviously be traceable to the power contained in words 'may continue to be levied' in s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act."

Dealing next with the import ot the words 'may continue to be levied' the same was summarised in these terms : ( 1) The tax must be one which was lawfully levied by a local authority for the purpose of a local area, ( 2) the identity of the body that collects the tax, the area for whose benefit the tax is to be utilised and the purposes for which the utilization is to take place continue to be the same, and ( 3) the rate of the tax is not enhanced nor its incidence in any manner altered, so that it continues to be the same tax.

It is obvious that if these tests were applied the submission on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted.

But authority apart, we cannot, even if this decision were put aside, accede to the construction for which Mr. Setalvad contends. lt is not disputed that in ultimate analysis the answer to the question raised should turn on the meaning of the word 'levied' in the phrase 'continue to be levied' which is the operative word conferring a power.

Mr. Setalvad submits that 'levied' is a word of wide and varying import and includes in its denotation not merely the actual coilection of the tax, but the imposition in the sense of the creation of the charge by the statute, as well as the ascertainment of the amount due from the tax payer.

Mr. Setalvad is right, for before a tax can be collected from any tax payer, its quantum must be ascertained and assessed, and for this to be lawfully done there must be legislative sanction-in other words an imposition of the chargebecause it is the charge under the Statute that is quantified by the authorities acting under the taxing enactment. The acceptance of this construction however does not lead to the result desired, for what can "continue to be levied" is what "was being lawfully levied" in the same sense of the

T""'" Munidl"'l'

Committt~

Ramchandra

A.yyangar /,

196~ word "levied", prior to the Constitution. Admittedly, there Town Muntci, ol was no imposition of the charge now sought to be recovered Committ.. prior to the Constitution, i.e., the Act did not impose the P.amc";;,.ndr• charge by s. 66 but merely enabled the Municipal Committee by appropriate procedure to impose the tax. If, of A.yyangu /, course, this power had been availed of and a charge had been imposed it would be a different matter.

So long as the Municipal Committee did not pass the necessary resolutions and impose the tax there was no charge levied on the commodity, so that it could not be said that the tax "was being lawfully levied" before the commencement of the Constitution. The words "was being lawfully levied'' obviously mean "was actually levied" and it would not be sufficient to satisfy those words that the Municipal authority could lawfully levy the tax, but had not availed itself of that power.

There is another circumstance to which also i; ofere.nce - 1 may be made. The last portion of Art. 277 uses the words

"continue to be levied" and "to be applied to the same purposes''.

By reason of this collocation between the concept of the levy and of application of the proceeds of the tax. the Constitution makers obviously intended the word 'levy' to be understood as including the collection of the tax, for it is only when a tax is collected that any question of its application to a particular purpose would arise. It is apparent that if the word "levied" were understood in the sense which Mr. Setalvad contends, there could be no "application" of the proceeds of the tax to the same purposes as at the commencement of the Constitution.

For ex concessis at that date there were no proceeds to be applied.

In this connection learned Counsel for the respondent referred us to the decision in Chuttilal v. Bagmal and Balwantrai (1) where the relationship between the levy and the application of the tax has been referred to as an aid to the construction of the expression "continue to be levied" in Art. 277. We find ourselves in agreement with the views there expressed.

The decision of the High Court is, therefore, correct and '.he appeal fails. ;'

(I) I.LR. [1956! Madhya Bharat 339.

6 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURt REPORTS 9"!

CIVIL APPEAL No. 695 OF 1962.

In this appeal a notificatiolt was issued under sub-ss. (5) and (7) of s. 67 of the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, on December 9, 1960 imposing a terminal tax on gun-powder imported into or exported out of the munici!lal

area by rail. It is admitted that previous to the Constitution there was no tax imposed on gun-powder.

The position in this case is, therefore, identical with that in Civil Appeal No. 598 of 1962 which we have just disposed of and it follows that this appeal also fails and should be dismisseJ.

CIVIL APPEAL No. 700 OF 1962.

In Civil Appeal 700 of 1962 the original notification imposing terminal taxes in respect of goods coming into or going out of the municipal area by rail was one dated March 17, 1926 which was operative from April 1, 1926.

This was amended by a notification under s. 67(5) of the C.P.

Berar Municipal Act, 1922 dated Septetnbet 23, 1960 by which new articles were inci uded to the list of items imported into or exported from the municipal area by rail subject to the terminal tax and besides the rate of tax on the previously existing items was also increased.

It was this inclusion of new articles for the levy of terminal tax by the notification of 1960 and the increase in the rate of duty on articles already subjected to tax, that was impugned in the writ petition filed by the respondent before the High Court.

On our reasoning on the basis of which we have dismissed Civil Appeal 598 of 1962 it would follow that this appeal should also fail. We can see no difference between the inclusion of new items and the increase in the rate of duty because if there is an increase it would not be a mere continuance of the duty which had been lawfully levied which is the only purpose and function of Art. 217.

The judgment of the High Court allowing the writ petition of the respondent was therefore correct.

In the result, all the three appeals fail and are dismissed with costs of the contesting respondent or respondents in each appeal.

Appeals dismissed.

134-159 S. C.-61

l!llH

Town M......,

Commi,,_.

"· Ramchandna

AyY••gar I.

s. 17

s. 2

State of Madras

THE TOWN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRAVATI

RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND

ANOTHER

K. N. WANCHOO

GUPTA, J

C. SHAH

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.

Art. 277

Btrar Municipalititt Act, 1922

InJia Act, 1935

Art. 277

Shah

' 196St•l1 of Madra3

"· D. Nam°'iwrfo

Mudaliar

Shah J.

196March 3

IfM

Town Mu..tn,.

a-cfNllllN

s. 143

Art. 277

Art. 226

Art. 277

M. C. Setalvad

S. Shaukat Hussain

Terrn MunlcitMI

A. G. Ratnaparkhi

S. G. Patwardhan

Udai Pratap Singh

M. S. Gupta

A. N. Goyal

I. N. Shroff

G. S. Pathak

I. B. Dadachan1i

. C. Mathur

Ravinder Narain

A YYANGAR

High Court of Bombay at Nagpur

High Court of Madhya Pradesh

Art. 277

Berar Municipalities Act, 1922

Municipal Committee of Amravati

Arts. 226 and 227

Berar Municipalities Act, 1922

Section 66

s. 66

Section 67

section 66

section 66

section 67

August 10, 1916

June 2, 1921

1st April, 1937

s. 14J

Government of India Act, 1935

April 1, 1937

26, 1950

Government of India Act, 1935

Art. 277

s. 143

Government of India Act, 1935

January 26, 1950

December 1, 1959

s. 67

Amravati municipality

Anangar

Article 277

Article 226

Ayyonpr

Parliament

1st April 1937

Part III of the Government of India Act

Art. 277

Art. 277

Setalvad

Art. 277

Art. 277

Art. 277

s. 143(2)

Government of India Act, 1935

Art. 277

s. 143(2)

Section 143

Sanyal

s. 143(2)

s. 66

A.yyangu

Art. 277

Art. 277

s. 67

Berar Municipalities Act, 1922

December 9, 1960

March 17, 1926

s. 67(5)

Berar Municipal Act, 1922

Septetnbet 23, 1960

Art. 217

Ramchandna


Morch, J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

CORPORATION OF MADRAS

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C.

SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND s. M. S!KRJ JJ.)

City Munici_nality Act 1919 (Act No. 4 of 1919), 1. lll(b), Government ; f India Act, 1935, ss. 142A(l), 143(2), 292, Constitution of India, Art. 271-Drawing pension-If amounts to employment or profession within the meaning of Act-Whether taxable.

The appellant held office as the last Governor-General of India.

He bas been drawing Rs. 15,000 prr annum as pension while residing Jn the city of Madras. The Corporation of Madras demaaded profession tax from him under section lll(i)(b) of the City Municipal Act, 191~ for the year 1958-59 on the ground of his residence tJeing within J\.fadras city and his drawing the pension to which he wa3 entitlei:I.

The ap.. pellant addressed a communication to the Corporation asserting that this derpand was illegal as the Corporation was empowered by the rele- Yant constitutional provisions merely to levy a tax "on a profession, trade calling or employment" and that as he as a pensioner did not fall under any of these classes, the said demand was illegal. The Corporation diCl not accept the contention of the appellant and therefore, the appellant filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. The High Court dismisse'd the writ petition of the appellant.

The High Court granted a certificate under Art. 133(J)(c) of the'" constitution to the appellant to file on appeal t'J the Supreme Court.

Hencl! tho appeal.

The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Corporation was entitled to levy a tax on pensioners in respect of the pensions received by them in Madras City.

Htld: (l) that the power of the Corporation Lo levy the tax is dependent on the subject of the tax being within the State Legislative power under the Constitution. The present levy comes within the purview of item 60 in the State list in Schedule VII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:...:.

HJ'axcs on profeMion, tra'<IC8, callings and employments."

Beina a "pensioner" cannot be a "profession, trade, business or calling", nor could a tax on a person because he is in receipt of a pension be said to be a tax on ''employments".

The tax. therefore,. under the last portion of sec. I 11 (I )(b) reading-profession tax on persons' .. in receipt of any pension or income from investments"-is aothina but a 011 income fallina wilhin EntJy 32 of the Union List.

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The taxes specified in item 60 are taxes on the carryiDi on of a pro- 1116' fcssion, trade etc., and would, therefore, apply only to a case of present -- employment. Tho mere fact that a person has previously been in a C. &jagopalac,..,_ profession or carried on trade etc. cannot justify a tax under this entry. Corpor:i;011 •I The tax on the receipt of pension or on the income from investments Madru which is referred to in the last part of sec. 111 ( 11 is in truth and substance a tax on income. At the time the tax is levied the appellantpenaioner is in no employment but is only in receipt of income.

(ii) The present levy of tax cannot be saved by Art. 277 of the Constitution because the tax was a new levy and nut a continuance of a tax which had been levied just prior to April 1, 1937. On thC facts of this case it was held that if the statutory charge to profession tax imposed on pensioners by the Act of 1919, was lifted by the Act of 1936, and the trix again came into operation only on April I, 1937. it would follow that there was no "ievy of the tax" immediately before the commencement of P1rt Ill of the Government of India Act. 1935. so as to bring it within the saving in s. 143(2) of that Act. Besides. the two circumt"nces, viz., that residence within the city for a specified

riod was 11'!' .... IC a condition of the liability to the tax, as well as the increase in tht .:'ltes would both serve to emphasise that the levy was a nc\v one, wilh a different texture and not a continuation of the tax

which \Vas le·ed just prior to April 1, 1937.

(iii) "['he mere fact that prior to 1st April, 1937 the Corporation had under Act of 1936 the power to bring the tax into force by a resolution does not on a proper construction of s. 143(2) bring it within the range of those taxes or duties which "were being lawfully levied" prior to the ..:ommencement of Part Ill of the Government ot India Act 1935, which alone are permitted to be continued to be levied notwithstanding that these duties were in the Federal Legislative List.

The mere existence of a power to bring a tax into operation, cannot be equated \Vith "a tax \vhich was bing lawfully levied" before Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935.

The High Court erred in holding that s. 292 of the Government ot India Act applies to this case.

The Town Municipal Committee, Amravati 'f. Ramchandra Yo.Judeo Chimor., [1964] 6 S.C.R. 947, South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. The

Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum, A.LR. 1964 S.C. 207, relied on.

(il') Under s. 111(1) as amende\1, the tax could be levied only in accordance with the rules in Schedule IV and as those rules did not make a provision for the leyY of a tax on pensioncn. it would follow that the tax "was not being lawfully levied" on them. The High Court erred

in holding that such defect would be removed by s. 18 of the Madras General Clauses Act.

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(v) S. 142-A(l) of the Government of India Act, 1935 would assist the respontlent's case only if tax imposed were on a profCMion, trade, callina or cmplovment. In the present cue, the tax la beitlll impooed

SUPREME COURT REPOkTS [:tg64]

IHI ott &11 ii'IMll!t C!t Ii pj:mionet and so thia provision hu no application: c . ..,.,,,.Jao11arl lt IS bot the illtenllon of f'ariiamcnt that Slate miibl levy a tax on

y, i.tlCOllle and call it "ptofessiott" tu. °"""""'°" ,,,

lllMl'll CIVIL APPELLATE JtrRISDICTIO!ll: Civll Appeal No. 580 - of 1962.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated May 1, 1961, of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 975 of 1959.

R. M. Seshadri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.

R. Ganapathy lyer, for respondent No. 1.

A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No. 2.

March 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was .. ' delivered by

A170n1ar I.' AYYANGAR, J.-This appeal comes before us by virtue of a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Madras under Art. 133 (1 )( c) of the Constitution against its judgment dismissing a petition filed by the appellant under Art. 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of prohibition against the Corporation of Madras challenging the constitutional validity of a notice requiring the appellant to pay profession tax.

The appellant held office as the last Governor-General of Irtdia.

Under s. 3 of Central Act XXX of 1951 the appellant is entitled to a pension of Rs. 15,000/- per annum and has been drawing this sum residirtg in the city of Madras.

The Corporation of Madras-the first respondent before us demanded profession tax from the appellant under s. lll(l)(b) of the City Municipal Act, 1919 hereinafter called the Act for the year 1958-1959 on the ground of the 11ppellant's residence within the city for the period therein specified and his drawing the pension to which he was entitled. The appellant addressed a communicatiort to tlie Corporation asserting that this demand was illegal as the Corporation was empowered by the relevant constitutional provisions merely to levy a tax "on a profession,

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6 S.C.R.

SUPRE1'4E COURT REPORTS

trade, calling or employment" and that as he as a pensioner JHf did not fall under ny of these clll$ses, the said demand was c. R.,;;;;._,_,, illegal. 1'4e authorities of the Corporation, however, v: insisted on cQmpHance with the demand on the ground that 00'1,, i:.J:: of

under the express terms of the Act persons in receipt of pensions were also liable to the tax. The appellant thereupon Ayon,., r 1• filed a writ petition for the relief already set out, and as the validity of the State Act was impugned impleaded the State of Madras also as a respondent.

It would be seen from tbe foregoing that the question

or consideration is whether the 1st respondent Corporation !S entitled to levy a tax on pensioners in respect of the pensions received by them. In order tQ appreciate the submissions made to us by learned Counsel for the appellant it would be ncessary to set out the history of the legislation in relation to profession tax and the impugned tax on

iperns in receipt of pensions applicable to the City of

adras because it is on a construction of these provisions lhat the learned Judges of the liigh Court have upheld the validity of the levy and dismissed the appellant's writ petition.

For this purpose it is not necessary to travel to any period anterior to the enactment of the Madras City Municipal Act (Madras Act IV of 1919) which with certain

mendments to br. referred to presently is still in force. The A.ct received the assent of the Governor on March 26, 1919, of the Governor -General in June, 1919 and came into force on publication in the Gazette which was in the same month. Having been enacted while the powers of the Local Legislatures were governed by the Government of India Act, 1915, the constitutional validity of the legislation is not '.)pen to any challenge. Section 111 ( 1) of this enactment ran:-

"Every person not liable for the companies' ta,:,

who, within the city and for the period prescril>- ed in Sec. 113, exercises a profession, art, trade

or calling or holds an appointment, public or private, bringing him within one or morr of the classes of persons specified in the tµadon rules in Schedule IV, shall ipay by way of Iicnce

fee and in addition to any other licence fee

JHI

C. Rll/aropalaclurrl ...

Corpo•atio" of

II ...

il.17_,., I.

that may be Jeviable under this Act a tax as determined under the said rules but in no rase exceeding rupees five hundred in the half year and such tax may be described as the profession tax."

The Section had two explanations of which the second i& material and thi& reada : ' Explanation 2 :

"A person in receipt of a pension paid from any

source shall be deemed to be a person holding an appointment within the meaning of this section."

The .next change in the relevant provision was effected by Madras City Municipal Amendment Act, 1936 (Madras Act X of 1936) which came into force on 14th April 1936.

By this amendment a new section-s. 111 was substituted for the old one just set out, and under this Explanation (2) was deleted and the substituted provision ran :

"111 (1). If the Council by a resolution determines that a profession tax shall be levied, every person not liable to the tax, on companies, who after the date specified in the notice published under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 98-A in any half year-

( a) exercises a profession, art or calling or transacts business or holds any appointment, public or private-

( i) within the city for not less than sixty days in the aggregate, or

(ii) outside the city but who resides in the city for not less than sixty days in the aggregate; or

( b) resides in the city for not Jess than sixty days in the aggregate and is in receipt of any pension or income from investments, shall pay in addition to any licence fee that may

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be leviable under this Act, a half yearly tax 1961 assessed in accordance with the rules in c. &Jaro~ Schedule IV in no case exceeding rupees five c •1 at h d d ,, orporat on un re .

Madru

Along with this was added a new section-s. 98-A which

_.,,.,.,,,, I. ran:

Sec. 98-A(l):

"Before the council passes any resolution imposing a tax or duty for the first time it shall direct the Commissioner to publish a notice in the Fort St. George Gazette and in the local papers of its intention and fix a reasonable period not being less than one month from the date of publication of such notice in the Fort St. George Gazette for submission of objections. The Council may, after considering the objections, if any, received within the period specified, determine by resolution to levy the tax or duty.

Such resolution shall specify the rate at .vhich,

the date from which and the period of levy, if any, for which suc!lfax or duty shall be levied.

(2) When the Council shall have determined to levy any tax or duty for the first time or at a new rate the Commissioner shall forthwith publish a notice in the manner laid down in sub-section ( 1) specifying the date from which the rate at which and the period of levy, if any, for which such tax or duty shall be levied."

At this stage it is necessary to refer to Schedule IV in accordance with which the tax has to be assessed under the terms of s. 111 ( I ) .

In the Act as enacted in 1919 the relevant rule in Schedule IV divided persons assessed to profession tax etc. into 8 classes, based upon the amount of monthly salary received in the case of those ho!ding appointments, and income derived in the case of those in trade, ; irt. calling etc. Each of these classes was again sub-divlded into two-the first sub-class comprising "persons holding appointl'Jents upon a monthly salary" and the other of

1964 "persons exercising any profession, trade, art, calling or c;;. R.i/agopalacliari transacting business". It would be seen that having regard v. to Explanation 2 to s. 111, as it stood in 1919, before its Corporation of d X Uadrm amen ment by Act of 1936 by reason of the provision which enacted that "persons in receipt of pension" were

A1YIJll80• 1• deemed to be "persons holding appointments" when the rule in :'icheduk IV referred to "persons holding appointments"

it included by the statutory fiction-pensioners who on the basis of the amount of pension which they derived were classilied as "persons holding appointments" under the various classes.

But when this Explanation to s. 111 was deleted by the Amending Act X of 1936 and when the new s. 111 ( 1) ( b) referred to the "half-yearly tax assessed in accordance with rules in Schedule IV, 1t was urged that there could not have been an assessment of persons in receipt of pension unless they could be comprehended as within the category of persons holding appointments, or of persons exercising any profession, trade, or art or calling"- as these were the only classes-relevant to the present purpose who were within the scope of the rules under Schedule

IV.

We shall refer to the ubmission based on this feature as regards the terminology employed in Schedule IV in its proper place. The Corporation of Madras availed itself of the provisions of s. 98-A and after the issue of the notices prescribed by it passed a resolution at a meeting held on March 31, 1937 to levy inter a/ia "profession tax" for the

yr 1937-38 at the rates which were specified in the resolution. As regards "profession tax", the resolution read:

"Resolved that the profession tax in respect of

clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 be fixed at the maximum rate and 25 per cent over and above the minimum rates prescribed in Schedule IV of the Act in respect of clauses 7, 8 and 9."

This resolution further specified thqt the tax at the rates therein set out which were higher than what prevailed before, were to have effect from April 1, 19~7. Notwithstam!ing tbe apparent inapplicability of the rules in Schedule JY to t!te le\'Y of profession ta:i: on pensioners, the Corporation continued to assess pensioners to the said tax and

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collected the same.

The lacuna in the enactment was 1964 apparently noticed in 1942 when by a notification in the c. Ra;;;;;;;;;;,1ac1um official gazette the Schedule was amended in exercise of the v .. powers conferred on Government by s. 34 7 ( 3) of the Act.

Corp;:~';';; "" Under the amendment instead of the words "Persons holding any appointment or persons exercising profession, trade or Ayyangar 1• calling etc. "the classes were divided on the basis of "the half yearly income received by the individual specified in s. 111 (Ii''. This amendment to the Schedule was directed to come into force from April I, 1942. The relevant terms of Schedule IV have continued up to date in the same from as amended in 1942-oniy the rate of tax has been progressiveiy increased; first in 1950, then in 1958 and again in 1961, but in the view we take of the principal contention raised by the appellant it is not necessary to set out or deal with these ir.crcases.

Pausing heie the ground upon which the demand for "profession tax" made by the Corporation was impugned may be briefly stated.

The power of the Corporation to levy the tax is dependent on the subject of the tax being within State legislative power under the Constitution. The relevant entry in the Legislative Lists conferring taxing power on the State under which alone, if possible, the present levy could be supported was item 60 in the State List in Schedule VII of the Constitution reading :

"Taxes on profession, trades, callings and employments."

Being a "pensioner" cannot be a "profession, trade, business or calling", nor could a tax on a person because he is in

1 , receipt of a pension be said to be a tax on "employments".

The tax therefore under the last portion of s. 111 (1 )(b) reading-Profession tax on persons "in receipt of any pension or income from investments"-is nothing but a tax on income falling within Entry 82 of the Union list.

If, therefore, the Corporation could not justify the tax as being within the State legislative power the only manner in which it could be done would be by reference to Art. 277 of the C'.onstiturion by which "taxes, duties, etc." which "were

being lawfully levied" prior to the commencement of the

!!!!_ Constitution were permitted to be levied "notwithstanding C. RA;.11opa/txhari that the tax was in the Union List" and "to be applied to

Corpor; iion of the same purposes" as before. Unless therefore the Madrt11 Corporation could make out that the tax now impugned wa!

A.yyanllJr J. being lawfully levied from before the Constitution the levy would be illegal and besides there was the complication introduced by the enhancement of the rates of tax which, as stated earlier, were effected in April, 1950, April 1958 and in 1961. Leaving aside for the moment the question of the effect of the enhancement of the rate, we have to see whether it has been established that the duty was lawfully levied by the Corporation prior to the Constitution.

The answer to the question whether it was "lawfully levied" prior to 26th January, 1950 when the Constitution came into force would depend upon the effect of certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under that enactment, as under the Constitution, the State legislative power as regards taxes of the nature now in controversy was couched in terms identical with that employed in entry 60 of the State List in the Constitution. Entry 46 in the Provincial Legislative List under the Government of India Act, 1935 ran :

"Taxes on profession, trades, callings and employments" : and "taxes on income" fell within the exclusive Federal Legislative power under Entry 54 of List I. By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940 the Parliament of the U.K. enacted s. 142-A to whose terms we shall advert later and by the same enactment entry 46 was amended and the words :

"Subject, however, to the provisions of s. 142-A" : were added at the end of entry 46. Here, again, it would be seen that if the right of the Corporation to levy profession tax on the pension received by a pemioner had to rest on the legislative entries it would fail because it was outside the legislative power of the Province under the Lists read with s. 100 of that Act corresponding to Art. 246 of the Comtitution. The validity of the levy during the period when the GoYernment of India Act was in force i.e. between 1st April, 1937 and 25th January, 1950 was dependent on

its falling within the saving contained in s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act which ran :

"Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act, were being lawfully levied by any Provincial Government, municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of the Province, municipality, district or other local - area under a law in force on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Federal Legislative List, continue to be levied and to .be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature."

No doubt the Amending Act was not in force on 1st January, 1935 having been passed in April 1936, but this would not take it out of s. 143(2) because para 3 of the Indo-Burma (Transitory Provisions) Order, 1937, being an Order in Council by His Majesty in Council authorised by s. 310 of the Government of India Act, provided :

"Para 3 (I): For a period of two yea~ from the commencement of Part III of the Indian Act, the provisions of sub-section ( 2) of section one hundred and forty-three of that Act (which authorises the continuance until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature. of certain provincial taxes falling within the Federal List) shall have effect as if the reference to the first of January nineteen hundred and thirty-five were a reference to the commencement of the said Part III."

It would follow, therefore, that for the present demand to be sustained as valid it would be sufficient if it was shown that the tax was lawfully levied immedhtely prior to the commencement of Part HI of the Government of India Act, 1935, i.e., on 31st March. 1937.

The learned Judes of the High Court held that this condition was satisfied and on this basis they have dismissed the appellant's petition.

1''4

C. Ra/agopaloclwf

Corporotio• O!

Jladra

A.yya,.. I.

1ffl Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted four points C. JWJugopQ/ri in support of the appeal : ( l) That the amending Act X

,.__ .• ·. ,, of 1936 was not validly passed by reason of its contravening .,.,.por..,•on 9, . Modr(lf. the Devolutmn Rules framed under s. 45-A of the Govern-

, fyyqfllw: ,. ment of India Act, 1919 by which Local Governments were given legislative power inter alia to )evy taxes on professions, trades, etc. but that the present tax which is really a "tax on income" was a Central subject outside the competence of the Local Legislature, ( 2) Even assuming that Act X of 1936 was valid, the tax which was peniT!tted to be levied under it was, having regard to the terms of s. 111 (1) a new tax which was levied for the first time by the resolution of the Corporation only on and from April 1, 193 7 and, therefore, the present tax was not in operation prior to the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935 and not therefore saved by s. 143(2) of that Act, ( 3) Besic!es, between 1st April, 193 7 to 1st April, 1942 it was not lawfully levied by reason of the lacuna created by the words of the rules in Schedule IV being inapplicable to the levy of a tax on pensioners, ( 4) The increase in the rates from 193 7 onwards could not be justified even under s. 143 ( 2) or Art. 277 and by reason of these changes in rates the tax became virtually a new tax and could not continue to be lawfully levied to any extent after the increases.

The first point need not detain us long. Prima facie it would seem that there being no rigid distribution of legislative power between the Central and Local Governments under the Government of India Act, 1919 any inf.raction of the rules made under the Devolution Rules framed under s. 45-A would be validated by s. 80-A(3) and s. 84(2) of the Government of India Act, 1919. The learned Judges of the High Court before whom this contention was urged rejected it, and the learned counsel submitted that the decision on this point was not correct. But in the view that we took of the other submissions made to us, we die! not hear learned counsel fully on this point and therefore do not , propose to express any final opinion on the tenability of tbe argument on this head.

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<i S.C.R.

SUPREME COtJRT REPORTS 973

As preliminary to the consideration of the second point 1961 it would be necessary to advert to one feature of the change c. Raia;;;;;, lac,.,,,,

effected by the Amending Act of 1936 to the tax levy. v ..

Under s. 111, as it originally stood, the liability to pay the Corp;$~':: of tax, i.e., the charge for the tax, was imposed by virtue of .ti.yyangar I. the statute itself, on persons who for the period prescribed "exercised a profession or trade or calling or held an

appointment", persons in receipt of pensions being deemed to be persons holding appointments.

This structure as regards the imposition of liability was altered by the Amending Act.

Under the provision, as recast, before a liability to pay the tax could arise the Council had to determine by a resolution that profession tax shall be levied and it was only that resolution which brought the charge into operation. Thus, the resolution of the Council was substituted for the statute itself as the mode by which the charge was to be imposed.

There was also a second change that was introduced by rendering residence for six months within the city, hesides the receipt of pension in the city, a necessary ingredient of the chargeability of the "profession tax" on pensioners.

The effect of these two changes now calls for consideration.

On the amendment of s. 111 by the Act of 1935 coming into force in April 1936, the statutory imposition of the charge to tax laid on persons in receipt of pensions within the city of Madras ceased, and the liability to tax as regards the period after that date was dependent on the passing of a resolution by the Council in terms of the amended s. 111 (I ) of the Act. In this connection it has to be pointed out that though recourse to the procedure as respects previous publication .etc. prescribed by s. 98-A was necessary only in the case of taxes newly levied, and might have been adopted in the present case because of the enhancement of the rates, still, a resolution of the Council was necessary to impose the tax as without it, no liability to profession tax would arise.

The charge to tax was imposed, as stated earlier by the resolution of the Council which was to have effect from April I, 1937.

In other words by reason of the repeal of the original section 111, the statutory charge to tax on pensions ceased in April 1936.

A charge was imposed again under. the resolution of the Council effective from !st Aprir,-'1937, so that

974 SURREME cou~~ REPQRTS [r~4]

19~ between ~J?ril f936 to 31st"Marc)l, 19~7, nq., charg!' was '<· RaJagopalachflri imposed by :virtue of any "ll\W". 1,-e<uned Counsel fo{ the

C v.. / Appellant submits that this is in effect., a new Jevy,-a levy

°'I.. orporat1on o f h" h' I II : ·

31 M h Madrm o a tax ";" !C wa~ nqt ega X 1D ex1stei; ice on st arc , 1931, and if this levy could not be supported as being .A.yyangar 1 • sa11ctionecl by s. 1~3 (2) pf the, Gpvern.mt of India Act,. 1935, it is comm, on ground Jhat th~ Jawfu)ness of the levy ', cannot be, .sv.tained. We consider this. _.ubmissiop. :well

founded. f the statutql)( charge to profes.sion tax imposed on pensioni:rs by the Act. of 1919. wa~ lifted by \he Act ..._ of 1936, and the' tax again came , into operatipn .only on 1st Aprii, 1937, it wol; lld,. follO\v tat tee i.vas no "levy of 1 the., tax" "imrl')ediate/y _before" , the cprr.11/!"ncment of Part III, of the Governmenf p, f India Al<t .. 19.35, so as to bring it within the saving in s. 143 ('.?.) of 'that Act.

Besides, the two ci!cumstances. viz. : that residence within the city for a specified period was, made a condition of the )iability to / < the tax, as well as the increase in the rates would' both serve .to emphasise that the

levy was a new one, with a differen, t texture and not n continuance of the tax ':Vhich was le'l'.ied just prior to the 1st April, 1937.

Learned Counsel , for the respondents the Corporation of Madras and the State have ur.ged that it was in substance the old levy.

We are unable to agree. The mere fact that prior to 1st April, 1937 the Corporation had unaer Act X of 1936 the power to bring the, tax into force by. a resolution does not on a woper coqs'truction of s. 14~ (2) bring it within the range of those taxes or duties which "were being. !awfully levied" prior ; o the commencement .of Part III of the Government o( ndfa Act Which alone are permitted to be continued to be lyvied notwit)1standing that these duties ; were 'in the Federal LegislaJive List.

This question has been considered , by us , in great detail in Tlie Town Municipal Committee~ Amravati v. Ram Ch.andra Vasudeo Chimote and A.not her, etc.(') in .yhich ]udgment has been pronounced today and 'it is u!1necessary to re-examine the same. The mere exisence of a power to bring a tax into operation, cannot, as p<;>inted out,. be equa!~.d with "a ta~.

which was being lawfully levied" before Part III of the 1964 Government of India AC!, 1935.

c. Rajagopalac/tan

The 3rd submission of learned Counsel for the appellant is also well-founded.

The conclusion we have reached as to the effect of the amendment to s. 111 by Act X of 193 6, and of the tax being imposed by resolution of the Council from 1st April, 1937 not being a tax which was being lawfully levied immediately prior to !st April, 1942, is reinforced by reference to the rules in Schedule IV which remained unamended till 1942. Under s. 111 ( 1) as amended, the tax could be levied only in accordance with the rules in Schedule IV and as those rules did not make a provision for the levy of a tax on pensioners. it would follow that the tax "was not being lawfully levied" on them.

As already painted out, the relevant rules in that Schedule ...., were framed at a time when Explanation 2 formed part of s. 111 and "pemioners" were deemed to "hold appointments".

With the deletion of the Explanation, the fiction created by the origin:il Madras Act IV of 1919 ceased and thereafter if the rules in Schedule IV had to be applied to them these had to be suitably modified. This, as we have pointed out earlier, was done only from April 1, 1942, so that in reality taxes on pensioners were "lawfully" levied upto 1936 and then after a break from April 1, 1942, we

~ use the wo:d "lawfully" on the assumption that this could have been legally done under the Government of India Act, 1935, a point already discussed. The learned Judges of the High Court have rejected the argument addressed to them under this head by reference to s. 18 of the Madras General Clause Act corresponding to s. 24 of the General Clauses _, Act (Central Act X of 1897). With great respect to the learned Judges we do not see how this provision affords any assistance in the matter. The Schedule and the rules continued without repeal or amendment when the new s. 111 ( 1) was substituted in 1936, and when tliis section made a reference to the rules in Schedule IV it could only be a reference to the rules in the Schedule IV which stood ,. unaltered. If the phraseology employed in the Schedule was inappropriate to a class which fell within s. 111 ( 1 ) , the only effect would be that the tax could not be levied, because

Corporation DI

Madrtz1

.A.yyan1ar I.

1961 of the defect in the law imposing the tax, but such a situation • C. RJijagopalacltari is not remedied by reference to the provision in the General Corpor; i;011 of Clauses Act on which the learned Judges have relied.

Madrai

.A.yyangar I.

If, therefore, the tax was one not lawfully levied just prior to April 1, 1937 and was one brought in after the Government of India Act, 1935 came into force, and really only from April l, 1942 assuming this to be lawful-it is obvious that the validity of this tax could not be sustained as a continuation of a lawful pre-existing levy under s. 143(2).

In this view it is not necessary to consider the last of the points urged by learned Counsel and examine whether in case of an increase of rate, the entire tax would become a new tax and so unconstitutional or whether it is only the increase in the rate that would become unenforcenble.

Learned Counsel for the respondent-Corporation submitted that the tax could not be deemed to be a tax on income, as was suggested by the appellant, but was really a tax on employment because it was in consideration of past services during employment that pension was payable.

This argument was admittedly not urged before the learned Judges of the High Court and is obviously untenable. The

taxes specified in item 60 are taxes on the carrying on of a profession, trade, etc. and would, therefore, apply only to a case of present employment.

The mere fact that a person has previously been in a profession or carried on a trade, etc. cannot justify a tax under this Entry. The tax on the receipt of pension or on the income from investments which is referred to in the last part of s. 111 ( I) 1s in truth and substance a tax on income and in fact the argument before the High Court proceeded on this basis, so have the learned Judges. At the time the tax is levied the pensioner is in no employment but is only in receipt of income though it might be for past services, in an employment.

He next submitted that Act X of 1936 which had been enacted prior to the Government of India Act, 1935 was continued as an existing law by s. 292 of the Government of India Act and as there was nothing in the Government <Of India Act against its continuance it would have effect

even if the terms of s. 143 (2) were not satisfied by the 1964 present levy. The learned Judges of the High Court accepted c. Rai,;;;;, lachtJr. ,. this submission. In our opinion, they were in order. The question of the correlation between Art. 372 corresponding to s. 292 of the Government of India Act and Art. 277 corresponding to s. 143 ( 2} of the Government of India Act was considered by this Court in South India Corporation

(P) Ltd. v. The Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum ( 1) and this Court said:

"It is settled law that a special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope, leaving the general provision to control cases where the special provision does not apply.

The earlier discussion makes it abundantly clear that the Constitution gives a separate treatment to the subject of finances, and Art. 277 saves the existing taxes etc. levied by States, if the conditions mentioned therein are complied with.

While Art. 372 saves all pre-Constitution valid laws, Art. 277 is confined only to laxes, duties, cesses or fees lawfully levied immediately before the Constitution.

Therefore, Art. 372 cannot be construed in such a way as to enlarge the scope of the saving of taxes, duties, cesses .:.. . or fees.

To state it differently, Art. 372 must be read subject to Art. 277."

Learned Counsel next drew our attention to s. 142-A(l) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and faintly suggested that it might afford him some assistance.

This provision. again, was not adverted to before the learned Judges of the , l High Court and for a proper reason.

S. 142-A(l) which corresponds to Art. 276(1) of the Constitution enacted:

"Notwithstanding anything in section one hundred of this Act, no Provincial law relating to taxes for the benefit of a Province or of a municipality, district board, local board or other local authority therein in respect of professions, ___ ._ _____ _

(I) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 207.

134-159 S.C.~2

Corporalio11 af

Madras

Ayyangar /.

JGM trades, callings or employments shall be invalid

c. RaJagopalacllari on the ground that it relates to a tax on income."

CorpoTinn of Thi~ section would assist the respondent only if tax imposed

J.ladrtU were one on a profession, trade, calliµg, or employment and in that event the section provides that such a tax shall

"""""" J.

March J.

not be deemed to be a tax on income, but where the tax imposed is one not on a profession,. etc. at all, it does not mean that the State might levy a tax on income and call it

"profession tax".

This is sufficient to dispose of a similar argument as regards the scope of the amended Entry 46 in the Provincial Legislature List (List II) to which we have advened earlier.

The appeal accordingly succeeds and the appellant is held entitled to the relief prayed by him in the petition he filed in the High Court, viz., a writ of Prohibition against the respondent-Corporation from enforcing the demand.

The appellant will be entitled to his costs from the respondents here and in the High Coun.

Appeal allowed.

MATIULLAH SHEIKH

THE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL

(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUllAR

DAYAL JJ.)

Criminal Law-Murder not actually committed-If conviction poJsiblt

under s. 449-"ln order to", meaning of-Charge under s. 307 with s. 34, if sustainable in /aw-Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of

1860) "· 34. 307, 449.

The appellants. were alleged to have entered the house of one E with the common intention of killing him. One of the appellants injured E with a dagger while the other three held him. E's injury did not prove fatal.

The Sessions Judge convicted them under ss. 449 and 307 with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. which on appeal was upheld by the Hif1i Co111'1. On appeal by certificate, ii was contended 11181 there can

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

CORPORATION OF MADRAS

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

SHAH

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

India Act, 1935

ss. 142A(l), 143(2), 292

Constitution of India

Art. 271

Madras

Art. 226

Art. 133(J)(c)

Supreme Court

Madras City

Schedule VII

sec. 111

Art. 277

April 1, 1937

April I, 1937

Ill of the Government of India Act

s. 143(2)

1st April, 1937

s. 143(2)

s. 292

[1964] 6 S.C.R. 947

s. 111(1)

Schedule IV

s. 18

General Clauses Act

S. 142

Government of India Act, 1935

Madras High Court

R. M. Seshadri

R. Gopalakrishnan

R. Ganapathy lyer

A. Ranganadham Chetty

A. V. Rangam

I.' AYYANGAR

Art. 133

Art. 226

Irtdia

s. 3

Central Act XXX of 1951

Corporation of Madras

City Municipal Act, 1919

Ayon

State of Madras

adras

Madras Act IV of 1919

March 26, 1919

Section 111

Sec. 113

Schedule IV

Madras Act X of 1936

14th April 1936

s. 111

Sec. 98

Schedule IV

s. 98

Sec. 98

Schedule IV

s. 111

Schedule IV

s. 111

s. 111

Amending Act X of 1936

s. 111

Schedule IV

Schedule

IV

Schedule IV

Corporation of Madras

s. 98

March 31, 1937

Schedule IV of the Act

April 1, 19~7.

s. 34

s. 111

Schedule IV

Schedule VII

s. 111

Art. 277

A.yyanllJr

26th January, 1950

Parliament of the U.K.

s. 142

s. 142

s. 100

Art. 246

25th January, 1950

s. 143(2)

Part III of this Act

No doubt the Amending Act

1st January, 1935

s. 143(2)

s. 310

Part III of the Indian Act

31st March. 1937

s. 45

India Act, 1919

s. 111

April 1, 193 7

s. 143(2)

1st April, 193 7

1st April, 1942

Schedule IV

s. 143

Art. 277

s. 45

s. 80

s. 84(2)

Government of India Act, 1919

s. 111

s. 111

s. 111

s. 98

section 111

s. 1

s. 143

s. 14

s. 111

Schedule IV

s. 111

Schedule IV

s. 111

Madras Act IV of 1919

Schedule IV

April 1, 1942

Government of India Act, 1935

s. 18

s. 24

Central Act X of 1897

s. 111

Schedule IV

Schedule IV

s. 111

C. RJijagopalacltari

Madrai

Government of India Act, 1935

s. 143(2)

s. 111

Government of India Act, 1935

s. 292

s. 143

Art. 372

s. 292

Art. 277

s. 143

Art. 277

Art. 372

Art. 277

Art. 372

Art. 372

Art. 277

s. 142

Government of India Act, 1935

S. 142

Art. 276(1)

RaJagopalacllari

MATIULLAH SHEIKH

K. SUBBA RAo

K. C. DAS GUPTA

RAGHUllAR

DAYAL

s. 449

s. 307

s. 34

Indian Penal Code, 1860

ss. 449 and 307

s. 34

Indian Penal Code


SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964]

JGM trades, callings or employments shall be invalid

c. RaJagopalacllari on the ground that it relates to a tax on income."

CorpoTinn of Thi~ section would assist the respondent only if tax imposed

J.ladrtU were one on a profession, trade, calliµg, or employment and in that event the section provides that such a tax shall

"""""" J.

March J.

not be deemed to be a tax on income, but where the tax imposed is one not on a profession,. etc. at all, it does not mean that the State might levy a tax on income and call it

"profession tax".

This is sufficient to dispose of a similar argument as regards the scope of the amended Entry 46 in the Provincial Legislature List (List II) to which we have advened earlier.

The appeal accordingly succeeds and the appellant is held entitled to the relief prayed by him in the petition he filed in the High Court, viz., a writ of Prohibition against the respondent-Corporation from enforcing the demand.

The appellant will be entitled to his costs from the respondents here and in the High Coun.

Appeal allowed.

MATIULLAH SHEIKH

THE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL

(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUllAR

DAYAL JJ.)

Criminal Law-Murder not actually committed-If conviction poJsiblt

under s. 449-"ln order to", meaning of-Charge under s. 307 with s. 34, if sustainable in /aw-Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of

1860) "· 34. 307, 449.

The appellants. were alleged to have entered the house of one E with the common intention of killing him. One of the appellants injured E with a dagger while the other three held him. E's injury did not prove fatal.

The Sessions Judge convicted them under ss. 449 and 307 with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. which on appeal was upheld by the Hif1i Co111'1. On appeal by certificate, ii was contended 11181 there can

be no conviction under s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code unless murder had actually been committed: and that a charge under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code was not sustainable in law.

1l1dd: There was no substance in either of these contentions.

An act can be sai'd to be committed "in order to the committing of an offence" even though the offence may not be completed. The words "in order to" have been used in s. 449 l.P.C. to mean uwith the purpose or'. Whether or not the purpose was actually accomplished t. quite irrclevanL

Once it is decided that the act is so done by a number of persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, the legal position that results is each person shall be held to have committed the entire criminal act.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal.

No. 111 of 1961.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 2, 1961 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 269 of 1961.

D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants.

P. K. Chakravarthy for P. K. Bose, for the respondent.

March 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

1961 ' .lfatiulluh Sh<1kh

Y. 'i; tate n/ We., t Be1111al

DAS GUPTA J.-The appellants were tried by the Das Gupta J.

Additional Sessions Judge, Birbhum, on charges under s. 449 and s. 307 /34 of the Indian Penal Code. Tiie prosecution case was that on the night of the 14th November,

1950 when Haji Ebrar Ali was sleeping on the Verandah of his hut, these appellants came there and while one of them Abdul Odud pressed his knees and Ekram and Habibullah pressed his chest and hands, Matiullah inflicted an injury on his neck with a dagger. Ebrar Ali woke up and raised a 'shout at the same time catching hold of Odud.

The other three assailants made good their escape.

Information about the occurrence was lodged at the Thana by Ebrar Ali who was then sent to Rampurhat hospital for treatment. It is alleged by the prosecution that these four appellants entered Ebrar Ali's house with the common intention of killing him, and that in furtherance of that

19~ common inten11on, Matiullah injured him with a dagger Matiutw; Sheikh while the other three held him down.

Fortunately, the v. injury inflicted on Ebrar Ali did not rprove fatal.

Stale of West

Bengal

Dm Gupta I.

The jury returned an unanimous verdict of guilt against all the appellants on both charges.

The learned Sessions Judge accepted that verdict, and convicted them all under ss. 449 and 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

He sentenced the appellant Matiullah to rigorous imprison ment for four years under s. 307 /34 and to rigorous imprisonment for two years under s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code.

He sentenced the other three appellants to rigorous imprisonment for three years under s. 307 /34 of the Indian Penal Code and for two years under s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code. All the four appealed to the High Court. of Calcutta.

But, the appeal was summarily dis missyd.

A Bench of the High Court however gave the appellants a certificate that this was a fit case for appeal to this Court, under Art. 134 (l )( c) of the Constitution. On the basis of that certificate this appeal has been preferre<!.

Two points are urged before us on behalf of the appel !ants.

The first is that there can be no conviction under s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code unless murder has actually been committed. The second is that a charge under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable in law. In our opinion, there is no substance in either of these contentions.

Section 449 of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever commits house trespass in oriler to the committing of any offence punishable with death, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with rigorous imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. and shall also be liable to fine. Mr. Mukherjee, who appeared before us on behalf of the appellants, argued that unless murdtr has been committed it is not possible to say that any house trespass was committed "in order to the committing" of an offence punishable with death. Accordin!! to the learned Counsel, from the fact that the purpose of the house trespass was to .. commit the murder it is not right to predicate that the house trespass was committed "in order to the committing of

.,.

murder". We are unable to agree. In our opinion, an act 1964 can be said to be committed "in order to the committing Matiul/ah Shlikh of an offence" even though the offence may not be completv.

State of W11t ed.

Thus, if a person commits a house trespass with the Bengal purpose of the committing of theft but has failed to accom- D 6 - 1 plish the purpose, it will be proper to say that he has as upta committed the house trespass in order to the committing of theft. It has to be noticed that the words "in order to" have been used by the legislature not only in s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code but in the two succeeding sections 450, 451 and again in s. 454 and s. 457 of the Indian Penal

Code.

Section 450 prescribes the punishment for house trespass if it is done "in order to" the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment for life. Section 451 makes punishable the commission of an offence of house trespass if it is committed "in order to" the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment.

Section_ 454 makes punishable, lurking house trespass or house breaking, if committed "in order to" the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment.

Section 457 prescribes the punishment for lurking house trespass by night or house breaking by night, if committed, "in order to" the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment.

It is worth noticing also that house trespass, apart from anything else is made punishable under s. 448 of the Indian Penal Code, the punishment prescribed being imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or both.

Higher punishment is prescribed where house trespass is committed "in order to" the commission of other offences.

An examination of ss. 449, 450, 451, 454 and 457 show that the penalty prescribed has been graded according to the nature of the offence "in order to" the commission of which house trespass is committed.

It is quite clear that these punishments for house trespass are prescribed quite independent of Lile question whether the offence "in order to" the commission of which the house trespass was committed has been actually committed or not. In our opinion, there can be no doubt that the words "in order to" have been used

1964 to mean "with the purpose of'. If the purpose in commit-

Ma11ullah Sheikh ting the house trespass is the commission of an offence v. punishable with death the house trespass becomes punish- Staze of West lien; ai able under s. 449 of the Indian Penal t::ode. If the purpose

DaJ Gupta J. in committing the house trespass is the commission of an

offence punishable with imprisonment for life the house trespass is punishable under s. 450 of the Indian Penal Code.

Similarly, ss. 451, 454 and 457 will apply if the house trespass or lurking house trespass, or lurking house trespass by night or house breaking by night are committed for the purpose of the offence indicated in those sections. Whether or not the purpose was actually accomplished is quite irrelevant in these cases.

Our conclusion therefore is that the fact that the murder was not actually committed will not affect the applicability of s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code.

fhe second contention that no charge under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is sustainable in law appears to proceed on a misreading of the effect of the provisions of s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code runs thus :-

"Whoever doe" any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished wjth imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life. or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."

According to Mr. Mukherjee, what is made punishable by this section is the individual act of a person when that individual has a particular intention or knowledge referred to in the section and so, where the act is done by a number of persons jointly it can have no application.

This argument ignores the legal position that the act committed by a number of persons shall in the circumstances mentioned in s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code be held to be the act ot

each one individual of those persons. Section 34 runs thus:-

'"When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done byhim alone."

It may, in many cases, be difficult to decide whether the crimi.nai act in question has been done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. But, once it is decided that the act is so done by a number of persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, the legal. position that results is that each person shall be held to have committed the entire criminal act. Thus, in the present case, when it is found that the four appellants attacked Haji Ebrar Ali in furtherance of the common intention of all of them to kill him and some of them held him down while one used the dagger on him, each of the four is in law considered to have done the entire act of holding Ebrar Ali down and applying the dagger. If Matiullah by himself had held Ebrar Ali down and struck him with the dagger, with the intention of causing his death and the injury had actually resulted in his death, he would have been guilty of murder, except in some special circumstances as mentioned_ in s. 300

of the Indian Penal Code. The act did not result in death.

So, he becomes punishable under s. 307 of the Indian Penal Code. The position is in no way different when Matiullah is not acting alone but he and several others are acting jointly in furtherance of the common intention of all of them to kill Ebrar Ali.

Each of the other three who did not use the dagger must in law be considered to have done this act of using the dagger; and so, each of them becomes punishable under s. 307 of the Indian Penal Code for injuring Ebrar Ali with the dagger on the neck as if the act had been done by himself alone.

The contention that a charge under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable in law, must therefore be rejected.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Matiullalt Sh•ikh

Stal• of Wut

!ltnfOl

Du Gupta I.

MATIULLAH SHEIKH

THE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL

K. SUBBA RAo

K. C. DAS GUPTA

DAYAL JJ.

s. 449

s. 307

s. 34

Indian Penal Code, 1860

ss. 449 and 307

s. 34

Indian Penal Code

s. 449

Indian Penal Code

s. 307

s. 34

Indian Penal Code

s. 449

Calcutta High Court

D. N. Mukherjee

P. K. Chakravarthy

P. K. Bose

DAS GUPTA

Das Gupta

s. 449

s. 307

Indian Penal Code

Haji Ebrar Ali

Abdul Odud

Ekram

Habibullah

Matiullah

Ebrar Ali

Odud

Rampurhat hospital

ss. 449 and 307

s. 34

Indian Penal Code

Matiullah

s. 307

s. 449

Indian Penal Code

s. 307

Indian Penal Code

s. 449

Indian Penal Code

High Court. of Calcutta

Art. 134

s. 449

Indian Penal Code

s. 307

s. 34

Indian Penal Code

Section 449

Indian Penal Code

Mukherjee

s. 449

Indian Penal Code

sections 450, 451

s. 454

s. 457

Section 450

Section 451

Section 457

s. 448

Indian Penal Code

ss. 449, 450, 451, 454 and 457

s. 449

DaJ Gupta

s. 450

Indian Penal Code

ss. 451, 454 and 457

s. 449

Indian Penal Code

s. 307

s. 34

Indian Penal Code

s. 34

Indian Penal Code

Section 307

Indian Penal Code

s. 34

Indian Penal Code

Section 34

s. 300

Indian Penal Code

s. 307

Indian Penal Code

s. 307

Indian Penal Code

s. 307

s. 34

Indian Penal Code

Matiullalt