1§61

March 1.3

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964}

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR

DALMIA INVESTMENT CO. LTD.

[AK. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. C. SHAH, JJ.]

Income-tax Act-Business-Investment company-Dealing in shares-Bonus shares-Valuation.

The assessee company dealt in shares and also held investments of shares on January 1, 1948. The assessee held 1,10,747. shares of Rohtas Industries at a book value of Rs. 15,57,902/-.

Of these shares 31,909 were bonus shares issued by Rohtas Industries in 1945 at the face value of Rs. 10/- each and the assessee had debited the investment account in respect of the bonus shares by Rs. 3,19,090 with a corresponding entry in the capital reserve account on its credit side for the same amount. The. assessee acquired these bonus shares at a cost of Rs. 5,84,283 in

1944. On January 29, 1948, the assessee sold the entire lot of 1,10,747 shares for Rs. 15,50,458. The assessee deducted the sale price from the book value of Rs. 15,57,902 and claimed a loss of Rs. 7,444 on the sale of shares. The appellate Tribunal valued the bonus shares at nil and held that the assessee had made a profit of Rs: 3,11,646/-. On a reference the High Court held that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the assessee had made a profit of Rs. 3,11,646/-.

Held (per Hidayatullah and Shah, JJ.): (i) The Income-tax Act defines "dividend" and also extends it in some directions but not so as to make the issue of bonus shares a release of reserves as profits so that they could be included in the term.

The face value of the shares cannot therefore be taken to be dividend by reason of anything in the definition. The shares certific

cate which is issued as bonus entitles the holder to a share in the assets of the company and to participate in future profits.

The bonus share when sold may fetch more or may fetch less than the face value, and this shows. that the certificate is not a voucher to receive the amount mentioned on its face. The market price is affected by many impcmderables, one such being the yield or the expected yield. The detriment to the share holder, if any, must therefore be calculated on some principle, but the method of computing the cost of bonus shares at their face value does not accord either with fact or business accountancy.

Swan Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Rex (1914) AC. 231, disapproved Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. John Blott, 8 Tax Cases 101, approved.

Bouch v. Sproule, (1887) 12 A.C. 385, referred to.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Mercantile Bank of India Ltd., 1936 A.C. 478 and Nicholas v. Commissioner of Taxes of'the State of Victoria, 1940 A.C. 744, referred to.

(ii) The bonus sh.ares cannot be said to have cost nothing to the share holder because on the issue of its bonus shares, there is an instant loss to him in the value of his original holding. The earning capacity of the capital employed remains the same, even after the reserve is converted into bonus shares. By the iS5ue of the bonus shares there is a corresponding fall in the divicinds

actual or expected and the market price moves accordingly.

The method of calculation which places the value of bonus shares, at nil cannot be correct.

(iii) The bonus shares can be valued by spreading the cost of the old shares over the old shares, and the new issue taken together, if the shares rank pari passu: When they d.o not, the price may have to be adiusted either m the proport10n of the face value they bear (if there is no other circumstances differentiating them) or on equitable considerations based on the market price before and after the issue taking the middle price not that represented by any unusual fluctuations. On the facts of this case it was held that since the bonus shares in this case rank pari passu with the old shares there is no difficulty in spreading. the original cost over the old and the new shares.

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maneklal Chunilal and Sons, Income-tax Reference No. 16/1948, dt. 23-3-1949, disapproved.

Emerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, (1956) 29 I.T.R. 814, distinguished.

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189-64 L.Ed. 521, referred to.

Per Sarkar, J. (dissenting): (i) The view taken by the majority of Judges in Blott's case is a correct one. In that case the learned Judges held that when the articles of a company authorise the issue of bonus shares and the transfer of a sufficient amount out of the accumulated profits in its hands representing their face value to the share capital account, what happens when the articles are acted upon is a capitalisation of the profits and the bonus shares issued are not in the hands of the snare holder income liable to tax. Following the majority opinion in Blott's case it was held that the High Court was in error in the'\iiew it took in the present case. There is no foundation for proceeding on the basis as if the bonus shares had been acquired by the assessee at their face value. Its profits cannot be computed on that basis.

Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Blott (1921)2 AC. 171, relied on.

Swan Brewery Co. Ltd. v. King (1914) A.C. 231, disapproved.

Osborne (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Steel Blzrrel Co. Ltd., 24 T.C. 293, inapplicable.

Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Fisher's Executors

(1926) AC. 395 and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Mer~ cantile Bank of India Ltd., (1936) A.C. 478, referred to.

Commissioner of Income-taxv. Maneklal Cliunilal and Sons LM ... I.T. Ref. No. 16 of 1948 and Emerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Incomg-tax, Bombay City, 29 I.T.R. 814, referred to .

. (Iii) Bai Shirinbai Kooka's case is the authority for the proposit!on. that where .it cannot be shown what was paid for the acqmsit10n of a tradmg asset by a trader, it has for tax purpose• to be deem<;<! to have b.een acquired at the market value of the date when it was cqmred. On the basis of this authority the Ijonu.s shares must m the present case be deemed to have been acqmred at the market value of the date of their issue.

(iii) On the basis of the same authority, it would not be correct to say that the bonus shares had been acquired for nothlng.

CommiBsianera of I ncometax, Bihar

Dalmia lnveatment

Co. Ltd.

1964 The view taken by the Appellate Commissioner and the Tribal CmnmUJaioner of cannot be supported.

Jnwmetax, Bihar v.

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka, Dolmia Inveatmen• [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 391, relied on.

Go. Lid.

Sarkar, J,

CIVIL APPELLATE fuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 780 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated November 28, 1960, of the Patna High Court, in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 724 of 1958.

K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.

S; K. Kapur and B. N. Kirpal, for the respondent.

March 13, 1964. The judgment of HIDAYATULLAH and SHAH, JJ. was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR J., delivered a dissenting opinion.

SARKAR, J .-This matter has come before us on a case stated by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The question is how to determine the cost of acquisition of bonus shares for ascertaining the profits made ona sale of them. The assessment year concerned is 1949-50 for which the accounting year is the calendar year 1948. ·

The assessee held shares by way of investment and also as stock in trade of his business as a share dealer. We are concerned in this case only with its holdings of ordinary shares in Rohtas Industries Ltd .. In 1944 the assessee acquired 31,909 of these shares at a cost of Rs. 5,84,283 /- and was holding them in January 1945. In that month the Rohtas Industries Ltd. distributed bonus shares at the rate of one ordinary bonu~ share for each original share and so the assessee got 31,909 bonus shares. Between that time and December 31, 1947, the assessee sold 14,650 of the original shares with the result that on January 1, 1948 it held the following shares:-(a) 17,259 original shares acquired in 1944, (b) 31,909 bonus shares issued in January 1945, (c) 59,079 newly issued shares acquired in the year 1945 after the issue of the bonus shares and (d) 2,500 further shares acquired in 1947. The total holding of the assessee on January 1, 1948 thus came to 1,10,747 shares which in its books had been valued at Rs. 15,57.902/-. In arriving at this figure the assessee had valued the bonus shares at the face value of Rs. JO/- each and the other shares at actual cost. On January 29, 1948, the assessee sold all these shares for the total sum of Rs. 15,50,458/-, that is, at Rs. 14/- per share and in its return for the year 1949-50 claimed a loss of Rs. 7,444/- on the.sale. It is this return which has led to this. appeal.

7 S.C.R.

SUPREJ\ffi COURT REPORTS 213

The Income-tax Officer held that the assessee was not en- 1964 titled to charge as the cost of acquisition of the bonus shares Commissioner of a sum equivalent to their face value for nothing had in fact Inwmetax, Biha• been paid and he computed their cost a.t Rs. 6-8-0 per share. Dalmi• Ivestment He arrived at this price by the following method, which has oo. Lid. been called as the method averaging: 584283 x Face value of bonus shares: 319090 x 1 /31909.

In adopting this procedure the Income-tax Officer purported to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maneklal Chunilal and Sons Ltd.('). The Bombay High Court later followed this case in Emerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City. Bombay('). On that basis he held that the assessee had made a profit of Rs. 2,39.317 by way of capital gains and levied tax on it accordingly. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that these shares were not investmept shares but formed the assessee's stock in trade on which it was liable to pay income-tax and not capital gains tax. He also held that the assessee having adopted the method of valuing the stocks at cost and no price having actually been paid for the bonus shares, it must be held that there was an inflation in the opening stock by Rs. 3,19,090. This figure, it may , be observed, represented the cost of the bonus shares at their face value. In his opinion the bonus shares had to be valued at nil.

The appellate Commissioner's conclusion was that the 'assessee was liable to be taxed on a trading profit of Rs. 3, 1 L646 /- in respect of the sale of shares. Thise view was confirmed on a further appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. It is however not clear whether the Tribunal held that there had been a trading profit or capital gains. This matter does not seem to have been raised at any stage after the Appellate Commissioner's order and is not material to the real question that has to be decided.

After the Tribunal's judgment the asessee got an order from the High Court directing the Tribunal to refer the following question to it:

"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the profit computed at Rs. 3,11,646/- on the sale of shares in Rohtas Industries Ltd. was in accordance with law?"

The ~~wer !O this question admittedly depends on the cost of acqu1s1tion, 1f any, to be properly attributed to the bonus shares. If the Appellate Commissioner's method of valuing

(') (I.T. Ref. No. 16 of 1948, unreported). {') 29 l.T.R. 814.

Sarkar, J.

1964 them at nil was wrong. the .question had to be answered in the

oommiS&iom:r of negative. The High Court, following the judgment of Lord Incometax, Bihm Sumner in Swan Brewery Company Limited v. The King('), ~-· . v1. , , held that the real cost of the bonus shares to the assessee was 4/U-mia nvu men . . co. LtrJ. the face value of the shares and answered the quest10n m the

Sarkar J. negative. The observations of Lord Sumner which he la.ter expressed more fully in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v.

Blott('), no doubt, lend support to the High Court's view. I shall consider the view expressed by Lord Sumner later. Now, [ wish to notice another case on which the High Court also relied and that was Osborne (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Steel

Barrel Co. Ltd('). I do not think that the observations of Lord Greene M. R. in this case to which the High Court referred, are of any assistance. All that was there said was that when fully paid shares were properly issued for a consideration other • than cash, the consideration must be at the least equal in value to the par value of the shares and must be based on an honest estimate by the directors of the value of the assets acquired.

In that case fully paid shares had been issued in lieu of stocks and the question was as to how the stocks were to be valued.

That case had nothing to do '.vith the issue of bonus shares or the ascertainment of_ the cost of their acquisition. •

As I have said earlier, Lord Sumner's observation in Blott's case(') certainly supports the view taken by the High Court but in that case Lord Sumner was in a minority. The other learned Judges, excepting Lord Dunedin, who took a somewhat different view to which reference is not necessary

beca.use it has not been relied upon, held that when the articles of a company authorise the issue of bonus shares and the transfer of a sufficient amount out of the accumulated profits in its hands representing their face value to the share capital account what happens when the articles are acted upon is a capitalisation of the profits and the bonus shares issued are not in the hands of the share-holder income liable to tax. In Blott's case(') the articles gave the power which had been acted upon. Lord Sumner on the other hand held that since a com pany could not issue shares for nothing nor pay for them out of its profits, it must be held that what happened in such a case was as if the company had issued cash dividend to the shareholder and had set it off against the liability of the share holder to pay for the bonus share issued to him.

I think the preferable view is that taken by the majority of the Judges. When the articles permit the issue of bonus shares and the transfer of undivided profits direct to the share capital account, it cannot be, said that a cash dividend must be

(') (1914) A.C. 231.

(') 24 T.C. 293.

(') (1921) 2 A.C. 171.

' )

deemed to have been declared which could be set off against 1964 the liability to pay for the shares. This is not what was done Commis_;;;;;;;, of in fact. What in fact was done, and legally done, was to trans-Incometax. Bihar fer the profits to the share capital account by a resolution pass- Dalinia 1~; estment'

ed by the majority of the shareholders so that the shareholders Co. Ltd. never acquired any right to any part of it. The view taken by the majority has since been followed unanimously, and even if it was open to doubt, for myself, at this distance of time, I would not be prepared to depart from it: Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Fisher's Executors(') and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Mercantile Bank of India Limited(').

It is of some significance to observe that the latter is a case from India.

In the present case the record does not contain any reference to the resolutions resulting in the issue of the bonus shares nor to the provisions of the articles but the case has proceeded before us on the basis that the bonus shares had been legally issued under powers contained in the articles and the profits had been equally legally transferred to the share capital account without the shareholders having acquired any right in them. Following the majority opinion in Blott's case(") I think I must hold that the High Court was in error in the view it took in the present case. There is no foundation for proceeding on the basis as if the bonus shares had been acquired by the assessee at their face value. Its profits cannot be computed on that basis.

Two other methods of ascertaining the cost of acquisition of the bonus shares for computing the profits made on their sale have been suggested. One of them is the method of a.veraging which is the method adopted by the Bombay High Court in the cases earlier mentioned. The other is the method of finding out Jhe fall in the price of the original shares on the issue of the bonus shares and attributing to the latter shares that fall and to value them thereby. The object of these methods seems to me to find out what the bonus shares actually cost the assessee. But this would be an impossible task for they actually cost the assessee nothing; it never paid anything for them. There would be more reason for saying that it paid the face value of the bonus shares because the profits of the Company of a similar amount which might otherwise have come to it had been directly appropriated to the share capital account on the issue of the bonus shares. But this method I have rejected already and, for the reason that no amount was actually paid for the bonus shares by the assessee. For the samereasons the two suggested methods for ascertaining the actual

(') (1926) A.C. 395.

(') (1921) 2 A.C. 171.

(') (1936) A.C. 478.

Sarkar, J,

1964 cost of these shares have also to be rejected. If however it -. -. were to be said that these methods were for finding out the

f:C~::!~J;; i:;;, market value of the bonus shares-:--the importance of which

v. ' value for the present purpose will soon be seen-I would say lJalmia lnv<Btment that the only way to find out the market value is from the

Co. Ltd. k t "ts If mar e I e .

Sarkar, J.

How then is the cost of the bonus shares to be determined? We start with this that nothing in fact was paid for them.

But if the cost of acquisition is nil, the whole of the sale proceeds of the shares would be taxable profits. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka(') this Court has approved of the Bombay High Court's view tha.t "obviously, the whole of the sale proceeds or receipts could not be treated as profits and made liable to tax, for that would make no sense" (p. 397). So the profits cannot be ascertained on the basis that the bonus shares had been acquired for nothing. The view taken by the Appellate Commissioner and the Tribunal cannot be supported.

It seems to me that the cost price of the bonus shares has to be decided according to the principle laid down in Bai Shirinbai Kooka's case('). The assessee in that case had purchased shares many years ago by way of investment a.t a comparatively lower price. She started trading with them from April I, 1945. The question was how the profits on the sale of these shares were to be ascertaiued. The sale price was known but what was the cost price? The High Court said that in order to arrive at real profits one must consider the accounts of the business on commercial principles and construe profits in .their normal and natural sense, a sense which no commercial man would misunderstand. The High Court's conclusion was this: When the assessee purchased the shares at a lesser price, that is what they cost her and not the business; but s<Y far as the business was concerned, the shares cost the business nothing more or less than their market value on April I, 1945. This date, it will be remembered, was the date when the business was started. These observations were fully approved by this Court.

Bai Shirinbai Kooka's case(') therefore is authority for the proposition that where it cannot be shown what was paid for the acquisition of a trading asset by a trader, it has for tax - purposes to be deemed to have been acquired at the market value of the date when it was acquired. I think on the authority of this case, the bonus shares must in the present case be deemed to have been acquired at the market value of the date of their issue.

L would, therefore, answer the question framed in the negative.

i'~)~[~19~6~2J;::-Su_p_p_.~3~S~.c~.=R-.~39~1-. ~~~~~~~~~-

HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This appeal by the Commissioner of 1964 Income-tax, Bombay raises the important question how bonus Gommi&Bioner of shares must be valued by an assessee who carries on business Incometax, Bihar in shares. The assessee here is Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd. D 1 . I" 1 1 (now Shri Rishab Investment Co. Ltd.) which is a public a m•00. "t:J. men limited company and the bonus shares were issued in the calendar year 1945 by Rohtas Industries Ltd. in the propor- Hidayatullah, J. tion of one bonus share for one ordinary share already held by the shareholders. In this way, the assessee company received 31,909 bonus shares of the face value of Rs. 10 /- per share which shows that its previous holding was 31,909 ordinary shares. The existing ordinary shares were purchased by the assessee company for Rs. 5,85,283 /- We now come to the assessment year 1949-50 which corresponded to the accounting period of the assessee companythe calendar year

1948. The assessee company was holding shares as investment and was also dealing in shares. The shares in the trading account, being the stock-in-trade, were valued at the beginning of the year and also at the end of the year and the book value was based on cost. Between December 31, 1945 and January 1, 1948, the assessee company sold some shares of Rohtas Industries Ltd. and . bought others. Its holding on the first day of January 1948 was 1,10,747 shares which were valued in its books at Rs. 15,57,902/-. The assessee company sold these shares 0n January 29, 1948 to Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Company Limited for Rs. 15,50,458 /-. This date, it may be pointed cut, fell within the period in which capital gains were taxable. The assessee company returned a loss of Rs. 7,444/- on this sale. In its books it had valued these shares as follows:

Exist.ing 11hares

(l) 17.259 (out of3l,909 original

s1ar£s).

(2) 31,909 Bonus shares ..

(3) 59,079 NClw Issue she.res

(4) 2,500 Ne'v purehase shares

Totsi 1,10,747 shares ..

Book valuo

3,10,951 00 Proportionate cost from Rs.

5,84,283.

Rs. !>.;:; 3,19,090·00 at face v:i.Jue of Rs. 10 per

aha.re. 8,88,561 00 at cost.

39,300 00 at tlost.

l5,57,902·0C

The amount of Rs. 3,19,090/- which represented the cost of the bonus shares in the above account was debited to the investment account and an identical amount was credited to a capital reserve account. The loss which was returned was the difference between Rs. 15,57,902/- claimed to be the cost price ofl,10,747 shares and their sale price of Rs.15,50,458/-.

The return Was not accepted by the Income-tax Officer.

Special Investigation Circle, Patna. In his assessment order, the Income-tax Officer held that the market value of the existing

1964 -Sb:at'es when bonus shares were issued, was Rs. 18 /- per share

Oonimi8'ioner of and the value of the shares was Rs. 5,74,362/- (3I,909 x

Incometax, Bihar Rs. 18). He held that the sale of the shares took place at .iial . ;· Rs. 14/- per share. To this data he purported to apply a deci- . m•~0."£:J'.mcn1 sion of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of lncometax v. Maneklal Chunnilal and Sons(') and held that there was Hidayutidiah, J. profit of Rs. 7 /8/0 per bonus share and thr otal profit was Rs. 2,39,317 /- which he held was capital gain. He brought Rs. 2,39,317 /-to tax as capital gains.

Before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Patna, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Emerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncometax, Bombay City(') and it was argued that by applying the principle laid down in that case, the average cost was Rs. 9/10/0 per share and total ]lfofit Rs. 1,49,355/-. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not accept the above calculation. According to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the bonus shares ha.d cost nothing to the assess1:e company. He omitted Rs. 3,19,090/- from the book valuation and held that the actual cost of 1,10,747 shares was Rs. 12,38,812/- and that the assessee company instead of suffering a Joss of Rs. 7,444 /- on the sale of the shares had actually made profit of Rs. 3. 11,646 /-. He issued a notice to the asoessee company and enhanced the assessment.

On further appeal to the Tribunal, the ass.ssee company submitted again on the strength of the ruling of the Bombay High Court in Emerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncome-tax, Bombay City(') that the actual profit was Rs. 1.57,326 /-. This was done by spreading the cost of the 31,909 ordinary shares over those shares and bonus shares taken together and adding to half the cost attributable to the old ordinary shares the cost of new purchases in the same year and finding out the average cost of shares other than bonus shares.

The Tribunal did not accept this calculation. According to the Tribunal it was not possible to put a valuation upon shares for which nothing was paid. The Tribunal held that the old shares and bonus shares could not be "clubbed together" and the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was right. The Tribunal, however, stated a case under s. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act at the instance of the assessee company suggesting the question for the opinion of the High Court:

"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the profit computed at Rs. 3.11,646/- on the sale of shares in Rdhtas Industries Ltd. was in accordance with law?"

(') Income-tax Reference No. 16 of 1948 dt. 23-3-1949.

(') (1956) 29 I.T.R. 814.

7 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTff 219

The reference was heard by V. Ramaswamy, C.J. and Kan- 1964 haiya Singh, J. They held that the Income-tax authorities were commissioner of wrong in holding that profit should be computed at lncom<tax. B;/1ar Rs. 3,11,646/- or at any other amount. According to them, D 1 . 1v. , • h a mia nres 11tenP t ere was no profit on the sale of 31,909 shares and they co. Ltd. answered the question in favour of the assessee. Before the ' High Court it was contended by the assessee company that the Ilidayatullah, J .. bonus shares must be valued at their face vafue of Rs. 10 I per share and the Department contended that they should be valued at nil. It appears that the other methods of calculation of the cost price of bonus shares were abandoned at that stage.

Ramaswami, C.J. and Kanhaiya Singh, J. held that the issue of bonus shares was nothing but a capitalisation of the company's reserve account or the profits and the bonus shares could not be considered to be issued free. According to them, the payment for the shares must be found in the bonus which was declared from the undistributed profits and the face value of the bonus shares represented the detriment to the assessee company in respect of the undistributed reserves. The present appeal was brought against the decision of the High Court by special leave granted by this Court.

It will be seen from the above that there are four possible methods for determining the cost of bonus shares. The first method is to take the cost as the equivalent of the face value of the bonus shares. This method was followed by the assessee company in making entries in its book)l. The second method adopted by the Department is that as the shareholder pays nothing in cash for the shares, cost should be taken at nil. The third meth9d is to take the cot of the original shares and to spread it over the original shares and bonus shares taken collectively. The fourth method is to find out the fall in the price of the original shares on the stock exchange and to attribute < this to the bonus shares. Before us the assessee company presented for our acceptance the first method and the Department the third method. We shall now consider which is the proper way to value the bonus shares.

It is convenient to begin with the contention that the cost' of bonus shares must be taken to be their face value. The argument requires close attention, because support for it is sought in certain pronouncements of Lord Sumner to which reference will be made presently. Mr. Kapur contends that a company cannot ordinarily issue shares at a discount, and argues that a. fortiori it cannot issue shares for nothing. He submits therefore that the issue of bonus shares involves a twofold operation-the creation of.new shares and the declara.tion of a dividend or bonus which dividend or bonus must be deemed to be paid to the shareholder and to be returned by him to acquire the new shares. Since the amount credited in

I 1961 the books of the company as contribution of capital by the shareholder is the face value of the bonus shares, he, contends

f~::;::;:n;; t;;, that the cost to the shareholder is equal to the face vahie of the . v. ' bonus shares. He relies upon the decision of the Privy Council C>alm"!J/"J'.:J.'.me"' in Swan Brewery Company Ltd. v. Rex('). In that case, Lord

Sumner observed: HidayatuUah, J.

"True, that in a sense it was all one transaction, but that is an ambiguous expression. In business, as in contemplation of law, there were two transa1:tions, the creation and issue of new shares on the company's part, and on the allottees' part the satisfaction of the liability to pay for them by acquiescing in such a transfer from reserve to share capital as put an end to any participation in the sum of £101,450 in right of the old shares, and created instead a right of general participation in the company's profits and assets in right on the new shares, without any further liability to make a cash contribution in respect of them."

Lord Sumner adhered to his view later in the House of Lords in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. John Blott(') but Lord Dunedin and he were fu a minority. and this view was not accepted by the majority. In view of this conflict, it is necessary to state what really happens when a company issues bonus shares.

A limited liability company must state in its memorandum of association the amount of capital with which the company desires to do business and the number of shares into which tha.t capital is to be divided. The company need not issue all its capital at the same time. It may issue only a part of its capital initially and issue more of the unissued capital on a later date.

After the company does business and profits result, it may distribute the profits or keep them in reserve. When it does the latter, it does not keep the money in its coffers; the mouey is used in the business and really represents an increase in the capital employed. When the reserves increase to a considerable extent, the issued capital of the company ceases to bear a true relation to the capital employed. The company may then decide to increase its issued capital and declare a bonus and issue to the shareholders in lieu of bonus, certificates entitling them to an additional share in the increased capital. As a matter of accounting the original shares in a winding up before the increase of issued capital would have yielded to the shareholder the same return as the old shares and the new shares taken together. What was previously ownell by the slweholder by virtue of the original certificates is after the issue of bonus

(') (1914) A.C. 231. (') 8 Tax Cases 101.

.shares, held by them on the basis of more certificates. In point 1964 of fact, however, what the shareholder gets is not cash but Commi .. w.er of. property from which income in the shape of money may be Incometa.:, Bi/iar derived in future. In this sense, there is no payment to him Dal . ~; """""' but an increase of issued capital and the right of the sharemoo. '1u. holder to it is evidenced not by the original number of certificates held by him but by more certificates. There is thus no Hidayalullah, J. payment of dividend. A dividend in the strict sense means a share in the profits and a share in the profits can only be said to be paid to the shareholder when a part of the profits is released to him in cash and the company pays that amount and the shareholder takes it away. The conversion of the reserves into capital does nol involve the release of the profits to the shareholder; the money remains where it was, that is to say, employed in the business. Thereafter the company employs that money not as reserves of profits, but as its proper capital issued to and contributed by the shareholders. If the shareholder were to sell his bonus shares, as shareholders often do, the shareholder parts with the right to participation in the capital of the company, and the cash he receives is not dividend but the price of that right The bonus share when stYld may fetch more or may fetch less than the face value and this shows that the certificate is not a voucher to receive the amount mentioned on its fa:ce. To regard the certificate as cash or as representing cash paid by the shareholder is to overlook the internal process by which that certificate comes into being.

We may now see what was decided in the Swem Brewery's(') case. In that case the company had not distributed all its profits in the past. As a result, .it had a vast reserve fund. The company increased its capital and from the reserve fund, issued shares pro rata. These shares, it was held by Lord Sumner, were dividend. It was claimed in that case that there was no dividend and no distribution of dividend, because nothing had been distributed and nothing given. Where formerly there was one share, after the declaration of bonus there were two but the right of participation was the same. This argument was not accepted and the face value of the shares was taken to be dividend. Section 2 of the Act of Western Australia, howevr, .defined dividend to include "every profit, advantage <ilr gam mtended to be paid or credited to or distributed among the l!lembers of any company." It is obvious that it was impossible to hold that the bonus shares were outside the extend- ed definition . . Swan Brewery'~(') case has been ccepted. as rightly dec1Jed on the special terms of the sect10n, as indeed it was.

In Blott's(') case, Rowlatt, J. observed that the bonus shares were included in the expressio~ "advantage" occurring in the

(') (1914) AC. 231. (') 8 Tax Cases,101.

1964 highly artificial definition of the word "dividend".

In the

0 . .

Court of Appeal. Lord Sterndale, M. R. and Warrington and: ;:::::,:;,,":'J{;;:J,, Scrutton, L. JJ. distinguished the case on the same ground . . v.

It was, however, pointed out by the Master of Rolls that in.

Dalmo/"t,~'""nt Bouch v. Sproule(') Lord Herschell had observed that in such a case, the company does not pay or mtend to pay any sum HidayatuUah, J. as dividend but intends to and does appropriate the undivided profits and deals with them as an increase of the capital stock in the concern.

Blott's(') case then reached the House of Lords. It may be pointed out at this stage that it involved a question whether super-tax was payable on the amount represented by the face value of the bonus share. For purposes of assessment of supertax which was (as it is in our country) a tax charged in respect • of income of an individual the total of ail income from all sources had to be taken into account and the tax was exigible if the total increased a certain sum. Such additional duty is really nothing but additional income-tax and is conveniently described as super-tax. Viscounts Haldane, Finlay and Cave held that an amount equal to the face value of the shares could not be regarded as received by the tax payer and that there was no more than the capitalisation of the profits of the company in respect of which certificates were issued to the shareholders entitling them to participate in the amount of the reserve but only as part of the capital. Lords Dunedin and Sumner, however, held .that the word "capitalisation" was. somewhat "hazy" and the issue of the shares involved a dual operation by which an amount was released to the shareholder but was retained by the company and applied in payment of those shares. In our opinion, and we say it respectfully, the better view is that of the majority and our conclusions set out earlier accord substantially with it.

It follows that though profits are profits in the hands of the company but when they are disposed of by converting them into capital instead of paying them over to the shareholders, no income can be said to accrue to the shareholder because the new shares confer a title to a larger proportion of the surplus assets at a general distribution. The floating capital used in the company which formerly consisted of subscribed capital and the reserves now becomes the subscribed capital. The amount said to be payable to the shareholders as income goes merely to increase the capital of the company and in the hands of the shareholders the certificates are property from which income will be derived. Lord Dunedin did not rely upon Swan_ Brewery's(') case. He held that as the company could not pay for another, the shareholder must be taken to have paid for the bonus shares himself and the payment was;

(') (1887) 12 A.C. 385.

(') (1914) A.C. 231. (') 8 Tax Cases 101.

I S.C.R.

SUPREME 00URT REPORTS 223

the amount which came from the accumulated profits as profits. Lord Sumner, however, stated that in Swan Brewery's(') .case, he did not rely upon the extended definition of dividend in the Australian Statute, but upon the principle involved. He observed that as a matter of machinery, what was done was to keep back the money released to the shareholder for application towards payment for the increased capital.

Lord Sumner had already adhered to his view in an earlier case of the Privy Council, but Swan Brewery's(') case and'

Blott's(') case were considered by the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. and others('). Lord Thankerton distinguished Swan Brewery's(') case and followed Blott's(') case, though in Nicholas

v. Commissioner of Taxes of the State of Victoria('), B/ott's(') .case was distinguished on the ground that the definition in the Unemployment Relief Tax (Assessment) Act, 1933 also, included within a person's assessable income "any dividend, interest, profit or bonus credited, paid or distributed to him by the company from any profit derived in or from Victoria or elsewhere by it", and that bonus shares must be regarded as dividend under that definition.

The Indian Income-tax Act defines "dividend" and also •extends it in some directions but not so as to make the issue of bonus shares a release of reserves as profits so that they could be included in the term. The face value of the shares cannot therefore be taken to be dividend by reason of anything in the definition. The share certificate which is issued as bonus entitles the holder to a "Share in the assets of the company and to participate in future profits. As pointed out above, if sold, it may fetch either more or less. The market price is affected by many imponderables, one such being the yield or the expected yield. The detriment to the shareholder, if any, must therefore be calculated on some principle. but the method of computing the cost of bonus shares at their face value does not accord either with fact .or business accounta'.ncy. .

Can we then say that the bonus shares are a gift and are acquired for nothing? At first sight, it looks as if they are so but the impact of the issue of bonus shares has to be seen to realise that there is an immediate detriment to the shareholder in respect of his original holding. The Income-tax Officer, in this case, has shown that in 1945 when the price of shares became stable it was Rs. 91per share, while the value of the shares before the issue of bonus shares was Rs. 18 /- per share.

In other words, by the issue of bonus shares pro rat a, which Tanked pari passu with the existing shares, the market price was exactly halved, and divided between the old and the bonus .-shares. This will ordinarily be the case but not when the shares

(') (1914) A.C. 231. ' (') 8 Tax Cases 101.

(") (1936) AC. 478.

(') (1940) AC. 744.

C'ommis, qioner of Jncometax, Bihar

Dalmia Jnvcst1nent

Co. Ltd.

Oommi., siontr of lncomdex, Bikar

Dam1"a Jnt'l.'8lmtnt

Oo.LtJ.

HidayatuUah, J.

do not rank pari passu and we shall deal with that case separately. When the shares rank pari passu the result may be stated by saying that what the shareholder held as a whole rupee coin is held by him, after the issue of bonus shares, in two 50 nP coins. The total value remains the same, but the evidence of that value is not in one certificate but in two. This was expressed forcefully by the Supreme Court of United States of America, quoting from an earlier case, in Eisner v.

Macomber(') thus:

"A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of the shareholders. Its property is not diminished, and their interests are not increased . . . . . . . . . . . . . The proportional interest of each shareholder remains the same. The only change is in the evidence which represents that interest, the new shares and the original shares together representing the same . proportional interest that the lll original shares represented before the issue of the new ones ............. In short. the corporation is no poorer and the stock-holder is no richer than they were before ............. If the plaintiff gained any small advantage by the change, it certainly was not an advantage of $417,450 the sum upon which he was taxed ............ What has happened is that the plaintiff's old certificates have been split up in effect and have diminished in value to the extent of the value of the new .

.. . ......... if a shareholder sells dividend stock. he necessarily disposes of a part of his capital interest, just as if he should sell a part of his old stock, either before or after the dividend. What he retains no longer entitles him to the same proportion of future dividends as before the sale. His part in the control of the company likewise is diminished."

Swan Brewery's('! case, it may be pointed out, was distinrnishcd

here also on the basis of the extended definition. It follows that the bonus shares cannot be said to have cost nothing to the shareholder because on the issue of the bonus shares, there is an instant loss to him in the value of his original holding.

The earning capacity of the capital employed remains the same, eveq after the reserve is converted into bonus shares. By the issue of the bonus shares there is a corresponding fall in the dividends actual or expected and the market price moves accordingly. The method of calculation which places the value of bonus shares at nil cannot be correct.

(') 252 U.S. 189-64 L.Ed. 521.

(') (1914) A.C. 231.

This leaves for consideration the other two methods.

Here we may point out that the new shares may rank pari passu with old shares or may be different. The method of cost accounting may have to be different in each case but in essence and principle there is no difference. One possible method is to ascertain the exact fall in the market price of the shares already held and attribute that fall to the price of the bonus shares.

This market price must be the middle price and not as represented by any unusual fluctuation. The other method is to take the amount spent by the shareholder in acquiring his original shares and to spread it over the old and new shares treating the new as accretions to the old and to treat the cost price of the criginal shares as the cost price of the old shares and bonus shares taken together. This method is suggested by the Department in this case. Since the bonus shares in this case rank pari passu with the old shares there is no difficulty in spreading the original cost over the old and the new shares and the contention of the Department in this case is right. But this is not the end of the present discussion. This simple method may present difficulties when the shares do not rank pari passu or are of a different kind. In such cases, it may be necessary to compare the resultant price of the two kinds of shares in the market to arrive at a proper cost valuation. In other words, if the shares do not rank pari passu, assistance may have to be taken of other evidence to fix the cost price of the bonus shares. It may then be necessary to examine the result as reflected in the market to determine the equitable cost. In England paragraph IO of Schedule Tax to the Finance Act, 1962 provides for such matters and for valuing Rights issue but we are not concerned with these matters and need not express an opinion.

It remains to refer to three cases to which we have already referred in passing and on which some reliance was placed. In The Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Bombay v. M / s A1a11ck/a/ Chunilal and Sons Ltd., Bombay('), the assessee held certain ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 100/- in Ambica Mills Ltd. and Arvind Mills Ltd. These two companies then declared a bonus and issued preference shares in the proportion of two to one of the face value of Rs. !00 /- each. These preference shares were sold by the assessee and if the face value was taken as the cost, there was a small profit. he Department contended that the entire sale proceeds were hable to be taxed. because the assessee had paid nothing for the bons s.hares and everything received by it was profit. The assessee s view was .that the cost was equal to the face value of the shares. The High Court rejected both these contentions a~~ held that the cost of the shares previously held must bti d1v1ded between those s and the bonus shares in the same

(') I.T. Ref. No. 16 of 1948 d. 23rd March ID49 L'PID)lSCl-.S .

Commissioner of Income.tax, Bihar

Dalniia Jnvelmetd

Co. Ltd.

Hiilayalullah, J.

226 SUPRE.ME COURT REPOR'l'S [196i]

19G4 proportion as their face value, and the profit or loss should

Commfasioncr of then be found out by comparin~ the cost price calculated on Income-fax, Bilmr this basis with the sale price. In our opinion, there is difficulty

DaJ . 1v. , , in the High Court's decision. The preference shares and the m•a ""''m'-· d" h Id h di b I d h . f .Co. Ltd. or mary s ares cou ar y e va ue m t e proport10n o their face value. The ordinary shares and the preference shares Hfrluyatullah, J. do not rank part passu.

The next case is Emerald Co. Ltd. v. C.l.T., Bombay City('). Jn that case, the assessee had, at the beginning of the year, 350 shares of which 50 shares were bonus shares and all were of the face value of Rs. 250 /- each. The assessee sold 300 shares and claimed a loss of Rs. 35,801/- by valuing the bonus shares at face value. The Department arrived at a loss of Rs. 27,766/- by the method of averaging the cost, following the earlier case of the Bombay High Court just referred to.

The Tribunal suggested a third method. It ignored the 50 shares and the less was calculated by considering the cost of

300 shares and their sale price. The loss worked out at Rs. 27,748/-, but the Tribunal did not disturb the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in view of the small difference. The High Court held that the method adopted by the Department was proper but this Court, on appeal, held that in that case the method ndopted by the Tribunal was correct.

This Court did not decide which of the four methods was the proper one to apply, leaving that question open. The reason was that the assessce originally held 50 shares in 1950; in 1951, it received 50 bonus shares. It sold its original holding three days later and then purchased another JOO shares after two months. In the financial year 1950-51 (assessment year 1951-52), the Income-tax Officer averaged the price of 150 shares and found a profit of Rs. 1,060 /-on the sale of 50 shares instead of a loss of Rs. 1.365 /- which was claimed. The asscssee did not appeal. In the financial year 1951-52 (assessment year 1952-53). the assessee started with 150 shares (JOO purchased and 50 bonus). It then purchased 200 shares in two lots and sold 300 shares, leaving 50 shares. The assessee company claimed a loss of Rs. 35,801 /-. The Income-tax Officer computed the loss at Rs. 27,766/- and the Tribunal computed the loss at Rs. 27,748/-. The Tribunal, however. did not chturb the loss as computed by te Income-tax Officer in view of the slender difference of Rs. 18 /-. The High Court's decision was reversed by this Court, because the High Court ignored all intermediate transactions and averaged the 300 shares with the 50 bonus shares. The shares in respect of which the bonus shares were issued were already averaged with the bonus shares. This was not a case of bonus shares issued in the year of account. It involved purchase and sale of some of the shares.

The average cost price of the original and bonus shares was

(') (1956) 29 I.T.R. 814.

'1 S.C.R.

SUPRK'IIE COURT REPORTS 227

already fixed in an earlier year by the Department and this 1964 fact should have been taken into account. No doubt, Chagla, Gommi,.ioner of CJ. observed that it was not known which of the several Income tax, Bilrar

shares were sold in the year of account, but in the Statement Dnlmia n•ulmtK

of the Case it was clearly stated that bonus shares were un- Go. Lld. touched.

The decision of this Court in Emerald Company's(') case. however, lends support to the view which we have expressed here. The bonus shares can be valued by spreading the cost of the old shares over the old shares and the new issue taken together, if the shares rank pari passu. When they do not, the price may have to be adjusted either in the proportion of the face value they bear (if there is no other circumstance differentiating them) or on equitable considerations based on the market price before and after the issue.

Applying the principles to the present case, the cost of 3L909 shares, namely, Rs. 5,84,283/- must be spread over those shares and the 31,909 bonus shares takentogether. The cost price of the bonus shares therefore was Rs. 2,92,141 /- because the bonus shares were to rank equal to the original shares. The account would thus stand as follows: -

Share in Rohtas Industries Ltd.

Rs.

I. Old issue of 17 ,259 shares brought forward

from 1945, at (proportionate) cost 1.58,035

2. Bonus shares 31,909 received in 1945, at (proportionate, spread out) cost 2,92,141

3. New issue 59,079 shares brought forward from 1945 ". 8,88,561

4. New purchases 2,500 shares brought forward from 1947 39,300

Total 1.10,747 shares 13.78,037

Sales of all the above shares in 1948 15.50.458

Profit 7.444

Profit to be added to the income returned 1,79,865

The answer to the question given by the High Court was therefore erroneous and the right answer wou!d be that the p, rofit computed at Rs. 3.11,6461was not in accordance with law. The appeal is therefore allowed with costs here and in the High Court.

Appeal allowed. ---------------~

(') (1956) 29 I.T.R. 814.

J, p (n)SCI-8(")

HiJaya!ullah, J.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR

DALMIA INVESTMENT CO. LTD

AK. SARKAR

M. HIDAYATULLAH

C. SHAH, JJ.

Income-tax Act

January 1, 1948

Rohtas Industries

January 29, 1948

Income-tax Act

S. 189

Per Sarkar

Blott

Bai Shirinbai Kooka

Sarkar

K. N. Rajagopal Sastri

R. N. Sachthey

K. Kapur

B. N. Kirpal

HIDAYATULLAH

SHAH

HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR

Rohtas Industries Ltd

Rohtas Industries Ltd.

December 31, 1947

Bombay High Court

Incometax, Bihm Sumner

Sumner

Greene

Dunedin

India

April I, 1945

Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd.

Rishab Investment Co. Ltd.

December 31, 1945

Patna

High Court of Bombay

Hidayutidiah

s. 66(1)

Income-tax Act

Rdhtas Industries Ltd.

V. Ramaswamy

haiya Singh

Ilidayatullah

Ramaswami

Kanhaiya Singh

Kapur

Sumner

HidayatuUah

Hidayalullah

Swem Brewery

Section 2

Western Australia

Swan Brewery'~

Rowlatt

Sterndale

Warrington

Scrutton

Herschell

Swan_ Brewery

Swan Brewery

Thankerton

ott

Victoria

Income-tax Act

C'ommis

S. 189

Ambica Mills Ltd.

Arvind Mills Ltd.

Hiilayalullah

Hfrluyatullah

Chagla

Emerald Company

HiJaya!ullah


March 16

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964}

RAM SHARAN

THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE.

AJMER RANGE AND OTHERS

[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH.

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.J

Police Act, 1861 (Act 5 of 1861) s. 2-Rajasthan P&lice- Divisic:;:i of State into range1'-Promotions rangewise-If denying equality before law or equality in matters of public employment-Constitution of India, Arts. 14 and 16.

The system prevailing in the State of Rajasthan for the purpose of promotion of head•constable to the post of Sub- Inspectors of Police was challenged as violative of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. The petitioner, who was promoted to the rrnk of Sub-Inspector of Police from the rank of head constable, was reverted when a permanent Sub-Inspector returned to the range as he was the junior most approved headconstable in that range, though in other ranges of the State there were many approved head-constables who were junior /to him but they continued to officiate as Sub-Inspectors. The petitioners grievance was that if the whole State had been treated as one unit for purpose of promotion to and reversion from the rank of Sub-Inspectors, the petitioner would not have been reverted. He conl'imded, inter alia, that the whole police force being one, the practice of promotion of -head-constables to officiate as Sub-Inspectors rangewise amounted to denial of equal opportunity before the law and was hit by Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution; and that the practice of confining promotions and reversions to officers serving at a particular point of time in one particular range and at the same time making inter-range transfers freely and frequently and as a: matter of official routine was bound to produce S€rious inequalities in promotions and reversions and also very haphazard changes in seniority amongst the officers inter se.

Held: (i) The system of giving promotions as evolved in the State cannot be struck down as denying equality before the law or denying equality in the matter of employment in public service, on the ground that the police force being deemed one for the whole State, promotion throughout from constable upw£rds should be on the bas!s of the whole State or simply on the ground of possible cases of hardship. The system has been evolved for the efficiency of the police in the State as \vell as for administrative convenience.

(ii) If there is wholesale abuse of the power of transfer by the Inspector-General of Police, (for he alone can transfer Sub-Inspectors from one range to another), a case of glaring -"' denial of equality before the law or glaring denial of equal opportunity for employment in the serviee of the State may arise. But a system like this cannot be struck down on the ground that it may be abused. In case of abu~ in this wholesale manner a case may arise for striking down the abuse and not the system.

(iii) In the face of Government Order of March 1955. directing not to ordinarily transfer officers drawing less than

Rs. 250/- p.m. outside their home district, it cannot be accept- 1964 ed tat free and frequent transfers are made as a matter of routme by the Inspector-General of Police in violation thereof Ram Sharaa Further the material that has been placed on the record by •· the petitioner is insufficient to come to the conclusion that along TGM. IJ.puty 1"'11"""' WI.th th" t f t• h . eneml of Po"'' is sys em o promo ion, t ere 1s also a prac1ce of free .Aj R .d and frequent transfers in Rajasthan as a matter of routine of me'ot,::;:• a Sub-Inspectors from one range to another.

. ~RIGINAL JURISDICTION-Writ Petition No. 175 of 1963.

Pet1t10n under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

B. D. Sharma, for the petitioner.

S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, State of Rajasthan and B. R. G. K.

Achar, for the respondents.

March 16, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by

W ANCHOO, J .-This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenges the system prevailing in the State of Rajasthan for the purpose of promotion of head-constables to the post of Sub-Inspectors of Police as violative of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. The petitioner was a headconstable in the former State of Ajmer and was duly included in the approved list of head-constables to be promoted to the rank of Sub-Inspectors of Police in 1955 and was appointed on July 14, 1956 as officiating Sub-Inspector of Police. On November 1, 1956, the former State of Ajmer merged in the State of Rajasthan under the States Reorganisation Act. The petitioner was absorbed in the police service of the State of Rajasthan and a fresh order posting him as officiating Sub-Inspector in Rajasthan was passed on November 1, 1956. According to the petitioner, the practice of Police administration in Rajasthan is that the whole police force of the State is generally under the administrative control of the Inspector General of Police. who is assisted by six Deputy Inspectors General of Police, each Deputy Inspector General of Police being in-<:harge or administration in one of the six ranges into which the whole State has been divided for administrative convenience. The petitioner however contends that though the State of Rajasthan is divided into six ranges, the Sub-Inspectors in different ranges belong to one cadre and one service and are governed by the same rules and regulations and the same conditions of service as regards pay, leave, pension, promotion, disciplinary action etc. The Sub-Inspectors of Police are also transferable from one range to another. It is usual for the Inspector General of Police to pass )orders of transfer from one range to another of three or four Sub-Inspectors every day on an

Wanchoo, J •

1964 average and thus the Sub-Inspectors in the different ranges s.m Sharan are similarly situated and similarly circumstanced in all resv. pects. The same is the case with head-constables serving in P0h• Dopu1 ·~ lp"'1J'd0' different ranges of the State. The petitioner further contends

'"''"

0 ' ofice, h h h h 1. f Ajmer Ra11f1• arui t at even t oug t e po ice orce 1s one for the entire State Othera in view of s. 2 of the Police Act, No. 5 of 1861, (hereinafter wanrkoo J. referred to as the Act) a practice grew up. in the State of Rajasthan of treating the members of police force serving at a particular point of time in each range as a separate and distinct unit for purposes of making promotions and reversions. In consequences of this practice, if a vacancy in the cadre of Sub-Inspectors of Police arose in one range, only the seniormost head-constables in that range were considered for promotion to that vacancy, even though there might be more senior head-constables in other ranges who had also been approved for promotion. These head-constables of other ranges were not considered and promotion was made on the basis of the head-constables in the particular range where the vacancy occurred. Similar was the case where reversion had to be made on account of exigency of public service. In view of this practice, the petitioner was reverted in April 1957 when a permanent Sub Inspector returned to the range as he was the juniormost approved head-constable in the Ajmer range, though in other ranges there were many approved head-constables who were junior to "him but they continued to officiate as Sub-Inspeetors.

The petitioner's grievance is that if the whole State had been treated as one unit for purposes of promotion to and reversion from the rank of Sub-Inspectors, the petitioner would not have been reverted. He contends that the whole police force being one, the practice of promotion of head-constables to officiate as Sub-Inspector rangewise amounts to denial of equal opportunity before the law and is hit by Arts. 14 and 16 of tlie Constitution. It is contended that the practice of confining promotions and reversions to officers serving at a particular point of time in one particular range (i.e. where the vacancy or the surplusage of posts actually occurred) and at the same time making inter-range transfers freely and frequently and as a matter of official routine is bound to produce serious inequalities in promotions and reversions and also very haphazard changes in seniority amongst the officers inter se.

The practice according to the petitioner allowing free transfers produces results which are violative of the equal protection of law and of equal opportunity to public servants in the matter of employment and thus violates Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

The petition has been opposed on behalf of the State and the system of promotion within the range is justified on

7 S.C.R.

SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS 231

the basis of the administrative organisation of the police 1964 force in the State and efficiency of administration for police Ram Sharan purposes. The organisation of the police force in the State v. 1 h h h 1 f d I G 1 £The D-:puty nspeclor 1s t at t e w o e orce IS un er an nspector enera o Gener<U of Police, Police; but for administrative efficiency the entire area of Ajmer Range and the State is divided into four ranges each under one Deputy Othtrs Inspector General of Police. Besides these four ranges there Wan<hoo, J. are two other units of the force which are separate administrative units, each under the charge of a Deputy Inspector General of Police, though they are not ranges. These two units are (!) Criminal Intelligence Department and Intelligence Branch, and (2) Railway and Crime Branch. Under the four ranges are the various district organisations of police under Superintendents of Police. The initial recruitment to the police force is made within a district in the rank of constable. These constables are posted in their respective districts after training. This is done with a view to administrative efficiency. as such constables are well acquainted with the conditions, topography, fairs, festivals and customs of their districts. From these constables approved lists are prepared for promotion to head-constable and these lists are prepare:! districtwise by the Superintendent of Police, who has the power to promote a constable to a head-constable within his district Once a constable has been confirmed as a heac0r.stablc, his further promotion as a Sub-Inspector is by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. For this purp;:ise, all the head-constables in the range consisting of a number of districts of which the Deputy Inspector General of Police is the administrative head are considered as one

groap for prnmotion to the rank of Sub-Inspectors. Consequently the Deputy Inspector General of Police prepares an

approvd list of head-constables on the basis of senioritycum-merit. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the range, the Deputy Inspector General of Police concerned makes promotion from this approved list according to seniority and if reversion is to take place it is the juniormost head-constable officiating as a Sub-Inspector who reverts. The Inspector General of Police only keeps a list of confirmed Sub- Inspectors as he is the officer who has the power to promote Sub-Inspecto:s to the. rank of Inspectors. Thus, according to the State, this thee tier system has always been prevalent in the State; promot10n from constable to head-constable is made by te Superinndent of Police and is confined to the d1stnct, promot10n from head-constable to Sub-Inspector is made by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. and is

cofined to the range, or, as the case may be, within the two umts already referred to, and finally promotion from the rank of Sub-Inspector to the rank of Inspector is on a State-wise basis made by the Inspector .General of Police

l964 The case of the State is that this system, has been evolved Ram Sharan for administrative efficiency and there is in the circumstances v. no inequality before the law and no denial of equality in the The Deputy Inspector f 1 f b f h J' f f h' General of Police, matter ? emp oyment o mem ers o t e po ice orce o t is Ajmer Range and descnpt10n. It 1s also contended on behalf of the State that

Othm this system, is necessary not only in the interest of good ad- Wanchoo, J. ministration but also in the interest of efficiency as there are about 20,000 constables, 3,000 head-constables and 1,000

Sub-Inspectors of Police in the whole of the State. It is therefore an extremely difficult job for the Inspector General of Police to order promotion of a constable to the rank of headconstable, and thereafter promote a head-constable to the rank of Sub-Inspector. Apart from that, it is averred that officers on the spot, like the Superintendent of Police who promotes a constable to the rank of head-constable within his district and the Deputy Inspector General of Police who promotes a head-constable to the rank of a Sub-Inspector within his range, or within the two units, know the staff and that is why the rules hav~ provided that promotions would be made either by the Superintendent of Police or the Deputy Inspector General of Police, as the case may be

It is not denied that sometimes on account of administrative reasons or exigencies of service, transfers are made from onL district to another or from one range to another; but it is urged that these are rare. The State has emphatically denied the statement of the petitioner that three or four Sub- Inspectors on an average are transferred everyday from one range to another. It is said that the policy of the Government is that transfers of subordinate staff even from one district to another should be rare. In that connection, the

State has referred to the Government Order issued to all Heads of Department in March 1955 in which it was said that it had come to the notice of the Government that officers were generally transferred outside their home districts, and sometimes even outside their divisions, thereby causing great hardship to the low paid employees. The Government had therefore decided to order that all officers drawing less than Rs. 250/- p.m. may not ordinarily be transferred outside their home districts, and if the transfer is unavoidable it should, as far as possible, be confined to the division. It may be mentioned that the revenue division would ordinarily be of the same extent as a police range, though not necessarily so. The State therefore contends that transfers of 'subordinate staff are not freely made as alleged by the petitioner from one district to another or from one. range to another and therefore the system of promotion of head-constables angewise does not ordinarily result in any hardship due to promotion being confined from head-constables to

Sub-Inspectors within the range and does not result in any 1964 inequality before the law or the denial of equal opportunity Ram Shara• in the matter of employment in the service of the State. v.

The Deputy Jmpedot

General of Pc1ict, It is true that under s. 2 of the Police Act, the entire Ajmer Range and police establishment under a State Government is for the Other• purposes of the Act, deemed to be one police force, and Wanchoo, J, pay and all other conditions. of service of members of. the subordinate ranks of any pohce force have to be detemuned by the State Government. Even so, the Act envisages the organisation of police administration under the Inspector General of Police by creation of ranges under Deputy Inspectors General of Police and districts under District Superintendents of Police. Such organisation is obviously necessary for the efficient functioning of the police force and that is why in practically all the States we find that the administration of the police force, though under one Inspector General of Police, is further sub-divided into ranges under Deputy Inspectors General of Police and districts under Superintendents of Police. Further it cannot be denied that local knowledge is generally speaking conducive to administrative efficiency in the police force and that is the reason for recruiting constables on districtwise basis and providing for their promotion as head-constables also on districtwise basis by the Superintendent of Police who is expected to know their work. The same idea is apparent in the second tier of the system by which head-constables in a range consisting of a number of districts are treated as one for promotion to the rank of Sub-Inspectbr which is vested in the Deputy Inspector General of Police. By providing promotion within the range, the area is a little widened as compared to a district: Even so, the advantage of local knowledge is still available when such selections are made on a rangewise basis. It is only when we reach third tier and come to promotion of Sub-Inspectors of Police as Inspectors of Police that local knowledge is not insisted upon so much as the work of Inspectors of Police and those above them is more of a supervisory nature. On the other hand so far as the work of a constable, head-constable and Sub-Inspector is concerned they deal with the public directly and in such a situatio; local kno"".ledge certainly plays an important part in the matter of efficiency of these ranks of the police force. If the State has evolved the three tier system of giving promotion from constables to head-constables, from head-constables to Sub-

Inspetors ad from Sub-Il)sl?ectors to Inspectors, which is done 11) the mterst of ad~11)1strative efficiency of the police force, 1t cannot m our opm1on be said that such a system sh?uld be. strnck down on the ground that the police force bemg deemed one for the whole State, promotion throughout

1964 from constable upwards should be on the basis of the whole Ram Sllaran State. Apart from administrative difficulties which may arise v. if all promotion of members in the police force is concen-

T~,;::!i"~} ~r;;: 0'!rated in the ha!1s of !he lnspec!or Geneal of Police which Ajmer Ran, q• and 1s what the pe!It10ner IS contendmg for, 1t seems to us that

Oth<r• there is a good deal of force in the contention of the State Wanchoo, J. that the three tier system works for the efficiency of the police force of these ranks and is designed with that object.

It is not denied that it may sometimes happen that in one range a head-constable may be promoted who may be junior to a head-constable in another range who does not get promotion at the same time because the promotion is rangewise.

But it is urged that this has to be balanced against considerations of efficiency which have led to the evolving of the three tier system of promotion already referred to and therefore the system should not be struck down, simply because at times it may happen that a junior head-constable may get promotion while a senior head-constable in another range may have to wait. Balancing the various considerations mentioned above therefore it seems to us that the system in force in the State of Rajasthan evolved as it has been for the efficiency of the police in the State as well as for administrative convenience cannot be said of itself to deny equality before the iaw or to deny equality in the matter of employment in public service, even though at times it may happen, because of the system that a junior head-constable in one range may get promotion as officiating Sub-Inspector while in another range a senior head-constable may have to wait for some time. We are therefore not prepared to strike down this system as denying equality before the law or denying equality in the matter of employment in the public service, simply on the ground of these possible cases of hardship. \ It is however urged that the system is capable of abuse and it is possible for the Inspector General of Police to transfer some Sub-Inspectors from one range to another with a view to deprive head-constables of a particular range of their due promotion and also with a view to favour head-constables of another range who might otherwise be junior on the basis of length of service. Now it is not and cannot be disputed on behalf of the petitioner that transfers from one district to another or from one range to another even in these ranks of the police force may have to be made in the exigencies of public service or for reasons peculiar to a particular of!icer; nor has it been contended that such transfers can be m any way illegal under the provisions of the Polic~ ct. W.hat is contended is that by means of such transfers 1t 1s possible to create conditions in which equality before the_ law or equality of opportunity in the matter of employment m publie service may be denied to a head-<:onstable of a particular 19114 range. It is true that if there is wholesale abuse of the power Rom 8hara3 of transfer by the Inspector General of Police, (for it is he v. alone who can transfer Sub-Inspectors from one range to T; D'!'i"'~ ~"'~"°' another), a case of glaring denial of equality before the law Aj;:;';,,. i!:,, ig: ~:.d or glaring denial of equal opportunity for employment in the Oth"'' service of the State may arise. But we cannot strike down w -h- J anc , w, • a system on the supposition that an Inspector General of Police may abuse his power and create glaring instances of denial of equality before the law or of the equal opportunity of employment in the service of the State. A system like this cannot be struck down on the ground that it may be abused.

In case of abuse in this wholesale manner a case may arise for striking down the abuse and not the system.

This brings us to the allegation made in the petition that inter-range transfers have been freely and frequently made as a matter of official routine and this therefore has resulted in serious inequalities in promotions and reversions.

The petitioner also stated in this connection that the Inspector General of Police was making three to four transfers of Sub-Inspectors on an average everyday. The State has emphatically denied this allegation. It is also brought to our notice that the policy of the State Government is that subordinate staff who get less than Rs. 250 /- per mensem should not generally be transferred outside their home district, and if the transfer is essential it should as far as possible be confined to the division. Constables, head-<:onstables and Sub Inspectors generally do not receive more than Rs. 250 /- per mensem as pay and therefore the policy of the Government is that such officers should not as far as possible be transferred outside the district and certainly not outside the division as far as possible.. In view of this Government Order

transfers of Sub-Inspectors should rarely take place , outside the range. We are therefore not prepared to accept that there is a policy of free and frequent transfers of-Sub-Inspectors as a mat!er of routine from one range to another, and that makes this _system result in serious inequalities in promotions and revers10ns. In the face of the Government Order of March 1955 we cannot accep_t free and frequent transfers are

mae s a mtter of routme by the Jnspector General of Pohce m v1ola!Jon thereof. Further the material that has been placed on the record by the petitioner is insufficient to com_e to the onclusion that along with this system of proi_not10!!, there is also a practice of free and frequent transfers m Raiasthan as a matter of routine of Sub-Inspectors from

me range. to another. In this view of the matter, the petition fads and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs.

1964 Before we part with this petition we should like to sound Ba• s1w.... a note of warning that the system of promotion of head-con- '" stables to Sub-Inspectors within a range can be rationally

T~::.:r:t~/';.f1:.~' supported on the basis that inter-range transfers of Sub

Aj""' Ranu• and Inspectors would be a matter of rare occurrence and would

Othtr1 not be effected liberally or for ulterior motives; this is an wanclwo, J. important aspect of the matter which should always be borne in mind by the authorities concerned in Rajasthan in order to avoid any further challenge to the system.

Petition dismissed.

RAM SHARAN

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.

K. N. WANCHOO, J.

c. SHAH

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

Police Act, 1861

s. 2

Constitution of India

Arts. 14 and 16

Arts. 14 and 16(1)

Arts. 14 and 16

Ram Sharaa

Rajasthan

Art. 32

Constitution of India

B. D. Sharma

S. V. Gupte

G. C. Kasliwal

B. R. G. K.

Achar

W ANCHOO

Art. 32

Arts. 14 and 16(1)

Ajmer

July 14, 1956

November 1, 1956

State of Rajasthan

Wanchoo

s. 2

Police Act

wanrkoo

Arts. 14 and 16

Arts. 14 and 16

Wan

hoo

Ram Shara•

s. 2

Police Act