{"document_id": "1964_2_838_846_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".838 SUPRE!v!E COCR T REPORTS [J 964) VOL.\n\nBASTI SUGAR .MILLS LTD.\n\nRAM UJAGAR A'.'\\D OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJg]'i; DRAOADKAR, K. N. WA.r;; OHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SIIAfl and\n\nN. RAJAOOPALA AYYANOAI~ JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Diptdt!--'l'ermint'Jtion uf Serri~-' Employr.r' and 'workman' t1ta11ing of-Infringtmcnt vf funda1nfnlal right\n\nlo carry on tra<le-Uttar l'rndult 1\"du-<lrial J)i, put<a Act, 1947 (U.P. XXVJll of 1947). '' 2 (i) (iv).•· 2 (Z).\n\nAn Industrial Di.pule arose bctwren tho appellant ad the respondent~ in respect of t\\\\'O rnatti:-rs, nan1ely (I) for\n\nterminatin~ the services of the respondents (2) and for paying the respondents at a rate lower than Rs. 55,'- per month which was the miniinum prescribed 'vage for workmen of \\tacuum Pan Sugar Factorirs of Uttar Pradesh under the Standin~ Orders dated Oct<>Uer 3, 1958, issued by the Government of\n\nUttar Pradesh. The dispute was refrrrcd to the Labour Court.\n\nThe appellant's case was that the work of removal of press mud had been given by the company to a contractor and these respondents were employed by that contractor to do that work.\n\nTheir services were terminated by the contractor .and the management had nothing to do with these workmen.\n\nTherefore the appellant contend\"! that the management con1pany did not come within the definition of \"employer\" under the provisions of littar Pradesh Industrial Di1putes Act, 1947. The respondents succreded in the Labour Court and hence this appeal.\n\nHtld (I) that the respondent> arc workmen within the meaning of s. 2 ( Z), being perso1 s employed in the industry to do manual work for reward, and the appellant is the employer within the meaning of sub-cl. (IV) of s. 2 (i) as the workman was employed by a contactor with whom the appellant company had contracted in the course of conducting the industry for the execution by the said contractor of the work of removal of press mud which i1 ordinarily a part of the indUltry.\n\n(2) that the imposition of restricti<;>~' on the appellan~'s right to carry on trade under the definmon of employer m sub-cl, (iv) of s. 2 (i) of the Act is in the intere<ts of the General public and as such the appellant's fundamental right under Art. 19 (1) (g) of , the Constitution has not been contravened.\n\n(3) that in the ordinary grammatical sense the words \"employed by a factory\" which occur in the definition of the word \"workmen\" in the Standing Orders include every person who is employed to do the work of the factory and they are wide enough to include workmen employed by the contractors of the factory also.\n\nThe appellant was not allowed to raise a new plea for tho first time in this Court.\n\nllahalakshmi Sugar Mills Company v. Their Workmtn, 1961 (II) L, L.J. 623, referred to.\n\nCrvIL APPELLATE . fURISDIOTION : Civil Appeal No. 225 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the award dated November 26, 1902 of the Labour Court, Lucknow, in Adjudication Case No. 68 of 1962.\n\nG.S. Pathak and D.N. Mukherjee for the appellant. M. Rajagopalan and /(. R. Chaudhuri for the r<!spondents.\n\n1963. April 4. The Judgment of the Court was. delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA J.-The twentyone persons who are the respondents in this appeal were engaged from November 21, 1958, to February 5, 1959, in the work of removal of press-mud in the sugar factory belonging to the appellant. On February 6, 1959, their services were terminated. It also appears that for the period of work of November 21, 1959, to February 5, 1959, they were paid wages at rates lower than Rs. 55/- per month which was\n\nBasti Su:ar Mills\n\nLtd.\n\n•• Ram Ujaz1r\n\nn., Gufll• J.\n\nBaJti Sugar ,\\fills\n\nLtd,\n\n\" Ram Ujagar\n\nDas Gu/J.'• J.\n\nthe mm1mum prescribed wage for workmen of vacuum pan sugar factori<'S of Uttar Pradesh under the Standing Orders dated October :~. I !151!; issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nOn .July 31, 1962, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh referred to the Labour Court, Lucknow, a dispute between these respondents and the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. In this the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd., was described as the employers and the respondeuts as their workmen.\n\nThe mailers in dispute were thus mentioned in the order of reference : -\n\n\"(!) Whether the employers have terminated the services of their workmen, named in the Annexure, will effect from February ti, 1959 legally and/or Justifiably ? If not, to what relief arc the workmen concerned entitled ~\n\n(2) Whether the action of the employers in paying to the workmen; named in the Annexure to issue No. 1, llt rates lower than the minimum prescribed wage of Rs. 55 per month, for the period from November 21, 1958 to February 5, 1959 is legal and/or justified. If not, to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled and with what details.\"\n\nThe appellant contended that these 21 workmen were not employed by the management of the sugar mills. The appellant's case was that the work of removal of pressmud had been given by the Company to a contractor, Banarsi Das, and that these 21 men were employed by that contractor to do the work.\n\nThe management of the Company, it was said, had nothing to do with these men.\n\nBanarsi Das left the work on February G, 1959, and the termination of the services of these workmen was made by him. The respondents through their\n\nUnion contended, on the contrary, that they had been employed directly by the management of the Company.\n\nOn a consideration of the evidence the Labour Court accepted the appellant's case that the work of removal of press-mud was being done through the contractor Banarsi Das and it was Banarsi Das under whom these 21 persons were employed. It further held that in view of the definition of \"employer\" in sub-cl. (iv) of s. 2 (i) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7, the appellant wa~ in law the employer of these 21 persons.\n\nIt held accordingly that they were entitled to the benefit of the ::, tanding Orders regarding minimum wages and were also entitled to reinstatement. In that view the Labour Court ordered, (a) payment to the •..vorkmen at the rate of Rs. 55/- per month from February 6, 1959 upto the end of the crushing season of 1958 59;\n\n(b) reinstatement of the workmen if not already employed by the Company in the crushing season of 1962-63; and (c) payment of difference of wages computed at the rate of Rs. 55/· per month and Re. I/· per day in the case of Ram Ujagar and 14 anaas per day in the case of other workmen for the period November 21, 1958 to February 5, 1959.\n\nAgainst this order of the Labour Court the present appeal. has been filed by the Company with the special leave of this Court.\n\nThree points are raised by Mr. Pathak in support of the appeal. The first is that the definition of\"employer\" in subcl. (iv) of s. 2 (i) of the Act does not make the appellant, the employer of these workmen. The second . point, urged rather faintly, is that if the above definition be so construed as to make the contractor's labourers, workmen of the company the definition should be held to violate the provisions of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution,\n\nI!ld3\n\nBasti Sugar ,\\lills\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRam Ujjagar\n\nDaJ G11.pta J,\n\nB4Sti Su1ar Mil/$\n\nLid.\n\nRam Ujota'\n\nDu Gup111 J.\n\nThe third point urged is that, In any case, the respondents arc not entitled to the benefit of the Standing Orders which fixed the minimum wage for the workmen of the Vacuum Pan Sugar Factories of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nSection 2 (i) of the Act contains an inclusive definition of employer. The effect of subcl. (iv) of s. 2 (i) is that where the owner of any industry in the . course of or for the purpose of conducting the industry contracts with any person for the execution by or under such person of the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily a part of the industry, the owner of such industry is an employer within the meaning of the Act. Mr. Pathak's su11gestion that the effect of this definition is that the owner of the industry becomes the employer of the contractor is wholly untenable and cau even be described as fantastic to deserve serious consideration. The obvious purpose of this extended definition of the word \"employer\" is to make the owner of the industry, in the circumstances mentioned in the subclause, the employer of the workmen engaged in the work which is done through contract. The words used in the sub.clause are clearly sufficient to achieve this purpose.\n\nIt is true, as pointed out by Mr. Pathak, that the definition of the word \"workmen\" did not contain any words to show that the. contract labour was included. That however does not affect the pos1t1on.\n\nThe words of the definition of workmen in s. 2 (z) to mean \"any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or rewacd, whether the terms of employment be express or implied\" are by themselves sufficiently wide to bring in persons doing work in an industry whether the employment was . by the management or by the contractor of the\n\n2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COllRT REPORTS 843\n\nmanagement. Unless howe'Ver the definition of the word \"employer\" included the management of the industry even when the employment was by the contractor the workmen employed by the contractor could not get the benefit of the Act since a dispute between them and the management would not be an industrial dispute between \"employer\" and workmen. It was with a view to remove this difficulty in the way of workmen employed by contractors that the definition of employer has been extended hy sub-cl. (iv) of s. 2 (i). The position thus is: (a) that the respondents are workmen within the meaning of s. 2 (z), being persons employed in the industry to do 'manual work for reward, and (b) they were employed by '!:. contractor with whom the appellant company had contracted in the course of concluding . the industry for the execution by' the said contractor of the work of removal of press-mud which is ordinarily a part of the industry. It follows therefore from s. 2 (z) read with sub-cl. (iv) of s. 2 (i) of the Act that they are workmen of the appellant company and the appellant company is their employer. There is no. substance therefore in the first point raised by the learned . counsel for the appellant.\n\nThe second point, viz., that this definition contravenes the appellant's fundamental rights under Art. 19 (I) (g) is equally devoid of substance.\n\nAssuming that the result of this definition of employer in sub-cl. (iv) of s. 2 (i) is the imposition of some restrictions on the appellant's right to carry on trade or business, it cannot be doubted for a moment that the imposition of such restrictions is in the insterest of the general public.\n\nFor, the interests of the general public require that the device of the engagement of a contractor for doing work which is ordinarily part of the industry should not be allowed to be availed of by owners of industry for evading . the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. That these provisions are in the interests of the general\n\nilasn Sugar Milts\n\nltd v.\n\nRam Uj1gar\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\n. 1963\n\nBa1ti Suar MiUs\n\nLld .\n\n•• &zm 1, ja1a'\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\npublic cnnot be and has not been disputed. That being the position, the impugned ddini1ion which gives the benefit of the provision of 1he Act to the workmen engaged under a contract in doing work which is ordinarily part of the industry cannot but be held to be also in the interesls of the general public.\n\nThis brings us to Mr. Palhak's main contention that in any case the respondents are not 'workmen' within the meaning of the Standing Orders and so cannot get the benefit of the minimum wage prescribed thereby.\n\nIn the standing Orders the word \"workmen\" is defined to mean \"any person (including an apprentice) employed by a factory, to do any skilled or uuskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward whether the terms of employment be express or implied\" but does not include any person mentioned in els. (i) and (ii). We are not concerned in this case with these clauses. Mr. Pathak argues that on a reasonable construction, the words \"employed by a factory\" in this definition can only mean \"employed by the management of the factory\" an<! can not include persons employed by a.contractor of the factory. He points out that this dfinition of 'workmen' in the Standing Orders uses the words \"employed by a factory\" though the definition of 'workmen' in the Act itself uses the words \"employed in any industry\" and contends that the words \"by a factory\" were deliberately used instead of words \"in a factory\" to exclude , persons other than those employed by the management of the factory from the benefit of the Standing Orders. Neither grammar nor reason supports this argument.\n\nOn the ordinary grammatical sense of the words \"employed by a factory\" they include, in our opinion, every person who is employed to do the work of the factory. The use of the word \"by\" has\n\nnothing to do with the question as to who makes the appointment .. The reason why \"by\" was used insiead of \"in\" appears to be to ensure that if a person has been employed to do the work of the industry, whether the work is done inside the factory or outide the factory, he will get the benefit of the\n\nStanding Orders.\n\nWe can also see no reason why the Government in making the Standing Orders would think of denying to some of the persons who fall within the definition of workmen under the Act, the benefit of the Standing Orders.\n\nThe Standing Orders were made under s. 3 (b) of the Act under which the State Government may make provision \"for requiring employers, workmen or both to observe for such period as may be specified in the order such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined in accordance with the order.\" The purpose of the order was thus clearly to require employers to observe certain terins and conditions of employment of their workmen as defined in the Act. It is unthinkable that in doing so the Government would want to exclude from its benefit~-parti culary, that of the minimum wage-a class of workmen who would otherwise get the benefit under the definitions of workmen and employer . in the Act itself. No reason has been suggested and we cannot think of any.\n\nWe have therefore come the conclusion that the words \"employed by a factory\" are wi\\ie enough to include workmen employed by the contractors of factory also.\n\nMr. Pathak wanted to raise a new point based on the provisions of cl. (K) of the Standing Orders.\n\nThat clause provides that a seasonal workman who has worked or, but for illness or any other unavoidable cause, would have worked under a\n\nBasti Sugr Mills\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRam Ujazar\n\nDas Gupta J • .\n\n!ltUri Sugar Mills\n\nLtd. . •.\n\n~Ml Ujagar\n\nUas Gupta J.\n\n846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [lll64J VOL.\n\nfactory during the whole of t, he second half of the.last preceding season will be employed by the factory in the current season.\n\nIn view of this Mr. Pathak . wants to urge that it will be difficult for the appellant to give effect to the order of reinstatement of these 21 workmen as that would mean getting rid of at least some workmen who are entitled to be employed by the factorv under the provisions of cl. (K). If the facts were known to be as suggested by the learned Counsel we would have felt obliged to take note of these provisions of cl. (K) and would have thought fit to make an order as was made by this Court in similar circumstances in Maha/akshmi Sugar Mills Company\n\nLtd. v. Their Workmen (1), making it clear that these 21 workmen should be re-employed in the crushing season of 1962-63 only in so for as it was possible to do so without breach of the provisions of cl. (K) of the Standing Orders. There are no materials on the record however to sh.1w how many of the workmen\n\nalrady employed by the Company in the crushing season of I 9ti2-196:l had actully worked in the latter half of I!J()[.(i2 season.\n\nIn the written statement of the Company. no such point about the difficulty of reinstatement of anv of these 21 workmen because of the provisions of c1: (K) was raised.\n\nIn these circumstamces. we have not allowed l\\fr. Pathak to raise th!s nw pka for the first time in this Court.\n\nA> all the pDint> raised in the appeal fail, the appeal is dismiscd with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(I) 1961 (Iii LL. J. 623,", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "BASTI SUGAR .MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BASTI SUGAR MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM UJAGAR A'.'\\D OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM UJAGAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Government of\n\nUttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 845, "end_char": 873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "55,'- per month which was the miniinum prescribed 'vage for workmen of \\tacuum Pan Sugar Factorirs of Uttar Pradesh under the Standin~ Orders dated Oct<>Uer 3, 1958, issued by the Government of\n\nUttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1528, "end_char": 1532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1681, "end_char": 1685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2077, "end_char": 2081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2191, "end_char": 2198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G.S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2937, "end_char": 2948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.S. Pathak and D.N. Mukherjee for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D.N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.S. Pathak and D.N. Mukherjee for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. Rajagopalan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2987, "end_char": 3001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Rajagopalan and /(."}}, {"text": "R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3010, "end_char": 3022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Chaudhuri for the r<!spondents."}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3106, "end_char": 3115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA J.-The twentyone persons who are the respondents in this appeal were engaged from November 21, 1958, to February 5, 1959, in the work of removal of press-mud in the sugar factory belonging to the appellant.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "February 6, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3326, "end_char": 3342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 6, 1959, their services were terminated."}}, {"text": "November 21, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3423, "end_char": 3440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also appears that for the period of work of November 21, 1959, to February 5, 1959, they were paid wages at rates lower than Rs."}}, {"text": "February 5, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3445, "end_char": 3461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also appears that for the period of work of November 21, 1959, to February 5, 1959, they were paid wages at rates lower than Rs."}}, {"text": "Basti Su:ar Mills\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3534, "end_char": 3557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "55/- per month which was\n\nBasti Su:ar Mills\n\nLtd.\n\n•• Ram Ujaz1r\n\nn., Gufll• J.\n\nBaJti Sugar ,\\fills\n\nLtd,\n\n\" Ram Ujagar\n\nDas Gu/J.'• J.\n\nthe mm1mum prescribed wage for workmen of vacuum pan sugar factori<'S of Uttar Pradesh under the Standing Orders dated October :~. I !"}}, {"text": "Governor of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3853, "end_char": 3878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On .July 31, 1962, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh referred to the Labour Court, Lucknow, a dispute between these respondents and the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. In this the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd., was described as the employers and the respondeuts as their workmen."}}, {"text": "Basti Sugar Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3962, "end_char": 3984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On .July 31, 1962, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh referred to the Labour Court, Lucknow, a dispute between these respondents and the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. In this the Basti Sugar Mills Ltd., was described as the employers and the respondeuts as their workmen."}}, {"text": "Banarsi Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4940, "end_char": 4951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's case was that the work of removal of pressmud had been given by the Company to a contractor, Banarsi Das, and that these 21 men were employed by that contractor to do the work."}}, {"text": "February G, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5133, "end_char": 5149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banarsi Das left the work on February G, 1959, and the termination of the services of these workmen was made by him."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5674, "end_char": 5678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5704, "end_char": 5727, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ram Ujagar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6344, "end_char": 6354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I/· per day in the case of Ram Ujagar and 14 anaas per day in the case of other workmen for the period November 21, 1958 to February 5, 1959."}}, {"text": "November 21, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6420, "end_char": 6437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I/· per day in the case of Ram Ujagar and 14 anaas per day in the case of other workmen for the period November 21, 1958 to February 5, 1959."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6619, "end_char": 6625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three points are raised by Mr. Pathak in support of the appeal.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DaJ G11.pta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7095, "end_char": 7106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 (1) (g) of the Constitution,\n\nI!ld3\n\nBasti Sugar ,\\lills\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRam Ujjagar\n\nDaJ G11.pta J,\n\nB4Sti Su1ar Mil/$\n\nLid."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7375, "end_char": 7384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7475, "end_char": 7479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8601, "end_char": 8605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9536, "end_char": 9540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9627, "end_char": 9631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9991, "end_char": 9995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10026, "end_char": 10030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10340, "end_char": 10347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10464, "end_char": 10468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10939, "end_char": 10962, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11062, "end_char": 11071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That these provisions are in the interests of the general\n\nilasn Sugar Milts\n\nltd v.\n\nRam Uj1gar\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\n.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Palhak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11470, "end_char": 11476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This brings us to Mr. Palhak's main contention that in any case the respondents are not 'workmen' within the meaning of the Standing Orders and so cannot get the benefit of the minimum wage prescribed thereby.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13523, "end_char": 13527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uas Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14752, "end_char": 14761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~Ml Ujagar\n\nUas Gupta J.\n\n846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [lll64J VOL.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_1001_1015_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C; R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1001\n\nNothing has been placed before us to establish that the 1961 Superintending Engineer was legally authorized to enter into Karamshi l•thasuch a contract on behalf of the Government; nor do the bhai d\n\n~ ocuments ex facie show that the agreement was expressed Stat< of Bombay to be made in the name of the Provincial Government. The Subba Rao J. letters mentioned the name of the Minister of the Public Works Department and also the Government, in the context of the rates that might be fixed thereafter, but the said documents did not purport to emanate from the Governor.\n\nAt best they were issued under the directions of the Ministe_r.\n\nWe find it difficult to stretch the point further, as such a construction will make the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, nugatory. We cannot, therefore, hold that either the contract was entered into by the person legally authorized by the Government to do so or expressed to be made in the name of the Governor. The agreement is void, as it has not complied with the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nIn this view, it is not necessary to express our opinion\n\n'111 other interesting questions raised in this case.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nI>HIRENDRA NA TH GORAi AND SUBAL CHANDRA\n\nSHAW AND OTHERS\n\nSUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nMarch 4.\n\n~ Execution-Court salt of property in execution of a decree in respect o/ a loan-Judgment-debtor not objecting to valuation even after 1ervict of notice-Application for selling asidt tht 1al• on tht vourul of\n\nDhirendranath Gorai v. 5udhir Chand1a\n\nGhos/1\n\nSUPREME CO!JRT REPORTS\n\nno11-cu1npliance of the provisions of s. 35 vf the Bengal Jo,, Jvney Lenders Act-Maintainability-Sale if, valid-Bengal AJoney Lenaer~' Act, 1940 ( 10 of 1940), s: 35-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908\n\n( V of 1908), U.XXI, rr. 64, 66 and 90.\n\nln execution of a decree passed in a mortgage suit, the appellant 11.n11exed in the execution application a Schedule comprising of J 1 provertlC1' sought to be sold for the satisfaction of the claim. The appellant gave valuation of the said properties.\n\nThough the 1st responUent received a notice under 0.XXl, r. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, be did not file any objection to the valuation. Though he got the sal.! adjourned a number of times promising to pay the decretal amount, be\n\nfailed to do so. Finally, two of the said properties were :sold.\n\nThe\n\nl.!:il respondent then filed an application in the executing court for setting\n\nai<le, the saiO. sale unde:- O.XXI, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\ninter aiia, on the ground that s. 35 of the Bengal NloneyLender's Act was not complied with. The learned subordinate Judge held that there was no fraua in publishing and conducting the ale, that the price of the lots sold was fair and that lhe s;.li~ was not vitiated by reason of 1nfringen1cnt of s. 35 of the A!.:t.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court held that though there bad not been any substantial injury to the 1st respondent,\n\nthe provisions of s. 35 of the Act were 111andatory and. therefore, the infringen1eut of the said provisions would invalidate the sale. In this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that whether s. 35 of the Act was mandatory or directory, the sale held in violation of the saiJ provision \\Vas only illegal but not a nullity and, therefore, it could be set aside only in the manner and for the reasons prescribed in Q.XX:l, r. ~O of the Code of Civil Procedure, and further that. as the respondents did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation of sale. the !).de could not be set aside at their instance.\n\nHeld; The non-compliance with the provisions of s. 35 of the Acl\n\nJ~ a defect or <.1 irregularity in publihing or conducting the sale.\n\nA pany who received the notice of the proclamation but did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation or did not object to the said defect cannot maintain an application under O.XXI, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even if he coul'd, the sale cannot be set aside unless by reason of the said defect or irregularity he bad sustained substantial injury.\n\nAshrun1 Thikadar v. Vijay Singh Chopra, LL.R. (1944) l Cal. 166, distinguished.\n\nAlanindra Cha11dra v. Jogdish Chandra, ( 1945) 50 C. W.N. 266 and Maniruddin Ahmed v. Umanprasamma, (1959) 64 C.W.N. 20, approved.\n\nOn a true construction of s. 35 of the Act, it must be hefd that it was intended only for the benefit of the judgment-debtor and, therefore, be could waive the right conferred on him under s. 35 of the Act. '\n\nCase law reviewed.\n\n1964 If that be the legal position, Q.XXI, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure is immediately attracted. The concurrent finding of the courts is that by reason of the non-observance of the provisions of s. 3S of the Act no substantial injury was caused to the judgment-debtor. Further, though notice was given to the judgment debtor, in one case he did\n\nD\\lt file objection at all and in the other case, though the judgment-debtor filed objections, he did not atlend at the drawing up of the proclamation.\n\nThe sales are. therefore, not liable to be set aside under the terms of the said provision.\n\nDhirendronath\n\nGorai v.\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nG'ho.rh\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A .. Nos. 85 and • 8':> of 1961.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated November 23, ! 954 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeals from Original Orders Nos. 84 and 83 of 1953.\n\nB. Sen and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellants (in both • the appeals).\n\nSuk111nar Ghosh, for the respondents Nos. 12 and 13 (in C.A. No. 85 of 1961).\n\nMarch 4, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSunnA RAO J .-These two appeals raise the question of Subba Rao J. the validity of the court sale held in contravention of s. 35 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940 (Bengal Act X of\n\n1940), hereinafter called the Act.\n\nThe facts in both the appeals may be briefly stated. In Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1961, Sudhir Chandra Ghosh, respondent No. l, executed a first mortgage in favour of one Provash Chandra Mukherjee, since deceased, for a sum of Rs. 12,000 /-. Respondent No. I executed a second, third and fourth mortgages in favour of the appellant for a total sum of Rs. 7,700/-. He also executed another, mortgage in favour of the 9th respondent. In the year 1948 respondents 2 and 3, representing the first mortgagee's estate, filed Title Suit No. 8 of 1948 in the 7th Additional Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, for enforcing the first mortgage. To that suit the puisne mortgagees were also made parties. On May 24, 1948, a preliminary decree by consent was made in the suit whereunder the judgment-\n\n:Jhirendranath\n\nGorai v.\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . debtor was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 15,473-7-9 to the appellant in 7 equal annual instalments. As the judgmentdebtor failed to pay the said amount, in due course a final decree was passed in the mortgage suit on or about February 2, 1949.\n\nThereafter, the decree was put in execution on January 31, 1950, and in the said execution application a schedule of properties sought to be sold for the satisfaction of the said claim was annexed. The schedule comprised 11 properties and the appellant gave valuation of the said properties.\n\nThough the I st respondent received a notice under 0. XXI, r. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he did not file any objection to the valuation.\n\nThough the first respondent got the sale adjourned a number of times promising to pay the decretal amount, he failed to do so.\n\nFinally two of the said properties were put up for sale on June 23, 1951, and one of the said propertie• was purchased by the 12th respondent for a sum of Rs. 11,800/- and the other, by the 13th respondent for a sum of Rs. 10,100/-.\n\nOn July 21, 1951, the 1st respondent filed an application in the executing court for setting aside the said sale under\n\n0. XXI, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inter alia, on the ground that s. 35 of the Act was not complied with.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge held that there was no fraud in publishing and conducting the sale, that the price of the lots sold was fair and that thesale was not vitiated by reason of infringement of s. 35 of the Act. On appeal a Division Bench of the High Court held that though there had not been any substantial injury to the !st respondent, the rprovisions of s. 35 of the Act were mandatory and, therefore, the infringement of the said provisions would invalidate the sale.\n\nIn that view, it set aside the sale and directed the appellant to refund the money with interest.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 86 of 1961 also arises out of the same execution proceedings.\n\nUnder the said compromise preliminary decree the judgment-debtor agreed to pay the decretal amount of Rs. 25,687 /- to the executors of the estate of the first mortgagee, respondents 2 and 3. As the amount was not paid, the said respondents filed an arpplica- , tion in the 7th Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Alipore, for the execution of the said decree. In the\n\nexecution petition 8 properties were described and their valuations were _given. The judgment-debtor filed objections to the valuations given by the decree-holders, but on the date fixed for settling the valuations of the said properties neither the judgment-debtor nor his advocate appeared in court.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge, by his order dated February 11, 1950, directed that both the valuations of the decreeholders and the judgment-debtor be noted in the sale proclamation. Thereafter the sale proclamation was duly issued and the date of the sale was fixed for May 11, 1950. The judgment-debtor took as many as 15 adjournments of the sale promising to pay the decretal amount, but did not do so. Finally the sale of the properties was fixed for June 23, 1951 and on that date two lots of the property were sold in execution and the appellants purchased lot No. 1 at a price 0f Rs. 14,000/- and respondent No. 9 purchased Lot No. 2 at a price of Rs. 19,60b/-.\n\nOn July 21, 1951, the 1st respondent filed an application' before the learned , Subordinate Judge for setting aside the sale under 0. XXI, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on grounds similar to those raised in the other application, the subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1961.\n\nThe said application was heard by the learned Subordinate Judge along with the said other application. For the same reasons, he dismissed the application.\n\nOn appea\\, the Division Bench of the High Court heard the\n\nappeal along with the connected appeal and set aside the sale. The present appeals me fikd by certificate against the common judgment of the High Court in both the matters.\n\nMr. Sen, learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeals, contends that whether s. 35 of the Act is mandatory or directory the sale held in violation of the said provision is only illegal but not a nullity and, therefore, it can be set aside only in the manner and for the reasons prescribed in\n\n0. XXT. r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and further that. as the respondents did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation of sale, the sale cannot be set aside at lheir instance.\n\nTo appreciate the argument it is necessarv and con- \\'enient to read at the outset the relevant provisions of the Act and the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nDliirendranath\n\nGorai v.\n\nSudhir Chandra Ghosh\n\nSubba Rao /.\n\nDhirt':1d1anath\n\nGorai v.\n\nSudhir Cha1u/ra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSection 35 of the Act.\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the proclamation of the intended sale of property in execution of a decree passed in respect of a loan shall specify only so much of the property of the judgment-debtor as the Court considers to be saleable at a price sufficient to satisfy the decree, and the property so specified shall not be sold at a price which is less than the price specified in such proclamation :\n\nProvided that, if the highest amount bid for the property so specified is less than the price so specified, the Court may sell such property for such amount, if the decree-holder consents in writing to forego so much of the amount decreed as is equal to the difference between the highest amount bid and the price so specified.\"\n\nCODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE\n\nOrder XX/, r. 64\n\nAny Court executing a decree may order that any property attached by it and liable to sale, or -' such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be sold, and that the proceeds of such sale, or a sufficient portion thereof, shall be paid to the party entitled under the decree to receive tbe same.\n\nOrder XX!, r. 66.\n\n( I ) Where any property is ordered to be sold by public auction in execution of a decree, the Court shall cause a proclamation of the intended snle to be made in the language of such Court.\n\n(2) Such proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to the decree-holder and the judgment-\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\ndebtor and shall state the time and place of sale, and specify as fairly and accurately as possible- -\n\nla) the property to be sold;\n\n• • • •\n\nOrder XX/, r. 90.\n\n(I) Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree. the decree-holder, or any person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets. or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set nside the sate on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it or on the ground of failure to issue notice to him a; required by rule 22 of this Order :\n\nProvided ( i) that no sale shalt be set aside on the ground of such irregularity. fraud or failure unless. upon the facts proved. the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity. fraud or failure.\n\n(ii) that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of any defect in the proclamation of sale at the instance of any person who after notice did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation or of any person in whose presence the proclamation was drawn up, unless ob, iection was made by him at the time in respect of the defect relied upon.\n\nUnder 0. XXT. r. 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the executing court may order that any property attached by it and liable to sale or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree shall be sold. Under r. 66 of the said Order of the Code when a property is ordered to be sold in public auction in execution of a decree the court shalt cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made and such proclamation shalt specify as fairly and accurate! y as possible. among others, the property to\n\nDhirendranath Gorai v.\n\nSudhir Chandra Ghosh\n\nSubba Rao J,\n\nDhirendranath Gorai v.\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nbe sold and such proclamation shall be drawn up after notice to tli'e decree-holder and the judgment-debtor: under sub-r. ( 4) thereof, the court may summon and examine any person or require him to produce any document in his possession or power relating thereto. Under the said provisions the court has power to direct the sale of the entire property attached or a part thereof sufficient to satisfy the decree and it shall also specify the said property directed to be sold in the proclamation fixed after giving notice to both the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor. Under s. 35 of the Act a duty is cast upon the court in settling the proclamation of the intended sale of property in execution of a decree passed in respect of a loan to which the Act applies to specify only so much of the property of the judgmentdebtor as the court considers to be saleal>le at a price sufficient to satisfy the decree and not to sell the property so specified at a price which is less than the price so specified in such proclamation. This provision is , in effect a statutory addition to 0. XXI, .r. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nIndeed, this provision could have been added as another clause to the said rule. This statutory provision pertains to the field of proclamation. The rule says so in terms. The said two conditions are also steps to be taken by the court in the matter of publishing or conducting the sale.\n\nIf a sale is held without complying with the said conditions, what is the remedy open to a party affected thereby to get the sale set aside? Order XXI, r. 90 of the Code in terms provides for the remedy. It says that a person whose interests are affected by the sale may apply to the court to set aside the sale on the groun4 of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it or on the ground of failure to issue notice to him as required by r. 22 of the Order.\n\nAs the non-compliance with the said conditions is a material irregulari.ty in publishing or conducting the sale the court under the first proviso to 0. XXI, r. 90 of the Code cannot set aside the sale unless it is satisfied that the applicant had sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity.\n\nThat apart, under the second proviso to the said rule, no sale shall be set aside on the ground of any defect in the proclamation of sale at the instance of any person, who after notice did not attend at the drawing up\n\nof the proclamation or of any person in whose presence the proclamation was drawn up unless objection was made by him at the time of drawing up of the proclamation in respect of the defect relied upon.\n\nShortly stated, the noncompliance with the provisions of s. 35 of the Act is a defect or a irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale.\n\nA party who received the notice of the proclamation but did not attend at the drawing up of the proclamation or did not object to the said defect cannot maintain an application under 0. XXT. r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nEven if he could, the sale cannot be set aside unless by reason of the said defect or irregularity he had sustained substantial injury,\n\nOn this question a divergence of views is reflected in the decisions cited at the Bar. Mukherjea and Pal. JJ., in Asharam Thikadar v. Bi jay Singh Chopra(') set aside the order of the executing court and sent the case back to that court. as the said court inserted in the proclamation the valuation of the property given by the judgment-debtor as well as that given by. the decree-holder and did not, as it should do under s. 35 of the Act. determine the price of the property which was to be put up for sale• on proper evidence.\n\nThis decision has no relevance to the question raised before us. as the appeal before the High Court was against the order made by the executing court dismissing the application fi'ed by the judgment-debtor requesting the court to demarcate the property to be sold pursuant to the provisions of s. 35 of the Act.\n\nThe question whether a sale held in non-compliance with the said provisions could be set aside de hors the provisions of 0. XXI, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not arise for consideration therein.\n\nThe question now posed before us directly arose for decision before a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, consisting of Akram and Chakravartti. JI., in\n\nManidra Chandra v. Jagadish Chandra( 2 ). Chakaravartti, J., met the objection raised by the judgment-debtor who sought to set aside the sale on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of s. 35 of the Act, thus :\n\n(I) I.I..R. [I944] I Clll. 166.\n\n134-159 S.C.-64\n\nl9'U\n\nI>hirP1ulranath\n\nG,, ra1\n\nSudhir Chand•a\n\nGhmh\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\n1964 - Dhirendral!lllh\n\nGorai\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhoah\n\nSubba Rt1Jl /.\n\n\"It (s. 35 of the Act) is a provision relating to the contents of the sale rproclamation and its effect, to my mind, is to amend or supplement Or. 21, r. 66(2) (a) which directs the Court to specify in the sale proclamation \"the property to be sold\". Any objection regarding non-compliance with sec. 35 in specifying the property to be sold is, in my view, a defect in the sale proclamation within the meaning of the second proviso to Or. 21, r. 90, C.P.C. It follows that an objection that the sale proclamation did not conform to sec. 35 of the Bengal Money- Lenders Act cannot avail a judgment-debtor in an application under Or. 21, r. 90, if he was present at the drawing up of the ale proclamation and did not raise any such objection at the time, nor can it avail a judgment-debtor who, after receiving notice did not attend at the drawing up of the sale proclamation at all.\"\n\nWe agree with this reasoning. Another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, consisting of Guba and Banerjee, JJ., in Maniruddin Ahmed v. Umaprasanna('), considered the entire case law on the subject, including the decision now under appeal, and differed from the view expressed by\n\nS. R. Das Gupta and Mallick, JJ., in the decision now under appeal and agreed with the view expressed by Akram and Chakravartii, JJ., in Manidra Chandra v. Jagdish Chandra( 2 ).\n\nThe said decisions are in accord with the view we have expressed earlier. The contrary view is\n\nsustaintd by the High Court in the present case on the principle that the sale held in contravention of the provisions of s. 3 5 of the Act was a nullity and, therefore, no question of setting aside the sale within the meaning of 0. XXI, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure would arise.\n\nThis raises the question whether such a sale is a nullity. If a provision of a statute is only directory, an act done in contravention of the provision is manifestly not a nullity.\n\nSection 3 5 of the Act is couched in a mandatory form and it casts in terms a duty on the court to comply with its r\n\n(t) (1959) 64 C.W.N. 20.\n\n(2) (1945) 50 C.W.N. 266 •. 270.\n\nprovisions before a sale is held.\n\nPrima fade the provision is mandatory; at any rate, we shall assume it to be so for the purpose of these appeals.\n\nEven then, the question arises whether an act done in breach of the mandatory provision is per force a nullity.\n\nIn Ashutosh Sikdar v. Behari Lal Kirtania('), 'Mookerjee, J., after referring to Macnamara on \"Nullity and Irregularities\", observed :\n\n\" ...... no hard and fast line can be drawn between a nullity and an irregularity; but this much is clear, that an irregularity is a deviation from a rule of Jaw which does not take away the foundation or authority for the proceeding, or apply to its whole operation, whereas a nullity is a proceeding that is taken without any foundation for it, or is so essentially defective as to be of no avail or effect whatever, or is void and.incapable of being validated.\"\n\nWhether a provision falls under one category or the other is not easy of discernment, but in the ultimate analysis it depends upon the nature, scope and object of a particular provision. A workable test has been laid down by Justice Coleridge in Holmes v. Russell('). which reads:\n\n\"It is difficult sometimes to distinguish between an irregularity and a nullity; but the safest rule to determine what is an irregularity and what is a nullity is to see whether the party can waive the objection; 'if he can waive it, it amounts to an irregularity; if he cannot, it is a nullity.\"\n\nA waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. but obviously an objection to jurisdiction cannot be waived, for consent cannot give a court jurisdiction where there is none.\n\nEven if there is inherent jurisdiction, certain provisions cannot be waived.\n\nMaxwell in his book \"On the\n\n(I) (1908) J.L.R. 3S Cal. 61, 72.\n\n(2) [18411 9 Dowl. 487.\n\n1964 - Dhire, idranatll\n\nGorai\n\n\"· .\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGho•h\n\nSubba RIJO J.\n\nDltlrndranath\n\nGorai\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubb1> Ra1> J.\n\nInterpretation of Statutes'', 11th Edn., at p. 375, describes the rule thus :\n\n\"Another maxim which sanctions the non-observance of a statutory provision is that cuilibet /icet renuntiare juri pro se introducto. Everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy.\"\n\nThe same rule is restated in \"Craies on Statute Law\", 6th Edn.,' at p. 269, thus :\n\n\"As a' general rule, the conditions imposed by statutes which authorise legal proceedings are treated a, being indispensable to giving the court jurisdiction.\n\nBut if it appears that the statutory conditions were inserted by the legislature simply for the security or benefit of the parties to the action themselves, and that no public interests are involved, such conditions will not be considered as indispensable, and either party may waive them without affecting the jurisdiction of the court.\"\n\nThe Judicial Committee in AL. AR. Ve/layan Chettiar v.\n\nGovernment of Madras(') pointed out that there was no inconsistency between the propositions that the provisions of s. ~O of the Code of Civil Procedure were mandatory and must be enforced by the court and that they might be ,.. waived by the authority for whose benefit they were provided.\n\nIn that case the Judicial Committee held that s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was explicit and mandatory; but still it held that it could be waived by the authority for whose benefit that was provided. This aspect of the law in the context of s. 3 5 of the Act was considered by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Gaya Prosatl v. Seth 'f\n\n(I) (1947] L.R. 74 I.A. 223. 228.\n\n' '\n\nOhanrupwal Bha11dari(').\n\nDealing with this argument, P. N. Muukerjee, J., speaking for the court, observed:\n\n\"'lt is true that section 35 of the Bengal Money-\n\nLenders Act casts a duty upon the court but such duty is solely for the benefit-the private benefit-of the judgment-debtor.\n\nIt is, therefore, open to him to waive this benefit, or;- in other words, to waive his objection of nonobservance of that statutory provision by the court . ..... \".\n\nGuha and Banerjee, JJ., expressed much to the same effect in Maniruddin Ahmed v. Umaprasanna(') thus, at p. 30:\n\n\"The Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940 enacted for the purpose of making better provision for the control of money-lenders and for the regulation and control of money-lending, has certainly a public policy behind it. But some of its provisions. and section 3 5 one of them, are intended for the benefit of the individual judgment debtors and have no publi~ policy behind them.\n\nSuch provisions may be waived by the -person for whose benefit the same were enacted.\"\n\nA Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Sheo Dayal Narain v. Musammat Moti Kuer('), speaking through Meredith. J., in the context of the provisions of s. 13 of the Bihar Monev-Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act. I 939, which are pari materia with the provisions of s. 35 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940, tejected the contention that a sale held in contravention thereof was a nullity in the following words :\n\n\"Illegal the sale may have been, in the limited sense that it was held in a manner at variance with a mandatory statutory provision. That provision, however, has no reference at all to the jurisdicrion of the Court. It affords no foundation for\n\n( l l (1953) 58 C.W.N. 503. 508.\n\n(2) 64 C.W.N. 20.\n\n(3) (1942) I.LR. 2t Pat. 281, 286.\n\n1) himulr..,...111\n\nGoral v.\n\nSudhir Challd111\n\nGhosh\n\nSubbll RllO I.\n\nDhirendranath Gorai v.\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nthe contention that the sale was one which the Court concerned had .no power at all to hold.\"\n\nWhere the court acts without inherent jurisdiction, a party affected cannot by. waiver confer jurisdiction on it, which it has not.\n\nWhere such jurisdiction is not wanting, a directory provision can obviously be waived. But a mandatory provision can only be waived if it is not conceived in the public interests, but in the interests of the party that waives it. In the present case the executing court had inherent jurisdiction to sell the property. We have'assumed that s. 35 of the Act is a mandatory provision. If so, the question is whether the said provision is conceived in the interests of the public or in the interests of the person affected by the non-observance of the provision. It is true that many provisions of the Act were conceived in the interests of the public, but the same cannot be said of s. 35 of the Act, which is really intended to rprotect the interests of a judgment-debtor and to see that a 1arger extent of his property than is necessary to discharge the debt is not sold. Many situations may be visualized when the judgment-debtor does not seek to take advantage of the benefit conferred on him under s. 35 of the Act; for instance, if the part of the property carved out by the court for sale is separated from the rest of his property, the value of the remaining property may be injuriously affected by the said carving out, in which case the judgment-debtor may prefer to have his entire property sold so that he may realize the real value of the property and pay part of the sale price towards the decretal amount.\n\nHe cannot obviously be compelled to submit to the sale of a part of the property to his disadvantage. A provision intended for his benefit cannot be construed in such a way as to work to his detriment. But it is said that the proviso to s. 3 5 of the Act indicates a contrary intention.\n\nUnder that proviso, \"if the highest amount bid for the pmperty so specified is less than the price so specified, the Court may sell such property for such amount, if the decree-holder consents in writing to forego so much of the amount decreed as is equal to the difference between the highest bid and the price so specified\".\n\nThis is only an option given to the decree-holder : he may exercise this option, if he does\n\nnot like to go through the entire sale proceedings overagain.\n\nIn one contingency this proviso also works for the benefit of the judgment-debtor, for he will be relieved of part of his indebtedness.\n\nBut anyhow this does not show that the main provision is not intended for the benefit of the judgment-debtor.\n\nWe are, therefore, satisfied, on a true construction of s. 35 of the Act, that it is intended only foi: the be.nefit of the judgment-debtor and, therefore, he can waive the right conferred on him under s. 35 of the Act.\n\nIf that be the legal position, 0. XX!, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure is immediately attracted. The concurrent finding of the courts is that by reason of the non-observance of the provisions of s. 35 of the Act no substantial injury was caused to the judgme.nt-debtor. Further, though notice was given to the judgment-debtor, in one case he did not file objections at all and in the other case, though the judgment-debtor filed objections, he did not attend at the drawing up of. the prodamation. The sales are, therefore, not liable to be set aside under the terms of the said provision.\n\nIn the result the orders of the High Court are set aside and those of the Additional Subordinate Judge are restored.\n\nThe appellants will get their costs throughout from the 1st respondent. There will be one set of hearing fee.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nN. VAJRAPANI NAIDU AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE NEW THEATRE CARNATIC TALKIES LTD.,\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI JJ.)\n\nAfadras City Tena111.~· PriJtection Act, 1922 (Act 3 o/ 1922),.ss. 9, 12-··\n\nuasr of land for purpo•• of •nacting buildlngl-lf l•as• not ,....,.\n\ned after twenty years lessor entitled to vacant possts&ion . of land after demolishing building-A.ct permitting tenant to either get\n\nDhittndranath\n\nGorai v.\n\nS11dhir ChaJulra\n\nGho•lt\n\nSubba Rao/.\n\nMorch 4.", "total_entities": 130, "entities": [{"text": "ocuments ex facie show that the agreement was expressed Stat< of Bombay to be made in the name of the Provincial Government. The Subba Rao J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 241, "end_char": 382, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. 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"metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sudhir Chandra Ghosh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "85 of 1961, Sudhir Chandra Ghosh, respondent No.", "canonical_name": "SUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Provash Chandra Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6215, "end_char": 6240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l, executed a first mortgage in favour of one Provash Chandra Mukherjee, since deceased, for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "7th Additional Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6595, "end_char": 6651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 of 1948 in the 7th Additional Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, for enforcing the first mortgage."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6749, "end_char": 6761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 24, 1948, a preliminary decree by consent was made in the suit 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"Chakaravartti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19386, "end_char": 19399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chakaravartti, J., met the objection raised by the judgment-debtor who sought to set aside the sale on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of s. 35 of the Act, thus :\n\n(I) I.I..R. [I944] I Clll.", "canonical_name": "Chakaravartti"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19541, "end_char": 19546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sudhir Chand•a", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19649, "end_char": 19663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134-159 S.C.-64\n\nl9'U\n\nI>hirP1ulranath\n\nG,, ra1\n\nSudhir Chand•a\n\nGhmh\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\n1964 - Dhirendral!lllh\n\nGorai\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhoah\n\nSubba Rt1Jl /.\n\n\"It (s. 35 of the Act) is a provision relating to the contents of the sale rproclamation and its effect, to my mind, is to amend or supplement Or.", "canonical_name": "SUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19760, "end_char": 19765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20050, "end_char": 20057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20205, "end_char": 20210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sec. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20287, "end_char": 20294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Guba", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20734, "end_char": 20738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, consisting of Guba and Banerjee, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20743, "end_char": 20751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, consisting of Guba and Banerjee, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "S. 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Behari Lal Kirtania('), 'Mookerjee, J., after referring to Macnamara on \"Nullity and Irregularities\", observed :\n\n\" ...... no hard and fast line can be drawn between a nullity and an irregularity; but this much is clear, that an irregularity is a deviation from a rule of Jaw which does not take away the foundation or authority for the proceeding, or apply to its whole operation, whereas a nullity is a proceeding that is taken without any foundation for it, or is so essentially defective as to be of no avail or effect whatever, or is void and.incapable of being validated.\""}}, {"text": "Macnamara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22194, "end_char": 22203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ashutosh Sikdar v. Behari Lal Kirtania('), 'Mookerjee, J., after referring to Macnamara on \"Nullity and Irregularities\", observed :\n\n\" ...... no hard and fast line can be drawn between a nullity and an irregularity; but this much is clear, that an irregularity is a deviation from a rule of Jaw which does not take away the foundation or authority for the proceeding, or apply to its whole operation, whereas a nullity is a proceeding that is taken without any foundation for it, or is so essentially defective as to be of no avail or effect whatever, or is void and.incapable of being validated.\""}}, {"text": "Coleridge", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22948, "end_char": 22957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A workable test has been laid down by Justice Coleridge in Holmes v. Russell(')."}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23561, "end_char": 23568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maxwell in his book \"On the\n\n(I) (1908) J.L.R. 3S Cal."}}, {"text": "Sudhir Chandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23688, "end_char": 23702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sudhir Chandra\n\nGho•h\n\nSubba RIJO J.\n\nDltlrndranath\n\nGorai\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubb1> Ra1> J.\n\nInterpretation of Statutes'', 11th Edn.,", "canonical_name": "SUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Subba RIJO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23711, "end_char": 23721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sudhir Chandra\n\nGho•h\n\nSubba RIJO J.\n\nDltlrndranath\n\nGorai\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubb1> Ra1> J.\n\nInterpretation of Statutes'', 11th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Dltlrndranath\n\nGorai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23726, "end_char": 23746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sudhir Chandra\n\nGho•h\n\nSubba RIJO J.\n\nDltlrndranath\n\nGorai\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubb1> Ra1> J.\n\nInterpretation of Statutes'', 11th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25017, "end_char": 25044, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25230, "end_char": 25235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25239, "end_char": 25266, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25432, "end_char": 25436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 74 I.A. 223", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25551, "end_char": 25567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ohanrupwal Bha11dari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25580, "end_char": 25600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' '\n\nOhanrupwal Bha11dari(')."}}, {"text": "P. N. Muukerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25634, "end_char": 25649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with this argument, P. N. Muukerjee, J., speaking for the court, observed:\n\n\"'lt is true that section 35 of the Bengal Money-\n\nLenders Act casts a duty upon the court but such duty is solely for the benefit-the private benefit-of the judgment-debtor."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25708, "end_char": 25718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26033, "end_char": 26037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Guha and Banerjee, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26151, "end_char": 26181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26392, "end_char": 26401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "The Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26633, "end_char": 26649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Sheo Dayal Narain v. Musammat Moti Kuer('), speaking through Meredith."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26764, "end_char": 26769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "The Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26884, "end_char": 26889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940", "statute": "The Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26897, "end_char": 26927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Goral", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27390, "end_char": 27395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) himulr..,...111\n\nGoral v.\n\nSudhir Challd111\n\nGhosh\n\nSubbll RllO I.\n\nDhirendranath Gorai v.\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nthe contention that the sale was one which the Court concerned had .no power at all to hold.\"", "canonical_name": "Gorai"}}, {"text": "Sudhir Challd111", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27400, "end_char": 27416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) himulr..,...111\n\nGoral v.\n\nSudhir Challd111\n\nGhosh\n\nSubbll RllO I.\n\nDhirendranath Gorai v.\n\nSudhir Chandra\n\nGhosh\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nthe contention that the sale was one which the Court concerned had .no power at all to hold.\"", "canonical_name": "SUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28069, "end_char": 28074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28410, "end_char": 28415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28730, "end_char": 28735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29386, "end_char": 29390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30225, "end_char": 30230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30371, "end_char": 30376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30438, "end_char": 30465, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30590, "end_char": 30595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. VAJRAPANI NAIDU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31233, "end_char": 31251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. VAJRAPANI NAIDU AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE NEW THEATRE CARNATIC TALKIES LTD.,"}}, {"text": "NEW THEATRE CARNATIC TALKIES LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31269, "end_char": 31301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. VAJRAPANI NAIDU AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE NEW THEATRE CARNATIC TALKIES LTD.,"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31318, "end_char": 31338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COIMBATORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31346, "end_char": 31359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COIMBATORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31374, "end_char": 31396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COIMBATORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. M. S!KRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31401, "end_char": 31412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COIMBATORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "PriJtection Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31443, "end_char": 31464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 9, 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31482, "end_char": 31491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "PriJtection Act, 1922", "statute": "PriJtection Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31724, "end_char": 31727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "PriJtection Act, 1922", "statute": "PriJtection Act, 1922"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_1015_1034_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1015\n\nnot like to go through the entire sale proceedings overagain.\n\nIn one contingency this proviso also works for the benefit of the judgment-debtor, for he will be relieved of part of his indebtedness.\n\nBut anyhow this does not show that the main provision is not intended for the benefit of the judgment-debtor.\n\nWe are, therefore, satisfied, on a true construction of s. 35 of the Act, that it is intended only foi: the be.nefit of the judgment-debtor and, therefore, he can waive the right conferred on him under s. 35 of the Act.\n\nIf that be the legal position, 0. XX!, r. 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure is immediately attracted. The concurrent finding of the courts is that by reason of the non-observance of the provisions of s. 35 of the Act no substantial injury was caused to the judgme.nt-debtor. Further, though notice was given to the judgment-debtor, in one case he did not file objections at all and in the other case, though the judgment-debtor filed objections, he did not attend at the drawing up of. the prodamation. The sales are, therefore, not liable to be set aside under the terms of the said provision.\n\nIn the result the orders of the High Court are set aside and those of the Additional Subordinate Judge are restored.\n\nThe appellants will get their costs throughout from the 1st respondent. There will be one set of hearing fee.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nN. VAJRAPANI NAIDU AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE NEW THEATRE CARNATIC TALKIES LTD.,\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI JJ.)\n\nAfadras City Tena111.~· PriJtection Act, 1922 (Act 3 o/ 1922),.ss. 9, 12-··\n\nuasr of land for purpo•• of •nacting buildlngl-lf l•as• not ,....,.\n\ned after twenty years lessor entitled to vacant possts&ion . of land after demolishing building-A.ct permitting tenant to either get\n\nDhittndranath\n\nGorai v.\n\nS11dhir ChaJulra\n\nGho•lt\n\nSubba Rao/.\n\nMorch 4.\n\nJllH\n\nN. J' aiNlfOnl\n\nN•illN\n\nN•w Th1alr1 Carnatic Talkie1\n\nCQRIPfRSalion jar building or purchase Ja.nd at price fixed by courtl'rovision whether violates landlord's jundamenral righ1s--('011s11rution of India, Arts. 19(l)(fj, 31.\n\nTilt appellant and his mother (the lessors) 11ranteJ a lease of an open silC m Ule town of co1mbatore to Abirama Chettiar under a re&istered 'deed dated Se9tember 19.1934.\n\nThe ao1..ual rent stipulated under the lease was Ks. 1u, u anu the penuU ot tne 1ease was .lu years. 1ne term under the lease was that the land was to be utilised for constructi•e bwldmgs thereon for .. purposes of cinema, drama etc.\" It was furthct agreed. between the par\\lc:s that iu the encl oi the term the lessee would demolish the buildings which be bad, constructed and deliver\n\nvacant posseSSJon ot the site to the Lessor.\n\nAbirama Cbettiar constructe'd a theatre on the site, and assigned his rights to the respondent-company. ln an action against the company for a decree in ejectment and for mesne profits, the Trial Court awarded to the 1cS£Ors iii. d.\"'rce for poSSC1SJ.on and UlCSne profits. Against uie decree lhe comp411Y-rospondent preferred an appeal to the Distncl Court wtuch was transterrod for trial to the High Court. During the , r pend.ency of this appeai., the ::, tale of Madras extended the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 3 of 1922, as amendea by Madras Act 19 of 1955 to the Municipal Town of Coimbatore. The company then applied under •. 9 of the Act and on thil appbcation the High Court dlrected that the lessors do sell to the company the site in aisputo under s. 9 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1922, agamsl paymont ol the lull marlr.et value of the i&lld on the date of the order.\n\nTbc 111der was coolirmed in an appeal under tho Letters i'atenL\n\nHeld: Per Gajendragadkar, C.J., Shah and Sikri, JJ. section 12 bas been enacted to protOct the tenants against any contractual engagements which may ha.ve been made expressly or by implication to deprive them selves wholly or parually of the protection intended to be conferr\"'1 by the Statute. And the only class of cases in which the protection becomei ineffective is where the tenant bas made a stipulation in writing registered as to the erecUon of buildings, erected after the date of the contract of lease. The stipulations not protected in s. 12 are only those in writing rogistered and relate to erection of buildiU&s. such as restrictions about the size and nature of the building consrructed, the building materials to be used therein and tlle purpose for which the building is to be utilized.\n\n(ii) Section 9( I) of the Act was manifestly in the interest of the general public to electuate the mutual understanding between the landlords and the tenants as to the duration of the tenancies, and to conserve building materials by maintaining existing building'i for rurposes for which the leases were granted. Restriction imposed upon the ri£)it of the landlord to obtain poos ... ion of the premises acmiscd accordin1\n\nto the lcrms of the lease would, therefore not be regarded as imposing\n\nllD unreasonable restriction in tho exeroioe of Ibo riibt coaferred upon\n\nN. J'a1rai•an1\n\nNaidu v.\n\nthe landlord by Art. 19(1) of the Constitution, because the restriction\n\nWOUIU Ot: n:garot:ll as on..: Ul [fit! Ullt:ICSLS U1 lllC , l4t:!H;:fi.1i puouc.\n\nWhats. 9 OOt:!J 1s nut so mu..:h to tit!!Jf!Vt: the 1anoton1 ot h1s property or 10 acquire hl.s nghts to it as to give effect to the real agreemc:nt betwi;:en hun aud his tenant which induced the tenants to constru~; t !us buUU1ng\n\non UJ.e p1ot u:t out lO hun. lt tne !aw lS not tnvaJ1J as ottenilillg Au.\n\nJ.l 1) llJ 01 Ule Luns~Hul!Oil, 110 1uuepc:uuc:ut 1nrnngcn1ent 01 Art. 31 ( l J ot the Constituuon may be set up.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\ni'er Wanchoa and Ayyangar, JJ (dissenting) (I) The preamble of the Act wowd indicate that tbe Act would not apply to allord protei.; l.lon r in a caso wnere oy an cxvress Lr.>fnl In a rt:g1su; reu least: ueeu a tenant agret:J 10 surrender the slte on wllich he had erected a owJ.umg, where he specJJiaHy contracted that he would demoJ.Jsh the buao1ng anll oeuvta\n\n\\4;,; anl p0s::.t!S:,1on or uie s1te on lht• term1natlon of his tenancy. 11 tile sco.ix ot the proviso to s. l!i! had to be construed 1n the;: light ot the preamote, u is obvious that the tenant who had entered into a couttact\n\nw11n a supulat1un of the sort as stated above could not be sa1U to have cun::.tructell the bwldJugs on another's lan'd \"in th~ hope tlld.t he woutu .. nut ae evicted so long as he pays rent for the land\". lhe Hlgh Court erreu 1n mterpretung the proviso to s. 12 of the Act.\n\n(ii) These words \"as to the erection of buildings., mean a stipulation\n\nwh1a uears on or is 10 re.1auon to the erection ui bu.1h.hn.:~. ,:, ucn a <:Uns1rucuon would reconc1le the proviso with the prcan10Jc: w.tucn ::.e1s\n\nout tne ObJCCt soul.ht to be acb..ieved by the Act. lt the lease deed contains no sUpulauon whatsoever 1n regard to Lhe e1echon of uw1d1ng::., as wa-s the case with the large number of leases in the city ot Aiauras wb.1ch were entered into prior to the enactment ot lhe Act 10 LY22., the tenant wb.o erected the bu1ldlng exconc:ess1s wHhuut contravening any\n\n1 • und.ertabng on his part, obtains protection under the Act. '1 he test wouJ.d therefore be \"did the panics advert to and have in m1nd tbe conungency ot lbe tenant erecting buildings on the Jeased. land\"'/ If they had and had included in a solemn registered instrument a provision wh1ch would bear upon the relative rights of the parties in the event of the n:l:t1on ot buJid1ngs on the site, the stipulation would have etlci..:t no1w1th.'!land1ng the Act; for in such an event the tenant would not have con::.tru..:ld buildings on the land in the hope that he would not be UJ..Stu1 oed from possession so long as be p8.ld the rent agreed upon.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 264 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated April 24, 1959 of the Madras High Court in L.P.A. No. 75 of 1958.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, M.A. Sattar Sayeed and R. Thiagarajan, for the respondent.\n\nN. Vajrapanl\n\nNaidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic T alkie.s\n\nShah J.\n\nMarch 4, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J., SHAH and SIKRI JJ. was delivered by Shah J.\n\nTiie dissenting opinion of WANCHOO and AYYANGAR JJ. was delivered by AYYANGAR J.\n\nSHAH J.-The appellant Vajrapani Naidu and his mother Bangarammal-hereinafter collectively called 'the lessors'- granted a lease of an open site in the town of Coimbatore to Abirama Chettiar under a registered deed dated September 19, 1934, for 20 years at an annual rental of Rs. 1,080/- ' for putting up a building suitable for use as a theatre.\n\nAbirama Chettiar constructed a theatre on the site, and assigned his rights to the New Theatre Carnatic Talkies Ltd., Coimbatore-hereinafter called 'the Company'. The Company attorned to the lessors and was recognised as tenant under the lease dated September 19, 1934. On March 9, ;. 1954 the lessors served a notice calling upon the Company to vacate and surrender vacant possession of the site, and the Company having failed to comply with the requisition, the lessors commenced an action against the Company for a decree in ejectment and for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per mensem from September 19, 1954. The Subordinate Judge at Coimbatore awarded to the lessors a decree for possession and mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 350/- per mensem and costs of the suit. Against the .~ decree the Company preferred an appeal to the District Court at Coimbatore which was transferred for trial to the High Court at Madras.\n\nDuring the pendency of this appeal by G.O. No. 608 dated February 10, 1958, the State of Madras extended the adras City Tenants' Protection Act 3 of 1922, as amended by Madras Act 19 of 1955, to the Municipal town of Coimbatore. The Company then applied .... under s. 9 of the Act for an order directing the lessors to convey the site demised to the Company for a price to be fixed by the Court.\n\nPanchapakesa Iyer, J., directed that the lessors do sell to the Company the site in dispute under s. 9 of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1922, against payment of the full market value of the land on the date of the order, and further directed that the trial -,., Court do appoint a Commissioner to fix the value of the site based on the market value prevalent on July 28, 1958.\n\nAn appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court against the order of Panchapakesa Iyer, J., was dism_issed. With certificate granted by the High Court of Madras, this appeal is preferred by the lessors.\n\nTwo questions fall to be determined in this appeal .:\n\n( 1) Whether the Company is entitled under s. 9 of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1922, notwithstanding the terms of the lease, to an order calling upon the lessors to sell the land demised under the deed dated September 19, 1934; and\n\n( 2) Whether the terms of s. 9 of the Act infringe the fundamental right under Arts. 19(1 )(f) and 31 ( 1 ) of the Constitution, of the lessors, and s. 9 is on that account invalid.\n\nIt is necessary in the first instance to notice the material terms of the lease.\n\nThe land demised under the lease was a vacant site situate in the municipal town of Coimbatore.\n\nThe annual rent stipulated was Rs. 1,080/- and the period of the lease was 20 years from the date of delivery of possession of the site.\n\nThe land was to be utilised for constructing buildings thereon for \"purposes of Cinema, drama, etc.\". After the expiry of the term of 20 years stipulated under the deed the Jessee had an option of renewal for another period of 20 years on fresh terms and conditions.\n\nThe deed provided that \"if after the termination of the stipulated period\" • • • the lessees \"fail to pay the arrears of rent that will fall due till that date and hand over ipossession of the site\" to the lessors \"after making it clear by dismantling the constructions therein and by demolishing the walls etc.\" the lessors \"shall, besides realizing the arrears of rent due to them according to law, have the right to take possession through Court of the site in which the aforesaid buildings are put up after dismantling the constructions and demolishing the buildings therein''.\n\nThe other covenants of the lease are not material.\n\nN Vajrapan1\n\nNaidu\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\nShah J.\n\nIt aiJpears that before 1922, in many cases on lands in the town of Madras belonging to others constructions had\n\nN. Vafrapani Naidu v.\n\nNew Theatre c:arnuti<: Taikies\n\nShah J.\n\nbeen put up by tenants obtained under periodic leases \"in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they paid falf rent\". But on account of the inflationary pressure m the wake of the First Wond War, there was a steep rise in land values and rents, and many tenants who had constructed buildings on lands obtained on leases were sought to be evicted by the landlords. To prevent loss to the tenants consequent upon the enforcement of the strict provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, the Legislature enacted the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act 3 of 1922.\n\nUnder the Act every tenant is on ejectment entitled to be paid as compensatJon the value of any building which may have been erected by him or by his predecessors-in-interest and for which compensation has not already been paid to him. Jn a suit for ejectment against a tenant in which the landlord succeeds, the Court has to ascertain the amount of compensation which is to be the value as on the date of the order of the buildings constructed, trees planted and other improvements made by the tenant and the decree in the suit must declare the amount so found due and direct that, on payment by the landlord into Court, within three months from the date of the decree, of the amount so found due, the tenant has to put the landlord into possession of the land and the building. By s. 9 it is provided that any tenant entiticd to compensation and against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted may within the time prescribed apply to the Court for an order that the landlord shall sell the whole or part of the land for a price to be fixed by the Court.\n\nThe price under the Act as originally\n\nnacted was to be the market value of the land on the date of the order, but by an amendment made in 1926 it has to be the lowest market value prevalent within seven years preceding the date of the order.\n\nOn the price being fixed, the tenant has the option wichin a period not being less than three months and not more than three years from the date of the order to pay into Court or otherwise the price either the whole or in instalments with or without interest as directed, and when the payment is made the Court has to pass the final order directing conveyance of the land by the landlord to the tenant, and thereupon the suit or proceeding is to stand dismissed, and any decree or order in\n\n... _\n\nejectment that may have been passed therein but which has not been executed is to stand vacated. By s. 12 it is provided:\n\n\"Nothing in any contract made by a tenant shall take away or limit his rights under this Act. provided that nothing herein contained ; hall affect any stipulations made by the tenant in writing registered as to the erection of buildings, in so far as they relate to buildings erected after the date of the contract.\"\n\nThe Act as originally enacted extended only to lands in the City of Madras. let out before the commencement of the Act for construction of buildings for non-residential as well as residential use.\n\nBy Madras Act 19 of 1955 power was conferred upon the State Government to extend Act 3 of 1922 by notification to tenancies of land created before the date on which the Act was extended. to any other municinal towns and any specified village within five miles of the Citv of Madras or such municipal town with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification. Exercising this µower. the Government of Madras issued a notification on February I 0. 1 958. extending the provisions of the Act to the municipal town of Coimbatore.\n\nThe scheme of the Act as extended by notification issued under Act 19 of 1955 is that when under a tenancy of open land within the municipal town created before the date with effect from which the Act is extended, a building has been constructed by the tenant. and he is sued in ejectment by the landlord. he has the right on eiectment to be pa; d as compensation the value as at the date of the llrder of ejectment, of the building constructed and trees planted by him, and he has in the alternative the right to claim an order from the Court that the land belonging to the lessor shall be sold to him at the price fixed by the Court according to the terms of the statute.\n\nBy s. 12 it is provided that the rights conferred by the Act shall not be taken away or restricted by any contract made between the landlord and the tenant provided. however. the stipulations made bv the tenant in writing registered as to the erection of buildings,\n\n/\\' Va1tr1r..ani\n\nNaidu\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\nShah J.\n\nN. V a1rapani Naidu v.\n\nNew ThetJtre Carnatic Talkies\n\nShah J.\n\nin so far as they relate to buildings erected after the date of the contract of lease, are exempt from this restriction.\n\nThe lease granted by the lessors in this case was before the date on which the Act was extended to the Coimbatore municipal town and it is common ground that the buildings were constructed after the date of the contract of lease.\n\nEx facie, the Company as lessee had, when an order for ejectment was made, an option to receive compensation for the value of the structure, or to claim that the lessors shall sell to it the land demised.\n\nBut the lessors contend that because of the stipulations in the deed of lease (which is registered under the law in force for registration of assurances) relating to the obligation of the tenant on the expiry of . the lease to deliver vacant possession of the land after dismantling the constructions therein, the Company has . by the terms of s. 12 disentitled itself to 1he benefit of s. 9 of . the Act. It is submitted that the stipulation relating to delivery of vacant possession of the site on the expiry of the period of the lease after removing the buildings is a stipulation \"as to the erection of buildings\" within the meaning of s. 12, and therefore the restriction on the liberty of contract between landlord and tenant ' imposed by the opening clause of s. 12 is removed, and the Company is bound by the terms of the lease and is not entitled to claim the benefit of s. 9 of the Act. We are, for reasons presently to be set out, unable to uphold that contention.\n\nSection 12 of the Act consists of two parts : by the first part it enacts that the rights conferred upon the tenant under the Act may not be taken away' or limited by any contract made by a tenant.\n\nSuch rights would, amongst others, include the right to claim compensation under ss. 3 and 4 . and the right to purchase the land from the lessor by order of the Court under s. 9.\n\nBy the second part of s. 12. the protection granted by the first part does not avail the tenant in certain conditions. If there be a stipulation \"as to the erection of buildings\" made by the tenant in writing registered, in so far as it relates to buildings erected after the date of the contract, the protection conferred by the first part of s. 12 shall not apply.\n\nA covenant in a lease which is duly registered that the tenant shall on expiry of\n\nthe lease remove the building constructed by him and deliver vacant possession, is undoubtedly a stipulation relating to ).. the building, but it is not a stipulation as to \"the erection of building\".\n\nSection 12 has manifestly been enacted to effectuate the object of the Act which is set out in the preamble-viz. \"to give protection to tenants who . . . . have constructed buildings on others' lands in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they pay a fair rent for the land\". The Legislature has sought thereby to protect \" the tenants against any contractual engagements which may have been made expressly or by implication to deprive themselves wholly or partially of the protection intended to be conferred by the statute.\n\nAnd the only class of cases in which the protection becomes ineffective is where the tenant has made a stulation in writing registered as to the erection of buildings, erected after the date of the contract of lease.\n\n~ The restriction is therefore made only in respect of a limited class ot cases which expressly attract fhe description of the stipulations as to the erection of buildings.\n\nHaving regard to the object of the Act, and the language used by the Legislature, the exception must be strictly construed, and a stipulation as to the erection of buildings would not, according to the. ordinary meaning of the words used, encompass a stipulation to vacate and deliver possession of the lanij en the expiry of the lease without claiming to\n\n. f enforce the statutory rights conferred upon the tenant by s. 9.\n\nThe stipulations not protected in s. 12 are only those in writing registered and relate to erection of buildings such as restrictions about the size and nature of the building constructed. the building materials to be used therein and the purpose for which the building is to be utilized. It is true that the operative part of s. 12 protects the tenant • against the cteprivation or limitation of his rights under the Act and the rights conferred by the Act do not directly relate to covenants relating to erection of buildings. But on that account it is not possible to give a wider meaning to the expression \"as to the erection of buildings\" that the stipulation as to the erection of buildings would include stipulations to remove buildings on the determination of the lease. It ,.- cannot be said that the literal meaning of the expression is likely to render the exception ineffective, for stipulations\n\n19M\n\nN. J'a}rapani\n\nNaidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\nShah /.\n\n1V. l' a1.apani\n\nNaidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Cnrnatic Talkies\n\nShah J.\n\nconcerning erection of buildings in registered leases, or contracts subsequent to the leases, providing for forfeiture on fai.ure to comply with the terms of the lease relating to ~\n\nthe erection of buildings may undoubtedly involve limitations or deprivation of the rights of the tenant under the Act and to that extent the protection conferred by s. 12 in favour of the landlord may be lost.\n\nThe construction for which the appellant contends assigns no meaning to the words \"as to the erection of buildings\" and makes them superfluous, besides it materially affects the scope of the ~. relief which the Act obviously extends to the tenants falling under its provisions.\n\nSection 9 (I) which enables a tenant to purchase on determination of the lease the land of 'the landlord is somewhat unusual.\n\nBut it cannot be said that it imposes an unreasonable restriction upon the right of the landlord to /. hold and dispose of property within the meaning of An. 19 ( 1 )! f) of the Constitution.\n\nThe Act applies to only a limited class of lands : it applied to lands granted in lease for construction of buildings before the date with effect from which the Act is extended to the town or village.\n\nIt was enacted with a view to give protection to the tenants who had, notwithstanding the usual covenants relating to deter- ~. mination of tenancies, obtained lands on lease in the hope that so long as they paid and continued to pay fair rent, '\\. they would not be evicted, but because of changed conditions 1 as a result of the War, appreciation in land values and consequent increase in the level of rents, were faced with actions in eiectment involving dismantling of properties constructed by them. and evictin. The protection becomes effective onlv when the landlord seeks to obtain, in breach of the mutual understanding. benefit of the unearned incre- • ment in the bnd values. by instituting a suit in ejectment.\n\nIt was manifestlv in the interest of the general public to effectuate the m utua I understanding between the landlords and the tenants as to the duration of the tenancies, and to conserve building materials by maintaining existing buildings for purposes for which the leases were granted. Restric- .._ tion imposed upon the right of the landlord to obtain - possession of the premises demised according to the terms\n\n,''(,\n\n\"I .1\n\nof the lease would, therefore, not be regarded as imposing an unreasonable restriction in the exercise of the right conferred upon the landlord by Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution, because the restriction would be regarded as in the interests of the general public.\n\nWe ought to emphasise that what s. 9 does is not so much to deprive the landlord of his property or to acquire his rights to it as to give effect to the real agreement between him and his tenant which induced the tenant to construct his building on the plot let out to him. If the law is not invalid as offending Art. 19 (1 )(f) of the Constitution, no independent infringement of Art. 31 ( 1) of the Constitution may be set up.\n\nIt was urged, however, that by the statute as amended by the Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act VI of 1926 (before it was amended by Act 13 of 1960),\n\nthe price which the Court may fix and at which the tenant is entitled to purchase the lane! is to be the lowest market value prevalent within seven years preceding the date of the order.\n\nThis, it was submitted was unreasonable.\n\nBut it is not necessary for the rpurpose of this case to decide that question, for the Company has offered to pay the market value of the land as at the date on which the order was passed by Panchapakesa Iyer, J.\n\nThat absolves us from the necessity to adjudicate upon the reasonableness of the provisions relating to payment of compensation at the rate prescribed by the Act as amended by Act VI of 1926.\n\nWe may observe that by the Amending Act 13 of 1960 several alterations have been made as regards the extent of the right of the tenants to require the landlords to sell the land and the price which has to be paid by the tenants for purchasing the land.\n\nFor instance. under the Amending Act the Court .nay direct sale only of the minimum area of land necessary for convenient enjoyment by the tenant of the house built by him and the rprice is to be the average marked value in the three years immediately preceding the date of the order.\n\nIn view of this amendment, and having regard to the special circumstances, viz. the offer made by the Company, notwithstanding the provisions of the Act, to pay the market value of the land at the date of the order, we decline to enter upon an academic consideration as to the validity of the\n\n1a~159 s.c.-s~\n\nN. Vajrapanl\n\nNaidu\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\nShah J.\n\nN Vajrapani Naidu v.\n\nNtw Theatre Carnt.ttic Talkie1\n\nShah J.\n\nprovmon fixing compensation at the lowest market value prevalent within seven years preceding the date of the order.\n\nAssuming that a provision fixing such compensation is •mreasonable and therefore invalid, it would be clearly severable from the rest of the statute and would not affect the validity of the provision relating to acquisition by the tenant of the land demised by purchasing it from the landlord.\n\nAt best, the landlord would be entitled to obtain compensation which is equivalent to the market value, and that the Company has agreed to pay. That, however, is a matter on which we express no opinion.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nAyyan1ar I.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-We regret our inability to agree with the order that the appeal should be , dismissed.\n\nThe facts of the case have been set out in the Judgment of our brother Shah, J. and do not, tlierefore, require to be repeated.\n\nThe two principal points arising for consideration and on which the decision of the appeal would turn are, first, the interpretation of s. 12 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act (Madras Act ill of 1922) and, second, the constitutional validity of s. 9 of that enactment. Section 12 enacts :\n\n\"Nothing in any contract made by a tenant shall take away or limit his rights under this Act, provided that nothing herein contained shall affect any\n\nstpulations made by the tenant in writing registered as to the erection of buildings, in so far as they relate to buildings erected after the date of the contract.\"\n\nThe question that first calls for examination is the proper construction of s. 12 and in particular the meaning and effect of the proviso contained in it.\n\nBefore, however, taking up the words of the section, it would be useful to read the preamble and certain of the other provisions of the Act because it is in the light of the guidance afforded by them that the content of the proviso to s. 12 could be determined.\n\nThe preamble recites that the Act had been I\n\nenacted as it was \"found necessary to give protection to tenants who in municipal towns and adjoining areas in the State of Madras have constructed buildings on others' land in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they pay a fair rent for the land\". Section 1 ( 3) of the Act which defines the tenancies within the local area to which the Act extends enacts (to read the provision as it now stands) that the Act shall apply only \"to tenancies of land created before the commencement of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1955 and in any municipal town or village to which this Act is extended by notification under\n\n5Ub-s. (2) only to tenancies created before the date with effect from which this Act is extended to such town or village.\" From these provisions two matters are clear:\n\n(1) that the Act was enacted in order to ensure that the hope entertained by tenants who had constructed buildings on others' lands that they would not be evicted so long as they paid fair rent was not frustrated, and (2) that the Act has application only to tenancies which having commenced earlier were subsisting on the date on which the Act came into force in the particular area.\n\nWith these preliminary observations we shall proceed to deal with the construction of s. 12 of the Act.\n\nThe tenancy under which the respondent was inducted into the land on which he has constructed buildings was of 1934, a date long anterior to 1958 when by a notification issued under s. 1 (2) of the Act its provisions were extended to the municipal town of Coimbatore where the land involved in the present proceedings is situated. It was therefore a tenancy governed by the provisions of the Act. Next, the lease under which the respondent held the land was in writing registered, and therefore the only question to be considered is whether the stipulations it contains are comprehended by the proviso.\n\nSection 12, it would be seen, is made up of two limbsfirst a general provision saving to tenants comprehended by the Act, the rights conferred by its operative terms, notwithstanding any contract, and next a proviso which makes an inroad into the generality of the saving, by saving con-\n\nN. Vajrapanl\n\nNaidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkitl\n\nAyyangar !.\n\nN. Vajrapani Naidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\n.A.yyangar J.\n\ntractual stipulations from the operation of the statutory rights created by the Act. The entirety of the debate before us is as to the nature, scope and width of the saving effected by the proviso. It does not need any argument to establish that if s. 12 had stopped with its first limb, the respondent would be entitled to the benefit of every right conferred upon tenants by the Act, but the proviso it is conceded is intended to cut down the scope of that saving. Expressed in other terms, from the prohibition against the operation of any stipluation in a contract limiting the rights conferred on tenants by the Act an exception is carved out. So much is common ground but the controversy is as regards the scope and limits of that exception. As regards the exception contained in the proviso four matters are clear: ( 1) The stipulation must find a place in a contract in writing which is registered, (2) the sipulation which is within the proviso and to that extent detracting from the non-obstante provision contained in the opening words must be one in relation to \"the erection of buildings\", (3) it must relate to buildings erected after the date of the contract, and ( 4) if there is a stipulation satisfying these three conditions such stipulation would have effect notwithstanding anything in the previous part of s. 12 which would be the same thing as saying that the rights of the tenant under the Act may be taken away or limited; by such a stipulation.\n\nIt is common ground and beyond controversy that conditions 1 & 3 above are satisfied and the only point in dispute is whether the 2nd condition is satisfied so as to attract the operation of condition 4.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court have understoo<!. the words \"as to the erection of buildings\" occurring in .... the proviso as equivalent to a stipulation regarding the manner in which the building may be erected, the materials to be used, the area the building should cover and other details in relation to the construction of the building and as not apt to cover the case of a stipulation whereby the tenant undertakes to remove the buildings constructed by him on the termination of the tenancy; and that was also the submission made to us by Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the respondent. With the greatest respect to the learned Judges\n\nof the High Court we are unable to agree with this construcr- tion of the proviso.\n\nBefore examining this we think it convenient and even necessary to refer to the tenns of the lease deed under which the appellant became a tenant before considering whether it is a stipulation which would fall within the words \"stipulations as to the erection of buildings\". The lease deed which has been marked as Ex. B-1 in the case is a registered ...' instrument dated September 19, 1934.\n\nThe tenn of the demise wa~ a period of 20 years from the date of delivery of possession and the rent stipulated was Rs. 1,080/- per year. The purpose for which the site was leased is stated in , the document to be \"to construct buildings thereon as he (the lessee) requires on the aforesaid site for the purpdse of cinema, drama etc. at his own expense and also further rconstructions necessary for the same\". This is followed by two clauses which have some relevance.\n\nNotwithstanding that the lease was for a fixed definite period of 20 years, the lessee was permuted to surrender the lease if he found that the business venture for which the lease was taken was not profitable.\n\nIn that event the lessee was entitled to surrender the lease, and put an end to the tenancy, when he had to dismantle the buildings constructed by him at his own expense and pay to the lessors one year's rent for r loss by the latter sustained by the premature tennination of the , lease. If this condition as to the removal of buildings were not fulfilled by the lessee, the lessors. were authorised to take ipossession of the vacant site dismantling the constructions and demolishing the walls. On the tennination of the stipulated period of 20 years the lessees stipulated that they would dismantle the constructions by demolishing the walls\n\n1> etc. and deliver possession of the vacant site to the lessors.\n\nThe qustion now for consideration is whether this stipulation contained in the registered lease deed that at the end of the tenn the lessee would demolish the buildings which he had erected and deliver vacant possession of the site is a stipulation which is saved by the proviso to s. 12. If the scope of the proviso had to be construed in the light of the preamble, it is obvious that the tenant who had entered into a contract with a stipulation of the sort we have extracted, could not be said to have constructed the buildings on\n\nN. V ajrapani Naidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\nAyyangar J,\n\nN. Vajrapani Naidu v.\n\nNew Theatre ·:arnatic Talkies\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nanother's land \"in the hope that he would not be evicted so long as he pays rent for the land\". The preamble would, therefore, indicate that the Act would not apply to afford protection in a case where by an express term in a registered lease deed a tenant agreed to surrender the site on which he had erected a building where he specifically contracted that he would demolish the building and deliver vacant possession of the site on the termination of his tenancy.\n\nThe next matter to be noticed is that the tenancies dealt ·~ with by the Act are tenancies which came into existence prior to the enactment or prior to the date .the Act became operative in the local area and therefore one cannot expect stipulations worded in exactly the same terms as in the Act, because exconcessis the Act and its provisions were not in the contemplation of the parties when they enterect into the contract.\n\nThe mere fact, therefore, that a stipulation \"' as regards the erection of the buildings is not worded in the same manner as under the provisions of the Act or in terms of the Act is no ground for refusing effect to it.\n\nLastly, since what is saved by the proviso from the operation of the Act are the rights which are created in favour of tenants by the Act, we are led to an inquiry as to the rights which are conferred by the Act, for the saving must obviously have reference to and be determined by these rights.\n\nBroadly speaking two kinds of rights have been conferred on lessees under tenancies falling within the scope of the Act-first a right to the payment of compensation for buildings erected by them on leased land before they are evicted, (under s. 3 of the Act) and secondly (this of course could be only in the alternative) a right or option to require the landlord to sell them the land under lease for a price to be computed in accordance with s. 9. It is obvious from the very nature of things having regard to the time when the lease was entered into that there would not and could not in terms be a stipulation in a deed against the option accorded to a teuant to purchase the leased land, and the matter is so self evident as not to need any argument in support. We therefore reach the position that the stipulation contemplated by the proviso to s. 12 could only be one in relation to the right of the tenant to claim compeni•ation for the buildings erected by him after the\n\n• ' '\n\ncommencement of the tenancy.\n\nExpressed differently, though the proviso is worded as to permit the saving of stipulations contained in registered deeds whether the stipulations relate to the right to the compensation receivable by tenants under s. 3, or their right to require the sale of the leased land to them under s. 9 when .on the termination of the tenancy they are sought to be evicted, the latter right is not one which could be affected by an express stipulation in that regard, but its non-availability to the tenant could be brought about only by a stipulation bearing on the right of the tenant to compensation under s. 3 for buildings erected by him during his tenancy.\n\n,;.; We shall now proceed to ascertain the stipulation which\n\nwould affect the right to compensation in respect of buildings erected conferred on tenants by s. 3.\n\nThat provision reads:\n\n\"Every tenant shall on cjectment be entitled to be paid as compensation the value of any building, which may have been erected by him, by any of his predecessors in interest, or by any person not in occupation at the time of the ejectment who derived title from either of them, and for which compensation has not already been paid.\n\nA tenant who is entitled to compensation for the value of any building shall also be paid the value of trees which may have been planted by him on the land and of any improvements which may have been made by\n\nhim.\"\n\nA stipulation which if effective would limit the quantum of compensation payable in respect of buiidings construct- ed by a tenant provided for by s. 3, it is conceded, is within the proviso to s. 12 as being one with respect to the \"erection of buildings\".\n\nThe effect of this concession on the meaning of the proviso, we shall consider later.\n\nBut the question is whether these wotds can on any resonable construction be limited or confined to such a contingency.\n\nLet us take a case where in a lease like the one before us ~· for a fixed term say of 20 years there is a stipulation that the tenant shall not b\\lild on the land and that if he erected\n\nJV. l'ajrapani\n\nNaidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\nAyyan1ar /,\n\nN. Vajra11ani Naidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nbuildings he shall remove the structures, and deliver vacant possession at the end of tbe tenancy.\n\nObviously such a stipulation would imply that he shall not claim any com- ipensation for the structures which contrary to his uner\n\ntalcing he erects.\n\nWe did not understand Mr. Setalvari to whom this was put during arguments to contend that the tenant, who constructed buildings under a lease with a stipulation such as this would be able to obtain compensation under s. 3, with the attendant rights conferred by s. 9.\n\nThis can only be on the basis that a stipulation forbidding the erection of buildings by the lessee is a stipulation as ·, regards \"erection of buildings\"-notwithstanding that it is part and parcel of this stipulation that the tenant shall demolish buildings which he constructed. If a stipulation forbidding erection of buildings and requiring their removal before surrendering possession of the site is conceded to be one 'in respect of erection of buildings'-as has to be .<,\n\nconceded, it is not possible to accept the construction that a stipulation for the removal of buildings which the lessee is permitted to erect and keep in the site only for the duration of the tenancy is any the less one \"in respect of erection of buildings\". We understand these words to mean a stipulation which bears on or is in relation to the erection of buildings.\n\nSuch a construction would reconcile the proviso with the preamble which sets out the object sought to be achieved by the Act. If the lease deed contains no ~. stipulation whatsoever in regard to the erection of buildings, as was the case with the large number of leases in the city of Madras which were entered into prior to the enactment of the Act in 1922, the tenant who erected a building ex concessis without contravening any undertaking on his part. obtains protection under the Act. Again if the lease though !t contains such a stipulation against construction of buildings on the leased land is not by a registered instrument-as were again several leases in the city-the statutory rights to compensation and purchase were protected. If however the parties had recourse to a formal registered instrument for putting through the transaction and such a deed contained a stipulation against erection of buildings, or against the continuance of the buildings on the land at the tennination -~ of the tenancy, or what comes to the same thing against the tenant being entitled to compensation for the buildin!!s\n\nerected by him during the currency of the lease, the stipulation would govern the rights of the tenant and not the statute. This in our opinion is the proper construction of the proviso to s. 12. The test would therefore 1\"-\"did the parties advert to and have in mind the contingency of the tenant erecting buildings on the leased land\"? If they had and had included in a solemn registered deed a provision which would bear upon the relative rights of the parties in the event of the erection of buildings on the site, the stipulation would have effect notwithstanding the Act; for in such an event the tenant would not have constructed buildings on the land in the hope that he would not be disturbed from possession so long as he paid the rent agreed upon.\n\nBefore concluding we shall examine how far the limited meaning attributed to the phrase \"as to the erection of buildings\" can be sustained. First let us take a case where there is a stipulation in a registered deed under which the lessee in consideration of a favourable rent undertakes to construct buildings of a particular type and deliver possession of the site as well as the building constructed at the end of the term without any claim to compensation.\n\nOn: the construction put forward by the respondent this would be a stipulation which would be saved by the proviso since it refers to the construction of buildings and not removal, though it negatives all right to compensation to which he would be entitled under s. 3. Such a stipulation being valid and enforceable, on a suit for ejectment being\n\nfile4, the tenant would not be entitled to CQ111pensation and would therefore be outside s. 9 because s. 9 applies only ' to cases where the tenant isentitled to compensation. Now, does it make any difference if the deed stipulated that the buildings erected by the tenant should be removed, without any claim to compensation in the event of non-removal. We\n\n1-\"llll see no sensible distinction between the two cases.. and if the one is a stipulation in respect of \"erection of bnildings\", the other is equally sc..\n\n1 Next we shall take the case which the respondent asserts . is precisely the one intended to be covmd by the provtSO viz: a stipulation that the lessee shall not construct a bnilding\n\n1 in excess of a pa11li.cular plinth area, or beyond a ground- . ft.oor, or in excess of a specified number of rooms.\n\n134-159 S.C.-66.\n\n1!164\n\nN. Y 11/rapa11i\n\nNaitbl\n\nNl!W Thntre CanuJtic Talkla\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nN. Y ajrapani Naidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic TgJkie1\n\nA.yyangar ],\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1gtJ4j\n\nObviously the question about the applicability of the proviso would come in only if the tenant broke the covenant an we shall therefore assume that in breach of the stipulation, the tenant erects buildings contrary to his undertaking. In such an event it is said that when the compensation to which the tenant is entitled under s. 3 is computed, the amount would be confined to what he would have got, if he had abided by the contract.\n\nBut this is to ignore the basic feature of the Act, under which the tenant who is entitled to compensation under s. 3, and certainly the limited com- , pensation that the tenant obtains even when he breaks a covenant would still be compensation under that section, is\n\ntntitled to purchase the lease land under s. 9. The c; onstruction suggested therefore comes to this that though under the proviso to s. 12 there might be stipulations which might reduce the quantum of compensation to which a tenent would be entitled under s. 3, there cannot be a stiphlation apart possibly from a covenant against any erection of buildings which we have already dealt with, which would preclude a tenant from his right under s. 9. If as must be conceded the first limb of s. 12, sa:ve the statutory rights of tenants both under SS. 3 & 9 from the operation of any contract, it appears to us to stand to reason that the proviso which saves rights lll!der contracts from the rights cqnferred\n\nby the Act should be construed to be co-extensive with and operate on the same field as the opening portion of s. 12.\n\nWe are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in their construction of the proviso to s. 12. In this view the question as regards the constitutional validity of s. 9 would not really arise for consideration, and we express no opinion on it. We would accordingly allow the appeal and decree the suit for eject ment filed by the appellant.\n\nORDER\n\nIn accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nNo order as to costs.\n\nAuueal dismissed.\n\nGMGIPND-L-134-59 S. C. Of India(6021-46)-18- 10-65--2.?0C),", "total_entities": 134, "entities": [{"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 405, "end_char": 410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 551, "end_char": 556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 618, "end_char": 645, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VAJRAPANI NAIDU AND ANOTHER\n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1416, "end_char": 1444, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VAJRAPANI NAIDU AND ANOTHER\n", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE NEW THEATRE CARNATIC TALKIES LTD.,\n\nCOIMBATORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1445, "end_char": 1495, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE NEW THEATRE CARNATIC TALKIES LTD., COIMBATORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. 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{"in_sentence": "was delivered by AYYANGAR J.\n\nSHAH J.-The appellant Vajrapani Naidu and his mother Bangarammal-hereinafter collectively called 'the lessors'- granted a lease of an open site in the town of Coimbatore to Abirama Chettiar under a registered deed dated September 19, 1934, for 20 years at an annual rental of Rs.", "canonical_name": "VAJRAPANI NAIDU AND ANOTHER\n"}}, {"text": "Coimbatore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8582, "end_char": 8592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by AYYANGAR J.\n\nSHAH J.-The appellant Vajrapani Naidu and his mother Bangarammal-hereinafter collectively called 'the lessors'- granted a lease of an open site in the town of Coimbatore to Abirama Chettiar under a registered deed dated September 19, 1934, for 20 years at an annual rental of Rs."}}, {"text": "Abirama Chettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8596, "end_char": 8612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by AYYANGAR J.\n\nSHAH 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"metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panchapakesa Iyer, J., directed that the lessors do sell to the Company the site in dispute under s. 9 of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1922, against payment of the full market value of the land on the date of the order, and further directed that the trial -,.,"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10201, "end_char": 10205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Protection Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10234, "end_char": 10254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 28, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10476, "end_char": 10489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court do appoint a Commissioner to fix the value of the site based on the market value prevalent on July 28, 1958."}}, {"text": "cl. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10508, "end_char": 10514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Protection Act, 1922", "statute": "Protection Act, 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Vajrapanl\n\nNaidu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26954, "end_char": 26973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the offer made by the Company, notwithstanding the provisions of the Act, to pay the market value of the land at the date of the order, we decline to enter upon an academic consideration as to the validity of the\n\n1a~159 s.c.-s~\n\nN. Vajrapanl\n\nNaidu\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\nShah J.\n\nN Vajrapani Naidu v.\n\nNtw Theatre Carnt.ttic Talkie1\n\nShah J.\n\nprovmon fixing compensation at the lowest market value prevalent within seven years preceding the date of the order."}}, {"text": "Ayyan1ar I.\n\nAYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27776, "end_char": 27797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyan1ar I.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-We regret our inability to agree with the order that the appeal should be , dismissed."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28155, "end_char": 28160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28272, "end_char": 28276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28296, "end_char": 28306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28710, "end_char": 28715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29025, "end_char": 29030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29363, "end_char": 29372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30387, "end_char": 30392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30588, "end_char": 30592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31010, "end_char": 31020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".A.yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31419, "end_char": 31429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Vajrapani Naidu v.\n\nNew Theatre Carnatic Talkies\n\n.A.yyangar J.\n\ntractual stipulations from the operation of the statutory rights created by the Act.", "canonical_name": ".A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31683, "end_char": 31688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32762, "end_char": 32767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33666, "end_char": 33674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the words \"as to the erection of buildings\" occurring in .... the proviso as equivalent to a stipulation regarding the manner in which the building may be erected, the materials to be used, the area the building should cover and other details in relation to the construction of the building and as not apt to cover the case of a stipulation whereby the tenant undertakes to remove the buildings constructed by him on the termination of the tenancy; and that was also the submission made to us by Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Setalvari"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35908, "end_char": 35913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37952, "end_char": 37956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38154, "end_char": 38158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38561, "end_char": 38566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38943, "end_char": 38947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39017, "end_char": 39021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39328, "end_char": 39332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39540, "end_char": 39544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40266, "end_char": 40270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40313, "end_char": 40318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Setalvari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41187, "end_char": 41196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We did not understand Mr. Setalvari to whom this was put during arguments to contend that the tenant, who constructed buildings under a lease with a stipulation such as this would be able to obtain compensation under s. 3, with the attendant rights conferred by s. 9.", "canonical_name": "Setalvari"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41378, "end_char": 41382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41423, "end_char": 41427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43585, "end_char": 43590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44880, "end_char": 44884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45054, "end_char": 45058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45067, "end_char": 45071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46305, "end_char": 46309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46527, "end_char": 46531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46725, "end_char": 46729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46817, "end_char": 46822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46940, "end_char": 46944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47126, "end_char": 47130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47173, "end_char": 47178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SS. 3 & 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47229, "end_char": 47238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47503, "end_char": 47508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47649, "end_char": 47654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47724, "end_char": 47728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_172_181_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "January 7\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nAFRAHIM SHEIKH AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Penal Code-Convictio11 under s. 304 Part II-If can be read with s. 34--'•/ntention\" & ~K11ow/edge\"-/11dian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of !860), ss. 34, 35. 38 and 304.\n\nThe six appellants were convicted under s. 304 Part II with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code by the SesSions Judge an'd their appeal was summarily dismissed by the High Court. On appeal by special leave, it was contended that s. 304, Part II could not be read with s. 34 Indian Penal Code because the second part of s. 304 excluded intention and was concerned with knowledge an'd the conviction was illegal.\n\nHeld: (i) Section 34 when it speaks of a criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, has regard not to the offence as a whole, but to the criminal act, that is tu say, the totality of the series of acts which result in the offence. In the case of a person assaulted by many accused, the criminal act is the offence \\Vhich finally results, though the achievement of that criminal act may be the result of the action of several persons.\n\n(ii) Knowledge in s. 304 Part II is the knowledge of likelihood of de1th and the common intention is with regard to the criminal act.\n\nIf the result of the criminal act is the death of the victim and if each of the assailants possesses the knowledge that death is the likely conse quencc of the criminal act, there is no reason why s. 34 shoufd not be read with the second part of s. 304 to make each liable individually.\n\n/bra Akanda v. Enzperar, I.L.R. [1942] 2 Cal. 405 and Saidu Khan\n\nv. State, I.LR. [1952] I All. 639, approved.\n\nRamnath v. Emperor, A.l.R. 1943 All. 271. Shahibzada v. The Crol1'11 A.I.R. 1950 Peshawar 24, Debi Chand Haldar v. Emperor, 41\n\nC.W.N. 570 and Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor, (!925) !.L.R. 52 Cal. 197. referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 134 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 5, 1963, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No 156 of 1963.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants.\n\nP. K. Chakravarti and P. K. Bose, for the respondent.\n\nJanuary 7, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAfrahim Sheikh\n\nThe State of Wesr\n\nBengal\n\nHIDAYATULLAH J.-The six appellants who have a:; i- Hidayatullah r pealed to this Court by special leave were convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Birbhum under s. 304 Part II read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six years' rigorous imprisonment each.\n\nTheir appeal to the High Court was summarily dismissed.\n\nWhen the ppcilants applied for a certificate in the High Court they made it plain that the only point which was required to be considered by this Court wa1 whether s. 34 could be read m conjunction with Part II of s. 304, Indian Penal Code. In this Court the argument was confined to this point of law.\n\nThe High Court rejected the application for the certificate pointing out that the controversy had been settled by a Full Bench dcision of the High Court reported in /bra Akanda v. Emperor(').\n\nThe learned Judges were of the opinion that the point was r.ot of sufficient importance for penn!tting the appellants to take an appeal to this Court\n\nFor the consideration of the point of law which has been debated before us, we may state only such facts as will bring out the controversy.\n\nOne Abdul Sheikh in the company of his son, Adut, aged 13. went to his field in village Noapara to uproot linseed plants.\n\nThis was on the morning of March 13, 1962.\n\nWhile he was so employed, two of the appellants, Afrahim and J esed, appeared on the scene, and Afrahim asked Jesed to catch hold of Abdul Sheikh. Abdul Sheikh took to his heels and was chased by these two appellants, who overtook him and threw him down on the ground Immediately thereafter, there appeared on the scene the reniaining appellants. Jarahim was armed with a ha/lam and he started to hit Abdul Sheikh on his legs with the hallam.\n\nThe appellant. Manu. arrived with a sabal (crowbar), and began to strike Abdul Sheikh and the appellant, Mesher. began to strike Abdul Sheikh with a lathi. All this, while, the sixth appellant, Makid, held Abdul Sheikh by the legs and Afrahim and Jesed held him down by his head and shoulders.\n\nThe incident was witnessed by Adut and two others, and it is on the testimony of Adut and these tWC1\n\n(I) I. L.R. (1944) 2 Cal. 405.\n\n1964 other witnesses, to whom reference is unnecessary, that the Afrahim Sheikh learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Birbhum, came io the conv. clusion that the offence was committed in the manner describ The State of West d b Abd 1 Sh \"kh 1 · d b h h\" 1 B\"ngal e a ove. u e1 was serious y m1ure ; ot 1s egs below the knee were fractured and one arm above the wrist Hida.vatullah 1 was also fractured. He had also some incised wounds and some bruises.\n\nHe was examined by one Dr. Bashiruddin, who gave him first aid. Dr. Bashiruddin stated on oath that Abdul Sheikh narrated to him the incident and named all the six appellants.\n\nLater, Abdul Sheikh was removed to Nalhati Health Centre, and while arrangements were being nrnde for recording his dying declaration, he succnm hed to his injuries. He had, however, made dying declarations to some of the prosecution witnesses and they have depoied to the fact that he had named the six appellants as his assailants.\n\nIn this appeal, we did not allow Dr. D. N. Mukherjee, counsel for the appellants, to argue on facts.\n\nWe assumed that the incident took place as narrated by the witnsscs Mr. Mukherjee contends that the conviction of the appellants under s. 304, Part II is illegal, because according to him. s. 34 cannot be called in aid. as the second part of s. 304 concerns itself with knowledge and absolutely excludes intention as the ingredient of the offence.\n\nHe relies upon the minority decision of Das J. (as he then was) in /bra Akanda\n\nv. Emperor(').\n\nIn that case, the learned Judge had expressed the opinion that s. 34 was incapable of being read with the second Part of s. 304.\n\nWith the view of the learned Judge, Lodge J. differed anq the case was then placed before Khundkar J. who agreed with Lodge J., and the decision was that s. 34 could be so read.\n\nAt the hearing~.\n\nMukherjee drew our attention to three other cases in which a view supporting his contention appears to have been taken.\n\nI The first is a single Judge decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Ramnath v. Emperor('), and the other is a Division Bench case from Peshawar reported in Sahibzada v. The Crown('). He also referred to an earlier Calcutta case reported in Debi Charan Haldar v.\n\nEmperor('), in which a division Bench had expressed some\n\n(1) I. L. R. (19441 2 Cal. 405.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1950 Peshawar 24.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1943 AIL 271. r4) 41 C.W.N. 570.\n\n. doubts about 1.he applicability of s. 34 to s. 304, Part I. As 1964 against this, Mr. Chakravarti, counsel for the State relied Afrahim Sheikh upon a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court Th 5 v. f w reported in Saidu Khan v. State(') where it has been e\n\n1 ~n:al est clearly held that s. 34 can be so read.\n\nBefore dealing with the point of law, we shall refer to the essential facts once again.\n\nApart from the fact that there is proof that there: were two parties and there was enmity between the appellants and Abdul Sheikh, the facts proved in the case clearly establish that Abdul Sheikh had gone for a peaceful purpose in the company of his young son, and immediately after his arrival, he was chased by two of the appellants and caught and felled to the ground.\n\nAfter this the remaining four appellants appeared and beat Abdul Sheikh with diverse weapons, while those who were not armed, held him pinned to the ground.\n\nMr. Chakravarti is right in contending on these facts that the act took place in furtherance of a common intention.\n\nNo doubt, as has been laid down by the Privy Council and by this Ceurt in cases which are now very familiar, common intention must exist before the criminal act is perpetrated, and that is the essence of s. 34.\n\nHere, in our opinion, :that requirment was completely satisfied, because the six accused could not but by a prior concert have appeared simultaneously at the scene, and chased and overthrown the. victim, held him down and beaten him.\n\nThe facts disclosed in the evidence clearly establish a prior concert amongst the six appellants.\n\nIt has 'been so infered by the Assistant Sessions Judge, and we see no reason to differ from him.\n\nNow that the criminal act has been held by us to have 'been the result of a previous concert and in furtherance of the common intention, we shall proceed to examine whether s. 34 IP.C. can be made applicable for the purpose of holding that culpable homicide not amounting to murder was .committed, and that each of the appellant was responsible for the offence.\n\nSection 34 of the Indian Penal Code reads :as follws:\n\n\"When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each\n\n(1) LL.R. '[19<~]' A11. 639.\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nAfra/Jim Sheikh v.\n\nThe State of West\n\nof such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.\"\n\nBengal In s. 33 which precedes, it is laid down that the word \"act\".\n\nHidayatullah J. denotes not only a single act but also a series of ats. In other words, as was stated by the Judicial Committee, in Barendra Kumar Ghosh's case (1) \"a criminal act means. that unity of criminal behaviour, which results in something, for which an individual would be punishable, if it were all done by himself alone, i.e., a criminal' offence.\" Here, the beating was perpetrated not by a single individual but by three persons with whom others were acting in concert. The criminal act resulted in the criminal offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.\n\nThere is no dispute as to that.\n\nWhether all the appellants individually would be responsible for the death of Abdul Sheikh is the question to be determined, and that conclusion can only be reached if it can be said that the act which was committed was done in furtherance of a common intention.\n\nIt is argued ihat s. 304 makes a difference in its two parts between the ccmmission of the offence of culpable homiide with a particular intention and the commission of the same offence without that intention but with a particular knowledge.\n\nIt is urged that this distinction makes it impossible that s. 34 which. deals only with common intention can be read with it. Sec-· tion 304 reads as follows:-\n\n\"Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting\n\nto murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of eitheP description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;\n\nor with imprisonment of either description for a\n\nterm which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both. if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but\n\n(I) [1925] l.L.R. 52 Cal. 197.\n\nwithout any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cnse\n\ndeath.\"\n\nA.frahim Sheikh\n\nTh• State of West Sec. 304 does not define culpable homicide not amounting . Bengal to murder. That definition is to be found in s. 299, which Hidayatullah J, provides:\n\n\"Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.;'\n\nCulpable homicide is the causing of the death of a person in three ways: (1) with the intention of causing death, ( 2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and ( 3) with the knowledge that the offender is likely by such act to cause death. The offence of culpable homicide becomes murder when four circumstances exist.\n\nThey are mentioned in.s. 300.\n\nA number of exceptions are however included, and those exceptions show extenuating circumstances on strict proof of which the offence is again brought down to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.\n\nThe causing of the death of a person by doing an act accompanied by intention in the two ways described in s. 299 or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death also decribed there is thus distinguished from cases of deaths resulting from accident or rash and negligent act and those cases where death may result but the offence is of causing hurt either simple or grievous Once it was established, as was established in this case, that the\n\nact was a deliberate act and was not the result of accident or rashness or negligence, it is obvious that the offence which was committed was one under s. 304.\n\nIn the present case however death was not the result of the act of a single individual but was the result of the act of several persons, and they shared the common intention, namely, the commission of the act or acts by which death was occasioned.\n\nSection 34 is a part of a group of sections, of which some other sections may also be seen. Section 35 is as follows:\n\n134-159 S.C.-12.\n\nA.fr\"\"'m Sheikh\n\n•• Th Stat• of West\n\n\"Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention.\"\n\nB1ngal\n\nBf\"1atul1\"h /.\n\nIn this section also the responsibility is shared by eaGh offender individually if the act which is criminal only by reason of certain criminal know ledge or intention is done by each person sharing that knowledge or intention.\n\nIndeed, this section also was applicable here. Under s. 37, \"when an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with an): other person, commits that offence.\" By co-operating in the doing of several acts which together constitute a single criminal act, each person who co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of the acts is either singly or jointly liable for that offence. Section 38 then provides:\n\n\"Where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act.\"\n\nThat is to say, even though several persons may do a single criminal act, the responsibility may vary according to the degree of their participation. The illustration which is given clearly brings out that point.\n\nViewing these sections in this manner, it is obvious that two sections in this group deal with individual responsibility for a single criminal act perpetrated by a large number of persons who either share a common intention or possess the criminal knowledge (ss. 34 and 35) and the third with cooperation between several accused in the completion of the criminal act (s. 37). Lastly s. 38 provides that the responsibility for the completed criminal act may be of different grades according to the share taken by the different accused in the completion of the criminal act, and this section does not mention anything about intention common or otherwise or knowledge.\n\nSection 34, when it speaks of a criminal act done by 1964 several persons in furtherance of the common intention of Afrahlm SIWll all, has regard not to the offence as a whole, but to the y. criminal act, that is to say, the totality of the series of acts TIN 81'if:,.:!, Wut which result in the offence. In the case of a person assaulted by many accused, the criminal act is the offence which finally Rldayolul/1111 1. results, though the achievement of that criminal act may be the result of action of several persons. No doubt, a person is only responsible ordinarily for what he does and s. 38 ensures that; but the law in s. 34 (and also s. 35) says that if the criminal act is the result of a common intention, then every person who did the criminal act with the common intention would be responsible for the total offence irrespective of the share which he had in its perpetration. In Barendra Kumar Ghosh' s case('), the Judicial Committee observed:\n\n\"Sec. 34 I.P.C. deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several persons; if all are done in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of them all as if he had done them himself.\n\nThat act' and then again 'it' in the latter part of the section must include the whole of the action covered by the criminal act in the first part of the section.\" Provided there is common intention, the whole of the result perpetrated by several offenders. is attributable to each offender, notwithstanding that individually they may have done separate acts, diverse or similar. Applying this test to the present case, if all the appellants shared the common intention of severely beating Abdul Sheikh and some held him down and others beat him with their weapons, provided the common intention is accepted, they would all of them be responsible for the whole of the criminal act, that is to say, the criminal offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder which was committed, irrespective of the part played by them. The common intention which is required by the section is not the intention which s. 299 mentions in its first part.\n\nThat intention is individual to the offender unless it is shared with others by a prior concert in which case ss. 34 or 35 again come into play. Here, the common\n\n(1) [19251 I.L.R. 52 Cal. 197\n\n1961 intention was to beat Abdul Sheikh, and that common .tffro/llm Sh•ikh intention was, as we have held above, shared by all of them.\n\nThat they did diverse acts would ordinarily make their The 8'f:,,:!i West responsibility individual for their own acts,. but because of the common intention, they would be responsible for the H/\"\"7atullah\n\n1. total effect that they produced if any of the three conditions in s. 299, l.P.C. applied to their case. If it were a case of the first two conditions, the matter is simple. They speak of intention and s. 34 also ll_;)eaks of intention.\n\nThe question is whether the second part of s. 304 can be made applicable. The second part no doubt speaks of knowledge and does not refer to intention which has been segregated in the first part. But knowledge is the knowledge .of the likelihood of death. Can it be said that when three or fo\\lf persons start beating a man with heavy lathis, each hitting his blow with the common intention of severely beating him and each possessing the knowledge that death was 'the likely result of the beating, the requirements of s. 304, Part Il are not satisfied in the case of each of them?\n\nIf it could be said that knowledge of this type was possible in the case of each one of the appellants, there is no reason why s. 304, Part Il cannot be read with s. 34. The common intention is with regard to the criminal act, i.e., the act of beating. If the result of the beating is the death of the victim, and if each of the assailants possesses the knowledge that death is the likely consequence of the criminal act, i.e., beating, there is no reason why s. 34 or s. 35 should not be read with thc:_second part of s. 304 to make each liable individually. ··\n\nThis matter has been elaborately considered in the judgment of Lodge I. and again in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. We do not think that we need / say more on this, because we are in agreement with the decision given by the majority in the Calcutta High Court case and the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. It appears to us that in other cases doubt was felt because s. 304 is in two parts, and first part is concerned with culpable homicide committed with two types of intention and the second part with culpable homicide committed with a particular knowledge. It appears that it was felt that s. 34. which deals with common intention, could not be read with\n\nthe second part of s. 304. In our opinion, the learned Judges 1964 -, who held that view and we say it respectfully fell into the Afrahlm Slwlkll error of viewing the second part of s. 304 divorced from Th s \"· / w . . h A d d • lat• 0\n\n•II common mtenllon w atever. person oes not o an act Bingal except with a certain intention, and the common intention Hidayatul/a/i J. which is requisite for the application of s. 34 is the common intention of perpetrating a particular act. Previous cqncert which is insisted upon is the meeting of the minds regarding the achievement of a criminal act. That circumstance is completely fulfilled in a case like the present where a large number of persons attack an individual, chase him, throw him on the ground and beat him till he dies. Even if the offence does not come to the grade of murder, and is only culpable homicide not amounting to murder, there is no doubt whatever that the offence is shared by all of them, and .s. 34 then makes the responsibility several if there was a knowledge possessed by each of them that death was likely to be caused as a result of that beating. This circumstance is completely fulfilled in the present case, and we are, therefore, satisfied that the conviction of the appellants was proper, and see no reason to interfere.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nV.N.VASUDEVA\n\nSETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA\n\n(M. ffIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH JJ.)\n\nRent Control--Ordor for d•po1lt of \"\"' at lnt•rlocutory ll•g•-lf pro,,.r-Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958), •· 15(1)-lndlan Income-tax Act. 1922 (II of 1922), •· \"6(5A).\n\nThe responllent made an 111plleation qalnst Ibo appellant under\n\n1. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In reply the appellant pleaded\n\nJanuarv. 9", "total_entities": 128, "entities": [{"text": "AFRAHIM SHEIKH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AFRAHIM SHEIKH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. 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Bose, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Afrahim Sheikh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2296, "end_char": 2310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAfrahim Sheikh\n\nThe State of Wesr\n\nBengal\n\nHIDAYATULLAH J.-The six appellants who have a:; i- Hidayatullah r pealed to this Court by special leave were convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Birbhum under s. 304 Part II read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six years' rigorous imprisonment each.", "canonical_name": "AFRAHIM SHEIKH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "State of Wesr\n\nBengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2316, "end_char": 2337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAfrahim Sheikh\n\nThe State of Wesr\n\nBengal\n\nHIDAYATULLAH J.-The six appellants who have a:; i- Hidayatullah r pealed to this Court by special leave were convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Birbhum under s. 304 Part II read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six years' rigorous imprisonment each."}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2339, "end_char": 2351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAfrahim Sheikh\n\nThe State of Wesr\n\nBengal\n\nHIDAYATULLAH J.-The six appellants who have a:; 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L.R. (1944) 2 Cal."}}, {"text": "Afrahim Sheikh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4569, "end_char": 4583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 other witnesses, to whom reference is unnecessary, that the Afrahim Sheikh learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Birbhum, came io the conv.", "canonical_name": "AFRAHIM SHEIKH AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "State of West", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4710, "end_char": 4723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "clusion that the offence was committed in the manner describ The State of West d b Abd 1 Sh \"kh 1 · d b h h\" 1 B\"ngal e a ove."}}, {"text": "Bashiruddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4981, "end_char": 4992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was examined by one Dr. Bashiruddin, who gave him first aid."}}, {"text": "Nalhati Health Centre", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5166, "end_char": 5187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, Abdul Sheikh was removed to Nalhati Health Centre, and while arrangements were being nrnde for recording his dying declaration, he succnm hed to his injuries."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5503, "end_char": 5518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this appeal, we did not allow Dr. D. N. Mukherjee, counsel for the appellants, to argue on facts.", "canonical_name": "D. N. 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Emperor(')."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6076, "end_char": 6081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6134, "end_char": 6140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khundkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6233, "end_char": 6241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With the view of the learned Judge, Lodge J. differed anq the case was then placed before Khundkar J. who agreed with Lodge J., and the decision was that s. 34 could be so read."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6297, "end_char": 6302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6507, "end_char": 6527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I The first is a single Judge decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Ramnath v. 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(19441 2 Cal."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6938, "end_char": 6943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6947, "end_char": 6953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chakravarti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6989, "end_char": 7000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "doubts about 1.he applicability of s. 34 to s. 304, Part I. As 1964 against this, Mr. Chakravarti, counsel for the State relied Afrahim Sheikh upon a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court Th 5 v. f w reported in Saidu Khan v. State(') where it has been e\n\n1 ~n:al est clearly held that s. 34 can be so read.", "canonical_name": "Chakravarti"}}, {"text": "Afrahim Sheikh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7031, "end_char": 7045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "doubts about 1.he applicability of s. 34 to s. 304, Part I. 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"regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13003, "end_char": 13009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13261, "end_char": 13271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13353, "end_char": 13363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14068, "end_char": 14073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14541, "end_char": 14551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 34 and 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15191, "end_char": 15204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15300, "end_char": 15305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 38", 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decision given by the majority in the Calcutta High Court case and the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20060, "end_char": 20066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20288, "end_char": 20293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20373, "end_char": 20379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20536, "end_char": 20542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hidayatul", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20710, "end_char": 20719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "person oes not o an act Bingal except with a certain intention, and the common intention Hidayatul/a/i J. which is requisite for the application of s. 34 is the common intention of perpetrating a particular act."}}, 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SHAH JJ.)"}}, {"text": "SETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21741, "end_char": 21767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.N.VASUDEVA\n\nSETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA\n\n(M. ffIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. ffIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21770, "end_char": 21786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.N.VASUDEVA\n\nSETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA\n\n(M. ffIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH JJ.)", "canonical_name": "M. ffIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "J.C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21791, "end_char": 21800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.N.VASUDEVA\n\nSETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA\n\n(M. ffIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21880, "end_char": 21908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21939, "end_char": 21953, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Januarv", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22120, "end_char": 22127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply the appellant pleaded\n\nJanuarv."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_181_192_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 181\n\nthe second part of s. 304. In our opinion, the learned Judges 1964 -, who held that view and we say it respectfully fell into the Afrahlm Slwlkll error of viewing the second part of s. 304 divorced from Th s \"· / w . . h A d d • lat• 0\n\n•II common mtenllon w atever. person oes not o an act Bingal except with a certain intention, and the common intention Hidayatul/a/i J. which is requisite for the application of s. 34 is the common intention of perpetrating a particular act. Previous cqncert which is insisted upon is the meeting of the minds regarding the achievement of a criminal act. That circumstance is completely fulfilled in a case like the present where a large number of persons attack an individual, chase him, throw him on the ground and beat him till he dies. Even if the offence does not come to the grade of murder, and is only culpable homicide not amounting to murder, there is no doubt whatever that the offence is shared by all of them, and .s. 34 then makes the responsibility several if there was a knowledge possessed by each of them that death was likely to be caused as a result of that beating. This circumstance is completely fulfilled in the present case, and we are, therefore, satisfied that the conviction of the appellants was proper, and see no reason to interfere.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nV.N.VASUDEVA\n\nSETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA\n\n(M. ffIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH JJ.)\n\nRent Control--Ordor for d•po1lt of \"\"' at lnt•rlocutory ll•g•-lf pro,,.r-Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958), •· 15(1)-lndlan Income-tax Act. 1922 (II of 1922), •· \"6(5A).\n\nThe responllent made an 111plleation qalnst Ibo appellant under\n\n1. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In reply the appellant pleaded\n\nJanuarv. 9\n\nV. N. Vllllldeva\n\n\"· J:lrori1111JI .l.uhtlrlwala\n\nthat the respondent bad no right to recover rent from him as a nolicounder s. 46(5A) of th• Indian Income-tax Act had been issued by the Ii.come-tax Officer, that the respondent had no locll8 standi as the property was in the custody of the Court and a receiver bad been\n\nappointed and that his professional fees were agreed anll be adjusted towards the rent dues. The Rent Controller recorded the statement vf the appellant and after hearing arguments directed the appellant under •· 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to deposit back rents at Rs. 300/· per month.\n\nOn appeal the decfaion of the Rent Controller was aftlrmed, and a further appeal to the High Court also failed.\n\nThe appellant contendell that the order under s. 15(1) for deposit of rent could only be made at the end of the case and not at an interlocutory stage,\n\nHeld: (i) that the order under sub•· (I) of s. IS is not a final order ut is preliminart to the trial of the case and is made only where the r.nt has in fact not been paid. For the purpose of an interim uder it was not nece!Sary that there should have been a full trial and that tbis was clear from the latter part of sub-s. ( 1) of s. IS because under it not only the arrears have to be deposited but rent as it falls\n\n:l.ue h•s to be deposited month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month.\n\nNalinakhya Bysack and , for. v. Shyam Sunder Halder, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 198, distinguished.\n\n(; ii Tho notice unJer s. 46(5A) of the Income-tax Act did not amount to a garnishee order and the appellant could make payment\n\n•~ th-. rent wntroller without incurring personal liability because the r.nt C'cntroller ha'd stated in his order that the amount would not be paid to any one till a clearance certificate was obtained from the Incomelax Department.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1041 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated September 2, 1963, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in L.P.A. No. 119-D of 1963.\n\nS. T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravin- •er Narain, for the appellant.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General of India and B. P.\n\nMaheshwari, for the respondent.\n\nJanuary 9, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHIDAYATULLAH J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court, Punjab, dated August\n\n14, 1963, by which an order of the Rent Controller 1mder s. 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, directing the appellant to deposit back rents at Rs. 300 per month from 1st July; 1957, was confirmed. The High Court granted the appellant one month's time from the date of its own order, as the original time had already run out.\n\nThe appellant is an advocate, who is practising at Delhi.\n\nHe is occupying No. 43, Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi as a tenant, and his landlord Seth Kirori Mal Luhariwala is the respondent in this appeal.\n\nThe tenancy commenced on July 28, 1957, and the memorandum of tenancy, dated July 1, 1957, produced in the case, shows that the premises were taken on a monthly tent of Rs. 300 The memorandum also contains other terms which need not be mentioned here, because they are not relevant to the present appeal.\n\nIt appears that Seth Kirori Mal was in arrears in payment of his income-tax, and a sum of Rs. 39,00,000 was outstanding from him. On October 31, 1957, the Income-tax Officer Central Circle, New Delhi, to whom all cases of Seth Kirori Mal were transferred, issued a notice to the appellant under s. 46(5A) of the Indian Income-tax Act directing him to deposit with the Income-tax Officer all sums due by way of rent as also future rents. The appellant sent no reply to this notice .. He had, however, on September 29, 1957, addressed a letter to the respondent Seth Kirori Mal.\n\nThe reply of Kirori Mal, dated October 15, 1957, figured in the arguments a great deal, and as it is brief, it may be quoted here:\n\n\"From\n\nDated Paigarh, the 15th October. 1957.\n\nY. N. Va.rrulna\n\n•• IQrorirnal Lulurrlwalll\n\nHlda)!alul/olt /.\n\nJI. N. JI a.rudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharilvala\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nDear Sir,\n\nWith reference to letter No. M-17-58, dated 29th September, 1957, I am to write that you may please. adjust six months rent of 43, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi, i.e., Rs. 1800 (rent from 1-10-57 to 31-3-1958) towards your professional fee in part payment thereof.\n\nThe balance of your fee will be paid later at the time of final settlement.\n\nYours faithfully,\n\n(Sd.) Paluram Dhanania,\n\nFor Kirorimal Luhariwala.\n\nKirori Mal also sent a receipt, dated October 16, 1957, for the amount, and is item 23 in the record.\n\nKirori Mal had litigation in Calcutta. He had brought a suit against four defendants, claiming the present property as his \"absolute\" and \"exclusive self-acquired property\"· The case was pending in the High Court and on May I, 1958, an order was made appointing one Chakravarti as a Receiver of the properties including No. 43, Prithvi Raj Road. Chakravarti also sent a notice on July 8, 19 5 8, to the appellant demanding rent already due and also as and when due.\n\nTo this notice, the appellant sent a reply on July 19, 1958.\n\nHe referred to the payment of rent by adjustment towards fees for the period 1st October, 1957 to 31st March, 1958, which was the subject of the letter above. He stated that as regards rent after 1st April. 1958, he had no objection to pay the amount to the Receiver or any other claimant but regretted that it was not possible for him to make the payment because of the notice served upon him by the Income-tax Officer. He asked the Receiver to get the notice withdrawn, and stated that he would be glad to remit the amount of rent to him when that was done. He also raised the question of certain other expenses which he had incurred in connection with the house which he claimed he was entitled to deduct from the rent and informed that a few repairs were required in the house. A second letter was sent by the Official Receiver on September 5. 1959, making another demand. In his reply, dated September 14, 1959, to this letter, the appellant raised the\n\n.question that a sum of Rs. 23,500 was payable to him for professional services rendered by him to Seth Kirori Mal.\n\nHe stated: . ' \"You will therefore appreciate that I am entitled to adjust the rent payable against the fees due to me and the amount due to me will absorb the rent for a little over six years.\n\nEven before this Seth Kirori Mal had paid me a sum of Rs. 1800 by way of adjustment of rent towards my professional fees due.\n\nYou will, therefore, kindly agree that the rent payable is adjustable against the professional fee due to me.\"\n\nWith this letter, he enclosed a copy of a statement of fees amounting to Rs. 23,500 which he had submitted to bis client on February 4, 1959. The Official Receiver then informed the appellant that the party concerned had denied the claim for fees as absolutely false, and observed in bis letter that the professional fees should be the subject of some other proceeding but the rent should be paid with out delay. He enquired if the amount of rent had been paid to the Income-tax department in response to the notice. In his reply to this letter, on July 5, 1960, the appellant for the first time stated that there was an agreement between him and Seth Kirori Mal to adjust the rent towards his professional fees until the fees were fully paid. He offered to reduce the fees if Seth Kirori Mal had any objection, but stated that till the professional fees were recouped, no rent could be considered to be due from him.\n\nOn November 25, 1960, Seth Kirori Mal applied to the High Court at Calcutta for directions to the Official Receiver to take appropriate proceedings to realise the arrears of rent from the appellant, and on December 19, 1960, the High Court appointed Seth Kirori Mal receiver in the case. Seth Kirori Mal then served a notice on December 21, l 960, on the appellant to pay the arrears of rent. To this notice, the appellant sent a detailed reply which, in substance, bas been his defence in the proceedings before the Rent Controller, from which the present appeal has arisen.\n\nV. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHidayatullah /.\n\nV. N. V asudeva\n\nOn January 4, 1961, Seth Kirori Mal made an application under s. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller, Delhi.\n\nIn his written statement in reply to that application, the appellant pleaded that Seth Kirori Mal had no right to recover rent from him, inasmuch as a notice under s. 46( SA) of the Indian Income-tax Act had been issued by the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle V,\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHldayatu/lah J.\n\nNew Delhi. He pleaded that the property was in the custody of the Court, and that Inasmuch as a receiver had been appointed, Kirori Mal had no locus standi to maintain the petition denying at the same tiine that Kirori Mal had informed him that he had been appointed a receiver of the property. The appellant also contended that under the Rent Control Act, a receiver had no right to act on behalf of the landlord.\n\nHe referred to the alleged agreement by which fees were to be recouped from rent as and when it fell due, pointing out that on an earlier occasion a sum of Rs. 1800 was allowed to be adjusted towards fees.. Some other pleas were raised, but it is not necessary to refer to them, because they were not raised before us.\n\nThe notice to quit which the appellant alleged was not issued to him was filed in the Court of the Controller on May 17, 1961.\n\nThe appellant was ordered to inspect it and to be ready for his statement as to the correctness of the nott:e. On the next date, a statement of the appellant was recorded and he denied the notice and also its receipt.\n\nThe casl! was then set down for arguments and after hearing the arguments, the Rent Controller passed his order on July 22, 1961. The Rent Controller held that there wa\" no proof or1 the file to show that the respondent had any right to make an adjustment of the rent against his professional I dues. He held that the rent was not paid after March 31,\n\n1958. With regard to the plea that a notice under s . . 46 ( 5 A) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, had been issued, the Rent Controller observed that the amount. if deposited in his court, would not be paid to Kirori Mal unless he produced a clearance certificate from the Income-tax Department. The Rent Controller also said that if in the enquiry to be subsequently made, the tenant proved that the amount of fees had to be recouped from rent, the amount would not be paid to Kirori Mal.\n\nAgainst the decision of the Rent Controller, the appellant filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal. The Rent Control Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Controller, observing that the plea taken by him that his professional fees were to come out of rent was an after-thought and there was no evidence to prove that there was such an agreement between the parties.\n\nOn other matters, the Tribunal expressed its agreement with the Rent Controller.\n\nThe appellant then appealed to the High Court of Punjab.\n\nThe High Court upheld the orders so far made and pointed out that in the letter dated July 19, 1958, to the Receiver, the appellant had not mentioned the agreement. The High Court held that the order made under s. 15 (1 ) of the Act was proper, because it was an admitted fact that rent had not been paid to anybody from April l, 1958. The High Court endorsed the view of the Tribunals below that the notice of the Income-tax Officer did not come in the way of making the deposit of the rent in the office of the Rent Controller, because the amount was not to be paid to anyone till the Rent Controller had decided who was entitled to receive it. The appeal was therefore dismissed.\n\nIn this court, emphasis is laid upon the letter of October 15, 1957, by Kirori Mal in which there was an adjustment of Rs. 1800 towards fees. It was contended that thl!re was an oral agreement to use the rent to pay the professional fees. The letter itself does not show that there was any such agreement.\n\nIn fact it shows the contrary where it says:\n\n\"The balance of your fees will be paid later at the time of final settlement.\"\n\nThis shows that the appellant was not entitled to retain the rent in his hands, and the Tribunals below were justified in saying that the plea about the so-called agreemeut was an after-thought, because till September 14, 1959, the appellant had not mentioned such an agreement.\n\nWe are also satisfied that the plea was a mere device to retain the money and to avoid paying the rent. It must be remembered that there were as many as four claimants, viz., the Income-tax Officer, the Receiver and Kirori Mal in person and Kirori\n\nJf. N. Jf a.rudeva\"\n\n•• Kirorimal Lulrariwala\n\nHidayatullali /.\"\n\nV. N. Vasudeva v.\n\nKirorimal Luhariwala\n\nHidoyatullah J.\n\nMal as Receiver. but the appellant avoided each of these in turn by pointing to the others, and in this way continued to occupy the premises without payment of any rent.\n\nIt was contended however as a matter of law that a proper opportunity ought to have been given to the appellant to prove his plea by leading evidence before ordering that the rent be deposited. Mr. S. T. Desai contended that under s. 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, an order for deposit of arrears of rent can only be made after the tenant has been given an opportunity of being heard, because if .the tenant makes a payment or deposit as required of him, the landlord is entitled to take the amount of the deposit and the Controller can award such costs as he may deem fit to the landlord and the case comes to nn end. By way of contrast, he pointed out that the case proceeds if the tenant fails to make the payment or deposit as required of him.\n\nIn other words, it was contended that an order under s. 15 (1) for deposit of rent should only be made at the end of the case and not at an interlocutory stage. Mr.\n\nDesai contended that the present order was made at an interlocutory stage and it was wrong, because if the tenant deposited the money, there would be no further hearing and his plea that there was an agreement between the parties that the rent as and when it fell due should be set off against the professional fc; es, would remain untried. In our opinion, this reading is not permissible.\n\nSection 15 (omitting ouch parts as are unnecessary for the present purpose) reads as follows: - Section 15.\n\n(1) In every proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1 ) of section 14, the Controller shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make an order directing the tenant to pay to the landford or deposit with the Controller within one month of the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the arrears of the rent were legally recoverable from the ten-\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1S 189\n\nV. N. Vasud.va\n\nKirorimal Luhariwaltl\n\nant including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made and to continue to pay or deposit month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum . Hldayatul/ah 1equivalent to the rent at that rate .\n\n• • I I I I I I o t • o I o o o\n\n( 3) If, in any proceeding referred to in subsection ( 1) or sub-section ( 2), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payahle by the tenant, the Controller shall, within fifteen days of the date of the first hearing of the proceeding, fix an interim rent in relation to the premises to be paid or deposited in accordance with the provisions of sub-section ( 1) or subsection ( 2), as the case may be, until the standard rent in relation. thereto is fixed having regard to the provisions of this Act, and the\n\namount of arrears, if any, calculated on the basis of the standard rent shall be paid or deposited by the tenant within next month of the date on which the standard rent is fixed or such further time as the Controller may allow in this behalf .\n\n• I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I\n\n( 6) If a tenant makes payment or deposit as required by sub-section ( 1) or sub-section ( 3), no order shall be made for the recovery of possession on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant but the Controller niay allow such costs as he may deem fit to the landlord.\n\n(7) If a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by this section the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that sub-section ( 3) also contemplat1~\n\nV. N. V asudeva v.\n\nKirorimal Luhariwala\n\nHidayatullah /.\n\npayment of interim rent determined by the Controller before the entire dispute is settled.\n\nSub-section ( 6) puts the case under sub-s. (1) and sub-s. ( 3) on the same footing and makes no distinction between them. It is also possible to visualise cases in which the tenant may deposit the amount of rent under protest and claim that his defence be tried. It is not that even on the deposit of the arrears of rent in these circumstances the case would come to an end.\n\nThe latter part of sub'section ( l) further shows that not only the arrears have to be deposited but rent as it falls due has to be deposited month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month.\n\nThis also shows that the order under sub-section ( l) is not a final order but is preliminary to the trial of the case and is made only where the rent has in fact not been paid. For the purpose of an interim order it was not necessary that there should have been a full trial. The Rent Controller had the affidavit of the appellant and he\n\nould judge whether in the circumstances of the case, an interim order ought or ought not to be made. He cam~ to the conclusion that the rent was not paid and the plea that it was being withheld under an agreement was an afterthought and not true. The High Court and the Rent Control Tribunal have agreed with this view of the Rent Controller and the conclusion appears to us to be sound. Once such a conclusion is reached, it is quite manifest that the order was made after affording an opportunity tlJ the appellant to be heard. No doubt, the appellant is entitled to lead oral evidence in regard to the agreement he alleges, but for that he will have an opportunity hereafter. At the moment, he is being asked to deposit the arrears in court, which admittedly are outstanding.\n\nMr. Desai next contended that the notice under s. 46(5A) amounted to a garnishee order and the appellant could not, while the notice stood, make any payment without incurring personal liability. There was no question of a personal liability because the Rent Controller had stated in his order that the amount would not be paid to :myone till the clearance certificate was obtained from the Incometax Department.\n\nThe Rent Controller had informed the Income-tax authorities and the appellant ran no risk in depositing the arrears of rent in the circumstances.\n\nIt was contended that the notice under s. 46(5AJ amounted to an attachment of the rent in the hands of the appellant and reference was made to the provisions of s. 46 sub-s SA para 5. The argument overlooks the next para which provides:\n\n\"'Vhere a person to whom a notice under this subsection is sent objects to it on the ground that the sum demanded or any part thereof is not due to the assessee or that he does not hold any money for or on account of the assessee, then, nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to require such person to pay any such sum or part thereof, as the case may be, to the Income-tax Officer.\"\n\nIf there was an agreement between the parties and Kirori Mal was '\"debted for such a. large amount, th~ appellant could have objected on the ground that he did not hold any money for or on account of the assessee and then he would not have been required to pay any sum to the Income-tax Officer. The appellant did nothing in the matter except to deny the payment to everyone.\n\nHe paid nothing to the Income-tax Officer, declined to deposit the money before the Rent Controller and refused to recognise the <lemands by the Receiver and his landlord. In other words, he was trying to take full advantage of the law, when he could have informed the Income-tax Officer about his own position and paid the money to the Rent Controller subject to its being paid to the Income-tax Department.\n\nReference was made in this connection to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Nalinakhya Bysack and another v. Shyam Sunder Halder and others(') in which Harries C.J. observed that before making an orde! for the deposit of the rent, a full enquirv should be made.\n\nThat was a case in which the tenant had pleaded that there was an agreement between him and the landlord that any amount spent on repairs would be set off against the rent.\n\nHarries C.J. held that without ascertaining the\n\n(1) A.I.R. (1952) Cal. 198.\n\nY. N. J' asudeva\n\nKirorimal Luhariw•la\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nV. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nJanuary, 13\n\ntruth of the plea that a large sum had been spent on repairs, an order to deposit the entire arrears of rent ought not tohave been made. It is quite clear that the facts there were entirely different. Payment by the landlord for repairs was a part of the tenancy agreement and rent under that tenancy could not be calculated without advertence to every term of the agreement of tenancy.\n\nHere the special agreement which is pleaded is outside the tenancy agreement and the allegation about the special agreement has been held to be an after-thought and false.\n\nIt is therefore diffici1\\t to apply the ruling to the present circumstances.\n\nThe appeal is wholly devoid of merit and it is dismissed with costs.\n\nBy the consent of parties, a period of two months from the date of hearing (20-12-1963) was granted to the appellant to deposit the arrears of rnt from 1st April, 1958, in the Court of the Rent Controller.\n\nAppeal dismissed ..\n\nSURAJ RATAN THIRANI & ORS.\n\nTHE AZAMABAD TEA CO. & ORS.\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nCode of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), O. IX, r. 9-Scope oflrow11 Grants Act, s. 3-Lease by Government-Effect of-Applica .. bility of s. 41 of Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882).\n\nThe property covered by the Tea Estate was granted by the Govern ment by way of lease in 1898 for 30 years.\n\nIn 1913 it was purchased' by Azam Ali. When he died in 1917, he left behind 8 sons, 9 daughters and 3 widows. The name of Ismail, his el(iest son. was entered in the official records as next in succession.\n\nIsmail borrowed considerable sums from National Agency Co. Ltd., and for securing the same, depo- sited the title deeds of the Tea Estate on the footing that he was its full owner.\n\nAs the amonnt under the mortgage was not paid, a suitr was filed for realisation of the amount by sale of mortgage property ..", "total_entities": 109, "entities": [{"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 62, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 219, "end_char": 225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hidayatul", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "person oes not o an act Bingal except with a certain intention, and the common intention Hidayatul/a/i J. which is requisite for the application of s. 34 is the common intention of perpetrating a particular act."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 452, "end_char": 457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1002, "end_char": 1007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.VASUDEVA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1412, "end_char": 1422, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.N.VASUDEVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1424, "end_char": 1450, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1476, "end_char": 1487, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1563, "end_char": 1591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1622, "end_char": 1636, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "V. N. Vllllldeva", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1815, "end_char": 1831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9\n\nV. N. Vllllldeva\n\n\"· J:lrori1111JI .l.uhtlrlwala\n\nthat the respondent bad no right to recover rent from him as a nolicounder s. 46(5A) of th• Indian Income-tax Act had been issued by the Ii.come-tax Officer, that the respondent had no locll8 standi as the property was in the custody of the Court and a receiver bad been\n\nappointed and that his professional fees were agreed anll be adjusted towards the rent dues."}}, {"text": "s. 46(5A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1940, "end_char": 1949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1957, "end_char": 1978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2363, "end_char": 2391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2598, "end_char": 2606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Nalinakhya Bysack", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3205, "end_char": 3222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nalinakhya Bysack and , for."}}, {"text": "s. 46(5A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3319, "end_char": 3328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3336, "end_char": 3350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3878, "end_char": 3889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3894, "end_char": 3907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3912, "end_char": 3921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravin- •er Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ravin- •er Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3926, "end_char": 3943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravin- •er Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3965, "end_char": 3977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General of India and B. P.\n\nMaheshwari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. P.\n\nMaheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4010, "end_char": 4027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General of India and B. P.\n\nMaheshwari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4111, "end_char": 4123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHIDAYATULLAH J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court, Punjab, dated August\n\n14, 1963, by which an order of the Rent Controller 1mder s. 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, directing the appellant to deposit back rents at Rs.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4278, "end_char": 4283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4295, "end_char": 4323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st July; 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4397, "end_char": 4411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "300 per month from 1st July; 1957, was confirmed."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is an advocate, who is practising at Delhi."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4658, "end_char": 4667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "43, Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi as a tenant, and his landlord Seth Kirori Mal Luhariwala is the respondent in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Seth Kirori Mal Luhariwala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4698, "end_char": 4724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "43, Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi as a tenant, and his landlord Seth Kirori Mal Luhariwala is the respondent in this appeal.", "canonical_name": "SETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA"}}, {"text": "July 28, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4785, "end_char": 4798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenancy commenced on July 28, 1957, and the memorandum of tenancy, dated July 1, 1957, produced in the case, shows that the premises were taken on a monthly tent of Rs."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4837, "end_char": 4849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenancy commenced on July 28, 1957, and the memorandum of tenancy, dated July 1, 1957, produced in the case, shows that the premises were taken on a monthly tent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Seth Kirori Mal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5082, "end_char": 5097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Seth Kirori Mal was in arrears in payment of his income-tax, and a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "SETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA"}}, {"text": "October 31, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5199, "end_char": 5215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 31, 1957, the Income-tax Officer Central Circle, New Delhi, to whom all cases of Seth Kirori Mal were transferred, issued a notice to the appellant under s. 46(5A) of the Indian Income-tax Act directing him to deposit with the Income-tax Officer all sums due by way of rent as also future rents."}}, {"text": "s. 46(5A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5361, "end_char": 5370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5385, "end_char": 5399, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September 29, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5569, "end_char": 5587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant sent no reply to this notice .. He had, however, on September 29, 1957, addressed a letter to the respondent Seth Kirori Mal."}}, {"text": "Seth Kirori Mal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5626, "end_char": 5641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant sent no reply to this notice .. He had, however, on September 29, 1957, addressed a letter to the respondent Seth Kirori Mal.", "canonical_name": "SETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA"}}, {"text": "Kirori Mal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5657, "end_char": 5667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reply of Kirori Mal, dated October 15, 1957, figured in the arguments a great deal, and as it is brief, it may be quoted here:\n\n\"From\n\nDated Paigarh, the 15th October."}}, {"text": "Y. N. Va.rrulna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. N. Va.rrulna\n\n•• IQrorirnal Lulurrlwalll\n\nHlda)!alul/olt /.\n\nJI."}}, {"text": "Kirorimal Luharilvala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5907, "end_char": 5928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. JI a.rudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharilvala\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nDear Sir,\n\nWith reference to letter No.", "canonical_name": "Kirorimal Luharilvala"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5930, "end_char": 5942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. JI a.rudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharilvala\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nDear Sir,\n\nWith reference to letter No.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "Kirorimal Luhariwala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6346, "end_char": 6366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paluram Dhanania,\n\nFor Kirorimal Luhariwala.", "canonical_name": "Kirorimal Luharilvala"}}, {"text": "October 16, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6407, "end_char": 6423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kirori Mal also sent a receipt, dated October 16, 1957, for the amount, and is item 23 in the record."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6501, "end_char": 6509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kirori Mal had litigation in Calcutta."}}, {"text": "May I, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6692, "end_char": 6703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had brought a suit against four defendants, claiming the present property as his \"absolute\" and \"exclusive self-acquired property\"· The case was pending in the High Court and on May I, 1958, an order was made appointing one Chakravarti as a Receiver of the properties including No."}}, {"text": "Chakravarti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6738, "end_char": 6749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had brought a suit against four defendants, claiming the present property as his \"absolute\" and \"exclusive self-acquired property\"· The case was pending in the High Court and on May I, 1958, an order was made appointing one Chakravarti as a Receiver of the properties including No."}}, {"text": "July 8, 19 5 8", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6852, "end_char": 6866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chakravarti also sent a notice on July 8, 19 5 8, to the appellant demanding rent already due and also as and when due."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6985, "end_char": 6998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this notice, the appellant sent a reply on July 19, 1958."}}, {"text": "1st October, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7078, "end_char": 7095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to the payment of rent by adjustment towards fees for the period 1st October, 1957 to 31st March, 1958, which was the subject of the letter above."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7099, "end_char": 7115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to the payment of rent by adjustment towards fees for the period 1st October, 1957 to 31st March, 1958, which was the subject of the letter above."}}, {"text": "September 5. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7836, "end_char": 7853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second letter was sent by the Official Receiver on September 5."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7898, "end_char": 7916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his reply, dated September 14, 1959, to this letter, the appellant raised the\n\n.question that a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 4, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8635, "end_char": 8651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23,500 which he had submitted to bis client on February 4, 1959."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9060, "end_char": 9072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his reply to this letter, on July 5, 1960, the appellant for the first time stated that there was an agreement between him and Seth Kirori Mal to adjust the rent towards his professional fees until the fees were fully paid."}}, {"text": "November 25, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9433, "end_char": 9450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 25, 1960, Seth Kirori Mal applied to the High Court at Calcutta for directions to the Official Receiver to take appropriate proceedings to realise the arrears of rent from the appellant, and on December 19, 1960, the High Court appointed Seth Kirori Mal receiver in the case."}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9483, "end_char": 9505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 25, 1960, Seth Kirori Mal applied to the High Court at Calcutta for directions to the Official Receiver to take appropriate proceedings to realise the arrears of rent from the appellant, and on December 19, 1960, the High Court appointed Seth Kirori Mal receiver in the case."}}, {"text": "December 19, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9636, "end_char": 9653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 25, 1960, Seth Kirori Mal applied to the High Court at Calcutta for directions to the Official Receiver to take appropriate proceedings to realise the arrears of rent from the appellant, and on December 19, 1960, the High Court appointed Seth Kirori Mal receiver in the case."}}, {"text": "December 21, l 960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9758, "end_char": 9776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seth Kirori Mal then served a notice on December 21, l 960, on the appellant to pay the arrears of rent."}}, {"text": "V. N. Vasudeva", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10007, "end_char": 10021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHidayatullah /.\n\nV. N. V asudeva\n\nOn January 4, 1961, Seth Kirori Mal made an application under s. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller, Delhi.", "canonical_name": "V. N. V asudeva"}}, {"text": "Kirorimal Luharlwala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10023, "end_char": 10043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHidayatullah /.\n\nV. N. V asudeva\n\nOn January 4, 1961, Seth Kirori Mal made an application under s. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller, Delhi.", "canonical_name": "Kirorimal Luharilvala"}}, {"text": "V. N. V asudeva", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10062, "end_char": 10077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHidayatullah /.\n\nV. N. V asudeva\n\nOn January 4, 1961, Seth Kirori Mal made an application under s. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller, Delhi.", "canonical_name": "V. N. V asudeva"}}, {"text": "January 4, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10082, "end_char": 10097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHidayatullah /.\n\nV. N. V asudeva\n\nOn January 4, 1961, Seth Kirori Mal made an application under s. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller, Delhi."}}, {"text": "Seth Kirori Mal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10099, "end_char": 10114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHidayatullah /.\n\nV. N. V asudeva\n\nOn January 4, 1961, Seth Kirori Mal made an application under s. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller, Delhi.", "canonical_name": "SETH KIRORIMAL LUHARIW ALA"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10141, "end_char": 10146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46( SA)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10377, "end_char": 10387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10402, "end_char": 10416, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 17, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11367, "end_char": 11379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice to quit which the appellant alleged was not issued to him was filed in the Court of the Controller on May 17, 1961."}}, {"text": "July 22, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11716, "end_char": 11729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was then set down for arguments and after hearing the arguments, the Rent Controller passed his order on July 22, 1961."}}, {"text": "March 31,\n\n1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11943, "end_char": 11958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He held that the rent was not paid after March 31,\n\n1958."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12027, "end_char": 12047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12934, "end_char": 12954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then appealed to the High Court of Punjab."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13168, "end_char": 13173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April l, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13278, "end_char": 13291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the order made under s. 15 (1 ) of the Act was proper, because it was an admitted fact that rent had not been paid to anybody from April l, 1958."}}, {"text": "October 15, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13692, "end_char": 13708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this court, emphasis is laid upon the letter of October 15, 1957, by Kirori Mal in which there was an adjustment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kirori\n\nJf. N. Jf a.rudeva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14595, "end_char": 14621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Income-tax Officer, the Receiver and Kirori Mal in person and Kirori\n\nJf."}}, {"text": "Hidoyatullah J.\n\nMal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14710, "end_char": 14730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Jf a.rudeva\"\n\n•• Kirorimal Lulrariwala\n\nHidayatullali /.\"\n\nV. N. Vasudeva v.\n\nKirorimal Luhariwala\n\nHidoyatullah J.\n\nMal as Receiver."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15096, "end_char": 15107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S. T. Desai contended that under s. 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, an order for deposit of arrears of rent can only be made after the tenant has been given an opportunity of being heard, because if .the tenant makes a payment or deposit as required of him, the landlord is entitled to take the amount of the deposit and the Controller can award such costs as he may deem fit to the landlord and the case comes to nn end.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15129, "end_char": 15134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15707, "end_char": 15712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15820, "end_char": 15825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nDesai contended that the present order was made at an interlocutory stage and it was wrong, because if the tenant deposited the money, there would be no further hearing and his plea that there was an agreement between the parties that the rent as and when it fell due should be set off against the professional fc; es, would remain untried."}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16211, "end_char": 16221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16307, "end_char": 16317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16467, "end_char": 16477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. N. Vasud.va", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16882, "end_char": 16896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) In every proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1 ) of section 14, the Controller shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make an order directing the tenant to pay to the landford or deposit with the Controller within one month of the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the arrears of the rent were legally recoverable from the ten-\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1S 189\n\nV. N. Vasud.va\n\nKirorimal Luhariwaltl\n\nant including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made and to continue to pay or deposit month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum .", "canonical_name": "V. N. V asudeva"}}, {"text": "Kirorimal Luhariwaltl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16898, "end_char": 16919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) In every proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1 ) of section 14, the Controller shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make an order directing the tenant to pay to the landford or deposit with the Controller within one month of the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid for the period for which the arrears of the rent were legally recoverable from the ten-\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1S 189\n\nV. N. Vasud.va\n\nKirorimal Luhariwaltl\n\nant including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made and to continue to pay or deposit month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum .", "canonical_name": "Kirorimal Luharilvala"}}, {"text": "s. 46(5A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20466, "end_char": 20475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22459, "end_char": 22478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made in this connection to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Nalinakhya Bysack and another v. Shyam Sunder Halder and others(') in which Harries C.J. observed that before making an orde!"}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22567, "end_char": 22574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made in this connection to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Nalinakhya Bysack and another v. Shyam Sunder Halder and others(') in which Harries C.J. observed that before making an orde!"}}, {"text": "Y. N. J' asudeva", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22930, "end_char": 22946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. N. J' asudeva\n\nKirorimal Luhariw•la\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nV. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nJanuary, 13\n\ntruth of the plea that a large sum had been spent on repairs, an order to deposit the entire arrears of rent ought not tohave been made."}}, {"text": "Kirorimal Luhariw•la", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22948, "end_char": 22968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. N. J' asudeva\n\nKirorimal Luhariw•la\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nV. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nJanuary, 13\n\ntruth of the plea that a large sum had been spent on repairs, an order to deposit the entire arrears of rent ought not tohave been made.", "canonical_name": "Kirorimal Luharilvala"}}, {"text": "Hldayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22970, "end_char": 22982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. N. J' asudeva\n\nKirorimal Luhariw•la\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nV. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nJanuary, 13\n\ntruth of the plea that a large sum had been spent on repairs, an order to deposit the entire arrears of rent ought not tohave been made.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "V. N. Vasudeva", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22987, "end_char": 23001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. N. J' asudeva\n\nKirorimal Luhariw•la\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nV. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nJanuary, 13\n\ntruth of the plea that a large sum had been spent on repairs, an order to deposit the entire arrears of rent ought not tohave been made.", "canonical_name": "V. N. V asudeva"}}, {"text": "Kirorimal Luharlwala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23003, "end_char": 23023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. N. J' asudeva\n\nKirorimal Luhariw•la\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nV. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nJanuary, 13\n\ntruth of the plea that a large sum had been spent on repairs, an order to deposit the entire arrears of rent ought not tohave been made.", "canonical_name": "Kirorimal Luharilvala"}}, {"text": "20-12-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23840, "end_char": 23850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the consent of parties, a period of two months from the date of hearing (20-12-1963) was granted to the appellant to deposit the arrears of rnt from 1st April, 1958, in the Court of the Rent Controller."}}, {"text": "SURAJ RATAN THIRANI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23992, "end_char": 24011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed ..\n\nSURAJ RATAN THIRANI & ORS."}}, {"text": "AZAMABAD TEA CO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24024, "end_char": 24039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE AZAMABAD TEA CO. &"}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24050, "end_char": 24061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B. P. SINHA, C.J., J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24069, "end_char": 24079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B. P. SINHA, C.J., J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24084, "end_char": 24097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B. P. SINHA, C.J., J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24099, "end_char": 24107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B. P. SINHA, C.J., J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24114, "end_char": 24137, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24194, "end_char": 24198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24250, "end_char": 24255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24259, "end_char": 24283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Azam Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24437, "end_char": 24445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1913 it was purchased' by Azam Ali."}}, {"text": "Ismail", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24530, "end_char": 24536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The name of Ismail, his el(iest son."}}, {"text": "National Agency Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24654, "end_char": 24678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ismail borrowed considerable sums from National Agency Co. Ltd., and for securing the same, depo- sited the title deeds of the Tea Estate on the footing that he was its full owner."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_192_213_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "V. N. Vasudeva\n\nKirorimal Luharlwala\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\nJanuary, 13\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\ntruth of the plea that a large sum had been spent on repairs, an order to deposit the entire arrears of rent ought not tohave been made. It is quite clear that the facts there were entirely different. Payment by the landlord for repairs was a part of the tenancy agreement and rent under that tenancy could not be calculated without advertence to every term of the agreement of tenancy.\n\nHere the special agreement which is pleaded is outside the tenancy agreement and the allegation about the special agreement has been held to be an after-thought and false.\n\nIt is therefore diffici1\\t to apply the ruling to the present circumstances.\n\nThe appeal is wholly devoid of merit and it is dismissed with costs.\n\nBy the consent of parties, a period of two months from the date of hearing (20-12-1963) was granted to the appellant to deposit the arrears of rnt from 1st April, 1958, in the Court of the Rent Controller.\n\nAppeal dismissed ..\n\nSURAJ RATAN THIRANI & ORS.\n\nTHE AZAMABAD TEA CO. & ORS.\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nCode of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), O. IX, r. 9-Scope oflrow11 Grants Act, s. 3-Lease by Government-Effect of-Applica .. bility of s. 41 of Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882).\n\nThe property covered by the Tea Estate was granted by the Govern ment by way of lease in 1898 for 30 years.\n\nIn 1913 it was purchased' by Azam Ali. When he died in 1917, he left behind 8 sons, 9 daughters and 3 widows. The name of Ismail, his el(iest son. was entered in the official records as next in succession.\n\nIsmail borrowed considerable sums from National Agency Co. Ltd., and for securing the same, depo- sited the title deeds of the Tea Estate on the footing that he was its full owner.\n\nAs the amonnt under the mortgage was not paid, a suitr was filed for realisation of the amount by sale of mortgage property ..\n\n•rhe suit was decreed and in execution the property was auctioned and -saJe was confirmed in 1931 in favour of the decreeholder who sold the same to Azarnabad Tea Estate, the principal respondent in this case.\n\nThe heirs of Azam Ali brought suit No. 58 of 1931 to set aside <the decree and sale in favour of the National Agency Co. Ltd.1 on -various grounds but that suit. was dismissed for default. -\n\nThe suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed subse~ -quently.\n\nThe plaintiffs.appellants who claimed title under purchasers for the heirs of Azam Ali .challenged the validity of the transactions by which the National Agency Co. Ltd. claimed to have purchased the entire 16 annas inlerest in the property at the court sale in pursuance .of a decree obtained by them against Ismail. The trial Court held 1hat\n\nthe purchase made by the National Agency Co. Ltd. was valid and extended to the entire interest in the property and hence the venders of .the plaintiffs had no title -to convey to them any interests in the pro- ; perty.\n\nThe High Court in appeal disagreed with this finding but di\"lmissed the appeal on other grounds except to the extent of an 8 pies share in the property.\n\nThe appellants came to this Court on a ccrtifi- Cate of fitness granted by the High Court.\n\nThe points raised before this Court were whether the High Court l\\Vas right in holding that\\ the present suit was barred by 0. IX, r. 9 on the :ground that when suit No. 58 of 1931 was dismissed in default, no ..action was taken to get it restored, this was raised by the respondent anJ whether in any event their claims to the 2 .as 13 odd gundas share of Ashfaq, son of Ismail, should not have been decreed.\n\nHELD (i) that the suit was substantially barred by 0. IX, r. 9. !he essential bundle of facts on which the plaintiffs based their title\n\n; and their right to relief were identical in the two suits the property sought to be recovered in the two suits was the same. The title of the persons from whom the plaintiffs claimed title by purchase was based -0n the same facts.\n\nThe additional allegation about possession in Octo- ber 1934 did not rea11y destroy the basic and substantial identity of the <auses of action in the two suits.\n\nThe ban imposed by 0. IX, r. 9 does not create merely a personal bar or estoppel against the particular plaintiff suing on the sa1ne cause of action and does not ltave the matter at large for those claiming under '.him.\n\nThe word \"plaintiff\" .in the .rule Jncludes his assigns and legal representatives.\n\n(ii) that When the Government granted the lease in 1928, the\n\nlease was granted not only in favour of Ismail but also in favour of the other co-sharers although the name of Ismail alone was mentioned in . -the lease deed.\n\nThe provisjons of s. 3 of the Crown Grants Act did ·.not affect the beneficial interest in the lease.\n\nSection 41 of the Transfer of Property Act did not belp the respon •dent as there was no evidence to show that Ismail .was put forward by\n\nil.34-139 S.C.-U\n\n1964'\n\nSura/ RatOll Thiranl v.\n\nAzamabad\n\nT•a Co.\n\n19~\n\nSura/ Ratan Thirani\n\nAzamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nthe other cowsharers as the ostensible owner of the property.\n\nTue con-- duct of the cowsbarers in permitting Ismail to manage the common pro-- perty did not by itself raise any estoppel precluding them from asscr-- ting their rights.\n\nEven a cursory enquiry by the mortgagee would have disclosed that Ismail was not the full owner.\n\nAs regards the contention of the appellants that they should have been granted a decree to the extent of 2 As. 13 odd gundas share of Ashfaq in additio'n to the 8 pies share decreed to them by the High Court, the case was ordered to be remitted to the trial Court for giving its finding_regarding the reality of the sale by Asbfaq.\n\nGopi Ram v. Jagannath Singh, l.L.R. 9 Pat. 447, Mohanunad Khalil Khan v. Muhbub Ali Mian, 15 I.A. 121 and Soorijomonee Dasee\n\nv. Suddanund, (1873) 12 Ben. L.R. 304, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 330 of 1960.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated March 18, 1954, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 80 of 1947.\n\nS. T. Desai and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants.\n\nB. Sen, N. R. Ghosh, Salil K. Datt and P. K. Ghosh, for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nJanuary 13, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyangM J, A YY ANGAR J .-This is an appeal .preferred, by virtue of a certificate of fitness granted by the Calcutta High Court, against its judgment, by which the decne passed by the Subordinate Judge of Darjeeling was substantially affirmed.\n\nThe plaintiffs are the appellants before this Court. The suit out of which the appeal arises wa> brought by the appellants claiming title to and the recovery of possession of a property known as the Azambad Tea Estate whieh comprised about 378 acres of land in Touzi No. 911 of the Darjeeling Collectorate.\n\nThis property was set out in Schedule A to the plaint and besides a claim was also made to certain other items of the movables and certain other tenures. but this appeal is not concerned with these others which were set out in Schs. B and C to the plaint.\n\nOne Kazi Azam Ali was admittedly a full owner of this entire property and the proceedings giving rise to the appeal are concerned with the rights of his heirs to it.\n\nThe plaintiffs claim their title on the basis of various purchases from the heirs of this Azam Ali.\n\nThe contesting defendants were the Azamabad Tea Co. who also claim the entire property as transferees from the National Agency Co. Ltd., who too have been impleaded as defendants.\n\nThe. National Agency Co. Ltd. claim to have purchased the entire 16 as. interest in the property at a Court sale in pursuance of a decree obtained by them against Kazi Mohammed Ismail, the eldest son of Azam Ali.\n\nVarious contentions were raised by the plaintiffs in challenge of the validity of the transactions by which the defendants claimed their title.\n\nBut the learned Subordinate Judge repelled the plaintiffs' claim and held that the purchase by the National Agency Co. Ltd. was valid and extended to the entire interest in the property and that in consequence the plaintiffs' vendors had no title to convey to them any interest in. the property. The plaintiffs' claim of the property in respect of Sch. A was therefore dismissed.\n\nThe plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court and the learned Judges upheld the title of the plaintiffs to an 8 pies share in the property mentioned in Sch. A to the plaint but confirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge as regards the rest.\n\nThe learned Judges however granted a certificate Of fitness to the plaintiffs on the strength of which the present appeal has been filed.\n\nThe history of the transactions before the suit occupies a period of over 20 years and the facts in relation thereto are at once long, voluminous and complicated.\n\nBut. for the disposal of the appeal and the points urged before us it is wholly unnecessary to set these out and we shall therefore confine ourselves to a narration of the bare outlines of the case along with those facts which are necessary to appreciate the contentions raised in support of the appeal.\n\nThe property covered by the Tea Estate was granted by Government by way of lease to one Mudir and another for 30 years, the term to start on the 1st of April 1898.\n\nThe grantees effected transfers of their lease-hold and after several successive transfers the property was purchased in\n\nSura/ Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nSura; Ratan Thiram\n\nAzamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1913 by one Kazi Azam Ali who got his name registered as a proprietor. It was Azam Ali who started the tea garden, constructed the requisite factories as accessories thereto and named it the Azamabad Tea Estate Azam Ali had several children and among them 8 daughters and in consideration of gifts made to them. these daughters by a registered deed executed in 1909 relinquished their rights of succession to Azam Ali.\n\nThey thus faded away from the picture and no more notice need be taken of them.\n\nBesides these 8 daughters, Azam Ali had 8 sons who survived him and were among his heirs, when he died on June 8, 1917. Mohammed Ismail was the eldest of these sons.\n\nAzam Ali also left behind him a daughter who was born after the relinquishment of 1909 and three widows.\n\nAdmittedly the sons of Azam Ali, his widows and his last daughters were all his heirs entitled to his estate in the shares as prescribed by Muslim Law.\n\nOn Azam Ali's death his eldest son-I mail-had his name entered in the Government records a, the next in succession and at the time the thirty years term of the lease expired, the lease continued to remain in the name of Ismail alone.\n\nWe now proceed to the transactions as a result of which the contesting defendants claim to have obtained the full title to the Tea Estate.\n\nIsmail made large borrowings and among them were some from the National Agency Co. Ltd. and for securing the loan he deposited with them the title -Oeeds of the Tea Estate.\n\nIt may be mentioned that the deposit was on the footing that he was the full owner of the 16 as. share of the property mortgaged.\n\nThe amount due under the mortgage was not paid in time and the mortgagee filed a suit for the enforcement of its mortgage and pravrd for the sale of the property for the realisation of the mortgage money.\n\nThe suit was decreed as prayed for and the property was sold in execution of the final decree and was purchased by the mortgage-decree holder on September 24, 1931. The sale was confirmed on November 13. 1931. l'his decree-holder purchaser sold the property to the . Azamabad Tea Estate-the principal respondent hefNe •1s.\n\nThere was some little controversy as regards the re.ality and effectiveness of the transfer of the property from the National Agency Co. Ltd. to the Azamabad Tea Estate,\n\nbut nothing turns on this, for even if that transfer was not effective that would not help the plaintiffs so long as they could not displace the iitle of the National Agency Co. Ltd. under the latter's court auction purchase.\n\nThe case of the plaintiffs rested on the fact that Ismail who got himself registered as if he were a fu]J proprietor of the lease-hold interest in Touzi 911 was merely one of several co-sharers of Azam Ali's estate to whom it passed on his death.\n\nThe lease-hold which was his property was according to them inherited by all his heirs including Ismail, the seven other sons, the three widows and the daughter born after 1909.\n\nThe term of the lease granted by the Government expired in 1928 and a renewed lease was granted in the name of Ismail alone.\n\nRival contentions were urged as regards the effect of this circumstance on the right of Ismail. It was the case of the contesting respondents that the lease granted in 1923 in favour of Ismail was his sole and individual property and even if for any reason the other heirs of Azam Ali had an interest in the previous lease-hold, they did not have any such interest in the property covered by the fresh lease.\n\nOn the other hand, the case of the plaintiffs was. that by -the renewal of the lease, Ismail obtained qua his co-heirs the same interest as he formerly had in the lease of.1828 .. The renewal, they stated, was for the benefit not merely of Ismail but for everyone of his co-heirs who still retained his or her interest in Azam Ali's estate.\n\nOn this basis the plaintiffs. raised the contentions that when by the sale in execution of the mortgage decree obtained by the National Agency Co. they purchased the property mortgaged, it was only the interest of Ismail that passed to them and not those of his co-sharers who were no parties to the mortgage.\n\nThere is one further transaction to which we . must advert before passing on to the next stage of the proceedings.\n\nAfter the mortgage by deposit of title deeds in favour of the National Agency Co., Ismail transferred his entire intrest in the mortgaged property, that is, in the equity of redemption, to his wife Mst. Nazifannessa, by a deed dated May 6, 193.0.\n\nNotwithstdnding this deed and this transfer of the equity of redemption Mst. Nazifannessa was not made a party to the'\n\nSurai Rata,.\n\nThirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co,\n\nAyyangar }..\n\nSura; Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nmortgage suit by the Na ti on al Agency Co.\n\nThe plaintiffs who claim to have acquired Mst. Nazifannessa's interest contended that by reason of the failure to implead N azifannessa in the mortgage action, her right to redeem the mortgage was still in tact in spite of the mortgage decree and the sale in pursuance thereof, and on this footing made a claim in the alternative to redeem the mortgage in favour of the National Agency Co. and obtain possession after re demption.\n\nTo complete the narrative of the relevant facts, very soon after the purchase in Court auction in execution of the mortgage decree, the heirs of Azam Ali brought a suit ( 58 of 1931 ) to set aside the decree and the sale in favour of the National Agency Co. Ltd. on various grounds--collusion, fraud, the circumstance that Ismail was merely a co-sharer entitled to about 2! as. share in the property and so could not mortgage more than that share, and that the decree could not bind a larger interest nor the sale convey anything more , than that share, even if it conveyed any title to the property.\n\nThis suit however did not proceed to trial, but was dismissed for default, in that the plaintiffs did not appear in Court on the date fixed for trial.\n\nThe only other matter to be mentioned is that the plaintiffs have, by their purchases, acqufred from the several co-heirs, directly or mediately. the entire 16 as. share in the property assuming that their vendors had any such right.\n\nArmed with these purchases the plaintiffs filed this suit for the reliefs already indicated.\n\nThe defences raised to the suit were three-fold:\n\n(1) That Ismail was the sole proprietor of the Tea Estate at the date of the mortgage and conse quently the entire interest was the subject of mortgage and so passed at the court sale.\n\nThis was based on the provisions of the Crown Grants Act, now the Government Grants Act.\n\nIt would be recollected that the thirty years lease of Touza 911 was renewed in 1928 and this renewal was made in the name of Ismail alone.\n\nBased on this feature a contention was raised that the grant of the lease created a new title in the grantee since the original !case in\n\nwhich alone the heirs of Azam Ali might have had a share was extinguished by the termination of that lease by efflux of time\n\n(2) The second line of defence was th.it Ismail, even if in fact or law was not the full owner, was an ostensible owner of the entire interest in the property and that the co-heirs were estopped from questioning the validity of the mortgage of the entire interest effected by him under s. 41 cf the Transfer of Property Act and that in consequence the sale in execution passed the entire 16 as. share to the purchaser. '\n\n(3) Lastly, it was urged that the plaintiffs' suit was liable to be dismissed by reason of the provisions of 0. IX, r. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code as the earlier Original Suit 58 of 1931 brought by the co-heirs to set aside the sale under the mortgage decree had been allowed to be dismissed for default.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court rejected the first two of the defences but held that except to the extent of an eight pies share which represented the interest of a co-heir which was not affected by the proceeding in Suit 58 of 1931, the plaintiffs were precluded by 0. IX. r. 9, Civil Procedurt'\n\nCode from disputing the sale in execution of mortgage decree by reason of the dismissal for default of Suit 58 of 1931.\n\nBefore proceeding to set out the arguments addressed to us by Mr. Desai, learned counsel for the appellants, it might\n\ne convenient to dispose of the submissions made to us by Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the respondents, seeking to sustain the first two defences which were repelled by the High Court.\n\nThe first of them was that by reason of the renewal of the lease in 1928 in the name of Ismail and the entry of his name as sole lessee in the revenue records, the leasehold became his sole property.\n\nApart from the arguments about Ismail being the ostensible owner of the entire 16 as. share in the lease-hold under the lease of 1898-v.nich we\n\nshall consider a little later-Mr. Sen did not dispute that\n\nSura; Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nSura; Rat1J11 Thir1J11i\n\nv. ..4zamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\n..4; yyangar /,\n\nIsmail's co-heirs were entitled to their fractional shares in. the property under the original lease.\n\nThe acceptability of this argument regarding the renewed lease has to be determined on the basis of two factors-first the intention of the\n\nparties, and here primarily of the grantor, as to the nature.\n\nand quantum of the title intended to be conferred on or obtained by Ismail and, second, the provisions of the Crown.\n\nGrants Act which governed the grant on which reliance was. placed as leading to that result. First, as to the intention of the parties. The original lease of 1898 was due to expire on March 31, 1928. On July 20, 1928 Mohd, Ismail made\n\na petition to the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling by which after drawing the latter's attention to the date on which the lease was to expire, he \"respectfully solicited the favour of kindly granting a further lease of the said Estate for a. further period of 30 years.\" The Deputy Commissioner replied by letter dated August 10, 1928 sending Ismail the draft of the renewed lease for his approval and return adding: \"in'tl\\e record of rights thy following names have been record, ed: ·\n\n1. Kazi Mohammed Ismail 2 as.;\n\n2. Kazi Isahaque 2 as_.;\n\n3. Kazi Yakub 2 as.;\n\n4. Kazi Samoddoha 2 as.;\n\n5. Kazi Nurul Ruda 2 as.;\n\n6. Kazi Badarudduza 2 as.;\n\n7. Kazi Insaf Ali 2 as.;\n\n8. Kazi Asfaque 2 as.;\n\nPlease mention the name in whose favour the lease wilt! have to be issued.\" Ismail returned the draft lease with his approval but desired that the lease should be issued' according to the name in the land register.\n\nWe are unable to read this request as meaning that Ismail; con tr a dieting what the Government said, wanted that the leasehold interest\n\nshould be his sole property in which his co-heirs who had interest in the earlier lease were to be denied all beneficial' interest.\n\nIt was thereafter that the lease was executed on February 1, 1929 in the name of Ismail to be operative from.\n\nApril 1, 1928 and was in terms in renewal of the previous,:\n\nlease.\n\nIn the circumstance, we are satisfied that the Government intended to grant a lease in favour of hi~ co-sharers\n\nas well, though the ]ease deed was in the name of Ismail alone. If Ismail intended to benefit himself at the expense of his co-sharers and as we have said, we do not read his reply to the Deputy Commissioner as disclosing such an intention, the same was not made known to the Government.\n\nWe are therefore unable to accept Mr. Sen's submission based on the intention of the parties.\n\nHe, however, submitted that whatever be the intention of the parties, by reason of s. 3 of the Crown Grants Act Ismail's title to the full\n\n16 as. share in the leasehold could no_t be disputed.\n\nThis section reads:\n\n\"3. All provisions. restrictions, conditions and limitations over contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take effect according to itheir tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding.\"\n\nIf, as we have held. it was the intention of the Government in granting the renewal that the co-heirs too should have the benefit of the lease we do not see how these provisions affect their beneficial interest in the lease.\n\nNor are there any clauses in the lease which preclude the existence of a beneficial interest in persons other than the lessee named.\n\nThis point i~ tb.~.nfore without substance and is rejected.\n\nThe next point urged was based on s. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act It was said that Ismail was by reason of the entry in the revenue registers, which the co-heirs did nothing to correct, ostensibly the full owner of the property and hence the mortgage by him as full owner and the sale in court auction in execution of the decree by the National Agency Co. Ltd. passed the full title to the Tea Estate and that the co-heirs were consequently estopped from disputing the defendant's right to the full 16 as. share in the property.\n\nIn order that s. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act could ' be attracted, the respondents should prove that Ismail was the ostensible owner of the property with the consent of his co-sharers and besides that they took reasonable care\n\n1964\"\n\nSuraj Ralan• Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nAyyn11ga1 } ..\n\nSuraj Ratan Thiranl v.\n\nAzamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nAyyangur J.\n\nto ascertain whether Ismail had the power to make a transfer of the full 16 as. interest. Now, the facts however were that except the property being entered in the revenue records in Ismail's name, and that the management of the property was left by the co-sharers with Ismail, there is not an iota of evidence to establish that Ismail was put forward by them as the ostensible owner of the property. It is manifest that the conduct of co-sharers in permitting one of them to manage the common property does not by itself raise any estoppel precluding them from asserting their rights.\n\nThe learned Judges have also pointed out that even the least\" enquiry by the mortgagee would have disclosed that Ismail was not the full owner and this finding was not seriously challenged before us.\n\nIn this view it is unnecessary for us to consider the submissions made to us by Mr. Desai that s. 41 was inapplicable to cases of sales in court auctions for the reason that what the court is capable of selling and what is sold in execution of a decree is only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor and nothing more.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that the learned Judges of the High Court rightly held that s. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act afforded no defence to the respondents.\n\nThe next and the only point remaining for consideration is whether the appellants' suit is barred under the provisions of 0. IX. r. 9, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe part of this provision material for our purpose runs:-\n\n\"Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action.\"\n\nTh.e learned Judges of the High Court have held that this provision barred the plaintiffs' claim in the present suit except to the extent of an 8 pies share in the estate which belonged to Azifunnessa and Najifennessa, two of the daughters of Azam Ali, who on the death of their mother became entitled to that share.\n\nThese two were. not the parties to suit No. 58 of 1931 and hence the learned Judges held that their share (which was purchased by the plaintiffs) was unaffected by the dismissal of that suit.\n\nThe decision of the High Court in regard to this 8 pies share has become final and thus is outside controversy.\n\nThe .only question is whether the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to anything beyond this share.\n\nSuraj Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nThe suit, 5 8 of 1931, was instituted by 7 plaintiffs- Ayyangar /.\n\nAshfaq, Shamsuzzoha, Nurul Huda, Mohd. Yakub, these four being the sons of Azam Ali, two of his daughters- Mahbuba Khatun and Habiba Khatun and one of his widows Bibi Marium.\n\nThere were two defendants-Ille National Agency Co. Ltd. the purchaser in court sale of the property under the mortgage decree, whose title was challenged and against whom reliefs were claimed and Mohd. Ismail who was a pro forma defendant. Ashfaq, 1 he first plaintiff, died after the institution of the suit and\n\ncertain of the parties already on record were recorded as his legal representatives .. The allegations in the plaint briefly were that the 2nd d6fendant Mohd. Ismail was not the sole proprietor or owner. of the 'Azamabad , Tea Estate and that for that reason, the mortgage in favour 0f the 1st defendant, the mortgage-decree obtained by it and the sale thereunder passed to it no title except to the extent at 2t as. share belonging to Mohd. Ismail. The plaintiffs therefore prayed for a decree declaring-\n\n( 1) that Mohd. Ismail had only 2t as. share in the . property and the remaining 13t as. share\n\nbelor.ged to the plaintiffs;\n\n(2) that only 2!- as. share was sold under the mortgage decree and purchased by the Na ti on al Agency Co. Ltd. at the court sale.\n\nThe suit was instituted on 28th November, 1931 and after the issues were settled, the suit was posted for trial on 22nd August, 1932. on which date the plaintiffs were absent, no witnesses on their behalf were present, and their pleader reported no instructions.\n\nThe suit was therefore directed to be dilrnissed with costs in favour of the Nation:jl Agency Co. Ltd. who was the only party present in Court.\n\nIt may be mentioned that Mohd. Ismail never appeared during the ltearing of the suit.\n\nSuraj Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamahad Tea Co.\n\nA7yansar J,\n\n204 SUPREl\\iE COURT REPORTS\n\nBefore taking up for consideration certain points urged. before us by Mr. Desai regarding the construction of 0. IX r. 9 C.P.C. we might dispose of a contention raised by him that Suit No. 58 of 1931 was filed fraudulently and collusively and the dismissal was the result of a settlement brought about collusively in order to defeat the plaintiffs' rights. We consider that there is no factual basis to sustain this plea for he could point to no definite proof in support, and the most he could do was to refer us to certain suspicious circumstances.\n\nWe cannot obviously base any decision or rest any finding, on mere suspicion and we have no hesitation in saying that the submission does not deserve serious consideration.\n\nThe next submission was that even the 2t as. share of Ismail did not pass under the sale in execution of the mortgage decree, because it was said Ismail had been adjudicated an insolvent in Insolvency Case 38 of 1931 by the Dist. Judge Purnia, as a result of which the properties which were the subject of the court-sale. had vested in the official receiver before the relevant date.\n\nThough, no doubt, an allegation regarding this matter was made in the plaint and this was denied by the plaintiffs there is nothing in the judgments of the courts below or in the evidence to indicate that the necessary facts were proved or that this point was urged with any seriousness at any stage of the proceedings until in this Court. We have therefore nothing beyond the bare allegations and denials and as the foll facts in relation to this matter were not placed before the Court we hold that this plea is devoid of merits and does not merit consideration.\n\nIt was next said that two of th~ plaintiffs in suit No. 58 of 1931, Nurul Huda and Habiba Khatun, a son and a daughter of Azam Ali were really adults but were shown in the cause titie as minors represented by their respective natural guardians as their next friends and that as these adults could not in law he represented by persons purporting to act as their guardians they could not be held to be parties tol the suit and hence their interests could not be affected by the dismissal of the suit. This also is one of the matters in respect of which the plaintiffs beyond a mere pleading which was denied, made no grievance in the courts\n\nbelow and the facts in relation 10 this issue, namely, the age of the two plaintiffs at the date of the plaint not having been clearly proved, we do not find it possible to entertain the plea at this stage.\n\nMr. Desai, then submitted that Ashfaq who had figured as the first plaintiff in suit No. 58 of 1931 had already on April 18, 1931 transferred his 2 as. 13 gandas and odd share in Touzi No. 911 to one Pir Baksh from whom the plaintiff obtained a conveyance by a deed dated September 2, 1943 of what he had purchased from Ashfaq.\n\nFor this reason he urged that on the findings on the merits of the title in favour of the plaintiffs on the first two defences we have dealt with earlier the plaintiffs should have been granted a decree to this share of Ashfaq in addition to the 8 pies share decreed to them by the High Court. No doubt, if this\n\ntransaction were made out and was real, it would stand on the same footing as the 8 pies share in regard to which a decree was granted in favour of the plaintiffs by the judgment now under appeal.\n\nWe shall however consider this matter after dealing with the point urged as regards the construction of 0. IX. r. 9, Civil Procedure Code, which was his main submission and which, if upheld, would entirely eliminate the bar under this provision of law.\n\nOn this the first submission was that the rule which spoke of the \"plaintiff\" being precluded from bringing a fresh suit created merely a personal bar against the plaintiff in the first suit and that in the absence of words referring to the representatives of the plaintiff or those claiming under the plaintiff as in s. 11 or s. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, the bar was not attracted to cases where the subsequent suit was by the heirs and assigns of that plaintiff.\n\nIn support df this submission Mr. Desai invited -our antention to the observations of Das J. in GoJ'l Ram\n\nv. Jagannath Singh(') where this argument was characterised as a weighty one and examined elaborately.\n\nThough the learned Judge decided this matter on quite a -different line of _reasoning, he referred to various . earlier -Oecisions which appeared to him to favour the view sub 11nitted to us by Mr. Desai and expressed his hesitation in\n\n(I) l.L.R. 9 Pat. 447 at p. 454.\n\nSura; Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nAyyangar }.\n\nSurdj Ratan Thirani v. .Azamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nrejecting that construction.\n\nWe are not however impressed: by the argument that the ban imposed by 0. IX. r. 9 creates merely a personal bar or estoppel against the particular plaintiff suing on the same cause of action and leaves the matter at large for those claiming under him.\n\nBeyond the absence in 0. IX. r. 9 of the words referring \"to those claiming under the plaintiff\" there is nothing to warrant this argument. It has neither principle, nor logic to commend it. It is not easy to comprehend how A who had no right to bring a suit or rather who was debarred from bringing a suit for the recovery of property could effect a transfer of his rights to that property and confer on the transferee a right which he was precluded by law from asserting.\n\nThere are, no doubt, situations where a person could confer more rights on a transferee than what he posses.sed but those are clearly defined exceptions which would not include the case now O.Jl hand. This argument was addressed to the High Court and the learned Judges characterised it as startling, a view which we share.\n\nThe rule would obviously have no value and the bar imposed by it would be rendered meaningless if the plaintiff whose suit was dismissed for default had only to transfer the property to another and the latter was able to agitate rights which his vendor was precluded by law from putting forward.\n\nAgain to say that an heir of the plaintiff is in a better position than himself and that the bar lapses on a plaintiff's death, does not appeal to us as capable of being justified by any principle or line of reasoning. In our opinion, the word '.Plaintiff' in the rule should obviously, in order that the bar may be effective. include his assigns and legal representatives.\n\nIt was next urged that 0. IX. r. 9 precluded a second suit in respect of \"the same cause of action\" and that the cause of action on which Suit 58 of 1931 was laid and the present suit-Title suit 18 of 1943 was not the same and so the bar was not attracted.\n\nIn view of this argument it is necessary to examine the cause of action on which the present suit has been filed and compare and contrast with that in Suit 58 of 1931.\n\nClosely analysed the material allegations to found the causeo of action on which reliefs were claimed in the present suit\n\nwere (i) That the Tea Estate was originally the property of Azam Ali. When he died his estate was inherited by his 8 sons, his widows and a daughter.\n\nThat the registration of the estate in the .name of Md. Ismail was as a co-sharer, the property belonging beneficially to all the heirs.\n\nThis position was not altered by the termination of the lirst lease and its renewal jn 1928 for a further period of 30 years.\n\nAll 1the co-heirs lived as a joint family with a common mess and hence there was no question of any adverse possession by Md. Ismail whose possession was not as sole proprietor or exclusive.\n\nThe suit on the mortgage was fraudulent and collusive, by Ismail colluding with the mortgagee to defraud his co-heirs. Details were mentioned as evidence of the fraud and collusion.\n\nThe sale in pursuance of the decree which was passed ex-parte was also fraudulent.\n\nOn the date of the auction Ismail had no title even to the 2t as. share because of his adjudication as an insolvent earlier. The manner in which the 8 pies share of the daughters was obtained by the plaintiff was set out, and similarly the purchase by them through Pir Baksh of the share of Ashfaq.\n\nThe other purchases by the plaintiffs whereby they claimed to have obtained the 16 as. share in the Tea Estate were set out.\n\nThe plaint then went on to refer to suit 58 of 1931 and set out their case as regards the nature of that litigation and its effect.\n\nLastly, they pleaded that they had obtained possession of the Tea gardens on October 10, 1934 and that on the next day the defendants moved the Magistrate for an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code and that the Magistrate had made an order against the plaintiffs restraining them from interfering with the possession of the defendants which necessitated their bringing the suit for the reliefs we have set out earlier.\n\nWe have already summarised the material allegations wnich were made in Suit 5 8 of 1931. The material difference between the cause of activn alleged in the present suit consists only in the addition of the allegations about the possession and dispossession in October, 1934.\n\nThis suit is based on the title of the plaintiffs by reason of their . purchas.!s and admittedly their vendors would have nothing to convey if the court sale conveyed, as it purported t~\n\nSuraj Ratan' Thirani v.\n\nA.zamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nAyyangar J.-\n\n.Suraj Rutan\n\n:J. hirant\n\nAzamabad\n\nlea <...o.\n\nST JPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nconvey, the full 16 as. interest in the Tea garden to the National Agency Co. Ltd.\n\nIt was because of this that allegations were made to sustain their title and this could be done only if they established want of title to the extent of 16 as. share in Ismail, the consequent ineffectiveness of the mortgage effected by Ismail and of the decree obtained in pursuance thereof and of the court sale in execution of that decree, being confined at the most to 2! as. share belonging to Ismail.\n\nThese allegations which were fundamental to the plaintiffs' case were identical with those which had been made in suit No. 58 of 1931.\n\nBearing these features in mind, the proposition that Mr. Desai submitted for our acceptance was briefly this.\n\nA cause of action is a bundle of facts on the basis of which relief is claimed. If in addition to the facts alleged in the first suit, further facts are alleged and relief sought on their basis also, and he explained the additional facts to be the allegations about possession and dispossession in October, 1934, then the position in law was that the entire complexion of the suit is changed with the result that the words of 0. IX. r. 9 \"in respect of the same cause of .action\" are not satisfied and. the plaintiff is entitled to te- . agitate the entire cause of action in the second suit.\n\nIn Support of this submission, learned counsel invited our attention to certain observation in a few decisions to which we do not consider it necessary to refer as we do not see any substance in the argument.\n\nWe consider that the test adopted by the Judicial Committee for determining the identity of the cause of action in the two suits in Mohammed Khalil Khan and Ors. v. Mahbub Ali Mian and Ors.(') is sound and expresses correctly the proper interpretation of the provision.\n\nIn that case Sir Madhavan Nair, after an exhaustive dis- . cussion of the meaning of the expression \"same cause of\n\naction\" which occurs in a similar context in para ( 1) of\n\n0. II r. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, observed:\n\n\"In considering whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit 1r. the same or not, as the cause of action in the previous suit, the test\n\n(') 75 !. A. I2r.\n\nto be applied is: are the causes of action in the two suits in substance-not technicallyidentical?\" The learned Judge thereafter referred to an earlier decision of the Privy Council in Soorijomonee Dasee v. Suddt:>- nund(') and extracted the following passage as laying down the approach to the question :\n\n\"Their Lordships are of opinion that the term 'cause of action' is to be construed with reference rather to the substance than to tho form of action ........ \".\n\nApplying this test we consider that the essential bundle ol facts on which the plaintiffs based their title and their right to relief were identical in the two suits.\n\nThe property sought to be recovered in the two suits was the same. The title of the persons from whom the plaintiffs claimed title by purchase, was based on the same facts viz., the position of Md. Ismail quoad his co-heirs and the beneficial interests of the latter not being affected or involved in th& mortgages, the mortgage-decree and the sale in execution thereof.\n\nNo doubt, the plaintiff set up his purchases as the source of his title to sue, but if as we have held the bar under Q. IX. r. 9 applies equally to the plaintiff in the first suit and those claiming under him, the allegations regarding the transmission of title to the plaintiffs in the present suit ceases to be material. The only new allegation was about the plaintiffs getting into possession by virtue of purchase and their dissession. Their addition, however, does not wipe out the identity otherwise of the cause of action.\n\nIt would, of course, have made a difference if, without reference to the antecedent want of full\n\ntitle in Ismail which was common to the case set up in the two plaints in Suit 58 of 1931 and Suit 18 of 1943, the plaintiffs could, on the strength of the possession and dispossession or the sessory title that they alleged, have obtained any relief.\n\nIt is, however, admitted that without alleging and proving want of full title in Md. Ismail the plaintiffs could be granted no relief in their present sutt.\n\n(1 : (18731 I2 B<ng. L.R 304, 315.\n\n134- SP S.C-14\n\n!uraj R.ataft Thil'flloi ...\n\nAV1mabad\n\nTIG c ..\n\nA.yyan1<1r I.\n\nSura/ Raton Tlllranl ...\n\nAiamabad\n\nTta Co.\n\nThe question is whether the further allegations about possession in October, 1934 have reajly destroyed tke basic and substantial identity of the causes of action in the two suits. This can be answered only in the negative. The learned Judges of the High Court therefore correctly held that the suit was substantially barred by 0. IX. r. 9.\n\nIt now remains to consider the claim of the plaintiffs to the 2 annas 13 odd gundas share of Ashfaq. In paragraph 52 of their plaint the plaintiffs stated that by a registered sale-deed executed on April 18, 1931 Ashfaq, the t0n of Azam Ali sold the entire interest which he. possessed in the Azamabad Tea Estate to Pir Baksh in pursuance of a Bainama dated April 7, 1930 and put him in possession, and in the succeeding paragraph they set out their purehases of this share by a Kabala dated September 2, 1943.\n\nIn the joint written statement filed on behalf of the defendlmts 1 and 2 these allegations were controverted.\n\nThe execution of the sale-deed in favour of Pir Baksh was de!)jed and it was further stated that even if the sale-deed were proved to have been executed it was a sham and nominal transaction and threfore inoperative to pass title.\n\nThough no specific issue in relation to this sale to Pir Baksh was raised, there was a: general issue (Issue No. 8) which elated to the plaintiff's acquiring dtle to the Tea Estate.\n\nThe sale deed by Ashfaq was filed and marked as Ex. 12(i)\n\nud the sale in favour of the plaintiffs by Pir Baksh as Ex.\n\n12 ( c). The effect however of this sale to Pir Baksh on the :rights of the plainti, ffs to relief does not appear to have been rai, sed before the learned trial Judge.\n\nIt may be pointed out that the learned trial Judge held that Ismail was the full owner of the property under the lease granted in 1928, by reason of the provisions of the Crown Grants Act and even if this were not so, he held that his co-heirs had consented to put him forward as the ostensible owner of the property with the result that they were estopped from imptiaching the mortgage and the sale of the property in execution of the mortgage decree.\n\nIt is therefore possible that because of the view which the learned trial Judge wa~ inclined to take of the title of Md. Ismail, the plaintiffs did not seriously put forward their rights under their purchase from Pir Baksh, because if the learned trial Judge was right, the sale by Ashfaq to Pir Baksh even if real\n\nwpuld riot have helJ>ed thi:i plaintiffs to obtain any relief.\n\nIn this connection it may be pointed that the plainti& claim\n\nto the 8 pies share which WI!$ allowed in their f<tvour bx the High Court, was not pressed in the trial court.\n\nEven in the High Court, however, the point arising from the sale by Ashfaq to Pir Baksh does not seem to have been pressed.\n\nWe shall presently advert to and examine th!' submis- &ions made to us by Mr. Sen as regards the merits of this claim to the share of Ashfaq, but before doing so we must refer to a point raised by Mr. Sen which necessitated. a prolonged adjournment of the appeal after the main arguments were heard.\n\nAfter pointing out that the plaintiffs did not agitate or press before the courts below any special right based on the purchase of Ashfaq's share through Pir Baksh, he submitted that this might possibly have been because the property covered by the sale deed Ex. 12(i) did not coo, iprise Touza ])lo. 911-the Azamabad Tea Estate.\n\nThere was scope for this submission because in the record as printed for the use of this Court, the Schedule annexed to the sale deed Ex. 12 ( i) was not printed but only the portion containing the description of the parties and the words of conveyance, with the result that Mr. Desai was unable to make out whether as a fact Ashfaq's interest in the suit property was sold under Ex. 12(i). To make matters worse the Schedule to the sale deed of 1943 executed by Pir Baksh was also not translated and printed in the record prei;>ared for the appeal.\n\nIn view, however, of the categorical statement in the plaint as regards the indentity of the property conveyed under F.x. 12 (i) with Ashfaq's share in the Azamabad Tea, Es tat~, we considered that the appellant's submission could not be rejected as frivolous.\n\nWe therefore acceded to the request of Mr. Desai and called for the original of Ex. 12 (i) from the High Court so that counsel might make submissions to \\is as regards the identity of the property conveyed,.\n\nThe document was accordingly obtained and traQ.slated for the\n\nuse of the Court and when the appeal was again placed before us Mr. Sen admitted that the property conveyed by\n\nEx. 12(i) was Ashfaq's 2 as. 13 gundas odd interest in rouza No. 9ll. .\n\n1964 -\n\nSura; Rat111t T}lir•iil\n\n'f.\n\nAzamabad r.a Co.\n\nAyyangar I,\n\nJP64\n\nSwaj Rot1J11 Tltiranl ...\n\nAzamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nAyyan1ar J,\n\nComing now to the merits of the plaintiff's claim, it is common ground that if the sale by Ashfaq were real and intended to pass title to Pir Baksh, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a decree for a declaration that in addition to the 8 pies share granted to them by the High Court, they would be entitled to a further 2 as. 13 gundas share of Ashfaq in the plaint A Schedule property.\n\nMr.\n\nSen's submission, however, was that we should not entertain or give effect to this claim, because several circumstances throw grave suspicion on the reality of the transaotion, and that in any event the claim could not be accepted without careful scrutiny of the facts.\n\nHaving regard to the definite case raised in the pleadi.itgs, we are not disposed to reject the claim merely because the same was not pressed in the courts below. Besides we cannot ignore the circumstance that the sale deeds Ex. 12(i) and 12(c) on which the claim was based were filed in the trial court, and Pir Baksh was examined to formally prove these deeds as the 31st witness for the plaintiff.\n\nMoreover, even though as regards certain other transfers, the trial Judge recorded findings that they were nominal, there was no such finding as regards the sale by Ashfaq.\n\nIn view of these features, we have decided not to reject the claim of the plaintiffs based on this ground.\n\nThere are, however, certain features which throw some suspicion on the reality of the transaction which Mr. Sen\n\npressed before us which have led us to desist from ourselves passing a decree for this additional share in their favour.\n\nThe circumstances to which Mr. Sen drew our attention were these; (i) though Ashfaq executed the sale deed Ex. 12(i) on April 18, 1931, he figured as the first plaintiff in Suit 58 of 1931 which was filed on 28th November,\n\n1931, without adverting to the sale, a piece of conduct certainly not consistent with the sale being real and intended to pass title; ( 2) though in the plaint the necessary averments were made regarding their obtaining the share of Ashfaq through Pir Baksh, the claim under this head waa not pressed before the trial court; ( 3) when the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court from the total dismissal of the suit, they did not raise any specific ground touching their right to this share, nor were any argument&\n\naddresed to the High Court on this point; and ( 4) there had been no mutation in the revenue records when this sale was effected and Pir Baksh who was examined as a witness admitted this fact.\n\nThese circumstances are certainly capable of explanation, but they show that the claim of the plaintiffs cannot be accepted by us straightaway and a decree passed in their favour.\n\nIn these circumstances, we consider that the proper order to pass would be to remit the matter to the trial Court for recording a finding as regards the reality of the sale on the evidence already on the record and to pass an appropriate decree in the suit, that is, if the sale under Ex. 12(i) were held to be real, the plaintiffs would be entitled in addition to the 8 pies share decreed to them by the High Court, to a further 2 as 13 gondas odd share belonging to Ashfaq which they obtained under Ex. 12 ( c) through Pir Baksh, and in the event of the sale not being held to be real to no more than what the High Court has decreed.\n\nWith this modification, the appeal is dismissed with\n\nCOlill.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCH. SUBBARAO\n\nMEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLl:AR JJ.)\n\nR1pre1tntation of th• P•ople Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), 11. 80, 31 (3),\n\n90(3),-.f'ttction Petition-No attutation in the copit1 oj thl petition that they •re true copit1-Whlth1r lhtr1 hod bt1n 1ub11turl comp/U.nct.\n\nThe third respondent was declared elected to the Lesislalive •11 of Andhra Pradesh in the general election held in 1962. Tho appo- ••t, a •oter of tbo constituency ftlcd an election petitioa challeqina\n\nSwa/\n\nR•IM Ihirani\n\n•• Atamabiul\n\nTta Co.\n\nAYY•Tllfll\". I.\n\n1•nW\"'\"J, IJ", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "SURAJ RATAN THIRANI & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1028, "end_char": 1053, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURAJ RATAN THIRANI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE AZAMABAD TEA CO. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1056, "end_char": 1082, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE AZAMABAD TEA CO. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1086, "end_char": 1103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1108, "end_char": 1115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1135, "end_char": 1147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AYYANGAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1150, "end_char": 1173, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1230, "end_char": 1234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1286, "end_char": 1291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1295, "end_char": 1319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ismail", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1566, "end_char": 1572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The name of Ismail, his el(iest son.", "canonical_name": "Ismail"}}, {"text": "National Agency Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1690, "end_char": 1714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ismail borrowed considerable sums from National Agency Co. Ltd., and for securing the same, depo- sited the title deeds of the Tea Estate on the footing that he was its full owner."}}, {"text": "Azarnabad Tea Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2110, "end_char": 2130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the amonnt under the mortgage was not paid, a suitr was filed for realisation of the amount by sale of mortgage property ..\n\n•rhe suit was decreed and in execution the property was auctioned and -saJe was confirmed in 1931 in favour of the decreeholder who sold the same to Azarnabad Tea Estate, the principal respondent in this case."}}, {"text": "Azam Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2185, "end_char": 2193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The heirs of Azam Ali brought suit No."}}, {"text": "National Agency Co. Ltd.1", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2273, "end_char": 2298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58 of 1931 to set aside <the decree and sale in favour of the National Agency Co. Ltd.1 on -various grounds but that suit."}}, {"text": "Ashfaq", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3613, "end_char": 3619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58 of 1931 was dismissed in default, no ..action was taken to get it restored, this was raised by the respondent anJ whether in any event their claims to the 2 .as 13 odd gundas share of Ashfaq, son of Ismail, should not have been decreed.", "canonical_name": "Ashfaq"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4746, "end_char": 4750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4831, "end_char": 4841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4849, "end_char": 4873, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6056, "end_char": 6075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 18, 1954, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6124, "end_char": 6135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6143, "end_char": 6156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6179, "end_char": 6185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, N. R. Ghosh, Salil K. Datt and P. K. Ghosh, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "N. R. Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6187, "end_char": 6198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, N. R. Ghosh, Salil K. Datt and P. K. Ghosh, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Salil K. Datt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6200, "end_char": 6213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, N. R. Ghosh, Salil K. Datt and P. K. Ghosh, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "P. K. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6218, "end_char": 6229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, N. R. Ghosh, Salil K. Datt and P. K. Ghosh, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "AyyangM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6328, "end_char": 6335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyangM J, A YY ANGAR J .-This is an appeal .preferred, by virtue of a certificate of fitness granted by the Calcutta High Court, against its judgment, by which the decne passed by the Subordinate Judge of Darjeeling was substantially affirmed.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR JJ."}}, {"text": "A YY ANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6339, "end_char": 6349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyangM J, A YY ANGAR J .-This is an appeal .preferred, by virtue of a certificate of fitness granted by the Calcutta High Court, against its judgment, by which the decne passed by the Subordinate Judge of Darjeeling was substantially affirmed.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Kazi Azam Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7143, "end_char": 7156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Kazi Azam Ali was admittedly a full owner of this entire property and the proceedings giving rise to the appeal are concerned with the rights of his heirs to it."}}, {"text": "Azamabad Tea Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7442, "end_char": 7458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contesting defendants were the Azamabad Tea Co. who also claim the entire property as transferees from the National Agency Co. Ltd., who too have been impleaded as defendants."}}, {"text": "National Agency Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7593, "end_char": 7617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "National Agency Co. Ltd. claim to have purchased the entire 16 as."}}, {"text": "Kazi Mohammed Ismail", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7751, "end_char": 7771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "interest in the property at a Court sale in pursuance of a decree obtained by them against Kazi Mohammed Ismail, the eldest son of Azam Ali.", "canonical_name": "Kazi Mohammed Ismail"}}, {"text": "1st of April 1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9333, "end_char": 9350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The property covered by the Tea Estate was granted by Government by way of lease to one Mudir and another for 30 years, the term to start on the 1st of April 1898."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9518, "end_char": 9526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grantees effected transfers of their lease-hold and after several successive transfers the property was purchased in\n\nSura/ Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nSura; Ratan Thiram\n\nAzamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1913 by one Kazi Azam Ali who got his name registered as a proprietor.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR JJ."}}, {"text": "June 8, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10190, "end_char": 10202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides these 8 daughters, Azam Ali had 8 sons who survived him and were among his heirs, when he died on June 8, 1917."}}, {"text": "Mohammed Ismail", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10204, "end_char": 10219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohammed Ismail was the eldest of these sons."}}, {"text": "September 24, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11541, "end_char": 11559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed as prayed for and the property was sold in execution of the final decree and was purchased by the mortgage-decree holder on September 24, 1931."}}, {"text": "November 13. 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11587, "end_char": 11604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sale was confirmed on November 13."}}, {"text": "Azamabad Tea Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11663, "end_char": 11682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Azamabad Tea Estate-the principal respondent hefNe •1s."}}, {"text": "Ismail", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12169, "end_char": 12175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the plaintiffs rested on the fact that Ismail who got himself registered as if he were a fu]J proprietor of the lease-hold interest in Touzi 911 was merely one of several co-sharers of Azam Ali's estate to whom it passed on his death.", "canonical_name": "Ismail"}}, {"text": "Nazifannessa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14053, "end_char": 14065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nazifannessa, by a deed dated May 6, 193.0."}}, {"text": "May 6, 193.0", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14083, "end_char": 14095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nazifannessa, by a deed dated May 6, 193.0."}}, {"text": "Surai Rata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14218, "end_char": 14228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nazifannessa was not made a party to the'\n\nSurai Rata,."}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16908, "end_char": 16913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16921, "end_char": 16945, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17842, "end_char": 17847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before proceeding to set out the arguments addressed to us by Mr. Desai, learned counsel for the appellants, it might\n\ne convenient to dispose of the submissions made to us by Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the respondents, seeking to sustain the first two defences which were repelled by the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17956, "end_char": 17959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before proceeding to set out the arguments addressed to us by Mr. Desai, learned counsel for the appellants, it might\n\ne convenient to dispose of the submissions made to us by Mr. Sen, learned counsel for the respondents, seeking to sustain the first two defences which were repelled by the High Court."}}, {"text": "4zamabad\n\nTea Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18571, "end_char": 18588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "share in the lease-hold under the lease of 1898-v.nich we\n\nshall consider a little later-Mr. Sen did not dispute that\n\nSura; Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nSura; Rat1J11 Thir1J11i\n\nv. ..4zamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\n..4; yyangar /,\n\nIsmail's co-heirs were entitled to their fractional shares in."}}, {"text": "July 20, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19234, "end_char": 19247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 20, 1928 Mohd, Ismail made\n\na petition to the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling by which after drawing the latter's attention to the date on which the lease was to expire, he \"respectfully solicited the favour of kindly granting a further lease of the said Estate for a. further period of 30 years.\""}}, {"text": "Mohd", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19248, "end_char": 19252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 20, 1928 Mohd, Ismail made\n\na petition to the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling by which after drawing the latter's attention to the date on which the lease was to expire, he \"respectfully solicited the favour of kindly granting a further lease of the said Estate for a. further period of 30 years.\""}}, {"text": "Darjeeling", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19306, "end_char": 19316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 20, 1928 Mohd, Ismail made\n\na petition to the Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling by which after drawing the latter's attention to the date on which the lease was to expire, he \"respectfully solicited the favour of kindly granting a further lease of the said Estate for a. further period of 30 years.\""}}, {"text": "August 10, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19585, "end_char": 19600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Commissioner replied by letter dated August 10, 1928 sending Ismail the draft of the renewed lease for his approval and return adding: \"in'tl\\e record of rights thy following names have been record, ed: ·\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Kazi Mohammed Ismail", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19757, "end_char": 19777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kazi Mohammed Ismail 2 as.;", "canonical_name": "Kazi Mohammed Ismail"}}, {"text": "Kazi Isahaque", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19789, "end_char": 19802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kazi Isahaque 2 as_.;", "canonical_name": "Kazi Isahaque"}}, {"text": "Kazi Yakub", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19815, "end_char": 19825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kazi Yakub 2 as.;"}}, {"text": "Kazi Samoddoha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19837, "end_char": 19851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kazi Samoddoha 2 as.;"}}, {"text": "Kazi Nurul Ruda", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19863, "end_char": 19878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kazi Nurul Ruda 2 as.;"}}, {"text": "Kazi Badarudduza", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19890, "end_char": 19906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kazi Badarudduza 2 as.;"}}, {"text": "Kazi Insaf Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19918, "end_char": 19932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kazi Insaf Ali 2 as.;"}}, {"text": "Kazi Asfaque", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19944, "end_char": 19956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kazi Asfaque 2 as.;", "canonical_name": "Kazi Isahaque"}}, {"text": "February 1, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20501, "end_char": 20517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was thereafter that the lease was executed on February 1, 1929 in the name of Ismail to be operative from."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20563, "end_char": 20576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 1, 1928 and was in terms in renewal of the previous,:\n\nlease."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21212, "end_char": 21216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22069, "end_char": 22074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22082, "end_char": 22106, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22585, "end_char": 22590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22598, "end_char": 22622, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23800, "end_char": 23805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view it is unnecessary for us to consider the submissions made to us by Mr. Desai that s. 41 was inapplicable to cases of sales in court auctions for the reason that what the court is capable of selling and what is sold in execution of a decree is only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor and nothing more.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23811, "end_char": 23816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24129, "end_char": 24134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24142, "end_char": 24166, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24343, "end_char": 24363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Azifunnessa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24775, "end_char": 24786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th.e learned Judges of the High Court have held that this provision barred the plaintiffs' claim in the present suit except to the extent of an 8 pies share in the estate which belonged to Azifunnessa and Najifennessa, two of the daughters of Azam Ali, who on the death of their mother became entitled to that share."}}, {"text": "Najifennessa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24791, "end_char": 24803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th.e learned Judges of the High Court have held that this provision barred the plaintiffs' claim in the present suit except to the extent of an 8 pies share in the estate which belonged to Azifunnessa and Najifennessa, two of the daughters of Azam Ali, who on the death of their mother became entitled to that share."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25408, "end_char": 25416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nThe suit, 5 8 of 1931, was instituted by 7 plaintiffs- Ayyangar /.\n\nAshfaq, Shamsuzzoha, Nurul Huda, Mohd.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Ashfaq", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25421, "end_char": 25427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nThe suit, 5 8 of 1931, was instituted by 7 plaintiffs- Ayyangar /.\n\nAshfaq, Shamsuzzoha, Nurul Huda, Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Ashfaq"}}, {"text": "Shamsuzzoha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25429, "end_char": 25440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nThe suit, 5 8 of 1931, was instituted by 7 plaintiffs- Ayyangar /.\n\nAshfaq, Shamsuzzoha, Nurul Huda, Mohd."}}, {"text": "Nurul Huda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25442, "end_char": 25452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nThe suit, 5 8 of 1931, was instituted by 7 plaintiffs- Ayyangar /.\n\nAshfaq, Shamsuzzoha, Nurul Huda, Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Yakub", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25454, "end_char": 25465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suraj Ratan Thirani v.\n\nAzamabad Tea Co.\n\nThe suit, 5 8 of 1931, was instituted by 7 plaintiffs- Ayyangar /.\n\nAshfaq, Shamsuzzoha, Nurul Huda, Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mahbuba Khatun", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25528, "end_char": 25542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yakub, these four being the sons of Azam Ali, two of his daughters- Mahbuba Khatun and Habiba Khatun and one of his widows Bibi Marium."}}, {"text": "Habiba Khatun", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25547, "end_char": 25560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yakub, these four being the sons of Azam Ali, two of his daughters- Mahbuba Khatun and Habiba Khatun and one of his widows Bibi Marium.", "canonical_name": "Habiba Khatun"}}, {"text": "Bibi Marium", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25583, "end_char": 25594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yakub, these four being the sons of Azam Ali, two of his daughters- Mahbuba Khatun and Habiba Khatun and one of his widows Bibi Marium."}}, {"text": "Ille National Agency Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25623, "end_char": 25652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were two defendants-Ille National Agency Co. Ltd. the purchaser in court sale of the property under the mortgage decree, whose title was challenged and against whom reliefs were claimed and Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Ismail", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25793, "end_char": 25805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were two defendants-Ille National Agency Co. Ltd. the purchaser in court sale of the property under the mortgage decree, whose title was challenged and against whom reliefs were claimed and Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Mohd. Ismail", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26064, "end_char": 26076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashfaq, 1 he first plaintiff, died after the institution of the suit and\n\ncertain of the parties already on record were recorded as his legal representatives .. The allegations in the plaint briefly were that the 2nd d6fendant Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd. Ismail"}}, {"text": "Azamabad , Tea Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26123, "end_char": 26144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the 'Azamabad , Tea Estate and that for that reason, the mortgage in favour 0f the 1st defendant, the mortgage-decree obtained by it and the sale thereunder passed to it no title except to the extent at 2t as."}}, {"text": "28th November, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26703, "end_char": 26722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was instituted on 28th November, 1931 and after the issues were settled, the suit was posted for trial on 22nd August, 1932."}}, {"text": "22nd August, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26791, "end_char": 26808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was instituted on 28th November, 1931 and after the issues were settled, the suit was posted for trial on 22nd August, 1932."}}, {"text": "jl Agency Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27024, "end_char": 27042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was therefore directed to be dilrnissed with costs in favour of the Nation:jl Agency Co. Ltd. who was the only party present in Court."}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27377, "end_char": 27382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Purnia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28218, "end_char": 28224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judge Purnia, as a result of which the properties which were the subject of the court-sale."}}, {"text": "Habiba Khatun", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29016, "end_char": 29029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58 of 1931, Nurul Huda and Habiba Khatun, a son and a daughter of Azam Ali were really adults but were shown in the cause titie as minors represented by their respective natural guardians as their next friends and that as these adults could not in law he represented by persons purporting to act as their guardians they could not be held to be parties tol the suit and hence their interests could not be affected by the dismissal of the suit.", "canonical_name": "Habiba Khatun"}}, {"text": "April 18, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29896, "end_char": 29910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58 of 1931 had already on April 18, 1931 transferred his 2 as."}}, {"text": "Pir Baksh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29981, "end_char": 29990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "911 to one Pir Baksh from whom the plaintiff obtained a conveyance by a deed dated September 2, 1943 of what he had purchased from Ashfaq."}}, {"text": "September 2, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30053, "end_char": 30070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "911 to one Pir Baksh from whom the plaintiff obtained a conveyance by a deed dated September 2, 1943 of what he had purchased from Ashfaq."}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30738, "end_char": 30758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31193, "end_char": 31198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31202, "end_char": 31207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31433, "end_char": 31436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support df this submission Mr. Desai invited -our antention to the observations of Das J. in GoJ'l Ram\n\nv. Jagannath Singh(') where this argument was characterised as a weighty one and examined elaborately."}}, {"text": "Md. Ismail", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34448, "end_char": 34458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the registration of the estate in the .name of Md. Ismail was as a co-sharer, the property belonging beneficially to all the heirs.", "canonical_name": "Mohd. Ismail"}}, {"text": "October 10, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35756, "end_char": 35772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly, they pleaded that they had obtained possession of the Tea gardens on October 10, 1934 and that on the next day the defendants moved the Magistrate for an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code and that the Magistrate had made an order against the plaintiffs restraining them from interfering with the possession of the defendants which necessitated their bringing the suit for the reliefs we have set out earlier."}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35853, "end_char": 35859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35861, "end_char": 35884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".Suraj Rutan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36630, "end_char": 36642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "purchas.!s and admittedly their vendors would have nothing to convey if the court sale conveyed, as it purported t~\n\nSuraj Ratan' Thirani v.\n\nA.zamabad\n\nTea Co.\n\nAyyangar J.-\n\n.Suraj Rutan\n\n:J. hirant\n\nAzamabad\n\nlea <...o.\n\nST JPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nconvey, the full 16 as."}}, {"text": "Madhavan Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38532, "end_char": 38545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Sir Madhavan Nair, after an exhaustive dis- ."}}, {"text": "!uraj R.ataft Thil'flloi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41003, "end_char": 41027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134- SP S.C-14\n\n!"}}, {"text": "April 7, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41813, "end_char": 41826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "possessed in the Azamabad Tea Estate to Pir Baksh in pursuance of a Bainama dated April 7, 1930 and put him in possession, and in the succeeding paragraph they set out their purehases of this share by a Kabala dated September 2, 1943."}}, {"text": "s 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45766, "end_char": 45769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pir Baksh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46925, "end_char": 46934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12(i) and 12(c) on which the claim was based were filed in the trial court, and Pir Baksh was examined to formally prove these deeds as the 31st witness for the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "28th November,\n\n1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47743, "end_char": 47763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12(i) on April 18, 1931, he figured as the first plaintiff in Suit 58 of 1931 which was filed on 28th November,\n\n1931, without adverting to the sale, a piece of conduct certainly not consistent with the sale being real and intended to pass title; ( 2) though in the plaint the necessary averments were made regarding their obtaining the share of Ashfaq through Pir Baksh, the claim under this head waa not pressed before the trial court; ( 3) when the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court from the total dismissal of the suit, they did not raise any specific ground touching their right to this share, nor were any argument&\n\naddresed to the High Court on this point; and ( 4) there had been no mutation in the revenue records when this sale was effected and Pir Baksh who was examined as a witness admitted this fact."}}, {"text": "SUBBARAO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49382, "end_char": 49390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUBBARAO\n\nMEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLl:AR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49450, "end_char": 49462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUBBARAO\n\nMEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLl:AR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49464, "end_char": 49478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUBBARAO\n\nMEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLl:AR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49480, "end_char": 49502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUBBARAO\n\nMEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLl:AR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. R. MUDHOLl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49507, "end_char": 49520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUBBARAO\n\nMEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLl:AR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "R•IM Ihirani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49952, "end_char": 49964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho appo- ••t, a •oter of tbo constituency ftlcd an election petitioa challeqina\n\nSwa/\n\nR•IM Ihirani\n\n•• Atamabiul\n\nTta Co.\n\nAYY•Tllfll\"."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_213_229_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 213\n\naddresed to the High Court on this point; and ( 4) there had been no mutation in the revenue records when this sale was effected and Pir Baksh who was examined as a witness admitted this fact.\n\nThese circumstances are certainly capable of explanation, but they show that the claim of the plaintiffs cannot be accepted by us straightaway and a decree passed in their favour.\n\nIn these circumstances, we consider that the proper order to pass would be to remit the matter to the trial Court for recording a finding as regards the reality of the sale on the evidence already on the record and to pass an appropriate decree in the suit, that is, if the sale under Ex. 12(i) were held to be real, the plaintiffs would be entitled in addition to the 8 pies share decreed to them by the High Court, to a further 2 as 13 gondas odd share belonging to Ashfaq which they obtained under Ex. 12 ( c) through Pir Baksh, and in the event of the sale not being held to be real to no more than what the High Court has decreed.\n\nWith this modification, the appeal is dismissed with\n\nCOlill.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCH. SUBBARAO\n\nMEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLl:AR JJ.)\n\nR1pre1tntation of th• P•ople Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), 11. 80, 31 (3),\n\n90(3),-.f'ttction Petition-No attutation in the copit1 oj thl petition that they •re true copit1-Whlth1r lhtr1 hod bt1n 1ub11turl comp/U.nct.\n\nThe third respondent was declared elected to the Lesislalive •11 of Andhra Pradesh in the general election held in 1962. Tho appo- ••t, a •oter of tbo constituency ftlcd an election petitioa challeqina\n\nSwa/\n\nR•IM Ihirani\n\n•• Atamabiul\n\nTta Co.\n\nAYY•Tllfll\". I.\n\n1•nW\"'\"J, IJ\n\n1964 the election of the third respondent on several grounds inclµding corrupt C& Subbarao practices.\n\nThe petition was acCompanied by the requisite nwnber of y.. copies which wre true copies and each of them bore the signature of &limber. Election the petitioner. But there was no attestation at the foot of the coPies that frllnutal Hyderathey were true copies.\n\nThe third respondent raised various preliminary ktl objections and the Election Tribunal rejected all of them.\n\nThereupon he filed writ petition in the High Court praying for the issue of a writ quashing the Tribunal's order.\n\nHis main contention was that since the copies of the petition did not contain an attestation stating that the copies were true copies there has been a violation of the mandatory provision of s. 80(3) of the Representaion of the People Act, 1951. Tho High Court accepted the contention and issued a writ as prayed for.\n\nThe present appeal was filed with special leave granted by this Court.\n\nHELD:\n\n(i) If there is a total or complete non compliance with the provisions of s. 81(3) the election petition might not be ••aa election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of the part\" within\n\n1. 80 of the Act.\n\n(ii) By the expression ''copy\" ins. 81(3) it was meant not an exact copy but only one so true that nobody by any possibility misunderstands it not being the same as the original.\n\nMurarka v. Roop Singh [1964] 3 S.C.R. 573, referred lo\n\nNoseworthy v. Overseers Buckland etc., L.R. 9 C. P. 233 ancl\n\nSpic~ v. Bacon, L.R. 2 Ex. D. 463, distinguished.\n\n(iii) In the present case the signatures on the copies cannot be held to have been merely intended to be a copy of those on the original, since a signature in original was not needed on the copy and writing or copying out the name of the signatory would suffice. The absence of a writing in the copy indicating the signature in the original would not detract the copy from being a true copy.\n\nThe facts and circumstance of the case show that there has been a substantial compliance with the requirement of s. 81(3). The wider question whether s. 81(3) or as part thereof is mandatory or directory is left open.\n\nThe appeal is allowed.\n\n\nXunjer Thevar, [1959] S.C.R. 583. followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 971 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 15, 1963 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 1096 of 1962.\n\nP. A. Choudhury and T. V. R. TaJaclwi, for the appellant.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General and P. Ram Reddy, for respondent No. 3.\n\nCh.\n\nSub,,_ ...\n\nJanuary 13, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was MT bmber\n\n1 •. E!~ • _ t1 una 'llJ~ delivered bybad\n\nAYYANGAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave Ayyangar /. against a judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which a Writ Petition filed by the 3rd Respondent-K.\n\nBrahmananda Reddy-was allowed and an Election Petition filed by the appellant was directed to be dismissed.\n\nThe facts giving rise to, the proceedings with which the appeal is concerned are briefly as follows: At the Genl!ral Elections held in the month of February 1962 for the 'Legislative Assembly-Constituency of Phirangipuram in Guntur District in Andhra Pradesh-the third respondent Brahamananda Reddy and one Chandramouli, the 2nd respondent before us, were the contesting candidates.\n\nThe polling at the Election took place on the 26th 'February 1962 and the Returning Officer declared Brahmananda Reddy, elected as\n\nhaving obtained the majority of valid votes.\n\nThereafter, ihe appellant who is a voter on the rolls of the said Constituency filed an Election Petition before the Election Commission on April 11, 1962 under s. 81 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, which we shall refer to as the Act.\n\nThere was no formal defect in the petition, it was accompanied by the requisite number of copies provided for by the Act and also by the treasury receipt evidencing the deposit of the requisite sum for security as provided by a. 117 of the Act.\n\nThe grounds on which the election was sought to be set aside were various and included inter alia allegations of corrupt practices against the returned candidate as well as his election agent, as also several irregularities in the polling by having the votes of dead voters recorded as well as by double voting. The petition was tcteived by the Commission, who after satisfying itself that it was in conformity with the Act had a copy of the petition published in the Official Gazette on May 17, 1962 as provided by s.\n\n86 of the Act.\n\nJn due course, an Election Tribunal was constituted and the petition was referred to the Tribunal for trial.\n\nThe returned candidate-Brahmananda Reddy-filed\n\n191~ his Written Statement on September 15, 1962 in which the Ch.\n\nSuhhara• allegations of fact made in the petition were denied. Be- •• b Y.EI 1. sides what might be termed the merits of the allegations in -•m tt, • ec ion h l . . .\n\nB .\n\nTribunal Hydtta t e e ectlon petll!on, rahmanda Reddy raised by his Wntba ten Statement several technical objections pointing out //4yyani• J. certain defects in the petition. This appeal is not concerned either with these technical defects in the election petition or with the defence raised on the merits to the charges that were formulated in it.\n\nThe merits have yet to be tried, and as regards the technical objections to the petition raised in the Written Statement dated Se; itember 15, 1962, they have been disposed of by the High Court and the same are not before us.\n\nA few days later on September 24, 1962, Brahmananda Reddy filed a further Statement of objections to the petition raising mostly objections of a technical nature and of these the only objections which is the subject matter of the present appeal is that contained in paragraph 2 which reads, and we quote the material words:\n\n\"It is further submitted on behalf of the 1st respondent that the above petition filed u/s 81 of the Act is not an Election Petition ...........• As the requirements of s. 81 (3) of the Act are not com;>lied with, the petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed u/s 90(3) of the Act as it does not comply with the provisions of sec. lt 1 of the Act. ............. \"\n\nThis second statement contained a prayer that in view of the technical objections, the maintainability of the petition might be decided as a preliminary issue as the objections went into the root of the matter.\n\nParagraph (2) extracted earlier is somewhat vague but in the arguments before the Tribunal it was explained as\n\nindicating an objection alleging non-compliance with s. 11(3) of the Act which runs:\n\n\"Every election petition shall be accompained by as\n\nmany copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and one more copy for the use of the Election Commission,\n\nCh.\n\nSubbtno\n\nand every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petitioa. • Member, B,..,,,_.\n\nTribunal ll)'U..\n\nWe shall refer later to the precise defect which was relied bad on in support of the case that there was a non-compliance A.yyangor 1. with this provision.\n\nThe Tribunal acceded to this request and by its order dated November 7, 1962, it decided the preliminary objections including the one just now mentioned in favour of the election ipetitioner and fixed a date for the trial of the petition on the merits.\n\nBrahmananda Reddy thereupon moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and prayed for the issue of the Writ quashing this decision of the Tribunal and sought the dismissal of the election petition for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court disallowed the other technical objections raised, but held that the petition did not comply with the requirements of s. 81 ( 3) of the Act and for this reason they directed the dismissal of the Election Petition.\n\nThe appellant thereafter has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nThe subject of controversy in this appeal lies in a very narrow compass.\n\nBut before we deal with it, it will be convenient to specify the precise defect which the learned Judges have held to be fatal to the maintainability of the Election Petition.\n\nAs stated earlier, the Election Petition filed was accompanied by the number of copies required to accompany the petition under s. 8 l (3).\n\nThe Election Petition was type-written and the CQ?ies which accompanied the petition were carbon copies of the type-script, so there was no question of the copies being other than 'true' copies.\n\nThe copies bore two signature in original of the Election Petitioner authenticating both the contents of the petition as well as the verification thereof.\n\nThe Petitioner did not however insert the words 'true copy' before or above his signa tures.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court considered that this rendered the petition one not in accordance with s.\n\n11 ( 3) of the Act and it is on this ground that the Election•\n\n1964 Petition filed by the ap;:iellant has been dismissed and it is Ci.\n\nSubb11No the correctness of this decision that is convassed in the appeal llart11n.\"· J:•ction before us.\n\nl'illlldtal 6ad 1~•ra In view of the arguments addressed to us it would be necessary to set out a few of the relevant provisions of the A.7yttngar 1 Act which bear upon ihe points urged, but before doing so we shall refer to Art. 329 of the Constitution which pro Vides:\n\n329(b) no election to either House of Parliament or I\n\nto the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the ap; iropriate Leplature.\"\n\nIn accordance with this. we have the provisions of the Act and particularly those contained in Part 'VI commencing with s. 79.\n\nSection 80 repeats the provision in the Constitution already extracted and enacts :\n\n\"No election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part.\"\n\n:Section 81 deals with the presenta.tion of petitions. It runs:\n\n\"81. I'rosntation cf peli ions. ( 1) An election petition ca!ling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (i) of seetion 100 and section 10 I to the Election Commission by any candidate at such eleetion or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier tlwn, the date of election of the returned cam!idate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election\n\nare different, the later of those two dates.\n\nExplanation.-In this sub-section, 'elector' means a\n\nJJU person who was entitled to vote at the election Ch.\n\nSubb•r•o to which the election petiion relates, whether Member,•· Electio\" he has voted at such elec!ion or not.\n\nTribulllll Hyder ...\n\n( 2) An election petition shall be deemed to have been presented to the Election Commission:-\n\n( a) when it is delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or to such other officer as may be appointed by the Election Commission in this behalf-\n\n( i) by the person making the petition, or\n\n(ii) by a person authorised in writing in this behalf by the person making the petition; or\n\n(b) when it is sent by registered post and is delivered to the Secretary to the Commissi\"~ or the officer so appointed.\n\n( 3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and one more copy for the use of the Election Commission, and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.\"\n\nBefore proceeding further it is necessary to advert to the history of the provision in sub-section (3) for learned counsel for the respondents laid some store by the object with which the provision was introduced.\n\nAs enacted in 1951, s. 81 contained only two sub-sections, the first dealing with the time within which a petition had to be filed and the second with the person or authority and the manner in which the petition had to be presented in order to constitute the presentation one to the Election Commission. At that date the Election Commission, after scrutinizing the petitions to ascertain whether there were any formal defects, had itself to make copies for being served on the respon- _dents.\n\nTo avoid this trouble and inconvenience to the Commission and the delay which the making of such copies\n\nbti4\n\nAyyallfOr /.\n\n19H necessarily involved, sub-section ( 3) which we have set out Ch.\n\nSubbarao earlier was introduced into s. 81 by an amendment affected Member, v. Election by Act XL of 1961.\n\nThe point made, based on this fea- Tribunal Hyd.rature, we shall reserve for later discussion.\n\nbad\n\nSection 82 deals with the parties who are to be impleaded in the petition and s. 83 with the contents of the petition.\n\nSection 8 3 (1 )( c) enacts:\n\n\"An election petition shall be signed .by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings.\"\n\nSub-section ( 2) requires a similar signature and verification of ichedules or annexures to the petition.\n\nSection 85 empowers the Election Commission to dismiss a petition in certain contingencies.\n\nIt reads:\n\n\"85. If the provisions of section 81 or section 82 or section 117 have not been complied with, the Election Commission shall dismiss the petition:\n\nProvided that the petition shall not be dismissed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard.\"\n\nThe succeeding sections deal with the trial of Election Petitions, after making provision for the 8(?pointment of an Election Tribunal by s. 86 but what is relevant in the present context is s. 90 and it is enough to quote the material wordi:\n\n\"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908, to the trial of iUits:\n\nSvb-scction ( 3 ) reads:\n\n''The Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which docs not comply with the provision1 of\n\nsection 81, notwithstanding that it has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under s. 85.\"\n\nCh.\n\nSubbarao\n\nMember, Electitnl The reasoning on which the learned Judges have based Tribunaiod Hyd.,.. their decision shortly stated is this.\n\nIt is the requirement of s. 81 (3) of the Act that an election petition should be A.yyangar 1 accompanied by the number of copies specified there, and equally so that the copies so accompanying \"shall be attest ed by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition\".\n\nThere was, of course, the signature of the petitioner on tl!ie copies, but there was no attestation by him that \"it was a true copy\".\n\nThis constituted a noncompliance with the requirements of s. 81 which brought into play the terms df s. 90 (3) of the Act which required the Tribunal to dismiss a petition which did not com?IY with the provisions of s. 81.\n\nThough the learned counsel for the appellant made several submissions, we propose to deal with only one, as the same is sufficient for the disposal of this appeal.\n\nThis was that in the circumstances of the case there had been a substantial compliance with the requirements of s. 81(3).\n\nBefore, however, dealing with it, it will be convenient tn refer to some of the submissions made to us by the learned Solicitor-General appearing for the contesting :es;>ondent!.\n\nHe submitted to us certain propositions which however we consider really unexceptionable.\n\nHe said that an election petition was not to be equated to an action at law or in equity, but that as the rights were purely the creature of statute, if the statute rendered any particular requirement mandatory, the courts possessed and could exercise no dispensing power to waive non-compliance.\n\nWe consider these i;:iropositions are sound and it is in the light of these basic positions that we shall proceed to consider whether the omission to add the words \"true copy\" in the copies which were idmittedly exact copies of the petition, constituted a non-compliance with s. 81 (3) as to render the petition liable to be rejected under s. 90 ( 3) of the Act.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant urged that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under s. 90(3) to dismiss 'an elec-\n\n19M. tion petition which does not comply with the <;>rovisions of Clo.\n\nSu6baroo s. 81' was attracted only if there was a defect in the petilf•mb.,,.. Election ion itself ~~ that a defect merely in the copy accompany- Tilbunar ll1d11amg the petition would not be a case of a \"petition not \"\"\" complying with the provisions of s. 81\" so as to require A1Jon1ar 1. or even permit the Tribunal to dismiss the petition. In support of this submission, the difference in the language employed in s. 85 and s. 90(3) of the Act in !he matter of making rference to the requirements of s. 81 w.a5 adverted to.\n\nBesides, it was pointed out that both s. 90(3) and before it s. 90 ( 4) were in their present form making reference to s. 81 when the latter section did not contain the third sub-section relating to copies accompanying the petition, and that the content of s. 90 ( 3) should not be held enlarged because in 1961 sub-section ( 3) was added to s. 81 particularly because the language of s. 90(3) was not altered to reflect the change.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument.\n\nWhen s. 81 ( 3) requires an election petition to be accompanied by the requisite number of copies, it became a requirement for the presentation of the election petition to the Commission, and therefore a condition precedent for the proper presentation of an election petition. If that is a requirement of s. 81, no distinction can be drawn between the requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) and of sub-section (3).\n\nWe might add that if there is a total and complete non-compliance with the provisions of s. 81 ( 3), the election petition might not be \"an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part\" within s, 80 of the Act.\n\nWe are therefore inclined to consider that if there had been such a non-com; iliance with the requirement of sub-section (3) not merely the Election Commission under s. 85 but the Election Tribunal under s. 90 ( 3) would prima facie not merely be justified but would be required to dismiss the election petition.\n\nThis takes us to the point as to whether the requirement of s. 81 ( 3) has been complied with or not.\n\nThe principal submission of the learned Solicitor-General was based on the language employed in s. 81(3) of the Act read in\n\nthe light of the direction contained in s. 90(3) which cast\n\nJ!M4 on the Tribunal the duty to dismiss an election petition Ch. Si4'6which did not conform to the requirements of the former. M b \"· E'..- In particular, he laid stress on the use of the imperative r,1:::,:1. H~\n\n'shall' in s. 81 (3) when denoting the requirement of \"attes- \"\"\" tation\" \"under the petitioner's signature\" of the copy bearing Ayyangqr 1. the signature being a \"true co;:>y''. It was in this connection that he pointed out that the provision for properly attested copies of the petition accompanying the petition was introduced by the amendment effected in 1961, and the object of Parliament was two-fold; first to save the time and inconvenience which the previous procedure cast on the Election Commission, of itself having to make copies for service on the respondents, and secondly by this means to exq>edite the conclusion of the trial of an election petition.\n\nHe submitted that the attainment of these objects would be entirely frustrated if the respondents on whom these copies were served had still to make enquiries to satisfy themselves whether the oopies were true copies, without the same being asserted to be so on their face.\n\nIn support he referred us to the decisions in Noseworthy v. Overseers of Buckland etc.(') and in Spice v. Bacon( 2 ) as illustrating the degree of strictness and literal compliance which was insisted on by courts in regard to provisions of like character.\n\nThe first of these cases was a registration appeal and the Act provided that a iperson who objected to a voter's qualification might be heard in support of his objection if he had given notice to the voter and the manner of giving notice was by sending it by post addressed to his place of abode \"as described\".\n\nIt was held that a notice by post addressed correctly but not to the address \"as described\" was not a compliance with the requirement and that in consequence the objector could not be heard.\n\nWe do not consider that this dec.ision lays down any hard and fast rule or principle of construction which is attracted to every case where a statute calls for interpretation.\n\nIn ultimate analysis the question is one of the construction of the relevant provision of the particular statutes which iproceeds on the basis\n\nof the words used understood in the context of the statute.\n\n(1) L.R. 9 C. P. 233. (') L.R. 2 Bx. D. 463.\n\n1964 The second case raised a question as to the meaning Ch.\n\nSubbarao of the word \"true copy\" in the Inn-keepers' Liability Act .!M•mhtr v.Election 1863, which required that in order to obtain the benefit of\n\nIribu11ai Hyderathe limitation of liability conferred by the Act, a \"copy\" of\n\nbad the Act had to be exhibited at the Inn.\n\nThe copy which Ayyangar J. was exhibited omitted some material words of the section which was required to be exhibited.\n\nThe Court held that when a claim was made on the inn-keeper for loss sustained by a guest, he could not claim the benefit of the statute. We are unable to appreciate the relevance of this decision. It turned on what was meant by the word 'copy' in the Act and the portion which was omitted in the copy exhibited was a material portion.\n\nThere is no doubt that such a 'copy' which differs in material particular from the original is not a 'copy' within the Act. In this connection we might make a reference to the decision of this Court in Murarka v. Roop Singh ( 1) where the question as to what is a \"copy\" is elaborately discussed and some of the English decisions touching this matter have been set out.\n\nWe shall have occasion to refer to Murarka's case later, but for the present we need only add that the decision relied on by the Solicitor-General is not at variance with what this Court has laid down in Murarka's case.\n\nThe next matter to be considered stems from the submission as regards the object of Parliament in enacting subsection ( 3) of s. 81 and that expeditious dispClsal of election petitions which was the object would be frustrated if substantial compliance with the provision was held sufficient.\n\nWe are not im; iressed with this argument.\n\nWhile we are conscious of the need for expeditious disposal of election petitions, and for the strict enforcement of provisions designed to achieve this purpose, we cannot be oblivious to the circumstance that to read every requirement literally might equally defeat the purpose for which Part VI is intended, viz., that elections are conducted in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions framed to ensure purity and orderliness and that the candidate who has not obtained a majority of valid votes or has obtained it in flagrant\n\n(t) [1964]3 S.C.R. 573\n\nbreach of the statutory provisions in not held entitled to 1964 represent the constituency.\n\nCh.\n\nSubbllNIO\n\nThe Conrt had to deal with a similar question of inter- Memb.,, Electio• Tribunal Hydm1r pretation of words which appeared mandatory in Kamara; bad\n\nNadar~• .• Kunju Thevar(1). One of the points which arose Ayyaniar 1• for consideration was whether the requirement of s. 117 of the Act which then required the petitioner to enclose with the petition a Government treasury receipt of Rs. 100 in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission had been complied with by the election petitioner and s. 90( 4) of the Act which corresponded substantially to the present s. 90(3) required the Election Tribunal to dismiss a petition which did not comply with the provision, inter alia, of s. 117.\n\nThe petitioner in that case had made the deposit of the requisite amount i11 the institutions named in the section but the deposit was made in favour of the Election Commission and not in favour of the Secretary to the Commission as required by statute.\n\nIt was contended that the petition did not conform to the provisions of s. 117 and had therefore to be dismissed by the Tribunal. This Court rejected this submis>ion .and after adverting to the purpose of the provisions, held that this was fulfilled by the deposit made and that though the requirement as to deposit was mandatory, the same was complied with by the deposit made.\n\nWe consider that this reasoning is not irrelevant to the construction of s. 81(3) of the Act either.\n\nIn this connection we might refer to the decision of this Court in Murarka v. Roop Singh( 2 ) in which this Court had to consider a question closely related to that now under debate.\n\nThat case was also concerned with certain\n\ndefect~ similar to what we have in the appeal before us.\n\nThe defects which were there relied on by the returned candidate as justifying or requiring the dismissal of the Election Petition fell into several categories whiCh includ\n\ned non-compliance with the requirements of s. 81 (3 ).\n\nThere, as here, the petition was accompanied with the re-\n\n(') (1959] S.C.R. 583.\n\n134-159 SC-15\n\n<'> [1964] 3 s.c.R. 573.\n\n1964 quisite number of copies as specified in s. 81 (3) but what Ch.\n\nSubharao was urged was as regards certain defects in the copies filed . ., b v.El .\n\nThese defects fell into two types.\n\nFirst there were two mat- ... m .r, ect1on h' . ed ed . fil J'rlbunal Hyd.raters w 1ch 1t was stat render the copies ed not 'true bad copies'. If the exipressions 'copy' or 'true copy' wre read Ayyangar J. as exact copies of the original, the copies filed did not satisfy that test.\n\nThe two defects were: ( 1) The original petition contained the signature of the petitioner at the foot of the petition as required by s. 83(1)(c) of the Act. In the copy filed there was no copy of this signature.\n\nTo that extent therefore the copy was not an exact copy.\n\nThe second matter under this head was that the verification in the copy served on the appellant did not exactly correspond to that in the original in that in the latter one of the paragraphs was stated to be true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner while in the former that paragraph was omitted from this group.\n\nThe other type of defect which was claimed to constitute non-compliance with s. 81 ( 3) was that the words 'true copy' with the signature of the petitioner underneath were not put down in one of the annexures to the petition, copies\n\nof which were annexed to the copies of the petition filed.\n\nThe order of the Returning Officer rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner was filed with the original petition as an annexure to it, and certified copies of that order were annexed to the copies of the petition.\n\nBut this certified copy did not contain an endorsement stating that it was a 'true copy' with the signature of the petitioner.\n\nThe High Court had held that so far as the defect in not reproducing the signature in the petition was concerned, it was cured by the fact that every page of the copy of the petition was attested to be a true copy and therefore it would not matter if the last page did not contain the signature. As rega•ds the second, the High Court held that the failure to include the paragraph in the verification was only a clerical defect which had crept in through oversight and as regards the other that it was no defect at all.\n\nThis decision was upheld by this Court holding that the word 'co;>y' in s. 81 ( 3) meant a copy which was substantially sc and which did not\n\ncontain any material or substantial variation.\n\nBy 'copy' 1964 in s. 81 ( 3) was meant not an exact copy but only one so Ch.\n\nSub/Hno true that nobody by any possibility misunderstand! it not M be \": Elecltoa being the same as the original.\n\nApplying this test, this Trlb~ B1\"1\" Court came to the conclusion that there was no failure to ~.., comply with the last part of s. 81 ( 3), with the re1ult that AY1•n1• 1. s. 90 ( 3) of the Act was not attracted.\n\nThis Court besides left open the question as to whether any part of s. 81 ( 3) was directory or whether any portion of it was mandatory. In the present case also, we do not propose to deal with the larger question as to whether 1.\n\n81(3) or any portion of it is merely directory. In view of the decis.ion of this Court it would be clear that if there ia\n\na substantial compliance with the requirement of s. S 1 ( 3), the election petition cannot be dismissed by the Tribunal under s. 90 ( 3). The question then is whether on the facts\n\nabove-stated, there is or is not a sufficient and substantial compliance with s. 81 (3).\n\nWe have already pointed out that the appellant has complied with the following requir&- ments:\n\n( 1) The petition has been accompanied by the requilite number of copies.\n\n(2) The copies that accompanied the petition were true copies. ·\n\n( 3) Each of those copies bore the signatures of the petitioner.\n\nIf the signature of the petitioner whose name is set oqt in the body of the petition is appended at the end, surely it authenticates the contents of the document. Now in regard to this the learned Judges of the High Court themselves observed after referring to the terms of s. 81 ( 3) : ·\n\n\"No doubt, what is necessary is a substantial com{i-'\n\nliance with the requirement of attestation.\n\nFor instance, if it is proved that\" the eleetion petitioner has signed animo atttstendi, and omitted the words 'true copy' by mistake or inadvertently, there i5 a substantial requirement of the compliance of s. 81 (3).\n\nThe\n\nCh.\n\ns., bbarao ...\n\nII.ember, Election\n\nsame may be said if the relative positions of the words 'true copy' and of the signature one below the other are not correct.\"\n\nTribunal Hyd1ra- 1. h h Id h h d f h bad hey owever e t at as t ere was no cv1 ence o t e sig-\n\n<4.yyangar J. nature having been appended animo attestendi, there was non-compliance with s. 81 (3). The learned Solicitor-General while not disputing the correctness of the observations of the learned Judges just extracted pressed upon us that the signature at the end of the copy was meant only as a ca:; iY of that in the original petition and could not satisfy the requirement as to attestation of the copy. He also submitted that the position would have been different if there were two signatures instead of one at the end of the copy, even if the words 'true copy' were omitted to be put down. In that case, he said, one signature could be treated as representing the copy of the signature on the original and the other mii:ht be taken to have been made animo attestendi.\n\nWe do not however consider that there is really need for so much refinement when one has to look at whether there is a substantial compliance withs. 81(3), seeing that a signature in origisignatures now found on the copies were intended to authenticate the document to which it is appended, viz .. the copy, it would only mean that the copy did not reproduce the signature in the original.\n\nThere is no compelling necessity to hold that the signatures were merely intended to be a copy of those on the original in order to spell out a noncompliance with the requirement of this provision. If the nal was not needed on the copy and a writing copying out the name of the signatory would suffice.\n\nThe decision of this Court in Murarka's case(') is authority for the position that the absence of a writing in the copy indicating the signature in the original would not detract the copy from being a true copy.\n\nJn the circumstances, we consider that there has been substantial compliance with the requirement d. s. 81 (3) in the petition that was filed by the appellant and the learned Judges were in error in directing the dismissal o! the petition.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court dismissing the petition is set ru; ide.\n\nAs owing\n\n(') [I964J 3 S.C.R. 573 -;\n\n.;,.\n\n10 the filing of the Writ Petition there has been a considerable delay in the trial of the Election Petition, we express the hope that the petition would be heard and disposed of at an early a date as is conveniently possible.\n\nThe appellant will be entitled to his costs here and in the High Court which will be paid by the contesting third respondent.\n\nAppeal Allowed.\n\nIN re: LILY ISABEL THOMAS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR\n\nAND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)\n\nSupreme Court Rules-''Right to practise\" if include! \"right to act\" -\n\nRule making power-If conflicts with legislative power of Parliament-Supreme Court Rules, 1950 (as amended in 1962). 0. IV. rr. 16, 17-Validity of-Constitution of .India, Art. 145-Advocates Act, 1961 (25 vf 1961) •s. 52, 58(3).\n\nThe petitioner was enrolled in the Madras High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, and later admitted to the rolls of this Court under the Supreme Court Rules.\n\nIn this petition, it was contended that under s. 58(3) of the Advocates Act, the petitioner was entitled \"as of right to practise\" in this Court. and the \"right to practise\" included not merely the right to plead hut also to act; that the rules mad~. N rr. 16 & 17 of the Supreme Court Rules are invalid; and that that by a rule made under Art. 145 (l)(a) this Court could neither entitle a person to practise nor impose qualifications as to tho right to practise, these matters being entirely within entry 77 and therefore exclusively for parliamentary legislation.\n\nHELD: (i) The words \"right to practise\" would in itt normal conaotation take in not merely right to plead but the right to act as well and if no rules had been made by the Supreme Court restricting the right to act, the petitioner could undoutedly have had a right both to plead es well as to act\n\nAshwani Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, [1953) S.C.R. 1, referred lo.\n\n(ii) Under s. 58(3) of the Advocates Act, the right conferred on Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act to practise in the Sup- Rme Court is made subject to any rules made by thia Oourt. SectiOD\n\nCh. Subbarao v.\n\nTribunal Hydera\n\nTribunal Hydera bad\n\nAyyanz\"1' 1,\n\nJanuary, 14", "total_entities": 140, "entities": [{"text": "Pir Baksh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "addresed to the High Court on this point; and ( 4) there had been no mutation in the revenue records when this sale was effected and Pir Baksh who was examined as a witness admitted this fact."}}, {"text": "Ashfaq", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 880, "end_char": 886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12(i) were held to be real, the plaintiffs would be entitled in addition to the 8 pies share decreed to them by the High Court, to a further 2 as 13 gondas odd share belonging to Ashfaq which they obtained under Ex."}}, {"text": "Pir Baksh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 933, "end_char": 942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 ( c) through Pir Baksh, and in the event of the sale not being held to be real to no more than what the High Court has decreed."}}, {"text": "CH. SUBBARAO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1131, "end_char": 1143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CH. SUBBARAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1145, "end_char": 1181, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEMBER, ELECTION TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1184, "end_char": 1201, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1203, "end_char": 1215, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1217, "end_char": 1231, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1233, "end_char": 1255, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 80(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2556, "end_char": 2564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representaion of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2572, "end_char": 2609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2837, "end_char": 2845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representaion of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representaion of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "[1964] 3 S.C.R. 573", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3190, "end_char": 3209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3843, "end_char": 3851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3880, "end_char": 3888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Xunjer Thevar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3974, "end_char": 3987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Xunjer Thevar, [1959] S.C.R. 583."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4019, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4160, "end_char": 4185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 15, 1963 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "T. V. R. TaJaclwi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4242, "end_char": 4259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. A. Choudhury and T. V. R. TaJaclwi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4281, "end_char": 4293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General and P. Ram Reddy, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. Ram Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4317, "end_char": 4329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General and P. Ram Reddy, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4472, "end_char": 4480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was MT bmber\n\n1 •. E!~ • _ t1 una 'llJ~ delivered bybad\n\nAYYANGAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave Ayyangar /. against a judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which a Writ Petition filed by the 3rd Respondent-K.\n\nBrahmananda Reddy-was allowed and an Election Petition filed by the appellant was directed to be dismissed.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "K.\n\nBrahmananda Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was MT bmber\n\n1 •. E!~ • _ t1 una 'llJ~ delivered bybad\n\nAYYANGAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave Ayyangar /. against a judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which a Writ Petition filed by the 3rd Respondent-K.\n\nBrahmananda Reddy-was allowed and an Election Petition filed by the appellant was directed to be dismissed.", "canonical_name": "K.\n\nBrahmananda Reddy"}}, {"text": "Brahamananda Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5032, "end_char": 5050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to, the proceedings with which the appeal is concerned are briefly as follows: At the Genl!ral Elections held in the month of February 1962 for the 'Legislative Assembly-Constituency of Phirangipuram in Guntur District in Andhra Pradesh-the third respondent Brahamananda Reddy and one Chandramouli, the 2nd respondent before us, were the contesting candidates.", "canonical_name": "K.\n\nBrahmananda Reddy"}}, {"text": "Chandramouli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5059, "end_char": 5071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to, the proceedings with which the appeal is concerned are briefly as follows: At the Genl!ral Elections held in the month of February 1962 for the 'Legislative Assembly-Constituency of Phirangipuram in Guntur District in Andhra Pradesh-the third respondent Brahamananda Reddy and one Chandramouli, the 2nd respondent before us, were the contesting candidates."}}, {"text": "Brahmananda Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5237, "end_char": 5254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The polling at the Election took place on the 26th 'February 1962 and the Returning Officer declared Brahmananda Reddy, elected as\n\nhaving obtained the majority of valid votes.", "canonical_name": "K.\n\nBrahmananda Reddy"}}, {"text": "April 11, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5454, "end_char": 5468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, ihe appellant who is a voter on the rolls of the said Constituency filed an Election Petition before the Election Commission on April 11, 1962 under s. 81 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, which we shall refer to as the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5475, "end_char": 5480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5488, "end_char": 5527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.\n\n86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6328, "end_char": 6334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Brahmananda Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6481, "end_char": 6498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The returned candidate-Brahmananda Reddy-filed\n\n191~ his Written Statement on September 15, 1962 in which the Ch.", "canonical_name": "K.\n\nBrahmananda Reddy"}}, {"text": "itember 15, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7228, "end_char": 7244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The merits have yet to be tried, and as regards the technical objections to the petition raised in the Written Statement dated Se; itember 15, 1962, they have been disposed of by the High Court and the same are not before us."}}, {"text": "September 24, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7344, "end_char": 7362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A few days later on September 24, 1962, Brahmananda Reddy filed a further Statement of objections to the petition raising mostly objections of a technical nature and of these the only objections which is the subject matter of the present appeal is that contained in paragraph 2 which reads, and we quote the material words:\n\n\"It is further submitted on behalf of the 1st respondent that the above petition filed u/s 81 of the Act is not an Election Petition ...........• As the requirements of s. 81 (3) of the Act are not com;>lied with, the petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed u/s 90(3) of the Act as it does not comply with the provisions of sec."}}, {"text": "s 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7738, "end_char": 7742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7818, "end_char": 7823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 90(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7916, "end_char": 7923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8396, "end_char": 8404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 7, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8997, "end_char": 9013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal acceded to this request and by its order dated November 7, 1962, it decided the preliminary objections including the one just now mentioned in favour of the election ipetitioner and fixed a date for the trial of the petition on the merits."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9246, "end_char": 9257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9610, "end_char": 9615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10181, "end_char": 10185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10747, "end_char": 10753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11220, "end_char": 11228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11689, "end_char": 11694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11697, "end_char": 11707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11915, "end_char": 11925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12165, "end_char": 12175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13410, "end_char": 13429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and one more copy for the use of the Election Commission, and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.\""}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13783, "end_char": 13788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14489, "end_char": 14494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14661, "end_char": 14671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14739, "end_char": 14744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14781, "end_char": 14790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14912, "end_char": 14941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15087, "end_char": 15097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15217, "end_char": 15227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15231, "end_char": 15241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15245, "end_char": 15256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15590, "end_char": 15595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15643, "end_char": 15648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15904, "end_char": 15927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16082, "end_char": 16092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16174, "end_char": 16179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "Subbarao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16188, "end_char": 16196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subbarao\n\nMember, Electitnl The reasoning on which the learned Judges have based Tribunaiod Hyd.,.."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16353, "end_char": 16358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16814, "end_char": 16819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16857, "end_char": 16862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16972, "end_char": 16977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17257, "end_char": 17265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18113, "end_char": 18118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18177, "end_char": 18182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18285, "end_char": 18293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18397, "end_char": 18402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18642, "end_char": 18647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18805, "end_char": 18810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18815, "end_char": 18823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18891, "end_char": 18896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18954, "end_char": 18962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18977, "end_char": 18982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19035, "end_char": 19040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19173, "end_char": 19178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19258, "end_char": 19263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19301, "end_char": 19309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19395, "end_char": 19400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19695, "end_char": 19700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19897, "end_char": 19902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20216, "end_char": 20221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20254, "end_char": 20259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20424, "end_char": 20429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20563, "end_char": 20571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20632, "end_char": 20640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20879, "end_char": 20884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21251, "end_char": 21261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in this connection that he pointed out that the provision for properly attested copies of the petition accompanying the petition was introduced by the amendment effected in 1961, and the object of Parliament was two-fold; first to save the time and inconvenience which the previous procedure cast on the Election Commission, of itself having to make copies for service on the respondents, and secondly by this means to exq>edite the conclusion of the trial of an election petition."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23351, "end_char": 23359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The copy which Ayyangar J. was exhibited omitted some material words of the section which was required to be exhibited.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "Murarka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24200, "end_char": 24207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall have occasion to refer to Murarka's case later, but for the present we need only add that the decision relied on by the Solicitor-General is not at variance with what this Court has laid down in Murarka's case."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24512, "end_char": 24517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kunju Thevar(1)", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25556, "end_char": 25571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Electio• Tribunal Hydm1r pretation of words which appeared mandatory in Kamara; bad\n\nNadar~• .• Kunju Thevar(1)."}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25664, "end_char": 25670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25895, "end_char": 25904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25964, "end_char": 25972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26082, "end_char": 26088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26418, "end_char": 26424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26799, "end_char": 26807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27330, "end_char": 27335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27513, "end_char": 27518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28076, "end_char": 28087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28613, "end_char": 28618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29774, "end_char": 29779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29910, "end_char": 29915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30215, "end_char": 30220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30259, "end_char": 30264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30369, "end_char": 30374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30708, "end_char": 30711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30782, "end_char": 30787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30915, "end_char": 30920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31504, "end_char": 31509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31828, "end_char": 31833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4.yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32111, "end_char": 32120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h h Id h h d f h bad hey owever e t at as t ere was no cv1 ence o t e sig-\n\n<4.yyangar J. nature having been appended animo attestendi, there was non-compliance with s. 81 (3)."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32200, "end_char": 32205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33899, "end_char": 33904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "LILY ISABEL THOMAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34569, "end_char": 34587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IN re: LILY ISABEL THOMAS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR\n\nAND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34609, "end_char": 34621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IN re: LILY ISABEL THOMAS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR\n\nAND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34640, "end_char": 34663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IN re: LILY ISABEL THOMAS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR\n\nAND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "J. R. MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34669, "end_char": 34684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IN re: LILY ISABEL THOMAS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR\n\nAND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "J. R. MUDHOLKAR"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34692, "end_char": 34711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rule making power-If conflicts with legislative power of Parliament-Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34763, "end_char": 34856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34933, "end_char": 34941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rule making power-If conflicts with legislative power of Parliament-Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "statute": "Rule making power-If conflicts with legislative power of Parliament-Supreme Court Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34942, "end_char": 34961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 52, 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34976, "end_char": 34988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35026, "end_char": 35043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was enrolled in the Madras High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, and later admitted to the rolls of this Court under the Supreme Court Rules."}}, {"text": "Indian Bar Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35054, "end_char": 35077, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35119, "end_char": 35154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35203, "end_char": 35211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35219, "end_char": 35232, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35429, "end_char": 35448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 & 17 of the Supreme Court Rules are invalid; and that that by a rule made under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35497, "end_char": 35505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35897, "end_char": 35910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD: (i) The words \"right to practise\" would in itt normal conaotation take in not merely right to plead but the right to act as well and if no rules had been made by the Supreme Court restricting the right to act, the petitioner could undoutedly have had a right both to plead es well as to act\n\nAshwani Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, [1953) S.C.R. 1, referred lo."}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36103, "end_char": 36111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36119, "end_char": 36132, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36157, "end_char": 36202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_229_237_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 229\n\n10 the filing of the Writ Petition there has been a considerable delay in the trial of the Election Petition, we express the hope that the petition would be heard and disposed of at an early a date as is conveniently possible.\n\nThe appellant will be entitled to his costs here and in the High Court which will be paid by the contesting third respondent.\n\nAppeal Allowed.\n\nIN re: LILY ISABEL THOMAS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALAN AYYANGAR\n\nAND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)\n\nSupreme Court Rules-''Right to practise\" if include! \"right to act\" -\n\nRule making power-If conflicts with legislative power of Parliament-Supreme Court Rules, 1950 (as amended in 1962). 0. IV. rr. 16, 17-Validity of-Constitution of .India, Art. 145-Advocates Act, 1961 (25 vf 1961) •s. 52, 58(3).\n\nThe petitioner was enrolled in the Madras High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, and later admitted to the rolls of this Court under the Supreme Court Rules.\n\nIn this petition, it was contended that under s. 58(3) of the Advocates Act, the petitioner was entitled \"as of right to practise\" in this Court. and the \"right to practise\" included not merely the right to plead hut also to act; that the rules mad~. N rr. 16 & 17 of the Supreme Court Rules are invalid; and that that by a rule made under Art. 145 (l)(a) this Court could neither entitle a person to practise nor impose qualifications as to tho right to practise, these matters being entirely within entry 77 and therefore exclusively for parliamentary legislation.\n\nHELD: (i) The words \"right to practise\" would in itt normal conaotation take in not merely right to plead but the right to act as well and if no rules had been made by the Supreme Court restricting the right to act, the petitioner could undoutedly have had a right both to plead es well as to act\n\nAshwani Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, [1953) S.C.R. 1, referred lo.\n\n(ii) Under s. 58(3) of the Advocates Act, the right conferred on Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act to practise in the Sup- Rme Court is made subject to any rules made by thia Oourt. SectiOD\n\nCh. Subbarao v.\n\nTribunal Hydera\n\nTribunal Hydera bad\n\nAyyanz\"1' 1,\n\nJanuary, 14\n\nUly l•ab•I\n\nT/wm.,\n\n'2 o! the AdTocal<I Act opocifically 1neo the JX>Wers o! thiJ Court to make rules under Art. 145.\n\nIn Ticw of the saving, repeated $. S2 there ii no question of the rule restricting the right to act to a certain cUiu o! advocates u bein1 contrary to a law made by Parliament.\n\n(iii) On the expreoo tenm o! Art.,14,(l)(a) rules 16 I 17 of 0. IV are 'Yalid and within the rule making powers of thi! Court.\n\nThis Court can. by its rules make pro'ri!ion prescribing qualifications entitling per ..\n\nIOD~ to practise before it, and Parliament can do likewise. There ia no question of a conflict between the legislative power of Parliament and the rule-making power of this Court. because by reason of the opening words of Art. 1'4-S, any rule made by this Court would have operation only aubjcct to lawi made by Parliament on the aubjcct of the entitle .. ., ent to practise.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petition No. 42 of 1963.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nThe petitioner appeared in person.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the Hon'ble Juages of the Supreme Court.\n\nA. V. Ranganadham Chetty, A. Vedavalli and A. V.\n\nRangam, for the intervener (W. C. Chopra).\n\nJanuary 14, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nA,,.,.,.,. J.\n\nAYYANGAR J.-The proper construction of Art. 145(1)\n\n(a) of the Constitution in the context of a prayer for a declaration that rule 16 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules as invalid is the principal point raised in this petition which has been filed by an Advocate who under the Advocates Act, 1961, is entitled to practise in this Court.\n\nThe petitioner was enrolled in the Madras High Court on November 15, 1955 under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and was admitted to the rolls of this Court on October 29, 1960 under Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules as they then stood. She states that as an Advocate entitled to practise in this Court, she is entitled as of right not merely to plead but also to act, and that the rules of this Court\n\nwhich prescribe qualifications before she could be permitted to act are therefore invalid. The prayer which she makes by her petition is therefore for a declaration that rule 16 ( 1) of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules as amended in 1962 which contains this prescription of qualifications be declared ultra vires of this Court and a further declaration that she is entitled to practise as an Advocate on record in this Court without conforming to the requirements now imposed by the impugned rule.\n\nRule 16 whose validity is challenged runs:\n\n\"16. No Advocate shall be qualified to be registered as an Advocate on Record unless he-\n\n(!) has undergone training for one year with an Advocate on Record approved by the Court, and has thereafter passed such tests as may be held by the Court for Advocates who apply to be registered as Advocates on Record, particulars whereof shall be notified in the Gazette of India from time to time; provided however, that an Attorney shall be exempted from such training and test;\n\n(2) has an office in Delhi within a radius of 10\n\nmiles from the Court House and gives an undertaking to employ, within one month of his being registered as Advocate on Record. a registered clerk; and\n\n( 3) pays a registration fee of Rs. 25\".\n\nIt might be mentioned that under the Rules though every Advocate whose name is maintained in the common roll of Advocates prepared under s. 20 of the Advocates' Act, is entitled to plead, only those Advocates who are registered as \"Advocates on record\" are entitled to act as well, for rule 17 of Order provides :\n\n\"17. An Advocate -on Record shall be entitled to\n\nact as well as plead for any party in a proceeding on his filing in the proceeding a memOl'lllldum of appearance accompanied by a Vakalat-\n\n196'\n\nLily liabll\n\nT/wma\n\nA.yyangar J.\n\nThoma1\n\nA.,,.,.,,,,.1.\n\nnama duly executed by the party in the prescribed form.\n\nNo Advocate other than an Advocate on Record shall be entitled to file an appearance or act for a party in the Court.\"\n\nThe contention urged by the petitioner who argue~. her case in person and presented the points arising with ability and moderation, is that under s. 58(3} of the Advocates Act which reads\n\n\"58. (3) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, every person who, immediately before the !st day of December, 1961, was an advocate on the roll of any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 or who has been enrolled as an advocate under this Act shall, until Chapter IV comes into force, be entitled as of right to practise in the Supreme Court, subject to the. rules made by the Supreme Court in this behalf\"\n\nshe is entitled \"as of right to practise\" in this Court. and she claims that the \"right to practise\" would include not merely the right to plead, but also the right to act. She is right so far. Her further submission is as regards the scope and content of the rules which might lawfully be made by this Court.\n\nUndoubtedly, if there were no rules made by the Supreme Court or if, as the petitioner contends, the rules now made-Order IV Rules 16 and 17-are invalid the petitioner would be entitled not merely to plead as she is now entitled to, but also to act which latter she is now prevented by rule 17 unless she has complied with the requirements of rule 16:\n\nThe question then for consideration is whether the impugned rules are valid. This depends upon the proper construction of Art. 145 (I )(a) by virtue of which the impugned rule has been framed, which reads:\n\n\"145. (1) Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the Supreme Court may from time to time, with the approval of the President.\n\nmake rules for regulating generally the practice 1964 and procedure of the Court including- Lily lsab~I\n\nThom@\n\n(a) rules as to the persons practising before the Ayyangar /. court;''\n\nAs regards this Article there are two matters to which attention might be directed. By the opening words of the Article the rciks m.1de by this Cou: t are subject to the provision of any law made by Parliament, so that if there is any provision in a law made by Parliament by which either the right to make the rule is restricted or which contains provisions contrary to the ruis. it is beyond dispute that the law made by Parliament would prevail. ft is the submission of the petitioner that s. 58(3) quoted earlier, is such a law made by Parliame, nt and that the absolute right granted to per sons in the position of the petitioner to \"practise as of right\" camwt be controlled by ruk; made by this Court. In this connection our attention was invited to the decision of this Court in Aswini Kumar Ghosh and Anr. v. Arabinda Bose and Anr. ('). Here this Court explained what the expression 'right to practise' meant. It was laid down that these words which occurred in the Supreme Court Advocates (Practise\n\nin High Court) Act, 1951 whose s. 2 enacted \"Every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of right to practise in any High Court whether or not he is an Advocate of that High Court\" meant that such an Advocate was entitled not merely to plead but to act as well, and that the enactment prevailed notwithstanding any rule made by the High Courts .of Calcutta and Bombay restricting the right to act on the original sides of those courts. The decision, however, does not carry the matter far, because it was based on the inconsistency between \"the right to practise as of right\" conferred by the enactment of I 951 and the saving as regards the rule making power of the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta to restrict \"the right to act\" on the original side of those courts which was contained in the Bar Councils Act 1926. This Court held that it was a case: of an implied repeal of that saving by the later legislation.\n\n(') [1953] S.C.R. J.\n\ni964\n\n•IJly l.rabel T1iomai\n\n-~J.\n\nNvertheless the petitioner, as stated earlier, is certainly nght m her submission that the words 'right to practise' would in its normal connotation take in, not merely right to plead but the right to act as well and that is why we said that if no rules had been made by the Supreme Court restricting the right to act, the petitioner could undoubtedly have a right both to plead as well as to act\n\nBut we have already pointed out that under s. 58(3) of the Act, the right conferred on Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act to practise in the Supreme Court is made subject to any rules made by this Court. To reinforce this position there is a saving enacted by s. 52 of the Advocates Act which specifically saves the powers of this Court to make rules under Art. 145. Section 52 reads:-\n\n\"52. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect the power of the Supreme Court to make rules under article 145 of the Constitution-\n\n(a) for laying down the conditions subject to which\n\na senior advocate shall be entitled to practise in that Court;\n\n(b) for determining the persons who shall be entitled to act in that behalf.\"\n\nIn view of the saving which is repeated in s. 52 there is no question of the rule restricting the right to act to a certain class of advocates as being contrary to a law made by Parliament. The only question for consideration is whether . Ait. 145(1) (a) is sufficient to empower this Court to frame the impugned rules.\n\nThe argument addressed to us with considerable earnestness was that under the Article the rules to be framed under the items (a) to (j) were all to be framed for regulating the 'practice and procedure of the Court which she urged indicated the underlying purpose with which the rule making power was vested in the Court. Secondly she urged that if •head (a)-in sub-Article (1) reading \"rules as to the persons practising before the Court'', were treated as an independent subject, entirelj divorced from the context of the opening 'words \"practice and procedure of the Court\", even then the\n\npower to make the rule was confined to the regulation of the conduct of the persons practising i.e. entitled under the law to practise and so practising before the Court.\n\nThough a number of decisions were cited to us as to what was meant by 'practise and procedure of the Court' we do not think it useful or necessary to refer to them.\n\nThey would have been relevant and might require serious consideration if the entire power to make the rule was to depend merely on the words \"regulating the practice and procedure of the Court\" but the Article specifically makes provision enabling rules to be made \"as to persons practising before the Court.\" We are inclined to read item (a} as an independent bead of rule making power and not as merely a part ol a power to make rules for \"regulating the practice and procedure of the Court.\" The word 'including' which precedes the enumeration of the items (a} to (i) as well as the subject matter of item (a), stamp it as an independent head of power.\n\nWe do not, therefore, propose to deal with what exactly would have been the content of a \"regulation of practice and proceedure.\" but shall proceed to consider the meaning of the words \"Rules as to the persons practising before the Court\" because if the rules now impugned could be justified as within this power their validity cannot be impeached.\n\nNow as regards these words in item (a) the submission of the petitioner was two-fold : Firstly, she contrasted these words with entry 77 in the Union List in Sch. VII the last portion of which reads :\n\n\"Persons entitled to practise before the Supreme\n\nCourt\"\n\nRelying on the contrast between the two expressions \"persons practising\" and \"persons entitled to practise\" the submission was that the words \"persons practising before the Court\" was narrower and gave this Court power to frame rules only to determine the manner in which persons who had obtained a right to practise under a law made by Parliament by virtue of its power under entry 77 could exercise\n\nLily lmbd\n\nThomiu\n\n.4yyang01' J.\n\nLily Isabel Thomas\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nthat right.\n\nIn this connection she drew a distinction between 'being entitled to practise' which would include determining or prescribing the qualifications that a person should possess before becoming entitled to practise, which she urged was the subject matter of entry 77, and a rule as to \"a person practising before a court\" which was the second stage after the right to practice had been obtained by Parliamentary legislation.\n\nIn other words, the submission was that by a rule made under Art. 145(i)(a) this Court could neither entitle a person to practise nor impose qualifications as to the right to practise-these being matters entirely within entry 77 and therefore exclusively for parliamentary legislation.\n\nWe feel unable to accept this argument.\n\nWe do not I agree that the words \"persons practisi.ng before the Court\" is narrower than the words \"persons entitled to practise before the Court\". The learned Additional Solicitor-General was well-founded i•1 his submission that if, for instance, there was no law made by Parliament entitling any person to practise before this Court, the construction suggested by the applicant would mean that this Court could not make a rule prescribing qualifications for persons to practise in this Court. In this connection it is interesting to notice that the words used in Art. 145(1)(a) have been taken substantially from s. 214(]) of the Government of India Act. 1935.\n\nThat section ran, to quote the material words:\n\n\"The Federal Court may from time to time, with the approval of the Governor-General in his discretion make rules qf Court for regulating\n\ngenerall~ the practice and procedure of the Court including rules as to the persons practising before the Court.. .... \"\n\nThe Government of India Act, 1935 did not in its legislative lists have a provision like as we have in entry 77 of List I (vide entry 53 of List I). The Federal Court immediately on its formation made rules and under Order IV of those rules provision was made prescribing qualifications for the\n\nenrolment as Advocates of the Federal Court.\n\nAdvocates entitled to practise in the High Courts with a &tanding of 5 years on the rolls of High Court and who satisfied certain requisite conditions were entitled to be enrolled as Advocates, while for enrolment as Senior Advocates a standing of 10 years as an Advocate of a High Court Bar was prescribed. We are pointing this out only for the purpose of showing that the words \"as to the persons practising before the Court\" were then used in a comprehensive snse so as to include a rule not merely as to the manner of practice but also of the right to practise or the entitlement to practice.\n\nThose words which are repeated in Art. 145(l)(a) have still the same content. We ought to add that there is no anomaly involved in the construction that this Court can by its rules make provision prescribing qualifications entitling persons to practise before 1t and that Parliament can do likewise.\n\nThere is no question of a confliCt between the legislative power of Parliament and the rule-making power of !his Court, because by reason of the opening words of Art. 145, any rule made by this Court would have operation only subject to laws !'1ade by Parliament on the subject of the entitlement to pactise.\n\nWe are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that on the express terms of Art. 145(l)(a) the impugned rules 16 and 17 are valid and within the rule-making power.\n\nThe learned Additional-Solicitor made a further submission that the rule could be justified under the inherent powers of the Court and relied for this purpe>se on the decision of this Court in in re: Sant Ram [1960] 3 S.C.R. 499 where at pages 504, 505 the inherent powers of this Court have been referred to. In the view we take about the construction of Art. 145(l)(a) we do not think it necessary to rest our decision on the inherent powers of this Court to frame a rule of this sort.\n\nThe petition, therefore. fails and is rejected.\n\nPetitiory t!isr!' 1< ; P1.\n\n-- ___._~--\n\nThoma.r\n\nAyyangar J.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "IN re: LILY ISABEL THOMAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 409, "end_char": 434, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IN re: LILY ISABEL THOMAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 437, "end_char": 454, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 456, "end_char": 468, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. 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MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 539, "end_char": 558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rule making power-If conflicts with legislative power of Parliament-Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 610, "end_char": 703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 780, "end_char": 788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rule making power-If conflicts with legislative power of Parliament-Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "statute": "Rule making power-If conflicts with legislative power of Parliament-Supreme Court Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 789, "end_char": 808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 52, 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 823, "end_char": 835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "statute": "Advocates Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 873, "end_char": 890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was enrolled in the Madras High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, and later admitted to the rolls of this Court under the Supreme Court Rules."}}, {"text": "Indian Bar Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 901, "end_char": 924, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 966, "end_char": 1001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1050, "end_char": 1058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1066, "end_char": 1079, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1344, "end_char": 1352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1744, "end_char": 1757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD: (i) The words \"right to practise\" would in itt normal conaotation take in not merely right to plead but the right to act as well and if no rules had been made by the Supreme Court restricting the right to act, the petitioner could undoutedly have had a right both to plead es well as to act\n\nAshwani Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, [1953) S.C.R. 1, referred lo."}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1950, "end_char": 1958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Court under the Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1966, "end_char": 1979, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2004, "end_char": 2049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uly", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2224, "end_char": 2227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subbarao v.\n\nTribunal Hydera\n\nTribunal Hydera bad\n\nAyyanz\"1' 1,\n\nJanuary, 14\n\nUly l•ab•I\n\nT/wm.,"}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2332, "end_char": 2340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act", "statute": "Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act"}}, {"text": "S2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act", "statute": "Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "advocates u bein1 contrary to a law made by Parliament."}}, {"text": "Art. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2961, "end_char": 2967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act", "statute": "Advocates enrolled under the Bar Councils Act"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3172, "end_char": 3182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3283, "end_char": 3294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the Hon'ble Juages of the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3326, "end_char": 3338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the Hon'ble Juages of the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3343, "end_char": 3355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the Hon'ble Juages of the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "A. V. Ranganadham Chetty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3403, "end_char": 3427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Ranganadham Chetty, A. Vedavalli and A. V.\n\nRangam, for the intervener (W. C. Chopra)."}}, {"text": "A. Vedavalli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3429, "end_char": 3441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Ranganadham Chetty, A. Vedavalli and A. V.\n\nRangam, for the intervener (W. C. Chopra)."}}, {"text": "A. V.\n\nRangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Ranganadham Chetty, A. Vedavalli and A. V.\n\nRangam, for the intervener (W. C. Chopra)."}}, {"text": "W. C. Chopra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3481, "end_char": 3493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Ranganadham Chetty, A. Vedavalli and A. V.\n\nRangam, for the intervener (W. C. Chopra)."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3575, "end_char": 3583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nAYYANGAR J.-The proper construction of Art.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "Art. 145(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3614, "end_char": 3625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3856, "end_char": 3875, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November 15, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was enrolled in the Madras High Court on November 15, 1955 under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and was admitted to the rolls of this Court on October 29, 1960 under Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules as they then stood."}}, {"text": "Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4001, "end_char": 4030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "October 29, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4078, "end_char": 4094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was enrolled in the Madras High Court on November 15, 1955 under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and was admitted to the rolls of this Court on October 29, 1960 under Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules as they then stood."}}, {"text": "Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4101, "end_char": 4136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4509, "end_char": 4544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5235, "end_char": 5240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "has undergone training for one year with an Advocate on Record approved by the Court, and has thereafter passed such tests as may be held by the Court for Advocates who apply to be registered as Advocates on Record, particulars whereof shall be notified in the Gazette of India from time to time; provided however, that an Attorney shall be exempted from such training and test;\n\n(2) has an office in Delhi within a radius of 10\n\nmiles from the Court House and gives an undertaking to employ, within one month of his being registered as Advocate on Record."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5364, "end_char": 5369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "has undergone training for one year with an Advocate on Record approved by the Court, and has thereafter passed such tests as may be held by the Court for Advocates who apply to be registered as Advocates on Record, particulars whereof shall be notified in the Gazette of India from time to time; provided however, that an Attorney shall be exempted from such training and test;\n\n(2) has an office in Delhi within a radius of 10\n\nmiles from the Court House and gives an undertaking to employ, within one month of his being registered as Advocate on Record."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5724, "end_char": 5729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6118, "end_char": 6127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An Advocate -on Record shall be entitled to\n\nact as well as plead for any party in a proceeding on his filing in the proceeding a memOl'lllldum of appearance accompanied by a Vakalat-\n\n196'\n\nLily liabll\n\nT/wma\n\nA.yyangar J.\n\nThoma1\n\nA.,,.,.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "nama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6156, "end_char": 6160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nama duly executed by the party in the prescribed form."}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6495, "end_char": 6508, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6672, "end_char": 6722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Order IV Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7370, "end_char": 7384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7729, "end_char": 7737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order IV Rules", "statute": "Order IV Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8636, "end_char": 8644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliame", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8683, "end_char": 8691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ft is the submission of the petitioner that s. 58(3) quoted earlier, is such a law made by Parliame, nt and that the absolute right granted to per sons in the position of the petitioner to \"practise as of right\" camwt be controlled by ruk; made by this Court."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9184, "end_char": 9188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Courts .of Calcutta and Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9498, "end_char": 9533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was laid down that these words which occurred in the Supreme Court Advocates (Practise\n\nin High Court) Act, 1951 whose s. 2 enacted \"Every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of right to practise in any High Court whether or not he is an Advocate of that High Court\" meant that such an Advocate was entitled not merely to plead but to act as well, and that the enactment prevailed notwithstanding any rule made by the High Courts .of Calcutta and Bombay restricting the right to act on the original sides of those courts."}}, {"text": "High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9833, "end_char": 9867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision, however, does not carry the matter far, because it was based on the inconsistency between \"the right to practise as of right\" conferred by the enactment of I 951 and the saving as regards the rule making power of the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta to restrict \"the right to act\" on the original side of those courts which was contained in the Bar Councils Act 1926."}}, {"text": "Bar Councils Act 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9963, "end_char": 9984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "l.rabel T1iomai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10119, "end_char": 10134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(') [1953] S.C.R. J.\n\ni964\n\n•IJly l.rabel T1iomai\n~J.\n\nNvertheless the petitioner, as stated earlier, is certainly nght m her submission that the words 'right to practise' would in its normal connotation take in, not merely right to plead but the right to act as well and that is why we said that if no rules had been made by the Supreme Court restricting the right to act, the petitioner could undoubtedly have a right both to plead as well as to act\n\nBut we have already pointed out that under s. 58(3) of the Act, the right conferred on Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act to practise in the Supreme Court is made subject to any rules made by this Court."}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10583, "end_char": 10591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bar Councils Act 1926", "statute": "the Bar Councils Act 1926"}}, {"text": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10627, "end_char": 10673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10812, "end_char": 10817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act", "statute": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10825, "end_char": 10838, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10909, "end_char": 10917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act", "statute": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act"}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10919, "end_char": 10929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act", "statute": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act"}}, {"text": "article 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11041, "end_char": 11052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act", "statute": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11314, "end_char": 11319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act", "statute": "Advocates enrolled under tlle Bar Councils Act"}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13772, "end_char": 13786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VII the last portion of which reads :\n\n\"Persons entitled to practise before the Supreme\n\nCourt\"\n\nRelying on the contrast between the two expressions \"persons practising\" and \"persons entitled to practise\" the submission was that the words \"persons practising before the Court\" was narrower and gave this Court power to frame rules only to determine the manner in which persons who had obtained a right to practise under a law made by Parliament by virtue of its power under entry 77 could exercise\n\nLily lmbd\n\nThomiu\n\n.4yyang01' J.\n\nLily Isabel Thomas\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nthat right."}}, {"text": "Lily lmbd\n\nThomiu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14191, "end_char": 14208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VII the last portion of which reads :\n\n\"Persons entitled to practise before the Supreme\n\nCourt\"\n\nRelying on the contrast between the two expressions \"persons practising\" and \"persons entitled to practise\" the submission was that the words \"persons practising before the Court\" was narrower and gave this Court power to frame rules only to determine the manner in which persons who had obtained a right to practise under a law made by Parliament by virtue of its power under entry 77 could exercise\n\nLily lmbd\n\nThomiu\n\n.4yyang01' J.\n\nLily Isabel Thomas\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nthat right."}}, {"text": "Lily Isabel Thomas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14225, "end_char": 14243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VII the last portion of which reads :\n\n\"Persons entitled to practise before the Supreme\n\nCourt\"\n\nRelying on the contrast between the two expressions \"persons practising\" and \"persons entitled to practise\" the submission was that the words \"persons practising before the Court\" was narrower and gave this Court power to frame rules only to determine the manner in which persons who had obtained a right to practise under a law made by Parliament by virtue of its power under entry 77 could exercise\n\nLily lmbd\n\nThomiu\n\n.4yyang01' J.\n\nLily Isabel Thomas\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nthat right."}}, {"text": "Art. 145(i)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14754, "end_char": 14768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 145(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15586, "end_char": 15600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 214(])", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15636, "end_char": 15645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15997, "end_char": 16026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 145(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16967, "end_char": 16981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17396, "end_char": 17404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 145(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17615, "end_char": 17629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 S.C.R. 499", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17913, "end_char": 17932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 145(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18060, "end_char": 18074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18292, "end_char": 18300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "._~--\n\nThoma.r\n\nAyyangar J.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_238_250_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "January, 17\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1g64]\n\nRAM SEW AK Y ADAY\n\nHUSSAIN KAMIL KIDW AI & ORS.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nElection-Challenge on the ground of improper reception, re/u!al and\n\nrejection of votes at the time of counting-Tribunal rejec:ting claim. far inspection of the ballot papers-Validity-Representation of the People A.ct, I95I (43 of I95I), SJ. 100, IOI and 102 and conduct of Election Rules, 1961. r. 93.\n\nThe respondent challenged the election of the appellant, inter alia,. on the ground that there had been improper reception, refusal and rejection of votes at the time of counting and that on a true count he would have received a majority of valid votes and that he was entitled to be declared duly elected.\n\nHe claimed that by inspection of theballot papers he would be able to establish his case on the aforesaid alleg<ition, anrl that the Tribunal was bound to grant an order for in!- pection. bec<!nse he h2'1 tendered the sealed boxes of ballot papers in evidence, and on that account all the ballot papers were part of the record.\n\nThe Tribunal in its order stated that nothing was brought to its notice which \\\\'ou!d justify granting an order for inspection. It • further observed: \"If in future from the facts that may be brought to the notice of the Tribunal, it appears that in the interests of justice inspection should be allowed, necessary orders allo\\\\ing an inspection could always be passed\".\n\nThereupon, another application was submitted by the respondent asking for inspection but no additional n1aterialA\n\nwere placed before the Tribunal and no oral evidence was led at the trial.\n\nThe Tribunal rejected the application for inspection.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court held that ballot papers had actually been called for from the Returning Officer and were before the Tribunal, and there was nothing in the Code of Civil Proceduq! which prevented the Tribunal from allowing inspection of the ballot papers in the custody of the Court. The Tribunal had therefore rejected the application for inspection without any adequate reasons.\n\nThe sole question for determination was whether the Election Tribunal erred in declining to grant an order for inspection of th!! ballot papers Y.'hich had been, pursuant to an order in that behalf, lodged before the Tribunal in sealed boxes by the R.eturnina: Officer.\n\nHeld: By the mere production of the sealed boxes, the ballot papers did not become part of the record and they were not liable to be inspected unless the Tribunal was satisfied that l!luch inspection was in the\n\ncircumstances of the case necessary in the interests of jusfce.\n\nThe Returnins Officer is not a party to an election petition, and a11 1964 order for production of the ballot papers cannot be made under 0. XI Ram s;;;;; l y...., of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nBut the Election Tribunal is not on Y. that account without authority in respect of the ballot papers.\n\nWhere Hus1ain the interests of ju•tice deman'd it, the Tribunal may call upon the Return- KidwoJ ing Officer to produce the ballot papers and may permit in!pection by the parties before it of the ballot papers: that power is clearly implicit in ss. JOO(r)(d)(iii), 101, 102 of the Representation of the People Act. 1951 and rule 93 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. This power to order inspection of the ballot papers which is apart from 0. XI Code of Civil Procedure may be exercised, subject to the statutory restrictions about the .ecrecy of the ballot papers pmcribed by ss. 94 and 128(1) of the AcL\n\nBhim Sen •· Gopali, 22 E.L.R. 288, distinguished.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1064 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 23, 1963, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in First Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1963.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee and J. P. Goyal, for the appellant.\n\nS. P. Sinha and S. Shaukat Hussain, for respondent No. 1.\n\nJanuary 17, 1964.\n\nTue Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH J .-At the general elections held in February 1962, Shah 1.: five candidates contested the election to the House of the People from the Barabanki single-member constituency.\n\nThe appellant Ram Sewak Yadav-who will be referred to as Yadav-was at the counting of votes found to have secured the highest number of votes and he was declared elected.\n\nHussain Kami!\n\nKidwai-hereinafter called Kidwai-who was one of the candidates at the election submitted a petition on April 6, 1962, to the Election Commission for an order declaring the election of Y ada v void and for an order that he (Kidwai) be declared duly elected.\n\nTue Election Tribunal, Lucknow, to which the petition was referred for trial dismissed the petition.\n\nIn appeal to the· High Court of Allahabad the order passed by the Election\n\n1964 . . _ Tribunal was reversed and the proceedmgs were remanded Ram Sewak Yadav for trial with a direction amonn others that the Tribunal T. . ' • o ' Hussain Kami/ do give reasonable opportumty to both the parties to inspect Kidwai the ballot papers and other connected papers. With special Shah J. leave, Yadav has appealed against the order of the High Court.\n\nThe principal grounds set up by Kidwai in support of his petition were~\n\n( 1) that there had been improper reception, refusal and rejection of votes at the time of counting, and in consequence thereof the election was materially affected;\n\n(2) that there were discrepancies between the total number of votes mentioned in Form 16 and Form 20;\n\n(3) that the tendered votes were wrongly rejected by the returning officer and on that account the election was materially affected:\n\n(4) that at the polling station No. 29, Majgawan in Bhitauli Unit and Kursi polling station in Kursi Assembly Unit, the polling officers did not give ballot papers to the voters;\n\n( 5) that the counting of votes of Bhitauli Assembly Unit continued till 8-30 P.M. in insufficient light notwithstanding the protest lodged by the petitioner; and\n\n(6) that on a true count he (Kidwai) would have received a majority of valid votes and that he was entitled to be declared du! y elected.\n\nThese allegations were denied by Yadav.\n\nAt the trial before the Tribunal the parties led no oral evidence. In respect of the pleas (3), (4) and (5) the burden of proof lay upon Kidwai and as no evidence was led to substantiate the same, those pleas failed. Again in the view of the Tribunal, Kidwai could discharge the burden of proof which lay upon him to establish that there were discrepancies 'between the original and the certified copies of Forms Nos\n\n6 S.C.K\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS\n\n16 & 20, and as the original forms were not called for by\n\n19M Kidwai, his second ground must also fail.\n\nKidwai claimed Rams;;;;; Yoda that he would be able to establish his case on oleas (I) & \"·\n\n(6) from the ballot papers, and submitted that a~ order fe>r Huss\"kdwaf•mfi inspection of the ballot papers be made and that he be permitted to show from the ballot papers that the Returni•~\n\nOfficer had improperly received, refused or rejected the votes, and that on a true count he would get the largest number of valid votes.\n\nThe Tribunal rejected the application for inspection holding that ballot papers may be allowed to be inspected only if it is necessary in the interest of justice and to support an order for inspection facts must be brought to its notice making out a prima facie case disclosing that errors were committed in the reception, refusal or rejection of votes at the time of counting, and unless a prima facie case was made out the Tribunal would be justified in declining to make an order for inspection. The High Court however held that ballot papers had actually been called for from the Returning Officer and were before the Tribunal, that there was nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prevented the Tribunal from allowing inspection of the ballot papers in the custody of the Court, and that the Tribunal had rejected the application for inspection without any adequate reasons for so doing.\n\nThe only question which falls to be determined in this appeal is whether the Election Tribunal erred in declining to grant an order for inspection of the ballot papers which had been, pursuant to its order in that behalf, lodged before it in sealed boxes by the Returning Officer. In considering this question the material provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the rules framed thereunder mav first be noticed.\n\nSection 80 of the Act provides that no -election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Part VI. Section 83(1) states what the election petition shall contain. It states:\n\n\"An election petition-\n\n(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relis:\n\n-159 SG-16\n\nShah /.\n\nRam Sewak Yadav\n\nv. lfussain Kamil Kidwai\n\nShah J.\n\n(b) shall set forth full particu '.ars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as posssible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and\n\n(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings:''.\n\nThe rest of the section is not material.\n\nSection 90(1) prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal. It states:\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits: \"\n\nSection 92 enumerates the powers which a Tribunal trying an election petition may exercise and the powers so enumerated are the powers which a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, when trying a suit, may exercise in respect of discovery and inspection, enforcing attendance of witnesses, compelling production of documents, receiving evidence taken on affidavits and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. Rules have been framed under the Act relating to prpduction and inspection of election papers.\n\nBy rule 93 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, it is provided that:\n\n\"(!) While in the custody of the returning officer-\n\n(a) the packets of unused ballot papers:\n\n(b) the packets of used ballot papers whether valid, tendered or rejected:\n\n(c) the packets of the marked copy of the electoral roll or, as the case may be, the list maintained under sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) of section 152; and\n\n(d) the packets of the declarations by electors the attestation of their signatures;\n\nand 1964\n\nRam Sewak Yada•\n\nv. shall not be opened and their contents shall not Hussai~ Kamll K1dwai be inspected by, or produced before, any per- - . son or authority except' under the order of a Shah 1 competent court or tribunal.\n\n(2) All other papers relating to the election shall be open to public inspection subject to such conditions and to the payment of such fee, if any, as the Election Commission may direct.\n\n(3) Copies of the returns by the returning officer forwarded under rule 64 or as the case may be_ under sub-rule (3) of rule 84 shall be furnished by the chief electoral officer of the State con- . cerned on payment of a fee of two rupees for each such copy.\"\n\nThe rule makes a clear distinction between ballot papers and other election papers: ballot papers may be il)spected only under the order of a competent court or tribunal, but other documents are, subject to certain conditions, open to public inspection.\n\nIn this case, on an oral request made by Kidwai all the ballot papers in sealed boxes were lodgd with the Election Tribunal.\n\nKidwai claimed in the first instance that the Tribunal was bound to grant an order for inspection, because he had tendered the sealed boxes of ballot papers in evidence, and on that account all the ballot -papers were part of the record. The Tribunal rightly rejected this plea,\n\nfo~ by the m'ere production of the sealed boxes pursuant to its order the ballot papers did not become part of the record and they were not liable to be inspected unless the Tribunal was satisfied that such inspection was in the circumstances of the case necessary in the interests of justice.\n\nAn election petition must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies in support of his case. If such material facts are set out the Tribunal has undoubtedly the power to direct discovery and inspection of documents with which a civil court is invest-\n\n1964 ed under the Code of Civil Procedure when trvin2 a suit. ilam s.;;;;;: Yadav But the power which the civil court may exe; cis; in the.\n\nRiulllli/· Kamrl trial of suits is confined to the narrow limits of 0.11, Code of Kidwai Civil Procedure. Inspection of documents under 0.11, Code Shah 1 of Civil Procedure may be ordered under rule 15, of documents which are referred to in the pleadings or particulars as disclosed in the affidavit of documents of the other party, and under rule 18(2) of other documents in the possession ur power of the other party. The Returning Officer is not a party to an election petition, and an order for production of the ballot papers cannot be made under 0.11 Code of Civil Procedure. But the Election Tribunal is not on that account without authority in respect of the ballot papers. In a proper case where the interests of justice demand it. the Tribunal may call upon the Returning Officer to produce the ballot papers and may permit inspection by the parties before it of the ballot papers. That power is clearly implicit in ss. IOO())(d)(iii), IOI, 102 and rule 93 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.\n\nThis power to order inspection of the ballot papers which is apart from 0.11 Code of Civil Procedure may be exercised, subject to the statutory restrictions about the secrecy of the ballot paper prescribed by ss. 94 and 128()).\n\nAn order for inspection may not be granted as a !!latter of course: having regard to the insistence upon the secrecy of the ballot papers, the Court would be justified in granting an order for inspection provided two conditions are fulfilled:\n\n(i) that the petition for setting aside an election contains an adequate statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies in support of his case; and\n\n(ii) the Tribunal is prima facie satisfied that in order to decide the dispute and to do complete justice\n\nbetv.een the parties inspection of the ballot papers is necessary.\n\nBut an order for inspection of ballot papers cannot be granted to support vague pleas made in the petition not supported by material facts or to fish out evidence to support such pleas. The case of the petitioner must be set out with precision supported by averments of material facts. To e>tab- 1964 lish a case so pleaded an order for inspection may undoubt Ram s1;;;; t Yada• edly, if the interests of justrce require, be granted. But a •· H UJ1ain Kam/I mere allegation that the petitioner suspects or believes that Kidwal there has been an improper reception, refusal or rejection of votes will not be sufficient to support an order for inspection.\n\nIt must be remembered that the rules framed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, set up an elaborate machinery relating to the stage of counting of vote:; by the Returning Officer, and provide ample opportunity to the can didate who has contested the election or his agents to remain\n\npresent and to keep an eye on any improper action which may be taken by the Returning Officer. Rule 53 provides for the admission of only certain classes of persons to thr\n\nplace fixed for counting and amongst such persons are ex pressly included candidates. their election agents and counting agents, who may watch the counting subject to the directions which the returning officer may give.\n\nRule 55 deals with the procedure for scrutiny and opening of ballot boxes.\n\nThe Returning Officer has to satisfy himself that \"none of the ballot boxes has in fact been tampered with\" and before any ballot box is opened at the counting table, the counting agents present at that table are allowed to inspect the seal affixed thereon and to satisfy themselves that it is intact. If the Returning Officer is satisfied that any ballot box has in fact been tampered with, he is prohibited from counting the ballot papers contained in that box and he has to follow the procedure prescribed in that behalf in s. 58. Clause (I) of rule 56 provides for the scrutiny and rejection of ballot papers.\n\nClause (2) sets out detailed provisions relating to cases in which the Returning Officer shall reject a ballot paper. B:; cl. ( 3) it is provided that before rejecting any ballot paper under sub-rule ( 2), the returning officer shall allow each counting agent present a reasonable opportunity to inspect such ballot papers. The Returning Officer has then to record on every ballot paper which he rejects the grounds of rejection. All the rejected ballot papers are required to be put in one bundle. Rule 57 deals with the counting of votes. Each ballot paper which is not rejected is counted\n\nShah J.\n\n1964 as one valid vote. The Returning Officer has to make the.\n\nRam Sewak Yadav entries in a result sheet in Form 20 after counting of the\n\n8 I \"' Kam\"l ballot papers contained in all the ballot boxes used at the uua n 1\n\n11. .\n\nKldwai po mg stations. Clause (3) of rule 57 enacts an elaborate Sha/• J. set of rules about the entries to be made in respect of the counting and scrutiny of the ballot papers.\n\nBy rule 60 counting has to be continuous, and rule 63 ( 1 ) provides that after the completion of the counting, the Returning Officer shall record in the result sheet in Form 20 the total number of votes polled by each candidate and announce the result.\n\nBy cl. ( 2) of rule 63 it is provided that after such announcement is made, a candidate or his election agent may apply in writing to the Returning Officer for a re-count of all or any of the ballot papers already counted stating the grounds on which he demands such re-count. The Returning Officer must decide the application and record his reasons in support of his decision and he may allow the application in whole or in part or may reject it if it appears to him to be frivolous or unreasonable.\n\nAfter the total number of votes polled by each candidate has been announced, the Returning Officer must complete and sign the result sheet in Form 20 and after such form is completed no application for re-count may be entertained.\n\nUnder rule 64 the declaration of the result of the election is made by declaring elected a candidate who has secured the largest number of valid votes, and the Returning Officer is required to complete and certify the return of election.\n\nThere can therefore be no doubt that at every st2 ge in the process of scrutiny and counting of votes the candidate or his agents have an opportunity of remaining present at the counting of votes, watching the proceedings of the Returning Officer, inspecting any rejected votes, and to demand a re-count.\n\nTherefore a candidate who seeks to challenge an election on the ground that there has been improper reception, refusal or rejection of votes at the time of counting, has ample opportunity of acquainting himself with the manner in which the ballot boxes were scrutinized and opened, and the votes were counted.\n\nHe has also opportunity of inspecting rejected ballot papers, and of demanding a re-count. It is in the light of the provisions of s. 83 ( 1) which require a concise statement of material facts\n\non which the petitioner relies and to the opportunity which 1964 a defeated candidate had at the time of counting, of watching Ram s;;;; k Y\"\"- and of claiming a recount that the application for inspection . v. b \"d Hussain Kanoll must e cons1 ered.\n\nKidwal In the petition filed by Kidwai the material allegations in Shah 1. support of the claim that there had been improper reception, refusal or rejection of votes were contained in paragraphs 6(H), 6(K) and 12. In paragraph 6(H) it was averred that numerous ballot papers cast in favour of the petitioner were wrongly included in the \"bundles of therespondents.\" In paragraph 6(K) it was averred that due to \"a deficiency in the supply of sealing ink, marks on some ballot papers, though not quite clear, yet the marks clearly indicating the intention of the voters, were wrongly rejected as invalid by the return ing officer.\" In paragraph 12 it was averred that \"the petitioner is confident that if the votes actually cast in favour of the petitioner are counted as votes of the petitioner and if the improperly accepted votes which have been counted in favour of other respondents are taken out, and if the ballot papers are correctly sorted, counted and bundled, the respondent No. I will be found to have polled less votes as com pared to . . . petitioner.\n\nThe petitioner further submit& that the result of the Election has been materially affected by the improper acceptance and refusal of votes and by the incorrect sorting, counting and bundling of ballot papers.\" These averments in the petition for setting aside the election on the ground of improper acceptance or rejection of votes were vague, and did not comply with the statutory requirements of s. 83(l)(a).\n\nParagraph 12 is deficient in the recital of material facts which must be deemed to be within the knowledge of the petitioner, and merely asserts that if the votes actually cast in favour of the petitioner are counted, the total number of valid votes found in his favour would exceed the number of votes received by Yadav.\n\nHaving regard to this infirmity the Tribunal was justified in declining to make an order for inspection of the ballot papers unless a prima facie case was made out in support of the claim.\n\nThe Tribunal has undoubtedly to exercise its discretion if it appears to be in the interests' of justice, but the discretic; n has manifestly to be exercised having regard to the nature of the allegations made.\n\nThe Tribunal would be justified in\n\n1V64 refusing an order where inspection is claimed with a view to .._ .;;; t Yadav fish out materials in support of a vague plea in the case set\n\n• \"· K .1 out in the petition. The Tribunal was conscious of the true\n\nB,,_,. ami • 'I. ed'. d A 25 9 Kitlwai p1'Ulc1p e: 1t stat m its or er dated ugust , I 62, that\n\nSWJ. nothing was brought to its notice which would justify granting an order for inspection prayed for by the petitioner at that stage.\n\nThe Tribunal further observed: \"If in future from facts that may be brought to the notice of the Tribunal, it appears that in the interests of justice inspection should be allowed, necessary orders allowing an inpection could always be passed\".\n\nRelying upon these observations another application was submitted by Kidwai asking for inspection but no additional materials were placed before the Tribunal.\n\nAs we have already observed Kidwai Jed no real evidence at the trial. In his second application for inspection he merely averred that \"the petitioner was almost sure\" that on inspection and scrutiny of ballot papers, the allegations contained in the various paragraphs would be proved. The 1llegation of Kidwai that he was satisfied that on inspection and scrutiny of ballot papers he would be able to demonstrate that there had been wrong counting on account of improper reception, refusal or rejection of votes was wholly insufficient to justify a claim for inspection.\n\nHe had to place before the Tribunal evidence prima facie indicating that an order for inspection was necessary in the interests of justice, which he failed to do.\n\nReliance was placed before this Court and the High Court upon the decision of this Court in Bhim Sen v. Gopali and others( 1) in support of the plea that mere absence of particulars will not furnish a ground for declining to grant inspection and tltat a defeated candidate is entitled to establish his case that void votes had been counted and included in the votes of the successful candidate from the evidence collected from inspection of the ballot papers.\n\nIn Bhim Sen's case ( 1) a petition was filed for setting aside an election of a candidate In a reserved seat in a double member constil'-'Cncy.\n\nThe principal ground in support of the petition\n\n(') 22 E.L.R. 288.\n\nwas that it was incumbent upon the Returning Officer to go 1964 into each case of double voting in order to reject Qne of the Ram Sewak Yadov two votes cast in contravention of s. 63(1) of the Represen- Ht1ssain v. Kamil ration of the People Act, and that the Returning Officer Kidwai having failed to discharge his duty to reject bllot papers Shah J. cast in contravention of s. 63 the petitioner belieed that the successful candidate \"could receive many void votes.\"\n\nThe ballot boxes were opened and it was found that 37 vmd votes were counted in favour of the successful candidate and in view of the disclosure made by the inspection of the ballot papers the petitioner applied for leave to amend the petition by adding a specific averment that 37 void votes had in fact been counted in favour of the successful candidate and that the words \"alleges\" and \"did\" be substituted respectively for the words \"believes· and \"could\". Along with the petition for leave to amend he filed a list giving the particulars of the void votes.\n\nThis application was allowed by the Tribunal but the order was reversed by the High Court on the ground that the Tribunal had erred in allowing the amendment. In appeal to this Court it was held that in a case like the one before the Court, definite particulars about the number and nature of the void votes that had been counted could only be supplied after inspection of the ballot papers, and the election petition as originally presented must therefore be regarded as having furnished the material particulars. and the amendment petition must be treated merely as an application for clarification of the pleadings.\n\nWe do not think that Bhim Sen's case(') lays down any general principle that a party is entitled without making allegations of material facts in support of his plea to set aside an election to claim an order for inspection of the ballot papers and seek to supply the lacuna in his petition by showing that if all the votes are scrutinized again by the Tribunal it may appear that there had been improper reception, refusal or rejection of votes at the time of counting. To support his claim for setting aside the election the petitioner has to make precise allegations of material facts which having regard to the elaborate rules are or must be deemed to be within his knowledge.\n\nThe nature of the allegations must of course depend upon the facts of each case. .But if material facts are not\n\n(1) 22 E.L.R .. 188.\n\n1964 stated, he cannot be permitted to make out a case by fishing .Ram Sewak Yadav out the evidence from an inspection of the ballot papers. In\n\nHussai~· Kamil Bhim Sen's case(1) the Court was primarily concerned with Kidwai the question whether amendment of the petition to set aside Shah!. an election should be granted. It was alleged by the defeated candidate that there had been contravention of the provisions of s. 63 ( I ) of the Act by the Returning Officer and the election was materially affected on that account.\n\nThe applicant had stated that he believed that the respondents had received many votes which were void.\n\nWhen the ballot box was opened it was found that among the votes credited to the successful candidate were 37 votes which were void.\n\nThereafter the applicant applied to substitute the words \"alleges\" for \"believes\" and \"did\" for \"could\". In that case the Court was not concerned to decide whether the order for inspection was properly made: the propriety of the order granting inspection does not appear to have ever been questioned.\n\nThe principal question raised in the appeal\n\n1 was whether the amendment of the petition should, in the circumstances, be granted and the observation of the Court that \"definite particulars about the number and nature of the void votes that had been counted could only be supplied after inspection of the ballot papers\" was not intended to be a general statement of the law that whenever an allegation is made in a petition to set aside an election that void votes have been included in the counting of votes received by a successful candidate, definite particulars with regard to the said void votes may only be supplied after the ballot papers are inspected, and that a defeated candidate may claim inspection of the ballot papers without making any specific allegations of material facts and without disclosing a prima facie <:ase in support of the claim made.\n\nIn our view the High Court was in error in interfering with the exercise of discretion by the Election Tribunal which proceeded upon sound principles.\n\nThe appeal therefore is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside.\n\nThe order of the Tribunal is restored with costs in this Court and the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n\") 22 E.L.R. 288", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "RAM SEW AK Y ADAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM SEW AK Y ADAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HUSSAIN KAMIL KIDW AI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HUSSAIN KAMIL KIDWAI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 189, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Election Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 466, "end_char": 486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R.eturnina", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2391, "end_char": 2401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ballot papers Y.'hich had been, pursuant to an order in that behalf, lodged before the Tribunal in sealed boxes by the R.eturnina: Officer."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2857, "end_char": 2884, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3272, "end_char": 3304, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3330, "end_char": 3361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3441, "end_char": 3464, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 94 and 128(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3572, "end_char": 3589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3793, "end_char": 3828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 23, 1963, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in First Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3869, "end_char": 3885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and J. P. Goyal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and J. P. Goyal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3923, "end_char": 3934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and S. Shaukat Hussain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. Shaukat Hussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3939, "end_char": 3957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and S. Shaukat Hussain, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4045, "end_char": 4049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tue Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH J .-At the general elections held in February 1962, Shah 1.:", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4102, "end_char": 4106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tue Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH J .-At the general elections held in February 1962, Shah 1.:", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Ram Sewak Yadav", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Ram Sewak Yadav-who will be referred to as Yadav-was at the counting of votes found to have secured the highest number of votes and he was declared elected.", "canonical_name": "RAM SEW AK Y ADAY"}}, {"text": "Hussain Kami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4397, "end_char": 4409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hussain Kami!", "canonical_name": "Hussain Kami/"}}, {"text": "Kidwai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4412, "end_char": 4418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kidwai-hereinafter called Kidwai-who was one of the candidates at the election submitted a petition on April 6, 1962, to the Election Commission for an order declaring the election of Y ada v void and for an order that he (Kidwai) be declared duly elected.", "canonical_name": "Kidwai Jed"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4790, "end_char": 4813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal to the· High Court of Allahabad the order passed by the Election\n\n1964 . . _"}}, {"text": "Ram Sewak Yadav", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4914, "end_char": 4929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tribunal was reversed and the proceedmgs were remanded Ram Sewak Yadav for trial with a direction amonn others that the Tribunal T. . ' •", "canonical_name": "RAM SEW AK Y ADAY"}}, {"text": "Hussain Kami/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5001, "end_char": 5014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o ' Hussain Kami/ do give reasonable opportumty to both the parties to inspect Kidwai the ballot papers and other connected papers.", "canonical_name": "Hussain Kami/"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5142, "end_char": 5146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With special Shah J. leave, Yadav has appealed against the order of the High Court.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Yadav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5157, "end_char": 5162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With special Shah J. leave, Yadav has appealed against the order of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Bhitauli Assembly Unit", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5906, "end_char": 5928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "29, Majgawan in Bhitauli Unit and Kursi polling station in Kursi Assembly Unit, the polling officers did not give ballot papers to the voters;\n\n( 5) that the counting of votes of Bhitauli Assembly Unit continued till 8-30 P.M. in insufficient light notwithstanding the protest lodged by the petitioner; and\n\n(6) that on a true count he (Kidwai) would have received a majority of valid votes and that he was entitled to be declared du!"}}, {"text": "Yoda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6796, "end_char": 6800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kidwai claimed Rams;;;;; Yoda that he would be able to establish his case on oleas (I) & \"·\n\n(6) from the ballot papers, and submitted that a~ order fe>r Huss\"kdwaf•mfi inspection of the ballot papers be made and that he be permitted to show from the ballot papers that the Returni•~\n\nOfficer had improperly received, refused or rejected the votes, and that on a true count he would get the largest number of valid votes."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7852, "end_char": 7879, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "considering this question the material provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8378, "end_char": 8473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8530, "end_char": 8540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In considering this question the material provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "In considering this question the material provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 83(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8694, "end_char": 8707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In considering this question the material provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "In considering this question the material provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8897, "end_char": 8901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It states:\n\n\"An election petition-\n\n(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relis:\n159 SG-16\n\nShah /.\n\nRam Sewak Yadav\n\nv. lfussain Kamil Kidwai\n\nShah J.\n\n(b) shall set forth full particu '.ars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as posssible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and\n\n(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings:''.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Kamil Kidwai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8935, "end_char": 8947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It states:\n\n\"An election petition-\n\n(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relis:\n159 SG-16\n\nShah /.\n\nRam Sewak Yadav\n\nv. lfussain Kamil Kidwai\n\nShah J.\n\n(b) shall set forth full particu '.ars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as posssible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and\n\n(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings:''."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9320, "end_char": 9349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 90(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9432, "end_char": 9445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9719, "end_char": 9748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9776, "end_char": 9786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9931, "end_char": 9958, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10315, "end_char": 10346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 152", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10686, "end_char": 10697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "Ram Sewak Yada•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10800, "end_char": 10815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While in the custody of the returning officer-\n\n(a) the packets of unused ballot papers:\n\n(b) the packets of used ballot papers whether valid, tendered or rejected:\n\n(c) the packets of the marked copy of the electoral roll or, as the case may be, the list maintained under sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) of section 152; and\n\n(d) the packets of the declarations by electors the attestation of their signatures;\n\nand 1964\n\nRam Sewak Yada•\n\nv. shall not be opened and their contents shall not Hussai~ Kamll K1dwai be inspected by, or produced before, any per- - .", "canonical_name": "RAM SEW AK Y ADAY"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12732, "end_char": 12759, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13416, "end_char": 13439, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13833, "end_char": 13864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13944, "end_char": 13967, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 94 and 128()", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14076, "end_char": 14092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15044, "end_char": 15046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kidwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15200, "end_char": 15206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But a •· H UJ1ain Kam/I mere allegation that the petitioner suspects or believes that Kidwal there has been an improper reception, refusal or rejection of votes will not be sufficient to support an order for inspection.", "canonical_name": "Kidwai Jed"}}, {"text": "must be remembered that the rules framed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15338, "end_char": 15427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16630, "end_char": 16635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Sewak Yadav", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17384, "end_char": 17399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sewak Yadav entries in a result sheet in Form 20 after counting of the\n\n8 I \"' Kam\"l ballot papers contained in all the ballot boxes used at the uua n 1\n\n11. .", "canonical_name": "RAM SEW AK Y ADAY"}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19704, "end_char": 19709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21484, "end_char": 21495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kidwai Jed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23144, "end_char": 23154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have already observed Kidwai Jed no real evidence at the trial.", "canonical_name": "Kidwai Jed"}}, {"text": "Bhim Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24317, "end_char": 24325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bhim Sen's case ( 1) a petition was filed for setting aside an election of a candidate In a reserved seat in a double member constil'-'Cncy."}}, {"text": "Ram Sewak Yadov", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24654, "end_char": 24669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was that it was incumbent upon the Returning Officer to go 1964 into each case of double voting in order to reject Qne of the Ram Sewak Yadov two votes cast in contravention of s. 63(1) of the Represen- Ht1ssain v. Kamil ration of the People Act, and that the Returning Officer Kidwai having failed to discharge his duty to reject bllot papers Shah J. cast in contravention of s. 63 the petitioner belieed that the successful candidate \"could receive many void votes.\"", "canonical_name": "RAM SEW AK Y ADAY"}}, {"text": "s. 63(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24705, "end_char": 24713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kamil ration of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24743, "end_char": 24773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kidwai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24806, "end_char": 24812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was that it was incumbent upon the Returning Officer to go 1964 into each case of double voting in order to reject Qne of the Ram Sewak Yadov two votes cast in contravention of s. 63(1) of the Represen- Ht1ssain v. Kamil ration of the People Act, and that the Returning Officer Kidwai having failed to discharge his duty to reject bllot papers Shah J. cast in contravention of s. 63 the petitioner belieed that the successful candidate \"could receive many void votes.\""}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24905, "end_char": 24910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kamil ration of the People Act", "statute": "Kamil ration of the People Act"}}, {"text": ".Ram Sewak Yadav", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27063, "end_char": 27079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 stated, he cannot be permitted to make out a case by fishing .Ram Sewak Yadav out the evidence from an inspection of the ballot papers.", "canonical_name": "RAM SEW AK Y ADAY"}}, {"text": "Kamil Bhim Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27151, "end_char": 27165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\n\nHussai~· Kamil Bhim Sen's case(1) the Court was primarily concerned with Kidwai the question whether amendment of the petition to set aside Shah!."}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27416, "end_char": 27421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_251_260_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 251\n\nPENTAPATI CHINNA VENKANNA & ORS.\n\nPENTAPATI BENGARARAJU & ORS.\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO AND J. R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\n<ode of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), s. 48-Execution Petl1iun-\n\nFresh application-What is-''closed\", meaning of.\n\nThe decree holders filed an application for execution of the dcrce !l:eing E.P. No. 13/1939.\n\nThis execution proceeding had to be stayed as a result of the stay order of the High Court.\n\nUltimately the c:xccu ting court made an order on E.P. 13/1939 to the effect that the Execution Petition was \"closed\".\n\nOn January 21, 1952, the decree holders made an application for reopening the execution E.P. No. 13/1939 and for proceeding with the execution of the decree. The Subordinate Judge, (executing court) holding that the previous execution petition was merely ''closed\" directed the decree holders to file a regular execution petition.\n\nOn October 11, 1952 the decree holders filed E.P. No. 58/53 to continue further proceedings in E.P. No. 13/1939. 'fhe judgment debtors filed a counter affidavit pleading, inter. alia that the decree sought to be executed was made on September 22, 1938, and that as E.P. No. J3/I939 was dismissed on December 28, l 948, the present apf)iic:ation. having been filed more than 12 years from the date of decree, was barred under s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nOn these fats the Subordinate Judge held that though the decree holders were entitled to continue previous execution petition, E.P. No. 58/53 was a fresh application as it differed from the original execution petition.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court held that E.P. No. 13/1939 was merely closed for statistical purposes, and. therefore, the execution petition filed in 1939 was still pending and the decree hofdeff. were entitled to proceed with that petition.\n\nIience the appeal.\n\nThe question for consideration is whether E.P. No. 58/53 is a fresh i:lpplication within the meaning of s. 48 of the Code.\n\nHeld: (i) It is true courts have condemned the practice of executing <:ourts using expressions like \"closed'', \"closed for statistical purposes'\", ••struck off\" \"recorded\" etc., and they have also pointed out that there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for making such orders. llut assuming that the court has no such power, the passing of such\n\nan order cannot be tantamount to an order of dismissal, for the inten- 1ion of the court in making an order \"closed\" for statistical purposes is ma:Ji.ifest. It is intended not to fina1Iy dispose of the application, but to keep it pending.\n\nWhether the order was without jurisdiction or whe- 1her it was valid, the legal position would be the same: in one case it would be ignored and in the other it would mean what it stated. In either case the execution petition would be pending on the file of the court. It is uot the phraseology used by the Executing Court that really\n\nJanuary, 211\n\n252 SUf'REME COURT REPORTS [19b4]\n\n1964 matters, but is is really the substance of the order that is material~ Whatever terminol0gy may be used, it is for the Court to ascercain.\n\nP. Chinna Ye1Jkanna having regard to the circumstances under which tbe said order \\Vas made, v. whether the Court intended to finally terminate the execution proceed- P. Bangara ·, Raju ings.\n\nIf it did not intend to do so, it must be held that Lhe execution proceedings were pending on the file of the Court. In the present case the subsequent application i.e. E.P. No. 58/53 is only an application to continue the previous application i.e. E.P. 13/1939.\n\nBiswa Sonan Chunder Gossyamy \\\". Binanda Chander Dibingar Adhikar Gossyamy, (1884) I.LR. 10 Cal. 416, Vadlamannati Damodara Rua v. Official Receiver, Kist11a, I.L.R. 1946 Mad. 527 anlt Moidht Kutty v. Doraiswami, A.LR 1952 Mad. 51, referred to.\n\n(ii) An application made after 12 years from the date of decree Wtluld be a fresh application within the meaning of s. 48 of the Code\n\nof Civil Procedure, if the previous application was finally disposed of.\n\nIt would also be a fresh application if it asked for a relief against parties or properties different from those proceeded against in the previous execution petition or asked for a relief substantially different from that asked for in the earlier petition.\n\nIn the present case the parties are substantially the same in both proceedings, and the decree holders are only proceeding against properties included in t!te previous.\n\napplication i.e. E.11. No. 13/1939.\n\nIt cannot, therefore, be treated as a fresh aprlication within the meaning of s. 48 of the Code.\n\nBundhu Si•1gh v. Kayastha Trading Bank, (1931) I.LR. SJ All. 419, Sri Raja D. K. Venkatc; Lingama Nayanim v. Raja lnuganti Rajagopala\n\nVenkata Narasimha Rayanim, I.L.R. [1947] Mad. 525, lppagunta Lakshn1i11ar\"si11ga Rao v. lppaf?unta Balas11brahama11yan1. A.l.R. 1949 fad. 251 and Gaianand Sah v. Dayanand Thakur (1942), J.L.R. 21 Pat. 838. discussed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 690 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated March 5, 1959, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal against order No. 151 of 1955.\n\nS. Suryaprakasam and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellants.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\nJanuary 20, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nS11bba Rao J.\n\nSUBBA RAo J.-This appeal by certificate raises the question of the applicability of s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter called the Code, to the facts of the case.\n\nThe relevant facts are as follows: In the year 1928 one Pentapati Venkataramana filed Original Suit No. 3 of 1928 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam, against 29 defendants for accounts of dissolved partnerships and for tbe recovery of amounts due to him.\n\nOn March 30, 1932, the suit was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court of Madras set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge and passed a joint and several decree in favour of the plaintiffs and defendants 24 to 27 for a sum of Rs. 54,350 with interest thereon.\n\nOn February 15, 1939, the decree-hol_ders filed an application for execution of the decree, being E.P. No. 13 of 1939, and prayed for realization of the decretal amount by attachment and sale of 31 items of properties described by them in the schedule (Ex.\n\nB-4) annexed thereto.\n\nThe judgmentdebtors filed an objection to the attachment of some of the\n\naid items, but that was dismissed.\n\nAgainst the order of dismissal of their objection, 1i1e judgment-debtors filed an appeal to the High Court, being C.M.A. No. 26 of 1944.\n\nPending the disposal of the C.M.A., the High Court granted an interim stay of E.P. 13 of 1939.\n\nLater, the appeal was dismissed on April 26, 1945.\n\nAfter the dismissal of the appeal, when the decree-holders sought to proceed with the execution, the judgment-debtors filed another application_ being E.A. No. 575 of 1945, alleging that the decree has been adjusted and for recording satisfaction of the decree.\n\nBut the said application was dismissed on December 12,\n\n1945. The judgment-debtors went up on appeal to the High Court against the said order of dismissal and obtained an interim stay of E.P. 13 of 1939.\n\nOn September 9, 1947, the High Court allowed the a ppeq] and remanded the case to the trial court for asce!\"taining whether there was an adjustment of the decree as pleaded by the judgmentdebtors.\n\nOn remand, the executing court again dismissed the application filed by the judgment-debtors.\n\nAgainst the\n\naid order, the judgment-debtors again preferred an appeal, being C.M.A. No. 127 of 1948, in the High Court of Madras and obtained an interim stay of the execution.\n\nThe interim order was made absolute on November 24, 1948.\n\nAs the execution of the decree was stayed by the High Court, the executing court made an order on E.P. 13 of 1939 to the effect that the petition was \"closed\".\n\nOn July 31, 1951, the\n\nP. Chi11na J:'e11kan11a\n\nP. Bangara Raju\n\nSubba Rao /.\n\n254 SlJ1'REME COURT REPORTS\n\n1964 High Court dismissed C.M.A.127 of 1948.\n\nOn January 21, P. Chinna Ven- 1952, the decree-holders made an application being E.A. kanna No. 142 of 1952, in E.P. 13 of 1939 for reopening the said\n\nBangra Raju execution petition and for proceeding with the execution of Subba Rao J. the decree.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge, holding that the previous execution petition was merely \"closed\", directed the decree-holders to file a regular execution petition.\n\nOn October 11, 1952, the decree-holders filed E.P. No. 58 of 1953 to continue further proceedings in E.P. 13 of 1939 as per the order made in E.A. No. 142 of 1952 passed on October 4, 1952.\n\nIn that petition the decree-holders prayed that the properties mentioned in the draft proclamation filed in E.P. No. 13 of 1939 and brought to sale may be sold for the realization of the money due to the decree-holders and the proceeds applied for the discharge of the decree-debt.\n\nThe judgment-debtors filed a counter-affidavit pleading, inter alia, that the decree sought to be executed was made on September 22, 1938, and that as E.P. No. 13 of 1939 was dismissed on December 28, 1948, the present application, . having been filed more than t 2 years from the date of the decree. was barred under s. 48 of the Code.\n\nThe learned Subord_inate Judge held that though the decree-holders were entitled to continue the previous execution petition, E.P. 58 of 1953 was a fresh application, as in form. as well as in details it materially differed from the original execution petition.\n\nOn appeal, a division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High. Court took a different view and held that E.P. 13 of 1939 was merely closed for statistical purposes and, therefore, the execution petition filed in 1939 was still pending and the decree-holders were entitled to proceed with that petition.\n\nThe High Court further observed that the said position was not contested by leaPned counsel for the respondents.\n\nWe understand this observation only to mean that learned counsel appearing for the respondents therein did not contest ihe position that if the execution petition was not dismissed but was only closed for statistical purposes, the decree-holders were entitled to proceed with that petition.\n\nThe High Court remanded the case to the learned Subordinate Judge for disposal according to law after considering the other contentions of the judgment-debtors. Hence the appeal.\n\nMr. Suryaprakasarn, learned counsel for the appellants, 1964\n\nraied before us the following two points: (I) The prernms p, Chin11a ven. execution petition was dismissed and, therefore, it was not kan11a pending al the time of filing of E.P. 58 of 1953, and, there- P. Ban;;, ra Ra/u• fore, the later execution petition was a fresh application Subba Rao J. within the meaning of s. 48 of the Code; and (2) even if the previous application was only closed for statistical purposes, and the decree-holders could apply for reviving those proceedings, E.P. No. 58 of 1'953 was a fresh execution petitian because the parties and the pro;>erties proceeded against were different and the relief asked for was also different.\n\nBefore we consider the question raised, it would be convenient at the outset to look at the material provisions of s. 48 of the Code.\n\nIt reads:\n\n\"( 1) Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an in junction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from-\n\n(a) the date of the decree sought to be executed.\" This section corresponds to paras 3 and 4 of s. 230 of the Code of 1882.\n\nThe relevant part of the section read:\n\n\"Where an application to execute a decree for the\n\npayment of money or delivery of other property has been. made under this section and granted, no subsequent appliction to execute the same decree shall be granted after the expiration of twelve years from any of the following dates:\n\nA comparison of the said two provmons shows that the phrase ''fresh application\" has been substituted for \"subsequent application\".\n\nThis amendment became necessary in order to make it clear that the application mentioned in s. 48 of the Code is a fresh substantive application and not an application to revive or continue a substantive application already pending on the file of th~ court.\n\n1'. Chinna Ven\n\nkunna\n\nv . . />. Hangara\n\nThe question, therefore, is whether E.P. 58 of 1953 is a fresh application within the meaning of s. 48 of the Code.\n\nThe answer to this question mainly turns upon the question\n\nR . whether the previous application i.e., E.P. 13 of 1939, was\n\nGJU fi 11 d' . na y tsposed of by the executmg court.\n\nFrom the narra- Subba Rao J. tion of facts given by us earlier it is clear that the said execution petition was \"closed\" for statistical purposes.\n\nAs the High Court stayed the execution pending the appeal filed by the judgment-debtors, the decree-holders were not in a position to proceed with the execution petition, and, therefore, it was closed.\n\nSome argument was raised on the question whether the said execution petition was closed for statistical purposes or was dismissed that it was contended that under the Code of Civil Procedure there was no power conferred upon a court to close execution proceedings for statistical purposes, and that even if such an.order was made, it must be deemed to be an order dismissing the execution petition.\n\nThe actual order dated December 28, 1948 has not been placed before us.\n\nBut in E.P. 58 of 1953 in col. 6 thereof it is mentioned that E.P. No. 13 of 1939 was closed on December 28, 1948. In the counter-affidavit filed by one of the judgment-debtors it is stated that E.P. 13 of 1939 was dismissed on December 28, 1948 and not merely closd.\n\nAfter the disposal of the appeal by the High Court and before the filing of E.P. No. 58 of 1953, the decree-holders filed E.A. No. 142 of 1952 for reopening E.P. No. 13 of 1939.\n\nOn that petition the learned Subordinate Judge made the following order:\n\n\"The previous E. P. was merely closed.\n\nPetitioner may file a regular E. P. on which proceedings will continue from the stage at which they were left in E.P. 13 of 1939.\"\n\nThis order discloses that the previous execution petition was only closed.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge must have presumably looked into the previous record.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge proceeded on the assumption that the previous execution petition was pending, though he dismissed the present execution petition on another ground.\n\nThis factual position was not contested even in the High Court. for the High Court stated that the previous application was merely closed for\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT kEPORTS 257\n\nstatistical purposes.\n\nIn the circumstances we must proceed on the assumption that the Execution Petition 13 of 1939 was only closed for statistical purposes.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants contends that the Code of Civil Procedure does not sanction the passing of an order closing an execution petition for statistical purposes and that that practice has been condemned by courts.\n\nUnder\n\n0. XXI, r. 17 ( 1) of the Code, the Court may reject an execution application if the requirements of rules 11 to 14 have not been complied with.\n\nUnder r. 23 thereof, if the judgment-debtor does not appear or does not show cause to the satisfaction of the court why the decree should not be executed, the court shall order the decree to be executed, and where such personoffers any objection to the execution of the decree, the Court shall consider such objection and make such orders as it thinks fit. Under r. 57 thereof, \"Where\n\nany property has been attached in execution of a decree but by reason of the decree-holder's default the Court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall either dismiss the application or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceedings to a future date ...... \". Relying upon these provisions it is argued that though the power of the court to make an order under 0. XXI, r. 23 (2) is wide and it can make any order it thinks fit, it can only make one or other of the two orders mentioned in r. 57 when it could not proceed with the execution because of the default of the decree-holder. It is said that in this case the dccreeholders could not proceed with the execution in view of the stay ordr of the High Court and, therefore, the executing court could have either dismissed the application or adjourned the proceedings to a future date and it has no jurisdiction to pass an order closing the execution for statistical purposes.\n\nIt is further said that an order closing proceedings for statistical purposes is not an order of adjournment, for an order of adjournment implies that the application is on the file, whereas the object of closing is to take it out of the file, though temporarily, and, therefore, the order, in effect and substance, is one of dismissal.\n\nAssuming that the order was made by reason of the decree-holder's default within the meaning of 0. XXI, r. 57 of the Code, we find it difficult to attribute something to the court which it never intended to\n\n31-c;9 ~.c. ;7\n\nP. Chinna Venkanna\n\nP. Bangara Raju\n\nSubb• Rao J_\n\n1964 do.\n\nIt is true courts have condemned the practice of exe-\n\n~. Chinna Vencuting courts using expressions like \"closed\", \"closed for kanna statistical pur:; ioses\", \"struck off\", \"recorded\" etc., and they v.\n\nI P. Bangara Raju a so pointed out that there was no provision in the Code of\n\nS•bba Rao /.\n\nCivil Procedure for making such orders: see Biswa Sonan Chunder Gossyamy v. Binanda Chunder Dibingar Adhikar Gossyamy ('); Vadlamannati Damodara Rao v. The Official Receiver, Kistna( 2 ); Moidin Kutty v. Doraiswami(3).\n\nIt is not necessary to express our opinion on the question whether such procedure is sanctioned by the Code of Civil Procedure or not; but assuming that the court has no such power, the passing of such an order cannot tantamount to an order of. dismissal, for the intention of the court in making an order\n\n\"closed\" for statistical purposes is manifest. It is intended not to finally dispose of the application, but to keep it pending.\n\nWhether the order was without jurisdiction or whether it was valid, the legal position would be the same; in one case it would be ignored and i.TJ the other, it would mean what it stated.\n\nIn either case the execution petition would be pending on the file of the court. That apart, it is not the phraseology used by the executing court that really matters, but it is really the substance of the order that is material.\n\nWhatever terminology may be used, it is for the court to ascertain, having regard to the circumstances under which the said order was :nade, whether the court intended to finally terminate the execution proceedings. If it did not intend to do so, it must be held that the execution proceedings were pending on the file of the court.\n\nWe have no hesitation, therefore, in agreeing with the High Court that E.P.\n\n13 of 1939 is pending on the file of the executing court and that the present application is only an application to continue the same.\n\nEven so, it is contended that E.P. No. 58 of 1953 is a fresh application. Learned counsel compared the recitals in E.P. 13 of 1939 and E.P. 58 of 1953 and pointed out that all the respondents in the former execution petition are not respondents in the pre5ent execution petition; that legal representatives of some of the defendnts are added to th• present execution petition; that the decree-holders did not\n\n(1) (188,) I.L.R. 10 Cnl. 416, 422. (') I.L.R. 1946 Mad. ,27. (') A.I.R.1952 Mad. 51.\n\n:;; eek to proceed against all the properties against which they 1'64 sought to proceed in the former execution petition; and that p, Chinna v.,.. one of the reliefs, namely, to attach the amount deposited in kanna court, asked for in the present execution petition is a comr. a.n;, ra R•I• pletely new one and that, therefore, the present execution Jub•a R\"\" J. petition is, both in form and in particulars, completely a different one. But a oomparison of the two execution petitions shows that the parties are the same: the new parties\n\nadded in the present execution petition are either the legal representatives of the deceased parties or the representative of a party who has become insolvent. In the present execution petition the decree-holders are not proceeding against any property against which they did not seek to proceed in the earlier proceeding; they only omitted some of the properties.\n\nThe decree-holders canno.t be compelled to proceed against all the properties against which at one time they sought to proceed.\n\nThe relief by way of atta(jiment of the amount deposited in court had been asked for by the decree-holders by a separate petition, namely, E.A. No. 143 of 1962, and that was dismissed and, therefore, nothing turns upon it.\n\nThe result is, therefore, in substance under both the execution petitions the decree-holders seek to iJroceed against the same parties and against the same properties.\n\nThe law on the subject is well-settled.\n\nIn Bandlm Sinh\n\nv. Kayastha Trading Bank(' J, where a decree-holder included new items of property for attachment in an application for execution of his decree filed 12 years after the date of the decree, it was held that the application to attach fresh property was a fresh application within the meaning of s. 48 of the Code and, therefore, having been made more than 12 years after the date of the decree, could not be entertained.\n\nIn Sri Raja D. K.\n\nVenkata Lingama Nayanim v. Raja Inuganti Rajagopala Venkata Narasimha Rayanim('). where an application was made for amending a pending execution petition with a view to attach another property not included in the pending application, the court held that the application for amendment could not be allowed, as it was 111ade beyond the period of 12 years from the date of the decree.\n\nIn lppagunta Lakshminarasinga Rao v. lppaguntl!\n\n(') (1931) J.L.R. 53 All. 419. (') l.L.R. 1947 Mad. 52 5\n\n11# Balasubrahmanyam ('), where the execution petition filed c-- ,.,,.. beyond 12 years of the decree asked for a new relief not\n\n....... asked for in the earlier execution petition, it was held that .. ,,;,,. R•iu the subsequent application, having been filed beyond 12 .ti.th ._ / years, was hit by s. 48 of the Code.\n\nIn Gajana11d Sah v. Dayanand thakur( 2), the decree-holder was not allowed to substitute a new property different from the one against which he wished to proceed in the earlier application on the ground that 1 Z years had expired from the date of the passing of the decree.\n\nThe result of the decisions may be summarized thus. An application made after 12 years from the date of the decree would be a fresh application within the meaning of s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if the previous application was finally disposed of. It would also be a fresh appliclltion if it asked for a relief against parties or properties different from those proceeded against in the previous execution petition or asked for a relief substantially different from that asked for in the earlier petition.\n\nIn this case, as we have pointed out, the parties are subitantially the same in both the proceedings, and the decreeholders are only proceeding, against properties included in the previous application. It cannot, therefore, be treated as a fresh application within the meaning of s. 48 of the Code. lt is only an application to continue E.P. No. 13 of 1939 which is pending on the file of the executing court.\n\nThat apart, the decree-holders filed E.A. No. 142 of 1952 in E.P. No. 13 of 1939 expressly asking for the reopening of the said execution petition and for proceeding with it.\n\nAs we have held that the earlier execution petition is still pending on the file of the court, the executing court will be well within its rights in proceeding on the basis of the earlier execution petition even without a new petition.\n\nIn the result, we hold that the order of the High Court is right.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nThere will be no oraer to cost!.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "251\n\nPENTAPATI CHINNA VENKANNA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PENTAPATI CHINNA VENKANNA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PENTAPATI BENGARARAJU & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PENTAPATI BENGARARAJU & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 11, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 901, "end_char": 917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 11, 1952 the decree holders filed E.P. No."}}, {"text": "September 22, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1131, "end_char": 1149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "alia that the decree sought to be executed was made on September 22, 1938, and that as E.P. No."}}, {"text": "December 28, l 948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1197, "end_char": 1215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J3/I939 was dismissed on December 28, l 948, the present apf)iic:ation."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1323, "end_char": 1328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1332, "end_char": 1359, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2203, "end_char": 2230, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "P. Chinna Ye1Jkanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3094, "end_char": 3113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Chinna Ye1Jkanna having regard to the circumstances under which tbe said order \\Vas made, v. whether the Court intended to finally terminate the execution proceed- P. Bangara ·, Raju ings."}}, {"text": "P. Bangara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3261, "end_char": 3271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Chinna Ye1Jkanna having regard to the circumstances under which tbe said order \\Vas made, v. whether the Court intended to finally terminate the execution proceed- P. Bangara ·, Raju ings.", "canonical_name": "P. Bangara Raju\n\nSubba Rao"}}, {"text": "Biswa Sonan Chunder Gossyamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3551, "end_char": 3579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Biswa Sonan Chunder Gossyamy \\\"."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3913, "end_char": 3918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4549, "end_char": 4554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja D. K. Venkatc", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "419, Sri Raja D. K. Venkatc; Lingama Nayanim v. Raja lnuganti Rajagopala\n\nVenkata Narasimha Rayanim, I.L.R. [1947] Mad."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4922, "end_char": 4950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. 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Suryaprakasam and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5267, "end_char": 5270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5282, "end_char": 5291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nS11bba Rao J.\n\nSUBBA RAo J.-This appeal by certificate raises the question of the applicability of s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter called the Code, to the facts of the case.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5366, "end_char": 5371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5375, "end_char": 5402, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pentapati Venkataramana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5516, "end_char": 5539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant facts are as follows: In the year 1928 one Pentapati Venkataramana filed Original Suit No."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5594, "end_char": 5626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of 1928 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam, against 29 defendants for accounts of dissolved partnerships and for tbe recovery of amounts due to him."}}, {"text": "March 30, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5737, "end_char": 5751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 30, 1932, the suit was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5826, "end_char": 5846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the High Court of Madras set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge and passed a joint and several decree in favour of the plaintiffs and defendants 24 to 27 for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 15, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6034, "end_char": 6051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 15, 1939, the decree-hol_ders filed an application for execution of the decree, being E.P. No."}}, {"text": "April 26, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6690, "end_char": 6704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, the appeal was dismissed on April 26, 1945."}}, {"text": "December 12,\n\n1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7012, "end_char": 7030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the said application was dismissed on December 12,\n\n1945."}}, {"text": "9, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7188, "end_char": 7195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 9, 1947, the High Court allowed the a ppeq] and remanded the case to the trial court for asce!\"taining whether there was an adjustment of the decree as pleaded by the judgmentdebtors."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7685, "end_char": 7702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The interim order was made absolute on November 24, 1948."}}, {"text": "P. Bangara Raju\n\nSubba Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7914, "end_char": 7940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 31, 1951, the\n\nP. Chi11na J:'e11kan11a\n\nP. Bangara Raju\n\nSubba Rao /.\n\n254 SlJ1'REME COURT REPORTS\n\n1964 High Court dismissed C.M.A.127 of 1948.", "canonical_name": "P. Bangara Raju\n\nSubba Rao"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8244, "end_char": 8253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "142 of 1952, in E.P. 13 of 1939 for reopening the said\n\nBangra Raju execution petition and for proceeding with the execution of Subba Rao J. the decree.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "October 4, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8607, "end_char": 8622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "142 of 1952 passed on October 4, 1952."}}, {"text": "December 28, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9096, "end_char": 9113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 of 1939 was dismissed on December 28, 1948, the present application, ."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9226, "end_char": 9231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High. Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9544, "end_char": 9570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, a division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High."}}, {"text": "Suryaprakasarn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10396, "end_char": 10410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Suryaprakasarn, learned counsel for the appellants, 1964\n\nraied before us the following two points: (I) The prernms p, Chin11a ven."}}, {"text": "P. Ban", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10657, "end_char": 10663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "execution petition was dismissed and, therefore, it was not kan11a pending al the time of filing of E.P. 58 of 1953, and, there- P. Ban;;, ra Ra/u• fore, the later execution petition was a fresh application Subba Rao J. within the meaning of s. 48 of the Code; and (2) even if the previous application was only closed for statistical purposes, and the decree-holders could apply for reviving those proceedings, E.P. No.", "canonical_name": "P. 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{"document_id": "1964_6_261_274_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT. REPORTS\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nBHAILAL BHAI & ORS.\n\n(P. B. GAJBNDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCl{OO, K. c. PAS GUPTA, ]. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll JI.)\n\nCOftltltution of India, 1950, A.rtl. 226, 301 and 304-luue of Wrlf-\n\nUnrewonahle delay in moving Coun-what iJ-Sale1 T~ lmpedint Inter Stolt trade-Validity-Tax paid under mistak~ Ordtr of np111me111-Jurildiction of High Court 1m4er A.rt. 221\n\nThe respondents are doalen iii tobaccp in the State of Madhya B))ant.\n\nThe appellant imposed sales tu on the sale of imported tobacco by the respondents.\n\nBut no such tax was imposed on the sale of indigcoot11 tobacco. The respondents filed petitions under Art. 226 of the Constiru.\n\nlion for the bsue of writ of mandamus 'directing the refund of sales tu: collected from them. They contended that the impugned tu violated Art. 301 (a) of the Constitution and they pru\"d the tax under a mistake at law and the tax so paid was refundable under s. 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The appellant contended that there was no violation ol.\n\nArt. 301 of the Constitution, even if there was such violation the tu: came witllin the special provision under Art. 304(a), the High Court bu no power to direct refund of tax already paid and in any event the Hiaft Court should not exercise its discretionary power of issuing a writ of martllamus directing this to be done since there was unreasonable delay la tiling the petition. The High Court rejected all the contentions of the appellant and a writ of mandamus was issued as prayed for. The appellants appealed to this Court. Before this Court substantially the same contention:;. a11 were canvassed before the High Court were raised.\n\nHeld: (i) Even though the liability to pay tax was crµted by the sale of tobacco in Madhya Pradesh and not by the import itself the facts\n\nand circumstances showed that trade and commerce. as between Madh11 Bharat and other parts of India was directly impeded by tb, o impulld wx and therefore the said tax violated Art. 30l(a) of the Constitution.\n\nAtiabarj Tea Co. Ltd. v. Statt of Assam. [1961) I S.C.R. 809, A.1110mnbileJ Transport (Ra/allhan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [1963) I S.C.R. 491 and Firm Mehtab Majid I Co. v. Stat• of MadrtU, A.l.jl. 1943 S.C. '21, referred to.\n\n(ii) Even thou'lb the tu contravened Art. ~OJ of the ConstituliGa it would he valid if it came within the saving provi•illtll ot Art. J04 pl tbe Constitution.\n\n(lii) Tobacco manufll!'!ured or produce4 in the appellant late, Ii niJac lo tho tobacco imported from outside bad no\" been subl\"tetl to lhe tu and therefore the tu wu noC l!lithin the saviiis provisipna ot Ad. 304 <•>\n\nol the Comtitlllioa.\n\n(iv) The tax which had already been paid was so paid under a mistake -- within s. 72 of the Indian Contract Act.\n\nThe High Courts have power State po!uiMhdhya for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights and statutory rights\n\n\"v, ei to grant consequential reliefs by or'dering repayment of money realised by Bhailol Bhai. the Governn1ent without the authority of law.\n\nFirm Mehtab Majid & Co. Y. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 921 and Sale& Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanhaiya Lal Saraf, [1963] S.C.R. 1360, referred to.\n\n( v) A~ a general rule if there has been unreasonble delay the coutt ought n9t ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by the extraordinary remedy of manrlamuJ. Even if there is not such delay, in cues where th.e\n\nopposite party raises a prima facie issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on grounds like limitation the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of mandamus.\n\n(vi) Though the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such .&pply to the grantin& of relief under Art. 226 the maximum period fixed I\n\nby the legish•_ture as the time within which relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be claimed 1nay ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by\n\n.wh~:; h delay in seeking remedy under Art. 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy. Where the delay is more than this period it will almost always be proper for the court to bold that it is unreasonable.\n\nThe period of limitation prescribed for recovery of money paid by mistake under the Limitation Act is three yeaN from the date when the mistake is known. In the result C.A. No!. 861-867 are allowed in part and the other appeals are di!iimhsed.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Civil Appeah Nos. 362-377 of 1962.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and orders dated December 16, 1959 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscella aeous Petitions Nos. 144 to 158 and 160 of 1958.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 858 to 867 of 1962.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and orders dated 28th October, 1960, 16th September, 1960 and 29th July, 1960 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petltiom Nos. 110, 119 and 136 of 1960, 198, 199, 202 to 206 of 1959 respectively.\n\n Civil Appeals Nos. 25 to 29 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and orders dated 29th July, 1960, 26th September, 1960, 28th October, 1960, 16th September. 1960 and 28th October, 1960 of the Madhya . .\n\nPradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 27' cf 1958, 73, 74, 120 and 132 of 1960 respectively.\n\nM. Adhikari, Advocate-General, Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 362/1962).\n\nS. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 363 to 377 and 858 to 867 of 1962 and 25 to 27 of 1963).\n\nJanuary 20, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by '\n\nStat• of Madlt1fl\n\nPrad111h\n\nBhailal BluJI\n\nDAS GUPTA J.-These 31 appeals by the State of Madhya o., Gurt• J.\n\nPradesh are against the orders made by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in 31 applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution by dealers in tobacco.\n\nAll these petitioners carried on business in Madhya Bharat which later became part of the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThey were assessed to sales tax on their sales of tobacco in accordance with the notification issued by the State Government in exercise of pow'ers under s. 5 of the State Sales Tax Act and large amounts were collected by the Madhya Bharat Government and later by the Madhya Pradesh Government.\n\nThe petitioners contended that the taxing pr9vi- 1ions under which the tax was assessed and collected from them was unconstitutional as it infringed Art. 301 of the Constitution and did not come Within the special provision of Art. 304(a). Accordingly, they prayed for appropriate writs or orders for refund of all the taxes that has been collected from them.\n\nIn resisting these applications the Madhya Pradesh Government contended, first, that the taxing provisions did not offend Art. 301 of the Constitution and that in any case, they satisfed the requirements of Art. 304(a).\n\nIt was further contended that even if tl)e taxing p10vision was unconstitutional and the assessment and collection of tax had been without any legal authority the petitioitiers were not en ti tied to the order for refund prayed for.\n\nI~ The l:ligb Count was of opinion on a consideration of • ;; fita41iyo the notification under which the tax was assessed that it 'fOllull imposed a tax only on imported tobacco and not on home •. b AJJJoJ B/ioi grown to acco and so it did not come within the special ,,_ a;;;,. 1. provisions of Art. 304 (a) of the Constitution and consequently the infringement of Art. 301 of the Constitution which resulted from the imposition of a tax on import of goods made the provisions void in law.\n\nThe prayer for refund was allowed in the applications out of which C.A.\n\nNos. 362-377, C.A. Nos. 861-867 of 1962 and C.A.\n\nNo. 25 of 1963 have arisen.\n\nThe prayer was rejecr.ed in the remaining applicatiom. ·\n\nIn the present appeals the State of Madhya Pradesh challenges the correctness of the High Court's decision that the taxirig provision was unconstitutional and void and also rders for refund m34e in some of the lions mentionC!( above.\n\nThe liability to pay tax arose under s.3 of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act. This Act came into force from\n\ne 1st day of May 1950. As originally enacted it 11rovided that (a) every dealer who imports goods into Madhya Bharat shall be liable to pay tax on his taxable turnover in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected from the lit day of May 1950 if his total turnover in the previous year\n\nin respect of sales or supplies of goods exceeded Rs 5,000; (I>) similarly every manufacturer or processor whose turnover in the previous year exceeded Rs. 5,000 was made\n\nliable to pay tax on his taxable turnover in respect of sales .Jf supplies of goods effected from the 1st day of May 1950; (c) every other dealer was made liable to pay tax on his taxable turnover in respect of sales or supplies or goods ellecOOd from the 1st day of May 1950, if the total\n\nturnover in the previous year exceeded Rs. 12,000.\n\nBy later amendments the word \"processor\" was deleted from\n\ncl. (b) of the section and the meaning of the words \"any other\" in cl. ( c) was made clearer by substituting the w9rds \"any goods of a dealer not falling in cl. (a) or cl.\n\nC)?)\".\n\nThere was also an amendment in 1950 making it clCM that the taxable turnover on which the tax liability\n\nIH4 arose was in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected in Madhya Bharat.\n\nState oj M,,,,,,,_\n\niaUlh Section 5 of the Act provides that the tax payable by a dealer shall be at a single point and shalt not be less than Rs. 1/9/- per cent or more than 6! per cent of the taxable turnover, as notified from time to time by the Go\\'ernment by publication in the Official Gazette.\n\nThis is 5ubject to a proviso that the Government may in respect of a special class of goods charge tax upto 12!% on the taxable turnover.\n\nThe second sub-section of s. 5 empowers the Government to notify at the time of notifying the tax payable by a dealer, the goods and the point of their sale at which the tax is payable. • The legal position therefore is that unless there is a valid notification under s. 5 no tax can be levied.\n\nThe contention of the petitioners-dealers which has succeeded in the High Court is that the notifications on the strength of which the tax was asse.ssed on tbem were invalid.\n\nThe first notification was issued on April 30, 1950.\n\nThis provided that with effect from the Ist day of May 1950 sales tax shall be oolleoted in respect of goods specified in column 2 of the Schedule that was attached to tho notification at the point of sale mentioned in column 3 at lhe rates mentioned in column 4. The relevant portion of the Schedule ran thus:-\n\nSI Name of commadit7 The point of sale Rate of No. by dealers IU\n\n• • • '\n\nTobacco leaves, manufactu~ Importer 6-4-0 red tobacco \\for eating and tr CCll1 amoking) and tobacco µscd alct~ for Jlldi manufacturing.\n\nThis was followed by another notification dated May 22, 1950 under which a lower rate was prescribed fur\n\ntobacco used for Bidi manufacturers.\n\nBut the point at which the tax was payable remained unaltered.\n\nTho rclo-\n\n\"· al#liW B,,_\n\nD. a.,,. J.\n\nl91U vant portion of the Schedule to this notification was in .ltate of Madh1• these words:\n\nPrade1h\n\nv. ----------~------------ ...., BhlzI\n\n.D-6 Gupta /.\n\nSI.\n\nNo.\n\nNainc of commodity\n\nIO.\n\nTobacco leaves and manufactured tobacco (for eating, smoking and snuffing)\n\nI I.\n\nTobacco used for Bidi manufacturing.\n\nPoint of sale by the dealers inM.B.\n\nImporter\n\nImporter\n\nRate per cent of tax '\n\n1-9-0\n\nFor a short period, i.e., from the 1st January 1954 to the ,21st January 1954 these two notifications remained inoperative in consequence of a notification dated the 24th Octoj>er, 1953, under which from the 1st January 1954 the point of sale at which the tax was payable was altered to \"on a sale by a dealer direct to a consumer or to a dealer who does not hold a licence or registration certificate under the Sales Tax Act\". This last notification was again superseded by a notification dated the 21st January, 1954 in consequence of which th:e old position was restored with effect from January 22, 1954. That is, with effect from 22nd January 1954 the point at which the tax was payable, again became a sale by an importer.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the tax payable at the point of sale by the importer in Madhya Bharat directly impeded the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Art. 30 l of the Constitution.\n\nIt is true that the import by itself would not bring in the liability to tax and that if the imported goods were not sold in Madhya Bharat no tax would be payable.\n\nQuite clearly however by far the greater part of the tobacoo leaves, manufactured tobacco (for eating and smoking) and tobacco used for Bidi manufacturing that would be imported into the State would be sold in Madhya Bharat.\n\nThat a very considerable amount was so sold is clear from the very assessment orders made .•in these several cases.\n\nThere can be no doubt therefore\n\nthat even though it is the sale in Madhya Bharat of the imported goods that creates the liability to tax and not the import by itself, the trade and commerce as between Madhya Bharat and other parts of India is directly impeded by this tax.\n\nOn the authority of this Court's decision in Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. v. State of Assam(') it must therefore be held that the tax contravenes the provisions of Art. 301 of the Constitution.\n\nIt may be mentioned that the later decision of this Court in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v.\n\nState of Rajasthan(') which slightly modified the majority decision in Atiabari Tea Co.'s case does not alter this position. If the tax could have been claimed to be regulatory or compensatory it would have got the benefit of th~\n\nlatter decision.\n\nThere is, however, no scope for such a claim (See Firm Mehtab Majid & Co. v.\n\nState of Madras)(').\n\nThe tax could still be good if even though it contravened the provisions of Art. 301 'it came within the saving provisions of AI1. 304( a) of the Constitution.\n\nThat Article provides in its cl. (a) that notwithstanding anything in Article 301 or Art. 303 the legislature of a State may by law impose on goods imported from other States any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject so however as not to discriminate between goods so itnported and goods so manufactured or produced.\n\nAn attempt was made on behalf of the State befl\"\"e the High Court and also before us to construe the notification mentioned above to mean that not only the tobacco imported from other States but also similar goods manufactured or produced in Madhya Bharat were subject to this tax and at the same rate.\n\nIt was argued that a dealer in these goods who was an importer and so sold goods imported by him into Madhya Bharat would also be selling goods not so imported but manufactured and produced in the State.\n\nWe are prepared to agree that that may well be so.\n\nWhat we are unable to see, however, is that in respect of sales of such other goods this person would be liable to\n\n(') [19611 I S.::;.R. 809.\n\n(' ; [1963] I S.C.R. 491.\n\n(') \\.I.R. 1963 S.C. 928.\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPu11J8'11\n\nBhaiW Bh4i\n\nDas Gupta/.\n\nST TPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64]\n\n1964 any tax under the notification.\n\nWe are informed that in Shot• of Madh1• tact where importers dealt with goods other than imported _?,..,. goods the sales of such other goods were in fact excluded llhaiW. IJ!wi from tax.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General of Madhya\n\nDtU G•pt• J. Pradesh who appeared before us in support of these appeals suggested that tha~ was done by the State Sales Tax Authorities on a mistaken interpretation of the law.\n\nWe do not think so. In our opinion, the only reasonable interpretation of the. notification as it stands, viz., that tax on tobacco leaves, manufactured tobacco and tobacco used for Bidi manufacturing would be payable at the point of sale by the importer, is that only the sale of goods which\n\nthe importer had imported would be liable to tax and not &ale of any other goods by him. If the intention had bCCll\n\nas. suggested by the learned Advocate-General that though . the tax is payable at the point of sale by an importer the\n\niiale by the same person of good> manufactured or produced in Madhya Bharat would also be liable to tax, the word \"importer\" would not have been used in column 3 but the word \"dealer\" would have been used and the point of sale would have been indicated by some othec words as the \"first sale in Madhya Bharat\" or \"the sW. t.o the retailer in Madhya Bharat\" as the rule-1p.aking authority chose.\n\nThe matter becomes even more clear if in column 3 we read for \"importer\" the definition of \"importer of goods\" in s. 2 ( i) of the Act. Reading this we find that the point of sale in Madhya Bharat at which the tax is payable i.s the sale \"by the dealer who brings or causes to be brought into Madhya Bharat any goods from outside for the purpose of processing, manufacturing br sale\" or ''who purchases goods in Madhya Bharat for the purpose of sale from a dealer who does not ordinarily carry on business iD\n\nMadhya. Bharat.\" When only such a sale is being made the point at which the tax is payable, there is hardly any scope for a serious argument that the notification was intended to make sales by that same dealer of goods manufactured or produced in Madhya Bharat liable to tax.\n\nIt may not be out of place to illOtice in this connection the distinction made by s.3 ofthe Madhya Bharat Sales\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME WURT REPORTS\n\nTax Act between sales bY. a dealer who imports gooda 1'64 lcl.(a)] and other dealers [els. (b) and (c)]. It is not un- St•t• ., lltullrya .!Casonable to think that the Act itself contemplated the '\"*\"' Bales by an importer of goods as meaning only sab by him .frd!i •i..1 of goods imported by him into Madhya Bharat.\n\nApart - from this, it has to be noticed that admittedly the notifica- DIM <lqta J, tion \\lid not make dealers who dealt only in home grown or home produced tobacco liable to pay the tax.\n\nThat by lbelf would be sufficient to bring in the vice of discrimination which is the purpose of Art. 304(a) to prevent.\n\nThere can, therefore, be no. escape from the conclusion that similar goods manufactured or produced in the State of Madhya Bharat hav'e not been subjected to the tax which tobacco leaves, manufactured tobacco and tobacco used for Bidi manufacturing, imI)Orted from other States have\n\nto pay on sale by the importer. J'his tax is, therefore, not within the saving provisions ' of Art. • 304 (a) .\n\nAs ruready • , 1/ I pointed out it contravenes the provisions of Art., 301 of tbe Constitution.\n\nThe tax has therefore been rightly held by the High Court to be invalid.\n\nIt is clear that the assessment of tax under these notifications was thus invaliil in law.\n\nA pottion of the tax thus assessed has been already vaid by _the petitioners.\n\nIt cannot now be disputed that this payment was made under a mistake within s. 72 of the Indian Contract Act and so the Government to whom the payment has been made by mistake must in law repay it.\n\nThe question is whether the relief of repayment has to be\n\n10ught by the tax-payer by an action in a civil court or whether such an order can be made by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 is in very\n\nwide terms.\n\nThis Article empowers the High Court to give relief by way of enforcement of fundamental rights and other rights by issuing directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitiol\"., quo warranto and certiorari. According to the petitioners a writ in the nature of mandamus can be appropnately used where r. oney has been paid to the Government by mistake to give relief by commanding repayment\n\n1964 of the same.\n\nThat in a number of cases the High Courts Stat• of Madya have used the writ of mandamus to enforce such repay-\n\nPradtJh ment is not disputed.\n\nIn a recent case in Firm Mehtab •• Bhailal Bhai Majid & Co., v. The State of Madras(') this Court made,\n\nDOI Gupta 1. in a petition under Art. 32, an order for refund of tax illegally collected from the petitioner under Rille 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939.\n\nThe queotion whether the Court has this power to order refund was not however raised there.\n\nIn Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kcmhaiya Lal Mukundlal\n\nSaraf(') the appellants disputed the correctness of the High Court's order made in an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution directing refund of taxes that had been paid ' under the U.P. Sales Tax Act on the respondent's forward transactions in silver bullion.\n\nAfter the levy of sales tax on such transactions was held to be ultra vires by the High Court of Allahabad the respondent asked for refund of the tax paid and when that was refused he applied to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari for quashing the assessment orders and a writ of mandamus requiring the appellants to refund the amount illegally collected.\n\nThe order made in this case by the High Court for refund was affirmed by this Court in appeal.\n\nIn this case also the power of the High Court to order such refund was not challenged either before the High Court or before this Court.\n\nWe see no reason to think that the High Courts have not got this power. If a right has been infringed-whether a fundamental right or a statutory right-and the aggrieved party comes to the court for enforcement of the right it will not be giving complete relief if the court merely declares the existence of such right or the fact that that existing right has been infringed.\n\nWhere there has been only a threat to infringe the right, an order commanding the Government or other statutory authority not to take the action contemplated would be sufficient.\n\nIt has been held by this Court that where there has been a threat only and the right has not been actually infringed an application\n\n(') A.LR. 1963 S.C. 928.\n\n(') [1959] S.C.R. 1350.\n\nunder Art. 226 would lie and the courts would give neces- 1964 llary relief by making an order in the nature of injunction. State of Mad/ry• It will hardly be reasonable to say that while the court will PradtJh grant relief by such command in the nature of an order of Bhailal. Bhai injunction where the invasion of a right -has been merely threatened the court must still refuse, where the right has Du GupttJ J, been actually invaded, to give the consequential relief and content itself with merely a declaration that the right exists and has been invaded or with merely quashing the illegal order made.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we are clearly of opinion that the High Courts have power for the 1;:mrpose of enforcement of fundamental rights and statutory rights to give consequential relief by ordering repayment of money realised by the Government without the authority of Jaw:\n\nAt the same time we cannot lose sight of the fact that the special remedy provided in Art. 226 is not intended to\n\nsupersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions.\n\nIt has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Art. 226 is a discretionary power.\n\nThis is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take inb consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it.\n\nAnother is the nature of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequential relief.\n\nTh:.is, where, ns in these cases, a person comes to the Court for relief under Art. 226 on the allegation that he has been asessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the court, if it finds that the assessment was void, being made under a void provision of law, and the payment was made by mistake, is still not bound to exercise .its discretion directing repayment.\n\nWhetlrer repayment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its own facts and circumstances. It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application.\n\nIt may however be stated\n\n1'64 as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay\n\nState of Madhya th~ court ou8?t not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by\n\nPrad<JA this extraordinary remedy of mandamus.\n\nAgain, where\n\nBhai/a~· JJhai even if there is . no sue~ delay the Government or the statutory authonty agamst whom the consequential relief Dtu Gupllr J. is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on grounds like limitation, the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of mandamus for such payment.\n\nIn \"clth these kinds of cases it will be sound use of discretion to leave the party to seek his remedy by the ordinary mode of action in a civil court and to refuse to exercise in his favour the extraordinary remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe prayer for refund has been allowed by the High Court in the applications out of which Civil Appeal Nos. 362-377 of 1962 and Civil Appeal Nos. 861-867 of 1962 and Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1963 have arisen.\n\nIt appears that the tax , provisions under which these taxes had been assessed and paid was declared void by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in their decision in Mohammad Siddique v. The State of Madhya Pradesh on January 17, 1956.\n\nLater, on August 27, 1957 the Appellate Authority, Sales Tax, i.ri Madhya Bharat made an order relying on the High Court's decision mentioned above.\n\nThe petitioners claim to have discovered their mistake in making the payments afrer they came to know of these decisions.\n\nIt is reasonable to think however that the petitioners must have discovered their mistake as soon as the High Court's decision in the case of Mohammad Siddique v. The Statt: of Madhya Pradesh dated January 17, 1956 became known to them.\n\nAll these 16 applications were made within less than three years from the 17th January, 1956. The High Court has taken the view that this was not unreasonable delay and in that view has ordered refund.\n\nThis appears to us to be a sound and judicial exerciSe of discretion with which this Court ought not to interfere.\n\nIt may be added\n\ntht n:J triable issue as regards the availability of this consequential relief was raised before the High Court nor has any been suggested before us The order of refund mado\n\n1'164\n\n' by the High Court in these cases cannot therefore be dist11rheti.\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPradesh The position in Civil Appeal Nos. 861 to 867 of 1962 is however different. The applications out of which these appeals have arisen were made in September 1959, i.e., about three years and eight months after January 17, 1956 when the High Court of Madhya Pradesh gave their decision declaring the tax provisions in question to be void,\n\nIt was necessary for the High Court to consider this question of delay before any order for refund was made.\n\nIt does not appear however that any attention was paid to this question.\n\nIn making the orders for refund in each of these cases the High Court merely said this:-\n\n'\"The present case is governed by Bhailai Bhai's Case (1960 M.P.C. 304). Learned Government Advocate formally raised the questiOn of the remedy open to the petitioner for refund of tax in order to keep the point open in the Supreme Court. . We accordingly allow this petition and issue a writ directing the opponents to refund to the applicant firm the amount of tax collected from it during the above-mentioned period.\"\n\nThe learned Judges appear to have failed to notice that tile delay in -these petitions was more than the delay in the petition made in Bhailal Bhai's case out of which Civil Appeal No. 362 of 1962 has arisen. On behalf of the respondents-petitioners in these appeals (C.A. Nos. 861 to 867 of 1962) Mr. Andley has argued that the delay in these cases even is not such as would justify refusal of the order for refund.\n\nHe argued that assuming that the remedy of recovery by action in a civil court stood barred on the date these applications were made that would be no reason to refuse relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nLearned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art. 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought\n\ntU-t'9 S.C. 18\n\nBhailal Bhai\n\nDtu '1-upta J.\n\n!!!!_ may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by St•ll of Madhya wluch delay in seeking remedy under Art. 226 can be\n\nPrndesh measured.\n\nThe Court may consider the delay unreason- \"· •uilal Bhai at>le even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribe<l lier GNptd J. for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than tlus period, it will almost always be proper ror the court to hold that it is unreasonable.\n\nThe period ot limitation prescribed for recovery of money paid by mistake under the Limitation Act is three years from the date when che mistake is known.\n\nIf the mistake was known in these cases on or shortly after January 17, 1956 the delay m making these applications should be considered unreasonable. lf, on the other hand, as Mr. Andley seems to argue, the mistake was discovered much later, this would be a controversial fact which cannot conveniently be decided in\n\nwrit proceedings.\n\nIn either view of the matter we are of opinion the orders for refund made by the High Court U. these seven cases cannot be sustained.\n\nThe application out of which Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1963 has arisen was also made in 1958, that is, within less than three years from the date of the High Court's decision in Mohammad Siddique v. The State of Madhya PradesJi.\n\nThe High Court was therefore right in stating in its judgment in this case that it is governed by Bhai/al Bhai's case.\n\nWe see no reason to interfere with the order for • .; fund made by the High Court in this case.\n\nIn the result, Civil Appeals Nos. 861 to 867 of 1962 are allowed in part and the orders for refund made in those cases are set aside.\n\nThe petitioners will be at liberty to seek such relief as they may be entitled to in a civil court, if it be not ban-ed by limitation.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs in these cases. In two other appeals, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 28 and 29 of 1962, the respondents have not appeared; so there will be no order as to costs in them.\n\nIn the other appeals which are dismissed, the appellant will pay costs to the respondents.\n\nOne hearing fee for all these appeals.\n\nAppeals Nos. 861-867 partly allowed, other app:itls dismissed.", "total_entities": 99, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAILAL BHAI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAILAL BHAI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. PAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 846, "end_char": 854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 966, "end_char": 971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 979, "end_char": 1004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1063, "end_char": 1071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1175, "end_char": 1186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1789, "end_char": 1803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (i) Even though the liability to pay tax was crµted by the sale of tobacco in Madhya Pradesh and not by the import itself the facts\n\nand circumstances showed that trade and commerce."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1938, "end_char": 1943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as between Madh11 Bharat and other parts of India was directly impeded by tb, o impulld wx and therefore the said tax violated Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2021, "end_char": 2028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2766, "end_char": 2771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2779, "end_char": 2798, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhailol Bhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3003, "end_char": 3015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Courts have power State po!uiMhdhya for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights and statutory rights\n\n\"v, ei to grant consequential reliefs by or'dering repayment of money realised by Bhailol Bhai.", "canonical_name": "BHAILAL BHAI & ORS"}}, {"text": "Though the provisions of the Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3627, "end_char": 3670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the provisions of the Limitation Act", "statute": "Though the provisions of the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3953, "end_char": 3961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the provisions of the Limitation Act", "statute": "Though the provisions of the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4325, "end_char": 4339, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. Adhikari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5299, "end_char": 5310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Adhikari, Advocate-General, Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5349, "end_char": 5361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Adhikari, Advocate-General, Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5405, "end_char": 5419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "S. N. Andley"}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5435, "end_char": 5449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5454, "end_char": 5465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "P. L. Vohra"}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5511, "end_char": 5523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents (in C.A. Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. N. Andley"}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5544, "end_char": 5555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents (in C.A. Nos.", "canonical_name": "P. L. Vohra"}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5758, "end_char": 5767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by '\n\nStat• of Madlt1fl\n\nPrad111h\n\nBhailal BluJI\n\nDAS GUPTA J.-These 31 appeals by the State of Madhya o., Gurt• J.\n\nPradesh are against the orders made by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in 31 applications under Art."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5795, "end_char": 5810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by '\n\nStat• of Madlt1fl\n\nPrad111h\n\nBhailal BluJI\n\nDAS GUPTA J.-These 31 appeals by the State of Madhya o., Gurt• J.\n\nPradesh are against the orders made by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in 31 applications under Art."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5868, "end_char": 5896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by '\n\nStat• of Madlt1fl\n\nPrad111h\n\nBhailal BluJI\n\nDAS GUPTA J.-These 31 appeals by the State of Madhya o., Gurt• J.\n\nPradesh are against the orders made by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in 31 applications under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5922, "end_char": 5930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6065, "end_char": 6088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these petitioners carried on business in Madhya Bharat which later became part of the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6245, "end_char": 6249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were assessed to sales tax on their sales of tobacco in accordance with the notification issued by the State Government in exercise of pow'ers under s. 5 of the State Sales Tax Act and large amounts were collected by the Madhya Bharat Government and later by the Madhya Pradesh Government."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6359, "end_char": 6384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were assessed to sales tax on their sales of tobacco in accordance with the notification issued by the State Government in exercise of pow'ers under s. 5 of the State Sales Tax Act and large amounts were collected by the Madhya Bharat Government and later by the Madhya Pradesh Government."}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6536, "end_char": 6544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6614, "end_char": 6625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6870, "end_char": 6878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6955, "end_char": 6966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7499, "end_char": 7507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8177, "end_char": 8180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8351, "end_char": 8364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As originally enacted it 11rovided that (a) every dealer who imports goods into Madhya Bharat shall be liable to pay tax on his taxable turnover in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected from the lit day of May 1950 if his total turnover in the previous year\n\nin respect of sales or supplies of goods exceeded Rs 5,000; (I>) similarly every manufacturer or processor whose turnover in the previous year exceeded Rs."}}, {"text": "1st day of May 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8813, "end_char": 8832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000 was made\n\nliable to pay tax on his taxable turnover in respect of sales .Jf supplies of goods effected from the 1st day of May 1950; (c) every other dealer was made liable to pay tax on his taxable turnover in respect of sales or supplies or goods ellecOOd from the 1st day of May 1950, if the total\n\nturnover in the previous year exceeded Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9508, "end_char": 9517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9949, "end_char": 9953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10191, "end_char": 10195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10432, "end_char": 10446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first notification was issued on April 30, 1950."}}, {"text": "May 22, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11022, "end_char": 11034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by another notification dated May 22, 1950 under which a lower rate was prescribed fur\n\ntobacco used for Bidi manufacturers."}}, {"text": "21st January, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12122, "end_char": 12140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This last notification was again superseded by a notification dated the 21st January, 1954 in consequence of which th:e old position was restored with effect from January 22, 1954."}}, {"text": "January 22, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12213, "end_char": 12229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This last notification was again superseded by a notification dated the 21st January, 1954 in consequence of which th:e old position was restored with effect from January 22, 1954."}}, {"text": "22nd January 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12257, "end_char": 12274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is, with effect from 22nd January 1954 the point at which the tax was payable, again became a sale by an importer."}}, {"text": "Madhya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12435, "end_char": 12441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt that the tax payable at the point of sale by the importer in Madhya Bharat directly impeded the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Art."}}, {"text": "Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12442, "end_char": 12448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt that the tax payable at the point of sale by the importer in Madhya Bharat directly impeded the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12514, "end_char": 12521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13487, "end_char": 13495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atiabari Tea Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13692, "end_char": 13708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that the later decision of this Court in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v.\n\nState of Rajasthan(') which slightly modified the majority decision in Atiabari Tea Co.'s case does not alter this position."}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14046, "end_char": 14054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14201, "end_char": 14212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14216, "end_char": 14224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15248, "end_char": 15263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madhya\n\nPu11J8'11\n\nBhaiW Bh4i\n\nDas Gupta/.\n\nST TPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64]\n\n1964 any tax under the notification.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16819, "end_char": 16823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya. Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17215, "end_char": 17229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reading this we find that the point of sale in Madhya Bharat at which the tax is payable i.s the sale \"by the dealer who brings or causes to be brought into Madhya Bharat any goods from outside for the purpose of processing, manufacturing br sale\" or ''who purchases goods in Madhya Bharat for the purpose of sale from a dealer who does not ordinarily carry on business iD\n\nMadhya."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17574, "end_char": 17577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17637, "end_char": 17644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18240, "end_char": 18251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SUPREME WURT REPORTS\n\nTax Act", "statute": "SUPREME WURT REPORTS\n\nTax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19080, "end_char": 19085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19093, "end_char": 19112, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19409, "end_char": 19417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19469, "end_char": 19477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Courts Stat• of Madya", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19991, "end_char": 20017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That in a number of cases the High Courts Stat• of Madya have used the writ of mandamus to enforce such repay-\n\nPradtJh ment is not disputed."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20242, "end_char": 20249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20659, "end_char": 20667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20750, "end_char": 20763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20908, "end_char": 20931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the levy of sales tax on such transactions was held to be ultra vires by the High Court of Allahabad the respondent asked for refund of the tax paid and when that was refused he applied to the High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21041, "end_char": 21049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22201, "end_char": 22209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhailal. Bhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22464, "end_char": 22477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Mad/ry• It will hardly be reasonable to say that while the court will PradtJh grant relief by such command in the nature of an order of Bhailal.", "canonical_name": "BHAILAL BHAI & ORS"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23169, "end_char": 23177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23409, "end_char": 23417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23966, "end_char": 23974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24623, "end_char": 24638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may however be stated\n\n1'64 as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay\n\nState of Madhya th~ court ou8?t not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by\n\nPrad<JA this extraordinary remedy of mandamus.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25343, "end_char": 25351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 17, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25797, "end_char": 25813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the tax , provisions under which these taxes had been assessed and paid was declared void by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in their decision in Mohammad Siddique v. The State of Madhya Pradesh on January 17, 1956."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25826, "end_char": 25841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, on August 27, 1957 the Appellate Authority, Sales Tax, i.ri Madhya Bharat made an order relying on the High Court's decision mentioned above."}}, {"text": "Authority, Sales Tax, i.ri Madhya Bharat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25856, "end_char": 25896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, on August 27, 1957 the Appellate Authority, Sales Tax, i.ri Madhya Bharat made an order relying on the High Court's decision mentioned above."}}, {"text": "17th January, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26401, "end_char": 26419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these 16 applications were made within less than three years from the 17th January, 1956."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26914, "end_char": 26938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madhya\n\nPradesh The position in Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Bhailai Bhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27583, "end_char": 27595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In making the orders for refund in each of these cases the High Court merely said this:-\n\n'\"The present case is governed by Bhailai Bhai's Case (1960 M.P.C. 304).", "canonical_name": "BHAILAL BHAI & ORS"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27773, "end_char": 27786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Government Advocate formally raised the questiOn of the remedy open to the petitioner for refund of tax in order to keep the point open in the Supreme Court. ."}}, {"text": "Bhailal Bhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28106, "end_char": 28118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges appear to have failed to notice that tile delay in -these petitions was more than the delay in the petition made in Bhailal Bhai's case out of which Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "BHAILAL BHAI & ORS"}}, {"text": "Andley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28273, "end_char": 28279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "861 to 867 of 1962) Mr. Andley has argued that the delay in these cases even is not such as would justify refusal of the order for refund."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28569, "end_char": 28577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28600, "end_char": 28684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28738, "end_char": 28746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act", "statute": "Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29061, "end_char": 29069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act", "statute": "Learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29480, "end_char": 29494, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhai/al Bhai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30349, "end_char": 30361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court was therefore right in stating in its judgment in this case that it is governed by Bhai/al Bhai's case.", "canonical_name": "BHAILAL BHAI & ORS"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_275_279_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "'6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 275\n\nSOM CHAND SANGHVI\n\nBIBHUTI BHUSAN CHAKRA VARTY\n\n(K. SuBBA RAo AND J. R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nCode of C1imi11al J'rocedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 191->l\"COP• o/\n\nThe appellant made a complaint against the respondent, an Auistaat Commissioner of Police for having committed an offence under s. 348, Indian Penal Code, alleging that on the arrest of the appellant under s. 1208/420 Indian PeIJal Code, the respondent had refused to grant him bail until a c.crtain i:.um was paid or acknowledged in writing to be paid to the complainant. The Chief Presidency Magistrate issued process. Oa revision, the liigh Court quashed the process holding that sanction of. the State Government under s. 197 Code of Criminal Procedure ought to haYC\n\nbeen obtained. On appeal by special leave. it was contended that the High Court in quashing the process had proceeded to decide on the merits of the case even though there was no material before it and therefore iii judgment could not stand.\n\nHeld:\n\n(i) For considering whether s. 197 Code of Criminal Proc. -tiure would apply the Court must confine itself to the allegations made ia\n\nthe complaint. But that does not mean that it need not look beyond U. form in which the allegations have been made and is incompetent to 1111ce.rtain for itself their substance.\n\n(ii) The .sanction of the appropriate authority for the respondeat't pr03ecution was necessary under s. 197 Code of CriminaJ Procedure. Whether a person chargetl with an offence should or should not be relcad\n\non bail was a matter within the discretion of the respondent and if whilt exercising a discretion he acted illegally by saying that bail would not be granted unless the appellant did something which the appellant waa DOt\n\nound to do, the respondent cannot be said to have acted otbenrile Illa in bis capacity as a public servant.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1961.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 10, 1961, of the Calcutta High Court ill Criminal Revision No. 1545 of 1960.\n\nSukumar Ghose, for the appellant.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent.\n\ns. C. Sanglivl ... llbhutl Bhushan Chakravarty\n\nJanuary 21, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMunHOLKAR. J.-This is an appeal against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court quashing the issue lof I. process against the respondent.\n\nThe respondent is an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the City of Calcutta and the appellant had made a complaint against him alleging that he had committed an offence under s. 348, l.P.C. that is, wrongful confinement in order to extort a confession or compel restoration of property.\n\nThe facts as alleged by the appellant are as follows:\n\nOne Manohar!al Seth had lodged a complaint on July 28, 1960 against him and two other persons Fatehlal and Jaichand for offences under s. 120B/420, I.P.C. and S 420 l.P.C. Manoharlal Seth had alleged in his complaint that these persons had induced him to purchase a bar of brass for Rs. 6,000 on the representation that it was of gold and thus duped him.\n\nUpon this complaint, investigation was taken up by the police. He came to know Manoharlal Seth in the course of his business.\n\nThey were on quite friendly terms in the beginning and later on considerable differences arose between him and Manoharlal Seth. As a result of that Manoharlal Seth told him that unless he settled his differences with Manoharlal Seth according to the latter's dictates he would put him into trouble through his friend, the respondent, and that it is because of this that Manoharlal lodged a complaint against him for cheating.\n\nThis complaint was thus a false complaint and it is common ground that ultimately it was dismissed by the Presidency Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta on January 2, 1961. ' Then according to the appellant, on August 3, 1960 at about 6-00 A.M. P. C. Kundu,, Sub-Inspector of Police attached to Burrabazar Police Station along with another Sub-Inspector S. Bhattacharya, visited his residence, searched his house and arrested him. Neither of them had any warrant with them for the search of the house or for the:\n\narrest of the appellant.\n\nUpon enquiry by him from these l!IM persons they told him. that this was being done under the s. c. s..n, lirl -0rders of the respondent. After his arrest the apellant said BibhJ1ti \"Bhw,._\n\nthat he was taken to the Burrabazar police station at about Chakrt1•11tl1 7-00 A.M. and then to Jorasanko Police Station and produced before T. K. Talukdar, Sub-Inspector in charge of that police station. From there he was taken to vanous places in Calcutta with a rope tied round his waist by Kundu and Bhattacharya and was eventually produced at about 12 noon before the respondent in his office at Lalbazar. There the respondent started threatening the appellant and asked him to settle the dispute with Manoharlal Seth and pay him Rs. 5,000 or to acknowle<jge in writing that he would pay this sum of money to Manoharlal Seth. At about 3-30 P.M. on the same day his brother Iswarilal accompanied by a lawyer Chakravarthy visited the resr, Jondent's office and sought the appellant's release on bail as the offence was a bailable one. The respondent, however, refused to grant bail saying that no bail would be granted until a sum of Rs. 5.000 was paid to Manoharlal Seth. The appellant says that he was detained at Lalbazar Police Station till 8-00 P.M. From there he was taken to Jorasanko Police Station and kept in the lock-up for the whole night. On the next day, that is, August 4, 1960 he was again produced before the respondent at Lalbazar where the latter repeated his threats and that after obtaining his finger prints and taking his photographs he was taken to the court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate where he was released on bail at about 2-30 P.M.\n\nOn August 19, 1960 the appellant preferred a complaint before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, under s. 348 and s. 220, I.P .C. and s. I 3C of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866.\n\nIn so far as two of the persons named as accused therein, S. I. Kun du and S. I. Talukda:, he decided to issu~ process against them under s. 220 I.P .C. and s. 13C .of the Calcutta Police Act. - As regards the respondent, he\n\ndecided to issue process against him under s. 348, I.P.C.\n\nUpon a revision application preferred by the respondent the High Court quashed the process issued against him by\n\nMudholkar '\n\n1964 the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate. The ground urged s. c. S..., hvi before the High Court on behalf of the respondent was that aibliuti •Bhushan betorc; he could be proceeded against sanction of the State\n\nChakravarty Government under s. 197, Cr. P.C. ought to have been Mud,;;;;;,\n\n1. obtained.\n\nThis contention was upheld by the High Court.\n\nOu behalf of the appellant Mr. Sukumar Ghose contends that the High Court in quashing the process has proceeded to decide on the merits of the case even though there was no material before it to do so and that therefore its judgment cannot stand.\n\nIt is true that for considering whether s. 197, Cr.PC. would apply the Court must confine itself to the allegations made in the complaint. But that does not mean that it need not lvok beyond the form in which the allegations have been made and is incompetent to ascertain for itself their 1mbstance.\n\nHere the substantial allegation is that the\n\n1 respondent questioned the appellant when he was produced at his office in Lalbazar, asked him to restore Rs. 5,000 to Mauoharlal Seth who had lodged a complaint of cheating against the appellant and two others and that he declined to release him on bail. No doubt the appellant has made a grievance in his complaint that the respondent said that the appellant would not be released on bail unless he either paid the amount or acknowledged in writing his liability to pay this amount. Assuming that the allegation is true a!! that the thing boils down to is that the respondent refused to enlarge the appellant on bail and that he wanted the appellant to settle the matter with Manoharlal Seth. It cannot be disputed that whether a person charged with an offence should or should not be released on bail was a matter within the discretion of the respondent and if while exercising a discretion he acted illegally by saying that bail would not be granted unless the appellant did something which the appellant was not bound to do, the respondent cannot be said tp have acted otherwise than in his capacity as a public servant.\n\nFor this reason the sanction of the appropriate authority for the respondent's prosecution was necessary under s. 197, Cr.P.C.\n\nMr Ghose, however, . contends that the appellant's 1964\n\ndetention in the respondent's office was illegal and that, s. c. San11i•i therefore, the respondent could not be said to have been in Bibhuti v.8huilwn a position to exercise any lawful authority with respect to Chakravor11 him. It is difficult to appreciate how the appellant's deten- Mudholkar I. tion could be said to be illegal because it was in pursuance of the investigation of the complaint lodged by Manoharlal Seth that he was arrested and brought for interrogation before the respondent. It was not disputed before us that investigation into Manoharlal's complaint had been ordered though there is a dispute as to whether it was ordered by the respondent or by the Deputy Commissioner of Police.\n\nWhether it was by one or the other makes little difference.\n\nWe would like to make it clear that Mr. Ghose did not contend before us that the appellant's detention in the office of the respondent was illegal because his initial arrest was without a warrant.\n\nBut we may point out that a police officer is legally empowered to arrest a person alleged to have committed an offence under s. 420, I.P.C. without a warran!.\n\nSuch being the position the High Court was justified in q, ushing the process. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n0. S. RAMASWAMY & ORS. ·\n\nv . ..\n\nINSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nStlltt Police Strvict-Sub-lnspector1 included in tligibility list of Cir1.:le\n\nJruptctor.s-RtorganUation of_ Statt1-Appointment tu Circle Iruptctor1 in new State-Rever1ion on return of 1enior o{fictr._, f rtduction in ra11k-My1ort Stniority Rult•, 19S1, r. 2(c)- H1derabad District Polict Mcnual, u. 399, 403, 486.\n\nlarumry., 21", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "275\n\nSOM CHAND SANGHVI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SOM CHAND SANGHVI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BIBHUTI BHUSAN CHAKRA VARTY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIBHUTI BHUSAN CHAKRAVARTY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 348", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325, "end_char": 331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 333, "end_char": 350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 1208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian PeIJal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 415, "end_char": 433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 720, "end_char": 726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian PeIJal Code", "statute": "Indian PeIJal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 727, "end_char": 753, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1047, "end_char": 1053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian PeIJal Code", "statute": "Indian PeIJal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1434, "end_char": 1440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2023, "end_char": 2042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 10, 1961, of the Calcutta High Court ill Criminal Revision No."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2084, "end_char": 2097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Sukumar Ghose"}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2119, "end_char": 2134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. Sanglivl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2160, "end_char": 2171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. C. Sanglivl ... llbhutl Bhushan Chakravarty\n\nJanuary 21, 1964."}}, {"text": "MunHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2267, "end_char": 2276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMunHOLKAR.", "canonical_name": "MunHOLKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 348", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manohar!al Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2755, "end_char": 2770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts as alleged by the appellant are as follows:\n\nOne Manohar!al Seth had lodged a complaint on July 28, 1960 against him and two other persons Fatehlal and Jaichand for offences under s. 120B/420, I.P.C. and S 420 l.P.C. Manoharlal Seth had alleged in his complaint that these persons had induced him to purchase a bar of brass for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Manohar!al Seth"}}, {"text": "July 28, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2797, "end_char": 2810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts as alleged by the appellant are as follows:\n\nOne Manohar!al Seth had lodged a complaint on July 28, 1960 against him and two other persons Fatehlal and Jaichand for offences under s. 120B/420, I.P.C. and S 420 l.P.C. Manoharlal Seth had alleged in his complaint that these persons had induced him to purchase a bar of brass for Rs."}}, {"text": "Fatehlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2845, "end_char": 2853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts as alleged by the appellant are as follows:\n\nOne Manohar!al Seth had lodged a complaint on July 28, 1960 against him and two other persons Fatehlal and Jaichand for offences under s. 120B/420, I.P.C. and S 420 l.P.C. Manoharlal Seth had alleged in his complaint that these persons had induced him to purchase a bar of brass for Rs."}}, {"text": "Jaichand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts as alleged by the appellant are as follows:\n\nOne Manohar!al Seth had lodged a complaint on July 28, 1960 against him and two other persons Fatehlal and Jaichand for offences under s. 120B/420, I.P.C. and S 420 l.P.C. Manoharlal Seth had alleged in his complaint that these persons had induced him to purchase a bar of brass for Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2886, "end_char": 2893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2899, "end_char": 2904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Manoharlal Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2923, "end_char": 2938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts as alleged by the appellant are as follows:\n\nOne Manohar!al Seth had lodged a complaint on July 28, 1960 against him and two other persons Fatehlal and Jaichand for offences under s. 120B/420, I.P.C. and S 420 l.P.C. Manoharlal Seth had alleged in his complaint that these persons had induced him to purchase a bar of brass for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Manohar!al Seth"}}, {"text": "Manoharlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3382, "end_char": 3392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of that Manoharlal Seth told him that unless he settled his differences with Manoharlal Seth according to the latter's dictates he would put him into trouble through his friend, the respondent, and that it is because of this that Manoharlal lodged a complaint against him for cheating.", "canonical_name": "Manohar!al Seth"}}, {"text": "Presidency Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This complaint was thus a false complaint and it is common ground that ultimately it was dismissed by the Presidency Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta on January 2, 1961. '"}}, {"text": "January 2, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3813, "end_char": 3828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This complaint was thus a false complaint and it is common ground that ultimately it was dismissed by the Presidency Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta on January 2, 1961. '"}}, {"text": "August 3, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3868, "end_char": 3882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then according to the appellant, on August 3, 1960 at about 6-00 A.M. P. C. Kundu,, Sub-Inspector of Police attached to Burrabazar Police Station along with another Sub-Inspector S. Bhattacharya, visited his residence, searched his house and arrested him."}}, {"text": "P. C. Kundu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then according to the appellant, on August 3, 1960 at about 6-00 A.M. P. C. Kundu,, Sub-Inspector of Police attached to Burrabazar Police Station along with another Sub-Inspector S. Bhattacharya, visited his residence, searched his house and arrested him."}}, {"text": "Burrabazar Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3952, "end_char": 3977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then according to the appellant, on August 3, 1960 at about 6-00 A.M. P. C. Kundu,, Sub-Inspector of Police attached to Burrabazar Police Station along with another Sub-Inspector S. Bhattacharya, visited his residence, searched his house and arrested him."}}, {"text": "S. Bhattacharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4011, "end_char": 4026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then according to the appellant, on August 3, 1960 at about 6-00 A.M. P. C. Kundu,, Sub-Inspector of Police attached to Burrabazar Police Station along with another Sub-Inspector S. Bhattacharya, visited his residence, searched his house and arrested him.", "canonical_name": "S. Bhattacharya"}}, {"text": "Burrabazar police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4413, "end_char": 4438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that he was taken to the Burrabazar police station at about Chakrt1•11tl1 7-00 A.M. and then to Jorasanko Police Station and produced before T. K. Talukdar, Sub-Inspector in charge of that police station."}}, {"text": "Jorasanko Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4484, "end_char": 4508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that he was taken to the Burrabazar police station at about Chakrt1•11tl1 7-00 A.M. and then to Jorasanko Police Station and produced before T. K. Talukdar, Sub-Inspector in charge of that police station."}}, {"text": "T. K. Talukdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4529, "end_char": 4543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that he was taken to the Burrabazar police station at about Chakrt1•11tl1 7-00 A.M. and then to Jorasanko Police Station and produced before T. K. Talukdar, Sub-Inspector in charge of that police station."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4637, "end_char": 4645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From there he was taken to vanous places in Calcutta with a rope tied round his waist by Kundu and Bhattacharya and was eventually produced at about 12 noon before the respondent in his office at Lalbazar."}}, {"text": "Kundu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4682, "end_char": 4687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From there he was taken to vanous places in Calcutta with a rope tied round his waist by Kundu and Bhattacharya and was eventually produced at about 12 noon before the respondent in his office at Lalbazar."}}, {"text": "Bhattacharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4692, "end_char": 4704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From there he was taken to vanous places in Calcutta with a rope tied round his waist by Kundu and Bhattacharya and was eventually produced at about 12 noon before the respondent in his office at Lalbazar.", "canonical_name": "S. Bhattacharya"}}, {"text": "Lalbazar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4789, "end_char": 4797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From there he was taken to vanous places in Calcutta with a rope tied round his waist by Kundu and Bhattacharya and was eventually produced at about 12 noon before the respondent in his office at Lalbazar."}}, {"text": "Iswarilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5066, "end_char": 5075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At about 3-30 P.M. on the same day his brother Iswarilal accompanied by a lawyer Chakravarthy visited the resr, Jondent's office and sought the appellant's release on bail as the offence was a bailable one."}}, {"text": "Chakravarthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5100, "end_char": 5112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At about 3-30 P.M. on the same day his brother Iswarilal accompanied by a lawyer Chakravarthy visited the resr, Jondent's office and sought the appellant's release on bail as the offence was a bailable one."}}, {"text": "Lalbazar Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5407, "end_char": 5430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant says that he was detained at Lalbazar Police Station till 8-00 P.M. From there he was taken to Jorasanko Police Station and kept in the lock-up for the whole night."}}, {"text": "August 4, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5569, "end_char": 5583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the next day, that is, August 4, 1960 he was again produced before the respondent at Lalbazar where the latter repeated his threats and that after obtaining his finger prints and taking his photographs he was taken to the court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate where he was released on bail at about 2-30 P.M.\n\nOn August 19, 1960 the appellant preferred a complaint before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, under s. 348 and s. 220, I.P .C. and s. I 3C of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866."}}, {"text": "Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5781, "end_char": 5819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the next day, that is, August 4, 1960 he was again produced before the respondent at Lalbazar where the latter repeated his threats and that after obtaining his finger prints and taking his photographs he was taken to the court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate where he was released on bail at about 2-30 P.M.\n\nOn August 19, 1960 the appellant preferred a complaint before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, under s. 348 and s. 220, I.P .C. and s. I 3C of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866."}}, {"text": "August 19, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5873, "end_char": 5888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the next day, that is, August 4, 1960 he was again produced before the respondent at Lalbazar where the latter repeated his threats and that after obtaining his finger prints and taking his photographs he was taken to the court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate where he was released on bail at about 2-30 P.M.\n\nOn August 19, 1960 the appellant preferred a complaint before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, under s. 348 and s. 220, I.P .C. and s. I 3C of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866."}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5936, "end_char": 5973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the next day, that is, August 4, 1960 he was again produced before the respondent at Lalbazar where the latter repeated his threats and that after obtaining his finger prints and taking his photographs he was taken to the court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate where he was released on bail at about 2-30 P.M.\n\nOn August 19, 1960 the appellant preferred a complaint before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, under s. 348 and s. 220, I.P .C. and s. I 3C of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866."}}, {"text": "s. 348", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5981, "end_char": 5987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5992, "end_char": 5998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Police Act, 1866", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6027, "end_char": 6052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. I. Kun du", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6113, "end_char": 6125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In so far as two of the persons named as accused therein, S. I. Kun du and S. I. Talukda:, he decided to issu~ process against them under s. 220 I.P .C. and s. 13C .of the Calcutta Police Act. -"}}, {"text": "S. I. Talukda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6130, "end_char": 6143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In so far as two of the persons named as accused therein, S. I. Kun du and S. I. Talukda:, he decided to issu~ process against them under s. 220 I.P .C. and s. 13C .of the Calcutta Police Act. -"}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6193, "end_char": 6199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Police Act, 1866", "statute": "the Calcutta Police Act, 1866"}}, {"text": "s. 13C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6212, "end_char": 6218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Police Act, 1866", "statute": "the Calcutta Police Act, 1866"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6236, "end_char": 6246, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 348", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6324, "end_char": 6330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Police Act, 1866", "statute": "the Calcutta Police Act, 1866"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6454, "end_char": 6463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the respondent, he\n\ndecided to issue process against him under s. 348, I.P.C.\n\nUpon a revision application preferred by the respondent the High Court quashed the process issued against him by\n\nMudholkar '\n\n1964 the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate.", "canonical_name": "MunHOLKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6713, "end_char": 6719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6853, "end_char": 6866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ou behalf of the appellant Mr. Sukumar Ghose contends that the High Court in quashing the process has proceeded to decide on the merits of the case even though there was no material before it to do so and that therefore its judgment cannot stand.", "canonical_name": "Sukumar Ghose"}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7110, "end_char": 7116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Cr.PC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7118, "end_char": 7123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mauoharlal Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7536, "end_char": 7551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000 to Mauoharlal Seth who had lodged a complaint of cheating against the appellant and two others and that he declined to release him on bail.", "canonical_name": "Manohar!al Seth"}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8655, "end_char": 8661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8663, "end_char": 8669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8675, "end_char": 8680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C.\n\nMr Ghose, however, ."}}, {"text": "s 1964", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8721, "end_char": 8727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9821, "end_char": 9827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9829, "end_char": 9834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. RAMASWAMY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9994, "end_char": 10006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. RAMASWAMY & ORS. ·"}}, {"text": "INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10025, "end_char": 10060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10063, "end_char": 10083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10085, "end_char": 10098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10100, "end_char": 10116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10118, "end_char": 10128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10133, "end_char": 10155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "larumry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10478, "end_char": 10485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "larumry.,"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_279_293_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 279\n\nMr Ghose, however, . contends that the appellant's 1964\n\ndetention in the respondent's office was illegal and that, s. c. San11i•i therefore, the respondent could not be said to have been in Bibhuti v.8huilwn a position to exercise any lawful authority with respect to Chakravor11 him. It is difficult to appreciate how the appellant's deten- Mudholkar I. tion could be said to be illegal because it was in pursuance of the investigation of the complaint lodged by Manoharlal Seth that he was arrested and brought for interrogation before the respondent. It was not disputed before us that investigation into Manoharlal's complaint had been ordered though there is a dispute as to whether it was ordered by the respondent or by the Deputy Commissioner of Police.\n\nWhether it was by one or the other makes little difference.\n\nWe would like to make it clear that Mr. Ghose did not contend before us that the appellant's detention in the office of the respondent was illegal because his initial arrest was without a warrant.\n\nBut we may point out that a police officer is legally empowered to arrest a person alleged to have committed an offence under s. 420, I.P.C. without a warran!.\n\nSuch being the position the High Court was justified in q, ushing the process. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n0. S. RAMASWAMY & ORS. ·\n\nv . ..\n\nINSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nStlltt Police Strvict-Sub-lnspector1 included in tligibility list of Cir1.:le\n\nJruptctor.s-RtorganUation of_ Statt1-Appointment tu Circle Iruptctor1 in new State-Rever1ion on return of 1enior o{fictr._, f rtduction in ra11k-My1ort Stniority Rult•, 19S1, r. 2(c)- H1derabad District Polict Mcnual, u. 399, 403, 486.\n\nlarumry., 21\n\nG. s. Ramaswamy\n\n•• /.\n\nG. Polict.\n\nMyvor~\n\n?UPREME COURT REPORTS [r¢4J\n\nAll the petitioners were appointed Sub-Inspecton in the former Hydorabad State. They were considered for promotion as Circle Inspectors and their names were included in the eli1ibility list. On account of the merger of certain areas of the former State of Hyderabad into Mysore petitioners\n\n..,.ere transferred to Mysore. The petitioners were promoted ad hoc Circle Inspectors from the eligibility list received from the former Hyderabad State and they continued to act for varying periods as such. When certain confirmed Circle Inspectors who were on leave or on deputation outside the State returned to the new State, the petitioners were ordered to be reverted.\n\nWhen tha( happened, the petitioners filed writ petitions in the Mysore High Court in which they claimed that as they bad been put in the e1igilibity list by the former Hyderabad State, they were entitled u of right to promotion as Circle Inspectors and to Continue as such thereafter and the order of their reversion amounted to reduction in rank. They prayed for a writ, order or direction quashing the orders of reYersion and directing the State Government to continue them as Circle Inspectors and confirm them as such.\n\nTheir writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court and they came to this Court by special leave. They also filed writ petitions. in this Court in addition to the appeals. Two others who had not appealed against the orders of the High Court also filed writ petitions in this Court.\n\nThe contentions raised before this Court were that as their names were put in the eligibility list, they got an indefeasible right to promotion as Circle Inspectors, that after promotion on a temporary or oftic1aung\n\nbasis they got a right not to be reverted under any circumstances, that as they had worked for more than two years on probation, they became automatically confirmed under R. 486. that their reversions amounted to reduction in rank in view of R7 2 (c) and that they shou1d be considered senior to other Circle Inspectors who were promoted after they were promoted as Circle Inspectors and therefore they should not have been reverted but the other Circle Inspectors who were promoted after them as Circle Inspectors should have been reverted on the principle that junior most officiating persons must be reverted. Dismissing the appeals and writ petitions.\n\nHeld: The mere fact that a Sub-Inspector's name is once put in the eJigibility list does not give him an in'defeasible right to promotion as a Circle Inspector. Moreover, after promotion on a temporary or oftlciating basis, he does not get a right not to be reverted under any circumstances.\n\nRule 486 does not contemplate automatic confirmation after the proba· tionary period of 2 years. The provision in the nile that promoted officern will be confirmed at the end of their probationary period. is qualified by the words \"if they have given satisfaction\". The competent authority\n\nmust be satisfied about their work and the order of confirmation must be pas'°d by that authority.\n\nReversion in the present case does not amount to reduction in rant because the petitioners were never confirmed as Circle Inspecton and had no right to that post and their reversion wu on account of ollisenclea cl\n\nservice and not on account of any fault on their part. Reversion on 1964 account of exigencies of service as senior officers had co1ne back trom G S R-- deputation or from leave, did not amount to reduction in rank. · ~\n\nThe petitioners could not rely on R. 2(c) in the pecllliar circumstances prevailing in the State after re-organisation because promotions were made ad hoc without regard to inter se seniority of officers from different States. lt cannot be said that reversion of the petitioners was on act of discrimination.\n\nG. Fo/ille,\n\nMysore\n\nSukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1711, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.\n\nCivil Appeal Nos. 972-977 of 1963.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 3, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1380, 1179, 1246, 1259 and 1312 of 1962.\n\nAND\n\nPetitions Nos. 64, 90 to 94 and l73 and 17 4 , of 1963.\n\nPetitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas and R. Gopa/akrislman, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 972-977 / l 963) and the petitioners (in Petitions Nos. 64 and 90 to 94 of 1963).\n\nR. Gopa/akrishnan, for the petitioners (in Petition Nos. 173 and 174 of 1963).\n\nS. V. Gup1e, Additional Solicitor General. B. R. L.\n\nIyengar and B. R. G. K. A char, for the res>pondent (In C.A.\n\nNos. 972-977 of 1963 and Petitions Nos. 64 and 90 to\n\n91 of 1963).\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent (in Petitions Nos. 173 and 174 of 1963).\n\nJanuary 21, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO J.-These appeals and writ pe!Itlons raise common questions and will be dealt with together.\n\nThe appeals arise out of six writ petitions filed in the Myore\n\nWa1U:hoo 1.\n\n1964 High Court and six of the writ petitions filed in this Court\n\nG. s. Ramaswamy are by the same petitioners who applied in the Mysore High v.\n\nCourt.\n\nTwo writ petitions (Nos. 173 and 174) have been f. <Ji,,::; ice, filed by two others. They also filed writ petJ'tions in the High Court, though they have not filed appeals from the Wtiltchoo J. decision of the High Court.\n\nThey will all be referred to as petitioners hereafter.\n\nThe case before the High Court was briefly this.\n\nAll the petitioners were appointed sub-inspectors in the former Hyderabad State, under s. 6 of the Hyderabad District Police Act (No. X of 1329 Fasli).\n\nUnder r. 399 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual, issued by the Government of Hyderabad under s. 10 of the Hyderabad Distncc Police Act, posts of circle inspectors were to be filled by promotion from tile rank of sub-inspectors.\n\nThe subsequent rules provided for the procedure for this purpose.\n\nThe names of selected sub-inspectors who were considered fit for promotion were sent by the Depnty Inspectors General of Police and the Commissioner of City Police of Hyderabad to the Inspector General of Police.\n\nThereafter a Board consisting of the Inspector General of Police and all the Deputy Inspectors General of Police. Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad and Assistant Inspector General of Police interviewed the candidates and prepared an approved list of sub-inspectors fit for promotion. This approved list used to be called the eligibility list and promotions to the post of circle inspector used to be made from this list.\n\nThe case of the peunoners in the High Court was that their names were included in the eligibility list published in the month of October 1956 before the States Reorganisation Act (No.\n\nXXXVII of 1956) came into force on November, 1, 1956.\n\nThey therefore contended that in view of the entry of their names in the e1ign>ility list they were entitled as of rignt to promotion to the post of circle inspector as and when vacancies occurred.\n\nOn the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, certain areas from the States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madras and the whole of Coarg were made part of the new State of Mysore in addition to the existing State of Mysore.\n\nIn consequence, certain public servants belonging to these States from which areas were added to the old State of Mysore wre transferred to the new State\n\nof Mysore thus fonned out of the old State of Mysore and 1964 the areas added to it.\n\nAmong these were the petitioners.\n\nG. s. ;;;;;;;..., amy\n\nUnder s. 115 of the States Reorganisation Act, public servants so transferred were deemed to serve in connection with the aff.airs of the principal successor State.\n\nProvision was also made for the establishment of one or more advisory boards for the purpose of assistance in regarel to the division and integration of services amongst the new\n\nStats and the ensuring of fair and equitable treatment to .all persons affected by the State Reorgar.isntion Act.\n\nSec tion 115 further provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day (name1y, November l, 1956) shall not be varied to the disadvantage of any person transferred to the new State except with tne prcviom, approval of the Central Government.\n\nSection 116 ( 1) provided for the continuance of public servants in the same posts; bnt sub-s. (2) thereof laid down that no; hing in sub-s. (I) shall prevent a competent authority aftc:· the appointed day from passing in relation to any such person any order affecting his continuance in such post or\n\noffice, thereby recognising the right of the succes>or State inter :ilia to transfer officers anywhere in the new State after November 1, 1956.\n\nThe petitioners continued to serve in the new State and as they were in the eligibility list referred to above they were promoted as circle inspectors on various dates after N ovember l, 1956.\n\nIt inay be mentioned that eligibility lists were received in the new State of Mysore from all the States from which areas had been transferred to it under the States Reorganisation Act and these lists continued to be acted upon as and when vacancies arose in the cadre of circle inspectors.\n\nIt also appears that pending integration promotions were made from these eligibility lists ad hoc, or as they were called \"ont of seniority\", and continued to be so made pending integration.\n\nThe petitioners were thus promoted ad hoc circle inspectors from the eligibility list received from the forriier Hyderabad State and continued to act for varying periods as such. It appears further that the petitioners were ordered to be reverted when certain confinned circle inspector~ who were on leave or on deputation outside the State\n\nJ. G. Polict,\n\nMysore\n\nWanchoo /.\n\n1964 returned to the new State.\n\nThereupon the petitioners filed ,6 , s. R,;;; aswamy writs before the High Court in which they claimed that as\n\n•· they had been put in the eligibility list by the former Hydera- 1 'l; ys!:.lice, bad State, they were entitled as of right to promotion as circle inspectors and to continue as such thereafter and the order Wanchoo 1. f h · d o t e1r reversion amounted to re ucuon in rank.\n\nThey therefore prayed for a writ, order or direction quashing the orders dated September 6, 1962, ordering their reversion and directing the . State Government to continue them as circle inspectors and to confirm them as such.\n\nFurther during the course of arguments before the High Court, reliance was placed on r. 2 ( c) of the Seniority Rules framed by the Governor of Mysore in 1957 and the writ petitions before this Court are mainly based on that seniority rule to which we shall refer in due course.\n\nThe case of the State Government was briefly thi,. It was admitted th.1t after November 1, 1956, these offlcers were transferred to the new State of Mysore and eligibility lists were received from all the States from which territories and officers were tarnsferred to the new State of Mysore.\n\nAs however integration of various services was bound to take time, the new State, by virtue of the powers conferred on it under the States Reorganisation Act, started acting on the eligibility lists received from the various Stats in anticipation of integration and promoting sub-inspectors to the rank of circle inspectors from those eligibility lists on an ad hoc basis and this was made clear in the various orders that were passed from time to time by using the words \"out of seniority\" when such promotions were made. Eventually a provisional integrated seniority list of all sub-inspectors including those who were officiating as circle inspector (hereinafter referred to as 'the provisional list) was prepared in February 1958.\n\nIn 1962 when senior circle inspectors returned to the State from deputation, some officiating circle inspectors (other than the petitioners) were reverted. They filed writ petitions before the High Court in 1962 contending that even though they had been promoted later, they should not have been reverted in view of their position in the provisional list and that that list should have been adhered to and those junior to them in the provisional list should have been reverted.\n\nThis contention was accepted by the High\n\nCourt and in consequence reversions began to be made in 1964 accordance with the provision.al list in compliance with the G. s. Ramaswamy view taken by the High Court.\n\nThat was why the junior- 1\n\nG •· P ,. most sub-inspectors according to the provisional list who My•o:'. ice, were in the eligibility list and who were officiating as circle inspectors were reverted.\n\nIn consequence the petitioners were also reverted when senior officers came back to the State. It was further urged that the eligibility lists gave no right to the sub-inspectors whose names were borne on those lists to promotion as circle inspectors, though it was not disputed that only those who were in the eligibility lists could be promoted as circle inspectors.\n\nBut the fact that a sub-inspector's name was in the eligibility list did not confer any right on him to promotion in view of the Rules.\n\nFurther it was contended that officiating circle inspectors could not claim confirmation as an automatic right after they had worked for a certain number of ye.ars as such and that they could only become confirmed circle inspectors when orders to that effect were expressly made by the Government In the present cases the petitioners were never confirmed by the Government as inspectors.\n\nThere was therefore no question of any reduction in rank. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were not reverted on account of any fault on their part; they had to be reverted only because of exigencies of service as senior inspectors had come back to the State from deputation or had returned from leave. It was urged that the reversion in the present case could not amount to reduction in rank and was in ordinary course due to exigencies of service.\n\nAs to r. 2(c) of the Seniority Rules, the case of the Government was that that rule governed the seniority of inspectors while they were aeting as such and had nothing to do with the question of reversion, and in any case considering th.at promotions had been made after November 1, 1956 on ad hoc basis, the rule would not confer any right on the petitioners and the Government was justified in following the provisional list in view of the observations of the High Court referred to above.\n\nIt was therefore contended that the petitioners had no right to the posts from which they were reverted and there was no reduction in rank and they were not entitled to any benefit of r. 2(c).\n\nWanchoo J.\n\n1964 The High Court accepted the contentions raised on\n\nG. s. omy behalf of the State and dismissed the petitions. Thereupon\n\nY. special leave was 0btained by six of the petitioners in the /. G. Police, H'gh C Mysore 1 ourt and that is how we have six appeals before us.\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nThese six appellants have also filed six writ petitions before this Court in addition to two other writ petitions filed by two ot)ler petitioners in the High Court who had not filed appeals.\n\nThe first two questions that fall for consideration are whether the fact that a sub-inspector's name is put in the eligibility list gives an indefeasible right to him to promotion, and whether after such promotion on a temporary or officiating basis he gets a right not to be reverted under any circumstances. We are of opinion that the fact that a subinspector's name is in the eligibility list gives him no right of the kind urged on behalf of the petitioners.\n\nThe rules in that behalf that are relevant are 399 to 403 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual.\n\nRule 399 provides that vacancies in the rank of circle inspector are to be filled by the promotion of selected sub-inspectors and r. 403 lays down that \"no direct appointments to the rank 0f Circle Inspector will be made\". Rule 400 prescribes the procedure for putting the names in the eligibility list.\n\nRule . lQ2 refers to sub-inspectors serving in the C.I.D. Rule 401 Jays down that sub-inspectors whose names are entered in the approved list will be interviewed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police in the course of his cold weather tour and each sub-inspector's work during the year will be examined and repo1t will then be made to the Inspector General of Police whether the officer had maintained his fitness for promotion or not.\n\nThus r. 40 I makes it clear that even after the sub-inspector's name is put in the eligibility list, his fitness for promotion is to be decided year by year and a report ha11 to be made whether he has maintained his fitness for promotion or not.\n\nThis obviously means that where a subinspector has not maintained his fitness his mme can be removed from the eligibility list.\n\nIt follows therefore that the mere fact that a sub-inspector's name is once put in the eligibility list does not give him an indefeasible right to promotion as a circle inspector.\n\nThen there is r. 486 which governs promotions generally.\n\nIt lays down that promotion\n\ncannot be claimed as a matter of right, though officers .and 1964 men of all ranks are entitled to expect promotion if they G. s. ;;;;;,_.,.., have good records, and if they are smart and efficient and ... have a thorough knowledge of their duties.\n\nThis again J. '1;,.%,~; u, clearly shows th.at merely because a sub-inspector's name is put in the eligibility list, he cannot claim promotion as a matter of right.\n\nRule 486 further provides that all officers who are promoted will be on probation for a period of two years. They may be reverted at any time during this period by the authority competent to promote them, if their conduct and work are not satisfactory, or if they are found unsuitable for the appointment to which they have been promoted.\n\nThis clearly shows that even where a sub-inspector has actually been promoted as circle inspector he remains on probation for two years and during that period he is likely to be reverted if his work and conduct are not found satisfactory. This again negatives the contention on behalf of the petitioners that they had an indefeasible right to promotion because their names had been put on the eligibility list and that they could not be reverted after they had once started acting as circle inspectors. Lastly, r. 486 provides that promoted officers will be confirmed at the end of their probationary period if they have given satisfaction.\n\nThis clearly shows that it is only when the probationary period is over and the promoted officer has given satisfaction during the whole of that iperiod that he will be confirmed.\n\nIt is clear therefore reading rr. 401 and 486 together that the mere fact that a sub-inspector's name is put in the eligibility list does not give him any indefeasible right to promotion. Further the fact that he is actually promoted, temporarily or as officiating, does not give him any right to continuance even during the period of two years' probation and he is liable to be reverted at any time even during those two years if his work is found unsatisfactory; it is only when the authority concerned has found that his work and conduct are satisfactory during the probation period that he can be confrmed.\n\nThe contention of the petitioners that they had any right under the eligibility list for promotion or that after they had actually been promoted, they had a right to continue in the post of circle inspector, therefore, must be negatived. -~\n\n288 SUPREMk COURT REPORTS [rg64)\n\n~ It has further been urged on the basis of r. 486 that as G. s. Ramaswamy the petitioners had worked for more than two vears on\n\n1• a. •r. Police, probation, they became automatic11Iy confirmed ti'nder the Mysore said rule, and reliance is placed on the following sentence -,,_, hoo 1. in r. 486, namely, \"promoted officers will be cofirmed at the end of their probationary period if they have given satisfaction\". The law on the question has been settled by this Court in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab('). It has been held in that case that a probationer cannot after the expiry of the probationary period automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service, unless of course the rules under which he is .appointed expressly provide for such a result.\n\nTherefore even though a probationer may have continued to act in the post to which he is appointed on probation for more than the initial period of probation, he cannot become a permanent servant merely because of efflux of time, unless the Rules of service which govern him specifically lay down that the probationer will be automatically confirmed after the initial period of probation is over.\n\nIt is contended on behalf of the petitioners before us that the part of r. 486 (which we have set out above) expressly provides for automatic confirmation after the period of probation is over.\n\nWe are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. It is true th.at the words used in the sentence set out above are not that promoted officers will be eligible or qualified for promotion at the end of their probationary period which are the words to be often found in the rules in such cases; even so, though this part of r. 486 says that \"promoted officers will be confirmed at the end of their probationary period\", it is qualified by the words \"if they have given satisfaction\".\n\nClearly therefore the rule does not contemplate automatic confirmation after the probationary period of two years, for a promoted officer can only be confirmed under this rule if he has given satisfaction.\n\nThis condition of giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before a promoted officer can be confirmed under this rule and this condition obviously means that the authority competent to confirm him must pass an order to the effect that the probationay officer has given satisfaction and is therefore confirmed. The etitioners therefore cannot\n\n(') A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1711.\n\nclaim that they mmt b~ treated as confirmed circlo inspec- 1944 tors simply because they have worked for more than two G. s. llml' rears on in:obation; they can only become confirmed circle /. G. ~Po/U:i, '\n\ninspectors 1f an order to that effect has been passed even My'\"'' under this rule by the competent authority.\n\nThe first contention therefore that the petitioners before us have an in lefeasible right to promotion once their names are put in the eligibility list and that they are entitled to continue as circle inspectors thereafter if they have once been promoted, on temporary or officiating basis, cannot be sustained.\n\nThis brings us to the next question whether the reversion in the present cases can be said to amount to reduction in rank.\n\nIn view of what we have said above on the first point raised on behalf of the petitioners, it is clear that the petitioners cannot be treated as confirmed circle inspectors.\n\nIt is not disputed that they have never been confirmed as such.\n\nIt is also not disputed that they have not been reverted on account of any fault in their work.\n\nThe reversion bas been made simply because senior circle inspectors have come back to the State either from deputation or from leave and they have to be accommodated.\n\nSuch reversion therefore cannot amount to reduction in rank for two reasons, firstly, because the petitioners before us were never confirmed as circle inspectors and had no right to that post, and secondly, because the reversion is on account of exigencies of service and not on account of any fault on their part. Reversion on account of exigencies of service, as senior officers have come back from . deputation or from leave, cannot in our opinion amount to reduction in rank.\n\nThe contention of the petitioner that by this reversion they have been reduced in rank therefore fails.\n\nThe next point that has been urged is that in any case till final integration of service was made, the State Government was not entitled to take into account the provisional list of sul>-inspectors and could only proceed to give promotions and to make transfers regionwise according to the eligibility lists of former States from which the territories came to the new State and if that was done the petitioners being senior in their region could not be reverted.\n\nWe are of opinion that there is no force in this contention.\n\nIt is\n\n134-159 S.C.-19.\n\nW anchoo I.\n\nIHf true that for some time the State Government did proceed . a. 8, amy °!1. this basis for thre was no integrated list, whether proy. v1s1onal or final, available; but that does not mean that under J. G. Police, the law it could not act on the provisional list once it was M:J1ore made till it was made final or that there was any estoppel\n\n,,.,,,,,..,,, I. against the State Government in view of its having acted regionwise for sometime.\n\nWe have already indicated that territories from four States came to the old State of Mysore to form the new State of Mysore and that necessarily raised difficult question of integration, and so the State Government made ad hoc promotions regionwise or out of seniority .as was stated by it in various government orders.\n\nBut the State is bound to be treated as one unit for purposes of administration.\n\nWe may also refer to s. 116 ( 2) of the States Reorganisation Act, which makes it clear that after the appointed day the whole State will be treated as one unit and nothing would prevent the competent authority after the appointed day from passing in relation to any such officer allotted to the new State any order affecting his con tinuanci: in such post or office.\n\nWe cannot tl)erefore accept the contention that the State Government was bound till the final list of integration was made, to make transfers only regionwise.\n\nWe can see nothing in law which prevents the State Government from proceeding according to the provisional list after such list was prepared.\n\nWe are of opinion that the view taken by the Mysore High Court in the earlier writ petitions after the frawing of the' provisional seniority list is correct and the State C. vernment would be entitled to act on that fot subject of course to this th.1t if the provisional list is in any way altered when the final list is prepared, the State Government would give effect to the final list.\n\nThe contention of the petitioners that the State Government should have continued to make promotions and transfers regionwise only even after the provisional list was made therefore must fail.\n\nIt may be added that the State Government would be entitled and bound after the appoint ed day to treat the State as one whole unit and make such orders of transfer, as it thought fit, treating the whole State\n\nas one unit.\n\nLastly, we come to the contention based on r. 2 ( c) of the Mysore Seniority Rules which was argued before the\n\nHigh Court at the he.Jring though it was not specifically 19tU raised in the petitions there and this is the main basis of G. s. Ra\"\"\"\"\"\"\"' the writ petitions before us.\n\nThe rule was promulgated\n\n1. G 'I. Poll by the Governor of Mysore from February 1958 and is in\n\nMYIOI\" ... these terms:-\n\n\"Seniority inter se of persons appointed on temporary basis will be determined by the dates of their continuous officiating in that grade and where the period of officiation is the same the seniority inter se in the lower gr.ade shall prevail.\" The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that in view of this rule, they should be considered senior to other circle inspectors who were promoted after they were promoted as circle inspectors and therefore they should not have been reverted but the other circle inspectors who were promoted after them as circle inspectors should have been reverted, on the principle that junior-most officiating phson must be reverted.\n\nNow r. 2(c) as it stands merely provides for seniority between persons officiating in a higher rank when they are officiating as such; it is not an express rule as to the manner in which , reversion should be made where reversions are necessary on account of exigencies of service.\n\nThe rule therefore cannot be held as expressly providing for the principle of \"last come first go\" with which one is familiar in industrial law.\n\nStrictly speaking therefore the petitioners cannot claim that r. 2 ( c) has been vioL'.tted by their reversion, for it does not provide for reversion and only rprovides for the seniority of officers who are officiating in a higher grade.\n\nEven so, it may be conceded that when reversion takes place on account of exigencies of public service, the usual principle is that the junior-most persons among those officiating in clear or long term vacancies are generally reverted to make room for the senior officers coming back from deputation or from leave etc.\n\nFurther ordinarily as promotion on officiating basis is generally according to seniority, subject to fitness for promotion, the junior-most person reverted is usually the person promoted last.\n\nThis state of affairs prevails oridinarily unless there are extraordinary circumstances, as in the present case.\n\nWe have\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nIi I\n\nt~ already set out above that the new State of Mysore was G .. s. &;;;;;, swamy formed of the territories of the old State of Mysore ; md the\n\nI G 0 1. territories of four other States.\n\nThe consequence of this • , oict. ffi f th S MysOl'e . was that o cers rom the o er tates as well as from the\n\n'\"•nchoo. I. old State of Mysore became officers of the new State and the question of their integration inter se had to be decided in accordance with s. 115 of the States Reorganisation Aot.\n\nThat matter had to take time and therefore in the interest of administration ad hoc promotions continued to be m1de by the new State of Mysore after November I, 1956. The result of this ad hoc promotion was that the normal principle of promotion based on seniority subject to fitness in a State where there is no question of integration could not work and that is why we find that orders were passed by the new State promoting sub-inspectors from various eligibility lists with regard to seniority inter se of officers ; from various States.\n\nIt was only in 1958 that the provisional list of sub-inspectors was prepared.\n\nWhen this provisional list was prepared it was found that the promotions which had till then been made out of eligibility lists received from various States were not in accordance with the provisional list and it so happened in many cases that sub-inspectors who were seniors in the provisional list and who were also in the eligibility lists of the various States were promoted after sub-inspectors who were junior in the provisional list though they were also in the eligibility lists. It was because of .these special circumstances arising out of the provisional list which began to be put into effect after 1958 that the situation arose that officiating inspectors who had been officiating for a longer time had to be reverted before officiating inspectors who had been officiating for a shorter time because of hie seniority in the provisional list.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that it was because of the special circumstances after November I, 1956 that the petitioners and those like them who were really junior to other subinspectors in the eligibility lists came to be promoted earlier because there was no provision.al list available or in actual force when the promotions were made ad hoc and out of seniortiy.\n\nIt was only when the provisional list was made that inter se seniority of officers conting from various States became prima facie known. Therefore when reversions had\n\n. to be mi de on account of exigencies of service in accordance with the provisional list it was bound to happen in view of the earlier ad hoc promotions that some officiating inspectors who had been promoted earlier had to be reverted in preference to others who had been promoted later in these c: rcumstances. It cannot therefore be said in view of the special circumstances prevailing in the State consequent on the States Reorganisation Act that the departure from the normal method of reversion was unjustified after the making of the provisional list.\n\nThe petitioners therefore cannot rely on r. 2(c) i~ the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the State after the reorganisation because promotions were made ad hoc without regard to inter se seniority of officers from different States.\n\nIt is only be- . cause of this special circumstance that it appears as if r. 2 ( c) is being disregarded in the matter of reversion for the promotions were made without regard to integrated seniority and resulted in sub-inspectors who were juniors in integrated seniority being promoted earlier.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that r. 2 ( c) does not strictly apply in the present ..:ase.\n\nBut even on the basis that the junior-most should first be reverted in case reversion has to take place .:in account of exigencies of service, it cannot be said that the reversion of the petitioners is an act of discrimination, for the affidavit on behalf of the State Government shows that they are really junior-most in the provisional list though they might have in the exceptional circumstances indicated above acted longer as officiating circle inspector than others who have not been reverted.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the charge of discrimination based on the violation of r. 2 ( c) cannot in the special circumstances of this case be\n\nsustained, for it is not in dispute that they were the juniormost according to the provisional list, when the orders of reversion were made.\n\nThe appeals and the writ petitions therefore fail and are hereby dismissed.\n\nIn the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs.\n\nAppeals and petitions dismissed.\n\n1!164\n\nG. !J. iimOiW•\"'J\n\nPolk1, Mysor•.\n\nW•nclloo /,", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 45, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr Ghose, however, ."}}, {"text": "s 1964", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 92, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manoharlal Seth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 502, "end_char": 517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is difficult to appreciate how the appellant's deten- Mudholkar I. tion could be said to be illegal because it was in pursuance of the investigation of the complaint lodged by Manoharlal Seth that he was arrested and brought for interrogation before the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Manoharlal Seth"}}, {"text": "Manoharlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 646, "end_char": 656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not disputed before us that investigation into Manoharlal's complaint had been ordered though there is a dispute as to whether it was ordered by the respondent or by the Deputy Commissioner of Police.", "canonical_name": "Manoharlal Seth"}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1194, "end_char": 1199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. RAMASWAMY & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1359, "end_char": 1377, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G.S.RAMASWAMY & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1390, "end_char": 1425, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, MYSORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1428, "end_char": 1448, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1450, "end_char": 1463, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1476, "end_char": 1485, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1486, "end_char": 1493, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1498, "end_char": 1520, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "larumry", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1843, "end_char": 1850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "larumry.,"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2186, "end_char": 2195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On account of the merger of certain areas of the former State of Hyderabad into Mysore petitioners\n\n..,.ere transferred to Mysore."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2201, "end_char": 2207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On account of the merger of certain areas of the former State of Hyderabad into Mysore petitioners\n\n..,.ere transferred to Mysore."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2660, "end_char": 2677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When tha( happened, the petitioners filed writ petitions in the Mysore High Court in which they claimed that as they bad been put in the e1igilibity list by the former Hyderabad State, they were entitled u of right to promotion as Circle Inspectors and to Continue as such thereafter and the order of their reversion amounted to reduction in rank."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6110, "end_char": 6120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6128, "end_char": 6149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6194, "end_char": 6214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and R. Gopa/akrislman, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6219, "end_char": 6226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and R. Gopa/akrislman, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gup1e", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6434, "end_char": 6445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gup1e, Additional Solicitor General."}}, {"text": "B. R. L.\n\nIyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6477, "end_char": 6494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L.\n\nIyengar and B. R. G. K. A char, for the res>pondent (In C.A.\n\nNos.", "canonical_name": "B. R. L.\n\nIyengar"}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. A char", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6499, "end_char": 6517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L.\n\nIyengar and B. R. G. K. A char, for the res>pondent (In C.A.\n\nNos.", "canonical_name": "B. R. G. K. A char"}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6617, "end_char": 6633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent (in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "B. R. L.\n\nIyengar"}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6638, "end_char": 6655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent (in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "B. R. G. K. A char"}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6781, "end_char": 6788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO J.-These appeals and writ pe!Itlons raise common questions and will be dealt with together.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "G. s. Ramaswamy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7026, "end_char": 7041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 High Court and six of the writ petitions filed in this Court\n\nG. s. Ramaswamy are by the same petitioners who applied in the Mysore High v.\n\nCourt.", "canonical_name": "G. s. Ramaswamy"}}, {"text": "Mysore High v.\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7089, "end_char": 7110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 High Court and six of the writ petitions filed in this Court\n\nG. s. Ramaswamy are by the same petitioners who applied in the Mysore High v.\n\nCourt."}}, {"text": "Wtiltchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7294, "end_char": 7303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also filed writ petJ'tions in the High Court, though they have not filed appeals from the Wtiltchoo J. decision of the High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7529, "end_char": 7533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7560, "end_char": 7570, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7663, "end_char": 7686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under r. 399 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual, issued by the Government of Hyderabad under s. 10 of the Hyderabad Distncc Police Act, posts of circle inspectors were to be filled by promotion from tile rank of sub-inspectors."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7693, "end_char": 7698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7724, "end_char": 7734, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8690, "end_char": 8715, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November, 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8757, "end_char": 8774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXXVII of 1956) came into force on November, 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "On the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8976, "end_char": 9033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9068, "end_char": 9074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, certain areas from the States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madras and the whole of Coarg were made part of the new State of Mysore in addition to the existing State of Mysore."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9087, "end_char": 9093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, certain areas from the States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madras and the whole of Coarg were made part of the new State of Mysore in addition to the existing State of Mysore."}}, {"text": "Coarg", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9111, "end_char": 9116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, certain areas from the States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madras and the whole of Coarg were made part of the new State of Mysore in addition to the existing State of Mysore."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9510, "end_char": 9516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act", "statute": "On the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act"}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9524, "end_char": 9549, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10224, "end_char": 10242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sec tion 115 further provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day (name1y, November l, 1956) shall not be varied to the disadvantage of any person transferred to the new State except with tne prcviom, approval of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10245, "end_char": 10256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10674, "end_char": 10690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 116 ( 1) provided for the continuance of public servants in the same posts; bnt sub-s. (2) thereof laid down that no; hing in sub-s. (I) shall prevent a competent authority aftc:· the appointed day from passing in relation to any such person any order affecting his continuance in such post or\n\noffice, thereby recognising the right of the succes>or State inter :ilia to transfer officers anywhere in the new State after November 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "N ovember l, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10867, "end_char": 10884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners continued to serve in the new State and as they were in the eligibility list referred to above they were promoted as circle inspectors on various dates after N ovember l, 1956."}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11046, "end_char": 11071, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "J. G. Polict", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11713, "end_char": 11725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears further that the petitioners were ordered to be reverted when certain confinned circle inspector~ who were on leave or on deputation outside the State\n\nJ. G. Polict,\n\nMysore\n\nWanchoo /.\n\n1964 returned to the new State."}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13104, "end_char": 13129, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16640, "end_char": 16647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wanchoo J.\n\n1964 The High Court accepted the contentions raised on\n\nG. s. omy behalf of the State and dismissed the petitions.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "G. s. Ramaswamy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21607, "end_char": 21622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-~\n\n288 SUPREMk COURT REPORTS [rg64)\n\n~ It has further been urged on the basis of r. 486 that as G. s. Ramaswamy the petitioners had worked for more than two vears on\n\n1• a. •r.", "canonical_name": "G. s. Ramaswamy"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27263, "end_char": 27269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27282, "end_char": 27307, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31105, "end_char": 31112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nIi I\n\nt~ already set out above that the new State of Mysore was G .. s. &;;;;;, swamy formed of the territories of the old State of Mysore ; md the\n\nI G 0 1."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31571, "end_char": 31577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November I, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31762, "end_char": 31778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That matter had to take time and therefore in the interest of administration ad hoc promotions continued to be m1de by the new State of Mysore after November I, 1956."}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34047, "end_char": 34072, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_294_301_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n1'64\n\nK. KANKARATHNAMMA AND OTIIERS ,.,._,, Zl\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTIIBRS\n\n(K. SuBBA RA<> AND J. R. MuoHOLKAR)\n\nLand Acquisition Act. 1894 (1 of 1894), s. 18(1)(2)-No reference to\n\nCourt on the queJtion of quantum of compensation-Court if competent to deal with such matter-No objection to the proceeding1 before the court by the State-Defect if deemed to be waived.\n\nOn a dispute with regard to the entitlement to the compensation awarded to the appellants in respect of certain land acquired by the State, the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference to the court for the apportion ment of the compensation amount among the various claimants.\n\nSix of the appellants did not accept the award of the Land Acquisition Officer and made applications to him for referring the matter, for determination by the court. No reference was made by him in pursuance of these appli catiolls When the matter came up before the Court it proceeded on the footing that the reference made to it was not merely limited to the appor tionment of compensation but also with respect to the amount of compensation.\n\nNo objection was raised by the State before the Subordinato Judge that in the absence of any reference upon the applications of six of the appellants the Court was incompetent to deal with that matter.\n\nWhen the matter went up in appeal before the High Court, the Government Pleader raised the question that in the absence of a reference on the question of quantum of compensation, the Court had no jurisdiction to consider that matter at all. The High Court, allowed this plea to be raised before it but ultimately negatived it. and it also modified the finding of the Court as to the amount of compensation. The appellants contended before the High Court that by reason of the failure of the 3tate to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge as to the absence of a reference the State must be deemed to have waived the point. The High Court accepted this argument upon the view that this was not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction and that the defect in the procedure was such as could be waived.\n\n llcld: (i) On consideration of the relevant prov1s1ons contained in \".. t~ of t.he J_and Acq1Jisition Act, the jurisdiction of the court arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it. Wherever jurisdiction is given by • statute and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein, it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. Therefore, it was • case of lack of inherc-.t jurisdiction and the failure of the State to ob. feet to the proceedings before the Court on the ground of an absence ol\n\n•cfcrencc in so far as the determination of compensation was concerned cannot amount to waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when there is an absence of 'inherent jurisdiction, the defect cannot be waived nor can be aired by a:quiesccncc.\n\n(ii) Tbe court had no jutisdiction to determine the amount of CO!ll ., ensation and thus go behind the order of the Land Acqui1ition OlllCor.\n\n. Nusserwanjee Pestonjee and others v. Mtet Mynoodeen Khan Wullu4 Mter Subroodeen Khan Bahadur, 6 M.L.A. 134, Alderson v. Pdli•<r and unother, [1901] 2 K.B. 833 and Seth Badri Prasad and 01her8 v. Seth\\ Nagarmal and others, [1959] Supp. (I) S.C.R. 769, relied on.\n\nVenkata Krishnayya Garu v. Secretary of State, A.l.R. 1939 (P.C. 39- 60 M.L.J. 299, distinguished.\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JurusDicTloN: Civil Appeal No. 325 of 1962. '\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated August 4, 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. 489 of 1954 .\n\nK. Rhimsankaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants.\n\np. R'am Reddy, T. V. R. Tatachari and B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar, for respondent No. 1.\n\nJanuary 23, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUDHOLKAR J.-This is an appeal against the judgment Mudlwlw 1. of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which it reduced the am11unt of compensation awarded to the appellants by the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada in respect of certain lands bt:longing to them which were acquired by the State.\n\nThe lands in question are survey Nos. 281/2, 339/1 to 8 and 338/1 to 3 which are situate at a short distance from the town of Vijayawada and lie alongside the Vijayaw ida-Eluru Road. The Land Acquisition Officer had fixed Rs. 3,500 per acre for the first two of 1hese survey Nos. amt Rs. 4.000 per acre for the third survey number.\n\nThe learned Subordinte Judge granted a uniform rate of Rs. 10,000 per acre for the lands comprised in all the survey numbC?rs.\n\nThere were some disputes with regard to\n\n!91-1 the entitlement to the compe.nsation for survey No. 339/1 K. KDn, karatli to 3 a11d the Land Acquisition Officer, therefore, made a , .. .i.ma reference to the Court for the apportionment of the com- . Stal~. ~I Andhra pensation amount among the various claimants. Six of the\n\nPraduh appellants did not accept the award of the Land Acquisi- M•halkar J. lion Officer and made applications in writing to him within the time allowed by Jaw for. referring the matter for deter- \"mination of the court. It is common ground that no reference was made by the Land Acquisition Officer in pursuance of these applications. When the matter came up before th<> Court it proceeded on the footing that the reference made to it by the Land Acquisition Officer was not merely limited to the apportionment of compensation but was also with respect to the amount of compensation. No objection w~,\n\nhowever, raised on behalf of the State that in the absence of any reference upon the applications of six of the appellants the Court was incompetent to deal with that niatter. . ... , When the matter went up before the High Court by way of an appeal from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, the Government pleader raised the question that in the absenr.e of a reference on the question of quantum of compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer, the Court had no jurisdiction to consider that matter at all.\n\nThe High Court, though it ultimately reversed the finding of the court as to the amount of compensation, unfortunately allowed the plea to be raised before it but ultimately upon a consideration of certain decisions, negatived it.\n\nWe say unfortunately because this is not a kind of plea which the State ought at all to have taken. Quite clearly applications objecting to th!( rates at which compensation was allowed were taken in time by persons interested in the lands which were under acquisition and it was no fault of theirs that a reference was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer.\n\nIndeed, whenever applications are made under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference unless there is a valid ground for rejecting the applications such as for instance that the applications wer~\n\nbarred by time. Where an officer of the State is remiss in tl\\e performance of his duties in fairness the State ought not to take advantage of this fact.\n\nWe are further of th•\n\n1964 .opinion that the High Court, after the plea had been raised, would have been well-advised to adjourn the matter for enabling the appellants before us, who were res_; iondents in the High Court, to take appropriate steps for compelling the La,1d Acquisition Officer to make a reference.\n\nK. K.ankaralJi.\n\nState of .A.ndhro\n\nPradesh\n\nAll the same since the point was permitted to be urged before it by the High Court and has been raised before us on behalf of the State it is necessary to decide it On behalf of the appellants it was contended before . the High Court that by reason of the failure of the State to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge as to the absence of a reference the State must be deemed to have waived the point.\n\nThe High Court accepted this argument upon the view that this was not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction and that the defect in the procedure was such as could be waived.\n\nIn our opinion the view of the High Court is not correct.\n\nSection 12( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that after an award is filed in the Col1ector's of!kc it shall. except\n\nas provided in the Act, be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested of the true area znd value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. The only manner in which the finality of the award can be called into question is by resort to the provisions of s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, sub-section (1) of which reads thus:\n\n\"Any person interested who has not accepted th~ award may, by written application to the C0llector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.\"\n\nThe proviso to sub-s. (2) prescribes the time within which an apnlication under sub-s. (l) is to be made. Section 1 !J\n\nprovldes for the making .of a reference by the .colle:tor and i!pCCiiies the metters which are to be comprised m that\n\nMudholkar 1.\n\n196-1 reference.\n\nThus the matter goes to the court only upon a K. Kankarath reference made by the Collector. It is only after such a '\"\"; ma reference is made that the court is empowered to determine State o/ Andhra the objections made by a claimant to the award. Section 21\n\nl'radeih t th f th eed' res nets e scope o e proc mgs before the court to Mlldholkar J. consideration of the contentions of the persons affected by the objection.\n\nThese provisions thus leave no doubt that the jurisdiction of the court arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it.\n\nNo doubt, the Land Acquisition Officer has made a reference under s. 30 . of the Land Acquisition Act but that reference was only in regard to the apportionment of the compensation amongst the varioUJ claimants. Such a reference would certainly not invest the court with the jurisdiction to consider a matter not directly connected with it. This is really not a mere technicality for as pointed out by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pe1tonjee & Ors. v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor(') wherever jurisdiction is given by a statute and such jurisdiction .is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. This was, therefore, a case of Jack of inherent jurisdiction and the failure of the s•atc to object to the proceedings before the court on the ground of an absence of reference in so far as the determin1tion of compensation was concerned cannot amount to waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when there is an absence of inherent jurisdiction, the defect cannot be waived nor can be cured by acquiescence.\n\nJn Alderson v. Palliser & A nr. ( 2 ) the Court of Apoeal held that where the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings. it cannot be waived.\n\nIn Seth Badri Prasad & Ors. v. Se h Nngarmal and Ors.(\") this Court has held that even the bar of illegality of a transaction though not pleaded in the courts below can be allowed to be pleaded in this Court if it appears on the face of the pleading in\n\n(') 6 M. !. A. 134 at 155. (')\n\n(1901) 2 K. B. 833. (') [ 19591 Supp. (1) s.c.R. 169.\n\nthe case. The High Court has, however, based itself largely upon a decision of the Privy Council in Venkata Krishnayya Garu v. Secreiary of State(').\n\nIn that case there was in fact a reference by the Collector to the court but that reference was made by the Collector not upon the application of the person legally entitled to compensation but by a person whose claim to ownership of property had failed before the civil court but who was still a party to the land acquisition proceedings.\n\nIn our opinion that decision is distinguishable on the short ground that whereas here there is no reference at all by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer, in that case the Collector had made a reference though in making it he had committed an error of Jaw in that he acted upon the application of a -person who had been found to have no interest in the land. Disagreeing with the High Court we, therefore, hold that the Court had no jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensa•ion and thus go behind the order of the Land Acquisition Officer.\n\nUpon this short ground tlie appeal must be dismissed.\n\nWe have, however, heard Mr. Bhimasankaram on merits and in our opinion there are no substantial grounds which would jus•ify interference with the conclusions arrived by the High Court.\n\nFor determining the amount of compensation seven sale deeds were filed, Exs. Al to A4, on behalf of the State and Bl to B3 on behalf of the anpellnnts.\n\nA synopsis of the sale deeds has been made by the High Court in i•s judgment and we can do no better than to reproduce it: --- ·-----\n\nSt. Exhi- Date E\"<t~1.t of AmJun.t Rate per Proximity of the No. bit land acre site acquired Acs. cts.\n\nRs.\n\nRs.\n\nA-1 15-z-46 0-40} 1,750 4,240 Opposite to the uit }and and abutt1ng the main road,\n\nA-2 25-8-46 0-651 2,500 3,800 Some distnce away\n\nfrom the site of the acquired land ti>- wards Eluru.\n\n(')A. I. R. 1939 P, C. 39; 6o M. L. J. 399,\n\nIP64\n\n1'.. Link.,.,,..\n\nlillllHilU\n\n•• Sta11 of A.tt4/w\n\nl'rodull\n\n/(, Lnkarallt-\n\n1iammo ...\n\nStal• of Andhra\n\nPrade1b\n\nMudho/kar J.\n\nA-3 9-10-46 1-00 4, Soo 4,500 Very near the acquired land the same vendee.\n\nA-4 !)-10-46\n\nIOO 4,500 . 4,500 Part of the same site,\n\nand the vendee. s.\n\nB-1 14-10-46 0-70 7,000 10,000 5 furlongs away from\n\nt;.c suit site and uearer .bezwari.a.\n\nB-2 14\"-41 l-09 Just over 5 furJongs away to- 12,000 12)000 wazd3 Bci; wada.\n\nB-3 24-1-46 0-36 r,850 s, oJO It is a pa.rt and pared of ti:1e ~1:1n1e 1u11d th;, ll is suught to be acqu1red. -----·- ---------- --- --------\n\nOut of these sale deeds Exs. Al and A2 were rejected by the High Court, Al on the ground that it is several months earlier than the date of notification under S 4 of the Act and Ex. A2 on the <; round that the land comprised in it is\n\nsome distance away from the land under acquisition and is\n\n'llso further away from Vijayawada than this land. The High Court similarly rejected Ex. B-2 on the ground that tile transaction was entered into four months after the publication of the notification and on the further ground that it is located in the direction of Vijayawada at a distance of five furlongs from the land acquired.\n\nIt has apparently rejected also Ex. B3, though the land sold thereunder is a part and parcel of the same land which is sought to be acquired.\n\nThe ground appears to be that the land sold thereunder is 011ly 36 cents in area. It has accepted Exs. A3 and A4 and on that basis awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 4,500 per acre for all these Jami>.\n\nIn so far a~ Ex. B 1 is concerned the High Court ha5 taken the view that thou,; h it bears the date of October 14, 1946 the cir-.\n\ncumstancs tlwt :t was actually registered on February 13, I 94 7 and som~ of the stamp papers used were in the names of persom unconnected with the transaction shows that it has rea'ly been ante-dated so as to make it appear to be\n\nearlir io point of time than the notification.\n\nIn our opinion what the High Court has said about these three exhibit~. Bl, B2 and B3, sems to have considerable force.\n\nAt any rate we do not think that there are lll1Y substantial grounds upon which we can look at these transact10ns in a different way. If these documents go away, as also Exs. Al and A2, we are left with only Exs.\n\nA3 and A4. Some argument was advanced before us to the effect that the lands comprised in the transactions repre- !iented by these documents have no direct access to tne road and that, therefore, they could not have fetched a good price.\n\nBearing in mind the fact that these are all agricultural lands a rate of Rs. 4,500 per acre at which they were sold cannot prima facie be regarded as inadequate.\n\nAs regards access, it is sufficient to say that they are parts of the same field which abut on the road, though the portions sold do not themselves abut on the road.\n\nSince the lamls :;:; Id under these sale deeds were part and parcel of the same field which abuts on the road those who purchased these lands would naturally obtain a right of way\n\nover the land unsold so as to have access to the road.\n\nIn the circumstances we hold that the appeal is without substance. Accordingly we dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nRANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF\n\nDHENKENAL\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, I. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)\n\nConJtitutio11 of India, 1950, Arts, 14 and 366(22)-0rissa Private Landr\n\nof Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act (13 of 1958), 11. 5 and 6- Validity-''Rulet', meaning of.\n\nThe petitioners in these three writ petitions challenged the operative provisions of the OrisSa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act, 1958 and the Rules framed thereunder. These petitioncro posses•\n\nl9M\n\nK. Kllllkarath-\n\n...\n\nStilt< of Andhra Pradesh\n\nMudhalkar I.\n\nlan•Vf, 11", "total_entities": 31, "entities": [{"text": "64\n\nK. KANKARATHNAMMA AND OTIIERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. KANKARATHNAMMA AND OTIIERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Zl\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTIIBRS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18(1)(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "K. Rhimsankaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3736, "end_char": 3751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rhimsankaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3756, "end_char": 3773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rhimsankaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "p. R'am Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. R'am Reddy, T. V. R. Tatachari and B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "T. V. R. Tatachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3811, "end_char": 3829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. R'am Reddy, T. V. R. Tatachari and B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3834, "end_char": 3852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. R'am Reddy, T. V. R. Tatachari and B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUDHOLKAR J.-This is an appeal against the judgment Mudlwlw 1."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4010, "end_char": 4038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which it reduced the am11unt of compensation awarded to the appellants by the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada in respect of certain lands bt:longing to them which were acquired by the State."}}, {"text": "Vijayawada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4358, "end_char": 4368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "281/2, 339/1 to 8 and 338/1 to 3 which are situate at a short distance from the town of Vijayawada and lie alongside the Vijayaw ida-Eluru Road."}}, {"text": "Praduh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5017, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Six of the\n\nPraduh appellants did not accept the award of the Land Acquisi- M•halkar J. lion Officer and made applications in writing to him within the time allowed by Jaw for."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6771, "end_char": 6776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. K.ankaralJi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7455, "end_char": 7469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K.ankaralJi.", "canonical_name": "K. KANKARATHNAMMA"}}, {"text": "State of .A.ndhro\n\nPradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7472, "end_char": 7498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of .A.ndhro\n\nPradesh\n\nAll the same since the point was permitted to be urged before it by the High Court and has been raised before us on behalf of the State it is necessary to decide it On behalf of the appellants it was contended before ."}}, {"text": "Section 12( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8145, "end_char": 8159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8602, "end_char": 8607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9167, "end_char": 9176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Kankarath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9378, "end_char": 9390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus the matter goes to the court only upon a K. Kankarath reference made by the Collector.", "canonical_name": "K. KANKARATHNAMMA"}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9579, "end_char": 9589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mlldholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9665, "end_char": 9675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 21\n\nl'radeih t th f th eed' res nets e scope o e proc mgs before the court to Mlldholkar J. consideration of the contentions of the persons affected by the objection."}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9948, "end_char": 9953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhimasankaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12747, "end_char": 12760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have, however, heard Mr. Bhimasankaram on merits and in our opinion there are no substantial grounds which would jus•ify interference with the conclusions arrived by the High Court."}}, {"text": "S 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14299, "end_char": 14302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16873, "end_char": 16893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF\n\nDHENKENAL\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, I. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16896, "end_char": 16909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF\n\nDHENKENAL\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, I. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16911, "end_char": 16926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF\n\nDHENKENAL\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, I. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "I. c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16928, "end_char": 16938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF\n\nDHENKENAL\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, I. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16943, "end_char": 16965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF\n\nDHENKENAL\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, I. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "Private Landr\n\nof Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17030, "end_char": 17052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_301_312_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 301\n\nderable force.\n\nAt any rate we do not think that there are lll1Y substantial grounds upon which we can look at these transact10ns in a different way. If these documents go away, as also Exs. Al and A2, we are left with only Exs.\n\nA3 and A4. Some argument was advanced before us to the effect that the lands comprised in the transactions repre- !iented by these documents have no direct access to tne road and that, therefore, they could not have fetched a good price.\n\nBearing in mind the fact that these are all agricultural lands a rate of Rs. 4,500 per acre at which they were sold cannot prima facie be regarded as inadequate.\n\nAs regards access, it is sufficient to say that they are parts of the same field which abut on the road, though the portions sold do not themselves abut on the road.\n\nSince the lamls :;:; Id under these sale deeds were part and parcel of the same field which abuts on the road those who purchased these lands would naturally obtain a right of way\n\nover the land unsold so as to have access to the road.\n\nIn the circumstances we hold that the appeal is without substance. Accordingly we dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nRANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF\n\nDHENKENAL\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, I. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)\n\nConJtitutio11 of India, 1950, Arts, 14 and 366(22)-0rissa Private Landr\n\nof Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act (13 of 1958), 11. 5 and 6- Validity-''Rulet', meaning of.\n\nThe petitioners in these three writ petitions challenged the operative provisions of the OrisSa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act, 1958 and the Rules framed thereunder. These petitioncro posses•\n\nl9M\n\nK. Kllllkarath-\n\n...\n\nStilt< of Andhra Pradesh\n\nMudhalkar I.\n\nlan•Vf, 11\n\n1964 private lands in the State of Orissa, which before the impugned Act were Rani - not subjected to the payment of rent. but which were assessed by the 1:):., n;-ovo Revenue Officers in conformity with the Rules framed under the Act. The\n\n-,. petitioners claims a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the said orders Stott o/ on.a of assessment. The Act was passed by the Orissa Legislature because it was thought expedient to provide for assessment of rent with respect to the private lands of Rulers in the State of Orissa.\n\nThe main object of the Act is to authorise the levy of rent 1n respect of the private lands of persons included in the definition of the word \"Ruler\"' prescribed by s. 2(h l of the Act. Section 2(h) defines a \"'Ruler\" as meaning the Ruler of a merged territory in the State of Orissa and includes his relatives and dependants. The petitioners attacked the provisions of the Act mainly on the ground that they contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nHeld: (i) that s. 6 of the Act does not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution for the reason that fair and equitable tests have been laid down under s. 6 of the Act for determining the rent which should be assess ed in respect of the private lands of the Rulers. In the present case the legislature had prescribed the method of determining the rent payable on the private lands; and the relevant factors specified by s. 6 appear to be just and substantially simiJar to the considerations which are generally taken into account at the time of survey settlement for determining the proper revenue assessment on ryotwari lands.\n\nThe problem posed by the requirement to levy assessment on these private lands had to be dealt with by the legislature on an ad ,\\oc basis.\n\nThe settlement of rent and assessment introduced by the Act had been made applicable to these lands for the first time, and so, these lands could not be treated as comparable in every respect with the lands which were governed by the rates prescribed under the previous !\\ettlement.\n\n(ii) In considering the validity of a statute under Art. 14 the well~ established principle is that the legislature can make class legislation, provided the classification on which it purports to be based is rational and has a reasonable nexus with the object intended to be achieved by it. If the party fails to show that the said classification is irrational, or has no nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the impugned Act, the initial presumption of constitutionality would help the State to urge that the failure of the party challenging the validity to rebut the initial presum ptiori goes against his claim that the Act is invalid.\n\nIn all oases where the material adduced before the court in matten relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the court may have to allow tho State to lean on the initial presumption of constitutionality.\n\n(iii) There is no substance in the contention that the impugned Act is void because the definition of the word \"Ruler\" is inconsistent with Art. 366(22) of the Constitution. There is no doubt that the definition of the word \"Ruler\" prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act is wider than that prescribed by Art. 366(22) of the Constitution.\n\nThe definitions prescribed by Art. 366 are intended for the purpose of 1964 interpreting the articles in the Constitution itself. unless the context other- R .\n\nRatnapTDN wise requires. The whole object of defining the word \"Ruler\" in the Act ani Del'l ia to specify and describe the lands in respect of which the operative pro- T.\n\nYisions of the Act would come into play.\n\nIt is in that connection that State of Orilla the word \"Ruler\" has been broadly defined in an inclusive manner.\n\n(iv) The impugned Act is entirely outside the purview of Art. 31 of the Constitution as it has not purported either to deprive the Rulers of their property, or to acquire or requisition the said property. It is a simple measure authorising the levy of a tax in respect of agricultural lands.\n\nPratap Kesari Deo v. The State of Orirsa, A.I.R. 1961 Orissa 13J. relied on.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 79 and 80 of 1963 and 140 of 1962.\n\nPetitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nS. N. Andley, Rameshawar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner (in Petition Nos. 79 and 80 of 1963).\n\nSarjoo Prasad, Ajoy Kumar Gajdhar Mahapatra and A.. D. Mathur for the petitioner (in Petition No. 140/1962).\n\nS. V. Gupte Additional Solicitor-General, S. B. Misra, R. Ganapathi Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the petitions).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, J. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and\n\n0. C. Mathur, for the interveners (in Petition No. 140/\n\n1962).\n\nJanuary 23,\n\n1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR J.-The pellt1oners in these three Ga1••dragadkar I. petitions have moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution and claimed a declaration that the operative provisions of the Orissa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act. 1958 (hereinafter called 'the Act') and the Rules framed thereunder are unconstitutional and ultra vires.\n\nThe private lands in the possession and enjoyment of the three respective petitioners have been assessed by the\n\nRevenu~ Officers in conformity with the Rules framed under the Act. The petitioners claim a writ or direction, or order\n\n1964 in the nature of certiorari quashing the said orders of assess- &ni aprova ment.\n\nvi The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 140/1962 is the Stat• of Ori\"a Patrani Saheba of Keonjhar and is in possession and enjoy-\n\nGaf•ndkar J. ment of eght villages, viz., Mangalpur; Barigan; N'.la Rampas; NI!ung; Ghutru; Mohadijore; Patang and Anara in the district of Keonjhar.\n\nThese villages were granted to her for maintenance a long time ago and as such, they have been recorded in the village papers as Khoraki Posaki\n\n(Maintenance Grant) Lands since the last settlement of 1918.\n\nShe has held these lands without paying assessment; and her case is that the rekvant provisions of the Act which authorise the levy of assessment in respect of her lands are unconstitutional and invalid.\n\nIn her petition, she has referred to the fact that from time to time, the Government of the day had refrained from levying any assessment in respect of her lands and thereby recognised her right to hold the said villages on assessment-free basis.\n\nThe Revenue Officer of Keonjhar levied an assessment in respect of the said villages purporting to act under the Rules framed under the provisions of the Act. The petitioner then preferred appeals to the Board of Revenue against the said assessment orders but these appeals were dismissed.\n\nThe assessment levied against the petitioner in respect of these rands is of the order of Rs. 9,000 and odd and it has to be paid by her from 1958 retrospectively.\n\nThe petitioner in W .P. No. 79 /1963 is Smt. Rani Raina Prova Devi who is the wife of Raja Sankar Pratap Singh Deo Mahindra Bahadur, ex-Ruler of Dhenkanal State in Orissa.\n\nAt the time when the State of Dhenkanal merged with India, the petitioner was in possession and enjoyment of lands in five villages as a Qroprietor. In respect of these lands, assessment had never been levied; but purporting to give. effect to the relevant provisions of the Act, the Revonue Officer Dhenkanal assessed rent in respect of all the lands which are in possession and enjoyment of the petitioner. The appeals preferred by the petitioner against the said order of assessment failed; and so, the petitioner filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of the Act as well as the validity of the assessment order.\n\nThe petitioner in W.P. No. 80 of 1963 is the ex-Ruler lf611 of Dhenkanal.\n\nOn the date of merger he held and was in Rani Rlltnaprovo possession of 89 acres 18 dee. and 5 kadis of land in Niz- Devi garh Town as his private lands.\n\nThese lands were never state !i Orln4 subjected to the payment of rent and yet the Revenue Offi- . - cers assessed rents in respect of these lands under _ the Gai•ndrapdkar 1\n\nprovisions of the Act.\n\nThe petitioner failed in persuading the Appellate Authority to set aside the order of assessment, and so, has filed the present writ petition challenging the validity of the Act and the order of assessment.\n\nThus, the facts on which the three petitions claim relief are substantially 5imilar and they have raised common points of law for our decision.\n\nThat is why the three petitions have been heard together and would be disposed of by a common judgment.\n\nThe Act which is challenged in the present proceedings was passed by the Orissa Legislature because \"it was thought expedient to provide for assessment of rent with respect to the private lands of Rulers in the State of Orissa\".\n\nIt received the assent of the Governor on the 21st Mav, 1958 and was published in the State Gazette on the 6th Iune, 1958. It consists of 15 sections and the main object of the Act is to authorise the levy of rent in respect of the private lands of persons included in the definition of the word \"Ruler\" prescribed by s. 2 ( h) of the Act. Section 2 ( e) defines 'private land' as meaning any land held on the date of merger by a Ruler free from payment of rent, while s. 2(h) defines a \"Ruler\" as meaning the Ruler of a merged territory in the State of Orissa and include~ his relatives and dependants. Thus, the definition of the word \"Ruler\" is an inclusive definition and takes within its sweep the relatives of the Ruler and his dependants, with the result that private lands held by such relatives or dependants by virtue of the grants made by the ruling_ Prince ?~ otherwise come within the mischief of the operative prov1s1ns of the Act.\n\nSection 2(i) provides that all other expressions. used and not defined in the Act shall have the same meanmg as are resi; iectively assigned to them under the tenancy laws in force in the concerned areas.\n\nSection 3 contaim he main operative provision and it lays down that notwlth\n\n134-159 S.C.-20\n\n~ standing anything contained in any other law, custon::, con- Rani Ratnaprova tract or agreement to the contrary, the private lands neJ<l\n\nD.vl by a Ruler shall, with effect from the date of commence- State i Orl.\"a men! of this Act, be liable to assessment and levy of rent\n\n0 ,.1, ndragadkar J. s provid.ed in the Act.\n\nThus, the effect of this provision is that pnvate lands held by Rulers which till then were not liable to pay rent or assessment, were made liable to pay the same.\n\nIn other words the exemption from the payment of assessment or rent which the private lands of Rulers enjoyed till then ceased to be operative, and the said !ands were treated like other lands in the State liable to pay assessment and rent.\n\nSection 4 provides for the appointment of Revenue Officers, and sections 5 and 6 deal with the classification of lands and prescribe the maximum rates of rent, and the procedure in detennining the rent respective; y. Under s. 5, the lands have to be classified as irripted-wet land, rainfed-wet land, and dry land; this section provides that subject to the provisions of s. 6, the rates at which the fair and equitable rent shall be assessed with respect to the said th re.~ cRl c.cries of land shall not exceed the amount as may be prescribed from time to time by the State Government.\n\nThe proviso to s. 5 deals with the special category of cases where the tenants of the Ruler have already acquired rights of occupncy, and lays down that the rent payable by the Ruler in respect of such lands shall be such proportion of the rent received by him from the tenants as may be prescribed. Under s. 6, the consideratiu:i< which have to be borne in minJ in cietermining the rates of fair r.nd eqt!itaole rent are specified by clauses (a) to ( e), viz., the nature of the soil and general productivity of such land; the class under which the land is assessable; market value of the land; the prevailing rates of rent obtaining for similar Janda in the neighbourhood; and such other matters relating thereto as may be prescribed. It is thus clear that whereas s. 5 requires the classification of the Ruler's private lands to be made and provides for the prescription of the maximum of the rent which may be levied in respect of them, s. 6 indicates the factors which have to be borne in mind in determining the rates of fair and equitable rent. Clause (e)\n\nshows that in addition to the factors mentioned in clauses 1964\n\n(a) to (d), other matters may also be specified by the Rules. Rani Ratnaprova The rest of the sections deal with matters relating to tho Devi levy and recovery of assessment with which we are not Stat• !; Orina concerned in the present petitions.\n\nGai•ndragadk., J.\n\nThe first contention which has been raised before us by the petitioners is that the provisions contained in sections 5 and 6 are invalid inasmuch as they contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is convenient to refer to some facts set out in W.P. No. 79/1963 in support of this argument.\n\nWe have already noticed that under s. 6 certain considerations which the Act considers to be relevant have been prescribed, and so, the Revenue Officer has to bear those considerations in mind in determining the fair and equitable rent in respect of a given land.\n\nW.P. No. 79/1963 points out that as a result of the consideration of the relevant factors mentioned in s. 6, the rates fixed by the reliminary pattas in respect of the petitioner's lands are in every case higher than the rates of rent which are in operation in respect of the Revisional Settlement Khatian. Basing themselves on the fact that in the calculation of the rent made by L'ie Revenue Officers in respect of the private lands of Rulers they have arrived at a figure of rent which is generally higher than the rent which would be determined in case the rates current under the Settlement prevailing in respect of the other lands were applied, the petitioners contend that in their operation the relevant provisions of the Act have introduced an illegal discrimination as between their lands and the other lands liable to assessment of rent in the State of Orissa. It is also, urged in support of this argument that it would not be a\\valid consideration for levying higher assessment in respect of the private lands of Rulern that they were not required to pay assessment until the Act was passed. The legislature may in its authority make the private lands of Rulers liable to assessment of rent, but when these lands are brought within the class of assessable lands, they should be treated in the same way as the other assessable lands are treated in Orissa. That, briefly stated, is the contention on which the validity of the\n\nct is challenged under Art. 14. Prima facie, there is\n\n1164 some force in this contention.\n\nBut, on the whole we arc llmti R;;;;.,, prova not satisfied that the plea thus raised by the petitioners can\n\n!Nvi be said to di; place and rebut the initial presumption of con- \"· Slid• of Orina stitutionality in favour of the impugned Ftatute.\n\nGn4r•f0dkor J.\n\nIn dealing with tl•e question raised before UF it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that in regard to other assessable lands, a survey settlement which had already been made was in operation and was expected to continue in operation for a certain specified period; usually, when a settlement has been made and assessment levied in pursuance of it, it cannot be revised merely by an executive order during the stipulated period, though, of course, the legislature can, if it so desires, make a law prescribing for a fresh assessment even during the said specified period.\n\nBut, in the present case, the legislature appears to have taken the view that it was not necessary or expedient to introduce a fresh • settlement in regard to all the other assessable lands, and so, it has passed the present statute only in regard to the private lands of Rulers.\n\nThat is one relevant and historical fact which cannot be ignored. •\n\nProceeding to deal with the private lands of Rulers on this basis, the legislature had to prescribe the method of determining the rent payable by the said lands; and the relevant factors specified by s. 6 ap; iear to be just and subtan tially similar to te considerations which are generally taken into account at the time of survey settlement for determining the proper revenue assessment on ryotwari lands.\n\nThere has been some argument at the Bar before us as to whether the market value of the land which has been prescribed as a relevant consideration by s. 6 was also treated as relevant on the occasion of the earlier settlement.\n\nNo material has, however, been placed before us in that behalf, and so, it is not possible to decide whether this consideration was taken into account on the earlier occasion or not, and if it was not, what the effect of the said circumstance would be on the validity of the impugned statute.\n\nHaving regard to the relevant factors presi; ribed by s. 6, it would, however, not be unreasonable to take the view that fair and equitable tests have been Iaici down for determin~\n\ning the rent which should be assessed in respect of the private lands of the Rulers, aPd in the absence of any proof Ralfi 11atna,_ that there has been a material departure in that behalf, we Dttll find it difficult to uphold the plea that s. 6 can be attacked llal• !i <>ru. on the ground that it has contravened Art. 14 of the Con- Gajendraiodkar I.\n\nstitution.\n\nThe problem posed by the requirement to levy assessment on these private lands had to be dealt with by the legislature on an ad hoc basis. The settlement of rent and assessment introduced by the Act had been made applicable to these lands for the first time, and so, strictly speaking, these lands cannot be treated as comparable in every respect with the lands which ere governed by the rates prescribed under the previous settlement and that may help to meet the argument that the impugned Act contravenes Art.\n\n14. If the two categories of lands do not constitute similar lands in all particulars, no valid complaint can be made on the ground that there has been discrimination as between them. That is another aspect which may be relevant.\n\nThere is yet another factor which may be mentioned in this connection. It appears that in 1959, the Orissa Legislature has passed an Act, No. 3 of 1959 with a view to conolidate and amend the Jaws relating to survey, record of rights and settlement operations in the State of Orissa, and so, it appears that after the settlement operations are duly conductea and completed under the relevant provisions of this latter Act, assessment in regard to all the assessable lands, including the private lands with which we are concerned in the present proceedings would be made on the basis precribed by it.\n\nThe operation of sections 3, 5 and 6 of the impugned Act is, therefore, limited to the period\n\nlletween June, 1958 when the Act came into force and the date when the assessment determined under the provisions of the subsequent Act actually come into operation in respect of all the lands. That is another factor which has to be considered in dealing with the question about the validity of the impugned Act.\n\nThe allegations made by the petitioners, in challonginc the validity of the Act are somewhat vague and the mate-\n\n!!!!,. rials placed by them in support of their challenge are inltJJlli RatMprova sufficient, inadequate and unsatisfactory.\n\nThe rerly made\n\n~:•' by t?e State is also not very helpful or satisfactory.\n\nIt is State of Ori61a precisely where a challenge to the validity of a statute is\n\nG•iendratadkar J. mae by a paty under Article 14 and he fails to adduce satisfactory evidence in support of his challenge that the task of the Court to decide the issue becomes very difficult.\n\nIn considering the validity of a statute under Art. 14, we cannot ignore the well-established principle that the legislature can make class legislation, provided the classification on which it purports to be based is rational :; nd has a reasonable nexus with the object intended to be achieved by it, and so, on the failure of the party to show that the said classification is irrational, or has no nexus with the obiect intended to be achieved by the impugned Act, the initial presumption of constitutionality would help the State to urge that the failure of the party challenging the validity to rebut the 'initial presumption goes against his claim that the Act is invalid. In all cases where the material adduced before the Court in matters relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the Court may have to allow the State to lean on the doctrine of initial presumption of constitutionality and that is precisely what has happened in these cases. On the whole therefore we must hold that the petitioners have failed to show that the impugned Act contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is then argued that the Act is invalid because the definition of the expression \"Ruler\" is inconsiste'-1t with the definition of the sai<I word prescribed by Art. 366(22) of the Constitution.\n\nArt. 366(22) defines a \"Ruler\" in relation to an Indian State as meaning the Prince, Chief, or other person by whom any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (1) of Art. 291 was entered into and who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the successor of such Ruler. There is no doubt that the definition of the word \" Ruler\" prescribed by s. 2(h) of the Act is wider thaa that prescribed by Art. 366(22). The dependants of the Ruler and his relatives not included in the latter defini..\n\ntion, though they are expressly included in the former. But 1964 it must be remern hred that the definitions prescribed by Rani Ratnapron Art. 3 66 are intended for the purpose of interpreting the Devi articles in the Constitution itself, unless the context other- Stat• i ortno wise requires, and so, the argument that the definition of - th d \"R 1 \" 'bed b h A · . h Gai<ndragadkar I. e wor u er prescn y t e ct 1s mcons1stent wit the definition prescribed by Art. 366(22), has really no substance or meaning.\n\nBesides, it is fallacious to assume that the Act ha> made any provision in respect of Rulers as such; what the Act has purported to do is to authorise the levy of assessment and rent in respect of lands situated in Orissa; tese lands are the private lands of the Rulers as defined bys. 2(h), and so, 'there is no doubt ihat the whole object of defining the word \"Ruler\" is to specify and describe the lands in respect of which the operative provisions of the Act would come into play.\n\nThe subject-matter of the levy consists of the private lands and the compendious way adopted by the legislature in describing the said lands is tbat they are the private lands of the Rulers.\n\nIt is in that connection that the word \"Ruler\" has been broadly defined in an inclusive manner.\n\nIf the legislature had said that the private lands of the Rulers as well as the pnvate lands of the dependants and relatives of Rulers were liable to the levy permitted under s. 3, the petitioners would not have been able to raise any objection because, then, it would have been unnecessary to define the word \"Ruler\" in a comprehensive way.\n\nOnce it is conceded, as it must be, that the Orissa Legi, lature was competent to pass the Act under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, it is idle to suggest that the method adopted by the Act in describing the lands which are made liable to pay assessment, introduces any infirmity in the Act itself.\n\nTherefore, we are satisfied that the contention that the definition of the word \"Ruler\" is inconsistent with Art. 366(22) and that makes !he whole Act void, is without any substance.\n\nThe third argument which was faintly urged before us is that the Act contruvenes the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution.\n\nThis argument is wholly misconceived. Art. 31 (I) deals with the deprivation of property save by authe>- rity of Jaw, and cannot obviously be invoked against any\n\n1964 of the provisions of the Act; and Art. 31 (2) deals with Jt4nt RaJn.aprova compulsory acquisition or requisition which also is entirely\n\n1!v• inapplicable to the present Act.\n\nWhat the Act has pur-\n\nS1a11 of Ori\"a ported to do is to authorise the levy of assessment in res-\n\nGoillldraiadkar J. pct of lands which till then had been exempted from the said levy, and as Art. 31{5)(b)(i) provides nothing contain ed in clause (2) shall affect the provisions of any Jaw which the State may make for the purpose of imposing or levying. any tax or penalty. If the Orissa Legislature has imposed a tax in the form of the assessment of the private lands of Rulers, clearly it has not purported either to deprive the Rulers of their property, or to acquire or requisition the said property; it is a simple measure authorising the levy of a tax in respect of agricultural lands and as &uch, it i~ entireiy outside 'the purview of Art. 31.\n\nIt appears that in Pratap Kessari Deo v. The State of Orissa & Ors., ( 1 ) the validity of the Act was challenged before the Orissa High Court, and the said High Court has repelled the challenge and upheld the validity of the Act.\n\nIn our opinion, the view taken by the Orissa High Court is right.\n\nJanuary, U\n\nThe result is. the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne set of hearing fees.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nFADDI\n\nl'.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)\n\nFirst lnformatinn Report by accused--Admi.sibility in Evide11c~-lndia•\n\nEvidenc~ Act. 1872 (1of1872) ss. '.!l, 25-Code of Cri1ninal Pro; tdu'\" 1898 (V of 1898), r. 162.\n\nOn the first information report lodged by th~ appellant, the corpse of his step-son was recovered. The police arrested three oth .... ner<; ons indicated to be the culprits, but as a result of the investigatio11. Lbe arpellant\n\n(') A. I. R. 1961 Orissa, 13!.", "total_entities": 113, "entities": [{"text": "RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF\n\nDHENKENAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1198, "end_char": 1245, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANI RATNA PROVA DEVI RANI SAHEBA OF DHENKENAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1247, "end_char": 1274, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1277, "end_char": 1297, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1300, "end_char": 1313, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1315, "end_char": 1330, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1332, "end_char": 1342, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1347, "end_char": 1369, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Private Landr\n\nof Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1434, "end_char": 1456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Kllllkarath-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1759, "end_char": 1774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These petitioncro posses•\n\nl9M\n\nK. 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GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6733, "end_char": 6740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Officers in conformity with the Rules framed under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7109, "end_char": 7167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Barigan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7492, "end_char": 7499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mangalpur; Barigan; N'.la Rampas; NI!ung; Ghutru; Mohadijore; Patang and Anara in the district of Keonjhar."}}, {"text": "Ghutru", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7523, "end_char": 7529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mangalpur; Barigan; N'.la Rampas; NI!ung; Ghutru; Mohadijore; Patang and Anara in the district of Keonjhar."}}, {"text": "Mohadijore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7531, "end_char": 7541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mangalpur; Barigan; 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"source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rani Raina Prova Devi who is the wife of Raja Sankar Pratap Singh Deo Mahindra Bahadur, ex-Ruler of Dhenkanal State in Orissa."}}, {"text": "Dhenkanal State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8851, "end_char": 8866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rani Raina Prova Devi who is the wife of Raja Sankar Pratap Singh Deo Mahindra Bahadur, ex-Ruler of Dhenkanal State in Orissa."}}, {"text": "State of Dhenkanal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8900, "end_char": 8918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when the State of Dhenkanal merged with India, the petitioner was in possession and enjoyment of lands in five villages as a Qroprietor."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8931, "end_char": 8936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when the State of Dhenkanal merged with India, the petitioner was in possession and enjoyment of lands in five villages as a Qroprietor."}}, {"text": "Dhenkanal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9179, "end_char": 9188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "effect to the relevant provisions of the Act, the Revonue Officer Dhenkanal assessed rent in respect of all the lands which are in possession and enjoyment of the petitioner."}}, {"text": "21st Mav, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10678, "end_char": 10692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It received the assent of the Governor on the 21st Mav, 1958 and was published in the State Gazette on the 6th Iune, 1958."}}, {"text": "6th Iune, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10739, "end_char": 10753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It received the assent of the Governor on the 21st Mav, 1958 and was published in the State Gazette on the 6th Iune, 1958."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10950, "end_char": 10954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10972, "end_char": 10981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11101, "end_char": 11108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11579, "end_char": 11591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11785, "end_char": 11794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ndragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12163, "end_char": 12173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of this Act, be liable to assessment and levy of rent\n\n0 ,.1, ndragadkar J. s provid.ed in the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12609, "end_char": 12618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12673, "end_char": 12689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12832, "end_char": 12836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12980, "end_char": 12984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13212, "end_char": 13216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13503, "end_char": 13507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13964, "end_char": 13968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14138, "end_char": 14142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rani Ratnaprova", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14388, "end_char": 14403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rani Ratnaprova The rest of the sections deal with matters relating to tho Devi levy and recovery of assessment with which we are not Stat• !;", "canonical_name": "Rani Raina Prova Devi"}}, {"text": "Gai•ndragadk", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14574, "end_char": 14586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gai•ndragadk.,"}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14701, "end_char": 14717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14758, "end_char": 14765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14920, "end_char": 14924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15253, "end_char": 15257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Revenue Officers in respect of the private lands of Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15536, "end_char": 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"Art.\n\n14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19856, "end_char": 19864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Orissa Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20193, "end_char": 20211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in 1959, the Orissa Legislature has passed an Act, No."}}, {"text": "sections 3, 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20711, "end_char": 20730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G•iendratadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21503, "end_char": 21517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is State of Ori61a precisely where a challenge to the validity of a statute is\n\nG•iendratadkar J. mae by a paty under Article 14 and he fails to adduce satisfactory evidence in support of his challenge that the task of the Court to decide the issue becomes very difficult."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21541, "end_char": 21551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21744, "end_char": 21751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22455, "end_char": 22462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22755, "end_char": 22762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 366(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22946, "end_char": 22958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the 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Rani Ratnapron Art.", "canonical_name": "Rani Raina Prova Devi"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23744, "end_char": 23750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 366(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24068, "end_char": 24080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25069, "end_char": 25073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25365, "end_char": 25381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 366(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25659, "end_char": 25671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25833, "end_char": 25840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25901, "end_char": 25908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26065, "end_char": 26072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26230, "end_char": 26232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26399, "end_char": 26406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26951, "end_char": 26958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27086, "end_char": 27103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ) the validity of the Act was challenged before the Orissa High Court, and the said High Court has repelled the challenge and upheld the validity of the Act."}}, {"text": "High Court has repelled the challenge and upheld the validity of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27118, "end_char": 27190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27400, "end_char": 27423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27426, "end_char": 27441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27446, "end_char": 27460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_312_321_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1g64J\n\n1964 of the provisions of the Act; and Art. 31 (2) deals with Jt4nt RaJn.aprova compulsory acquisition or requisition which also is entirely\n\n1!v• inapplicable to the present Act.\n\nWhat the Act has pur-\n\nS1a11 of Ori\"a ported to do is to authorise the levy of assessment in res-\n\nGoillldraiadkar J. pct of lands which till then had been exempted from the said levy, and as Art. 31{5)(b)(i) provides nothing contain ed in clause (2) shall affect the provisions of any Jaw which the State may make for the purpose of imposing or levying. any tax or penalty. If the Orissa Legislature has imposed a tax in the form of the assessment of the private lands of Rulers, clearly it has not purported either to deprive the Rulers of their property, or to acquire or requisition the said property; it is a simple measure authorising the levy of a tax in respect of agricultural lands and as &uch, it i~ entireiy outside 'the purview of Art. 31.\n\nIt appears that in Pratap Kessari Deo v. The State of Orissa & Ors., ( 1 ) the validity of the Act was challenged before the Orissa High Court, and the said High Court has repelled the challenge and upheld the validity of the Act.\n\nIn our opinion, the view taken by the Orissa High Court is right.\n\nJanuary, U\n\nThe result is. the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne set of hearing fees.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nFADDI\n\nl'.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)\n\nFirst lnformatinn Report by accused--Admi.sibility in Evide11c~-lndia•\n\nEvidenc~ Act. 1872 (1of1872) ss. '.!l, 25-Code of Cri1ninal Pro; tdu'\" 1898 (V of 1898), r. 162.\n\nOn the first information report lodged by th~ appellant, the corpse of his step-son was recovered. The police arrested three oth .... ner<; ons indicated to be the culprits, but as a result of the investigatio11. Lbe arpellant\n\n(') A. I. R. 1961 Orissa, 13!.\n\nFaJdi\n\n\"'\n\nwas &ent up for trial for the murder and sentenced to death. Th¢ High Court confirmed the C\" f!viction and sentence. On appeal by special leave it was contended that the first information report was inadmissible in evi~\n\ndence nd should not have been, therefore, taken on the reord.\n\nState of Mtulh7'>·\n\nHeld: There v, as no force in the contention. The report was neit'~\\.r confession of the accused nor a statement made to a police officer during the ..:ourse of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act and s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not bar its admissibility. The report was an admission by the accused of certain facrs which had a bearir.b on the question to be determined by the Court viz., how and by whom the murJcr was committeJ, or whether the accuser.l's statement in court denv\n\ning the correctness of certain statements of the prosecution witnesses was\n\ncorrct or not. 1\\dn1!ssions are admissib!e in cvitlence under s. 21 of the Evidence Act and admission of an accused can be proved against him.\n\nDal S£ngli v. King Emperor, L. R. 44 I.A. 137, applied.\n\nNi.mr Ali v. Stai. of U.P. [1957] S.C.R. 657, considered and distingui~.hi:J.\n\nState v. Balach.ind /\\ l.R. 1960 Raj. Io'l. State of R, ajasthan v.\n\nShiv Singh A.LR. 1962 Raj. 3 and.Allohdia.v. State, 1959 All. LJ. 340.\n\nreferred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURlSUICT!ON: Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 27, 1963, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) in Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1963 ; ind Criminal Reference No. 4 of 1963.\n\nK. K. Luthra, for the appellant.\n\nI. N. Shroff, for the respondent.\n\nJanuary 24, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nPra<hlh\n\n_RAGHUIJAR DAYAL. J.-'.addi appals. by special leave, Raghubar Dayal I; aga1mt the order of tne High Court of Madhya Pradesh confirming bis conviction i.lnd sentence of death under s. 302 I.P .C. by the Additional Se1sions J uclge, Morena.\n\nJaibai, widow of Buddhu, began to Jive with Faddi 8 few years after the death of her husband Buddhu.\n\nFaddi and Jaibai 81 first lived 8! Agra, but later on shifted to\n\n1964 Morena.\n\nJaibai had a son named Guiab, by Buddhu.\n\nFaddi Guiab was aged 11 years and lived in village Torkheda at\n\n• 1v.M dh the house of his phupa Ramie. He was living there from ... tale o a ya Pradesh Sawan, 1961.\n\nRaehubar Dayal J.\n\nGulab's corpse was recovered from a well of village Jarah on January 21, 1963.\n\nIt reached the mortuary at Morena at 5-15 P.M. that day. It is noted on the postmortem report that .it had been despatched from the place of occurrence at 1 P.M.\n\nDr. Nigam, on examination, found an injury on the skull and has expressed the opinion that 1he boy died on account of that injury within two or three days of the post-mortem ex.1mination.\n\nHe stated in Court that no water was found inside either the lungs or the abdomen or the larynx or in the middle ear.\n\nThis rules out the possibility of Gulab's dying due to drowning.\n\nAs a result of the investigation, the appellant and one Banwari were sent up for trial for the murder of Guiab.\n\nIt is interesting to observe the course of the inve,1tigation. The police knew nothing of the offence till 9 P.M. on January 20, 1963, when the appellant himself went to the police station, Saroichhola, and lodged a first informatio~ rep01t stating therein that on peeping into the well near the reepul tree of Hadpai on the morning of January 20, 196'.l, he found hi> son lying dead in the well.\n\nEarlier, he had narrated the events leading to his observing the corpse and th.'lt narration of facts accused Ramie, Bhanta and one cyclist of the offence of murdering the boy Guiab.\n\nIt wai this information which took the police to the well and to the recovery of the corpse.\n\nThe police arrested the persons indicated to be the culprits, viz., Ramie, Bhanta and the cyclist, who was found to be Shyama, by January 26.\n\nThese persons remained in the lock-up for 8 to 11 days.\n\nIn the meantime, on January 26, the investigation was taken over, under the orders of the Superintendent of Police, by the Circle Inspector, Nazai Mohd. Khan from Rajender Singh, who was the Station Officer of Police Station, Saraichhola. The Cirde Inspector arrested Faddi on January 27.\n\nThe other arrested persons -were got released in due course.\n\nFaddi took the Circle\n\nInspector to the house and, after taking out .a pair of shorts 1964 of Guiab, de!i;.:red them to the Circle Inspector.\n\nRamie, Faddi Bhanta alias Dhanta and Shyamlal have been examined as s 1•M dh . .\n\nN 15 5 . t•t• o a ya prosecul!on witnesses os. , 4 and respectively.\n\nPradesh\n\n. . • Rathubar Dayal 1.\n\nTI1e conviction of the appellant 1s based on circumstantial evidence, there being no direct evidence about his actually murdering Guiab by throwing him into the well or by murdering him first and then th owing the dead body into the well.\n\nThe circumstances which were accepted by the tril Court were these:\n\n!. Faddi went to the house of Ramie at about noon on 19th January, 1962 and asked Ramle to send the boy with him.\n\nGuiab was at the time in the fields.\n\nAfter meals, Faddi left suddenly when Shyama arrived and gave a message to Ramle from Gulab's mother th at the boy be not sent with any one.\n\nFaddi caught hold of Guiab from the fields forcibly and took him away. It may be mentioned here that one Banwari who has been acquitted is also said to have been with Faddi at this time.\n\n2. Guiab had not been seen alive subsequent to Faddi's taking him away on the afternoon of January, 19. His corpse was recovered on the forenoon of January, 21. Faddi had not been able to give any satisfactory explanation as to how he and Guiab parted company.\n\n3. Faddi knew the pl.ace where Gulab's corpse lay.\n\nIt was his information to the Police which led them to recover the corpse. His statement that he had noted the corpse floating on the morn\n\ning of January 20 was untrue, as according to the opinion of Dr. Nigam, the corpse could come up and float in the water approximately after two days.\n\nThe witnesses of the recovery deposed that they could not see the corpse floating and that it had to be recovered by tlle\n\nuse of angles.\n\n1'64\n\nPot/di ...\n\nSlat• of Madlrya\n\nPradull\n\nR aghubar Dayal I\n\n4. The accused's confession to J aibai and two other witnesses for the prosecution viz., Jimipal anel Sampatti about his killing Guiab.\n\n5. The pair of shorts recovered was the one which\n\nGuiab was wearing at the time he was taken away by Faddi.\n\nThe High Court did not rely on the confession and 011 the recovery of the pair of shorts from the appellant's possession, and we think, rightly. The evidence about the confession is discrepant and unconvincing.\n\nBhagwan Singh and Ramie deposed that the deceased was wearing the pair of shorts recovered, at the time the appellant took him away.\n\nBhagwan Singh did not go to the test identification.\n\nThe accused was not questioned about the deceased wearing these pair of shorts .at the time he was taken away from the village.\n\nThe High Court considered the other circumstance~\n\nufficient to establish that the appellant had committed the murder of Gu!Jb. It therefore confirmed the conviction and sentence.\n\nLearned counsel for the ; ippellant has taken us through the entire evidence and commented on it.\n\nHe has contended that the evidence is unreliable .and should not have been accepted by the Courts below.\n\nWe have considered h~ criticism and are of opinion that the Courts below have correctly ap; ireciated the evidence.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to discuss it over again.\n\nIt may be mentioneu now that the appellant denies having gone to Ramie's house in village Torkheda and to have taken away Guiab from that village forcibly on the afternoon of January 19, but admits his lodging the report, and the recovery of the dead body from the well with the help of the angle.\n\nHe however states that he had lodged the report on the tutoring of one Lalla Ram of Utampur. He bas neither stated why he was so tutored nor led any evidence in support of his allegation.\n\nIn his report the appellant admitted the prosecution allegations up to the stago of\n\nhis forcibly taking away Guiab from village Tork:heda. He 1'64 then stated that Ramie, Bhatta and the third person, viz., FaAdi Shyamlal threatened him with life, took out the pyjama and •. half-pant froin the body of Gui.ab and taking the boy with State p~:f,, ad/rya them remained sitting on the well near the peepul tree of - Hadpai.\n\nThe appellant kept himself concealed from their Rafl:iubar Dayal J. view, .nearby. He heard the sound of something being thrown into the well.\n\nThose three persom then ran away, but he himself remained sitting there lthroughout the night and then, on peeping into the well next morning, observed the corpse of his son in the well.\n\nHe then went to Morena, consulted one Jabar Singh. Vakil, and one Chhotey Singh and was advised to lodge the report.\n\nHe definitely accused\n\nR.mle, Bhatta and the cycle-rider with killing his son Guiab by throwing him into the well.\n\nThis report is not a confessional statement of the appellant.\n\nHe states nothing which would go to show that he was the murderer of the boy.\n\nIt is the usual first information report an aggrieved person or someone on his behalf lodges against the alleged murderers.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge and the High Court considered the appellant's stte ments in this report which went to explain his separation from Guiab on account of the conduct of Ramie and others and came to the conclusion that those statements were false.\n\nThis was in a way justified as the burden lay on the appellant to account for the disappearance of Guiab when the prosecution evidence showed that the appellant had taken Guiab with him.\n\nBesides, what the appellant had stated in the report, he had given no explanation for the disappearance. Of course, he had denied that he took Guiab with him.\n\nThe evidence about that aspect of the case conists of the statement of Ramie, Shyamlal and Bhagwan Singh which have been accepted by the Courts below.\n\nThe High Court also took into consideration the fact that the appellant knew where the deceased's body was as it was on what he had stated in the report that the police went to the well of village Jarah and recovered the dead body. The accused gave no explanation in Court as to how he came to know about it.\n\nWhat he had stated in the report had been considered and found to be untrue and\n\n1964 . specially in view of the appellant's own conduct.\n\nIt has Fa:.d• been rightly _stressed that if Gu!ab had been forcibly taken State of Madhya away from him by Ramie and others, the appellant ordinari-\n\nPh ly would have gone and taken some action about it, without Raghubar Dayal J. wasting his time it1 just following those people.\n\nEven if he felt interested in following them and had ha,,! th~ sound of something being thrown inside the well nd had also seen th:1se p.ersons running a\\V~!y, he h~1d no rc:l-on to re!11:.1in hidden at that spot the whole night.\n\nHe should have informed people of wh.:t he hJd obsrnd as he must have suspected that these pcrso'1S had played mischief with Guiab.\n\nThe High Court also took into consideratioa the incorrectness of the appellant's statement that he observed the dead body floating in the well on the morning ot Januc; ry\n\n20. It is contended for the appellant that the first information report was inadmissible in evidence and should not have\n\nmen therefore tJken on the record.\n\nJn support, reliance is placed on the case reported as Nisar Ali v. State of U.P.(').\n\nWe have considered this comention and do not see any force in it.\n\nThe report is not a confession of the appellant. It is not a statement made to a police officer during the course of investigation.\n\nSection 25 of the Evidence Act and s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procdure do not bar its admissibility.\n\nThe report is an admission by the accused of certain facts which have a bearing on the question to be determined by the Court, viz., how and by whom the murder or Guiab was committed, or whether the appellant's statement in Court denying the correctness of certain statements of the prosecution witnesses is correct or not. Admissions are admissible in evidence under s. 21 of the Act.\n\nSection 17 defines an admission to be a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or rel\"> vant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances. thereafter mentioned, in the Act.\n\nSection 21 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against a person who makes them. illustrations\n\n( 1) [1957] S.C.R. 657.'\n\n(c), (d) and (e) to s. 21 are of the circumstances in which 1964 an accused could prove his own admissions which go in his Faddi\n\nfavor in v 1 iew odf h~ exceptio 1 dns mentionedcdinbs. h21 to the State ol°Madhya provision t 1at a m1ss10ns cou not be prov y t e person Prade1h who makes them. It is therefoe clear th.at admissions of R h b-D al 1 . aguar ay . an accused can be proved agamst him.\n\nThe Privy Council in very similar circumstances, held long ago in Dal Singh v. King Empero1 (') such first information reports to be admissible in evidence.\n\nIt was said in that case at p. 1142:\n\nI I/ \"It is imprtant to compare the story told by Dal\n\nSingh when making his statemnt at the trial with what he said in the report he made to the police in the document which he signed, a document which is sufficiently authenticated.\n\nThe report is clearly admissible.\n\nIt was in no sense a confession. As appears from its terms, it w:is rather in the nature of an infoimation or charge laid against Mohan and Jhunni in respect of the assault alleged to have been made on Dal Singh on his way from Hardua to Jubbulpore.\n\nAs such the statement is proper evidence against him ...... .\n\nIt will be observed that this statement is at several points at complete variance with what Dal Singh afterwards stated in Court.\n\nThe Sessions Judge regarded the document as discrediting his defence.\n\nHe had to decide between the story for the prosecution and that told for Dal Singh.\"\n\nLeamed counsel for the appellant submits that the facts of that case were distinguishable in some respects from the facts of this case.\n\nSuch a distinction, if any, has no bearing on the question of the admissibility of the report. The report was held admissible because it was not a confession and it was helpful in determining the matter before the Court.\n\n(') L. R. 44 I. A. 137.\n\nFaddi\n\n•• litm~ of Madhya\n\nPl'rllksh\n\n4tqlou6ar Dayal I.\n\nIn Nis(Jr Ali's case(') Kapur J. who spoke for the Court said, after narrating the facts:\n\n\"'An objection has been taken to the admissibility of this report as it was \\made by a person who was a co-accused.\n\nA first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under s. 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under s. 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence against '!he maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, n0r to corroborate or contradict other witnesses.\n\nIn this case, therefore, it is not evidence.\"\n\nIt is on these observations that it has been contended for the appellant that his report !Was inadmissible in evidence.\n\nOstensibly, the expression 'it cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused supports the appellant's contention. But it appears to us that in the context in which the observation is made and in the circumstances, which we have verified from the record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had definitely 'held the first inform.ation report lodged by the co-accused who was acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this observation really refers to a first information report which is in the nature of a confession by the maker thereof.\n\nOf course, a confessional first information report cannot be used .against the maker when he be an accused and necessarily cannot be used against a co-accused.\n\nFurther, the last sentence of the above-quoted observation is significant and indicates what the Court meant was that the first information report lodged by Qudratullah, the co-accused, was not evidence against Nisar Ali. This Court did not meanas it had not to determine in that case-that a first information reoort which is not a confession cannot be used as an admission under s. 21 of the Evidence Act or as a relevant statement under any other provision of that Act.\n\nWe find also that this observation has been unden:tood in this way by the Rajasthan High Court in State v. Balclzand(') and\n\n<1; (19~7:s.c.R.657.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1960 Raj 101.\n\nin State of Ra; asthan v. Shiv Singh(') and by the Allaha- . bad High Court in A/lahdia v. State( 2 ).\n\n1!164\n\nFaddi\n\nWe therefore hold that the objection to the admissibility 51• 1• P~!d::f1h1• of , the first information report lodged by the appellant is not - sound and that the Courts below have rightly admitted it in Raghubar Day-11. evidence and have made proper use of it.\n\nThe circumstances held established by the High Court are sufficient, in our opinion, to reach the conclusion that Guiab was murdered by the appellant who was the last person in whose company the deceased was seen alive and who knew where the dead body lay and who gave untrue explanation about his knowing it in the report lodged by him and gave no explanation in Court as to how he separated from the deceased.\n\nWe therefore dismiss the appeal.\n\nAppeal di.rmi1sed.\n\nBALMUKAND\n\nKAMLA WA TI & ORS.\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo AND J. R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nContract by manager to sell joint property-Specific Performance when\n\nnrdered-Hindu Law-Joint family.\n\nThe appellant entered into a contract with the karta for the purchase of property belonging to a joint Hindu family.\n\nThis property consisted of a fractional share belonging to the family in a large plot of land.\n\nEarnest 1noney was paid to the karta.\n\nAs the karta did not execute the sale deed the appellant instituted a suit for specific performance. The other members who are the brothers of the k:arta and who were adults\n\n(') A.I.R. 1962 Raj 3.\n\n134-159 S.C.-21 (') 1959 All. L.J. 340.\n\nJanuaryt 21,", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 76, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234, "end_char": 236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 955, "end_char": 962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1090, "end_char": 1107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 ) the validity of the Act was challenged before the Orissa High Court, and the said High Court has repelled the challenge and upheld the validity of the Act."}}, {"text": "High Court has repelled the challenge and upheld the validity of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1122, "end_char": 1194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "FADDI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1388, "end_char": 1393, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FADDI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1400, "end_char": 1427, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. 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Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "RAGHUIJAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pra<hlh\n\n_RAGHUIJAR DAYAL.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3823, "end_char": 3829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaibai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3883, "end_char": 3889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaibai, widow of Buddhu, began to Jive with Faddi 8 few years after the death of her husband Buddhu.", "canonical_name": "J aibai"}}, {"text": "Faddi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3927, "end_char": 3932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaibai, widow of Buddhu, began to Jive with Faddi 8 few years after the death of her husband Buddhu.", "canonical_name": "FADDI"}}, {"text": "Faddi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3985, "end_char": 3990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faddi and Jaibai 81 first lived 8!", "canonical_name": "FADDI"}}, {"text": "Jaibai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3995, "end_char": 4001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faddi and Jaibai 81 first lived 8!", "canonical_name": "J aibai"}}, {"text": "Guiab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4088, "end_char": 4093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaibai had a son named Guiab, by Buddhu.", "canonical_name": "Gui.ab"}}, {"text": "Faddi Guiab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4107, "end_char": 4118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faddi Guiab was aged 11 years and lived in village Torkheda at\n\n• 1v."}}, {"text": "Torkheda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4158, "end_char": 4166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faddi Guiab was aged 11 years and lived in village Torkheda at\n\n• 1v."}}, {"text": "Raehubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4274, "end_char": 4288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raehubar Dayal J.\n\nGulab's corpse was recovered from a well of village Jarah on January 21, 1963.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ."}}, {"text": "Gulab", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raehubar Dayal J.\n\nGulab's corpse was recovered from a well of village Jarah on January 21, 1963.", "canonical_name": "Gulab"}}, {"text": "Jarah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4345, "end_char": 4350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raehubar Dayal J.\n\nGulab's corpse was recovered from a well of village Jarah on January 21, 1963."}}, {"text": "Morena", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4400, "end_char": 4406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reached the mortuary at Morena at 5-15 P.M. that day."}}, {"text": "Nigam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4540, "end_char": 4545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is noted on the postmortem report that .it had been despatched from the place of occurrence at 1 P.M.\n\nDr. Nigam, on examination, found an injury on the skull and has expressed the opinion that 1he boy died on account of that injury within two or three days of the post-mortem ex.1mination."}}, {"text": "Gulab", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4878, "end_char": 4883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rules out the possibility of Gulab's dying due to drowning.", "canonical_name": "Gulab"}}, {"text": "Banwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the investigation, the appellant and one Banwari were sent up for trial for the murder of Guiab."}}, {"text": "January 20, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5140, "end_char": 5156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police knew nothing of the offence till 9 P.M. on January 20, 1963, when the appellant himself went to the police station, Saroichhola, and lodged a first informatio~ rep01t stating therein that on peeping into the well near the reepul tree of Hadpai on the morning of January 20, 196'.l, he found hi> son lying dead in the well."}}, {"text": "January 20, 196'.l", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5359, "end_char": 5377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The police knew nothing of the offence till 9 P.M. on January 20, 1963, when the appellant himself went to the police station, Saroichhola, and lodged a first informatio~ rep01t stating therein that on peeping into the well near the reepul tree of Hadpai on the morning of January 20, 196'.l, he found hi> son lying dead in the well."}}, {"text": "Ramie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5531, "end_char": 5536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'lt narration of facts accused Ramie, Bhanta and one cyclist of the offence of murdering the boy Guiab.", "canonical_name": "Ramie"}}, {"text": "Bhanta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5538, "end_char": 5544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'lt narration of facts accused Ramie, Bhanta and one cyclist of the offence of murdering the boy Guiab.", "canonical_name": "Bhanta"}}, {"text": "Shyama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5818, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramie, Bhanta and the cyclist, who was found to be Shyama, by January 26.", "canonical_name": "Shyamlal"}}, {"text": "Nazai Mohd. Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6040, "end_char": 6056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, on January 26, the investigation was taken over, under the orders of the Superintendent of Police, by the Circle Inspector, Nazai Mohd."}}, {"text": "Rajender Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6062, "end_char": 6076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khan from Rajender Singh, who was the Station Officer of Police Station, Saraichhola."}}, {"text": "Ramie", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramie, Faddi Bhanta alias Dhanta and Shyamlal have been examined as s 1•M dh . ."}}, {"text": "Faddi Bhanta alias Dhanta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6401, "end_char": 6426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramie, Faddi Bhanta alias Dhanta and Shyamlal have been examined as s 1•M dh . ."}}, {"text": "Shyamlal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6431, "end_char": 6439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramie, Faddi Bhanta alias Dhanta and Shyamlal have been examined as s 1•M dh . ."}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rathubar Dayal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rathubar Dayal 1."}}, {"text": "19th January, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6942, "end_char": 6960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faddi went to the house of Ramie at about noon on 19th January, 1962 and asked Ramle to send the boy with him."}}, {"text": "Ramle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6971, "end_char": 6976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faddi went to the house of Ramie at about noon on 19th January, 1962 and asked Ramle to send the boy with him.", "canonical_name": "Ramie"}}, {"text": "J aibai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8211, "end_char": 8218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused's confession to J aibai and two other witnesses for the prosecution viz.,", "canonical_name": "J aibai"}}, {"text": "Jimipal anel Sampatti", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8269, "end_char": 8290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jimipal anel Sampatti about his killing Guiab."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8639, "end_char": 8652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwan Singh and Ramie deposed that the deceased was wearing the pair of shorts recovered, at the time the appellant took him away."}}, {"text": "Lalla Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9883, "end_char": 9892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He however states that he had lodged the report on the tutoring of one Lalla Ram of Utampur."}}, {"text": "Utampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9896, "end_char": 9903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He however states that he had lodged the report on the tutoring of one Lalla Ram of Utampur."}}, {"text": "Tork:heda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10130, "end_char": 10139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his report the appellant admitted the prosecution allegations up to the stago of\n\nhis forcibly taking away Guiab from village Tork:heda."}}, {"text": "Bhatta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10173, "end_char": 10179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He 1'64 then stated that Ramie, Bhatta and the third person, viz.,", "canonical_name": "Bhanta"}}, {"text": "FaAdi Shyamlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10208, "end_char": 10222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FaAdi Shyamlal threatened him with life, took out the pyjama and •. half-pant froin the body of Gui.ab and taking the boy with State p~:f,, ad/rya them remained sitting on the well near the peepul tree of - Hadpai."}}, {"text": "Gui.ab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10304, "end_char": 10310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FaAdi Shyamlal threatened him with life, took out the pyjama and •. half-pant froin the body of Gui.ab and taking the boy with State p~:f,, ad/rya them remained sitting on the well near the peepul tree of - Hadpai.", "canonical_name": "Gui.ab"}}, {"text": "iubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10477, "end_char": 10488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant kept himself concealed from their Rafl:iubar Dayal J. view, .nearby."}}, {"text": "Jabar Singh. Vakil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10794, "end_char": 10812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then went to Morena, consulted one Jabar Singh."}}, {"text": "Chhotey Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10822, "end_char": 10835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vakil, and one Chhotey Singh and was advised to lodge the report."}}, {"text": "R.mle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10897, "end_char": 10902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He definitely accused\n\nR.mle, Bhatta and the cycle-rider with killing his son Guiab by throwing him into the well."}}, {"text": "Shyamlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11938, "end_char": 11946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence about that aspect of the case conists of the statement of Ramie, Shyamlal and Bhagwan Singh which have been accepted by the Courts below.", "canonical_name": "Shyamlal"}}, {"text": "Gu!ab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12506, "end_char": 12511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has Fa:.d• been rightly _stressed that if Gu!ab had been forcibly taken State of Madhya away from him by Ramie and others, the appellant ordinari-\n\nPh ly would have gone and taken some action about it, without Raghubar Dayal J. wasting his time it1 just following those people."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12536, "end_char": 12551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has Fa:.d• been rightly _stressed that if Gu!ab had been forcibly taken State of Madhya away from him by Ramie and others, the appellant ordinari-\n\nPh ly would have gone and taken some action about it, without Raghubar Dayal J. wasting his time it1 just following those people."}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12674, "end_char": 12688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has Fa:.d• been rightly _stressed that if Gu!ab had been forcibly taken State of Madhya away from him by Ramie and others, the appellant ordinari-\n\nPh ly would have gone and taken some action about it, without Raghubar Dayal J. wasting his time it1 just following those people.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ."}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13724, "end_char": 13734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13759, "end_char": 13765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14198, "end_char": 14203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14217, "end_char": 14227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14467, "end_char": 14477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14631, "end_char": 14636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dal\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15255, "end_char": 15265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said in that case at p. 1142:\n\nI I/ \"It is imprtant to compare the story told by Dal\n\nSingh when making his statemnt at the trial with what he said in the report he made to the police in the document which he signed, a document which is sufficiently authenticated.", "canonical_name": "Dal\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15605, "end_char": 15610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As appears from its terms, it w:is rather in the nature of an infoimation or charge laid against Mohan and Jhunni in respect of the assault alleged to have been made on Dal Singh on his way from Hardua to Jubbulpore."}}, {"text": "Jhunni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15615, "end_char": 15621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As appears from its terms, it w:is rather in the nature of an infoimation or charge laid against Mohan and Jhunni in respect of the assault alleged to have been made on Dal Singh on his way from Hardua to Jubbulpore."}}, {"text": "Dal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15677, "end_char": 15686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As appears from its terms, it w:is rather in the nature of an infoimation or charge laid against Mohan and Jhunni in respect of the assault alleged to have been made on Dal Singh on his way from Hardua to Jubbulpore.", "canonical_name": "Dal\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Hardua", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15703, "end_char": 15709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As appears from its terms, it w:is rather in the nature of an infoimation or charge laid against Mohan and Jhunni in respect of the assault alleged to have been made on Dal Singh on his way from Hardua to Jubbulpore."}}, {"text": "Jubbulpore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15713, "end_char": 15723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As appears from its terms, it w:is rather in the nature of an infoimation or charge laid against Mohan and Jhunni in respect of the assault alleged to have been made on Dal Singh on his way from Hardua to Jubbulpore."}}, {"text": "L. R. 44 I. A. 137", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16440, "end_char": 16458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16543, "end_char": 16548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faddi\n\n•• litm~ of Madhya\n\nPl'rllksh\n\n4tqlou6ar Dayal I.\n\nIn Nis(Jr Ali's case(') Kapur J. who spoke for the Court said, after narrating the facts:\n\n\"'An objection has been taken to the admissibility of this report as it was \\made by a person who was a co-accused."}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16862, "end_char": 16868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16910, "end_char": 16916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nisar Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17702, "end_char": 17711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it appears to us that in the context in which the observation is made and in the circumstances, which we have verified from the record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had definitely 'held the first inform.ation report lodged by the co-accused who was acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this observation really refers to a first information report which is in the nature of a confession by the maker thereof."}}, {"text": "Qudratullah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18222, "end_char": 18233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the last sentence of the above-quoted observation is significant and indicates what the Court meant was that the first information report lodged by Qudratullah, the co-accused, was not evidence against Nisar Ali."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18445, "end_char": 18450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BALMUKAND", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19559, "end_char": 19568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BALMUKAND\n\nKAMLA WA TI & ORS."}}, {"text": "KAMLA WA TI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19570, "end_char": 19581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BALMUKAND\n\nKAMLA WA TI & ORS."}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19591, "end_char": 19603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. SUBBA RAo AND J. R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. R. MuDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19608, "end_char": 19623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. SUBBA RAo AND J. R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Januaryt 21,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20226, "end_char": 20238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Januaryt 21,"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_321_330_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 321\n\nin State of Ra; asthan v. Shiv Singh(') and by the Allaha- . bad High Court in A/lahdia v. State( 2 ).\n\n1!164\n\nFaddi\n\nWe therefore hold that the objection to the admissibility 51• 1• P~!d::f1h1• of , the first information report lodged by the appellant is not - sound and that the Courts below have rightly admitted it in Raghubar Day-11. evidence and have made proper use of it.\n\nThe circumstances held established by the High Court are sufficient, in our opinion, to reach the conclusion that Guiab was murdered by the appellant who was the last person in whose company the deceased was seen alive and who knew where the dead body lay and who gave untrue explanation about his knowing it in the report lodged by him and gave no explanation in Court as to how he separated from the deceased.\n\nWe therefore dismiss the appeal.\n\nAppeal di.rmi1sed.\n\nBALMUKAND\n\nKAMLA WA TI & ORS.\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo AND J. R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nContract by manager to sell joint property-Specific Performance when\n\nnrdered-Hindu Law-Joint family.\n\nThe appellant entered into a contract with the karta for the purchase of property belonging to a joint Hindu family.\n\nThis property consisted of a fractional share belonging to the family in a large plot of land.\n\nEarnest 1noney was paid to the karta.\n\nAs the karta did not execute the sale deed the appellant instituted a suit for specific performance. The other members who are the brothers of the k:arta and who were adults\n\n(') A.I.R. 1962 Raj 3.\n\n134-159 S.C.-21 (') 1959 All. L.J. 340.\n\nJanuaryt 21,\n\nat the time of the contract were also impleaded in the suit as defendants.\n\nThe suit was resisted on the ground that there was no legal necessity and that the contract for sale was not for the benefit of the family. The trial court as well as the High Court upheld these contentions.\n\nBefore this Court it was contended that even though there was no legal necessity the transaction was for the benefit of the family which the karta as a prudent owner was entitled to enter into for the benefit of the family.\n\nHeld: (i) For a transaction to be regarded as one which is of benefit to the family it need not necessarily be only of a defensive character. but what transactions would be for the benefit of the family would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nIn each case the Court must be 11atisficd from the material before it that it was in fact such as con ferred or was necessarily expected to confer benfit on the family at the time it was entered into.\n\n(ti) No part of the joint family property coc, J be parted with or\n\need to be parted with by the manager on the grouncl of alleged benefit to the family when the transaction is opposed by the :101Jit members of the family.\n\n(iii) In the present case the appropriate pleas were not raised by the plaintiff nor the necessary evidence led. The granting of specific performance is always in the discretion of the court. In the facts and circumstances of the case the courts below were justified in refusing to order specific performance and the appeal is dismissed.\n\nJagatnarain v. Mathura Das, I.L.R. SO All. 969, Honooman Prasod Pandey v. Babooee Munraj Koonwaree, (1856) 6 Moo. I.A. 393, Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh. l.L.R. 39 All. 437, Palaniappa Chetty v. Sreemath Daiya.rikamony Pandara Sannadhi, 44 I.A. 147, Sita/ Prasad Singh\n\nv. Ajablal Mander, I.L.R. 18 Pat. 306 and In the matter of A. V. Va•udevan & Ors. Minors, A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 260. referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated October 14, 1957 of the Punjab High Court in RF.A. No. 219 of 1950.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, H. L. Mittal, S. S. Khanduja and Ganpat Ral, for the appellant.\n\nRam Lubhaya and S. D. Sekhri, for respondents Nos. 1-12.\n\nS. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondents Nos. 13-15.\n\nJanuary 27, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUDHOLKAR J.-This is a i; ilaintiff's appeal from the dismissal of his suit for specific i; ierformance of a contract for the sale of 3 /20th share of land in certain fields situate in Mauza Faizpur of Batala in the State of Punjab. He had instituted the suit in the court of Sub-Judge, First Class, Batala, who dismissed it in its entirety. Upon appeal the High Court of Punjab, while upholding the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for specific performance, modified the decree of the trial court in regard to one matter. By that modification the High Court ordered the defendants to repay to the plaintiff the earnest money which he had paid when the contract of sale was entered into by him with Pindidas.\n\nIt may be mentioned that Pindidas died during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court and his legal representatives were, therefore, substituted in his place.\n\nAgi¥ieved by the dismissal of his claim for specific performance the plaintiff has come up to this Court by a certificate granted by the High Court, under Art. 133 of the Constitution.\n\n'The relevant facts are these:\n\nThe plaintiff owned 79/120th share in Kasra Nos. 494, 495, 496, 497, 1800/501, 1801/501 and 529 shown in the zamabandi of 1943-43, situate at Mauza Faizpur of Batala.\n\nOn October 1, 1943 he purchased 23/120th share in this land belonging to op.e Devisahai. He thus became owner of 17 /20th share in this land. The remaining 3 /20th share belongs to the joint Hindu family of which Pindidas was the Manager and his brother Haveliram, Khemchand and Satyapal were the members.\n\nAccording to the plaintiff he paid Rs. 17 5 per maria for the land which he purchased from Devisahai. In order to consolidate his holding, the plaintiff desired to acquire the 3 /20th share held by the _joint family of Pindidas and his brothers. He, therefore, approached Pindidas in the matter and the latter agreed to sell the 3 /20th share belonging to the family at the rate of Rs. 250 per maria.\n\n'The contract in this regard was entered into on October 1,\n\nBalmukand v.\n\nKamlawatl\n\nM udholkar 1.\n\nBalmukimd\n\n\"· Kam law a ti\n\nMudh/J/kar J.\n\n1945 with Pindidas and Rs. l 00 were paid to him as earnest money. As the manager of the family failed to execute the sale deed in his favour, the plaintiff instituted the suit and made Pindidas and his brothers defendants thereto.\n\nThe suit was resisted by all the defendants.\n\nPindidas admitted having entered into a contract of sale of some land to the plaintiff on October 1, 1945 and of having received Rs. 100 as earnest money.\n\nAccording to him, however, that contract pertained not to the land in suit but to another piece of land.\n\nHe further pleaded that he had no right to enter into a contract on behalf of his brothers who are defendants. 2 to 4 to the suit and are now respondents 13 to 15 before us.\n\nThe defendants 2 to 4 denied the exltence of any contract and further pleaded that even if Piadidas was proved to be the karta of the joint family and hall agreed' to sell the land in suit the transaction was not blnding upon them because the sale was not for the benefit of the family nor was there any necessity for that sale.\n\nThe courts below have found in the plaintiff's favour that Pindidas did enter into a contract with him for the sale of 3 /20th share of the family land in suit and received Rs. 100 as earnest money.\n\nBut they held that the contract was not binding on the family because there was no nece:;- sity for the sale and the contract was not for the benefit of the family.\n\nIt is not disputed before us by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the plaintiff that the defendants are persons in affluent circumstances and that there was no necessity for the sale.\n\nBut according to him, the intended sale was beneficial to the family inasmuch as it was not a practical proposition for the defendants to make any use of their fractional share in the land and, therefore, by converting it into money the family stood to gain.\n\nHe further pointed out that whereas the value of the land at the date of the transaction was Rs. 175 per maria only the plaintiff had agreed under the contract to purchase it at Rs. 250 per maria the family stood to make an additional gain by the transaction.\n\nThe substance of his argument was that the Manager of 11 joint\n\nHindu family has power to sell the family property not only for a defensive purpose but also where circumstances are such that a prudent owner of property would alienate it for a consideration which he regards to be adequate.\n\nIn support of his contention he has placed reliancjl on three decisions.\n\nThe first of these is Jagatnarain v.\n\nMathura Das('). That is a decision of the Full Bench of that High Court in which the meaning and implication of the term \"benefit of the estate\" is used with reference to transfers made by a Manager of a joint Hindu family was considered.\n\nThe learned Judges examined a large number of decisions, including that in Hanooman Persaud Pandey\n\nv. Babooee Munraj Koonweree( 2 ); Sahu Ram Chandra v.\n\nBhup Singh ( 3 ) and Palaniappa Che tty v. Sreemath Daivasi kamony Pandra Sannadhi (') and held that transactions justifiable on the principle of benefit to the estate are not limited\n\nto thme which are of a defensive nature.\n\nAccording to the High Cour< if the transaction is such as a prudent owner of property would, in the light of circumstances which were within his knowledge at that time, have entered into, though the degree of prudence required from the manager would be a little greater than that expected of a sole owner of property.\n\nThe facts of that case as found by the High Court were:\n\n\" ...... the adult managers of the family found it very inconvenient and to the prejudice of the family's interests to retain property, 18 or 19 miles away from Bijnor, to the management of which neither of them could possibly give proper attention, that they considered it to the advantage of the estate to sell that property and purchase other property more accessible with the proceeds, that they did in fact sell that property on very advantageous terms, that there is nothing to indicate that the transaction would not have reached a profitable conclu sion .... \" (p. 979).\n\n(1) I.L.R. 50 All. 969.\n\n(') I.L.R. 39 AIL 437.\n\n(~ (1856) 6 Moo. I.A. 393.\n\n() 44 I.A. 147.\n\n.1964\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nMudholkar J.\n\nWe have no doubt that for a transaction to be regarded as one which is of benefit to the family it need not necessarily be only of a defensive character. But what transaction would be for the benefit of the family must necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. In the case before the Full Bench the two managers of the family found it difficult to manage the property at all with the result, apparently, that the family was incurring losses.\n\nTo sell such property, and that too on advantageous terms, and to invest the sale proceeds in a profitable way could certainly be regarded as beneficial to the famiiy. In the present case there is unfortunately nothing in the plaint to suggest that Pindidas agreed to sell the property because he found it difficult to manage it or because he found that the family was incurring loss by retaining the property. Nor again is there anything to suggest that the idea was to invest the sale proceeds in some profitable manner.\n\nIndeed there are no allegations in the plaint to the effect that the sale was being contemplated by any considerations of prudence. Ali that is said is that the fraction of the family's share of the land owned by the family bore a very small proportion to the land which the plaintiff held at the date of the transaction.\n\nBut that was indeed the case even before the purchase by the plaintiff of the 23/120th share from Devisahai. There is nothing to indicate that the i;>osition of the family vis-avis their share in the land had in any way been altered by reason of the circumstance that the remaining l 7 /20th interest in the land came to be owned by the plaintiff alone.\n\nTherefore, even upon the view taken in the Allahabad case the plaintiff cannot hope to succeed in this suit.\n\nThe next case is Sita/ Prasad Singh v. Ajablal Mander(').\n\nThat was a case in which one of the questions which arose for consideration was the power of a manager to alienate part of the joint family property for the acquisition of new property. In that case also the test applied to the transaction entered into by a manager of a joint Hindu family was held to be the same, that is, whether the transaction was one into which a prudent owner would enter in the ordinary\n\n(1) l.L.R. x8 Pat. 306.\n\ncourse of management in order to benefit the estate. Following the view taken in the Allahabad case the learned Judges also held that the expression \"benefit of the estate\" has a wider meaning than mere compelling necessity and is not limited to transactions of a purely defensive nature. In the course of his judgment Harries C.J. observed at p. 31-l:\n\n\". . . . . . . . the karta of a joint Hindu family being merely a manager and not an absolute owner, the Hindu law has, like other systems of law, placed certain limitations upon his power to alienate property which is owned by the joint family. The Hindu law-givers, however, could not have intended to impose any such restriction on his power as would virtually disqualify him from doing anything to improve the conditions of the family. The only reasonable limitation which can be imposed on the karta is that he mu_st act with prudence, and prudence implies caution as well as foresight and excludes hasty, reckless and arbitrary conduct.\"\n\nAfter observing that the transaction entered into by a manager should not be of a speculative nature the learned Chief Justice observed:\n\n\"In exceptional circ:umstances, however, the court will uphold the alienation of a part of the joint family property by a karta for the acquisition of new property as, for example, where all the adult members of the joint family with the knowledge available to them and possessing all the necess<_try information about the means and requirements of the family are convinced that the proposed purchase of the new property is for the benefit of the estate.\"\n\nThese observations make it clear that where adult members are in existence the judgment is to be not that of the manager of the family alone but that of all the adult members of the family, including the manager. In the case before us all the brothers of Pindidas were adults when the\n\nBalmuka111/\n\n•• Kamlawldl\n\nMudho/k., I.\n\n•• Kam/awati\n\nM wlholkar J.\n\ncontract was entered into. There is no suggestion that they agreed to the transaction or were consulted about it or even knew of the transaction. Even, therefore, if we hold that the view expressed by the learned Chief Justice is right it does not help the plaintiff because the facts here are different from those contemplated by the learned Chief Justice.\n\nThe other Judge who was a party to that decision, Mano:b.arlal J., took more or less the same view.\n\nThe third case relied on is In the matter of A .T. V asudevan & Ors., minors('). There a single Judge of the High Court held that the manager of joint Hindu family is competent to alienate joint family property if it is clearly beneficial to the estate even though there is no legal necessity justifying the transaction.\n\nThis view was expressed while dealing with an. application under cl. 17 of Letters Patent\n\nby one Thiruvengada Mudaliar for being appointed guardian of the joint family property belonging to, inter alia, to his five minor sons and for sanction of the sale of that property as being beneficial to the interests of the minor sons.\n\nThe petitioner who was karta of the family had, besides the five minor sons, two adult sons, his wife and unmarried daughter who had rights of maintenance. It was thus in connection with his application lhat the learned Judge considered the matter and from that point of view the decision is distinguishable.\n\nHowever, it is a fact that the learned Judge has clearly expressed the opinion that the manager has power to sell joint family property if he is satisfied that the transaction would be for the benefit of the family. In coming to this conclusion he has based himself mainly upon the view taken by Venkata Subba Rao J., in Sellappa v.\n\nSuppan(2). That was a case in which the question which arose for consideration was whether borrowing money on the mortgage of joint family property for the purchase of a house could be held to be binding on the family because the transaction was of benefit to the family. While holding that a transaction to be for the benefit of the family need not be of a defensive character the learned Judges, upon the evidence before them, held that this particular transac-\n\n(') A.I.R. 1949 Mad. >6o. (') A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 496.\n\ntion was not established by evidence to be one for the benefit of the family.\n\nThus, as we have already stated, that for a transaction to be regarded as of benefit to the family it need not be of defensive character so as to be binding on the family. In each case the court must be satisfied from the material before it that it was in fact such as conferred or was reasonably expected to confer benefit on the family at the time it was enered into.\n\nWe have pointed out that there is not even an allegation in the plaint that the transaction was such as was regarded as beneficial to the family when it was entered into by Pindidas. Apart from that we have the fact that here the adult members of the family have stoutly resisted the plaintiff's claim for specific performance and we have no doubt that they would not have done so if they were. satisfied that the transaction was of benefit to the family. It may be possible that the land which was intended to be sold had risen in value by the time the present suit was instituted and that is why the other members of the family are contesting the plaintiff's claim. Apart from that the adult members of the family are well within their rights in saying that no part of the family property could be parted with or agreed to be parted with by the manager on the ground of alleged benefit to the family without consulting them. Here, as already stated, there is no allegation of any such consultation.\n\nIn these circumstances we must hold that the courts below were right in dismissing the suit for specific performance. We may add that granting specific performance is always in the discretion of the court and in our view in a case of this kind the court would be exercising its discretion right by refusing specific performance.\n\nNo doubt Pindidas himself was bound by the contract which he has entered into and the plaintiff would have been entitled to the benefit of s. 15 of the Specific Relief Act which runs thus:\n\n\"Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which\n\nBalmukand v.\n\nKamlawati\n\nMudholkar J.\n\nBalmukand must be left unperformed forms a considerable portion of the whole, or does not admit of compensation in money, he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance. But the court may, at the suit of the other party, direct the party in default to perform specifi. cally so much of his part of the contract as he can perform, provided that the plaintiff relinquishes all claim to further performance, and all right to compensation either for the defici ency, or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default of the defendant.\"\n\nMudholklJI' J.\n\nJanuary, 27\n\nHowever, in the case before us there is no claim on behalf ot the plaintiff that he is willing to pay the entire considera tion for obtaining a decree against the interest of Pindidas alone in the property. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nC. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS\n\nANDHRA\n\nPRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nR.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JI.)\n\nMotor Vehicles-Nationalisation of road transport 1ervice-Pree.aration\n\nand enforcement of scheme-Validity-Issue of permits fo State Transport Undertakings-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), \"' amended by Act I of 1956, Ch. IV, ss. 68C, 68D(3), 68F(l)- Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957, rr 4, 141.\n\nThe respondent corporation appointed an expert committee to go into the question as to the working of nationalised ~nsport in the S_tate. i:ie Committee laid down the criteria for determining the order 1n which", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "Guiab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 532, "end_char": 537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstances held established by the High Court are sufficient, in our opinion, to reach the conclusion that Guiab was murdered by the appellant who was the last person in whose company the deceased was seen alive and who knew where the dead body lay and who gave untrue explanation about his knowing it in the report lodged by him and gave no explanation in Court as to how he separated from the deceased."}}, {"text": "BALMUKAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 885, "end_char": 894, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BALMUKAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KAMLA WA TI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 896, "end_char": 913, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAMLA WATI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 917, "end_char": 929, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 937, "end_char": 953, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3501, "end_char": 3529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3671, "end_char": 3687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, H. L. Mittal, S. S. Khanduja and Ganpat Ral, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "H. L. Mittal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, H. L. Mittal, S. S. Khanduja and Ganpat Ral, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. S. Khanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3703, "end_char": 3717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, H. L. Mittal, S. S. Khanduja and Ganpat Ral, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Ral", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee, H. L. Mittal, S. S. Khanduja and Ganpat Ral, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ram Lubhaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3754, "end_char": 3765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lubhaya and S. D. Sekhri, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. D. Sekhri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3770, "end_char": 3782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lubhaya and S. D. Sekhri, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3812, "end_char": 3823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3828, "end_char": 3839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUDHOLKAR J.-This is a i; ilaintiff's appeal from the dismissal of his suit for specific i; ierformance of a contract for the sale of 3 /20th share of land in certain fields situate in Mauza Faizpur of Batala in the State of Punjab.", "canonical_name": "MUDHOLKAR"}}, {"text": "Batala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4134, "end_char": 4140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMUDHOLKAR J.-This is a i; ilaintiff's appeal from the dismissal of his suit for specific i; ierformance of a contract for the sale of 3 /20th share of land in certain fields situate in Mauza Faizpur of Batala in the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Sub-Judge, First Class, Batala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4208, "end_char": 4238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had instituted the suit in the court of Sub-Judge, First Class, Batala, who dismissed it in its entirety."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4290, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon appeal the High Court of Punjab, while upholding the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for specific performance, modified the decree of the trial court in regard to one matter."}}, {"text": "Pindidas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4633, "end_char": 4641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that modification the High Court ordered the defendants to repay to the plaintiff the earnest money which he had paid when the contract of sale was entered into by him with Pindidas.", "canonical_name": "Pindidas"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4968, "end_char": 4976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 1, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5202, "end_char": 5217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1943 he purchased 23/120th share in this land belonging to op.e Devisahai."}}, {"text": "Haveliram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5453, "end_char": 5462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining 3 /20th share belongs to the joint Hindu family of which Pindidas was the Manager and his brother Haveliram, Khemchand and Satyapal were the members."}}, {"text": "Khemchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5464, "end_char": 5473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining 3 /20th share belongs to the joint Hindu family of which Pindidas was the Manager and his brother Haveliram, Khemchand and Satyapal were the members."}}, {"text": "Satyapal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5478, "end_char": 5486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining 3 /20th share belongs to the joint Hindu family of which Pindidas was the Manager and his brother Haveliram, Khemchand and Satyapal were the members."}}, {"text": "Devisahai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5597, "end_char": 5606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 5 per maria for the land which he purchased from Devisahai."}}, {"text": "Balmukimd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6009, "end_char": 6018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Balmukimd\n\n\"· Kam law a ti\n\nMudh/J/kar J.\n\n1945 with Pindidas and Rs.", "canonical_name": "BALMUKAND"}}, {"text": "October 1, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pindidas admitted having entered into a contract of sale of some land to the plaintiff on October 1, 1945 and of having received Rs."}}, {"text": "Piadidas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6859, "end_char": 6867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants 2 to 4 denied the exltence of any contract and further pleaded that even if Piadidas was proved to be the karta of the joint family and hall agreed' to sell the land in suit the transaction was not blnding upon them because the sale was not for the benefit of the family nor was there any necessity for that sale.", "canonical_name": "Pindidas"}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7500, "end_char": 7516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed before us by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee for the plaintiff that the defendants are persons in affluent circumstances and that there was no necessity for the sale.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Bijnor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9723, "end_char": 9729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of that case as found by the High Court were:\n\n\" ...... the adult managers of the family found it very inconvenient and to the prejudice of the family's interests to retain property, 18 or 19 miles away from Bijnor, to the management of which neither of them could possibly give proper attention, that they considered it to the advantage of the estate to sell that property and purchase other property more accessible with the proceeds, that they did in fact sell that property on very advantageous terms, that there is nothing to indicate that the transaction would not have reached a profitable conclu sion .... \" (p. 979)."}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10243, "end_char": 10252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".1964\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nMudholkar J.\n\nWe have no doubt that for a transaction to be regarded as one which is of benefit to the family it need not necessarily be only of a defensive character.", "canonical_name": "MUDHOLKAR"}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11965, "end_char": 11974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, even upon the view taken in the Allahabad case the plaintiff cannot hope to succeed in this suit."}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12847, "end_char": 12854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of his judgment Harries C.J. observed at p. 31-l:\n\n\". . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Mano:b.arlal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14887, "end_char": 14899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other Judge who was a party to that decision, Mano:b.arlal J., took more or less the same view."}}, {"text": "cl. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15325, "end_char": 15331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thiruvengada Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15358, "end_char": 15379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 of Letters Patent\n\nby one Thiruvengada Mudaliar for being appointed guardian of the joint family property belonging to, inter alia, to his five minor sons and for sanction of the sale of that property as being beneficial to the interests of the minor sons."}}, {"text": "Venkata Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16196, "end_char": 16213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In coming to this conclusion he has based himself mainly upon the view taken by Venkata Subba Rao J., in Sellappa v.\n\nSuppan(2)."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18673, "end_char": 18678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18686, "end_char": 18705, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Balmukand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18823, "end_char": 18832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt Pindidas himself was bound by the contract which he has entered into and the plaintiff would have been entitled to the benefit of s. 15 of the Specific Relief Act which runs thus:\n\n\"Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which\n\nBalmukand v.\n\nKamlawati\n\nMudholkar J.\n\nBalmukand must be left unperformed forms a considerable portion of the whole, or does not admit of compensation in money, he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance.", "canonical_name": "BALMUKAND"}}, {"text": "MudholklJI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19424, "end_char": 19434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MudholklJI' J.\n\nJanuary, 27\n\nHowever, in the case before us there is no claim on behalf ot the plaintiff that he is willing to pay the entire considera tion for obtaining a decree against the interest of Pindidas alone in the property."}}, {"text": "C. S. ROWJEE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19740, "end_char": 19752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS\n\nANDHRA\n\nPRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nR.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19817, "end_char": 19828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS\n\nANDHRA\n\nPRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nR.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19850, "end_char": 19864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS\n\nANDHRA\n\nPRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nR.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "R.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19870, "end_char": 19890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS\n\nANDHRA\n\nPRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nR.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "J. R. MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19895, "end_char": 19910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS\n\nANDHRA\n\nPRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nR.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JI.)"}}, {"text": "Validity-Issue of permits fo State Transport Undertakings-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20014, "end_char": 20096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 68C, 68D(3), 68F(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20147, "end_char": 20170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Validity-Issue of permits fo State Transport Undertakings-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Validity-Issue of permits fo State Transport Undertakings-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20172, "end_char": 20213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_330_368_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nBalmukand must be left unperformed forms a considerable portion of the whole, or does not admit of compensation in money, he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance. But the court may, at the suit of the other party, direct the party in default to perform specifi. cally so much of his part of the contract as he can perform, provided that the plaintiff relinquishes all claim to further performance, and all right to compensation either for the defici ency, or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default of the defendant.\"\n\nKamlawati\n\nMudholklJI' J.\n\nJanuary, 27\n\nHowever, in the case before us there is no claim on behalf ot the plaintiff that he is willing to pay the entire considera tion for obtaining a decree against the interest of Pindidas alone in the property. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nC. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS\n\nANDHRA\n\nPRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nR.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JI.)\n\nMotor Vehicles-Nationalisation of road transport 1ervice-Pree.aration\n\nand enforcement of scheme-Validity-Issue of permits fo State Transport Undertakings-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), \"' amended by Act I of 1956, Ch. IV, ss. 68C, 68D(3), 68F(l)- Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957, rr 4, 141.\n\nThe respondent corporation appointed an expert committee to go into the question as to the working of nationalised ~nsport in the S_tate. i:ie Committee laid down the criteria for determining the order 1n which\n\nareas and routes had to be selected for nationalisation and had drawn up a list of the remaining districts in which nationalisation should be suctessively taken up. Accordingly, Nellore would have been the next district to be taken up and the turn of Kurnool district would have come up _after nationalisation of the routes in Nellore, Chittore and Cuddapah districts were completed. This report was submitted to the Corporation in February, 1961 and the Corporation accepted it and embodied the approval in its Administration Report dated March 24, 1962 which was published in April, 1962. After the General Election in 1962 the Chief Minister assumed office as Chief Minister on March 12, 1962. On April 19, 1962, he summoned a conference of the Corporation at which, he suggested that the nationalisation of bus routes in the Kurnool district should be taken up first. By its resolution dated 4-5-1962, the Corporation made an alteration in the order of the districts, successively to be taken up for nationalisation and selected the western half of the Kurnool as the area to be nationalised in the first instance. ne appellants, motor transport operators whose routes were all in western half of the Kumool districts filed objections to the Schemes before the Transport Minister. The Transport Minister approved the schemes. Thereafter, the Corporation applied to the Regional Transport Authority for permits.\n\nThe appellants then challenged the validity of the schemes in the High Court and in support of that allegations were made in the affidavit that the ..Chief Minister was motivated by bias and personal ill-will against the appellants, that he tell chagrined at the defeat of his partymen and supporters and desiring to wreak his vengeance against the motor transport operators of the western parts of Kwnool, his political opponents, instructed the Corporation to change the order in which the districts should be taken up for nationalisation and that the corporation gave effect to these instructions and directions. These allegations were not denied by the Chief Minister, nor was an affidavit filed by any person who could claim to know personally about the truth about these allegations. 1he High Court repelled these allegations and dismissed the petition. On appeal by certificate the appellants mainly contended:\n\n(1) that the schemes did not in reality reflect the opinion of the Corporation as required by s. 68-C of the Act, but that the schemes owed their origin to the direction of the Chief Minister who acted ma la fide in directing the Transport Undertaking to frame the impugned schemes; (2) that the approval of the schemes by the Transport Minister under s. 68-D(3) must be held to be vitiated by the malafides of th.e Chief Minister; (3) that the impugned schemes did not conform to the statutory requirements of s. 68-C and rule 4 of the Rules regarding the particulars to be embodied in the schemes; ( 4) that some of the routes included in the schemes were inter-state routes and that under the proviso to s. 68-D(3) it could not be deemed to be an arproved scheme unless the previous approval of the Central Government had been obtained and ( 5) that even when a transport undertaking applies for a stage carriage permit under s. 68-F(l) it must comply with the provisions of r. 141 of the Rules.\n\nReid: (!) On the evidence placed in the present case it must be held that it was a result of the conference of the 19th April, 1962 and in\n\nC. s. Rowi••\n\nState of Andhr•\n\nPradesh\n\n19M\n\nC. S. Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\norder to give efiect to the wishes of the Chief Minister expressed there,\n\nthat the ipugned scher:n~ were fonnulated by the Corporatiori and\n\nthe~fore, 1t would be vitiated by malafides notwithstanding the interposition of the semi-autonomous corporation.\n\n1hough the counler-affidavits contained a denial of the allegation that the Corporation was acting at the behest of the Chief Minister, there was no explanation for the choice of the western portion of Kurnool district.\n\nTherefore, the impugned schemes were vitiated by the fact that !hey were not in conformity wjth the requirements of s. 68..C of the Act.\n\n(ii) There was nothing on the record to indicate that the Chlef Minil ter influenced the Transport Minister.\n\nBesides, the Transport Minister stated on oath that in considering the objections under s. 68-D(3) and approving the schemes he was uninfluenced by the Chief Minister. Therefore, it cannot be held that his approval of the schemes did not satisfy the requirements of the law.\n\n(iii) In the present case some of the variations between the maxima and minima in the number of the vehicles propoSed to be operated on each route were such as to really contravene r. 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957.\n\nDosa Satyanarayanamurthy v. The Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation, [19611 I S.C.R. 642, referred to.\n\n(iv) The route which was proposed to be nationalised under the scheme admittedly lay wholly within the State. The right of the private operators to ply their vehicles beyond the State border was not affected by any of the schemes.\n\nTherefore, the proviso to s. 68D(3) was not attracted and consequently the schemes did not suffer from the defects alleged.\n\n(v) The High Court was right in holking that the Regional Transport Authority which is specifically mentioned in s. 68-F( I) is empowered to issue the permit to the transport undertaking ''notwithstanding anything\n\nto the contrary contained in Chapter IV\" and that the section rendered the provisions of r. 141 of the Motor Vehicles Rules inappJicable to cases covered by s. 68-F( 1). No doubt~ in a State where there is no Regional Transport Authority at all. but there is some other authority which func~ tions as the Regional Transport Authority for the purposes of the Act, such an authority might be that which would be comprehended by s. 68-F (I) but where as in Andhra Pradesh there is admittedly a Regional Transport Authority, it cannot be held that such authority is deprived of the power to issue a permit by reason of s. 68-F( I) merely becauso the Regional Transport Authority of that area cannot grant permits under Chapter IV.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 770 of 1963.\n\nWITH\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 771-778, 883 and 884 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from ihe judgment and order dated April 19, 1963, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 267-275 and 289 anct 295 of 1963.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri, P. Babula Reddy and K. R.\n\nChaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 77 /1963).\n\nP. Babula Reddy and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. A. Nos. 771-777 /1963).\n\nK. R. Chaudhuri, for the ap; iellants (in C.A. No. 778/ 1963).\n\nK. Srinivasa Murthy and K. R. Chaudhuri,, for , the appellants (in C. A. Nos. 883 and 884 of 196~).\n\nD. Narasaraju, Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, P. R. Ramachandra Rao and B; R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in all the appeals).\n\nJanuary 2 7, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nC. S. Rowiu ..\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPrad<1h\n\nAYYANGAR J .-This batch of 11 Appeals which have Ayyangar 1. been consolidated for hearing are directed against the common judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and are before us on the grant of a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution by the said High Court.\n\nThe proceedings concerned in the appeals arise out of Writ Petitions filed before the High Court by the several appellants before us under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of three Schemes framed under Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, I 939. nationalising motor transport in certain areas in the Kumool Di~\n\ntrict of the State of Andhra Pradesh which for convenience we shall refer to as the impugned Schemes.\n\nThe appellants who impugn the validity of the schemes are the previously existin11: motor transport operators whose permits are liable to be modified or cancelled under the provisions of\n\n!964 the Schemes on their coming into force.\n\nThe impugned\n\nc. s. Rowjee schemes were published by Government as G.0.Ms. 292,\n\nState 0~· Andhra 293 and 294 of the Home, Transport Department on the\n\nPradesh 5th February, 1963 in virtue of the powers conferred on Government by sub-s. 2 of the 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Ayyangar J.\n\nAct.\n\nThe Andhra Pradesh State Road Trans; x>rt Corporation which for shortness we shall refer to as the Corporation, besides the State of Andhra Pradesh and the Regional Transport Authority,· Kllffioo! were impieaded as respondents to the petitions.\n\nThey are also the respondents before us.\n\nBy reason of the first Scheme, 34 routes were intended to be taken over, while under the 2nd and 3rd, 17 and 13 routes respectively were proposed to be nationalised.\n\nThe routes covered by these three schemes are all in the western half of the Kurnool District.\n\nBefore adverting to the points requiring consideration in the appeals, it would be convenient to set out the relevant statutory provisions relating to the nationalisation of Road Transport for it is primarily on their construction that the decision of the appeals would turn.\n\nChapter IV-A containing special provisions relating to \"State Transport Uundertakings\" was introduced into the Motor Vehicles Act (Act IV of 1939) by an amenclment effected bv Central Act I of 1956 which came into effect on 16-2-1957. The Chapter consists of sections numbered 68-A to 68-I. 68-A contains definitions and of these it is sufficient to refer to the definition of \"State Transport Undertaking\" which includes inter alia \"any undertaking providing road transport service, where such undertaking is carried on by ...... any Road Transport Corporation established under sec. 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act 1950.\" (to refer to the portion which is material.)\n\n(It might be mentioned that the Corporation, the first respondent before us is a body established under this enactment.) 68-B reads :-\n\n\"The provisions of this Chapter and the rules and,\n\norders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith\n\ncontained in Chapter IV of this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.\"\n\nThe next section 68-C which is the one most involved in the appeals runs:\n\n\"Where any State Transport undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service, it is nec1111sary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the\n\nState transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, tb, e State transport undertaking may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered the area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed, and shall cause every such scheme to be published in the Official Gazette and also i.n such other manner as the State Government may direct.\"\n\nThe first two sub-sections of section 68-D enable persons affected by a Scheme published under s. 68-C to file objections thereto before the State Government within thirty days after the publication of the Scheme.\n\nIt further provides for the State Government considering the objections raised by persons affected by the Scheme after giving an opportunity to the objectors and the \"undertaking\" to be heard in the matter before approving or , nodifying the Scheme. The Scheme so approved or modified ;, required to be published in the State Gazette and on sucl:i publication it becomes final and is to be called \"the approved scheme\".\n\nThis is followed by sub-sec. (3) which reads:-\n\n\"The scheme as approved or modified under sub-s.\n\n(2) shall then be published in the Official\n\nC. s. Row}tt\n\n\\'.\n\nState of Andhra Pradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n19M\n\nC. S. Row; u\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nGazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route :\n\nProvided that no such scheme which relates to any inter-State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme under it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previous approval of the Central Government.\"\n\nSection 68-E provides :\n\n\"any scheme published under sub-s. (3) of S. 68-D may at any time be cancelled or modified by the State transport undertaking and the procedure laid down in s. 68-C and s. 68-D shall so far as it can be made applicable be followed in every case where the scheme is proposerl to be modified as if the modification proposed were a separate scheme.\"\n\nSection 68-F is really consequential on the approval of the scheme and sub-s. (1) thereof enacts:-.\n\n\"Where, in pursuance of an apprnved scheme, any\n\nState Transport Undertaking applies in the manner specified in Chapter IV for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit or a contract carriage i; iermit in respect of a notified area or notified rolite, the Regional Transport Authority shall .issue such permit to the State transport undertaking, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter\n\nIV.\" Its second sub-section er.ables the Regional Transport Authority to refuse renewil of any other permits to private operators and otherwise to deal with those permits so as to give effect to the Scheme.\n\nSections 68-G and 68-H deal with the payment of compensation and the methods by which the same should be computed but as these are hot material, we shall not quote them.\n\nSection 68-I empowers the State Government to make 196\" rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions\n\nc. s. Row; .. of Chapter IV-A and amog the specific purposes for which State of ndhra such rules may be framed 1s one under s. 68-1(2) (a) which Prad<1h provides for the form in which any scheme or approved Ayyangar J scheme may be published under section 68-C or sub-section\n\n(3) of Section 68-D and as usual a residuary clausereading:\n\n\"any other matter which has to be or mav be considered.\"\n\nThese draft schemes prepared by the Corporation were published under s. 68-D in the official Gazette on the 29th of November, 1962.\n\nThe appellants among others filed objections to the schemes and thereafter there was a hearing of theSe objections by the Transport Minister of the State under s. 68-0(2) on the 1 Hh of January, 1963. The Minister passed an order according approval to the schemes on the 12th of February, 1963, and the schemes as finalis~\n\ned weno published in the Gazette on the next day, February 13, 1963.\n\nIn pursuance of the provisions of the schemes the Corporation made applica:io'l to the Regional Transport Authori.y for permits.\n\nSoon thereafter the appellants and a few others filed writ petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for the quashing of the schemes.\n\nThese petitions were dismissed by the High Court by a common judgment on the 19th of April, 1963, holding that the objections made to the validity of the schemes would not be sustained.\n\nThe learned Judges, however, on the application of the Appellants granted a certificate of fitness under Art. 133 in pursuance of which these appeals have been preferred.\n\nThe points urged by the appellan<s before us in support of their submission regarding the invalidity of the impugned schemes, were substantially the same as were urged before High Court and which the learned Judges repelled. Briefly stated the principal ones were:-(!) that the schemes did not in reality reflect the opinion of the Corporation that \"it was necessary in the public interest that the Road Transport services in the area or over the route, specified in the\n\n134-159 S.C.-22\n\n1964 schemes should be run and operated by the State Transc. s. Rowjee port Undertaking\" as is required by s. 68-C but that the\n\nS v1. A dh schemes owed their origin to the direction of the Chief tale o n ra M' , f A dh .\n\nPradesh 1ruster o n ra Pradesh who acted ma/a fide m direct-\n\nAyyangar J. ing the Transport Undertaking to frame the impugned schemes for the areas for which they were purported to be framed; (2) that the decision by the Trnnsport Minister overruling the objections raised by the several road transport operators to the schemes was also ma/a fide, in that he too acted i.n pursuance of the mala fide intentions of the Chief Minister. of Andhra Pradesh; (3) that the provisions of the schemes (and this applied both to the draft schemes published by the Corporation as well as the approved schemes published under s. 68-0(3) did not conform to the statutory requirements of s. 68-C and rule 4 of the Rules regarding the particulars to be embodied in the schemes and that in consequence the core of the scheme was in violation of Rule 68(E) of the Act; (4) that the schemes comprised not merely intra-state routes but also included inter-state transport routes and in the latter case the procedure prescribed by the proviso to s. 68-D was not followed and hence all the impugned schemes which are integrated ones are bad and require to be set aside.\n\nThere were also a few minor ones which we shall notice and examine later.\n\nWe shall deal with these four pomts in the same order.\n\nBefore taking up the first one viz .. that the draft scheme in s. 68-D really did not originate fromf the Corporation. the State Transport Undertaking, but that it was done under the direction of the Chief Minister who, it was alleged for reasons which were set out in the affidavits and to which we shall refer presently was stated to have compelled, directed or induced the Corporation to do so, it would be necessary to give a short resume of the history of nationalised transport in Andhra Pradesh as well as certain events in Andhra Pradesh politics which have been the subject of allegations in these proceedings.\n\nThe present State of Andhra Pradesh is made uo of two distinct areas- ( 1) what . ' is known as the \"Telengana area\" consisting of nine districts of the old Hyderabad State and (2) the \"Andhra area\" which separated from Madras i.e. from the composite\n\nMadras State, in October 1953 and which comprised 11 districts. These two areas were integrated under the States\n\nRe-organization Act, 1956, to form the present State of Andhra Pradesh. In the Telengana area the road transport services had been run by the Government of the Nizam since the year 1932 and by 1956 private motor road transport operators had been completely eliminated from this entire area. In the Andhra Area comprising the 11 districts however, nationalisation of motor transport had not been undertaken.\n\nSoon after the formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation was established with effect from 11th of January, 1958 with a view to take steps for extending nationalised transport to the Andhra areas of the State. Certain routes in three of the 11 Districts Krishna, West Godavari and Guntur were nationalised from 1959 onwards. The Vijayawada-Masulipatam and Vijayawada-Guntur routes -were nationalised in the first instance and thereafter by about September, 1959, almost the entire routes in Krishna District were nationalised.\n\nThe next district to be taken up was West Godavari which was done in March, 1960. The process was nearly completed in this district by tl).e 1st of February, 1960, except for a few routes. The Government had sanctioned certain schemes for nationalisation in Guntur District which were expected to be completed by Oc.ober, 1961. The question which was thereafter the subject of consideration was the manner in which and the stages whereby nationalisation of the motor transport throughout the State might be brought about.\n\nWith this object the Corporation adopted a resolution in 1960 by which it decided to appoint an expert Committee to go into question as to the working of nationalised transport with a view to improve its efficiency as well as for drawing up plans for the future expansion of the road transport services in the State.\n\nThe terms of reference to that Committee were comprehensive and it started functioning very soon after the members were appointed.\n\nShri S. Anantharamakrishnan, Chainnan of Messrs.\n\nSimpson & Co. Ltd., Madras, one of the principal motor transport operators of the Madras State, was the Chairman of the Committee and it comprised three other members who were officials of the\n\nC. s. Row/ff\n\n\"· State of ttndlrra\n\nPradtlh\n\nAyyangar /,\n\n1964 Andhra Pradesh State Government.\n\nThe Committee\n\nc. s. Row} .. made various recommendations in the Report which it v. submitted to the Corporation on the 9th February, 196L\n\nStai.P~:a1.i!hra Among the several recommendations which this Committee made, what is of relevance to the present appeals and on Ayyangar J. h h 1 • th w 1c re,1ance was placed in support of the plea that -e impugned schemes were vitiated by ma/a {ides are those contained in Chapter IX of the Report and in particular the priorities of areas for taking up nationalisation which the Committee recommended in paragraph 125. They set out in paragraph 124 the factors which should be taken into account in fixing the orde1' in which new areas should be taken up for nationalisation as being (1) \"the most profitable areas should be taken up first;\" (2) \"from the traffic point of view there should be contiguous expansion;\" (3) \"from the administrative point of view it is convenient to nationalise bus services district by district;\" and ( 4) \"the proposal to form large sized divisions should be borne in view.\" Adopting these ariteria ithe Committee stated in paragraph 125 \"that the nationalisation of bus transport may be extended to the remaining districts in the Andhra area as indicated below:-\n\n1961-62-Guntur District\n\n1962-63-Nellore and Chittor Districts\n\n1963-64-Cuddapah and Kumool Districts\n\n1964-65-Anantapur and East Godavari Districts\n\n1965-66-Visakhapatnam and Srikakulam Dis tricts\".\n\nThe Committee also added in paragraph 126 \"we recommend that a policy decision may be taken by Government on the proposal to extend nationalisation of bus services to the remaining Andhra Districts during the Third Five Year Plan. The order in which the new areas will be taken over may also be decided by Government.\n\nThe Corporation will then be able to make its pla'1s well in advance, and arrange to provide all the facilities that are needed for expanding its activities to other ditricts.\" This report of the\n\nAnantharamakrishnan Committee was the subject of consideration by the Corporation and they accepted in March, 1962 the above recommendation regarding the phased programme of nationalisa, ion of districts in the order indicated and embodied this recommendation in their Administration Report for the period January 11, 1958. (the day on which the Corporation was formed) to March 31, 1961 which was submitted to the Government as required bys. 35(2) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1960, on the 7th of April,\n\n1962. In this last document they said speaking of future trends, \"the programme for nationalisation of transport services in the remaining of tlre Andhra Pradesh is as indicated below:- 1961-62-Guntur District 1962-63-Nellore and Chittor Districts\n\n1963-64-Cuddapah and Kurnool Districts 1964-65-Ananthapur and East Godavari Districts 1965-66-Vishakhapatnam and Srikakulam Districts.\" In the impugned schemes, however, the Corporation made an alteration in the order of the Districts successively to be taken up for nationalisation. It would be seen that after Guntur District which was nearly completed by the end of 1961 the next districts to be taken up during the 1962-63 would have been Nellore and Chittor Districts in that order and it was only thereafter that the District of Cuddapah\n\nand after it Kurnool would be taken up.\n\nThat was the recommendation of the Anantharamakrishnan Committee and which had been accepted by the Road Transport Corporation as late as April, 1962 and it may be mentioned in this connection that the Vice-Chairman of the Road Transport Corporation was himself a member of the Anantharamakrishnan Committee.\n\nBy its resolution dated, 4th May, 1962,' the Road Transport Corporation decided that instead of the above order Kurnool, Nellore and Cuddapah Distric<s in that order would be chosen for nationalisation and in the three schemes which were formulated in pursu ; mce of this Resolution the western half of Kurnool was selected as the area to be nationalised in the first instance.\n\nC. s. Rowjee\n\nState of .A.ndhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1964 As we have indicated earlier the appellants before us are\n\nc. s. Row~• transport operators whose routes are all in the western half Stat• 0/' A.ndhro of the. Km°:°l Ditrict. It is this change in the orders of\n\nProd,.,, the Districts m which the routes are to be nationalised and A.yyangar 1. the choice of the Western part of Kurnool for being taken up in the first instance that are alleged to be due to the ma/a fide intentions of the Chief Minister and this fonns the main ground upon which the validity of the schemes is impugned.\n\nThe allegations in this respect may now be stated.\n\nIn the affidavit in support of the Writ Petition No. 267 of 1963 from which Civil Appeal No. 770 of 1963 arises, this is what is stated:\n\n\"The General Elections for the various Constituencies of Assembly and Parliament were held in February, 1962. It is well-known that there are two groups in the Congres and they wer~ actively ranged against each other. The previous Chief Minister (Shri Sanjivayya) and the present Chief Minister (Shri Sanjiva Reddy) were both returned from Kurnool District in general elections. The then Chainnan of the Zila Parishad Shri Vijaya Bhaskara Reddy contested unsuccessfully from Yemniga11Qur Constituency in Kurnool District. (Yemniganpur is in the western part of the Kurnool District) . He is the active supporter of the present Chief Minister.\n\nShri C. Ram Bhopal son-in-law of the present Chief Minister also unsuccessfully contested from the Nandikothur Constituency in Kurnool District. (Nandikothur is also iµ the western part of Kumool).\n\nThe person who successfully opposed him Sri P. Venkafakrishna Reddy now M.L.A. is a partner in 'Venkata Krishna Bus Service' Nandikothur. This firm owns 2 pem1its and they stand in the name of J ayaram11yya who wa8 the Election Agent of Sri Venkata Krishna Reddy.\n\nTwo persons Sri Ganikhan and Sri Antony Reddy who are staunch supporters c, f\n\nthe preseni Chief Minister Sri Sanjiva Reddy were selected as Congress candidates by the Parliamentary Board at Delhi when Sanjiva Reddy was the President of the Indian National Congress, were also defeated in their respective Constituencies. It was considered by one and all that leading transport operators among them, (the petitioners) were responsible for the defeat of these persons and this enraged the feelings of Shri Sanjiva Reddy against the operators in Kurnool District and particularly the operators whose routes lay in the western areas of the District and wi\\h a view to cause them loss and to ruin their business this nationalisation of transport in the western part of Kurnool was directed to be undertaken in spite of the Emergency and in spite of the incapacity of the Road Transport Corporation to fulfil their eariier commitments for want of buses. The undivided brothers of Sri T. Narayan. a transport operator, namely Sri Venkataswamy contested the Assembly seat against Sri Sanjiva Reddy in the Dhone Constituency from which he was returned and he refused to withdraw even though lots of pressure were brought on him.\n\nSri Rajasekhara Reddy and Sri Vijayakumara Reddy sons l>f Sri P. Ranga Reddy, Minister in the previous Cabinet are also transport operators in the Kurnool District.\n\nIt is known to every one that Sri P. Ranga Reddy is in the group opposed to Sri Sanjiva Reddy.\n\nSri Y. Mahananda Reddy another transport operator is a staunch supporter of Sri P. Ranga Reddy.\n\nWhen Sanjiva Reddy was President of the Indian National Congress his selection for the Congress ticket was set aside by him and one Vengal Reddy was selected by th<' Pradesh Congress Committee. It is significant that the three schemes framed for the part of the Kurnool District relate to the areas in\n\nC. s. Rowjee\n\nState of Andhro\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar /..\n\nC. s. Row/••\n\nStal• of Andhra\n\nPrail1sh\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nwhich the routes on which the _above stated persons are running their buses. It is also significant that the areas in Kurnool District where the supporters of the present Chief Minister are having permits are not sought to be inr.luded in any of the three nationalisatior, schemes.\n\nIn the Nandyal area most of the transport operators are the supporters of the present Chief Minister and their routes are excluded from the schemes.\n\nIt is with a view to achieve the object of hitting against those' operators who have fallen into disfavour am' to protect those who are in his good books that the schemes have been evolved over routes and parts of the .District.\"\n\n11wo further matters were also urged as SW?porting this plea of' mala {ides.\n\nThe first was that with a view to carry out the original programme which was approved and confirmed by the Corporation in their Administration Report published on April 7, 1962, the routes in the Nellore District which according to the Anantharamakrishnan Committee Report had to be taken up next were surveyed and though the elements of contiguity and profitable nature were both present in regard to the extension of the services to Nellore, contiguity by reason of the fact that some buses\n\nbelonging to the Corporation and running from Guntur were already plying in Nellore District and the profitable nature since these were evaluated by the Anantharamakrishnan Committee whose recommendations were examined and approved by the Corporation, the nationalisation of the routes in Nellore was, however, abandoned and that of the western part of Kurnool was decided upon.\n\nThe other fact was that the National Defence Council passed a resolution as late as the first week of November, 1962, urging the -deferring of further nationalisation of transport services for the present and it was in the teeth of this resolution which was passed at the meeting at which the Chief Minister himself was present that the schemes of nationalisation of transport services in Kurnool district was published by the Corpor<ition on the 29th November, I 962.\n\nBefore examining whether these allegations have been ruaae out it would be necessary to explain the legal po>ition in relation to which they have to be considered.\n\nTo begin with the schemes now impugned have been formulated by the Corporation which is an independent semi-autonomous body brought into existence by the State Governmen, by acting under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950.\n\nUnder s. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act ii is the Corporation which is the State Transport Undertaking which has to form the opinion whether \"for the puv;:iose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-urdinated road transport service it is necessary in the public interest whether the service should be run c.nd operated by the State\n\nTransport Undertaking.\" Secondly, it is the Corporation that has to be satisfied that such services should in public interests be provided \"for any area or route''.\n\nIn , the presen< case, it is undoubtedly the 'Corporation 'that 'has published the schemes under s. 68-C in which' t\\lese two matters are stated to have been considered and decided upon by the Corporation itself.\n\nIt was not disputed by the appellants that whatever be the inclinations, desires or motives of the Chief Minister, if the Corporation had by an independent consideration of the situation decided on the formulation of the impugned schemes, their validity could not be successfully impugned mearly because the schemes satisfied the alleged grudge which the Chief Minister bore to the affected operators.\n\nThe argument urged by the appellants on this part of the case was however tow-fold: (1) That it was not in fact the Corporation that formed the opinion indicated in s. 68-C but really the Chief Minister; (2) That the Chief Minister was motivated by extraneous considerations, namely, to strike at his political opponents who worked either against himself or his friends, supporters and relationsin the elections in Bebruary, 1962 and had devised the schemes in order to cause them loss and compass their ruin.\n\nA subsidiary point was also urged that the Transport Minister who heard the objections under s. 68-0(2) was also influenced by the Chief Minister.\n\nIt was thus said that the Chief Minister dominated at every stage through\n\nC. S. Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andhro Pradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1964 . which the sche1es .passed and that the schemes were really C. s. Rowree the result of lllS improper motive to ruin his political\n\nState 0/· Andhra ?pponents. It was again not disputed by the respondent that Pradesh if these steps were made out the schemes would be invalid\n\nAyyangar J. and ought to be quashed.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court have on this part of the case held: (I) That the allegations made against the Chief Minister had not been proved; (2) Assuming, however, that the Chief Minister was actuated by political motives to hit at his opponents, still, the schemes which were published by the Corporation, had been framed by the Corporation not at the dictation of the Chief Minister, but as a result of their own independent judgment; and (3) Lastly, the learned Judges held that there was no proof that the Transport Minister who i1eard the objections raised by the appellants to the schemes was influenced by the Chief Minister or acted at his behest, and therefore that the schemes framed and approved wefe fully in conformity with the requirements of s. 68-C.\n\nThe correctness of these conclusions have been challenged before us and the first matter that requires to be considered is as to whether the allegations against the Chief , Minister have been made out.\n\nThe question raised has manifestly to be considered from two aspects. The first is whether the facts alleged which were stated to have been the cause of the Chief Minister's animus against the transport o; ierators in the western part of Kurnool have been established. In regard to this the first point to be noticed is that the contents of the affidavit were, not vague, but details were given and these were: (I) The existence of two groups in the Congress Party, at the time of the General Elections in 1962, the Chief Minister being the head of one of them and of the other Mr. Sanjivayya; (2) That at the last General Elections certain c; mdidates who were named and who are stated to have belonged to the group of the Chief Minister were defeated; (3) The Constituencies where tlley stood were in the western portion of the Knrnool District; ( 4) That tllis defeat was occasioned by persons belonging fo. the other group in the Congress Party whose names are\n\nalso given; (5) That several of these members supporting the dissident group were motor transport operators and who are stated to have taken a prominent part in the elections and in the defeat of the candidates belonging to the Chief Minister's group; ( 6) The matters in relation to Ranga Reddy and his sons etc.\n\nThese are what might be termed objective facts.\n\nIf thes.: allegations were held not proved, then the entire plea of the appellants on this part of the case fails, because there would be no foundation for the submission regarding the ma/a {ides of the Chief Minister.\n\nIf, however, these facts were held to be made out, the second aspect requires to be examined and that is whether the Court has material to hold that these facts led the Chief Minister to en; ertain feelings of personal hostility to these transport operators because of the aid and support the latter gave to the candidates belonging to the group opposed to him which led to the defeat of .his partymen.\n\nOn this aspect the. allegations were that the Chief Minister felt chagrined at the defeat of his partymen and supporters and desiring to wreak his vengeance against the motor transport operators of the western parts of Kurnool, his political opponents. instructed the Corporation to change the order in which the districts should be taken up for nationalisation and had Kurnool taken up first, departing from what had been decided upon, just a little while previously by the Corporation, and that the Corporation gave effect to these instructions and directions by not only taking Kurnool first, but even in that district eliminating the private operators from the western portions of the distrfot who were the political opponents of the Chief Minister. This, it is obvious, would be a matter of probabilities and of the inference to be drawn by the Court from all the circumstances on which no direct evidence can be adduaed.\n\nIt is, no doubt, true that allegations of mala [ides and of improper motives on the part of those in power are frequently made and their frequency has increasecl in recent times.\n\nIt is also somewhat unfortunate that allegations of this nature which have no foundation, in fact, are made in\n\nC. S. Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1964 several of the cases which have come u; i before this and other C. s. Rowjee Courts and it is found that they have been made merely\n\nState oj Andhra with a view to cause prejudice or in the hope that whether Pradesh they have basis in fact or not some of it at least\n\nAyyangar 1. might stick.\n\nConsequently it has become the duty of the Court to scrutinise these allegations with care so as to avoid being in any manner influenced by them, in cases where they have no foundation in fact. i In this task which is thus cast on the courts it would conduce to a more satisfactory disposal and consideration of them, if those against whom allegations are made came forward to place before the court either their denials or their version of the matter, so that the court may be in a position to judge as to whether the onus that lies upon those who make ailegations cf ma/a {ides on the part of authorities of the status of those with which this appeal is concerned, have discharged their burden of proving i.t.\n\nIn the absence of such affidavits or of .materials, placed before the Court by these authorities, the Court is left to judge. of the veracity of the allegations merely on tests of probability with nothing more substantial by way of answer. This is precisely the situation in which we find ourselves in the present case.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court have repelled the allegations contained in the affidavits which we have set out earlier on grounds and for reasons which do not appeal to us.\n\nAs the learned Advocate-General did not seek to support those grounds and that reasoning we do not consider it necessary to set them out or deal with them.\n\nIf the reasons given by the learned Judges of the High Court be put aside, th\\: position resolves itself into this that allegations with particularity and detail have been made in the petition. We are here having in mind the allegations we have enumerated and categorised earlier as objective facts.\n\nAs to these there is no denial at all of them, not even by the Transport Minister who though he filed an affidavit, confined himself to the allegations regarding his having been dictated to by the Chief Minister when he approved the schemes, though it is obvious they are capable of denial and if need be wiih the same particularity' with which they have been made in the petition. The learned judges of the High Court have not rejected the allegations regarding the objective facts on the ground of their\n\natent improbability or absurdity, nor did the learned Advocate-General make any submission on these Jines.\n\nC. s. Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andltro\n\nPradesh The next question is as regards the inference to be drawn from these facts which in the absence of their denial AY\"\"\"gar J. have to be taken as true. It is here that we have felt the greatest uneasiness, because if the facts which serve as the foundation for the plea of mala fides are made out, the only question would be whether the inference of mala fides on the part of the Chief Minister would be a reasonable one to draw.\n\nIt is at this point that we are faced with the necessity of having to proceed without there being any effective answer to the propriety of drawing the inference which the appellants desire.\n\nThere has been no denial by the Chief Minister, nor an affidavit by any person who claims or can claim to know personally about the truth about these allegadons. The Secretary to the Home Department-one Mr.\n\nS. A. Iyengar has filed a counter-affidavit in which the allegations we have set out earlier have been formally denied.\n\nHe says, \"I have been expressly instructed and authorised by the Hon'ble the Chief Minister to state that the allegations suggesting personal animus and giving mandate are false and mischievous and have been deliberately made to create an atmosphere of sympathy\". The learned Advocate- General did not suggest that the Court could act upon this second-hand denial by the Chief Minister, as the statement by Sri S. A. Iyengar is merely hearsay.\n\nWe are, therefore, constrained to hold that th.e allegations that the Chief Minister was motivated by bi~ and personal ill-will against the appellants, stands unrebutted.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General realising this position, desired us to proceed on that basis and his submission was that assuming that the allegations made against the Chief Minister were made out and that he had bias and ill-will against the iippellants, still there was no proof thM the Corporation which was an autonomous body was similarly motivated and that unless the appellants were able to establish it,' bias or ill-will on the part of the Chief Minister would be irrelevant\n\n1964 We agree as already indicated that he is right in this C. s. Rowjee submission. This takes us to the consideration of the ques-\n\nState of Andhra tion as to whether the Corporation carried out the mandate\n\nPradesh of the Chief Minister as was alleged by the appellants or\n\nAyyangar J. whether the impugned schemes were formulated bv them as a result of the opinion which they themselves foriiJed that they were necessary in public interest for the purposes set out in s. 68-C of the Act. On this matter there is an affidavit by the Corporation denying the allegation made by the appellants that the Corporation acted merely as the tool of the Chief Minister in order to carry out his. behest, and it is there asserted that the decision to frame the schemes was taken as a result of the independent opinion formed by them after an examination of the entire question. The acceptability of these rival assertions were debated before us most >trenuously during the hearing of these ~.ppeals.\n\nCertain facts already set out have a bearing on this question, and these we shall recall. The Anantharamakrishnan Committee had laid down the criteria for determining the order in which areas and routes had to be selected for nationalisation, and applying these principles had drawn up a list of the remaining disllicts in which nationalisation should be successively taken up. If that order was followed, Nellore would have been the next district to be taken up and the tnrn of the Kurnool District would have come up after nationalisation of the routes in the Nellore, Chittor and Cuddapah districts were completed.\n\nThis report had been submitted to the Corporation in February, 1961 and after further detailed examination of these recommendations the Corr,:ioration had accepted the recommendation regarding the order of the Districts to be taken up for nationalisation and had embodied this approval in its Administration Report dated March 24, 1962 which was published in April, 1962. It is only necessary to add that the Cor/oration had also had the routes in Nellore surveyed a little while before.\n\nIn February, 1962, however, the general elections to the Assembly and the Parliamentary Constituencies had taken place and the allegations of the appellants related to the feelings that arose during the course of elections. The present Chief Minister assumed office as Chief\n\nMinister on March 12, 1962. On April 19, 1962, it is admitted that he summoned a conference of the Corporation and its officials at which, and this also is admitted, he suggested that the nationalisation of bus routes in the Kurnool District should be taken up first.\n\nNow the Chief Minister himself made a statement as to what he did at this meeting.\n\nIt is the case of the appellants that it was the mandate given to the, Corporation by the Chief Minister at this Conference that brought about this change in the order of the districts to. be taken up for nationalisation and not the independent opinion of the Corporation as to what was needed in the public interest as required by s. 68-C.\n\nAs regards his part at the conference, the Chief Minister himself stated in the Assembly on July 26, 1962:\n\n\"To say that the Corporation will do everything for the simple reason that it is an autonomous body, and also to say that we will not at all interfere, is not fair. It will not be fair. Now and then we shall have conferences. For exampl~, the Corporation wanted to nationalise Chittoor district. We had discussions. Kurnool is surrounded by three nationalised distdcts; one side Mahaboobnagar, one side Guntur and the other side the district of Nellore which is going to be nationalised. I questioned as to why the district of Kurnool which is surrounded by three nationalised districts i~ left out, and instead the district of Chittoor which is abutling the borders of Madras and Bangalore is sought to be taken up.\n\nThey could not explain, I said Kurnool district is a very compact one and three districts around it are nationalised. They thought that was more practicable and reasonable, Therefore they changed their minds.\n\nAs a result of such discussions, once in a way we (Government) do interfere but will not interfere in day to day administration.\"\n\nThe conference, as stated earlier, addressed by the Chief Minister was on the 19th of April, 1962. This was follow-\n\nC. s. Rowjee\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nC. S. Rowjee v.\n\nStale of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\n4yyangar J.\n\ned by the resolution of the Corporation of May 4, 1962.\n\nThis ran:\n\n\"The Corporation noted the discussion which took place in the office of the Chief Minister on 19th April, 1962, in regard to programme of nationalisation of Road Transport Services during the Third Five Year Plan period and resolved that during the Third Five Year Plan\n\nthree more districts in the order mentioned could be nationalised, viz., Kurnool, Nellore and Cuddapah in view of difficult financial position ........ Chief Executive Officer explained that as there is a depot at Kurnool and as Kurnool is contiguous to the nationalised districts, it would be easier to nationalise Kurnool rather Nellore district.\n\nThe nationalisation could be extended to the Nellore district after Kurnool disirict is nationalised. The Corporation therefore resolved that Kurnool district could be taken up for nationalisation in preference to Nellore.\" In the counter-affidavit which 1J1e Corporation filed to the writ petition the Chief Executive Officer after denying that the Corporation was actuated by ma/a fides in framing the three impugned schemes, stated that the acceptance by the Corporation of the recommendation of 1he Anantharamakrishnan Committee was tentative and that it could not fetter them from discharging its powers and duties under the statute. It gave the following reasons for the decision to nationalise Road Transport Services in a part of the Kurnool district in preference to other areas: (1 ) because there is a Government depot at Kurnool, (2) Kurnool is contiguous to the entire Telangana area which is nationalised and also contiguous to the nationalised area of Guntur.\n\nIt also stated that the choice was made in the interest of the maintenance of service contiguity and coordination and it added that \"the impending completion of the Ra.ngapur\n\nBridge over the river Krishna, which when completed would facilitate the operation of direct services from Hyderabad through Kurnoof to the areas beyond.\" Besides it\n\nasserted that the Corporation which was an autonomous statutory authority was vested with powers under the Road Transport Act and it was, therefore, malicious to allege that the decision by the Corporation to prepare the impugned schemes was either infiuened by the Chief Minister or .was under a mandate from him and it a_sserted that in formulating the schemes the necessary opinion under s. 68-C was formed by itself.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court have accepted this statement, made on behalf of the Corporation and have repelled the attack made on it based on the schemes not having been formulated as a result of the opinion formed by the Corporation itself.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General commended this approach and this conclusion for our acceptance.\n\nHe also pointed out. that the Anantharamakrishnan Committee had themselves indicated in paragraph 126 of their report that the order in which the new areas will be taken over for nationalisation might be decided by the Government, so that the order in which motor transport in the several districts should, be nationalised, was not prescribed by the Committee as a rigid or hard and fast rule, but the order of the districts was treated even by them as a flexible one which was capable of and was intended to be, modified by the Government by making policy decisions on these matters taking into account not merely the finances available for nationalisation but also other relevant matters.\n\nWe have given the matter our best consideration, but we are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court in their conclusion.\n\nThe first matter which stands out prominently in this connection is the element of time and the sequence of dates. We have already pointed out that the Corporation had as late as March, I 962 considered the entire subject and had accepted the recommendation of ihe Anantharamakrishnan Committee as to the order in which the transport in the several districts should be nationalised and had set these out in their Administration Report for the three year perio<i 1958 to 1961. It must, therefore, be taken that every factor which the Anantha-\n\n134-159 S.C.-23\n\nC. S. Row/u v.\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar /,\n\n1964 ramakrishnan Committee had considered relevant and C. s. Rowie• material for determining the order of the districts had been State 0/· Andhra independently investigated, examined and concurred in, Pradesh before those recommendations were approved.\n\nIt means Ayyangar 1. that upto March-April, 1962 a consideration of all the relevant factors had led the Corporation to a conclusion identical with that of the Anantharamakrishnan Committee.\n\nThe next thing that happened was a conference of the Corporation and its officials with the Chief Minister on April 19, 1962. The proceedings of the Conference are not on the record nor is there any evidence as to whether any record was made of what happened at the conference. But we have the statement of the Chief Minister made on the floor of the State Assembly in which he gave an account of what transpired between him and the Corporation and its officials. We have already extracted the relevant portions of that speech from which the following points emerge: ( 1) that the Chief Minister claimed a right to lay down rules of policy for the guidance of the Corporation and, in fact, the learned Advocate-General submitted to us that under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. the Government had a ight to give directions as to policy to the Corporation; (2) that the policy direction that he gave related to and included the order in which the districts should be taken up for nationalisation; and (3) that applying the criteria that the districts to be nationalis~.d should be contiguous to those in which nationalised services ~!ready existed, Kumool answered this test better than Chittoor and he, applying the tests he laid down, therefore suggested that instead of Chittoor, Kurnool should be taken up next. One matter that emerges from this is that it was as a result of policy decision taken by the Chief Minister and the direction given to the Corporation that Kurnool was taken up for nationalisation next after Guntur. It is also to be noticed that if the direction by the Chief Minister, was a policy decision, the Corporation was under the law bound to give effect to it ( vide s. 34 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950). We are not here concerned with the question whether a policy deciion contemplated by s. 34 of the Road Transport Act could relate to a matter which under s. 68-C of the Act is left to the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Corporation, where that is the State Undertak 1964 ing, or again whether or not the policy decision has to be\n\nc. s. Row}•• by a formal Government order in writing, for what is rele P .,.d h . . mu vant 1s whether the materials placed before the Court estab- .Stat• 01 AlllihN\n\nIish that the Corporation gave effect to it as a direction which they were expected to and did obey. If the Chief Minister was impelled by motives of personal ill-will against the Road Transport Operators in the western part of Kurnool and he gave the direction to the Corporation to change the order of the districts as originally planned by them and instead take up Kurnool first in order to prejudicially affect his political opponents, and the Corporation carried out his directions it does not need much argument to show that the resultant scheme framed by the Corporation would also be vitiated by ma/a {ides notwithstanding the interposition of the semi-autonomous Corporaiion.\n\nIt is also to be noticed that the Chief Minister in his statement to the Assembly stated that when he made an enquiry of the Corporation as to why they did not choose Kurnool as the next district, the officials of the Corporation had no answer to give.\n\nIt is somewhat remarkable that the Corporation and its officials should have remained silent and tongue-tied notwithstanding that its Vice-Chairman was a member of the Anantharamakrishnan Committee and had as a inember thereof considered the entire question in all its aspects and laid down ( 1) the criteria for determining the order of priority; and (2) by ap;>lying these tests had laid down the priorities among the districts and more than this, the entire body of the Corporation had considered the several recommendations of the Committee in their report and while rejecting some had accepted this particular recommendation regarding the order in which the districts should be taken up and this last one had happened within a month or so before the conference addressed by the Chief Minister. If in these circumstances the appellants allege that whatever views the Co11poration entertained they were compelled to or gave effect to the wishes of the Chief Minister, it could not be said that the same is an unreasonable inference from facts. It is also somewhat remarkable that within a little over two weeks from this Conference by its\n\nA.yyangar /.\n\nC. s. Rowjee\n\nStai. of Andhra\n\n Pradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nresolution of May 4, 1962, the Corporation dropped Ne1lore altogether, a district which was contiguous to Gumm and proceeded to 1ake up the nationalisation of the routes of the western part of the Kurnool district and were able to find reasons for taking he tep. It is also worthy of note that in the resolution of the 4th May, 1962, of the Corporation only one reason was given for preferring Kurnool to Nellore, namely, the existence of a depot at Kurnool because the other reason given, namely, that Kurnool was contiguous to an area of nationalised transport equally applied to Nellore and, in fact, this was one of the criteria o.n the basis of which the Anantharamakrishnan Committee itself decided the order of priority among 'he districts.\n\nAs regards the depot at Kurnool which was one of the two reasons set out in the resolution for the choice of that district i.n the first instance, learned Counsel for the <!Qpellants submitted that this rea1on was one invented to justify the Corporation's action directed against them and to obviate the comment that the reason for the change was political and not for providing an adequate service for the area.\n\nHe submitted that the so-called depot wa1 merely a garage with a few repairing tools and not any full-fledged repairing workshop. None of the affidavits filed on behalf of the appellants, however, made any allegation regarding the nature of the facility afforded at this 'depot'-and so we are not in a position to act merely on the arguments adduced to us at the bar. It has however to be noticed that the existence of this 'depot' at Kurnool escaped the notice of the Anantharamakrishnan Committee, who in their report have devoted some attention to the need for depots and the equipment these should possess and referred to certain deficiencies which they noticed in the depots which they inspected.\n\nThe officials of the Corporation did not evidently bring this depot at Kumool to the notice of the Committee.\n\nAgain, when in their Administration Report, the Corporation accepted the recommendations a1 regards the order in which the districts should be nationalised, the existence of this depot at Kurnool seems also to have escaped the a; tention of the Corporation itself, as a factor to be taken into account in making the choice of the district. But we are basing no conclusion on this feature.\n\nWhen the Transport Corporation, however, filed the counter-affidavit it was not content to rest merely with the reasons given in the resolut:on as those which were taken into account in arriving at the decision but added one more, namely, the impending completion of the bridge at Rangapur across the Krishna as a further reason which had been taken into account for arriving at a decision.\n\nWhat the Court is concerned with and what is relevant to the enquiry in the appeal is not whether theoretically or on a consideration of the arguments for and against, now advanced the choice of Kurnool as the next district selected for nationalisation of iransport was wise or improper, but a totally different question whether this choice of Kurnool was made by the Corporation as required by s. 68-C or, whether this choice was in fact and in substance, made by the Chief Minister, and implemented by him by utilism~ the machinery of the Corporation as alleged by the appellants. On the evidence placed in the case we are satisfied that it was as a result of the conference of the 19th April, 1962, and in order to give effect to the wishes of the Chiet Minister expressed there, that the schemes now impugned were formulated by the. Corporation.\n\nThe next submission of the learned Advocate-General was that even assuming the Chief Minister directed the order in which districts were to be taken up for nationalisation, still the scheme framed by the Corporation could not be assailed as not in conformity with the requirements of s. 68-C of the Ac: so long as the choice of the \"area\" in which and the routes in it to be run by the Corporation was made by them alone.\n\nThis argument proceeds from the circumstance that even taking it that the Chief Minister directed the Corporation to take up the nationalisation of the routes in the Kurnool district in the first instance, there was no allegation that he gave any direction regarding the area in the district and the routes. We fail to see any fore in this argunient. If the choice of the district was that ot the Chief Minister, the fact that within the area of the di~ trict pointed out to them, the Corporation selected some area witl1 in the district and the routes within that area.\n\nC. s. Row/et\n\nState of AndhN\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nC. s .. Row/•• ... 11Gt6 \"f Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\ncannot on any reasonable construction of s. 68-C be a sufficient compliance with the statute. We are disposed to read the word 'area' in the section as meaning such 'area• in the entire State as the Corporation should consider proper and not as the learned Advocate-General would read as area within a circumscribed part of the State determined by an outside authority.\n\nBesides, there is really little or no explanation forthcoming from the Corporation for choosing the western part of the Kurnool district for the exclusion of the private operators in the first instance. The principal allegation regarding mala {ides on the part of the Chief Minister made by 1the appellants was directed to demonstrate that the object of the present schemes was to eliminate operators whose routes lay .on the western side of the district. It is also stated in the affidavits that the friends or supporters of the Chief Minister were operating motor transport in the eastern part of Kurnool. Therefore it might. be expected that\n\nth~ counter-affidavits filed offered a rational explanation as to why this portion of the Kurnool district was chosen in the first instance in preference to the other portion of the district. Needless to say the resolution of the Corporation of May 4, 1962, offers no assistance in this matter and as we have said earlier though the counter-affidavits contained a denial of the allegation that the Corporation was acting at the behest of the Chief Minister, there is no explanation for the choice of the western portion.\n\nOur conclusion therefore is that the impugned schemes are vitiated by the fact that they were not in conformity with the requirements of s. 68-C.\n\nThe next question is as regards the approval of the schemes by the Transport Minister under s. 68-D(3).\n\nIt was the case of the appellants that just like the Corporation, the Transport Minister also merely carried out the wishes of the Chief Minister and that therefore the approval by the Transport Minister must be held to be vitiated by the mala {ides of the Chief Minister.\n\nIn regard to this, however, two matters hav11 to be remembered. The first is that there is nothing on the record to show that the Chief\n\nMinister influenced his colleague and beyond the fact that both the Chief Minister as well as the Transport Minister are members of the same Council of Ministers, there is nothing to indicate that the Chief Minister influenced the Transport Minjster. The other matter is that the Transport Minister had stated on oath that in considering the objections under s. 68D ( 3) and approving the schemes he wrus uninfluenced by the Chief Minister.\n\nWe, therefore, consider that tliere is no basis for holding that the Transport Minister's approval of the schemes does not satisfy the requirements of the law.\n\nIn view that we take the schemes have to be set aside as not in conformity with s. 68-C of the Act, the other objections raised do not require consideration but in view, however, of the arguments addressed to us on them we shall briefly deal with them.\n\nThe next point that was urged was that the schemes were not in conformity with s. 68-C of the Act for another reason. A scheme to be published by the Transport Undertaking is required by s. 68-C to give \"particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed\", prescribed, of course, meaning \"prescribed by rules\". These particulars, it is obvious, are required to be set out in the scheme, so that (a) transport operators running vehicles on\n\ntl!e routes might know that they are afrected by the scheme and might, if they see sufficient reason therefor, prefer\n\nobjpctions under s. 68-D(l); '3lld (b) the operators and others formulate. their objections properly, particularly in the matter of pointing out the deficiency or inadequacy of the schemes or the services proposed to be run under the schemes for the approving authority to consider. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the impugned scheme did not furnish particulars required by this provision. The draft scheme, as published under s. 68-C, and that as approved finally, contains six columns which are respectively headed (1) Serial Number: (2) Name of the Route, indicating its course; (3) I&ngtlr of the route in miles; ( 4)\n\nC. s. Rowi ..\n\n•• State of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nC. s. Row/tt\n\nStole of A.ndhra\n\n1Prad'8h\n\nA.yyangar /.\n\nNumber of vehicles proposed to be operated on each route:\n\n(5) Total number of trips each way to be performed on each route; and (6) The nature of the services.\n\nNow. columns 4 and 5 do not contain the precise number of vehicles proposed to be operated or the precise total of the trips each way to be performed daily. But on the other hand each of these columns is sub-divided into twcr-4 and 4(a), 5 and 5(a). Under column 4 is given the minimum number of vehicles proposed to be operated and under 4 (a) the maximum number.\n\nSimilarly column 5 sets out the minimum number, of total trips each way and 5(a) the maximum number. Now in several of these the variation between the maximum and the minimum in columns 4 and 5 is 1 to 2 i.e. if one is the minimum two is the maximum, and similarly if two is the minimum, four is the maximum, but there are others in which the variation is even more pronounced. for instance, in scheme number one, 1rt serial number 15 the. minimum is one and the maximum three in both columns 4 and 5 and in serial number 16 the proportion between, the maximum and minimum is even more pronounced for in column 4 it is 1 to 4. The position is similar in regard to serial No. 20. The objection that is raised to this method of specifying the maximum and the minimum of the number of vehicles which will be put on the route and the number of trips which these vehicles will operate is, that one of , the objects of the schemes is the provision, among others, of an adequate road transport serviCe. It is common ground that the persons affected by the schemes may object to the scheme on the ground that it does not offer an adequate service and that this would be a relevant matter for consideration by the authority approving the scheme. It is, therefore, urged on behalf of the appellants that the schemes as promulgated which disclose not the actual number of vehicles that would run or the number of trips which the vehicles would make, do not enable the affected objectors to raise their objections to the adequacy of the service proposed and similarly do not afford requisite information to the approving authority under s. 680(3) to decide whether to approve the scheme or not. Besides this general objection, it is pointed out that the cpecification of a minimum\n\nand a maximum in columns 4 and 5 is contrary to what has been prescribed by the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957, made in relation to \"the particulars to be contained in schemes under Ch. IV-A.\" Rule 4 of these Rules which have statutory force under s. 68-C requires draft schemes and awroved schemes to contain inter alia \"the\n\nnumber of vehicles proposed to be operated on each route and the total number of trips to be performed daily on each rou•e.\" By a rule framed on the 26th of December, 1958, the State Government framed a rule numbered as Rule 5 of these Rules which reads:\n\n\"5. The State Transport Undertaking may at its discretion, vary the frequency of services on any of the notified routes or within any nodfied area having regard to the needs of traffic during any period, either by increasing or decreasing the number of trips of the existing buses or by increasing or decreasing the number of buses.\"\n\nThe validity of Rule 5 was one of the mattel's that was raised for consideration by this Court in Dosa Satyanarayanamurty etc. v. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation(') and this Court held that Rule 5 was repugnant to s. 68-E which reads:\n\n\"Any scheme published under sub-s. ( 3) of s. 68-D may at any time be cancelled or modified by the State Transport Undertaking and the procedure laid down in s. 68-C and s. 68-D shall, so far as it can be made applicable be followed in every case where the scheme is proposed to be modified as if the modifications proposed were a separate scheme.\" and struck it down.\n\nThereafter rule 5 was deleted, but rule 4 remains as we have set out. The question for consideration is whether the prescription of maxima and minim:·:\n\nin c_olumns 4 & 5 is in conformity with the requirements of Rule 4. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants ( 1) that the reason why these maxi!Jla and minima were put ----------\n\nC. s. Rowjee\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nC. s. Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andhra Pradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\ndo\"\":n in the schmes, contravening Rule 4, was in reality to avoid the operation of s. 68-E and to get over the decision of this Court striking down Rule 5 and that for the same reason which underlay the decision of this Court in Dosa Satyanarayanamurty' s case(') the prescription of maxima and minima contravened s. 68-E as it operates iu no way dissimilar to Rule 5 and that as this vice pervades the entirety of the scheme as published, all the three schemes should be set aside. In further support of their submission the appellants relied -0n the affidavit filed by the Assistant Secretary to the Transport Department who stated that the prescription of maxima and minima was adopted because \"it enabled the Corporation to provide adequate services with reference to the public needs, without having to go through the elaborate gamut of modifying the approved scheme for the purpose.\"\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court have repelled this contention on the grqund of the analogy furnished b ss. 46 and 48 of the Act under which applications for State carriage permits by private operators and the permits granted to them are required tu state the minimum and maximum number of daily services proposed to be provided in relation to each route or area, was an indication that a scheme specifying the maxima and minima of the number of buses and services was in conformity with and did not contravene Rule 4.\n\nThe learned Advocate-General adopted the same line of argument and submitted that the language of Rule 4 did not in terms prohibit the specification of a minimum and maximum and that Rule 5 which this Court struck down as being repugnant to s. 68-E was attracted only when the maxima or minima set out in the scheme was departed from.\n\nHe, however, conceded that the gap between the minimum and the maximum specifiee in a scheme might be so wide as to render the same a contradiction of Rule 4 but he submitted that the variations in the 3 schemes before us between columns 4 and 4(a) and columns 5 and S(a) respectively were so slight as not to amount to a failure to fix the number of vehicles to be operated or the trips they\n\nwould do on the routes.\n\nc'l [19611 1 s.c.R. 642.\n\nIn the case before us in view of the conclusion we have reached that some of the variations between the maxima and the minima in the number of vehicles proposed to be operated on each route are such as, adopting the test suggested by the learned Advocate-General himself, to really contravene Rule 4 we have not thought it necessary to finally decide the larger question, whether the mere prescription of the maxima and minima, particularly for the reasons set out in the affidavit of the Assistant Secretary to the Transport Department, constitutes a violation of s. 68-E as also of Rule 4 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957 as to require the same to be struck down.\n\nWe might, however, mention in passing that' we are not much impressed by the argument based on ss. 46 and 48. It must be remembered that we are concerned with a requirement of Ch. IV-A and under s. 68-B of the Act, not only the provisions of that Chapter but the rules made thereunder are to have effect notwithstanding anything in Ch. IV in which s. 46 and ~· 48 occur. This apart, the rule-making authority had the analogy of the provisions of ss. 46 and. 48 before it, but yet chose not to adopt the same phraseology as was employed in these sections.\n\nBesides, as the provisions of Ch. IV-A invade the rights of private operators to carry on business and is justified as a reasonable restriction on their rights in public interest, it might very well have been considered that a more precise indication should be afforde<i by the scheme to enable its adequacy to be tested by the quasijudiciat procedure which has to be followed before the scheme becomes effective. However, as stated already, there is no need to decide this matter finally in view of om conclusion that the scheme contravenes Rule 4 even on the test submitted by the Advocate-General. In saying this we have in mind routes 15, 16, 18 and 20 of scheme No. 1 in which the variation in the number of vehicles fa 1 to 3, 1 to 4 and 3 to 8 and similarly in scheme No. 2 route No. 1 where the variation is 6 to 12 and in scheme No. 3 route No. 1 the variation is 5 to 9. We might mention that we have taken into account not merely the proportion but the variation in the number. We have set these out as merely illustrative and we have not thought it necessary to make an exhaustive list of all the routes.\n\nRowjee v.\n\nState of Andhro\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nRow; ee v. 5tate of AnJhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nThe next objection was that some of the routes mcluded in the scheme were inter-State routes and that under the l(lroviso to s. 68D ( 3) it could not be deemed to be an approved scheme unless the previous approval of the Central Government had been obtained. We consider this objection as without force.\n\nThe route which is proposed to be nationalised under the scheme admittedly lies wholly within the State. The right of the private operators to ply their vehicles beyond the State border is not affected by any of the scitemes. 1t would, therefore, follow that the proviso to s. 68-D ( 3) is not attracted and consequently the scheme does not suffer from the defect alleged.\n\nThe next point made was that the language employed to indicate the na:ure of the service in column 6 of th.~ schemes was vague, with the result that operators who had, in fact, been affected by the scheme understood the words employed as not affecting them and consequently did not make objections as they were entitled to under s. 68-0(2).\n\nWe have examined the language employed and we consider that the submission does not deserve serious consideration nor we are satisfied that any party was really misled by ambiguous phrasing of column 6 of the scheme.\n\nIn fact, learned Counsel did not press this objection after the matter was discussed during arguments.\n\nThe next series of objections to the schemes are those which arise in Civil Appeals Nos. 771 to 778.\n\nThe point most strenuously contended related to an illegality which was alleged to have occurred in the implementation of the scheme.\n\nUnder s. 68-(1) the State Transport Undertaking has to make the application in the manner specified in Chapter IV-A for \"a Stage Carriage permit\" ....... . \"to the Regional T1 ansport Autliority\" and that Authority is directed to grant the permit to the Undertaking notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Ch. IV. In accordance with the provisions of this section the State Road Transport Corporation made an application for the grant of permits to the Regional Transport Authority. The objection raised is that the application had to be made not to the Regional Transport Authority but only to the State Transport Authority which authority alone, it is urged, is competent to en\n\ntertain applications for the grant of permits where the length of the route is 100 miles or over and such route is over a Trunk Road. Three of the rou:es in scheme 2 with which Civil Appeal Nos. 773, 776 and 777 are concerned are of a length beyond 100 miles and the roadway on\n\nwhich the route lies are admittedly Trunk Roads.\n\nUnder Rule 141 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Act Rules permits on routes covering a distance of over I 00 miles on Trunk\n\nRoads could be granted only by the S:ate Transport Authority. It was this Authority that had granted the pertnits to operate on these three routes to the respective appell; ints in these appeals. The argument is that even when a Transport Undertaking applies for a stage carriage permit under s. 68-F(l) it must comply with the provisions of Rule 14 I.\n\nOn the basis of this reasoning the appellants in these thr.ee Civil Appeals have applied for a writ of prohibition against the Regional Transport Authority before whom the applications have been filed.\n\nSection 68-F(I) reads:\n\n\"68-F(I). Where, in pursuance of an approved scheme any State transport undertaking applies in the manner specified in Chapter IV for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's pertnit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or notified route. the Regional Transport Authority shall issue such permit to the State transport undertaking. notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter IV.\"\n\n'Ihe learned Judges of the High Court have held that the Regional Transport Authority which is specifically mentioned in s. 68-F(I) is empowered to issue the pertnit to the\n\ntransport undertaking \"notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter TV\" and that the section rendered the provisions of Rule 141 of the Motor Vehicles\n\nRuls inapplicable to cases covered by s. 68-F( 1). We find ourselves in agreement with this view.\n\nBc>ide,. s. 68-B of the Act enacts:\n\n\"68-B. The provisions of this Chapter and the rules and orders made thereunder..ma}l have effect\n\nRowiee v.\n\nState of Andhra Pradesh\n\nAyyungar J.\n\n19M\n\nRowfee •• Stat• of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nnotwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV of this Act or in any law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.\"\n\nTherefore any provisions in Chapter IV which are inconsistent with those contained in Chter IV-A would to that extent be superseded.\n\nNo doubt, s. 68-F( 1) speaks of an application in the manner specified in Ch. IV which if the words stood alone are capable of being understood as meaning the authority to whom the application has to be made, but as the authority to issue the permit in pursuance of the aipplication is specified as the Regional Transport Authority and as that authority is directed 'lo issue the permit notwithstanding anything in Ch. IV so much of Ch. IV or the Rules made thereunder, which specify the authority to grant the permit as being someone other than the Regional Transport Authority, is to that extent superseded.\n\nIt was pointed out that under Rule 141 the State Transport Authority was itself vested with the powers of the Regional Transport Authority where the route was of the description mentioned earlier, but this, in our opinion, makes no difference.\n\nNo doubt, in a State where there is no Regional Transport Authority at all [vide e.g. proviso to s. 44(1 )], but there is some other authority which functions as the Regional Transport Authority for the purposes of the Act, such an Authority might be that which would be comprehended by s. 68-F(l) but where as in Andhra Pradesh there is admittedly a Regional Transport Authority, we cannot accede to the submission that such authority is deprived of the power to issue a pormit by reason of s. 68F(l) merely because the Regional Transport Authority of that area cannot grant permits under Ch. IV\n\nThere were certain other points urged in Civil Appeal No. 771 which arose only if the Regional Transport Authority to whom applications under s. 68-F (1) were made, was not competent to entertain application and issue a permit.\n\nIn view of our conclusion as regards the point urged in Civil Appeal No. 771 of 1963 do not arise.\n\nThere remains for being dealt with one minor point which was urged in Civil Appeals Nos. 883 and 884 which we consider entirely without substance. The point was that the description of the rout¢ in the scheme was too vague and misleading, so much so that the appellants did not file their objections before the Government. Taking the case of Civil Appeal No. 883, it is by an operator who runs a service from Uravakonda to Adoni. Serial No. 16 of scheme No. 1 describes the route as Adoni to Uravakonda. It was urged that as the scheme notified the route Adoni to Uravakonda but not Uravakonda to Adoni, the appellant thought !!tat his route was not affected.\n\nThe objection is on its very face frivolous because throughout the scheme, it is only the terminal points that are specified and that specification carries with it and obviously implies that the operation of transport between the two terminii is intended to be nationalised.\n\nThe complaint in Civil Appeal No. 8 84 is the same, only the route is different.\n\nThis completes all the points that are urged before us.\n\nIn view of our conclusion that the schemes are vitiated by non-compliance with the requirements of s. 68-C and the Rules made thereunder, we hold that they have to be quashed as not warranted by Jaw.\n\nThe aippeals are accordingly allowed and the appellants are granted a declaration that the schemes are invalid and cannot be enforced.\n\nThe appellants would be entitled to their costs here and in the High Court-one hearing fee.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nAYYANGAR J.-When the judgment in the above appeals was pronounced on January 27, 1964 the learned Advocate for the appellants brought to our notice the following order passed by this Court on June 10, 1963 when the interim stay of the operation of the schemes which are impugned in the above appeals, was vacated on the opposition by the State Government:\n\n\"Stay vacated on the learned Advocate-General for Andhra Pradesh giving an undertaking that\n\nIJIU\n\nRowlee v.\n\nStatt of Andlml\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nRowjee v.\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nJanuary, 29\n\nin case the appeals succeed, the State will compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period that the appeals were pending in this Court by reason of the fact that they were not allowed to ply their buses on the routes under the respective permits granted to them.\n\nThe learned Advocate- General further undertakes that this amount of compensation will be determined in the present proceedings themselves. No order as to\n\ncosts.\"\n\nThe learned Coun'sel requested us that we should give some directions in terms of this undertaking.\n\nIn view of the above we would add the following at the end of the judgment which was pronounced on January 27, 1964:\n\n\"In view of the order r, iassed by this Court on June\n\n10, 1963, when the in1erim order of stay was vacated at the instance of the respondent, recording the undertaking on the part of the\n\nState that it would compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period when the appeals were pending in this Court. there will be a declaration to that effect, and the High Court will determine the amount so payable and pass suitable directions for the payment thereof.\"\n\nR. CIDTRALEKHA & ANR.\n\nST A TE OF MYSORE & ORS.\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nConstitution of //idia, 1950, Arr. 166-1/ mandatory-List I Entry 66--\n\nScope of-Viva Voce test for admission in college-If violation of\n\nArt. 14--Article 15(4)-Classification of backward classes-Yali tlity.", "total_entities": 243, "entities": [{"text": "Pindidas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 800, "end_char": 808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamlawati\n\nMudholklJI' J.\n\nJanuary, 27\n\nHowever, in the case before us there is no claim on behalf ot the plaintiff that he is willing to pay the entire considera tion for obtaining a decree against the interest of Pindidas alone in the property."}}, {"text": "C. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 912, "end_char": 935, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ANDHRA\n\nPRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 937, "end_char": 986, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 989, "end_char": 1006, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1008, "end_char": 1020, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAo", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1022, "end_char": 1036, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1042, "end_char": 1062, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1070, "end_char": 1082, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Validity-Issue of permits fo State Transport Undertakings-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 68C, 68D(3), 68F(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1319, "end_char": 1342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Validity-Issue of permits fo State Transport Undertakings-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Validity-Issue of permits fo State Transport Undertakings-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1344, "end_char": 1385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nellore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1789, "end_char": 1796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, Nellore would have been the next district to be taken up and the turn of Kurnool district would have come up _after nationalisation of the routes in Nellore, Chittore and Cuddapah districts were completed."}}, {"text": "Kurnool district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1862, "end_char": 1878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, Nellore would have been the next district to be taken up and the turn of Kurnool district would have come up _after nationalisation of the routes in Nellore, Chittore and Cuddapah districts were completed."}}, {"text": "Chittore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1947, "end_char": 1955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, Nellore would have been the next district to be taken up and the turn of Kurnool district would have come up _after nationalisation of the routes in Nellore, Chittore and Cuddapah districts were completed."}}, {"text": "Cuddapah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1960, "end_char": 1968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, Nellore would have been the next district to be taken up and the turn of Kurnool district would have come up _after nationalisation of the routes in Nellore, Chittore and Cuddapah districts were completed."}}, {"text": "March 24, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2151, "end_char": 2165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This report was submitted to the Corporation in February, 1961 and the Corporation accepted it and embodied the approval in its Administration Report dated March 24, 1962 which was published in April, 1962."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2292, "end_char": 2306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the General Election in 1962 the Chief Minister assumed office as Chief Minister on March 12, 1962."}}, {"text": "April 19, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2311, "end_char": 2325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 19, 1962, he summoned a conference of the Corporation at which, he suggested that the nationalisation of bus routes in the Kurnool district should be taken up first."}}, {"text": "4-5-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2507, "end_char": 2515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its resolution dated 4-5-1962, the Corporation made an alteration in the order of the districts, successively to be taken up for nationalisation and selected the western half of the Kurnool as the area to be nationalised in the first instance."}}, {"text": "Kurnool", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2668, "end_char": 2675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its resolution dated 4-5-1962, the Corporation made an alteration in the order of the districts, successively to be taken up for nationalisation and selected the western half of the Kurnool as the area to be nationalised in the first instance."}}, {"text": "Kumool", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2816, "end_char": 2822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ne appellants, motor transport operators whose routes were all in western half of the Kumool districts filed objections to the Schemes before the Transport Minister."}}, {"text": "Kwnool", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3426, "end_char": 3432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants then challenged the validity of the schemes in the High Court and in support of that allegations were made in the affidavit that the ..Chief Minister was motivated by bias and personal ill-will against the appellants, that he tell chagrined at the defeat of his partymen and supporters and desiring to wreak his vengeance against the motor transport operators of the western parts of Kwnool, his political opponents, instructed the Corporation to change the order in which the districts should be taken up for nationalisation and that the corporation gave effect to these instructions and directions."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4040, "end_char": 4045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4457, "end_char": 4462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4653, "end_char": 4658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4748, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by certificate the appellants mainly contended:\n\n(1) that the schemes did not in reality reflect the opinion of the Corporation as required by s. 68-C of the Act, but that the schemes owed their origin to the direction of the Chief Minister who acted ma la fide in directing the Transport Undertaking to frame the impugned schemes; (2) that the approval of the schemes by the Transport Minister under s. 68-D(3) must be held to be vitiated by the malafides of th.e Chief Minister; (3) that the impugned schemes did not conform to the statutory requirements of s. 68-C and rule 4 of the Rules regarding the particulars to be embodied in the schemes; ( 4) that some of the routes included in the schemes were inter-state routes and that under the proviso to s. 68-D(3) it could not be deemed to be an arproved scheme unless the previous approval of the Central Government had been obtained and ( 5) that even when a transport undertaking applies for a stage carriage permit under s. 68-F(l) it must comply with the provisions of r. 141 of the Rules."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4875, "end_char": 4880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Andhr•\n\nPradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5100, "end_char": 5124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evidence placed in the present case it must be held that it was a result of the conference of the 19th April, 1962 and in\n\nC. s. Rowi••\n\nState of Andhr•\n\nPradesh\n\n19M\n\nC. S. Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\norder to give efiect to the wishes of the Chief Minister expressed there,\n\nthat the ipugned scher:n~ were fonnulated by the Corporatiori and\n\nthe~fore, 1t would be vitiated by malafides notwithstanding the interposition of the semi-autonomous corporation."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5768, "end_char": 5773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chlef Minil", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5848, "end_char": 5859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) There was nothing on the record to indicate that the Chlef Minil ter influenced the Transport Minister."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5988, "end_char": 5993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6369, "end_char": 6410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 68D(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6782, "end_char": 6791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "statute": "the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6994, "end_char": 6999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "statute": "the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7253, "end_char": 7258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "statute": "the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7522, "end_char": 7527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7550, "end_char": 7564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but there is some other authority which func~ tions as the Regional Transport Authority for the purposes of the Act, such an authority might be that which would be comprehended by s. 68-F (I) but where as in Andhra Pradesh there is admittedly a Regional Transport Authority, it cannot be held that such authority is deprived of the power to issue a permit by reason of s. 68-F( I) merely becauso the Regional Transport Authority of that area cannot grant permits under Chapter IV."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7711, "end_char": 7716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8090, "end_char": 8113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, P. Babula Reddy and K. R.\n\nChaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "P. Babula Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8115, "end_char": 8130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, P. Babula Reddy and K. R.\n\nChaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "P. Babula Reddy"}}, {"text": "K. R.\n\nChaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8135, "end_char": 8151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, P. Babula Reddy and K. R.\n\nChaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "K. R.\n\nChaudhuri"}}, {"text": "P. Babula Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8197, "end_char": 8212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Babula Reddy and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. A. Nos.", "canonical_name": "P. Babula Reddy"}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8217, "end_char": 8232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Babula Reddy and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. A. Nos.", "canonical_name": "K. R.\n\nChaudhuri"}}, {"text": "K. Srinivasa Murthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8349, "end_char": 8368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Srinivasa Murthy and K. R. Chaudhuri,, for , the appellants (in C. A. Nos."}}, {"text": "D. Narasaraju", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8450, "end_char": 8463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narasaraju, Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, P. R. Ramachandra Rao and B; R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. R. Ramachandra Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8499, "end_char": 8520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narasaraju, Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, P. R. Ramachandra Rao and B; R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8528, "end_char": 8542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narasaraju, Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, P. R. Ramachandra Rao and B; R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "C. S. Rowiu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8651, "end_char": 8662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nC. S. Rowiu ..\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPrad<1h\n\nAYYANGAR J .-This batch of 11 Appeals which have Ayyangar 1.", "canonical_name": "C. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8667, "end_char": 8682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nC. S. Rowiu ..\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPrad<1h\n\nAYYANGAR J .-This batch of 11 Appeals which have Ayyangar 1."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8693, "end_char": 8701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nC. S. Rowiu ..\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPrad<1h\n\nAYYANGAR J .-This batch of 11 Appeals which have Ayyangar 1.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8926, "end_char": 8937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9122, "end_char": 9130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9226, "end_char": 9244, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9890, "end_char": 9894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9929, "end_char": 9937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "292,\n\nState 0~· Andhra 293 and 294 of the Home, Transport Department on the\n\nPradesh 5th February, 1963 in virtue of the powers conferred on Government by sub-s. 2 of the 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Ayyangar J.\n\nAct.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh State Road Trans; x>rt Corporation", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9952, "end_char": 10001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Andhra Pradesh State Road Trans; x>rt Corporation which for shortness we shall refer to as the Corporation, besides the State of Andhra Pradesh and the Regional Transport Authority,· Kllffioo!"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10072, "end_char": 10095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Andhra Pradesh State Road Trans; x>rt Corporation which for shortness we shall refer to as the Corporation, besides the State of Andhra Pradesh and the Regional Transport Authority,· Kllffioo!"}}, {"text": "Kurnool District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10480, "end_char": 10496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The routes covered by these three schemes are all in the western half of the Kurnool District."}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10887, "end_char": 10905, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Act I of 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10952, "end_char": 10973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "16-2-1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11000, "end_char": 11009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter IV-A containing special provisions relating to \"State Transport Uundertakings\" was introduced into the Motor Vehicles Act (Act IV of 1939) by an amenclment effected bv Central Act I of 1956 which came into effect on 16-2-1957."}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11356, "end_char": 11362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act I of 1956", "statute": "Central Act I of 1956"}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporation Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11370, "end_char": 11405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chapter IV of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11745, "end_char": 11767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11889, "end_char": 11899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of this Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of this Act"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12851, "end_char": 12861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12916, "end_char": 12921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13619, "end_char": 13642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Andhra Pradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n19M\n\nC. S. Row; u\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nGazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route :\n\nProvided that no such scheme which relates to any inter-State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme under it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previous approval of the Central Government.\"", "canonical_name": "State of .A.ndhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra\n\nPradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13676, "end_char": 13700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Andhra Pradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n19M\n\nC. S. Row; u\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nGazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route :\n\nProvided that no such scheme which relates to any inter-State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme under it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previous approval of the Central Government.\"", "canonical_name": "State of .A.ndhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar"}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14143, "end_char": 14153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14210, "end_char": 14215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14325, "end_char": 14330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14337, "end_char": 14342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14516, "end_char": 14526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15245, "end_char": 15256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15416, "end_char": 15426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15658, "end_char": 15663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15782, "end_char": 15792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15818, "end_char": 15828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15999, "end_char": 16004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16223, "end_char": 16228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th of February, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16334, "end_char": 16356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Minister passed an order according approval to the schemes on the 12th of February, 1963, and the schemes as finalis~\n\ned weno published in the Gazette on the next day, February 13, 1963."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16706, "end_char": 16714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th of April, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16854, "end_char": 16873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These petitions were dismissed by the High Court by a common judgment on the 19th of April, 1963, holding that the objections made to the validity of the schemes would not be sustained."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17069, "end_char": 17077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17732, "end_char": 17737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18461, "end_char": 18466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18521, "end_char": 18526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18873, "end_char": 18878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19191, "end_char": 19196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19969, "end_char": 19975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is known as the \"Telengana area\" consisting of nine districts of the old Hyderabad State and (2) the \"Andhra area\" which separated from Madras i.e. from the composite\n\nMadras State, in October 1953 and which comprised 11 districts."}}, {"text": "Re-organization Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20115, "end_char": 20140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Telengana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20194, "end_char": 20203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Telengana area the road transport services had been run by the Government of the Nizam since the year 1932 and by 1956 private motor road transport operators had been completely eliminated from this entire area."}}, {"text": "Government of the Nizam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20257, "end_char": 20280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Telengana area the road transport services had been run by the Government of the Nizam since the year 1932 and by 1956 private motor road transport operators had been completely eliminated from this entire area."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20413, "end_char": 20419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Andhra Area comprising the 11 districts however, nationalisation of motor transport had not been undertaken."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20584, "end_char": 20631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation was established with effect from 11th of January, 1958 with a view to take steps for extending nationalised transport to the Andhra areas of the State."}}, {"text": "11th of January, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20665, "end_char": 20686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation was established with effect from 11th of January, 1958 with a view to take steps for extending nationalised transport to the Andhra areas of the State."}}, {"text": "Krishna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20828, "end_char": 20835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain routes in three of the 11 Districts Krishna, West Godavari and Guntur were nationalised from 1959 onwards."}}, {"text": "Godavari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20842, "end_char": 20850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain routes in three of the 11 Districts Krishna, West Godavari and Guntur were nationalised from 1959 onwards."}}, {"text": "Guntur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20855, "end_char": 20861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain routes in three of the 11 Districts Krishna, West Godavari and Guntur were nationalised from 1959 onwards."}}, {"text": "Masulipatam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20914, "end_char": 20925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Vijayawada-Masulipatam and Vijayawada-Guntur routes -were nationalised in the first instance and thereafter by about September, 1959, almost the entire routes in Krishna District were nationalised."}}, {"text": "Krishna District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21065, "end_char": 21081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Vijayawada-Masulipatam and Vijayawada-Guntur routes -were nationalised in the first instance and thereafter by about September, 1959, almost the entire routes in Krishna District were nationalised."}}, {"text": "West Godavari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21139, "end_char": 21152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next district to be taken up was West Godavari which was done in March, 1960."}}, {"text": "1st of February, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21243, "end_char": 21264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The process was nearly completed in this district by tl).e 1st of February, 1960, except for a few routes."}}, {"text": "Guntur District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21360, "end_char": 21375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government had sanctioned certain schemes for nationalisation in Guntur District which were expected to be completed by Oc.ober, 1961."}}, {"text": "Oc.ober, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21415, "end_char": 21428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government had sanctioned certain schemes for nationalisation in Guntur District which were expected to be completed by Oc.ober, 1961."}}, {"text": "S. Anantharamakrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22080, "end_char": 22102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri S. Anantharamakrishnan, Chainnan of Messrs.\n\nSimpson & Co. Ltd., Madras, one of the principal motor transport operators of the Madras State, was the Chairman of the Committee and it comprised three other members who were officials of the\n\nC. s. Row/ff\n\n\"· State of ttndlrra\n\nPradtlh\n\nAyyangar /,\n\n1964 Andhra Pradesh State Government."}}, {"text": "Madras State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22207, "end_char": 22219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri S. Anantharamakrishnan, Chainnan of Messrs.\n\nSimpson & Co. Ltd., Madras, one of the principal motor transport operators of the Madras State, was the Chairman of the Committee and it comprised three other members who were officials of the\n\nC. s. Row/ff\n\n\"· State of ttndlrra\n\nPradtlh\n\nAyyangar /,\n\n1964 Andhra Pradesh State Government."}}, {"text": "Visakhapatnam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23815, "end_char": 23828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Adopting these ariteria ithe Committee stated in paragraph 125 \"that the nationalisation of bus transport may be extended to the remaining districts in the Andhra area as indicated below:-\n\n1961-62-Guntur District\n\n1962-63-Nellore and Chittor Districts\n\n1963-64-Cuddapah and Kumool Districts\n\n1964-65-Anantapur and East Godavari Districts\n\n1965-66-Visakhapatnam and Srikakulam Dis tricts\"."}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporation Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24830, "end_char": 24866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "7th of April,\n\n1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24875, "end_char": 24894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "35(2) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1960, on the 7th of April,\n\n1962."}}, {"text": "Vishakhapatnam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25233, "end_char": 25247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this last document they said speaking of future trends, \"the programme for nationalisation of transport services in the remaining of tlre Andhra Pradesh is as indicated below:- 1961-62-Guntur District 1962-63-Nellore and Chittor Districts\n\n1963-64-Cuddapah and Kurnool Districts 1964-65-Ananthapur and East Godavari Districts 1965-66-Vishakhapatnam and Srikakulam Districts.\""}}, {"text": "Srikakulam Districts", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25252, "end_char": 25272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this last document they said speaking of future trends, \"the programme for nationalisation of transport services in the remaining of tlre Andhra Pradesh is as indicated below:- 1961-62-Guntur District 1962-63-Nellore and Chittor Districts\n\n1963-64-Cuddapah and Kurnool Districts 1964-65-Ananthapur and East Godavari Districts 1965-66-Vishakhapatnam and Srikakulam Districts.\""}}, {"text": "Chittor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25594, "end_char": 25601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be seen that after Guntur District which was nearly completed by the end of 1961 the next districts to be taken up during the 1962-63 would have been Nellore and Chittor Districts in that order and it was only thereafter that the District of Cuddapah\n\nand after it Kurnool would be taken up."}}, {"text": "Anantharamakrishnan Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25760, "end_char": 25789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was the recommendation of the Anantharamakrishnan Committee and which had been accepted by the Road Transport Corporation as late as April, 1962 and it may be mentioned in this connection that the Vice-Chairman of the Road Transport Corporation was himself a member of the Anantharamakrishnan Committee."}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25825, "end_char": 25851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was the recommendation of the Anantharamakrishnan Committee and which had been accepted by the Road Transport Corporation as late as April, 1962 and it may be mentioned in this connection that the Vice-Chairman of the Road Transport Corporation was himself a member of the Anantharamakrishnan Committee."}}, {"text": "4th May, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26060, "end_char": 26073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its resolution dated, 4th May, 1962,' the Road Transport Corporation decided that instead of the above order Kurnool, Nellore and Cuddapah Distric<s in that order would be chosen for nationalisation and in the three schemes which were formulated in pursu ; mce of this Resolution the western half of Kurnool was selected as the area to be nationalised in the first instance."}}, {"text": "State of .A.ndhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26428, "end_char": 26464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. s. Rowjee\n\nState of .A.ndhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1964 As we have indicated earlier the appellants before us are\n\nc. s. Row~• transport operators whose routes are all in the western half Stat• 0/' A.ndhro of the.", "canonical_name": "State of .A.ndhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar"}}, {"text": "Sanjivayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27452, "end_char": 27462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The previous Chief Minister (Shri Sanjivayya) and the present Chief Minister (Shri Sanjiva Reddy) were both returned from Kurnool District in general elections."}}, {"text": "Sanjiva Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27501, "end_char": 27514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The previous Chief Minister (Shri Sanjivayya) and the present Chief Minister (Shri Sanjiva Reddy) were both returned from Kurnool District in general elections."}}, {"text": "Zila Parishad Shri Vijaya Bhaskara Reddy", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27604, "end_char": 27644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The then Chainnan of the Zila Parishad Shri Vijaya Bhaskara Reddy contested unsuccessfully from Yemniga11Qur Constituency in Kurnool District. ("}}, {"text": "Yemniganpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27723, "end_char": 27734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yemniganpur is in the western part of the Kurnool District) ."}}, {"text": "C. Ram Bhopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27849, "end_char": 27862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri C. Ram Bhopal son-in-law of the present Chief Minister also unsuccessfully contested from the Nandikothur Constituency in Kurnool District. ("}}, {"text": "Nandikothur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27990, "end_char": 28001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandikothur is also iµ the western part of Kumool)."}}, {"text": "P. Venkafakrishna Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28087, "end_char": 28110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The person who successfully opposed him Sri P. Venkafakrishna Reddy now M.L.A. is a partner in 'Venkata Krishna Bus Service' Nandikothur."}}, {"text": "Venkata Krishna Bus Service' Nandikothur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28139, "end_char": 28179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The person who successfully opposed him Sri P. Venkafakrishna Reddy now M.L.A. is a partner in 'Venkata Krishna Bus Service' Nandikothur."}}, {"text": "Venkata Krishna Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28284, "end_char": 28305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This firm owns 2 pem1its and they stand in the name of J ayaram11yya who wa8 the Election Agent of Sri Venkata Krishna Reddy."}}, {"text": "Ganikhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28324, "end_char": 28332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two persons Sri Ganikhan and Sri Antony Reddy who are staunch supporters c, f\n\nthe preseni Chief Minister Sri Sanjiva Reddy were selected as Congress candidates by the Parliamentary Board at Delhi when Sanjiva Reddy was the President of the Indian National Congress, were also defeated in their respective Constituencies."}}, {"text": "Antony Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28341, "end_char": 28353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two persons Sri Ganikhan and Sri Antony Reddy who are staunch supporters c, f\n\nthe preseni Chief Minister Sri Sanjiva Reddy were selected as Congress candidates by the Parliamentary Board at Delhi when Sanjiva Reddy was the President of the Indian National Congress, were also defeated in their respective Constituencies."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28499, "end_char": 28504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two persons Sri Ganikhan and Sri Antony Reddy who are staunch supporters c, f\n\nthe preseni Chief Minister Sri Sanjiva Reddy were selected as Congress candidates by the Parliamentary Board at Delhi when Sanjiva Reddy was the President of the Indian National Congress, were also defeated in their respective Constituencies."}}, {"text": "Indian National Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28549, "end_char": 28573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two persons Sri Ganikhan and Sri Antony Reddy who are staunch supporters c, f\n\nthe preseni Chief Minister Sri Sanjiva Reddy were selected as Congress candidates by the Parliamentary Board at Delhi when Sanjiva Reddy was the President of the Indian National Congress, were also defeated in their respective Constituencies."}}, {"text": "T. Narayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29287, "end_char": 29297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The undivided brothers of Sri T. Narayan."}}, {"text": "Venkataswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29332, "end_char": 29344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a transport operator, namely Sri Venkataswamy contested the Assembly seat against Sri Sanjiva Reddy in the Dhone Constituency from which he was returned and he refused to withdraw even though lots of pressure were brought on him."}}, {"text": "Rajasekhara Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29534, "end_char": 29551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Rajasekhara Reddy and Sri Vijayakumara Reddy sons l>f Sri P. Ranga Reddy, Minister in the previous Cabinet are also transport operators in the Kurnool District."}}, {"text": "Vijayakumara Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29560, "end_char": 29578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Rajasekhara Reddy and Sri Vijayakumara Reddy sons l>f Sri P. Ranga Reddy, Minister in the previous Cabinet are also transport operators in the Kurnool District."}}, {"text": "P. Ranga Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29592, "end_char": 29606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Rajasekhara Reddy and Sri Vijayakumara Reddy sons l>f Sri P. Ranga Reddy, Minister in the previous Cabinet are also transport operators in the Kurnool District."}}, {"text": "Y. Mahananda Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29796, "end_char": 29814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Y. Mahananda Reddy another transport operator is a staunch supporter of Sri P. Ranga Reddy."}}, {"text": "Vengal Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30021, "end_char": 30033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Sanjiva Reddy was President of the Indian National Congress his selection for the Congress ticket was set aside by him and one Vengal Reddy was selected by th<' Pradesh Congress Committee."}}, {"text": "State of Andhro", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30206, "end_char": 30221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant that the three schemes framed for the part of the Kurnool District relate to the areas in\n\nC. s. Rowjee\n\nState of Andhro\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar /..\n\nC. s. Row/••\n\nStal• of Andhra\n\nPrail1sh\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nwhich the routes on which the _above stated persons are running their buses."}}, {"text": "Nandyal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30590, "end_char": 30597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Nandyal area most of the transport operators are the supporters of the present Chief Minister and their routes are excluded from the schemes."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31205, "end_char": 31218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was that with a view to carry out the original programme which was approved and confirmed by the Corporation in their Administration Report published on April 7, 1962, the routes in the Nellore District which according to the Anantharamakrishnan Committee Report had to be taken up next were surveyed and though the elements of contiguity and profitable nature were both present in regard to the extension of the services to Nellore, contiguity by reason of the fact that some buses\n\nbelonging to the Corporation and running from Guntur were already plying in Nellore District and the profitable nature since these were evaluated by the Anantharamakrishnan Committee whose recommendations were examined and approved by the Corporation, the nationalisation of the routes in Nellore was, however, abandoned and that of the western part of Kurnool was decided upon."}}, {"text": "Nellore District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31238, "end_char": 31254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was that with a view to carry out the original programme which was approved and confirmed by the Corporation in their Administration Report published on April 7, 1962, the routes in the Nellore District which according to the Anantharamakrishnan Committee Report had to be taken up next were surveyed and though the elements of contiguity and profitable nature were both present in regard to the extension of the services to Nellore, contiguity by reason of the fact that some buses\n\nbelonging to the Corporation and running from Guntur were already plying in Nellore District and the profitable nature since these were evaluated by the Anantharamakrishnan Committee whose recommendations were examined and approved by the Corporation, the nationalisation of the routes in Nellore was, however, abandoned and that of the western part of Kurnool was decided upon."}}, {"text": "National Defence Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31944, "end_char": 31968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other fact was that the National Defence Council passed a resolution as late as the first week of November, 1962, urging the -deferring of further nationalisation of transport services for the present and it was in the teeth of this resolution which was passed at the meeting at which the Chief Minister himself was present that the schemes of nationalisation of transport services in Kurnool district was published by the Corpor<ition on the 29th November, I 962."}}, {"text": "first week of November, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32004, "end_char": 32032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other fact was that the National Defence Council passed a resolution as late as the first week of November, 1962, urging the -deferring of further nationalisation of transport services for the present and it was in the teeth of this resolution which was passed at the meeting at which the Chief Minister himself was present that the schemes of nationalisation of transport services in Kurnool district was published by the Corpor<ition on the 29th November, I 962."}}, {"text": "29th November, I 962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32363, "end_char": 32383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other fact was that the National Defence Council passed a resolution as late as the first week of November, 1962, urging the -deferring of further nationalisation of transport services for the present and it was in the teeth of this resolution which was passed at the meeting at which the Chief Minister himself was present that the schemes of nationalisation of transport services in Kurnool district was published by the Corpor<ition on the 29th November, I 962."}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32742, "end_char": 32778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32787, "end_char": 32792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32802, "end_char": 32820, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33402, "end_char": 33407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34087, "end_char": 34092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bebruary", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34337, "end_char": 34345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument urged by the appellants on this part of the case was however tow-fold: (1) That it was not in fact the Corporation that formed the opinion indicated in s. 68-C but really the Chief Minister; (2) That the Chief Minister was motivated by extraneous considerations, namely, to strike at his political opponents who worked either against himself or his friends, supporters and relationsin the elections in Bebruary, 1962 and had devised the schemes in order to cause them loss and compass their ruin."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34526, "end_char": 34531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34848, "end_char": 34853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which the sche1es .passed and that the schemes were really C. s. Rowree the result of lllS improper motive to ruin his political\n\nState 0/· Andhra ?"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35797, "end_char": 35802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Congress Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36460, "end_char": 36474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to this the first point to be noticed is that the contents of the affidavit were, not vague, but details were given and these were: (I) The existence of two groups in the Congress Party, at the time of the General Elections in 1962, the Chief Minister being the head of one of them and of the other Mr. Sanjivayya; (2) That at the last General Elections certain c; mdidates who were named and who are stated to have belonged to the group of the Chief Minister were defeated; (3) The Constituencies where tlley stood were in the western portion of the Knrnool District; ( 4) That tllis defeat was occasioned by persons belonging fo."}}, {"text": "Knrnool District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36840, "end_char": 36856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to this the first point to be noticed is that the contents of the affidavit were, not vague, but details were given and these were: (I) The existence of two groups in the Congress Party, at the time of the General Elections in 1962, the Chief Minister being the head of one of them and of the other Mr. Sanjivayya; (2) That at the last General Elections certain c; mdidates who were named and who are stated to have belonged to the group of the Chief Minister were defeated; (3) The Constituencies where tlley stood were in the western portion of the Knrnool District; ( 4) That tllis defeat was occasioned by persons belonging fo."}}, {"text": "Ranga Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37260, "end_char": 37271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the other group in the Congress Party whose names are\n\nalso given; (5) That several of these members supporting the dissident group were motor transport operators and who are stated to have taken a prominent part in the elections and in the defeat of the candidates belonging to the Chief Minister's group; ( 6) The matters in relation to Ranga Reddy and his sons etc."}}, {"text": "AY\"\"\"gar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41981, "end_char": 41989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. s. Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andltro\n\nPradesh The next question is as regards the inference to be drawn from these facts which in the absence of their denial AY\"\"\"gar J. have to be taken as true."}}, {"text": "S. A. Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42697, "end_char": 42710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secretary to the Home Department-one Mr.\n\nS. A. Iyengar has filed a counter-affidavit in which the allegations we have set out earlier have been formally denied."}}, {"text": "C. s. Rowjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43977, "end_char": 43989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Advocate-General realising this position, desired us to proceed on that basis and his submission was that assuming that the allegations made against the Chief Minister were made out and that he had bias and ill-will against the iippellants, still there was no proof thM the Corporation which was an autonomous body was similarly motivated and that unless the appellants were able to establish it,' bias or ill-will on the part of the Chief Minister would be irrelevant\n\n1964 We agree as already indicated that he is right in this C. s. Rowjee submission.", "canonical_name": "C. S. ROWJEE AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44389, "end_char": 44394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46979, "end_char": 46984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 26, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47081, "end_char": 47094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be taken up for nationalisation and not the independent opinion of the Corporation as to what was needed in the public interest as required by s. 68-C.\n\nAs regards his part at the conference, the Chief Minister himself stated in the Assembly on July 26, 1962:\n\n\"To say that the Corporation will do everything for the simple reason that it is an autonomous body, and also to say that we will not at all interfere, is not fair."}}, {"text": "Chittoor district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47374, "end_char": 47391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For exampl~, the Corporation wanted to nationalise Chittoor district."}}, {"text": "Mahaboobnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47476, "end_char": 47489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kurnool is surrounded by three nationalised distdcts; one side Mahaboobnagar, one side Guntur and the other side the district of Nellore which is going to be nationalised."}}, {"text": "Chittoor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47725, "end_char": 47733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I questioned as to why the district of Kurnool which is surrounded by three nationalised districts i~ left out, and instead the district of Chittoor which is abutling the borders of Madras and Bangalore is sought to be taken up."}}, {"text": "Bangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47778, "end_char": 47787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I questioned as to why the district of Kurnool which is surrounded by three nationalised districts i~ left out, and instead the district of Chittoor which is abutling the borders of Madras and Bangalore is sought to be taken up."}}, {"text": "4yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48369, "end_char": 48377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was follow-\n\nC. s. Rowjee\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nC. S. Rowjee v.\n\nStale of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\n4yyangar J.\n\ned by the resolution of the Corporation of May 4, 1962."}}, {"text": "Nellore district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49052, "end_char": 49068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kurnool, Nellore and Cuddapah in view of difficult financial position ........ Chief Executive Officer explained that as there is a depot at Kurnool and as Kurnool is contiguous to the nationalised districts, it would be easier to nationalise Kurnool rather Nellore district."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50330, "end_char": 50339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also stated that the choice was made in the interest of the maintenance of service contiguity and coordination and it added that \"the impending completion of the Ra.ngapur\n\nBridge over the river Krishna, which when completed would facilitate the operation of direct services from Hyderabad through Kurnoof to the areas beyond.\""}}, {"text": "Kurnoof", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50348, "end_char": 50355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also stated that the choice was made in the interest of the maintenance of service contiguity and coordination and it added that \"the impending completion of the Ra.ngapur\n\nBridge over the river Krishna, which when completed would facilitate the operation of direct services from Hyderabad through Kurnoof to the areas beyond.\""}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50781, "end_char": 50786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Besides it\n\nasserted that the Corporation which was an autonomous statutory authority was vested with powers under the Road Transport Act", "statute": "Besides it\n\nasserted that the Corporation which was an autonomous statutory authority was vested with powers under the Road Transport Act"}}, {"text": "Advocate-General submitted to us that under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53753, "end_char": 53837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kumool", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54209, "end_char": 54215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Government had a ight to give directions as to policy to the Corporation; (2) that the policy direction that he gave related to and included the order in which the districts should be taken up for nationalisation; and (3) that applying the criteria that the districts to be nationalis~.d should be contiguous to those in which nationalised services ~!ready existed, Kumool answered this test better than Chittoor and he, applying the tests he laid down, therefore suggested that instead of Chittoor, Kurnool should be taken up next."}}, {"text": "Kurnool", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54532, "end_char": 54539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One matter that emerges from this is that it was as a result of policy decision taken by the Chief Minister and the direction given to the Corporation that Kurnool was taken up for nationalisation next after Guntur."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54753, "end_char": 54758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Advocate-General submitted to us that under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "statute": "Advocate-General submitted to us that under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54766, "end_char": 54802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54890, "end_char": 54895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54959, "end_char": 54964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Rangapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 60112, "end_char": 60120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Transport Corporation, however, filed the counter-affidavit it was not content to rest merely with the reasons given in the resolut:on as those which were taken into account in arriving at the decision but added one more, namely, the impending completion of the bridge at Rangapur across the Krishna as a further reason which had been taken into account for arriving at a decision."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60618, "end_char": 60623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th April, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60907, "end_char": 60923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evidence placed in the case we are satisfied that it was as a result of the conference of the 19th April, 1962, and in order to give effect to the wishes of the Chiet Minister expressed there, that the schemes now impugned were formulated by the."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61358, "end_char": 61363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of AndhN\n\nPradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62083, "end_char": 62106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. s. Row/et\n\nState of AndhN\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nC. s .. Row/•• ... 11Gt6 \"f Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\ncannot on any reasonable construction of s. 68-C be a sufficient compliance with the statute.", "canonical_name": "State of .A.ndhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62220, "end_char": 62225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 4, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63441, "end_char": 63452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Needless to say the resolution of the Corporation of May 4, 1962, offers no assistance in this matter and as we have said earlier though the counter-affidavits contained a denial of the allegation that the Corporation was acting at the behest of the Chief Minister, there is no explanation for the choice of the western portion."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63855, "end_char": 63860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63957, "end_char": 63962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64740, "end_char": 64746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65064, "end_char": 65069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65317, "end_char": 65322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65425, "end_char": 65430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65896, "end_char": 65901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66321, "end_char": 66326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 680(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68783, "end_char": 68792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69008, "end_char": 69049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69187, "end_char": 69192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "statute": "the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "26th of December, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69415, "end_char": 69437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a rule framed on the 26th of December, 1958, the State Government framed a rule numbered as Rule 5 of these Rules which reads:\n\n\"5."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70091, "end_char": 70096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70156, "end_char": 70161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70271, "end_char": 70276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70283, "end_char": 70288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71013, "end_char": 71018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dosa Satyanarayanamurty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71159, "end_char": 71182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was submitted on behalf of the appellants ( 1) that the reason why these maxi!Jla and minima were put ----------\n\nC. s. Rowjee\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nC. s. Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andhra Pradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\ndo\"\":n in the schmes, contravening Rule 4, was in reality to avoid the operation of s. 68-E and to get over the decision of this Court striking down Rule 5 and that for the same reason which underlay the decision of this Court in Dosa Satyanarayanamurty' s case(') the prescription of maxima and minima contravened s. 68-E as it operates iu no way dissimilar to Rule 5 and that as this vice pervades the entirety of the scheme as published, all the three schemes should be set aside."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71244, "end_char": 71249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 46 and 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71929, "end_char": 71942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72586, "end_char": 72591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73691, "end_char": 73696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73724, "end_char": 73750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 46 and 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73889, "end_char": 73902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73989, "end_char": 73994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74142, "end_char": 74147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "ss. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74240, "end_char": 74246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "State of Andhro", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75479, "end_char": 75494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andhro\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nRow; ee v. 5tate of AnJhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nThe next objection was that some of the routes mcluded in the scheme were inter-State routes and that under the l(lroviso to s. 68D ( 3) it could not be deemed to be an approved scheme unless the previous approval of the Central Government had been obtained.", "canonical_name": "State of .A.ndhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar"}}, {"text": "5tate of AnJhra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75529, "end_char": 75544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andhro\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nRow; ee v. 5tate of AnJhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nThe next objection was that some of the routes mcluded in the scheme were inter-State routes and that under the l(lroviso to s. 68D ( 3) it could not be deemed to be an approved scheme unless the previous approval of the Central Government had been obtained."}}, {"text": "s. 68D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75693, "end_char": 75699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76147, "end_char": 76152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76576, "end_char": 76581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77154, "end_char": 77159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78191, "end_char": 78209, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78576, "end_char": 78581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78840, "end_char": 78850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79413, "end_char": 79418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79673, "end_char": 79678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79743, "end_char": 79748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyungar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79905, "end_char": 79913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. 68-B of the Act enacts:\n\n\"68-B. The provisions of this Chapter and the rules and orders made thereunder..ma}l have effect\n\nRowiee v.\n\nState of Andhra Pradesh\n\nAyyungar J.\n\n19M\n\nRowfee •• Stat• of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nnotwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV of this Act or in any law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.\""}}, {"text": "Chapter IV of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80033, "end_char": 80055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80306, "end_char": 80311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of this Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 44(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81249, "end_char": 81258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81439, "end_char": 81444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68F(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81644, "end_char": 81653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81892, "end_char": 81897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uravakonda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 82488, "end_char": 82498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "883, it is by an operator who runs a service from Uravakonda to Adoni."}}, {"text": "Adoni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 82502, "end_char": 82507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "883, it is by an operator who runs a service from Uravakonda to Adoni."}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83254, "end_char": 83259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 27, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83672, "end_char": 83688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AYYANGAR J.-When the judgment in the above appeals was pronounced on January 27, 1964 the learned Advocate for the appellants brought to our notice the following order passed by this Court on June 10, 1963 when the interim stay of the operation of the schemes which are impugned in the above appeals, was vacated on the opposition by the State Government:\n\n\"Stay vacated on the learned Advocate-General for Andhra Pradesh giving an undertaking that\n\nIJIU\n\nRowlee v.\n\nStatt of Andlml\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nRowjee v.\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nJanuary, 29\n\nin case the appeals succeed, the State will compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period that the appeals were pending in this Court by reason of the fact that they were not allowed to ply their buses on the routes under the respective permits granted to them."}}, {"text": "June\n\n10, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84896, "end_char": 84910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the above we would add the following at the end of the judgment which was pronounced on January 27, 1964:\n\n\"In view of the order r, iassed by this Court on June\n\n10, 1963, when the in1erim order of stay was vacated at the instance of the respondent, recording the undertaking on the part of the\n\nState that it would compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period when the appeals were pending in this Court."}}, {"text": "R. CIDTRALEKHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85331, "end_char": 85345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. CIDTRALEKHA & ANR."}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85401, "end_char": 85413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85431, "end_char": 85454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85618, "end_char": 85625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85627, "end_char": 85640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_368_411_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Rowjee v.\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nJanuary, 29\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nin case the appeals succeed, the State will compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period that the appeals were pending in this Court by reason of the fact that they were not allowed to ply their buses on the routes under the respective permits granted to them.\n\nThe learned Advocate- General further undertakes that this amount of compensation will be determined in the present proceedings themselves. No order as to\n\ncosts.\"\n\nThe learned Coun'sel requested us that we should give some directions in terms of this undertaking.\n\nIn view of the above we would add the following at the end of the judgment which was pronounced on January 27, 1964:\n\n\"In view of the order r, iassed by this Court on June\n\n10, 1963, when the in1erim order of stay was vacated at the instance of the respondent, recording the undertaking on the part of the\n\nState that it would compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period when the appeals were pending in this Court. there will be a declaration to that effect, and the High Court will determine the amount so payable and pass suitable directions for the payment thereof.\"\n\nR. CIDTRALEKHA & ANR.\n\nST A TE OF MYSORE & ORS.\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nConstitution of //idia, 1950, Arr. 166-1/ mandatory-List I Entry 66--\n\nScope of-Viva Voce test for admission in college-If violation of\n\nArt. 14--Article 15(4)-Classification of backward classes-Yali tlity.\n\nTho Government of Mysore by an order defined backward classes and directed tbat 30 per cent of tbo aoata in professional and technical colleges\n\nChitraltkhn\n\nv. and institutions shall be reserved for them and 18 per cent to tbe Sche- R. dule castes and Scheduled Tribes. It was laid down tbat classification of aocially and educationally backward classes should be made on tho basil Stat• of M1-•\n\nof economic condition and occupation. By a letter the Government in .. formed tbe Director of Technical Education tbat it had been decided that 253 of the maximum marks for tbe examination in optional subjects shall be fixed as interview marks. The selection will be conducted by a committee composed of Heads of Technical Institutions aod in allottins marks for interview factors like general knowledge, personality and extracurricular activities of the candidates should be taken into consideration.\n\nOn the basis of the above criteria selections were made for admission to Engineering and Medical Colleges.\n\nThereupon some of the candidates whose applications for admission were rejected filed writ petitions before tbe High Court of Mysore for quashing the orders issued by tbe Government and for directing that they shall be admitted in tho colleges strictly in tbe order of merit. The High Court rejected tbe contention• raised on points of law but found that the selection committee has abused its power and directed that the petitioners be interviewed afresh aild admissions be made in accordance with tbe Government Order and letter which were declared valid.\n\nBefore this Court it was contended that the Government Jetter was invalid inasmuch as it did not comply with tbe provisions of Art. 166 of tbe Constitution. The next contention was that the Government had no power .to appoint a selection committee for admitting students to colleges on the basis of higher or different qualifications than tbose pres-\n\n:ribed by the University. Another contention was that selection by viva voce examination was illegal by reason of the fact that it enables tho interviewers to act arbitrarily and therefore it contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution. Lastly it was contended that unless the observation of the High Court that the classification was not perfect since tbe Government has not applied the caste test as well as the economic test ii corrected it will mislead the Government.\n\nHeld: (Per B. P. Sinha, C.J., Subba Rao, P.aghubar Dayal and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) (i) Ibe provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory and, if they are not complied with, it can be established as a question of fact tbat the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor. In the present case the impugned order !bough it does not conform to tbe provisions of Art. 166 ex facie says that an order to the effect mentioned therein was issued by the GovcrnmCnt and it is not denied by the appellants tbat the order was made by the Government and neither it iJ denied that it was communicated to the selection committeee.\n\nTherefore it iJ valid.\n\n134-159 S.C.-24\n\n1964 Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay [1952] S.C.R. . 612, State of Bombay, v. Purushottam log Naik;-[1952] S.C.R. 74, Ghaio R. Chitralekha Mall & sons v. State of Delhi, (1959] S.C.A. 1424 and Bachillar Singh v.\n\nState ;; Mysor. Stat• of Punjab, (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713, referred to.\n\n(ii) If the impact of the State law providing for standards of education on entry 66 of List I is so heavy and devastating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge the Central field it may be ; truck down.\n\nBut that i1 a question of fact to be ascertained in each case. . If a State Jaw Prescribes higher percen!!J.ge _ _of. mark-sfot -extra-curricular activities in the matter of admission to colleges it cannot be said that it would be directly encroaching on the field covered by entry 66 of List I. The Government Orders do not contravene the mini111uJn qualification prescribed by the Mysore University; what the Government did was to appoint a selection committee and prescribe for selection of students who have the minimum qualifications prescribed by the University. Since they cannot admit all the students who have secured the minimum marks pre.scribed by the University they had necessarily to select the applicants on some reasonable basis. The State Government is therefore entitled to prescribe a machinery and also the criteria for admission of qualified students to medical and enginee1ing colleges run by the Government and with the consent of the management of the Government aided colleges, to the said colleges also.\n\nGujarat University v. Shri Krishna, [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 112, dis tinguished.\n\n(iii) The selection by viva voce is one of the methods suggested by modern authorities on education in preference to written tests. It is not for the court to say which method should be adopted, it should be left to the authorities concerned.\n\nThe fact that one particular method is capable of abuse is not sufficient ground for quashing it as being violative of Art. 14. If in a given case the selection committee abuses its powers in violation of Art. 14 the selection will be held invalid and will be set aside as the High Court has done in the present case.\n\n(iv) A classification of backward classes based on economi• conditions and occupation is not bad and does not offend Art.\n\nI 5 ( 4). The caste of a group of citizens may be a relevant circumstance in ascertaining their social b8ckWardness and though it is a relevant factor to determine social backwardness of a class, it cannot be the sole or dominent test in that behalf.\n\nIf in a given selection caste is excluded in ascertaining a class within the meaning of .Art. 1 S ( 4) it does not vitiate the classification if it satisfied other tests. The inference to the contrary which may be drawn from the observation of the High Court in the impugned judgment will not be correct in law or a correct reading of the observations of this Court in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp.\n\n1 s.c.R. 439.\n\n(v) Various provisions of the Constitution like Arts. 151 29, 46, 341 and 342 which recognise the factual existence of backward classes in our\n\ncountry and which make a sincere attempt to promote the welfare of the weaker sections thereof should be construed to effectuate that policy and not to give weightage to progressive sections of the society under the false colour of caste to which they happen to belong. Under no circumstances a \"class\" can be equated to a \"caste\" though the caste of an individual or group of individuals may be a relevant factor in putting him in a particular class.\n\nIf in a given situation caste is excluded in ascertaining a class within the meaning of Art. J 5 ( 4) it would not violate the classification if it satisfied other tests. If an entire sub-caste by and large; is backward, it may be included in the Scheduled Castes by following the appropriate procedure laid down by the Constitution.\n\nPer Mudholkar, J. (dissenting): (i) The decisions of this Court dealing with Art. 166 of the Constitution have definitely held that where the existence of a Government Order itself is challenged by a person who is affected by it the burden is upon the Government to establish that an lrdcr was in fact made by the Governor in the manner provided for in the rules of business framed by the Governor under cl. (3) of Art. 166.\n\n(ii) It is not correct to say, in this case, that the appellants have not denied the existence of the order. Right from the beginning they have been saying that there was no \"Government Order\" in so far as admission to the Medical College was concerned. Since both the appellants. were concerned only with the admission to a Medical College they had no necessity to deny the existence of the Government Order regarding ad .. mission to an Engineering College. The document which is relied on by the State to establish that there was a Government Order is nothing but a communication from the Secretary to Government of Mysore addressed to the selection committee and Deans Medical College Mysore. It is thus not. an order of the kind contemplated by Art. 166. Except a statement in that communication that the Under Secretary is ''directed to state\" that the Government has taken a decision there is no evidence or averment that the Governor has made an order providing for interview.\n\nIn no case has this Court held that such a document can be treated as\n\nthe Governor's Order or even evidence of the existence of the Governor's Order.\n\n(iii) The decision of this Court in Guiarat Univtrsity v. Shri Krishna, [1963] Supp. J S.C.R. 112, establishes that the power to provide for coordination and determination of standards in certain institutions like the medical colleges is vested in the Parliament and even though Parliament may not have exercised that power the State Legislature cannot step in and provide for the determination and coordination of standards by requiring that marks on the basis of interviews be awarded to the applicants for admission of candidates to such institutions as is done in the present case. It constitutes an interference with the standards of admission laid down by the University.\n\n(iv) The executive power of the State which is co-extensive with legislative power under Art. 162 of the Constitution cannnt be exercised where such exercise is contrary to law or where it has been assipied to\n\nR. Chitralekha v.\n\nState of Mysoro\n\n1964 other authorities or bodies.\n\nSection 23 of the Mysore University Act, R. Chltraltkha provides that the Acadamic Council shall have power to prescribe the v. conditions of admission to the University and therefore the executive Slate of Mysort cannot encroach on this power.\n\nRai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, [1955) 2 S.C.R. 225 and Motl/a/ v. Government of State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1951 All\n\n259 (F.B.).\n\n(v) It would not be in aecor'dance with cl. (!) of Art. IS or cl. (2) of Art. 29 to require the consideration of the caste of persons to be home in mind for determining what are socially and educationally backward\n\nclasses.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1056 and 1057 of 1963.\n\nAppeals by special !eave from the judgment and order dated September 30, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1592 and 1522 of 1963.\n\nS. K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants (in both the appeals) .\n\nc. K .. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. A char, for the respondents (in both the appeals).\n\nJaruary 29,\n\n1964. The Judgment of B. P. Sinha, C.J., K. Sobba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Raghubar Dayal JJ. was delivered by Sobba Rao J. Mudholkar J. delivered a dissenting opinion.\n\n$ubba Rao I.\n\nSUB BA RAo J .-These two appeJls raise the question of the validity of the orders made by the Government of Mysore in respect of admissions to Engineering and Medical Colleges in the State of Mysore.\n\nThe facts may be briefly stated: In the Statei of Mysore there are a number of Engineering and Medical Colleges-most of them are Government Colleges and a few of them are Government aided Colleges.\n\nThe State Government appointed a common selection committee for settling admissions to the Engineering Colleges and another common selection committee for settling admissions to Medical Colleges.\n\nThe Government by an order dated July 26, 1963, marked as Ex. C in the\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT'. 373\n\nHigh Court, defined backward classes and directed that 30 per cent of the seats in professional and technical colleges and institutions shall be reserved for them and 18 per cent. to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.\n\nOn July 6, 1963, the Government sent a letter to the Director of Technical Education in Mysore, Bangalore, informing him that it had been decided that 25 per cent of the maximum marks for the examination in the optional subjects taken into account for making the selection of candidates for admission to Engineering Colleges shall be fixed as interview marks; it also laid down the criteria for allotting marks in the interview.\n\nIt appears that a similar order was issued in respect of Medical C9lleges.\n\nThe selection committee converted the total of the marks in the optional subjects to a maximum of 300 marks and fixed the maximum marks for interview at 75.\n\nOn the basis of the marks obtained by the candidates in the eXamination and those obtained in the interview, selections were made for admission to Engineering and Medical Colleges.\n\nSome of the candidates whose applications for admission to the said colleges were rejected filed petition> under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Mysore for quashing the orders issued by the Government in the matter of admissions to the said Colleges and for a direction that they shall be admitted in the Colleges strictly in the order of merit.\n\nThe High Court, after considering the various contentions raised by the petitioners, held that the orders defining backwardness were valid and that the criteria laid down for interview of\n\nstudent~ were good; but it held that the selection committee had abused the powers conferred upon it and on that finding set aside the interviews held and directed that the applicants shall be interviewed afresh in accordance with the s.cheme laid down by the Government in Exs. C and D and in Annexure IV, subject to the directions given by it.\n\nTwo , of the petitioners have filed the present appeals against the said order of the High Court.\n\nWe shall now proceed _to deal with .the various conten tions raised by learned counsel for the appellants.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants contends that the Government did not issue any order to the selection com-\n\nR. Chitraltkha\n\nState of My1oro\n\nSubba Rao /.\n\n1964 mittee in charge of admissions to Medical Colleges prescrib- R. Chitralekha ing the marks for interview or .fixing the criteria for allotting v. the said marks.\n\nAnnexure IV daited July 6, 1963, relates Sldte of Mysore to award of marks for the interview of candidates seeking Subba R\"\" I. admission to Epgineering Colleges and Technical Institutions. It was a letter written by the Secretary to the Government of Mysore, Education Department, to the Director of Technical Education in Mysore, Bangalore. Therein the Government fixed the percentage of marks to be allotted nt the interview.\n\nThe selection committee was authorised to , allot marks to the candidates, having regard to the following factors:\n\n(1) General Knowledge.\n\n(2) Aptitude and personality.\n\n(3) Previous academic career, including special distinctions, etc.\n\n(4) N.C.C., A.C.C., etc. ( 5) Extra curricular activities including sports, social service, debating, dramatics, etc.\n\nBut at the time of arguments no letter written by the Government in respect of admissions to Medical Colleges was pl!lced before _us.\n\nThere is no definite allegation in either of the two affidavits filed by the appellants that no such order was issued by the Government in respect of Medical Colleges.\n\nBut, in the petition filed by Chitralekha in pa•: 22 the following statement s found:\n\n\"As the order empowering them to award 75 marks as interview marks has so far remained secret in that it has not been made available, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to send for the same, as the order falls to be quashed.\"\n\nThis averment assumes that such an order was made. In the counter-affidavit filed by Dr. Dharmaraj, Dean, Medical College, and Chairman of the selection committee for admission to Medical Colleges, it is stated that -the Government by its letter directed that the said selection committee shall interview candidates and allot marks the maximum of which shall be 25 per cent of the maximum marks for the optional subjects and laid down the criteria for allotting\n\nmarks in the interview. In the paper-book as typed the description of the letter is omitted.\n\nBut the learned Attorney-General stated thaf in the original the description is given and that is, PLM 531 MNC 63 dated 12th July,\n\n1963. In the counter-affidavit filed by B. R. Verma, Deputy Secretary to .the Government of Mysore, Education Department, Bangalore, after referring to Annexure IV, it is stated that a similar letter was sent by the Government to the Selection Committee for admission to Medical Colleges. It does not appear from the judgment of the High Court that learned counsel for the appellants denied the existence of such a communication in respect of Medical Colleges, but nroceeded with his argument on the basis that a communication similar to Annexure IV issued in connection with admissions to Engineering Colleges existed in the case of Medical Colleges also.\n\nBut before us the learned counsel for the appellants heavily relied upon the fact that the said order was not filed in the court and was not willing to accept the assurance given by the Attorney-General on instructions that such an order existed.\n\nIn the circumstances we directed the Attorney-General to file the said order.\n\nA copy of th¢ letter written by the Government bas since been filed and it clearly shows that the relevant instructions were issued in respect of admission to Medical Colleges also.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that the Government sent a letter similar in terms to annexure rv' to the selection committee for admission to Medical Colleges.\n\nThe next contention advanced is that Annexure IV was invalid as it did not conform to the requirements of Art. 166 of the Constitution.\n\nAs the argument turns upon the for::: of the said annexure it will be convenient to read the material part thereof.\n\nusir,\n\nSub : Award of marks for the \"interview\" of the candidates seeking admission o Engineering Colleges and Technical Institutions.\n\nWith reference to your letter No. AAS. 4.ADW I 63/2491, dated the 25th June, 1963, on the subject\n\n196'\n\nR. Chitraltklut\n\nState of My1or\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nl964 mentioned above, I am directed to state that Government R. c1111roltkha have decided that 2S per cent of the maximum marks ...... v.\n\nSI.,, of M710N\n\n.fu6611 Rao I.\n\nYours faithfully,\n\nSd/- S. NARASAPPA, Under Secretary to Government, Education Department.\"\n\nEx facie tJ:iis letter shows that it was a communication of the order issued by the Government under the signature of the Under Secretary to the Government, Education Department. Under Art. 166 of the Constitution all executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in th.e name of the Governor, and that orders made in the name-Of the Governor shall be authenticated in such , manner as mlly be specified in rules to be made by the Governor and the validity of an order , which is so\n\nauenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor.\n\nIf the conditions laid down in this Article are complied with, the order cannot be called in question on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. It is contended that as the order in question was not issued in the name of the Governor the order was void and no interviews could be held pursuant to that order. The law on the subject is well-settled. In Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar\n\nv. The State of Bombay (1) Das 1., as he then was, observed:\n\n\"Strict compliance with the requirements of article 166 gives an immunity to the order in that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor.\n\nIf, therefore, the requirements of that article are not complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be claimed by the State. This. however, does not vitiate the order itself .......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Article 166 directs al! executive action to be expressed and authenticated in the manner therein laid down but an\n\n(') [1952] S.C.R. 612, 625.\n\nomission to comply with those provisions does not render the executive action a nullity.\n\nTherefore, all that the procedure established ·-by law requires is that the appropriate Government must take a decision as to whether the detention order should be confirmed or not under section 11 (I ) . \"\n\nThe same view was reiterated by this Court in The State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog Naik('), where it was pointed out that though the order in question then was defective in form it was open to the State Government to prove by other means that such an order had been validly made. This view has been reaffi:/med by this Court in subsequent decisions: see Ghaio ,.!all and Sons v. The State of Delhi( 2 ),\n\nnd it is, therefore, settled law that provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory in character and, if they are not complied with, it can be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor. The judgment of this Court in Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Pun; ab( 8 ) does not help the appellants, for in that case the order signed by the Revenue Minister was not communicated to the party and, therefore, it was held that there was no effective order.\n\nIn the light of the aforesaid decisions, let us look at the facts of this case.\n\nThough Annexure IV does not conform to the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution, it ex facie says that an order to the effect mentioned therein was issued by the Government and it is not denied that it was communicated to the selection committee.\n\nIn neither of the affidavits filed by the 39pellants there was any specific averment that no such order was issued by the_ Government.\n\nIn the counter-affidavit filed by B. R. Varma, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Mysore, Education Department, there is a clear averment that the Government gave the direction contained in Annexure IV and a similar letter was\n\n(1) (1952) S. C.R. 674. (') f •9591 S. C. R. 1424. (')\n\n1962) Supp, 3 S. C.R. 713.\n\nR. Chitraltkha\n\nState of Myio,.\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\n1964 issued to the selection committee for admissions to Medical R.\n\nChitralekha Colleges and this averment was not denied by the appel-\n\nState 0/· Mysore !ants by filing any affidavit.\n\nIn the circumstances when - there are no allegations at all in the affidavit that the order Suhba Rao J. was not made by the Government, we have no reason to reject the averment made by the Deputy Secretary to the Government that the order was issued by the Government.\n\nThere are no merits in this contention.\n\nIt is then contended that the Government has no power to appoint a selection commitee for admitting students to colleges on the basis of higher or different qualifications than those prescribed by the University and, therefore, the orders made by the Government in respect of admission were illegal.\n\nThe first argument is that co-ordination and determination of standards of a university is a Union subject and, therefore, the State Legislature has no constitutional competency to make a law for maintaining the standards of university education.\n\nAs the State Government's executive power extends to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws, the argument proceeds, the Government of the State cannot make - an order or issue directions for maintaining the standards of the University. The further argument is that prescribing higher marks for dmission to a College is for the purpose of maintaining the standards of University education and therefore the State Government is not empowered to do so.\n\nIn support of_this contention reliance is placed upon the judgment of t~Court in Gujarat University v. Shri Krishna('). There, one of the questions raised related to alleged conflict between entry 1 l. of List II and entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. By item No. 11 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State Legislature has power to legislate in respect of education including Universities subject to the provisions of items 1, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and 25 of List III.\n\nBy item 66 power is entrusted to Parliament to legislate on co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific\n\nind technical institutions.\n\n(1) [1963) Supp. I S. C.R. 112.\n\nChitralekha\n\nThe question was whether medium of instruction wa> comprehended by either of those entries or whether it fell R. under both. In that context it was observed at p. 715-716: State of Mysor~ \"The State has the power to prescribe the \\ yllabi ana\n\ncourses of study in the institutions named m entry 66 (but not falling within entries 63 to 65) and as an incident thereof it has the power to indicate the medium in which instruction should be imparted. But the Union Parliament has an overriding legislative ipower to ensure that the syllabi and courses of study prescribed and the medium selected do not impair standards of education or render the co-ordination of such standards either on an All India or other basis impossible or even difficult.\"\n\nThis and similar other passages indicate that if the law made by the State by virtue of entry l l of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution makes impossible or difficult the exercise of the legi:; iativ0 power of the Parliament under the entry \"Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions\" reserved to the Union, the State law may be bad.\n\nThis cannot obviously be decided on speculative and hypothetical reasoning. If the impact of the State !aw providing for such standards on entrv 66 of List I is so heavy or deva1tating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge the central field, it may be struck down. But that is a question of fact to be ascertained in each case. It is not possible to hold that if a Staite legislature made a law prescribing a higher percentage of marks for extra-curricular activities in the matter of admission to colleges, 1t would be directly encroaching on the field covered by entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. If <o, it is not disputccl that the State Government would be within its rights to prescribe qualifications for admission to colleges so long as its action does not contravene any other law.\n\nIt is then said that the Mysore University Act conferred power to prescribe rules for admission to Colleges on the University and the Government cannot exercise that power\n\nSubba Rtzo J.\n\n1964 It is true that under s. 23 of the Mysore University Act, R.\n\nChitralekha 1956, the Academic Council shall have the power to pres-\n\n'f• M cribe the conditions for admission of students to the Uni- Stat• ''0\" versity and, in exercise of its power, it has prescribed the Subba Rao I. percentage of marks which a student shall obtain for getting admission in medical or engineering colleges.\n\nThe orders of the Government do not contravene the minimum qualifications prescribed by the University; what the Government did was to appoint a selection committee and prescribe rules for selection of students who have the minimum qualifications prescribed by the University.\n\nThe Government runs most of the medical nd engineering colleges.\n\nExcluding the State aided colleges for a moment, the po:H\n\ntion is as follows: The Colleges run by the Government, having regard to financial commitments and other relevant considerations, can only admit a specific number of students to the said Colleges.\n\nThey cannot obviously admit all the applicants who have secured the marks prescribed by the University. It has necessarily to screen the applicants on some reasonable basis.\n\nThe aforesaid orders of the Government only prescribed criteria for making admissions to Colleges from among students who secured the minimum qualifying marks prescribed by the University.\n\nOnce it is conceded, and it is not disputed before us, that the State Government can run medical and engineering colleges, it cannot be denied the power to admit such qualified students as pass the reasonable tests laid down by it. This is a power which every 9rivate owner of a College will have, and the Government which runs its own Colleges cannot be denied that power.\n\nEven so it is argued that the same power cannot be exercised by the Government in respect of private Colleges though they are receiving aid from the State.\n\nBut the management of aided institutions have not raised any objections.\n\nIndeed, from the year 1960 admissions were made to the Colleges by the selection committees constituted by the Government.\n\nThe High Court, after considering the material placed before it, held that, with the consent of the management of the various professional and technical colleges, the Government took over the responsibility ot regulating admission of students to the colleges in question.\n\nNothing has been placed before us to prove that the selection committees were constituted .against the wishes of the management of the aided colleges. In the circumstances, we cannot disturb the finding of the High Court in this regard.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that the Government has power to prescribe a machinery and .also the criteria for admission of qualifir.d students to medical and engineering colleges run by the Government and, with the consent of the management of the Government aided colleges, to the said colleges also.\n\nIt is then contended that the system of selection by interviews and viva voce examination is illegal inasmuch as it enables the interviewers to act arbitrarily and to manipulate the results and, therefore, it contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to notice how the interview is held and the criteria laid down for the selection committee to adopt.\n\nThe Government by its orer dated May 17, 1963 constituted a committee consisting of the following members for selection to Government Medical Colleges:\n\n(I) The Dean, Medical College, Mysow-Chairman.\n\n(2) The Dean, Medical College, Bangalore-Member.\n\n(3) The Dean, Medical College, Hubli-Mem1Jer.\n\nSq too, highly qualified edµc.ationists were appointed to the selection committee for the Engineering Colleges.\n\nBy notification dated July 6, 1963, in respect of the Engineering Colleges and a similar notification issued in respect of the Medical Colleges, the Government prescribed that in addition to the examination marks in optional subjects there should be an interview of students for which •the maximum mark prescribed shall be 25 per cent of the maximum marks of the option.al subjects. The selection committee has to allot marks, having regard to general knowledge, aptitude and personality, previous academic career, including special distinctions etc., N.C.C., A.C.C. etc., extra-curricular activities including sports, social service, debating, dr:\\matics etc.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear thlt the Governme'lt by its order not only laid down a clear policy and prescribed definite criteria in the matter of giving marks at the interview but\n\nR. Chitralek/u;\n\ny, State of My1ort\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\n1964 also appointed competent men to make the selection on R.\n\nChitra/ekha that basis.\n\nThe order of the Government does not in any\n\n5101, ~· Myior• way contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nSubb• Rao J.\n\nBut learned counsel for the appellants raised a larger question that selection by interviews is inherently repugnant to the doctrine of equality embodied in Art. 14 of the Constitution, for, whatever may be the objective test laid down, in the fiool analysis the awarding of marks is left to the subjective satisfaction of the selection committee and, therefore, it gives ample room for discrimination and manipulation.\n\nWe cannot accept such a wide contention and con- . demn one of the well-accepted modes of selection in educational institutions.\n\nJames Hart in his \"An Introduction to Administrative Law\" observes, at p. 180 thus:\n\n\"A test or examination, to be competitive, must employ an objective standard of measure.\n\nWhere the st3ndard or measure is wholly sulJjective to the examiners, it differs in effect in no respect from an uncontrolled opinion of the examiners and cannot be termed competitive.\"\n\nIn the field of education there are divergent views as regard the mode of testing . the capacity and calibre of students in the matter of admissions to colleges.\n\nOrthodox educationists stand by the marks obtained by a student in the annual examination.\n\nThe modern trend of opinion insists upon other addition.al tests, such as interview, performance in extra-curricular activities, personality test, psychiatric tests etc. Obviously we are not in a position to judge which method is preferable or which test is the correct one. If there can be manipulation or dishonesty in allotting marks at interviews, there can equally be manipulation in the matter of awarding marks in the written examinations. In the ultimate analysis, whatever method is adopted its success depends on the moral standards of the members constituting the selection committee and their sense of objectivity and devotion to duty.\n\nThis criticism is more a reflection on the examiners than on the system itself.\n\nThe scheme of selection, however perfect it may be on paper, may be abused in practice.\n\nThat it is ca?able of abuse is\n\nnot a ground for quashing it.\n\nSo long as the order lays down relevant objective criteria and entrusts the business ol selection to qualified persons,\" this Court cannot obviously have any say in the matter.\n\nIn this case the criteria laid down by the Government are certainly relevant in the matter of awarding marks at the interview.\n\nLearned counsel contends that the ability of a student on the basis of the said criteria can be better judged by other methods like certificate from the N.C.C. Commander or a medical board or a psychatrist and should not be left to a body like the selection committee which cannot possibly arrive at the correct conclusion in a short time that would be available to it.\n\nThis criticism does not affect the validity of the criteria, but only suggests a different method of applying the criteria than that adopted by the Committee. It is not for us to say which method should be adopted: that must be left to the authority concerned. If in any particular case the selection committee abuses its power in violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, that may be a case for setting aside tile result of a particular interview, as the High Court did in this case.\n\nWe cannot, therefore, hold without better anc! more scientific material placed before us that selection by interview in addition to the marks obtained in the written examination is itself bad as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nLastly it is contended that though the High Court did not quash the order of the Government embodied in Ex. C, it held that it was not a perfect classification and also indicated its mind that the Government should have adopted the caste test as well as the residence test in making the classification.\n\nIf the observations of the learned Judge, the argument proceeds, are not corrected, the State may be bound by such observations in the matter when it finally prescribes the criteria for ascertaining the backward classes under Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution.\n\nIn Ex. C the Government laid down that classification of socially and educationally backward classes should be made on the following basis: (1 ) economic condition; and (2) occupation.\n\nAccording to that order a family whose income is Rs. 1,200 per annum or less and persons or classes following occupations of agriculture petty business, inferior services, crafts or other\n\nR. Chitralekha v.\n\nStdte of Mysore\n\nSubba Rao 1.\n\n1964 occupations involving manual Jabour. are in general, socially, R. Chitral•kha economically and educationally backward.\n\nThe Govero- \"· ment lists the following occupations as contributing to social State of Mysor• k d ) . . _ bac war ness: (1 actual cultivator; (2) artisan; (3) petty Subbn Ran I. businessmen; (4) inferior services (i.e., Class IV in Government services and corresponding class or service in private employment) including casual labour; and ( 5) any other occupation involving manual labour.\n\nIt is, therefore, manifest that the Government, as a temporary measure pending an elaborate study, has taken into consideration only the economic condition and occupation of the family concerned as the criteria for backward classes within the meaning of Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution.\n\nThe order does not take into consideration the caste of an applicant as one of the criteria for backwardness.\n\nLearned counsel does not attack the validity of the said order. But in the High Court conllicting arguments were advanced in support of this order as well as against it.\n\nThe High Coul't heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in M. R. Balaji v. The State of Mysore(') and came to the conclusion that the scheme adopted by the State was a very imperfeot scheme and that in addition to the occupation and poverty tests, the State should have adopted the \"caste\" test as we!l as the \"residence\" test in making the classification.\n\nIt also observed that the decision in Balaji's case says that \"the 'caste' basis is undoubtedly a relevant, nay an important basis in determining the classes of backward Hindus but it should not be made the sole basis\".\n\nIt concluded that part of the discussion with the following observation:\n\n\"But I earnestly hope that soon the State will make a more appropriate classification lest its bonafides should be questioned.\"\n\nLearned counsel contends that these observations are not supported by the decision in Ba/aji' s case, and that they are in conflict with the observations made therein.\n\nWe shall, therefore, consider the exact scope of the observations in the said decision of this Court. There, 68 per cent of seats in Colleges were reserved for the alleged backward communities.\n\nIt was argued before this Court on behalf of the peti\n\n(1) [196al Supp. I s. c. R. 439.\n\ntioners therein that the impunged order, which was passed under Art: 15 ( 4) of the Constitution, was not valid because the basis adopted by the order in specifying and enumerating the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens in the State was unintelligible and irrational, and the classi fication made on the said basis was inconsistent with and outside the provisions of Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution.\n\nIn considering the said question, Gajendragadkar J., speaking for the Court, made the following observations, at p. 658:\n\n\"The backwardness under Art. 15(4) must be social and educational. It is not either social or educational, but it is both' social and educational; and that takes us to the question as to how social and educational backwardness has to be determined.\"\n\nAdverting to the expression \"classes\" of citizens in Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution, the learned Judge proceeded to state:\n\n'The group of citizens to whom Art. 15 ( 4) applies\n\n are described as \"classes of citizens\", not as castes of citizens.\n\nA class according to the dictionary meaning, shows division of society according to, status, rank of caste ........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether any class of citizens is socially backward or not, it may not be irrelevant to consider the caste of the said group of citizens.\n\nIn this connection it is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the special provision is contemplated for classes of citizens\n\nand not for individual citizens as such, and so, though the caste of the group of citizens may be relevant, its importance should not be exaggerated. If the classification of backward classes of citizens was based solely on the caste of the citizen, it may not always be logical and may perhaps contain the vice of perpetuating the castes themselve&.\n\n134-159 S.C.-25\n\n1964 -· R. ChttrakU.\n\n\"· State of M71t1tS\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\n1964 R. C\"itralekha\n\ny, 111111 of My1ore\n\nlubbo Rao 1.\n\nBesides, if the caste of the group of citizens was made the sole basis for determining <the social backwardness of the said group, that test would inevitably break down in relation to many sections of Indian Society which do not recognise castes in the conventional sense known to Hindu society .............. That is why we think that though castes in relation to Hindus may be a relevant factor to consider in determining the social backwardness of groups or classes of citizens, it cannot be made the sole or the dominant test in that behalf.\"\n\nTwo principles stand out prominently from the said observations, namely, (i) the caste of a group of citizens may be a relevant circumstance in ascertaining their social backwardness; and (ii) though it is a relevant factor to determine the social backwardness of a class of citizens, it cannot be the sole or dominant test in that behalf.\n\nThe observations extracted in the judgment of the High Court appear to be in conflict with the observations of this Court.\n\nWhile this Court said that caste is only a relevant circumstance and that it cannot be the. dominant test in ascertaining the backwardness of a class of citizens, the High Court said that it is an imwrtant basis in determining the class of backward Hindus and that the Government should have adopted caste as one of the tests.\n\nAs the said observations made by the High Court may lead to some confusion in the mind of the authority concerned who may be entrusted with the duty of prescribing the. rules for ascertaining the backwardness of classes of citizens within the meaning of Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution, we would hasten to make it clear that caste is only a relevant circumstance in ascertaining the backwardness of a class and there is nothing in the judgment of this Court which precludes the authority concerned from determining the social backwardness of a group of citizens if it can do so without reference to caste. While this Court has nc; it excluded caste from ascertaining the backwardness of a class of citizens, it has not made it one of the compelling circumstances affording a basis for the ascertainment of backwardness of a class.\n\nTo put it differently, the authority concerned may take caste .into consideration in ascertaining\n\nthe backwardness of a group of persons; but, if it does not, its order will not be bad on that account, if it can ascertain the backwardness of a group of persons on the basis of other relevant criteria.\n\nThe Constitution of India promises Justice, social, , economic and political; and equality of status and vf opportunity, among others.\n\nUnder Art. 46, one of th: Articles in Part IV headed \"Directive Principles of Sta'e Po!i; y\", the Seate shall promote with special care the ~.:ucational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.\n\nUnder Art. 341,\n\n''The President may with respect to any State or\n\nUnion territory, and where it is a State after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the puJ:1?oses of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be.\"\n\nUnder Art. 342, in the same manner, the President may specify the tribes or tribal communities as Scheduled Tribes.\n\nArticle 15(4) says:\n\n\"Nothi11g in this article or in clause (2) of article\n\n291 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially .and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.\"\n\nThese provisions form a group of Articles which have relevance in the making of a special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens in the matter of admissions to colleges.\n\nThese provisions recognize the factual existence of backward classes in our country brought about by historical reasons and make a sincere attempt to promote the welfare of the weaker sections thereof.\n\nThey shall be so construed\n\nR. Chitrakki..\n\nState of M1MIN\n\nSubba Rao/,\n\n196\" as to effctuate the said policy but not to give weightage to R. Chitraldllo progressive sections of our society under the false colour of\n\n1161, 0/· Myior1 caste to w?ich tey happen to belong.\n\nThe important factor - to be noticed m Art. 15 ( 4) is that it does not speak of lubba Rao I. castes, but only speaks of classes. If the makers of the Constitution intended to take castes also as units of social and educational backwardness, they would have said so as they have said in the case of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.\n\nThough it may be suggested that the wider expression \"classes\" is used in cl. ( 4) of Art. 15 as there are communities without castes, if the intention was to equate classes wi.th castes, nothing prevented the makers of the Constitution from using the expression \"backward classes or castes\". The juxtaposition of the expression \"backward classes\" and \"Scheduled Castes\" in Art. 15 ( 4) also leads to a reasonable inference that the expression \"classes\" is not synonymous with castes.\n\nIt may be that for ascertaining whether a par\\icular citizen or a group of citizens belong to a backward class or not, his or their caste may have some relevance, but it cannot be either the sole or the dominant criterion for ascertaining the class to which he or they belong.\n\nThis interpretation will carry out the intention of the Constitution expressed in the aforesaid Articles.\n\nIt helps the really backward classes instead of promoting the interests of individuals or groups who, though they belong to a particular caste a majority whereof is socially and educationally backward, really belong to a class which is socially and educationally advanced.\n\nTo illustrnte, take a caste in a State which is numerically the largest therein.\n\nIt may be that though, a majority of the people in that caste are socially and educationally backward, an effective minority may be socially and educationally far more advanced than another sll).all sub-caste the total number of which is far less than the said minority. If we interpret the expression \"classes\" as \"castes\", the object of the Constitution will be frustrated and the people who do not deserve any adventitious aid may get it to the exclusion of those who really deserve.\n\nThis anomaly will not arise if, without equating caste with class, caste is taken as only one of the considerations to ascertain whether a person belongs to a backward\n\n6 S.C.lt\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 389\n\nclass or not. . On the other hand, if the entire sub-; aste, by and large, is backward, it may be included in the Scheduled Castes by following the appropriate procedure laid down by the Constitution.\n\nWe do not intend to Jay down any inflexible rule for the Government to follow.\n\nThe laying down of criteria for ascertainment of social and educational backwardness of a class is a complex problem depending upon many circums tances which may vary from State to State and even from place to plaC:e in a State.\n\nBut what we intend to emphasize is that under no circumstances a \"class\" can be equated to a \"caste\", though the caste of an individual or a group of individual may be considered along with other relevant factors in putting him in a particular class. We would also like to ma)ce it clear that if in a given situation caste is ex cluded in ascertaining a class within the meaning of Art. 15 ( 4) of the Constitution, it does not vitiiµe the classification if it satisfied other tests.\n\nIn the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nThere will be ao order as to costs.\n\nMummLKAR J .-The appellants in these appeals had challenged before the High Court of Mysore the validity of the mode of selection of candidates for admission to the Medical Colleges in that State by preferring petitions before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThey pointed out in their petitions that the selection committee, .instead of selecting persons for admission on the basis of merit, chose to interview the candidates and made the ultimate selection by adding marks upto 75 to the marks actually secured by the candidate at the Pre-University Course examination (herein referred to as P.U.C.\n\nExamination} on the basis of the interview.\n\nTheir contentions are that in the absence of any Government order there was no basis upon which marks at the interview could be added to the marks secured in the P.U.C. examination, that the so-called order on which reliance was pl.aced on behalf of the State is not a Government order at all as the document produced does nut comply with the requirements of Art. 166 of the Constitution, that no criteria were laid down for allotting marks ro the candidates at the interview, that this was a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, that the Govem\n\nR. Chltrald;,,. ...\n\nStall of M,_.\n\n8ub6a Rao J\n\nJladlt..U. 1.\n\n1964 ment was constitutionally incompetent to prescribe qualificalt Chltraltkha tions for admission to Colleges under the University diffe- • \"· rent from those prescribed by the University and that under ~1ateofM11ore th M\n\nU · A th U · 1 h d h _ e ysore mvers1ty ct e mvers1ty a one a t e Mudho/kar J. power to prescribe rules for admission to Colleges affiliated to the University.\n\nThe High Court held against the appellants on all these points. But upon the view that the Selection Committee had \"misused\" the powers conferred upon it and had wrongly interpreted the Government Order, quashed the results of the interview and directed tlt1t after interview ing the petitioners before it afresh their cases should be considered for admission by the Selection Committee in accordance with the Government Order. In the course of its order the High Court has found fault with the Govern ment for not taking the castes of the candidates into consi deration while exercising its powers under Art. 15 ( 4) and making provision for the advancement of backward classes and made certain remarks to which objection has been taken on behalf of the appellants.\n\nMy learned brother Subba Rao J. whose judgment I have had the opportunity of seing has upheld the judgment of the High Court but has not agreed with the observations made by it suggesting that the caste of candidates should also have been taken into consideration while determining the social and educational backwardness of a class.\n\nI regret my inability to agree with many of the conclusions reached by my learned brother and I am of opinion that the appeals ought to be allowed.\n\nEven assuming for the time being that the Government of Mysore !tad the power both under the Constitution and under a law enacted by the Legislature to prescribe qualifications for admission to any Colleges in the State, includ ing colleges imparting technical or professional education, the first question is whether there was in fact a Government Ofder justifying the course adopted by the Selection Committee.\n\nIt may be mentioned that the document which was filed in the High Court as being the Government Order was merely a communication addressed on behalf of the Government by one of its Secretaries to the Selection Committee and signed by an Under Secretary.\n\nBut this document only\n\nrefers to the interview prescribed for making selections of candidates for admission to Engineering Colleges. At the hearing in this Court the Attorney-General who appeared for the State of Mysore stated that there was a Government.\n\nOrder also as regards admission to Medical Colleges .that it was actually brought to the notice of the High Court and that he may be permitted to produce that order. Leave was granted by us to him to do so.\n\nOn December 20, 1963, th.at is, after judgment had been reserved Mr. Achar, Assis tant Government Advocate, placed on record, what accord ing to the State, is the Government Order. This document, however, was not a part of the record of the writ petitions and the only manner in which the so-called Government Order relating to admission to Medical Colleges was brought to the notice of the High Court was by specifying in Dr.\n\nDharmaraj's affidavit, the number of the letter addressed by a Secretary to the Government to the Selection Committee dealing with admissions to the Medical Colleges.\n\nIt is desirable to reproduce in extenso the document which has been filed now in this Court.\n\nIt runs thus:\n\n\"GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE\n\nCONFIDENTIAL:\n\nNo. PLM 351 MMC 63\n\nFrom\n\nSii,\n\nMysore Government Secretariat, Vidhana Soudha, Bangalore, dated 12th July, 1963/\n\nSE 1885\n\nThe Secretary to Government of Mysore, PH. Labour & Munl. Admn. Department, Bangalore.\n\nThe Chairman, Selection Committee & Dean, Medical College, Mysore.\n\nS-'JBJECT.-Award of marks for the interview of the\n\nR. Chitrahklw\n\n\"· State of M1_.\n\nMudholkar /.\n\nR. Cllitraldha\n\n' of M7rort\n\nMudholkar /.\n\ncandidates seeking admission to Medical Colleges in the St.ate.\n\nI am directed to state that Government have decided that 25 per cent of the maximum marks for the examination in the optional subjects taken mto account for making the selection of candidates for admission to Medical Colleges, shall be fixed as interview marks~\n\nI am further to state that the Selection Committee is authorised to allot marks for the interview of the candidates as fixed above, having regard to the following factors:\n\n1. General Knowledge.\n\n2. Apti!Ude and personality.\n\n3. Previous academio career including special dis tinctions, etc.\n\n4'. N.C.C., A.C.C., etc.\n\nS. Extra curricular activities including sports, social\n\nservice, debating, dramatics, etc.\n\nI am also to state that Government have decided that students with exceptional merit in games and sports-State and inter-State standard-may be selected upto a maximum of two per cent of the total number of seats.\n\nYours faithfully,\n\nSd./- L. G. DESAI,\n\nUnder Secretary to Government, PH. Labour & Munl. Admn. Dept.\n\nAttested\n\nSd./- H. L. LINGARAJ URS,\n\nDy. Secretary to Government, PH. Lb. & MI. Admn.\n\nThis is nothing more than a communication emanating from a Secretary to the Government of Mysore to the Chairman, and addressed to the Selection Committee and Dean, Medical College, Mysore.\n\nIt is thus not an order of the kind contemplated by Art. 166 of the Constitution.\n\nThat Article lays down that all executive actions of the Government of a State shall be expressed to b~ taken in the name of the Governor and that the orders made and executed in the name of the Governor sh.all be authenticated in such manner :as may be specified in the rules made by the Governor.\n\nIt further provides that where an order is authenticated in the manner prescribed in the rules made by the Governor, its validity shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor.\n\nThe essence of Art. 166, however, is that executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.\n\nThe document placed before us does not show that the action, to wit, prescribing an interview, allotting marks for it and laying down the criteria to be observed by the Selection Committee in allotting marks even purports to emanate from the Governor.\n\nAll that the Secretary on whose behalf some Under Secretary has signed, says 1s that he is \"directed to state\" that the Government has taken a certain decision.\n\nThis document thus is not that decision.\n\nWhat that decision is, how it is worded, when it was taken and whether it is expressed in ; he name of the Governor, we do not know.\n\nThe cases in which it has been held by this Court that the provisions of Art. l 66 ( 2) are directory and not mandatory are of no help because here what we are concerned with is about the actual existence of an order made by the Governor.\n\nNo doubt, where there is merely non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 166 ( l) or of the rules framed by the Governor in the matter of authentication of an order, evidence aliunde could he Jed to establish that in fact an order was made by the Governor.\n\nThis clearly, does not mean that the existence of a Government order need not be established.\n\nOn the contrary these decisions accept the position that the making of a Government Order is sine qua non for justifying any action which is purported to be taken by an officer of the Government on its behalf.\n\nHere the Secretary has said a certain procedure was to be foll owed by the Selection Committee. He has himself\n\nR. Chitrahklra\n\n\"· State of 11.,_\n\nMudholkar I.\n\n1964 no power to order that to be done de hors an order of the R. ChitralekhtJ Government. It is for this reason that he has made a refers\n\nv. M ence to such an order.\n\nBut that order is not before us. It tale.!!!__ 1\"'\" was said by the learned Attorney-General that the existence Mudlwlkar J. of the order was not denied by the appellants.\n\nBut that is not correct. Right from the beginning they have been saying that there was no \"Government Order\" in so far as admission to the Medical Colleges was concerned. What was relied on behalf of the State was the letter addressed to the Selection Committee concerned with the applications of persons for admission to Engineering Colleges.\n\nBut since both the .appellants were applicants for admission to a Medical College it was not necessary for them to say further that what was relied on was not a Government Order-even in regard to Engineering Colleges.\n\nIn reply to the appellants' averment reliance was placed u; mn an affidavit by Dr. Dharamraj in which reference is made to the very communication which I have reproduced earlier as being the \"Governor's Order\". If that is what is claimed to be !he Governor's Order, theI!j the State must fail on the short ground that it is not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor and is thus prime facie not the Governor's -Order.\n\nIn Bachittar Singh v. The State of Punjab(') one of the questions which arose for consideration was whether what a Minister wrote on the file of a case and initialled amounted to an Order of the Governor within the meaning of Art. 166.\n\nThis Court negatived the contention on the ground that since what he had said there was not expressed in the name of the Governor, it cannot be regarded as the Governor's Order.\n\nIt is true that in that case there was no communication of the Minister's so-called order to the party in whose favour it was made but mention was made of this fact in the judgment only to emphasise that what was said in the note of the Minister had not attained any finality.\n\nThe view taken in Bachittar Singh's(') case does not run counter to any decisions of this court; but on the other hand is supported by that taken in the State of Punjab\n\nv. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh(\"). The appellant's first contention must succeed and it must be held that the addition of\n\ni 1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713.\n\n(') [1962] 2 S. C.R. 371.\n\nmarks for interview by the Selection Committee was without any validity or legal authority.\n\nLearned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that the decision of this Court in Bachittar Singh's case is contrary to at least three other decisions of this Court.\n\nThe first of them is Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The Stflte of Bombay and Ors. (1). In that case the petitioner who had been deta, ined under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 had challenged the legality of the detention on two grounds.\n\nOne of those grounds was that the order of confirmation of detention under s. 11 ( 1) was not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor as required by Art. 166 ( 1) of the Constitution.\n\nDealing with the argument Das J. (as he then was) with whom Patanjali Sastri C.J. agreed has observed as follows at p. 623:\n\n\"Section 11 ( 1) plainly requires an executive decision as to whether the detention order should or should not be confirmed.\n\nThe continuation of the detention as a physical fact automatically follows as a consequence of the decision te confirm the detention order and, for reasons stated above, does not require any further executive decision to continue the detention. It follows, therefore, that the Preventive Detention Act contemplates and require the taking of an executive decision either for confirming the detention order under s. 11 (1) or for revoking or modifying the detention order under section\n\n13. But the Act is silent as to the form in which .the executive decision, whether it is described as an order or an executive action, is to be taken.\n\nNo particular form is prescribed by the Act at all and the requirements of the Act will be fully satisfied if it can be shown that the executive decision has in fact been taken. It is at this stage that learned counsel for the petitioner passes on to Article 166 of the Constitution and contends that all executive actio•\n\nof the Government of a State must be expressci ----- (1)\n\n[1952] S.C.R. 612.\n\nR. Chitralekha\n\nState of Mysort\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nR. Chitral•lt:ha\n\nStat• of My1or.\n\nMudholkar /.\n\nand authenticated in the manner therein provided.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General points out that there is a distinction between the taking of an executive decision and giving fo1mal expression to the decision so taken.\n\nUsually executive decision is taken on the office files by way of notings or endorsements made by the appropriate Minister or officer. If every executive decision has to be given a formal expression the whole governmental machinery, he contends, will be brought to a standstill.\n\nI agree that every executive decision need not be formally expressed and this is particularly so when one superior officer directs his subordinate to act or forbear from acting in a Qarticular way, but when the executive decision affects an outsider or is required to be officially notified or to be communicated it should normally be expressed in the form mentioned in Article 166(1) i.e., in the name of the Governor.\"\n\nThus according to the learned Judge where an order affects an outsider it must normally be made in the name of the Governor.\n\nHere, what is said to be an order is intended to affect outsiders in that the selection committee was required to hold interviews and allot marks to the candidates under different heads.\n\nFurther it affects the candidates seeking admission to the Medical College.\n\nMoreover this 'order' has not remained merely on the files of the Government for enabling its officers to take certain action but was specifically intended to govern the actions of the Selection Committee.\n\nThat is an additional reason why it was nece>sary to express it in the name .of the Governor.\n\nAfter saying what I have already quoted, the learned Judge proceeded to observe in his judgment:\n\n\"Learned Attorney-General then falls back upon the plea that an omission to make and authenticate an executive decision in the form mentioned in Article I 66 does not make the decision itself illegal, for the provisions of that Article, like their counterpart in the Government of India\n\nAct, are merely directory and not mandatory as held in J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd., and Ors. v.\n\nThe King- Emperor('). In my opinion, this contention of the learned Attorney-General must prevail. It is well-settled that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative.\n\nWhen the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done.\"\n\nThus, even upon the view taken by him that the provisions are merely directory the learned Judge has clearly taken the view that it has to be shown that the decision upon which reliance is placed on behalf of the Government was in fact taken.\n\nIn the case befQre him he found as a fact that such a decision had been taken.\n\nThere is no material in this case on the basis of which it could be said that in the present case any decision had at all been taken by the Government in so far as interviews for admission to Medical Colleges were concerned.\n\nAccording to Mukherjea J. (as he then was) with whom Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., agreed, while cl. ( 1) relates to the mode of expression of an executiv~ order, cl. (2~ lays down the manner in which such order is to be a?then~1cated\n\nand that when both the requirements are complied with the order would be immune from challenge in a court of law on the ground that it had not been made or exe:ted b~ the Governor.\n\nAlso, according to him, the provIS10ns o -·------ --- -·-----\n\n') (1947] F. C.R. 141, 154-9.\n\nR. Chitrakkha\n\nState of Mysore\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nR. Chitralekha v.\n\nState of Mysore\n\nMudho/kar J.\n\ncl. ( l) are directory and not imperative in their character.\n\nIn the course of the judgment the learned Judge observed:\n\n\" ............ I agree with the learned Attorney- General that non-compliance with the provisions of either of the clauses would lead to this result that the order in question would lose the protection which it would otherwise enjoy, had the proper mode for expression and authentication been adopted.\n\nIt could be challenged in any court of law even on the ground that it was not made by the Governor of the State and in case of such challenge the onus would be upon the State authorities to show affirmatively that the order was in fact made by the Governor in accordance with the rules framed under Article 166 of the Constitution\" (p. 632).\n\nMahajan J., (as he then was) expressed no opinion upon this point, which was the second point raised in the case, as according to him, the detention was invalid because the Government had at the time of confirming the order omitted to specify the period during which the detention should continue.\n\nIt will thus be clear that all the learned Judges who have dealt with the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution have definitely held that where the existence of a Government Order is itself challenged by a person who is affected by it the burden is upon the Government to establish that an order was in fact made by the Governor in the manner provided for in the rules of business framed by the Governor under cl. ( 3) of Art. 166.\n\nEven my learned brother does not say that in a case like the present the existence of the Governor's order is not required to be established by the State.\n\nBut according to him here the petitioners have not in fact denied the existence of the Governor's Order.\n\nIn para 20 of the writ petition of Chitralekha she hM definitely averred: \"Even the Government Order enabling them to award 7 5 marks is not made available\"; and again in para 22 she stated: \"As the order empowering them to award 75 marks as interview marks has so far remained secret in that is has not been made available, this'\n\nHon'ble Court may be pleased tc send for the same, as the order falls to be quashed.\" In reply to these averments a counter-affidavit was filed by Dr. J. J. Dharmaraj, Dean, Medical College and Chairman of the Selection Committee for admission to Medical Colleges.\n\nIn para 4 thereof he has stated as follows:\n\n\"The Government by its letter No. PLM 531 MMC\n\n63 dated the 12th July, 1963 directed that the Selection Committee shall interview the candi dates and allot marks the maximum of which shall be 25 per cent of the maximum marks for optional subjects and laid down the criteria for allotting marks in the interview.\"\n\nIt is abundantly clear from this that reliance was placed not upon any order of the Governor but upon a directi0n contained in a certain communication addressed to the Selectinn Committee.\n\nMr. Varma, Deputy Secretary to the Government also filed a counter-affidavit in para 36 of which he has stated as follows:\n\n\"The Government gave a direction by its letter No.\n\nSD 25 THL 63, dated 6th July, 1963 to the Director of Technical Education (copy of which is marked as Annexure IV) that in addition to the examination marks in the Optional subjects, there should be an interview of candidates in which the maximum marks allotted would be 25 per cent of the maximum for the optional subjects. A similar Jetter was sent by the Government to the Selection Committee for adl)lission to Medical Colleges.\"\n\nThus, here again, there is no positive averment that the Governor had made an order providing for interview of candidates who had applied for admission to Medical Colleges.\n\nThe only other place where the appellants' allega tions are dealt with is para 44 of Mr. Varma's affidavit:\n\n\"The allegations made in some of the petitions that only the first Government Order embodied the decision of the Government and the second Government Order did not embody the decision\n\n196'\n\nR. ChitralelM\n\n\"· Stat~ of MyMJtt\n\nMudhoU:ar 1.\n\nR. Chitralelcha v.\n\nState of My1ore\n\nMudholkar 1.\n\nof the Government but only the decision of the Minister for Education, is untenable. When an order is issued in the name of the Governor, I submit it is not permissible to enquire whether any advice, and if so, what advice, was tendered by any Minister to the Governor.\"\n\nHere, what the Deputy Secretary has done is merely to state the legal position without affirming definitely that an order had in fact been made in the name of the Governor.\n\nIt may be mentioned that the two orders dealing with the classification of backward classes and reserving seats in technical institutions were in faci issued in the name of the Governor on July 26, 1963 and copies of those orders have been placed on record.\n\nThev are in the appropriate form.\n\nIf a similar order had actually been made by the Governor there is no reason why it should not have been filed. Even in this Court the Assistant Government Advocate has filed on behalf of the State only a copy of the letter sent by a Secretary to the Government and has not only not produced a copy of the Governor's Order but has not even alleged that such order exists.\n\nNor again, during the arguments did the learned Attorney-General make a categorical statement that the Governor had made an order in regard to thll interviews. That may be because he has not been instructed to say that such order in fact exists. We have given no opportunity to the appellants to file any further affidavit after the production before us of the Secretary's letter. Jn this state of the material on record can it then be said that the burden which was upon the State to establish the existence of an order of the Governor has been dischi:rged'l I do not think that we can ignore the omission of the State to aver categoric.ally that there is in existence an order of the Governor or to make any attempt to produce it or to seek an opportunity to establish its existence by other evidence.\n\nIf there is an order of the Governor dealing with the matter nothing would have been easier than saying so and either to produce the original or its copy or to establish its existence by other evidence.\n\nThe whole tenor of the affidavits filed on behalf of the State as well as of the argument advanced before us leaves no doubt in my mind that all that there is on the subject is the aforesaid letter of 'the\n\nSecretary to the Selection Committee and nothing more. In llO case has this Court held that such a document can bo trr:ated as the Governor's order or even evidence of the existence of ·.the Governor's order.\n\nThe two other cases of this Court on which reliance was placed are: The State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog Naik(') and Ghaio Mall and Sons v. The State of De!hi(') which purpllrt to follow Pangarkar's case(') also underline the necessity of proof of the existence of the Governor's Order when what is relied upon is defective in form.\n\nIt is these reasons which impel me to differ from my learned brother on the second point dealt with by him in his judgment.\n\nWhat I have said above is sufficient for the purpose of disposing of both the appeals.\n\nBut in view of the import ance of one of the other points on which my learned brother has expressed his opinion, I would say a few words.\n\nThat point concerns the power of the Government of a State to prescribe by an executive order the standards for selection of candidates for admission to technical institutions afliliated to a university.\n\nIn Gujrat University v. Shri Krishna'(') the question which was raised in this Court was whether the Gujrat University could lay down and impose Gujrati and/ or Hindi i.n Devnagari script as excl!-!sive media of instruction and examination in institutions other than those maintained by the University and institutions affiliated to the University and Constituent colleges.\n\nOne of the important arguments raised in that case was that under Entry 66 of List l of the Seventh Schedule the power of co-ordination and cetermination of standards in institutions for higher education or research in scientific •md technical institutions was conferred upon Parliament and that these matters must be regarded as having been excluded from entry 11 of List II of that schedule, which runs thus:\n\n\"Education, including universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64. 65 and 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List ID.\"\n\n<'l r1952] S. C.R. 674,\n\n(\")\n\n11~52] S. C. R 612, tM-159-S.C.-26\n\n(1) [1959] S. C.R. 1424. ·(') (1!)63] Supp. 1 'S. C.R. n:z.\n\n- R. CllJtnildho\n\n\"· S111t1 of M7MO - 111111/lolUr 1.\n\nJiff In the c:oune al. his judgment, Shah J., speaking for the It Cllllrokl:llo majority (my learned brother Subba Rao J., dissenting) \"\"' ;,· lb\"m observed:\n\n,.,,;;;;;;., l \"It is manifest that the extensive power vested in . the Provincial Legislatures to legislate with respect to higher scientific and technical education and vocational and technical training of labour, under the Government of India Act is under the Constitution controlled by the five items in List I and List III mentioned in item 11 of List II.\n\nItems 63 to 66 of List I are oarved out of the subject of education and in respect of these items the power to legislate iS vested exclusively in the Parliament .......• Power of the State to legislate in respect of education including Universities must to the extent to which it is entrusted to the Unioti Parliament, Whether such power Is exercised or not, be deemed to be restricted. If a subject of legislation is covered by items 63 to 66 even if it otherwise falls within the larger field of 'education including universities' power to legislate on that subject must lie with the Parliament. The plea raised by counsel for th8 University and for the State of Gujarat that legislation prescribing the medium or media iD which instruction should be imparted in institutions of higher education and in other institutions always falls within item 11 of List II h~ no force. .......... Item 11 of List II and item 66 of List I must be harmoniously construed. 'The two entries undoubtedly overlap:\n\nut to the extent of overlapping, the power conferred by item 66 of List I must prevail over tb._o power of the State under item 11, of List IL It is manifest that the excluded beads deal primari!y with education in institutions of national 0r special importance and institutiom of highr education including research, sciences. technology and vocational training of labour •\n\n• • • • • . . . . . . . Power to legislate in respect of\n\nmedium of instruction is, however not a dmiru:t JHf legislative head; it resides with the State legila- R. CM!hi.k• tures in which the power to legislate on educa- ,., tion is vested, unless it is taken away by neces State ~'1#0\" sary intendment to the contrary. Under items MudhOlk01 J. 63 to 65 the power to legislate in respect of medium of instruction, having regard to the width of those items, must be deemed to vest in the Union. Power to legislate in respect of medium of instruction, in so far it has a direct bearing and impact upon the legislative head of co-ordinatjon and determination of standard5 in institrdions of higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions, . must also be deemed by item 63 of List I to be vested in the Union.\" (p. 715). (italics mine)\n\nWhat I have quoted above and particularly the words occurring in the earlier part of the quotation and those in italics would make it clear that this Court has emphatically lJid down that where the question of co-ordination and determination of standards in certain institutions like a medical college is concerned the power is vested in the Parliament and even though Parliament may not have exercised that power the State Legislature cannot step in and provide for tlie determilllltion and co-ordination of standards. It seems\n\nto me that by requiring the Selection Committee to add to die marks secured by ihe candidates at the P. U. C. Examination the marks awarded by the Selection Committee for the interviews and prepare a fresh order of merit on the basis of the total marks so arrived at the State would be quite Clearly interfering with the standards for admission laid down by the University. It seems to me that the standard ot any educational institution would certainly be affected by admitting to it candidates of lower academic merit in preference to those with higher academic merit by us, ing\n\nthe devious method of adding to the qualifications of. less meritorious candidates marks at the discretion of the selec tors on the basis of interviews.\n\nThis is not a universal practice in institutions of higher or technical education in tht; country and by adopting it the State of Mysore has provided\n\n19641 a. standard of its own for admission of students to such ins- R. Cliill'llkkfra titutions.\n\nIt is evidently with a view to prevent the happen- \"'*. o'f 1.17;,,,, ing of such things that our Constitution has excluded matters\n\npertaining to standards in institutions of higher education Mn411olblr I. and some other institutions from the purview of the State legislatures.\n\nThe second portion in italics by me in the above quotation makes it clear that according to the majority of this Court the power to legislate in respect of matters such as the medium of instruction which have a direct bearing .and impact upon the legislative he.ad of coordination and determination of standard~ in the institutions referred to in item 66 of List I is vested in the Union.\n\nTherefore. in each case it will be for the Coutit to consider whether what is being sought to be done by a. State legislature will have a direct impact upon entry 66 of List I. In my judgment where any law of the State legislature seeks to vary academic standards for admission to institutions of the kind\n\nrefe~ to in Entry 66 its action has a direct bearing upon that entry and the power in this regard is excluded fm; n the purview of entry 11 of List II.\n\nI may quote a part of paragraph 24 of the majority Judgment which my learned brother has quoted.\n\nIt reads thus:\n\n\"The State has the power to prescribe the syllabi and courses of study in th.~ imtitntiom named in entry 66 (but not falling within entries 63 to\n\n65) and as an incident thereof it has the power to indicate the medium in which instruction should be imparted.\n\nBut the Union Parliament has an overriding legislative power to ensure that the syllabi and courses of study prescribed and the medium selected do not impair standards of education or render the co-ordination of such standards either on an All-India or other basis impossible or even difficult.\"\n\nCan it be said that this and other passages in this judgment show that according to the majority the law made by the State Legislature by virtue of entry 11 of List II would be bad oruy if it makes it impossible or difficult for Parliament\n\nto exercise its legislative power under entry 66 of List I?\n\nDoes the judgment mean that it has to be ascertained in each casewhether the impact of the State law providing for such standards is so great on entry 66 of List I as to abridge appreciably the central field or, does it not follow from the judgment that if a State Legislature has made a law prescribing a different, even higher, percentage of marks or prescribing marks for extra-curricular activitie£, it would be directly encroaching on the field covered by entry 66 of List I '! The majority judgment after saying what has been quoted above proceeds thus:\n\n\"Though the powers of the Union and the State are in the exclusive lists, a degree of overlapping is ine1itable. It is not possible to Jay down any general test which would afford a solution for every question which might arise on this head.\n\nOn the one hand, it is certainly within the province of the State Legislature to prescribe sy ;\\a bi and courses of study and of course t<J indicate the medium or media of instruction.\n\nOn the other hand, it is also within the power of the Union to Jegisbte in respect of media of instruction so as to ensure co-ordination and determination of standards, that is, to ensure maintenance or improvement of standards. The fact that the Union has not-legislated, or refrained from legislating to the full extent of its power does not invest the State with the power\n\nto legislate in respect of a matter assigned by the Constitution to the Union.\n\nIt does not, however, follow that even within the pennitted relative fields there might not be JeglGJJtive provisions in enactments made each :r:t1 p.iu ance of separate exclusive and distinct powers which may conflict. Then would arise the question of repugnancy and paramountcy which may have to be resolved on the application af the 'doctrine of rpith and substance' of the impunged enactment, . . . . . . . . . . the validity of State legislation would depend upon whether it prejudicially affects co-ordination and determination of standards, but not upon the existence\n\nR. Chitr•l1k1\"' v.\n\nStall of MylON\n\nMwlholkar I.\n\n406 SUPREME a>URT REPORTS (1964]\n\nlltU of some definite Union legislation directed to R. Chllraldllo achieve that purpose.\" (p. 716).\n\ns1a11 ofMJ\"'\" These observations do not seem to justify the conclusion that it is only where the State law makes it impossible or \"\"'4holk\"7 1• difficult for Parliament to exercise its legislative power under entry 66 that the State law would be bad. According to the decision of the majority the validity of a State legislation would depend upon whether it prejudicially affects the coordination and determination of standards and th at if it does so, that is enough to invalidate that legislation. Interference with academic standards would of necessity affect coordination and determination of standards amc1g<t institutions of similar type all over the country and, therefore, upon the view taken in the Gujarat University case(') State legislation embodying provisions of the kind referred to in the letter of the Secretary to the Government to the Sekc'.ion Committee would be bad.\n\nAs I understand the decision what it means when it says that regard must be had to the pith and substance of a State law to see whether it is in conflict with the powers of Parliament is that conflict must be the direct result of the State law and not one which is merely incidental.\n\nIt does not mean that for ascertaining whether there is a conflict one has to gauge the force of the impact of a State law on Parliament's power.\n\nThus where a law is in pith and substance one which will directly affect Parliament's power to coordinate and determine standards in the institutions comprised in entry 66 of List I it will be directly in conflict with it and the extent or force of such conflict will make no difference.\n\nN \"W just as prescribing a medium of instruction for being adhered to in those institutions would, if it has the effect of affecting the standards, which must mean, the academic standard of their institutions, produce a direct impact on Parliament's power under the aforesaid entry, so would prescribing interviews for admissions to these institutions, since admissions would thereby be made to depend on standards other than purely academic. I fail to see how else can the impact of the State law on l>arliament's power can be characterised. The fact that raising of the interview marks from 25 in the past to 75 now (which we are told\n\n<') [1963! Supp. 1. s.c.R. n:z.\n\nrepresents 25% of the total marks for the P.U.C. Examination) has raised a furore, only highlights the directness of the impact which was there even when the interview marks were 253. To hold otherwise would mean that where interview marks are low in comparison with the total marks for the P.U, C. Examination the impact would be merely oblique or indirect but by some process it will become direct, if the marks are rais~ to a higher percentage, say 50 per cent or even 100 per cent of the P.U.C. Examination marks.\n\nSurely the directness of the impact would not depend upon its intensity.\n\nAgain, the addition of interview marks to the marks secured at the P.U.C. examination by a candidate for admission to an institution of the kind comprised in entry 66 of List I cannot but be said to affect the standard in such institution.\n\nAn illustration would make it clear.\n\nSuppose the maximum P.U.C. marks are 300 and interview marks are 600.\n\nCould there be a doubt that the academicstandard of the institution would remain unaffected and that th~ impact on entry 66 is direct ? Now, instead of 600, if the interview marks are only 30, would not the standard still be affected? May be that the effect on academic merit would be much less than when the maximum interview marks were 600 but still there would be some effect. ln either case the effect is the direct consequence of the additional requirement of an interview and therefore the impact of the State law would be direct in both cases. It is not as if a consequence which is direct can be regarded as obllque or indirect just because it is less significant by reason of the fact that the proportion of interview marks to the\n\nP.U.C. marks is low.\n\nTherefore, whether the State law affects the standards of such institutions materially br only slightly has no relevance for the purpose of determining whether it operates in an excluded field or not.\n\nThe only test is whether or not the effect it has on the standards is direct. That is how I understand the majority decision of this Court.\n\nEven upon the view that for a State law to be bad, its impact must be \"so heavy or devastating as to wipe out the central field\", I think that it is in fact of that kind in this\n\n'\"'\n\nR.C~,\n\n11.\n\nStot• ti/ \"1.- - Miul/lolw I.\n\n- .R. . Cliin.J.1:1\"'\n\n.. 'v. 11141• of My,,,,, -· Jllldliolkar I.\n\ncase. Already by reserving 48 per cent of the total number of seats for scheduled castes and tribes and backward classes\n\nthe seats available for meritorious candidates have been reduced to 52 per cent.\n\nBy providing in addition, fordilution of academic merit by bringing in considerations of the kind set out in the Secretary's Jetter, meritorious candidates\n\nare likely to be placed in a further disadvantageous position.\n\nAccording to that letter the matters to be considered at the interview are:\n\n( 1 ) General knowledge. ·\n\n(2) Aptitude and personality.\n\n( 3) Previous academic career, including specia! distinctions, etc. ( 4) N.C.C., A.C.C. etc.\n\n( S) Extra cU!Ticular activities including !lpO[tS. social service, debating, dramatics, etc.\n\nWhile the first and the third of these matters would be of some relevance in deciding who should be allowed a chance to be future doctors what relevance the other three matters\n\nhave it is difficult to appreciate.\n\nFurther \"aptitude and personality\" would be a matter entirely for the subjective satisfaction of the selectors and is in itself quite vague.\n\nThen again the total mark:s under these beads are as high\n\nas 75 and there is no allocation of marks under the different beads. Thus if the selectors choose to allocate say 30 or 40 marks for ''personality\" many meritorious candidates may go far down in the list prepared on the basis of tho total of marks at the interview and the P.U.C. Examination.\n\nSince the number of marks for the interview is high and according marks for interviews and allocating marks under different beads is left entirely for the Selection Committee to decide, the impact of the alleged directive on the central field must necessarily be regarded as heavy. For, its effect\n\nwould be 'to lower further the already alarmingly low stan• &eds in our educational institutions.\n\nAgain, here what we have is not a State Jaw but merely what is claimed to be an executive fiat. It is true that Art.\n\n162 says that the executive power of the State is co-ez:ten sive with the power of he legislature to legislate and\n\n196' this Court has held in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur cl Ors. v. The State of Punjab(') that the power of the State is not confined to matters over which legislation has already been passed.\n\nBut neither Art. 162 nor the decision of this Court goes so far as to hold that the State's power can be exercised in derogation of a Jaw made by a competent legislature.\n\nOn the other hand the Court appears to have approved of the view taken by two learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in Motilr.1 v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh(2) that an act would be within the\n\nexecutive power of the St<ite if it is not an act which has been assigned by the Constitution to ether authorities or bodies and is not contrary to the provisions of any law and\n\ndoes not encroach on the legll rights of any member of the public.\n\nHere we have the Mysore University Act, s. 23 of which provides that ,!he Academic. Council shall have power to prescribe the conditions for admission of student! to the University.\n\nNow since a competent legislature bas conferred this power on a particular body the State cannot encroach upon that power by its executive act.\n\nThus this is a case where there is not merely an ab, ence of legislative sanction to the action of the State but there is an implied !imitation on its executive power in regard to this matter.\n\nR. Chi1ra/1ku\n\n\"· Stall of MylOr<\n\nM udholkar Ji\n\nMoreover, while the Constitution permits the State without the necessity of any law empowering it to do so to make reservations of seats for the benefit of backward classes and scheduled castes and tribes there is no provision either in the Constitution or in any other law which empowers the State Government to issue directions to selection committees charged with the consideration of applications for admission to any colleges as to what should be the basis of making admissions.\n\nIt was said that most of the Medical Colleges are owned by the State and the State as the owner of those Colleges was entitled to give directions to its officers as to the mode of selection of persons for admission to those Colleges.\n\nBut it seems to me that the matter is not quite as simple as that. Educational institutions which are affiliated to the University must conform to the pattern evolved by the University and the proprie-\n\n ~') [1955) 2 S. C.R. 22' (') A. I. R. 19s1 All. 257 (F. B)\n\n19d4 tors or the governing bodies of those institutions can claim R. Chitralekha no right to adopt a different pattern. The pattern set by v. the University would necessarily be affected if the standards 811111 of Myior• of ad.mission, teaching, etc., are varied by those who run lludholkar J. those institutions.\n\nIt is not material to consider whether either the object or effect of the addition of an interview for selecting candidates for admission to the institutions is to improve upon the standards fixed by the Academic Council.\n\nFor, it is to that body to which the legislature has entrusted the whole matter.\n\nIt was said that no objection to the Government's action was taken by the University.\n\nWhat is important is not whether no objection was t1ken by the University but whether it consented to the action of the Government.\n\nThat it did not consent would appear from the consent memo filed. in the High Court on behalf. of the University a copy of which has been filed in this Court after our judgment was reserved.\n\nTherein the counsel for the University has stated;\n\n\"Under section 23 (b) and section 43 of the Mysore .\n\nUniversity Act read with section 2 (a) of the same Act, the Academic Council alone can prescribe qualifications for admission.\n\nThe Uµiversity is not onsulted about either Exhibit 'D' or increasing the interview marks to 25 per cent as per letter dated 6.7.1963.\n\nInterview marks must also be treated as marks given to a subject.\"\n\nThere is thus no substance in the plea made on behalf of the State.\n\nThis is an additional reason why I think that tho '?fOvision for interviews is not valid.\n\nMy learned brother bas dealt at length with the question as to the value of interviews in the matter of making admissions to educational institutions.\n\nI do not think it necessary to pronounce any opinion upon that question in this case and would reserve it for a future occasion. I would also likewise reserve my opinion on the other points upon which he has expressed himself excepting one, that is, as to the relevance of the consideration of caste in determining the classes which are socially and educationally backward.\n\nI would only say this that it would not be in accordance\n\neither with cl. (1) of Art. 15 or cL (2) of Art. 29 to require 1964 the consideration of the castes of persons tto be borne in R. Chilraleklw mind for determining what are socially and educationally Stat• ofM\"Jton backward classes. It is true that cl. ( 4) of Art, 15 contains a non-obstante clause with 1the result that power conferred Mudholkar 1. by that clause can be exercised despite the provisions of\n\ncl. (1) of Art. 15 and cl. (2) of Art. 29.\n\nBut that does not justify the inference that castes have any relevance in determining what are socially and educationally backward communities. As my learned brother bas rightly i; iointed out the Constitution has used in cl. ( 4) the expression \"classes\" and not \"castes\".\n\nUpon the view which I have taken on the two points I have discussed the appeals must be allowed and a direction be issued to the Selection Committee to make the selection of candidates solely on the basis of the result of P.U.C. examination. I would allow them with costs here as well as in the High Court.\n\nORDER BY COURT In view of the judgment of the majority, the appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs.\n\nINCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, SITAPUR v.\n\nMURLIDHAR BHAGWANDAS, LAKHIMPUR KHERl\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nlncome Tax-Assessment or reassts!ment made under order or direction\n\nfrom higher authority must relate to the assessment o/ tlae year under revfcw:....__Mear.ing of \"finding\", \"direction.\" and \"any person''- Decision of lncometax Officer for a particular year not res judicata for subsequent year-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 34(3), provi•o-M<aning and ico~ of.\n\nThe respondent was a firm carrying on business in different Jines. It was .. sessed lo income-tax under s. 23 ( 4) of tho Income lax Act, 1922 for\n\nthe assessment year 1949-50 on the ground that notices issued under\n\n~. 22(2) aud ( 4) bad not been complied with. Later on, that assessment\n\nJanuary, 29", "total_entities": 203, "entities": [{"text": "Ayyangar J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 27, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 742, "end_char": 758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the above we would add the following at the end of the judgment which was pronounced on January 27, 1964:\n\n\"In view of the order r, iassed by this Court on June\n\n10, 1963, when the in1erim order of stay was vacated at the instance of the respondent, recording the undertaking on the part of the\n\nState that it would compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period when the appeals were pending in this Court."}}, {"text": "June\n\n10, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 810, "end_char": 824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the above we would add the following at the end of the judgment which was pronounced on January 27, 1964:\n\n\"In view of the order r, iassed by this Court on June\n\n10, 1963, when the in1erim order of stay was vacated at the instance of the respondent, recording the undertaking on the part of the\n\nState that it would compensate the appellants for the loss incurred by them during the period when the appeals were pending in this Court."}}, {"text": "R. CIDTRALEKHA & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1245, "end_char": 1265, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. CIDTRALEKHA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ST A TE OF MYSORE & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1268, "end_char": 1291, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MYSORE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1295, "end_char": 1306, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. P. SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1315, "end_char": 1327, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1343, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.aghubar Dayal", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1376, "end_char": 1392, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1532, "end_char": 1539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1541, "end_char": 1554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho Government of Mysore by an order defined backward classes and directed tbat 30 per cent of tbo aoata in professional and technical colleges\n\nChitraltkhn\n\nv. and institutions shall be reserved for them and 18 per cent to tbe Sche- R. dule castes and Scheduled Tribes."}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2724, "end_char": 2744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon some of the candidates whose applications for admission were rejected filed writ petitions before tbe High Court of Mysore for quashing the orders issued by tbe Government and for directing that they shall be admitted in tho colleges strictly in tbe order of merit."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3298, "end_char": 3306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3727, "end_char": 3734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. P. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4004, "end_char": 4015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (Per B. P. Sinha, C.J., Subba Rao, P.aghubar Dayal and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) (", "canonical_name": "B. P. SINHA"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4023, "end_char": 4032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (Per B. P. Sinha, C.J., Subba Rao, P.aghubar Dayal and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) (", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "P.aghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4034, "end_char": 4049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (Per B. P. Sinha, C.J., Subba Rao, P.aghubar Dayal and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) (", "canonical_name": "P.aghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4054, "end_char": 4073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (Per B. P. Sinha, C.J., Subba Rao, P.aghubar Dayal and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.) ("}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4101, "end_char": 4109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4418, "end_char": 4426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mysore University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5610, "end_char": 5627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mark-sfot -extra-curricular activities in the matter of admission to colleges it cannot be said that it would be directly encroaching on the field covered by entry 66 of List I. The Government Orders do not contravene the mini111uJn qualification prescribed by the Mysore University; what the Government did was to appoint a selection committee and prescribe for selection of students who have the minimum qualifications prescribed by the University."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6702, "end_char": 6709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6788, "end_char": 6795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7366, "end_char": 7372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 151", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7756, "end_char": 7765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8644, "end_char": 8653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Mudholkar, J. (dissenting): (i) The decisions of this Court dealing with Art.", "canonical_name": "R. MUDHOLKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8717, "end_char": 8725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9055, "end_char": 9063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9671, "end_char": 9691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document which is relied on by the State to establish that there was a Government Order is nothing but a communication from the Secretary to Government of Mysore addressed to the selection committee and Deans Medical College Mysore."}}, {"text": "Deans Medical College Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9733, "end_char": 9761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The document which is relied on by the State to establish that there was a Government Order is nothing but a communication from the Secretary to Government of Mysore addressed to the selection committee and Deans Medical College Mysore."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9816, "end_char": 9824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10456, "end_char": 10466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J S.C.R. 112, establishes that the power to provide for coordination and determination of standards in certain institutions like the medical colleges is vested in the Parliament and even though Parliament may not have exercised that power the State Legislature cannot step in and provide for the determination and coordination of standards by requiring that marks on the basis of interviews be awarded to the applicants for admission of candidates to such institutions as is done in the present case."}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10972, "end_char": 10980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11165, "end_char": 11175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955) 2 S.C.R. 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11458, "end_char": 11477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11634, "end_char": 11641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11944, "end_char": 11961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "eave from the judgment and order dated September 30, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Venkataranga Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12015, "end_char": 12035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants (in both the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12040, "end_char": 12057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants (in both the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "K .. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12106, "end_char": 12119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. K .. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. A char, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12139, "end_char": 12155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. K .. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. A char, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. A char", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12160, "end_char": 12178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. K .. Daphtary, Attorney-General, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. A char, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. Sobba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12278, "end_char": 12290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of B. P. Sinha, C.J., K. Sobba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Raghubar Dayal JJ.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "N. Rajagopala Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12292, "end_char": 12314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of B. P. Sinha, C.J., K. Sobba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Raghubar Dayal JJ.", "canonical_name": "N. Rajagopala Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12319, "end_char": 12333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of B. P. Sinha, C.J., K. Sobba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Raghubar Dayal JJ.", "canonical_name": "P.aghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Sobba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12355, "end_char": 12364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Sobba Rao J. Mudholkar J. delivered a dissenting opinion.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "$ubba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12414, "end_char": 12423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "$ubba Rao I.\n\nSUB BA RAo J .-These two appeJls raise the question of the validity of the orders made by the Government of Mysore in respect of admissions to Engineering and Medical Colleges in the State of Mysore.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "SUB BA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12428, "end_char": 12438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "$ubba Rao I.\n\nSUB BA RAo J .-These two appeJls raise the question of the validity of the orders made by the Government of Mysore in respect of admissions to Engineering and Medical Colleges in the State of Mysore.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12536, "end_char": 12542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "$ubba Rao I.\n\nSUB BA RAo J .-These two appeJls raise the question of the validity of the orders made by the Government of Mysore in respect of admissions to Engineering and Medical Colleges in the State of Mysore."}}, {"text": "July 26, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13058, "end_char": 13071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government by an order dated July 26, 1963, marked as Ex."}}, {"text": "July 6, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13369, "end_char": 13381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 6, 1963, the Government sent a letter to the Director of Technical Education in Mysore, Bangalore, informing him that it had been decided that 25 per cent of the maximum marks for the examination in the optional subjects taken into account for making the selection of candidates for admission to Engineering Colleges shall be fixed as interview marks; it also laid down the criteria for allotting marks in the interview."}}, {"text": "Bangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13462, "end_char": 13471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 6, 1963, the Government sent a letter to the Director of Technical Education in Mysore, Bangalore, informing him that it had been decided that 25 per cent of the maximum marks for the examination in the optional subjects taken into account for making the selection of candidates for admission to Engineering Colleges shall be fixed as interview marks; it also laid down the criteria for allotting marks in the interview."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14325, "end_char": 14333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. Chitraltkha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15431, "end_char": 15445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the Government did not issue any order to the selection com-\n\nR. Chitraltkha\n\nState of My1oro\n\nSubba Rao /.\n\n1964 mittee in charge of admissions to Medical Colleges prescrib- R. Chitralekha ing the marks for interview or .fixing the criteria for allotting v. the said marks.", "canonical_name": "R. Chitraltkha"}}, {"text": "State of My1oro\n\nSubba Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15447, "end_char": 15473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the Government did not issue any order to the selection com-\n\nR. Chitraltkha\n\nState of My1oro\n\nSubba Rao /.\n\n1964 mittee in charge of admissions to Medical Colleges prescrib- R. Chitralekha ing the marks for interview or .fixing the criteria for allotting v. the said marks."}}, {"text": "N.C.C.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16318, "end_char": 16324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) N.C.C., A.C.C., etc. ("}}, {"text": "Chitralekha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16767, "end_char": 16778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in the petition filed by Chitralekha in pa•: 22 the following statement s found:\n\n\"As the order empowering them to award 75 marks as interview marks has so far remained secret in that it has not been made available, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to send for the same, as the order falls to be quashed.\""}}, {"text": "Dharmaraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17139, "end_char": 17148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by Dr. Dharmaraj, Dean, Medical College, and Chairman of the selection committee for admission to Medical Colleges, it is stated that -the Government by its letter directed that the said selection committee shall interview candidates and allot marks the maximum of which shall be 25 per cent of the maximum marks for the optional subjects and laid down the criteria for allotting\n\nmarks in the interview.", "canonical_name": "Dharmaraj"}}, {"text": "12th July,\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17727, "end_char": 17743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the learned Attorney-General stated thaf in the original the description is given and that is, PLM 531 MNC 63 dated 12th July,\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "B. R. Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17779, "end_char": 17790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by B. R. Verma, Deputy Secretary to .the Government of Mysore, Education Department, Bangalore, after referring to Annexure IV, it is stated that a similar letter was sent by the Government to the Selection Committee for admission to Medical Colleges.", "canonical_name": "B. R. Verma"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19163, "end_char": 19171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. NARASAPPA", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19794, "end_char": 19806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of M710N\n\n.fu6611 Rao I.\n\nYours faithfully,\n\nSd/- S. NARASAPPA, Under Secretary to Government, Education Department.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20048, "end_char": 20056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20990, "end_char": 21001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21370, "end_char": 21381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21791, "end_char": 21801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22270, "end_char": 22278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22913, "end_char": 22921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. R. Varma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23280, "end_char": 23291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit filed by B. R. Varma, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Mysore, Education Department, there is a clear averment that the Government gave the direction contained in Annexure IV and a similar letter was\n\n(1) (1952) S. C.R. 674. (')", "canonical_name": "B. R. Verma"}}, {"text": "State of Myio", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23577, "end_char": 23590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Chitraltkha\n\nState of Myio,.", "canonical_name": "State of Mysort"}}, {"text": "Suhba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23887, "end_char": 23896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances when - there are no allegations at all in the affidavit that the order Suhba Rao J. was not made by the Government, we have no reason to reject the averment made by the Deputy Secretary to the Government that the order was issued by the Government.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25393, "end_char": 25409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25464, "end_char": 25480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Mysor~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26094, "end_char": 26109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that context it was observed at p. 715-716: State of Mysor~ \"The State has the power to prescribe the \\ yllabi ana\n\ncourses of study in the institutions named m entry 66 (but not falling within entries 63 to 65) and as an incident thereof it has the power to indicate the medium in which instruction should be imparted."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26784, "end_char": 26800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27704, "end_char": 27720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rtzo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28107, "end_char": 28117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is then said that the Mysore University Act conferred power to prescribe rules for admission to Colleges on the University and the Government cannot exercise that power\n\nSubba Rtzo J.\n\n1964 It is true that under s. 23 of the Mysore University Act, R.\n\nChitralekha 1956, the Academic Council shall have the power to pres-\n\n'f• M cribe the conditions for admission of students to the Uni- Stat• ''0\" versity and, in exercise of its power, it has prescribed the Subba Rao I. percentage of marks which a student shall obtain for getting admission in medical or engineering colleges.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28149, "end_char": 28154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28396, "end_char": 28405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is then said that the Mysore University Act conferred power to prescribe rules for admission to Colleges on the University and the Government cannot exercise that power\n\nSubba Rtzo J.\n\n1964 It is true that under s. 23 of the Mysore University Act, R.\n\nChitralekha 1956, the Academic Council shall have the power to pres-\n\n'f• M cribe the conditions for admission of students to the Uni- Stat• ''0\" versity and, in exercise of its power, it has prescribed the Subba Rao I. percentage of marks which a student shall obtain for getting admission in medical or engineering colleges.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31240, "end_char": 31247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 17, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31450, "end_char": 31462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government by its orer dated May 17, 1963 constituted a committee consisting of the following members for selection to Government Medical Colleges:\n\n(I) The Dean, Medical College, Mysow-Chairman."}}, {"text": "Dean, Medical College, Mysow", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31578, "end_char": 31606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government by its orer dated May 17, 1963 constituted a committee consisting of the following members for selection to Government Medical Colleges:\n\n(I) The Dean, Medical College, Mysow-Chairman.", "canonical_name": "Dean, Medical College, Hubli-Mem1Jer"}}, {"text": "Dean, Medical College, Bangalore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31626, "end_char": 31658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) The Dean, Medical College, Bangalore-Member.", "canonical_name": "Dean, Medical College, Hubli-Mem1Jer"}}, {"text": "Dean, Medical College, Hubli-Mem1Jer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31676, "end_char": 31712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) The Dean, Medical College, Hubli-Mem1Jer.", "canonical_name": "Dean, Medical College, Hubli-Mem1Jer"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32882, "end_char": 32889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Subb• Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32912, "end_char": 32921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subb• Rao J.\n\nBut learned counsel for the appellants raised a larger question that selection by interviews is inherently repugnant to the doctrine of equality embodied in Art.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33083, "end_char": 33090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "James Hart", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33477, "end_char": 33487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "James Hart in his \"An Introduction to Administrative Law\" observes, at p. 180 thus:\n\n\"A test or examination, to be competitive, must employ an objective standard of measure."}}, {"text": "N.C.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35435, "end_char": 35441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel contends that the ability of a student on the basis of the said criteria can be better judged by other methods like certificate from the N.C.C. Commander or a medical board or a psychatrist and should not be left to a body like the selection committee which cannot possibly arrive at the correct conclusion in a short time that would be available to it."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35997, "end_char": 36004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36344, "end_char": 36351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36904, "end_char": 36911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38134, "end_char": 38141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Balaji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38854, "end_char": 38860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also observed that the decision in Balaji's case says that \"the 'caste' basis is undoubtedly a relevant, nay an important basis in determining the classes of backward Hindus but it should not be made the sole basis\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40081, "end_char": 40088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40150, "end_char": 40164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In considering the said question, Gajendragadkar J., speaking for the Court, made the following observations, at p. 658:\n\n\"The backwardness under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40262, "end_char": 40272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40542, "end_char": 40549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40646, "end_char": 40653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. ChttrakU.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 41584, "end_char": 41596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134-159 S.C.-25\n\n1964 -· R. ChttrakU.\n\n\"· State of M71t1tS\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\n1964 R. C\"itralekha\n\ny, 111111 of My1ore\n\nlubbo Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "R. Chitraltkha"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43284, "end_char": 43291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44171, "end_char": 44192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44309, "end_char": 44316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 341", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44670, "end_char": 44678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45089, "end_char": 45097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45200, "end_char": 45213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article\n\n291", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45267, "end_char": 45279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. Chitrakki", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 45934, "end_char": 45946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They shall be so construed\n\nR. Chitrakki..\n\nState of M1MIN\n\nSubba Rao/,\n\n196\" as to effctuate the said policy but not to give weightage to R. Chitraldllo progressive sections of our society under the false colour of\n\n1161, 0/· Myior1 caste to w?ich tey happen to belong.", "canonical_name": "R. Chitraltkha"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46217, "end_char": 46224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46611, "end_char": 46618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46899, "end_char": 46906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49340, "end_char": 49347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "MummLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49532, "end_char": 49540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MummLKAR J .-The appellants in these appeals had challenged before the High Court of Mysore the validity of the mode of selection of candidates for admission to the Medical Colleges in that State by preferring petitions before the High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49780, "end_char": 49788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50557, "end_char": 50565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50704, "end_char": 50711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 50791, "end_char": 50794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8ub6a Rao J\n\nJladlt..U. 1."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51804, "end_char": 51811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53325, "end_char": 53340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing in this Court the Attorney-General who appeared for the State of Mysore stated that there was a Government."}}, {"text": "December 20, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53589, "end_char": 53606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 20, 1963, th.at is, after judgment had been reserved Mr. Achar, Assis tant Government Advocate, placed on record, what accord ing to the State, is the Government Order."}}, {"text": "Achar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53655, "end_char": 53660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 20, 1963, th.at is, after judgment had been reserved Mr. Achar, Assis tant Government Advocate, placed on record, what accord ing to the State, is the Government Order."}}, {"text": "GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54292, "end_char": 54312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It runs thus:\n\n\"GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE\n\nCONFIDENTIAL:\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Chairman, Selection Committee & Dean, Medical College, Mysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54544, "end_char": 54605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chairman, Selection Committee & Dean, Medical College, Mysore."}}, {"text": "R. Chitrahklw", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 54660, "end_char": 54673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S-'JBJECT.-Award of marks for the interview of the\n\nR. Chitrahklw\n\n\"· State of M1_.", "canonical_name": "R. Chitraltkha"}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54693, "end_char": 54702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mudholkar /.\n\nR. Cllitraldha\n\n' of M7rort\n\nMudholkar /.\n\ncandidates seeking admission to Medical Colleges in the St.ate.", "canonical_name": "R. MUDHOLKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "R. Cllitraldha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54707, "end_char": 54721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mudholkar /.\n\nR. Cllitraldha\n\n' of M7rort\n\nMudholkar /.\n\ncandidates seeking admission to Medical Colleges in the St.ate."}}, {"text": "L. G. DESAI", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 55729, "end_char": 55740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yours faithfully,\n\nSd./- L. G. DESAI,\n\nUnder Secretary to Government, PH."}}, {"text": "H. L. LINGARAJ URS", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 55822, "end_char": 55840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attested\n\nSd./- H. L. LINGARAJ URS,\n\nDy."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56136, "end_char": 56144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56705, "end_char": 56713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57740, "end_char": 57748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. Chitrahklra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 58348, "end_char": 58362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has himself\n\nR. Chitrahklra\n\n\"· State of 11.,_", "canonical_name": "R. Chitraltkha"}}, {"text": "R. ChitralekhtJ Government", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58460, "end_char": 58486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mudholkar I.\n\n1964 no power to order that to be done de hors an order of the R. ChitralekhtJ Government."}}, {"text": "Mudlwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58678, "end_char": 58687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\"'\" was said by the learned Attorney-General that the existence Mudlwlkar J. of the order was not denied by the appellants."}}, {"text": "Dharamraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59386, "end_char": 59395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to the appellants' averment reliance was placed u; mn an affidavit by Dr. Dharamraj in which reference is made to the very communication which I have reproduced earlier as being the \"Governor's Order\".", "canonical_name": "Dharmaraj"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59958, "end_char": 59966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bachittar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60444, "end_char": 60459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken in Bachittar Singh's(') case does not run counter to any decisions of this court; but on the other hand is supported by that taken in the State of Punjab\n\nv. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh(\")."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 60588, "end_char": 60594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken in Bachittar Singh's(') case does not run counter to any decisions of this court; but on the other hand is supported by that taken in the State of Punjab\n\nv. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh(\")."}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S. C.R. 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 60744, "end_char": 60764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61175, "end_char": 61205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61343, "end_char": 61348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61426, "end_char": 61434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Das J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61488, "end_char": 61494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the argument Das J. (as he then was) with whom Patanjali Sastri C.J. agreed has observed as follows at p. 623:\n\n\"Section 11 ( 1) plainly requires an executive decision as to whether the detention order should or should not be confirmed."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61522, "end_char": 61538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the argument Das J. (as he then was) with whom Patanjali Sastri C.J. agreed has observed as follows at p. 623:\n\n\"Section 11 ( 1) plainly requires an executive decision as to whether the detention order should or should not be confirmed."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61588, "end_char": 61598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62124, "end_char": 62129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section\n\n13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62189, "end_char": 62200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "No particular form is prescribed by the Act at all and the requirements of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62350, "end_char": 62432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62601, "end_char": 62612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No particular form is prescribed by the Act at all and the requirements of the Act", "statute": "No particular form is prescribed by the Act at all and the requirements of the Act"}}, {"text": "R. Chitralekha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 62751, "end_char": 62765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Chitralekha\n\nState of Mysort\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nR. Chitral•lt:ha\n\nStat• of My1or.", "canonical_name": "R. Chitraltkha"}}, {"text": "State of Mysort", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62767, "end_char": 62782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Chitralekha\n\nState of Mysort\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nR. Chitral•lt:ha\n\nStat• of My1or.", "canonical_name": "State of Mysort"}}, {"text": "Article 166(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63716, "end_char": 63730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66292, "end_char": 66301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mukherjea J. (as he then was) with whom Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., agreed, while cl. ("}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66332, "end_char": 66352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mukherjea J. (as he then was) with whom Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., agreed, while cl. ("}}, {"text": "(1947] F. C.R. 141", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 66758, "end_char": 66776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. Chitrakkha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 66786, "end_char": 66799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Chitrakkha\n\nState of Mysore\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nR. Chitralekha v.\n\nState of Mysore\n\nMudho/kar J.\n\ncl. (", "canonical_name": "R. Chitraltkha"}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 66801, "end_char": 66816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Chitrakkha\n\nState of Mysore\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nR. Chitralekha v.\n\nState of Mysore\n\nMudho/kar J.\n\ncl. (", "canonical_name": "State of Mysort"}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67606, "end_char": 67617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67650, "end_char": 67657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J., (as he then was) expressed no opinion upon this point, which was the second point raised in the case, as according to him, the detention was invalid because the Government had at the time of confirming the order omitted to specify the period during which the detention should continue."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68037, "end_char": 68045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68376, "end_char": 68384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "J. J. Dharmaraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69132, "end_char": 69147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to these averments a counter-affidavit was filed by Dr. J. J. Dharmaraj, Dean, Medical College and Chairman of the Selection Committee for admission to Medical Colleges."}}, {"text": "12th July, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69352, "end_char": 69367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PLM 531 MMC\n\n63 dated the 12th July, 1963 directed that the Selection Committee shall interview the candi dates and allot marks the maximum of which shall be 25 per cent of the maximum marks for optional subjects and laid down the criteria for allotting marks in the interview.\""}}, {"text": "Varma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69800, "end_char": 69805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Varma, Deputy Secretary to the Government also filed a counter-affidavit in para 36 of which he has stated as follows:\n\n\"The Government gave a direction by its letter No."}}, {"text": "6th July, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69992, "end_char": 70006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SD 25 THL 63, dated 6th July, 1963 to the Director of Technical Education (copy of which is marked as Annexure IV) that in addition to the examination marks in the Optional subjects, there should be an interview of candidates in which the maximum marks allotted would be 25 per cent of the maximum for the optional subjects."}}, {"text": "Pangarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73708, "end_char": 73717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two other cases of this Court on which reliance was placed are: The State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog Naik(') and Ghaio Mall and Sons v. The State of De!hi(') which purpllrt to follow Pangarkar's case(') also underline the necessity of proof of the existence of the Governor's Order when what is relied upon is defective in form."}}, {"text": "Gujrat University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 74415, "end_char": 74432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Gujrat University v. Shri Krishna'(') the question which was raised in this Court was whether the Gujrat University could lay down and impose Gujrati and/ or Hindi i.n Devnagari script as excl!-!sive media of instruction and examination in institutions other than those maintained by the University and institutions affiliated to the University and Constituent colleges."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74879, "end_char": 74895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75475, "end_char": 75479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75546, "end_char": 75550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his judgment, Shah J., speaking for the It Cllllrokl:llo majority (my learned brother Subba Rao J., dissenting) \"\"' ;,· lb\"m observed:\n\n,.,,;;;;;;.,"}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 76686, "end_char": 76702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plea raised by counsel for th8 University and for the State of Gujarat that legislation prescribing the medium or media iD which instruction should be imparted in institutions of higher education and in other institutions always falls within item 11 of List II h~ no force. .........."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84088, "end_char": 84090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gujarat University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84796, "end_char": 84814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Interference with academic standards would of necessity affect coordination and determination of standards amc1g<t institutions of similar type all over the country and, therefore, upon the view taken in the Gujarat University case(') State legislation embodying provisions of the kind referred to in the letter of the Secretary to the Government to the Sekc'.ion Committee would be bad."}}, {"text": "P.U", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 86660, "end_char": 86663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To hold otherwise would mean that where interview marks are low in comparison with the total marks for the P.U, C. Examination the impact would be merely oblique or indirect but by some process it will become direct, if the marks are rais~ to a higher percentage, say 50 per cent or even 100 per cent of the P.U.C. Examination marks."}}, {"text": "P.U.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 86861, "end_char": 86867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To hold otherwise would mean that where interview marks are low in comparison with the total marks for the P.U, C. Examination the impact would be merely oblique or indirect but by some process it will become direct, if the marks are rais~ to a higher percentage, say 50 per cent or even 100 per cent of the P.U.C. Examination marks."}}, {"text": "A.C.C.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 89355, "end_char": 89361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) N.C.C., A.C.C. etc."}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90683, "end_char": 90692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 90833, "end_char": 90846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "162 says that the executive power of the State is co-ez:ten sive with the power of he legislature to legislate and\n\n196' this Court has held in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur cl Ors."}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91010, "end_char": 91018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 91270, "end_char": 91290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand the Court appears to have approved of the view taken by two learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in Motilr.1 v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh(2) that an act would be within the\n\nexecutive power of the St<ite if it is not an act which has been assigned by the Constitution to ether authorities or bodies and is not contrary to the provisions of any law and\n\ndoes not encroach on the legll rights of any member of the public."}}, {"text": "Here we have the Mysore University Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91634, "end_char": 91672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91674, "end_char": 91679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here we have the Mysore University Act", "statute": "Here we have the Mysore University Act"}}, {"text": "R. Chi1ra/1ku", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 92156, "end_char": 92169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Chi1ra/1ku\n\n\"· Stall of MylOr<\n\nM udholkar Ji\n\nMoreover, while the Constitution permits the State without the necessity of any law empowering it to do so to make reservations of seats for the benefit of backward classes and scheduled castes and tribes there is no provision either in the Constitution or in any other law which empowers the State Government to issue directions to selection committees charged with the consideration of applications for admission to any colleges as to what should be the basis of making admissions."}}, {"text": "[1955) 2 S. C.R. 22", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 93134, "end_char": 93153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "lludholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93470, "end_char": 93480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are varied by those who run lludholkar J. those institutions."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94281, "end_char": 94291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94300, "end_char": 94310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94353, "end_char": 94362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6.7.1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94581, "end_char": 94589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Uµiversity is not onsulted about either Exhibit 'D' or increasing the interview marks to 25 per cent as per letter dated 6.7.1963."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95428, "end_char": 95435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95449, "end_char": 95456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95742, "end_char": 95751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) of Art, 15 contains a non-obstante clause with 1the result that power conferred Mudholkar 1.", "canonical_name": "R. MUDHOLKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95825, "end_char": 95832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95848, "end_char": 95855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, SITAPUR v.\n\nMURLIDHAR BHAGWANDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 96571, "end_char": 96631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, SITAPUR v.\n\nMURLIDHAR BHAGWANDAS, LAKHIMPUR KHERl\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "LAKHIMPUR KHERl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96633, "end_char": 96648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, SITAPUR v.\n\nMURLIDHAR BHAGWANDAS, LAKHIMPUR KHERl\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96701, "end_char": 96723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, SITAPUR v.\n\nMURLIDHAR BHAGWANDAS, LAKHIMPUR KHERl\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N. Rajagopala Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "R. MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96731, "end_char": 96743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, SITAPUR v.\n\nMURLIDHAR BHAGWANDAS, LAKHIMPUR KHERl\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "R. MUDHOLKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97054, "end_char": 97068, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97089, "end_char": 97097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Decision of lncometax Officer for a particular year not res judicata for subsequent year-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Decision of lncometax Officer for a particular year not res judicata for subsequent year-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97233, "end_char": 97238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Decision of lncometax Officer for a particular year not res judicata for subsequent year-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Decision of lncometax Officer for a particular year not res judicata for subsequent year-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income lax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97251, "end_char": 97271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_411_437_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 411\n\neither with cl. (1) of Art. 15 or cL (2) of Art. 29 to require 1964 the consideration of the castes of persons tto be borne in R. Chilraleklw mind for determining what are socially and educationally Stat• ofM\"Jton backward classes. It is true that cl. ( 4) of Art, 15 contains a non-obstante clause with 1the result that power conferred Mudholkar 1. by that clause can be exercised despite the provisions of\n\ncl. (1) of Art. 15 and cl. (2) of Art. 29.\n\nBut that does not justify the inference that castes have any relevance in determining what are socially and educationally backward communities. As my learned brother bas rightly i; iointed out the Constitution has used in cl. ( 4) the expression \"classes\" and not \"castes\".\n\nUpon the view which I have taken on the two points I have discussed the appeals must be allowed and a direction be issued to the Selection Committee to make the selection of candidates solely on the basis of the result of P.U.C. examination. I would allow them with costs here as well as in the High Court.\n\nORDER BY COURT In view of the judgment of the majority, the appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs.\n\nINCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, SITAPUR v.\n\nMURLIDHAR BHAGWANDAS, LAKHIMPUR KHERl\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nlncome Tax-Assessment or reassts!ment made under order or direction\n\nfrom higher authority must relate to the assessment o/ tlae year under revfcw:....__Mear.ing of \"finding\", \"direction.\" and \"any person''- Decision of lncometax Officer for a particular year not res judicata for subsequent year-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 34(3), provi•o-M<aning and ico~ of.\n\nThe respondent was a firm carrying on business in different Jines. It was .. sessed lo income-tax under s. 23 ( 4) of tho Income lax Act, 1922 for\n\nthe assessment year 1949-50 on the ground that notices issued under\n\n~. 22(2) aud ( 4) bad not been complied with. Later on, that assessment\n\nJanuary, 29\n\nlHf\n\nJ, T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas, Lakhimpurkheri\n\nwas cancelled.\n\nHowever, before tbc cancellation. ii waa found that ID interest income of Rs. 88,737 in the shape of U.P. Encumbered Estatea.\n\nAct Bonds received by the respondent from third parties had escaped assessinent as the assessce failed to disclose the same. The Income-tu Officer isseed a notice for the assessment year 1949-50 on the ground that\n\na sum of Rs. 88,737 had escaped assessment in the said assessment year.\n\nAfter the caiJceJlation of the assessment made under s. 23(4), the Incom~\n\ntax Officer, ignoring the notice isued by hi1n under s. 34(l)(a). included that amount in the fresh assessment made by him for the }'ear 1949- 10.\n\nThe respontlent 2ppcaled to the Appell::te Assistant Commissioner who ordered the deletion of the sum of Rs. 88,737 from the assessment for the year 1949-SO and directed the same to be included in th• ass ..... ment for the year ending 1948-49.\n\nPursu:111t to the direction given, the I:icome.tax Officer sened a notice on the respondent under s. 34(1). Against that notice the aesse.s filed a writ petition in the High Court for quashini; the abovernentioned proceeding on the ground that these were initiated beyond the time p,..,_ cribed by s. 34. The High Court accepted the petition and quashed the\n\nnotice on the ground that it was issued by the appellant beyond the ordinary period of limitation It also overruled the contention of the appel lant that no period of limitation governed the notice in as much as the second proviso to s. 34(3) was attracted to the facts of the case. The only direc!ion which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner could give was one which was covered by s. 31 of the Act and as the appeal before him was confined to a particular assessment year, the tlirection must necessarily be limited to a matter falling within that year. If the direction be treated as based on a finding recorded by AppeJiate Assistant Commissioner, tbot findin& would have to be disregarded when applyiq the proviso. The appellant came to this Court by special leave.\n\nHeld: (po.r B. P.\n\nSinh•, CJ., K. Subba Rao and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.). The proviso to sub•· (3) of s. 34 of the Indian Incom.,. tax Act, 1922 dOCll not save the time limit prescribed under sub-s. (1) ot s. 34 in respect of an escaped assessment of a year other than that which is the subject matter of appeal or revision as the case may be and hence the notice under s. 34(1) (a) issued in the present = was clearly\n\nbarred by time.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court under s. 66 ors. 66(b) is a limited one and is confined only to the questions referred to them.\n\nMoreover, the questions referred by Tribunal cannot excee4 it.9 jrnisdiction. Therefore the assessment or reassessment made under fbe said !ections or pursuant to the orders or directions made thereunder most necessarily relate to the assessment of the year under review, rerision or appeal as the case may be. The proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34 does not confer any fresh power upon the lncome--tax Officer to mate assessment in respect of the escaped incomes without any time limit. It\n\nonly lifts the ban of limitation in respect of certain assessments made under certain provisions of the Act and the lifting of the ban cannot bl so construed as to increase the jurisdiction of the tribunal under Ille\n\nlevant sections. The lifting of the ban was only to give effect to the orders that may be made by the appellate, revisional or reviewing Tribu nal within the scope of its jurisdiction. If the intention wu to remove the period of limitation in respect of any assessment against any person, the proviso would not have been added as proviso to sub-s. (3) which deals with completion of an assessment but would have belln added to .UbS. (I) of s. 34.\n\nThe word 'finding' covers only the material questions which arise in a particular case for decision by the authority hearing the case or the appeal which, being necessary for passing the final order or giving tbc final decision in the appeal, has been the subject of contrOTerny between the interested partie!:I: or on which the parties concerned have been given • hearing.\n\nThe expression 'direction' refm to a direction which the appellate or revisivnal authority is empowered to give under the law. The expression \"any person\"' must be confined to a person intimately connect ed with the assessment of the year under appeal or revision.\n\nHeld: per Raghubar Dayal and J. R. Mudholkar JJ. (dissenting): That the notice Was not in contravention of the provisionl of 1. 34 and hence could not b~ quashed on that grund~ Whcri an appeal is before\n\nan appeHate authority, the whofe ..matter is at large before it and therefore when a specific case is put bef6re it by an assessee, it lias both the power as welt as the duty to give its finding thereon. The ground given by an e1ssessee for claiming: a reduction or annulment of assessment may be that the income upon which he had been assessed was not earned in the accounting period of the year to which the assessment pertained but in respect of a specified earlier or later year.\n\nThe appellate authority is\n\nI. T. Offica.\n\nA-Wlll'd, Si1-\n\n\"· M urlld1\"\" Bhagwandal, LIZkhlmpurkhm\n\nentitled to go into the whole question and come to a finding one way or ' the other.\n\nThc-fin:Jirig af a tribunal is its conclusion on a point agitated before it and for a conclusion to amount to a finding, it is not necessary that it should be the final and ultimate conclusion.\n\nThe contention of respondent that the second proviso to e. 34(3) enabling a notice to issue only to P.Ssesscc in respect of escaped income without limit of time on the ground that the appellate authority has made a finding or direction in the proceeding before it makes a discrimination against such assessec because it does not lift the bar of limitation with regard to other assessees similarly situated but with regard to whom no finding has been made or direction given by appellate authority, was rojected, It was held that prima facie, there was a reasonable basis for the classification.\n\nThe ground on which classification was made had a rational relationship with the object which was intended to be achieved by law, i.e., lo detect and bring to assessment the escaped income.\n\nComminioner of Income-tax v. S. M. Chitnavi1, (1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 290, Sir Kikabhai Premchand •· Commi<1ioner of lncom .. tax (Ctntral),\n\nSomay, [' 954) S.C.R. 219. Pr. Bazar! Lal v. Income-tax Officer, Kanpur,\n\n(1960) 39 LT.R. 26$, L1Zk1/unan PraktUll •· Commiuioner of Incom,.\n\n1964 tax, UP., (1963 J 48 J.T.R. 70S, A. S. Khader Ismail v. lncomt-la:t Of!ic.rl T Otfi Salem, (1963)48 l.T.R. 16, Simrathmul v. Additional Income-ta:< Officer, .A.:W,;, d, sft\":i,,,, Ootachamund, (1959)36 l.T.R. 41, Brindaban Chandra Bosak v. lncome-\n\nY. tax Officer, ( 1962) 46 I.T.R. 14, K. C. Thomas, First Income-tax Officer.\n\nMutlldhu Bombay v. Vasant Hira Lal Shah [1964] 6 S.C.R. 431, Prashar & Anr. v. :.::tf.\"and\":k 1 Sasantsen Dwarkadas 49 I.T.R. (S.C.) 1, Kamlapat Hotilal v. Income-tax\n\n•mpur ' Of!icer, 29 l.T.R. 192, Hiralal Amrit Lal Shah v. K. C. Thomas, Income lax Officer, Bombay, 34 I.'f, R. 4 ... 6, General Construction and Supply Co.\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISJ; llCT!ON: Civil Appeal No. 130 of 1962.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and decree dated March 17, 1959, of the Allahabad High Court in Misc. Writ Petition No. 280 of 1958.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant Bishan Nar4in, G. C. Sharma, O.C. Mathur, /. B.\n\nDadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.\n\nA. Y. Yishwanatha Sastri, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the intervener.\n\nJanuary 29, 1964. The Judgment of B. P. Sinha C.J., IC. Subba Rao and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao J. The dissenting opinion of Ragbubar Dayal and Mudholkar JJ., was delivered by Mudholkar J .\n\n.SltbN Boo J.\n\nSullBA R.Ao J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question of the construction of the proviso • ., sub-s. ( 3) of s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended by Act 2S of 1933, hereinafter called the Act.\n\nThe facts lie in a small compass and they ate as follows: The respondent is a firm can'}'ing on business in different lines. It was assessed to income-tax under s. 23 ( 4) of the Act for the assessment year 1949-50 on the ground that the notice issued under sub-ss. ( 2) and ( 4) of s. 22 of the\n\nAct had not been complied with.\n\nOn September 27, 1955, the said assessment was cancelled under s. 27 of the Act.\n\nBut before the said cancellation, it was found that an in'teiest income of Rs. 88,737 in the shape of U.P. Encum- ' bered &tales Act Boiids received by him in discharge of\n\nthe debts due from third parties had escaped assessment as 1964 the assessee failed to disclose the same. The Income-tax • 1. T. Of/ictr, Officer issued a notice under s. 34 ( 1 )(a) of the Act for A-Word, Sitopur the assessment year 1949-50 on the ground that the said Murlidhar sum of Rs. 88,737 had escaped assessment in the said assess- Bhagwandtu, ment year. After the assessment of that year was set aside Lakhlmpurkh4n under s. 27 of the Act, the Income-tJx Officer, ignoring the Subba Rao I. notice i>s1.ed by him under s. 34( 1 l (a) of the Act, included that amount in the fresh assessment made by him.\n\nThe assessee preferred an appeal against that order and that was disposed of by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on December 4, 1957. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner in his order held that the bonds were received by the assessee in the previous accounting year and, therefore, directed that the sum representing interest on the bonds should be deleted from the assessment for the year ending 1949-50 and included in the assessment for the year ending 1948-49.\n\nPursuant to the direction givn by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the Income-tax Officer initiated proceedings under s. 34( 1) of the Act in respect of the assessment year 1948-49. The notice issued under that section was erved on the respondent on December S, 1957.\n\nThe assessee filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for quashing the said proceedings, mairily on the ground that the proceedings were itiated beyond the time prescribed by s. 34 of the Act.\n\nThe High Court accepted the contention and quashed the proceedings initiated by the Income-tax Officer.\n\nHence the appeal.\n\nThe proceedings would be in time, if the second proviso: to s. 34 ( 3) of the Act could be invoked. The question, therefore, is what is the true meaning of the terms of the ICCODd proviso to s. 34(3) of the Act. It reads:\n\n\"Provided further that nothing in this section limit\n\ning the time within which any action may bo taken, or any order, assessment or re-assessment may be made, shall apply to a re-assessment made under s. 27 or to an assessment ot to-auessment made on the assessee or any person in consequmce of or to give effect to ant\n\nI. T. Officer, .A-Ward, Sitapur ...\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas, Lakhimpurkheri\n\nlubba Rao /.\n\nfinding or directiOn contained in an order lll!der s. 31, s. 33, s. 33A, s. 33B, s. 66 or s. 66A.\"\n\nPrima facie this proviso lifts the ban of limitation imposed by the other provisions of the section in the matter of taking an action in rpect of or making an order of assessment or re-assessment falling within the scope of the said proviso.\n\nThe scope of the proviso is confinedl to an assessment or re-assessment made on the assessee or any person in consequence of an order to give effect to any finding or direction contained in any order made under s. 31 i.e., in an appeal before the Assistant Appellate Commissioner, under s. 33 I.e., in an appe.al before the Tribunal, under s. 33A i.e., in a revision before the Commissioner, under s. 33B i.e .. in a revision before the Commissioner against an order of the Income-tax Officer, and under ss. 66 and 66A i.e., .in a reference to the High Court and appeal against the High Court's order to the Supreme Court.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contends that the scope of the proviso is only confined to the assessment of the year that is the subjectmatter of the appeal or the revision, as the case may be.\n\nLearned counsel for the Department argues that the comprehensive phraseology used in the pro\"'.iso takes in its broad sweep any finding given by the appropriate authority necessary for the disposal of the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, and to any direction given by the said authority to effectuate its finding and that the said finding or direction may be in respect of any year or any person.\n\nAs the phraseology used in the proviso is not clear or unambiguous, the question raised cannot be satisfactorily resolved without having a precise appreciation o~ a brief history of s. 34 of the Act culminating in the enactment of the proviso in the present form.\n\nUnder s. 3 of the Act, income-tax for any year shall be charged in respect of the total income of the previous year <if every assessee.\n\nNotice under s. 22 calling for return of income is the first step in the assessment proceedings.\n\nTwo types of. notices are mentioned in that section, namely,\n\n(i) the public notice and (ii) the individual notice.\n\nThe public: notice shall be issued on or before the 1st May of each year and the individual notice may be issued at any\n\ntime in the course of the assessment year.\n\nIncome-tax 1964\n\nproceedings, therefore, for a particular assessment year have . 1. r. Ofl\"r, to be initiated in the course of that year.\n\nBut there may be A-Ward, Sitopw cases of escaped assessment or under-assessment.\n\nSection Murlklhar 34 empowers the Income-tax Officer to take proceedings f.,.'kf;\",:;!\";;,.,, under that section both in respect of concealed income and also in bona fide cases where the income has escaped assess- Sxbba R• 1. ment or full assessment.\n\nSection 34 ( 1 )(a) provides for the initiation of assessment proceedings in respect of concealed income and s. 34(l)(b) for other escaped income, Section 34 ( 1) has been amended from time to time.\n\nUnder the said section, as it originally stood, the Income-tax Officer\n\nwas empowered to initiate proceedings at any time within one year of the end of the year in respect whereof the income escaped assessment.\n\nBy Act 7 of 1939 that section was amended arid eight years' limitation from the end of the year was prescribed in respect of concealed income and a limitation of four years for other escaped income.\n\nUnder Act 48 of 1948, the same periods of limitation were retained, but certain conditions were imposed.\n\nBy the Finance Act of 1956, it was enacted that in the case of concealed income the proceedings could be initiated at any time within 4 years of the end of the relevant assessment year. Though no period of limitation was prescribed in respect of concealed income, three conditions were imposed, namely, (i) that an Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice for any year prior to the year ending on March 31, 1941, (ii) that if the escaped income was less than rupees one lakh, he shall not issue a notice if 8 years have elapsed after the expiry of the relevant assessment year, and (iii) that unless he has recorded his reasons and unless the Central Board of Revenue in any case falling under cl. (2) of the proviso and in any other case, the Commissioner, is satisfied that for such reasons as recorded it is a fit case for the issue of a notice.\n\nBefore 1939, there was no period of limitation for completing the assessment once it had been initiated within the prescribed period of limitation.\n\nBut Act 7 of 1939 for the first time introduced cl. (2) in s. 34 whereunder \"no order of asseisment under s. 23 or of assessment or re-assessment under sub-section ( 1) of this section shall be made after tht\n\n134-159 s. c~27\n\n1964 expiry, in any case to which ( c) of sub-section (1) of sec- . 1. r. Offic••· tion 28 applies, of eight years, and in any other case, of four . A-Ward, Sitapur years from the end of the year in which the income, profits\n\nMurTidhar or gains were first assessable\". Section 28 ( 1) ( c) dealt with\n\nBhaanda•, . a case of an assessee concealing the particulars of his income Lakhimpurkhw or deliberately furnishing inaccurate particulars of his in- Subka Rao 1. come.\n\nAct 23 of 1941 inserted a proviso in s. 34(2) providing that \"nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to a re-assessment made in pursuance of an order under section 31, section 33, section 66 or section 66-A'', i.e., provisions relating to appeals, revisions and references: that is to say, if the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer was set aside and a re-assessment was directed to be made, the said periods of limitation would not apply to such reassessment.\n\nAct 48 of 1948 introduced sub-s. ( 3) in s. 34 in substitution of sub-s. (2) thereof.\n\nUnder that sub-section the period of limitation prescribed by sub-s. (2) was retained, and the proviso to s. 34(2) before the amendment was made the second proviso, with some modifications, to the amended sub-s. ( 3). While the scope of the previous proviso was confined only to the completion of re-assessment proceedings, the scope of the amended proviso is much wider in that it exempts the subject-matter o( that proviso from the operation of the period of limitation prescribed by the section; that is to say, it gives full scope to the operation of the substantive part of the section unhampered by the periods of limitation prescribed by sub-ss. (1), ( 2) and ( 3) of s. 34 of the Act.\n\nWhile the previous proviso lifted the ban only in regard to the period of limitation prescribed for the completion of the assessment, the new proviso lifted the ban even in respect of the initiation of proceedings under s. 34 (1) of the Act. It fo!Iows that if a matter fell within the terms of the proviso, there would be no period of limitation for initiating an action or making an assessment or reassessment in respect of that matter. Briefly stated, the said proviso is a proviso to the entire s. 34: We shall consider the scope of the proviso at a later stage of our judgment. Then came the Finance Act of 1956. It amended s. 34 ( 1) and introduced a proviso to the said sub-section, which we have noticed earlier.\n\nThat proviso, while removing the period of limitation in respect of concealed income, Imposed\n\nsome conditions in respect thereof, but the four-year period of limitation in respect of other escaped income was retained. We are not concerned in this appeal with the subseauent amendments.\n\nThe history of the section gives us the following hack ground to the proviso under consideration.\n\nBroadly stated, under s. 34, as it existed in 1956, (i) there was no time limit for initiating proceedings under s. 34 (1) in respect of concealed income, but such initiation could be made only subject to the conditions laid down in the proviso to s. 34 (1);\n\n(ii) in the case of other escaped income, the proceedings could not be initiated after the expiry of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year; (iii) the assessment proceedings once commenced shall be completed within the period of limitation prescribed under s. 34(3); and (iv) to a case to which the proviso to s. 34(3) applies, there is no period of limitation either for initiating the proceedings under s. 34 or for completing the assessment commenced either under s. 23 or under s. 34( 1).\n\nWith this background let us give a closer look to the relevant terms of the proviso.\n\nThe first part of the proviso released the operation of the proviso from the restriction imposed by s. 34 only in respect of the time-limit within which any action may be taken or any order of assessment or re-assessment may by made. It means that the proviso continues to be subject to the other restrictions imposed under the section and it cannot override the said provisions in that regard.\n\nUnder the proviso, the period of limitation will not apply to a re-assessment made under s. 27 or to an assessment or re-assessment made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direc tion contained in an order under s. 31, s. 33, s. 33B, s. 66 or s. 66A of the Act.\n\nIt was not contended, nor was it possible to contend, that by reason of the referei:ice to the said provisions the powers and jurisdiction conferred on the respectivr. auth_orities, tribunals or courts referred to therein were enlarged or modified by a reference in the proviso or that the proviso could be read or construed as amending those sections conferring on those bodies wider or different powers or jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the department\n\nexpress!·~ disclaimed any such submission.\n\nTherefore, the\n\n_ I. T. OIJic.r,\n\nA.· Ward,- Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar BhagwandaJ, Lakhimpurkherl\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nscope of the proviso cannot ordinarily exceed the scope of !!!!_ the jurisdiction conferred on an authority under the said\n\n1. T.\n\nOfficer, provisions. It is not, and cannot be disputed that under .A-Ward, Sitapur th I ta A t h ' f Th . v. e ncomex c , year rs t e umt o assessment. e Murlidhar Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. M.\n\nBhag'!'anda.J, Chitnavis(') pointed out Lakhimpurkhtrl •\n\nSuhba Rao I. \"For the purpose of computing the yearly profits and gains, each year is a separate self-contained period, time, in regard to which profits earned or losses sustained before its commencement are irrelevant.\"\n\nThis Court in Sir Kikabhai Premchand v. Commissioner of lncome-tG..< (Central), Bombay(') accepted this legal position when it said:\n\n\" ........ for income-tax purposes, each year is a\n\nsolf-coiitained accounting period and we can only take into consideration income, profits and gains made in that year and are not concerned with potential profits which may be made in another year any more than we are with loss~ which may occur in the future.\"\n\nIndeed, the decision of an Income-tax Officer given in a particular year does not operate as res judicata in the mattec of assessment of the subsequent years.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the tribunals in the hierarchy created by the Act is no higher than that of the Income-tax Officer.\n\nIt is also confined to the year of assessment.\n\nUnder s. 27 of the Act, the Incometax Officer cancels the best-judgment assessments made by him if the assessee shows that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making the returns under s. 22 of the Act.\n\nSection 31 prescribes the mode of disposal by an Assistant Appellate Comrrussioner ot an appeal preferred to him: the\n\nappel before him is certainly confined to an assessment year; after hearing the appeal, he can either confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; he can set aside the\n\n(1932) L. R. 59 I. A. 290, 297. (') [I9l~I s. C.R. 219, :122.\n\nassessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh 1964\n\nassessment.\n\nThe various sub-sections of that section describe /. T. Officer, 1 h d\" h A-Ward, Sitapur m detru t e orders or Irect1ons t at can be made or issued v. by him in respect of various matters; but, no power is con- Murlidhar ferred on him to make an order or issue directions in respect Lafi.~'::; und':i.eri of an assessment of a year which was not the subject-matter of the appeal. It may, therefore, be held on a construction Subba Rao J. of the provisions of s. 31, that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner ii strictly cruifined to the assessment orders of a particular year nnder appeal. Section 33, inter alia, deals with an appeal to the Tribunal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under s. 31; and s. 33B confers power of revision on the Commissioner against an order of the Income-tax Officer. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal or the Revisional Tribunal, as the provisions indicate, is confined only to the subject-matter which is under appeal or revision.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court under s. 66 or s. 66B, as the case may be, is far more limited and it is confined only to the questions referred to them. Obviously the questions referred by the Tribunal cannot exceed its jurisdiction.\n\nIt is, therefore, manifest that assessment or re-assessment made under the said sections or pursuant to the orders or directions made thereunder must necessarilv relate to the assessment of the year under review, revision or appeal, as the case may be.\n\nIt is important to remember that the proviso does not confer any fresh power upon the Income-tax Officer to make assessments in respect of escaped incomes without any time-limit. It only lifts the ban of limitation in respect of certain assessments made under certain provisions of the Act and the lifting of the ban cannot be so construed as to increase the jurisdiction of the Tribunals under the relevant sections.\n\nThe lifting of the ban was only to give effect to the orders that may be made by the appellate, revisional or reviewing tribunal within the scope of its jurisdiction. If the intention was to remove the period of limitation in respect of any assessment against any person, the proviso would not have been added as a proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34, which deals with comp!etion of an 11S1essment, but would have been added to sub-s. ( 1)\n\nthereof.\n\n1964 Now, let us scrutinize the expressions on which strong\n\nI. T.\n\nOffier, reliance is placed for the contrary conclusion. The words AWard, v Sitapur relied upon are \"section limiting the time\", \".any person\", \"in\n\nMurlidhar consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction\". , -kBhhagwandKash. . Pointing out that before the amendment the word \"sub- \"\"\"' 1mpur ari . ,, . th . secl!on was m e proviso but it was replaced by the Subba Rao I. expression \"section\", it is contended that this particular amendment will be otiose if it is confined to the assessment year under appeal. for it is said that under no circumstances the Income-tax Officer would have to initiate proceedings for the said year pursuant to an order made by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner. This contention is obviously untenable. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal may set aside the notice itself for one reason or other and in th.at event the Income-tax Officer may have to initiate the proceedings once again in which case s. 34 (1 ) will be attracted.\n\nThe expression \"finding or direction\", the argument proceeds, is wide enough to take in at any rate a finding that is necessary to dispose of the appeal or directions which Appellate Assistant Commissioners have in practice been issuing in respect of assessments of the years other than those before them in appeal. What does the expression \"finding\" in the proviso to sub-s. ( 3) of s. 34 of the Act mean? \"Finding\" has not been defined in the Income-tax Act. Order XX, r. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads :\n\n\"In suits in which issues have been framed, the Court shall state its finding or decision, with the reasons therefor, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the i'ues is sufficient for the decision of the suit.\"\n\nUnder tfils Order, a \"finding\" is, therefore, a decision on an issue framed in a suit.\n\nThe second part of the rule shows that such a finding shall be one which by its own force or in combination with findings on other issues should lead to the decision of the suit itself.\n\nThat is to say, the finding shall be one which is necessary for the disposal of the suit.\n\nThe scope of the meaning of the expression \"finding\" is considered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in\n\nPt. Hazari Lal v. Income-tax Officer, Kanpur(').\n\nThere, the learned Judges pointed out:\n\n\"The word \"finding\", interpreted i.n the sense indicated by us above, will only cover material questions which arise in a particular case for decision by the authority hearing the case or the appeal which, being necessary for passing the final order or giving the final decision in the appeal, has been the subject of controversy between the interested parties or on which the pwties concerned have been given a hearing.\"\n\nWe agree with this definition of \"finding\".\n\nBut a Full Bench of the same High Court in Lakshman Prakash v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, U.P. (') construed the word \"finding\" in a rather comprehensive way. Desai, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed:\n\n\"A finding is nothing but what one finds or decides\n\nand a decision on a question even though not absolutely necessary or not called for is a finding.\"\n\nIf that be the correct meaning, any finding on an irrelevant or extraneous matter would be a finding.\n\nThat certainly cannot be the intention of the Legislature.\n\nThe Madras High Court also in A. S. Khader Ismail v. Income-tax Officer, Salem(') gave a very wide interpretation to that won1, though it did not go so far as the Full Bench of thP Allahabad High Court. Ramachandra lye J ., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed tha: :he w0rd \"finding\" in the proviso must be given a wide significance so as to include not only findings necessary for the disposal of the appeal but also findings which were incidental to it.\n\nWith respect, this interpretation also is inconsistent with the well-known meaning of that expression in the legal terminology.\n\nIndeed, learned counsel for the respondent himself will not go so far, for be concedes that the expression \"finding\" cannot be\n\n(1) (1960) 39 I. T. R. 265, 272.\n\n(') (1963) 48 I. T. R. 705, 718.\n\n(') (1963) 48 I.T.R. 16.\n\nI. T. O/finr, A-Ward, $itapw ...\n\nMurUdhar Bhagwandal, Lakhlmpurkherf\n\nSubbo Roa I.\n\n1964 any incidental finding, but says that it must be a conclusion I. T. Officer, on a material question necessary for the disposal of the 4.-Ward, Sitapur appeal, though it need not necessarily conclude the appeal.\n\nMuriidhar This concession does not materially differ from the definition\n\nLa Bhak. hf1':\"andh • we have given, but the difference lies in the application of\n\nimpur. '\" th d fi · h find\" · th at e mtion to t .e mg given m e present case.\n\nA Subu Raa I. ''finding\", therefore, can be only that which is necessary for the disposal of an appeal in respect of an assessment of a particular year. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner may hold, on the evidence, that the income shown by the assessee is not the income for the relevant year and thereby exclude that income from the assessment of the year under appeal.\n\nThe finding in that context is that that income does not belong to the relevant year.\n\nHe may incidentally find that the income belongs to another year, but that is not a finding necessary for the disposal of an appeal in respect of the year of assessment in question.\n\nThe expression \"direction\" cannot be construed in vacuum, but must be collated to the direc; tions which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can give under s. 31. Under that section he can give directions, inter a/ia, under s. 31 ( 3) (b), ( c) or ( e) or s. 31 ( 4). The expression \"directions\" in the proviso could only refer to the directions which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or other tribunals can issue under the powers conferred on him or them under the respective sections.\n\nTherefore, the expression \"finding\" as well as the expression. \"direction\" can be given full meaning, namely, that the findin~ is a finding necessary for giving relief in respect of the assessment of the year in question and the direction is a direction which the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be, is empowered to give under the sections mentioned therein.\n\nTI1e words \"in consequence of or to give effect to\" do illOt create any difficulty, for they have to be collated with, and cannot enlarge, the scope of the finding or direction under the proviso. If the scope is limited as aforesaid, the said words also must be related to the scope of the findings and . directions.\n\nThe words \"any person\", it is said, conclude the matter in favour of the Department.\n\nThe expression \"any person~ in its widest c0nnotation may take in any peNon, whether connected or not with the assessee, whose income for any\n\n1964 year has escaped assessment; but this contruction cannot be accepted, for the said expression is necessarily ircumscribcd . 1. T.O/licn-, by the scope of the subject-matter of the appeal or revision, A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nas the case may be.\n\nThat is to say, that person rr:ust be one Murlidhar who would be liable to be assessed for the whole or a part Bh;:rand\"tkrt of the income tliat went into the assesment of the ye.qr under La •mpur appeal or revision. If so construed, we must turn to s. 31 Subba Rao 1. to ascertain who is that person other than the appealing assessee who can be liable to be assessed for the income ot the said assessment year.\n\nA cobined reading of s. 30 ( 1.) and s. 31 (3) of the Act indicates the cases where persons other than the appealing assessees might be affected by orders passed by the Appellate Commissioner.\n\nModification or setting aside of assessment made on a firm, joint Hindu family, association of persons, for a µarticuhr year may affect the assessment for the said ye.ar on a partner or partners of the firm, member or members of the Hindu undivided family or the individual, as the case may be.\n\nIu such cases though the latter are not eo nomine parties to the appeal, their assessments depend upon the assessments on the former.\n\nThe said instances are only illustrative. It is not necessary to pursue the matter further.\n\nWe would, therefore, hold that the expression \"any person\" in the setting in which it appears must be confined to a person intimately connected in the aforesaid sense with the assessment of the year under appeal.\n\nWe shall now briefly touch upon the conflict of decisions on the question. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Lakshman Prakash's case(') overruled the decision of the Division Bench in Pt.\n\nHazari Lat's case(').\n\nA Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajagopalan and Balakrishna Ayyar JJ., in Simrathmull v.\n\nAdditional Income-tax Officer, Ootacamund(3 ), took the same view as the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Lakshman Prakash's case('). But a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, consisting of Bose C.J., and Mookerjee J., in Brindaban Chandra Basak v. Income-tax\n\nOfficer('), though it had not finally expressed any opinion\n\n( 1) [1963) 48 I.T.R. 705, 718.\n\n(') (1959) 36 I. T. R. 41.\n\n(') [1960139 I.T.R. 265, 272.\n\n(') (1962) 46 I. T. R. 14.\n\n1964 on that, was inclined to accept the view expressed by tnc\n\n1. T.\n\nOfficer, Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Pt. Hazari A-Ward, Sitapur Lal's case('). We have gone through the decisions carefully.\n\nMurTidhar For the reasons given by us, we agree with the view Bhagwandas,. expressed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Lakh, mpurkhm C rt p H L l' (') th · h Subba Rao 1. ou m I. azarz a s case on e mterpretahon of t e proviso to sub-s. ( 3) of s. 34 of the Act.\n\nIn the result, we hold that the said proviso would not save the time-limit prescribed under sub-s. ( 1) of s. 34 of the Act in respect of an escaped assessmcDt of a year other than that which is the subject-matter of the r.ppcal or the revision, as the case may be. It follows that the notice under s. 34 ( 1) (a) of the Act issued in the present case was ckarly barred by limitation.\n\nIn this view no other question anses for our consideration.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nlludholkar 1.\n\nMUDHOLKAR J.-This is an appeal l:Jy special leave from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution quashing a notice under s. 34 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 issued by the appellant, Income-tax Officer, A Ward, Sitapur on December 5, 1957 against respondent No. 4.\n\nThe relevant facts are briefly these: For the assessment year 1949-50, corresponding to Samvat year 2005, the appellant made an ex-parte assessment under s. 23 ( 4) of the Act on November 13, 1953 which he later set aside under s. 27 of the Act.\n\nBefore that he had issued a notice to the respondent firm under s. 34( 1 J\n\nla) of the Act in respect of the same assessment year on the ground that a sum of Rs. 88,737 representing interest alleged to have been earned by the firm during that year had escaped assessment in the assessment made under s. 23 ( 4).\n\nAfter, however, fresh proceedings were tken under s. 23 ( 3) by the appellant consequent upon his order under s. 27, he proceeded to include in the assessment a sum of Rs. 88,737 which was alleged to have escaped assessment in the notice earlier issued under s. 34 (1 )(a) and made an assessment\n\n(1)\n\n(1963) 48 I. T. R. 705, 718.\n\norder on January 31, 1957.\n\nAgainst this order the respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in which he urged two main grounds and the one accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was that the aforesaid amount of interest was received by the firm in the accounting period of the previous assessment year and not in that of the assessment year 1949-50. Upon this view, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner reduced the assessment and observed as follows in his order :\n\n\"I, therefore, hold that the amount in dispute should be deleted from the assessment for 1949-50 and that, instead, the Income-tax Officer should take steps to assess the amount for the assessment year 1948-49.\"\n\nTreating this as a direction or finding of the Appellate Authority, the appellant issued the impugned notice dated December 5, 1957 under s. 34(1)(a). The respondent immediately moved the High Court for quashing the aforesaid notice.\n\nThe High Court quashed the notice on the ground that it was issued by the appelLnt beyond the ordinary period of limitation, overruling the appellant's contention that no period of limitation governed the notice inasmuch as the second proviso to s. 34 ( 3) of the Act was attracted to the facts of the case.\n\nThe High Court in doing so purported to follow its own decision in Pt. Hazari Lal v.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer, Distt. II, Kanpur(').\n\nBriefly stated, the view taken by the High Court is that the only direction which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can competently give is one which is covered by s. 31 of the Act and that since the appeal before him was confined to a particular assessment year, the direction must also be necessarily limited to a matter falling within that year.\n\nThe High Court further held that if the direction be treated as based on a finding recorded by the Aµpellate Assistant Commis sioner, that finding will have to be disregarded when applying the proviso. The correctness of the view taken by the High Court is challenged before us on behalf of the appellant. ·\n\n----····---\n\n(') Civil Misc. Writ. 2227 of 1956.\n\n196'\n\nI. T. 0(/icer, A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurUdlrJJI Bhagwandm,\n\nLakhimpurkrl\n\nMudholkar 1.\n\n1964 The relevant part of s. 34(3) and the second proviso\n\n• I. T.\n\nOfficer, thereto run thus: A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurridhar \"No order of assessment or reassessment, other tha~ Bhagwandtu, an order of assessment under s. 23 to which Lakhimpurkheri clause ( c) of sub-section ( 1) of section 28\n\nMudholka1 J. applies or an order of assessment or reassessment in cases falling within clause (a) af subaoction (1) or sub-section ( lA) of this section shall be made after the expiry of four years from the end of the year in which the income, profits or gains were first assessable:\n\nProvided further that nothing contained in this section limiting the time within which any action may be taken or any order, assessment or reassessment may be made shall apply to a reassessment made under section 27 or to an assessment or reassessment made on the assessee or any person fu consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 31, section 33, section 33A, section 33B, section 66 or section 66A.\"\n\nThis is how the provision stands as from April 1, 1956 and it is not disputed before us that it is the amended provision which would apply to the present case.\n\nWhat is, however, contended on behalf of the respondent is that the only issue before an Income-tax Officer in every case being the assessment for a particular year and no other year, the direction or finding contemplated by the second proviso which the Appellate Authority could make must necessarily be limited to that year alone.\n\nThe alternative contention is that if the second proviso is so construed as to permit of a direction or finding being made with respect to any other year, it is ultra vires being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was further contended that since the amount in this case is below one lakh of rupees, the second proviso will not apply.\n\nAs regards the last point we may advert to our judgment delivered today in K. C. Thomas, First Income-tax Of]icer, Bombay v. Vasant Hiralal Shah(') in which we have\n\n( 1) (1964] 6 S.C.R. 437\n\nnegatived a similar contention. For the reasons given there, we reject the argument of learned counsel for the respondent.\n\nComing to the first contention of the respondent, it is no doubt true that the whole scheme of the Income-tax Act is to confine the assessment pursuant to the notice given under s. 22 to a particular year and particular year alone and in the proceed.1ng before him he is bound to confine himself to the income of that year. If income in previous years has escaped assessment, he has no power to bring it to assessment along with the income of a subsequent year.\n\nThe only power which he has for bringing such income to assessment is to resort to the provisions of s. 34 (1) and issue a separate notice with respect to it to the assessee and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax hearing an appeal from an order of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer is in no better position in this matter than the Income-tax Officer. All that is perfectly true. But the question which we have to consider is whether the wide language employed by the legislature in enacting the second proviso should not be.given its natural meaning.\n\nThis proviso removes the bar of limitation enacted bys. 34(1) and its first two provisos not only with respect to the assessee but with respect to \"any person\" in certain circumstances.\n\nNo doubt, this Court has recently held in S. C. Prashar & Anr. v.\n\nF_,•a1<1sen Dwarkadas & ors. (1) that the proviso in so far as it 1emoves the bar of limitation with respect to persons other than the assessee, is invalid as it infringes the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThat, however, is a question apart.\n\nWhat we have to consider is the legislative intent, and for ascertaining it, it is legitimate to look also at that part of the enactment which has been held to be invalid.\n\nBy permitting the Appellate Authority to make a finding or give a direction with respect to a person other than the assessee the Legislature has made it abundantly dear that for bringing escaped income to assessment the bar of limitation would not apply provided there is a finding or direction of the Appellate Authority that a particular item of income had escaped assessment and may, therefore, be brought to assessment.\n\nUnder the operative portion of s. 34(1), the Income-tax Officer is empowered to give notice\n\n(1) [19f4l r-S.C.R. 29.\n\n1. T. 0/fictr, A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas, LlzkhimpurkMri\n\nMudholkar I.\n\n1964 to an assessee in respect of escaped assessment.\n\nHe can _ 1. r. Officer, issue such notice under cl. (a) thereof where income has A-Ward, Sitapur escaped assessment due to any conduct on the part of the Muriidhar assessee and in such a case he can issue a notice at any time.\n\nBhag':\"andaJ, . Certain restrictions, however, have been placed upon his IAkhimpurkheri power by the first proviso to sub-s. ( 1) of s. 34, one of which Mudholkar J. is the period of limitation of eight years with respect to income of less than a lakh of rupees.\n\nThe second proviso to sub-s. ( 3) is a proviso to the whole of s. 34 and would consequently apply to a case falling under s. 34(1)(a). The restrictions placed by the enacting provisions of s. 34(3) would not, as made clear in the second proviso, apply to such a case.\n\nThus, the proviso in terms says that when a notice is issued under s. 34 ( 1) (a), no question of limitation would arise when such notice is issued in pursuance of a direction or finding of an appellate authority.\n\nSince the proceeding in pursuance of a notice under s. 34 is necessarily independent of the assessment proceedings under s. 22 with respect to a particular year, the provio in question need not be so interpreted as to be limited to a direction made by the Appellate Authority while dealing with an appeal for that particular year.\n\nThe fact that certain income has escaped assessment may come to the notice of an Appellate Authority in any case and it clearly appears to be the intention of the Legislature to require an Income-tax Officer to take cognizance of it in the circumstances stated in the proviso.\n\nIt is, however, contended that the power of the Appellate Authority to make a direction or finding in any appeal before it is confined to matters specified in s. 31 and that upon a pro;>er conlltruction of that provision, a direction or finding with respect to income of any 'particular year other than the one with respect to which there is an appeal before it, cannot be competently made by the Appellate Authority.\n\nIn support of this contention reliance is placed up on the decisions in Kamlapat Motilal v. Income-tax Officer and anr.( 1 ), Hiralal Amritlal Shah v. K. C. Thomas, Income-tax Officer, Bombay('); Pt. Hazari Lal v. Income-tax Officer, Dist.\n\nII Kanpur(\"); Brindaban Chandra Basak v. Income-tax\n\n(I) (1956) 29 !. T. R. 192.\n\n(2) (1958) 34 J. T. R. 446. '\n\n(3) (196o) 39 I. T. R. 265.\n\nOfficer('). In the first of these cases the learned judges have observed:\n\n\"In our opinion the powers of the Appellate Tribunal under section 33 ( 4) are limited to the passing of such order as it thinks fit to make in the proceedings which are then before it on appeal, and in our judgment it has no power under this section to pass an order or give directions with reference to the proceedings of an earlier year which are concluded.\"\n\nWe may point out that s. 33 ( 4) only refers to a finding or direction made by an Appellate Authority and does not itself confer any power on an Appellate Authority to make a finding or direction. fndeed, s. 34 deals with entirely a different aspect, that of empowering an Income-tax Officer to bring to assessment escaped income, and has no concern with the powers of an Appellate Authority. The provisions which deals with the powers of an Appellate Authority is ~. 31 and it is with that provision that we must concern ourselves primarily.\n\nThe next case is not strictly relevant to this point.\n\nBut the third one which is again a decision of the Allahabad High Court has proceeded to construe s. 31 of the Act and we, therefore, have to consider it.\n\nAfter observing that the scope of the orders which can be passed by the Appellate Authority under s. 31 the learned Judges have observed:\n\n\"The very fact that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, when making an order under section 31, is dealing with an appeal filed by an assessee in respect of an assessment order indicates the scope of his jurisdiction to give findings and to make consequential orders. The various orders, which an Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax can make, are detailed in section 31 (3) though there is no detailed provision about the findings which he can record.\n\nIt appears to us, however, that,\n\n(t) (1962) 46 I. T. R. 14.\n\n1. T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitaplll\"\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandtu, Lakhimpurklwrl\n\n11!11dholkar I.\n\n• l. T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v.\n\nMurlidhar BhagwandaJ, 1Akhimpurkheri\n\nMudholkar J.\n\nfrom the very nature of the jurisdiction which an Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income\n\ntax exercises, it must follow that his power of recording findings is limited to matters which he is called upon to decide when passing an order in appeal in conformity with the details laid down in section 31 ( 3). Any order passed by him, which is beyond the scope of section 31 ( 3), would be an order without jurisdiction and, similarly, any finding recorded by him, which is not necessary for the purpose of making an order covered by s. 31 ( 3), would be a find ing without jurisdiction. Further, when apply ing the second proviso to section 34(3) of the Income-tax Act, the Income-tax Officer is only competent to take into account orders which are in conformity with the provisions of section 31(3) and findings which are necessary for passing those orders.\n\nOrders, which are out side the scope of section 31(3) or findings which are not at all necessary for making such orders, cannot be taken into account by the Income-tax Officer for the purpose of relying on the second proviso to section 34 ( 3) which we are now considering.\" (p. 271)\n\nThe learned Judges have proceeded to hold that the word ''finding'' must be given the same meaning as that in the Code of Civil Procedure, that is. a decision of the Court.\n\nIn other words, they seem to hold that a finding means only the final conclusion in the case.\n\nIn support of this conclu sion they placed reliance upon 's. C. Prashar v. V asantsen Dwarkadas(').\n\nSection 31 ( 3) of the Act confers certain express powers upon the Appellate Authority, one of which is to 'confirm. reduce, enhance or annul the assessment'. This power can be exercised only after the Appellate Authority arrives at some conclusions on facts.\n\nThus, if an assessee wants to be exonerated from tax with respect to a particular item of\n\n(1) (1956) 29 I. T. R.857\n\nincome and sets out the grounds on which he bases his claim for exoneration the Appellate Authority has to consider them and arrive at its findings with regard to them before it can reduce or annul the assessment.\n\nIt would follow, therefore, th.at the power to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul an assessment is implicit in the power of giving findings on the grounds on which a claim is made for one or the other of these results by the department or the assesee.\n\nNo express mention of such power was required in s. 31( 3).\n\nWhen an appeal is before an Ap; iellate Authority the whole matter is at large before it and, therefore, when a specific case is put before it by an assessee it has both the power as well as the duty to give its finding thereon.\n\nThe ground given by the assessee for claiming a reduction or annulment of assessment may well be that the income upon which he has been assessed was not earned in the accounting period of the year to which the assessment pertains but in respect of a specified earlier or later year.\n\nThe Appell.ate Authority is entitled to go into the whole question and come to a finding one way or the other, whether the income was earned in the year in which it was alleged by the assessee to have been earned or in the year with respect to which he has been assessed by the Income-tax Officer.\n\nTo give a finding on this question would be obligatory upon the Appellate Authority and his duty to give a finding must necessarily be referable to the provisions of s. 31(3). We cannot accept the view of the Allahabad High Court that the word \"finding\" occurring in s. 34(3) is susceptible of only one meaning, and that is that ascertainable from the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe finding of a tribunal is its conclusion on a point agitated before it and for a conclusion to amount to a finding it is not necessary that it should be the final and ultimate conclusion.\n\nWe are, therefore, unable to accept the view taken by the Allahabad High Court. The last mentioned case does not decide the matter finally. But there the learned Judges have expressed a preference for the view taken by the Allahabad High Court as against that taken by the Madras High Court in K. Simrathmull v. Additional Income-tax Officer, Ootacamurd( 1). In that case a sirnil.ar argument to that urged before us and before the ----------\n\n(1) (1959) 36 I. T. R. 4t. 134-159 s. c.-28.\n\nI. T.\n\nOfficer, A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwanda.t, Lakhimpurkheri\n\nMrulholkar J.\n\n1964 Allahabad- High Court was advanced.\n\nDealing with it the r. T. Officer, learned Judges have observed: A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwanda, Lakhimpurlch<ri\n\nMudhclkar ., J.\n\n\"To support this argument no authority was cited and it appear to us to be completely untenable.\n\nWhen an assessment is made and either the Department or the assessee appeals, the who!e matter would be before the Assistant Commissioner, and, no express provision would be necessary to enable him to give directions in respect of a matter already before him.\n\nThis would apply also to the Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\" (p. 47)\n\nThey then explained the reason for an express provision like the one contained in s. 34(3) by saying that it was necessary to have such provision o as to enable the Income-tax Officer to take action in pursuance of a finding recorded or direction given by an Apellate Authority.\n\nFinally they observed:\n\n\"To construe the proviso in the manner in which Mr. Subbarya Aiyar invited us to do would be to make that proviso otiose.\"\n\nWith these observations we concur.\n\nThis decision has been followed by the Bombay High Court in General Construction and Supply Co., v. Income-tax Officer (8th) C. Ward, Bombay(').\n\nThe same High Court has reaffirmed the view taken in Simrathmull's case( 2) in A. S. Khader Ismail v. Income-tax Officer, Salem(') and held that the word \"finding\" .in the proviso to s. 34(3) must be given a wide significance so as to include not only findjngs necessary for the disposal of the appeal but also findings which are incidental to it and would include its conclusion as to whether the income in question in the appeal was not received during the year to which the appeal relates.\n\nUpon this view the High Court held that if in pursuance of such a finding, the Income-ta\"I: officer proceeds to investigate afresh as to in which year the income was received, the action of the Income., ax Officer\n\n(1) (1962) 44 I. T. R. 16.\n\n(2) (1959) 36 I. T. R. 41.\n\n(3) (1963) 47 I. T. R. 16.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 435\n\n~would still be the result of or the logical consequence of 1964 the finding arrived at for the purpose of the clispoal of the , 1. -r. Officer, appeal and the proviso to s. 34 ( 3) would apply to such a •A-Ward: Sitapur case. The view taken by the High Court is in our judgment Murlidhar correct. ' BhagwandaJ.\n\nLakh:impllrkheri Thus in our view upon a construction of the relevant Mudholkar J. provisions we have no doubt that the notice was not in contravention of the provisions of s. 34 of the Income-tax Act and could not be quashed on that ground. ·\n\nThe question then remains whether the second proviso belows. 34(3) is bad as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention reliance is placed by Mr. Bishan Narain for the respondent on the decisions of this Court in Suraj Mall Mohata & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri & anr.(1 ) and S. C. Prashar & anr. v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas & ors.('). In the first case it was held that both s. 34 of the Income-tax Act and sub-s. ( 4) of s. 5 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, deal with all persons who have similar characteristics and similar properties, that the procedure prescribed in the later Act is substantially more prejudicial and more drastic to the assessee than the procedure under the former Act and that, therefore, sub-s. ( 4) of s. 5 of the former Act in so far as it affects the persons proceeded against thereunder is void as offending the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution.· On the analogy of this case learned counsel contends that the second proviso to s. 34(3) enabling a notice to issue only to an assessee in respect of escaped income without limit of time on the ground that an Appellate Authority has made a finding or direction in the proceeding before it makes a discrimination against such an assessee because it does not lift the bar of limitation with regard to other asses. sees, similarly sjtuate, but with regard to whom no finding has been made or direction given by an Appellate Authority. No doubt, persons whose income have escaped assessment, and the fact that they have escaped assessment has not been discovered till after the lapse of eight years from the year in which they could have been assessed to tax on such\n\n(1) [1955] l S. C.R. 448.\n\n(2) [1964] l S. C. R. 29\n\n1964 income, can be placed in one class. But surely it does not\n\n1. r. Offtctr, follow that even in that class there can be no further classi- A-Ward, Sitapur fication.\n\nThe legislature in enacting the particular provi- Muriidhar sion has made a further or a sub-classification by putting B\"; r; nd\";;, under one head those whose assessments have come up for La prtr erl scrutiny before an Appellate Authority and with respect to Mudhnlkar J. whose escl!Qed assessment a judicial finding or direction is made by the Appellate Authority and under another head other assessees whose escaped income was not detected by the Appellate Authority and with respect to which no judicial finding or direction was, therefore, made by such authority.\n\nThere is a real difference between the two categories of assessees. Prima facie there is reasonable basis for the sub-classification and the grounds on which-, it is made, that is, discovery by a higher Income-tax Authority and a judicial finding or direction made with' respect to the fact by it. These grounds have a rational relationship with the object which was intended to be achieved by the law. that is. to detect and bring to assessment the escaped income. (See for example A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalarn Patti & anr.( 1) where a further classification of war porfiteers into those who had evaded substantial amount of income-tax and those whose evasion was not of a substantial amount was upheld.) We can find nothing in the decision upon which reliance i~ phced which runs counter to our view.\n\nOn the other hanrl we find ample support from the decision in Ba/aji v. Income\n\ntax Officer, Special Investigation Circle(') where it has been pointed out that the two tests of permissible classification under Art. 14 are (a) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and (b) that the differentia must be reasonably connected with the object of the legislation, and that where thev are satisfied by a statute. it does not violatP Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nAs regards the other decision relied upon. it is sufficient to point out that the majoritv of the learned Judges have only struck down that part of the proviso which enables a notice to issue \"to any person\" on the ground that it is violative of Art. 14.\n\nThP Precise question which we have before us does not appear to have been the subject of decision in that case.\n\n(I) [19~5) 2 $, C.R. n96,\n\n(2) [1g62l 2 S.C.R. 983\n\nare, therefore, unable to accept the contention of learned counsel.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons we allow the appeal and quash the writ of certiorari issued by the High Court. It may be mentioned that in the absence of a stay of proceedings by the High Court the Income-tax Officer has actually made an assessment in pursuance of the impugned notice.\n\nThat assessment wii.1 stand unless it is modified or annulled in any proceeding permitted by law.\n\nCosts of the appeal and the petition before the High Court will be borne by tbe respondent.\n\nORDER BY COURT\n\nIn view of the judgment of the majority, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nK. C.\n\nTHOMAS,\n\nFIRST INCOME-TAX OFFICER,\n\nBOMBAY\n\nVASANT HIRALAL SHAH & ORS.\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SuBBA RAo,\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Escaped income-Notice issued for assessment after expiry\n\nof 8 years-If sanction required-Indian lncom1-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922). ss. 34(i), 34(ii), 34(3) proviso. os amended b1 Act XXV of 1953 and Act XVIl of 1956.\n\nThe appellant had issued notice to the respondents under s. 34( I) (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 in respect of an escaped income of Rs. 47,595 for the assessment year 1944-45. The ca.e of tte respondents was that the, impugned notice was bad because the Income-Tax Officer proceeded against the respondents without obtaining the necessary sanction of the Central Board of Revenue as required by cl. (iii) of the proviso to s. 34(1) of the Act. The respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the notice issued under s. 34( I) of the Act.\n\nThe respondents succeeded bofore the High Court.\n\n1. T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v.\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas, Lakhimpurkheri\n\nM11dho/kar J.\n\nJanuary, 29", "total_entities": 273, "entities": [{"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 67, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 88, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15 contains a non-obstante clause with 1the result that power conferred Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 302, "end_char": 383, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. 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P.\n\nSinh•, CJ.,"}}, {"text": "K. Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4203, "end_char": 4215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Subba Rao and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.).", "canonical_name": "IC. Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "N. Rajagopala Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4220, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Subba Rao and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ.).", "canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4277, "end_char": 4282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4381, "end_char": 4386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4545, "end_char": 4553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The jurisdiction of the High Court or the Supreme Court under s. 66 ors."}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4674, "end_char": 4679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5105, "end_char": 5110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5911, "end_char": 5916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: per Raghubar Dayal and J. R. Mudholkar JJ. (", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL"}}, {"text": "J. R. Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6589, "end_char": 6604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: per Raghubar Dayal and J. R. Mudholkar JJ. (", "canonical_name": "J. R. Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "(1932) L.R. 59 I.A. 290", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8463, "end_char": 8486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. C. Thomas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8989, "end_char": 9001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1963 J 48 J.T.R. 70S, A. S. Khader Ismail v. lncomt-la:t Of!ic.rl T Otfi Salem, (1963)48 l.T.R. 16, Simrathmul v. Additional Income-ta:< Officer, .A.:W,;, d, sft\":i,,,, Ootachamund, (1959)36 l.T.R. 41, Brindaban Chandra Bosak v. lncome-\n\nY. tax Officer, ( 1962) 46 I.T.R. 14, K. C. Thomas, First Income-tax Officer.", "canonical_name": "K. 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Thomas, Income lax Officer, Bombay, 34 I.'f, R. 4 ... 6, General Construction and Supply Co.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISJ; llCT!ON: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9565, "end_char": 9587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant Bishan Nar4in, G. C. Sharma, O.C. Mathur, /. B.\n\nDadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9592, "end_char": 9606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant Bishan Nar4in, G. C. Sharma, O.C. Mathur, /. B.\n\nDadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bishan Nar4", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9626, "end_char": 9637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant Bishan Nar4in, G. C. Sharma, O.C. Mathur, /. 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Y. Yishwanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9728, "end_char": 9752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Y. Yishwanatha Sastri, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9754, "end_char": 9769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Y. Yishwanatha Sastri, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "B. N.\n\nGhosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9774, "end_char": 9786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Y. Yishwanatha Sastri, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "B. P. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9843, "end_char": 9854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of B. P. Sinha C.J., IC.", "canonical_name": "B. P. SINHA, C.J."}}, {"text": "IC. Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9861, "end_char": 9874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of B. 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''finding\", therefore, can be only that which is necessary for the disposal of an appeal in respect of an assessment of a particular year."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33014, "end_char": 33019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33082, "end_char": 33087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33114, "end_char": 33119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assistant Commissioner", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33224, "end_char": 33246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression \"directions\" in the proviso could only refer to the directions which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or other tribunals can issue under the powers conferred on him or them under the respective sections."}}, {"text": "Murlidhar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34561, "end_char": 34570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is to say, that person rr:ust be one Murlidhar who would be liable to be assessed for the whole or a part Bh;:rand\"tkrt of the income tliat went into the assesment of the ye.qr under La •mpur appeal or revision.", "canonical_name": "Murlidhar"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34769, "end_char": 34774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34775, "end_char": 34784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If so construed, we must turn to s. 31 Subba Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34953, "end_char": 34958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34969, "end_char": 34974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lakshman Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35985, "end_char": 36001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Lakshman Prakash's case(') overruled the decision of the Division Bench in Pt."}}, {"text": "Hazari Lat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36065, "end_char": 36075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hazari Lat's case(')."}}, {"text": "Rajagopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36144, "end_char": 36155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajagopalan and Balakrishna Ayyar JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36160, "end_char": 36177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajagopalan and Balakrishna Ayyar JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36373, "end_char": 36392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, consisting of Bose C.J., and Mookerjee J., in Brindaban Chandra Basak v. 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Income-tax\n\nOfficer('), though it had not finally expressed any opinion\n\n( 1) [1963) 48 I.T.R. 705, 718."}}, {"text": "Sitapur Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36805, "end_char": 36816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hazari A-Ward, Sitapur Lal's case(')."}}, {"text": "MurTidhar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36875, "end_char": 36884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MurTidhar For the reasons given by us, we agree with the view Bhagwandas,.", "canonical_name": "Murlidhar"}}, {"text": "Bhagwandas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36937, "end_char": 36947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MurTidhar For the reasons given by us, we agree with the view Bhagwandas,.", "canonical_name": "BhagwandaJ."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37130, "end_char": 37135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37256, "end_char": 37261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37448, "end_char": 37453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lludholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37658, "end_char": 37668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lludholkar 1."}}, {"text": "MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37673, "end_char": 37682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUDHOLKAR J.-This is an appeal l:Jy special leave from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the writ petition under Art.", "canonical_name": "Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37796, "end_char": 37804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37849, "end_char": 37854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37866, "end_char": 37893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "December 5, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37958, "end_char": 37974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution quashing a notice under s. 34 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 issued by the appellant, Income-tax Officer, A Ward, Sitapur on December 5, 1957 against respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38156, "end_char": 38161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38230, "end_char": 38235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34( 1 J\n\nla)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38313, "end_char": 38328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38549, "end_char": 38554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38612, "end_char": 38617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38672, "end_char": 38677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38821, "end_char": 38826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39755, "end_char": 39766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40098, "end_char": 40103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40461, "end_char": 40466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41121, "end_char": 41129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41310, "end_char": 41315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41375, "end_char": 41385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mudholka1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41387, "end_char": 41396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 The relevant part of s. 34(3) and the second proviso\n\n• I. T.\n\nOfficer, thereto run thus: A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurridhar \"No order of assessment or reassessment, other tha~ Bhagwandtu, an order of assessment under s. 23 to which Lakhimpurkheri clause ( c) of sub-section ( 1) of section 28\n\nMudholka1 J. applies or an order of assessment or reassessment in cases falling within clause (a) af subaoction (1) or sub-section ( lA) of this section shall be made after the expiry of four years from the end of the year in which the income, profits or gains were first assessable:\n\nProvided further that nothing contained in this section limiting the time within which any action may be taken or any order, assessment or reassessment may be made shall apply to a reassessment made under section 27 or to an assessment or reassessment made on the assessee or any person fu consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 31, section 33, section 33A, section 33B, section 66 or section 66A.\"\n\nThis is how the provision stands as from April 1, 1956 and it is not disputed before us that it is the amended provision which would apply to the present case.", "canonical_name": "Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41877, "end_char": 41887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42051, "end_char": 42061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42063, "end_char": 42073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42075, "end_char": 42086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42088, "end_char": 42099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42101, "end_char": 42111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42115, "end_char": 42126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42171, "end_char": 42184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 The relevant part of s. 34(3) and the second proviso\n\n• I. T.\n\nOfficer, thereto run thus: A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurridhar \"No order of assessment or reassessment, other tha~ Bhagwandtu, an order of assessment under s. 23 to which Lakhimpurkheri clause ( c) of sub-section ( 1) of section 28\n\nMudholka1 J. applies or an order of assessment or reassessment in cases falling within clause (a) af subaoction (1) or sub-section ( lA) of this section shall be made after the expiry of four years from the end of the year in which the income, profits or gains were first assessable:\n\nProvided further that nothing contained in this section limiting the time within which any action may be taken or any order, assessment or reassessment may be made shall apply to a reassessment made under section 27 or to an assessment or reassessment made on the assessee or any person fu consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 31, section 33, section 33A, section 33B, section 66 or section 66A.\"\n\nThis is how the provision stands as from April 1, 1956 and it is not disputed before us that it is the amended provision which would apply to the present case."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42817, "end_char": 42824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. C. Thomas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43046, "end_char": 43058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the last point we may advert to our judgment delivered today in K. C. Thomas, First Income-tax Of]icer, Bombay v. Vasant Hiralal Shah(') in which we have\n\n( 1) (1964] 6 S.C.R. 437\n\nnegatived a similar contention.", "canonical_name": "K. C.\n\nTHOMAS"}}, {"text": "(1964] 6 S.C.R. 437", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 43142, "end_char": 43161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43386, "end_char": 43400, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43465, "end_char": 43470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43851, "end_char": 43856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44770, "end_char": 44777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45466, "end_char": 45474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45623, "end_char": 45632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. 0/fictr, A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas, LlzkhimpurkMri\n\nMudholkar I.\n\n1964 to an assessee in respect of escaped assessment.", "canonical_name": "Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46053, "end_char": 46058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46247, "end_char": 46252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46306, "end_char": 46317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46373, "end_char": 46381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46520, "end_char": 46525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46720, "end_char": 46725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46789, "end_char": 46794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47437, "end_char": 47442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48214, "end_char": 48224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48540, "end_char": 48545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48723, "end_char": 48728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49215, "end_char": 49220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49371, "end_char": 49376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49511, "end_char": 49521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49797, "end_char": 49807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitaplll\"\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandtu, Lakhimpurklwrl", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49956, "end_char": 50023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitaplll\"\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandtu, Lakhimpurklwrl\n\n11!11dholkar I."}}, {"text": "11!11dholkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50025, "end_char": 50037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitaplll\"\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandtu, Lakhimpurklwrl\n\n11!11dholkar I."}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50424, "end_char": 50434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50495, "end_char": 50505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50665, "end_char": 50670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50765, "end_char": 50778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50786, "end_char": 50800, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50918, "end_char": 50931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51032, "end_char": 51045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51220, "end_char": 51230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51387, "end_char": 51414, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51647, "end_char": 51657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31( 3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52542, "end_char": 52551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53533, "end_char": 53541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53634, "end_char": 53642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53715, "end_char": 53742, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "I. T.\n\nOfficer, A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwanda.t, Lakhimpurkheri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54427, "end_char": 54497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. T.\n\nOfficer, A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwanda.t, Lakhimpurkheri\n\nMrulholkar J.\n\n1964 Allahabad- High Court was advanced."}}, {"text": "Mrulholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54499, "end_char": 54509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. T.\n\nOfficer, A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwanda.t, Lakhimpurkheri\n\nMrulholkar J.\n\n1964 Allahabad- High Court was advanced."}}, {"text": "A-Ward, Sitapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54621, "end_char": 54636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with it the r. T. Officer, learned Judges have observed: A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwanda, Lakhimpurlch<ri\n\nMudhclkar .,"}}, {"text": "Murlidhar Bhagwanda", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54638, "end_char": 54657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with it the r. T. Officer, learned Judges have observed: A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwanda, Lakhimpurlch<ri\n\nMudhclkar .,", "canonical_name": "MURLIDHAR BHAGWANDAS, LAKHIMPUR KHERl"}}, {"text": "Mudhclkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54676, "end_char": 54685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with it the r. T. Officer, learned Judges have observed: A-Ward, Sitapur\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwanda, Lakhimpurlch<ri\n\nMudhclkar .,", "canonical_name": "Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55225, "end_char": 55233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subbarya Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55499, "end_char": 55513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally they observed:\n\n\"To construe the proviso in the manner in which Mr. Subbarya Aiyar invited us to do would be to make that proviso otiose.\""}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 55646, "end_char": 55663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision has been followed by the Bombay High Court in General Construction and Supply Co., v. Income-tax Officer (8th) C. Ward, Bombay(')."}}, {"text": "Simrathmull", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55806, "end_char": 55817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same High Court has reaffirmed the view taken in Simrathmull's case( 2) in A. S. Khader Ismail v. Income-tax Officer, Salem(') and held that the word \"finding\" .in the proviso to s. 34(3) must be given a wide significance so as to include not only findjngs necessary for the disposal of the appeal but also findings which are incidental to it and would include its conclusion as to whether the income in question in the appeal was not received during the year to which the appeal relates."}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55936, "end_char": 55944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56756, "end_char": 56761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BhagwandaJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56885, "end_char": 56896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BhagwandaJ.\n\nLakh:impllrkheri Thus in our view upon a construction of the relevant Mudholkar J. provisions we have no doubt that the notice was not in contravention of the provisions of s. 34 of the Income-tax Act and could not be quashed on that ground. ·", "canonical_name": "BhagwandaJ."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57071, "end_char": 57076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57084, "end_char": 57098, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57230, "end_char": 57237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57315, "end_char": 57328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this contention reliance is placed by Mr. Bishan Narain for the respondent on the decisions of this Court in Suraj Mall Mohata & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri & anr.(1 ) and S. C. Prashar & anr.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Narain"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57543, "end_char": 57548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57556, "end_char": 57570, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57590, "end_char": 57594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57928, "end_char": 57932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58055, "end_char": 58062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58165, "end_char": 58173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mudhnlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59332, "end_char": 59341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legislature in enacting the particular provi- Muriidhar sion has made a further or a sub-classification by putting B\"; r; nd\";;, under one head those whose assessments have come up for La prtr erl scrutiny before an Appellate Authority and with respect to Mudhnlkar J. whose escl!Qed assessment a judicial finding or direction is made by the Appellate Authority and under another head other assessees whose escaped income was not detected by the Appellate Authority and with respect to which no judicial finding or direction was, therefore, made by such authority.", "canonical_name": "Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60674, "end_char": 60681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60923, "end_char": 60930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61199, "end_char": 61206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. C.\n\nTHOMAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62020, "end_char": 62033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C.\n\nTHOMAS,\n\nFIRST INCOME-TAX OFFICER,\n\nBOMBAY\n\nVASANT HIRALAL SHAH & ORS.", "canonical_name": "K. C.\n\nTHOMAS"}}, {"text": "VASANT HIRALAL SHAH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62071, "end_char": 62090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C.\n\nTHOMAS,\n\nFIRST INCOME-TAX OFFICER,\n\nBOMBAY\n\nVASANT HIRALAL SHAH & ORS."}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62119, "end_char": 62131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SuBBA RAo,\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "IC. Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "J. R. MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62178, "end_char": 62193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SuBBA RAo,\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "J. R. Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "ss. 34(i), 34(ii), 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62343, "end_char": 62367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62487, "end_char": 62496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62508, "end_char": 62528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62855, "end_char": 62863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62968, "end_char": 62977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_437_446_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 437\n\nare, therefore, unable to accept the contention of learned counsel.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons we allow the appeal and quash the writ of certiorari issued by the High Court. It may be mentioned that in the absence of a stay of proceedings by the High Court the Income-tax Officer has actually made an assessment in pursuance of the impugned notice.\n\nThat assessment wii.1 stand unless it is modified or annulled in any proceeding permitted by law.\n\nCosts of the appeal and the petition before the High Court will be borne by tbe respondent.\n\nORDER BY COURT\n\nIn view of the judgment of the majority, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nK. C.\n\nTHOMAS,\n\nFIRST INCOME-TAX OFFICER,\n\nBOMBAY\n\nVASANT HIRALAL SHAH & ORS.\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C.J., K. SuBBA RAo,\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Escaped income-Notice issued for assessment after expiry\n\nof 8 years-If sanction required-Indian lncom1-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922). ss. 34(i), 34(ii), 34(3) proviso. os amended b1 Act XXV of 1953 and Act XVIl of 1956.\n\nThe appellant had issued notice to the respondents under s. 34( I) (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 in respect of an escaped income of Rs. 47,595 for the assessment year 1944-45. The ca.e of tte respondents was that the, impugned notice was bad because the Income-Tax Officer proceeded against the respondents without obtaining the necessary sanction of the Central Board of Revenue as required by cl. (iii) of the proviso to s. 34(1) of the Act. The respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the notice issued under s. 34( I) of the Act.\n\nThe respondents succeeded bofore the High Court.\n\n1. T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v.\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas, Lakhimpurkheri\n\nM11dho/kar J.\n\nJanuary, 29\n\nK. C. Thomas, /, T. O/fic<r,\n\nBombay ..\n\nV. H. Shah\n\nHeld: (i) The sanction under cl. (iii) of the proviso to s. 34(1) is, however, necessary only where the notice in question is issued under\n\ncl. (ii) of the proviso.\n\nThat is evidently what the legislature meant when it said \"in aDf case falling under cl. (ii)\". The words \"in any case\" used in cl. (iii) only mean a case in which notice can be issued under\n\ncl. (ii). Such a notice can be issued only when. the escaped income is of one lakh of rupees and over.\n\nClause (iii) requires such !ianction where the notice is issued under cl. (ii) and when on a construction of\n\ncl. (ii). no notice can be issued with respect to a class of escaped asse:ssments, there can possibly be no requirement of the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue. If a notice is issued by virtue of some other pr~ vision euch as the second proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34, it would be a notice \"!n any other cas~\" referred to in cl. (iii) of the proviso to subs. (J) o( ' 34 and in such a case the sanction which is required is only that of the Commissioner. Such a sanction was obtained in this case and therefore, the notice cannot be said to be bad because the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue had not been obtained.\n\nIn the present case the income which has escaped assessment is below one lakh of rupees and more than eight years have elapsed since tho assessment year in respect of which the income is alleged to have escaped assessment. Clearly, therefore, no notice could issue under cl. (ii).\n\n(ii) The High Court erred in holding that the provisions of the 8Ccond proviso to s. 34(3) would not apply to a case where the escaped assessment is of an amount less than a lakh of rupees and more than eight years have elapsed. Apparently, the High Court has overlooked the fact that the second proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34 was amended first by Act 25 of .1953 and then by Act. 18 of 1956. The amendment of 1956 would govern the whole of s. 34( l) and would consequently include even an escaped assessment with respect to which limitation is provided in cl.\n\n(ii) of the first proviso to s. 34(1). The result would be the same even if the case fell to be governed by the Amending Act of 1953, though not by that of the Amending Act of 1956.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 688 of 1962.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April l, 1958 of the Bombay High Court in Misc.\n\nApplication No. 202 of 1957.\n\nN. D. Karkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nl. N. Shroff, for the respondents.\n\nJanuary 29, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMlldliolkar J.\n\nMuoHoLKAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Bombay High Court in a writ petition challenging the notice issued under s. 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 by the First Income-tax Officer,\n\nBombay, who is the appellant before us.\n\nIn the writ petition various grounds were urged by the respondent in support of the contention that the notice was bad in law.\n\nThe High Court, however, dealt with only one of those contentions, accepted it, and did not permit the respondents' counsel Mr. Mehta to put forward the other contentions urged in the writ petition by the respondents.\n\nThe appellant had issued notice to the respondents under s. 34(1Xa) of the Income-tax Act in respect of an escaped income of Rs. 47,595 for the assessment year 1944-45.\n\nThis notice was issued by him on March 27,\n\n1957. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the notice was bad becaµse, though it was in respect of an amount of less than Rs. 1 lakh it was issued after the expiry of the assessment year and that the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue for issuing that notice had not been obtained by the Income-tax Officer as required by cl.\n\n(iii) of the proviso to s. 34(1) of the Act. It is not disputed before us that the case falls under s. 34(l)(a). That provision reads thus:\n\n\"(1) If-\n\n(a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission of failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act, or excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, or ....\n\nhe may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time . . . . . . serve on the assessee . • . . . a notice containing all or any of the require ments which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 and may proceed\n\nK. c. noma1.\n\nf. T. O(fictr,\n\nBombay v.\n\nJI. H. Shah\n\n.lludholkar J.\n\nJ, T. Officer,\n\nBombt11\n\n1.\n\nY. H. Shoh\n\nM11dholkar J.\n\nto assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that subsection:\"\n\nWe have quoted only the relevant portion. Then follows the first proviso which runs thus:\n\n\"provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice under clause (a) of sub-section\n\n(1) (i) for any year prior to the year ending on the 31st day of March 1941;\n\n(ii) for any year, if eight years have elapsed after the expiry of that year, unless the income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax which have escaped assessment or have been underassessed or assessed at too low a rate or have been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act, or the loss or depreciation allowance which has been computed in excess, amount to, or are likely to amount to, one lakh of rupee5 or more in the aggregate, either for that year, or for that year and any other year or years after which or after each of which eight years have elapsed, not being a year or years ending before the 31st day of March 1941;\n\n(iii) for any year, unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so, and, in any case falling under clause (ii), unless the Central Board of Revenue, and, in any other case, the Commis.sioner,\n\nis satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice:\"\n\nIt will thus be seen that where the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that due to any act of the assessee a full and accurate declaration was not made by the assessee for any year, with the result that part of his income has escaped assessment for that year, the Income-tax Officer may issue a notice under cl.(a) at any time.\n\nThe respondents' contention before the High Court was that the notice was bad because it had not complied with the two conditions laid down in the proviso to s. 34(1).\n\nAdverting to this contention the High Court has observed thus:\n\n\"Before the amendment of this section which was in force on the 27th March, 1957 the period of limitation of eight years was provided with regard to the issue of notices under Section 34(1)\n\n(a) and a period of four years for cases falling under Section 34(1)(b).\n\nBy the amendment tne period of limitation was removed and the Legislature provided that if the case fell under Section 34(1) (a) a notice can be served at any time. But while removing any bar of limitation, the Legislature provided some safeguards for the assessee and these safeguards were three in number and they were set out in the proviso. The first safeguard was that a notice shall not be issued for any year prior to the year ending on the 31st day of March 1941; the second safeguard was that if eight years had elapsed then the notice should not be issued for an escaped income which aggregated to less than one lakh of rupees; and the third safeguard was that the Central Board of Revenue had to be satisfied on reasons to be recorded that this was a fit case for the issue of a no tice, which was for a period beyond eight years. Now, admittedly, this notice is for an amount which is less than a lakh of rupees and admittedly the Central Board of Revenue has not considerd this matter at all.\n\nTherefore, there does not seem to be any answer to the contention put forward by the petitioner.\"\n\nThe High Court is right in saying that a notice cannot De issued where the income which has escaped assessment 1s less than a lakh of rupees and where more than eight years have elapsed from the assessment year. To this, however,\n\n[. T. Officer, Bombay v.\n\nV. H. Shah\n\nMudlrolkar I.\n\nK. c.\n\nT/ioma..~1 I. T. Officer,\n\nBon1bny\n\nV. H. 5/iah\n\nM11dirolkar J.\n\nthere is one exception and that is where the matter would fall to be governed by the second proviso to s. 34(3). To this aspect we will, however, come little later. But before that what we must consider is the view of the High Court that the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue was a!>O necessary.\n\nUnder cl. (iii) of the proviso to s. 34(1) a notice can issue only if the Central Board of Revenue is satisfied with the reasons recorded by the Income-tax Officer for issuing a notice.\n\nFor convenience we are describing this process as sanction of the Central Board of Revenue. The sanction under this clause is, however, necessary only where the notice in question is issued under cl. (ii) of the proviso.\n\nThat is evidently what the Legislature meant when it says\n\n\"in any case falling under clause (ii)\". For, cl. (ii) has to be read with the opening words of the proviso: \"Provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice under clause (a) of sub-section (1)\".\n\nSo read it will be clear that the words \"in any case\" used in cl. (iii) only mean a case in which notice can be issued under cl. (ii).\n\nSuch a notice can be issued only when the escaped income is of one lakh of rupees and over. It was, however, contended by Mr.\n\nShroff that cl. (ii) of the proviso dealt not only with the escaped assessment of one lakh of rupees and over but also with assessments which were less than one Iakh of rupee' and that, therefore, even in the present case the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue was required. By excluding action with respect to escaped assessment of less than one lak.h of rupees, cl. (ii) can, in one sense, be regarded as dealing with escaped assessments of this kind. But it would be wrong to say that because of this, cl. (iii) requires the obtaining of the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue for a notice to be issued with respect to it.\n\nAs already pointed out, cl. (iii) requires such sanction where the notice is issued under cl. (ii) and when on a construction of cl. (ii), no notice can be issued with respect to a class of escaped assessments, there can possibly be no requirement of the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue. If a notice is issued by virtue of some other provision such as the second proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34, it would be a notice \"in any other case\" referred to in cl. (iii) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 34 and in such a case the sanction which Is\n\nrequired is only that of the Commissioner.\n\nSuch a sanction was obtained in this case and, lherefore, the notice cannot be said to be bad because the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue has not been obtained. Now, we will come to the other aspect of the matter.\n\n/. T. Officer,\n\nBombay v.\n\nY. H. Shah\n\nLimitation is no doubt placed upon the power of the Mudholkar J.\n\nIncome-tax Officer by cl. (ii) of the first proviso which says that if eight years have elapsed after the expiry of that yeai no such notice can issue unless the income which has escaped assessment is likely to amount to one lakh of rupees or more.\n\nHere admittedly the income which has escaped assessment is below one lakh of rupees and more than eight years have elapsed since the assessment year in respec; of which the income is alleged to have escaped assessment.\n\nClearly, therefore no notice could issue under cl. (ii).\n\nTh~ answer given by the Income-tax Officer, however, is that limitation is taken away by the second proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34. We would quote s. 34(3) and the second proviso to it. They run thus:\n\n\"No order of assessment or reassessment, other than an order of assessment under section 23 to which clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 28 applies or an order of assessment or reassessment in cases falling within clause (a) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (1 A) of this section shall be made after the expiry of four years from the end of the year in which the income profits or gains were first assessable :\n\nProvided further that nothing contained in this section limiting the time within which any action may be taken or any order, assessment or reassessment may be made shall apply to a reassessment made under section 27 or to an assessment or re-assessment made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 31, section 3 3, section 33A, section 33B, section 66 or section 66A.\"\n\nK. C. Thomas, I. T. Officer, Bombay v.\n\nV. H. Shah,\n\nMudholkar J.\n\nThe second proviso to s. 34(3) could be presied in aid Dy the Income-tax Officer because in issuing the notice he was giving effect to a direction contained in the order of a nigher Income-tax authorit}r.\n\nDealing w]th this matter the High Court has observed as follows in its judgment:\n\n\"Now, when there was a limitation of eight years under section 34(1)(a) the second proviso to Section 34(3) has to be resorted.\n\nSection 34 ( 3) had to be resorted to by the Income-tax Department if it wanted to issue a notice after the period of limitation, and a notice atter eight years in a case falling under section 34( l)\n\n(a) ci; mld only be issued provided it was a result of a direction contained in an order passed by an Income-tax Authority. But by reason of the recent amendment the question of !imitation does not arise, but the Legislature has provided certain safeguards as already pointed out. Therefore, whether a notice is issued as a result of a direction contained in any order of an Income-tax Authority or not, if it is a notice which is issued beyond eight years the notice must satisfy the conditions laid down in the proviso to Section 34(1). Therefore, the result is that in some respects the Jaw has been made more rigorous against the assessee; and in other respects it has been made more lenient. Before the amendment a nqtice could be issued after eight years in respect of any escaped income, whatever the amount, provided the notice was issued to give effect to a direction contained in an order of an Income-tax Authority. Now a direction is not necessary for the issue of a notice.\n\nBut as against that an assessee whose escaped income is not a lakh of rupees is completely protected and even though there may be a direction contained in an order of an In-, come-tax Authority no notice can be issued\n\nagainst the assessee if the escaped income is less than a Iakh of rupees.\n\nTherefore, on the one hand, the assessee whose escaped income is less than a Iakh of rupees is now put in a better position than he was before the amendment.\n\nThe assessee whose escaped income is more than a lakh of rupees is put in a worse position because he can be proceeded against even without a direction contained in an order of an Income-tax Authority provided the Central Board of Revenue has applied its mind to the question of the issue of the notice.\"\n\nIt would appear that the view of the High Court was that the provisions of the second proviso to s.- 34(3) would not apply to a case where the escaped assessment is of an amount less than a Iakh of rupees and more than eight years have elapsed.\n\nApparently, the High Court has overlooked the fact that the second proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34 was amended first by Act 25 of 1953 and then by Act 18 of 1956. As it stood prior to these amendments it read thus:\n\n\"Provided further that nothing contained in this subsection shall apply to a re-assessment made under section 27 or in pursuance of an order under section 31, section 33. section 33A, section 33B. section 66 or section 66A.\"\n\nBy the amendment of 1953, for the words \"sub-section\", the words \"section limiting the time within which any action may be taken or any order, assessment or re-assessment may be made\" were substituted. By the amendmenr of 1956 it now stands as already quoted by us. If the proviso in its present form applies here it would govern the whole of s. 34(1) and would consequently include even an escaped assessment with respect to which limitation is provided in cl. (ii) of the first proviso to s. 34(1).\n\nThe result, in our opinion. would be the same even if the case were to fall to be governed by the Amending Act of 1953, though not by that of the Amending Act of 1956.\n\nK. c. Thoma.z.\n\n/. T. Officer, Bombay v.\n\nV. H. %ah\n\nMudholkar J.\n\n1. T. Officer,\n\nBombay v.\n\nV. H. Shah\n\nMudho/kor J.\n\nJa1iuary, 29\n\nWe may add that the amendment of 1953 took effect from April I, 1953 and that of 1956 from April 1, 1956.\n\nApart from the view expressed by the learned Judges as regards the effect of the changes made in s. 34( 1) with the provisos we have set out earlier a view which we have held is not correct-they did not further consider the proper construction to be placed on the second proviso to s. 34 ( 3) of the Aot on whlch the validity of the impugned notice to the respondents must ultimately be decided.\n\nAs we have pointed out earlier, at the beginning of the judgment, the learned Judges confined their attention practically only to the construction of proviso (iii) to s. 34(1) which was decided in favour of the respondents and did not permit them to argue the other points raised by them. We do not propose to decide these other points, particularly for the reason that the parties are not agreect as to what pre-'\n\ncisely were the contentions which were raised for argument.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the decision of the High Court is clearly wrong.\n\nWe, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for the consideration of the other points which were raised before it by the respondents but upon which they were not heard. As regards costs we think that they should abide the result of the appeal before the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.).\n\nDetention under Preventive Detention Act, 1950-0rder revoked by the\n\nState Government-Re-arrest under Defence of India Rules-Validity -Proper athority for passing order of detention-Allocation of", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "THOMAS,\n\nFIRST INCOME-TAX OFFICER,\n\nBOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 690, "end_char": 732, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C.THOMAS, FIRST INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VASANT HIRALAL SHAH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 734, "end_char": 759, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VASANT HIRALAL SHAH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 763, "end_char": 780, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 794, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 797, "end_char": 811, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 814, "end_char": 836, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 844, "end_char": 860, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 34(i), 34(ii), 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1006, "end_char": 1030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1150, "end_char": 1159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1171, "end_char": 1191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1518, "end_char": 1526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1631, "end_char": 1640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "K. C. Thomas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1805, "end_char": 1817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v.\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas, Lakhimpurkheri\n\nM11dho/kar J.\n\nJanuary, 29\n\nK. C. Thomas, /, T. O/fic<r,\n\nBombay ..\n\nV. H. Shah\n\nHeld: (i) The sanction under cl. (", "canonical_name": "K. c. Thoma.z"}}, {"text": "V. H. Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1846, "end_char": 1856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v.\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas, Lakhimpurkheri\n\nM11dho/kar J.\n\nJanuary, 29\n\nK. C. Thomas, /, T. O/fic<r,\n\nBombay ..\n\nV. H. Shah\n\nHeld: (i) The sanction under cl. (", "canonical_name": "V. H. Shah"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1915, "end_char": 1923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2700, "end_char": 2705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a sanction was obtained in this case and therefore, the notice cannot be said to be bad because the sanction of the Central Board of Revenue had not been obtained."}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3427, "end_char": 3435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3786, "end_char": 3795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3936, "end_char": 3944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. D. Karkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4286, "end_char": 4301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. D. Karkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4306, "end_char": 4320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. D. Karkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mlldliolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4440, "end_char": 4451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMlldliolkar J.\n\nMuoHoLKAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Bombay High Court in a writ petition challenging the notice issued under s. 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 by the First Income-tax Officer,\n\nBombay, who is the appellant before us."}}, {"text": "MuoHoLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4456, "end_char": 4465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMlldliolkar J.\n\nMuoHoLKAR J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Bombay High Court in a writ petition challenging the notice issued under s. 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 by the First Income-tax Officer,\n\nBombay, who is the appellant before us.", "canonical_name": "M11dholkar"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4605, "end_char": 4613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4621, "end_char": 4648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4980, "end_char": 4985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, however, dealt with only one of those contentions, accepted it, and did not permit the respondents' counsel Mr. Mehta to put forward the other contentions urged in the writ petition by the respondents."}}, {"text": "s. 34(1Xa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5128, "end_char": 5138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5146, "end_char": 5160, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 27,\n\n1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5274, "end_char": 5289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This notice was issued by him on March 27,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5656, "end_char": 5664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5732, "end_char": 5743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5938, "end_char": 5948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6550, "end_char": 6560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".lludholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6632, "end_char": 6643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. Shah\n\n.lludholkar J.\n\nJ, T. Officer,\n\nBombt11\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Y. H. Shoh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6677, "end_char": 6687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. H. Shoh\n\nM11dholkar J.\n\nto assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that subsection:\"\n\nWe have quoted only the relevant portion."}}, {"text": "M11dholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6689, "end_char": 6699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. H. Shoh\n\nM11dholkar J.\n\nto assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that subsection:\"\n\nWe have quoted only the relevant portion.", "canonical_name": "M11dholkar"}}, {"text": "31st day of March 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7183, "end_char": 7205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then follows the first proviso which runs thus:\n\n\"provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice under clause (a) of sub-section\n\n(1) (i) for any year prior to the year ending on the 31st day of March 1941;\n\n(ii) for any year, if eight years have elapsed after the expiry of that year, unless the income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax which have escaped assessment or have been underassessed or assessed at too low a rate or have been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act, or the loss or depreciation allowance which has been computed in excess, amount to, or are likely to amount to, one lakh of rupee5 or more in the aggregate, either for that year, or for that year and any other year or years after which or after each of which eight years have elapsed, not being a year or years ending before the 31st day of March 1941;\n\n(iii) for any year, unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so, and, in any case falling under clause (ii), unless the Central Board of Revenue, and, in any other case, the Commis.sioner,\n\nis satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice:\"\n\nIt will thus be seen that where the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that due to any act of the assessee a full and accurate declaration was not made by the assessee for any year, with the result that part of his income has escaped assessment for that year, the Income-tax Officer may issue a notice under cl.(a) at any time."}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8633, "end_char": 8641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27th March, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8772, "end_char": 8788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Adverting to this contention the High Court has observed thus:\n\n\"Before the amendment of this section which was in force on the 27th March, 1957 the period of limitation of eight years was provided with regard to the issue of notices under Section 34(1)\n\n(a) and a period of four years for cases falling under Section 34(1)(b)."}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8884, "end_char": 8897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8954, "end_char": 8970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9084, "end_char": 9097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M11dirolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10419, "end_char": 10430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. Officer, Bombay v.\n\nV. H. Shah\n\nMudlrolkar I.\n\nK. c.\n\nT/ioma..~1 I. T. Officer,\n\nBon1bny\n\nV. H. 5/iah\n\nM11dirolkar J.\n\nthere is one exception and that is where the matter would fall to be governed by the second proviso to s. 34(3)."}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10538, "end_char": 10546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10773, "end_char": 10781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11681, "end_char": 11687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, contended by Mr.\n\nShroff that cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12717, "end_char": 12722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12822, "end_char": 12827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13229, "end_char": 13238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/. T. Officer,\n\nBombay v.\n\nY. H. Shah\n\nLimitation is no doubt placed upon the power of the Mudholkar J.\n\nIncome-tax Officer by cl. (", "canonical_name": "M11dholkar"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13896, "end_char": 13901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13918, "end_char": 13926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14054, "end_char": 14064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14107, "end_char": 14117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14596, "end_char": 14606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14771, "end_char": 14781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14783, "end_char": 14792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14796, "end_char": 14807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14809, "end_char": 14820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14822, "end_char": 14832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14836, "end_char": 14847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. H. Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14891, "end_char": 14901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They run thus:\n\n\"No order of assessment or reassessment, other than an order of assessment under section 23 to which clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 28 applies or an order of assessment or reassessment in cases falling within clause (a) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (1 A) of this section shall be made after the expiry of four years from the end of the year in which the income profits or gains were first assessable :\n\nProvided further that nothing contained in this section limiting the time within which any action may be taken or any order, assessment or reassessment may be made shall apply to a reassessment made under section 27 or to an assessment or re-assessment made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 31, section 3 3, section 33A, section 33B, section 66 or section 66A.\"\n\nK. C. Thomas, I. T. Officer, Bombay v.\n\nV. H. Shah,\n\nMudholkar J.\n\nThe second proviso to s. 34(3) could be presied in aid Dy the Income-tax Officer because in issuing the notice he was giving effect to a direction contained in the order of a nigher Income-tax authorit}r.", "canonical_name": "V. H. Shah"}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14940, "end_char": 14948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15261, "end_char": 15277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15300, "end_char": 15313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15335, "end_char": 15345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15520, "end_char": 15534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16060, "end_char": 16073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17621, "end_char": 17626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17846, "end_char": 17856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17891, "end_char": 17901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17903, "end_char": 17913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17915, "end_char": 17926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17928, "end_char": 17939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17941, "end_char": 17951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17955, "end_char": 17966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18313, "end_char": 18321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18461, "end_char": 18469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. c. Thoma.z", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18641, "end_char": 18654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. c. Thoma.z.", "canonical_name": "K. c. Thoma.z"}}, {"text": "s. 34( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18979, "end_char": 18988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19164, "end_char": 19169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19446, "end_char": 19454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20192, "end_char": 20218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)."}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20255, "end_char": 20275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)."}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20277, "end_char": 20289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)."}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20291, "end_char": 20304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)."}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20307, "end_char": 20322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)."}}, {"text": "Detention under Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20358, "end_char": 20404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_446_461_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "K. C. Thomas.\n\n1. T. Officer,\n\nBombay v.\n\nV. H. Shah\n\nMudho/kor J.\n\nJa1iuary, 29\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT-S\n\nWe may add that the amendment of 1953 took effect from April I, 1953 and that of 1956 from April 1, 1956.\n\nApart from the view expressed by the learned Judges as regards the effect of the changes made in s. 34( 1) with the provisos we have set out earlier a view which we have held is not correct-they did not further consider the proper construction to be placed on the second proviso to s. 34 ( 3) of the Aot on whlch the validity of the impugned notice to the respondents must ultimately be decided.\n\nAs we have pointed out earlier, at the beginning of the judgment, the learned Judges confined their attention practically only to the construction of proviso (iii) to s. 34(1) which was decided in favour of the respondents and did not permit them to argue the other points raised by them. We do not propose to decide these other points, particularly for the reason that the parties are not agreect as to what pre-'\n\ncisely were the contentions which were raised for argument.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the decision of the High Court is clearly wrong.\n\nWe, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for the consideration of the other points which were raised before it by the respondents but upon which they were not heard. As regards costs we think that they should abide the result of the appeal before the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.).\n\nDetention under Preventive Detention Act, 1950-0rder revoked by the\n\nState Government-Re-arrest under Defence of India Rules-Validity -Proper athority for passing order of detention-Allocation of\n\nbusiness of Governor under A.rt. 166(3) of Constitution whether\n\nnecessary--Satisfaction of State Government that detention is necessary-Who should pass order of detention-Revocation of order of detention during pendency of appeal.\n\nAppellants were first detained on November 7, 1962 under Preventive Detention Act, 1950. That order was revoked by the Government and the appellants were released but re-arrested under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules.\n\nThe orders of detention were served on appellants in Jail. Tue appellants challenged those orders in the High Court by filing\n\nhabe:is corpus petitions under Art. 226 of the Constilutio:1 and <;, 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe writ petitions were ; iismissed by the High Court and the appellants came to this Court under a certificate from the High Court.\n\nThe contentions raised by the appellants were that their detention was illegal because the detention order was served on them when they were in jail, that the orders of detention were passed without the satisfaction of the authority concerned regarding their necessity, the satisfaction was to be that of the Governor and not of any Minister, that there should have been fresh allocation of business by the Governor under Art. l66(3) of the Constitution after the passing of the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules. that before the State Government could exercise the power conferred by Rule 30, there had to be delegation by the Central Government that the order of detention did not show that s. 44 of Defence of India Act was kept in mind when the order was made and that unless the order showed on the face of it that the State Government thought that detention was the only mode in which the purpose of the Act and Rules could be carried out, the order was bad. Dismissing the appeals.\n\nHeld: The orders of detention passed by the State Government and their service on the appellants in jail were perfectly valid and did not make the detention illegal. The appellants were detained not as undertrials or as convicted persons but as detenus and hence the cases of Rameshwar Shaw and Makhan Singh Tarsikka did not apply in the present case.\n\nReading the detention order as a whole, it was clear that it did say in substance that it was necessary to detain the appellants with a view to preventing them from acting in a manner prejudicial to the Defence of India, public safety and maintenance of public order. There was no difference between the words ''so to do'' in Rule 30 and the words \"to make the following order\" in the detention order.\n\nAs the detention order mentioned both the defence of India and maintenance of public order, such an order could be made on the satisfaction of a Minister who was incharge of both the subjects in view of the Rules of Business promulgated by the Governor.\n\nIt was not necessary that fresh allocation of business should be made by the Governor under Art. 166(3) after the passing of the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules. It is enough if the allocation of the\n\nG. S. Parulekar\n\nStatr. of 1Wahara•\n\nshtra\n\n1964 subject to which the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules refer bas G. S. Parulekar een made wit~ reference to _the ee lists in the Seventh Schedule and v. if such allocallon aJready exists, It may be taken advantage of if and State of Mahara~ when laws are passed. shtra Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules lays down that the power can be exercised by the Central Government or the State Government and hence no further delegation is necessary in favour of the State Government for the exercise of power under Rule 30.\n\nIt is true that s. 44 of the Defence of India Act provides that there should be as little interference with the ordinary avocation of life as possible when orders are made under the Act or the Rules, but that does not mean that a detention order must show on the face of it that the State Government had considered the various clauses of Rule 30( 1) and had come to the conclusion that the only way in which the purpose of the Act and the Rules could be carried out was by the use of Rule 30(1){b).\n\nWhen the order says that it is necessary to make an order of detention in order to restrain the prejudicial activities mentioned therein, it means that that was the only way which the State Government thought was\n\nnecessary to adopt in order to meet the situation. it is for ti~ detenu to show that the order had gone beyond the needs of the situation and was therefore contrary to s. 44.\n\nMak/w11 Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1964 S.C: 381 Keshav Talvade v. King Emperor, [1944] F.C.R. 57, Rames/1war Shaw\n\nDistrict Magistrate, Burdwan, A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 334, J.lakhan Singh Tarasikka v. State of Puniab, A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1120, rderred to\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 109-111 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated May 31, 1963, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Applications ll<os. 217, 218 and 114 of 1963.\n\nThe appellants (in Cr. A. Nos. 109 & 110 of 1963) appeared in person.\n\nJanardan Sharma and Appellant a/so, for the Appellant (in Cr. A. No. 111 of 1963).\n\nN. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents (in Cr. A. Nos. 109-111of1963).\n\nPurushottam Trikamdas and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in Cr. A. No. 110 of 1963).\n\nJanuary 29, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was ItH delivered by G. s. PllrliltMr W ANCHOO J.-These three appeals on certificates grant St<ll~ 0, V-MtJ!ultt> ed by the Bombay High Court raise common questions of 11ttra law and will be dealt with together. They arise out of three WMCll# 1• habeas corpus petitions filed by the appellants in the High Court under s. 491 of the Code of Crimin~ Procelurc challenging their detention under r. 30 of the Defence ol India Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). A large number of constitutional questions were raised in the applications and were decided by the High Court against the appellants. These appeals came up for hearing in August 1963 along with some otll.er appeals from decisions of other High Courts, and the constitutional questions were decided by this Court on September 2, 1963, (see Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab) (1). It was held therein that the\n\napplications under s. 491 (1) of the Code of Criminal Pn>- cedure were incompetent in so far as they sought to challenge the validity of the detention on the ground that the Defence of India Act and Rules framed thereunder suffer from the vice that they contravened the fundamental right~ guaranteed by Arts. 14, 21, 22(4), (5) and (7). The other points raised in the appeals were not considered at that time and it was directed that the appeals should be set down for hearing before a Constitution Bench to be dealt with in accordance with law. Consequently, these appeals have been put up before this Bench for disposal of the other points raised therein.\n\nA preliminary objection has however, been raised on behalf of the State to the hearing of these appeals on the ground that the orders under which the appellants were detained and which are under consideration in these appeals had been revoked by the State Government and fresh orders of detention had been passed, and in consequence these appeals had become infructuous. Reliance in this connection is placed on the decision of the Federal Court in Keshar Talpade v. King Emperor( 2 ). In that case the detenu was\n\nreleased while his appeal was pending before the Federal Court.\n\nIt was however urged on his behalf that even\n\n(1) A.I.R. (1964) S.C. 381. 134-859 s.c.-29.\n\n'. ' . ,,. , '\n\n1964 though he had been release<! and no order could thereafter a S p, I k be made on the habeas corpus application, the court should \\ .. arut ar . • v. pronounce an opiruon on the correctness of the High Court .Stat• 0\"'1,, Mahara• judgment.\n\nThe Federal Court refused to do so and dis- • missed the appeal on the ground that no order in the appeal\n\n11'1111Choo 1. could be made after the release of the detenu. Generally speaking, no useful purpose would be served by the appeal court deciding the appeal in a habeas corpus matter where the detenu has been released before the appeal comes up for final hearing.\n\nBut the facts in the presem case are different. Here what has happened is that the earlier order of detention which is the basis of the present appeals has been revoked by the Government of Maharashtra on the ground of a technical defect and a fresh order of detention\n\nwas passed on the same date, and the appellants were immedii!tely re-arrested after their release from jail under the fresh order of detention. In the Federal Court case, however, it ai; ipears thait the detenu was released and there was no question of a fresh order of detention being made on the\n\nsame day leading to his re-arrest. In the circumstances, it is urged by the appellants that though technically the appellants were released before the present appeals came up for final hearing, in substance they are under detention even now and the points of law raised by them against the earlier .:>rder of detention will apply equally to the fresh order of detention. It is therefore urged that the Court should dectde the present appeals as that would settle the law and help the detenus in case they make fresh application under\n\n1. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the fresh order of detention. It is further urged that the appellants ibtend after the emergency is over to sue for damages for false imprisonment and the order of the Bombay High Court would stand in their way fu. case such a suit is brought, and therefore an authoritative pronouncement on the questions dl law raised should be made by this Court in the present appeals, even though technically the order out of which the present appeals have arise_n has been revoked. We are of opinion that the circumstances of the present cases are dilferent from the circumstances in Keshav Ta/pade's case(')\n\nand therefore it would be in the interests of justice to decide\n\n(1) [1944 J F.C.R. 57\n\nthe points raised in the present appeals. We may add that 1964 there is nothing to preclude this Court from deciding th- G. s. Parulel\"r appeals even though the order from which these appeals s r '{~· have arisen has been revoked, though ordinarily this Court tate ~/UN would not do so. But as we have already indicated, it seems to us just and fair in view of the fact that the appellants have not been finally released and are still under do-- tention under a fresh order of detention under the Rules that the points raised in these appeals should be decided.\n\nThe points are of general importance and are likely to arise in many cases.\n\nWe therefore over-rule the preliminary objection.\n\nThe facts in the three appeals are similar and we shall therefore briefly refer to the facts in Appeal No. 110 for tbs\n\npurposes of dealing with the points raised on behalf of th• appellants.\n\nThe appellants were first detained on November 7, 1962 by an order made by the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, under the Preventive Detention Act, No.\n\nIV of 1950. The matter was then reported to the Government. Before this, however, the security of India had been threatened by the Chinese invasion and an Emergency had been declared under Art. 352 of the Constitution. Further on October 26, 1962, the Defence of India Ordinance 1962 was passed, followed by the Rules framed thereunder. When the matter came before the Government, it decided that the order of November 7, 1962 made by the Commissioner of Police should be revoked and ordered accordingly on November 10. On the same day, the Government decided to detain the appellants and passed an order under r. 30 of the Rules. This order said that with a view to preventing the appellants from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the public safety and the maintenance of public order, it was necessary to detain them, and therefore in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by r. 30 of the Rules, the Government directed the detention of the appellants. This order was served on the appeJ-. !ants in jail. It was challenged by the appellants by filing habeas corpus petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The\n\nWanclu>o J.\n\nJiff High Court, as already indicated, dismissed the applicat10ns ._ & l/ilrulekar but granted leave to the appellants to appeal to this Court. ....., .t M htu. • The constitutional points raised, as already indicated, were\n\n\"\"\"\" 0\n\n\" decided by this Court on September 2, 1963, and now we are concerned with the other points raised on behalf of the lr-1ro<> I. appellants.\n\nThe first contention that has been urged is that the detention is illegal inasmuch as the detention order was served on the appellants while they were in jail, and reliance in this connection is placed on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Rameshwar Shaw v. Distric! Magistrate, Burdwan('), and Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State of Punjab('). In those cases, it was held by this Court that where a person Is detained in jail as an under-trial prisoner no qrder of detention either under the l'reventive Detention\n\nAc;:t or under the Rules could be serve.:! on him because one of the necessary ingredients which go to make up the satisfaction of the detaining authority is necessarily absent in such a case. It was pointed out in Rameshwar Shaw's case(') that \"before an authority can legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner, the authority has to be satisfied that if the person is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to the said person at the relevant time. If a person is already in jail custody, how can it rationally be postulated that if he is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner?\n\nAt the point of time when an order of detention is going to be served on a person, it must be patent that the\n\nsaid person would act prejudicially if he is not detained and that is a consideration which would be absent when the authority is dealing with a person already in detention.\" The same principle was reiterated in the case of Makhan Singh Tarsikka( 2 ). There is however a vital difference between the facts of those two cases and the facts in the present appeals.\n\nThose two cases were concerned with the service of an order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act or under the Rules on a person who was in jail in one of two\n\n( 1) A. I.\n\n1964 S.C. 334,\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1964 S.C. 1120\n\ncircumstances, namely-(!) where he was in jail as an 1964 under-trial prisoner and the period for which he was in jail G. s. ;;;; w,..\n\nwas indeterminate, or (2) where he was in jail as a convictv. ed person and the period of his sentence had still to run State 0!,::- for some length of time. In those cases the service of the order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act or under the Rules in jail would not be legal for one of the necessary ingredients about which the authority haa to be satisfied would be absent, namely, that it was necessary to detain the person concerned which could only be postulated of a person who was not already in prison. In the present cases, however, the appellants were not under detention either as under-trial prisoners for an indeterminate time or as convicted persons whose sentences were still to run for some length of time.\n\nThey were detained under the Preventive Detention Act by an order of November 7, 1962 which had been reported to Government for approval and which order could only remain in force for 12 days under s. 3 (3) of the Preventive Detention Act unless in the meantime it had been approved by the State Government. The State Government, however, decided on November IO, 1962, to revoke the order of the Commissioner of Police under the Preventive Detention Act and to pass an order itself under the Rules. In those circumstances, the principle of the two cases referred to above would not in our opinion apply, for the detention of the appellants depended upon the approval of the State Government. The State Government, however, decided to revoke the order of November 7, 1962 and instead decided to pass an order under the Rules on the same day, namely November 10, 1962. In these circumstances it would be in our opinion an empty formality to allow the appellants to go out of jail on the revocation of the order of November 7, and to serve them with the order dated November I 0, 1962 as soon as they were out of jail. Where the detention is not of the two kinds considered in the cases of Rameshwar Shaw(') and Makhan Singh Tarsikka( 2 ) and is either under the Preventive Detention Act or under the Rules, and its duration is dependent upon the will of the State Government, we cannot see any reason for holding that if the State Government decides\n\n1964 s.c. 334.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1964 S.C. n20.\n\nWanc.9o I.\n\nIM to revoke an earlier order of detention it cannot pass a fresh - a. s p,,,,.q, order of detention the same day and serve it on the detenu ....., !° MaJuuo. in jail, for the two orders are really of the same nature and .. are directed towards the same purpose. Further the order w ......... I. of the Commissioner dated November 7, 1962 was subject to the approval of the State Government without which it could only be in force for 12 days.\n\nIn these circumstances the order passed by the State Government on November\n\n10 under the Rules when it had decided to revoke the order af November 7, 1962, would in our opinion be perfectly valid so far as the time of the making of the order was concerned and its service in jail on the persons who were detained not as under-trials or as convicted persons but as de\n\ntenus, could not be assailed on the ground on which the order of detention was assailed in the cases of Rameshwar Shaw{1 ) and Makhan Singh Tariskka(2). The principal of those two cases cannot in our opinion be applied to a case where a fresh order of detention is passed after the cancellation or revocation of an earlier order of detention. 'The contention therefore that the making of the order of detention on November 10, 1962 or its service in jail in these cases, makes the detention illegal, must be negatived.\n\nIt is next urged that the detaining authority has failed to arrive at that kind of satisfaction which the Rules require. This contention is based on the words of the order dated November 10, 1962.\n\nRule 30 inter alia lays down that the State Government, if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, India's relations with foreign powers, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of India, lhe efficient conduct of military operations or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it is necessary so to do, may make an order directing that the person be detained. Now the order of November 10, 1962 is in these terms:-\n\n\"No. S.B.Ill/DOR.1162-IV Home Department (Special)\n\n(1) A.LR. 1964 S.c. 334.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1964 S.c. n20.\n\nORDER 1964\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Maharashtra is saris- G. s. ; rJllebr fled with respect to the person known as Shri St.r~ of JUJ:!zr ..\n\nShamrao Visimu Parulekar of Bombay that with a v:ew to preventing him from acting in a' W:Pnchoo J. n::annm- Fejudicial to the defence of India, the public safety and. the maintenance of pu°!>' lie order, it is necessary to make the following order:\n\n\"Now; therefore, in exercise of the. powers conferred,\n\nupon it by rule 3 0 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, the Government of Maharashtra does hereby direct that the said Shri Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar be detained.\n\nSachivalaya, Bombay,\n\nBy order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra.\n\nSd. Deputy Secretary to Government of Maharashtra,. (Home Department)\n\nthis 10th day of November, 1962\".\n\nThe contention of th() appellants is that the first part of the order does not say that it is necessary to detain the appellants. The words used in the first part of the ordet are \"it is necessary to make the following order\" and then follo\\vs ·\n\nthe second part which says that the Government directs that the said person be detained. \\Ve are of opinion that when the first part says \"it is necessary to make the following order'', it in effect says that \"it is necessary so to do\" which is what r. 30 of the Rules requires.\n\nReading the order as a whole, in substance it does say that it is necessary to detain the person with a vfow to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, etc. In r. 30 the words are \"so to do\" while in the order they are \"to make the following order\". The two expressions in our opinion mean the same thing. and 1we cannot•\n\nl964 accept the argument that the satisfaction necessary under\n\n, G. s. Parulelar r. 3 0 of the Rules was not arrived at in these cases by the StaJe ol\" Ma/uua. authority making the order. &htra ·._ \\ Then it•.is urged that as the Sta_te Government is equi- Wanchoo 1• valant to the Governor,· it is the Governor who should be\n\nsatisfied and not the Home Minister as is the case according to the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Gove=ent.\n\nThe State Gove=ent in this connection relies on the Rules of Business, copy of which has been made available to us.\n\nThese rules have been framed by the Governor under Art. 166 of the Constitution for the more convenient transaction of the business of Government and for the alfocation among Ministers of the said business.\n\nIn the affidavit on behalf of the State Gove=ent reliance is . placed on item 2 (b) of the First Schedule to the Rules of Business dealing with subjects allocated to the Home Department (Special), entry (7) which provides for preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of a State,\n\n!lie maintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. During the liearing, our attention was drawn. to item (I) of the First Scliedule to the Rules of Business dealing with subjects r alfotted to General Administration Department, entry (44),\n\nwhich provides for preventive detention for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs or the security of India.\n\nIt is obvious from ihe .Rules of Business that preventive detention has been divid~ into two parts and allocated to two dillerent departments.\n\nWhere preventive detention is fur reasons connected with the security of a State, t1ie r.iaintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, it can be dealt with by the Minister in-charge of. item 2 (b) dealing with . suojects allocated to the Home Department (Special); but wliere the preventive detention is for reasons connected with de.fence, foreign affairs or the security of India, it can be ' dealt with by the Minister in-charge of item 1 relating to sufijects allotted to the General Administration Department.\n\nTiie detention order in the present cases states that it was made with a view to preventing the appellants from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of Inia, the public\n\nsafety and the maintenance of public order. As the deten- 1964 tion order mentions both the defence of India and the a. s. PllllllUllr maintenance of public order, such an order could only be v. made by a Minister who was in-charge both of item 1 relating Stat• \"/,,,!,,,_. to subjects allotted to the General Administration Department and of item 2(b) relating to subjects allotted to Home Wanclloo 1• Department (ecial). In the affidavit on behalf of the\n\nState the order was sought to be justified on the ground that it was made by the Home Minister in-charge of item 2 (b) relating to subjects allocated to the Home Department (Special) . We are of opinion that as the detention order was for reasons connected with the defence of India also, it could not be dealt with under item 2 (b), entry (7) only which item deals with subjects allocated to the Home Department (Special) and had to be dealt by a Minister who was in-charge of both item 1 relating to subjects allotted to the General Administration Department and item 2 (b) relating to subjects allotted to Home Deparment (Special).\n\nIn the original affidavit filed on behalf of the State it was however not clear whether the Minister who dealt with these orders was also in-charge of the subjects allotted to the General Administration Department but it was stated at the bar that the Minister who dealt with the matter and passed the order on the basis of which the appellants were detained was in -charge not only of item 2 (b) relatiiig to subjects allocated to the Home Department (Special) but was also in-charge of item 1 relating to subjects allotted to the General Administration Department.\n\nWe therefore called upon the State Government to file an affidavit to that effect and an affidavit was filed on December 21, 1963.\n\nThat affidavit says that the order of November IO, 1962 was passed by the Chief Minister who was at the relevent time in-charge both of the General Administration Department as well as the Home Department (Special).\n\nWe have already referred to the terms of the order of detention.\n\nThat order refers to three reasons as the basis for the order. namely, (i) the defence of India, (ii) the public safety, and\n\n(iii) the maintenance of public order. Now preventive detention connected with the defence of India could only be ordered under the Rules of Business by the Minister who was in-charge of the General Administration Department\n\n1964 while preventive detention for reasons connected with the O. s. Parulekar maintenance of public order could only be ordered by the Stat. o{Mahara Minister in-charge of subjects allocated to the Home Depart-\n\n•htra ment (Special).\n\nThe order therefore in the present case Wanchoo I. could only be made by a Minister who was in-charge both of subjects allotted to the General Administration Department and subjects allotted to the Home Department (Special). In view of the affidavit now filed it appears that the Chief Minister was in-charge of both the departments and in the circumstances be could pass the order under challenge.\n\nThe contention under this bead must therefore fail.\n\nThe next argument is that there is no order of allocation made by the Governor under Art. 166 of the Constitution after the passing of the Defence of India Ordinance and the Rules framed thereunder and therefore the allocation of business by the Rules of Business which were enforced by an order of tbe Governor dated May 1, 1960 would not be of any effect in allocating the subject of preventive detention arising under the Defence of India Ordinance Act and the Rules to the Minister and the Governor should have passed the order of detention himself. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. Allocation of business under Art 166 (2) of the Constitution is not made with reference to particular laws which may be in force at the time the allocation is made; it is made with reference to the three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, for the executive power of the Centre and the State together extends to matters with respect to which Parliament and the Legislature of a State may make laws. Therefore, when allocation of business is made it is made with reference to the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule and thus the allocation in the Rules of Business provides for all contingencies which may arise for the exercise of the executive power. Such allocation may be made even in advance of legislation made by Parliament to be available whenever Parliament makes legislation conferring power on a State Government with respect to rn atters in List I of the Seventh Schedule. It was therefore in our opinion not necessary that there should have been an allocation made by the Governor under Art. 166 ( 3) of the power to detain under\n\nf I d. 0 d\" A d R 1 ft th G. s. P.uultkar the Defence o n 1a r mance, ct an u es a er ey v. were passed; it will be enough if the allocation of the su1'- State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules shtra refer has been made with reference to the three Lists in the Wanchoo 1.\n\nSeventh Schedule and if such allocation already exists, it may be taken advantage of if and when laws are passed.\n\nPreventive detention is provided for in List I, item 9, for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs and the security of India, and in item 3 of List III for reasons connected with the security of a State, the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The allocation of business made under Art. 166 is in pursuance of these entries in the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule and would be available to be used whenever any law relating to these entries is made and JX'Wer is conferred on the State Government to act under that Jaw.\n\nThe contention of the appellants that fresh allocation should have been made under Art. 166 (3) by the Governor after the passing of the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules must therefore fail.\n\nLastly reliance is placed on ss. 40 and 44 of the Defence of India Act. Section 40 gives power to the Central Government to delegate its powers under the Act or the Rules to any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or to any State Government or any officer or authority subordinate to such Government or to any other authority, and the argument is that before the State Government can exercise the power conferred by r. 30, there has to be a delegation by the Central Government. This argument in our opinion is misconceived. It is true that s. 40\n\ngives authority to the Central Government to delegate its powers un.er the Act or the Rules to the State Government and others. But no delegation under that section is required for the exercise of the power under r. 30 by the State Government, for r. 30 itself lays down that the power therein can be exercised by the Central Government or the State Government.\n\nNo further delegation therefore was necessary in favour of the State Government in so far as the exercise of power under r. 30 is concerned.\n\n1964 Next it is urged that the order of detention does not G. s. Parulekar show that s. 44 was kept in mind when it was made. Sec- State or Maharalion 44 lays down that \"any authority or person acting in\n\n1htra pursuance of this Act shall interfere with the ordinary avo- Wanchoo J. cations of life and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and interest and the defence of India and civil defence\". It is urged that an order of detention necessarily interferes completely with the ordinary avocation of life of the person detained and therefore before such .an order could be made, s. 44 should be borne: in mind. Therefore the order of detention is to be made when it is the only way of carrying out the purposes of the Act, for s. 44 provides that there should be as little interference with the ordinary avocations of life as possible under the Act. The argument further is that r. 30 (1) provides as many as eight clauses which provide for the regulation of conduct of an individual\n\nand cl. (b) relating to detention, which amounts to complete interference with the avoc; ition of life of the detenu cou 1 only be resorted to in view of s. 44 when it is shown that no other way of regulating the conduct of the person detained as provided in the other clauses of r. 30 (I) would meet the needs of the situ; ition. So it is urged that unless the order shows on the face of it that the State Government thought that the detention was the only mode in which the purposes of the Act and the Rules could be carried out, the order would ht bad in view of s. 44 of the Act. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. It is true that s. 44 prvvides that there should be as little interference with the ordinary avocations of life as possible when orders are made under the Act or the Rules; but that does not mean that a detention order must show on the face of i• that the State Government had considered the various clauses of r. 30 (1) and had come to the conclusion that the only way in which the purposes of the Act and the Rules could be carried out was by the use of cl. (b) of r. 30\n\n( 1). In our opinion when the order says that it is necessary to make an order of detention in order to restrain the prejudicial activities mentioned therein it means that that was the.only way which the State Government thought was necessary to adopt in order to meet the situation. It will then\n\nbe for the detenu to show that the order bad gone beyond 1964 the needs of the situation and was therefore contrary to s. 44. a. s. Paruldar No such thing bas been shown in the present cases and we s 1v.M_L . fi d h b d . . . b .d tale 0 anaraare satis e t at t e or ers m queshon cannot e sa1 to go •htra beyond the needs of the situation, even assuming that s. 44 is mandatory as urged on behalf of the appellants and no: merely directory as urged on behalf of the State.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed.\n\nAppeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nAct of State-Ruler of a 11ative 1tate granted certain right1 in /ore:ll to\n\ngra1ttecs-State merged with Domini'on of India-Dominion of India did not recognise the grant-Effect of non-recognition before Co11sti tution and after Constitution-If non-recognitio:t of the grant anJounts to an act of State-Government of India Act 1935-Constitution of India, Art. 32.\n\nThe Ruler of the State of Sant bad issued a Tharao dated 12th March 1948, granting full right and authority to the jagirdars over the forests in their respective villages. Pursuant to the agreement dated March 19, 1948, the State of Sant merged with the Dominion of India. On October 1, 1948, Shree V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the day of April !st 1948, would be questioned.\n\nAfter merger there was obstruction by the forest officers when the respondents were cutting the forests, but after some correspondence they were permitted to cut the trees on furnishing an undertaking that they would abide by the decision of the government.\n\nThe Government of Bombay, after considering the implications of the Tharao, decided that the order was ma/a nde and cancelled it on 8th July\n\n1949 In the meantime these respondents were stopped ; rom working the forests by the Government of Bombay.", "total_entities": 109, "entities": [{"text": "K. C. Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C. Thomas."}}, {"text": "s. 34( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 495, "end_char": 500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 777, "end_char": 785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1523, "end_char": 1549, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1586, "end_char": 1606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.).", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1608, "end_char": 1620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)."}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1622, "end_char": 1635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)."}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1638, "end_char": 1653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed and case remanded,\n\nGODAVARI SHAMRAO PARULEKAR\n\nSTA TE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)."}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1658, "end_char": 1680, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Detention under Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1689, "end_char": 1735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2176, "end_char": 2206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2502, "end_char": 2510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2551, "end_char": 2577, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3350, "end_char": 3368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that before the State Government could exercise the power conferred by Rule 30, there had to be delegation by the Central Government that the order of detention did not show that s. 44 of Defence of India Act was kept in mind when the order was made and that unless the order showed on the face of it that the State Government thought that detention was the only mode in which the purpose of the Act and Rules could be carried out, the order was bad."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3415, "end_char": 3420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Shaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3988, "end_char": 4002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were detained not as undertrials or as convicted persons but as detenus and hence the cases of Rameshwar Shaw and Makhan Singh Tarsikka did not apply in the present case.", "canonical_name": "Rameshwar Shaw{1"}}, {"text": "Makhan Singh Tarsikka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4007, "end_char": 4028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were detained not as undertrials or as convicted persons but as detenus and hence the cases of Rameshwar Shaw and Makhan Singh Tarsikka did not apply in the present case.", "canonical_name": "Makhan Singh Tariskka(2"}}, {"text": "Art. 166(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4815, "end_char": 4826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "G. S. Parulekar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is enough if the allocation of the\n\nG. S. Parulekar\n\nStatr."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5120, "end_char": 5136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5527, "end_char": 5532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6393, "end_char": 6398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 57", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6496, "end_char": 6512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Janardan Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6947, "end_char": 6962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janardan Sharma and Appellant a/so, for the Appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7031, "end_char": 7043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents (in Cr."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents (in Cr."}}, {"text": "Purushottam Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7111, "end_char": 7132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purushottam Trikamdas and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in Cr."}}, {"text": "January 29, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 29, 1964."}}, {"text": "G. s. PllrliltMr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7266, "end_char": 7282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was ItH delivered by G. s. PllrliltMr W ANCHOO J.-These three appeals on certificates grant St<ll~ 0, V-MtJ!ultt> ed by the Bombay High Court raise common questions of 11ttra law and will be dealt with together."}}, {"text": "W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7283, "end_char": 7291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was ItH delivered by G. s. PllrliltMr W ANCHOO J.-These three appeals on certificates grant St<ll~ 0, V-MtJ!ultt> ed by the Bombay High Court raise common questions of 11ttra law and will be dealt with together."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7369, "end_char": 7386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was ItH delivered by G. s. PllrliltMr W ANCHOO J.-These three appeals on certificates grant St<ll~ 0, V-MtJ!ultt> ed by the Bombay High Court raise common questions of 11ttra law and will be dealt with together."}}, {"text": "s. 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7563, "end_char": 7569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 2, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8028, "end_char": 8045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals came up for hearing in August 1963 along with some otll.er appeals from decisions of other High Courts, and the constitutional questions were decided by this Court on September 2, 1963, (see Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab) (1)."}}, {"text": "s. 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8148, "end_char": 8154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 21, 22(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8432, "end_char": 8451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Keshar Talpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9237, "end_char": 9251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance in this connection is placed on the decision of the Federal Court in Keshar Talpade v. King Emperor( 2 )."}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10268, "end_char": 10293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here what has happened is that the earlier order of detention which is the basis of the present appeals has been revoked by the Government of Maharashtra on the ground of a technical defect and a fresh order of detention\n\nwas passed on the same date, and the appellants were immedii!tely re-arrested after their release from jail under the fresh order of detention."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11210, "end_char": 11236, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Keshav Ta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11818, "end_char": 11827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of opinion that the circumstances of the present cases are dilferent from the circumstances in Keshav Ta/pade's case(')\n\nand therefore it would be in the interests of justice to decide\n\n(1) [1944 J F.C.R. 57\n\nthe points raised in the present appeals."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12854, "end_char": 12870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were first detained on November 7, 1962 by an order made by the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, under the Preventive Detention Act, No."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13074, "end_char": 13079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before this, however, the security of India had been threatened by the Chinese invasion and an Emergency had been declared under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13165, "end_char": 13173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "October 26, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13206, "end_char": 13222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further on October 26, 1962, the Defence of India Ordinance 1962 was passed, followed by the Rules framed thereunder."}}, {"text": "Defence of India Ordinance 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13228, "end_char": 13259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14095, "end_char": 14103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Ordinance 1962", "statute": "the Defence of India Ordinance 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 491", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14134, "end_char": 14140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Ordinance 1962", "statute": "the Defence of India Ordinance 1962"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14148, "end_char": 14174, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "They were detained under the Preventive Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17415, "end_char": 17468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17613, "end_char": 17617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "They were detained under the Preventive Detention Act", "statute": "They were detained under the Preventive Detention Act"}}, {"text": "November IO, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17765, "end_char": 17782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government, however, decided on November IO, 1962, to revoke the order of the Commissioner of Police under the Preventive Detention Act and to pass an order itself under the Rules."}}, {"text": "November 10, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18263, "end_char": 18280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government, however, decided to revoke the order of November 7, 1962 and instead decided to pass an order under the Rules on the same day, namely November 10, 1962."}}, {"text": "November I 0, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18478, "end_char": 18496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances it would be in our opinion an empty formality to allow the appellants to go out of jail on the revocation of the order of November 7, and to serve them with the order dated November I 0, 1962 as soon as they were out of jail."}}, {"text": "November\n\n10", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19433, "end_char": 19445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances the order passed by the State Government on November\n\n10 under the Rules when it had decided to revoke the order af November 7, 1962, would in our opinion be perfectly valid so far as the time of the making of the order was concerned and its service in jail on the persons who were detained not as under-trials or as convicted persons but as de\n\ntenus, could not be assailed on the ground on which the order of detention was assailed in the cases of Rameshwar Shaw{1 ) and Makhan Singh Tariskka(2)."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Shaw{1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19839, "end_char": 19855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances the order passed by the State Government on November\n\n10 under the Rules when it had decided to revoke the order af November 7, 1962, would in our opinion be perfectly valid so far as the time of the making of the order was concerned and its service in jail on the persons who were detained not as under-trials or as convicted persons but as de\n\ntenus, could not be assailed on the ground on which the order of detention was assailed in the cases of Rameshwar Shaw{1 ) and Makhan Singh Tariskka(2).", "canonical_name": "Rameshwar Shaw{1"}}, {"text": "Makhan Singh Tariskka(2", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19862, "end_char": 19885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances the order passed by the State Government on November\n\n10 under the Rules when it had decided to revoke the order af November 7, 1962, would in our opinion be perfectly valid so far as the time of the making of the order was concerned and its service in jail on the persons who were detained not as under-trials or as convicted persons but as de\n\ntenus, could not be assailed on the ground on which the order of detention was assailed in the cases of Rameshwar Shaw{1 ) and Makhan Singh Tariskka(2).", "canonical_name": "Makhan Singh Tariskka(2"}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21232, "end_char": 21257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ORDER 1964\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Maharashtra is saris- G. s. ; rJllebr fled with respect to the person known as Shri St.r~ of JUJ:!zr ..\n\nShamrao Visimu Parulekar of Bombay that with a v:ew to preventing him from acting in a' W:Pnchoo J. n::annm- Fejudicial to the defence of India, the public safety and."}}, {"text": "Pnchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21441, "end_char": 21447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ORDER 1964\n\n\"Whereas the Government of Maharashtra is saris- G. s. ; rJllebr fled with respect to the person known as Shri St.r~ of JUJ:!zr ..\n\nShamrao Visimu Parulekar of Bombay that with a v:ew to preventing him from acting in a' W:Pnchoo J. n::annm- Fejudicial to the defence of India, the public safety and."}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21685, "end_char": 21713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21783, "end_char": 21807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "powers conferred,\n\nupon it by rule 3 0 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, the Government of Maharashtra does hereby direct that the said Shri Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar be detained."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23508, "end_char": 23516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23756, "end_char": 23770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Inia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25254, "end_char": 25258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tiie detention order in the present cases states that it was made with a view to preventing the appellants from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of Inia, the public\n\nsafety and the maintenance of public order."}}, {"text": "December 21, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27046, "end_char": 27063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We therefore called upon the State Government to file an affidavit to that effect and an affidavit was filed on December 21, 1963."}}, {"text": "Now preventive detention connected with the defence of India could only be ordered under the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27514, "end_char": 27612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28475, "end_char": 28483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now preventive detention connected with the defence of India could only be ordered under the Rules", "statute": "Now preventive detention connected with the defence of India could only be ordered under the Rules"}}, {"text": "May 1, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28708, "end_char": 28719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "166 of the Constitution after the passing of the Defence of India Ordinance and the Rules framed thereunder and therefore the allocation of business by the Rules of Business which were enforced by an order of tbe Governor dated May 1, 1960 would not be of any effect in allocating the subject of preventive detention arising under the Defence of India Ordinance Act and the Rules to the Minister and the Governor should have passed the order of detention himself."}}, {"text": "Art 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29034, "end_char": 29041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29222, "end_char": 29238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29362, "end_char": 29372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allocation of business under Art 166 (2) of the Constitution is not made with reference to particular laws which may be in force at the time the allocation is made; it is made with reference to the three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, for the executive power of the Centre and the State together extends to matters with respect to which Parliament and the Legislature of a State may make laws."}}, {"text": "Lists in the Seventh Schedule and thus the allocation in the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29505, "end_char": 29571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29886, "end_char": 29902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lists in the Seventh Schedule and thus the allocation in the Rules", "statute": "Lists in the Seventh Schedule and thus the allocation in the Rules"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30019, "end_char": 30027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lists in the Seventh Schedule and thus the allocation in the Rules", "statute": "Lists in the Seventh Schedule and thus the allocation in the Rules"}}, {"text": "State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30217, "end_char": 30276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30371, "end_char": 30387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance", "statute": "State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30842, "end_char": 30850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance", "statute": "State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30910, "end_char": 30926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance", "statute": "State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance"}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31167, "end_char": 31175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance", "statute": "State of Maharaject to which the Defence of India Ordinance"}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31314, "end_char": 31327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31357, "end_char": 31367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31849, "end_char": 31854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32446, "end_char": 32451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33008, "end_char": 33013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33156, "end_char": 33161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33568, "end_char": 33573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33980, "end_char": 33985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34075, "end_char": 34080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34950, "end_char": 34955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35029, "end_char": 35032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35191, "end_char": 35196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35379, "end_char": 35449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35452, "end_char": 35463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35472, "end_char": 35484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAII", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35487, "end_char": 35503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35518, "end_char": 35528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35531, "end_char": 35546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35548, "end_char": 35572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "J. R. MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35577, "end_char": 35592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Jounts to an act of State-Government of India Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35874, "end_char": 35928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35929, "end_char": 35950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35952, "end_char": 35959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Sant", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36186, "end_char": 36199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the agreement dated March 19, 1948, the State of Sant merged with the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36216, "end_char": 36233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the agreement dated March 19, 1948, the State of Sant merged with the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36238, "end_char": 36253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1948, Shree V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the day of April !"}}, {"text": "Shree V. P. Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36255, "end_char": 36272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1948, Shree V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the day of April !"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36291, "end_char": 36310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1948, Shree V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the day of April !"}}, {"text": "Maharana of Sant State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36334, "end_char": 36356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 1, 1948, Shree V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the day of April !"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36749, "end_char": 36769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Bombay, after considering the implications of the Tharao, decided that the order was ma/a nde and cancelled it on 8th July\n\n1949 In the meantime these respondents were stopped ; rom working the forests by the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "8th July\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36877, "end_char": 36891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Bombay, after considering the implications of the Tharao, decided that the order was ma/a nde and cancelled it on 8th July\n\n1949 In the meantime these respondents were stopped ; rom working the forests by the Government of Bombay."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_461_593_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nbe for the detenu to show that the order bad gone beyond 1964 the needs of the situation and was therefore contrary to s. 44. a. s. Paruldar No such thing bas been shown in the present cases and we s 1v.M_L . fi d h b d . . . b .d tale 0 anaraare satis e t at t e or ers m queshon cannot e sa1 to go •htra beyond the needs of the situation, even assuming that s. 44 is mandatory as urged on behalf of the appellants and no: merely directory as urged on behalf of the State.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed.\n\nAppeals dismissed\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\nWanchoo I.\n\nVORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO,\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO,\n\nJ. C. SHAH,\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nAct of State-Ruler of a 11ative 1tate granted certain right1 in /ore:ll to\n\ngra1ttecs-State merged with Domini'on of India-Dominion of India did not recognise the grant-Effect of non-recognition before Co11sti tution and after Constitution-If non-recognitio:t of the grant anJounts to an act of State-Government of India Act 1935-Constitution of India, Art. 32.\n\nThe Ruler of the State of Sant bad issued a Tharao dated 12th March 1948, granting full right and authority to the jagirdars over the forests in their respective villages. Pursuant to the agreement dated March 19, 1948, the State of Sant merged with the Dominion of India. On October 1, 1948, Shree V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the day of April !st 1948, would be questioned.\n\nAfter merger there was obstruction by the forest officers when the respondents were cutting the forests, but after some correspondence they were permitted to cut the trees on furnishing an undertaking that they would abide by the decision of the government.\n\nThe Government of Bombay, after considering the implications of the Tharao, decided that the order was ma/a nde and cancelled it on 8th July\n\n1949 In the meantime these respondents were stopped ; rom working the forests by the Government of Bombay.\n\nStat• of G11iarat\n\nY, Yor11 Fldda/i\n\nThereupon these respondents filed suits for declaration of rights in the forests and for a permanent injunction against interff.rence with those rights by the State. The respondents claimed in these suits that the rights of the grantees to the forests were not liable to be cancelled by the Dominion of India after the merger of the State of Sant in June, 1948, by executive action, and that the Government of Bombay was not competent to obstruct them in the exercise of those rights. Their claims were opposed by the State of Bombay mainly on the ground that in the absence of recognition, express or implied, by the successor State of the rights conferred by the former ruler on the jagirdars the respondents could not enforce them in the Municipal Courts. These respondents qied five suits against the State of Gujarat. All suits except one were dismissed by the Trial Court. The District Judge on appeal ordered the dismissal of that suit also and dismissed the appeals of the plaintiffs in the other suits.\n\nThe plaintiffs then appealed to the High Court and the High Court allowed all appeals and the suits were decreed.' The High Court held on the basis of the letter written by Shri Y. P. Menon, Secretary that the succeeding sovereign had waived or relinquished its right to repudiate the Tharao.\n\nThe High Court further held that the Tharao was not a legislative action of the Ruler of Sant State. The State Government appealed to this Court by special leave.\n\nHence the appeal.\n\nPer majority:\n\nHidayatullah J. (i) The Act of State come .. to an end only when the new sovereign recognises either expressly or impliedly the rights of the aliens. It does not come to an end by an action of subordinate officers who hav~ no authority to bind the new sovereign.\n\nTill recognition, either express or implied, is granted by the new sovereign, the Act of the State continues. In the present case, the Act of State could only come to an end if Government recognised the rights flowing from Tharao.\n\nThat Government never did.\n\nThere was thas no recognition of the Tharao or the rights flowing from it at any time.- In the present case, the subordinate officers of the Forest Department allowed each respondent to cut the trees on furnishing an undertaking that he would abide by the decision of the Government and 50 the question of waiver or relinquishment does not arise.\n\nSecretary of State in Council for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba,\n\n(1859) 13 Moore P. C. 22, Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustom Khan and Others, (68) I. A. 109, M/S. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. Com\n\nmissioner of lncometax, [1959} S.C.R. 729, The State of Saurashtra v.\n\nMemon Haji lsmale Haji, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 537, Jagan Nath Agarwala v.\n\nState of Orissa, [19621 1 S.C.R. 205, State of Saurashtra v. Jamadar Mohamed Abdulla and Ors., [1961} 3 S.C.R. 970 and Vaje Singhji Jorwar Singh v. Secretary of State for India, (1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 357, relied on.\n\nVirendra Singh and Ors, v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1955] I S.C.R. 415, disapproved.\n\nBhola Nath v. State of Saurashtra, A.l.R. 1954 S.C. 680, Bhojrajji Y.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra, 61 Born. LR. 20, referred to.\n\n(ill The Act of State did not come to an end by virtue o! Article 299(1) of Government of India Act, 1935 and so the respondents could not claim the protection of that section. Section 299(1) did not come into play because it could only come into play after the rights were recognised.\n\nIn the present case the rights were never recognised by the Government.\n\n(iii} The original Act of State continued even after January 26, 1950, because there was no state succession on January 26, 1950 in so far as the people of Sant State were concerned. For them state succession was over some time in 1948. The Act of State which began in 1948 could continue uninterrupted even beyond 1950 and it did not lapse or get replaced by another Act of State. These rights in question cannot be protected under the Constitution because these rights were not recognised even before 1950.\n\n(iv) That the impugned Tharao was not a law as it did not lay down any rule of conducl. It was a grant made to the Jagirdars mentioned in the Tharao.. The fact that Maharana's Tharao was passed to benefit a larger number of persons en bloc does not make it any the nlore a law if it did not possess any of the indicia of a law. The Tharao did give rights to the grantees but did not lay down any rule of conduct. It is a grant and as a grant it was open to the new sovereign not to .rccognis..\n\n\nAmeer-unnissa Begum and Ors. v. Mahboob Begum and Ors. A.l.R. 1955 S.C. 352. distinguished.\n\nMaharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and Others. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 953 and The Bengal Nagpur Catton Mill Ltd. v. Tlie Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh and Others, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 888 relied on.\n\n(v) The right claimed here is not even a concessionary right such as has received the support of the International writers.\n\nIt is more of the nature of a gift by the Ruler at the expense of the Slate. It lacks bona {ides which is one o[ the things to look for. There is no treaty involved and v.•hatever guarantee there is, Art. 363 of the Constitution precludes the Municipal Courts from considering. This distinguishes the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court of the United States in which considera tion Of treaties is included. In the United States the Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.\n\nIn India the position is different.\n\nArticle 253 enables legislation to be made to implement international treaties. This Court has accepted the principles laid down by the Courts in England in regard to the limits of the jurisdiction of Municipal Courts.\n\nThe view of the Supreme Court of United States or the view taken in inttrnauonal Jaw has not been accepted by this Court.\n\nPolitically and\n\nStat• at Gll/tlrtll ,..\n\nVora Flddall\n\n1964 6of Gu/arat v.\n\nVOlll Fidda/i\n\nethicaily there might have been some reason to accept and respect such concessions but neither is a reason for the Municipal Courts to intervene.\n\nThe Rule that the Act of the State can be questioned in a Municipal Court has never been adopted and it has been considered that it is a matter for the political departments of the State. However desirable it may be that solemn gTJarantees should be respected, this Court should not impose its will upon the State, because this is outside its jurisdiction.\n\nJn this case, the present respondents who were not parties to the merger agreement or to the letter written by Mr. Menon which was m:tde expressly a part of the Agreement cannot take advantage of cl. 7. U they were parties, Article 363 would bar such plea.\n\nMaharai Umeg Singh and Others v. The State of Bombay and Other•· ll955) 2 S.C.R. 164, relied on. ·\n\nU.S. v. Fercheman, 32 U.S. 51 at 86, disapproved:\n\nShapleigh v. Miar, 299 U.S. 468, referred to .\n\n. Salaman v. Secretary of State for India, [1906) I K. B. 613, referred to.\n\nCook v. Sprigg. [1899) A.C. 572, referred. to.\n\nFoster v. Nielson. (1829) 2 Pet. 253. referred to.\n\nBirma v. The State, A.I.R. 1951 Rajasthan I to 7, referred to.\n\nAmodutiiani v.\n\nSecretary Southern Nigeria, Ll921J\n\n2 A.C. 399, referred to.\n\nClark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503. referred to.\n\nWest Rand Ceiural Gold Minning Co. v. Regem, [1905] 2 K.B. 391, referred to.\n\nSecretary of State v. Bal Raj Bai, ( 19 5) L.R. 42 IA. 229, relied on.\n\nPer Shah J. (I) The rule that cession of territory by one State to another is an act of State and the sub, jects of the former State may enforce only those rights in Municipal Courts which the new sovereign recognises has been accepted by this Court.\n\nMis. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1959) S.C.R. 729, Jagannath Agarwala v. State of Orissa, [1962) I S.C.R. 205, Promod Chandra Dev v. State of Oris3a, [1962) Suppl. I S.C.R. 405 and the State of Saurashtra v. lamadar Mohd.\n\nAbdullah,\n\n11962) 3 S.C.R. 970, relied on.\n\nThe Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachtt Boye Sahaba, 7 Moore's I.A. 476, Vajesinghji Joravarsinghji v. Secretary of State for India in Council, L.R. 51 I.A. 357 and Secretary of State v. Sardar Runam Khan and Others, L.R. 68 I.A. 109, relied on.\n\n(ii) The Constitutional provisions in the United States arc son1ewhat 4ilf=nL Under the Constitution of the United States each treaty becomes a part of the law of the land; the provisions thereof are justiciable .m the covenants enforceable by the Courts. In India the treaties have\n\naot the force of law and do not give rise to rights or obligations enfor c:eable by the Municipal Courll.\n\nIn the present case by virtue of Art. 363 of the Constitution, it ;,, eat open to the respondents to enforce the covenants of the agreement es llaled in the letter of guarantee written by Mr. V. P. Menon in the\n\nMunicipal Courts.\n\nUnited Stat<1 v. Parch<man, (1833] 32 U.S. 51 at 86, 87, DOI relied ....\n\nCook v. Sprigg. (1899] A.C. ,72, referred to. ' Maharaj Um<g Singh and Oth<r1 Y. Th< Stal• of Bombfl1 8nd Oth<r1, {tl>SS) 2 S.C.R. 164, relied on.\n\n(iii) An act of State may be opread over a period and does not ari,. eerety on the point of acquisition of sovereign right.\n\nNor ii tbc new aovercign required to announce his decision when he assumes or accepts aovereignty over foreign territory, about the rights created by the quond::tm\n\nIOign, on pain of being held bound by the right '° created. Therefore till the right to property of the subjeets of the former Indian State ._ recognized by the new sovereign there was no title capable of beinJ enfon:cd in the courts of the Dominion or the Union.\n\n(iv) The functions of a State whether it contains a democratic set Gp or is administered by an autocratic sovereign fan into three broad categories-executive, legislative and judicial.\n\nThe line of demarcation of these functions in an absolute or autocratic form of government may be thin and may in certain cases not easily discernible.\n\nBut on that accuunt it is not possible to infer that every act of an autocratic sovereign has a legislative content or that every direction made by him must be regarded as law.\n\nThe legislative power is the power to n:iake, alter, amend or repeal Ian and within certain definite limits to delegate that power. Therefore It is power to lay down a binding rule of conduct.\n\nExecutive power is Che power to execute and enforce the laws, and judicial power is the power to' ascertain, construe and determine the rights and obligations of the parties before a tribunal.\n\nIn the present case the order dated Man:h 12, 1948, is expressly in the form of a grant of the rights which were not previously granted and does not either expressly or by implication seek to lay down any binding rule of conduct. The impugned order - not a law or an order made under any law within the meaning of d. 4 ot. the Administration of the Indian States Order of 1948.\n\nPromod Chandra Dtb and Oth<r1 v. Th< Stat< of Ori\"a Olld Oth<r1, (1962] Suppl I S.C.R. 405, Am<.,..un-Niua Begum and Olhtr1 Y.\n\nMalrboob Btgwn and Othtrl, A.I.R. (1955) S.C. 352, Director of Endow-\n\n•34-159 S.C.-3G.\n\nStal• of G*\"'\n\n•• Yor• £\"\"\"11\n\n\"iffl\n\n~ ii/ GN/aral\n\n. . ' .,._ Flddlill\n\nmenu, Government of Hyderabad v. Akram Ali, A.I.R. (1956) S.C. 60 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan and Other'>\n\nA.l.R. (1963) S.C. 1638, distinguished, discussed .\n\nMadhorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] I s.c.a: 951 discussed.\n\nMaharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v, Union of India, A.I.R. 1963- S.C. 953, relied on,\n\nTM Bengal Nagpur 'Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The Board of Revenut', Madhya Pradesh and Others, C.A. No. 416 of 1961 decided on July 30',\n\n1963, relied on.\n\n(v) To attracts. 299(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, thert must, exist a right to property which is sought to be protected, The subjects of the acceding State arc entitled only to such rights as the new\n\nsoVereign cbOoseS to recognize, in the abSence of the any recl1gnition of the rights o~ the respondents or their predecessor J agirdars, there waS 110 rigqt tq .property of which protection .could be claimed. On the same . pning, grantees of the Ruler !X>uld not claim protection under Ar\\.\n\n31 (1) of the Constitu_tion.\n\n' P1r Mo4holkar J. (i) The rule of international law on which the meral Privy Council decisions as to the effect of conquest or cession on the private righ\"ts of the inhabitants of the conquered or ceded territory arc founded has become a part of the common law of this country. This being a \"liiw in force\" and at the commencement of the Constitution is saved by Art. 372 of the Constitution. The Courts in India are, therefore, bound to e°\" force that rule and not what according to Marshall C.J. is the rule of International Law governing the same matter, though the latter has alSQ received the approval of several text book writers. The rule which h8' been appljed in this country is not inequitor nor can it be: regarded U bt> an anachronism.\n\nVirendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [19SS]\n\nS.C.R. 41', United State v. Percheman, (1833) 32 U.S. SI, disapproved.\n\nSecretarY of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sal1iba, (ISS9) 13 Moore P. C. 22, Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, )ljmer. A.J.R. 1947 P.C. l, Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of lncomttax, (19591 S.C.R. 729, State of Saurashtra v . • \\.fenion lluji Ismail. [1960] I S.C.R. 537, State of Saurashtra v. Jamadar Mohamed Abdullah and Ors., [19621 3 S.C.R. 970, Vajesinghji v. Secretary of St<llt? for Indio, '1 I.A. 357 and Secreta, y of State for India v. Bai Rajbai, 42 I.A. 229,\n\nPromod Chandra Dev v. State of Orissa and Ors. (1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 405, relied on.\n\n(ii) Two concepts underlie our law.\n\nOne is that the inhabitants of acquired territories bring with them no rights enforceable against the new sovereign. The other is that the Municipal Courts have no jurisdicjion to enforce ny rights claimed by them, against the sovereign despi(f tho provisiODl! of a treaty unless their rights liave been recognised by the\n\nacw sovereip after cession or conquest. In Olher wi;>rds a right which cannot on its own strength be enforced against a sovereign in the Courts of that sovereign must be deemed to have ceased to exist. It followa therefore that a right which bas ceased to exist does not, require repudiation.\n\nMunicipal courts derive their jurisdiction from the Municipal law and not from the Jaws of nations and a change in the laws of nations brought about by the consent of the nations of the world cannot confer upon a Municipal Court a jurisdiction which it does not enjoy under the Municipal law.\n\n(iii) The grantees of the Ruler could not claim the protection or L 299 of Government of India Act, 193S or of Art. 31 of the Constitution of India as they possessed no right to property enforceable against the new eovercign.\n\n(iv) The impugned Tharao was not law.\n\nMadhorao Phalk< v. Th< Stat< of Madhya Pradesh (1961) I S.C.R. 'S1, referred to.\n\nPu minority Sinha CJ. and Ayyangar J. (i) 'lbe juristic basis of tile theory underlying the Privy Council decisions is that with the extinction of the previous sovereign the rights theretofore exerc!seabl.:: by the subjc.:ts of that sovereign by virtue of grants for that sovereign were likewise extinguished and that without gnition which is really tantaftiount to a fresh grant by the new sovereign. no title enforceable in the municipal courts of the succeeding sovereign came into being. The doctrine of Act of State evolved by English courts is one purely. of municipal law. It denies to such a court jurisdiction to enquire into the consequences of acts which are inseparable from an extension of its sovereignty. That doctrine was, however, not intended to deny any rule of International Law.,\n\nThe British practice that bas prevailed in this country bas not proved in actual practice to lead to injustice. but bas proceeded on a just balance between the acquired rights of the Private individual and the economic interests of the community, and therefore there is nothing in it so out of tune with notions of propriety or justice to call for its rejection. Even in the case of Virendra Singh this Court did not express any decisive opinion in favour of accepting the observations in Percheman's case as Proper to be applied by the municipal courts in India. This Court has in subsequent decisions followed the Privy Council decisions. The view of the Supreme Court of the United States has net been accepted bY this Court for the reason that the Constitutional position in regard to the recognition of treaties in both countries are different.\n\nIn the United States a treaty has the force oflaw, which is not the position here.\n\nBesides, in India by virtue of Article 363 of the Constitution, Municiral Courts are deprived of jurisdiction to enforce any righlll arisina from ciertaiA treaties.\n\nJ!IU\n\nStat• of G•/GNI\n\n\"· Yoiw FIMall\n\nJINU\n\n,.,.ofO.;..t\n\ny, YON P!Mall\n\n. Vinrendra Sinalr v. T/w Star. of Uttar Prad•sh, [1955) 1 S.C.R. 415, diaapprovcd.\n\nVajesinghji v. S<er<lary of Stal< for India, SI I.A. 357, Cook Y, Sprigg, (1899] A.C. S12, relied on.\n\nWalker v. Baird, [1892] A.C. 491, Joh/UfoM v.\n\nP<dlar, [1921) 2 A.C. 262. referred to. Unit<d Stat<a ,., P<rcheman, 32 U.S. SI, disapproved.\n\nM/1, Dalmia Dadri C•m<nt Co. Ltd. \"· Th• Commwione of lncoJttlo llU, [1959) S.C.R. 729, Jagan Nath Agarwa/JJ v. Th< Stat• of Ori-,\n\n[1962) 1 S.C.R. 205, Promodh Chandra Dov v. The State of Orism,\n\n(1962) I Supp. S.C.R. 405, The Stat• of Saurashtra v. Jamadar Mohamad Abdul/JJ, [1962) 3 S.C.R. 970, Stcretary of State for India v. Kamach•• Boye Sahiba [1859] 7 Moore, I.A. 476, Stcr<tary of State for India IJo Couocil v. Bai Raj Bai, 42 I.A. 229 and Secretary of State \\'. Rulll{loan, 68 I.A. 109. relied on.\n\nmodu Tijani v. Secretary South<rn Nigeria, [1921) 2 A.C. 399, referred lo.\n\nWost Rand C<ntral Gold Mining Co.,\n\nv. Rex, [1905) 2 K.B. 391, nferred lo.\n\nAsrar Ahm•d v. Duraha Committ<e, Aimer, A.l.R. 1947 P.C. I, relied OD.\n\nArtomeyGtneral of Canada T. Attorney-G<n<ral of O•tario, [1937) A.C. 326, referred to.\n\n(ii) Whe1e the new sovereign MBumes jurisdiction and it does tom.e act and the~ is ambiguity as to whether the 1ame amount.s to a recognition of a pre-existing right or not, the covenant and the treaty nif!ht be looked at in order to ascertain the intention and purpose of that equivocal act, but beyond this tlie covena:::i.t and the treaty cannot by them selves be used either as a recognition pure and simple or, as waiver of a right lo repudiate the preexisting rights. It is needless to point out that since the enforceability of the rights against the succeeding sovereign springs into existence only on recognition by the sovereign, there i& no question of a waiver or the right to repudiate.\n\nJn the present case the High Court erred in holding on the basis of cl. 7 of the letter of Shri V. P. Menon that the Government waived their right 10 repudiate the grant made by the previous ruler.\n\nBhola Natlr v. Tiie Stat< of Saura1hlra, A.l.R. (1954) S.C. 680. cliadn- , W.hocl.\n\n(iii) Just previous to the Constitution the grantee had no risht of property enforceable against the State. The coming into force of the Constitution could not, therefore, make any difference, for the Constitution,\n\ndid not create rights in property but only protected rights which otherwise existed.\n\n(iv) In tho present case the \"Tharao\" wu not a grant to any indiridual but to the holders of 5 specified tenures in the State. The 'TharDD' is more consistent with its being a law effecting an alteration in the tenures of the 5 cluses of Jagirdars by expanding the range of the beneficial enjoyment to the forests lying within the boundaries of the villages whicb\n\nhad already been granted to them. In this light, the 'Tharoo' would not be administrative order in 'l!'Y sense but would partake of Iba characr..\n\nof legislation by which an alteration wu effected in the scope and content of tenures, referred to.\n\nTho \"Tharao\" dated March 12, 1918 satisfies Ille requirement of \"a law\" within Art. 366(10) of the Constitution and in consequence, the executive orden of the Government ol Bombay by whicll the forests rights of the plaintiffs were sought to be denied were illegal\n\nand void. The \"Tharao'' was in truth and substance a law which wu .::ontinued by Art. 372 of the Constitution and therefore it could be ruoked by the appellant by legislative authority and not by IUl oxecuti\"' act.\n\nMadhorao Pha/ke v. The State Madhya Bharat {1961) I S.C.L 957, Anuu-un-niua Begum v. Mahboob Begum, A.l.R. 1955 Supreme\n\nCourt, 352 a'ld Director of Endowment1, Goyernment of Hyderabad Y.\n\nAkram A.Ii, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 60, relied on.\n\nPer Subha Rao J. (i) Tho decision in Virendra Singh., cue is Doi only oorrec~ but a also in accord with the progressive trend of modern international law.\n\nIt may, therefore, be stated without contradiction that in none of the decisions of this Court that were given subsequent to Vire,.,. dra Singh's case the correctness of that decision was doubted. After all. an act of State is an arbitrary act not based on law, but on the modem version of 'Might is right'. It is an act outside the law. There were two different lines of approach. One adopted by the imperialistic nations and the other by others who wer~ not. That divergence wu reftected in English and American Courts. All the jurists of International law recognise the continuity of title to immovable property of the entwhile citizens of the ceding state after the sovereignty changed over to the absorbina atate. It may, therefore, be held that so far u title to immovable property u concerned the doctrine of International law bu become crystallized and thereunder the change of sovereignty does not affect\n\nthe title of the erstwhile citizens of the ceding state to their property.\n\nIn America the said principle of International Law Iw been accepted without any qualification.\n\nM/1. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commis1ion., of ,,.. com<-taz, [1959) S.C.R. 729, /agannath A.garwala v. The State of Oris\"\"\n\n(1962) I S.C.Jt 205, Promodh Chand,. D,.. \"· The Stat1 of Ori.,\n\nJ\"4\n\n&t•t• of 0,,,,,,., ...\n\nYoro l'id41111\n\n'JJU [1962] Supp. l S.C.R. 405, State of Saurashtra v.\n\n\n'f. Yors Piddali United States v. Percheman, (1833) 32 U.S. SI, relied on.\n\nFoster v. Neilson, (1829) 2 P.E.T., 2S3, The American Insurance Co. r•d the Ocean Insurance Co. v. Bales of Cotton (1828) 7 L.Ed. Sil, t,'/1arles Dehault v. United States, (1835) 9 Ed. 117, Vajeenngli Joravarsingji v, Secretary of State for India in Council, (1951) I.A. 357, referred to.\n\n(ii) The law in England is that the municipal courts cannot enforce the acquired rights of the erstwhile citizens of the ceding state against\n\nthe absorbing state unless the said state has recognized or acknowledged their title. This Court accepted the English doctrine of Act of State in a series of decisiolls.\n\nThe word ''recognize\" means \"to admit, to acknowledge, somethin& existing before\".\n\nBy recognition the absorbing state does not create or confer a new title, but only confirms a pre-exisiing one. Non-recognition : by the absorbing does not divest the title, but Only makes it unenforceable against the state in municipal courts.\n\nPramod Chandra Dev. v. The State of Orissa, [1962] Supp. I S.C.R. 403, relied on.\n\n(iii) The doctrine of acquired rights, at any rate in regard to immovable property has become crystallized in International Law. Under the said law the title of a. citizen of a ceding state is preserved and not lost by cession.\n\nThe change of sovereignty does not affect his title.\n\nThe municipal laws of different countries vary in the matter of its enforceability against the state. AB the title exists, it must be held that even in those countries, which .accepted the doctrine of act of State and the riht of a sovereign to repudiate the title, the title is good against all except the state. Before the Constitution came into force the State did not 1epudiate the title. When the Constitution of India came into force the re>o ponden.t and persons similarly situated who had title to immovable property in the Sant State had a tille to the said property and were in actual possession thereof.\n\nThey had title to the property except against tho State and they had, at any rate, possessory title therein.\n\nThe Constitu tion in Article 31 ( 1) declares that no person shall be deprived of bis property save by authority of law. That is, the Constitution recognised the title of the citizensof erstwhile State of Sant, and issued an injunction against the sovereign created by it not to interfere with that right except in accordance with law. A recognition by the Supreme Law of the land must be in a higher position than that of an executive authority of a conquering State. It was held that the title to immovable property of the respondent was recognised by the Constitution itself and, therefore, necessarily by the sovereign which .s bound by it\n\nIn the present case the letter written by the Government of India dated October I, ! 948, clearly recognized the title of the respondents to their\n\nproperties. 1be letter clearly contains a statement in paragraphs S and 7 thereof that enjoyment of J agirs, grants etc., existing on April l, 1948, were guaranteed and that any order passed or action taken by the Ruler before the said date would not be questioned. 'Ibis is a clear recognition of the property rights of the respondent and si!Dilar e>tbers.\n\nVirendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1955) I S.C.R. 4U, retied on.\n\nMis. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Co1nmissioner of Incom~ tax [1959). S.C.R, 729, Jagan Nath Agarwa/a v. The State of Ori$<a\n\n(1962], I S.C.R. 205, Promodh Chandra Dev v. The State of Orissa 11962], Supp. I S.C.R. 405 and State of Saura.<htra v. Jamadar Mohamed Abdullah (1962). 3 S.C.R, 970, discussed and distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals No~; 182-186 of 1963.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 1961 of the Gujarat High Court in Second\n\nAppeals Nos. 105, 106, 107, 112 and 193 of 1960.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant (in all the appeals).\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas, B. Parthasarathy, J, B. Dadachat1ji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents (irt all the appcais).\n\nJanuary 30, 1964.\n\nHidayatullah J., Shah J., and Mudholkar 1. delivered separate Judgments allowing the appeal. Raghubar Dayal J. agreed with the order proposed by Hidayatullah J.\n\nThe dissenting opiniorr of Sinha C. J, and Rajagopala Ayyangar J, w.as delivered by Ayyangar J. Subba Rao J. delivered a separate dissenting opinion.\n\nlflU\n\nSlat• of G,,,_,\n\n'\" ' Vmw Pl4QU\n\nA yy AN GAR J .-In this batch of five analogous appeals, \"\"..,., 1• by special leave, the main question for determination is whether the rights which were in controversy between the\n\nJIU ai.t, of Gujarat\n\n\"· Yor.r Fiddall\n\n,,,,,,.,,.,°' J.\n\nparties in the courts below could be enforced by the Munici pal courts; or in other words, whether or not \"Act of State,. pleaded by the State of Gujarat is an effective answer to the claims made by the respective respondents to the rights over forests claimed by them in the suits giving rise to these appeals.\n\nVora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala is the respondent in Civil Appeals Nos. 182 and 184 of 1963. Vora Halci muddin Tayabali Amthaniwala is the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 183 of 1963. Mehta Kantilal Chandulal is the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 185 of 1963, and Pathan Abbaskhan Ahmedkhan is the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 186 of 1963. In all these Appeals the State of Gujarat\n\nis the appellant.\n\nThe course these litigations have taken in the courtl below may briefly be stated as follows: The respondent in Civil Appeal No. 182 of 1963, is the assignee of the rightl of one Vora Hatimbhai Badruddin and was brought on re• cord as plaintiff during the pendency of the suit in the trial court, namely, the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Godhra, being Civil Suit No. 115 of 1950, for an injunc tion and ancillary reliefs to restrain the appellant and its officers from interfering with the plaintiff's alleged rights to cut and carry away timber etc., from the Gotimada jungle,\n\nJ:ing his rights under a contract dated August 21, 1948, for a period of three years on payment of a consideration of Rs. 9,501 to the Jagirdar of the village, Thakore Sardar\n\nSingh Gajesingh.\n\nCivil Suit No. 134 of 1950, giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 184 of 1963, was also instituted by the same plaintiff who claimed by virtue of an assignment of the rights under a similar contract in respect of another forest in village N anirath for a period of four years, the considera lion being the cash payment of Rs. 9,501. Civil Suit No.\n\n106 of 1951, giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 183 of 1963, was instituted by Vora Hakimuddin Tayyabali Amthaniwal la. His claim was based on an agreement with the Jagirdar, dated December 7, 1948, for a period of four years for a consideration of Rs. 6,501 in respect of the forest in village Rathda. All these three suits, in which the reliefs claimed\n\nwere &imilar, were tried together and disposed of by a com Stal• of GuJ.,.,,,\n\nmon judgment, delivered by the trial court on I anuary 3, 1964\n\n1956. All the suits were dismissed. The Court took the Y. view that. the rights of the plaintiffs, such as they were, could Yora Fiddall not be enforced by the courts.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 185 of\n\n\"'\"\"\"'\"' J. 1963 arises out of Suit No. 80 of 1953, filed by Mehta Kantilal Chandulal. He owned the Inami villages Laleka\n\npur and Narsingpur and alleged that he had given a contract for cutting the trees in his villages for a consideration of Rs. 11,000 on May 29, 1948, for a period of four years, and that his transferee had been prevented by the State from exercising those rights. He also prayed for a similar injunction, as in the other suits. This suit was also dismissed by the trial court by its judgment, dated March 23, 1956. The last of the suits is Suit No. 90 of 1955, giving rise to Civil Appeal 186 of 1963. The plaintiff had claimed to have obtained similar right of felling trees in the forest belonging to the Jagirdar of Mayalapad on August 16, 1948 for Rs. 1,191 for a period of three years. This suit was decreed by a judgment dated August 6, 1956.\n\nThe unsuccessful plaintiffs filed four appeals to the District Judge, Pancb Mahals, at Godra, being appeals Nos. 17, 18, 19 and 48 of\n\n1956. All the appeals were heard together and, by a common judgment, were dismissed on February 28, 1957, the judgment of the trial court being confirmed.\n\nThe 5th appeal, being appeal No. 74 of 1956, was filed by the State.\n\nThe appeal was allowed by a separate judgment, dated September 30, 1957, dismissing the suit.\n\nThe plaintiffsrespondents filed five second appeals, being Second Appeals Nos. 105, 106, 107, 112 and 193 of 1960 in the High Court of Gujarat. The appeals were heard together and were allowed on January 24, 1961 with the result that the suits were decreed and the appellant was restrained by an injunction from interfering with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of the rights in the forests, as claimed by them. As the State failed to obtain the necessary certificate of fitness from the High Court, it moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal. And that is how these appeals have come up to this Court. These appeals were first heard by a Bench of five Judges, and it was directed that the matter he placed for hearing by a larger Bench, as the Bench was of the opinion\n\nthat the decision of this Court in Virendra Singh v. Th~\n\n'lllzte of Gujarat\n\n\"· Vora Fiddali\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh(') required reconsideration. how these appeals have been placed before this Bench.\n\nThat is special\n\n.A11angar J.\n\nBefore dealing with the questions that arise for deter mination in these appeals, it is necessary and convenient at this stage to set out the course of events leading up to the institution of the suits aforesaid, giving rise to these appeals.\n\nThe several villages, the forest rights in which are in dispute in these cases, formed part of the State of Sant. The steps in the transition of this State under its ruler who was designated the Maharana into an integral part of the territory of the Union of India conformed to the usual pattern.\n\nWith the lapse of the paramountcy of the British Government on the enactment of the Indian Independence Act, the ruler achieved complete sovereignty. Soon thereafter by an instrument of accession executed by the ruler, the State acceded to the Dominion of India so as to vest in the latter power in relation to 3 subjects-Defence, External Affairs and Communications. On March 19, 1948 the ruler enter ed into a merger agreement with the Governor-General of India by which \"with a view to integrate the territory with the Province of Bombay at as early a date as possible\", the full and exclusiYe authority and powers in relation to the administration of the State were ceded to the Dominion Government. The agreement was to take effect from June 10, 1948. It is necessary to set out two of the Articles of this Agreement. Article 1 ran thus:\n\n\"I. The Maharana of Sant hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on .the 10th day of June, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as \"the said day\").\n\nAnd from the said day the Dominion Government will be competent to exercise the said powers,\n\n(1) {19551 1 s.c.R. 415.\n\nauthority and jurisdiction in such manner and through such agency as it may think fit.\"\n\nUnder Article 3 of the agreement, the ruler agreed to furnish to the Dominion Government before October 1, 1948 a list of all his private properties over which he was, under the terms of the agreement, to retain full ownership and enjoyment.\n\nAfter this agreement came in force on June 10, 1948, the Central Government delegated its functions to the Bombay Government by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act. 1947. Subsequently, Shri V. P. Menon. Secretary in the Ministry of State, wrote\n\na letter to the Maharana'of Sant on October !, 1948 (Ex. 194). This letter was entitled a \"Letter of Guarantee\" and was to be treated as supplementary to the Agreement of Merger dated Mnrch 19, 1948. Amongst other matters. it provided by cl. 7:\n\n\"No order passed or action taken by you before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government will be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken after the 1st day of April, 1948, and it is considered by the Government of India to be palpably unjust or unreasonable. The decision of the Government of India in their respect will be final.\"\n\nIn view of the forthcoming integration of the territory of Indian States into the Dominion of India, the Government of India Act, 1935, was amended ands. 290-A was inserted.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by that section, the Governor-General of India promulgated the States Merger (Governor Provinces) Order, 1949, on July 27, 1949 which came into force on August 1, 1949. As a result of that order the in'egration of Indian States, indudin3 the Sant State with that of the province of Bombay, was completed with effect from that date, namely August 1, 1949.\n\nIn the meantime, the ruler of the Sant State passed or issued \"a resolution\" or Tharao on March 12, 1948, which has given rise to the present series of litigations. Under this\n\n*instrument\" marked as Ex. 192, to use a neutral expres-\n\n19\"\n\nStat• of Gll/ar•\n\n•• Vo\"' Fiddali\n\nA.11anior /.\n\nJ,76\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] lftU\n\nsion in view of the controversy as to its nature, called I- 01 Gaiut11 Tharao, an order was passed by the Maharana of Sant State\n\nY, h Yoro Plddali w ose terms will be referred to later and discussed in greater\n\n\"'\"\"\"'\"' I. detail, granting forest rights to holders of certain specified tenures.\n\nThe holders of such tenures in the mt State entered into a number of agreements with thi, parties, parting with their rights in the forest timber, e1c., for a specified period, in consideration of cash payments made by those third parties to the holders of the tenures. It is not necessary to set out in detail all those agreements; it is enough to mention, by way of a sample the agreement dated August 21, 1948 (Ex. 175) whereby the tenure-holder granted as briefly adverted to earlier to Vohra Hatimbhai Badruddin Mithiborwala the right to cut and remove timber and firewood from the. forest of Mouja Gothimada for a consideration of Rs. 9,501 for a period of three years.\n\nThe written agreement contains quite a number of clauses which it is not necessary to set out for the purposes of this case.\n\nAfter the aforesaid grants, correspondence started between the grantors and the grantees on the one hand, and the State Forest Department on the other. When the Di5trict Forest Officer was informed about the transactions aforesaid. and the grantees applied for authorisation to remove timber etc., the Forest Authorities ordered that no export outside would be permitted, pending receipt of orders from Government.\n\nThey also required an undertaking from the purchaser that\n\n- he would abide by the decision and orders passed by the Government. Thereupon the grantor, Thakur Sardar Singh Gaje Singh gave an undertaking to abide by the decision and oders of the Government of Bombay in respect of the Gothimada forests \"rights over which were conferred on me by Santrampur State Government on March 12, 1948 in their resolution No. G. 371, dated March 12, 1948.\" The Divisional Forest Officer, by his order dated January I 0, 1949, passed an order under the provisions of r. 4 of the Rufes under s. 41 of the Indian Forest Act authorising the grantee to remove forest produce like timber firewood and charcoal from Gothimada forest.\n\nThis was followed by a memorandum by the Conservittor of Forests North Western Circle of the Bombay State by which the Divisional Forest Officers were directed to cont>\n\nnue to issue authorisations to contractors of J agirdars who bad obtained rights over the forests in the Sant State under the Tharao of the ruler, dated March 12, 1948. He, however, pointed out that until the question of the rights of the grantees over private forests was finally settled by the Government an undertaking should be taken from the persons concerned that they would abide by the orders passed by the Government in respect of their rights. This, as stated alread;·. had been obtained by the District Officers even earlier. On July 8, 1949, the Government of Bombay passed an order in which they stated \"Government considen that the order passed by the ruler of the Sant State under his No. 371, dated March 12, 1948, transferring forest rights to all the J agirdars of the Jagir viJlages, are ma/Cl fid~ and that they should be cancelled ...... \" This decision or order was, however, not communicated to the Jagirdars or Cheir contractors though effect was given to it by the Forest\n\nAuthorities by stopping all further fellings.\n\nSome time thereafter the respondents issued notices under 's. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code to the Government of Bombay seeking respect for their rights under the Tharao of March, 1948\n\nand after waiting for two months filed the suits out of which these appeals arise.\n\nBy the written statements which they filed, the Government of Bombay raised principally the defence that the act of the ruler in passing the Tharao was not binding on them as the successor State and that they in exercise of their sovereign authority, had cancelled the concession as unreasonable and ma/a fide by their order, dated July 8, 1949, already referred. It might be mentioned that after the suit was instituted and while it was pending before the trial judge a formal resolution of the Government of Bombay was passed and published on the 6th of February, 1953, in which they set out the legal position that the rights acquired under the Tharao were not enforceable as against the Bombay Government as the successor State unless those rights were recognised and that as on the other hand the 1ame had been specifically repudiated, the J agirdars and their contractors had no title which they could enforce against the Government.\n\nWe have already narrated the course of the litigations and this would be the convenient stage at which to indicate\n\nSlflti of G\"\"\"\"' .. ,. ..... \"\"\"\"\"\n\n,,.,,,,_ '\n\nJ!IU '- of Gu/arot ....\n\nV- Fiddoli\n\n-'Y1fJllZU 1.\n\nthe grounds on which the teamed Judges of the High Court have upheld the claims of the plaintiffs who are the respondents in the several appeals before us.\n\nThere were two principle points that were urged on their behalf before the learned Judges. The first was that the Tharao of March 12, 1948, was in truth and substance a 'law', a legislative act of the ruler of Sant, which was continued under Art. 372 of the Constitutio; i and that in consequence the rights obtained. by the grantees thereunder could not be abrogated or set at naught by a mere executive order which the Government resolution of February, 1953, undoubtedly was.\n\nThis submission was rejected by the Court holding that the Tharao was merely a grant originating in an administrative or executive order of the ruler.\n\nThe other contention was that through the agreement of merger by which the integrac lion of the Sant State with the Dominion of India brought about an \"act of state\" and that accordingly, no rights based on the agreement of merger, dated March 19, 1948, or in ¢e supplementary letter, dated October l, 1948, could be asserted or enforced in the Municipal Courts of the successor State unless the same were recognised by Government still cl. 7 of the letter of Shri V. P. Menon, dated October l, 1948, to the ruler could be referred to and relied on for the purpose of drawing an inference that the right of the Government to repudiate the grant by the ruler had been waived.\n\nThis submission was accepted and it was on this reasoning that the learned Judges have decreed the suits of the several plaintiffs.\n\nIt is the correctness of these two conclusions that are being challenged before us, the first by the respondenig and the other by the appellant State. Arising from the submissions of the barned Attorney-General the points that require examination are as to the legal effect of the accession, integration and merger of the Sant State in the Indian Union, on the rights that the plaintiffs acquired under the Tharao, dated March 12, 1948 and secondly whether the provisions in s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, or those contained in Part III of the Constitution affect the nature or enforceability of those rights. The' questions to be considered under the first head in particular are:-\n\n(a) Whether the rights acquired under the previous\n\nruler are enforceable against the Governments of the Union and the States without those rights being recognised by the appropriate Government.\n\n(b) What is the effect of the letter of the Government of India, dated October 1, 1948, on the right of the Government to refuse to recognise a grant under the Tharao.\n\n( c) What is the effect of the Government's communication to the Chief Conservator of Forests dated July 8, 1949 and of the resolution of Government' of February, 1953.\n\nUnder the second head, besides the constitutional guarantees protecting rights to property contained in the Government of India Act and the Constitution, the effect in the first instance of s. S of the Government of India Act, 1935, of the acceding Stat.:s becoming part of the Dominion of India and later of the manner in which the Constitution of India was framed.\n\nThe other question that requires consideration is whether the Tharao dated March 12, 1948 is merely a grant originating in an executive order or is it a law which is continued in operation by Art. 372 of the Constitution.\n\nIn Virendra Singh's case(') this Court held that even on the basis that the merger of the Indian States in the Indian Union and the treaties by which that was accomplished were acts of State, still by reason of the manner in which the Constitution of India was brought into being and because of the provisions which it contained, in particular those guaranteeing property rights of its citizens, the acquired rights of the inhabitants of the Indian States quoad their rulers could not, after the Constitution, be annulled or abrogated by arbitrary executive action on the part of the Union or State Governments. The learned Judges thus assumed as correct the rule of Public International Law relevant to that context expounded by the Privy Council in a number of decisions rendered on appeals from the Indian\n\n(I) [I 55] 1 s.c.R. -1\n\nS; att of Gujanit-\n\n1' Vora Fiddali\n\n.A.yyanaar I.\n\n\"'°11 of Gu/Mat\n\n\"· Y or• Plddali\n\nA.17onpr I • .\n\nHigh Courts. For this reason we consider that it would be convenient for a proper appreciation of the points now in controversy to premise the discussion by briefly setting out the principles underlying these decisions of the Privy Council, reserving their detailed examination to a later stage.\n\nThese principles have been tersely summarised and the ratio of the rule explained by Lord Dunedin in Vajesinghji v.\n\nSecretary of State for India etc.(') in a passage which has been often quoted in later cases on the subject and we consider that it would be sufficient if we extract it. . The learned Lord said:\n\n\"When a territory is acquired by a sovereign state\n\nfor the first time that is an act of State.\n\nIt matters not how the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by\n\na recognised ruler.\n\nIn all cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the te\"itory can make good in the municipal courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has through his officers, recognised.\n\nSuch rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing.\n\nNay more, even if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants could enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to those inhabitants to enforce these stipulations in the municipal courts. The right to enforce remains only with the high contracting parties.\" (italics ours).\n\nThis has been accepted as expressing the constitutional Jaw of the United kingdom and the same has been applied not merely to claims or titles which were sought to be enforced against the Indian Government but also in other parts of the British Empire-See Cook v. Spring('). This was the law laid down and given effect to by the Privy Council until India attained independence.\n\nISi IA 3S7•\n\n(2) (1899] A.c. S12.\n\nVirendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh('), however, struck a different note particularly as regards the matters covered by the sentences we have given in italics in Lord Dunedin's exposition of the law, and to this decision we shall immediately turn. The facts of the case were briefly these: On January 5, 1948, the ruler of Sarila granted the village Rigwara to the petitioners who moved this Court while on the 28th of January, 1948, the ruler of Charkari granted certain other villages to the same petitioners. As the rights of the petitioners were sought to be nullified by an order of the Government of Uttar Pradesh they filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying that the order of the Government of Uttar Pradesh revoking the grants in their favour be declared void nnd for consequential reliefs.\n\nA few more facts in regard to the constitutional history of these two States is necessary to be stated to appreciate some of the matters which figured in the decision in Virendra Singh' s case(').\n\nAfter the date of the grant in favour of the petitioners 35 States in Bundelkhand and Bhagalkhand, including Charkari and Sarila agreed to unite themselves into a State to be called the United State of Vindhya Pradesh. While this Union was in existence, certain officials of this Government interfered with the rights of the petitioners but the Government of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh issued orders directing the officers to abstain from such interference.\n\nSubsequently the rulers of the 35 States dissolved their Union and ceded to the Governnient of Indian Dominion all their powers and jurisdiction and the Dominion constituted the area into a Chief Commissioner's province for the purpose of administration, but the four villages granted to the petitioners were, however, detached from the centrally administered State and absorbed into Uttar Pradesh.\n\nOn August 29, 1952, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh revoked the grants made in favour of the petitioners. The question before the Court was whether this order of revocation of the grants made by the former rulers was justiciable in courts and if justiciable, valid .\n\n(I) [1955J•1 S, C.R. 415.\n\n134-194 s.c.-J•\n\nStal• of <Ju/otrtl\n\nYora Flddoll\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1964 \"'* of Gu/arat\n\n\"· Y- Plddali \"\"\"\"gar 1.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [rcJ(>4J\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by Bose J.\n\nThe learned Judge after stating the question arising for decision as being \"whether the Union Government had the right and the power to revoke these grants as an act of State?\", pointed out that jurists had held divergent views on this matter. At one extreme, he said, was the view expressed by the Privy Council in a series of cases to which reference was made and as summarising their effect the passage from the judgment of Lord Dunedin we have extracted already was cited.\n\nAt the other extreme was the view of Marshall CS, in United StaJes v. Percheman(') from which he quoted the following:\n\n\"It may not be unworthy of remark that it is very\n\nunusual, even in case of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country.\n\nThe modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilised world would be outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled.\n\nThe people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; by their relations to each other, and their rights of property, remain undisturbed. If this be the modern rule even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case of an amicable cession of territory?. . . . . . A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the property belonging to the inhabitants. The King cedes that only which belonged to him.\n\nLands he had previously granted were not his to cede. Neither party could consider itself as attempting a wrong to individuals, condemned by the practice of the whole civilised world.\n\nThe cession of a territory by its name from one sovereign to another, conveying the compound idea of surrendering at the same time the lands and the people who inhabit them, would be\n\n(1) 32 U.S. s1 at pp. 86-87.\n\nnecessarily understood to pass the sovereignty only, and not to interfere with private property.\"\n\nAlter referring to a few other decisions of the English Courts the learned Judge proceeded:\n\n\"We do not intend to discuss any of this because, in our opinion, none of these decisions has any bearing on the problem which confronts us, namely, the impact of the Constitution on the peoples and territories which joined the Indian Union and brought the Constitution into being ....... .\n\nNow it is undoub(ed that the accessions and the acceptance of them by the Dominion of India were acts of State into whose competency no municipal court could enquire; nor any Court in India, after the Constitution, accept jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out of them because of Article 363 and the proviso to Article 131; all they can do is to register the fact of accession ............ But what then; Whether the Privy Council view is correct or that put forward by Chief Justice Marshall in its broadest outlines is more proper, all authorities are agreed that it is within the competence of the new sovereign to accord recognition to existing rights in the conquered or ceded territories and, by legislation or otherwise, to apply its own laws to them and these laws can, and indeed when the occasion arises must, be examined and interpreted by the municipal courts of the absorbing State.\"\n\nThe learned Judge then went on to point out that the title of the petitioners to the disputed villages had not been repudiated upto January 26, 1950. Because of the non-exercise of the right to repudiate till that date, the petitioners were , admittedly in de facto possession of the villages and the learned Judge adverted to the circumstance that those possessory rights could have been asserted and enforced against all persons except the rulers who granted the lands, and\n\nitate af 'luj•at ...\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nA.yyangor J.\n\nStat• of Gu/oral\n\nVora Piddali\n\nAyyangar ],\n\nexcept possibly the succeeding State. Considering it unnecessary to pronounce whether these rights could be enforced against the rulers as well as the Dominion of India as the succeeding sovereign, he observed that as these rights were factually in existence at the date of the Constitution and as by that date the subjects of the rulers of Charkari and Sarila had become the subjects of the Union, there could be no question of the Union Government claiming to exercise an\n\n\"act of State\" operating to deprive the petitioners of their property following in this respect the well-k®wn decisions ol' Walker v. Baird(') and Johnstone v. Pedlar(').\n\nHe further explained that \"the Constitution by reason of the authority derived from and conferred by the peoples of this land blotted out in one magnificent sweep all vestiges of arbitrary and despotic power in the territories of India and over its citizens and lands and prohibited just such acts of arbitrary power as the State now seeks to uphold.\"\n\nThe passage extracted and indeed the entire judgment is replete with a description of the poetry of India's constitutional evolution as an unified State during the most momentous period of her history from the Declaration of Independence on August 15, 1947, to the coming into force of the Constitution on January 26, 1950 and of the saga of the march of the subjects of the former Indian princes from being subjects of an autocratic ruler to a modern democatic set up in which they are full-fledged citizens of India, in language at once picturesque and of authentic eloquence.\n\nWe should not be understood to minimise in any manner the political significance of the events described or underrate their importance, content or meaning if we differ somewhat from certain of the conclusions drawn on matters which are relevant for the purposes of the points arising for decision in these appeals.\n\nPausing here we ought to point out that several decisions of this Court subsequent to Virendra Singh's case(') of which it is sufficient to refer to M / s. Dal mi a Dadri Ceme_nt Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax('), Jagan-\n\n(1) (1892) A.c;. 491.\n\n(3) [1955] 1 s.c.R. 415.\n\n(2) (1921) 2 A.c. 262.\n\n(4) [1959] S.C.R. 729.\n\nnath Agrawa/a v. State of Orissa('), Promod Chandra Deb\n\nv. The State of Orissa( 2 ) and State of Saurashtra v. Jamadar Mohamad Abdulla(') have proceeded on the acceptance of the constitutional doctrine enunciated by the Privy Council. We shall be referring to them later, but before doing so it is necessary to set out certain matters which are not in controversy.\n\nThe native Indian rulers were undoubtedly sovereign in the territories under their jurisdiction and they parted with their sovereignty in stages, firstly on accession, then on integration and finally by what has been felicitously termed in the White Paper on Indian States as 'unionization' i.e., by State territory becoming part and parcel of the territory of the Union of India which meant the complete extinction of their separate existence and individual sovereignty and of their States as separate political units.\n\nProceeding next to deal witb Virendra Singh's case(') a close analysis cf the reasoning underlying the decision discloses the following as its ratio:\n\n( 1 ) There were two schools of thought as regards the effect of a change in sovereignty in respect of the enforceability of the rights of private individuals against the succeeding sovereign.\n\nAt one end of the scale were the decisions of the Privy Council which proceeded on the acceptance of the principle, that rights enforceable against the previous ruler or sovereign ceased to be enforceable by the Municipal Courts of the succeeding sovereign unless and until a competent authority or organ of the succeeding sovereign recognised those rights.\n\nThe passage in the judgment of Lord Duneclin in Vajesingji's case(\") was typical of this view.\n\nOn the other hand, there was another and, if one might say so, an opposite view expressed in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of which the classic exposition by\n\n(1) [1962) 1 S.C.R. 205.\n\n(3) [19621 3 S.C.R. 70.\n\n(5) 51 I. A. 357\n\nr21 [196211 Supp. s.c.R. 405.\n\n(4) l i955J 1 s.c.R. 415.\n\nSt•tt of G•i-\n\n\"· V 0111 F\"\"\"'1i\n\n\"\"\"\"\"\" J.\n\nSink of Gujarat\n\n....\n\nYoN Fiddali\n\nA.yyangar /,\n\nChief Justice Marshall i.n Percheman's case(') was typical, that the proper and just rule of Public International Law which should be given effect to by municipal courts was that the changes in sovereignty over a territory did not or should not have any effect on the rights of the private individuals even as regards the enforceability of their claims as against the State and that it was the obligation certainly moral, if not also legal, of the succeeding sovereign to give effect to such rights previously acquired by grants from the previous sovereign.\n\nAfter pointing out these divergent views the learned Judges, in Virendra Singh's case(2), considered it unnecessary to express their opinion as regards the correctness or acceptability of either view, but proceeded, however, on the assumption that the constitutional doctrine as enunciated by the Privy Council appealed to the facts of the case before them.\n\n(2) Starting from the position that the petitioners obtained a good title to the villages granted to them by the rulers of Sarila and Charkari, they proceeded to analyse the nature of the title which they had under the grants.\n\nAs a result of this examination they arrived at the conclusion that even on the basis of the decisions of the Privy Council, their title was only voidable at the ()ption of the succeeding sovereign. They recognised that the changes that took place in the constitutional position of the State of Chartari and Sarila undoubtedly brought in a change in the sovereignty of that territory and hold that the changes thus brought about including the treaties which marked the transition were \"Acts of State\" and that the interpretation or enforcement of rights under the treaties was outside the jurisdiction of municipal courts. The petitioners, they held, could not, therefore obtain any advantage by reliance on any provision in the\n\n(1) 32 U.S. 51 at pp. 86-87-\n\n(2) [19551 l s.c.R. 4r5.\n\ntreaty safeguarding their rights, for apart from the treaties being \"Acts of State\" they were engagements between two sovereign States and enforceable between them at the instance of the high contracting parties through diplomatic channels and not by recourse to municipal courts, and the petitioners not even being parties to the treaties could not obviously claim any right to enforce them. In this connection the terms of Art. 363 of the Constitution which contained an express embargo on the enforcement by the municipal courts of the provisions of these treaties were adverted to as reinforcing this position.\n\n(3) If guarantees contained in the treaties be put aside, the next question to be considered was whether the Governments which emerged as a result of the Constitution, were competent to avoid or repudiate the titles obtained by the petitioners under the previous ruler by an \"Act of State\". They answered this question in the negative for four reasons:\n\n(i) The constitution emerged as a result of the conjoint action of the subjects of the former Indian rulers and the people of former British India.\n\nWhen as a result of this joint effort the Constitution was brought into existence there was no question of conquest or cession so as to attract those doctrines of Public International Law relating to the effects of rights arising out of changes in sovereignty brought about by conquest, cession, treaty etc.\n\n(ii) The subjects of the former Indian rulers became, when the Constitution emerged, Indian citizens, and as against its own sub- .iects or citizens there was no question of any \"Act of State\" by any Indian Governl\\lent.\n\n(iii) Even if the previous rulers had vested in them autocratic powers to revoke grants\n\nState o/ Gll/lnl\n\nVora PUltlalJ\n\nAyyanglJI' I.\n\niltlll6 ti/ Gu}aral\n\n\"' \"\"\"' Flddall\n\nJf11'1'114T_/.\n\nmade by them in favour of their subjects, the Government of the Union and the States\n\nwhich were functioning under a Constitution which contained fundamental rights guaranteeing protection of property rights against arbitrary executive action could not claim to exercise those arbitrary powers which they might have inherited from the previous rulers, and\n\n(iv) The petitioners had at the commencement of the Constitution a possessury title to the property granted to them and had also a right at that date, to continue in possession unless and until their title which was voidable was extinguished by repudiation by the Governments which were established by the Constitution. These proprietary rights were, however, protected by Arts. 19(1)(g) and 31(1) of the Constitution and so the petitioners could not be deprived of their proprietary rights except by competent legislation enacted after the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nWe shall now proceed to examine the above reasoning of the learned Judges. Reserving for later consideration the arguments addressed to us regarding the divergent views of judges, jurists and writers on Public International Law on the topic of the enforceability of the rights derived from previous sovereigns against a succeeding sovereign on a change of sovereignty, we sh_all proceed on the same lines as in Virendra Singh's case(') viz., on the acceptance of the rule as enunciated in the decisions of the Privy Council.\n\nIt is necessary, first to understand the precise scope and implications of these decisions and of the law explained in them. The earliest of these usually referred to in this conneetion is Secretary of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahiba(') which was concerned with the justiciability in municipal courts of a seizure by the East India Company of not merely the Raj but even of the private properties o: the\n\n(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 415.\n\n(2) (1859) 7 Moo. I.A. 476-13 Moo. P.c. 22.\n\nRaja of Tanjore. The Privy Council held in a judgment delivered by Lord Kingston that as the seizure haJ been made by the Company as a sovereign power the municipal courts \"had no means of forming or the right of expressing if they had formed any opinion of the propriety or the justice of that act.\" That is, however, a different aspect of what is termed 'Act of State' from what is strictly relevant to the facts before us.\n\nThat decision was referred to with approval by the Privy Council in a case from India-Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hai Rajbai(') where the point in controversy was somewhat akin to those in the present appeals. The question at issue before the Privy Council was whether the respondent was entitled to the continued ownership and possession of a village called Charodi in the province of Gujarat The respondent's title to the village was ultimately based on rights claimed to have been granted by the Gaekwar of Baroda. The territory in which the village was situated was ceded by the Gaekwar to the British Government in 1817. The claim of the respondent to full ownership of the property was not recognised by the Indian Government after the cession and Government held that the respondent had no more than a leasehold interest. The question before the Privy Council was whether the respondent was entitled to assert in municipal courts rights more extensive than what had been recognised by the authorities. Dealing with this Lord Atkinson delivering the judgment of the Board stated:\n\n.... It is essential to consider what was the precise relation in which the kasbatis (respondents) stood to the Bombay Government the moment the cession of their territory took effect, and what were the legal rights enforceable in the tribunals of their new sovereign, of which they were thereafter possessed.\n\nThe relation in which they stood to their native sovereigns before this cession, and the legal rights they enjoyed under them, are, save in one respect, entirely irrelevant matters.\n\nThey could not carry in under the new regime the legal rights. -------\n\n(!) 4> I.A. \"9.\n\nState of Gujatd\n\n•• Vora Fiddali\n\nA.yyangar I.\n\n. Stale of Gujar.-1t v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\n.A.yyangar 1.\n\nif any, which they might have enjoyed under the old. The only legal enforceable rights they could have as against their new sovereign were those, and only those, which that new sovereign, by agreement expressed or implied, or by legislation, chose to confer upon them. Of course, this implied agreement might be proved by circumstantial evidence, such as the mode of Jealing with them which the new sovereign adopted, his recognition of their old rights, lllld express or implied election to respect them and be bound by them, and it is only for the purpose of determining whether and to what extent the new sovereign has recognised these antecession rights of the kasbatis, and has elected or agreed to be bound by them, that the consideration of the existence, nature, or extent of these rights becomes a relevant subject for enquiry in this case.\n\nThis principle is wellestablished, though it scarcely seems to have been kept steadily in view in the lower courts in the present case. It is only necessary to refer to two authorities on the point, namely, the case of Secretary of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahiba [(1859) 7Moo. I.A. (476) decided in the year 1859, and Cook v.\n\nSprigg\n\n(1899) A.C. 572] decided in the year 1899.\" This passage would appear to indicate that the effect of the change of sovereignty is not to treat rights previously enforceable against the former ruler as only voidable at the instance of the succeeding sovereign, but to effect a complete destruction of those rights until by recognition or by legislation of the succeeding sovereign the same is obtained by the previous grantee.\n\nA question very similar to Bai Rajbi:tis case(') arose in Vajesingji's case(') where the statement of the law as explained by Lord Atkinson was approved and Lord Dunedin, as already stated, conveyed the i; ame idea when he said:\n\n\"Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal Courts established by the new -------\n\n(1) 4> I.A. 229.\n\nsovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers recognised.\n\nSuch rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing.\"\n\nIt need hardly be stated that this passage, just like that extracted from Lord Atkinson, is wholly inconsistent with the theory that an inhabitant of a territory in which there has been a change of sovereignty carries with him a voidable title to property which inheres in him until by some positive act of the new sovereign he is divested of that right.\n\nComing nearer to the present times we have the decision in Secretary of State v. Rustam Khan(') which related to the enforceability of the right to certain land claimed to have been acquired under the Khan of Kalat against the British Government after the cession by the Khan of the territory which included the villages in which the lands of the respondent were situate.\n\nFor the. appellant the plea raised was 'Act of State' and the decisions of the Board in Bai Raihai's case( 2 ) and Vijayesingji's case(') were relied on.\n\nAm0ng the submissions made to the Board on behalf of the respondent we would refer to two as of some relevance to the points under consideration in these appeals.\n\nThe two contentions were: ( 1) that a mere change in sovereignty was not to be presumed to disturb the rights of private owners, and ihe terms of the cession by which full sovereignty was transferred were to be construed as passing only public property-relying for this proposition on A modu Tijani v. Secretarv Southern Nigeria(•), (2) that the effect of a change in sovereignty in regard to title to land which had been perfected under a previous sovereign was different from that in regard to personal obligations. For the latter proposition support was sought on the observations of Lord Alverstone CJ. in West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v.\n\nRex( 5) reading:\n\n\"It must not be forgotten that the obligation of conquering States with regard to private pro-\n\n(1) 68 I.A. 109.\n\n(3) SI I.A. 357\n\n(2)\n\n42 I.A. 229\n\n(4) [1921] 2 A. C. 3'9\n\nStal• of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar 1.\n\n196-1\n\nStal• of Gujarat v.\n\nJI' or/J Fiddali\n\nAyyongar I.\n\n492 SUPREME COURT REPUl<l'S • ...n 1\n\nLC~4J\n\nperty and private individuals, particularly land to which title had already been perfected before the conqueror annexation are altogether different from the obligations which arise in respect of personal rights by contract.\"\n\nWe have referred to these arguments and particularly to the citation of these two decisions, because they are usually referred to in connection with a suggestion that even according to the British view rights of private individuals to land and interests in relation to land continue to be enforceable unaffected by changes in sovereignty.\n\nLord Atkinson who delivered the judgment of the Board pointed out that the cession of the territory by the Khan constituted a complete transfer of all sovereignty to the British Government, stated:\n\n\"On the legal position that arises in such circumstances there is a wealth of weighty authority.\"\n\nAfter referring in detail to the earlier decisions of the Board in Kamachee Boye('). Cook v. Sprigg,( 2 ) Bai Rai Bai( 8 ) and Vi; ayesingii.(') applied them to the facts and held that as the title which was asserted had not been recognised by the British Government; allowed the appeal and directed the dismissal of the suit of the respondents. If the Privy Council decisions lay down the law correctly and we are applying that law, the fact that it is land or immovable property which is claimed or as regards which the right is asserted makes no difference for the application of the principle.\n\nThe last decision to be referred to in this context is that reported as Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Aimer(') where Lord Simonds said:\n\n\"From this it follows that the rights, which the inhabitants of that State enjoyed against its former rulers, availed them nothing against the British Government and could not be asserted in the Courts established by that Government\n\n(I) (1859) 7 Moo. I.A. 476-13 Moo. P.c .••.\n\n(3) 42 I.A. 229.\n\n(5) A.I.R. 1947 P. C. 1.\n\n(2 [1899) A.C 572.\n\n(4) SI I.A. 357\n\nexcept so far as they had been recognised by the new sovereign power. Recognition may be by legislation or by agreement express or implied.\n\nThis well-established rule of law, for which reference may be made to 42 I.A. 229 at p. 237 and 51 I.A. 357 at p. 360, appears to -their Lordhips to be peculiarly applicable to an office, to which material benefits appertain and which, so far the records show, had consistently been regarded as within the disposition of the sovereign power.\" As we have already pointed out, these decisions of the Privy Council have been referred to and followed by this Court in Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. (1) and the other deciions already referred.\n\nThe statement of the law therefore in Virendra's case(2 ) that if the doctrine of Public International Law enunciated by the Privy Council were applied, the petitioners in that case had a voidable title, which inhered in them even after the change of sovereignty, is nN seen to be correct.\n\nIf the view expressed by the Privy Council was to be adopted there is no escape from the conclusion, that the grantee~ under the previous rulers did not carry with them, on a change of sovereignty, as subjects of the succeeding sovereign any inchoate rights as against the new sovereign, but their rights in so far as enforceability against the new sovereign was concerned prang into existence only on recognition express or implied b~· the duly constituted competent authorities of the succeeding sovereign, apart from legislation.\n\nPausing liere we might observe that this error on the part of the learned Judges in appreciating the ratio of the judgments of the Privy Council necessarily led them to assume that the petitioners before them had certain rights which they continued to enjoy even after the change of sovereignty and which were protected by the guarantees contained in Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution.\n\nThe next step in the reasoning of the learned Judges was based on the fact that the Constitution was framed not merely by the people inhabiting the Provin-\n\n(I) [19;9] S.C.R. 729. (2l [ 1955] 1 s.c.R. 415.\n\nState of Gujarat ...\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAnangar I.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\n.Ayyangar J.\n\nces of India but as a result of their conjoint action along with the subjects of the former Indian rulers.\n\nFrom this the inference was drawn that those rules of Public International Law which recognised the rights of a successor State to refuse to be bound by obligations incurred by or enforceable against the predecessor State had no application to the change in sovereignty brought about when the Union of India was brought into existence.\n\nThis was on the theory that for that doctrine to operate there must be a cession or transfer of territory by one ruler to another and that where the people of the entire subcontinent by their united action brought into existence a new sovereign State there was no question of transfer of territory from one sovereign to another to afford scope for the application of the rule of Public International Law.\n\nWith the greatest respect to the learned Judges, we feel constrained to differ.\n\nThat a new sovereign emerged on the unification of India by the merger or absorption of the Indian States with the Provinces of British India cannot be questioned and that this was by the process of the sovereignty of the rulers of the former Indian States being extinguished cannot be disputed either.\n\nWe are here not concerned with whether India as an International person has undergone any change, vis-a-vis in its relationship with other States or in the International Organisations but in a more limited and, so to speak, domestic sphere.\n\nThe territories under the rulers of the former Indian Princes uncfoubtedly passed from one sovereign to another when as a result of the 'unionisation' by the Government of India, they Became integral parts first of the Dominion of India and later of the lJnion of India. A transfer of territory from under one sovereign to another may be effected in a variety of ways--conquest, annexation; by cession under a treaty after a war or without a war, by revolution by emancipation of subject peoples and by territorial resettlements. These changes possess one common feature viz., that one sovereign ceases to rule a territory and another takes its place. For the application of the rules which have been evolved in connection with the problems arising from such succession, little turns for the purpose of British Constitutional Law on either the manner in which the change of\n\nsovereignty was brought about or whether the absorption was partial or complete, complete in the sense of a total extinction of the previous sovereignty of the absorbed State, leaving no trace of survival after the merger. In passing we might mention that, in fact. it was in most cases the rulers of the Indian States who effected the merger and who on behalf of their State and their subjects participated by themselves or through their representatives in th~ deliberations which brought into existence the Constitution, and the legal and political unity of India.\n\nIf, then, as a result of the absorption there was a State succession, its consequences have to be judged by tests or principles similar to those by which State succession is brought about by other means. We cannot, therefore, agree that the manner in which the Indian States ceased to exist or in which the Constitution and with it the complete political unification of the territory of India was brought about negatives the applicability of rules which govern the enforceability of rights against a succeeding sovereign on State succession.\n\nThe point next to be considered is whether the fact that the subjects of the former Indian rulers became, after the Constitution, citizens and subjects of the Indian Union precludes the Indian Government from refusing recognition to titles which such persons could have enforced against their previous rulers on the well-accepted principle that \"there can be no act of State against its own subjects.\" The application of this principle last mentioned of which Walker v.\n\nBaird(') and Johnstone v. Pedlar(') are classic examples, is intimately bound up with the question as to the precise nature of the action taken by a succeeding State, when it refuses to accord recognition to the right of a former inhabitant of the territory of an earlier sovereign and enforceable against the predecessor.\n\nIf the true position in law were that a positive action is necessary to be taken by the succeeding sovereign before it interferes with the pre-existing rights of the subjects of the former ruler and that the action thus taken is really a continuance of the act of the State by which the territory of the former ruler became transferred to the new sovereign, it is possible that the rule that there can be no act of State by\n\n(1)(1892] A.C. 491.\n\n(2) [19>1] 2 A.c. 262.\n\nState of Gujarat'\n\n•• Vora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nStille of Gujarat v.\n\nYora Fiddali\n\nA.yyaogar J.\n\nthe Government against its own subjects might have some application. But if, on the other hand, the true theory were, that on the extinction of the sovereignty of the previous ruler over the territory ceded or surrendered, there is an extinction ipso jure of the rights enforceable against the State and that it is really a new right that springs into existence on recognition by the succeeding sovereign, it would be manifest that the refusal of the succeeding sovereign to recognise preexisting rights could in no sense be an act of State. No doubt, that refusal is in the exercise of sovereign power but by such exercise it neither annihilates nor affects any enforceable right which its subjects had against it.\n\nWe consider, therefore, that if the doctiine of Public International Law expounded by the Privy Council were held applicable to the termination of the rights arising on the change of sovereignty in India, as the learned Judges in Virerulra Singh's case(') did, the power of the Government of India as at present constituted to refuse to recognise titles originating in executive grants by former Indian rulers cannot be negatived by resort to the rule of Jaw laid down in Walker v.\n\nBaird(') and Johnstone v. Pedlar(').\n\nThe next proposition of law which underlies the decision in Virendra Singh's case(') is that the arbitrary and absolute powers which the former Indian rulers possessed to revoke grants made by them did not survive the change in sovereignty brought about by the Constitution, when as a result of the setting up of a democratic polity informed by justice and the rule of law, the right to exercise any arbitrary power was abandoned and was no longer available for revoking the grants made by the former rulers. If the theory of Public International Law which was explained and given effect to by the decisions of the Privy' Council rested on the doctrine that the powers of the succeeding sovereign to recognise or not to recognise grants by the preceding sovereign or to repudiate them was based on the rights of the preVl\\JUS ruler so to revoke or repudiate, the argument would have considerable force.\n\nThe juristic basis of the theory underlying the Privy Council decisions is that with the extinction of the previous sovereign the rights theretofore exercisable\n\n(1) [1955] 1 s.c.R. 415.\n\n(2) (1892] A.C. 49I.\n\n(3) [1921J 2 A. C. 2~2.\n\nby the subjects of that sovereign were likewise extinguished and that without recognition which is really tantamount to a fresh grant by the new sovereign, no title enforceable in the municipal courts of the succeeding sovereign came into being.\n\nIf this latter be the correct juristic approach, and that is what the decisions of the Privy Council lay down as we have shown by the extracts we have made of the relevant passages in Bai Rajbai's(') and in Vajeysinghji's(') case, then it matters not whether the earlier grant was by an absolute ruler who could revoke his grant or by a ruler of a different type who could not or even if he could, had renounced his rights to revoke by unilateral executive action.\n\nIn either case, where the question at issue is whether the right could be enforced against the succeeding sovereign in its courts, nothing turns bn the power of the preceding ruler to derogate from his grant; for it is not by virtue of any power derived from the previous sovereign that the succeeding sovereign claims the right not to recognise the earlier rights or grants but as an incident of its own sovereignty and sovereign power. In the circumstances, the existence of the arbitrary powers of the native Indian rulers and its absence in the Governments under the Constitution i.s not relevant, nor the fact that these were not inherited by and did not devolve on the Governments of the Union and the States functioning under the Constitution.\n\nThe last of the steps in the reasoning underlying Virendra Singh's case(') proceeds on the basis that the petitioners had brought with them from their previous rulers into the Indian Union certain rights in the property granted to them, enforceable against the Government in regard to which they were entitled to the protection of Arts. I 9 and 31.\n\nThis question has to be approached from two points of view arising from the two stages through which the territory of the former Indian rulers became part of the territory of India under the Constitution. The first stage is concerned with the effect of the changes which took place from the accession of the States to the Dominion of India followed by the merger a.greement ex_ecuted by the rulers all of which were governed by the provisions of the Government of India\n\n(1) 42 !.'\\. 229.\n\n(2) 51 I.A. 357\n\n(3) [1955] l s.c.R. 415.\n\n134 1,0 SC-\"·\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nVora Fiddoli\n\nA.yyangor J,\n\nState of Gu}arat\n\n\"· Vora Fiddali\n\nA.Y_yangar J,\n\nAct, 1935 as it stood from time to time Gnd the second stage with the complete 'unionization' of these territories so as to form part of an unified polity, the Union of India.\n\nSo far as the first stage is concerned, !here was certainly a transfer of sovereignty over the territory of the former Indian rulers to the Government of India for the purposes of the exercise by the latter of sovereignty with plenary powers of administration.\n\nSections 290A and 2908 were introduced into the Government of India Act for enabling the administration by the Dominion Government of the territories of the acceding States which under s. 5 of that Act became part of the Dominion of India.\n\nAt this stage the powers of the Government of India for the administration of the acceding territories were exercised under the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act (Act XLVII of 1947) which' used th~ phraseology 'areas outside Provinces which were' acquired y the Central Government by treaty, agreement, grant, , usage, sufferance or other lawful means'.\n\nIt may be mentioned that under orders made by virtue of powers conferred by the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act all laws theretofore in force prevailing in the territories which were being administered under that Act were continued in force. Later by an order issued under s. 290A of the Government of India Act, known as the States Merger Order 1949, laws in operation in the merged States, were continued until re1lealed or modified. If in that situation the law as to acquired rights enforceable against the successor State as enunciated by the Privy Council applid, all grants which rested solely on executive action could acquire vitality for being enforced against the administration by the Government of India or , its delegates only if those rights were recognised; for there was here a true case of State succession-transfer of territory by one sovereign to another and without the complication arising from the fact that the rulers or the people of the various Indian States participating in the making of the Constitution which the people of India gave to themselves.\n\nWe have already explained that if the view of the Privy Council as to the effect of a change in sovereignty were accepted, it unmistakably points to their being no survival of any vestige of rights on the extinction of the sovereignty of the previous\n\nruler and to the emergence of any right only by the action express or implied of the new sovereign.\n\nIf this principle were applied, there would have been no rights <•f property vesting in the grantee which he could assert against the new ruler.\n\nNo doubt, if the grantees were in possession they would have a right to retain their possession against private trespassers but that is not the question with which we are here concerned, for what is now under consideration is the capacity of these grantees to assert rights as against the Government which is totally different from their right to possession as to the rest of the world. Digressing a little it may be pointed out that s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 as well as Arts. 19 and 31 which are referred to in this connection deal exrlusively with the inference with proprietary rights by the State and have nothing to do with rights inter se between the grantee and his fellow subjects or citizens.\n\nIf, therefore, we are correct in our understanding of the decisions of the Privy Council that on a change of soverreignty no scintilla of right inhered in the grantee quoad his right to assert or enforce his rights under the grants against the rulers survived tl\\e change of sovereignty, the guarantee against deprivation of property contained in s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, availed him nothing, for when the succeeding sovereign refused to recognise the rights obtained by him under the previous sovereign its action deprived him of no right to property; because he brought with him no rights from the previous ruler which he could assert against the new sovereign.\n\nThe position, therefore, reduces itself to this: Just previous to the Constitution the grantee had no right of property enforceable against the State and in regard to which, therefore, be could invoke the protection of Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution.\n\nThe coming into force of the Constitution could not, therefore, make any difference; for the Constitution does not create rights in property but only protected rights which otherwise existed. It is necessary to add that if the learned Judges in Virendra Singh's case(') were right in their understanding of the Privy Council decision to\n\n(I) [19551 I S.C.R. 415.\n\nStat1 of Gujarat v.\n\nVora l'lddalt\n\nAyyon1ar I.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fldda/i\n\nA.Y, angar J.\n\nmean that a grantee under the previous ruler had a voidable title which he continued to possess and en joy until by action of the succeeding ruler the same was revoked or repudiated, they might also be right in their conclusion that such title as the grantees had could not be extinguished by the executive action of the Union or of the State Governments because of the guarantee of the right to property contained in Arts. 19 and 31. But, if as we have shown, the decisions of the Privy Council do not lend support to such a view, the conclusion in Virendra Singh's case(') as regards this last proposition also cannot be correct.\n\nThis takes us to the consideration of the question which was raised by Mr. Purshottam Tricumdass submitting to us that we should discard the theory of Public International Law which underlies the decisions of the Privy Council but that we should accept and give effect to what might be termed the American view as formulated by Chief Justice .Marshall in U.S. v. Percheman( 2 ) which was approved and applied in the later decisions of the American Supreme Court to which also he drew our attention. Learned Counsel submitted that this Court was not bound by the decisions of the Privy Council and was free to adopt the more rational, just and . human doctrine which found expression in these American decisions.\n\nIn this connection his thesis was that the doctrines evolved by the Privy Council were conditioned by Britain being an Imperialist and expansionist power at the date when they originated and were applied and that while these might have been suited to the regime of a colonial power, they were wholly out of place in the set up of this country and with the type of Constitution under which it functions.\n\nHaving considered this matter carefully we are clearly of the opinion that there is no justification or reason to discard the British view as regards the jurisdiction of municipal courts to enforce rights against succeedi1; g sovereigns on a change of sovereignty.\n\nIn the first plac~, Percheman's case(') itself came before the courts for ascertaining the proper construction of the treaty under which Florida was surrendered to the United States by Spain under the Florida treaty dated February 22, 1819, on the terms of which the\n\n< 1) [1955] 1 s.c.R. 415.\n\n(2) 32 U.S. 51 at pp. 86-Si.\n\nrespondent contended that his title to the property claimed by him had been recognised and confirmed. The place of a treaty entered into by the Unitee1 States and the provisions contained in it, in the Constitutional Law of the United States, we shall be referring to later, but that apart the F'Jorida treaty was followed by an Act of Congress of 1 gzg entitled \"an Act supplementary to the several Acts providing for the settlement of confirmation of private land claims in Florida.\" Under the terms of this Act of the Congress, Commissioners were set up to investigate claims by private individuals to lands and in cases where the validity of a claim set up was not upheld by the Commissioner, provision was made for resort to courts for resolving the dispute.\n\nThere was, therefore, no scope for invoking the British rule of the lack of jurisdiction of municipal courts to adjudicate on unrecognised titles to property, even if such a doctrine was applicable and the only point in controversy was as to the interpretation of the clauses of the treaty relative to the titles which were recognised because on any view of the law if the treaty and the Act of Congress confirmed the respondent's title, the same was enforceable in the municipal courts of the United States.\n\nBefore passing on from thi~. decision it is necessary to bear in mind the difference in constitutional law prevailing in the United States and in India as regards the effect of treaties and the provisions contained therein. Art. 6 cl. (2) of the United States Constitution reads:\n\n\"6 .. ...................... .\n\n(2) All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the: United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in tlie Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.\" Willoughby explains* the object and effect of this provision thus:\n\n\" .... the primary purpose of this provision, (Art.\n\nVI cl. \\2) ...... was to make indubitable the supremacy of treaties over State Statutory or\n\n~~~~~~~~~\n\n•constitution of the United States VoJ. 1, 548.\n\nStal• of Gu/arat\n\nVar• Fiddall\n\nA.yyangar J.\n\nStall of Gujarat\n\nY ora Fiddalt\n\nJfyyangar J.\n\nconstitutional provisions ...... it has, from the beginning been held that treaties, so far as they are self-executory, operate in the United States, by virtue of this constitutional provision, to create municipal law which the courts are called upon to recognise and apply.\"\n\nIn the United Kingdom and in India the position is entirely different.\n\nA treaty is, in British jurisprudence, treated merely as a contract between two States and does not become a part of the law of the land unless by an express Act of the Legislature. A treaty does not confer rights or obligations between the State and its subjects or as between subjects, such rights can be conferred only by an enactment of the Legislature. As explained by Lord Atkin in Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontraio('):\n\n\"Unlike some other countries the stipulations of treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone have the force of law.\" It was in recognition of this constitutional posiiion that s. 106 of the Government of India Act, 1935 was enacted.\n\nIts terms are in substance re-enacted in Art. 25 3 of the Constitution which reads:\n\n\"253. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for !mp!cmenting any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body.\" and to reinforce this position we have Art. 363 by which municipal C<lnrts are depril'ed of jurisdiction t-1 enforce any rights arising from certain treaties.\n\nIt would be apparent that in the context of the different constitutionnl position i:egarding treaties in the two countries, the rule of law which was enunciated by the American Supreme Court, cannot automatically be applied here. For in ultimate analysis the court in Percheman' s case(\") was giving effect to provisions\n\n(1) 1937 A. C. 326 at o 347.\n\n(2) ::2 U.S. 51 at pp. 86-87.\n\nof the treaty with Spain which was the law of the land, and if the treaty provisions were different, these again would !lave been enforced by the courts. We are making this observation not to minimise the importance of the doctrine of Public International Law explained by Chief Justice Marshall, but to point out that the decision must be understood in the setting of the provisions of the treaty with Spain and the articles of the American Constitution.\n\nAs indicated earlier, we are not insensible to the position that apart from the place of treaties in American Constitutional Law what Marshall C.J., expounded was a doctrine of Public International Law which he considered it was necessary; just and proper for succeeding States to observe in their dealings with the rights acquired by private individuals under predecessor sovereigns.\n\nWe shall now proceed to deal with the question whether we should discard the rule as enunciated in the decisions of the Privy Council and adopt that which was formulated in Percheman's case(').\n\nThere are several reasons why we are unable to accept C. J. Marshall's exposition in Percheman's case(') as laying down a law which has to be given effect to by municipal courts in this country.\n\nIn the first place, it could not be said that the broad terms in which Marshall C.J., stated the doctrine that every private rights derived from a predecessor sovereign ought to continue to be enforceable against a successor sovereign and that a change in sovereignty m,3kes no difference to the enforceability of private rights, be it against other individuals or the succeeding State, has been in that absolute form accepted as valid by jurists and writers on Public International Law.\n\nEven in treaties in Public International Law in which the most exte!lded scope has been afforded to the enforceability of acquired rights against a successor State two limitations have always been recognise:\\: (I) that the origin of the right should be bona fide and not .Jne designed to injure the economic interests of the successor State, and ( 2) that the right should not be a political concession.\n\nNext, jurists and even the Permanent Court of International Justice have drawn a marked distinction between\n\n(I) 32 U ' ciat pp. 86-87.\n\nState of Gujarat\n\ny, Vora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J,\n\nStat• of G u}arat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nwhat might be termed the theory of the law and the enforceability of these rights and in municipal courts. C.C. Hydl! in his treatise on Public International Law(*) after referring to the decision in Percheman's case(') and those which followed it adds: \"Acknowledgement of the principle that a change of sovereignty does not in itseif serve to impair rights of private property validly acquired in areas subjected to a change, does not, of course, touch the question whether the new sovereign is obliged to respect those rights when vested in the nationals of foreign States. such as those of its predecessor.\"\n\nSimilarly George Schwarzenberger in his fnternational Law ( • •) after referring to a passage in the decision of the\n\nPennanent Court of International Justice in the ase of German Settlers in Poland reading:\n\n\"Private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty.\n\nNo one denies that the German Civil Law, both substantive and adjective, has continued without interruption to operate in the territory in question. It can hardly be maintained that, although the law survives, private rights acquired under it have perished. Such a contention is based on no principle and would be contrary to an almost universal opinion and practice\" adds that though the Permanent Court of International Justice negatively stated that private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty, the Court did not expressly pronounce on the question whether in the absence of legislation to the contrary on the part of Poland, she was bound by International Law to consider German Civil Law as valid in the ceded territories.\n\nThe doctrine of act of State evolved by English Courts is one purely of municipal Jaw. It denies to such a Court jurisdiction to enquire into the consequences of acts which are inseparable from an eension of its sovereignty.\n\nThat doc-\n\n(*) Vol. Ip. 433. ( .. ) Vol. I p. 83,\n\n(I) 32 U.S. 51 at pp. 86-87.\n\n1964 trine was, however, not intended to deny any rule of international law.\n\nState of Guiarat\n\nNext we might examine the juristic concept un<lerlymg the American view, putting aside for the moment what one might call authority. There has been at one time a school of thought among writers on Public International Law which has described the process of State succession as if it were a transmission of sovereignty bringing in for this purpose the anaiogy of an heir in private law clothing the successor with the totality of the rights and obligations qua all inhabitants without exception or modification.\n\nThis theory has now been discarded because of the realisation that there could be no analogy between individuals and States, nor could the theory be sustained in the face of the circumstance that it does not accord with practice, which after all is one of the basic foundations of the rules of Public International Law.\n\nIt is hardly necessary to add that there is here no inconsistency with the comity of nations. Nor could it be maintained that the theory is just, because it would force upon the successor State obligations which might have owed their birth to political considerations which would not survive the predecessor State.\n\nBesides, it must not be forgotten that when a successor State exercises its sovereignty even over territory which has passed to it from a preceding ruler, it does not do so as a representative of or by delegation from the latter-as in the case of the heir in Private Law, but as a sovereign of the territory deriving authority from its own constitution and set up.\n\nIt is true that Public International Law might lay on the successor State duties with respect to the acquired territory and to the rights of the inhabitants thereof but those must be compatible with its undoubted sovereignty.\n\nIt is in recognition of such a position that successor States give effect to laws which regulate rights inter se between the subjects which theretofore applied, save in so far as either its constitution or its legislation has made other provision. We are, however, here concerned with rights possessed by individuals in the predecessor's territory enforceable against the previous rulers and even as regards these we are concerned with a very limited range of rights-rights arising out of grants of immovable property or concessions of righrts in relation thereto and\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nState of Gujarat enforceable against the predecessor State.\n\nWe made thil' reservation because in the Dalmia Dadri Cement case(') which dealt with the continued enforceability of a concesv.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J. sion regarding the levy of income tax, even Bose J. agreed that such rights did not survive and in a separate judgment confined the operation of the principle that he enunciated in Virendra Singh's case(') to rights of immovable property.\n\nIf the theory that rights and duties or rather the bundle of them pass ipso jure from the predecessor to the successor State is discarded and at the same time it is recognised that International Law and justice which underlies that body of law might impose some obligations which the successor State should respect, two questions arise: First what are the obligations which International Law might impose? and\n\necondly, whether these obligations which are not the creatures of municipal law, might give rise to claims enforceable in municipal courts.\n\nIt is impossible to lay down exact rules a~ to the inte1 -\n\nsts which are protected by a consensus of opinion as acquired rights.\n\nSo much, at least, is clear that to receive the protection of International Law the interest must have been properly vested in the sense that it must not have been voidable at the instance of the predecessor State and bona fide and legally acquired.\n\nNeither the comity of nations, nor any rule of International Law can be invoked to prevent a sovereign State from safeguarding its national economy and taking steps to protect it from abuse.\n\nOn the one side the principles of acquired rights demands that the interest of the private individual be not abrogated and on the other side the public interest of the successor State has to be considered. It is this conflict between the public and private aspects that hinders the laying down of hard and fast rules.\n\nAs has been pointed out by O'Connell in his Treatise on the Law of State Succession, the problems posed by State succession in International Law are notably different in character from those of municipal law though they arise al a different plane, but there is no necessary reason why the one system should not draw on the doctrine or concepts fo:mulated and found to be adequate within the other\n\n\nsystem. The principle of universal succession based on analogy from the civil law was essentially juristic in character, but the analogy was wrong and the practice of States was not consonant with the theory.\n\nThe rejection of this doctrine led to the assumption that solutions are to be found on experience alone. The choice of the appropriate theory by writers was coloured by their standpoint and their legal experience. In theory, therefore, we must have regard both to past experience and the necessities of the present and while on the one hand not being unduly restrictive, ought not on the other become so doctrinaire as to deprive the State of the option not to recognise even mala fide transactions.\n\nLooked at from this point of view the British practice that has prevailed in this country has not proved in actual practice to lead to injustice, but has proceeded on a just balance between the acquired rights of the private individual and the economic interests of the community, and therefore there is nothing in it so out of tune with notions of propriety or justice to call for its rejection.\n\nIt is undoubted that the British doctrine was part of the jurisprudence and the constitutional practice that prevailed in pre-Constitution India.\n\nMost certainly it does not need to be stated that the British Parliament when it enacted the Government of India Act as the constitutional framework by which this country should be governed, could not have had in contemplation any other rule by which the rights of the inhabitants newly brought into the political set up by other territories becoming part of India. With this historical background it would not be a violent presumption if we assume that the framers of the Constitution should also be taken to have proceeded on the basis of the acceptance of this doctrine and this state of the law, unless one found some provision or indication in the Constitution repugnant to its continuance.\n\nAs already pointed out, the position of treaties vis-a-vis municipal law was not changed. On the other hand, by Art. 363 an embargo was laid in express terms on municipal courts giving effect to the provisions of treaties with rulers of Indian States. This, in our opinion is a clear indication that the Constitution-makers intended no\n\nState of Gujarat v. , Vora Fiddali\n\nA.yyangar J.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nA.yyangar J.\n\ndeparture from the Constitutional doctrine that was theretofore accepted as law. It would, of course, be different if the provisions of any treaty became embodied in subsequent legislation; then they would be enforced as part of the law of the land.\n\nIt is also not to be assumed that the Constitution-makers were oblivious of the need for continuity of the law when the Indian States were absorbed and a change in sovereignty took place.\n\nBy Art. 3 72 of the Constitution all the laws which were in force in these States just as in British India without any distinction were continued until they' were altered or repealed by competent legislation. It is only necessary to point out that in the interval between the merger of these States and the coming into force of the Constitution, there were other provisions to which we have already adverted which continued the laws which obtained in these territories till Art. 3 72 could be availed of.\n\nThere was thus no legal vacuum or hiatus created so far as laws were concerned and it is only where the right sought to be enforced was created not by the laws of the previous sovereign but merely as a result of an administrative order that we have the problem to be solved in these appeals. If the definition of law in Art. 366( JO) were as that in Art. 12 so as to include even executive orders every right, however, created would have been continued.\n\nBut the Constitution-makers decided otherwise and preferred to continue only laws as distinguished from administrative orders.\n\nNext we have the circumstance that the doctrine enunciated in !he decisions of the Privy Council have been accepted as correct and thus applicable equally in post- Constitution India in a series of decisions of this Court commencing from Da/mia Dadri Cement Co.(') and unless compelling reasons are found for holding that all these were wrongly decided, it would be neither proper or even open for us to depart from these precedents, and as explained earlier, there are none.\n\nLastly, as we have already noticed, even in the case of Virendra Singh('), though the divergent views of the jurists on this question of Public International Law were set\n\n(1) [1959] s.c.R. 729.\n\n(2)[ 1955] IS ('.R. 415,\n\nout the court did not express any decisive opinion in favour of accepting the observations in Percheman's case(') as proper to be applied by the municipal courts in India. In the face of these circumstances we would not be justified in departing from the decisions of the Privy Council which have been accepted and applied by this Court. These decisions both of the Privy Council as well as the earlier ones of this Court were reviewed and the propositions laid down in them were examined and summarised by this Court in Promod Chandra Deb and Ors. v. The State of Orissa and\n\nOrs.(') as laying down the following propositions:\n\n\" ( 1) 'Act of State' is the taking over of sovereign power by a State in respect of territory which was not till then a part of its territory, either by conquest, treaty or cession, or otherwise, and\n\nmy be said to have taken place on a particular date, if there is a proclamation or other public declaration of such taking over.\n\n(2) But the taking over full sovereign powers may be spread over a number of years, as a result of a historical process.\n\n(3) Sovereign power, including the right to legislate for that territory and to administer it, may be acquired without the territory itself merging in the new State, as illustrated in the case of Dattatraya Krishna Rao Kane v. Secretary of State for India in Council [(1930) L.R. 57\n\nI.A. 3181. ( 4) Where the territory has not become a part of the State the necessary authority to legislate in respect of that territory may be obtained by a legislation of the nature of Foreign Jurisdiction Act. ( 5) As an act of State derives its authority not from a municipal law but from ultra-legal or supra-legal means, Municipal Courts have no power to examine the propriety or legality of an act which comes within the ambit of 'Act of State.'\n\n(r) 32 U.S. at pp. 86-87.\n\n(2) [1962] 1 Sup~. s.c.R. 405.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nState of Guiaral v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n( 6) Whether the Act of State has reference to public rights or to private righis, the result is the same, namely, that it is beyond the jurisdiction of lllunicipal Courts to investigate the rights and wrongs of the transaction and to pronounce upon them and, that therefore, such a Court cannot enforce its decisions, if any. It may be that the presumption is that the pre-existing laws of the newly acquired territory continue, and that according to ordinary principles of International Law private property of the citizens is respected by the new sovereign, but Municipal Courts have no jurisdiction to enforce such international obligations. ( 7) Similarly, by virtue of the treaty by which the new territory has been acquired it may have been stipulated that the pre-cession rights of old inhabitants shall be respected, but such stipulations cannot be enforced by individual citizens because they are no parties to those stipulations. ( 8) The Municipal Courts recognised by the new sovereign have the power and the jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain only such rights as the new sovereign has chosen to recognise or\n\nacknowledg~ by legislation, agreement or otherwise. ( 9) Such an agreement or recognition may be either express or may be implied from circumstances and evidence appearing from the mode of dealing with those rights by the new sovereign.\n\nHence, Vie Municipal Courts have the jurisdiction to find out whether the new sovereign has or has not recognised or acknowledged the rights in question, either expressly or by implication, as aforesaid.\n\n(10) In any controversy as to the existence of the right claimed against the new sovereign, the burden of proof lies on the claimant to establish that the new sovereign had recognised or acknowledged the right in question.\"\n\nWe consider this summary succinctly exrressed the rule to be applied in this country as regards the enforceability against the Governments in India of private rights originating in excutive or administrative orders of the former Indian rulers.\n\nThe next matter to be con5idered is the correctness of !he view expressed by the High Court. that even though the ueaty be an Act of State. and the merger agreement executed by the ruler a document on which no rights enforceable in municipal courts could be based. still cl. ( 7) of the Jetter Of Shri V. P. Menon dated October I, 194~ could be referred to and relied upon for founding an argument that the Government waived their right to repudiate the grant made by the previous ruler.\n\nWe consider that the submission of the learned Attorney-General that the learned Judges were in error in this respect is well-founded. If the treaty mits provisions cannot be looked at to spell out any right, as the learned Judges themselves conceded. the use to which they have put the provisions of cl. !7)-that the Government would not re-examine grants made earlier than April 1. 1948, is virtually the same though called by another name.\n\nWe can see no sensible distinction between reliance on the provisions of the treaty as pointing to a recot; nition by ih~\n\nGovernment of rights claimed and reliance on it for the purpose of establishing that Government had wQivcd their right not to recognise such rights.\n\nIn substance. they are the\n\name-though the nomenclature employed is different.\n\nIn support of the reasoning on which this distinction was accepted the learned Judges have placed reliance on the approach to this question in Virendra Singh's case('). We have discussed this matter fully in the earlier part of this judgment and there is no need to repeat it.\n\nThe learned Judges have further referred to and relied on a decision of this Court in Bholanath v. The State of Saurashtra(') and certain observations contained in it.\n\nWe do not agree that the observations in the decision, though couched somewhat widely could properly be understood in the manner in which the learned Judges have done.\n\nThe question that arose in the case was whether the condition of service of a person\n\n-----....--<\n\n(1) [1055] I S.CR. tr5.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 680.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar 1.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J.\n\noriginally employed as an officer of one State continued to govern his services after that State became merged in the 'JOVernment of Saurashtra.\n\nThe condition of service in ,; ontroversy was as to the age at which an officer had to retire on superannuation. By an enactment of the ruler of Wadhwan State this was, in the case of officers like the ap; Jellant before this Court, fixed at 60.\n\nAn order by the Government of Saurashtra retiring him after he reached the age of 55 against his will, gave rise to the suit from which the proceedings before this Court arose. There was controversy in the Courts below as to whether the law embodying the service conditions was competently enacted by the Wadhwan State.\n\nBut this contention was not persisted in this court, and the court recorded a finding that the terms of service of the appellant were regulated by a law which was competently enacted and that the law was continued by Art. 372 in the Saurashtra State.\n\nOn that finding there could really be no defence to the appellant's claim.\n\nThe decision in favour of the appellant was rested on the ground that the law of the Wadhwan State was continued by express provisions contained, first, in statutes of the Saurashtra State and, again, by Art. 372 of the Constitution when the latter merged in the Dominion of India. On this it followed that without a valid change in the law the rights of the appellant could not be restricted.\n\nIn stating this position, however, the following words were used:\n\n\"The Covenant (between the ruler of the Wadhwan\n\nState and the State of Saurashtra) could be looked at to see whether the new sovereign had waived his rights to ignore rights given under the laws of the former sovereign.\" We do not understand this passage to mean that the covenant which under Art. 363 could itself not be looked at for founding any right, could be used indirectly for inferring that rights were recognised, without anything more.\n\nThe true position appears to us to be that where the new sovereign assumes jurisdiction and it does some Act and there is ambiguity as to whether the same amounts to a recognition of a pre-existing right or not, the covenant and the treaty might be looked at in order to ascertain the intention and purpose of that equivocal act, but beyond this the covenant and the treaty cannot by themselves be used either as a recognition pure and simple or, as the learned Judges of the High Court have held, as waiver of a right to repudiate the pre-existing rights. It is needless to point out that since the enforceability of the rights against the succeeding sovereign springs into existence only on recognition by the sovereign, there is no question of a waiver of the right to repudiate.\n\nThe expression 'right to repudiate' in this context is a misnomer and there could be no question of a waiver of such right.\n\nThis, however, does not conclude the matter, for we have still to deal with thi: question whether the grant by the ruler of the Sant State which was embodied in a 'resolution' of his was a \"law\" or was merely an executive or administrative order. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted to us thwt, the grant under the Tharav No, 371 dated March 12, 1948 was not a grant by executive power but was in truth and substance a law which was continued by Art. 372 of the Constitution and which, therefore, could be undone only by legislation and not by any executive fiat as has been done in the present case and in this connection relied strongly on the decisions of this Court in Madhaorao Phalke\n\nv. The State of Madhya Bharat(') and in Promod Chandra Deb and Ors. v. The State of Orissa and Ors.('). Both in the trial Court as well as before the High Court the cases had proceeded on the footing that the ruler of the Sant State was an absolute monarch with no constitutional !imitations upon his authoriity, and it was not suggested that this was incorrect.\n\nHe was the supreme legislature as well as the supreme head of the executive so that his orders however issued would be effective and would govern and regulate the affairs of the State including the rights of the citizens; (vide Ameer-zm-nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum(') and Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad v.\n\nAkram Ali('). We should, however, hasten to point out that though in the case of such absoluite monarchs the distinction between the administrative action under their executive power and laws passed by them as the supreme legislature\n\n(1) [1961] 1 s.c.R. 957.\n\n(3) A. LR. 1955 S .C. 352. 134-159 s. c.-33.\n\n(2) [196211 Supp. s.c.R. 405.\n\n(4) A.LR. 1956 S.C. 60.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J,\n\nof the State, possess no deference as regards 'their effectiveness, still the distinction between the two is of vital importance for the purpose of determining their continued efficacy after the coming into force of the Constitution.\n\nUnder Art. 372 of the Constitution-\"all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority\". The expression \"existing law\" is defined in Art. 366 ( l 0) :\n\n\"Existing law means any law, Ordinance, Order\n\nbye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, Ordinance, Order, bye-law, rule or regulation.\"\n\nThis definition would include only laws ipassed by a competent authority as well as rules, bye-laws and regulaitions made by virtue of statutory power.\n\nIt would therefore not include administrative orders which are traceable not to any law made by the Legislature but derive their force from executive authority and made either for 'the convenience of the administration or for the benefit of individuals, though the power to make laws as welt as these orders was vested in the same authority-the absoi11te ruler. What survives the Constitution and is continued by Art. 372 are those laws which could trace their origin to the exercise of legislative power.\n\nThe problem next is to discover that which is \"law\" from that which is merely an executive order and this is by no means an easy one to solve.\n\nIn the case of some States where there are rules which prescribe particular forms which the laws have to or generally take or where laws as distinguished from executive orders are issued bearing a defined nomenclature, there is not much difficulty. But the oases which have come up before this Court have shown that this is by no means the universal rule. In the case of the Sant State with which we are concerned it was not suggested that there was any particular formality or process\n\nwhich had to be observed in the promulgation of laws er any iJaiiticular form which laws had to take or took or that they went by any particular nomenclature to distinguish them from executive or administrative orders.\n\nWe have, therefore, to consider whether from the nature of the. instrument its contents and its general effect-whether the Tharav dated March 12, 1948 constitutes a law within Art. 366( 10) and is therefore continued by Art. 372 or whether it is merely an executive grant or administrative order which might confer rights but which without recognition by the Union or State Government cannot be enforced in the municipal courts of this country .\n\n• We shall therefore proceed 1to consider the terms of the Tharav and for this purpose it would be convenient to set it out in full.\n\nIt is headed 'Tharav Order' by Maharana, Santrampur State dated March 12, 1948. It was explained to us that the expression of 'Tharav' meant a resolution. The text of this resolution or order by the Maharana is as follows :\n\n\"The Jivak, Patavat Inami, Chakariyat, Dharmada villages in Sant State are being given (granted) to Jagirdars and the holders of the said villages are not given rights over forests.\n\nHence after considering the complaints of cetain Jagirs, they are being given full rights and authority over the forests in the villages under their vahivat.\n\nSo, they should manage the vahivat of the forest according to the po !icy and administration of the State.\n\nOrders in this regard to be issued.\n\nSd/- in English\n\nMaharana, Santrampur State.\"\n\nThere are a few matters to which it is necessary to advert in this document : The first of them is that it is not a grant to any individual, that is, treating him as an individual.or as one of a number of individuals or to a group\n\nStal• of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nA.yyangar /,\n\nStat• of Gu/amt\n\nY ora Fiddali\n\nA)yangar J,\n\ntreating them merely as separate individuals, but to the holders of five specified tenures in the State-Jivak, Patavat, Inami, Chakariyat and Dharmada villages.\n\nNext, it states that the rights in the forests of the villages of the several kinds of tenure-holders are being given to them in response to the representations made in regard to the villages in the possession and enjoyment of 1the Jagirdars as regards this matter. Lastly, the tenure-holders were directed to manage and administer the forest according to the policy and administration of the State. The learned Judges of the High Court have treated the 'Tharav' as merely an administrative order treating it as if consisted of as many grants of forest rights to the tenure-holders as there were such holders and this. was the view that was stressed upon us strongly by the learned Attorney-General. We are, however, not impressed by 'this argument. We have no evidence as regards the creation of the several tenures referred to in the Tharav to , base any' conclusion as flowing from the original grant.\n\nNo doubt, there is on record the trans1ation of the grant of the village of Gothimada dated 1867, but from this it does not follow that everyone of the grants comprised in the five tenures specified was of this pattern. We consider that the 'Tharav' is more consistent with its being a law effecting an alteration in the tenures of the five classes of Jagirdars by expanding the range of the beneficial enjoyment to the forests lying within the boundaries of the villages which had already been granted to them.\n\nJn this light, the 'Tharav' would not be an administrative order in any sense but would ipartake of the character of legislation by which an alteration was effected in the scope and content of the tenures referred to.\n\nThis aspect is reinforced by the reference to the complaints of the tenure-holders whose grievance apparently was that though villages had been granted to them for their enjoyment under the several tenures, they were not permitted any rights in the forests within their villa?-es. It was not thus a case of an individual grant hut the yielding by the ruler to the claims of these large group of fogirdars who requested that their rights should be extended. Lastly. the manner of the enjoyment was specified as having to be in accordance with the policy and administration m the\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUf<T REPORTS 517\n\nState. It s obvious that there must have been some rules which have the force of law as regards the administration -0f these forests and the enjoyment by the Jagirdars was made subjeot to the observance of these laws.\n\nWe, therefore, consider that the 'Tharav' dated March 12, 1948 satisfies the requirement of a \"law\" within Art. 366(10), and in consequence, the executive orders of the Government of Bombay by which the forest rights of the plaintiffs were sought to be denied were illegal and void.\n\nThe result is that we agree with the learned Judges that the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed, though for different reasons, and we direct that the ap; ieals should be dismissed.\n\nThe appellant will pay the costs of the respondents--0ne set of hearing fees.\n\nState of Gu/tltal\n\nVora F/ddall\n\nAyyangar I,\n\nSuBBA RAO J.-1 have had the advantage of going Subba Rao I. through the judgment of my learned brother, Rajagopala Ayyangar J. I agree with him that Ex. 192 is law and that it continued in force after the making of the Constitutian.\n\nThis conclusion would be enough to dispose of the appeals.\n\nBUit, Rajagopala Ayyangar J., further expressed his disagreement with the unanimous view pro; iounded by this Court in Virendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(').\n\nAs I regret my inability to share his view, I shall state the reasons for my agreement with the decision in Virendra Singh's case.\n\nAs the question raised is common to all the appeals, it is enough if I take up Civil Appeal No. 182 of 1963 for\n\nonsideration.\n\nThe facts necessary to appreciate the alternative contention may now be briefly stated.. In the year 1947, the then ruler of the Sant State made a gram of the village Gotimada to th~ predecessor-in-interest of Thakor Sardarsingh Gajesing. On August 15, 1947, India obtained independence. Under s. 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the suzerainty of the British Crown over the Indian States lapsed, with the result the Sant State became. a full sovereign State. On March 12, 1948, the Maharana\n\n(1) [19551 I S.C.R. 415.\n\nState of Guiarat v.\n\nP' ora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nof Sant State issued an order conferring full rights over forests to the holders of villages in the State, which included the said Gotimada village. On March 19, 1948, there was an agreement, described as the Merger Agreement entered into between the Maharana of Sant State and the Dominion Government of India where under the Mah.arana ceded to the Dominion Government full exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power for and in relation to the governance of the Sant State and agreed to transfer the administration of the Sant State to the Dominion Government on June 10, 1948. It was also agreed that as from June 10, 1948, the Dominion Government would be competent to exercise full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the Governance of the Sant State in such manner and through such agency as it might think fit. Under the other articles of the said agreement certain personal rights and privileges of the Maharana were preserved. After the merger, under s. 3 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 194 7,. the Government of India delegated the administration of the Sant State to the State of Bombay.\n\nFrom October l, 1949, under the States' Merger (Governor's Provinces) Order 1949, the said\n\nState became part of the State of Bombay; that is to say, from June 10, 1948 to October l, 1949 the Bombay State administered the Sant State as a delegatee of the Dominion of India, and thereafter the State became merged with the State of Bombay.\n\nThe Sant State, therefore, became part of the Dominion of India on June 10, 1948 and thereafter tile citizens of that State became, the citizens of the Dominion of India. On August 21, 1948 the respondent entered into a contract with Thakor Sardarsing Gajesing for cutting of the trees in the forest of village Gotimada. On October l, 1948 i.e., 4 months after the merger and more than a month after the said contract, Shri V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government would be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken after the 1st day of April 1948, and if considered by the Government of India to be 9alpably unjust or unreasonable. By that letter it was also guaranteed that,\n\namong others, \"the enjoyment of ownership\" of jagirs, grants etc., existing on April 1, 1948 would be respected.\n\nA combined reading of the paragraphs of this letter makes it clear that the Dominion of India declared in clear and unambiguous terms that no grants made or orders issued by the Maharana before April 1, 1948 would be questiond by it.\n\nIt may be mentioned that in the last paragraph of this letter it was stated that the contents of the letter would be regarded as pat of the Merger Agreement entered into by the Maharana with the Governor-Genera! of India. It may be recalled that this letter was written months after the merger and after the citizens of the extinct State became the citizens of the absorbing State. The effect of the last paragraph of the said letter will be considered in due course.\n\nOn July 8, 1949 the Government of Bombay sent a communication to the Commissioner, Northern Division, stating that the Government considered that the order passed by the ruler of Sant State on March 12, 1948 transferring forest rights to all the Jagirdars of the Jagir villages was ma/a fide and that it should be cancelled. It was suggested that the Commissioner should do some other preliminary acts before taking further action in the matter. It would be seen from this communication that the order was not actually cancelled, but there was some correspondence in respect of that matter and that it was not even communicated to the jagirdars. There was obstruction by the forest officers when the contractor was cutting the trees, but after some correspondence he was permitted to cut the trees, on an undertaking that he would abide by the decision of the Government.\n\nOn February 6, 1963 the Government of Bombay passed a resolution after receiving a report from the Forest Settlement Officer specially appointed by it to investigate the rights of jagirdars. It was stated in the resolution 'that the Tharav issued by the ruler of Sant State in 1948 was ma/a fide and, therefore, not binding on the Government.\n\nThereafter, it scrutinized the claims of jagirdars to forests in 7 4 villages in the erstwhile Sant State and recognized their rights in some of the villages. So far as Gotimada village. is concerned, it was stated that the question of forest rights in the said village was still under the\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nYora Fiddall\n\nSubbd' Rao J. .\n\nStatt of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nconsideration of the Government and necessary orders in that behalf would be issued in due course. It is clear that till 1953 the Government did not refuse to recognize the tvtle of the Jagirdars to forests; indeed, in the case of Gotimada village no final order was made even on that date.\n\nOn these facts, the question that arises is whether the respondent would be entitled to a permanent injunction issued by the High Court restraining the ap;>ellant from interfering with his right to cut trees in Gotimada village.\n\nThe argument of the iearned Attorney-General, so far as it is relevant to the question which I propose to deal with, runs as follows : After the merger of the Sant State with the Dominion of India the jagirdar had no title to the fore;, ts against the Dominion of India unless it recognized such a right, and that, as in the instant case the said Government did not recognize such a right, he or his assignees could not maintain any aotion against the State on the basis of his title to the said forests.\n\nHe conceded that on the basis of the finding of the High Court that the Dominion of India did not repudite the title of the jagirdar to the forests till after the Constitution came into force, the decision of this Court in Vireiufra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(') is against him.\n\nBut he contended that it was not correctly decided and indeed its binding force was weakened bv later decisions of this Court. As the correctness of the decision in Virendra Singh's case(') is questioned, it is necessary to consider the scope of that decision in some detail and also to ascertain whether later decisions of this Court had in any way weakened its authority.\n\nThe facts in that case were as follows.\n\nThe petitioners in that cage were granted in January, 1948, Jagirs and Muafis by the Ruler of Sarila State in one village and by the Ruler of Charkhari State in three villages. In March, 1948. a Union of 35 States, including the States of Sarila and Charkhari. was formed into the United States of Vindhya Pradesh.\n\nThe Vindhya Pradesh Government confirmed these grants in December, 1948, when its Revenue Officers interfered with them questioning their validity.\n\nThe integration of the States however did not work well and the same 35 Ruler~ entered into an\n\n(1) [1955J 1 s.c.R. 4r5.\n\n.agreement in December 1949, and dissolve the newly created\n\nState as from January 1, 1950, each Ruler acceding to the Government of India all authority and jurisdiction in relation to the Government of that State.\n\nAfter the Constitution came into force, the Government of Uttar Pradesh in consultation with the Government of India revoked the grant of Jagirs and Muafis in four of the villages.\n\nOn an application filed by the pl)!itioners under Art. 32(2) of the Constitution, this Court issued a writ against the State. From the said facts it would be seen that the grants were made to the petitioners before the merger, and it was\n\nheld that the Government had no right to revoke the said grants after the Constitution came into force. Bose J ., speaking for the Court, elaborately considered the doctrine of \"Act of State\"' in the light of English and American decisions and the opinions of jurists of International Law and came to the following conclusion :\n\n\"We think it is clear on a review of these authorities that whichever view be taken, that of the Privy\n\nCouncil and the House of Lords, or that of Chief Justice M1rshall, these petitioners, who were in de facto possession of the disputed lands, had rights in them which they could have enforced up to 26th January, 1950, in the Dominion Courts against <JI persons except possibly the Rulers who granted the land and except possibly the State.\n\nWe do not by any means intend to suggest that they would not have enforced them against the Rulers and the Dominion of India as well, but for reasons which we shall presently disclose it is not necessary to enter into that particular controversy. It is enough for the purpose of this case to hold that the petitioners had, at any rate, the rights defined above.\"\n\nPausing here it will be noticed that this Court did not express a final opinion on the question whether the petitioners could have enforced their title to the property against the Rulers before the Constitution came into force, but it had definitely held that the petitioners had title to the property agajnst all\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nStat• of Gufarat\n\nVora Fiddall\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nipersons except the Rulers.\n\nOn the basis of that finding, Bose J., proceeded to consider the impact of the Constitution on the said finding. The learned Judge obse.i; ved :\n\n\"But however thalt may be, there is no question of conquest or'cession here. The new Republic was born on 26th January, 1950, and all derived their rights of dtizenship from the same source and from the same moment of time; so also, at the same instant and for the same reason, all territory within its boundaries became the territory of India. There is, as it were from the point of view of the new State, Unity of Possession, Unity of Interest, Unity of Title and Unity of Time.\"\n\nThen the learned Judge proceeded to state:.\n\n\"All the citizens of India, whether residing in States or Provinces, will enjoy the same fundamental rights and the same legal remedies to enforce them.\"\n\nThis decision struck a new and refreshing note. It pleaded for a departure from imperialistic traditions and to adopt the American traditions, which are in consonance with the realities of the situation created by our Constitution.\n\nIt gave new orientation to the doctrine of the act of State to reflect the modern liberal thought embodied in our Constitution. It held that citizens of a ceding State have a title to their property against all except possibly the ruler.\n\nThough it inclined to go further and hold that the change of sovereignty does not affect the title of the citizens of the ceding State even against the new sovereign, it did not think fit to decide that question finally, as it found ample justification to sustain the title of the petitioners therein against the sovereign under our Constitution.\n\nIt pointed out that the concept of ceding and absorbing States is foreign to our Constitution and that all the people of India, to whichever part of the country they might have belonged, through their representatives, framed the Constitution recognizing the fundamental rights of a citizen to hold property and not to be deprived of it save by authority of law. In that view it\n\nheld that the title of the petitioners in that case to their property was protected by the Constitution. This is a unanimous and considered decision of five learned Judges of this Court. I shall not obviously differ from this view unless there are compelling reasons to do so. I find uone.\n\nI shall now proceed to consider whether the subsequent decisions of this Court threw any doubt on the correctness of the decision in regard to the following two aspects on which it had given a firm decision:\n\n(1) The citizen of a ceding State does not lose his title to immovable property but continues to have a right thereto against all except possibly the absorbing State; and (2) on the making of the Constitution, his title thereto .became indefeasible even against the absorbing State. '\n\nWhere a company entered into an agreement with the erstwhile State of Jind whereunder it had to pay income-tax only at concessional rates, it was held in M / s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax(') that, after the said State merged with the Union of India, the latter was not bound by the contractual obligations of the ceding State on the basis of the principle that the treaty between the two sovereigns was an act of State and the clauses of that treaty were not enforceable. In Jagannath Agarwa/a v. State of Orissa (\") it was held that after Mayurbhan j State had merged with the Province of Orissa the two money claims of the appellant against the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj State were not enforceable against the Orissa State on the ground that the Act of State did not come to an end till the claims made by the appellant were rejected and, therefore, municipal courts had no jurisdiction in the matter. Where the petitioners held Khor Posh grants from the Rulers of Talcher, Bamra and Kalahandi under the respective State laws it was held in Promod Chandra Deb\n\nv. The State of Orissa( 8 ) that the laws continued to have legal force after the merger of the said States with the Union of India. Where the Nawab of Junagadh State made grants of property before he fled the State, it was held in\n\n(!) [19591 S.C.R. 720.\n\n(2) (1962) 1, S.C.R. 20S.\n\n(3) [1962) Supp. (!) S.C.R. 40S.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fidd!llJ\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\n.State of Guiarat v.\n\nVora Fidda/i\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nStGte of Saurashtra v.\n\nJamadar Mohamad Abdullah(') that the cancellation of the said grants by the Regional Commissioner, who assumed charge of the administration of the State before the said State was integrated with the United States of Saurashtra, was an act of State.\n\nThe question now raised did not arise for consideration in those cases.\n\nThis Court accepted the English doctrine of Act of State and acted on the principle that till the right of an erstwhile citizen of a ceding State was recognized by the absorbing State, he has no enforceable right against the State. The scope and extent of the title to immovable property of a citizen of a ceding State was not examined in those decisions. Nor the impact of the Constitution on such rights was considered therein.\n\nJn lyf:'s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of lncome-tax( 2 ) the following observations are found at p .. 7 41, which may have some bearing on th~ first aspect of the question:\n\n\"It is also well-established that in the new set-up these residents do not carry with them the rights which they possessed as subjects of the ex-sovereign, and that as subjects of the new sovereign, they have only such rights as are granted or recognized J>y him.\"\n\nThis observation is couched in wide terms. But this Court was not concerned in that case with the distinction between pre-existing title of a citizen of a ceding State to his property against all and that against the State. Indeed, Bose J., in his dissenting judgment, made it. clear that they were only concerned in that case with the contractual obligation of the erstwhile sovereign and that they were not dealing with the question of the title of the citizens to immovable property.\n\nThat the judgment had also nothing to do with the second aspect was made clear by the following observations of Venkatarama Aiyar J., who expressed the majority view, at p. 749: ·\n\n''This argument assumes that there were in existence at the date when the Constitution came into\n\n\n(2) [1959] S.C.R. 720.\n\nforce. some rights in the petitioner which are capable of being protected by Art. 19(l)(f).\n\nBut in the view which we have taken that the concessions under cl. (23) of Ex. A came to an end when Ordinance No. 1 of S. 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner had no rights subsisting on the date of the Constitution and therefore there was nothing on which the guarantees enacted in Art. 19(1)(0 could operate.\"\n\nThese observations indicate that this Court did not go back on the decision in Virendra Singh's case(') indeed, it rejected the argument based on that decision on the ground that the appellant Jost his rights if any, under a pre- Constitutional valid Ordinance.\n\nIn State of Saurashtra v.\n\nJamadar Mohamad Abdulla(\"), Mudholkar J., speaking for himself and for Sarkar J.,,, expressed the •view on the question of int pact of s. i99 (1) of' the Constitµtion Act of 1935 on the title to immovable property of a citizen of a ceding State thus, at p. 1001 : \" ...... before the respondents could claim the benefit of s. 299 ( 1) of the Constitution Act, 1935, they had to establish that on November 9, 1947, or thereafter they possessed legally enforceable rights with respect to the properties in question as against the Dominion of India.\n\nThey could establish this only by showing that their pre-existing rights, such as they were recognized by the Dominion of India. If they could not establish this fact, then it must be held that they did not possess any legally enforceable rights against the Dominion of India, and, therefore, s. 299( I) of the Constitution Act, I 935, avails them nothing.\n\nAs already stated s. 299(1) did not enlarge anyone's right to propocty but only protected the one which a person already had. Any right to property which in its very nature is not legally enforceable was clearly incapable of being protected by that section.\"\n\n(! l [IPH] I S.C.R. 415, 433, 4. 37.\n\n(2) [1962) 3 S.C.R. 970.\n\nState of Gujarat ,.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nThe same view was restated by the learned Judge in Promod Chandra Deb v. The State of Orissa( 1). It may be stated that \\he said question did not arise for consideration in either of those two decisions, for in the former the cancellation of the order issued by the Ruler of the ceding State was made before the merger and in the latter, the Court held that the laws whereunder the grants were made continued to have legal force after the merger of the concerned States with the Dominion of India. It may be pointed out that Das J., in the earlier decision and Sinha C.J., in the later decision, who delivered the leading judgments in those cases, had specifically left open that question.\n\nIt may, therefore, be stated without contradiction that in none of the decisions of this Court that were given subsequent to Virendra Singh's case(') the correctness of that decision was doubted. Indeed, in the latest two decisions, the principle was sought to be extended to a situation arising under the Government of India Act. but the majority of the learned Judges left open the question, though two of the learned Judges constituting the Bench expressed their view against such an extension. On the findings, I have accepted, the said question does not arise for consideration in this case and I do not propose to express my opinion thereon.\n\nIf that be the position. is there any justification for this\n\nourt to refuse to follow the decision in Virendra Singh's case('). In my view, the said decision is not only correct, but is also in accord with the progressive trend of modern international law.\n\nAfter all, an 3Ct of State is an arbitrary act not based on law, but on the modern version of \"might is right''. It is an act outside the law.\n\nIn the primitive society when a tribe conquered another tribe, the properties of the vanquished were at the mercy of the conqueror. The successful army used to pillage, plunder and commit acts of arson and rape.\n\nWhen society progressed, the doctrine of Act of State was evolved. which really was a civilized version of the primitive acts of pillage and plunder of the properties of the conquered tribe. But the further progress of civilization brought about by custom and agreement factual recognition of pre-existing rights of the people of the conquered State.\n\nThere were two different lines of\n\n(I) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 405.\n\n(2) [19SS] 1 S.C.R. 415.\n\napproach-one adopted by imperialistic nations and the other by others who were not. That divergence was reflected in English and American Courts. All the jurists of international law recognise the continuity of title to immovable property of the erstwhile citizens of ceding State after the sovereignty changed over to the absorbing State.\n\nIn A Manual of International Law by Georg Schwargenberger, 4th Edn., Vol. l, at p. 81 the learned author says:\n\n\"Private rights acquired under the law of the ceding\n\nState are not automatically affected by the cession. They must be respected by the cession ary State.\" A more emphatic statement is found in The Law of State Succession by O'Connell.\n\nUnder the heading \"The Doctrine of Acquired Rights\" the learned author points out, at pp. 78-79:\n\n\" ... , .. only sovereignty and its incidents expired with the personality of a State.\n\nThe relationships of the inhabitants one to another, and their rights of property were recognized to remain undisturbed.\" He observes at p. 104:\n\n\"The doctrine of acquired rights is perhaps one of the few principles firmly established in the law of State succession, and the one which admits of least dispute.\" In Hyde's International Law, second revised edition, Vol. l, at p. 433, the following extract from the Sixth Advisory Opinion of September 10, 1923 of the Court of International Justice is quoted:\n\n\"Private rights acquired under existing Jaw do not cease on a change of sovereignty.\n\nNo one denies that the German Civil Law, both subs tantive and adjective, has continued without interruption to operate in the territory in question.\n\nIt can hardly be maintained that, although the law survives, private rights acquired under it have perished.\n\nSuch a contention is based on no principle and would be contrary to an almost universal opinion and practice ..... \"\n\nStat• of Gujarat\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nStale of <Jujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao/.\n\nIn Oppenheim's International Law, 8th edition, Vol. I the same legal position is re-stated at p. 571 thus:\n\n\"It must be specially mentioned that, as far as the law of Nations is concerned, the subjugating State does not acquire the private property of the inhabitants of the annexed territory. Being now their sovereign, it may indeed impose any burdens it pleases on its new subjects-it may even confiscate their private property, since a sovereign State can do what it likes with its subjects; but subjugation itself does not by International Law affect private property.\"\n\nStarke in his book, An Introduction to International Law 5th edn., observes, at p. 274:\n\n\"Such of these rights as have crystallised into vested or acquired rights must be respected by the successor State, more especially where the formet municipal law of the predecessor State has continued to operate, as though to guarantee the sanctity of the rights.\" \" Much to the same effect the relevant statement of international law is found in Briggs' The Law of Nations, 2nd edn.\n\nIt may, therefore, be held that so far as title to immovable property is concerned the doctrine of international law has become crystallised and thereunder the change of sovereignty does not affect the title of the erstwhile citizens of the ceding State to their property.\n\nIn America the said principle of International Law has been accepted without any qualification. Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court has succinctly stated the American. legal position in United States v. Percheman ( 1) thus:\n\n\"The peopk change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of property, remain undisturbed. If this be\n\n(l) (1833) 32 U.S. Sloat 86, 87.\n\n6 SC.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REl'ORTS 529\n\nthe modern rule even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case of an amicable cession of territory? ....... A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the property belonging to its inhabitants. The King cedes that only which belonged to him.\n\nLands he had previously granted were not his to cede.\n\nNeither party could so understand the cession. Neither party could consider itself as attempting a wrong to individuals. condemned by the practice of the whole civilised world.\n\nThe cession of a territory by its name from one sovereign to, another, conveying the compound idea of surrendering, at the same time the lands and the people who inhabit them, would be necessarily understood to pass the sovereignty only, and not to interfere with private property.\"\n\nThis principle has been accepted and followed by the American Courts in other decisions. But it is said that the view of the American. Courts is really based upon the circumstance that international treaties are part of the supreme law of the land.\n\nArticle VI of the Constitution of the United States declares that all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the bnd; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any . State to the contrary notwithstanding.\n\nChief Justice Marshall in Foster v. Neilson(') said:\n\n\"Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.\"\n\nA treaty in America may be deemed to be a law of the land; but the American view is not solely based on treaties.\n\n(I) (1829) 2 Pet. 253\n\n134-159 S.C.~34.\n\nState of Guiarat\n\nVora FiddaU\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nJtale of Gujarat v.\n\nY•>ra Fiddali\n\nSubba .Rao J.\n\nIn The American Insurance Co. and the Ocean Insurance Co. v. Bales of Cotton('), Chief Justice Marshall clearly recorded the view of the American Courts thus:\n\n\"On such transfer of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change.\"\n\nAgain the learned Chief Justice in Charles Dehault v.\n\nThe United States(') expressly pointed out the existence of the said rights apart from any treaty. He observed:\n\n\"Independent of treaty stipulations, this right would be held sacred.\n\nThe sovereign who acquires an inhabited territory acquires full dominion over it; but this dominion is never supposed to divest the vested rights of individuals to property.\"\n\nTherefore, the distinction sought to be made may perhaps have some relevance, if in a particular treaty there is a specific term that the United States shall recognize the acquired rights of a citizen of a ceding State, but none if the treaty does not contain such a covenant. The American decisions, therefor~, cannot be distinguished on this narrow ground; they have recognized the doctrine 0f International Law and inter-woven it in the texture of the American municipal law.\n\nThe Courts in England have developed the doctrine of act of State which. in the words of Stephen, means \"An act injurious to the person or property of ome person who is not at the time of that act a subject of Her Majesty; which act is done by a representative of Her Majesty's authority, and is either sanctioned or subsequently ratified by Her Majesty.\" A treaty whereunder a sovereign territory is ceded is held to be an act of State, for it is not done under colour of any title but in exercise of a sovereign power. Has the law of England denied the doctrine of acquired rights so weU-sett!ed in International Law?\n\n(!) (1828) 7 L.Ed. 511.\n\n(2) (1835) 9 L.Ed. 117, 131.\n\n[n Vajesingji loravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India in Council ( 1), the Judicial Committee summarized the law on the subject thus:\n\n\"When a territory is acquired by a sovereign State\n\nfor the first time that is an act of State ....\n\nAny inhabitant of the territory can make good in the Municipal Courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognized.\n\nSuc1' rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing.\n\nNay more, even if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to those inhabitants to enforce these stipulations in the municipal Courts.\n\nThe right to enforce remains only with the high contracting parties .......... \".\n\nThe sentence in the said passage, namely, \"such rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing\", cannot be, in the context in which it appears, interpreted as a denial of the doctrine of acquired rights evolved by International Law, but it only refers to the question of enforceability of such an acquired right in a municipal court. The same view has been expressed in a number of English decision. Therefore, the law in England is that the municipal courts cannot enforce the acquired rights of the erstwhile citizens of the ceding State against the absorbing State unless the said State has recognized or acknowledged their title.\n\nThis Court accepted the EngJi, h doctrine of act of State in a series of decisions noticed by me earlier. What does the word \"recognize\" signify? It means \"to admit, to acknowledge, something existing before.\" By recognition the absorbing State does not create or confer a new title, but only confirms a pre-existing one. It follows that till the title Js recognized by the absorbing State, it is not binding on that State. An exhaustive exposition of this branch of law is found in Promod Chandra Dab's case( 2 ). I am bound by that decision.\n\nO'Connell in The Law of State Succession\n\n(I) 51 I.A. 357. 360.\n\n(2) [1962] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 405.\n\nStal• of Gu}- .,, Vora Fldd41'\n\nSubbo Rao I.\n\nStal.of Gu/oral\n\nY, l\"ora Flddall\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nbrings out the impact of the doctrine of act of State on that of acquired rights under International Law, at p. 88, thus:\n\n\"The doctrine of act of State is one of English municipal law.\n\nIt merely dnies an English Court jurisdiction to inquire into the consequences of Acts of the British Government which are inseparable from the extension of its sovereignty.\n\nThe court is not entitled to ask if such acts are 'just or unjust, politic or impolitic' or what legal rights and duties have been carried over in the change of sovereignty. The doctrine is not intended, however, to deny a rule of International Law.\"\n\nIn the words of the same author, the fact that a right cannot' be enforced does not mean that it does not exist. Nonrecognition by the absorbing State does not divest title, but only makes it unenforceable against the State in municipal courts.\n\nThe result of the discussion may be summarized thus: the doctrine of acquired rights, at any rate in regard to immovable property, has become crystallized in International Law.\n\nUnder the said law the title of a citizen of a coding State is preserved . and not lost by cession.\n\nThe change of sovereignty does not affect his title. The municipal law of dilierent countries vary in the matter of its enforceability against the State. As the title exists. it must be held that even in those countries, which accepted the doctrine of act of State and the right of a sovereign to repudiate the title, the title is good against all except the State.\n\nBefore the Constitution came into force the State did not repudiate the title.\n\nWhen the Constitution of India came into force the respondent and persons similarly situated who had title to immovable property in the Sant State had a title to the said property and were in actual possession thereof.\n\nThey had title to the property except against the State and they had, at any rate, possessory title therein. The Constitution in Art. 31 ( 1) declares that no person shall be dep rived of his property save by authority of law. That is, the Constitution recognized the title of the citizens of the erstwhile State of Sant, and issued an injunction against the\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REfORTS 533\n\nsoveriegn .created by it not to interfere with that right except 1964 in accurdance with law. A recognition by the supreme law State of Gu/aral of the land must be in a higher position than that of an cxe- •.\n\nVora Flddall cutive amhority of a conquering State. I would, therefore, hold that the title to immovable property of the respond- Subba Rao J. ent was recognized by the Constitution itself and therefore,\n\nnecssariiy by the sovereign which is bound by it. I, therefore, respectfully hold that Virtmdra Singh's case(') has been corrcctiy decided.\n\nApart from the recognition of the ti.tie of the respondent by the Constitution, in this case. the letter written by the Government of India, dated October l, 1948, clearly recogmzed the title of persons situated in the position of the responaent to their properties.\n\nBut the learned Attorney- General contends that the letter shall be regarded as part of the merger agreement and therefore its terms cannot be relied upon for the purpose of recognition of the respondent's title or of evidence of the Government's waiver of its right to repudiate the respondent's title. It is true that in the concluding portion of the letter it is stated that the contents of the letter will be regarded as part of the merger agreement. But the merger had already taken place on June 10. 1948 and this letter was written on October l,\n\n1948. It does not appear from that letter that the Maharana of Sant State, who ceased to be the Ruler except in name for certain privileges, was a party to it. This letter, therefore, can at best be treated as one of the acts of the Government of India implementing the terms of the merger agreement. It cannot, therefore, be said to be a part of the merger agreement. If it was not, by calling it so it did not become one. At the time the Jetter was sent all the citizens of the erstwhile Sant State had become the citizens of India.\n\nThe Jetter contains a clear statement in paragraphs 5 and 7 thereof that enjoyment of ownrship of jagirs, grant etc. existing on April 1, 1948 were guaranteed and that any order passed or action taken by the Ruler before the said date would not be questioned. This is a clear recognition of the property rights of the respondent and similar others.\n\nIt is necessary, therefore, to express my opinion on the ques-\n\n(I) !19.S.SJ 1 S.C.R. 415.\n\nStai. of Gujarat\n\nYoro Flddall\n\nSubbo Rao 1.\n\ntion whether, even if the said letter formed part of the merger agreement, any recital therein can be relied upon as evidence of recognition of pre-existing titles by the absorbing State or waiver of its sovereign right to repudiate the said titles.\n\nFor the aforesaid reasons I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.\n\nFor the same reasons Civil Appeals No. 183 to 186 of 1963 are also dismissed with costs.\n\nHida, atullah 1.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH J.-These appeals by the State of Gujarat impugn a common judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dated January 24, 1961.\n\nThe respondents were plaintiffs in five suits for declaration of rights in forests and for permanent injunction against interference with those rights by the State. All suits except one were dismissed by the Court of first instance.\n\nThe District Judge on appeal ordered the dismissal of that suit also and dismissed the appeals of the plaintiffs in the other suits. The plaintiffs then appealed to the High Court and by the judgment under appeal, all appeals were allowed and the suits were decreed.\n\nThe State Government has now appealed to this court by special leave.\n\nThe forests in respect of which the declaration and injunction were sought are situated in the former State of Santrampur (also called Sant State).\n\nSantrampur was an Indian State and the Ruler attained independence and sovereignty on August 15, 1947 on the ceasing of the paramountcy of the British Crown. The Ruler at first ceded his sovereignty on three subjects to the Government of India but on March 19, 1948, ceded the territory of the State to the Government of India by an agreement which came into force from June 10, 1948. The Central Government, by virtue of powers vested in it by the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, delegated its functions to the Provincial Government of Bombay and on June 2, 1948, the Administration of the Indian States Order was passed and it was applied to Sant State from June 10, 1948. On July 28, 1948, the Indian States (Application of Laws) Order, 1948\n\nwas passedL Certain enactments in force in the Province of I96f Bombay were extended to Sant State and then under the state of Gu/arat States' Merger (Governor's Provinces) Order, 1949, Sant Y.\n\nVora Fiddall State became a part of the Province of Bombay from August 1, 1949. On October 1, 1948, a letter of guarantee was Hidayatullah 1. written to the Ruler by Mr. V. P. Menon in which it was stated as follows: ..\n\n7. No order passed or action taken by you before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government will be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken after the 1st day of April, 1948, and it is considered by the Government of India to be palpably unjust or unreasonable.\n\nThe decision of the Government of India in this respect will be final.\"\n\nIt was added that the letter would be read as part of the original Merger agreement.\n\nA week before ceding the territories of his State, the Ruler of Sant made a Tharao or Thavan order as follows:\n\n\"Order\n\n3. Ta. Mu. Outward Register No. 371. The Jivak, Patayat, Inami, Chakariyat, Dharmada villages in Sant State are being given (granted) to Jagirdars and the holders of the said villages are not given rights over forests. Hence after considering the complaints of certain Jagirs, they are being given full rights and authority over the forests in the villages under their vahivat.\n\nSo, they should manage the vahivat of the forest according to the policy and administration of the State. Orders in this regard to be issued.\n\nSd. In English.\n\nMaharana, Sant State.\"\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nHidtryatul/ah /.\n\nThe former grants which were made in favour of the jagirdars and holders of the villages have not been produced, but they were probably like the grant of village Gothimada dated December 1, 1857, which was to the fo11owing effect:\n\nYou have to do the vahivat (management) of the land situate within the permanent boundaries of the outskirts of the villages in four directions.\n\nThis village has been granted for the appropriation and enjoyment of the income thereto except in respect of civil and criminal matters.\n\nSo you must behaYe in the State in accordance with the custom and usage and practice of other Thakarati villages of the State.\n\nIf any person of the village is ordered in regard to any work or matter then you should not in any way interfere. therein but produce the said person as per order.\n\nYou have to act and behave according to the said clauses and should remain with integrity and honesty and loyal to the State.\n\nDated: 1-12-1867 A.D.S.Y. 1929 Magsar.\n\nSudu 5.\"\n\nAfter the Tharao was issued on March 12, 1948, some of the Thakores executed contracts in favour of 1he plaintiffs between May 1948 and 1950. The agreements which were made with the contractors are on the file of the appeals.\n\nThe ; fhakores and the contractors then began to take forest prodhce but they were stopped in April 1949. The present five suits were then filed.\n\nFour of the suits were instituted by the contractors and the fifth by one of the Thakores in the capacity as inamdar.\n\nAfter merger, a question arose whether these contracts should be approved or not.\n\nOn January 1949, on the application of one of the Thakores, an order was passed by the Divisional Forests Officer. It was as follows:\n\n\"Gothimada village of Santrampur State. Application of the owner requesting to grant authorization to the Contractor and states that he has no objection if the authorization is issued.\n\nIs the authorization up to Lunawada and Signally\n\nonly, time-limit up to 31-3-1949.\n\nNo expo.rt outside to be permitted, pending rer; eipt of orders from Government.\n\nWritten undertaking to be taken from the purchaser that he will abide by the decision and orders passed by Government and then the authorization handed over. Send copy to F.O. Lunawada.\"\n\nSimilar orders were passed in respect of other villages and undertakings were taken from the Thakores and the contractors. A sample is quoted here-\n\n\"UNDERTAKING:\n\nI, Thakore Sardarsingh Gajesingh hereby give an undertaking to abide by the decision and orders passed by the Government of Bombay in respect of Gothimada forests, rights over which were conferred on me by Santrampur State Government on 12-3-48 in their resolu\n\ntion No. G. 371 dated 12-3-48.\n\nAuthorization Nos. 111, 112 of 1948-49, in respect of village in Santrampur State issued by the Divisional Forest Officer, Integrated States Division, Devgad- Baria 'in fav()ur of Mr.\n\nHatimbhai Badruddin is subject to the above undertaking.\n\nDated 1-2-49.\n\nSd. in Gujarathi ...\n\nThe Conservator of Forests, North Western Circle also' issued a memorandum on January 18, 1949 stating: .. . . . . . . . ..\n\nHowever, to safeguard the Government interest writien .undertaking should be taken from the Jmagirdan, InamdaB of person or perlOlll\n\nState oJ Uu/D1'd\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nHidayatullah /.\n\nStille of Gujarat ...\n\nYora Fiddali\n\nHU/ayatullah J.\n\nconcerned that he or they would abide by the decision or orders passed by the Bombay Government in respect of such private forests, when the question of rights over such private forests is finally settled.\"\n\nWhen the undertakings were furnished, passes were issued to the contractors.\n\nIn April 1949, however, the work of all the contractors was stopped and on July 8, 1949, Government sent a communique to the Collector of Panch Mahals repudiating the Tharao of March 12, 1948.\n\nIn this letter it was stated as follows:\n\n\"Reference your memorandum No. ADM(P) 50-A-\n\nII, dated 24th May, 1949, Government considers that the order passed by the Ruler of the Sant State under his No. 371, dated 12th March, 1948 transferring forest rights to all the jagirdars of the jagir village, are mala fide and that they should be cancelled. Before, however, taking further action in the matter, please ascertain whether the possession of the forests in question is with Government or has gone to the Jagirdars. If the possession is still with Government please ask the Officer of the Forest Department to retain the same and to refuse to issue passes, etc. to private contractors and purchasers.\n\nBy order of the Governor of Bombay.\n\nSd/- \"\n\nIt appears that this was not communicated to the contractors of the Thakores.\n\nOn June 29, 1951, the Government of Bombay passed a resolution that the Maharana's order would not be given effect to. Another resolution was passed on February 6, 1953 as follows:\n\n\"On. the eve of the merger of the Sant State in the\n\nState of Bombay, the Ruler of that State issued Tharav No. 371 on 12th March, 1948, under which Jiwai, Patawat, lnami, Chakriat and Dharmada Jagirdars and inamdars were given full forest rights over the villages in their charge. The Government\n\nof Bombay, after considering the implication o[ the 1964 Tharav, decided that the order was ma/a fide and Stai. of Gu/aral cancelled it on 8th July, 1949 vide Government Vora vFiddalt Letter, Revenue Department No. 2103-M 49 dated the 8th July, 1949. By the time these orders were Hidayatullah J. issued, the tree growth in the Jagiri forests concerned was already sold by some of the Jagirdars and the trees cut.\n\nFurther cutting of trees and export of trees cut was however stopped by the Forest Department after receipt of the orders of 8th July, 1949. On representation being made to Government, Government, however, agreed to allow to release the material felled from the forest under dispute, pending decision on the settlement of forest rights, subject to the condition that the contractor furnished two sureties solvent for the material removed or deposited with the Divisional Forest Officer certain amount per wagon load of material. The owner of the material was also asked to give a written undertaking that he would abide by the ultimate decision of Government.\n\n5. Government is, however, pleased to examine individual cases of Jagirdars and inamdars irrespective of the Tharav of 1948, on the basis of the Forest Settlement Officer's Report and other considerations.\n\n7. The question of forest rights in the following villages is still under consideration of Government and necessary orders in that behalf will be issued in due course:-\n\n(1) Nanirath.\n\n(2) Gothimada. (3) Rathada.\n\nBefore this the suits we are dealing with were filed.\n\nThe contention of the plaintiffs was that the Merger agreement of March 1948 was not an Act of State, because it was preceded by surrender by the Ruler of sovereignty in respect of three subjects. This contention was not accepted in the High Court and has not been raised here. The next contention was that the Tharao or order of March 12, 1948 was a\n\n1964 legislative act and as all the old laws of the State were to Stat• of Gujarat continue to be in force except as modified by the Indian v. States (Apnlication of Laws) Order, 1948, the Tharao Vora Fiddali could be revoked by the appellant by Lcg!slative authority Hidayatullah J. only and no: by an executive act. The High Court did not accept this contention, because according to the High Court, the Tharao was not a pice of legislation, but was a grant by the Ruler. The third contention was that the Central\n\nGovernmnt thrnugh Mr. V. P. Menon has undertaken not to questioa any order or action taken before 1st April, 1948, and thJt this created a bar to the repudiation of the order of the Maharana dated March 12, 1948. This contention was not accepted by the High Court. The High Court held that the letter formed a part of an Agreement which could only be enforced by the High Contracting Parties, if at all, but not by any other person, and in any event, municipal courts had no authority to enforce the agreement.\n\nThe High Court relied upon Art. 363 of the Constitution and the decisions of this Court.\n\nThe High Court, however, accepted the contention of the plaintiffs, that it was open to the succeeding sovereign to waive or relinquish its right to repudiate the actions of the previous Ruler and to acknowledge either expressly or impliedly the rights conferred on the subjects of the previous Ruler and that this had been done in this case. They referred to the permission which had been given by the officers of the Forest Department to the plaintiffs in this suit to cut and carry away the timber and regarded the letter of Mr.\n\nV. P. Menon .1s evidence of waiver and relinquishment. They held on the authority of Virendra Singh and Others v. The\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh(') and Bholanath J. Thakar v.\n\nState of Saurashtra (2 ) and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Bhojrajji v. Saurashtra State(\") that the Government must. in these circumstances, be held to have waived or relinquished its rights to enforce the Act of State against the plaintiffs.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant, it is urged (a) that the Act of State continued till the resolutions were passed and there\n\n(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 415.\n\n(2) A.J.R. (1954) S.C. 680\n\n(3) 61 Born. L.R. 20.\n\nwas no waiver or relinquishment in favour of the appellants, and (b) that the action of the subordinate officers of the Forest Department did not bind Government and the respondents cannot take advantage of the le\\ter of Mr. V. P.\n\nMenon. On behalf of the respondents, in addition to meeting the above arguments, it is contended that the Tharao was a law and could only be revoked by another law. It is further argued that after the Merger, s. 2990) of the Government of India Act. 1935 which read \"No person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law\" protected the respondents and this protection became abso!me on January 26, 1950, by reason of Art. 31 of the Constitution.\n\nAs the resolutions in question were passed after the commencement of the Constitution, it is urged that they cannot affect the rights of the respondents who came under the protection of Art. 31 of the Constitution. It is contended that in any case, the Act of State could not operate against the citizens of the State which the respondents became on the Merger or on the inauguration of the Constitution. It is also argued on behalf of the respondents on the authority of a case of the Permanent Court of International Justice and certain cases of the Supreme Court of the United States that the Act of State should not interfere with rights in property held from a former Ruler.\n\nThe appellant contends in reply that the Act of State continned, because the contractors, and jagirdars were permitted to work the forests on their furnisl!ing undertakings, and it was only completed agair!st them in April, 1949, wl1en they were asked to stop their work even though the actual order of Government deciding whether to accept the Tharao or not was communicated to them in 1953. It is argued that what was of real consequence was not the decision of the Government but the stoppage of the work.\n\nIt is also argued that s. 299(1) did not protect the respondents against the Act of State and that as there was no State suecession on January 26, 1950, the original Act of State did not come to an end. It is also pointed out that this Court has not accepted the rule of International L1w referred to in Virendra Singh's case(') and has instead acted on\n\n(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 415.\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nVora Fiddall\n\nHidayatullah J,\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nllil#yatu/lah J.\n\nthe doctrine of Act of State as interpreted by the Courts in England.\n\nI shall deal with these points in brief, because most of them have been decided against the respondents in the High Court on the basis of earlier rulings of this Court.\n\nTo begin with, this Court has interpreted the integration of Indian States with the Dominion of India as an Act of State and has applied the law relating to an Act of State as laid down by the Privy Council in a long series of cases beginning with Secretary of State in Council for India v.\n\nKamachee Boye Saheba(') and ending with Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustam Khan and Other('). The cases on this point need not be cited.\n\nReference may be made to M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax('), The State of Saurashtra v. Menon Haji Isma/i Haji('), Jaganath Agarwala v. State of Orissa(\") and State of Sauraslztra v. lamadar Mohamed Abdulla and Others(\"). In these cases of this Court, it has been laid down that the essence of an Act of. State is an arbitrary exercise of sovereign power on principles which are paramount to the Municipal Law, against an alien and the exercise of the power is neither intended nor purports to be legally founded. A defence that the injury is by an Act of State does not seek justification for the Act by reference to any law, but questions the jurisdiction of the court to decide upon the legality or justice of the action. The Act of State comes to an end only when the new sovereign recognises either expressly or impliedly the rights of the aliens. It does not come to an end by any action of subordinate officers who have no authority to bind the new sovereign.\n\nTill recognition. either express or implied, is granted by the new sovereign, the Act of State continues.\n\nIf we apply these tests (rightly applied in the High Court), we reach the result that the Government of Bombay and the Central Government could refuse to recognise the rights created on the eve of the Merger by the Tharao of the Maharana and to say that it was not acceptable to them and therefore not binding on them.\n\nSuch action may be\n\n(!) (1859) 13 Moore P.C. 22.\n\n(3) [1959] S.C.R. 729.\n\n\n(2) .0941) 68 I.A. 109.\n\n\n(6) [1962) 3 S.C.R. 970.\n\nharsh or unfair; but the Municipal Courts cannot declare it to be so, because unless the rights are irrevocably recog nised earlier the Municipal Courts have no jurisdiction to pronounce upon the legality or the justness of the action. It is for this reason that the respondents pleaded in the High Court that there was a waiver or relinquishment of the Act of State in their favour.\n\nRelinquishment and waiver were again relied upon by the respondents before us and they refer to two circumstances from which an inference about waiver or relinquishment can be raised.\n\nThe first is cl. 7 of the letter of Mr. V. P. Menon quoted above and the second is the conduct of the officers of the Forest Department in allowing the contractors and the jagirdurs to work the forests in accordance with the Tharao of the Maharana.\n\nCl. 7 of a similar letter of guarantee was considered by this Court in Maharaj Umeg Singh and Others v. The State of Bombay and Others('). In that case also arguments. were the same as here. It was then contended that the Ruler's agreement with the Government ensured for the. benefit of the subjects even if they were not parties to the agreement.\n\nIt was then pointed out on behalf of the Governm, nt that the agreement, if any, could not be sought to be enforced by persons who were not parties to it. This Court observed:\n\n\"We do not feel called upon to pronounce upon the validity or otherwise of these contentions also for the simple reason that the petitioners would be out of Court either way. If they were deemed to be parties to the agreements of merger and letters of guarantee they would be faced with the bar to the maintainability of the petitions under Article 3 63 of the Constitution which lays down that neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of\n\n\nStato of Guf_.\n\nVora FldtWI\n\nHidayatullah ]..\n\nStat• of Gujarat\n\n\"· Y ora Fiddali\n\nHidaymullah J.\n\nthe Dominion of India ...... was a party. If on tlie other hand they were deemed not to have been parties to the same they would not be the contracting parties and would certainly not be able to enforce these obligations.\"\n\nIt would, therefore, appear that the present respondents who were not parties to the Merger agreement or to the letter\n\nwrfoten by Mr. Menon which was made e1\"; iressly a part of the Agreement cannot take advantage of cl. 7. If they were parties, Art. 363 would bar such a plea.\n\nIt is next contended that the Act of State had come to an end after the Government of India Act, 1935 was applied to the State and the State beeame a part of the territories of the Government of India. This argument was raised to claim the benefit of s. 299 (1) of the Government of India Act 19 3 5.\n\nThe interference with the rights in forests conferred by the Tharao and the agreements with the contractors based on the Tharao took place in April, 1949.\n\nIt was contended that on June 10, 1948, the subjects of Sant State became Indian citizens and they were protected by s. 299 (I). The Officers of the Forest Department did not unconditionally allow the forests to be worked.\n\nThey made it clear to the contractors and the jagirdars that what they were doing was not final and that Government was going to decide about the Tharao and the contracts later.\n\nNo doubt, the forests were allowed to be worked, but an undertaking was obtained from each contractor and jagirdar.\n\nThis showed that the officers of the Forest Department did not attempt to bind the Government, even if they could.\n\nIt is true that the order of Government to stop work was not communicated to the contractors and the jagirdars but the working of the forests was as a matter of fact sto;:iped. much earlier and the learned Atturney-General is. right in pointing out that it was all that mattered. This action of the officers was later approved by Government when it decided that it would not allow any rights to flow from the Tharao and the contracts. In other words, while Government was considering the maitter, the officers of the Forest Department tentatively allowed the forests to be worked but in no. manner to bring the Act of State to an end. The Act\n\ncl State could only come to an end if Government recognised the rights flowing from the Tharao.\n\nThat, Government never did.\n\nThere was thus no recognition of the Tharao or the rights flowing from it at any time. It was pointed out by this Court in A ggarwa/a's case (1) that Government may take time to consider and delay does not militate against the Act of State. In that case also the decision of Government was taken after the coming into force of the Constitution.\n\nThis Court pointed out, agreeing with Vaje Singhji Jorawar Singh v. Secretary of State for India(') that enquiries may continue for some time without any inference of waiver or relinquishment. No doubt, in Bho/anath Thaker's case(\") and in Virendra Singh's case(') waiver or relinquishment was inferred from the conduct of Government.\n\nSuch an inference may legitimately be raised where Government, after having accepted the rights, attempts to go back upon such acceptance.\n\nThere must. however, be a clear indication, either eX1; Jressly or by implication. that Government has, in fact, accented the rights.\n\nIn the present case, the subordinate officers of the Forest Department allowed the forests to be worked, making it quite clear that Government was comideri.ng the matter and to0k undertakings from the resJJondents that they would abide bv the decision of Government. Government passed an order declinin~ to accent the Tharan.\n\nThe order so passed was not\n\ncomunicnted to the respondents but later it was reiterated as a resolution which was communicated.\n\nTo avoid this result, there are two arguments upon which the respondents rely and thev are the main contentions in these appeals. The respondents seek support for the iudgment by challen11ing the deci<ion on some of the points decided against them.\n\nThe first is that the Thoran was a law which-could only be rescinded bv Bnother faw.\n\nTn this connection. the respondents relv unon the ohservaticns made bv this Court in Madhaoran Phalke v. The Srote nf\n\nMadhy~ Bhara•(•).\n\nThese observations were based unon\n\n(l) [1?62] 1 S.C.R. 205.\n\n(2) (1924) L. R. 51 I. A. 357\n\n(3) A 1.R. (1954) S.C. 680.\n\n\n134-159 SC-35.\n\n1'1U\n\nStat• of Gu/IUOI\n\nY 0111 Pidflall\n\nHidaya.tul/ah /,\n\n1~ ,_ of Ga/Mill ,.\n\nJl/Jrll Putdali\n\nBldayatu//ah /.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1C)fi4J\n\nthe earlier case in Ameer-un-nissa Begum and Others v.\n\nMehboob Begum and Others(').\n\nJn these cases it was . . pomted out that the distinction between legislative. executive and judicial acts of an absolute Ruler (such as the Indian Rulers were) was apt to disappear when the source of authority was the sovereign. These observations are sought to be applied here.\n\nIn the i; iast also these observations were invoked on occasion.\n\nIn so far as the subjects of the Ruler were concerned, they were bound to obey not only laws blllt any orders of the Ruler, whether executive or judicial.\n\nFor them they did not exist any difference because each emanation of the will of the sovereign required equal obedience from them.\n\nBut it does not mean , that the Ruler acted legislatively all the time and never judicially or executively. If this was the meaning of the observations of this Court, then in Phalke's case(2 ) it would not have been necessary to insist that in determining whether there was a law which bound the succeeding sovereign, the character, content and purpose of the declared will must be independently considered. Jn Ameer-un-nissa's case,(') this Court was concerned.\n\nWith a Firman of the Nizam and that was one of the accepted modes of making laws in Hyderabad State. In Phalke's case('), this Court was concerned with Kalambandis which were held by this Court to be laws binding upon the subsequent Government unless repealed or replaced by other law. The Kalambandis were so regarded i; iartly because the M 0 harana had himself laid down that Kalambandis issued by him were to be regarded as law, and partly because the Kalambandis created a tenure which carried with it pensions. The pensions were grants but the manner of enjoyment of the pensions was determined by the rules of tenure provided in the Kalambandis also bearing upon succession and devolution. These cases were distinguished in more recent cases when the observations were sought to be exiended to others which were clearly not legislative and reference may be made to M flhflraifl Shru\n\nUmaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of lndia and Others(') and The Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mill.~ ltd. v. The Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh and Others('). It was pointed\n\n(1) A.T.R. 195~ S.C. 352.\n\n(3) A.I.R. -1963' S.C. 953.\n\n(2) [1961] 1 S.C.'R. 957. 964.\n\n(4) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 888.\n\nout in these two cases that the observations in Ameer-unnissa's case(') Phalke's case(') could not be read as indicating that everything that the Maharaja said or ordered was a law. In the latter case, this Court pointed out that a proper law would be one which was made in accordance with the traditional mode of making laws in the territory or in accordance with some procedure which was expressly devised for the occasion. It was pointed out that law is the result of a legislrutive process and the result must be intended to bind as a rule of conduct; it must not for example be a contract or a grant or a gift etc.\n\nViewed from this angle, it is quite obvious that the Tharao was not a law. It was a grant made to the jagirdars mentioned in the Tharao. It is contended that it is made ai; iplicable to persons belonging to five different tenures and that the 'management' of the forests was to be done according to the policy and administration of the State.\n\nNo doubt, the Tharao is applicable to a large number of persons enjoying different tenures but it is stated therein that orders were to be issued individually to all of them. The Tharao was issued only 8 days before the Merger. It is surprising that the Maharaja thought of the complaints of the grantees on the eve of the Merger. The fact that the Maharana's Tharao was passed to benefit a large number of persons en bloc does not make it any the more a law if it did not possess any of the indicia of a law. The respondents would not admit that if it had been addressed to individuals, it would have changed its character from a law to a grant.\n\nThis fact makes no difference to its character. content and purpose.\n\nFurther, the original grant of which the Tharao became a r, iart was also a grant. One such grant has been quoted above. The word \"Vahivat\" does show that the grant was for management but in this context, it means more than management.\n\nIt was customary to use this word in conferring rights which were liable to be resumed. These grants did give rights to the grantees but did not lay down any rule of conduct. It may be pointed out that in Umeg Singh's case(') it was contended that cl. 5 of the letter of\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1955 S.C. 352.\n\n\n- ltWtf of Glll'i*\n\n\"ot11 '*;.111dilii\n\nHid&jlitUllllh i.\n\nlfHU\n\nStille of G•/IUOI\n\nYou F/tl4al;\n\nNidqlllllllali /.\n\n. Mr. Menon prevented legislation and it was then held that the grants were not legislative measures of the Maharaja and did not bar the making of laws to set the grant at naught In that case also there was a Tharao in dispute.\n\nThe Tharao cannot, therefore, be treated as a law at all.\n\nIt is a grant and as a grant it was open to the new sovereign not to recognise it\n\nIt was contended that in any event, after the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935. the respondents had the protection of s. 299( 1). This point was raised but was left open by the majority in Jamadar's case(') to which we have already referred.\n\nOn that occasion, Sarkar and Mudholkar JJ. in a separate judgment held that s. 299 ( 1) did not afford any protection. The learned Judges pointed out that s. 299 ( 1 ) did not add to the rights of persons but protected such rights as existed. If on the Merger of the territories of the Indian Rulers with those of the Government of India. there was Act of State and if as held by this Court in the cases to which reference has already ben made it was open to the Government of India to decide whether or not to recognise certain rights, the Government of India could do so. In that event, s. 299 (I ) did not come into play because Ft could only come into play after the rights were recognised. The Act of State continued because Government was taking time to consider whether to accept the Tharao or not and while the decision was. being reached, there was a second change inasmuch as the present Constitution was passed. It is contended that there was a lapse of the original Act of State because of a State succession on January 26,\n\n1950, and as this was before the Resolutions of 1951 and 1953, the respondents were protected.\n\nThe first question to consider is whether there took place in 1950 a State succession. State succession takes place either in Jaw or in fact. It takes place in Jaw when there is a juridical substitution of one State for another. It take• olace in fact when there is (a) annexation (') or (b) cession(')\n\n\n(2) e.g. Algiers by France (1831) or South African Republic by Great Britain (1901).\n\n(3) e.g. the Ionian Islands by Britain to Greece (1864) or territory to Poland by Germany.\n\nor ( c) fusion of one State with another (') or ( d) entry into a federal Union (2 ) or (e) partition (') or (f) separation of secession('). It will be seeri that on the 26th January, 1950, there was no succession in fact because none of these events took place.\n\nAs Oppenheim defined \"succession\"-\n\n\"A succession of International Persons occurs when one or more International Persons take the place of another International Person in consequence of certain changes in the latter's position International Law, 5th edn. p. 151.\"\n\nIn this sense, though the people of India gave themselves a Constitution, there was rlo State succession in so far as the people of Sant State were concerned. For them the State succession was over sometime before. No doubt, when the Dominion of India became a sovereign Democratic Re; iublic, there was a breaking away from the British Crown, but that was a State succession in a different field. We are not concerned with the secession of India from the British Crown, but with State succession between Sant State and India, and there was no second succession in 1950. Whatever had happened had already happened in 1948 when Sant State merged with the Dominion of India. The Act of State which began in 1948 could continue uninterrupted even beyond\n\n1950 and it did not lapse or get replaced by another Act of State. The Constitution no doubt guaranteed the rights of citizens after 1950 but these rights granted by the Ruler were not recognised even before 1950 and the Constitution gave its support to those rights which were extant on January 26,\n\n1950 ..\n\nIt only remains to consider the argument of Mr.\n\nPurushotham based on the view of Chief Jmtice John Marshall, of the Supreme Court of the United States expressed in U.S. v. Percheman(\") followed by Cardozo J. in 1937\n\n(1) •.g. Fusion of Serbia with croat etc. to form Yulnia.\n\n(2) •·~· Hawaii in U.S.A. (3i •.g. India and Pakistan.\n\n(4) \"I U.S.A. from Britain. (S) 32 U.S. 51 at 86. 87.\n\nStal• of G,,,.,.,\n\n\"· Vont Fiddali\n\nHldtqatulloh /.\n\n• ftflf l/f (if{Nft\n\nYIQ 'Fl!lfHI\n\nfl'4Rllllllloli ,.\n\nSuPREME cowr REPORTS [:rg64]\n\nin Shqpleigh v. Mier('). It Wl!S there laid down that privatll .ownership is not disturbed by cha11ges i.n sovereignty and tljat\n\n11.CPPrding to the mo<lern usge of nations a cession of teqitqry\n\nj$ not understood to be cession of the property of thi: iJ!4abitants.\n\nTh!)Se two Casi:$ were refel'fed to in tho judgment of Bose J. in Virendra Singh's case (') who pointed out that these principles were also reflected in the Sixth Advisory Opinion of Se; itember 10, 1923 of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Mr. Purushotham cited other cases where the Supreme Court of the United States had considered obligations which old Spanish and Maxican treaties had created. It was argued :that this represents the modern and progressive view and we were asked to revise the entire law of Act of State as understood in India during the past 100 years and particularly the last dozen years.\n\nThe principle on which this Court has acted in the past few years has been amply indicated earlier in this judgment.\n\nIt may be summarized in the words of Fletcher Moulton, L: J. in Salamon v. Secretary of State for India('): ' ' \"An Act of State is essentially an exercise of sovereign power, and hence cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by munici?al courts. Its sanction is not that of law, but that of sovereign power, and, whatever it be, municipal courts must accept it, as it is without question. But it may, and often must, be part of their duty to take cognizance of it.\n\nFor instance, if an act is relied on as being an act of State, and as thus affording an answer to claims made by a subject, the courts must decide whether it was in truth an act of State. and what was its nature and extent\".\n\nThe Courts in England have also acted on the further principle which may be shortly stated in the words of Lord McNair('):\n\n(I) 299 US. 468 at 470.\n\n(3) (19061 I K. B. 613.\n\n(2) [1955) 1 S.C.R. 415.\n\n(4) International Law Opinions (1956) Vol. I. P. 1129; See abo O'Connel-B. Y. B. (1950) P. 93.\n\n''The t~ ·ct of State' is Ulied, not only narrowly\n\nto descnqe the defence eXQlained al>ove, but\n\n!11&<>, perhps somewh!lt loosely, to denote a rule which is wider aiid more fundamental, namely, that 'those acts of the Crown which are done under the prerogative in the sphere of foreign affairs' (sometimes called 'Acts of State' or 'Matters of State'); for instance, tho making of peace and war, the anneirntion or\n\nabandonment of territory, the recognition of a new State or the new Government of an old State, etc., cannot form the basis of an action brought against the Crown, or its agents or servants, by any person British or alien, or by any foreign State, in British Municipal Tribunals.\n\nSuch acts are not justiciable in British Courts, at the suit either of British subjects or of aliens; they may form the subject of political action in Parliament or, when the interests of foreign States or their nationals are involved, of diplomatic protest or of any international judicial process that may be availab!e\".\n\nWe are not concerned with the obligations created by treaty which according to the opinions of some writers 'run with the land' and bind the territory. Other writers, as pointed out by Lord McNair in his Law of Treaties by Keiith in his Theory of State Succession and Crandall in Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement. hold that on cession, the treaties are abrogated automatically. Such a view was taken by the United Kingdom and United States when Algiers was annexed by France and by the former when South Africa was annexed by Great Britain and by the United States when Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. (See Mervyn Jones B. Y. B. (1947) P. 360; Dr. C. W. Jenks B. Y. B. (1952 P. 105). On the other hand, the treaties of the annexing or cessionary State are held to apply to the new territories.\n\nThese are treaties with other States which is not the case here. Where is the .treaty here? The righm conferred by the Ruler were not the result of a treaty. Nor\n\n.laH\n\n111111 oJ 0....,\n\nYon 'uw.Ji\n\nIlld4Jiitllllllli l\n\nStttU. of Gujarat\n\n\"· J!ora Fiddali\n\nBidayatul/ah /.\n\ncan the Merger agreement be exalted to the position of a. treaty.\n\nThere is no treaty involved here. Even if it were possible to hold that there was a treaty between the Ruler and the Central Government, there is no power in the Municipal Courts in India to pronounce upon the Agreement as the subject is outside their jurisdiction by reason of Art. 363. This distinguishes the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court of the United States i.n which consideration of treaties is included.\n\nThe bar of our Constitution also precludes the consideration whether these agreements can be said to be of the nature of treaties.\n\nAs regards the principles of International Law, it may be pointed out that after the Report of the Transvaal Concessions Commission and Professor Keith's theories in his book, the attention of the world communities has indeed been drawn to the preservation of economic concessions and acquired rights by the annexing or cessionary State. When the Indian Islands weire ceded to Greece the Law Officers (Sir Robert Phillimore was one of them) advised:\n\n\"Both according to the principles of International Law and the !Practice of all civilised States, ceded territories pass, cum onere to the new sovereign.\" (Opinion of 15th August, 1863, F. 0. 83/2287.) McNair International Opinions, Vol. 1 p. 156.\n\nSimilar advice was given on the occasion of annexation of Peruvian territory by Chile (1884), of Madagascar by France (1896), cession of Cuba and the Philipines by\n\nSpain (1898). McNair ibid pp. 157 et seq.\n\nAgain at the annexation of the Boer Republics between 1900 and 1909 what should be the attitude of Britain led to domestic controversy. The legal advisor to the High Commissioner advised that responsibities arising from obligwtions incurred by the South African Republic and Orange Free State could be repudiated but the Law Officers in England reported that a Government annexing territory annexes it sub•ct. speaking generally. to such legal obligations as have been incurred by the previously existing Government.\n\nThe 0bligations included concessionary contracts but the Law Officers added a\n\n6 $:C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUH.T REPORTS 553\n\nrider that \"the duty to observe such contracts <'nnot be enforced in a municipal court; it rests merely on the recogni\n\ntion of International Law of what is equitable upon the acquisition of property of the conquered State\" tsce opinion of 30th November, 1900, F.O. quoted by B. Y. B. 1\\150 at p. 105).\n\nThe Transvaal Concessions Commission made its report in April 1901. The report said inter alia:\n\n\"After annexation, it has been said, the people change their allegiance, but their relations to each other and their rights of property remain undisturbed; and proprty includes rights which lie in contract.\n\nConcessions of the nature of those which are the subject of enquiry resent examples of mixed public and private rights : they probably continue to exist after annexation until abrogated by the annexing State, and as a matter of practice in modern times, where treaties have been made on cession of territory, have often been maintained by agreement.\" The Commission, however said that no rule of International Law compelled this but added that the best modern O?inion favoured that such rights should be respected.\n\nThe distinction between what is a rule of law and what is a rule of ethics was criticised: see Westlake in (1901) 17 Law Quarterly Review p. 395.\n\nHowever, Prof. Keith gave support t1> the view.\n\nThe report of the Commission was considerably influenced by the opinion in Cook v.\n\nSprigg(') International experts, however, in drafting the terms of settlement of the first Balkan War accepted a new formula in 1920 by which the cessionary State was treated as subrogated in all rights and changes.\n\nThese opinions were put to test in some cases before the Permanent Court of International Justice in conneotion with the Jaffa Concessions and the case of the German Settlers Case. In the former, the Court decided, for technical reasons, that it had no jurisdiction but added that \"if Protocol XII left intact the general principles of subrogation,\" the administration of Palestine was bound to recognise the Jaffa\n\n(1) [1899) A.C. 572.\n\nState of Gu/llNI• .,, Vora Fiddall\n\nHid4Jatul/al I•\n\nl~ i!f GuJOT!ll y. ro/!' Fiddali\n\ni#Wn.,\"'1Db /.\n\nConcessions \"in consequence Of the general principles rl. lllternational Law.\" In the case of Settlers of German origin in territory ceded by Germany to Poland and Germm interest in Upper Silesia case (P.C.l.J. series B No. 6 pnd series A No. 7), the doctrine of acquired rights was accepted, in respect of private rights. The term \"acquired rights\" has not received a consistent meaning in this connection. It is not the notion of ius quaesitum which wa, the result of juristic activity fo; lowing upon the social contract theory.\n\nIn International Law, it has different meanings.\n\nAt one extreme is the view that it must be \"a grant to an individual of rights under municipal law which touch public interest\" and at the other end \"every economic concession\" is held included. Of course even International Law does not recognise a universal succession. The term \"economic concessions\" mnst involve a contract between the State or a public authori, ty on the one hand and a concessionaire on the other and must also involve an investment of capital by the latter for erection of public works or exploitation in the public sector. Such cases are the Mavrommais case, LiJ?hthouses case, Lighthouses in Crete and Samos case (P.C.I.J. Series A No. 5 and Series A B No. 62 and 71). Cases of mere private rights without any corresponding benefit to the public are .not regarded as concessions brnt there are two cases in which it has been ruled that private rights must be respected.\n\nThey are the case of Poland mentioned above.\n\nMost of the cases deal with Concessions in which there are reciprocal advantages.\n\nAll this recognition is still in 1he diplomatic field. It has never gone beyond political consideration except in the United States.\n\nThe cases of the United States are mostly to be found in 2-12 Peters and , the leading case is U. S. v.\n\nPercheman ('). Occasionally the ouestion of concessionary rights has been considered in the Courts in En!!land : but of that latter.\n\nIn U. S. v. Percheman('), Chief Justice John Marshall observed :\n\n\"It may not be unworthy of remark that it is very unusual, even in cases of conquest for the\n\n(1) 7. Pet. 61.\n\n<i $.C.R.\n\nSpPRE~ COURT REPORTS\n\nconqueror to do QJ.ore than t0 4i$p, lce tJ!p\n\nsovreign and assume dominion ov~ $.!l country. The µiodem usage of nations, v; hi~ has become law, would be violated; that ~~ of justice anc! of right which is acknowledg~ and felt by th~ whole civilised world would outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled.\n\nThe people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of property remain undisturbed. If this be the modern rule even in cases of conquest, who can doubt i1ts application to the case of an amicab!e cession of territory? .....\n\nA cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the Qroperty belonging to its inhabitants.\n\nThe King cedes that only which belonged to him.\n\nLands he had previously granted were not his to cede.\n\nNeither party could so understand the cession. Neither party could consider nself as attempting a wrong to individuals. condemned by the practice of the whole civilised world. The cession of a territory by its name from one sovereign to another, con veving the comnound idea of urrendering at the same time the lands and the poole who inhabit them would be necessarily understol'd to pass the sovereignty only, and not to interfere with private property.\"\n\nThese words of Chief Justice Marshall have been quoted in legal opinions and have influenced international opinion. The question has been raised that we must accent this as the exposition of the law to be applied by municipal courts here.\n\nThe doctrine in the United States is not unlimned.\n\nLimitations were pointed out by Chief Justice John Marshall himself in the case of Foser v. Nielson(').\n\nThat ca!IC\n\n(I) [1829) 2 Pct. 2,3.\n\nJM§4\n\nSfflll .91 9\"\"1r!t v . .y R/IU4lll\n\n(i~I\n\nS\"'\" of Gujarat\n\n~- J' .,. , iddall\n\nB\"\"'1atul/JJh /.\n\ninvolved the effect upon private land titles of 11 phrase in an Article of a treaty wit!i Spain. That phrase was \"shall be ratified and confirmed to those in possession\". lt was, as the Chief Justice said, in the \"language of contract\" and it required legislative im, Plementation before titles couid be claimed. This has led to a differentiation between selfexecuting treaties and non-self-executing treaties.\n\nSays Chief Justice John Marshall:-\n\n\"A treaty is in its .nature a contract between two nations, not a Legislative Act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be\n\naccomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign powers of the respective parties to the instrument.\n\nIn the United States a different principle is established.\n\nOur Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an Act of Legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contractwhen either of the parties engages to perform a particular act-the treaty addresses itself to th• political, not the Judicial Department; and th• Legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.\"\n\nIn India, the position is different. Article 253 enables legislation to be made to implement international treaties.\n\nThis means that the law would bring the treaty in the field of municipal law. The matter was considered in one case Birma v. The State('), where the High Court declared:\n\n''Treaties which are a part of international law do not form part of the law of the land unless expressly made so by the legislative authority\".\n\nThis accords with wha~ has been said by me but the judgment\n\nlleCIIls to suggest that treaties which do not affect private\n\n(I) A.l.R. [1951) Raj. 127.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RI<, PORTS 557\n\nrights also require legislative implementation.\n\nThis is not quite accurate, because it is not necessary that all treaties must be made a part of municipal law.\n\nI agree with Alexander in \"International Law in India\" in International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1952) p. 289 at p. 295.\n\nPreuss [Michigan Law Review (1953) p. 1123 n. 15] calls it a rare example of a treaty which was not enforced without legislative sanction.\n\nThe only other example he gives is Re Arrow River and Tributaries Slide and Boom Co. Ltd.\n\n(1932) 2 B.L.R. 250. see B.Y.B. ( 1953) 30, pp. 202, 203.\n\nThe precedent of the United States cannot be useful because it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States thrut, although the Courts have no power to question the validity of the Act of State, they can consider its effect.\n\nSee U.S. v. Percheman( 1) at p. 86 and that the enunciation of treaties Must be accepted bv Courts, Clark v. Allen(').\n\nOur practice and Comtitution shows that there are limitations upon the powers of Courts in matters of treaties and Courts cannot step in where onlv political devartments can act. Tue power of the Courts is further limited when the right is claimed against the political exercise of the power of the State.\n\nAgain, the right claimed here is not even a concessionary right such as he has received the support of international writers. It is more of the nature of a gift by the ruler at the expense of the State. It lacks bona fides which is one of the things to look for. There is no treaty involved and whatever guarantee there is, the Constitution precludes the municipal courts from considering. Politically and ethically there might have been some reason to accept and respect such concessions but neither is a reason for the municinal courts to intervene.\n\nThe position of the municinal courts according to En!!lish Jurisryrudence has been noticed in earlier cases.\n\nTo them may be added the following considerations. Jn Amodu Tijani 'f. Secretary, Southern Nigeria (8 ) it was said:\n\n\"a mere change in sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to disturb rights of private owners, and\n\n~~~~~~·-~-\n\n(!) 7. Pet. 61.\n\n(2) 331 U.S. 503.\n\n(3) [1921] 2. A.C. 399.\n\n1\"4\n\nS1111e of G11/-\n\nYora l'UltWJ\n\nHid,,, atldW. /.\n\nStli/1 of Gtljarat\n\n~- \" oro Piddali\n\nBidayatul/IJA J.\n\nthe general terms of a cession are prima facie to be construed accordingly.\" (p. 407).\n\nAgain, in West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v.\n\nRe gem ( 1), it was said:\n\n\"It must not be forgotten that the obligations of conquering states with regard to private property of private individuals, particularly land as to which the title had already been perfected before the conquest or annexation are altogether different from the obligations which arise in respect of rpersonal rights by contracts.\" The observations in Amodu Tijani's case(') were cited before the Privy Council in Sardar Rustam Khan's case(').\n\nBut Lord Atkin after referring to all cases from Kamachee Boye Saheba('), referred to the observ.1tions of Lord Halsbury in Cook v. Sprigg(').\n\n\"It is well-established principle of law that the 1transactions of independent States between each other are governed by other laws than those which municipal courts administer. It is no answer to say that by the ordinary principles of international law private property is res; iected by the sovereign which accepts the cession and assume the duties and legal obligations of the former sovereign with respect of such private property within the ceded territory. All that can be properly meant by such a proposition, is that, according to the well understood rules of international law, a change of sovereignty by cession ought not to affect i; irivate propertv, but no municipal tribunal has authority to enforce such an obligation\".\n\nLord Atkin referred in his judgment to Secretarv of State\n\nv. Bai Rajbai(6 ) and Vajje Singh's case(') as laying the\n\n(I) [1905] 2 K.B. 391.\n\n(2) ( 19?.1) 2. A.C. 39~.\n\n(3) (1941) 68 I.A. 109.\n\n(4) (1859) 13 Moore P.C. 22\n\n(51 1899 A.C. 572.\n\n(6) (1915) L. R. 42 I.A. 229.\n\n(7) (1924) L. R. SI I.A. 357.\n\nlimits of the jurisdiction of municipal courts. These cases have been applied in several decisions by this Court and the view of the Supreme Court of the United States or the view taken in International Law has not been accepted. It is not that the Courts in England have not been pressed by the rules of International Law as a science. As Westlake pointed out in the Nature and Extension of Title by Conquest (op. cit.):\n\n\"The authorities on the law of England appear to be\n\nprepared to pay that homage to international law. We may refer to what was said by Vice- Chancellor Lord Cranworth in King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, I Sim. N.S. 327-9, and by Vice-Chancellor Wood in United States of America v. Prioleau, 2 Ham. 563; and to tl!e generality of the proposition laid down by Vice- Chancellor James in United States of America\n\nv. Mcrae, L.R.8. Eq. 75. 'I apprehend it,' he said, 'to be the clear public universal Jaw that any government which de facto succeeds to any other government, whether by revolution or restoration, conquest or reconquest, succeeds to all the public property, to everything in the nature of public i;:iroperty, and to all rights in respect of the public property, of the displaced power, whatever may be the nature or origin of the title of such displaced powers\".\n\nBut the rule that the Act of State can be questioned in a Municipal Court has been adopted and it has been considered that it is a matter for the political departments of the State.\n\nTo quote from Cook v. Sprigg(').\n\n ..... if there is either an express or a well-understood bargain, between the ceding potentate and the Government to which the cession is made, that private property shall be respected, that is only a bargain which can be enforced by sovereign\n\n{I) [1899] A.C. 572.\n\nState of Gu/artlt'\n\nVora Fidd4U\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\n:S,,,,. of Gujarat ...\n\nYONJ Flddali\n\nJlidayatul/ali J.\n\nShoJa J.\n\nagainst sovereign in the ordinary course of diplomatic pressure.\"\n\nI do not, therefore, accept the contention that a change of opinion is necessary. Even Bose J., did not decide in Virendra Singh's case('}, on the basis of international law or the o; iinion of the Supreme Court of the United States. In my opinion, these are matters for the political department of the State. However, desirable it may be that solemn guarantees should be respected, we cannot impose our will upon the State, because it is outside our jurisdiction.\n\nFor these reasons, I would accept the appeals and would set aside the judgment under appeal and restore the decrees dismissing the suits with costs throughout.\n\nSHAH J.-The Ruler of Sant State had made grants of villages to jagirdars but without right to trees. On March 12, 1948, the Ruler issued an order reciting that the holders of the villages were not given \"rights of the forests\" and after considering the complaints of certain jagirdars they were given full rights and authority over the fore>ts in the villages under their vahivat.\n\nThe jagirdars were directed to manage \"the forests according to the policy and admini•tration of the State\". The respondents claim in these appeals that the rights of the grantees to the forests were not liable to be cancelled by the Dominion of India after the merger of the State of Sant in June 1948, and by executive action the Government of Bombay was not comlJCtent •to obstruct the exercise of those rights.\n\nPursuant to the agreement dated March 19, 1948 as from June 1, 1948, the State of Sant merged with the Dominion of India. The sovereignty of the Ruler was thereby extinguished and the subject• of the Sant State became citizens of the Drm1inion of India. Accession of one State to another is an act of State and the subiects of the former State may, as held in a large number of decisions of the Judicial Committee and of this Court. claim protection of only such rights as the new sovereign recognises as enforceable by the subject~ of the former State in his municioal courts.\n\n(I) (1955] I S.C.R. 415.\n\nIn The SeJ:retary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Saheba ( 1) the jurisdiction of the courts in India to adjudicate upon the validity of the seizure by the East India Company of the territory of Rajah of Tanjore as an escheat, on the ground that the dignity of the Raj was extinct for want of a male heir, and that the property of the late Rajah lapsed to the British Government, fell to be determined.\n\nThe Judicial Committee held that as the seizure was mado by the British Government, acting as a sovereign power, through its delegate the East India Company it was an act of State, to inquire into the propriety of which a Municipal Court had no Jurisdiction.\n\nLord Kingsdown observed at p. 529:\n\n\"The transactions of independent States between each other are governed by other laws than those which Municipal Courts administer : Such Courts have neither the means of deciding_what\n\nis right, nor the power of enforcing any decision which they may make.\"\n\nIn Va; esingii Joravarsing; i v. Secretary of State for India m Council(\") the Board observed (at p. 360) :\n\n. when 11 territory is acquired by a sovereign State for the first time that is an act of State. It matters not how the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognized ruler.\n\nIn all cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised.\n\nSuch rights as, he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing.\n\nNay more, even if in a treatv of cession it is stipulated .that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that does not give 11 title to those\n\n(I) 7 Moode'1 I.A. 47'.\n\n(2) L.R. SI LA. 357.\n\nlM-111 s.c ........\n\n1964 S-of O,,,_\n\n\"· Y 010 FllUall\n\nSW J,\n\n.SUPREME Cbuttt \"REPORTS [~}\n\ninhabitants to enforce 'these stipulatiODS in tho 'municipal courts.\n\nThe right to enforce remainl only with the high contracting parties. n\n\nIn Secretary of Sttite v. -Sardar Rustam Khan and Others( 1 ) in considering \"whetjier the right~ of a granieo of certain proprietary rights in lands from the then Kllan of. Kalat, ceased to be 1 enforceable ce th~ agieement between th, e' Khan and t{te Agent o the Governbr-Gencral in Baluchistan under which the 'Khan 'had granted to \"the British Government. a_perpetual lease of. a. part of the Kalat tertitory, at a quit rent; imd _had ceded in perpetuity w\\th fuJJ and exclu.sive revenue, civil and criminal jurisdiction and aJJ ther forms of administrtgn, it was.,,9bse; ved by Lord Atkin <; lelivering the judgment of :t}le, Board that :\n\n\" . . in this case the G'ovemment of India had\n\nthe right t,9 recogl)i.se or. riot recognise the existing titles to land. In the case of .the lands in suit they decid~ n~ 'to recognize them, and it follows tJiat., the plaintiffs havp. no reqourso against the Government in the Municipal Courts.\" ' ..\n\nThe rule that cessiol\\ of terrlfory by one State to another is an act of State and the subjects of the former State may enforce only, those right& which the new sovereign recognise1 hes been itci:eptM by, this Cot!rt in MI s. Dalmia Dadrl Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Comm.ifSioner of Income-tax(•); Jagannath Agarwalav. State of Orissa (\"); Promod Chandra Deb and Others v. The State of brissa and Others(') and The State of Saurashtra v. lalrladar Mohamad Abdulla and others(•), and may be regarded as well settled.\n\nMr. Purshottam on behalf of' the respodents however contended that this rule was. a relic of the imperialistic and C1X9ansionist philoso_phy of the Briish Jurisprudence, whicll\n\n(1) L. R. 611\" I.A. 109.\n\nJ2l (1959) S.C.R.\" 729.\n\n(3) [19621 1 s.c.R. 205.\n\n(4) [19621 Suppl. l s.c.a. •· (5l (19621 3 s.c.•. m ..\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE1IE COUJ<T REPORTS\n\n',)s inconsistent with our Constitutional set-up •... Counsel--: 1964\n\nsubmits that in jurisdictions where truly democratic Stlftl of OuJarat institutions exist the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee •· has not been accepted.\n\nThe rule is;· counsel submits, Vora Fiddali inconsistent with the tn:e spirit of our Constitution, which Slcah I. seeks to eschew all n•bitrary authority, and establishes the rule of law by subjer.ting every executive action to the scrutiny of the courts and to test it in the light of fundamental rights.\n\nCounsel says that the true rule should be the one which has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States that of the accession of a State to another, private rights of the citizens enforceable against their sovereign are not affected, and may be enforced in the Courts of the new sovereign. In support of this argument Mr.\n\nPurshottam relied upon the observations made by Marshall, C. J.; in Tlnited States v. Percheman(1 ):\n\n\"The people change their allegiance; tl:eir relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of pro- . perty, remain undisturbed. If this be the modem rule even in cases of conquest, who can\n\ndoubt its application to the case of an amicable cession of territory ? ... . . . . . . . . .. . . A cession of territory is never understood to b~ a cession of the property belonging to its inhabitants. The king cedes that only which belonged to him.\n\nLands he had previously granted were. not his to cede.\n\nNeither party could consider itself as attending a wrong to individuals, condemned by the practice of the whole civilised world. The ·\n\ncession of a territory by its name from one sovereign to another, conveying the compound idea of surrendering, at the same time the lands and the people who inhabit them, would be necessarily understood to pass the sovereignty only, and to interfere with private property.\"\n\nBut the rights and their enforceability in. the Municipal Courts of a State must depend upon the will of the sovereign.\n\nThe sovereign is the fountain head of all rights, all laws and\n\n(ll (18331 32 U.S. St, at 86, 87. '\n\n196#\n\n6toi. of Guf-\n\nYON PllldtJli\n\n\"\"'' J.\n\nall justice within the State and only those rights which arc recognised by the. sovereign are enforceable in his Courts.\n\nThe Municipal Courts which derive their authority from their aovereign and administer his laws cannot enforce the rights which the former sovereign whose territory has merged or been seired by the new sovereign recognised but the new 10vcrcign has not, for the right to property of the citizen is only that right which the sovereign recognises.\n\nIt may also be observed that the constitutional provisions in the United States are somewhat different.\n\nUnder the Constitution of the United States each treaty becomes a part of the law of the land, the provisions thereof are justiciable and the covenants enforceable by the Courts.\n\nRecognition of the rights of the citizens of the acceding State being the prerogative of the sovereign, if rights be recognized by treaty which by the special rules prevailing in the United States become part of the law of the land, they would be enforceable by the Municipal Courts. Under the rule adopted hy this Court, a treaty is a contract between two natio'ls, it creates rights and obligations between the contracting States, but there is no judicial tribunal which is competent to enforce those rights and obligations. The treaties have not the force of law 1and do not give rise to rights or obligations enforceable by the Municipal Courts as observed by Hyde in his •1n1emational Law\" vol. 1 p. 433:\n\n\"Acknowledgement of the principle that a change of\n\nsovereignty does not in itself serve to impair rights of private property validly acquired in areas subjected to a change, does not, of course. touch the question whether the new sovereign\n\nis obliged to respect those rights when vested in the nationals of foreign States, such as those of its predecessor. Obviously, the basis of :tny\n\nrestraint in that regard which the law of nations may be deemed to impose must be sought in another quarter.\"\n\nTile observations made by Marshall C. J., have received nipeetcd recognition in treaties of cession concluded by the\n\nUnited. States. But as observed by Lord Halsbury in Cook\n\nv. Sprigg(') '\n\nult is a well-established principle of law that the transactions of inde; iendent States lietween 'each other are governea by the others laws than .those which Municiphl Courts administer. lit is no answer to say that by the ordinary principles of international law private property is respected by the sovereign which accepts the cession and assumes the duties and legal obligationa of the former sovereign with respect to such private property within the . ceded territory.\n\nAll that. can 'be properly meant oy such a proposition is thal! according to tlie well-understood /\n\nrules of international law a chan'ge of sovereignty by cession ought not to affec~ privaill property, but no municipal tribunal has authority to enforce such an obligation.\"\n\nIt-was then urged that by cl. 7 of the letter of guarant.:. written by Mr. V. P. Menon on behalf of the Government of India on October r, 1948, which was to be regarded as expressly stated in that Jetter, as part of the merger !lgn\"- ment dated March 19, 1948, the Government of IQdia had undertaken tq accept all orders passed and actions taken by the Ruler prior to the date of .handing over of the admiW. tration to the Dominion q, overnment Clause 7 of the letter is in the following terms: \"No order passed or action taken by you before tho date of> making over the administration to the pominion Government will be questioned unless the order was passed or aotion taken after the 1st day of April 1948, and it is considered by the Government of India. to be palpably unjust or unreasonable.\n\nThe decision of th11 Government of India in their respect will be final.\" ·\n\nBut by virtue of Art. 363 of the Citution, it isnot opea\n\nto the respondents to enforce tlt% Cd'venants df this agrN-\n\n(1) (1899) A.C. 512.\n\n-... ,.\n\nment in the Municipal Courts; Maharaj Umeg Singh and Others v. The State of Bombay and o<hers( 1), It was then urged that the Government of Bombay as delegate of the Dominion of India had recognised the right al the respondents when they were ipermEtted to cut the forests.\n\nBut the plea of recognition has no force.\n\nIt is true that some of the forests were permitted to be cut by the contractors under special conditions pending decision of the Government of Bombay.\n\nThe Conservator of Forests North Western Circle had ordered that the question as to the approval to be given to the agreement dated March 12, 1948, was under the consideration of the Government and that written undertakings should be taken from the jagirdars, inamdars or persons concerned that they would abide by the decision or orders passed by the Bombay Government in respect of such' private forests when the question of rights over such private forests wi'.l be finally settled. On January 9, 1949,\n\non the appliation of the jagirdar the Divisional Forest Officer agreed to issue authorisation to the contractor valid npto March 31, 1949, subject to the condition that export outside was not to be permitted pending recipt of the orders by the Government and that a written undertaking was given by the purchaser that he would abide by the decision and orders passed by Government.\n\nIn pursuance of this arrangement undertakings were given by the contractors and the jagirdars agreeing to abide by the decision and the orders to be passed by the Government of Bombay in respect .of the forest rights and admitting that the authorization issued by the Divisional Forest Officer was subject to those undertaking.\n\nThe Forest Officers therefore did not allow ihe forests to be worked unconditionally. Cutting of trees in the forests by the contractors was permitted subiec! to certain terms and conditions and on the clear undertaking that the question as to the right and the terms under which they could cut the forests would be decided by the Government.\n\nThe Government of Bombay on July 8, 1949, resolved that the order passed by the Ruler of the Sant State dated March 12, 1948, transferring forest rights to holders of the\n\n(I) [19SSJ 2 S.C.R. 164.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPGRTS\n\njagirs villages were ma/a fide aaq that they should be cancelled, but before taking further action in the matter, tho Commissioner should ascertain whether the possession of the forests in question was with the Qovenunent or was\n\nwith the jagirdars.\n\nThe order proceeded to state: \"It the possession is still with Government please ask the Officer of the Forest Department to retain the same and to refuse to issue passes, etc., to privaJte contractors and purchasers\".\n\nA copy of this order was forwarded to the Forest Officers, Santrampur for information and guidance and it is found endorsed on that order that no transit passes be issued to the jagirdars to whom rights over forests were conceded in March 1948 and all further felling in such jagir forests should be stopped at once and compliance reported. It is true that the order of the Governor was not directly communicated to the jagirdars or the contractors. But if the conduct of the Forest Officers in permitting cutting of the forests is sought to be relied upon, it would be necessary to take into consid& ration the orders passed by the Conservator of Forests, North-Western Circle, the undertakings given by the contractors and the jagirdars and the order passed by the Gover.nor of Bombay and the execution of that crdcf by stoppage of the cutting of the forests.\n\nIt appears that cutting of trees in forests was permitted only upto some time in 1949 and was thereafter stopped altogether by order of the Revenue Department.\n\nThe final resolution cancelling the agreement was passed on February 6, 1953. It was recited in the resolution that\n\nthe Tharav issued by the Ruler m 1948 had been considered by the Government to be ma/a fide and the same had already been repudiated and it was not binding on the Go- Temrnent of Bombay both by law and under the agreement of integration, in spite of the assurance contained in the collateral letter.\n\nIt was also recited. \"Si.nee the Tharav has not been recognised by Go.-\n\nvernment but has been specifically repudiated, everything done in pursuance thereof includint the contracts entered into after passing of ti.\n\nTharav, is not valid and. therefore, binding OJI this Govcnnment\"\n\nllfllU of G,,,_\n\n\"· y- F\"\"4ll\n\n,,,.,, I.\n\nHaving regard to llbe conduct of the Officers of the Govemment of Bombay and the resolution of the Government, tb9 \"lea that the Government of Bombay as delegate of the ~\n\nminion had renounced its right not to regard itself as bound by the order made by the Ruler of Sant State cannot be ·· sustained.\n\nThe next question which falls to be determined is wh~ ther the order can be regarded as \"law\" within the meaninJ of cl 4 of the Administration of the Indian States Order,\n\n1948. Clause 4 (1) provided:\n\n\"Such provisions, or such parts of provisiCllll\n\n(a) of any law, or\n\n(b) of any notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law issued, made or prescribed under any law, as were in .force immediately before th•\n\nappointed day in any Indian State shall cont> nue in force until altered, repealed or amended by an order, under the Extra Provincial Juri.9diction Act, 1947 (XLVll of 1947): Provided that the powers that were exercised by the\n\nRuler of an Indian State in respect of or in relation to such Indian State under any such i; irovisions of law immediately before tht\n\nappointed day, shall be exercised by the Pr<>- vincial Government or any officer specially empowered in this behalf by the Provincial Government.\"\n\nIt was urged that the order issued by the Ruler of Sant State\n\nwa~ either \"law\" or an \"order made or prescribed under any law\" in force immediately before the appointed day and by virtue of cl. 4 of the Administration of the Indian States Order, it must be deemed to have remained in operation and any action taken in contravention thereof by executive action was unjustified. Our attention has not been invited to any statutory provisions relating to forests in tho State of Sant, nor does the order dated' March 12, 1948, purport to be issued in exercise of any statutory power.\n\nOa the face of it the order grants certain rights in forests which bad not been previously granted to the jagirdan by tht\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT Rr~PORTS\n\nRuler. It is urged that the Ruler of Sant was an absolule Ruler in whom were vested all authority legislative, executive and judicial, and whatever he did or directed had to be complied with and therefore his actions and directions must be deemed to be \"law\" within the meaning of cl 4 of the Administration of the Indian States Order. But the fact that the Ruler of Sant State was an absolute Ruler not bound by any constitutional limitations upon the exercise of his powers does not, in my judgment, invest every exercise of his powers with legislative authority. The functions of a State whether it contains a democratic set-up or is administered by an autocratic sovereign fall into three broad categories-executive, legislative and judicial. The line of demarcation of these functions in an absolute or autocratic form of Government may be thin and may in certain cases not be easily discernible.\n\nBut on that account it is not po5sible to infer that every act of an autocratic sovereign has a legislative content or that every direction made by him must be regarded as Jaw.\n\nThat an act or an order of a sovereign with absolute authority may be enforced and the subjects have no opportunity of getting redress against infringement of their rights in the Municipal Courts of the State will not be decisive of the true character of the functions of the sovereign in the exercise of which the act was done or the order was made. The distinction between functions . executive, legislative and judicial vested in one person may not be obliterated, merely because they are in fact exc:rcised or are capable of being exercised indiscriminately.\n\nIn the ultimate analysis, the legislative power is the power to make, alter. amend or repeal laws and within certain definite limits to delegate that power. Therefore it is power to lay down a binding rule of conduct. Executive power Is the power to execute and enforce the laws, and judicial power is power to ascertain, construe and determine the rights and obligations of the i;>arties before a Tribunal in respect of a transaction on the application of the laM and even in an absolute regime this distinction of the functions prevails.\n\nH an order is made during the regime of a sovereign who exercises absolute powers, and it is enfo11:e.:I or executed leaving nothing more to be done there-\n\nState of G~·\n\nV oTG FlddalJ\n\nShah /.\n\n1964 . sof Gujarat\n\n\"· Vo\"' Flddali\n\nSW J.\n\nunder to effectuate it, any discussion of its true character would be an idle exercise.\n\nWhere however in a set-up in which the rule of law prevails, to support action taken pursuant to an order you have to reach the source of authority in the power of the previous autocratic sovereign, the true nature of the function exercised may become important, when the laws of the former State are by express enactment continued by the new sovereign.\n\nThe order dated March 12, 1948, conveys to the jagirdars rights which had been previously excluded from the grants.\n\nThe form of the order is of course not decisive. An important test for determining the character of the sovereign f'unction is whether the order expressly or by clear implication prescribes a rule of conduct governing the subject which may be complied with a sanction demanding compliance therewith.\n\nThe order dated March 12, 1948, is expressly in the form of a grant of the rights which were not previously granted and does not either expressly or by implication seek to lay down any binding rule of conduct. I am therefore unable to hold that the order issued on March 12, 1948, by the Ruler of Sant State was \"Jaw\" or an order made under\n\nany Jaw within the meaning of cl. 4 of the Administration ' of the Indian States Order. 1948.\n\nCases which have come before this Court in which the <JUestion as to the binding effect of orders issued by the Rulers of the former Indian States fell to be determined clearly illustrate that principle. In Ameer-un-Nissa Begum and others v. Mahboob Begum and others(') the question as to the binding character of two 'Firmans' dated February 24, 1949, and September 7, 19~9. issued by H. E. H. the Ninm of Hyderabad fell to be determined.\n\nThe Court in that case observed (at p. 359) ;-\n\n\"The 'Firmans' were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were binding in the same way as any othr Jaw;-nay, they would override all other Jaws which were in conflict with them.\n\nSo long as a particular 'Firman' held the field, that alone would gov-\n\n'') A.T.R. (19SS) S.C. 3S2.\n\nem or regulate the rights of the parties concerned, though it could be annulled or modified by a later 'Firman' at any time that the Nizam willed.\"\n\nThe Court declined to consider whether the 'Firmans' were in the nature of \"legislative enactment\" or \"judicial orders\"\n\ntnd observed:\n\n'\"I'he Nizam was not only the supreme legislature, he was the fountain of justice as well.\n\nWhen he constituted a new Court, he could, according to ordinary notions, be deemed to have exercised his legislative authority. When again he affirmed or reversed a judicial decision, that may appropriately be described as a judicial act.\n\nA rigid line of demarcation, however, between the one and the other would from the very nature of things be not justified or even possible.\" .\n\nIn that case the primary question which the Court had to consider was whether certain 'Firmans' issued by the Nizam could be enforced. . It was held that the order may be legislative or judicial in character, but it could not be regarded as executive. It may be noticed that no action was requ!red to be taken after the cessor of the sovereignty of the Nizam, in pursuance of the 'Firmans'. The 'Firmans' had become effective, and titles of the parties stood adjusted in the light of those 'Firmans' during the regime of the Nizam.\n\nIn Director of Endowments. Government of Hyderabad\n\nv. Akram Ali(') the effect of a 'Firman' issued by the Nizam on December 30. 1920, directing that the Ecclesiastical Department to supervise a Dargah within the jurisdiction of the Nizam until the rights of the parties were enquired into and adjudicated upon by a civil court fell to be determined. The Court in that cae held that the right of Akram Ali who claimed to be hereditary Sajjad Nashin and Mutwa/li was subject to the order of the Nizam which had been passed before the Hyderabad State merged with the Union of India and the applicant having no rights it could\n\n(I) A.I.II..\n\n19S6 S.C. 60.\n\n1964 .\n\nStal• of Gujatrll\n\n•• Vol'll Fi4dall\n\nSM• I.\n\nStal• of Gu/- v.\n\nYo111 Fiddali\n\nSliuTt I.\n\nbe enforced at the date of the Constitution and the Com1$ were incompetent to grant him relief till the rights wero determined by the Constitution. The effect of the 'Firman' was to deprive the respondent Akram Ali and all other claimants of all rights to ipossession pending enquiry into the case. It is clear from the observations made in that judgment that the only decision of the Court was that by tht\n\n'Firman' the rights of the Sajjad Nashin and Mutwa/li was. suspended till determination by the civil court of his right to possession. The 'Firman' was given effect not because it was regarded as the expression of the legislative will but because it had become effective before the Constitution came into effect suspending the rights of the applicant.\n\nIn Madhorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat(') the true character of certain 'Kalambandis' issued by the Rulers of Gwalior fell to be determined. The appellant was the recipient of a hereditary military pension granted by the Ruler of Gwalior to his ancestors in recognition of their military services. The right to receive pension was recognised by the 'Kalambandis' of 1912 and 1935 issued by the Ruler. After the formation of the State of Madhya Bharat under the Constitution, the Government of that State by an executive order terminated the right of the appellant. The 'Kalambandis' though not issued in the form of legislative enactments were issued for the administration of the department relating to the Shiledari units, i!nd the nature of the provisions unambiguously impressed upon them the character of statutes or regulations having the force of Jaw. The 'Kalambandis' recognised and conferred hereditary rights: they provided for the adoption of a son by the widow of a deceased Silledar subject to the approval of the State and also for the maintenance of widows out of funds specially set apart for that purpose, and contemplated the offering of a substitute when a silledar became old or otherwise unfit to render service: they made detailed provision as to mutation of names after the death of a silledar.\n\nThey further enacted that the Asami being for the shiledari service it could not be mortgaged for a debt of any banker, and if a decree holder sought to proceed against the amount\n\n(I) [19611 S.C.R. 957.\n\npayable to him, execution had to be carried out in accordance with and fh the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in that behalf. The 'Kalambandis' were not treated as administrative orders issued merely for the purpose of regulating the working of the administration of the department of irregular forces, and were therefore to be regarded as regulations having all the characteristics of legislative enactments.\n\nIn Promod Chandra Deb's case(') the true character of certain 'Khor Posh' grants granted by the Rulers of Talcher, Bamra and Kalahandi fell to be determined, in a group of petitions for enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nOut of the four petitions, petition No. 167 of 1958 was dismissed on the ground that under an order passed by the Extra\n\nProvincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, a grant made by the Ruler -0f Bamra in favour of the petitioner was annulled before Bamra became part of the Union of India and the right created by the grant had on that account ceased to exist.\n\nIn two other petitions Nos. 168 of 1958 and 4 of 1959 it was found by the Court that the maintenance grants in favour of certain members of the family of the Ruler were recognised by the Government of India and the right thus recognised was giveri effect to and payments pursuant thereto were continued for nearly eight years after the merger of the State. This Court held that the State having recognized its obligation to pay the maintenance grants which were agreed to be granted under the statutory law and the custom of the State, the grants could not be annulled by executive action. In the principal writ petition No. 79 of 1957 the grants by the Ruler of Talcher was made subject to the terms and conditions laid down under Order 31 of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Talcher of 1937.\n\nThese Rules and Regulations of Talcher of 1937 were regarded as the law of the State and it was in accordance with the law that the 'Khor Posh' grants were made by the Ruler.\n\nIt was held that these grants had the effect of law.\n\nSinha.\n\nC.J., delivering the majority judgment of the Court obser- 'l'ed (at p. 436):\n\n\"There is also no doubt that the grant made by the ruler of Talcher in favour of the petitioner\n\n(I) (t9•21 Suppl. I S.CR. 40S.\n\nState of <Ju/lltrll ....\n\nVora Fitldoa\n\nShah I.\n\n1964 ,_ of G,,,..,.\n\nYoru Fi, J, Wi\n\nSW I.\n\ncontinued to be effective until the Merger. Tbs nature and conditions of such grant of. Khorposh are governed by the provisions of th• laws of that State as embodied in Order 31 of the 'Rules and Regulations of Talcher, 193 7'.\n\nUnder the laws of Talcher, the petitioner had been enjoying his Khorposh rights until th• cash grant, as it became converted in 1943-44 as aforesaid, was stopped by the State of Orissa, in April, 1949.\"\n\nIn the view of this Court the terms and conditions, subject to which the grant was made, were on the facts of the ca11 in the nature of legislative acts and not exercise of executive functions.\n\nThe Court in that case did not purport to lay down that any act done by the Ruler whether it be executive, legislative or judicial must be regarded since the merger of the State as in the exercise of the legislative will of tlw Ruler an.d therefore continuing as law.\n\nIn a recent judgment of this Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. Sta:e of Rajasthan and others(') the 'Firman' issued by the Udaipur Darbar in 1934 relating to the administration of the temple of Sharnath ji at Natbdwara, which was expressly declared to be a public temple, and governing the devolution of the right to the managoment of the temple, and certain. incidental matters, fell to be determined. The 'Firman' consisted of four clauses. By the first clause it was declared that according to the law of Udaipur the shrine of Shrinathji had always been and waa a religious institution for the followers of the Vaishnava Sampradaya and that all the property immovable and mov able dedicated, offered or presented to or otherwise coming to the deity Shrinathji had always been and was the property of the shrine and that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the tim• being was merely the custodian manager and trustee of tho said property for the shrine. The second clause prescribed the rule of succession and declared that it was regulated by the law of primogeniture, and provided that the Udaipur Darbar had absolute right to depose any Tilkayat Maharaj on the ground that such Tilkayat Maharaj was unfit.\n\nTlw\n\n(I) A.I.II.. (1963) S.C. 1631.\n\nthird clause provided for measures to be taken by the Ruler 1964 for management of the shrine during the minority of the Stat• of Gut- Tilkayat Maharaj and by the last clause it was provided that Vora vFld\"41i in accordance with the law of Udaipur the Maharana had declared Shri Damodarlalji-the then Tilkayat Maharajunfit to occupy the Gaddi and had approved of the succession of Goswami Govindlalji to the Gaddi of Tilkayat Maharaj. This 'Firman' declared the character of the trust relating to the Shrinathji temple, laid down rules as to the succession and provided for the management during the minority of the Tilkayat, and declared the right of the State to remove the Tilkayat and for enforcement of that right by declaring that the then Tilkayat was unfit to occupy the Gaddi. This was in substance though not in form exercise of the legislative will of the sovereign. Its operation was\n\nnet e.thausted by its enforcement during the regime of the Maharana of Udaipur. D,0!ution of the Gaddi, and declaration about the rower of the Ruler over the shrine wero intended to govern the administration of the shrine for all times. It is true that in that case in paragraph-32 it was observed , after referring to Madhorao Phalke's case('), Ameer-un-Nissa Begum's case( 2 ) and the Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad's case( 3 ):\n\n\"In the case of an absolute Ruler ii ke the Maharana of Udaipur it is difficult to make any distinction between an executive order issued by him or a legislative command issued by him. Any order issued by such a Ruler has the force of Jaw and did govern the rights of the partiet affected thereby.\"\n\nIt was not and could not be laid down that all orders issued by an absolute Ruler were legislative in character: it was merely sought to be emphasized that so long as the territory of Udaipur and the shrine were under the sovereignty of tbe Maharana the distinction between commands legislative and executive was academic, for all orders and commands of the Ruler had to be obeyed alike. But since the merger of the Stale with the Union of India, the question\n\n(!) [1961) S.C.R. 957.\n\n(2) A.LR. (1955) S.C. 352.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1956 S.C. 611.\n\nShalt I.\n\n1961 whether the 'Firman' was a mere executive order or a legis-\n\n.s1111. of Guiarat Iative enactment assumed vital importance. If the com- Yora vFiddali mand was merely executive unless the rights created thereby\n\nSlrah J. were recognized by the Dominion of India they had no validity and no reliance could be placed upon them in the Municipal Courts.\n\nIf the command was legislative, the laws of the former State having been continued upon merger, the legislative command retained vitality and remained enforceable. In the context in which it occurs the statement set out did not and was not intended to lay down, that there is no distinction between legislative commands and executive orders which have to be enforced after the merger of the State with the Indian Union.\n\nI may refer to decisions which illustrate the distinction between legislative commands and executive orders of tho Rulers of the former Indian States. 1n Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and Others(') the question whether an agreement between the Ruler of Jodhpur and a limited Company whereby the Ruler agreed to exempt or remit certain duties or royalties and to hold the Company not liable to pay taxes and further gave an assurance to the Company to amend the laws so as to make them consistent with the agreement was not regarded as \"Jaw\" within the meaning of Art. 372 of the Constitution. In the view of the Court the agreement rested solely on the consent of the parties: it was entirely contractual in nature and had none of the characteristics of law. The Court in that case observed that every order of an absolute Ruler who combines in himself all functions cannot be treated as \"law\" irrespective of the nature or character of the order passed. There is, it was observed, a valid distinction between an agreement between two or more parties even if one of the parties is the sovereign Ruler, and the Jaw relating generally to agreements; the former rests on consensus of mind, the latter expresses the will of the sovereign.\n\nThis case supports the proposition that every act done or order passed by an absolute Ruler of an Indian State cannot have the force of law or be regarded as \"law\" since the merger of his territory with the l fnion of India. To have the vitality of law after\n\n(I) A.l.R. (1963) S.C. 9S3.\n\nmerger, it must be the expression of the legislative will of the Ruler.\n\nThere is yet another judgment of this Court in The Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh and Others(') in which also the question whether an agreement between the Ruler of Rajnandgaon and M/s. Shaw Wallace and Company in connection with the setting up of a textile factory on certain concessional terms in the matter of imposition of octtoi duties on imported goods fell to be determined. It was observed in that case:\n\n\"It is plain iliat an agreement of the Ruler el!:pressed in the shape of a contract; cannot be regarded as a law. A law must follow the customary forms of law-making and must be expressed as a binding rule of conduct. There is generally an established method for the enactment of laws, and the laws, when enacted, have also a distinct form. It is not every indication of the will of the Ruler, however expressed, which amounts. to a law.\n\nAn indication of the will meant to bind as a rule of conduct and enacted with some formality either traditional or specially devised for the occasion, results in a law but not an agreement to which there are two parties, one of whict is the Rulet .\" The order of the Ruler of Sant dated March 12, 1948, was not in the form of a legislative enactment. It also did not seek to lay down a course oii> conduct: it merely purported to transmit certain rights which were. till the date of the order vested in the Ruler to the jagirdars who were grantees of the villages. It is difficult to hold that an order merely granting forest rights not in pursuance of any legislative authority, but in exercise cf the power of the sovereign in whom the rights were vested, to the jagirdars to whom the villages were granted without forest rights, can be regarded as \"law\" w_ithin the meaning of cl. 4 of the Administration of the Indian States Order, 1948, when the order was not intended to lay down any binding rule of\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 888.\n\n134-154 S.C.-37.\n\n- Stat• of G, q,,,. .... ' Yofll Fidiall\n\nSW J,\n\nStal• of G•iarat\n\nY\"\"' FldJa/I\n\n.... ,, J.\n\nconduct of the grantees and merely purported to convey the rights which till then were vested in the Ruler.\n\nThe other question which remains to be determined is whether the respondents are entitled to the protection of s. 299(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, or Art. 31 ( 1) of the Constit\\ltion.\n\nUndoubtedly the order which deprives them of the right to cut forest trees which they claimed from the jagirdar who derived them under the grant dated March 12, 1948, from the Ruler of Sant is an executive order.\n\nSection 299 (l) of the Government of India Act, 1935, protection of which was claimed on the merger of the State of Sant with the Dominio!1 of India provided:\n\n\"No person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law.\" The clause conferred protection upon the property rights of pc; rsons against any executive action. not supported by law.\n\nTo attract the clause, there must, however, exist a right to property which is sought to be protected. If for reasons which we have already stated in considering the first question, the subjects of the acceding State are entitled only to such rights as the new sovereign chooses to recognize, in the absence of any recognition of the rights of the respondents or their predecessor jagirdars, there was no right to property of which protection could be claimed. As held by this Court in State of Saurashtra v. Jamailar Mohamad Abdulla and others(') orders passed by the Administrator of the State of Junagadh appointed on behalf of the Government of India (which had assumed charge of the administration of the State after the Nawab of Junagadh fled the country) on various dates between November 9, 194 7 and January 20, 1949, cancelling grants in favour of certain persons in whose favour the grants had previously been made by the Nawab of Junagadh were not liable to be challenged in suits filed by the grantees in the Civil Courts of the Dominion, on the plea that the porperties had been taken away without the authority of Jaw. This Court held that the impugned orders cancelling the grants in favour of the respondents and taking of the properties arose out of and during an act of State and they could not be questioned before Municipal Tribunals, for the\n\n(I) \\1962] 3 S.C.R. 970.\n\n6 S.C, R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REI'ORTS 579\n\norders of cancellation were passed before the change over of de jure sovereignty.\n\nThere is no support for the assumption made by the respondents that an act of State arises merely at a fixed point of time when sovereignty is assumed. An act of State may be spread over a period, and does not arise merely on the point of acquisition of sovereign right: see Promod Chandra Deb's case('). Nor is the new sovereign required to announce his decision when he assumes or accepts sovereignty over foreign territory, about the rights created by the quondam sovereign, on pain of being held bound by the rights so created. The decision of this Court in Jagannath Agarwalla's case(2 ) pointedly illustrates this principle.\n\nThe State of Mayurbhanj merged with the Province of Orissa on January 1, 1949, but an order dated June 28, 1952, made by the Board of Revenue acting on behalf of the State of Orissa rejecting the claim made by a person who had entered into an agreement or arrangement with the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj in 1943 was held to be in the course of an act of State, the rejection of the claim being in pursuance of an order issued under s. 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 47 of 1947. Therefore till the right to property of the subjects of the former Indian State was recognized by the new sovereign there was no title capable of being enforced in the Courts of the Dominion or the Union.\n\nIt was then urged that in any event since the enactment of the Constitution, by executive action a person may not be deprived of his right to property, and this protection applies as much to rights granted by the former Rulers to persons who on merger became citizens of the Dominion of India as to rights of propertv of other citizens.\n\nIn substance it is urged that even if there was no recognition of the right to property which was granted by the former sovereign by the Dominion Government, after the enactment of the constitution the right granted by the former Rulers may only be taken away by legislative command and not by executive action.\n\nThis argument proceeds upon a misconception of the nture of the fundamental right conferred by Art. 31(1) of the Constitution. In terms, the Article confers a right to claim protection against deprivation of property otherwise than by\n\n(I) [1962) Suppl. I S.C.R. 405.\n\n(2) [1962) 1 S.C.R. 205.\n\nSt•I• of Gu;- . •.\n\nVora Fiddall\n\nShali J.\n\n. 19\"\n\nSlot• df Gujarat f. ' f'Mi Flddali\n\n.tlloUl i.\n\nsso' SUPREME COl Rt REPORTS\n\nauthority of law. A right to property is undoubtedly protected against all actions otherwise than under the authority of law. But the clause postulates a right to porperty which is protected. It does not purport to invest a person with a right to Property which has not been recognized by the Dominion of India or the Union. Even if the right to property was recognized by the Indian State of which the claimant was subject, so long as it is not recognized by the Dominion or the Union it is not enforceable by the Courts in India. On the merger of the State of Sant with the Dominion of India, undoubtedly the respondents became citizens of the Dotninion and they were entitled like any other citizen to the protection of the rights which the Dominion recognized .\n\n. It has also to be remembered that promulgation of the C<;>nstitution did not result in transfer of sovereignty from the. Dominion of India to the Union. It was merely change in' the form of Government. By the Constitution, the authority of the British Crown over the Dominion was extinguished, and the sovereignty which was till then rooted in the Crown was since the Constitution came into force derived from the people of India. It is true that whatever vestige of authority which the British Crown had over the Dominion of India, since the Indian Independence Act was thereby extinguished, but there was no cession, conquest occupation or transfer of territory.\n\nThe new governmental set up was the final step in the process of evolution towards self-government.\n\nThe fact that it did not owe its authority to an outside agency but was taken by the Tepresentatives of the people made no difference in its true character.\n\nThe continuance of the governmental machinery and of the laws of the Dominion, give a lie to any theory of transmission of sovereignty or of the extinction of the sovereignty of the Dominion, and from its ashes, the springing up of another sovereign as suggested in Virendra Singh and Others v .. The Sta:e of Uttar Pradesh(') which I will presently examine.\n\nIf therefore the respondents had under the Government of India Act, 1935, after the merger not acquired any right to the forests by virtue of any recognition of the Tharav dated March 12, 1948, the promulgation of the Constitution\n\n, I) [1955] I S.C.R. 415.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\n SUPREME COUJ(T I<EPOJ.<TS\n\ndid not invt them with any ad4itional rights which }Vould convert either their claims to the fores.t rights µito property or to enable them to enforce in the IQ.dian Courts such cl11ims not recognized by the State as fundall).ental right to property.\n\nBy Art. 31 right to property is protected against all actions save by authority of law.\n\nBt if ere was no right to property, an executive action refusing recognjtion of a claim io P• \"1X'r1Y could not infringe Art. 31 of the Consµiutjon.\n\nIn Virendra Singh's case(') this ourt helg !hat il!Ce tlie promulgation of the Constitution grants which had been made by the previous Rulers, even if they were not recognized by the Dominion of India or the Union, could not be interfered with except by authority of law. In that case tl)e petitioners were grans from the Rulers of the States of Sarila and Charkhari of certain villages before' tiio~ ta~ merged with the Dominion of India. The States originally merged with the Union of Vindhya Praqesh, and !he Vindlcya Pradesh Government confirmed the grants in December 1948, But the Union of the States of Vindhya Prcle., h w~ djssolved, and the covenanting States separately acceded to the Dominion of India, and surrendered all ii.uthority apd jurisdiction in relation to the governance of the States and executed instrument called 'The Vindhya J'rl!desh Mge~ Agreement'.\n\nThe States which formed the Vindhya Pradesh were transformed into a Chief Commissioner's Province on January 23,\n\n1950. The grants of the fol!I' villages made in favour of the petitioners were revoked in August 1952 by the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh to which State those villages being enclaves within its territory wer~ transferred.\n\nThe grantees of the villages then petitioned this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the orders revoking the grant of iagirs and maufis in the four villages as violative of Arts. 31 (I) and 19(1) (f) of the Constitution.\n\nThis Court observed that the properties in question we•e the properties over which the Rulers had right of disposition at the date of the grants, and the grants were absolute in cllaracter and would under any civilised system of law pass an .absolute and indefeasible title to the grantees and that usuming that the titles were defeasible at the mere will of ·------------\n\n(l) (19.HJ I S.C.&. 41$,\n\n$1~!~ of Gu/'f'PI\n\n\"· lltJfO Ffddoll\n\nSI/al! I•\n\n1'64\n\nStat• of Gujarat\n\n\"· fl OTO Plddali\n\nShah J.\n\nthe sovereign the fact remained that they were neither resumed by the former Rulers nor confiscated by the Dominion of India as an act of State and upto the 25th of January, 1950, the right and title of the grantees to continue in possession was good and was not interfered with. The Court accordingly held that the Constitution by the authority derived from and conferred by the people of India; destroyed all vestige of arbitrary and despotic power in the territories of India and over its citizens and lands and prohibited just such acts of arbitrary power as the State of Uttar Pradesh in that case was seeking to uphold. It was further observed that the Dominion of India and the States had abandoned their sovereignty and surrendered it to the people of the land who framed the new Constitution of India and as no sovereign can exercise an act of State against its own subjects, the orders of revocation of the grants were invalid. In my view the conclusion of the Court proceeded upon two assumptions, neither of which was true:\n\n(i) that the sovereignty of the Dominion of India and of the States was surrendered to the people of India, and in the exercise of the sovereign power the people gave themselves the new Constitution as from January 26, 1950; and\n\n(ii) the petitioners who were in de facto possession of the disputed lands had rights in them which they could have enforced upto 26th January, 1950, in the Dominion Courts against all persons except possibly the State.\n\nThese assumptions are not supported by history or by constitutional theory. There is no warrant for holding at the stroke of mid-night of the 25th January, 1950, all our preexisting political institutions ceased to exist, and in the next moment arose a new set of institutions completely unrelated to the past. The Constituent Assembly which gave form to the Constitution functioned for several years under the old regime, and set up the constitutional machinery on the foundations of the earlier political set up. It did not seek to destroy the past institutions: it raised an edifice on what existed before.\n\nThe Constituent Assembly moulded no new\n\nsovereignty: it merely gave shape to the aspirations of the people, by destroying foreign control and evolving a completely democratic form of government as a republic. The process was not one of destruction, but of evolution.\n\nFor reasons already stated it is impossible to hold that what were mere claims to property till the 25th of January.\n\n1950, could be regarded as enforceable against any one.\n\nTill the Dciminion of India recognised the right, expressly or by implication there was no right to property which the Courts in India could enforce. There is nothing in the Constitution which transformed the claims which till January 25, 1950, had not been recognized into property rights so as to prevent all further exercise of the act of State, and extinguish the powers of the Union to refuse to recognize the claims.\n\nThe order passed in August 1952 revoking the grants by the Rulers of Sarila and Charkhari was in my view in substance an act of State. It is true that there can be no act of State by a sovereign against his own subjects. But the State was seeking to refuse to recognize the claims made by the grantees from the former Rulers, and the fact that the act of State operated to the prejudice of persons who were at the date of refusal of recognition citizens, did not deprive the\n\nact of State of either its character or efficacy.\n\nThese appeals must therefore be allowed and the suit filed by the respondents dismissed with costs throughout.\n\nStat•ofG~\n\nVora Fidtl.U\n\nSltalt /.\n\nRAGHUB,\\R DAYAL J.-1 agree with the views expressed Raghubar D•1\"' I. by my learned brother Ayyangar J., on all the points except in regard to the Tharao dated March 12, 1948, being law.\n\nI agree with brother Hidayatullah J ., that this Tharao is not Jaw, and further agree with him in the order proposed.\n\nMUDHOLKAR J.-This Bench has been constituted for Mudlwlktu J. considering whether the reasoning underlying the decision of this Court in Virendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(') that the inhabitants of the Indian States brought with them, after the merger of those States in the Dominion of India pursuant to agreements entered into by the Rulers of those\n\nI 0 l\\9~SJ I S.C.R. 41S.\n\n JH4 .\n\nStates, rights to property granted to them by the Rulers of ,_ ;;-a..;.at those States, is correct or not. The decision and the various\n\nI' \"· . grouncfs upon which it rests have been carefully examined by .,,. Flildali my brother Ayyangar J., in his judgment and I am generally MWliolUr I. in agreement with what he has said. As, however, I take a somewhat different view on some of the matters which arise for consideration in this case this judgment has become necessary.\n\nThe facts have been set out fully in the judgment of my learned brother and, therefore, it will be sufficient to mention only such of them as are necessary to elucidate the questions wbich I propose to deal with. In consequence of two agree-. ments entered into by the former Ruler of Sant State, the territory of that State merged in the Dominion of India as from June 10, 1948. Prior to that date it had acceded to the Dominion of India on three subjects only. This State, along with other ruling States in India, became an independent sovereign State in the year 1947 when the Dominions o{ India and Pakistan were constituted. By virtue of the powers vested in the Central Government by the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 194 7 it delegated its functions to the Government of Bombay which passed the Indian States (Application of Laws) Order, 1948 on July 28, 1948. Io\n\nconsequence of that Order certain Jaws in force in the Province of Bombay were extepded to !be merged territories.\n\nBy the operation of the Indian States (Merger of Governors Provinces) Order, 1949, the Sant State became part of the Province of Bombay. '\n\nThe agreement relatjng to the merger of the State in the Dominion of India was entered into by the Ruler of Sant Some time before the date on which the merger becaine effective. The Ruler of the State passed a Tharao ( whicll is translated as 'Order') on March 12, 1948 in the following terms:-\n\n\"S. Ta. Mu Outward Reter No. 371.\n\nThe Jivak, Patavat, Inami, Chakariyat, Dharmada villages in Sant State are being given (grantedl to Jagir<Ws and the holders of the said villages are\n\nnot given rights over forests. Hence alter considering the complaints of certain J agirs, they\n\nare being given full rights and authority over the l!!IU forests in the villages under their vahivat.\n\nSo, Stat• of G~: they should manage the vahivat of the forest 1, FJdali' according to the policy and administration of ora the State. Orders in this regard to be issued.\" Mudholkar A.\n\nTaking advantage of the Tharao several Jagirdars entered into contracts pertaining to the exploitation of the forests in their J agirs. The respondents in these appeals are some of the forest contractors. The Government of the Province of Bombay through the officers of ils Forest Department did not !lllow the respondents to exer.cise their rights under the conuaots entered into with them by the Jagirdars on the ground that the grant of forest rights by the former Ruler to the Jagirdars was not binding upon the successor Government.\n\nThus being deprived of their right to work the forests the various respondents instituted suits after the coming into force of the Constitution of India. Their claims were opposed by the State of Bombay mainly on the ground that in the absence of recognition, express or implied, by the successor State of rights conferred by the former Ruler on the Jagirdars the respondents could not enforce them in the munici;:ial courts.\n\nThe suits of the respondents were cjisn)issed by the court of first instance and appeals preferred therefrom by them were dismissed by the District Court. In second appeal, however, the appeals were allowed by the 'High Court by a common judgment in which reliance is placed largely upon what has been held and £aid by this Court in Virendra Singh's case(') though a reference has also been made to two other decisio~ of this Court and some decisions of the Privy Council.\n\nIn the arguments before us it has never been in question that the acquisition of the territory of Sant State by the Dominion of India in pursuance of the Instrument of Accession and Merger Agreement was an act of State. The respondents' contentions were, however, that ( l) in point of fact the Government of Bombay, acting through the officers of the forest department had recognised the Jagirdar's rights by permitting •the contractors to carry on the work of cutting . timber; (2) that though the Government of\n\n(1j fl 9HJ I S.C.R. 4 U.\n\nSt.le of Gujarat v.\n\nYora Fiddali\n\nMwl%nlkcr /.\n\nBombay subsequently repudiated the Jagirdars' rights that repudiation was of no avail; (3) that the letter sent to the Ruler of Sant State by the Secretary to the States Department, Mr. V. P. Menon, in October, 1948 amounted to a waiver by the Dominion of India of the right of repudiation of the rights of Jagirdars; ( 4) that after the Jagirdars became the citizens of the Dominion of India there could be no act of State against them; (5) that the doctrine evolved by the Privy Council in its decisions starting from Secretary of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahiba(') and going upto Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer( 2 ) was opposed to the (resent view on the effect of conquest and cession upon private rights as exemplified in the decisions in United States v. Percheman(') and that this Court should, therefore, discard the Privy Council's view and adopt the modem view inasmuch as the latter is considered by common consent to be just and fair and finally ( 6) that the Jagirdars could not be deprived of the forest rights deprived by them from the Ruler of Sant State before the Constitution, without complying with the provisions of s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and after the coming into force of the- Constitution without complying with the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution.\n\nI agree with my brother Ayyangar J., that the fact that some officers of the forest department had permitted the respondents to carry on operations in the forests leased out to them by the J agirdars does not amount to recognition of the right conferred upon the latter by the Tharao of .\n\nMarch 12, 1948. In the first rplace, it was not open to the officers of the forest department to grant recognition to the J agirdars' rights for the simple reason that the right of granting reco!lllition could be exercised only by the Government acting through its appropriate agency. Moreover the permission which was accorded to the respondents was only tentative and expressly subject to the final decision of the Government on the question of their right under the leases granted by the Jagirdars.\n\n(I) (1859) 13 Moore P.C. 22.\n\n(3) (1883) 32 U. S. SI.\n\n(7) A.IR 1'>47 P. CI.\n\nThe second contention of the respondents is based upon .a misapprehension of the legal position flowing from the long series of decisions of the Privy Council which have been accepted by this Court in several of its decisions and in particular Da/mia Dadri, Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax('); Slate of Saurashtra v. Memon Haji Ismail('); Promod Chandra Deb and Ors. v. The State\n\nof Orissa and Ors. (3 ); State of Saurashtra v. Jamadar Mahamad Abdulla and Ors.('). The one decision in which the Privy Council's view is criticised is that of Virendra Singh's case('). The view of the Privy Council has been expressed by Lord Dunedin in Vajesinghji v. Secretary of\n\nState for lndia( 6 ) in the following passage which has been quoted with approval in several judgments.\n\n\"Wheat a territory is acquired by a sovereign State\n\nfor the first time that is an Act of State. It matters not how lhe acquisition has been brought about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised ruler.\n\nIn all cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the territory can\n\nmak~ good in the municipal courts estabhsheo by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised.\n\nSuch rights as he had under the rule o: predecessors avail him nothing. Nay more. even if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights. that does not give a title to those inhabitants to enforce those stipulations in the municipal courts. The right to enforce remains only with the high contracting parties.\"\n\nThus what is clear beyond doubt is that the rights derived by the inhabitants of the conquered and ceded territory from its former rulers cannot be enforced by them against the new\n\n(1) [1959] S.C.R. 729.\n\n(3) [1962] Supp. I. S.C.R. 405.\n\n(5) [19551 I S C.R. 415.\n\n(2) [1960] I S.C.R. 537.\n\n\n(6) 51 I.A. 357.\n\nSt.ii. of Gujarat ...\n\nVora FiddaU\n\nMuJholkar I.\n\n19~\n\nS/lll, of GMjarat\n\nYora fiddali\n\nM1ulliolkor J.\n\nsovereign in the courts of that sovereign unless they ha\\e been recognized by the sovereign. The only basis upon which rights of this kind can be enforced in a municipal court would be the fact of its recognition by the new sovereign. A right which cannot on its own srength be enforced against a sovereign in the courts of that sovereign must be deemed to have ceased to exist. It follows therefore that a right which has, ceased to exist does not require repudiation.\n\nAs regards the argument thait the Government has waived its right to withold recognition, I agree with all that has been said by my brother A yyan gar J.\n\nIndeed, if the inhabitants of a ceded territory have ceased to have a right against the new sovereign there is nothing for the sovereign to waive. I also agree with my learn<\".d brother that if the letter of the Secretary to the States Department IJ90n which reliance is placed by the respondents is regarded as part of the agreement of merger the municipal courts are precluded by Art. 363 of the Constitution from enforcing any rights arising thereunder.\n\nThe argument that .there can be no Act of State against its citizens is based upon the supposition that , the rights claimed by the J agirdars from their former Ruler would be available to them against the new sovereign unless they were repudiated and that here, as the resolution of the Government of Bombay dated February 6, 1953 stating that Jagirdars' rights have already been re:iudiated amounts to an Act of State against persons who had long before this date become the citizens of the Republic of India it was incompetent.\n\nAs already pointed out, the municipal courts cannot take notice of a right such as this unless it had been recognized expressly or by implication by the new sovereign.\n\nNo doubt, the Government resolution speaks of repudiation.\n\nThat in my opinion is only a loose way of conveying that the rights of the Jagirdars have not been recognized. That resolution does no more than set out the final decision of the Government not to give recognition to the Tharao of March 12, 1948 by which the former Ruler of Sant State had couferred certain forest rights on the J agirdars. Indeed, it is clear from paraiira11h 3 of that resolution that the Government had expressly borne in mind the legal positior\n\nthat rights claimed under the Tharao gave no title to the . inhabitants of Sant State to enforce them in a municipal\n\n-court and •that the right to enforce them remained only with the high c:ontracting partie>.\n\nNow as to the argument that this Court should discard the view taken by the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Kamchee Boye Sahiba('); Secretary of State for India v. Bai Rafbai( 2 ); Vajesinghii v. Secretary of State for India('); Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustom Khan(') and Asrar Ahmed's case(') and adopt the view taken by Chief Justice Marshall in Percheman's case(\"). I agree with much which my learned brother has said but would .add one thing.\n\nIt is this.\n\nThe courts in England have applied the principles of international law upon the view that what is by the common consent of all civilized nations .held to be an .appropriate rule governing iitterntional relations m.ust also be deemed to be a part of the common law of England.\n\nThus English courts have given effect to rules of'intemational law by resorting to a process of incorporation(7). The English courts also recognise the. principle that since the British Parliament is paramount the rules of international law are subject to the right of Parliament to modify or abrogate any of its rules. A municipal court can only enforce the law in force in the State. Therefore, if a rule of\n\nintematiOn.11 law is abrogated by Parliament it cannot be enforced by the municipal courts of the State and where it is modified by Parliament it can be enforced by the municipal courts subject to the modification.\n\nWould the position be different where a particular rule of international Jaw has been incorporated into the common Jaw by decisions of courts?\n\nSo far as the municipal courts are concerned that would be the law of the land which alone it has the power and the duty to enforce. Where Parliament does not modify or abrogate a rule of international Jaw which has become part of the common law, is it open to a municipal\n\nIll (1859) 13 Moore P.C. 22\n\n(2) 42 I.A. 229.\n\n(3) 51 I.A. 357.\n\n( 4) 68 I.A. 109.\n\n(5) A.1.R. 1947 P.C. l.\n\n(6) (1833) 32 U. S. 5t.\n\n(7) See International Law-a Text 1962 by Jacobini, p. 32 ct seq.\n\nStat• of Gui-\n\n•· Vora FIJ<Wi\n\nMudholkar ; ·\n\nSi.tt of Gujaw ...\n\nYora Fiddali\n\nM1ui!wlkor !.\n\ncourt to abrogate it or to enforce it in a modified form on the ground 1that the opinion of civilized States has undergone a change and instead of the old rule a more just and fair rule has been accepted ? Surely the law of a State can only be modified or repealed by a competent legislature of the State and not by international Qpinion however weighty that opinion may be. Now, a rule of international law on which the several :fuivy Council decisions as to the effect of conquest or cession on the private rights of the inhabitants of the conquered or ceded territory is founded. has bewme\n\na part of the common law of this countrv. This is 'law in force' and ts saed by Art. 372 of the Constitution.\n\nThe courts in India are, therefore, bound to enforce that rule and not a rule of international law governing the same matter based upon the princii; ile of state succession which had received the approval of Marshall C.J. and which has also received the approval of several text-book writers, including Hyde(1).\n\nIt is true that the International Court of Justice has also stated the law on the point to be the same but 1that does not alter the position so far as the municipal courts are concerned. If in the light of this our law is regarded as inequitous or a survival of an imperialistic system the remedy lies not with us but wi.th the legislature or with the appropriate Government by granting recognition to the private rights of the inhabitants of a newly acquired territory.\n\nThus while according to one view there is a State succession in so far as private rights are concerned according to the other which we might say is reflected in our laws, it is not so. Two concepts underlie our law : One is that the inhabitants of acquired territories bring with them no rights enforceable against the new sovereign.\n\nThe other is that the municipal courts have no jurisdiction to enforce any rights claimed by them, even by virtue of the provisions of a treaty or other transaction internationally binding on the new sovereign unless L'ieir rights have been recognized\n\n(I) See Hyde International Law, Vol. I, 2nd ed. p. 43 I, and Wesley L.\n\nGould-An introduction to International Lan pp. 42~27.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COlJRT REPORTS 591\n\nby the new sovereign. Municipal courts derive their jurisdiction from the municipal law and not from the laws of nations and a change in the laws of nations brought about by the consent of the nations of the world cannot confer upon a municipal court a jurisdiction which it does not enjoy under the municipal law.\n\nApart from that the rule cannot be regarded merely as a device 0f colonial powers for enriching themselves at the expense of the inhabitants of conquered territories and, therefore, an anachronism. It would neither be just nor reasonable to bind the new sovereign by duties and obligp.tions in favour of private parties created by the ex-sovereign from political motives or for the purpose of robbing the new sovereign of the full fruits of his acquisition.\n\nNo doubt, International Law does not prevent legislation b) the new sovereign for the pU!1pose of freeing itself froin rnch duties and obligations but that would be a long and foborious process and may be rendered onerous or by reason of constitutional provisions such as those contained in Pnrt Ill of our Constitution, even impossible. It would also not be reasonable to regard the new sovereign as being bound by duties and obligations created by the ex-sovereign till such time as the new sovereign was able to show that they were incurred by the ex-sovereign ma/a fide. It is apparently for such reasons that the law as found by the Privy Council deprives the grantees under the former ruler completely of their rights as against a new sovereign by making those rights unenforceable in a municipal court. It, however, also envisages the recognition of those rights by the new sovereign. This means that the new sovereign is expected to examine all the grants and find out for himself whether any of the grants are vitiated by ma/a fides or were against his legitimate interests so that he can give recognition to those grants only which were not vitiated by ma/a {ides or which were not against his interests. That this is how the rule was applied would be clear from what happened in this country when time and again territories were ceded by former Indian Rulers to the British Government. As an instance of this there was the Inam Enquiry in the middle cf the last century as a result ot which a very large number of Inams were ultimately\n\nStai. of Gulanll-\n\n'f.\n\nVora Fidddl\n\nM11dolkar J.\n\n196~\n\n..,_of Guiarat\n\n....\n\nYGrw Fiddali\n\nlliidlw!kar I\n\nrecognised by the British Government. That while dealing with the claims of the former grantees in ceded territories used to be examined meticulously would be clear from the facts in Bai Rajbai's case('). Such being the actual position I do not think that the rule which has been applied in this country can be regarded to be anachronism or to be inequitous.\n\nIn so far as the argument is based on the. provisions of s. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Art. 31 of the Constitution is concerned I \\VOuld reiterate the •iew which my brother Sarkar J. and myself have taken in lamadar Mohamad Abdulla's case( 2 ) and Promod Chandra Deb's case(') which is the s.!!Jtle as that expressed by my brother Ayyangar J., and with which my brother Hidayatullah J., has agreed. ,, Adverting to a similar argument advanced by Mr.\n\nPathak in the former case we quoted the following passage from the judgment of Venkatarama Aiyar I., in Dalmia . Dadri Cement Co's case('):-\n\n\"H is also well estabiished that in the new set up these residents do not carry with them the rights which they possessed as subjects of the ex sovereign and that as .subjects of the new sovereign, they have only such rights as are granted or recognised by him.\"\n\nand a passage from the judgment in lJai Rajbai's case(•), and then observed :\n\n\"Any right to property which in its very nature is not legally enforcable was clearly incap.1ble of being protected by that section.\" (pp. 1001-2).\n\nThat was a reference to s. 299 (l) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nIn the other case we have observed at p. 499:-\n\n\"In our opinion s. 299 (1) of the Constitution Act of 1935 did not help grantees from the former\n\n(I) 42 I.A. 229.\n\n\n(3) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 40S. ( 4) [19S9] s.C.R. 729.\n\n(S) 42 I. A. 229.\n\nrulers whose rights had not been recognized by his new sovereign in the matter of establishing their rights in the municipal courts of the new sovereign because that provision only rotected such; rights as the new citizen had at the moment of his becoming a citizen of the Indian Dominion.\n\nIt did not enlarge his rights nor did it cure any infirmity in the rights of the citizen: ............ \"\n\nThe other point raised in these appeals was as to whether the Tharao relied upon by the respondents was a law and, therefore, could be said , to have been kept in force by the provisions of the Application of Laws Order, 1949 made by the Province of Bombay. My brother Ayyangar J., has largely on the basis of the decision of this Court in Madhorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') held that it is law.\n\nOn the other hand my brother Hidayatullah J., has come to the opposite conclusion. My brother Shah J., has also held that the Tharao is not a law.\n\nI agreed with the view taken by my brother Hidayatullah J., and brother Shah J., that it is not a law and that the decision in Madhorao Pha/ke's case(') does not justify the conclusion that it is 'law'. I do not think it necessary for the purpose of this case to examine further the question a~ . to what are the indicia of a Jaw.\n\nFor these reasons I would allow the appeals with costs throughout.\n\nORDER\n\nSINHA C.J .-In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeals are allowed with costs throughout-one set of hearing fees.\n\n(t) (1961] I S.C.R. 951.\n\n134-154 S.C.-.'18.\n\nState of Gu1arot\n\n•• V ura Fidrla~1\n\n.\\fudholka1", "total_entities": 624, "entities": [{"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231, "end_char": 234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 581, "end_char": 597, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "State of Saurashtra", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 611, "end_char": 646, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 654, "end_char": 665, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 674, "end_char": 686, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 730, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 743, "end_char": 748, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 766, "end_char": 774, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.Y_yangar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 798, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. 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P. Menon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3425, "end_char": 3436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held on the basis of the letter written by Shri Y. P. Menon, Secretary that the succeeding sovereign had waived or relinquished its right to repudiate the Tharao.", "canonical_name": "V. P.\n\nMenon"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3739, "end_char": 3751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per majority:\n\nHidayatullah J. (i) The Act of State come .. to an end only when the new sovereign recognises either expressly or impliedly the rights of the aliens.", "canonical_name": "M. 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The fact that Maharana's Tharao was passed to benefit a larger number of persons en bloc does not make it any the nlore a law if it did not possess any of the indicia of a law."}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7376, "end_char": 7384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7507, "end_char": 7541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This distinguishes the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court of the United States in which considera tion Of treaties is included."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7598, "end_char": 7611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States the Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7678, "end_char": 7683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India the position is different."}}, {"text": "Article 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7712, "end_char": 7723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7858, "end_char": 7865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court has accepted the principles laid down by the Courts in England in regard to the limits of the jurisdiction of Municipal Courts."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7948, "end_char": 7978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view of the Supreme Court of United States or the view taken in inttrnauonal Jaw has not been accepted by this Court."}}, {"text": "Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8767, "end_char": 8772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn this case, the present respondents who were not parties to the merger agreement or to the letter written by Mr. Menon which was m:tde expressly a part of the Agreement cannot take advantage of cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8848, "end_char": 8853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8876, "end_char": 8887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9034, "end_char": 9039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 468", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9086, "end_char": 9092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 503", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9450, "end_char": 9456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 42 IA. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9593, "end_char": 9608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9626, "end_char": 9630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Shah J. (I) The rule that cession of territory by one State to another is an act of State and the sub, jects of the former State may enforce only those rights in Municipal Courts which the new sovereign recognises has been accepted by this Court.", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "1962) 3 S.C.R. 970", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10143, "end_char": 10161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 51 I.A. 357", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10334, "end_char": 10350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 68 I.A. 109", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10407, "end_char": 10423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10861, "end_char": 10869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V. P. Menon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11020, "end_char": 11031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "363 of the Constitution, it ;,, eat open to the respondents to enforce the covenants of the agreement es llaled in the letter of guarantee written by Mr. V. P. Menon in the\n\nMunicipal Courts.", "canonical_name": "V. P.\n\nMenon"}}, {"text": "S. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11099, "end_char": 11104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Man:h 12, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12777, "end_char": 12791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case the order dated Man:h 12, 1948, is expressly in the form of a grant of the rights which were not previously granted and does not either expressly or by implication seek to lay down any binding rule of conduct."}}, {"text": "Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13683, "end_char": 13714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v, Union of India, A.I.R. 1963- S.C. 953, relied on,\n\nTM Bengal Nagpur 'Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The Board of Revenut', Madhya Pradesh and Others, C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13950, "end_char": 13979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14818, "end_char": 14826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14939, "end_char": 14947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Courts in India are, therefore, bound to e°\" force that rule and not what according to Marshall C.J. is the rule of International Law governing the same matter, though the latter has alSQ received the approval of several text book writers.", "canonical_name": ".Marshall"}}, {"text": "Olher", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16314, "end_char": 16319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Olher wi;>rds a right which cannot on its own strength be enforced against a sovereign in the Courts of that sovereign must be deemed to have ceased to exist."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16934, "end_char": 16957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16970, "end_char": 16977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16985, "end_char": 17006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17189, "end_char": 17191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pu minority Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17207, "end_char": 17224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pu minority Sinha CJ."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17233, "end_char": 17241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Ayyangar J. (i) 'lbe juristic basis of tile theory underlying the Privy Council decisions is that with the extinction of the previous sovereign the rights theretofore exerc!seabl.::", "canonical_name": "A.Y_yangar"}}, {"text": "Virendra Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18392, "end_char": 18406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in the case of Virendra Singh this Court did not express any decisive opinion in favour of accepting the observations in Percheman's case as Proper to be applied by the municipal courts in India.", "canonical_name": "Virerulra Singh"}}, {"text": "Percheman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18498, "end_char": 18507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in the case of Virendra Singh this Court did not express any decisive opinion in favour of accepting the observations in Percheman's case as Proper to be applied by the municipal courts in India."}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18975, "end_char": 18986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955) 1 S.C.R. 415", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19234, "end_char": 19253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19355, "end_char": 19358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dalmia Dadri C•m<nt Co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19519, "end_char": 19547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/1, Dalmia Dadri C•m<nt Co. Ltd. \"· Th• Commwione of lncoJttlo llU, [1959) S.C.R. 729, Jagan Nath Agarwa/JJ v. Th< Stat• of Ori-,\n\n[1962) 1 S.C.R. 205, Promodh Chandra Dov v. The State of Orism,\n\n(1962) I Supp."}}, {"text": "[1962) 1 S.C.R. 205", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19646, "end_char": 19665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962) 3 S.C.R. 970", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19791, "end_char": 19810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ArtomeyGtneral of Canada T. Attorney-G<n<ral of O•tario, [1937) A.C. 326", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20248, "end_char": 20320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ArtomeyGtneral of Canada T. Attorney-G<n<ral of O•tario, [1937) A.C. 326, referred to."}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21105, "end_char": 21110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. P. Menon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21133, "end_char": 21144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 of the letter of Shri V. P. Menon that the Government waived their right 10 repudiate the grant made by the previous ruler.", "canonical_name": "V. P.\n\nMenon"}}, {"text": "March 12, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22254, "end_char": 22268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho \"Tharao\" dated March 12, 1918 satisfies Ille requirement of \"a law\" within Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 366(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22314, "end_char": 22326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22582, "end_char": 22590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22829, "end_char": 22843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. 1955 Supreme\n\nCourt, 352 a'ld Director of Endowment1, Goyernment of Hyderabad Y.\n\nAkram A.Ii, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 60, relied on."}}, {"text": "Subha Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22955, "end_char": 22964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Subha Rao J. (i) Tho decision in Virendra Singh.,", "canonical_name": "Subbd' Rao"}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24101, "end_char": 24108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In America the said principle of International Law Iw been accepted without any qualification."}}, {"text": "American Insurance Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24617, "end_char": 24639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Foster v. Neilson, (1829) 2 P.E.T., 2S3, The American Insurance Co. r•d the Ocean Insurance Co. v. Bales of Cotton (1828) 7 L.Ed."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26274, "end_char": 26295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26619, "end_char": 26629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28158, "end_char": 28186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals No~; 182-186 of 1963."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28384, "end_char": 28398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28418, "end_char": 28435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. K. P. Shankardass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28437, "end_char": 28457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28462, "end_char": 28474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28517, "end_char": 28537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas, B. Parthasarathy, J, B. 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Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents (irt all the appcais)."}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28703, "end_char": 28712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah J., Shah J., and Mudholkar 1.", "canonical_name": "Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28766, "end_char": 28780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghubar Dayal J. agreed with the order proposed by Hidayatullah J.\n\nThe dissenting opiniorr of Sinha C. J, and Rajagopala Ayyangar J, w.as delivered by Ayyangar J. Subba Rao J. delivered a separate dissenting opinion.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUB,\\R DAYAL"}}, {"text": "Sinha C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28862, "end_char": 28870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghubar Dayal J. agreed with the order proposed by Hidayatullah J.\n\nThe dissenting opiniorr of Sinha C. J, and Rajagopala Ayyangar J, w.as delivered by Ayyangar J. Subba Rao J. delivered a separate dissenting opinion.", "canonical_name": "Sinha C."}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28878, "end_char": 28897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghubar Dayal J. agreed with the order proposed by Hidayatullah J.\n\nThe dissenting opiniorr of Sinha C. J, and Rajagopala Ayyangar J, w.as delivered by Ayyangar J. Subba Rao J. delivered a separate dissenting opinion."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar J. Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28919, "end_char": 28940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghubar Dayal J. agreed with the order proposed by Hidayatullah J.\n\nThe dissenting opiniorr of Sinha C. J, and Rajagopala Ayyangar J, w.as delivered by Ayyangar J. Subba Rao J. delivered a separate dissenting opinion."}}, {"text": "Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29579, "end_char": 29614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwala is the respondent in Civil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "VORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA"}}, {"text": "Vora Halci muddin Tayabali Amthaniwala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29676, "end_char": 29714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vora Halci muddin Tayabali Amthaniwala is the respondent in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Pathan Abbaskhan Ahmedkhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29846, "end_char": 29872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "185 of 1963, and Pathan Abbaskhan Ahmedkhan is the respondent in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29949, "end_char": 29965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In all these Appeals the State of Gujarat\n\nis the appellant.", "canonical_name": "State of Saurashtra"}}, {"text": "Vora Hatimbhai Badruddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30165, "end_char": 30189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "182 of 1963, is the assignee of the rightl of one Vora Hatimbhai Badruddin and was brought on re• cord as plaintiff during the pendency of the suit in the trial court, namely, the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Godhra, being Civil Suit No."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Godhra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30308, "end_char": 30347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "182 of 1963, is the assignee of the rightl of one Vora Hatimbhai Badruddin and was brought on re• cord as plaintiff during the pendency of the suit in the trial court, namely, the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Godhra, being Civil Suit No."}}, {"text": "Gotimada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30564, "end_char": 30572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the Gotimada jungle,\n\nJ:ing his rights under a contract dated August 21, 1948, for a period of three years on payment of a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30622, "end_char": 30637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the Gotimada jungle,\n\nJ:ing his rights under a contract dated August 21, 1948, for a period of three years on payment of a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "Thakore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30742, "end_char": 30749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9,501 to the Jagirdar of the village, Thakore Sardar\n\nSingh Gajesingh."}}, {"text": "Singh Gajesingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30758, "end_char": 30773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9,501 to the Jagirdar of the village, Thakore Sardar\n\nSingh Gajesingh."}}, {"text": "N anirath", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31009, "end_char": 31018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "184 of 1963, was also instituted by the same plaintiff who claimed by virtue of an assignment of the rights under a similar contract in respect of another forest in village N anirath for a period of four years, the considera lion being the cash payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Vora Hakimuddin Tayyabali Amthaniwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31195, "end_char": 31231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "183 of 1963, was instituted by Vora Hakimuddin Tayyabali Amthaniwal la."}}, {"text": "Jagirdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31281, "end_char": 31289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His claim was based on an agreement with the Jagirdar, dated December 7, 1948, for a period of four years for a consideration of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Jagirdars"}}, {"text": "December 7, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31297, "end_char": 31313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His claim was based on an agreement with the Jagirdar, dated December 7, 1948, for a period of four years for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "Rathda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31411, "end_char": 31417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,501 in respect of the forest in village Rathda."}}, {"text": "I anuary 3, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31597, "end_char": 31613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mon judgment, delivered by the trial court on I anuary 3, 1964\n\n1956."}}, {"text": "Yora Fiddall", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31739, "end_char": 31751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the rights of the plaintiffs, such as they were, could Yora Fiddall not be enforced by the courts.", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "Mehta Kantilal Chandulal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31870, "end_char": 31894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "80 of 1953, filed by Mehta Kantilal Chandulal."}}, {"text": "Laleka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31924, "end_char": 31930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He owned the Inami villages Laleka\n\npur and Narsingpur and alleged that he had given a contract for cutting the trees in his villages for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "pur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31932, "end_char": 31935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He owned the Inami villages Laleka\n\npur and Narsingpur and alleged that he had given a contract for cutting the trees in his villages for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "Narsingpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31940, "end_char": 31950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He owned the Inami villages Laleka\n\npur and Narsingpur and alleged that he had given a contract for cutting the trees in his villages for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "May 29, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32067, "end_char": 32079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11,000 on May 29, 1948, for a period of four years, and that his transferee had been prevented by the State from exercising those rights."}}, {"text": "March 23, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32330, "end_char": 32344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suit was also dismissed by the trial court by its judgment, dated March 23, 1956."}}, {"text": "Mayalapad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32550, "end_char": 32559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff had claimed to have obtained similar right of felling trees in the forest belonging to the Jagirdar of Mayalapad on August 16, 1948 for Rs."}}, {"text": "August 16, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32563, "end_char": 32578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff had claimed to have obtained similar right of felling trees in the forest belonging to the Jagirdar of Mayalapad on August 16, 1948 for Rs."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32664, "end_char": 32678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suit was decreed by a judgment dated August 6, 1956."}}, {"text": "District Judge, Pancb Mahals, at Godra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32735, "end_char": 32773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The unsuccessful plaintiffs filed four appeals to the District Judge, Pancb Mahals, at Godra, being appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32903, "end_char": 32920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the appeals were heard together and, by a common judgment, were dismissed on February 28, 1957, the judgment of the trial court being confirmed."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33095, "end_char": 33113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was allowed by a separate judgment, dated September 30, 1957, dismissing the suit."}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33258, "end_char": 33279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "105, 106, 107, 112 and 193 of 1960 in the High Court of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "January 24, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33333, "end_char": 33349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals were heard together and were allowed on January 24, 1961 with the result that the suits were decreed and the appellant was restrained by an injunction from interfering with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of the rights in the forests, as claimed by them."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34009, "end_char": 34031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These appeals were first heard by a Bench of five Judges, and it was directed that the matter he placed for hearing by a larger Bench, as the Bench was of the opinion\n\nthat the decision of this Court in Virendra Singh v. Th~\n\n'lllzte of Gujarat\n\n\"· Vora Fiddali\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh(') required reconsideration."}}, {"text": ".A11angar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34133, "end_char": 34142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is special\n\n.A11angar J.\n\nBefore dealing with the questions that arise for deter mination in these appeals, it is necessary and convenient at this stage to set out the course of events leading up to the institution of the suits aforesaid, giving rise to these appeals."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35060, "end_char": 35074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 19, 1948 the ruler enter ed into a merger agreement with the Governor-General of India by which \"with a view to integrate the territory with the Province of Bombay at as early a date as possible\", the full and exclusiYe authority and powers in relation to the administration of the State were ceded to the Dominion Government."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35223, "end_char": 35229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 19, 1948 the ruler enter ed into a merger agreement with the Governor-General of India by which \"with a view to integrate the territory with the Province of Bombay at as early a date as possible\", the full and exclusiYe authority and powers in relation to the administration of the State were ceded to the Dominion Government."}}, {"text": "Dominion Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35372, "end_char": 35391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 19, 1948 the ruler enter ed into a merger agreement with the Governor-General of India by which \"with a view to integrate the territory with the Province of Bombay at as early a date as possible\", the full and exclusiYe authority and powers in relation to the administration of the State were ceded to the Dominion Government."}}, {"text": "June 10, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35431, "end_char": 35444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreement was to take effect from June 10, 1948."}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35512, "end_char": 35521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "With the lapse of the paramountcy of the British Government on the enactment of the Indian Independence Act", "statute": "With the lapse of the paramountcy of the British Government on the enactment of the Indian Independence Act"}}, {"text": "Maharana of Sant", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35541, "end_char": 35557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 1 ran thus:\n\n\"I. The Maharana of Sant hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on .the 10th day of June, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as \"the said day\")."}}, {"text": "10th day of June, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35789, "end_char": 35811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 1 ran thus:\n\n\"I. The Maharana of Sant hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on .the 10th day of June, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as \"the said day\")."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36073, "end_char": 36082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36367, "end_char": 36385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this agreement came in force on June 10, 1948, the Central Government delegated its functions to the Bombay Government by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act."}}, {"text": "Bombay Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36417, "end_char": 36434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this agreement came in force on June 10, 1948, the Central Government delegated its functions to the Bombay Government by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act."}}, {"text": "October !, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36631, "end_char": 36646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary in the Ministry of State, wrote\n\na letter to the Maharana'of Sant on October !,"}}, {"text": "Mnrch 19, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36779, "end_char": 36793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was entitled a \"Letter of Guarantee\" and was to be treated as supplementary to the Agreement of Merger dated Mnrch 19, 1948."}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36833, "end_char": 36838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st day of April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37031, "end_char": 37053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7:\n\n\"No order passed or action taken by you before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government will be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken after the 1st day of April, 1948, and it is considered by the Government of India to be palpably unjust or unreasonable."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37321, "end_char": 37350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 27, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37541, "end_char": 37554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by that section, the Governor-General of India promulgated the States Merger (Governor Provinces) Order, 1949, on July 27, 1949 which came into force on August 1, 1949."}}, {"text": "August 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37580, "end_char": 37594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by that section, the Governor-General of India promulgated the States Merger (Governor Provinces) Order, 1949, on July 27, 1949 which came into force on August 1, 1949."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37873, "end_char": 37887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, the ruler of the Sant State passed or issued \"a resolution\" or Tharao on March 12, 1948, which has given rise to the present series of litigations."}}, {"text": "Vohra Hatimbhai Badruddin Mithiborwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38901, "end_char": 38939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "175) whereby the tenure-holder granted as briefly adverted to earlier to Vohra Hatimbhai Badruddin Mithiborwala the right to cut and remove timber and firewood from the."}}, {"text": "Mouja Gothimada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39008, "end_char": 39023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "forest of Mouja Gothimada for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "Thakur Sardar Singh Gaje Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39781, "end_char": 39811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the grantor, Thakur Sardar Singh Gaje Singh gave an undertaking to abide by the decision and oders of the Government of Bombay in respect of the Gothimada forests \"rights over which were conferred on me by Santrampur State Government on March 12, 1948 in their resolution No.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Sardar Singh Gaje Singh"}}, {"text": "Santrampur State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39974, "end_char": 40001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the grantor, Thakur Sardar Singh Gaje Singh gave an undertaking to abide by the decision and oders of the Government of Bombay in respect of the Gothimada forests \"rights over which were conferred on me by Santrampur State Government on March 12, 1948 in their resolution No."}}, {"text": "January I 0, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40125, "end_char": 40142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Divisional Forest Officer, by his order dated January I 0, 1949, passed an order under the provisions of r. 4 of the Rufes under s. 41 of the Indian Forest Act authorising the grantee to remove forest produce like timber firewood and charcoal from Gothimada forest."}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40208, "end_char": 40213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40221, "end_char": 40238, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40439, "end_char": 40451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by a memorandum by the Conservittor of Forests North Western Circle of the Bombay State by which the Divisional Forest Officers were directed to cont>\n\nnue to issue authorisations to contractors of J agirdars who bad obtained rights over the forests in the Sant State under the Tharao of the ruler, dated March 12, 1948."}}, {"text": "July 8, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41056, "end_char": 41068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 8, 1949, the Government of Bombay passed an order in which they stated \"Government considen that the order passed by the ruler of the Sant State under his No."}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41620, "end_char": 41625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th of February, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42381, "end_char": 42402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It might be mentioned that after the suit was instituted and while it was pending before the trial judge a formal resolution of the Government of Bombay was passed and published on the 6th of February, 1953, in which they set out the legal position that the rights acquired under the Tharao were not enforceable as against the Bombay Government as the successor State unless those rights were recognised and that as on the other hand the 1ame had been specifically repudiated, the J agirdars and their contractors had no title which they could enforce against the Government."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43388, "end_char": 43396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44215, "end_char": 44220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October l, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44262, "end_char": 44277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 of the letter of Shri V. P. Menon, dated October l, 1948, to the ruler could be referred to and relied on for the purpose of drawing an inference that the right of the Government to repudiate the grant by the ruler had been waived."}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45062, "end_char": 45068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45076, "end_char": 45105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46022, "end_char": 46051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46153, "end_char": 46174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46380, "end_char": 46388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46646, "end_char": 46667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vora Fiddali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47268, "end_char": 47280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. -1\n\nS; att of Gujanit-\n\n1' Vora Fiddali\n\n.A.yyanaar I.\n\n\"'°11 of Gu/Mat\n\n\"· Y or• Plddali\n\nA.17onpr I • .", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47735, "end_char": 47742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These principles have been tersely summarised and the ratio of the rule explained by Lord Dunedin in Vajesinghji v.\n\nSecretary of State for India etc.(')", "canonical_name": "Duneclin"}}, {"text": "United kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48915, "end_char": 48929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This has been accepted as expressing the constitutional Jaw of the United kingdom and the same has been applied not merely to claims or titles which were sought to be enforced against the Indian Government but also in other parts of the British Empire-See Cook v. Spring(')."}}, {"text": "Indian Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49036, "end_char": 49053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This has been accepted as expressing the constitutional Jaw of the United kingdom and the same has been applied not merely to claims or titles which were sought to be enforced against the Indian Government but also in other parts of the British Empire-See Cook v. Spring(')."}}, {"text": "British Empire", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49085, "end_char": 49099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This has been accepted as expressing the constitutional Jaw of the United kingdom and the same has been applied not merely to claims or titles which were sought to be enforced against the Indian Government but also in other parts of the British Empire-See Cook v. Spring(')."}}, {"text": "S12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49256, "end_char": 49259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 5, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49560, "end_char": 49575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case were briefly these: On January 5, 1948, the ruler of Sarila granted the village Rigwara to the petitioners who moved this Court while on the 28th of January, 1948, the ruler of Charkari granted certain other villages to the same petitioners."}}, {"text": "Sarila", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49590, "end_char": 49596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case were briefly these: On January 5, 1948, the ruler of Sarila granted the village Rigwara to the petitioners who moved this Court while on the 28th of January, 1948, the ruler of Charkari granted certain other villages to the same petitioners."}}, {"text": "Rigwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49617, "end_char": 49624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case were briefly these: On January 5, 1948, the ruler of Sarila granted the village Rigwara to the petitioners who moved this Court while on the 28th of January, 1948, the ruler of Charkari granted certain other villages to the same petitioners."}}, {"text": "28th of January, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49678, "end_char": 49699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case were briefly these: On January 5, 1948, the ruler of Sarila granted the village Rigwara to the petitioners who moved this Court while on the 28th of January, 1948, the ruler of Charkari granted certain other villages to the same petitioners."}}, {"text": "Charkari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49714, "end_char": 49722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case were briefly these: On January 5, 1948, the ruler of Sarila granted the village Rigwara to the petitioners who moved this Court while on the 28th of January, 1948, the ruler of Charkari granted certain other villages to the same petitioners."}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49859, "end_char": 49886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the rights of the petitioners were sought to be nullified by an order of the Government of Uttar Pradesh they filed a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49915, "end_char": 49922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bundelkhand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50354, "end_char": 50365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the date of the grant in favour of the petitioners 35 States in Bundelkhand and Bhagalkhand, including Charkari and Sarila agreed to unite themselves into a State to be called the United State of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Bhagalkhand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 50370, "end_char": 50381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the date of the grant in favour of the petitioners 35 States in Bundelkhand and Bhagalkhand, including Charkari and Sarila agreed to unite themselves into a State to be called the United State of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Charkari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50393, "end_char": 50401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the date of the grant in favour of the petitioners 35 States in Bundelkhand and Bhagalkhand, including Charkari and Sarila agreed to unite themselves into a State to be called the United State of Vindhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "Charkhari"}}, {"text": "Sarila", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50406, "end_char": 50412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the date of the grant in favour of the petitioners 35 States in Bundelkhand and Bhagalkhand, including Charkari and Sarila agreed to unite themselves into a State to be called the United State of Vindhya Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "Sarila"}}, {"text": "United State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50470, "end_char": 50501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the date of the grant in favour of the petitioners 35 States in Bundelkhand and Bhagalkhand, including Charkari and Sarila agreed to unite themselves into a State to be called the United State of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Government of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50629, "end_char": 50678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While this Union was in existence, certain officials of this Government interfered with the rights of the petitioners but the Government of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh issued orders directing the officers to abstain from such interference."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51136, "end_char": 51149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently the rulers of the 35 States dissolved their Union and ceded to the Governnient of Indian Dominion all their powers and jurisdiction and the Dominion constituted the area into a Chief Commissioner's province for the purpose of administration, but the four villages granted to the petitioners were, however, detached from the centrally administered State and absorbed into Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "August 29, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51155, "end_char": 51170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 29, 1952, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh revoked the grants made in favour of the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51631, "end_char": 51635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [rcJ(>4J\n\nThe judgment of the Court was delivered by Bose J.\n\nThe learned Judge after stating the question arising for decision as being \"whether the Union Government had the right and the power to revoke these grants as an act of State?\","}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53545, "end_char": 53547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54335, "end_char": 54346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54366, "end_char": 54377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vora Fiddali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55452, "end_char": 55464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Because of the non-exercise of the right to repudiate till that date, the petitioners were , admittedly in de facto possession of the villages and the learned Judge adverted to the circumstance that those possessory rights could have been asserted and enforced against all persons except the rulers who granted the lands, and\n\nitate af 'luj•at ...\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nA.yyangor J.\n\nStat• of Gu/oral\n\nVora Piddali\n\nAyyangar ],\n\nexcept possibly the succeeding State.", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "A.yyangor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55466, "end_char": 55475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Because of the non-exercise of the right to repudiate till that date, the petitioners were , admittedly in de facto possession of the villages and the learned Judge adverted to the circumstance that those possessory rights could have been asserted and enforced against all persons except the rulers who granted the lands, and\n\nitate af 'luj•at ...\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nA.yyangor J.\n\nStat• of Gu/oral\n\nVora Piddali\n\nAyyangar ],\n\nexcept possibly the succeeding State.", "canonical_name": "A.Y_yangar"}}, {"text": "Sarila", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55879, "end_char": 55885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Considering it unnecessary to pronounce whether these rights could be enforced against the rulers as well as the Dominion of India as the succeeding sovereign, he observed that as these rights were factually in existence at the date of the Constitution and as by that date the subjects of the rulers of Charkari and Sarila had become the subjects of the Union, there could be no question of the Union Government claiming to exercise an\n\n\"act of State\" operating to deprive the petitioners of their property following in this respect the well-k®wn decisions ol' Walker v. Baird(') and Johnstone v. Pedlar(').", "canonical_name": "Sarila"}}, {"text": "August 15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56766, "end_char": 56781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The passage extracted and indeed the entire judgment is replete with a description of the poetry of India's constitutional evolution as an unified State during the most momentous period of her history from the Declaration of Independence on August 15, 1947, to the coming into force of the Constitution on January 26, 1950 and of the saga of the march of the subjects of the former Indian princes from being subjects of an autocratic ruler to a modern democatic set up in which they are full-fledged citizens of India, in language at once picturesque and of authentic eloquence."}}, {"text": "nath Agrawa/a v. State of Orissa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 57752, "end_char": 57784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nath Agrawa/a v. State of Orissa('), Promod Chandra Deb\n\nv. The State of Orissa( 2 ) and State of Saurashtra v. Jamadar Mohamad Abdulla(') have proceeded on the acceptance of the constitutional doctrine enunciated by the Privy Council."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58484, "end_char": 58498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The native Indian rulers were undoubtedly sovereign in the territories under their jurisdiction and they parted with their sovereignty in stages, firstly on accession, then on integration and finally by what has been felicitously termed in the White Paper on Indian States as 'unionization' i.e., by State territory becoming part and parcel of the territory of the Union of India which meant the complete extinction of their separate existence and individual sovereignty and of their States as separate political units."}}, {"text": "Duneclin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59380, "end_char": 59388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The passage in the judgment of Lord Duneclin in Vajesingji's case(\") was typical of this view.", "canonical_name": "Duneclin"}}, {"text": "Vajesingji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59392, "end_char": 59402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The passage in the judgment of Lord Duneclin in Vajesingji's case(\") was typical of this view.", "canonical_name": "Vajeysinghji"}}, {"text": "[1962) 1 S.C.R. 205", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 59629, "end_char": 59648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sink of Gujarat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59797, "end_char": 59812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St•tt of G•i-\n\n\"· V 0111 F\"\"\"'1i\n\n\"\"\"\"\"\" J.\n\nSink of Gujarat\n\n....\n\nYoN Fiddali\n\nA.yyangar /,\n\nChief Justice Marshall i.n Percheman's case(') was typical, that the proper and just rule of Public International Law which should be given effect to by municipal courts was that the changes in sovereignty over a territory did not or should not have any effect on the rights of the private individuals even as regards the enforceability of their claims as against the State and that it was the obligation certainly moral, if not also legal, of the succeeding sovereign to give effect to such rights previously acquired by grants from the previous sovereign."}}, {"text": "YoN Fiddali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59820, "end_char": 59831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St•tt of G•i-\n\n\"· V 0111 F\"\"\"'1i\n\n\"\"\"\"\"\" J.\n\nSink of Gujarat\n\n....\n\nYoN Fiddali\n\nA.yyangar /,\n\nChief Justice Marshall i.n Percheman's case(') was typical, that the proper and just rule of Public International Law which should be given effect to by municipal courts was that the changes in sovereignty over a territory did not or should not have any effect on the rights of the private individuals even as regards the enforceability of their claims as against the State and that it was the obligation certainly moral, if not also legal, of the succeeding sovereign to give effect to such rights previously acquired by grants from the previous sovereign."}}, {"text": "Marshall i.n Percheman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59861, "end_char": 59883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St•tt of G•i-\n\n\"· V 0111 F\"\"\"'1i\n\n\"\"\"\"\"\" J.\n\nSink of Gujarat\n\n....\n\nYoN Fiddali\n\nA.yyangar /,\n\nChief Justice Marshall i.n Percheman's case(') was typical, that the proper and just rule of Public International Law which should be given effect to by municipal courts was that the changes in sovereignty over a territory did not or should not have any effect on the rights of the private individuals even as regards the enforceability of their claims as against the State and that it was the obligation certainly moral, if not also legal, of the succeeding sovereign to give effect to such rights previously acquired by grants from the previous sovereign."}}, {"text": "Charkari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60899, "end_char": 60907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Starting from the position that the petitioners obtained a good title to the villages granted to them by the rulers of Sarila and Charkari, they proceeded to analyse the nature of the title which they had under the grants.", "canonical_name": "Charkhari"}}, {"text": "Chartari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 61288, "end_char": 61296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They recognised that the changes that took place in the constitutional position of the State of Chartari and Sarila undoubtedly brought in a change in the sovereignty of that territory and hold that the changes thus brought about including the treaties which marked the transition were \"Acts of State\" and that the interpretation or enforcement of rights under the treaties was outside the jurisdiction of municipal courts."}}, {"text": "S. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61732, "end_char": 61737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62204, "end_char": 62212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)(g) and 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64350, "end_char": 64374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65408, "end_char": 65426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earliest of these usually referred to in this conneetion is Secretary of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahiba(') which was concerned with the justiciability in municipal courts of a seizure by the East India Company of not merely the Raj but even of the private properties o: the\n\n(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 415."}}, {"text": "Kingston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65635, "end_char": 65643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Privy Council held in a judgment delivered by Lord Kingston that as the seizure haJ been made by the Company as a sovereign power the municipal courts \"had no means of forming or the right of expressing if they had formed any opinion of the propriety or the justice of that act.\"", "canonical_name": "Kingsdown"}}, {"text": "Charodi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66364, "end_char": 66371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question at issue before the Privy Council was whether the respondent was entitled to the continued ownership and possession of a village called Charodi in the province of Gujarat The respondent's title to the village was ultimately based on rights claimed to have been granted by the Gaekwar of Baroda."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66391, "end_char": 66398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question at issue before the Privy Council was whether the respondent was entitled to the continued ownership and possession of a village called Charodi in the province of Gujarat The respondent's title to the village was ultimately based on rights claimed to have been granted by the Gaekwar of Baroda."}}, {"text": "Baroda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 66515, "end_char": 66521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question at issue before the Privy Council was whether the respondent was entitled to the continued ownership and possession of a village called Charodi in the province of Gujarat The respondent's title to the village was ultimately based on rights claimed to have been granted by the Gaekwar of Baroda."}}, {"text": "State of Gujatd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67675, "end_char": 67690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gujatd\n\n•• Vora Fiddali\n\nA.yyangar I.\n\n.", "canonical_name": "State of Saurashtra"}}, {"text": "Bai Rajbi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69426, "end_char": 69435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A question very similar to Bai Rajbi:tis case(') arose in Vajesingji's case(') where the statement of the law as explained by Lord Atkinson was approved and Lord Dunedin, as already stated, conveyed the i; ame idea when he said:\n\n\"Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal Courts established by the new -------\n\n(1) 4> I.A. 229.", "canonical_name": "lJai Rajbai"}}, {"text": "Atkinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69530, "end_char": 69538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A question very similar to Bai Rajbi:tis case(') arose in Vajesingji's case(') where the statement of the law as explained by Lord Atkinson was approved and Lord Dunedin, as already stated, conveyed the i; ame idea when he said:\n\n\"Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal Courts established by the new -------\n\n(1) 4> I.A. 229.", "canonical_name": "Atkinson"}}, {"text": "Bai Raihai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70725, "end_char": 70735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant the plea raised was 'Act of State' and the decisions of the Board in Bai Raihai's case( 2 ) and Vijayesingji's case(') were relied on."}}, {"text": "Vijayesingji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70752, "end_char": 70764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant the plea raised was 'Act of State' and the decisions of the Board in Bai Raihai's case( 2 ) and Vijayesingji's case(') were relied on."}}, {"text": "Alverstone", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71548, "end_char": 71558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the latter proposition support was sought on the observations of Lord Alverstone CJ."}}, {"text": "perty", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71947, "end_char": 71952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196-1\n\nStal• of Gujarat v.\n\nJI' or/J Fiddali\n\nAyyongar I.\n\n492 SUPREME COURT REPUl<l'S • ...n 1\n\nLC~4J\n\nperty and private individuals, particularly land to which title had already been perfected before the conqueror annexation are altogether different from the obligations which arise in respect of personal rights by contract.\""}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73535, "end_char": 73542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last decision to be referred to in this context is that reported as Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Aimer(') where Lord Simonds said:\n\n\"From this it follows that the rights, which the inhabitants of that State enjoyed against its former rulers, availed them nothing against the British Government and could not be asserted in the Courts established by that Government\n\n(I) (1859) 7 Moo."}}, {"text": "Dalmia Dadri Cement Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 74515, "end_char": 74538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have already pointed out, these decisions of the Privy Council have been referred to and followed by this Court in Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. (1) and the other deciions already referred."}}, {"text": "Virendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74623, "end_char": 74631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statement of the law therefore in Virendra's case(2 ) that if the doctrine of Public International Law enunciated by the Privy Council were applied, the petitioners in that case had a voidable title, which inhered in them even after the change of sovereignty, is nN seen to be correct.", "canonical_name": "Virerulra Singh"}}, {"text": "Arts. 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75761, "end_char": 75776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76089, "end_char": 76098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gujarat ...\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nAnangar I.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\n.Ayyangar J.\n\nces of India but as a result of their conjoint action along with the subjects of the former Indian rulers.", "canonical_name": "A.Y_yangar"}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 77163, "end_char": 77176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That a new sovereign emerged on the unification of India by the merger or absorption of the Indian States with the Provinces of British India cannot be questioned and that this was by the process of the sovereignty of the rulers of the former Indian States being extinguished cannot be disputed either."}}, {"text": "lJnion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 77835, "end_char": 77850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The territories under the rulers of the former Indian Princes uncfoubtedly passed from one sovereign to another when as a result of the 'unionisation' by the Government of India, they Became integral parts first of the Dominion of India and later of the lJnion of India."}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80832, "end_char": 80848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gujarat'\n\n•• Vora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nStille of Gujarat v.\n\nYora Fiddali\n\nA.yyaogar J.\n\nthe Government against its own subjects might have some application.", "canonical_name": "State of Saurashtra"}}, {"text": "A.yyaogar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80917, "end_char": 80926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gujarat'\n\n•• Vora Fiddali\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nStille of Gujarat v.\n\nYora Fiddali\n\nA.yyaogar J.\n\nthe Government against its own subjects might have some application.", "canonical_name": "A.Y_yangar"}}, {"text": "Virerulra Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81878, "end_char": 81893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We consider, therefore, that if the doctiine of Public International Law expounded by the Privy Council were held applicable to the termination of the rights arising on the change of sovereignty in India, as the learned Judges in Virerulra Singh's case(') did, the power of the Government of India as at present constituted to refuse to recognise titles originating in executive grants by former Indian rulers cannot be negatived by resort to the rule of Jaw laid down in Walker v.\n\nBaird(') and Johnstone v. Pedlar(').", "canonical_name": "Virerulra Singh"}}, {"text": "Bai Rajbai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83739, "end_char": 83749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If this latter be the correct juristic approach, and that is what the decisions of the Privy Council lay down as we have shown by the extracts we have made of the relevant passages in Bai Rajbai's(') and in Vajeysinghji's(') case, then it matters not whether the earlier grant was by an absolute ruler who could revoke his grant or by a ruler of a different type who could not or even if he could, had renounced his rights to revoke by unilateral executive action.", "canonical_name": "lJai Rajbai"}}, {"text": "Vajeysinghji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83762, "end_char": 83774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If this latter be the correct juristic approach, and that is what the decisions of the Privy Council lay down as we have shown by the extracts we have made of the relevant passages in Bai Rajbai's(') and in Vajeysinghji's(') case, then it matters not whether the earlier grant was by an absolute ruler who could revoke his grant or by a ruler of a different type who could not or even if he could, had renounced his rights to revoke by unilateral executive action.", "canonical_name": "Vajeysinghji"}}, {"text": "Governments of the Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84696, "end_char": 84720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances, the existence of the arbitrary powers of the native Indian rulers and its absence in the Governments under the Constitution i.s not relevant, nor the fact that these were not inherited by and did not devolve on the Governments of the Union and the States functioning under the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Vora Fiddoli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85689, "end_char": 85701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134 1,0 SC-\"·\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nVora Fiddoli\n\nA.yyangor J,\n\nState of Gu}arat\n\n\"· Vora Fiddali\n\nA.Y_yangar J,\n\nAct, 1935 as it stood from time to time Gnd the second stage with the complete 'unionization' of these territories so as to form part of an unified polity, the Union of India.", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "A.Y_yangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85752, "end_char": 85762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134 1,0 SC-\"·\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nVora Fiddoli\n\nA.yyangor J,\n\nState of Gu}arat\n\n\"· Vora Fiddali\n\nA.Y_yangar J,\n\nAct, 1935 as it stood from time to time Gnd the second stage with the complete 'unionization' of these territories so as to form part of an unified polity, the Union of India.", "canonical_name": "A.Y_yangar"}}, {"text": "Sections 290A and 2908", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86206, "end_char": 86228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86391, "end_char": 86395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 290A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87077, "end_char": 87084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88817, "end_char": 88823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88831, "end_char": 88860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88872, "end_char": 88887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89451, "end_char": 89457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89465, "end_char": 89494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90008, "end_char": 90023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Arts. 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90927, "end_char": 90942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricumdass", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91217, "end_char": 91238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This takes us to the consideration of the question which was raised by Mr. Purshottam Tricumdass submitting to us that we should discard the theory of Public International Law which underlies the decisions of the Privy Council but that we should accept and give effect to what might be termed the American view as formulated by Chief Justice .Marshall in U.S. v. Percheman( 2 ) which was approved and applied in the later decisions of the American Supreme Court to which also he drew our attention.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Tricumdass"}}, {"text": ".Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91484, "end_char": 91493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This takes us to the consideration of the question which was raised by Mr. Purshottam Tricumdass submitting to us that we should discard the theory of Public International Law which underlies the decisions of the Privy Council but that we should accept and give effect to what might be termed the American view as formulated by Chief Justice .Marshall in U.S. v. Percheman( 2 ) which was approved and applied in the later decisions of the American Supreme Court to which also he drew our attention.", "canonical_name": ".Marshall"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 91590, "end_char": 91603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This takes us to the consideration of the question which was raised by Mr. Purshottam Tricumdass submitting to us that we should discard the theory of Public International Law which underlies the decisions of the Privy Council but that we should accept and give effect to what might be termed the American view as formulated by Chief Justice .Marshall in U.S. v. Percheman( 2 ) which was approved and applied in the later decisions of the American Supreme Court to which also he drew our attention."}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 91957, "end_char": 91964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection his thesis was that the doctrines evolved by the Privy Council were conditioned by Britain being an Imperialist and expansionist power at the date when they originated and were applied and that while these might have been suited to the regime of a colonial power, they were wholly out of place in the set up of this country and with the type of Constitution under which it functions."}}, {"text": "Spain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 92710, "end_char": 92715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first plac~, Percheman's case(') itself came before the courts for ascertaining the proper construction of the treaty under which Florida was surrendered to the United States by Spain under the Florida treaty dated February 22, 1819, on the terms of which the\n\n< 1) [1955] 1 s.c."}}, {"text": "February 22, 1819", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 92747, "end_char": 92764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first plac~, Percheman's case(') itself came before the courts for ascertaining the proper construction of the treaty under which Florida was surrendered to the United States by Spain under the Florida treaty dated February 22, 1819, on the terms of which the\n\n< 1) [1955] 1 s.c."}}, {"text": "S. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92829, "end_char": 92834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Florida", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93326, "end_char": 93333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The place of a treaty entered into by the Unitee1 States and the provisions contained in it, in the Constitutional Law of the United States, we shall be referring to later, but that apart the F'Jorida treaty was followed by an Act of Congress of 1 gzg entitled \"an Act supplementary to the several Acts providing for the settlement of confirmation of private land claims in Florida.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94349, "end_char": 94355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Willoughby", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94705, "end_char": 94715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Willoughby explains* the object and effect of this provision thus:\n\n\" .... the primary purpose of this provision, (Art."}}, {"text": "A.yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95011, "end_char": 95020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stal• of Gu/arat\n\nVar• Fiddall\n\nA.yyangar J.\n\nStall of Gujarat\n\nY ora Fiddalt\n\nJfyyangar J.\n\nconstitutional provisions ...... it has, from the beginning been held that treaties, so far as they are self-executory, operate in the United States, by virtue of this constitutional provision, to create municipal law which the courts are called upon to recognise and apply.\"", "canonical_name": "A.Y_yangar"}}, {"text": "Y ora Fiddalt\n\nJfyyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95043, "end_char": 95067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stal• of Gu/arat\n\nVar• Fiddall\n\nA.yyangar J.\n\nStall of Gujarat\n\nY ora Fiddalt\n\nJfyyangar J.\n\nconstitutional provisions ...... it has, from the beginning been held that treaties, so far as they are self-executory, operate in the United States, by virtue of this constitutional provision, to create municipal law which the courts are called upon to recognise and apply.\""}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95800, "end_char": 95805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As explained by Lord Atkin in Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontraio('):\n\n\"Unlike some other countries the stipulations of treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone have the force of law.\"", "canonical_name": "Atkinson"}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96081, "end_char": 96087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96095, "end_char": 96124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96180, "end_char": 96187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 96300, "end_char": 96310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for !"}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96599, "end_char": 96607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "S. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97082, "end_char": 97087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "C. J. Marshall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98195, "end_char": 98209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are several reasons why we are unable to accept C. J. Marshall's exposition in Percheman's case(') as laying down a law which has to be given effect to by municipal courts in this country."}}, {"text": "C.C. Hydl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99572, "end_char": 99581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.C. Hydl!"}}, {"text": "George Schwarzenberger", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 100088, "end_char": 100110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly George Schwarzenberger in his fnternational Law ( • •) after referring to a passage in the decision of the\n\nPennanent Court of International Justice in the ase of German Settlers in Poland reading:\n\n\"Private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty.", "canonical_name": "George Schwarzenberger"}}, {"text": "Poland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 100270, "end_char": 100276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly George Schwarzenberger in his fnternational Law ( • •) after referring to a passage in the decision of the\n\nPennanent Court of International Justice in the ase of German Settlers in Poland reading:\n\n\"Private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty."}}, {"text": "S. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101427, "end_char": 101432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Guiarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 101526, "end_char": 101542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Guiarat\n\nNext we might examine the juristic concept un<lerlymg the American view, putting aside for the moment what one might call authority."}}, {"text": "O'Connell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105811, "end_char": 105820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been pointed out by O'Connell in his Treatise on the Law of State Succession, the problems posed by State succession in International Law are notably different in character from those of municipal law though they arise al a different plane, but there is no necessary reason why the one system should not draw on the doctrine or concepts fo:mulated and found to be adequate within the other\n\nsystem.", "canonical_name": "O'Connell"}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108248, "end_char": 108256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Most certainly it does not need to be stated that the British Parliament when it enacted the Government of India Act", "statute": "Most certainly it does not need to be stated that the British Parliament when it enacted the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109015, "end_char": 109021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109486, "end_char": 109492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 366( JO)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109838, "end_char": 109851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109868, "end_char": 109875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1930) L.R. 57\n\nI.A. 3181", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 112151, "end_char": 112176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1. 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 115683, "end_char": 115696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7)-that the Government would not re-examine grants made earlier than April 1."}}, {"text": "Wadhwan State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 117263, "end_char": 117276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an enactment of the ruler of Wadhwan State this was, in the case of officers like the ap; Jellant before this Court, fixed at 60."}}, {"text": "Government of Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 117381, "end_char": 117405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An order by the Government of Saurashtra retiring him after he reached the age of 55 against his will, gave rise to the suit from which the proceedings before this Court arose."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117903, "end_char": 117911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 117919, "end_char": 117929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "372 in the Saurashtra State."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118218, "end_char": 118226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118539, "end_char": 118558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In stating this position, however, the following words were used:\n\n\"The Covenant (between the ruler of the Wadhwan\n\nState and the State of Saurashtra) could be looked at to see whether the new sovereign had waived his rights to ignore rights given under the laws of the former sovereign.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118770, "end_char": 118778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120289, "end_char": 120297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121923, "end_char": 121931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122228, "end_char": 122236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123070, "end_char": 123078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 366( 10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124191, "end_char": 124204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124235, "end_char": 124243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dharmada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 124860, "end_char": 124868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The text of this resolution or order by the Maharana is as follows :\n\n\"The Jivak, Patavat Inami, Chakariyat, Dharmada villages in Sant State are being given (granted) to Jagirdars and the holders of the said villages are not given rights over forests."}}, {"text": "Sant State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 124881, "end_char": 124891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The text of this resolution or order by the Maharana is as follows :\n\n\"The Jivak, Patavat Inami, Chakariyat, Dharmada villages in Sant State are being given (granted) to Jagirdars and the holders of the said villages are not given rights over forests."}}, {"text": "Jagirdars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124921, "end_char": 124930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The text of this resolution or order by the Maharana is as follows :\n\n\"The Jivak, Patavat Inami, Chakariyat, Dharmada villages in Sant State are being given (granted) to Jagirdars and the holders of the said villages are not given rights over forests.", "canonical_name": "Jagirdars"}}, {"text": "cetain Jagirs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125046, "end_char": 125059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence after considering the complaints of cetain Jagirs, they are being given full rights and authority over the forests in the villages under their vahivat."}}, {"text": "Gothimada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 126825, "end_char": 126834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, there is on record the trans1ation of the grant of the village of Gothimada dated 1867, but from this it does not follow that everyone of the grants comprised in the five tenures specified was of this pattern."}}, {"text": "Art. 366(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128424, "end_char": 128436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Gu/tltal\n\nVora F/ddall\n\nAyyangar I", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 128863, "end_char": 128906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gu/tltal\n\nVora F/ddall\n\nAyyangar I,\n\nSuBBA RAO J.-1 have had the advantage of going Subba Rao I. through the judgment of my learned brother, Rajagopala Ayyangar J. I agree with him that Ex."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128909, "end_char": 128918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gu/tltal\n\nVora F/ddall\n\nAyyangar I,\n\nSuBBA RAO J.-1 have had the advantage of going Subba Rao I. through the judgment of my learned brother, Rajagopala Ayyangar J. I agree with him that Ex.", "canonical_name": "Subbd' Rao"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128956, "end_char": 128965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gu/tltal\n\nVora F/ddall\n\nAyyangar I,\n\nSuBBA RAO J.-1 have had the advantage of going Subba Rao I. through the judgment of my learned brother, Rajagopala Ayyangar J. I agree with him that Ex.", "canonical_name": "Subbd' Rao"}}, {"text": "Thakor Sardarsingh Gajesing", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 129842, "end_char": 129869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts necessary to appreciate the alternative contention may now be briefly stated.. In the year 1947, the then ruler of the Sant State made a gram of the village Gotimada to th~ predecessor-in-interest of Thakor Sardarsingh Gajesing.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Sardar Singh Gaje Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129926, "end_char": 129930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129938, "end_char": 129967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130195, "end_char": 130204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Guiarat v.\n\nP' ora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nof Sant State issued an order conferring full rights over forests to the holders of villages in the State, which included the said Gotimada village.", "canonical_name": "Subbd' Rao"}}, {"text": "Dominion Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 130491, "end_char": 130519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 19, 1948, there was an agreement, described as the Merger Agreement entered into between the Maharana of Sant State and the Dominion Government of India where under the Mah.arana ceded to the Dominion Government full exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power for and in relation to the governance of the Sant State and agreed to transfer the administration of the Sant State to the Dominion Government on June 10, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131205, "end_char": 131209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 131338, "end_char": 131353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Government of India delegated the administration of the Sant State to the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "October l, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 131361, "end_char": 131376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From October l, 1949, under the States' Merger (Governor's Provinces) Order 1949, the said\n\nState became part of the State of Bombay; that is to say, from June 10, 1948 to October l, 1949 the Bombay State administered the Sant State as a delegatee of the Dominion of India, and thereafter the State became merged with the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Sant State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 131700, "end_char": 131710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sant State, therefore, became part of the Dominion of India on June 10, 1948 and thereafter tile citizens of that State became, the citizens of the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "Thakor Sardarsing Gajesing", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 131930, "end_char": 131956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 21, 1948 the respondent entered into a contract with Thakor Sardarsing Gajesing for cutting of the trees in the forest of village Gotimada.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Sardar Singh Gaje Singh"}}, {"text": "Maharana of Sant State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 132213, "end_char": 132235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October l, 1948 i.e., 4 months after the merger and more than a month after the said contract, Shri V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government would be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken after the 1st day of April 1948, and if considered by the Government of India to be 9alpably unjust or unreasonable."}}, {"text": "1st day of April 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 132460, "end_char": 132481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October l, 1948 i.e., 4 months after the merger and more than a month after the said contract, Shri V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government would be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken after the 1st day of April 1948, and if considered by the Government of India to be 9alpably unjust or unreasonable."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 132691, "end_char": 132704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "existing on April 1, 1948 would be respected."}}, {"text": "February 6, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 134306, "end_char": 134322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 6, 1963 the Government of Bombay passed a resolution after receiving a report from the Forest Settlement Officer specially appointed by it to investigate the rights of jagirdars."}}, {"text": "Gotimada village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 134816, "end_char": 134832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as Gotimada village."}}, {"text": "Yora Fiddall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134956, "end_char": 134968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is concerned, it was stated that the question of forest rights in the said village was still under the\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nYora Fiddall\n\nSubbd' Rao J. .", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "Subbd' Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134970, "end_char": 134980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is concerned, it was stated that the question of forest rights in the said village was still under the\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nYora Fiddall\n\nSubbd' Rao J. .", "canonical_name": "Subbd' Rao"}}, {"text": "Jagirs and Muafis by the Ruler of Sarila State in one village and by the Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 136829, "end_char": 136906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Charkhari State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 136911, "end_char": 136926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners in that cage were granted in January, 1948, Jagirs and Muafis by the Ruler of Sarila State in one village and by the Ruler of Charkhari State in three villages."}}, {"text": "Charkhari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 137019, "end_char": 137028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Union of 35 States, including the States of Sarila and Charkhari."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 137067, "end_char": 137082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was formed into the United States of Vindhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 137089, "end_char": 137115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Vindhya Pradesh Government confirmed these grants in December, 1948, when its Revenue Officers interfered with them questioning their validity."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 137431, "end_char": 137446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".agreement in December 1949, and dissolve the newly created\n\nState as from January 1, 1950, each Ruler acceding to the Government of India all authority and jurisdiction in relation to the Government of that State."}}, {"text": "Art. 32(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137804, "end_char": 137814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jagirs and Muafis by the Ruler of Sarila State in one village and by the Rule", "statute": "Jagirs and Muafis by the Ruler of Sarila State in one village and by the Rule"}}, {"text": "M1rshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138483, "end_char": 138491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speaking for the Court, elaborately considered the doctrine of \"Act of State\"' in the light of English and American decisions and the opinions of jurists of International Law and came to the following conclusion :\n\n\"We think it is clear on a review of these authorities that whichever view be taken, that of the Privy\n\nCouncil and the House of Lords, or that of Chief Justice M1rshall, these petitioners, who were in de facto possession of the disputed lands, had rights in them which they could have enforced up to 26th January, 1950, in the Dominion Courts against <JI persons except possibly the Rulers who granted the land and except possibly the State.", "canonical_name": ".Marshall"}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 138623, "end_char": 138641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speaking for the Court, elaborately considered the doctrine of \"Act of State\"' in the light of English and American decisions and the opinions of jurists of International Law and came to the following conclusion :\n\n\"We think it is clear on a review of these authorities that whichever view be taken, that of the Privy\n\nCouncil and the House of Lords, or that of Chief Justice M1rshall, these petitioners, who were in de facto possession of the disputed lands, had rights in them which they could have enforced up to 26th January, 1950, in the Dominion Courts against <JI persons except possibly the Rulers who granted the land and except possibly the State."}}, {"text": "Vora Fiddall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139509, "end_char": 139521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pausing here it will be noticed that this Court did not express a final opinion on the question whether the petitioners could have enforced their title to the property against the Rulers before the Constitution came into force, but it had definitely held that the petitioners had title to the property agajnst all\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nStat• of Gufarat\n\nVora Fiddall\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nipersons except the Rulers.", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "Jind", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 142450, "end_char": 142454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a company entered into an agreement with the erstwhile State of Jind whereunder it had to pay income-tax only at concessional rates, it was held in M / s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax(') that, after the said State merged with the Union of India, the latter was not bound by the contractual obligations of the ceding State on the basis of the principle that the treaty between the two sovereigns was an act of State and the clauses of that treaty were not enforceable."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 142650, "end_char": 142664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a company entered into an agreement with the erstwhile State of Jind whereunder it had to pay income-tax only at concessional rates, it was held in M / s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax(') that, after the said State merged with the Union of India, the latter was not bound by the contractual obligations of the ceding State on the basis of the principle that the treaty between the two sovereigns was an act of State and the clauses of that treaty were not enforceable."}}, {"text": "Mayurbhanj State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 143075, "end_char": 143091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Jagannath Agarwa/a v. State of Orissa (\") it was held that after Mayurbhan j State had merged with the Province of Orissa the two money claims of the appellant against the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj State were not enforceable against the Orissa State on the ground that the Act of State did not come to an end till the claims made by the appellant were rejected and, therefore, municipal courts had no jurisdiction in the matter."}}, {"text": "Orissa State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 143125, "end_char": 143137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Jagannath Agarwa/a v. State of Orissa (\") it was held that after Mayurbhan j State had merged with the Province of Orissa the two money claims of the appellant against the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj State were not enforceable against the Orissa State on the ground that the Act of State did not come to an end till the claims made by the appellant were rejected and, therefore, municipal courts had no jurisdiction in the matter."}}, {"text": "Talcher", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 143380, "end_char": 143387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where the petitioners held Khor Posh grants from the Rulers of Talcher, Bamra and Kalahandi under the respective State laws it was held in Promod Chandra Deb\n\nv. The State of Orissa( 8 ) that the laws continued to have legal force after the merger of the said States with the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Bamra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 143389, "end_char": 143394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where the petitioners held Khor Posh grants from the Rulers of Talcher, Bamra and Kalahandi under the respective State laws it was held in Promod Chandra Deb\n\nv. The State of Orissa( 8 ) that the laws continued to have legal force after the merger of the said States with the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Kalahandi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 143399, "end_char": 143408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where the petitioners held Khor Posh grants from the Rulers of Talcher, Bamra and Kalahandi under the respective State laws it was held in Promod Chandra Deb\n\nv. The State of Orissa( 8 ) that the laws continued to have legal force after the merger of the said States with the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Junagadh State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 143628, "end_char": 143642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where the Nawab of Junagadh State made grants of property before he fled the State, it was held in\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "Jamadar Mohamad Abdullah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 143918, "end_char": 143942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R. 40S.\n\nState of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fidd!llJ\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\n.State of Guiarat v.\n\nVora Fidda/i\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nStGte of Saurashtra v.\n\nJamadar Mohamad Abdullah(') that the cancellation of the said grants by the Regional Commissioner, who assumed charge of the administration of the State before the said State was integrated with the United States of Saurashtra, was an act of State.", "canonical_name": "Jamadar Mohamad Abdullah"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145734, "end_char": 145751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the judgment had also nothing to do with the second aspect was made clear by the following observations of Venkatarama Aiyar J., who expressed the majority view, at p. 749: ·\n\n''This argument assumes that there were in existence at the date when the Constitution came into\n\n(2) [1959] S.C.R. 720."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146003, "end_char": 146016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 2005", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146139, "end_char": 146146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146694, "end_char": 146700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In State of Saurashtra v.\n\nJamadar Mohamad Abdulla(\"), Mudholkar J., speaking for himself and for Sarkar J.,,, expressed the •view on the question of int pact of s. i99 (1) of' the Constitµtion Act of 1935 on the title to immovable property of a citizen of a ceding State thus, at p. 1001 : \" ...... before the respondents could claim the benefit of s. 299 ( 1) of the Constitution Act, 1935, they had to establish that on November 9, 1947, or thereafter they possessed legally enforceable rights with respect to the properties in question as against the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146946, "end_char": 146952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 146965, "end_char": 146987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 9, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 147019, "end_char": 147035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In State of Saurashtra v.\n\nJamadar Mohamad Abdulla(\"), Mudholkar J., speaking for himself and for Sarkar J.,,, expressed the •view on the question of int pact of s. i99 (1) of' the Constitµtion Act of 1935 on the title to immovable property of a citizen of a ceding State thus, at p. 1001 : \" ...... before the respondents could claim the benefit of s. 299 ( 1) of the Constitution Act, 1935, they had to establish that on November 9, 1947, or thereafter they possessed legally enforceable rights with respect to the properties in question as against the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "s. 299( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147464, "end_char": 147474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution Act, 1935", "statute": "the Constitution Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147547, "end_char": 147556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution Act, 1935", "statute": "the Constitution Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "[1962) 3 S.C.R. 970", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 147831, "end_char": 147850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148476, "end_char": 148479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out that Das J., in the earlier decision and Sinha C.J., in the later decision, who delivered the leading judgments in those cases, had specifically left open that question."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148512, "end_char": 148517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out that Das J., in the earlier decision and Sinha C.J., in the later decision, who delivered the leading judgments in those cases, had specifically left open that question.", "canonical_name": "Sinha C."}}, {"text": "Georg Schwargenberger", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 150729, "end_char": 150750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A Manual of International Law by Georg Schwargenberger, 4th Edn.,", "canonical_name": "George Schwarzenberger"}}, {"text": "Hyde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 151543, "end_char": 151547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hyde's International Law, second revised edition, Vol."}}, {"text": "September 10, 1923", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 151669, "end_char": 151687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l, at p. 433, the following extract from the Sixth Advisory Opinion of September 10, 1923 of the Court of International Justice is quoted:\n\n\"Private rights acquired under existing Jaw do not cease on a change of sovereignty."}}, {"text": "Oppenheim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 152301, "end_char": 152310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a contention is based on no principle and would be contrary to an almost universal opinion and practice ..... \"\n\nStat• of Gujarat\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nStale of <Jujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nSubba Rao/.\n\nIn Oppenheim's International Law, 8th edition, Vol."}}, {"text": "Starke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 152874, "end_char": 152880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Starke in his book, An Introduction to International Law 5th edn.,"}}, {"text": "Briggs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 153311, "end_char": 153317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Much to the same effect the relevant statement of international law is found in Briggs' The Law of Nations, 2nd edn."}}, {"text": "John Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 153733, "end_char": 153746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court has succinctly stated the American.", "canonical_name": "John Marshall:-"}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 153754, "end_char": 153781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court has succinctly stated the American."}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 155967, "end_char": 155972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Guiarat\n\nVora FiddaU\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nJtale of Gujarat v.\n\nY•>ra Fiddali\n\nSubba .Rao J.\n\nIn The American Insurance Co. and the Ocean Insurance Co. v. Bales of Cotton('), Chief Justice Marshall clearly recorded the view of the American Courts thus:\n\n\"On such transfer of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change.\""}}, {"text": "Subba .Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156048, "end_char": 156058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Guiarat\n\nVora FiddaU\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nJtale of Gujarat v.\n\nY•>ra Fiddali\n\nSubba .Rao J.\n\nIn The American Insurance Co. and the Ocean Insurance Co. v. Bales of Cotton('), Chief Justice Marshall clearly recorded the view of the American Courts thus:\n\n\"On such transfer of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change.\"", "canonical_name": "Subbd' Rao"}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 157338, "end_char": 157345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the words of Stephen, means \"An act injurious to the person or property of ome person who is not at the time of that act a subject of Her Majesty; which act is done by a representative of Her Majesty's authority, and is either sanctioned or subsequently ratified by Her Majesty.\""}}, {"text": "Promod Chandra Dab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 159855, "end_char": 159873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An exhaustive exposition of this branch of law is found in Promod Chandra Dab's case( 2 ).", "canonical_name": "Promod Chandra Dab"}}, {"text": "O'Connell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159917, "end_char": 159926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O'Connell in The Law of State Succession\n\n(I) 51 I.A. 357.", "canonical_name": "O'Connell"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161706, "end_char": 161727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162046, "end_char": 162053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vora Flddall", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 162524, "end_char": 162536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A recognition by the supreme law State of Gu/aral of the land must be in a higher position than that of an cxe- •.\n\nVora Flddall cutive amhority of a conquering State.", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "Virtmdra Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 162816, "end_char": 162830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, therefore, respectfully hold that Virtmdra Singh's case(') has been corrcctiy decided.", "canonical_name": "Virerulra Singh"}}, {"text": "June 10. 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 163635, "end_char": 163648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the merger had already taken place on June 10."}}, {"text": "October l,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 163680, "end_char": 163696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1948 and this letter was written on October l,\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 165158, "end_char": 165170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HIDAYATULLAH J.-These appeals by the State of Gujarat impugn a common judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dated January 24, 1961.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "Santrampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 165975, "end_char": 165985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The forests in respect of which the declaration and injunction were sought are situated in the former State of Santrampur (also called Sant State)."}}, {"text": "Santrampur was an Indian State and the Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166013, "end_char": 166056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166462, "end_char": 166501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 2, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 166573, "end_char": 166585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government, by virtue of powers vested in it by the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, delegated its functions to the Provincial Government of Bombay and on June 2, 1948, the Administration of the Indian States Order was passed and it was applied to Sant State from June 10, 1948."}}, {"text": "July 28, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 166700, "end_char": 166713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 28, 1948, the Indian States (Application of Laws) Order, 1948\n\nwas passedL Certain enactments in force in the Province of I96f Bombay were extended to Sant State and then under the state of Gu/arat States' Merger (Governor's Provinces) Order, 1949, Sant Y.\n\nVora Fiddall State became a part of the Province of Bombay from August 1, 1949."}}, {"text": "Vora Fiddall State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 166963, "end_char": 166981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 28, 1948, the Indian States (Application of Laws) Order, 1948\n\nwas passedL Certain enactments in force in the Province of I96f Bombay were extended to Sant State and then under the state of Gu/arat States' Merger (Governor's Provinces) Order, 1949, Sant Y.\n\nVora Fiddall State became a part of the Province of Bombay from August 1, 1949.", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "December 1, 1857", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 168561, "end_char": 168577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gujarat v.\n\nVora Fiddali\n\nHidtryatul/ah /.\n\nThe former grants which were made in favour of the jagirdars and holders of the villages have not been produced, but they were probably like the grant of village Gothimada dated December 1, 1857, which was to the fo11owing effect:\n\nYou have to do the vahivat (management) of the land situate within the permanent boundaries of the outskirts of the villages in four directions."}}, {"text": "1-12-1867", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 169326, "end_char": 169335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dated: 1-12-1867 A.D.S.Y. 1929 Magsar."}}, {"text": "Gothimada village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 170081, "end_char": 170098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was as follows:\n\n\"Gothimada village of Santrampur State."}}, {"text": "Santrampur State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 170102, "end_char": 170118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was as follows:\n\n\"Gothimada village of Santrampur State."}}, {"text": "31-3-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 170339, "end_char": 170348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Is the authorization up to Lunawada and Signally\n\nonly, time-limit up to 31-3-1949."}}, {"text": "F.O. Lunawada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 170604, "end_char": 170617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Send copy to F.O. Lunawada.\""}}, {"text": "Thakore Sardarsingh Gajesingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 170788, "end_char": 170817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A sample is quoted here-\n\n\"UNDERTAKING:\n\nI, Thakore Sardarsingh Gajesingh hereby give an undertaking to abide by the decision and orders passed by the Government of Bombay in respect of Gothimada forests, rights over which were conferred on me by Santrampur State Government on 12-3-48 in their resolu\n\ntion No.", "canonical_name": "Thakur Sardar Singh Gaje Singh"}}, {"text": "12-3-48", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 171022, "end_char": 171029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A sample is quoted here-\n\n\"UNDERTAKING:\n\nI, Thakore Sardarsingh Gajesingh hereby give an undertaking to abide by the decision and orders passed by the Government of Bombay in respect of Gothimada forests, rights over which were conferred on me by Santrampur State Government on 12-3-48 in their resolu\n\ntion No."}}, {"text": "Hatimbhai Badruddin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 171264, "end_char": 171283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "111, 112 of 1948-49, in respect of village in Santrampur State issued by the Divisional Forest Officer, Integrated States Division, Devgad- Baria 'in fav()ur of Mr.\n\nHatimbhai Badruddin is subject to the above undertaking."}}, {"text": "24th May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 172298, "end_char": 172312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ADM(P) 50-A-\n\nII, dated 24th May, 1949, Government considers that the order passed by the Ruler of the Sant State under his No."}}, {"text": "12th March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 172413, "end_char": 172429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "371, dated 12th March, 1948 transferring forest rights to all the jagirdars of the jagir village, are mala fide and that they should be cancelled."}}, {"text": "June 29, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 173032, "end_char": 173045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 29, 1951, the Government of Bombay passed a resolution that the Maharana's order would not be given effect to."}}, {"text": "February 6, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 173181, "end_char": 173197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another resolution was passed on February 6, 1953 as follows:\n\n\"On."}}, {"text": "Patawat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 173367, "end_char": 173374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "371 on 12th March, 1948, under which Jiwai, Patawat, lnami, Chakriat and Dharmada Jagirdars and inamdars were given full forest rights over the villages in their charge."}}, {"text": "lnami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 173376, "end_char": 173381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "371 on 12th March, 1948, under which Jiwai, Patawat, lnami, Chakriat and Dharmada Jagirdars and inamdars were given full forest rights over the villages in their charge."}}, {"text": "Chakriat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 173383, "end_char": 173391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "371 on 12th March, 1948, under which Jiwai, Patawat, lnami, Chakriat and Dharmada Jagirdars and inamdars were given full forest rights over the villages in their charge."}}, {"text": "Dharmada Jagirdars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 173396, "end_char": 173414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "371 on 12th March, 1948, under which Jiwai, Patawat, lnami, Chakriat and Dharmada Jagirdars and inamdars were given full forest rights over the villages in their charge."}}, {"text": "Government\n\nof Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 173497, "end_char": 173518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government\n\nof Bombay, after considering the implication o[ the 1964 Tharav, decided that the order was ma/a fide and Stai."}}, {"text": "8th July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 173648, "end_char": 173662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Gu/aral cancelled it on 8th July, 1949 vide Government Vora vFiddalt Letter, Revenue Department No."}}, {"text": "Nanirath", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 174966, "end_char": 174974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question of forest rights in the following villages is still under consideration of Government and necessary orders in that behalf will be issued in due course:-\n\n(1) Nanirath."}}, {"text": "Gothimada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 174981, "end_char": 174990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Gothimada. ("}}, {"text": "Rathada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 174996, "end_char": 175003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3) Rathada."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 176028, "end_char": 176043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third contention was that the Central\n\nGovernmnt thrnugh Mr. V. P. Menon has undertaken not to questioa any order or action taken before 1st April, 1948, and thJt this created a bar to the repudiation of the order of the Maharana dated March 12, 1948."}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176469, "end_char": 176477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Forest Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 176951, "end_char": 176968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They referred to the permission which had been given by the officers of the Forest Department to the plaintiffs in this suit to cut and carry away the timber and regarded the letter of Mr.\n\nV. P. Menon .1s evidence of waiver and relinquishment."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 177287, "end_char": 177304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They held on the authority of Virendra Singh and Others v. The\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh(') and Bholanath J. Thakar v.\n\nState of Saurashtra (2 ) and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Bhojrajji v. Saurashtra State(\") that the Government must."}}, {"text": "V. P.\n\nMenon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 177916, "end_char": 177928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was no waiver or relinquishment in favour of the appellants, and (b) that the action of the subordinate officers of the Forest Department did not bind Government and the respondents cannot take advantage of the le\\ter of Mr. V. P.\n\nMenon.", "canonical_name": "V. P.\n\nMenon"}}, {"text": "s. 2990", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178132, "end_char": 178139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178372, "end_char": 178379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178588, "end_char": 178595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179616, "end_char": 179625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act of State does not seek justification for the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 181329, "end_char": 181381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962) 3 S.C.R. 970", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 182280, "end_char": 182299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182885, "end_char": 182890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183122, "end_char": 183127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183990, "end_char": 183999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hidaymullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 184465, "end_char": 184476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vora FldtWI\n\nHidayatullah ]..\n\nStat• of Gujarat\n\n\"· Y ora Fiddali\n\nHidaymullah J.\n\nthe Dominion of India ...... was a party.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184923, "end_char": 184928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184952, "end_char": 184960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "is next contended that the Act of State had come to an end after the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184988, "end_char": 185086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185236, "end_char": 185242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is next contended that the Act of State had come to an end after the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "It is next contended that the Act of State had come to an end after the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185560, "end_char": 185566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is next contended that the Act of State had come to an end after the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "It is next contended that the Act of State had come to an end after the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Bho/anath Thaker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 187401, "end_char": 187417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, in Bho/anath Thaker's case(\") and in Virendra Singh's case(') waiver or relinquishment was inferred from the conduct of Government."}}, {"text": "(1924) L. R. 51 I. A. 357", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 188802, "end_char": 188827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Phalke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 189917, "end_char": 189923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If this was the meaning of the observations of this Court, then in Phalke's case(2 ) it would not have been necessary to insist that in determining whether there was a law which bound the succeeding sovereign, the character, content and purpose of the declared will must be independently considered."}}, {"text": "Jn Ameer-un-nissa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 190150, "end_char": 190167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Ameer-un-nissa's case,(') this Court was concerned."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 190290, "end_char": 190299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With a Firman of the Nizam and that was one of the accepted modes of making laws in Hyderabad State."}}, {"text": "A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 888", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 191350, "end_char": 191370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) A.l."}}, {"text": "Ameer-unnissa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 191421, "end_char": 191434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "out in these two cases that the observations in Ameer-unnissa's case(') Phalke's case(') could not be read as indicating that everything that the Maharaja said or ordered was a law.", "canonical_name": "Ameer-un-Nissa Begum"}}, {"text": "Umeg Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 193498, "end_char": 193508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out that in Umeg Singh's case(') it was contended that cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193541, "end_char": 193546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 194147, "end_char": 194176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 299( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194216, "end_char": 194226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Jamadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 194287, "end_char": 194294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This point was raised but was left open by the majority in Jamadar's case(') to which we have already referred."}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194417, "end_char": 194423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194496, "end_char": 194502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194930, "end_char": 194936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "January 26,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 195365, "end_char": 195382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended that there was a lapse of the original Act of State because of a State succession on January 26,\n\n1950, and as this was before the Resolutions of 1951 and 1953, the respondents were protected."}}, {"text": "France", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 195799, "end_char": 195805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It take• olace in fact when there is (a) annexation (') or (b) cession(')\n\n(2) e.g. Algiers by France (1831) or South African Republic by Great Britain (1901)."}}, {"text": "South African Republic", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 195816, "end_char": 195838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It take• olace in fact when there is (a) annexation (') or (b) cession(')\n\n(2) e.g. Algiers by France (1831) or South African Republic by Great Britain (1901)."}}, {"text": "Ionian Islands", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 195878, "end_char": 195892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) e.g. the Ionian Islands by Britain to Greece (1864) or territory to Poland by Germany."}}, {"text": "Greece", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 195907, "end_char": 195913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) e.g. the Ionian Islands by Britain to Greece (1864) or territory to Poland by Germany."}}, {"text": "Germany", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 195947, "end_char": 195954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) e.g. the Ionian Islands by Britain to Greece (1864) or territory to Poland by Germany."}}, {"text": "Sant State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 197113, "end_char": 197123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever had happened had already happened in 1948 when Sant State merged with the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "Act of State which began in 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 197163, "end_char": 197195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Purushotham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197597, "end_char": 197608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution no doubt guaranteed the rights of citizens after 1950 but these rights granted by the Ruler were not recognised even before 1950 and the Constitution gave its support to those rights which were extant on January 26,\n\n1950 ..\n\nIt only remains to consider the argument of Mr.\n\nPurushotham based on the view of Chief Jmtice John Marshall, of the Supreme Court of the United States expressed in U.S. v. Percheman(\") followed by Cardozo J. in 1937\n\n(1) •.g.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Tricumdass"}}, {"text": "Jmtice John Marshall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 197636, "end_char": 197656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution no doubt guaranteed the rights of citizens after 1950 but these rights granted by the Ruler were not recognised even before 1950 and the Constitution gave its support to those rights which were extant on January 26,\n\n1950 ..\n\nIt only remains to consider the argument of Mr.\n\nPurushotham based on the view of Chief Jmtice John Marshall, of the Supreme Court of the United States expressed in U.S. v. Percheman(\") followed by Cardozo J. in 1937\n\n(1) •.g."}}, {"text": "Cardozo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197746, "end_char": 197753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution no doubt guaranteed the rights of citizens after 1950 but these rights granted by the Ruler were not recognised even before 1950 and the Constitution gave its support to those rights which were extant on January 26,\n\n1950 ..\n\nIt only remains to consider the argument of Mr.\n\nPurushotham based on the view of Chief Jmtice John Marshall, of the Supreme Court of the United States expressed in U.S. v. Percheman(\") followed by Cardozo J. in 1937\n\n(1) •.g."}}, {"text": "S. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197918, "end_char": 197923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act of State which began in 1948", "statute": "Act of State which began in 1948"}}, {"text": "Fletcher Moulton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 199123, "end_char": 199139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be summarized in the words of Fletcher Moulton, L: J. in Salamon v. Secretary of State for India('): ' ' \"An Act of State is essentially an exercise of sovereign power, and hence cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by munici?al courts."}}, {"text": "McNair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 199903, "end_char": 199909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Courts in England have also acted on the further principle which may be shortly stated in the words of Lord McNair('):\n\n(I) 299 US."}}, {"text": "[1955) 1 S.C.R. 415", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 199969, "end_char": 199988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Keiith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 201332, "end_char": 201338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Other writers, as pointed out by Lord McNair in his Law of Treaties by Keiith in his Theory of State Succession and Crandall in Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement.", "canonical_name": "Keiith"}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 201522, "end_char": 201536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a view was taken by the United Kingdom and United States when Algiers was annexed by France and by the former when South Africa was annexed by Great Britain and by the United States when Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. ("}}, {"text": "Algiers", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 201560, "end_char": 201567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a view was taken by the United Kingdom and United States when Algiers was annexed by France and by the former when South Africa was annexed by Great Britain and by the United States when Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. ("}}, {"text": "South Africa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 201613, "end_char": 201625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a view was taken by the United Kingdom and United States when Algiers was annexed by France and by the former when South Africa was annexed by Great Britain and by the United States when Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. ("}}, {"text": "Great Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 201641, "end_char": 201654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a view was taken by the United Kingdom and United States when Algiers was annexed by France and by the former when South Africa was annexed by Great Britain and by the United States when Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. ("}}, {"text": "Korea", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 201685, "end_char": 201690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a view was taken by the United Kingdom and United States when Algiers was annexed by France and by the former when South Africa was annexed by Great Britain and by the United States when Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. ("}}, {"text": "Japan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 201706, "end_char": 201711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a view was taken by the United Kingdom and United States when Algiers was annexed by France and by the former when South Africa was annexed by Great Britain and by the United States when Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. ("}}, {"text": "C. W. Jenks", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 201767, "end_char": 201778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Mervyn Jones B. Y. B. (1947) P. 360; Dr. C. W. Jenks B. Y. B. (1952 P. 105)."}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202533, "end_char": 202541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Transvaal Concessions Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 202912, "end_char": 202944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the principles of International Law, it may be pointed out that after the Report of the Transvaal Concessions Commission and Professor Keith's theories in his book, the attention of the world communities has indeed been drawn to the preservation of economic concessions and acquired rights by the annexing or cessionary State."}}, {"text": "Keith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 202959, "end_char": 202964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the principles of International Law, it may be pointed out that after the Report of the Transvaal Concessions Commission and Professor Keith's theories in his book, the attention of the world communities has indeed been drawn to the preservation of economic concessions and acquired rights by the annexing or cessionary State.", "canonical_name": "Keiith"}}, {"text": "Robert Phillimore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 203219, "end_char": 203236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Indian Islands weire ceded to Greece the Law Officers (Sir Robert Phillimore was one of them) advised:\n\n\"Both according to the principles of International Law and the !"}}, {"text": "15th August, 1863", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 203431, "end_char": 203448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Opinion of 15th August, 1863, F. 0."}}, {"text": "Cuba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 203650, "end_char": 203654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar advice was given on the occasion of annexation of Peruvian territory by Chile (1884), of Madagascar by France (1896), cession of Cuba and the Philipines by\n\nSpain (1898)."}}, {"text": "30th November, 1900", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 204596, "end_char": 204615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 0bligations included concessionary contracts but the Law Officers added a\n\n6 $:C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUH.T REPORTS 553\n\nrider that \"the duty to observe such contracts <'nnot be enforced in a municipal court; it rests merely on the recogni\n\ntion of International Law of what is equitable upon the acquisition of property of the conquered State\" tsce opinion of 30th November, 1900, F.O. quoted by B. Y. B. 1\\150 at p. 105)."}}, {"text": "State of Gu/llNI• .,, Vora Fiddall", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 206416, "end_char": 206450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gu/llNI• .,,"}}, {"text": "Mavrommais", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 207668, "end_char": 207678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such cases are the Mavrommais case, LiJ?hthouses case, Lighthouses in Crete and Samos case (P.C.I.J. Series A No."}}, {"text": "Crete", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 207719, "end_char": 207724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such cases are the Mavrommais case, LiJ?hthouses case, Lighthouses in Crete and Samos case (P.C.I.J. Series A No."}}, {"text": "John Marshall:-", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 211017, "end_char": 211032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Says Chief Justice John Marshall:-\n\n\"A treaty is in its .nature a contract between two nations, not a Legislative Act.", "canonical_name": "John Marshall:-"}}, {"text": "Article 253", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211964, "end_char": 211975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Alexander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 212730, "end_char": 212739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agree with Alexander in \"International Law in India\" in International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1952) p. 289 at p. 295."}}, {"text": "Amodu Tijani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 214516, "end_char": 214528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Amodu Tijani 'f. Secretary, Southern Nigeria (8 ) it was said:\n\n\"a mere change in sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to disturb rights of private owners, and\n\n~~~~~~·-~-\n\n(!)", "canonical_name": "Amodu Tijani"}}, {"text": "S. 503", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214722, "end_char": 214728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 214761, "end_char": 214766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amodu Tijani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 215378, "end_char": 215390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations in Amodu Tijani's case(') were cited before the Privy Council in Sardar Rustam Khan's case(').", "canonical_name": "Amodu Tijani"}}, {"text": "Sardar Rustam Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 215440, "end_char": 215458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations in Amodu Tijani's case(') were cited before the Privy Council in Sardar Rustam Khan's case(')."}}, {"text": "Kamachee Boye Saheba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 215520, "end_char": 215540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Lord Atkin after referring to all cases from Kamachee Boye Saheba('), referred to the observ.1tions of Lord Halsbury in Cook v. Sprigg(')."}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 215583, "end_char": 215591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Lord Atkin after referring to all cases from Kamachee Boye Saheba('), referred to the observ.1tions of Lord Halsbury in Cook v. Sprigg(')."}}, {"text": "Vajje Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 216432, "end_char": 216443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Atkin referred in his judgment to Secretarv of State\n\nv. Bai Rajbai(6 ) and Vajje Singh's case(') as laying the\n\n(I) [1905] 2 K.B. 391."}}, {"text": "(1915) L. R. 42 I.A. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 216598, "end_char": 216622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Westlake", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 216996, "end_char": 217004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Westlake pointed out in the Nature and Extension of Title by Conquest (op."}}, {"text": "Cranworth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 217237, "end_char": 217246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may refer to what was said by Vice- Chancellor Lord Cranworth in King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, I Sim."}}, {"text": "S. 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217296, "end_char": 217302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 217329, "end_char": 217333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.S. 327-9, and by Vice-Chancellor Wood in United States of America v. Prioleau, 2 Ham."}}, {"text": "James", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 217459, "end_char": 217464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "563; and to tl!e generality of the proposition laid down by Vice- Chancellor James in United States of America\n\nv. Mcrae, L.R.8."}}, {"text": "State of Gu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 218443, "end_char": 218454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gu/artlt'\n\nVora Fidd4U\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\n:S,,,,.", "canonical_name": "State of Saurashtra"}}, {"text": "Jlidayatul", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 218531, "end_char": 218541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Gujarat ...\n\nYONJ Flddali\n\nJlidayatul/ali J.\n\nShoJa J.\n\nagainst sovereign in the ordinary course of diplomatic pressure.\""}}, {"text": "ShoJa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 218550, "end_char": 218555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Gujarat ...\n\nYONJ Flddali\n\nJlidayatul/ali J.\n\nShoJa J.\n\nagainst sovereign in the ordinary course of diplomatic pressure.\""}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 219254, "end_char": 219258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH J.-The Ruler of Sant State had made grants of villages to jagirdars but without right to trees.", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "Kingsdown", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 221340, "end_char": 221349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Kingsdown observed at p. 529:\n\n\"The transactions of independent States between each other are governed by other laws than those which Municipal Courts administer : Such Courts have neither the means of deciding_what\n\nis right, nor the power of enforcing any decision which they may make.\"", "canonical_name": "Kingsdown"}}, {"text": "Baluchistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 223049, "end_char": 223060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalat, ceased to be 1 enforceable ce th~ agieement between th, e' Khan and t{te Agent o the Governbr-Gencral in Baluchistan under which the 'Khan 'had granted to \"the British Government."}}, {"text": "G'ovemment of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 223432, "end_char": 223451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in this case the G'ovemment of India had\n\nthe right t,9 recogl)i.se or."}}, {"text": "Purshottam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 224228, "end_char": 224238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Purshottam on behalf of' the respodents however contended that this rule was.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Tricumdass"}}, {"text": "Vora Fiddali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 224834, "end_char": 224846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule is;· counsel submits, Vora Fiddali inconsistent with the tn:e spirit of our Constitution, which Slcah I. seeks to eschew all n•bitrary authority, and establishes the rule of law by subjer.ting every executive action to the scrutiny of the courts and to test it in the light of fundamental rights.", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "YON PllldtJli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 226757, "end_char": 226770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Guf-\n\nYON PllldtJli\n\n\"\"'' J.\n\nall justice within the State and only those rights which arc recognised by the."}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229716, "end_char": 229721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of IQdia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 229955, "end_char": 229974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lgn\"- ment dated March 19, 1948, the Government of IQdia had undertaken tq accept all orders passed and actions taken by the Ruler prior to the date of .handing over of the admiW. tration to the Dominion q, overnment Clause 7 of the letter is in the following terms: \"No order passed or action taken by you before tho date of> making over the administration to the pominion Government will be questioned unless the order was passed or aotion taken after the 1st day of April 1948, and it is considered by the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230135, "end_char": 230143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230582, "end_char": 230590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 9, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 231674, "end_char": 231689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 9, 1949,\n\non the appliation of the jagirdar the Divisional Forest Officer agreed to issue authorisation to the contractor valid npto March 31, 1949, subject to the condition that export outside was not to be permitted pending recipt of the orders by the Government and that a written undertaking was given by the purchaser that he would abide by the decision and orders passed by Government."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 231815, "end_char": 231829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 9, 1949,\n\non the appliation of the jagirdar the Divisional Forest Officer agreed to issue authorisation to the contractor valid npto March 31, 1949, subject to the condition that export outside was not to be permitted pending recipt of the orders by the Government and that a written undertaking was given by the purchaser that he would abide by the decision and orders passed by Government."}}, {"text": "cl 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 235636, "end_char": 235640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 235698, "end_char": 235706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236638, "end_char": 236643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 237224, "end_char": 237228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged that the Ruler of Sant was an absolule Ruler in whom were vested all authority legislative, executive and judicial, and whatever he did or directed had to be complied with and therefore his actions and directions must be deemed to be \"law\" within the meaning of cl 4 of the Administration of the Indian States Order."}}, {"text": "cl 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 237468, "end_char": 237472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "fact that the Ruler of Sant State was an absolute Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 237531, "end_char": 237585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of G~·\n\nV oTG FlddalJ\n\nShah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 239530, "end_char": 239563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H an order is made during the regime of a sovereign who exercises absolute powers, and it is enfo11:e.:I or executed leaving nothing more to be done there-\n\nState of G~·\n\nV oTG FlddalJ\n\nShah /.\n\n1964 ."}}, {"text": "cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240846, "end_char": 240851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 24, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 241245, "end_char": 241262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ameer-un-Nissa Begum and others v. Mahboob Begum and others(') the question as to the binding character of two 'Firmans' dated February 24, 1949, and September 7, 19~9."}}, {"text": "September 7, 19~9.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 241268, "end_char": 241286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ameer-un-Nissa Begum and others v. Mahboob Begum and others(') the question as to the binding character of two 'Firmans' dated February 24, 1949, and September 7, 19~9."}}, {"text": "Nizam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 241461, "end_char": 241466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court in that case observed (at p. 359) ;-\n\n\"The 'Firmans' were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were binding in the same way as any othr Jaw;-nay, they would override all other Jaws which were in conflict with them."}}, {"text": "December 30. 1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 243109, "end_char": 243126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of Hyderabad\n\nv. Akram Ali(') the effect of a 'Firman' issued by the Nizam on December 30."}}, {"text": "Akram Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 243389, "end_char": 243398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court in that cae held that the right of Akram Ali who claimed to be hereditary Sajjad Nashin and Mutwa/li was subject to the order of the Nizam which had been passed before the Hyderabad State merged with the Union of India and the applicant having no rights it could\n\n(I) A.I.II..\n\n19S6 S.C. 60.", "canonical_name": "Akram Ali"}}, {"text": "Akram Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 243950, "end_char": 243959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect of the 'Firman' was to deprive the respondent Akram Ali and all other claimants of all rights to ipossession pending enquiry into the case.", "canonical_name": "Akram Ali"}}, {"text": "Sajjad Nashin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 244180, "end_char": 244193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from the observations made in that judgment that the only decision of the Court was that by tht\n\n'Firman' the rights of the Sajjad Nashin and Mutwa/li was."}}, {"text": "Gwalior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 244626, "end_char": 244633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Madhorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat(') the true character of certain 'Kalambandis' issued by the Rulers of Gwalior fell to be determined."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 244944, "end_char": 244966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the formation of the State of Madhya Bharat under the Constitution, the Government of that State by an executive order terminated the right of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Promod Chandra Deb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 246472, "end_char": 246490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Promod Chandra Deb's case(') the true character of certain 'Khor Posh' grants granted by the Rulers of Talcher, Bamra and Kalahandi fell to be determined, in a group of petitions for enforcement of fundamental rights.", "canonical_name": "Promod Chandra Dab"}}, {"text": "Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 246812, "end_char": 246845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Regulations of Talcher of 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 247864, "end_char": 247894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Talcher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 248225, "end_char": 248232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J., delivering the majority judgment of the Court obser- 'l'ed (at p. 436):\n\n\"There is also no doubt that the grant made by the ruler of Talcher in favour of the petitioner\n\n(I) (t9•21 Suppl."}}, {"text": "State of <Ju/lltrll ....\n\nVora Fitldoa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 248294, "end_char": 248332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40S.\n\nState of <Ju/lltrll ....\n\nVora Fitldoa\n\nShah I."}}, {"text": "Yoru Fi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 248364, "end_char": 248371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yoru Fi, J, Wi\n\nSW I.\n\ncontinued to be effective until the Merger."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 248785, "end_char": 248800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the laws of Talcher, the petitioner had been enjoying his Khorposh rights until th• cash grant, as it became converted in 1943-44 as aforesaid, was stopped by the State of Orissa, in April, 1949.\""}}, {"text": "Udaipur Darbar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 249424, "end_char": 249438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Sta:e of Rajasthan and others(') the 'Firman' issued by the Udaipur Darbar in 1934 relating to the administration of the temple of Sharnath ji at Natbdwara, which was expressly declared to be a public temple, and governing the devolution of the right to the managoment of the temple, and certain.", "canonical_name": "Udaipur Darbar"}}, {"text": "Natbdwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 249510, "end_char": 249519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Sta:e of Rajasthan and others(') the 'Firman' issued by the Udaipur Darbar in 1934 relating to the administration of the temple of Sharnath ji at Natbdwara, which was expressly declared to be a public temple, and governing the devolution of the right to the managoment of the temple, and certain."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 249809, "end_char": 249816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the first clause it was declared that according to the law of Udaipur the shrine of Shrinathji had always been and waa a religious institution for the followers of the Vaishnava Sampradaya and that all the property immovable and mov able dedicated, offered or presented to or otherwise coming to the deity Shrinathji had always been and was the property of the shrine and that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the tim• being was merely the custodian manager and trustee of tho said property for the shrine.", "canonical_name": "Udaipur Darbar"}}, {"text": "Shrinathji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 249831, "end_char": 249841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the first clause it was declared that according to the law of Udaipur the shrine of Shrinathji had always been and waa a religious institution for the followers of the Vaishnava Sampradaya and that all the property immovable and mov able dedicated, offered or presented to or otherwise coming to the deity Shrinathji had always been and was the property of the shrine and that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the tim• being was merely the custodian manager and trustee of tho said property for the shrine."}}, {"text": "Vaishnava Sampradaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 249915, "end_char": 249935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the first clause it was declared that according to the law of Udaipur the shrine of Shrinathji had always been and waa a religious institution for the followers of the Vaishnava Sampradaya and that all the property immovable and mov able dedicated, offered or presented to or otherwise coming to the deity Shrinathji had always been and was the property of the shrine and that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the tim• being was merely the custodian manager and trustee of tho said property for the shrine."}}, {"text": "Tilkayat Maharaj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 250128, "end_char": 250144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the first clause it was declared that according to the law of Udaipur the shrine of Shrinathji had always been and waa a religious institution for the followers of the Vaishnava Sampradaya and that all the property immovable and mov able dedicated, offered or presented to or otherwise coming to the deity Shrinathji had always been and was the property of the shrine and that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the tim• being was merely the custodian manager and trustee of tho said property for the shrine."}}, {"text": "Damodarlalji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 250818, "end_char": 250830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "third clause provided for measures to be taken by the Ruler 1964 for management of the shrine during the minority of the Stat• of Gut- Tilkayat Maharaj and by the last clause it was provided that Vora vFld\"41i in accordance with the law of Udaipur the Maharana had declared Shri Damodarlalji-the then Tilkayat Maharajunfit to occupy the Gaddi and had approved of the succession of Goswami Govindlalji to the Gaddi of Tilkayat Maharaj."}}, {"text": "Goswami Govindlalji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 250920, "end_char": 250939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "third clause provided for measures to be taken by the Ruler 1964 for management of the shrine during the minority of the Stat• of Gut- Tilkayat Maharaj and by the last clause it was provided that Vora vFld\"41i in accordance with the law of Udaipur the Maharana had declared Shri Damodarlalji-the then Tilkayat Maharajunfit to occupy the Gaddi and had approved of the succession of Goswami Govindlalji to the Gaddi of Tilkayat Maharaj."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 251507, "end_char": 251514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its operation was\n\nnet e.thausted by its enforcement during the regime of the Maharana of Udaipur."}}, {"text": "Madhorao Phalke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 251755, "end_char": 251770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that in that case in paragraph-32 it was observed , after referring to Madhorao Phalke's case('), Ameer-un-Nissa Begum's case( 2 ) and the Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad's case( 3 ):\n\n\"In the case of an absolute Ruler ii ke the Maharana of Udaipur it is difficult to make any distinction between an executive order issued by him or a legislative command issued by him.", "canonical_name": "Madhorao Phalke"}}, {"text": "Ameer-un-Nissa Begum", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 251782, "end_char": 251802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that in that case in paragraph-32 it was observed , after referring to Madhorao Phalke's case('), Ameer-un-Nissa Begum's case( 2 ) and the Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad's case( 3 ):\n\n\"In the case of an absolute Ruler ii ke the Maharana of Udaipur it is difficult to make any distinction between an executive order issued by him or a legislative command issued by him.", "canonical_name": "Ameer-un-Nissa Begum"}}, {"text": "Government of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 251847, "end_char": 251870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that in that case in paragraph-32 it was observed , after referring to Madhorao Phalke's case('), Ameer-un-Nissa Begum's case( 2 ) and the Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad's case( 3 ):\n\n\"In the case of an absolute Ruler ii ke the Maharana of Udaipur it is difficult to make any distinction between an executive order issued by him or a legislative command issued by him."}}, {"text": "s1111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 252802, "end_char": 252807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jodhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 253783, "end_char": 253790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1n Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and Others(') the question whether an agreement between the Ruler of Jodhpur and a limited Company whereby the Ruler agreed to exempt or remit certain duties or royalties and to hold the Company not liable to pay taxes and further gave an assurance to the Company to amend the laws so as to make them consistent with the agreement was not regarded as \"Jaw\" within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 254093, "end_char": 254101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajnandgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 255334, "end_char": 255345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is yet another judgment of this Court in The Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh and Others(') in which also the question whether an agreement between the Ruler of Rajnandgaon and M/s. Shaw Wallace and Company in connection with the setting up of a textile factory on certain concessional terms in the matter of imposition of octtoi duties on imported goods fell to be determined."}}, {"text": "Shaw Wallace and Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 255355, "end_char": 255379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is yet another judgment of this Court in The Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh and Others(') in which also the question whether an agreement between the Ruler of Rajnandgaon and M/s. Shaw Wallace and Company in connection with the setting up of a textile factory on certain concessional terms in the matter of imposition of octtoi duties on imported goods fell to be determined."}}, {"text": "cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256901, "end_char": 256906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Yofll Fidiall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 257100, "end_char": 257113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yofll Fidiall\n\nSW J,\n\nStal• of G•iarat\n\nY\"\"' FldJa/I\n\n.... ,, J.\n\nconduct of the grantees and merely purported to convey the rights which till then were vested in the Ruler."}}, {"text": "s. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257386, "end_char": 257395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 257403, "end_char": 257432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257437, "end_char": 257444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257687, "end_char": 257698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 257710, "end_char": 257739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Junagadh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 258658, "end_char": 258666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As held by this Court in State of Saurashtra v. Jamailar Mohamad Abdulla and others(') orders passed by the Administrator of the State of Junagadh appointed on behalf of the Government of India (which had assumed charge of the administration of the State after the Nawab of Junagadh fled the country) on various dates between November 9, 194 7 and January 20, 1949, cancelling grants in favour of certain persons in whose favour the grants had previously been made by the Nawab of Junagadh were not liable to be challenged in suits filed by the grantees in the Civil Courts of the Dominion, on the plea that the porperties had been taken away without the authority of Jaw."}}, {"text": "November 9, 194 7 and January 20, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 258846, "end_char": 258884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As held by this Court in State of Saurashtra v. Jamailar Mohamad Abdulla and others(') orders passed by the Administrator of the State of Junagadh appointed on behalf of the Government of India (which had assumed charge of the administration of the State after the Nawab of Junagadh fled the country) on various dates between November 9, 194 7 and January 20, 1949, cancelling grants in favour of certain persons in whose favour the grants had previously been made by the Nawab of Junagadh were not liable to be challenged in suits filed by the grantees in the Civil Courts of the Dominion, on the plea that the porperties had been taken away without the authority of Jaw."}}, {"text": "1962] 3 S.C.R. 970", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 259429, "end_char": 259447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jagannath Agarwalla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 260134, "end_char": 260153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of this Court in Jagannath Agarwalla's case(2 ) pointedly illustrates this principle."}}, {"text": "State of Mayurbhanj", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 260208, "end_char": 260227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Mayurbhanj merged with the Province of Orissa on January 1, 1949, but an order dated June 28, 1952, made by the Board of Revenue acting on behalf of the State of Orissa rejecting the claim made by a person who had entered into an agreement or arrangement with the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj in 1943 was held to be in the course of an act of State, the rejection of the claim being in pursuance of an order issued under s. 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 47 of 1947."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 260256, "end_char": 260262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Mayurbhanj merged with the Province of Orissa on January 1, 1949, but an order dated June 28, 1952, made by the Board of Revenue acting on behalf of the State of Orissa rejecting the claim made by a person who had entered into an agreement or arrangement with the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj in 1943 was held to be in the course of an act of State, the rejection of the claim being in pursuance of an order issued under s. 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 47 of 1947."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 260266, "end_char": 260281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Mayurbhanj merged with the Province of Orissa on January 1, 1949, but an order dated June 28, 1952, made by the Board of Revenue acting on behalf of the State of Orissa rejecting the claim made by a person who had entered into an agreement or arrangement with the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj in 1943 was held to be in the course of an act of State, the rejection of the claim being in pursuance of an order issued under s. 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 47 of 1947."}}, {"text": "June 28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 260302, "end_char": 260315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Mayurbhanj merged with the Province of Orissa on January 1, 1949, but an order dated June 28, 1952, made by the Board of Revenue acting on behalf of the State of Orissa rejecting the claim made by a person who had entered into an agreement or arrangement with the Maharaja of Mayurbhanj in 1943 was held to be in the course of an act of State, the rejection of the claim being in pursuance of an order issued under s. 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 47 of 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260632, "end_char": 260636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 261643, "end_char": 261653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1962) 1 S.C.R. 205", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 261821, "end_char": 261840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 261877, "end_char": 261882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vora Fiddall\n\nShali J.\n\n."}}, {"text": "If therefore the respondents had under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 264025, "end_char": 264097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264500, "end_char": 264504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "If therefore the respondents had under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "If therefore the respondents had under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264577, "end_char": 264584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "If therefore the respondents had under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "If therefore the respondents had under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 264784, "end_char": 264791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "If therefore the respondents had under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "If therefore the respondents had under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Ce tlie promulgation of the Constitution grants which had been made by the previous Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 264864, "end_char": 264952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union of Vindhya Praqesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 265291, "end_char": 265315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The States originally merged with the Union of Vindhya Praqesh, and !"}}, {"text": "Vindlcya Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 265325, "end_char": 265352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Vindlcya Pradesh Government confirmed the grants in December 1948, But the Union of the States of Vindhya Prcle.,"}}, {"text": "Union of the States of Vindhya Prcle", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 265400, "end_char": 265436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Vindlcya Pradesh Government confirmed the grants in December 1948, But the Union of the States of Vindhya Prcle.,"}}, {"text": "January 23,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 265793, "end_char": 265810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The States which formed the Vindhya Pradesh were transformed into a Chief Commissioner's Province on January 23,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 265915, "end_char": 265955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grants of the fol!I' villages made in favour of the petitioners were revoked in August 1952 by the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh to which State those villages being enclaves within its territory wer~ transferred."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 266103, "end_char": 266110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 266247, "end_char": 266255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "25th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 266954, "end_char": 266975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I•\n\n1'64\n\nStat• of Gujarat\n\n\"· fl OTO Plddali\n\nShah J.\n\nthe sovereign the fact remained that they were neither resumed by the former Rulers nor confiscated by the Dominion of India as an act of State and upto the 25th of January, 1950, the right and title of the grantees to continue in possession was good and was not interfered with."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 267364, "end_char": 267386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court accordingly held that the Constitution by the authority derived from and conferred by the people of India; destroyed all vestige of arbitrary and despotic power in the territories of India and over its citizens and lands and prohibited just such acts of arbitrary power as the State of Uttar Pradesh in that case was seeking to uphold."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 267585, "end_char": 267606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 268427, "end_char": 268445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no warrant for holding at the stroke of mid-night of the 25th January, 1950, all our preexisting political institutions ceased to exist, and in the next moment arose a new set of institutions completely unrelated to the past."}}, {"text": "25th of January.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 269265, "end_char": 269281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For reasons already stated it is impossible to hold that what were mere claims to property till the 25th of January."}}, {"text": "January 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 269567, "end_char": 269583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing in the Constitution which transformed the claims which till January 25, 1950, had not been recognized into property rights so as to prevent all further exercise of the act of State, and extinguish the powers of the Union to refuse to recognize the claims."}}, {"text": "Charkhari", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 269844, "end_char": 269853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order passed in August 1952 revoking the grants by the Rulers of Sarila and Charkhari was in my view in substance an act of State.", "canonical_name": "Charkhari"}}, {"text": "State was seeking to refuse to recognize the claims made by the grantees from the former Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 269993, "end_char": 270086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "RAGHUB,\\R DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 270439, "end_char": 270454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U\n\nSltalt /.\n\nRAGHUB,\\R DAYAL J.-1 agree with the views expressed Raghubar D•1\"' I. by my learned brother Ayyangar J., on all the points except in regard to the Tharao dated March 12, 1948, being law.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUB,\\R DAYAL"}}, {"text": "Raghubar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 270491, "end_char": 270499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U\n\nSltalt /.\n\nRAGHUB,\\R DAYAL J.-1 agree with the views expressed Raghubar D•1\"' I. by my learned brother Ayyangar J., on all the points except in regard to the Tharao dated March 12, 1948, being law.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUB,\\R DAYAL"}}, {"text": "MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 270746, "end_char": 270755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUDHOLKAR J.-This Bench has been constituted for Mudlwlktu J. considering whether the reasoning underlying the decision of this Court in Virendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(') that the inhabitants of the Indian States brought with them, after the merger of those States in the Dominion of India pursuant to agreements entered into by the Rulers of those\n\nI 0 l\\9~SJ I S.C.R. 41S.\n\n JH4 .", "canonical_name": "Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "Mudlwlktu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 270795, "end_char": 270804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUDHOLKAR J.-This Bench has been constituted for Mudlwlktu J. considering whether the reasoning underlying the decision of this Court in Virendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(') that the inhabitants of the Indian States brought with them, after the merger of those States in the Dominion of India pursuant to agreements entered into by the Rulers of those\n\nI 0 l\\9~SJ I S.C.R. 41S.\n\n JH4 ."}}, {"text": "States in the Dominion of India pursuant to agreements entered into by the Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 271018, "end_char": 271097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Flildali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 271355, "end_char": 271363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Flildali my brother Ayyangar J., in his judgment and I am generally MWliolUr I. in agreement with what he has said."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 272223, "end_char": 272231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This State, along with other ruling States in India, became an independent sovereign State in the year 1947 when the Dominions o{ India and Pakistan were constituted."}}, {"text": "Government of the Province of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 273828, "end_char": 273864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of the Province of Bombay through the officers of ils Forest Department did not !"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 274289, "end_char": 274310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 276802, "end_char": 276808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 276816, "end_char": 276845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 276941, "end_char": 276948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "for the first time that is an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 278683, "end_char": 278716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "St.ii. of Gujarat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 279815, "end_char": 279832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St.ii."}}, {"text": "Vora FiddaU\n\nMuJholkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 279838, "end_char": 279860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Gujarat ...\n\nVora FiddaU\n\nMuJholkar I.\n\n19~\n\nS/lll, of GMjarat\n\nYora fiddali\n\nM1ulliolkor J.\n\nsovereign in the courts of that sovereign unless they ha\\e been recognized by the sovereign."}}, {"text": "M1ulliolkor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 279903, "end_char": 279914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Gujarat ...\n\nVora FiddaU\n\nMuJholkar I.\n\n19~\n\nS/lll, of GMjarat\n\nYora fiddali\n\nM1ulliolkor J.\n\nsovereign in the courts of that sovereign unless they ha\\e been recognized by the sovereign."}}, {"text": "A yyan gar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 280530, "end_char": 280540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the argument thait the Government has waived its right to withold recognition, I agree with all that has been said by my brother A yyan gar J.\n\nIndeed, if the inhabitants of a ceded territory have ceased to have a right against the new sovereign there is nothing for the sovereign to waive.", "canonical_name": "A.Y_yangar"}}, {"text": "Art. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280927, "end_char": 280935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Republic of India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 281496, "end_char": 281513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument that .there can be no Act of State against its citizens is based upon the supposition that , the rights claimed by the J agirdars from their former Ruler would be available to them against the new sovereign unless they were repudiated and that here, as the resolution of the Government of Bombay dated February 6, 1953 stating that Jagirdars' rights have already been re:iudiated amounts to an Act of State against persons who had long before this date become the citizens of the Republic of India it was incompetent."}}, {"text": "Asrar Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 282737, "end_char": 282748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now as to the argument that this Court should discard the view taken by the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Kamchee Boye Sahiba('); Secretary of State for India v. Bai Rafbai( 2 ); Vajesinghii v. Secretary of State for India('); Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustom Khan(') and Asrar Ahmed's case(') and adopt the view taken by Chief Justice Marshall in Percheman's case(\")."}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284374, "end_char": 284378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285217, "end_char": 285225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Wesley L.\n\nGould", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 286682, "end_char": 286698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 43 I, and Wesley L.\n\nGould-An introduction to International Lan pp."}}, {"text": "Vora Fidddl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 289133, "end_char": 289144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Gulanll-\n\n'f.\n\nVora Fidddl\n\nM11dolkar J.\n\n196~\n\n..,_of Guiarat\n\n....\n\nYGrw Fiddali\n\nlliidlw!kar I\n\nrecognised by the British Government.", "canonical_name": "Vora Fiddall State"}}, {"text": "M11dolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 289146, "end_char": 289155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Gulanll-\n\n'f.\n\nVora Fidddl\n\nM11dolkar J.\n\n196~\n\n..,_of Guiarat\n\n....\n\nYGrw Fiddali\n\nlliidlw!kar I\n\nrecognised by the British Government."}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 289634, "end_char": 289640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 289648, "end_char": 289677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 289682, "end_char": 289689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "lamadar Mohamad Abdulla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 289803, "end_char": 289826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 of the Constitution is concerned I \\VOuld reiterate the •iew which my brother Sarkar J. and myself have taken in lamadar Mohamad Abdulla's case( 2 ) and Promod Chandra Deb's case(') which is the s.!!Jtle as that expressed by my brother Ayyangar J., and with which my brother Hidayatullah J., has agreed. ,,", "canonical_name": "Jamadar Mohamad Abdullah"}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 290046, "end_char": 290052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Adverting to a similar argument advanced by Mr.\n\nPathak in the former case we quoted the following passage from the judgment of Venkatarama Aiyar I., in Dalmia ."}}, {"text": "Dalmia . Dadri Cement Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 290150, "end_char": 290174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Adverting to a similar argument advanced by Mr.\n\nPathak in the former case we quoted the following passage from the judgment of Venkatarama Aiyar I., in Dalmia ."}}, {"text": "lJai Rajbai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 290487, "end_char": 290498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and a passage from the judgment in lJai Rajbai's case(•), and then observed :\n\n\"Any right to property which in its very nature is not legally enforcable was clearly incap.1ble of being protected by that section.\" (", "canonical_name": "lJai Rajbai"}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 290704, "end_char": 290710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 290722, "end_char": 290751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 290818, "end_char": 290824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Madhorao Pha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 292078, "end_char": 292090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agreed with the view taken by my brother Hidayatullah J., and brother Shah J., that it is not a law and that the decision in Madhorao Pha/ke's case(') does not justify the conclusion that it is 'law'.", "canonical_name": "Madhorao Phalke"}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 292358, "end_char": 292363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ORDER\n\nSINHA C.J .-In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeals are allowed with costs throughout-one set of hearing fees.", "canonical_name": "Sinha C."}}, {"text": "State of Gu1arot", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 292535, "end_char": 292551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Gu1arot\n\n•• V ura Fidrla~1\n\n.\\fudholka1", "canonical_name": "State of Saurashtra"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_594_622_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nINDO-CffiNA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. LID.\n\nJASJIT SINGH, ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF\n\nCUSTOMS & ORS. (P. B. GAJBNDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)\n\nSea Customs-Prohibitr\"on of entry of certain types of ships in India-\n\nSection\n\nS2A when applicable-Whether mens rea necessary- Nature of liability under s. 167(12A)--Section 167(12A) and s. 183-Petition under Art. 136 when competent-When is a body or authority a Court-Whether the Central Board of Revenue or Central Government a Tribunal under Art. 136---Whether penalty of Rs. 25 lacs excessive-Whether s. 52A ultra vires Arts. 14, 19 and 31 (I) and hence invalid-Constitution of India, Art. 13ea Customs Act, 1878, ss. 52A, 167(12A), 183, 188, 190A and 191.\n\nThe appellant carries on the business of carriage of goods and passengers by sea and own• a fleet of ships for that purpose. One of its ships named Eastern Saga arrived at Calcutta and was rummaged by the Calcutta Customs Officers. In the sailors' accommodation, a hole measuring 2i\"X5t\" was found in the wall panelling behind the back batton of a wooden seat which had been screwed to the wall. The bole was covered with a piece of wood and over-painted. The hole opened into a space and in that space, Customs Officers found 1,4S8 bars of gold valued at more than Rs. 23 lacs. Notices were duly served and after hearing the parties, the AJditional Collector of Customs came to the conclusion that the vessel had rendered itself liable to confiscation under s. !67(12A) because it had infringed the provisions of s. S2A.\n\nHe ordered the confiscation of the ship but gave the owners thereof an option to pay a fine of Rs. 25 lacs in lieu of confiscation. The appellant went in appeal to the Central Board of Revenue but that appeal was rejected. The appellant went in revision to the Central Government but the revision petition was also dismissed.\n\nThe appellant then came to this Court for special leave and obtained the same.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHeld: (i) The Custom• authorities were right in holding that the facts proved in the case showed that the \"Eastern Saga\" nor contravened the provisions of s. 52A when it entered the port of Calcutta and hence had incurred the liability prescribed by s. !67(12A) of the Sea Customs Act.\n\n(ii) The fine of Rs. 25 13cs was not excessive.\n\nIDegal importation of gold had assumed the proportions of a major problem facing the country and it was open to the Customs authorities to take the view that the best way to check smuggling was to impose deterrent fines whenever those offences were discovered and proved.\n\n(iii) Section 52A was not ultra vires Arts. 14, 19 and 31(1) and beace was not unconstitutional or invalid.\n\nThe appellant was not only\n\na company but also a foreign company and as such was not entitled to 1964 claim the benefits of Art. 19. The plea under Art. 31(!) as well as -.- under s. 14 could not be sustained for the simple reason that in support lndoN Ch!~ 1 Steam ing the said two pleas, the appellant had inevitably to fall back upon \"\"'~~ on the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19( I )(fl.\n\nJtujit Sing~\n\nBefore an appeal can be entertained under Art. 136, two conditions have to be satisfied. The order impugned must be an order of a judicial or quasijuOicial character and should not be purely an administrative or evecutive order. The sid order should have been passed either by a Court or Tribunal in the territory of India. It is difficult to lay down any definite test to determine whether a body is a court/tribunal or not. Sometimes, courts enquire whether that body or authority is clothed with the trappings of a court. whether it can compel witnesses to appear before it and administer oath to them, whether it was required to follow certain rules of procedure, whether it was bound to comply with the rules of natural justice whether it was etpected to tieal with the matters before it fairly, justly and on merits and. not be guided by subjective considerations and whether it was required to adopt judicial or quasi-judicial approach.\n\nIf all or some of the important tests are satisfied the proceeding\"S can be characterised as judicial proceedings and the test of \"trappings\" is satisfied. Likewise, if it appears that such a body or authority has been constitute'd by the legislature and on it has been conferred the inherent judicial power of the State, that is significant, if not a decisive indication. that the said body or authority is a Tribunal.\n\nThe scheme of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the nature of the prc:>- ceeding brought before the appellate and revisional authorities, the extent of the clain1 involved, the nature of the penalties imposed and the kind of enquiry which the Act contemplates, all indicate that both the Central Board of Revenue and the Central Government, while acting as appellate or revisional authorities, constitute Tribunals under Art. 136 of the Constitution because they are invested with the judicial power of the State and are required to act judicially.\n\nIn order to prove the offence of s. 52A agaj1181 a vessel, what is to be moved is that there has been a construction. adaptation, alteration of fitting and the said construction, adaptation, alteration or fitting had been made for the purpose of concealing goods. The section prohibits absolutely the entry of vessels which show that there has been construe tion, adaptafon, alteration or fitting made in them for the purpose of concealing goods in them.\n\nIt is not necessary for the purpose of s. S2A to prove mens rea against the person responsible for the contravention of s. 52A. It is impossible to prove such mens rea or guilty mind.\n\nThe knowledge of the owners or even of the masters is entirely irrelevant.\n\nSection 167(12A) and s. 183 have to be read together. Though confiscation is a statutory corollary of the contravention of s. 52A, s. 183 expressly require1' the adjudicating officer to give an option to the owners of the offending vessel to pay fine in lieu of confiscation. Confiscation is\n\n1964 no doubt authorised and required by s. 167( 12A) but the statutory\n\n1 tJd Ch-.-S obligation ,.makes it necessary for the officer to give an option to the 0Navi':iioeam owner. The result is that the ultimate penalty which can be imposed\n\n•· on the owners falls to be determined by the adjudicating officer in his Ja.s; it Singh discretion.\n\nShewpujanrai lndrasanrai Ltd. v. Collector of Customs [1959] S.C.R. 821, F. N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, [1957]\n\nS.C.R. 1151, Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, District .Tail, Amritsar and\n\nAnr., [1958] S.C.R. 822, Thomas Dana v. State of P1111jab, [1959] Supp.\n\n(4) S.C.R. 274, Maqboo/ Hussain v. Stare of Bombay, [1953] S.C.R. 730, Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala and Ors.,\n\n[1962] 2 S.C.R. 339, Shivii Nathubhai v. Union of India, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 115, Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. Lakshmi Chand, [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 242, Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. [1963] Supp.\n\nI s.C.R. 625, Ravula Hariprasada Rao v. The State, [1951] S.C.R. 322, Brend v. Wood, (1946) 110 J.P. 317 and Sherra.s v. De Rutzen, (1895) I Q.B. 918, referred to.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 770 of 1962.\n\nAppeal by special leave from order No. 17 42 of 1960 of the Government of India Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) dated December 17, 1960 in Custom Revision Application No. 1631 of 1959 and/or from the order dated May 12, 1959 of the Central Board of Revenue in Customs Appeal No. 151 of 1959 and\n\nPetition No. 138 of 1961\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nSachin Chaudhury, B. Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 770/62) and the petitioner (in petition No. 138/1961).\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in C.A. No. 770/62 and petition No. 138 of 1961).\n\nFebruary 3, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n. GoJindragadkar GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J .-This appeal by special leave C. l. raises a short question about the true scope and effect of section 52A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (No. 8 of 1878)\n\n61S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REJ:'ORTS 597\n\n(hereinafter called 'the Act').\n\nThe appellant, the Indo- 1964 China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., which carries on the Indo c;;;;;;; s .. am business of carriage of goods and passengers by sea, owns Navigation a fleet of ships, and has been carrying on its business for Jasi{ Singh over 80 years. One of the routes plied by its ships is the Calcutta-Japan-Calcutta route.\n\nAn order has been passed Gajendragadkar by the Customs Authorities confiscating the appellant's motor vessel \"Eastern Saga\" under section 167(12A) of the Act, and giving the appellant the option under s. 183 of paying a fine of Rs. 25 lakhs in lieu of confiscation. The appellant contends that this order has been based upon a misconstruction of the provisions of s. 52A.\n\nThe vessel \"Eastern Saga\" has 6,631 gross registered tons, and 4,441 net registered tons. It has an overall length of 475'-2-l/2\" a breadth of 59'-3\" and a summer draft of 24'-7\". It carries a crew of 14 officers and 56 seamen. It appears that the vessel has 119 separate rooms, including 34 crews' cabins, 8 passengers' cabins, a sailor's mess, a fireman's mess, a comprador's office, a hospital, a boys' mess, a ship's office, an engineer's office, a saloon, lounge, pantry, chart-room, radio officer's cabin, captain's cabin, wheel house, alleyways, and stairways. It is clear that the vessel is a well equipped big vessel. It has also domestic refrigeration compartments which are lined by insulated walls.\n\nAll crew accommodation in the vessel has been insulated as required by statutory regulations.\n\nSuch insula• tion consists of a sheathing or panelling of fibre board or similar material tacked to wooden frames inserted between the stiffeners jutting out from the steel bulkheads or walls of the said vessel, in consequence of which hollow spaces are left between the panelling and the walls of the vessel.\n\nThe said panelling or sheathing formed a removable feature or furnishing of the said vessel.\n\nThe 'Eastern Saga' arrived at Calcutta from the Far East on October 29, 1957. In the course of its ordinary voyage, as a cargo vessel carrying a legitimate cargo of 24,815 packages of general merchandise weighing 1,506 tons, it was rummaged by Calcutta Customs Officers on the\n\n30th aud 31st October and on the 12th November, 1957.\n\nC.I.\n\n1~ On search being made of the vessel's domestic refrigeration tndo c;;;;; Sttam compartments, a two-tier white painted shelf was found Navigation fixed to the insulated wall of the handling room.\n\nThe ltuJit•Singh screws which seemed like holding the shelf to the wall, in fact, did not do so they had been hammered flat and could Gai•ndragadkar not be turned by a screw driver; the shelf was held by some\n\nC.J. wooden plugs which had been hidden below a coat of paint; below the shelf, there was a hole in the panelling closed with a plug; this hole gave access to the insulation space of the compartment; it was of the size 7\"X4-l/2\". Nothing was found hidden in that space.\n\nA cabin on the forecastle of the vessel was then searched and two rectangular openings in the cabin wall panelling were discovered behind a steel clothes locker which was screwed to the wall. One of these was closed with a wooden cover.\n\nThey measured S\"X 13\" and 5\"X5\" respectively.\n\nNothing was found hidden in either of these two spaces.\n\nThe cabin marked \"Compradores\" was also searched, and when a wooden bench which was screwed to the wall panelling was removed, two rectangular holes were found in the panelling behind the bench.\n\nThese holes which were covered with wooden plugs and overpainted, measured 5\"X4-l/2\" and 8\"X2-l/2\". Nothing was found in these spaces either. The cabin of No. 1 Fitter was then searched and two rectanglllar holes were found in the visible part of the wall panelling which had been filled in and overpainted; they were. respectively 7-1/2\"Xl0-1/2\" and 12\"X 12\" in size.\n\nNothing was found hidden in these spaces. That took the searching party to the sailors' accommodation where a hole measuring 2-1/2\"X5-1/2\" was found in the wall panelling behind the back batten of a wooden seat which had been screwed to the wall.\n\nThis hole was covered with a piece of wood and over painted.\n\nThe hole opened into a space and in that space, the Customs Officers found a large quantity of gold in bars.\n\nFurther search in the sailors' accommodation led to the discovery of a hole in the wall panelling behind a steel clothes locker which was closed with a wooden plug. Nothing was found in it.\n\nThat is how a search was made by the customs ol!lcers on Easteni Saga and in one of the holes a large quantity of gold in bars was dilCOVercd.\n\nOn November 12, 1957, notices were served on the 1964 owners' Agents at Calcutta, M / s. Jardine Henderson 11nd Inda c;;;;;; s1 .. m Co. Ltd., and on the master of the vessel, Captain Kiunear, respectively to show cause why the vessel should not be confiscated under s. 167(12A) since it had contravened s. 52A of the Act and penal action should not be taken against the agents and the master in that behalf. On the same day, a notice in similar terms was issued to Kwok Cho, a member of the crew of the Eastern Saga who had <ome forward to claim the gold which was discovered as a result of the search. On November 13, 1957, a further notice to show cause was served on the master in regard to another hole which had been discovered after the issue of the first notice.\n\nThe agents and the master thereupon sent elaborate replies setting forth their pleas that, in law, no action could be taken against them.\n\nThe master pleaded that he had no knowledge of the presence of gold or unauthorised_ holes in the ship and had taken all reasonable precautions in accordance with the Company's instructions.\n\nHe fully adopted the other pleas made by the agents.\n\nThe agents substantially relied on a report by M/s. Norman Stewart and Co., Marine Surveyors, Naval Architects and Consulting Engineers, and urged tbat unless special, extensive, time-consuming and uneconomic detailed searches were carried out, it was impossible to discover special hiding places like the ones discovered on the search made by the customs authorities.\n\nThey also urged that they had no knowledge about the holes or about the gold which was discovered from one of them. They referred to the statement made by Kwok Cho and alleged that the said statement showed that gold could be smuggled by a smuggler without the knowledge of the master and the owners of the ship.\n\nThe ship moves on High-seas from place to place during the course of business, and it was impossible that the master, though in the ship, would know anything about the criminal activities of a smuggler carried on in nooks and comers of the ship, and it was inconceivable that the owners of the ship would ever know what was happening on the ship during its travel on the High-seas. They also relied on the fact that they had taken all the precautions which could be taken reasonably and had issued express and definite instructions\n\nNavigation\n\nv ]Ol/il Sinrh\n\nGa/endragadkar\n\nC.1.\n\n1964 to their crew against committing any offence like smuggling.\n\nIr.do China Steam On receiving the replies sent by t)le agents, the master, Navigation and Kwok Cho, the Additional Collector of Customs heard ...\n\nJasiit Singh the appellant, and on November 23, 1957, he passed the\n\nGajendragadkar impugned order. He held that having carefully considered c.1. the written explanations tendered and oral arguments urged before him, he was satisfied that the preventive measures taken by the owners, the agents, and the master proved to be hopelessly inadequate and ineffective. He accepted their plea that they need not be regarded as persons concerned in the illegal importation of gold into India within the meaning of s. 167 ( 8) of the Act. He also upheld their plea that the openings found in the cabin of No. 1 Fitter did not attract the provisions of s. 167 (12A). In regard to other matters, the explanations offered appeared to him to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable. His conclusion, therefore, was that the vessel had clearly rendered itself liable to confiscation under s. 167(12A) because it had infringed the provisions of s. 52A. The quantity of gold found on the vessel was approximately of the value of Rs. 23,79,490/80 nP. ® Rs. 109 /24 nP. per to/a, and he noticed the fact that this was the recovery made in one of the several cavities found on the ship.\n\nHe was, therefore, inclined to infer several holes discovered in the vessel indicating the extent to which the hiding places were used for contravening s. 52A. That is why he confiscated 1,358 gold bars discovered as a result of the search absolutely under s. 167 ( 8) read with s. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. He also imposed a personal penalty of Rs. 10,000 on the sailor Kwok Cho.\n\nIn regard to the ship, he directed that Eastern Saga be confiscated under s. 167(12A) and in lieu thereof, he gave the owners of the ship an option to pay a fine of Rs. 25 lacs which he directed should be paid within 30 days of the date of the despatch of the order, or such extended time as may be allowed. In passing this order, the Additional Collector observed that he had taken into consideration the fact that the agents had already suffered some loss due to the vessel's detention at the port.\n\nThe appellant then preferred an appeal before the Central Board of Revenue.\n\nThe Board considered the matter and came to the conclusion that none of the contentions\n\nrafsed by the appellant was either warranted or supported 1964 by the law as it stands.\n\nThe Board expressed its concur- Indo China Steam rence with the conclusions of the Additional Collector that NaviRation the offence under s. 52A of the Act had been proved, and Jasgir Singh the appellant was liable to be dealt with under s. 167(12A) of the Act. In regard to the grievance made by the appel- Gajendragadkar\n\nC. I. !ant that the fine imposed by way of option was excessive, the Board observed that having regard to the quantity and value of the smuggled gold and other relevant facts, it was not inclined to make any change in the said order.\n\nThe penalty imposed on the master, s\"aid the Board, was also not so large as to need any revision. It is not disputed that the value of the ship is very much more than the amount of Rs. 25 lacs imposed by way of fine under s. 183. This order was pronounced on May 12, 1959. The appellant's attempt to move the Government of India in its revisional jurisdication failed and its application was dismissed on December 20, 1960. The appellant then moved this Court for special leave and it is with the special leave granted by this Court that the present appeal has come before us.\n\nAt the hearing of this appeal, the learned Additional Solicitor-General has urged a preliminary objection. He contends that none of the Customs Authorities which had dealt with the appellant's case is a tribunal under Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution, and so, the appeal preferred by the appellant is incompetent.\n\nIt is true that special leave has been granted to the appellant by this Court, but there can be little doubt that even in cases where special leave has been granted at the ex parte hearing of the matter on the petition of the appellant for special leave, the respondent can at the final hearing, raise a preliminary contention that special leave should not have been granted, since the decision, judgment, or order appealed against, has not been pronounced either by a Court or Tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136(1). The Additional Solicitor-General argues that neither the Customs Collector, nor the Central Board of Revenue, nor the Central Government is a Tribunal, and so, special leave granted to the appellant should\n\n1:>e revoked on that ground.\n\nIt is settled by decisions of this Court that the Customs Officer who initially acts under s. 167(12A) is not a Court\n\n1964 or Tribunal, though it is also settled that in adjudicating lndo China Steam upon the question as to whether s. 52A has been contraven- Navigation ed by any ship and by such contravention the said ship has Ja,,;{s; ngh made itself liable to nfiscation under s. 167(12A), the Customs Officer has to act in a quasi-J\"udicial manner. In Gajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nShewpujanrai Indrasanarai Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Other11(') this Court has held that an order of confiscation or penalty passed under the Sea Customs Act is not a mere administrative or executive act, but is really a quasi-judicial act, and, therefore, an application for a writ of certiorari lies in respect of such order under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nIn expressing this conclusion, S. K. Das J. who 1poke for the Court, has referred to two earlier decisions where this point had been considered and it was held that in holding his proceedings under the Sea Customs Act, the Collector acts judicially, vide F. N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta,( 2 ) and Leo Roy Frey v. The Superintendent, District Jail, Amritsar and Anr.(').\n\nSimilarly, in Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab,(') this Court has observed that the Collector and other Officers in the hierarchy mentioned by the Sea Customs Aot may have to act judicially in the sense of having to consider evidence and. hear arguments in an informal way; even so, the Act does not contemplate that in doing so, the said authorities are functioning as a Court.\n\nIn Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay etc.,(') while dealing with .the impact of the confiscation of goods under the relevant provisions of s. 167 of the Act on the question as to the constitutionality of a subsequent prosecution launched against a person whose goods had been confiscated, this Court had occasion to consider the effect of the order of confiscation in relation to the provisions of Art. 20 of the Constitution, and it was held that the proceeding before the Sea Customs Authorities under the Act was not a prosecution and the order of confiscation was not a punishment inflicted by a Court or Judicial Tribunal within the meaning of Art. 20(2), and so, the impugned prose-\n\n(!) [1959) S.C.R. 821.\n\n(2) [1957] S.C.R. WH.\n\n(3) [1958) S.C.R. 822.\n\n(4) [1959) Supp. (I) S.C.R. 274.\n\n(5) [1953] s.c.R. 7'0. at p. 742.\n\ncution was not incompetent or invalid. It would thus be 1964 seen that one of the points which this Court had to consider lndo c;;;;;; Steam in that case was whether the Collector who had passed the Navigarion order of confiscation, was a Judicial Tribunal within the JasJ{singh meaning of Art. 20, and the answer rendered by this Court h · · h\" h\" Gajendragadkar was m t e negative. It 1s true that m g1V1ng t 1s answer t 1s\n\nc. J.\n\nCourt has observed that the Customs Officers are not required to act judicially on legal evidence tendered on oath and they are not authorised to administer oath to any witness.\n\nThe appeals, if any, lie before the Chief Customs Authority which is the Central Board of Revenue and the power of revision is given to the Central Government which certainly is not a judicial authority. It would be noticed that the last observation is purely in the nature of an obiter observation because the status of the Central Board of Revenue or the Central Government is dealing with the appeals or revision applications under section 190 and 191 of the Act did not fall to be considered in that case, was not argued, and naturally has not been examined; and so, this observation cannot be treated as a decision on the question which has been argued before us in the present appeal.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that it is no longer open to doubt that the Customs Officer is not a Court or Tribunal, though in adjudicating upon matters under s. 167 of the Act, he has to act in a judicial manner. It may be conceded that neither the Central Board of Revenue, nor the Central Government is a Court within the meaning of Art. 136.\n\nThe question which then arises is, can the Central Board of Revenue exercising its appellate power under s. 190 of the Act, or the Central Government exercising its revisional jurisdiction under s. 191, be held to be a Tribunal under Art. 1367 It is clear that before an appeal can be entertained in this Court under Art. 136, two conditions have to be satisfied; the order impugned must be an order of a judicial or quasi-judicial character and should not be purely an administrative or executive order; and the said order should have been passed either by a Court or a Tribunal in the territory of India. It is difficult to lay down any definite or precise test for determining the character of a body which is called upon to adjudicate upon matters brought before it.\n\nSometimes in deciding such a question, courts enquire\n\n1964 whether the body or authority whose siatus or character is /ndo China Steam the subject-matter of the enquiry, is clothed with the trap- Navigation pings of a court. Can it compel witnesses to appear before Ja.•ii;''singil it and administer oath to them, is it required to follow certain rules of procedure, is it bound to comply with the rules Gajendragadkar\n\nc. J. of natural justice, is it expected to deal with the matters before it fairly, justly and on the merits and not be guided by subjective considerations; in other words, is the approach which it is required to adopt judicial or quasi-judicial approach? If all or some of the important tests in that behalf are satisfied, the proceedings can be characterised as judicial proceedings and the test of trappings may be said to be satisfied. But apart from the test of trappings, another test of importance is whether the body or authority had been constituted by the State and the State has conferred on it its inherent judicial power. If it appears that such a body or authority has been constituted by the legislature and on it has been conferred the State's inherent judicial power, that would be a significant, if not a decisive, indication that the said body or authority is a Tribunal. It is in the light of these considerations that we have to examine the question as to whether the Central Board of Revenue and the Central Government is a Tribunal or not under Art. 136.\n\nBefore doing so, however, we may refer to some of the decisions which were cited at the Bar on this point.\n\nIn M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and Others(') the question raised before this Court was whether the Central Government while exercising its powers under section 111 (3) of the Companies Act, 1956 (No. I of 1956) is a Tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136, or not. In dealing with this question, this Court first enquired whether, while exercising its powers under s. 111 of the Companies Act, the Central Government was required to act judicially or not. The scheme of s. 111 was then analysed and it was observed tht in an appeal preferred under s. 111, there was a /is or dispute between the contesting parties relating to their civil rights, and the Central Government was invested with the power to determine that dispute according to law. This dispute was in regard to the claim made by a transferee of a Company's shares to have\n\n\nhis transfer registered in the Company's register, and the 1964 view which this Court took was that when such a dispute lndo China Steam goes before the Central Government under s. 111, it has to Naviation consider and decide the proposal and the objections in the Jasiit., Sin.; h light of the evidence, and not on grounds of policy or expediency. That is why this Court came to the conclusion that Gajendragadkar th C\n\nc. J. e entral Government was a Tribunal under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nIn support of the view taken on this point, this Court referred to an earlier decision in Shivji Nathubhai v. The\n\nUnion of India and Ors., (1) where it was held that the Central Government exercising power of review under r. 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 against an administrative order of the State Government granting a mining lease was subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, because the power to review was judicial and not administrative. Thus, these, two decisions. show how the character of the adjudication made by the Central Government either under s. 111 (3) of the Companies Act, or under r. 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, was determined by this Court.\n\nAs illustrations of cases where the application of the said tests leads to the conclusion that certain authorities cannot be held to be tribunals, we may refer to the decisions of this Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut\n\nv. Lakshmi Chand and Ors.(2) and Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and Anr. v. Hind Cycles Ltd.( 3 ). It is in the light of these decisions that we will proceed to consider whether the Central Board of Revenue and the Central Government can be said to be a Tribunal under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\n- In considering this matter, let us briefly examine the procedure prescribed by the Act in relation to the adjudications made under its provisions. Before we do so, however, we ought to refer to the authorities that function under the Act. Section 3 of the Act refers inter a/ia, to three authorities which function under it. The Chief Customs Authority is the Central Board of Revenue constituted under the Central Board of Revenue Act, 1924. The Chief Customs Officer is the Chief Executive Officer of Sea-customs for any\n\n(1) [1960] 2 S C.R. 775.\n\n(2) [1963] Supp. l S.C.R. 242.\n\n(3) (1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 625.\n\n1964 port to which the Act applies; and the Customs Collector lndo China Steam includes every officer of Customs for the time being in Navigation separate charge of a custom-house, or duly authorised t<i • perform all, or any special duties of an officer so in charge.\n\nGajendragadkar It is by reference to these three categories of officers that the\n\nc. J. procedure prescribed by the Act has to be considered.\n\nChapter XVII of the Act deals with the procedure relating to offences, appeals, etc.\n\nSection 169 confers on the Customs Officers power to search on reasonable suspicion. Section 170A confers power on the Customs Officer to screen or X-ray bodies of persons for detecting secreted goods. Section 171 prescribes the powers of Customs Officer for boarding and searching such vessels.\n\nSection 171-A lays down the powers of Officers of Customs to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents. The power to summon a person to give evidence would include the power to administer oath to him under s. 4 of Act I of 1873. An enquiry held by the Officer of Customs under s. 17 lA is by sub-section (4) of s. 171-A deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nUnder s. 183, the officer adjudging the matter brought before him under s. 167 of the Act is empowered to give an option to a oerson to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation.\n\nHaving thus broadly referred to the provisions rdating to adjudication by the Customs Officer, we would now examine the provisions in regard to appeals and revisions made by the Act. Section 18 8 provides for an appeal against any decision or order passed by any officer of Customs, and it requires that the said appeal must be filed within three months from the date of the orde\"t or decision challenged.\n\nThis appeal lies to the Chief Customs Authority, or in such cases as the Central Government directs, to any Officer of Customs not inferior in rank to a Customs Collector and empowered in that behalf by name or in virtue of his office by the Central Government.\n\nThe section further provides that the appellate authority may make such enquiry and pass such order as it thinks fit, confirming, altering or annulling the decision or order under appeal.\n\nThe proviso to this section makes it clear that no order passed in appeal can impose upon the person any greater confiscation, penalty or\n\nrate of duty than has been adjudged against him in the 1964 original decision or order.\n\nThe section adds that every Inda ch;;;; Steam order passed in appeal shall be final, subject to the power Navigation of revision conferred by s. 191. It is thus clear that the JasiitvSingh orders passed by the Officers of Customs are made appealbl d Gajendragadkar a e, an the appellate authority is required to reconsider\n\nc. J. the matter, hold additional enquiry if thought necessary and decide the contentions raised by the appellant on the merits.\n\nSection 189 refers to the requirement of the deposit of duty demanded which has to be made by the appellant pending the appeal, and it naturally provides that if as a result of the decision of the appeal, the whole or any portion of tlie amount deposited is not leviable, the Customs Collector shall return such amount or portion, as the case may be, to the owner of such goods on demand by such owner.\n\nSection 190 confers upon the Chief Customs Authority the power to remit penalty or confiscation. Section l 90A deals with the revisional powers of the Chief Customs Authority and the Chief Customs Officer; and s. 191 prescribes for the revisional powers of the Central Government.\n\nBoth the revisional powers specified bys. 190A ands. 191 can be exercised either suo motu by the revisional authority, or on an application made by an aggrieved party in that behalf. That, briefly, is the scheme of appeals and revisions contemplated by the Act. There is a regular hierarchy of authorities beginning with the Customs Officer who deals with the problems of adjudication initially and ending with the Central Government which is the final revisional authority. We may also incidentally refer to Rule 49 of the Rules framed by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred on it by s. 9 ( c) of the Aot. This Rule provides that every appeal presented to the Chief Customs Authority under s. 18 8 and every application made to the Governor- General-in-Council under s. 191 shall be accompanied by a copy of the decision or order by which the appellant or the applicant is aggrieved. The question which we are considering at this stage is whether the appellate authority acting under s. 188 and the revisional authorities acting under sections l 90A and 191 can be said to be tribunals within the meaning of Art. 136.\n\n1964 It is thus clear that after the order of confiscation is /ndo China Steam made under s. 167 (12A) and an option is given to the\n\nNaviation ?wner of the offending ship under s. 183, the inifial proceedlwditvSinh ings taken 'under the Act come to an end and a stage is Gajendragadkar reached for making an appeal against the order of confiscac. 1 tion or the imposition of fine.\n\nIn the present appeal, we are concerned with the subsequent stage of the proceedings, because what we have to decide on the preliminary objection raised by the Additional Solicitor-General is the status or character of the appellate authority or the Central Government which exercises its revisional jurisdiction. In our opinion, having regard to the scheme of the sections which we have just cited, there is no difficulty in holding that the Central Board of Revenue which functions as an appellate authority, and the Central Government which exercises revisional powers are both Tribunals within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution. A dispute is raised either by way of appeal or revision by the party aggrieved by the order passed by the Customs Officers, and that dispute has to be tried by the appellate or the revisional authority in the light of the facts adduced in the proceedings and according to law.\n\nAll the proceedings under the. Act, whether before the Customs Officer, or whether in appeal or revision, have to be conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and they are in that sense judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The fact that the status of the Customs Officer who adjudicates under s. 167(12A) ands. 183 of the Act is not that of a tribunal, does not make any difference when we reach the stage of appeal or revision.\n\nA period of limitation is prescribed for the appeal, a procedure is prescribed by Rule 49 that the appeal or revision must be accompanied by a copy of the decision or order complained against, and the obvious scheme is that both the appellate and the revisional authorities must consider the matter judicially on the evidence and determine it in accordance with law. It is obvious that heavy fines are imposed in these proceedings and the confiscation orders passed may affect ships of very large value. By his appeal or revisional application the ship-owner naturally contends that the order of confiscation is improper or invalid and he sometimes urges that the fine imposed is unreasonable and excessive. Where disputes of this character are raised before the appellate or\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR rs 609\n\nthe revisional authority, it would be difficult to accede to ~964 the argument that the authority which deals with these dis llldo Chiu s1111111 putes in its appellate or revisional jurisdiction is not a tribu- N••igatw11 nal under Art. 136.\n\nThese' authorilies are constituted by 1u;;;'s11fg/11 the legislature and they are empowered to deal with the disputes brought before them by aggrieved persons. Thus. the ™1\"1J.1':\"\"\" scheme of the Act, the nature of tne proceedings 11rouht\n\nbefore the appellate and the revisional authonues. the extent of the claim involved, the nature of tne oenames 1mnosed and the kind of enquiry which the Act contemplates, all indicate that both the appellate and the revisional authorities acting under the relevant provisions of the Act constitute Tribunals under Art. 136 of thr- Constitution, because they are invested with the judicial power of the State, and are required to act judicially. Therefore, we must over-rule the preliminary objection raised by the Additional Solicitor- General and iproceed to deal with the appeal on the merits.\n\nThat takes us to the principal question as to the c0nstruction of s. 52A of the Act which has been elaborately argued before us by Mr. Sachin Choudhury. Section 52A provides that no vessel constructed, adapted, altered, or fitted for the purpose of concealing goods shall enter, or be within the limits of any port in India, or the Indian customs waters.\n\nThis section is the only section included in Chapter VIA and it was inserted by Act 10 of 1957. The plain construction of this section appears to be that whenever a ship answering the description contained in its first part enters or is within the limits of any port in India, or the Indian customs waters, it contravenes the prohibition prescribed by it. The prohibition is against the construction, adaptation, alteration or fitting for the purpose of concealing goods.\n\nWhat has to be proved against a vessel which is charged with having contravened s. 52A is that there has been a construction, adaptation, alteration or fitting, and that the said construction, adaptation, alteration or fitting has been made for the purpose of concealing goods.\n\nTherefore, if an alteration in a vessel made for the purpose of concealing goods is proved, the contravention of s. 52A must be inferred.\n\nIn other words, the section prohibits absolutely the entry of vessels which show that there has been any\n\nIM-159 S.C.-!9.\n\n610 SUPREME, rou~T .REPORTS\n\n!P~ .construction, adapta, tion, alteration or fitting made in them \"'4o. chi;\" t•om for the purpose qf concealin_g goods.\n\nJlt1Pltotion !qRIJ''sinth Mr. Choudhury contends that the contravention. of s. 52A -' - cannot be established _unless IJJens. rea is proved against\n\n~\"(!_oj:iir the persons responsible J'or the iilleged contravention.\n\nIn that connection he has ri:lieQ, on the fact that the sectio, n ma)ces no difference between conceafed goods, which are .not .ontraband and those ' which are. c0ntraband. in oih~_r woras. the argument is that if , an alteration is proved to .have been made for the purpose of concealing goods which .11.re legitimately carried by the v<;_ssel, eyn so the contravention would attract the provisions of s. 167(!2A) of the Act:\n\nThat being so if the sweep of the prohjbition prescribed by s. 52A is so-wide,-it--is pecessary to import the requirement .of mrns rea in deterdijning. 'its. cqpi:.' He has also relied ou\n\nthe well-rec, ognised principle of criminal' jurisprude9ce that unless a statute creating an offence and providing for its punishment clearly, or by necessary lmplication, rules out_~ __ mens rea as aii essel).tial part of the offence, no person should be found guilty of the said offerice unless his guilty miiid is proved, There is no doubt that in Ravula Hariprasada. /?.ao v,. The State(')', this Courl speaking through Faz! Ali/., bl!S accepteg the 'ollser.vations ,1)1.ade by the Lord Chief 1ustice of England in Brend v. Wood(') that \"it is of the\n\nutmost importance fdr the protection of the liberty of the subject that a Court should al)>; ays bear' in mind fuat uni~ the statute, either clearly or by necessary implication, rul~ out mens rea as a constitu'ent part of a , crime, a defendan~ shoµ)d not b~ found guilty of an offence against the .:riminal il!w uiiless he has , g'ot a guilty mind\". ( 1ide also :; herras v. f>e J?.utzen ( 8 ).\n\nIt may also be conceded that offences in respect of which m, ens rea is not required to be established, are usuaily oJ a comparatively minor cliaracter and sentences impo, se4 11gainst the 'offenders are, therefore, not of a sverp typ!',; and in the present case, it cannot be disputed tj:iat the coµfiscation of th!' ship may mean a serious los5 to the OF/JI~\n\n(I) [1951) S.G.R. 322.\n\nCi)'(-1946) 110 J.P. 317, 318.\n\n(3) (1895) I Q.B. 918, 921.\n\nbf the ship, or imposing a fine against him by way of giving 1164 • him option in lieu of the confiscation of his ship 1.11ay also '\"\"\" cM;; sinvolve the payment of a very large amount; and so,-prima Ntni~ facie, there is some force in Mr. Cboudhary's argument that l...Ji;'\"Slsa& the 'element of mens rea should not be excluded in considering the scope and effect of s. 52A of the Act Go/8n4cragad/ra\n\n. I.\n\nOn the other band, the scheme of s. l67 supports the contention of the Additional SolicitorG1<neral that if \\ve reads. 52A along witli s. 167(1'ZA), it would be clear that the legislature intends, 'by necessary implication, the exclusion of mens rea in dealing with \"the contrav_c;.ntiori of ~· 52A: Section 167(12A) provides that if a vessel .constructed. adapted, altered or fitted for the purpose of concealing goods under s. 52A, enters or is within t_he limits of .any porr in India or within the Indian Customs waters such vessel sliall be liable to confiscation and the master of such vessel -shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding Rs. 1,000.\n\nIt would be noticed thatin column 1, s. 167(12A) reproduces the material words of s. S2A and does not add the words \"knowingly or wilfully\".\n\nIt is significant .that the words. \"knowingly ur wilfully\" are used in several other provisions contained in: s. 167. Section 16704) and s. 167\n\n(61) use the word \"wilfully\" in .respect of the commission of the offences there specified.\n\nSimilarly s. 167(3) and s. 167(81) use'the word \"knowingly\" and s. 1.67(78) uses the word \"intentionally\".\n\nSimilarly, ih s. 167(8), though the words \"knowingly or wilfully\" l!re,.not used, we have the expression \"concerned in\", and that may introduce considerations .of mens rea. Thus. where the' legislature wanted to inttoduce the knowledge or intention actuating the commission of the offence as an essential element of the offence, it has used appropriate words to indicate that intention.\n\nThe failure to use a similar word in s. 167(12A) .cannot, therefore, be regarded as accidental, but must be held to be deliberate. In our opinion, there. is some force in this argument as well.\n\nBesides, tl).ere can be po doubt that in cbnstruing a section, it would be relc; vant for the Court to consider whether. the construction for which1Mr. Chouahary contends would not make the provisions of s. S2i\\ read with s. 167 (12A) substantially nugatory: If it appears that the adoption\n\nlPH of the said construction would substantially defeat the very \"\"° c;;;;;; St•am purpose and intention of the legislature in enacting the said\n\nNavigation section, that would be a legitimate reason for rejecting the 1 .. 1;,''s; n11t said construction. U the words used in s. 52A are capable of only one construction and no other, and that construction O./indragadkar\n\nt;, 1. is the one suggested by Mr. Choudhary, the fact that by adopting the said construction the section would be rendered nugatory, would not be of any material significance. If, on the other hand, two constructions are reasonably possible one of which leads to the anomaly just indicated, while the other does not and helps the effectuation of the intention of the legislature, it would be the duty of the Court to accept the. latter construction.\n\nThe intention of the legislature in providing for the prohibition prescribed by s. 52A is, inter alia. to put an end to illegal smuggling which has the effect of disturbing very rudely the national economy of the country. It is wellk:nown, for example, that smuggling of gold has become a serious problem in this country and operations of smuggling are conducted by operators who work on an international basis. The persons who actually carry out the physical part of smuggling gold by one means or another are generally no more than agents and presumably, behind them stands a well-knit organisation which, for motives of profit making, undertakes this activity. That is why s. 52A makes an absolute prohibition against the entry of a vessel which contains, inter alia any alteration made for the purpose of concealing goods. Entry of contraband gold with the help of ships has thus become a serious problem and is intended to be checked by this absolute prohibition. If it was held that the knowledge of the owners of the offending vessel or of its master should be proved before s. 52A is held to be contravened, in a majority of cases, the offending vessels will escape punishment. It is not difficult to imagine that mens rea or guilty mind could rarely be established against the owners of vessels which are travelling on the High-seas and it may not be always easy to prove the guilty knowledge even of the master of the ship. If the guilty mind is made an essential constituent of the section, it would be very easy both for the owners and the master of the ship to plead that the alleged alteration, adaptation or fitting was made without their knowledge and even contrary to their instructions.\n\nJ'6f It is not difficult to realise in this connection that it would lndo c;;;; stbe almost impossible for the customs authorities to establish Navi1atio11 mens rea in the manner suggested by the appellant. Section 1..;; rsingll 52A refers to the construction for the purpose of concealing Ga/tndragadktr goods, but it is obvious that no vessel would ordinarily be\n\nc. J. constructed initially for the purpose of concealing goods.\n\nLike the adaptation, alteration or fitting, the construction also would be made in such a manner as would not be easily detected or discovered. Therefore, it seems to us plain that if we are to accept the construction suggested by Mr.\n\nChoudhary, mens rea would rarely be proved against the owners of the vessel, or even its master and the section, in substance, would remain a dead letter on the statute.book.\n\nIn this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind that as the heading of the Chapter shows, what s. 52A aims at is the entry of the vessels and that, in fact, is the manner deliberately adopted by the legislature in prescribing the prohibition. It is the entry of the vessel that is prohibited and the use of the negative form adopted by the legislature in enacting s. 52A is intended to show that the prohibition is not concerned with the owner of the vessel or the master; the prohibition is concerned with the vessel itself and it provides that a vessel is prohibited from entering the limits of any port in India or the Indian Customs Waters. or romaining there, provided it answers the description mentioned in the iirst part of s. 52A.\n\nThe only safeguard which is legitimately available to the vessel in resisting the charge that it has contravened s. 52A is provided by the requirement that the alleged alteration, for instance, must be shown to have been initially made for the purpose of concealing goods. If the alteration is shown to serve any operational or functional purpose in the ship, that would clearly justify the plea that it was not made for the purpose of concealing goods. It may be that if the alleged alteration, adaptation or construction is proved to have been initially made for a functional or operational purpo; e, and it is shown that subsequently it has been used witho11t the knowledge of t!le master or the owners for the\n\nillegal purpose, that may raise a triable issue as to whether lltdo c;;;; Strt11tt the alteration falls within the description of s. 52A; but\n\nlflW;,.ttmi where thcalteration is not shown to serve any functional or i.11t'su.111 operational purpose and its very nature suggests that it was <hifruha6Wll/ulr intended to serve some secret purpose, it would be easy to\n\nc. 1. draw the inference that its purpose was to conceal goods.\n\nTherefore, in our opinion, there is no doubt that the Customs Authorities were right in holding that the mere fact that the owners of the vessel or the master were not shown to have been privy to the alteration etc. or the concealment of gold bars recovered from the offending ship would not take the case of appellant outside the purview of s.\n\n52A.\n\nThe knowledge of the owners, or even of the master is, in the context of s. 52A, entirely irrelevant. What is relevant is the proof of the fact that the vessel answering the description prescribed by s. 52A entered within the limits of Calcutta which is a port in India.\n\nMr. Choudhary further argued that the alteration on which the case against the appellant is based in the present case cannot be said to be an alteration contemplated by s. 52A. because it is not an alteration of the vessel.\n\nHe suggests that the construction, adaptation. alteration or fitting must be of the vessel as a wh,.le, or, at any rate, of any part of the vessel which can be regarded as its integral or essential part; the panelling wall in which the apertures were made, cannot be treated as a part of the vessel, and so, the alteration in question cannot be said to attract s. 52A.\n\nThat, in substance, is another argument which has been pressed before u~ on behalf of the appellant. In support of this argument, Mr. Choudhary referred us to the certificate issued by Mr. B. Hill who is a Surveyor to Lloyds Register of Shipping united with the British Corporation Regfr•er.\n\nIn this certificate Mr. Hill purports to say that in his opinion the panelling and lining constitute no part of the vessel & the expression \"vessel\" is understood for the purpose of its being assigned the notation 100 AI or any other class notation in the Register Book of Lloyds Register of Shipping or for the purpose of the issue\" of a Loadline Certificate under the Merchant Shipping Acts and that such panelling or lining is not required to be shown in the ship's official\n\nplans submitted to Lloyds Register of Shipping in connection with the above purposes.\n\nHe adds that such panelling is 11146 c;;;;; siil/M cpstomarily installed in British Vessels for the health and Navlta/f(nj comfort of crew as a methoo of insulating accommodation. l11Ji/lts1nt/I\n\nWe are not prepared to accept Mr. Choudhary's argument that there is any material on the record to show that the panelling is not a part of the vessel. A vessel is defined by s. 3 ( f) of the Act as including anything made for the conveyance by water of human beings or prnperty; and there seems to be no reason to hold that the panelling is not its integral part. Mr. Hill who has purported to give this certificate has not given evidence in the present proceedings and the statements made by him in his certificate have, therefore. not been tested. Besides, his opinion that the panelling does not form part of the vessel as understood for the two purposes mentioned by him in his certificate cannot assist us\n\nin determining whether it can be held to be a part of the vessel under s. 52A. For whatever purpose panelling may be constructed, once it is constructed it becomes a part of the vessel and as such, any alteration made in the panelling would attract the provisions of s. 52A. We must therefore, reject Mr. Choudhary\"s argument 1hat even if an alterat10n\n\nis proved to have been made in the panels of the vessel, s. 52A could not be applied.\n\nThe contention which Mr.\n\nChoudhary faintly urged before us, that the holes made in the panelling walls do not constitute an alteration at all is, clearly ill-founded, because the manner in which the holes were made and the use which was obviously intended to be made of the said holes, leave no doubt that they constitute alteration within the meaning of s. 52A. Thus, our on clusion is that the Customs Authorities were right in holding that the facts proved in the case showed that the appellant's vessel Eastern Saga contravened the provisions of s. 52A when it entered the port of Calcutta and as such, incurred !!ability prescribed by s. 197 ( 12A) of the Act.\n\nWhat is the nature of the liability prescribed by s. 167 'l2A) is the next question which calls for an answer in the present appeal.\n\nWe have already seen that s. 16702A) llf<>Vides that if a vesoel contravenes s. 52A, it shall be liable\n\nG'aflldraRlf<(IM\n\nc. J.\n\n1964 to confiscation and the master of such vessel shall be liable . (ndo ci.;;;; St•om to a penalty not exceeding Rs. LOOO. Can it be said that\n\nN11Vigation the penalty prescribed by s. 167(12A) may in any given case 1'uptsint/I not be imposed against the ship on the ground that the contravention proved against it is of a very trivial haracter, or GaJ•ndragadk• has been the result of an act on the part of a criminal who .\n\nC, J. acted on his own contrary to the instructions of the master of the ship? The words used in the third column of cl. 12A are that \"such vessel shall be liable to confiscation\". The context seems to require that it is not open to the Customs Authority to refuse to confiscate the vessel on the ground that there are any extenuating circumstances surrounding the contravention of s. 52A in a given case and that it would be unfair to impose the penalty of confiscation. Two penalties are prescribed, one is the confiscation of the ship, and the other is a tine against the master. In regard to the latter penalty, it is within the discretion of the Customs Authority to decide what amount of penalty should be imposed; just as in the case of the first penalty it is not open to it to say that it would not impose the penalty of confiscation against the offending ship, so in the case of the second penalty it is not open to it to say that it will not levy any penalty against the master. In its discretion, it may impose a very small fine against the master if it is satisfied that the master was innocent and despite his best efforts, he could not prevent the contravention of s. 52A. If the two penalties prescribed by clause 12A had been alternative, the position may have been different; but they are independent penalties. one is against the ship and the other is against the master: and so, there is no scope for contending that the Customs Authority may refuse to impose one penalty and impose the other, or may refuse to impose either of the two prnalties.\n\nIt must be regarded as an elementary requirement of clause 12A that as soon as the offence referred to in column I of the said clause is proved, some penalty has to be imposed and cl. 12A indicates that two penalties have to be imposed and not one, there being discretion in regard to the penalty imposable against the master as regards the amount of tlie said penalty. Therefore. we do not think it would b~ ,?ossible\n\nto take the view that if there are extenuating circumstances attending tho contravention of 1. 52A in a given case the\n\nCustoms Authority can refrain from confiscating the vesse1. i964 Confiscation of the vessel is the immediate statutory conse- Indo Ch;,;;; Steam, quence of the finding that an offence under clause 12A is Navigation established, just as the imposition of some penalty against lasii:Singh the master is another statutory consequence of the same - contravention. In fairness, we ought to add that Mr. Ga/endc_g~kar Choudhary did not support the view which appears to have been taken by Sinha J. in the case taken before him under Art. 226 by the Everett Orient Line Incorporated (vi de W.P. No. 121/ 1959 and C.A. No. 374/1961 which have been heard along wi:h this appeal and will be dealt with separately). It an:iars !hat in that case Sinha J., held that there was discretion in the Customs Authority in the exercise of which it may, in a proper case refuse to confiscate the offending vessel. In our opinion, this view is not justified by the words of clause 12A of s. 167.\n\nBut the confiscation of the offending vessel under clause 12A is not the end of the matter. In dealing with the \"\"ence adjudicated under cl. 12A of s. 167. the Customs Officer has also to exercise his jurisdiction under s. 183 of the Act.\n\nIn fact, s. 167(12A) and s. 183 have to be read together ancl the adiudication proceedings have to be dealt with in the li3ht of the provisions of the said two sections.\n\nSection 18 3 lays down that whenever confiscation is authorised by this Act, the officer adjudicating it shall give the owner of the goods an option to pay in lieu of confiscation such fine as the officer >hinks fit. It is thus clear that in dealing with offences under s. 167(12A), an obligation is imposed upon the Customs Officer to give the owner of the goods an option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation. It is not disnuted, and rightly. that the word \"goods\" used in s. 183 includes vessels, and so. when the adjudicating officer was dealing wi h the present case, it was his duty to indicate the fine which the owners of the ship can, in their option, choose to pay. That is why the construction of clause 12A of s. 167 which leaves no discretion in the adjudicating officer in the matter of confiscating the ship, does not finally determine the ma'ter. . Though confiscation is a statutory corollarv of the contravention of s. 52A, the legislature realised that confiscation of the vesrel may cause unnecessary hardship to the owners of the vessel, and so s. 183 expressly\n\n1964 requires the adjudicating officer to give an option to tho\n\n.lrtdo China Steam owners of the offending vessel.\n\nConfiscation is no doubt Navigation authorised and required bys. 167(12A), but the statutory\n\n1111/i, V-Singh obligation makes it necessary for the officer to give an option to the owners, and so, in substance, the ultimate penalty Gajendragadkar which may be imposed on the owners does fall to be deter-\n\nC, /. mined in the discretion of the said officer.\n\nSection 183 confers discretion on the officer to determine what amount of fine should be imposed in lieu of confiscation, and in doing so, he will undoubtedly have to take into account all relevant and material circumstances, including the extenuating factors on which the owners may rely. Tb us, the confiscation of the offending vessel which has been taken out of the domain of the Customs Officer's discretion under clause 12A, is indirectly brought within his discretion under s. 183.\n\nIndeed, the scheme of s. 183 shows that the only penalty which in law, the officer can impose is one of confiscation.\n\nHaving done that, he gives an option to the owners of the vessel to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation. There is little doubt that this scheme has been adopted, because if the imposition of fine was made an alternative penalty, difficulties would have arisen in the way of recovering the fine; and so, the legis ature has provided that the offending ship should be detained; if the offence is proved, it should be confiscated and the owner of the vessel 5hould be given an option to get his vessel released by paying the fine which may be im; iosed on him under s. 183. The very fact that an option has to be given to the owner shows that the fine imposed under s. 18 3 is not a matter of penalty imposed by the officer as such, but is only an option given to the owner.\n\nTherefore, we are satisfied that on a fair reading of s. 167( 12A) ands. 183 of the Act, the course adopted by the Customs Authorities is not ov •.n to any challenge.\n\nMr. Choudhary then attempted to argue that on the merits, the Centra I Board of Revenue was in error in holding that s. 52A had been contravened by the appellant's vessel Eastern Saga.\n\nWe have already indicated in brief the findings recorded by the customs authorities. It is true that the Additional Collector of Customs accepted the plea of the appellant that the owners of the vessel were not concerned with the illegal importation of gold into India within the\n\n', meaning of s. 167 ( 8) of the Act; but he has also found that ----- 1951 the preventive measures taken by the owners, the agents and Indo chl;;; Steam, the master for stopping smuggling on board th, eir vessel Na•iga!Wn proved hop;; lessly in:idequate and ineffective. He has also.\n\nJasfitvSlngh examined the na!nre of the alterations made and -he has I d d h i, f <lajendragadkar cone u e ti at l'..e alterations were made for the purpose o\n\nc. 1. concealing goods. In fact, the presence of so many alterations on this vessel itself would justify the conclusion thal they were made for the illegal purpose prohibited by s .. 52A.\n\nBut when gold bars 1,358 in numbers were actually re-· covered from one of the holes made in the panelling wall, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the said alteration had been made for the purpose of concealing the said gold.\n\nIt is clear that the said alterations serve no operational or functional purpose in the ship and the manner in which the said alterations have been made unmistakably indicates the design for concealing goods. If the goods intended tO be concealed were not contraband,_ this elaborate designing of the alteration would be wholly unnecessary. Therefore, we see no substance in the argument that t):J.e Customs Authorities-were in error in finding that s. 52A had been contravened in the present case.\n\nBesides, there is no doubt that the question as to whether s. 52A had been contravened is sub- - stantially a question of fact and this Court would not ordinarily reconsider the matter on evidence with a view to decide whether the said finding is right or .not.\n\nMr. Choudhary has then argued that the imposition of a fine of Rs. 25 lacs is excessive and should be modified by us. He suggests that if such a heavy fine is imposed against a vessel, it may indirectly and eventually affect the trade of the country. Besides, he urges that the fine appears to be so unreasonable that it may be characterisedas vindicative.\n\nIncidentally, he has argued that in impoing the fine, the Additional Collector of Customs took into consideration an irrelevant fact inasmuch as he bore in mind the loss_ suffered by the a;:ipellant during the period that the vessel was detained. There is no difficulty in rejecting the last argument, because if the consideration in question was irrelevant, it has operated in favour of the appellant and not against it. If that consideration - had not weighed in the mind of the Additional Collector,\n\n1964' he would-obviously have imposed--ahigher fine. Then.\n\nIndo c;;;;;; si .. m as to the. extent of the fine, we are nbt prepared to hold\n\nN111i1atic11 that the fine is unreasonable or excessive. We have Jas/itsingh already noticed the value of the gold illegally imported and we have seen the presence of many suspicious alterations in- Gajendragadlar the panelling walls and other parts of the vessel. It is not c.1;. easy to detect the illegal importation of gold, and so, if the Customs Authorities took the view that having regard to the value of the gold imported, the presence of a large number of alterations and the value of the ship, Rs. 25 lacs should be imposed as a fine, we cannot entertain the argument that a case is made out for our interference under Art: 136 of the Constitution. After all, the imposition of the fine merely gives an option to the appellant to pay the fine and secure the release of the vessel. Since the amount of the fine imposed is very much less than the yalue of the vessel,. it is in the interests of the appellant to get the vessel released.\n\nBesides, the question as to the propriety of the fine imposed' by the Additional Collector of Customs has been examined by the appellate and the revisional authorities and they have ' seen no reason to interfere with the amount of fine. In such a case, the appellant cannot be heard to complain against the impugned order of fine in an appeal under Art. 136, when no question or principle of law is involved.\n\nIn this connection, we may mention one consideration which has weighed in our mind~ It is true. that modem criminology does not encourage the imposition of severe or savage sentences against criminals, because the deterrent or punitive aspect of punishment is no longer treated as a valid consideration in the administration 'of criminal law.\n\nBut\n\n- it -must be remembered that ordinary offences with which the normal criminal law of the country deals are committed by persons either under the pressure of provoked and unbalanced emotions; or as a result of adverse environments and circumstances, and so, while dealing with these criminals who, in many cases, deserve a sympathetic treatment and in a few cases, are more sinned against than sinners, criminal law treats punishment more as a reformative or corrective than as a deterrent or punitive measure. But it\n\nmay not be appropriate to adopt the s=e approach in deal-\n\nIng with every offence committed by a vessel which contra-\n\n19U venes s. 52A. Illegal importation of gold has assumed the lndo c;;;;;;; s1.,.,.. proportions of a major problem faced by the country, and Na¥igatlon the manifold, clever and ingenious devices adopted in carry- 1u;{s; ngh ing out these illegal operations tend to show that the organisation which is responsible for them is inspired merely by Galtn'JI.i~ cupidity because it conducts its operations solely for the purpose of making profit, and so, it would be open to the Customs Authorities to take the view that the best way to check the spread of these illegal operations is to impose deterrent fines whenever these offences are discovered and proved. Having regard to this aspect of the matter, if the Customs Authorities took the view that the fine of Rs. 25 lakhs was called for in the present case, we see no reason whatever to entertain the plea made by Mr. Choudbry that the said fine should be reduced.\n\nThe argument that the impact of such heavy fines may adversely affect the trade of the country, seems to us to be wholly misconceived and ill-founded.\n\nThere is one more point which must be mentioned before we part with this appeal. Mr. Choudhary attempted to argue that if mens rea was not regarded as an essential element of t. 52A, the said section would be ultra vires of Articles 14, 19 and 31 ( 1) and as such, unconstitutional and invalid.\n\nWe do not propose to consider the merits of this argument, because the appellant is not only a company, but also a foreign company, and as such, is not entitled to claim the benefits of Art. 19. It is only citizens of India who have been guaranteed the right to freedom enshrined in the said article.\n\nIf that is so, the plea under Art. 31 ( l) as well as under Art. 14 cannot be sustained for the simple reason that in supporting the said two pleas, inevitably the appellant has to fall back upon the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 ( 1) ( f).\n\nThe whole argument is that the appellant is deprived of its property by operation of the relevant provisions of the Act and these provisions are invalid. All that Art. 31 (1 ) provides is that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. As soon as this plea is raised, it is met by the obvious answer that the appellant has been deprived of its property by authority of the provisions\n\n1964 of the Act and that would be the end of the plea under Art. 1114 Ch_i\"\". s11- 31 ( 1) unless the appellant is able to ta1ce the further step\n\nNav':.\"'\"'\" f challenging the validity of the Act, and that necessarily IMiil Si1181t 1mports_Art. 19(l)(f). Similarly, when a plea is raised\n\nGpJ.,.dragadur under Art. 14, we face the same position.\n\nIt may be that c, J. if s. 52A contravenes Art. 19(1 )(f), a citizen of India may contend that his vessel cannot be confiscated even if it has contravened s. 52A, and in that sense, there would be inequality between the citizen and the foreigner, but that inequality is the necessary consequence of the basic fact that Art. 19 is confined to citizens of India, and so, tl:ie r; ilea that Art. 14 is contravened also must take in Art. 19 if it has to succeed.\n\nThe plain truth is that certain rights guaranteed to thr citizens of Ind!a under Art. 19 are not available to foreigners and pleas which may successfully be raised by the citizens on the strength of the said rights guaranteed under Art. 19 would, therefore, not be available to foreigners.\n\nThat being so, we see no substance in the argument that if s. 52A is construed against the appellant, it would be invalid, and so, the appellant would be able to resist the confiscation of its vessel under Art. 31 ( 1). W c ought to make it clear that we are expressing no opinion on the validity of s. 52A under Art. 19(l)(f). If the said question were to arise for our decision in any case, we would have to consider whether the provisions of s. 52A are not justified by Art. 19 ( 5). That Is a matter which is foreign to the rr.quiry in the present appeal.\n\nThe result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nThe appellant has also filed W.P. No. 138 of 1961 chai- Jenging the validity of the order passed by the Central Government in the same matter. Since the appeal preferred hJ the appellant against the said order is dismissed, the writ petition also fails and is dismissed.\n\nThere would be no order as to costs in the writ petition.\n\nAppeal and petition dismissed.", "total_entities": 282, "entities": [{"text": "INDO-CffiNA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. LID", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDO-CHINA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. LID", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JASJIT SINGH, ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF\n\nCUSTOMS & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JASJIT SINGH, ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOM & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 188, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 193, "end_char": 220, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S2A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 303, "end_char": 306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 377, "end_char": 388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390, "end_char": 406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 411, "end_char": 417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 433, "end_char": 441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 505, "end_char": 529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 when competent-When is a body or authority a Court-Whether the Central Board of Revenue or Central Government a Tribunal under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 569, "end_char": 577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 629, "end_char": 635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 648, "end_char": 667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 690, "end_char": 711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 713, "end_char": 720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 52A, 167(12A), 183, 188, 190A and 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 742, "end_char": 783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 958, "end_char": 966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of its ships named Eastern Saga arrived at Calcutta and was rummaged by the Calcutta Customs Officers."}}, {"text": "S2A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1603, "end_char": 1606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1870, "end_char": 1888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant went in revision to the Central Government but the revision petition was also dismissed."}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2195, "end_char": 2201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2313, "end_char": 2324, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2655, "end_char": 2666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2687, "end_char": 2709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2882, "end_char": 2889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2906, "end_char": 2916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2938, "end_char": 2943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3489, "end_char": 3494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sid order should have been passed either by a Court or Tribunal in the territory of India."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4571, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5819, "end_char": 5825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5921, "end_char": 5927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5929, "end_char": 5935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167( 12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 339", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6848, "end_char": 6867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 115", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6905, "end_char": 6924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7637, "end_char": 7644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7652, "end_char": 7673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sachin Chaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7718, "end_char": 7734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin Chaudhury, B. Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "Sachin Chaudhury"}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7736, "end_char": 7742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin Chaudhury, B. Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7747, "end_char": 7762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin Chaudhury, B. Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7851, "end_char": 7862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "D. R. Prem", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7894, "end_char": 7904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7909, "end_char": 7920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "GoJindragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8059, "end_char": 8073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GoJindragadkar GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J .-This appeal by special leave C. l. raises a short question about the true scope and effect of section 52A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (No."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8074, "end_char": 8088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GoJindragadkar GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J .-This appeal by special leave C. l. raises a short question about the true scope and effect of section 52A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (No.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8189, "end_char": 8200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8208, "end_char": 8229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jasi{ Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8554, "end_char": 8565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, the Indo- 1964 China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., which carries on the Indo c;;;;;;; s .. am business of carriage of goods and passengers by sea, owns Navigation a fleet of ships, and has been carrying on its business for Jasi{ Singh over 80 years.", "canonical_name": "Jasiit Singh"}}, {"text": "Japan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8634, "end_char": 8639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the routes plied by its ships is the Calcutta-Japan-Calcutta route."}}, {"text": "section 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8787, "end_char": 8803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8858, "end_char": 8864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9021, "end_char": 9027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "October 29, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10302, "end_char": 10318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 'Eastern Saga' arrived at Calcutta from the Far East on October 29, 1957."}}, {"text": "30th aud 31st October", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10520, "end_char": 10541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of its ordinary voyage, as a cargo vessel carrying a legitimate cargo of 24,815 packages of general merchandise weighing 1,506 tons, it was rummaged by Calcutta Customs Officers on the\n\n30th aud 31st October and on the 12th November, 1957."}}, {"text": "12th November, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10553, "end_char": 10572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of its ordinary voyage, as a cargo vessel carrying a legitimate cargo of 24,815 packages of general merchandise weighing 1,506 tons, it was rummaged by Calcutta Customs Officers on the\n\n30th aud 31st October and on the 12th November, 1957."}}, {"text": "Easteni Saga", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12836, "end_char": 12848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is how a search was made by the customs ol!lcers on Easteni Saga and in one of the holes a large quantity of gold in bars was dilCOVercd."}}, {"text": "November 12, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12926, "end_char": 12943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 12, 1957, notices were served on the 1964 owners' Agents at Calcutta, M / s. Jardine Henderson 11nd Inda c;;;;;; s1 .. m Co. Ltd., and on the master of the vessel, Captain Kiunear, respectively to show cause why the vessel should not be confiscated under s. 167(12A) since it had contravened s. 52A of the Act and penal action should not be taken against the agents and the master in that behalf."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13048, "end_char": 13050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kiunear", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13107, "end_char": 13114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 12, 1957, notices were served on the 1964 owners' Agents at Calcutta, M / s. Jardine Henderson 11nd Inda c;;;;;; s1 .. m Co. Ltd., and on the master of the vessel, Captain Kiunear, respectively to show cause why the vessel should not be confiscated under s. 167(12A) since it had contravened s. 52A of the Act and penal action should not be taken against the agents and the master in that behalf."}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13190, "end_char": 13201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13227, "end_char": 13233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kwok Cho", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13389, "end_char": 13397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same day, a notice in similar terms was issued to Kwok Cho, a member of the crew of the Eastern Saga who had <ome forward to claim the gold which was discovered as a result of the search."}}, {"text": "November 13, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13530, "end_char": 13547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 13, 1957, a further notice to show cause was served on the master in regard to another hole which had been discovered after the issue of the first notice."}}, {"text": "Norman Stewart and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14132, "end_char": 14154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agents substantially relied on a report by M/s. Norman Stewart and Co., Marine Surveyors, Naval Architects and Consulting Engineers, and urged tbat unless special, extensive, time-consuming and uneconomic detailed searches were carried out, it was impossible to discover special hiding places like the ones discovered on the search made by the customs authorities."}}, {"text": "Jasiit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15562, "end_char": 15574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ir.do China Steam On receiving the replies sent by t)le agents, the master, Navigation and Kwok Cho, the Additional Collector of Customs heard ...\n\nJasiit Singh the appellant, and on November 23, 1957, he passed the\n\nGajendragadkar impugned order.", "canonical_name": "Jasiit Singh"}}, {"text": "November 23, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15597, "end_char": 15614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ir.do China Steam On receiving the replies sent by t)le agents, the master, Navigation and Kwok Cho, the Additional Collector of Customs heard ...\n\nJasiit Singh the appellant, and on November 23, 1957, he passed the\n\nGajendragadkar impugned order."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15631, "end_char": 15645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ir.do China Steam On receiving the replies sent by t)le agents, the master, Navigation and Kwok Cho, the Additional Collector of Customs heard ...\n\nJasiit Singh the appellant, and on November 23, 1957, he passed the\n\nGajendragadkar impugned order.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16068, "end_char": 16074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16205, "end_char": 16211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16431, "end_char": 16442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16486, "end_char": 16492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16877, "end_char": 16883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16982, "end_char": 16988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17004, "end_char": 17010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17199, "end_char": 17210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indo China Steam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17914, "end_char": 17930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board expressed its concur- Indo China Steam rence with the conclusions of the Additional Collector that NaviRation the offence under s. 52A of the Act had been proved, and Jasgir Singh the appellant was liable to be dealt with under s. 167(12A) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18020, "end_char": 18026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jasgir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18059, "end_char": 18071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board expressed its concur- Indo China Steam rence with the conclusions of the Additional Collector that NaviRation the offence under s. 52A of the Act had been proved, and Jasgir Singh the appellant was liable to be dealt with under s. 167(12A) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Jasiit Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18120, "end_char": 18131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18190, "end_char": 18204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to the grievance made by the appel- Gajendragadkar\n\nC. I. !", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18664, "end_char": 18670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 12, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18701, "end_char": 18713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was pronounced on May 12, 1959."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18751, "end_char": 18770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's attempt to move the Government of India in its revisional jurisdication failed and its application was dismissed on December 20, 1960."}}, {"text": "December 20, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18847, "end_char": 18864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's attempt to move the Government of India in its revisional jurisdication failed and its application was dismissed on December 20, 1960."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19238, "end_char": 19246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19844, "end_char": 19855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20185, "end_char": 20196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20327, "end_char": 20333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20476, "end_char": 20487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20552, "end_char": 20566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Gajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nShewpujanrai Indrasanarai Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Other11(') this Court has held that an order of confiscation or penalty passed under the Sea Customs Act is not a mere administrative or executive act, but is really a quasi-judicial act, and, therefore, an application for a writ of certiorari lies in respect of such order under Art.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "Court has held that an order of confiscation or penalty passed under the Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20650, "end_char": 20738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20914, "end_char": 20922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court has held that an order of confiscation or penalty passed under the Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Court has held that an order of confiscation or penalty passed under the Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20976, "end_char": 20985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In expressing this conclusion, S. K. Das J. who 1poke for the Court, has referred to two earlier decisions where this point had been considered and it was held that in holding his proceedings under the Sea Customs Act, the Collector acts judicially, vide F. N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta,( 2 ) and Leo Roy Frey v. The Superintendent, District Jail, Amritsar and Anr.(')."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21151, "end_char": 21162, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21850, "end_char": 21856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22109, "end_char": 22116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22360, "end_char": 22370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22831, "end_char": 22838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 190 and 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23589, "end_char": 23608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24002, "end_char": 24008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24179, "end_char": 24187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24295, "end_char": 24301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24385, "end_char": 24391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 1367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24424, "end_char": 24433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24507, "end_char": 24515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26451, "end_char": 26459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26755, "end_char": 26766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26778, "end_char": 26797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26850, "end_char": 26858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26968, "end_char": 26974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26982, "end_char": 26995, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27073, "end_char": 27079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27151, "end_char": 27157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "China Steam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27566, "end_char": 27577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This dispute was in regard to the claim made by a transferee of a Company's shares to have\n\nhis transfer registered in the Company's register, and the 1964 view which this Court took was that when such a dispute lndo China Steam goes before the Central Government under s. 111, it has to Naviation consider and decide the proposal and the objections in the Jasiit.,"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27619, "end_char": 27625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27909, "end_char": 27917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28176, "end_char": 28206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28524, "end_char": 28530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28542, "end_char": 28555, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28579, "end_char": 28609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29134, "end_char": 29142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29406, "end_char": 29415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S C.R. 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29695, "end_char": 29714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30194, "end_char": 30217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30280, "end_char": 30291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 170A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30365, "end_char": 30377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30482, "end_char": 30493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30577, "end_char": 30588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30795, "end_char": 30799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30866, "end_char": 30871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 171", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30900, "end_char": 30906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "sections 193 and 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30966, "end_char": 30986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30994, "end_char": 31011, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31020, "end_char": 31026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31086, "end_char": 31092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XVII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter XVII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31370, "end_char": 31380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32416, "end_char": 32422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JasiitvSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32450, "end_char": 32462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is thus clear that the JasiitvSingh orders passed by the Officers of Customs are made appealbl d Gajendragadkar a e, an the appellate authority is required to reconsider\n\nc. J. the matter, hold additional enquiry if thought necessary and decide the contentions raised by the appellant on the merits.", "canonical_name": "Jasiit Singh"}}, {"text": "Section 189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32728, "end_char": 32739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33132, "end_char": 33143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33342, "end_char": 33348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34018, "end_char": 34022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34124, "end_char": 34129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34201, "end_char": 34207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34418, "end_char": 34424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34542, "end_char": 34550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34643, "end_char": 34649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34731, "end_char": 34737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35549, "end_char": 35557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36174, "end_char": 36185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1111111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37262, "end_char": 37270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37358, "end_char": 37366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37413, "end_char": 37416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37924, "end_char": 37932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38273, "end_char": 38279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sachin Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38342, "end_char": 38358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That takes us to the principal question as to the c0nstruction of s. 52A of the Act which has been elaborately argued before us by Mr. Sachin Choudhury.", "canonical_name": "Sachin Chaudhury"}}, {"text": "Section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38360, "end_char": 38371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39116, "end_char": 39122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39428, "end_char": 39434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Choudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39760, "end_char": 39769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "qRIJ''sinth Mr. Choudhury contends that the contravention.", "canonical_name": "Choudhary\"s"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39806, "end_char": 39812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(!2A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40352, "end_char": 40363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40437, "end_char": 40443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ravula Hariprasada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40917, "end_char": 40935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has also relied ou\n\nthe well-rec, ognised principle of criminal' jurisprude9ce that unless a statute creating an offence and providing for its punishment clearly, or by necessary lmplication, rules out~  mens rea as aii essel).tial part of the offence, no person should be found guilty of the said offerice unless his guilty miiid is proved, There is no doubt that in Ravula Hariprasada."}}, {"text": "Cboudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42206, "end_char": 42215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bf the ship, or imposing a fine against him by way of giving 1164 • him option in lieu of the confiscation of his ship 1.11ay also '\"\"\" cM;; sinvolve the payment of a very large amount; and so,-prima Ntni~ facie, there is some force in Mr. Cboudhary's argument that l...Ji;'\"Slsa& the 'element of mens rea should not be excluded in considering the scope and effect of s. 52A of the Act Go/8n4cragad/ra\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Choudhary\"s"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42334, "end_char": 42340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(1'ZA)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42510, "end_char": 42522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42675, "end_char": 42691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42801, "end_char": 42807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43067, "end_char": 43078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S2A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43115, "end_char": 43118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43282, "end_char": 43288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16704", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43290, "end_char": 43303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43309, "end_char": 43315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43420, "end_char": 43429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(81)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43434, "end_char": 43444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43474, "end_char": 43478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43532, "end_char": 43541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43943, "end_char": 43954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chouahary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44253, "end_char": 44262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chouahary contends would not make the provisions of s. S2i\\ read with s. 167 (12A) substantially nugatory: If it appears that the adoption\n\nlPH of the said construction would substantially defeat the very \"\"° c;;;;;; St•am purpose and intention of the legislature in enacting the said\n\nNavigation section, that would be a legitimate reason for rejecting the 1 .. 1;,''s; n11t said construction.", "canonical_name": "Choudhary\"s"}}, {"text": "S2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44308, "end_char": 44310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44323, "end_char": 44329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44668, "end_char": 44674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Choudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44799, "end_char": 44808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is the one suggested by Mr. Choudhary, the fact that by adopting the said construction the section would be rendered nugatory, would not be of any material significance.", "canonical_name": "Choudhary\"s"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45296, "end_char": 45302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45892, "end_char": 45898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46298, "end_char": 46304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47129, "end_char": 47138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47865, "end_char": 47871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48134, "end_char": 48140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48502, "end_char": 48508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48624, "end_char": 48630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49356, "end_char": 49362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49999, "end_char": 50006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50082, "end_char": 50088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50209, "end_char": 50215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50450, "end_char": 50456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50867, "end_char": 50873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Hill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51065, "end_char": 51072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this argument, Mr. Choudhary referred us to the certificate issued by Mr. B. Hill who is a Surveyor to Lloyds Register of Shipping united with the British Corporation Regfr•er."}}, {"text": "Lloyds Register of Shipping", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51094, "end_char": 51121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this argument, Mr. Choudhary referred us to the certificate issued by Mr. B. Hill who is a Surveyor to Lloyds Register of Shipping united with the British Corporation Regfr•er."}}, {"text": "Hill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51193, "end_char": 51197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this certificate Mr. Hill purports to say that in his opinion the panelling and lining constitute no part of the vessel & the expression \"vessel\" is understood for the purpose of its being assigned the notation 100 AI or any other class notation in the Register Book of Lloyds Register of Shipping or for the purpose of the issue\" of a Loadline Certificate under the Merchant Shipping Acts and that such panelling or lining is not required to be shown in the ship's official\n\nplans submitted to Lloyds Register of Shipping in connection with the above purposes."}}, {"text": "Loadline Certificate under the Merchant Shipping Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51508, "end_char": 51560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52106, "end_char": 52110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Loadline Certificate under the Merchant Shipping Act", "statute": "Loadline Certificate under the Merchant Shipping Act"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52715, "end_char": 52721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52911, "end_char": 52917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Choudhary\"s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52949, "end_char": 52960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, his opinion that the panelling does not form part of the vessel as understood for the two purposes mentioned by him in his certificate cannot assist us\n\nin determining whether it can be held to be a part of the vessel under s. 52A. For whatever purpose panelling may be constructed, once it is constructed it becomes a part of the vessel and as such, any alteration made in the panelling would attract the provisions of s. 52A. We must therefore, reject Mr. Choudhary\"s argument 1hat even if an alterat10n\n\nis proved to have been made in the panels of the vessel, s. 52A could not be applied.", "canonical_name": "Choudhary\"s"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53055, "end_char": 53061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53441, "end_char": 53447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53636, "end_char": 53642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53726, "end_char": 53732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53803, "end_char": 53809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16702A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53913, "end_char": 53922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53964, "end_char": 53970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54201, "end_char": 54212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54562, "end_char": 54569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54827, "end_char": 54833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55625, "end_char": 55631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55668, "end_char": 55678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56065, "end_char": 56075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56193, "end_char": 56200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56743, "end_char": 56753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ga/endc_g~kar Choudhary", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56951, "end_char": 56974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fairness, we ought to add that Mr. Ga/endc_g~kar Choudhary did not support the view which appears to have been taken by Sinha J. in the case taken before him under Art."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57036, "end_char": 57041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fairness, we ought to add that Mr. Ga/endc_g~kar Choudhary did not support the view which appears to have been taken by Sinha J. in the case taken before him under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57080, "end_char": 57088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Everett Orient Line Incorporated", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57096, "end_char": 57128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 by the Everett Orient Line Incorporated (vi de W.P. No."}}, {"text": "clause 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57505, "end_char": 57515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57519, "end_char": 57525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57579, "end_char": 57589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57665, "end_char": 57672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57676, "end_char": 57682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57748, "end_char": 57754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57777, "end_char": 57788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57793, "end_char": 57799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57939, "end_char": 57949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58209, "end_char": 58220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58413, "end_char": 58419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58646, "end_char": 58656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58660, "end_char": 58666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58872, "end_char": 58878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59004, "end_char": 59010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59497, "end_char": 59508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59916, "end_char": 59926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59978, "end_char": 59984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60009, "end_char": 60015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60668, "end_char": 60674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60768, "end_char": 60773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167( 12A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60932, "end_char": 60944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Centra I Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61108, "end_char": 61133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Choudhary then attempted to argue that on the merits, the Centra I Board of Revenue was in error in holding that s. 52A had been contravened by the appellant's vessel Eastern Saga."}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61163, "end_char": 61169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61527, "end_char": 61533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JasfitvSlngh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61799, "end_char": 61811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JasfitvSlngh examined the na!nre of the alterations made and -he has I d d h i, f <lajendragadkar cone u e ti at l'..e alterations were made for the purpose o\n\nc. 1.", "canonical_name": "Jasiit Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62838, "end_char": 62844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62947, "end_char": 62953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65450, "end_char": 65458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66508, "end_char": 66514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66574, "end_char": 66576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Choudbry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67366, "end_char": 67374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 lakhs was called for in the present case, we see no reason whatever to entertain the plea made by Mr. Choudbry that the said fine should be reduced.", "canonical_name": "Choudhary\"s"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67790, "end_char": 67812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68048, "end_char": 68055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68194, "end_char": 68201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68224, "end_char": 68231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68396, "end_char": 68403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68579, "end_char": 68586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 1114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68888, "end_char": 68897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68906, "end_char": 68909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69139, "end_char": 69146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69200, "end_char": 69206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69219, "end_char": 69233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69331, "end_char": 69337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69495, "end_char": 69502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69564, "end_char": 69571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69605, "end_char": 69612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69717, "end_char": 69724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69868, "end_char": 69875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69986, "end_char": 69992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70133, "end_char": 70140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70227, "end_char": 70233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70240, "end_char": 70253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70372, "end_char": 70378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70400, "end_char": 70407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_623_636_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 623\n\nHARI CHARAN KURMI AND JOGIA HAJAM v.\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J. K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\n£., jdence Act-Confession of co-accused-Not ''evidtnce'' within the meaning of s. 3 Evidence Act-Not substantive evidence against co .. accused-Can be used only to give assurance to conclusion of guilt\n\nbased on other evidence-Sections 30 and 133 Evidence Act-Distinction between-Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872). s. 3, 30, 133.\n\nThe appellants along with four others were tried and convicted by the Sessions Judge for the offences of dacoity and murder and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.\n\nOn appeal the High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence.\n\nPending that appeal it issued a rule for enhancement of the sentence, and finally the rule was made absolute and they were ordered to be banged. The appellants thereupon filed the present appeals by special leave granted by this Court\n\nThe main point raised before this Court was that the High Court misconceived the ambit and scope of the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash v. State of Puniab [1959] S.C.R. 121 and that the High Court\n\ncommitted an error in law in treating the confession made by the co-accused u substantive evidence against the appellants.\n\nHeld: (i) Though a confession mentioned in s. 30 of the Indian Evince Act is not evidence as defined by s. 3 of the Act, it is an element which may be taken into consideration by the criminal courts and in that sense, it may be described as evidence in a non-technical way.\n\nBut in dealing With a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person, it must begin with other\n\n\"vidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to lend assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said\n\nother evidence.\n\nKashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1952]\n\nS.C.R. 526, l!mperor v. La/it Mohan Chukerbutty, [1911] I.LR. 38 Cal. 559, ln re: Perivsswami Moopan, [1913] I.LR. S• Mad. 75 and Bhuboni Sahu Y.\n\nThe King, [1949] 76 I.A. 147, followed.\n\n(ii) The distinction between evidence of an accomp1ice under s. 133 and confeuion under s. 33 E\\-idence Act is that the former is evidence 'Padcr s .. 3 and the court may treat it as substantive evidence and seek s:orroboration in other evidence but the latter is not evidence under s. 3 Jllcl the coµrt should first start from other evidence and then find ass11 naco in the confessional statement for conviction.\n\nFebrl!ary, J ·\n\n. Harl CluuaN\n\nKurmi v . • ltaH of Biltar\n\n• Gajendragadkar\n\nC. J.\n\n(iii) The High Court was in .error in taking the view that the deci sion in R.:im rakash.~ case was intended to strike a dissenting note from the well-established principles in regard to the admissibility and the eifcct of confessional statement made by accused persons.\n\nRam Prakash v. State of Punjab [1959] S.C.R. 1219, explained.\n\n(iv) On examining the evidence in the present case on the above principles it is found that there is no sufficient evidence to vrove the prosecution case. '\n\n. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 208 and 209 of 1963.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 17, 1963, of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 554 and 556 of 1961.\n\nT. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants.\n\nD. P. Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.\n\nFebruary 3,\n\n1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam were charged along witll four other persons with having committed an offence punishable under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code, in that during the night intervening the 24th and the 25th March, 1960, they committed dacoity in the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal, and during the course of the said dacoity, they committed the murder of Damyanti Devi, wife of the said Deokinandan J aiswal.\n\nThe names of the four other accused persons are; Ram Bachan Ram, Joginder\n\nSingh, Ram Surat Choudhury and Achheylal Choudhury.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur, who tried the case; found all the six accused persons guilty of the offence charged.\n\nHe accordingly convicted them of the said offence and sentenced them to suffer imQrisonment for life.\n\nThis order of conviction and sentence was challenged by the said six accused persons by preferring appeals before the Patna High Court.\n\nThe High Court has held that the\n\nlearned trial Judge was right in convicting five of the six appellantsbecause, in its opinion, the evidence led by the prosecution proved the charge against them beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nIn regard to Joginder Singh, however, the High Court was not inclined to agree with the conclusion of the trial Judge and gave the benefit of doubt to him. Pending the hearing of these appeals, a rule for the enhancement of sentence was issued by the High Court against all the aP;>ellants.\n\nThis rule has been discharged in regard to Joginder Singh who has been acquitted, as well as Ram Bachan Ram, Ram Surat Choudhury and Achheylal Choudhury, and the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on them by <he trial Judge has been confirmed. In regard to the two appellants, however, the High Court took the view that the ends of justice required 1that the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on them should be enhanced to that of death.\n\nAccordingly, the rule against them was made absolute and they have been ordered to be hanged.\n\nIt is against this order of conviction and sentence that the present appeals have been brought before us by special leave; and the short question of law which has been raised before us by Mr. Tatachari is that the High Court has erred in law in treating the confession made by the co-accused Ram Surat Choudhury as substantive evidence against them.\n\nThis course adopted by the High Court in dealing with the case of the appellants on the basis of the confession made by the co-accused person is, it is urged, inconsistent with the consensus of judicial opinion in regard to the true scope and effect of section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act (hereinafter called 'the Act').\n\nThese appeals were argued before a Division Bench of three learned Judges of this Court and it was brought to the notice of the said Bench that in dealing with the case of the appellants in the light of the confession made by a co-accused person, the High Court had relied on the observations made by this Court in Ram Prakash v.\n\nThe State of Punjab.(') Si.nee these observations, prima facie, supported the view taken by the Patna High Court, the Division Bench thought it necessary to refer this matter to a\n\n(l) [1959) S.C.R. 1291.\n\n134-159 S.C.-40.\n\n19U\n\nBtu! Cluu'M\n\nKurml\n\nY, Stal• of Bilulr\n\nGaitndragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nBtwi Chara~\n\nKurmt\n\n•• Statt tYf Bihar\n\nGajendraadkar\n\nC./.\n\nlarger Bench in order that the correctness of the said observations may be examined.\n\nThat is how these appeals have come before a Constitution Bench .\n\nThe facts leading to the prosecution of the appellants lie within a narrow compass, and so far as the point which falls to be considered in the present appeals is concerned, there is no dispute in respect of the said facts.\n\nDeokinandan J aiswal is a fairly weal<thy businessman and lives in village Dumarbana within the i; io!ice station of Bairgania in the district of Muzaffarpur. He has a house of his own.\n\nAchheylal and Ram Bachan served under him as munims.\n\nJogender Singh was Jaiswal's sepoy and Ram Surat was his personal servant. The appellants are the co-villagers of J ogender Singh who was one of the accused persons. It appears that on the 24th March, 1960, Jaiswal had received Rs. 15,000 in currency notes from his partner Nathmal Marwari in the presence of his munims Achheylal and Ram Bachan; in fact, as the said amount was handed over to I aiswal in the form of different currency notes, Ram Bachan and Achheylal were asked by him to count 'the said amount.\n\nThe said amount was then put in different bundles by Jaiswal and to it was added another amount of Rs. 2,000 which he took out from his iron safe.\n\nThe two bundles were then put together in a bigger bundle and to it was attached a slip containing his signature and date.\n\nAccording to Jaiswal, he handed over the amoun:t of Rs. 17,000 thus put in two bundles to his wife Damyanti Devi, and in her turn, she put the said bundles into the iron safe which had been kept at the first floor of the house in the room adjoining the bed-room.\n\nAbout this time, some functions were organised by the Bharat Sevak Samaj in the village and J aiswal was the convener in regard to the said functions.\n\nNaturally, he had to attend to the delegates who had come to the village for the said functions.\n\nDuring the days af these functions, J aiswal used to return home by ii.bout 10 P.M., but on the night of the 24th March, 1960, the function went on late, and so, J aiswal slept at the Dharamshala where the function took place and did not return home.\n\nThat is how Damyanti Devi was left alone in the house on the first floor and her only companion was her\n\nchild Mina about 3t years old. Apparently, Damyanti Devi retired to her bed-room with he1 little child and on the ground floor were sleeping three of the accused persons, Achheylal, Ram Bachan and Jogender Singh.\n\nRam Surat was on leave, so that out of the four servants employed by Jaiswal, three were sleei; iing on the premises.\n\nBatahu, the cook of the family, was sleeping in a verandah attched to the motor garage.\n\nNext day Batahu was awakened by Achheylal who reported to him that the door of the hall was open.\n\nThereupon Achheylal and this witness went on the first floor and found that Damyanti Devi was lying dead in a pool of blood.\n\nThere were cut injuries in her neck which had presumably caused severe bleeding.\n\nThe little girl Mina was fast asleep.\n\nThe bundles of currency notes had been removed by the miscreants who had committed the murder of Damyanti Devi.\n\nThereupon, word was sent to Jaiswal and on his return to the house, steps were taken to report to the police station about the commission of the offence; and that set the investigation machinery into operation.\n\nAs a result of the investigation, the six accused persons were nut up for their trial for the offence under s. 396 l.P.C.\n\nThat, in brief, is the nature of the prosecution case.\n\nThe prosecution sought to prove its case against the six accused persons by relying on the confessions made by three of them, the recovery of the stolen property and discovery of bloodstained clothes in respect of the two appellants. 'There is no direot evidence to show how, when, and by whom the offence was committed.\n\nBesides the confessions,· the evidence on which the prosecution relies is circumstantial and it is on this evidence that the case has been tried in tho courts below.\n\nFor our purpose in the present appeals it is unnecessary to refer to the details set out by the conf~ li.onal statements i.n regard to the commission of the offenco nnd the part played by each one of the accused persons.\n\nRam Surat, Achheylal and Ram Bachan made confeslions and it has been held by the High Court as well as the learned Sessions Judge that the charge against them is\n\nliMH c~,; n,,, . lurriii .,, Sf•t• of Billilr\n\nGa}erldrapadkar\n\nC.J.\n\n' 1164\n\nBui Charon\n\nXurml\n\n'f. ,,.,. Df Bllvlr\n\nGojendragadkllr\n\nC.I.\n\nproved.\n\nWith the correctness or propriety of the conviction of these accused persons we are not concerned in the present appeals.\n\nThe only point to which reference must be made at this stage is that there is a concurrent finding of the courts below that the confession made by Ram Surat is voluntary and true.\n\nIn fact, both the courts did not feel any hesitation in taking the said confession into account against Ram Surat who made the said confession and convicting him on the said confession read in the light of other evidence adduced against him.\n\nThe charge against the two appellants has been sought to be proved by the prosecution by the statements contained in the confession made by the three accused persons and certain other discoveries, such as blood-stained clothes with both of them and stains of blood in the house of the appellant Haricharan.\n\nWe will presently refer to this evidence. The High Court took the view that having regard to the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Prakash ( 1), it was open to the High Court to consider the evidence supplied by the confessional st:itements made by the co-accused persons and enquire whether the said evidence received corroboration from any other evidence adduced by the prosecution.\n\nApproaching the question from this point of view, the High Court came to the conclusion that the blood stains on the clothes found with both the appellants and blood stains found in the house of the appellant Haricharan afforded sufficient corroboration to the confession of Ram Surat, and so, it has confirmed the conviction of the two appellants under s. 396 I.P.C.\n\nThe High Court then considered the question about the llCiltence which should be imposed on the two appellants. It appeared from the confession of Ram Surat as well as the\n\nonfessional statements .of Achheylal and Ram Bachan that the two appellants had played a major part in the commission of the offence.\n\nIn fact, the injuries which proved fatal are alleged by all the 3 accused persons who confessed to have been caused by the two appellants.\n\nIt is in the light of these statements that the High .Court was persuaded to enhance the sentence imposed by the trial Judge against the appellants and it has directed that instead of imprisonment for life, the sentence of death ought to be imposed on\n\n(I) (1959] S.C.R.. 1219.\n\nthem. That is how the only question which calls for our decision in the present appeals is: is the approach adopted by the High Court justified by the provisions of s. 30 of the Act as it has been consistently interpreted by judicial decisions for more than half a century ?\n\nBefore we address ourselvea to this question of law, we may briefly indicate the nature of the other evidence on which the prosecution relies against the appellants. The appellants were arrested the next day after the commission of the offence on the report made by Jaiswal that he suspected that the murder of his wife had been committed by his four employees and .their accomplices, the two appellants before us. On the 26th March, 1960, at about 3.30 P.M.\n\nthe investigation officer visited the lane between the southern wall of Jaiswal's godown and the northern wall of the east-facing room of the appellant Haricharan and found some blood stains in the lane and on the walls of the grain godown. Later, a shirt bearing blood stains was also found.\n\nPieces of earth containing blood stains and the shirt were subsequently ent to the Chemical Analyser. The origin of the blood found on the pieces of earth sent to the Chemical Analyser could not be determined by him, but the stains\n\nof blood on the shirt which was seized from the person of the appellant Haricharan were found to have traces of human blood.\n\nSimilarly, the nails of Haricharan's hands showed traces of blood and they were got cut by a barber and sent to the Chemical Analyser.\n\nThe report shows that these blood stains were too small for serological test. The High Court thought that \"the presence of human blood on the shirt which Haricharan was wearing, his nails and at several places beginning from the lane leading to his house and on so many materials kept in his house is a factor\" which had to be taken into account. These discoveries were made about 8 A.M. following the night of the murder.\n\nIn regard to the appellant Jogia, a red-coloured check gamcha which bore blood-like stains was recovered from the top of the earthern granary in his house at about 6 A.M. on 27th March. 1960. This gamcha was sent to the Chemical Analyser and it is reported to bear stains of human blood.\n\nIt may be added that when the house of Jogia was searched on the 26th March. 1960 this gamcha was not found.\n\nJ.:;\n\n.JH4\n\nBal C,._,\n\nJriantl ...\n\nStat• of JJU..\n\nGandrawaabl c.t.\n\nHui r...J.·-·\n\n~, j; fi'\"\"' ...\n\nS'1i~ qi BiluJr\n\nwe have jµst in(licated, the judgment Qf tpe Jfigh ourt s!t<>wt Jhat it took the view that the confessional statement by the co-accused persons of the appellants, particularly Ram Sµr!I~ was corroborated by the discovery of blood stains and that\n\nGpjendragadkar\n\n~.I.\n\njustified the conviction of the appellants under s. 396 of the Indian Panel Code.\n\nThe question about the part which a confession made by a co-accused person can play in a criminal trial, has to be determined in the light of the provisions of s. 30 of the Act. Section 30 provides that when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.\n\nThe basis on which 'this provision is found is that if a person makes a confession implicating himself, that may suggest that the maker of the confession is speaking the truth. Normally, if a statement made by an accused person is. found to be voluntary and it amounts to a confession in the sense that it implicates the maker, it is not likely that the maker would implicate himself untruly, and so, s. 30 provides that such . a confession may be taken into consideration even against\n\na co-accused who is being tried along with the maker of the confession.\n\nThere is no doubt that a confession made voluntarily by an accused person can be used against the maker of the confession, though as a matter of prudence criminal courts generally require some corroboration to the said confession particularly if it has been retracted.\n\nWith that aspect of the problem. however, we are not concerned in the present appeals. When s. 30 provides that the confession of a co-accused may be taken into consideration, what exactly is the scope and effect of such taking into consideration, is precisely the problem which has been raised in the present appeals. It is clear that the confession mentioned in s. 30 is not evidence under s. 3 of the Act. Sec. 3 defines \"evidence\" as meaning and including-\n\n(!) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry: such 1tatements are called oral evidence;\n\n(2) all documents produced for the inspection of the Court: Such documents are called documentary evidence.\n\nTechnically construed. this definition will not apply to a confession. Part (I) of the definition refers to oral statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it:. and clearly, a confession made by an accused person is not such a statement: it is not made or permitted to be made before the court that tries the criminal case. Part ( 2) of the definition refers to documents produced for the inspection of the court; and a confession cannot be said to fall even under this part. Even so, s. 30 provides that a confession may be taken into consideration n\\Jt only against its maker, but also against a co-accused person; that is to say, though such a confession may not be evidence as strictly defined by s. 3 of the Act, it is an element which may be taken into consideration by the criminal court and in that sense, it may be described as evidence in a non-technical way. But it is significant that like other evidence which is produced before the Court. it is not obligatory on the court to take the confession into account. When evidence as defined by the Act is produced before the Court, it is the duty of the Court to consider that evidence.\n\nWhat weight should be attached to such evidence, is a matter in the discretion of the Court.\n\nBut a Court cannot say in respect of such evidence that it will just not take that evidence into account.\n\nSuch an approach can, however, be adopted by the Court in dealing with a confession, because s. 30 merely enables the Court to take the confession into account.\n\nAs we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. In dealing with a criminal case where the proscu tiou relies upon the confession of one accused person agamst another accused person. the proper approach to adopt is to cousider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the coun is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustam me charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that\n\nffari Cha-\n\nK\"rmi\n\nSta~ of BiMr\n\nGajendragadk41\"\n\nC.J.\n\nHari Charan\n\nKur mi . v.\n\nSta# of Bihar\n\naa/endragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nthe conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right.\n\nAs was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. La/it Mohan Chuckerbutty( 1 ) a confession can only be used to \"lend assurance to other evicknce against a co-accused\".\n\nIn In re. Peryaswami Noopan,(') Reilly J. observed that the provision of s. 30 goes not further than this : \"where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in s. 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.\" In Bhuboni Sahu v. King( 8 ) the Privy Council has expressed the same view.\n\nSir fohn Beaumont who spoke for the Board observed that a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type.\n\nIt does not indeed come within the definition of \"evidence\" contained in s. 3 of the Evidence Act.\n\nIt is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities.\n\nSection 30, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount\n\nto proof.\n\nClearly there must be other evidence.\n\nThe confession is only one element in the consideration of all tho facts proved in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence.\" It would be noticed\n\ntht as a result of the provisions contained in s. 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of s. 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by s. 3 of the Act.\n\nThe result, therefore; is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court Cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must\n\n(I) (1911) l.L.R. 38 Cal. 559 at p. $88.\n\n(2) (1913) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 75 at p. 77.\n\n(3) (1949) 76 I.A. 147 at p. !SS.\n\nbegin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence.\n\nThat, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in s. 30.\n\nThe same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh(') where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu's(') case has been cited with approval.\n\nIn appreciating the full effect of the provisions contained in s. 30, it may be useful to refer to the position of the evidence given by an accomplice under s. 133 of the Act.\n\nSection 133 provides that an accomq>lice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and that conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Illustration (b) to s. 114 of the Act brings out the legal position that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Reading these two provisions together, it follows that though an accomq>lice is a competent witness, prudence requires that his evidence should not be acted upon unless it is materially corroborated; and that is the effect of judicial decisions dealing with this point.\n\nThe point of significance is that when the Court deals with the evidence by an accomplice, the Court may treat the said evidence as substantive evidence and enquire whether it is materially corroborated or not. The testimony of the accomplice is evidence under s. 3 of the Act and has to be dealt with as such. It is no doubt evidence of a tainted character and as such, is very weak; but, nevertheless, it is evidence and may be acted upon, subject to the requirement which has now become virtually a part of the law that it is corroborated in material particulars .\n\n. The statements contained in the confessions of the co-accused persons stand on a different footing.\n\nT n cases where such confessions are relied upon by the prosecution against an accused person, the Court cannot begin with the examination of the said statements.\n\nThe stage to consider\n\n(I) [1952] S.C.R. S,\n\n(2) (t949) 76 lA. 147 •Ir. 155.\n\nHari Charar1 ·\n\nKurmi v.\n\nState of Bihar\n\nGajtndragadkar-\n\nC. J.\n\nHari Charan\n\nKurmi\n\n•• Sta\" of Biluzr\n\n-Gajendragadkar\n\nC.1.\n\nth~ said \".°nfessi?nal statements arrives only after the other\n\ne~1dence considered and found to be satisfactory.\n\nThe diffe.rence. Ill .the approach which the Court has to adQ?t in dealing with these two types of evidence is thus clear, well-\n\nnderstood and well-established.\n\nIt, however, appears that Ill Ram Prakash's case('), some observations have been made which do not seem to recogniz.e the distinotion between the evidence of an accomplice and the statements contained in the confession made by an accused person. \"An examination of the reported decisions of< the various High Courts in India,\" said Imam J., who spoke for the Court in that case, \"indicates that the preponderance of opinion is in favour of the view that the retracted confession of an accused person may be taken into consideration against a co-accused by virtue of the provisions of s. 30 of the Act, its value was extremely weak and there could be no conviction without the fullest and strongest corroboration on material particulars.\" The last portion of <this observation has been interpreted by the High Court in the present case as supporting the view th3t like the evidence of an accomplice, a confessional statement of a co-accused person can be acted upon if it is corroborated in material particulars. In our opinion, the context in which the said observation was made by this Court shows that this Court did not intend to lay down any such proposition.\n\nIn fact, the other evidence against the appellant Ram Prakash was of such a strong character that this Court a!!reed with the conclusion of the\n\nHigh Court and held that the said evidence was satisfactory and in that connection, the confessional statement of the co. accused person was considered.\n\nWe are, therefore. satisfied that the High Court was in error in this case in taking the view that the decision in Ram Prakash's(') case was intended to strike a discordant note from the well-established princip 1es in regard to the admissibility and the effect of confessional statements made by co-accused persons.\n\nConsidering the evidence from this ooint of view. we must first decide whether the evidence other than the confessional statements of the co-accused persons. particularly Ram Surat, on whose confession the High Court has substan-\n\n(I) [1959) S.C.R. 1219.\n\ntially relied, is satisfactory and tends to prove the prosecution case. It is only if the said evidence is satisfactory and is treated as sufficient by us to hold the charge proved against the two appellants, that an occasion may arise to seek for an assurance for our conclusion from the said confession.\n\nThus considered, there can be no doubt that the evidence about the discovery of blood stains on which the prosecution relies is entirely insufficient to justify the prosecution charge against both the appellants. In our opinion, it is impossible to accede to the argument urged before us by Mr. Singh\n\nthat the said evidence can be said to prove the prosecution case. In fact, the judgment of the High Court shows that it made a finding against the appellants substantially because it thought that the confessions of the co-accused ; iersons\n\ncould be first considered and the rest of the evidence could be treated as corroborating the said confessions.\n\nWe are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not right in confirming the conviction of the two appellants under s. 396 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nIt is true that the confession made by Ram Surat is a detailed statement and it attributes to the two appellants a major part in the commission of the offence. It is also true that the said confession has been found to be voluntary, and true so far as the part played by Ram Surat himself is concerned, and so, it is not unlikely that the confessional statement in regard to the part played by the two appellants may also be true; and in that sense, the reading of the said confession may raise a serious suspicion against the accused. But it is precisely in 5uch cases that the true legal approach must be adopted and suspicion. however grave, must not be allowed to take the place of proof.\n\nAs we have already indicated, it has been a recognised principle of the administration of criminal law in this country for over half a century that the confession of a co-accused person cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into service only when the court is inclined to accept other evidence and feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its conclusion deducible from the said evidence. In criminal trials, there is no scope for applying the principle of moral conviction or grave suspicion.\n\nIn criminal cases where the other evidence adduced against an accused person is wholly\n\n'~ llllri ciw. x.,,.,,., .\n\nSt~ of llilw\n\nGajendragad/fllr\n\nC.I.\n\nHori CliaNn\n\nK111'11fl'\n\nStol• of Biliar\n\nGa/•ndragadkor\n\nC.I.\n\nJNI\n\nunsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely on the confession of a co-accused person, the presumption of innocence which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence assists the accused person and compels the Court to render the verdict that the charge is not proved against him, and so, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. That is precisely what has happened in these appeals.\n\nIn the result, the appeals are allowed and the orders of conviction and sentence passed against the two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam are set aside and the accused are ordered to be acquitted.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nSHY AM BEHAR! AND 01HERS\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nLand Acquisition-Who/• comp•nsation to b• paid by th• company- No declaration that the land wa.r needed for a compani-Yalidlty- . T.st- Land Acquisition Act, (I of 1894), ss. 4, 6(1).\n\nThe Government issued a notification on December 3, 1960 under\n\n1. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act stating that the land described in the anncxure to the notification was required for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of buildings for god.owns and administrative office.\n\nThe appellants challenged the validity 'of the notification in the High Court contending that the notification under s. 6 of the Act did not\n\ndescribe the land to be acquired with sufficient particularity and that\n\nalthough the notification mentioned that the land was required for a public purpoSe, in fact it was required for a company, which was entirely different from Government and was therefore invalid. Soon after the writ petition Was filed, the State Government issued a fresh notification on April 19, 1961 mainly under s. 17(1) read withs. 17(4) of the Act The notiftc:ation stated that it was declared under 1. 6 of the Act that tho land wu\n\nrequired for a public purpo5e, namely, \"for the Premier Refractory Fae-. tory and work connected therewith.\" At the time of beari111 of the writ petition in the High Court, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that llotb the notifications nndu 1. 6 of the December 3, 1960 lllld AprD I,,", "total_entities": 122, "entities": [{"text": "623\n\nHARI CHARAN KURMI AND JOGIA HAJAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARI CHARAN KURMI AND JOGIA HAJAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 193, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275, "end_char": 279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 30 and 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 423, "end_char": 442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Evidence Act-Distinction between-Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 443, "end_char": 501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3, 30, 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 515, "end_char": 528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act-Distinction between-Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act-Distinction between-Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1376, "end_char": 1381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act-Distinction between-Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act-Distinction between-Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1437, "end_char": 1441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act-Distinction between-Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act-Distinction between-Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Perivsswami Moopan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2195, "end_char": 2213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "559, ln re: Perivsswami Moopan, [1913] I.LR."}}, {"text": "Bhuboni Sahu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2243, "end_char": 2255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75 and Bhuboni Sahu Y.\n\nThe King, [1949] 76 I.A. 147, followed."}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2362, "end_char": 2368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2389, "end_char": 2394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2584, "end_char": 2588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Febrl!ary", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2716, "end_char": 2725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Febrl!ary, J ·\n\n."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2777, "end_char": 2791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ltaH of Biltar\n\n• Gajendragadkar\n\nC. J.\n\n(iii) The High Court was in .error in taking the view that the deci sion in R.:im rakash.~ case was intended to strike a dissenting note from the well-established principles in regard to the admissibility and the eifcct of confessional statement made by accused persons.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "T. V. R. Tatachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3519, "end_char": 3537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3560, "end_char": 3571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. P. Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3677, "end_char": 3691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam were charged along witll four other persons with having committed an offence punishable under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code, in that during the night intervening the 24th and the 25th March, 1960, they committed dacoity in the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal, and during the course of the said dacoity, they committed the murder of Damyanti Devi, wife of the said Deokinandan J aiswal.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Haricharan Kurmi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3716, "end_char": 3732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam were charged along witll four other persons with having committed an offence punishable under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code, in that during the night intervening the 24th and the 25th March, 1960, they committed dacoity in the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal, and during the course of the said dacoity, they committed the murder of Damyanti Devi, wife of the said Deokinandan J aiswal.", "canonical_name": "Haricharan Kurmi"}}, {"text": "Jogia Hajam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3737, "end_char": 3748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam were charged along witll four other persons with having committed an offence punishable under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code, in that during the night intervening the 24th and the 25th March, 1960, they committed dacoity in the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal, and during the course of the said dacoity, they committed the murder of Damyanti Devi, wife of the said Deokinandan J aiswal."}}, {"text": "section 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3843, "end_char": 3854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3862, "end_char": 3879, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "24th and the 25th March, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3922, "end_char": 3951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam were charged along witll four other persons with having committed an offence punishable under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code, in that during the night intervening the 24th and the 25th March, 1960, they committed dacoity in the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal, and during the course of the said dacoity, they committed the murder of Damyanti Devi, wife of the said Deokinandan J aiswal."}}, {"text": "Deokinandan Jaiswal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3992, "end_char": 4011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam were charged along witll four other persons with having committed an offence punishable under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code, in that during the night intervening the 24th and the 25th March, 1960, they committed dacoity in the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal, and during the course of the said dacoity, they committed the murder of Damyanti Devi, wife of the said Deokinandan J aiswal.", "canonical_name": "Deokinandan J aiswal"}}, {"text": "Damyanti Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4085, "end_char": 4098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam were charged along witll four other persons with having committed an offence punishable under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code, in that during the night intervening the 24th and the 25th March, 1960, they committed dacoity in the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal, and during the course of the said dacoity, they committed the murder of Damyanti Devi, wife of the said Deokinandan J aiswal."}}, {"text": "Deokinandan J aiswal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4117, "end_char": 4137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam were charged along witll four other persons with having committed an offence punishable under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code, in that during the night intervening the 24th and the 25th March, 1960, they committed dacoity in the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal, and during the course of the said dacoity, they committed the murder of Damyanti Devi, wife of the said Deokinandan J aiswal.", "canonical_name": "Deokinandan J aiswal"}}, {"text": "Ram Bachan Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4189, "end_char": 4203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names of the four other accused persons are; Ram Bachan Ram, Joginder\n\nSingh, Ram Surat Choudhury and Achheylal Choudhury.", "canonical_name": "Ram Bachan Ram"}}, {"text": "Joginder\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4205, "end_char": 4220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names of the four other accused persons are; Ram Bachan Ram, Joginder\n\nSingh, Ram Surat Choudhury and Achheylal Choudhury.", "canonical_name": "Joginder\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Ram Surat Choudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4222, "end_char": 4241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names of the four other accused persons are; Ram Bachan Ram, Joginder\n\nSingh, Ram Surat Choudhury and Achheylal Choudhury."}}, {"text": "Achheylal Choudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4246, "end_char": 4265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names of the four other accused persons are; Ram Bachan Ram, Joginder\n\nSingh, Ram Surat Choudhury and Achheylal Choudhury."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4616, "end_char": 4632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order of conviction and sentence was challenged by the said six accused persons by preferring appeals before the Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "Joginder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4870, "end_char": 4884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to Joginder Singh, however, the High Court was not inclined to agree with the conclusion of the trial Judge and gave the benefit of doubt to him.", "canonical_name": "Joginder\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Tatachari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5890, "end_char": 5899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is against this order of conviction and sentence that the present appeals have been brought before us by special leave; and the short question of law which has been raised before us by Mr. Tatachari is that the High Court has erred in law in treating the confession made by the co-accused Ram Surat Choudhury as substantive evidence against them."}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6302, "end_char": 6312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6320, "end_char": 6339, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "19U\n\nBtu! Cluu'M\n\nKurml\n\nY, Stal• of Bilulr\n\nGaitndragadkar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6928, "end_char": 6987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19U\n\nBtu!"}}, {"text": "Deokinandan J aiswal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7435, "end_char": 7455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deokinandan J aiswal is a fairly weal<thy businessman and lives in village Dumarbana within the i; io!ice station of Bairgania in the district of Muzaffarpur.", "canonical_name": "Deokinandan J aiswal"}}, {"text": "Dumarbana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7510, "end_char": 7519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deokinandan J aiswal is a fairly weal<thy businessman and lives in village Dumarbana within the i; io!ice station of Bairgania in the district of Muzaffarpur."}}, {"text": "Muzaffarpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7581, "end_char": 7592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deokinandan J aiswal is a fairly weal<thy businessman and lives in village Dumarbana within the i; io!ice station of Bairgania in the district of Muzaffarpur."}}, {"text": "Achheylal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achheylal and Ram Bachan served under him as munims.", "canonical_name": "Achheylal"}}, {"text": "Ram Bachan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7636, "end_char": 7646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achheylal and Ram Bachan served under him as munims.", "canonical_name": "Ram Bachan Ram"}}, {"text": "Jogender Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7676, "end_char": 7690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jogender Singh was Jaiswal's sepoy and Ram Surat was his personal servant.", "canonical_name": "Joginder\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Ram Surat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7715, "end_char": 7724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jogender Singh was Jaiswal's sepoy and Ram Surat was his personal servant."}}, {"text": "J ogender Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7790, "end_char": 7805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are the co-villagers of J ogender Singh who was one of the accused persons.", "canonical_name": "Joginder\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "24th March, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7865, "end_char": 7881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on the 24th March, 1960, Jaiswal had received Rs."}}, {"text": "Jaiswal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7883, "end_char": 7890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on the 24th March, 1960, Jaiswal had received Rs.", "canonical_name": "J aiswal"}}, {"text": "Nathmal Marwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7950, "end_char": 7965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000 in currency notes from his partner Nathmal Marwari in the presence of his munims Achheylal and Ram Bachan; in fact, as the said amount was handed over to I aiswal in the form of different currency notes, Ram Bachan and Achheylal were asked by him to count 'the said amount."}}, {"text": "Achheylal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7996, "end_char": 8005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000 in currency notes from his partner Nathmal Marwari in the presence of his munims Achheylal and Ram Bachan; in fact, as the said amount was handed over to I aiswal in the form of different currency notes, Ram Bachan and Achheylal were asked by him to count 'the said amount.", "canonical_name": "Achheylal"}}, {"text": "I aiswal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8069, "end_char": 8077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000 in currency notes from his partner Nathmal Marwari in the presence of his munims Achheylal and Ram Bachan; in fact, as the said amount was handed over to I aiswal in the form of different currency notes, Ram Bachan and Achheylal were asked by him to count 'the said amount."}}, {"text": "Bharat Sevak Samaj", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8780, "end_char": 8798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About this time, some functions were organised by the Bharat Sevak Samaj in the village and J aiswal was the convener in regard to the said functions."}}, {"text": "J aiswal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8818, "end_char": 8826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About this time, some functions were organised by the Bharat Sevak Samaj in the village and J aiswal was the convener in regard to the said functions.", "canonical_name": "J aiswal"}}, {"text": "Dharamshala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9160, "end_char": 9171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the days af these functions, J aiswal used to return home by ii.bout 10 P.M., but on the night of the 24th March, 1960, the function went on late, and so, J aiswal slept at the Dharamshala where the function took place and did not return home."}}, {"text": "Mina", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9339, "end_char": 9343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is how Damyanti Devi was left alone in the house on the first floor and her only companion was her\n\nchild Mina about 3t years old."}}, {"text": "Batahu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9666, "end_char": 9672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Batahu, the cook of the family, was sleeping in a verandah attched to the motor garage."}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10534, "end_char": 10540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haricharan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12471, "end_char": 12481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge against the two appellants has been sought to be proved by the prosecution by the statements contained in the confession made by the three accused persons and certain other discoveries, such as blood-stained clothes with both of them and stains of blood in the house of the appellant Haricharan.", "canonical_name": "Haricharan Kurmi"}}, {"text": "Ram Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12619, "end_char": 12630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court took the view that having regard to the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Prakash ( 1), it was open to the High Court to consider the evidence supplied by the confessional st:itements made by the co-accused persons and enquire whether the said evidence received corroboration from any other evidence adduced by the prosecution.", "canonical_name": "Ram Prakash"}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13232, "end_char": 13238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13239, "end_char": 13244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14139, "end_char": 14144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "26th March, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14672, "end_char": 14688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th March, 1960, at about 3.30 P.M.\n\nthe investigation officer visited the lane between the southern wall of Jaiswal's godown and the northern wall of the east-facing room of the appellant Haricharan and found some blood stains in the lane and on the walls of the grain godown."}}, {"text": "Haricharan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15387, "end_char": 15397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, the nails of Haricharan's hands showed traces of blood and they were got cut by a barber and sent to the Chemical Analyser.", "canonical_name": "Haricharan Kurmi"}}, {"text": "Jogia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15950, "end_char": 15955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to the appellant Jogia, a red-coloured check gamcha which bore blood-like stains was recovered from the top of the earthern granary in his house at about 6 A.M. on 27th March.", "canonical_name": "Jogia"}}, {"text": "27th March. 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16097, "end_char": 16113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to the appellant Jogia, a red-coloured check gamcha which bore blood-like stains was recovered from the top of the earthern granary in his house at about 6 A.M. on 27th March."}}, {"text": "Jogia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16251, "end_char": 16256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be added that when the house of Jogia was searched on the 26th March.", "canonical_name": "Jogia"}}, {"text": "26th March. 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16277, "end_char": 16293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be added that when the house of Jogia was searched on the 26th March."}}, {"text": "Bal C", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16334, "end_char": 16339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.:;\n\n.JH4\n\nBal C,._,"}}, {"text": "Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16618, "end_char": 16621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hui r...J.·-·\n\n~, j; fi'\"\"' ...\n\nS'1i~ qi BiluJr\n\nwe have jµst in(licated, the judgment Qf tpe Jfigh ourt s!t<>wt Jhat it took the view that the confessional statement by the co-accused persons of the appellants, particularly Ram Sµr!I~ was corroborated by the discovery of blood stains and that\n\nGpjendragadkar\n\n~.I.\n\njustified the conviction of the appellants under s. 396 of the Indian Panel Code."}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16760, "end_char": 16766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16954, "end_char": 16959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16972, "end_char": 16982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17717, "end_char": 17722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18238, "end_char": 18243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18510, "end_char": 18515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18538, "end_char": 18542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18555, "end_char": 18561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19403, "end_char": 19408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19619, "end_char": 19623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20358, "end_char": 20363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ffari Cha-\n\nK\"rmi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21142, "end_char": 21159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the proper approach to adopt is to cousider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the coun is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustam me charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that\n\nffari Cha-\n\nK\"rmi\n\nSta~ of BiMr\n\nGajendragadk41\"\n\nC.J.\n\nHari Charan\n\nKur mi ."}}, {"text": "Hari Charan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21198, "end_char": 21209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the proper approach to adopt is to cousider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the coun is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustam me charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that\n\nffari Cha-\n\nK\"rmi\n\nSta~ of BiMr\n\nGajendragadk41\"\n\nC.J.\n\nHari Charan\n\nKur mi .", "canonical_name": "Haricharan Kurmi"}}, {"text": "Lawrence Jenkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21363, "end_char": 21379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. La/it Mohan Chuckerbutty( 1 ) a confession can only be used to \"lend assurance to other evicknce against a co-accused\"."}}, {"text": "Peryaswami Noopan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21525, "end_char": 21542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Peryaswami Noopan,(') Reilly J. observed that the provision of s. 30 goes not further than this : \"where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in s. 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.\""}}, {"text": "Reilly", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21547, "end_char": 21553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Peryaswami Noopan,(') Reilly J. observed that the provision of s. 30 goes not further than this : \"where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in s. 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.\""}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21588, "end_char": 21593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21764, "end_char": 21769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "fohn Beaumont", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21934, "end_char": 21947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir fohn Beaumont who spoke for the Board observed that a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22132, "end_char": 22136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22403, "end_char": 22413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22901, "end_char": 22906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23272, "end_char": 23277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23334, "end_char": 23338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24019, "end_char": 24024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24282, "end_char": 24287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24376, "end_char": 24382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24396, "end_char": 24407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24627, "end_char": 24633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25300, "end_char": 25304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25979, "end_char": 25993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hari Charar1 ·\n\nKurmi v.\n\nState of Bihar\n\nGajtndragadkar-\n\nC. J.\n\nHari Charan\n\nKurmi\n\n•• Sta\" of Biluzr\nGajendragadkar\n\nC.1.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR"}}, {"text": "Ill Ram Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26385, "end_char": 26400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, appears that Ill Ram Prakash's case('), some observations have been made which do not seem to recogniz.e the distinotion between the evidence of an accomplice and the statements contained in the confession made by an accused person. \""}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26678, "end_char": 26683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An examination of the reported decisions of< the various High Courts in India,\" said Imam J., who spoke for the Court in that case, \"indicates that the preponderance of opinion is in favour of the view that the retracted confession of an accused person may be taken into consideration against a co-accused by virtue of the provisions of s. 30 of the Act, its value was extremely weak and there could be no conviction without the fullest and strongest corroboration on material particulars.\""}}, {"text": "Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26691, "end_char": 26695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An examination of the reported decisions of< the various High Courts in India,\" said Imam J., who spoke for the Court in that case, \"indicates that the preponderance of opinion is in favour of the view that the retracted confession of an accused person may be taken into consideration against a co-accused by virtue of the provisions of s. 30 of the Act, its value was extremely weak and there could be no conviction without the fullest and strongest corroboration on material particulars.\""}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26943, "end_char": 26948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Prakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27574, "end_char": 27585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the other evidence against the appellant Ram Prakash was of such a strong character that this Court a!!reed with the conclusion of the\n\nHigh Court and held that the said evidence was satisfactory and in that connection, the confessional statement of the co. accused person was considered.", "canonical_name": "Ram Prakash"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28999, "end_char": 29004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, it is impossible to accede to the argument urged before us by Mr. Singh\n\nthat the said evidence can be said to prove the prosecution case."}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29479, "end_char": 29485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29493, "end_char": 29510, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SHY AM BEHAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31576, "end_char": 31588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHY AM BEHAR!"}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31602, "end_char": 31625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND 01HERS\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J.C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31700, "end_char": 31709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND 01HERS\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31879, "end_char": 31899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 4, 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31914, "end_char": 31925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "December 3, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31968, "end_char": 31984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government issued a notification on December 3, 1960 under\n\n1."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32328, "end_char": 32332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "April 19, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32714, "end_char": 32728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the writ petition Was filed, the State Government issued a fresh notification on April 19, 1961 mainly under s. 17(1) read withs."}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32742, "end_char": 32750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_636_642_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Hori CliaNn\n\nK111'11fl'\n\nStol• of Biliar\n\nGa/•ndragadkor\n\nC.I.\n\nJNI\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64J\n\nunsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely on the confession of a co-accused person, the presumption of innocence which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence assists the accused person and compels the Court to render the verdict that the charge is not proved against him, and so, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. That is precisely what has happened in these appeals.\n\nIn the result, the appeals are allowed and the orders of conviction and sentence passed against the two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam are set aside and the accused are ordered to be acquitted.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nSHY AM BEHAR! AND 01HERS\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nLand Acquisition-Who/• comp•nsation to b• paid by th• company- No declaration that the land wa.r needed for a compani-Yalidlty- . T.st- Land Acquisition Act, (I of 1894), ss. 4, 6(1).\n\nThe Government issued a notification on December 3, 1960 under\n\n1. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act stating that the land described in the anncxure to the notification was required for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of buildings for god.owns and administrative office.\n\nThe appellants challenged the validity 'of the notification in the High Court contending that the notification under s. 6 of the Act did not\n\ndescribe the land to be acquired with sufficient particularity and that\n\nalthough the notification mentioned that the land was required for a public purpoSe, in fact it was required for a company, which was entirely different from Government and was therefore invalid. Soon after the writ petition Was filed, the State Government issued a fresh notification on April 19, 1961 mainly under s. 17(1) read withs. 17(4) of the Act The notiftc:ation stated that it was declared under 1. 6 of the Act that tho land wu\n\nrequired for a public purpo5e, namely, \"for the Premier Refractory Fae-. tory and work connected therewith.\" At the time of beari111 of the writ petition in the High Court, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that llotb the notifications nndu 1. 6 of the December 3, 1960 lllld AprD I,,\n\n1961 were invalid became the acquisition was not for a public purpose\n\nIJU as stated therein; in fact it was for a company which was entirely diff• . rent from Government. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and Slayam ••llM held that the notifications under s. 6 must in substance and in law be Stall of\" M\"\"1qs deemed to be for acquisition of land for a company in the present case.\n\nPrml~61t\n\nHeld: Where the entire compensation is to be paid by a company, the notification under s. 6 must contain a declaration that the land is needed for a company.\n\nNo notification under s. 6 can be made where the entire compensation is to be paid by a company declaring that the acquisition is for a public purpose, for, such a declaration requires that either wholly or in part, compensation must come out of public revenue1 or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.\n\nPandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Puniab, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 459, followed.\n\nIn the present case, the whole compensation was to be paid by th• company, therefore the notification under s. 6 had to declare that the land was needed for a company.\n\nThere was nothing in either of the two notifications of December 3, 1960 and April 19, 1961 to show that thl land was needed for a company, therefore they were invalid in view of lhe proviso to s. 6 (I ) of the Act and all proceedings following on 1uc:h\n\nnotifications would be of no effect under the Act.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 111 of 1962.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 8, 1961, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 81 of 1961.\n\nNaunit Lal, for the a'?pellant.\n\nl. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1-4.\n\nRajani Patel and l. N. Shroff, for the Intervener.\n\nFebruary 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nW ANCHOO J .-This is an appeal by special leave 8gainst the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court.\n\nThe appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of a notification issued under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, No. I of 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), Their case was that they were owners of certain lands in Chhaparwah. On July 8, 1960, a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Act to the effect that certain land in village Chhaparwah was required for a\n\n.,,_,,,,,_ I.\n\n19/U public purpose, namely, \"for the construction of building~\n\n111y11111 B•lulrl for godowns and administrative office\". Thereafter proceedv. irgs appear to have been taken under s. 5-A of the Act and Stat• P':!, d,1:,•dhya an inquiry was made by the Collector. It may be mentioned that the acquisition proceedings were taken at the instance Wanclwo I. of the Premier Refractories of India Private Limited, Katni, which is a company. The Collector reported that the land was essential for the company and was needed for a public purpose and the objections of the land-owners has no S!!bst ance. He therefore recommended that a declaration under s. 6 of the Act might be made.\n\nHe also reported that a draft agreement to be executed between the company and the Government as required by s. 41 of the Act was being sub milted along with a draft notification under s. 6. This\n\nreport was made on October 17, 1960.\n\nOn December 3. 1960, the notification under s. 6 was issued stating that the State Government was satisfied that the land described in the annexure to the notification was required for a public pur pose, namely, for the construction of buildings for godowns and administrative office, and hence the notification was issued. It may be noticed that the notification under s. 6 did not say that the land was required for a company. Thereupon the appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court on March 20, 1960, and their main contentions were two, namely. II) that the notification under s. 6 did not describe the land to be acquired with sufficient particularity and was therefore of no effect, and (2) that the notification mentioned that the land was required for a public purpose, though in actual fact the land was required for a company, which was entirely different from Government and therefore was invalid. Soon after the writ petition was filed, the State Government issued a fresh notification on April 19, 1961. This notification was mainly under s. 17 ()) read with s. 17(4) of the Act, which provides that in case of urgency, the State Government may direct the Collector before the award is made under certain circumstances to take possession of a..'ly\n\nwaste or arable land needed for a public purpose or for a company. Curiously enough this notification stated that the State Government also directed that the provisions of ;,. S-A would not apply, though as we have already stated, all inquiry under s. S-A had already been made before the notl- 6cation of December 3, 1960 was issued.\n\nThe notificatioi\n\nfr.rther stated that it was declared under s. 6 of the Act that i964\n\nthe land was required for a public purpose, namely, \"for the Shyam IJehiul Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith\". s v. d I h h h 1 f . . h\" . tale of Ma h1•• t appears owever t at t e rea reason or 1ssmng t 1s notl Pradesh fication in this form was to make good the lacuna which appeared in the notification of December 3, 1960 inasmuch as the property to be acquired was not specified with suffi cient particularity in that notification. It may be noticed that this notification of April 19, 1961, treating it as a notification under s. 6 as well, nowhere specified that the land was re quired for a company; it only stated that the land was required for a public purpose, namely, for the Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith.\n\nWhen <the matter came to be argued before the High Court, the main point that was urged was that both the notifications under s. 6 of December 3, 1960 and April 19, 1961 were invalid, because the acquisition was not for a public purpose as stated therein; in fact the acquisition was for a company which was entirely different from Govern ment. The High Court apparently held that the substance of the notifications showed that the land was being required for a public purpose as well as for the punpose of a company. The High Court was further of the view that insofar as the declaration spoke of the acquisition of land for a public purpose it was ineffective, as admittedly the compensation for the property was to be paid wholly by the company and no part of it was to be paid out of public funds.\n\nEven so, the High Court held that the declarntion must be read in substance and in Jaw as one for acquisition of land for a company. namely, .the Premier Refractories of India\n\nPrivate Limited.\n\nIn this view of the mater, the High Court dismissed the writ petition.\n\nThe only question that has been urged before us on behalf of the appellants is that the High Coun was in error in reading the two notifications as in substance amounting to a declaration that the land was required for a company.\n\nSection 6 (1) of the Act requires that whenever any land is needed for a public purpose or for a com('any, a declaration 1hall be made to that effect. Further the proviso to s. 6(1) provides that no such declaration shall be made unless the\n\nWanchoo /,\n\n1964 compensation to be awarded for such i;>roperty is to be paid Shyam Beh•rl by a company, or wholly or partly out of pub!~ revenues\n\nl/State 0f' Madhya or .some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.\n\nPrad<1h ThIS clearly contemplates two kinds of declarations. 1n the Wanchoo I. first place, a declaration may be made that land is required for a public purpose, in which case in view of the proviso, the compensation to be awarded for the property to be acquired must come wholly or rpartly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.\n\nNo declaration under s. 6 for acquisition of land for a public purpose can be made unless either the whole or part of the compensation for the property to be acquired is to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority; see Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab ( 1). In the second place, the declaration under s. 6 . may be made that land is needed for a company in which case the entire compensation has to be paid by the company.\n\nIt is clear therefore that where the entire compensation is to be paid by a company, the notification under s. 6 must contain a declaration that the land is needed for a company.\n\nNo notification uner s. 6. can be made where the entire compensation is to lie paid by a company declaring that the acquisition is for a public purpose, for such a declaration requires that either wholly or in rpart, compensation must come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.\n\nIn the present case it is not in dispute that no part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority; on the other hand the whole compensation was to be paid by the company. Therefore the notification under s. 6 if it was to be valid in the circumstances of the present case had to declare that the land was needed for a company. No valid notification under s. 6 could be made in the circumstances of this case declaring that the 1and was needed for a qiublic purpose, for no part of compensation was to be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.\n\nThat is why the High Court felt that the notification under s. 6 declaring that the land was needed for a public purpose\n\n(I) [19611 2 S.C.R. 3S9.\n\n\"I'\n\nwould in the circumstances of this case be ineffective. But 1964 the High Court went on liO hold that the notifications under Shy\"'\" B1,_., s. 6 must in substance and in law be deemed to be for v. acquisition of land for a company in the present case. We Slate P °ttJ !{\"\"iJis are of opinion that this view of the High Court is incorrect. '-\"- There is nothing in either of the two notifications dated W411Clroo I.\n\nDecember 3, 1960 and April 19, 1961 to show that the land was needed for a company.\n\nThe notification of December 3, 1960 says in so many words that it was required for a rpublic purpose, namely, for the construction of buildings for godowns and administrative office.\n\nNo one reading this notification can possibly think that the land was needed for a company. Similarly the notification of April 19, 1961 says that the land was needed for a public purpose, namely, for the Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith. Now the company for which the land in this case was in fact required is the Premier Refractories of India Private Limted, Katni.\n\nThere is nothing in the notification of April 19, 1961 to show that the land was needed for this company or any other company. All that the notification of April 19, 1961 says is that the land was needed for a public purpose, and the public purr, iose mention- .,4 there was that the land was :equired for the Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith. The High Court thought that in substance this purpose showed that the land was required for the company mentioned above.\n\nBnt we do not see how, because the purpose specified was for the Premier Refractory Factory and work cbnnected therewith, it can be said that the notification declared that the land was needed for the company. It is not impossible for the Government or for a local body to own such a factory and construct works in connection therewith.\n\nThe mere fact that the public puripose mentioned was for the Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith, therefore, cannot mean that the land was needed for a company; as one reads the notification of April 19, 1961 one can only come to the conclusion that the land was needed for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of some work for a factory.\n\nThere is no mention of any company anywhere in this notification and it cannot necessarily be concluded that the Premier Refractory Factory was a com-\n\n134-159 S.C.--41\n\n1964 paLy, for a \"factory\" is something very different from a\n\nSllyam Behari \"company\" _and may belong to a company or to Govern- &.I• 0;\" Madhya ment or to a local. body or even to an individual. The mere\n\nPradesh fact that the pubhc purpose declared in the notification was\n\nWanchoo J. for the Premier Refractory FactQry and work connected therewith cannot therefore lead to the inference that the acquisition was for a company. It follows that when the two notifications declared that the land was needed for a public purpose in a case where no part of the compensation was .to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority, they were invalid in view of the proviso to s. 6 (1) of the Act.\n\nAll proceedings following on such notifications would be of no effect under the Act.\n\nFebruary, 3\n\nWe therefore allow -the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and quash the notifications under s. 6 of the Act and restrain the respondents from taking any steps towards the acquisition of the land notified thereunder. As however the point on which the appellants have succeeded was not specifically taken in the writ petition, we direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nMRS. M. N. CLUBW ALA AND ANR. v.\n\nFIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS.\n\n(K. SuBBA RAo AND J. R. MunHoLKAR JJ.)\n\nLicence or Lease-Provision requiring notice to vacate-If inconsistent with licence-Intention of parties-To be ascertained from Agree ment-lnference from circumstance.! and conduct, if formdl document absent-Exclusive possession if conclusive evidence of lease.\n\nIn disputes regarding extra fees in respect of meet-stalls in a private market owned by the appellants, the respondents-tall-holders filed a sujt alleging that the relationship between them and the appellants was that of lessees and lessors; while according to the appellants, the respondents", "total_entities": 63, "entities": [{"text": "Hori CliaNn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hori CliaNn\n\nK111'11fl'\n\nStol• of Biliar\n\nGa/•ndragadkor\n\nC.I.\n\nJNI\n\nunsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely on the confession of a co-accused person, the presumption of innocence which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence assists the accused person and compels the Court to render the verdict that the charge is not proved against him, and so, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt."}}, {"text": "SHY AM BEHAR! AND 01HERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 707, "end_char": 731, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHYAM BEHARI AND 0THERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 733, "end_char": 767, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 796, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 798, "end_char": 811, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 824, "end_char": 832, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 833, "end_char": 840, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 845, "end_char": 871, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1010, "end_char": 1030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 4, 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1045, "end_char": 1056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "December 3, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1099, "end_char": 1115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government issued a notification on December 3, 1960 under\n\n1."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1459, "end_char": 1463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "April 19, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1845, "end_char": 1859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the writ petition Was filed, the State Government issued a fresh notification on April 19, 1961 mainly under s. 17(1) read withs."}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1873, "end_char": 1881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2556, "end_char": 2560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2780, "end_char": 2784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2874, "end_char": 2878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 459", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3210, "end_char": 3229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3350, "end_char": 3354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3718, "end_char": 3746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3921, "end_char": 3931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal, for the a'?pellant."}}, {"text": "l. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3954, "end_char": 3966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Rajani Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3995, "end_char": 4007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajani Patel and l. N. Shroff, for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4109, "end_char": 4117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nW ANCHOO J .-This is an appeal by special leave 8gainst the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4324, "end_char": 4328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chhaparwah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4467, "end_char": 4477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I of 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), Their case was that they were owners of certain lands in Chhaparwah."}}, {"text": "July 8, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4482, "end_char": 4494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 8, 1960, a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Act to the effect that certain land in village Chhaparwah was required for a\n\n.,,,,,,,"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4528, "end_char": 4532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanclwo I.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4977, "end_char": 4987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that the acquisition proceedings were taken at the instance Wanclwo I. of the Premier Refractories of India Private Limited, Katni, which is a company."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5280, "end_char": 5284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5497, "end_char": 5501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 17, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\nreport was made on October 17, 1960."}}, {"text": "December 3. 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5550, "end_char": 5566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 3."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5591, "end_char": 5595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5917, "end_char": 5921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 20, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6044, "end_char": 6058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court on March 20, 1960, and their main contentions were two, namely."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6137, "end_char": 6141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6608, "end_char": 6613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6628, "end_char": 6636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7215, "end_char": 7219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyam IJehiul Premier Refractory Factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7303, "end_char": 7343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notificatioi\n\nfr.rther stated that it was declared under s. 6 of the Act that i964\n\nthe land was required for a public purpose, namely, \"for the Shyam IJehiul Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith\"."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7796, "end_char": 7800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8135, "end_char": 8139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Premier Refractories of India\n\nPrivate Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8958, "end_char": 9004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "namely, .the Premier Refractories of India\n\nPrivate Limited."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9309, "end_char": 9318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9483, "end_char": 9490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10170, "end_char": 10174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10497, "end_char": 10501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10728, "end_char": 10732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10821, "end_char": 10825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11391, "end_char": 11395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11542, "end_char": 11546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11837, "end_char": 11841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12070, "end_char": 12074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Katni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13000, "end_char": 13005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now the company for which the land in this case was in fact required is the Premier Refractories of India Private Limted, Katni."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14652, "end_char": 14659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mere\n\nPradesh fact that the pubhc purpose declared in the notification was\n\nWanchoo J. for the Premier Refractory FactQry and work connected therewith cannot therefore lead to the inference that the acquisition was for a company.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15085, "end_char": 15089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15313, "end_char": 15317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15686, "end_char": 15698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. SuBBA RAo AND J. R. MunHoLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. R. MunHoLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15703, "end_char": 15718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. SuBBA RAo AND J. R. MunHoLKAR JJ.)"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_642_654_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n1964 paLy, for a \"factory\" is something very different from a\n\nSllyam Behari \"company\" _and may belong to a company or to Govern- &.I• 0;\" Madhya ment or to a local. body or even to an individual. The mere\n\nPradesh fact that the pubhc purpose declared in the notification was\n\nWanchoo J. for the Premier Refractory FactQry and work connected therewith cannot therefore lead to the inference that the acquisition was for a company. It follows that when the two notifications declared that the land was needed for a public purpose in a case where no part of the compensation was .to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority, they were invalid in view of the proviso to s. 6 (1) of the Act.\n\nAll proceedings following on such notifications would be of no effect under the Act.\n\nFebruary, 3\n\nWe therefore allow -the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and quash the notifications under s. 6 of the Act and restrain the respondents from taking any steps towards the acquisition of the land notified thereunder. As however the point on which the appellants have succeeded was not specifically taken in the writ petition, we direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nMRS. M. N. CLUBW ALA AND ANR. v.\n\nFIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS.\n\n(K. SuBBA RAo AND J. R. MunHoLKAR JJ.)\n\nLicence or Lease-Provision requiring notice to vacate-If inconsistent with licence-Intention of parties-To be ascertained from Agree ment-lnference from circumstance.! and conduct, if formdl document absent-Exclusive possession if conclusive evidence of lease.\n\nIn disputes regarding extra fees in respect of meet-stalls in a private market owned by the appellants, the respondents-tall-holders filed a sujt alleging that the relationship between them and the appellants was that of lessees and lessors; while according to the appellants, the respondents\n\nwere only their licensees.\n\nThe stall-holders have been executing agreements, signed by the stall-holders alone, in which the payment is styled as rent. Though the building in which the market is located is owned by the appellants it could not be used as a market for the sale of meat or comestibles without the permission of the municipal council, and a number of duties have been imposed upon the owners including that of closing the market and tha.t market functioned only \\Vi thin he stated hours.\n\nThe City Civil Court Judge finding that the respondents were bare licensees dismissed their suit. His decision was affirmed in appeal. On a further appt:JI the High Court reversed the findings of the c:ourts below holding that from the general tenor of the document the terms created onJy a tenancy in respect of the stalls and not a mere licence or permissive occupation saying that if the occupation of the stall-holders was only permissive the condition as to the payment of rent, eviction for default in payment of rent for more than 3 days, the provision for annual repairs being carried out by the landlord, the further provision that repaii\" that might be occasioned by the carelessness of the respondents should be carried out at their expense and the adequate provision for 30 days notice for vacating the stalls if they were required by the landlord would all seem to be inconsistent and irrelevant. On appeal by !<pecial leave:\n\nHeld: (i) While it is true that the essence of a licence is that it i1 revocable at the will of the granter the provision in the licence that the licensee would be entitled to a notice before being required to vacate is not inconsistent with a licence, and the mere necessity of giving such a notice would not indicate that the transaction was a lea.1:; e.\n\nWhether an agreement creates between the part; es the relationship of landlord and tenant or me1ely that of licensor and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties, which has to be :.t!)cert::iined on a consideration of all the relevant provisions in the agreement. In the absence, however, of a formal document the intention of the parties must be inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties.\n\n(ii) The fact that a person has exclusive possession is not conclusive evidence of bis being a lessee. If, however, exclusive possession to which a person is entitled under an agreement with a landlord is coupled with an interest in the property, the agreement would be construed not as a mere licence but as a lease.\n\nAssociated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R. N. Kapur, [1960] I S.C.R. 368 Errington v. Errington and Woods, [1952] 1 K. B. 290, Cobb. v. Lane [1952] 1 All. E.R. 1199, Clove v. Theatrical Proprietors Ltd. and Westby & Co. Ltd. [1936] 3 All. E.R. 483. Smith & Son v. The Assessment Com mittee for the Parish of Lambeth, [1882-83] 10 Q.B.D. 327 and l'urum Subba Rao v. The Elum Municipal Co1mcil, I.LR. [1956] A.P. 5lS, referred to.\n\n(iii) In view of the duties cast upon the landlord and the circumstances of the present case the intention of the parties was to bring into existence merely a licence and :iot a lease and the word 'rent' was used loosely for 'fee'.\n\nM. N. Clubwaw\n\nFida HusJtZi-n,\n\nSaheb\n\n1~, CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 151 .\n\nIt. N. C\"\"-J. of 1963 .\n\n'\"\"' H-'11 s.Mll Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated February 17, 19:i9 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 252 of 1957.\n\nS. T.' Desai and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants.\n\nR. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondelllts Nos. 1-6.\n\nFebruary 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nlludfrllllnt 1.\n\nM UDHOLKAR J .-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Madras reversing the decisions of the courts below and granting a number of reliefs to the plaintiffs-respondents.\n\nThe main point which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs-respondents are the lessees of the appellants who were defendants 4 and 5 in the trial coun or only their licensees.\n\nIn order to appreciate the point certain facts need to be stated.\n\nThe appellants are the owners of a private market situate in Madras known as Zam Bazar Market. There are about 500 odd stalls in that market and meat, fish, vegetables, etc., are sold in that market. The practice of the appellants has been to farm out to contractors the right to collect dues from the users of the stalls. Defendants 1 to 3 to the uit were the contractors appointed by the appellants for collecting rent at the time of the institution of the suit. Two of these persons died and their legal representatives have not been impleaded in appeal as they have no interest in the subject-matter of litigation. The third has been transposed as .respondent No. 7 to this appeal.\n\nThey were, however, alive when the special leave petition was filed and were shown as appellants 1 to 3, but two of them were struck out from the record. after their death and the third transposed as Respondent No. 7. Though the building in which the mjll'ket is located is owned by the appellants it cannot\n\nbe used as a market for the purpose of sale of meat or any 1964 other article of human consumption without the permission 11• N. Clllbnla of the municipal council under s. 303 of the Madras City v.\n\nMunicipal Act, 1919 (hereafter referred to as the Act) .\n\nF\"ula s1/..'f\"\" Before such a permission is granted the owner has to obtain a licence from the Municipal Commissioner and under.take Jludholkor 1• to comply with the terms of the licence. The licence granted to him would be for one year at a time but he would be eligible for renewal at the expiry of the period. Section 306 of the Act confers ipower on the Commissioner to require the owner, occupier or farmer of a private market for the sale of any animal or article of food to do a number of things, for example to keep it in a clean and proper state, to remove all filth and rubbish therefrom, etc. Breach of any condition of the licence or of any order made by the Commissioner would result, under s. 307, in suspension of\n\nthe licence and thereafter it would not be lawful for any such person to keep open any such market.\n\nSection 308 9f the Act confers powers on the Commissioner to make\n\nregulations for markets for various purposes such as fixing the days and hours on and during which any market may be held or kept for use, requiring that in the market building separate areas be set apart for different classes of articles. requiring every market building to be 1rept in a clean and proper state by removing filth and rubbish therefrom and requiring the provision of proper ventilation in the market building and of passages of sufficiellJI width between the stalls therein for the convenient use of the building.\n\nWe are told that regulations have been made by the Commissioner in pursuance of the ipowers conferred upon him by\n\nS. 308 of the Act. Thus as a result of the Act as well as the regulations made thereunder a number of duties appear to have been placed upon the owners of private markets.\n\nIt would also appear that failure to comply with any of the requirements of the statute or the regulations would bri.'lg on the consequence of suspension or even cancellation of the licence. We are mentioning all this because it will have some bearing upon the i.riteripretation of the documents on which the plaintiffs have relied in support of the contention that the relationship between them and l:he appellants is thdt of tenants and landlord.\n\n196'1 The suit out of which this appeal arises came to be filed M. N. Clubwala because disputes arose between the plaintiffs and the defendants 1 to 3 who became the contractors for collection of rent as from February 9, 1956. These disputes were with regard to extra carcass fees and extra fees for Sunday Gutha\n\nFida Hussain\n\nSaheb\n\nMudholkar J. which were claimed by the contractors.\n\nThe respondents further alleged that the relationship between them and the appellants was, as already stated, that of lessees and lessors while according to the appellants, the respondents were oniy their licensees.\n\nThe respondents further challenged the extra levies made by the contractors, i.e., the original defendants 1 1to 3 who are no longer in the picture. The reliefs sought by the respondents were for an injunction against the appellants and the defendants 1 to 3 restraining them from realising the extra levies and for further restraining them from interfering with their possession over their respective stalls as long as they continued to pay their dues.\n\nThe First Additional City Civil Court Judge before whom the suit had been filed found in the respondents' favour that the extra fees sought to be levied by the contractor were sanctioned neither by the provisions of the Municipal Act nor by usage but upon the finding that the respondents werr b;:re hcensees dismissed their suit.\n\nThe appellate bench of the City Civil Court before whom the respondents had preferred an appeal affirmed the lower court's decision.\n\nThe High Court reversed the decision of the courts below and in the decree passed by it pursuant to its judgment granted a number of reliefs to the respondents.\n\nHere we are concerned only with reliefs (ii) (e). (f) and ( g) since the appellants are not intereted in the other reliefs.\n\nThose reliefs are :\n\n\"(ii) that Je respondents defendants, in particular defendants 1 to 3 (respondents 1 to 3) be and hereby are restrained from in any manner interfering with the appellants-iplaintiffs 1 to 4, 6 and 7 carrying on their trade peacefully in their respective stalls at Zam Bazar Market, Royapettah, Madras and imposing any restrictions or limitations upon their absolute right to carry on business as mentioned hereunder :\n\n6 S.C.R\n\n(e)\n\nInterfering with the possession and enjoyment of the respective stalls by the appellants :; ilaintiffs 1 to 4, 6 and 7 so long as they pay the rents fixed for each stall;\n\n(f) increasing the rents fixed for the appellantsplaintiffs' 1 to 4, 6 and 7 stalls under the written agreements between the said plaintiffs and defendants 4 and 5;\n\n(g) evicting of the appellants-plaintiffs 1 to 4, 6 and 7 or disturbing the '?laintiffs and their articles in their stalls by defendants 1 to 3.\"\n\nFurther we are concerned in this case only with the relationship between the meat vendors occupying and using some of the stalls in the market (as the plaintiffs-respondents belong to this category) and the appellants-landlords. What relationship subsists or subsisted between the appellants and other stall-holders vending other commodities is not a matter which can be regarded as relevant for the purpose of deciding the dis?ute between the appellants and the respondents.\n\nIt is common ground that under the licence granted by the Municipal Corporation, the market is to remain open between 4 A.M. and 11 P .M. and that at the end of the day the stall-holders have all to leave the place which has then to be swept and disinfected and that the gates of the market have to be locked. None of the stall-holders or their servants is allowed to stay in the market after closing time. Jn point of fact this market used to be opened at 5 A.M. l!lld closed at 10 P.M. by which time all the stall-holders had to go away. It is also common ground that the stalls are open stalls and one stall is separated from the other only by a low brick wall and thus there can be no question of a stallholder being able to lock up his stall before leaving the market at the end of the day. -The stall-holders were required to remove the carcasses brought by them for sale by the time the market closed.\n\nMeat being an article liable to speedy decay the stall-holders generally used to 5nish their\n\nM. N. Club,..,,,,\n\nFida JI uuairt\n\nSah6b\n\nMudlroll:ar J.\n\n19~ business of vending during the afternoon itself and remove II. N. Clubwa/4 the carcasses. They, however, used to leave in their stalls\n\nFidll Iiu.uain wooden blocks for chopping meat, weighing scales, meat Swb choppers and other implements used by them in connection JllU/holur J. with their business. These used to be left either in boxes or almirahs kept in the stall and locked up therein.\n\nIt is also an admitted fact that some of the stall-holders have been carrying on business uninterruptedly in their stalls for as long as forty years while some of them have not been in occupation for more than five years. It is in evidence that these stall-holders have been executing fresh agreements governing their use and occupation of stalls and payment of what is styled in the agreements as rent whenever a new contractor was engaged by , the appellants for collecting rents.\n\nThe next thing to be mentioned is that the agreements referred to the money or charges payable by the stall-holders to the landlords as 'rent' and not as 'fee'. It has, however, to be noted that the dues payable accrue from day to day.\n\nThus in Ex.A-I the rent of Re. I/- is stid to be payable every day by 1.00 P.M. In all these agreements there is a condition that in case there is default in payment of rent for three days the stall-holder was liable to be evicted by being given 24 hours' notice.\n\nA further condition in the agreements is that a stall-holder may be required by the landlord to vacate the stall after giving him 30 days' notice.\n\nThere is a provision also regarding repairs in these agreements. The liability for the annual repairs is placed by the agreement upon the landlord and these repairs are ordinarily to be carried out in the month of June every year. Where, however, repairs became necessary on account of the carelessness of a stall-holder they were to be carried out at the expense of that stall-holder. It may be also mentioned that these agreements are obtained by the contractors from the stall-holders in favour of the landlord and bear the signatures only of the stall-holde111.\n\nIt was contended before us by Mr. R. Gopalakrishnan that in order to ascertain the relationship between the appellants and the respondents we must look at the agree-\n\nDients alone and that it was not open to us to look into extraneous matters such as tpe surrounding circumstances.\n\nIt is claimed on behalf of the respondents that the lease in their favour is of a permanent nature. But if that were so, the absence of a registered instrument would stand in their way and they would not be permitted to prove the existence of that lease by parol evidence.\n\nFrom the fact, however, that with every change in the contractor a fresh agreement was executed by the stall-holders it would be legititnate to infer that whtever the nature of the right conferred by the agreement upon the stall-holders, it could not be said to be one which entitled them to permanent occupation of the stalls. It could either be a licence as contended for by the appellant or a tenancy from month to month.\n\nIn either case there would be no necessity for the execution of a written agreement signed. by both the parties.\n\nHer~, the agreements in question are in writing, though they have been signed by the stall-holders alpne. All the same, 9ral evidence to prove their terms would be excluded by s. '92 of the Evidence Act. To that extent Mr. Gopalakrishnan is right.\n\nThough that is so, under the 6th proviso to that section the surrounding circumstances can be taken into consideration for ascertaining the meaning of the word 'rent' used in the agreements.\n\nIndeed, the very circumstance that rent is to fall due every day and in default of payment of ent for three-· days the stall-holder is liable to be evicted by being given only 24 hours' notice it would not be easy to say that this 'rent' is payable in respect of a lease.\n\nOn the other hand, what is called rent may well be only a fee payable under a licence. At any rate this circumstance shows that there is ambiguity in the document and on this ground also surrounding circumstances could be looked into for ascertaining the real relationshir,> between the parties.\n\nIndeed, the City Civil Court has gone into the surrounding circumstances and it is largely on the view it took of them that it found in favour of the appellants.\n\nThe High Court, however, has based itself upon the agreements themselves.\n\nTo starit with if pointed out-and in our opinion rightly-that the use of the word 'rent' in - Ex, A-1 did not carry the respondents' case far. The reasons.\n\n196f\n\nM. N. Cl\"\"\"\"\"-\n\nFida Hu.aaia\n\nSaireb\n\nMudlwllcar 1-\n\n M. N. Clubwala v.\n\nFida Huuain\n\nSaheb\n\nMudholluir J.\n\ngiven by it for coming to the conclusion that the transaction was a lease, are briefly as follows :\n\n( 1) Notice was required to be given to the stallholder before he could be asked to vacate even on the ground of non-payment of rent;\n\n(2) the annual repairs were to be carried out by the landlord only in the month of June;\n\n(3) the stall-holder was liable to carry out the repairs at his own expense when they are occasioned by his carelessness;\n\n( 4) even if the landlord wanted the stalls for his own pul'pose he could obtain possession not immediately but only after giving 30 days' notice to the stall-holder;\n\n( 5) the possession of the stalls by the responde.'lts\n\nhad been continuous and unbroken by virtue of the terms of the agreement and that the terms of the original agreement were not shown to have been substituted by fresh agreements executed by the respondents.\n\nThe High Court, therefore, held that from the general tenor of the documents it is fairly clear that as between the appellants and the rspondents the terms created only a tenancy in respect of the stalls and not a mere licence or permissive occupation. After saying that if the occupation of the stall-holders was only ipermissive the condition as to payment of rent, eviction for default in payment of rent for more than 3 days, the provision for annual repairs being carried out by the landlord, the further provision that repairs that might be occasioned by the carelessness of the respondents should be carried out at their expense and the adequate provision for 30 days' notice for vacating the stalls if they were required by the landlord would all seem to be inconsistent and irrelevant, it observed :\n\n\"As a matter of fact, there is no evidence whatsoever to show that any of these plaintiffs were at any time turned out of their possession of their\n\nstalls at the will of the landlords or for default of any of the terms and conditions stipulated in the agreements.\n\nThe specific provision for 30 days' notice for vacating and delivering . possession seems to be conclusive 0f the fact that the plaintiffs were to occupy the stalls as permanent tenants and not as mere licensees.\n\nThe terms of the agreements further disclose that the plaintiffs were to be in exclusive possession of these stalls for the purpose of their trade as long as they comply with the terms and until there was a notice of termination of their tenancy in res;>ect of the shops held by them.\n\nThe very tenor of the agreements, the intention behind the terms contained in the agreements and the measure of control established by the terms of the agreements, all point only to the fact that the plaintiffs were to be in undisturbed and exclusive possession of the st:ills as long as they paid the rent and until there was a valid termination of their right to hold the stalls as such tenants.\"\n\nWhile it is true that the essence of a licence is that it is revocable at the will of the grantor the provision in the licence that the licensee would be entitled to a notice before being required to vacate is not inconsistent with a licence.\n\nIn England it has been held that a contractual licence may be revocable or irrevocable according to the express or implied terms of the contract between the parties.\n\nIt has further been held that if the licensee under a revocable licence has brought property on to the land. he is entitled to notice of revocation and to a reasonable time for removing his pro; ierty, and in which to make arrangements to carry on his business elsewhere. (See Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd edn. vol. 23, p. 431). Thus the mere necessity of giving a notice to a licensee requiring him to vacate the licensed premises would not indicate that the transaction was a lease. Indeed, s. 62 ( c) of the Indian Easements Act.\n\nI 882 itself provides that a licence is deemed to be revoked 'Vhere it has been either granted for a limited period, or\n\nM. N. Clubwai.\n\nFida II Ul!ain\n\nSahtb\n\n1964 acquired on condition that it shall become void on the M. N.Chuiwa/a performance or non-performance of a specified act, and the Fida liuualn period . expires •. or the con.dition is fulfille~. !n the ar.ee- SIJMb ments lil question ¢he reqwrement of a notice 1s a condition and if that condition is fulfilled the licence will be deemed Mudliolkar J. to be revoked under s. 62.\n\nIt would seem that it is this iparticular requirement in the agreements which has gone a long way to influence the High Court's finding that the transaction was a lease. Whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship of landlord. and tenant or merely that of licensor and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties.\n\nThis intention has to be ascertained on a consideration of all the relevant provisions in the agreement. In the absence, however, of a formal document the intention of the parties must be inferred from .the circumstances and conduct of the parties. (Ibid p. 427).\n\nHere the terms of the document evidencing the agreement between the parties are not clear and so the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties hnve also to be borne in mind for ascertaining the real relationship between the parties. Again, as already stated, the documents relied upon being merely agreements executed unilaterally by the stall-holders in favour of the landlords they. cannot be said to be formal agreements between the parties.\n\nWe must, therefore, look at the surrounding circumstances.\n\nOne of those circumstances is whether actual possession of the stalls can be said to have cop.tinued with the landlords or whether it had passed on to the stall-holders.\n\nEven if it had passed to a person, his right to exclusive possession would not be conclusive evidence of the existence of a tenancy though that would be a consideration of first importance. That is what was held in Errington v. Errington and Woods( 1 ) and Cobb v. Lane(2 ). These decisions reiterate. the view which was taken in two earlier decisions: Clore v.\n\nTheatrical Properties Ltd. and Westby & Co. Ltd., (3 ) and Smith & Son v. The Assessment Committee for the Parish of Lambeth('). Mr. S. T. Desai appearing for the\n\nappellants also relied on the decision of the High Court of\n\n(I) [1957) I K.B. 290.\n\n(2) [1952) I All. E.R. 1190.\n\n(3) [1936] 3 All. E.R. 483.\n\n(4) (1882-83) 10 Q.B.D. 327 at 330.\n\nAndhra Pradesh in Vurum Subba Rao v. The Eluru Municipal Council ( 1) as laying down the same proposition.\n\nThat was a case in which the High Court held that stallholders in the municipal market who were liable to pay what was called rent to the municipality were not lessees but merely licensees. The fact, therefore, that a stall-holder has exclusive possession of the stall is not conclusive eVidence of his being a lessee. If, however, exclusive possession to which a person is entitled under an agreement with a landlord is coupled with an interest in the r;>roperty, the agreement would be construed not as a mere licence but as a lease. (See Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R. N.\n\nKapoor(').\n\nIn the case before us, however, while it is true that each stall-holder is entitled to the exclusive use of his stall from day to day it is Clear that he has no right to use it as and when he chooses to do so or to sleep in the stall during the night after closure of the market or enter the stall during the night after 11-00 P .M. at his pleasure.\n\nHe can use it only during a stated period every day and subject to several conditions. These circumstances, coupled with the fact that the responsibility for cleaning the stalls, disinfecting them and of closing the market in which the stalls are situate is placed by the Act, the regulations made thereunder and the licence issued to the landlords, is on the landlords, would indicate that the legal possession of the stalls must also be deemed to have been with the landlords and not with the stall-holders. The right which the stallholders had was to the exclusive use of the stalls during stated hours and nothing more. Looking at the matter in a slightly different way it would seem that it could never have been the intention of the parties to grant anything more than a licence to the stall-holders. The duties cast on the landlord by the Act are onerous and for performing those duties they were entitled to free and easy access to the stalls.\n\nThey are also required to see to it that the market functioned only within the stated hours and not beyond them and also that the q:iremises were used for no purpose other than of vending comestibles.\n\nA further duty which lay upon the landlords was to guard the entrance to the market.\n\nThese duties\n\n(I) I.L.R. [1956] A.P. 515 at pp. 520-4.\n\n(2) [1960) I S.C.R. 368.\n\nM. N. Clu,,.,.,.\n\nFida HuSNirt sa. .. b\n\nMudl10lkar I.\n\nM. N. Cl11bwala\n\nFida Hussain\n\nSalieb\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nFt!bruary, 4\n\ncould not be effectively carried out by the landlord by parting with possession in favour of the stail-holders by reason of which the performance by the landlords of their duties and obligations could easily be rendered impossible if the stall-hoiders adopted an unreasonable attitude. If the landlords failed to perform their obligations they would be exposed to penalties under the Act and also >too<l in danger of having their licences revoked.\n\nCould, in such circumstances, the landlords have ever intended to part with possession in favour of the stall-holders and thus place themselves at the mercy of these people? We are, therefore, of the opinion that the intention of the parties was to bring into existence merely a licence and not a lease and the word 'rent' was used loosely for 'fee'.\n\nUjJon this view we must allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the High Court and dismiss the suit of the respondents in so far as it relates to reliefs (ii) (e), (f) and (g) granted by the High Court against the appellants are concerned.\n\nSo far as the remaining reliefs granted by the High Court are concerned, its decree will stand.\n\nIn the result we allow the a?peal to the extent indicated above but in the particular circumstances of the case we order costs throughout will be borne by the parties as incurred.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.\n\nTHANSINGH NA THMAL AND ORS.\n\nA. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nSale& Tax-Assessments made by Superintendent of Taxes-Appeab\n\nreiected by As, fistant Commissioner of Taxes and Revisions re; ected by Commissioner of Taxes, Assam-No reference to High Court", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "Sllyam Behari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 99, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 paLy, for a \"factory\" is something very different from a\n\nSllyam Behari \"company\" _and may belong to a company or to Govern- &.I• 0;\" Madhya ment or to a local."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 733, "end_char": 737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 961, "end_char": 965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MRS. M. N. CLUBW ALA AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1270, "end_char": 1298, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MRS. M. N. CLUBWALA AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1304, "end_char": 1330, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1334, "end_char": 1346, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. N. Clubwaw", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5142, "end_char": 5155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Clubwaw\n\nFida HusJtZi-n,\n\nSaheb\n\n1~, CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "M. N. Clubwala"}}, {"text": "S. T.' Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5419, "end_char": 5431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T.' Desai and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "S. T.' Desai"}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5436, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T.' Desai and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5476, "end_char": 5493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondelllts Nos.", "canonical_name": "R. Gopalakrishnan"}}, {"text": "M UDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M UDHOLKAR J .-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court of Madras reversing the decisions of the courts below and granting a number of reliefs to the plaintiffs-respondents."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6145, "end_char": 6151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are the owners of a private market situate in Madras known as Zam Bazar Market."}}, {"text": "s. 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7249, "end_char": 7255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipal Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7279, "end_char": 7298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Act, 1919", "statute": "Municipal Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "Section 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7650, "end_char": 7661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Act, 1919", "statute": "Municipal Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8041, "end_char": 8047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Act, 1919", "statute": "Municipal Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "Section 308", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8168, "end_char": 8179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Act, 1919", "statute": "Municipal Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "S. 308", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8881, "end_char": 8887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. N. Clubwala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9568, "end_char": 9582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196'1 The suit out of which this appeal arises came to be filed M. N. Clubwala because disputes arose between the plaintiffs and the defendants 1 to 3 who became the contractors for collection of rent as from February 9, 1956.", "canonical_name": "M. N. Clubwala"}}, {"text": "February 9, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9713, "end_char": 9729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196'1 The suit out of which this appeal arises came to be filed M. N. Clubwala because disputes arose between the plaintiffs and the defendants 1 to 3 who became the contractors for collection of rent as from February 9, 1956."}}, {"text": "Saheb\n\nMudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9832, "end_char": 9848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These disputes were with regard to extra carcass fees and extra fees for Sunday Gutha\n\nFida Hussain\n\nSaheb\n\nMudholkar J. which were claimed by the contractors."}}, {"text": "Royapettah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11620, "end_char": 11630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those reliefs are :\n\n\"(ii) that Je respondents defendants, in particular defendants 1 to 3 (respondents 1 to 3) be and hereby are restrained from in any manner interfering with the appellants-iplaintiffs 1 to 4, 6 and 7 carrying on their trade peacefully in their respective stalls at Zam Bazar Market, Royapettah, Madras and imposing any restrictions or limitations upon their absolute right to carry on business as mentioned hereunder :\n\n6 S.C.R\n\n(e)\n\nInterfering with the possession and enjoyment of the respective stalls by the appellants :; ilaintiffs 1 to 4, 6 and 7 so long as they pay the rents fixed for each stall;\n\n(f) increasing the rents fixed for the appellantsplaintiffs' 1 to 4, 6 and 7 stalls under the written agreements between the said plaintiffs and defendants 4 and 5;\n\n(g) evicting of the appellants-plaintiffs 1 to 4, 6 and 7 or disturbing the '?"}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15928, "end_char": 15945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended before us by Mr. R. Gopalakrishnan that in order to ascertain the relationship between the appellants and the respondents we must look at the agree-\n\nDients alone and that it was not open to us to look into extraneous matters such as tpe surrounding circumstances.", "canonical_name": "R. Gopalakrishnan"}}, {"text": "Gopalakrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17214, "end_char": 17228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To that extent Mr. Gopalakrishnan is right."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21615, "end_char": 21622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England it has been held that a contractual licence may be revocable or irrevocable according to the express or implied terms of the contract between the parties."}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22274, "end_char": 22279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Easements Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22292, "end_char": 22312, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. N. Clubwai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22436, "end_char": 22449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 882 itself provides that a licence is deemed to be revoked 'Vhere it has been either granted for a limited period, or\n\nM. N. Clubwai.", "canonical_name": "M. N. Clubwala"}}, {"text": "Mudliolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22816, "end_char": 22826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n the ar.ee- SIJMb ments lil question ¢he reqwrement of a notice 1s a condition and if that condition is fulfilled the licence will be deemed Mudliolkar J. to be revoked under s. 62."}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22850, "end_char": 22855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24672, "end_char": 24683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S. T. Desai appearing for the\n\nappellants also relied on the decision of the High Court of\n\n(I) [1957) I K.B. 290.", "canonical_name": "S. T.' Desai"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24884, "end_char": 24898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Andhra Pradesh in Vurum Subba Rao v. The Eluru Municipal Council ( 1) as laying down the same proposition."}}, {"text": "M. N. Clu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27261, "end_char": 27270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Clu,,.,.,.", "canonical_name": "M. N. Clubwala"}}, {"text": "Cl11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27323, "end_char": 27327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fida Hussain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27334, "end_char": 27346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b\n\nMudl10lkar I.\n\nM. N. Cl11bwala\n\nFida Hussain\n\nSalieb\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nFt!bruary, 4\n\ncould not be effectively carried out by the landlord by parting with possession in favour of the stail-holders by reason of which the performance by the landlords of their duties and obligations could easily be rendered impossible if the stall-hoiders adopted an unreasonable attitude."}}, {"text": "THANSINGH NA THMAL", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28730, "end_char": 28748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THANSINGH NA THMAL AND ORS."}}, {"text": "A. MAZID", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28759, "end_char": 28767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28795, "end_char": 28815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28823, "end_char": 28836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28838, "end_char": 28847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J.C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28856, "end_char": 28865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28870, "end_char": 28892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_654_666_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "M. N. Cl11bwala\n\nFida Hussain\n\nSalieb\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nFt!bruary, 4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\ncould not be effectively carried out by the landlord by parting with possession in favour of the stail-holders by reason of which the performance by the landlords of their duties and obligations could easily be rendered impossible if the stall-hoiders adopted an unreasonable attitude. If the landlords failed to perform their obligations they would be exposed to penalties under the Act and also >too<l in danger of having their licences revoked.\n\nCould, in such circumstances, the landlords have ever intended to part with possession in favour of the stall-holders and thus place themselves at the mercy of these people? We are, therefore, of the opinion that the intention of the parties was to bring into existence merely a licence and not a lease and the word 'rent' was used loosely for 'fee'.\n\nUjJon this view we must allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the High Court and dismiss the suit of the respondents in so far as it relates to reliefs (ii) (e), (f) and (g) granted by the High Court against the appellants are concerned.\n\nSo far as the remaining reliefs granted by the High Court are concerned, its decree will stand.\n\nIn the result we allow the a?peal to the extent indicated above but in the particular circumstances of the case we order costs throughout will be borne by the parties as incurred.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.\n\nTHANSINGH NA THMAL AND ORS.\n\nA. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nSale& Tax-Assessments made by Superintendent of Taxes-Appeab\n\nreiected by As, fistant Commissioner of Taxes and Revisions re; ected by Commissioner of Taxes, Assam-No reference to High Court\n\ndemanded although provided for in the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947- 1964 Writ Pelitions filed in High Court under Art. 226-EUect of- Than Sinth Scheme of the Act-Tax on sales whether ultra vires-When can v. new points other than those on which certificate was granted by Supdt. of Taus the High Court, be allowed to be raised in Supreme Court- Extent of jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 226-Constitution of India, Art. 226--Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Act 17 of 1947).\n\nExplanation to s. 2(12).\n\nThe <ti)pellants who are merchants carrying on business as dealers in jute in Calcutta, submitted returns of turnover for purposes of salestax due under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, but as they did not comply with the requisition of the Superintendent of Taxes to produce their books, the latter made a ''best judgment assessment\" under s. 17 ( 4) of the Act. Their appeals to the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes and revision petitions to the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam were dismissed. The appellants then moved the High Court of Assam by petitions under Art. 226 and contended that Explanation to s. 2 ( 12) of the Act was ultra vires the Assam Legislature and that the tax could not be levied on sales irrespective of the place where the contracts were made. They also contended that the finding of the Commissioner that the goods were actually in the State of Assam at the time when the contract was made was based on mere speculation.\n\nThe writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court and the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court with certificate under Art. 13 2 ( 1 ) of the Constitution.\n\nBefore the Supreme Court the appellants applied for leave under Art. 132(3) of the Constitution to challenge the correctness of the decision of the High Court that the goods were actually within the State of Assam when the contracts were made.\n\nHeld: (i) Leave under Art. 132(3) be refused and the appeal must be restricted to the question of Jaw as to the interpretation of the Constitution, certified by the High Court.\n\nIf these questions were desired to be raised the appellants ought to have moved the Commissioner to refer the case to the High Court under s. 32 of the Act. They could have moved the High Court if the Commissioner refused to refer the case to the High Court.\n\nThe Act provided machinery for obtaining relief and the same had to be re.sorted to and could not be allowed to be by-passed.\n\nOrdinarily, the High Court does not entertain a petition for a writ under Art. 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy~ The High Court does not generally enter upon questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the rights to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 act as a court of appeal against tbe decision of a court or Tribunal correct errors of fact.\n\n1964 The scheme of the Assam Sales Tax Act iS that all questions of rAiat Silllll fact are to be decided by the taxing authorities. The opinion of the Y.\n\nHigh Court can be obtained on questions of law arisiog out of the s.,41. of Tazt1 decisions of the taxing authorities. The High Court has under the Act no power to decide questions of fact which are exclusively within the campetence of the taxing authorities.\n\nSliah /.\n\n(ii) Explanation to s. 2(12) of the Act is not ultra virt1 tho Assam Legislature.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 86 to 97 of 1962.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated July 25, 1955, of the Assam High Court in Civil Rule Nos. 94-97, 105, 106, 114 and 175 to 179 of 1953.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Sohan Shroff, P. K. Kapi/a and Sukumar Ghosh, for the appellants.\n\nNaunit Lal, for the respondents.\n\nFebruary 4, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH J .-These appeals have been filed with certificates granted by the High Court of Assam undt:r Art. 132 of the Constitution against orders passed in certain petitions filed by the appellants praying for writs of certiorari or other appropriate writs quashing orders relating to assessment of sales-tax, and prohibiting the Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and other officers from taking action in enforcement of the said orders. The appeals raise common question> and may be disposed of by a common judgment.\n\nThe appellants are merchants carrying on business as dealers in jute, and have their principal place of business at Calcutta. The appellants have a branch office at Dhubri in the State of Assam and are registered dealers under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 (17 of 1947). The appellants purchased jute at Dhubri and other r,:>laces in the State of Assam and despatched bales of jute to diverse factories outside the Province of Assam.\n\nThe appellants submitted returns of turnover for purposes of sales-tax before the Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri, under the Assam Sales Tax Act in respect of transactions of sale during the period\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 657 . ' between.March 1948 to March l9SO. The Superintendent 1964 of Taxes called upon:the a:;>pellants under s.17(2)\"'of\"the ·-r,; a-;;5, nh Act to pro:lt, ce thdr !:>ooks of account and other evidence v. ' - Supdt. of Tqxes in support°<Ji thcit rrp_::-as and granted them time to enable them to cor!'ply ,.,.;,;, the.· requisition, . but the appellants ::1iah 1• failed to do so.\n\nThe Superintendent of Taxes . then made \"best judgment assessments\" exercising his powe~. under s. 17 ( 4) of the Act and issued demand notices for the tax . determined.\n\nAgainst the orders passed by the Superintendent of Taxes appeals were preferred to the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes.\n\nBefore the. appellate authority the appellants produced some but not all their books of account and documents in support of their returns.\n\nBefore the appellant authority it was contended, inter alia, that the definition of \"sale\" in s. 2 ( 12) of the Act was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature, that tax was sought to be levied on sales effected outside the State, and that imposition of sales tax on the transactions of the appellant amounted to levying an \"export tax\" which was not open to the Provincial Legislature. It was however not contended before the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes that the jute bales, sale price of which was included in the turnover were not at the time of the contracts in the form of jute bales actually within the State of Assam and therefore the Explanation to s. 2(12) did not make that sale price liable to be included in the turnover of the appellants.\n\nThe Assistant Commissioner of Taxes', Assam, dismissed the appeals.\n\n' In the revision applications preferred to the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam, against the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes it was contended for the first time that the price of jute included in the turnover under the orders passed by the Superintendent of Taxes was not liable to be taxed because within the meaning of the Explanation to s. 2 ( 12) the goods were not at the time of the contracts actually .. in the Province of Assam.\n\nThe Commissioner rejected the contention after examinmg what he called the \"time-table of cultivation\". He observed that the usual time for marketing jute of the new crop was between July and June of the following year, jute being planted in or\n\n134-159 S.C.'-42.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPQRTS\n\n1964 about February and being ready for marketing some time Than Singh about the month of June.\n\nThe Commissioner further\n\nS d\n\n•1 T observed that the contracts were made on diverse dates up t. o axes . . - between March and September and deliveries under the Shah J. contracts were made after the month of July when the new crop was brought into the market.\n\nThe contracts between the months of March and July were therefore in respect of the last year's crop and tJ\\e goods sold must actually have been in the Province of Assam at the date of the contracts.\n\nThe Commissioner made certain modifications in the assessment order, but with those modifications we are not concerned in these appeals.\n\nAgainst the order passed by the Commissioner, !Petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution were filed by the appellants for writs of certiorari and prohibition.\n\nAmongst the grounds urged before the High Court were the following two grounds, which alone survive for determination in these appeals:\n\n(1) that the Explanation to s. 2 ( 12) of the Act was ultra vires the Assam Legislature under the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, and therefore tax could not be levied on sales irrespective of the place where the contracts were made merely relying upon the circumstance that at the time of the contracts of sale the goods contracted to be sold were actually in the Province of Assam; and ( 2) that the finding recorded by the Commissioner\n\nthat the goods were actually in the Province of Assam at the time when the contracts were made was \"speculative\".\n\nThe High Court held 1that the Explanation to s. 2 ( 12) was, in respect of the 11eriod prior to the Constitution, not ultra vires the authority of the Provincial Legislature, and that no attempt was made to establish before the appellate authority that the books of account supported the contention that the goods were not actually in existence in the State of Assam at the time of the contracts of sale.\n\nHolding that the reasons which the Commissioner had given in support of his finding were not \"altogether unjustified\" and that tho taxing\n\nauthorities being \"fully conscious'\" that one of the essential ingredients of tax liability was that the goods must be actually in existence in the Stiite of Assam at the time of the contracts of sale, the High Court declined to consider whether the conclusions of , foe taxing authorities on questions of fact wer:: correct. But the High Court held that the plea about the vires of s. 2 (12) and the Exiplanation thereto raised a substantial question as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and accordingly granted certificates of fitness under Art. 132 of the Constitution.\n\nAt the hearing of these appeals counsel for the appellants sought leave to challenge the correctness of the decision that the goods were when the contracts were made actually within the Province of Assam. We have heard counsel for the appellants at great length upon this application for leave to appeal on grounds other than constitutional on which the certificates were granted by the High Court. After carefully considering the arguments, we are of the view that no case has been made out for acceding to that request.\n\nA person arppealing to this Court under Art. 132 of the Constitution may not challenge the correctness or propriety of the decision appealed against on grounds other than those on which the certificate is granted, unless this Court grants him leave to raise other questions. Such leave is generally granted where the trial before the High Court has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice or where the appeal raises such substantial questions that on an application made to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution leave would be granted to the applicant to appeal against the decision on those questions.\n\nThe Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, was enacted in 1947.\n\nBy s. 2 ( 3) the expression \"dealer\" is defined as meaning any person who carries on the business of selling or supplying goods in the Province, and by the Explanation the manager or agent of a dealer who resides outside the . Province and carries on the business of selling or supplying\n\ngoods in the Province is in respect of such business to be deemed a dealer for the pUI1pOSC of the Act. Clause (12) of s. 2 defines 'sale'. Section 3 is the charging section and s. 4 prescribes the rates of tax. The sales-tax authority may,\n\nSupdt. of Taus\n\nShah /.\n\n1964 if he is not satisfied that the return furnished by the dealer nan Singh is correct and complete, serve on the dealer a notice v. 1 requiring him either to attend in person and to produce or upa1. of axes . • __ cause to be produced any evidence on which he may rely Shah .r. in support of his return [sub-s. (2) of s. 17], and may make an assessment to the best of his judgment if the dealer fails to make a return or fails to comply with the terms of the notice issued under sub-s. ( 2) of s. 17.\n\nSection 30 confers a right of appeal to an aggrieved dealer to the authority prescribed by the rules, and by s. 31 revisional jurisdiction may be exercised by the Commissioner of Sales Tax against the order of the sales-tax authorities. By s. 32, within sixty days from the date of service of any order in appeal or revision, the dealer may, by application in writing, require the Board of Revenue or the Commissioner, as the case may be, to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order, and if the Board or the Commissioner decline to state the case, the dealer may apply to the High Court calling upon the Board or the Commissioner to state the case, and the High Court may if it be not satisfied with the correctaess of the decision of the Commissioner, require the authority concerned to state the case and refer it and on receipt of any such requisition, such. authority shall state and refer the case.\n\nThe High Court upon hearing any such case decides the question of law raised on the reference and delivers its judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded [sub-s. (8)].\n\nThe Act therefore provides a hierarchy of taxing tribunals competent to decide question as to the liability of the tax-qiayer under the Assam Sales Tax Act, with a right to have questions of law arising out of the order decided by the High Court of the Province.\n\nPrimarily it is the Superintendent of Taxes who assesses the liability to pay tax. An appeal against the order of the Superintendent lies to the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes and against the order of the Assitant Commissioner a revision application lies to the Commissioner. Against the order of the Commissioner a reference may be demanded on questions of law to the High Court and if reference is refused the High Court may be moved to call for a reference.\n\nThe scheme evolved by the Legislature for determination\n\nof tax liability is that all questions of fact are to be decided 1964\n\nby the taxing authorities and on questions of law arising Than Singh out of the decision of the taxing authorities the opinion of , ,1\n\n•·, T •• upu . .J a,.eL High Court may be obtained. The High Court has however - no power to decide questions of fact, which are exclusively\n\nSW J. within the competence of the taxing authorities. The High Court is again not an appellate authority over the decision of the Commissioner; it has merely to give its opinion on questions of law arising out of the order of the Commissioner.\n\nWhether the decision of the Commissioner is not su, pported by any evidence, or is based upon a view of facts which could never be reasonably entertained, is a question of law which arises out Qf the order.\n\nAgainst the order of the Commissioner an order for reference could have been claimed if the appellants satisfied the Commissioner or the High Court that a question of law arose out of the order. But the procedure provided by the Act to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was bypassed. The appellants moved the High Court challenging the competence of the Provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 and sought to reopen the decision of the taxing authorities on questions of fact. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is couched i.n wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are exipressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as' an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Art. 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without being unduly onerous, provides a.n equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is\n\n1961 claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court Than Singh of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to .\\upat. ~I Taz., correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction -· under An. 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided S/utlt J. by statute for obtaining relief.\n\nWhere it is o; ien to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.\n\nIn the present case the appellants had the right to move the .Commissioner to refer a case to the High Court under s. 32 of the Act, and to move the High Court if the Com missioner refused to refer the case.\n\nBut they did not do so and moved the High Court in its jurisdiction under Art.\n\n22,6 of tl!e Constitution, and invited the High Court to re-open the decision of the taxing authorities on questions of fact, which jurisdiction by the statute constituting them is exclusively vested in the taxing authorities.\n\nThis they did, without even raising the questions before the Superintendent of Taxes and the Assistant Commissioner.\n\nThe appellants who are dealers registered under the Assam Sales Tax Act submiNed their returns to the Superintendent of Taxes, but failed when called upon to produce their books of account and other evidence in support of their returns.\n\nEven before the Assistant Commissioner, they produced some but not all their books of account and evidence demanded by the Superintendent. By the Explanation to s. 2(12) of the Act the expression 'sale', notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, includes sale of any goods which are actually in the Province at the time when the contract of sale in respect thereof iiL made, irrespective of the place where the said contract is made and such sales are deemed for the purposes of. the Act to have taken place in the Province. Under the Indian Sale of Goods Act, a sale takes\n\nplace when property in the goods passes.\n\nBut, for the purposei of the Assam Sales Tax Act situation of the goods\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPI{EME COURT REPORTS\n\nis seized by the Legislature for the purpose of fictionally regarding the sale as having taken place within the Province of Assam if at the time of the contract of sale the goods are within the Province. Liability to sales tax in respect of the goods where the transfer in the property of the goods has taken place outside the Province of Assam undoubtedly arose if the conditions prescribed by the Explanation, exist : viz. the goods are actually in the Province when the contract of sale is made, and not otherwise. But the question whether the goods at the date of the contract of sale were actually in the Province is a question of fact which had to be determined by the sales tax authorities. Before the Superintendent of Taxes liability to pay tax was challenged but it does not\n\n<1; ipear to have been contended that at the time of the contract of sale, the goods were not actually within the Province, and no such contention appears to have been even raised before the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes.\n\nBefore the Commissioner in the revision application filed by the appellants it was urged that part of the goods the price of which was sought to be included in the turnover were not within the Province at the time of the contract of sale and therefore the price of those goods could not be taken into account in computing the taxable turnover. The Commissioner held having regard to the \"time-table of cultivation of jute\" and the time when the jute is brought into the market for sale, that the goods sold were within the Province on the dates of the contracts and therefore the price thereof was liable to be included in the taxable turnover. The High Court, as we have already observed, took the view that the finding of the Commissioner was not \"altogether unjustified\", nor could it be said that the Commissioner and the other taxing authorities \"were not quite conscious of\" the requirements which attracted the UQplication of the Explanation to s. 2(12) and declined to enter upon a reappraisal of the evidence which in the view of the High Court the taxing authorities alone were competent to enter upon.\n\nIn these appeals Mr. Setalvad oil behalf of the appellants contends that there is clear evidence on the record to show tbat even ap; ilying the test laid down by the Commissioner\n\nSupdt. of Taxes\n\nShah J.\n\nSupdt. of Taxes\n\nS/!ah J.\n\nsome ot the contracts of sale were made before the goods were marketable and therefore the view taken by the taxing authorities that the goods were at the date of the contract in existence within the Province of Assam was \"without any foundation\".\n\nCounsel also submitted that some of the contracts related to jute grown in Pakistan and with respect to those contracts also the assumption made by the Commissioner that the goods were within the State of Assam at the date of the contraot of sale could not be warranted.\n\nCounsel then said that the description of the goods in the contracts of sale indicated that they related to bales whereas the contracts for purchase by the appellants were in respect of loose jute and as the goods purchased were not identical or ascertainable with reference to the contracts of sale made by the appellants, liability to 1; iay tax was not attracted under s. 2 ( 12) of the Act. We are unable to entertain these pleas because they were never raised before the Superintendent of Taxes and the Assistant Commissioner and no evidence was produced by the appellants to support those pleas.\n\nBefore the Commissioner it was broadly urged that the goods in respect of the contracts could not have been in existence within the Province at the date of the reSQective contracts of sale but that argument was for reasons already mentioned rejected by the Commissioner and the High Court declined to allow the question whether the findings of the Commissioner were \"speculative\" to be agitated.\n\nThe appellants now seek to plead that the taxing authorities were in error in holding that the goods conformed to the conditions as to the situs of the goods at the dates of the contracts of sale, prescribed by s. 2 (12) so as to make the price liable to be included in the taxable turnover.\n\nThe Legislature has entrusted power to ascetain facts on which the price received on sales becomes taxable, to the authorities appointed in that behalf with right of recourse to the High Court on questions of law arising out of the order of the Commissioner of Taxes.\n\nIt is therefore contemplated by the Legislature that all material evidence on which a tax-payer relies to justify his claim that his transactions are not taxable, should be placed before the taxing authorities so that they may have an opportunity to adjudicate upon the claim. If after a proper trial, the claim is negatived,\n\nbecause the facts on which it is founded are not proved, 196' the proceeding must end.\n\nIf, however, the adjudication of Than Singh the Commis_sioner. is_ vitiated because. there is no .eidence Supdt. : 1 iu., to support Jt or 1t 1s based on con1ectures, susp1c1ons or - irrelevant materials, or the proceedings of the taxing autho- Shah J. rities are otherwise vitiated so that there has been no fair trial, the High Court may undoubtedly advise the Commissioner on questions properly referred to it in the manner provided by the Act. But the High Court can.not be asked to assume the role of an appellate authority over the decision of the Commissioner on questions of fact or even of law.\n\nAssuming that there is some substance in the contention that the adjudication by the Commissioner proceeded on grounds which the appellants characterised as \"speculative\", it was open to them to resort to the machinery provided by the Act, and having failed to do so, they could not ask the High Court to act as an agpellate authority in clear violation of the statutory provisions and to bypass the machinery provided by the Act.\n\nWe accordingly decline to entertain the applicittion to raise questions other than those raised by the certificate granted by the High Court, because the questions sought to be raised are questions of fact which were not canvassed at the appropriate stage before the taxing authorities and the machinery provided under the Act for determination of questions relating to liability to tax is arttempted to be bypassed.\n\nThe constitutional question on which certificate was granted does not need consideration in any detail. By the Explanation to s. 2 ( 12) of the Act notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the provisions of the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, a sale is deemed to be complete when the goods which are actually within the State of Assam at the time when the contract of sale is made, irrespective of the place where the contract is made.\n\nUnder the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, in the absence of a contract to the contrary a sale is complete when property in the goods passes, but by the Assam Sales Tax Act the Legislature has attempted to locate the situs of sale for the purpose of levy\n\n1964 of sales-tax by fixing upon the actual situation of the goods\n\nThan Singh within the Province at 1the date of the contract, for the .. .. v.f T purposes of levying tax on sales. The Legislature has thereby ... qJt:o. o axes - not overstepped the limits of its authority : The Tata Iron Shah J. & Steel Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar('). No argument has therefore been advanced before us to support the plea of unconstitutionality.\n\nFebruary, 4\n\nAll the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nH. R. S. MURTHY\n\nCOLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nMining Lease-Notice of demand for payment of land cess-Validity- Land cess, if recoverable as an arrear of land revenue-If a tax on mineral rights-Expression ''Royalty'', 1ne1111ing of-If include.s royalty payable under a mining lease-Madras District Boards Act (Mad. Act No. XIV of 1920), ss. 78 and 79-Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, (Lill of 1948), and Act LXV/l of [957, Entry 49 of the State List.\n\nUnder the terms of a mining lease the lessee worked the mines and won iron ore in a tract of land in a village in Chittor district and bound himself to pay a dead rent if he used the leased land for the extraction of iron ore, to pay a royalty on iron ore if it Were used for extraction of iron and in addition to pay a surface rent in respect of the surface area occupied or used. The lessee working the mines extracted ore and marketed it. After separation from Madras in 1953, the District of Chittoor became part of the Andhra State. In 1955 a demand was made for the payment of land cess under ss. 78 and 79 of the Madras District Boards Act and including in the computation of the ''annual rent value\", the amounts payable to Government in each year under the mining lease both as surface rent and royalty. On challenge to the validity of this notice by the lessee, the High Court quashed the notices.\n\n(I) [19S8] S.C.R. !3S5.", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "Cl11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 10, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "THANSINGH NA THMAL AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1436, "end_char": 1462, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THANSINGH NATHMAL AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1468, "end_char": 1498, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1501, "end_char": 1521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. MAZID, SUPERINTENDENT OF TAXES\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. 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"Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2223, "end_char": 2248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2283, "end_char": 2291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2372, "end_char": 2380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The <ti)pellants who are merchants carrying on business as dealers in jute in Calcutta, submitted returns of turnover for purposes of salestax due under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, but as they did not comply with the requisition of the Superintendent of Taxes to produce their books, the latter made a ''best judgment assessment\" under s. 17 ( 4) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2451, "end_char": 2476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2762, "end_char": 2767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their appeals to the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes and revision petitions to the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam were dismissed."}}, {"text": "High Court of Assam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2814, "end_char": 2833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants then moved the High Court of Assam by petitions under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2853, "end_char": 2861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2896, "end_char": 2900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3325, "end_char": 3338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court and the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court with certificate under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3362, "end_char": 3369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 132(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3464, "end_char": 3475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 132(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3667, "end_char": 3678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3962, "end_char": 3967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4284, "end_char": 4292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4647, "end_char": 4655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5196, "end_char": 5204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5474, "end_char": 5488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sohan Shroff, P. K. Kapi/a and Sukumar Ghosh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sohan Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5490, "end_char": 5502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sohan Shroff, P. K. Kapi/a and Sukumar Ghosh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. K. Kapi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5504, "end_char": 5514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sohan Shroff, P. K. Kapi/a and Sukumar Ghosh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5521, "end_char": 5534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sohan Shroff, P. K. Kapi/a and Sukumar Ghosh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5557, "end_char": 5567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5653, "end_char": 5657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH J .-These appeals have been filed with certificates granted by the High Court of Assam undt:r Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5752, "end_char": 5760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dhubri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6005, "end_char": 6011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "132 of the Constitution against orders passed in certain petitions filed by the appellants praying for writs of certiorari or other appropriate writs quashing orders relating to assessment of sales-tax, and prohibiting the Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and other officers from taking action in enforcement of the said orders."}}, {"text": "s.17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6942, "end_char": 6949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants have a branch office at Dhubri in the State of Assam and are registered dealers under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The appellants have a branch office at Dhubri in the State of Assam and are registered dealers under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7311, "end_char": 7316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellants have a branch office at Dhubri in the State of Assam and are registered dealers under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The appellants have a branch office at Dhubri in the State of Assam and are registered dealers under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7741, "end_char": 7745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8332, "end_char": 8340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8847, "end_char": 8851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9995, "end_char": 10003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10260, "end_char": 10264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act was ultra vires the Assam Legislature under the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10278, "end_char": 10377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10849, "end_char": 10853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act was ultra vires the Assam Legislature under the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Act was ultra vires the Assam Legislature under the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11732, "end_char": 11736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11901, "end_char": 11909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12495, "end_char": 12503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12947, "end_char": 12955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13072, "end_char": 13097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13124, "end_char": 13128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13529, "end_char": 13533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13550, "end_char": 13559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13588, "end_char": 13592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "nan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13745, "end_char": 13754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Taus\n\nShah /.\n\n1964 if he is not satisfied that the return furnished by the dealer nan Singh is correct and complete, serve on the dealer a notice v. 1 requiring him either to attend in person and to produce or upa1."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13998, "end_char": 14003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14174, "end_char": 14179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14182, "end_char": 14192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14291, "end_char": 14296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14422, "end_char": 14427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17386, "end_char": 17394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17518, "end_char": 17526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18175, "end_char": 18183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19053, "end_char": 19061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19339, "end_char": 19344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19507, "end_char": 19515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20258, "end_char": 20266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20343, "end_char": 20373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20671, "end_char": 20688, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22816, "end_char": 22824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22999, "end_char": 23007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these appeals Mr. Setalvad oil behalf of the appellants contends that there is clear evidence on the record to show tbat even ap; ilying the test laid down by the Commissioner\n\nSupdt."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23535, "end_char": 23543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel also submitted that some of the contracts related to jute grown in Pakistan and with respect to those contracts also the assumption made by the Commissioner that the goods were within the State of Assam at the date of the contraot of sale could not be warranted."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24104, "end_char": 24108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24943, "end_char": 24947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Than Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25742, "end_char": 25752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, however, the adjudication of Than Singh the Commissioner."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27290, "end_char": 27294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27395, "end_char": 27418, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27624, "end_char": 27647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "H. R. S. MURTHY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28405, "end_char": 28420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. S. MURTHY\n\nCOLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "COLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28422, "end_char": 28443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. S. MURTHY\n\nCOLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28501, "end_char": 28517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. S. MURTHY\n\nCOLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA"}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28519, "end_char": 28529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. S. MURTHY\n\nCOLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "J. C. SHAH"}}, {"text": "N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28534, "end_char": 28557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. S. MURTHY\n\nCOLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "Madras District Boards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28799, "end_char": 28825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28854, "end_char": 28867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras District Boards Act", "statute": "Madras District Boards Act"}}, {"text": "Chittor district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29103, "end_char": 29119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the terms of a mining lease the lessee worked the mines and won iron ore in a tract of land in a village in Chittor district and bound himself to pay a dead rent if he used the leased land for the extraction of iron ore, to pay a royalty on iron ore if it Were used for extraction of iron and in addition to pay a surface rent in respect of the surface area occupied or used."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29453, "end_char": 29459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After separation from Madras in 1953, the District of Chittoor became part of the Andhra State."}}, {"text": "Chittoor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29485, "end_char": 29493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After separation from Madras in 1953, the District of Chittoor became part of the Andhra State."}}, {"text": "Andhra State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29513, "end_char": 29525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After separation from Madras in 1953, the District of Chittoor became part of the Andhra State."}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29588, "end_char": 29601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras District Boards Act", "statute": "Madras District Boards Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_666_678_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n1964 of sales-tax by fixing upon the actual situation of the goods\n\nThan Singh within the Province at 1the date of the contract, for the .. .. v.f T purposes of levying tax on sales. The Legislature has thereby ... qJt:o. o axes - not overstepped the limits of its authority : The Tata Iron Shah J. & Steel Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar('). No argument has therefore been advanced before us to support the plea of unconstitutionality.\n\nFebruary, 4\n\nAll the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nH. R. S. MURTHY\n\nCOLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nMining Lease-Notice of demand for payment of land cess-Validity- Land cess, if recoverable as an arrear of land revenue-If a tax on mineral rights-Expression ''Royalty'', 1ne1111ing of-If include.s royalty payable under a mining lease-Madras District Boards Act (Mad. Act No. XIV of 1920), ss. 78 and 79-Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, (Lill of 1948), and Act LXV/l of [957, Entry 49 of the State List.\n\nUnder the terms of a mining lease the lessee worked the mines and won iron ore in a tract of land in a village in Chittor district and bound himself to pay a dead rent if he used the leased land for the extraction of iron ore, to pay a royalty on iron ore if it Were used for extraction of iron and in addition to pay a surface rent in respect of the surface area occupied or used. The lessee working the mines extracted ore and marketed it. After separation from Madras in 1953, the District of Chittoor became part of the Andhra State. In 1955 a demand was made for the payment of land cess under ss. 78 and 79 of the Madras District Boards Act and including in the computation of the ''annual rent value\", the amounts payable to Government in each year under the mining lease both as surface rent and royalty. On challenge to the validity of this notice by the lessee, the High Court quashed the notices.\n\n(I) [19S8] S.C.R. !3S5.\n\nAfter this decision the lessee died.\n\nOn March 10, 1955, two notices 1964 were issued to the appellant demanding payment of cess for the years H. R. s. Murthy 1952-54 and 1955-57 respectively and threatening coercive proceedv. ings, for their recovery in the event of non-compliance.\n\nImpugning Collector of the validity of the earlier notices of demand, the appellant filed a writ Chittoor petition in the High Court and a similar petition challenging the validity of the notice of demand for the later period. Pending these petitions a further notice of demand for payment of cess for the years 1958-59 was served on the appellant in August 29, 1960 and to obtain a similar relief in respect of this notice and the proceedings for recovery thereof, the appellant filed a writ petition in this Court and contended: (I) that the expression \"royalty\" under s. 79(1) does not signify royalty as commonly understood but is confined to the rent payable for the beneficial use of the surface of the land; (2) assuming that royalty in the sense mentioned in point No. l is within ss. 78 and 79, of the Act, the provision imposing the land cess quoad royalty under the mining leases must be held to be repealed by the Central Acts of 1948 and 1957; (3) is the land cess demanded by the impugned notices dated March 10, 1958 and August 29, 1960 recoverable as an arrear of land revenue under the law? (4) s. 221 of the Act which made the provision for the recovery of sums due as taxes had, by reason of the changes effected in the rules, ceased to be applicable to the recovery of land cess under s. 78.\n\nHeld: (i) Where the land is held On lease, as in the present case, the lease amount is specifically referreU to in s. 79 of the Act as one of the components for the complltation of the annual rent value.\n\nIt i1 therefore obvious that 'royalty' which follows the expression 'lease amount' is something other than the return to the lessor or licenser for the use of the land surface and represents as it normally connotes the payment made for the materials or minerals won from the land.\n\n(ii) There is no connection between the regulation and development of mines and minerals dealt with in the Central Acts and the levy and collection of land cess under ss. 78 and 79 of the Act. There is therefore, nothing in common between the Act and the Central Acts of 1948 and 1957 so as to require any detailed examination of the enactments for discovering whether there is any overlapping.\n\nHingir Rampur Coal Co. v. State of Orissa, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 537 and State of Orissa v. M. A. Tullock, A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1284, distinguished.\n\n(iii) In the context of ss. 78 and 79 of the Act and the scheme >f those provisions it is clear that the land cess is in truth a 'tax on lands' within the entry 49 of the State List.\n\nWhere the land is held under lease it is the lease amount mat forms the basis. Where land is held under a mining lease, that which the occupier is willing to pay is accordingly treated a8 the ''annual rent value\" of the property; such rent value would, therefore, necessarily\n\nH. R. S. Murthy v.\n\nCollector of Chittoor\n\ninclude not merely the surface rent but the dead rent, as well as the royalty payable by the licensee, lessee or occupier for the user of the :iroperty.\n\n(iv) The cess under s. 78 would be \"a cess lawfully imposed upon land\" under s. 52 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act and woufd therefore be covered by its terms.\n\nThe legality of the procedure, which the respondents proposed to adopt for the recovery of the sums could not, therefore, be successfully challenged.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 316-A and 316-B of 1962.\n\nAppeals by special leave and by certificate from judgment and order dated March 25, 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 534 and 535 of 1958.\n\nAND\n\nWrit Petition No. 302 of 1960.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nP. Ram Reddy, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 316A and 316B of 1962) and the petitioner (in petition No. 302 of 1960).\n\nT. V. R. Tatachari and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in both the appeals and the peti1tion).\n\nFebruary 4, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nAYYANGAR J.-The two Civil Appeals and the Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution which have been heard together raise a common point rega,-ding the validity of notices of demand for the payment. of land cess under the Madras District Boards Act (Madras Act XIV of 1920) which for shortness we shall call the Act, and the legality of the procedure for the recovery of the amount of the said cess.\n\nThe impugned notices made a demand also for education cess but as this cess is merely a proportion of the land-cess, and as the validity of that demand stands or falls with that of the land-cess, it is sufficient if we refer to and consider the challenge to the demand of land-cess\n\nalone, as that will determine the validity of the entire sum demanded.\n\nThe appellant's father obtained a mining lease from the Government of Madras dated September 15, 1953 under which he was permitted to work and win iron ore in a tract of land in a village in Chittoor district.\n\nThe terms upon which the lessee was to work the mines are not very relevani but what is material is that under this instrument the lessee bound himself to pay a dead rent of Rs. 1,140/2 per year if he used the leased land for the extraction of iron ore and a higher amount if used for other purposes.\n\nBesides, he also bound himself to pay a royalty of 8 annas per ton of iron ore if the ore were used for extraction of iron and if the iron ore was used for any other punpose such as for sale in specie, at Re. l /- per ton. In addition, the lease also stipulated for the payment of surface rent at Rs. 1-8-3 per acre per annum in respect of the surface area occupied or used. The lessee worked the mines, extracted ore and marketed i.t.\n\nTo raise finances for carrying on the local administration in the District Boards, several taxes are leviable.\n\nAmong them section 78 of the Act imposes a land-cess on lands in the district in these terms :\n\n\"78. The land-cess shall be levied on the annual rent value of ali occupied lands on whatever tenure held and shall consist of a tax of two annas in the rupee of the annual rent value of all such lands in the district.\"\n\nThe \"annual rent value\" on the basis of which the land-cess to be levied was to be computed in the manner laid down in s. 79 and this section ran :\n\n\"79. The annual rent value shall, for the purposes of section 78, be calculated in the following manner:\n\n(i) In the case of lands held direct from Government on ryotwari tenure or on lease or licence, the assessment, lease amount, royalty or other sum payable to Government for the lands,\n\nH. R. s. Murthy\n\nCollector of Chittoor\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nH R. S. Murthy v.\n\nCollector of Chittoor\n\nA.yvangar !.\n\ntogether with any water-rate which may be payable for their irrigation, shall be taken to be the annual rent value.\n\n(ii) In the case of inam lands or lands held wholly or partially free from assessment, the full assessment which such lands would bear if they were I).ot inam, together with any water-rate which may be payable for their irrigation, shall be taken to be the annual rent value; and such full assessment and water-rate shall be determined by the district collector under the general orders of the Board of Revenue.\n\n(iii) In the case of lands held on any other tenure, the annual rent payable to the landholder, sublandholder or any other intermediate landholder holding on an under-tenure created, continued or recognized by a landholder or sub-landholder, as the case may be, by his tenants, together with any water-rate which may be payable for their irrigation, shall be taken to be the annual rent value; and where such lands are occupied by the owner himself or by any person holding the same from him free of rent or at a favourable rent, the annual rent value shall be calculated according to the rates of rent usually paid by occupancy ryot for ryoti lands in the neighbourhood with similar advantages, together with any water-rate which may be payable for the irrigation of the lands so occupied.\n\n(iv) In the case of lands, the assessment of rent of\n\nwhkh is paid in kind, the aooual rent value shall be calculated according to the rates of rent established or paid for neighbouring lands of a similar description and quality, together with any water-rate which may be payable for the irrigation of the lands first mentioned, or if such method of calculation is, in the opinion of the Board of Revenue, impracticable in any\n\n' particular case, according to any method which 1964 the Board of Revenue may approve for that H. R. S.-Murtltv case :\n\nProvided that, where any landholder or sub-landholder has obtained under the provisions of sections 30 (iii) and 3 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, a decree empowering him to increase his rent in consequence of any additional payment by way of water-rate made by him 'to Government, the annual rent value shall !le the balance remaining after deducting such increase of rent up to the amount of the waterrate from the sum ascertained as aforesaid.\"\n\nWhen the State of Andhra was separated from Madras in October, 1953 the district of Chittoor became part of the State of Andhra.\n\nTn 1955 a demand was made upon the father of the appellant for the payment of land cess calculated in accordance with the provisions of ss. 7 6 and 79 of the Act and including in the computation of the \"annual rent value\", the amounts payable to Government in each year under the mining lease both as surface rent and royalty. The validity of this notice was objected to on grounds which are no longer material and the objections being upheld. the notices were quashed on writ petitions filed to the High Court. Andhra Pradesh by the appellant's father.\n\nAfter the decis10n by the High Court in his favour the appellant's father died.\n\nOn March 10, 1958 two notices were issued to the appellant demanding the payment of the sums specified therein as being the cesses for the years 1952 to 1954 and 1955 to 1957 resrpectively and threatening coercive proceedings for their recovery in the event of the demand not being complied with.\n\nImpugning the validity of the notices of demand for the earlier triennuim, the appellant filed writ petition 534 of 1958 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and a similar petition No. 535 of 1958 challenging the validity of the notice of demand for the later period. While these petitions were pending before the High Court a further notice of demand claiming the payv.\n\nCollector of Chittoor\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1964 ment of cess for the years 1958 and 1959 was served on\n\nH. R. ·-;-Murthy the appellant in August 1960 and to obtain a similar relief\n\nv. in respect of this notice and the proceedings for the recovery Collector of Chittoor thereof, the appellant has filed writ petition 302 of 1960\n\nA.yyangar .1. in this Court. To complete the narrative it is only necessary to mention that both the writ petitions 534 and 535 of 1958 were dismissed by the High Court and when the appellant sought to obtain certificates of fitness the learned Judges granted a certificate in respect of their judgment in writ petition 535 of 1958 on the ground that the value of the claim made against the appellant was over Rs. 20,000, but refused a similar certificate in writ petition 534 of 1958 where the amount demanded was less than that figure-it was Rs. 15,000 and odd. The appellant thereupon moved this court for special leave in respeot of the dismissal of his writ petition 534 of 1958 and the same having been granted all these three matters have been heard together.\n\nThe matter in controversy in the appeal is very limited and the point involved very narrow.\n\nMr. Ram Reddylearned counsel for the appellant raised three points in support of the appeal : ( 1) What is the meaning of the expression 'royalty' in s. 79 ( 1) of the Act? Does it include the royalty payable under a mining lease on the ore won by the lessee. (2) Assuming that royalty in the sense mentioned in point No. I is within ss. 78 and 79, of the Act the provision imposing the land cess quoad royalty under mining leases must be held to be repealed by the Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Develo; Jment) Act, 1948 (Central Act LITI of 1948) or in any event, by the Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 (Central Act L.XVII of 1957). so that after the date when these Central enactments came into force the land cess that could be levied under s. 78 must be exclusive of royalty under a mining lease.\n\n(3) Is the land cess which was demanded by the impugned notices dated March 10, 1958 and August 29, 1960 recoverable as an arrear of land revenue under the law?\n\nWe shall examine these submissions in thrut order. The first contention that the expression 'royalty' under s. 79 ( l)\n\ndoes not signify royalty as commonly unrlerstood but is\n\nconfined to the rent payable for the beneficial use of the surface of the land, scarcely deserves serious consideration.\n\nWhere the land is held on lease, as in the present case, the lease amount is specifically referred to in s. 79 of the Act as one of the components for the computation of the annual rent value.\n\nIt is therefore obvious that \"royalty\" which follows the expression \"lease amount\" is something other than the return to the lessor or licensor for the use of the land surface and represents as it normally connotes the payment made for the materials or minerals won from the land.\n\nThe argument is therefore without substance and is rejected.\n\nThe second i; ioint has 'not, in our opinion, more merit The en.tirety of the argument on this head is based on two decisions of this Court in which this Court had to consider the continued operation of the Orissa mining areas !Development Fund) Act, (Act XXVIT of 1952)-The Hinglr- Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and Others v. The State of Orissa and Others(') and State of Orissa v. M. A. Tullock & Co. (2).\n\nAs a matter of fact it migM be mentioned that the present appellant intervened in State of Orissa v. M. A. Tullock & Co. and there was a direction by this Court that the present appeals and ; petition might be heard ater the judgment was pronounced in the Orissa appeals. We are, however, clearly of the opinion that neither of the two decisions, the later one really following the earlier in respect of the matter now relevant, really help the appellant in these ap; ieals. In Hingir-Rampur Coal Co.'s case(') the decision rendered on writ petitions filed in this court under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Orissa\n\nMining Areas (Development Fund) Act.\n\nA cess had been levied under that enactment and it was the validity of the imposition of the cess that was the subject of debate in the petition.\n\nOne of the points urged in support of the petition was that on the enactment of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (Central Act LITI of 1948) the Orissa Act stood repealed and the cess leviable under its provisions was not thereafter capable of\n\n\n134-159.SC-43\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1284.\n\nH. R. S. Murthy v.\n\nCo/ltctor ol\n\nChittoor\n\nAyyangar I.\n\n196.f being enforced, with the result that the demand for the cess s. R. S.-1111rthy could not be sustained. This Court on a detailed comparison\n\neoik:i 1 of the provisions of the Orissa Act and the Central Act of Chin°.:,,° 1948 came to the conclusion that 'the Central Act covered the same field as the Orissa enactment.\n\nAn examination\n\n_.,,,,..,,,.., J. of the scheme of the Orissa Act disclosed that it had been passed for the purpose of the develQ;>ment of 'mining areas' in the State and this was affected by constituting \"mining areas\" and making provision for the development of such areas by improving communications by the construction of roads, by providing means of transport, supply of water, electricity and other amenities for sanitation as also for the edm; ation of the labour force to attract workmen to these 'mining areas'.\n\nThe cess which was there impugned was levied and collected for meeting the cost of this development of tJie \"mining areas\". An examination of the Central enactment which was also passed to provide for the conservatibn of minerals was held to cover the same field as the Orissi Act.\n\nThe Orissa State enactment had been passed m pursuance of the legislative power conferred by Entry 23 of the State List in the 7th Schedule reading :\n\n\"Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.\"\n\nThe provision in List I referred to here is Entry 54 in the Union List reading :\n\n\"Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by law made by Parliament to be expedient in public interest.\"\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the State that the Central Act of 1948 though it contained a declaration that the Regulation and Development of mines and mineral development was expedient in the public interest, still such a declaration was not by \"Parliament\" as required by Entry No. 54, but by the Dominion legislature and could not on the terms of item 23 of List II affect the State power of legislation. This\n\nargument was accepted and the State Act was, therefore, held to be competently enacted, and to remain unaffected H. R. s. Murthy by the Central Legislation.\n\nIt was the same enactment of the Orissa legislature that came up for consideration in State of Orissa v. M.A. Tullock & Co.( 1 ). By that date however Parliament had legislated and had enacted Central Act LXVII of 1957 which contained, if anything, more comprehensive provisions for the regulation and development of mines and minerals throughout the country.\n\nThe Central Act also contained a declaration that \"it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided.\" This Court held that having regard to the comprehensive provisions contained in the several sections of the Act which were examined, \"the extent provided\" included those which fell within the scope of the State Act of Orissa which was, as stated earlier, for the regulation and development of \"mining areas\" within the State. For these reasons it was held that the Orissa Act must be deemed to have been impliedly repealed and rendered ineffective by the Central Act.\n\nIt will be seen that there is no resemblance, whatever, between the provisions of the Orissit Act considered in the two decisions and the provision for the levy of the land cess under ss. 78 and 79 of the Act with which we are c-oncerned. Sections 78 and 79 have nothing to do and are not concerned with the development of mines and minerals or their regulation. The proceeds of the land cess are, under s. 92 of the Act, to be credited to the District fund, into\n\nv1hich, under the terms of the Finance Rules in Sch. V to t!he Act, the land-cess as well as several other taxes, fees and receipts are directed to be credited. This fund is to be used under Ch. VTT of the Act with which s. 112 starts ''for everything necessary for or conducive to the safety, health, convenience or education of the inhabitants or the amenities of the local area concerned and everything incidental to the administration\" and include in particular the several natters which are mentioned in those sections. It will thus le seen that there is no connection between the regulation\n\n(!) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1284.\n\nCoUtctor at\n\nChittoor\n\nAyyangtll' J.\n\nand development of mines and minerals \"dealt with in the\n\nH. R. s. Murzhy Central Acts and the levy and collection of Jand-cess for\n\n•· which provision is made by ss. 78 and 79 of the Act. There Col/tctor of Chlttoor is therefore no scope, at all, for the argument that there is anything in common between the Act and the Central Acts of 1948 and 1957 so as to require any detailed examination of these enactments for discovering whether there is any over-lapping.\n\nIt was next urged that the land-cess was really a tax on mineral rights falling within Entry 50 of the State List reading\n\n\"Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitation imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development\"\n\nand that the Central Acts under which also taxes and fees might be levied brought into play the last portion of this Entry and that as a result the wer to impose this ta'\"C was not available after the Central Acts of 1948 and 1957 came into force. In this connection Mr. Ram Reddy pointed out that as the impugned Iand-cess was payable only in the event of the mining lessee winning the mineral and so paying the royalty and nut when no minerals were extracted, it was in effect a tax on the minerals won and therefore on mineral rights.\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument.\n\nWhen a question arises as to me precise head of legislative power under which a taxing statute has been passed, the subject for enquiry is what in truth and substance is the nature of the tax.\n\nNo doubt, in a sense, but in a very remote sense, it has relationship to mining as also to the mineral won from the mine under a contract by which royalty is payable on the quantity of mineral extracted. But that, does not stamp it as a tax on either the e.'\"Ctraction of the mineral or on the mineral right. It is unnecessary for the rpurpooe of this case to examine the question as to what exactly is a tax on mineral rights seeing that such a tax is not leviable by Parliament but only by the State and the sole !imitation on the State's power to levy the tax is that it must not interfere with a law made by Parliament as regards mineral development. Our attention was not invited to the provision of any such law enacted by Parliament. In\n\nthe context of ss. 78 and 79 and the scheme of those provi- 1964 sions it is clear that the land .cess is in truth a \"tax on s. R. s. Miln/11 lands\" within Entry 49 of the State List.\n\nColl.;;,,, °'\n\nUnder ~. 78 of the Act the cess is levied on occupied land on whatever tenure held. The basis of the levy is the \"annual ren.t value\" i.e., the value of the beneficial enjoyment of thi: property. This being the basis of the tax and disclosing its true nature, s. 79 provides for the manner in which the \"annual rent value\" is determined i.e., what is the amount for which the land could reasonably be let, the benefit to fie lessor representing the rateable value \"or the annual rent value\". In the case of ryotwari lands it is the assessment which is payable to the Government that is taken as the rental value being the benefit that accrues to the Government. Where the land is held under lease it is the lease amount that forms the basis. Where land is held under a mining kase, that which the occwpier is willing fo pay is accordingly treated as the \"annual rent value\" of the property.\n\nSuch a rent value would, therefore, necessarily include not merely the surface rent, but the dead rent, as well as the royalty payable by the licensee, lessee or occupier for the user of the property. The position then is that the rent which a tenant might be expected to pay for the property is, in the case of leas1>-hold interests, treated as the statutory \"annual rent value\". It is therefore not possible to accept the contention, that the faot that the lessee or licensee pays a royalty on the mineral won, which is in excess of what he would pay if his right over the land extended only to the mere use of the surface land, places it in a category different from other types where the lessee uses the surface of the land alone. In each case the rent which a lessee or licensee actually pays for the land being the test, it is manifest that the land-cess is nothing else except a land tax.\n\nLearned counsel pointed out that in the case of inam lands and other lands dealt with in els. (ii), (iii) and (iv) of s. 79 the royalty payable by the lessee or licensee did not figure in the computation of the annual rent value.\n\nThat, however, ap; iears to us to be wholly irrelevant, for\n\nChltlOM\n\nAyyon\"\" /.\n\n1964 what we are concerned with is whether on the terms of\n\n11. R. T M 11rthy sub-cl. (i) the land cess is not in truth a tax on land. v.\n\nCollector of Chittoor The last of the points raised relates to the threat on the part of the Government to recover the impugned demands as an arrear of land revenue. Learned counsel pointed out that s. 221 of the Act which made provision for the recovery of sums due as taxes had, by rea>on of the changes effected in the rules, ceased to be applicable for the recovery of land cess under s. 78.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court upheld this submission and, in our opinion, correctly, but this is of no assistance to the appellant because of s. 52 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act which enacts:\n\n\"52. All arrears of revenue other than land-revenue\n\ndue to the State Government, all advances made by the State Government for culitivation or other urposes connected with the revenue, and all fees or other dues payable by any person to or on behalf of the village servants employed in revenue or police duties, and all cesses lawfully imposed upon land and all sums due to the State Government, including compensation for any loss or damage sustained by them in consequence of a breach of contract, may be recovered in the same manner as arrears of land-revenue under the provisions of this Act, unless the recovery thereof shall have been or may hereafter be otherwise specially provided for.\"\n\nlit was not disputed that the cess under s. 78 would be \"a cess lawfully imposed upon land\" and would therefore be covered by its terms. The legality of the procedure, which the respondents proposed to adopt for the recovery of the sums could not, therefore, be successfully challenged.\n\nThe appeals and the writ petition fail and are dismissed with costs----<me hearing fee.\n\nAppeals and petition dismised.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "for the .. .. v.f T purposes of levying tax on sales. The Legislature has thereby ... qJt:o. o axes - not overstepped the limits of its authority : The Tata Iron Shah J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 321, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. R. S. MURTHY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 566, "end_char": 581, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "H. R. S.-Murtltv", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 583, "end_char": 616, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 619, "end_char": 645, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 647, "end_char": 660, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 673, "end_char": 682, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 722, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madras District Boards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 960, "end_char": 986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1015, "end_char": 1028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras District Boards Act", "statute": "Madras District Boards Act"}}, {"text": "Chittor district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1264, "end_char": 1280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the terms of a mining lease the lessee worked the mines and won iron ore in a tract of land in a village in Chittor district and bound himself to pay a dead rent if he used the leased land for the extraction of iron ore, to pay a royalty on iron ore if it Were used for extraction of iron and in addition to pay a surface rent in respect of the surface area occupied or used."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1614, "end_char": 1620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After separation from Madras in 1953, the District of Chittoor became part of the Andhra State."}}, {"text": "Chittoor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1646, "end_char": 1654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After separation from Madras in 1953, the District of Chittoor became part of the Andhra State."}}, {"text": "Andhra State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1674, "end_char": 1686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After separation from Madras in 1953, the District of Chittoor became part of the Andhra State."}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1749, "end_char": 1762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras District Boards Act", "statute": "Madras District Boards Act"}}, {"text": "March 10, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2125, "end_char": 2139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 10, 1955, two notices 1964 were issued to the appellant demanding payment of cess for the years H. R. s. Murthy 1952-54 and 1955-57 respectively and threatening coercive proceedv."}}, {"text": "August 29, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2720, "end_char": 2735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending these petitions a further notice of demand for payment of cess for the years 1958-59 was served on the appellant in August 29, 1960 and to obtain a similar relief in respect of this notice and the proceedings for recovery thereof, the appellant filed a writ petition in this Court and contended: (I) that the expression \"royalty\" under s. 79(1) does not signify royalty as commonly understood but is confined to the rent payable for the beneficial use of the surface of the land; (2) assuming that royalty in the sense mentioned in point No."}}, {"text": "s. 79(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2940, "end_char": 2948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3158, "end_char": 3171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 10, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3386, "end_char": 3400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "78 and 79, of the Act, the provision imposing the land cess quoad royalty under the mining leases must be held to be repealed by the Central Acts of 1948 and 1957; (3) is the land cess demanded by the impugned notices dated March 10, 1958 and August 29, 1960 recoverable as an arrear of land revenue under the law? ("}}, {"text": "s. 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3481, "end_char": 3487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3674, "end_char": 3679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3797, "end_char": 3802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4336, "end_char": 4349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no connection between the regulation and development of mines and minerals dealt with in the Central Act", "statute": "There is no connection between the regulation and development of mines and minerals dealt with in the Central Act"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 537", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4728, "end_char": 4741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no connection between the regulation and development of mines and minerals dealt with in the Central Act", "statute": "There is no connection between the regulation and development of mines and minerals dealt with in the Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5382, "end_char": 5387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5439, "end_char": 5444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Revenue Recovery Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5459, "end_char": 5479, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5677, "end_char": 5705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5850, "end_char": 5875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave and by certificate from judgment and order dated March 25, 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5973, "end_char": 5980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5988, "end_char": 6009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "T. V. R. Tatachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6173, "end_char": 6191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. V. R. Tatachari and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in both the appeals and the peti1tion)."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6196, "end_char": 6213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. V. R. Tatachari and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in both the appeals and the peti1tion)."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6339, "end_char": 6347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nAYYANGAR J.-The two Civil Appeals and the Petition under Art.", "canonical_name": "Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6352, "end_char": 6360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nAYYANGAR J.-The two Civil Appeals and the Petition under Art.", "canonical_name": "Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6409, "end_char": 6416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras Act XIV of 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6602, "end_char": 6624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7164, "end_char": 7184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's father obtained a mining lease from the Government of Madras dated September 15, 1953 under which he was permitted to work and win iron ore in a tract of land in a village in Chittoor district."}}, {"text": "September 15, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7191, "end_char": 7209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's father obtained a mining lease from the Government of Madras dated September 15, 1953 under which he was permitted to work and win iron ore in a tract of land in a village in Chittoor district."}}, {"text": "Chittoor district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7299, "end_char": 7316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's father obtained a mining lease from the Government of Madras dated September 15, 1953 under which he was permitted to work and win iron ore in a tract of land in a village in Chittoor district."}}, {"text": "section 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8181, "end_char": 8191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8606, "end_char": 8611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8690, "end_char": 8700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. R. s. Murthy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8927, "end_char": 8942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The annual rent value shall, for the purposes of section 78, be calculated in the following manner:\n\n(i) In the case of lands held direct from Government on ryotwari tenure or on lease or licence, the assessment, lease amount, royalty or other sum payable to Government for the lands,\n\nH. R. s. Murthy\n\nCollector of Chittoor\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nH R. S. Murthy v.\n\nCollector of Chittoor\n\nA.yvangar !.", "canonical_name": "H. R. S.-Murtltv"}}, {"text": "H. R. S.-Murtltv", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10882, "end_char": 10898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iv) In the case of lands, the assessment of rent of\n\nwhkh is paid in kind, the aooual rent value shall be calculated according to the rates of rent established or paid for neighbouring lands of a similar description and quality, together with any water-rate which may be payable for the irrigation of the lands first mentioned, or if such method of calculation is, in the opinion of the Board of Revenue, impracticable in any\n\n' particular case, according to any method which 1964 the Board of Revenue may approve for that H. R. S.-Murtltv case :\n\nProvided that, where any landholder or sub-landholder has obtained under the provisions of sections 30 (iii) and 3 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, a decree empowering him to increase his rent in consequence of any additional payment by way of water-rate made by him 'to Government, the annual rent value shall !", "canonical_name": "H. R. S.-Murtltv"}}, {"text": "sections 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10998, "end_char": 11009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Estates Land Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11031, "end_char": 11060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11382, "end_char": 11388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the State of Andhra was separated from Madras in October, 1953 the district of Chittoor became part of the State of Andhra."}}, {"text": "ss. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11630, "end_char": 11635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908", "statute": "the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "High Court. Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11994, "end_char": 12020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the notices were quashed on writ petitions filed to the High Court."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12556, "end_char": 12584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Impugning the validity of the notices of demand for the earlier triennuim, the appellant filed writ petition 534 of 1958 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and a similar petition No."}}, {"text": "A.yyangar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13122, "end_char": 13131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Collector of Chittoor\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1964 ment of cess for the years 1958 and 1959 was served on\n\nH. R. ·-;-Murthy the appellant in August 1960 and to obtain a similar relief\n\nv. in respect of this notice and the proceedings for the recovery Collector of Chittoor thereof, the appellant has filed writ petition 302 of 1960\n\nA.yyangar .1."}}, {"text": "Ram Reddylearned", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13987, "end_char": 14003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ram Reddylearned counsel for the appellant raised three points in support of the appeal : ( 1) What is the meaning of the expression 'royalty' in s. 79 ( 1) of the Act?", "canonical_name": "Ram Reddylearned"}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14133, "end_char": 14138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14317, "end_char": 14330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14750, "end_char": 14755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15078, "end_char": 15083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15374, "end_char": 15379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hingir-Rampur Coal Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16686, "end_char": 16708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hingir-Rampur Coal Co.'s case(') the decision rendered on writ petitions filed in this court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16785, "end_char": 16792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19088, "end_char": 19098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provision in List I referred to here is Entry 54 in the Union List reading :\n\n\"Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by law made by Parliament to be expedient in public interest.\""}}, {"text": "H. R. s. Murthy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19661, "end_char": 19676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\nargument was accepted and the State Act was, therefore, held to be competently enacted, and to remain unaffected H. R. s. Murthy by the Central Legislation.", "canonical_name": "H. R. S.-Murtltv"}}, {"text": "Orissa legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19739, "end_char": 19757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was the same enactment of the Orissa legislature that came up for consideration in State of Orissa v. M.A. Tullock & Co.( 1 )."}}, {"text": "Central Act LXVII of 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19899, "end_char": 19924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20949, "end_char": 20962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21004, "end_char": 21022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21169, "end_char": 21174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21451, "end_char": 21457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyangtll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21879, "end_char": 21888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CoUtctor at\n\nChittoor\n\nAyyangtll' J.\n\nand development of mines and minerals \"dealt with in the\n\nH. R. s. Murzhy Central Acts and the levy and collection of Jand-cess for\n\n•· which provision is made by ss."}}, {"text": "Murzhy Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21961, "end_char": 21979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22057, "end_char": 22070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Murzhy Central Act", "statute": "Murzhy Central Act"}}, {"text": "Ram Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22868, "end_char": 22877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection Mr. Ram Reddy pointed out that as the impugned Iand-cess was payable only in the event of the mining lessee winning the mineral and so paying the royalty and nut when no minerals were extracted, it was in effect a tax on the minerals won and therefore on mineral rights.", "canonical_name": "Ram Reddylearned"}}, {"text": "ss. 78 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24130, "end_char": 24143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24575, "end_char": 24580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26222, "end_char": 26227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Collector of Chittoor", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26556, "end_char": 26577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nCollector of Chittoor The last of the points raised relates to the threat on the part of the Government to recover the impugned demands as an arrear of land revenue.", "canonical_name": "COLLECTOR OF CHITTOOR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "s. 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26755, "end_char": 26761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26945, "end_char": 26950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27102, "end_char": 27107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Revenue Recovery Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27122, "end_char": 27142, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27897, "end_char": 27902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_679_690_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nKARTAR SINGH\n\n(P.B. GAJBNDRAGADKAR, C.1., A.\n\nWANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA\n\nAND\n\nAYYANGAR, JJ )\n\nSARKAR, K . . N.\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA\n\nConstitution of India-Prevention of Fsod Adulteration-Fization of Reichert value of ghee for different State• of India-If un7'tuoMbk or discriminatory-Constitution of India, Art. 14-Prevention of Food Adulterations Act, 1954, ss. 1, 16(l)(a) (i), 23-Prevtntion of Food Adulteration. Rules, 1955, r. 5, Appendix B All, iltm 14.\n\nThe respondent was tried for the commission of an offence under s. 7 read with s. 16(1 )(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 for selling adulterated ghee.\n\nThe analysis of the ghce bad disclosed that it bad a Reichert Value of only 22·5 whereas tho minimum Reichert value fixed for Uttar Pradesh, where the respondent sold tho ghoe, was 28. The defence of the respondent was that he bad obtained the ghee which ho sold from Jodhpur where the Reichert value fixed was only 22 and that the sample must be held not to be adulterated on the basis of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in State v.\n\nMalik Ram, A.I.R. 1962 All. 156.\n\nThis decision laid down that a distinction should be made between gbee obtained from cattle in the hill districts and gbee obtained from cattle in the plains and that ghce obtained from the hill districts of U.P. cannot be held to be adulterated if its Reiehert value was equal to that prescribed for Himachal Pradesh which is a hilly area.\n\nIt was the contention of the respondent that bis ghee was admittedly pahadi ghee and therefore this decision would apply.\n\nThe First Class Magistrate rejected these contentions and convicted him and sentenced him to six months' R.I. and a fine of Rs. 500. On appeal the Sessions Judge concurred in the findings of the trial court but reduced the sentence. The respondent thereupon filed a Criminal Revision Petition before the High Court. The High Court agreed with the courts below that the ghee was not Jodhpur ghee but it was produced locally. But it held that the Reichert values as fixed were not based on any reasonable classification and therefore it was sufficient if a vendor satisfied the minimum standard prescribed for any area in tho country and since the minimum prescribed for certain areas is 21 and since the ghee in question had 22 2 the respondent was not guilty of the olfence charged. The State thereupon appealed to this Court by way of a certificate under Art. 134(l)(e) of the Constitution.\n\nIt was uried by the appellant that tho High Court was wrong in striking down or re-drafting the mies framed by the Central Government in the manner in which the High Court has done purportina to invoke\n\nI964\n\nFtbruary 6,\n\nPradesh\n\nartar Singh\n\nArt. 14 of the Constitution and virtually setting up what the High Court considered was the reasonable standard.\n\nHeld: (i) Where the Government have prescribed certain standatds after taking into considerations various factors the court cannot strike down these standards as unreasonable or discriminatory merely on some apriori reasoning.\n\nIt can do so only by basing its decision on materials placed before it by way of scientific analysis. The party invoking Art. 14 must make averments with details to sustain such l plea and lead evidence to establish his allegations.\n\nIn the absence of such plea and evidence the court cannot accept the statement of a party as to the unconstitutionality of a rule and refuse to enforce that rule as it stands merely because in its view the standards are too high and for this reason the rule is unreasonable.\n\n(ii) Applyin2' these principles it is found that the case State v.\n\nMalik Ram (A.l.R. 1962 All. 156) was wrongly Jeci<lcd by the Allahabad High Court. In the case under appeal the High Court took the matter a step further and adopted the lowest Reichert value prescribed for any area in the country as what should be adopted for every other area in the country disregarding the rules.\n\nHence the High Court was wrong in allowing the revisions.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 164 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated May 2, 1962, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1579 of 1961.\n\n0. P. Rana and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.\n\nHarnam Singh Chadda and Harbans Singh, for the respondent.\n\nFebruary 6, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAYYANGAR J.-This appeal which comes before us on a certificate of fitness .granted by the High Court of Allahabad under Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution, is against a judgment of that Court acquitting the respondent Kartar Singh of an offence under s. 7 read withs. 16(1)(a)\n\n(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 which may be conveniently referred to as the Act.\n\nThe facts giving rise to the prosecution are briefly these: 1964 The respondent runs a shop at Haldwani and among the State of Uttar products sold by him is ghee.\n\nOn March 19, 1960 a Pradesh quantity of the ghee was purchased by the Food Inspector Karta;· Singh' of the area and he put samples of the purchase into three - phials which were sealed in the respondent's presence. It Ayyangar 1•\n\nmay be mentioned that even in the seizure memo the Food Inspector noted the ghee purchased by him as \"pahadi ghee\".\n\nOne of the samples was forwarded to the Public Analyst to the Government of Uttar Pradesh for analysis for ascertaining whether the said ghee was adulterated.\n\nThe analysis disclosed that in several respects the sample was sub-standard and that in particular it had a Reichert V aluc of 22 5 as against the prescribed minimum of 28 for ghee in Uttar Pradesh.\n\nAfter setting out the details of the analysis, the Public Analyst expressed the opinion that the sample \"contained a small proportion of vegetable fat or oil foreign to pure ghee\".\n\nOn receipt of this report, the Medical Officer of Health, Haldwani sanctioned the prosecution of the respondent and a complaint was thereafter laid before the Magistrate Ist Class by the Food Inspector.\n\nThe respondent pleaded not guilty and entered on his defence. Subsequently, the second sample was got analysed by the Director, Central Food Laboratory, who reported that his analysis disclosed a Reichert Value of 21·7 as against 22 5 of the Public Analyst. The opinion expressed by him as regards the sample of ghee which he analysed was the same as that of the Public Analyst, viz., that the sample was adulterated.\n\nThe defence of the respondent who admitted that he had sold the ghee, samples of which were the subject of analysis, but denied it was adulterated, was two-fold:\n\n(I) He had obtained the ghee which he sold from Jodhpur, ( 2) The sample must be held not to be adulterated on the basis of the decision of the Allahabad High Court m State v.\n\nMalik Ram(').\n\nThe plea by the respondent regarding the ghee sold having come from Jodhpur was made because if this were established under the rules framed unde; the Act, to which\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1962 All. 156.\n\nState of U liar\n\nl'rad,.lt\n\n' v.\n\nKartar Singh\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nwe shall later refer, the minimum Reichert value prescribed for ghee in the Jodhpur area was 21 and that minimum requirement was satisfied by the sample analysed.\n\nThe respondent led evidence to prove his purchase from Jodhpur but the learned Magistrate did not accept this case.\n\nThe other defence was a point of law relying on the decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported as State v.\n\nMalik Ram('). The learned Judges who decided that case drew a distinction between ghee obtained from cattle in the hill clistricts of Uttar Pradesh and those from cattle in the plains.\n\nThis decision was relied on by the respondent because the ghee sold by him was noted as 'pahadi ghee' by the Food Inspector. The learned Judges held that notwithstanding the terms of the rules to which we shall later refer, ghee obtained from hilly areas of Uttar Pradesh like Kumaun hills, could not be held to be adulterated if its Reichert value was equal to that prescribed for Himachal Pradesh which was mostly a hilly area.\n\nThey therefore held that though the rules under the Food Adulteration Act prescribed a minimum Reichert value of 28 for ghee for the entire State of Uttar Pradesh, still if ghee from hill areas of the Uttar Pradesh State reached a minimum of 26 Reichert value, such ghee would not be \"adulterated ghee\".\n\nWe shall consider the correctness of this decision after completing the narrative of the proceedings.\n\nThe learned Magistrate held that this decision did not affect the present case because the Reichert value of the respondent's ghee was less than 26.\n\nThe Magistrate therefore convicted the respondent and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of Rs. 500 and in default to further imprisonment for three months.\n\nThe respondent preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge Kumaon, and raised the same pleas and defences as he put forward before the learned Magistrate.\n\nThe Sessions Judge concurred/ in the finding of the Magistrate regarding the story of the respondent having bought the ghee from Jodhpur, and he also agreed with the Magistrate about the effect of the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court which was also relied on before him. The\n\n(l), A.l.R. 1962 All. U6.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT PEPORTS\n\nSessions Judge, however, while upholding the conviction 1educed the sentence of imprisonment from six months to one month and the fine to Rs. 200.\n\nThe respondent thereupon filed a Criminal Revision petition to the High Court under ss. 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe learned Judge of the High Court agreed with the Courts below on the finding of fact as regards the Jodhpur origin of the ghee observing \"as the file stands I am satisfied that this ghee was of local origin\". 1 here was, of course, no point raised before him as regards the correctness of the analysis.\n\nThe learned Judge, however, held that the basis on which the Reichert value had been prescribed for the several areas in the country was not based on any rational classification and he therefore held that it was sufficient if any vendor of ghee in the country satisfied the minimum standards prescribed for any area under these rules.\n\nAs there were areas in the country in regard to which a minimum Reichert value of 21 had been prescribed, he held that the respondent was not guilty of adulteration and so directed his acquittal.\n\nIt is from this decision that the present appeal has been filed by the State.\n\nBefore considering the point about the standards prescribed under the Food Adulteration Act being violative of Art. 14, an Article which though not specifically mentioned, is apparently the ground upon which the learned Judge has held that the prescription of the Reichert value of 28 for Uttar Pradesh was unenforceable, it would be necessary to set out the statutory provisions on which the decision of the present appeal turns.\n\nThe preamble to the Act describes it as one \"to make provision for the prevention of adulteration of food\". Section 2 defines the word 'adulterated' as follows :\n\n\"An article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated-\n\n(i) if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescnbed limits of variability;\"\n\nPrade1h\n\nv, Kartar Singh\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nSlate of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nKartar Singh\n\nAyyanaar J.\n\nto read only the portion that is material. Section 3 enables the Central Government to constitute a committee for food standards and it runs :\n\n\"3. (1) The Central Government shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, constitute a Committee called the Central Committee for Food Standards to advise the Central Government and the State Governments on matters arising out of the administration of this Ai:t and to carry out the other functions assigned to it under this Act.\n\n(2) The Committee shall consist of the following members, namely:-\n\n( a) the Director General, Health Services, exo!Jicio, who shall be the Chairman;\n\n(b) the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, ex officio;\n\n( c) two experts nominated by the Central Gov- ·\n\nernment;\n\n(d) one representative each of the Central Ministries of Food and Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Railways and Defence nominated by the Central Government;\n\n( e) one representative each nominated by the Government of each State;\n\n(f) two representatives nominated by the Central Government to represent the Union territories;\n\n( g) two representatives of Industry and Commerce nominated by the Central Government;\n\n(h) one representative of the medical profession nominated by the Indian Council of Medical\n\nResearch\".\n\nSection 7 which prohibits the manufacture and sale of adulterated food reads:\n\n\"No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute- ( i) any adulterated food; ...... \" Section 8 makes provision for State Governments appointing\n\nPublic Analysts and s. 9 for the appointment of Food Inspectors.\n\nThe next material provision is that contained in s. 13 which deals with the reports of the analysis of food for the purpose of ascertaining whether there are adulterated or sub-standard etc.\n\nIts first sub-section directs the Public Analyst to make a report and under sub-s. ( 3) the Certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-s. ( 2) is to supersede the report given by a Public Analyst under sub-s. (I). Section 16 provides for the penalties for offences under the Act.\n\nSection 23 confers on the Central Government power to make rules but these rules have to be framed after consultation with the Committee established under s. 3 and among the rules which might be made are- Section 23 (I )(b )--defining the standards of quality for, and fixing the limits of variability permissible in respect of, any article of food;. . . . . ...... .\n\n\"23. (2) All rules made by the Central Government under this Act shall as soon as possible after they are made be laid before both Houses of Parliament.\" Under the power conferred by s. 23, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, were promulgated.\n\nRule 5 which occurs in Part III of the rules--headed \"Definitions and Standards of quality\"-specifies that \"the standards of quality of the various articles of food specified in Appendix B to these rules are as defined in that appendix.\" Ghee is one of the articles of food whose standards are prescribed in Appendix B, milk and milk products being listed under head A'.-11.\n\nGhee is dealt with in item 14 of A-11 and the standard prescribed for it runs: Ghee means the pure clarified fat derived solely from milk or from curds or from cream to\n\nPrad<sh ..\n\nKartar Singh\n\nA.yyangar I.\n\nPrad••h\n\nKartar Singh\n\nAyyangar J,\n\nwhich, no cok>uring matter or preservative has been added. It shall conform to the following specifications--\n\nIn Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bhopal, ............... .\n\nVindhya Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal (except Bishnupur) and PEPSU (except Mahendragarh) :\n\n(a) ............... .\n\n(b) Reichert Value Not less than 28.\n\n(c)\n\n(d)\n\nIn Madras, Andhra, Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, Mysore, Orissa, Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Madhya Bharat, Bombay, Himachal Pradesh, Mahendragarh District of PEPSU, Madhya Pradesh (except cotton tract areas) and Ra jasthan (except Jodhpur) the specifications will be the same as above except that Reichert value shall be not less than 26·0.\n\nIn Saurashtra, Kutch, cotton tract areas of Madhya Pradesh, Jodhpur Division of Rajasthan and Bishnupur Sub-division of West Bengal the Reichert value shall not be less than 21 and the Butyro refractometer reading at 40°C shall be between 41 5 to 45·0. The limits for free fatty acids and moisture shall be the same as for ghee in Punjab, PEPSU etc. given above ..\n\nExplanation.-By cotton tract is meant the areas in Madhya Pradesh where cotton seed is extensively fed to the cattle.\n\nThe learned counsel for the 'State has urged before us that the learned Judge was not justified in striking down or re-drafting the rules framed by the Central Government in the manner in which he has done, purporting to invoke Art. 14 of the Constitution, and in virtually setting up what he considered was the reasonable standard of quality which should detennine whether the ghee sold by the respondent was adulterate.d or not.\n\nWe entirely agree with this submission.\n\nNow, it is common ground that if the rules were valid and the standards prescribed enforceable, the ghee\n\nsold by the respondent was 'adulterated' with the result that 1964 the respondent was guilty of an offence under s. 7 read with State of Uttar s. 16 of the Act.\n\nThe only question is whether there was Prad••h •• any material placed before the Court for refusing to apply Kartar Singh the rules for determining the standards of quality.\n\nThe standards themselves, it would be noticed, have been prescribed by the Central Government on the advice of a Committee which included in its composition persons considered experts in the field of food technology and food analysis.\n\nIn the circumstances, if the rule has to be struck down as imposing unreasonable or discriminatory standards, it could not be done merely on any apriori reasoning but only as a result of materials placed before the Court by way of scientific analysis.\n\nIt is obvious that this can be done only when the party invoking the protection of Art. 14 makes averments with details to sustain such a plea and leads evidence to establish his allegations.\n\nThat where a party seeks to impeach the validity of a rule made by a competent authority on the ground that the rules offend Art. 14 the burden is on him to plead and prove the infirmity is too well established to need elaboration.\n\nIf, therefore, the respondent desired to challenge the validity of the rule on the ground either of its unreasonableness or its discriminatory nature, he had to lay a foundation for it by setting out the facts necessary to sustain such a plea and adduce cogent and convincing evidence to make out his case, for there is a presumption that every factor which is relevant or material has been taken into account in formulating the classification of the zones and the prescription of the minimum standards to each zone, and where we have a rule framed with the assistance c, Z a committee containing experts such as the one constituted under s. 3 of the Act, )hat presumption is strong, if not overwhelming. We might in this connection add that the respondent cannot assert any fundamental right under Art. 19 (l ) to carry on business in adulterated foodstuffs.\n\nWhere the necessary facts have been pleaded and established, the Court would have materials before it on which it could base findings, as regards the reasonableness or otherwise or of the discriminatory nature of the rules. In\n\n.4.yyangar /,\n\nPradesh\n\nKartar Singh\n\nAyyangar /,\n\nthe absence of a pleading and proof of unreasonableness or arbitrariness the Court cannot accept the statement of a party as to the unreasonableness or unconstitutionality of a ruie and refuse to enforce the rule as it stands merely because in its view the standards are too high and for this reason the rule is unreasonable. In the case before us there was neither pleading nor proof of any facts directed to that end.\n\nThe only basis on which the contention regarding unreasonableness or discrimination was raised was an apriori argument addressed to the Court, that the division into the zones was not rational, in that hilly and plain areas of the country were not differentiated for the prescrip- tion of the minimum Reichert values.\n\nThat a distinction should exist between hilly regions and plains, was again based on apriori reasoning resting on the different minimum Reichert values prescribed for Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and on no other.\n\nIt was, however, not as if the entire State of Himachal Pradesh is of uniform elevation or even as if no part of that State is plain country but yet if the same minimum was prescribed for the entire area of Himachal Pradesh, that would clearly show that the elevation of a place is not the only factor to be taken into account.\n\nAt this stage it might be pointed out that the test for Reichert or Re1chert-Meissl value of ghee is one of the important tests for detecting adulteration with certain vegetable oils by determining the proportion of the volatile soluble acids in the ghee.\n\nThe presence of the adulterant disturbs the ratio existing in normal butter fat or ghee between soluble and insoluble acids and volatile and nonvolatile acids. The Reichert value of pure ghee is not constant, but is dependent on several factors-among them the breed of the cattle to be found in an area, whether the cattle are pasture fed or stall fed, and the nature of the additional feed given, the nature of the terrain, the rain-fall and climatic conditions etc.\n\nThat the feed available for the cattle is a very material and determining factor is apparent even from the rules, for a distinction ;. drawn between different areas of Madhya Pradesh depending on cotton seed being available for feeding the cattle. It is on the basis oi the conjoint effects of these and other factors which\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RI~.PORTS 689\n\nobtain in the different areas, some pointing to a higher Reichert value and others neutralising it and after extensive survey conducted from samples collected and analysed during various seasons, that the country has been divided into zones under the rule in Appendix 'B' and the minimum Reichert value ascertained and prescribed for each. From the fact that certain areas includen in some of the zones are hilly, it does not automatically follow that that was the potent factor or the only factor which was taken into consideration for prescribing the standard for that region.\n\nWithout appreciating the several factors which bear upon the Reichert value of the ghee produced in a locality and the value attributed to each o, f these several relevant factors, it would not be possible fo pronounce upon the reasonablenciss or correctness of the classification of the areas and tbe prescription e>f different standards to each of them.\n\nIn State v. Malik Ram(') a Division Bench of the High Court held that because certain areas of Uttar Praoe,.., \\\\ere hilly, the Reichert value prescribed for the hilly areas like those in Himachal Pradesh should be adopted and be given effect to notwithstanding there was no ambiguity in the rules .., regards the area where the prescribed standards should be applicable.\n\nExcept a principle which the Court deduced from the rules themselves there was no material before the Court Illat the minimum standard prescribed for Uttar Pradesh was defective in any respect. The approach adopted by the learned Judges in Malik Ram's case appears to us to be a reversal of the well-recognised principle that it is for those who challenge the constitutionality of a statute or a statutory rule to allege and prove the grounds of invalidity and the adoption of the contrary rule that when a party makes such a challenge it is for those who seek to support it to sustain it by positive evidence of its reasonableness and legality.\n\nThe Court evolved from a reading of the rules a principle that the standards vary with the elevation of the place, without having before it any materials for such a conclusion save what it considered was the rationale underlying the division into zones.\n\nAs already explained, even in Himachal Pradesh the elevation of every place is not the same and there are areas which\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1962 All. 156.\n\n134-159 S, C,-44\n\n19/U\n\nStat• of u-\n\nPraduli ...\n\nX.artar Siltllli\n\nAyya- 1.\n\n196\"\n\nSta< of Ut:ar\n\nPradt1h ...\n\nLutar Slnzh\n\nA.7Y•n1ar I.\n\nare higher !hail others and so the test adopted does not even satisfy logic.\n\nWe do not consider that the Court was justified in practically legislating and laying down what the rules should be rather than give effect to the law by adherence to the rules as framed.\n\nIn the case now under appeal the learned Judge tc0k the matter a step further and he adopted the lowest Reichert value prescribed for any area in the country as that which he would adopt for every other area in the country disregarding the rules.\n\nWe find no justification for this eit'1er and, in fact, if the learned Judges in Malik Rams case(') were in error in applying the Himachal standard to hilly areas of Uttar Pradesh, the judgment now under appeal discloses even more error. We might add that if one could legitimately discard the standard prescribed in the rules, as the learned Judge has done, we do not see any principle in hdlding, as he seems to indicatt. that where the Reichert value is below 21 the ghee should be treated as adulterated.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that the _learned Judge was not justified in allowing the revision of the respondent and acquitting him.\n\nThe result is that the appeal is allowed, the acquittal of the respondent is set aside and his conviction restored.\n\nIt was stated to us on behalf of the respondent that of the imprisonment for one month to which the sentence passed on him by the Magistrate was modified by the Sessions Judge, he had already undergone a sentence of 18 days.\n\nHe has been on bail practically since the ad1.:ission of his Revision Petition in the High Court.\n\nIn the circumstances, we consider that the sentence of imprisonment passed on him might be reduced to the period already undergone.\n\nThe sentence of fine imposed will, however, stand.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n1) /..I.R. 1962 All. 156.", "total_entities": 90, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KARTAR SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Karta;· Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AYYANGAR, JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 334, "end_char": 355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulterations Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 365, "end_char": 407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 1, 16(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 409, "end_char": 424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulterations Act, 1954", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulterations Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 575, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulterations Act, 1954", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulterations Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 16(1 )(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 590, "end_char": 605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulterations Act, 1954", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulterations Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 613, "end_char": 654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jodhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 954, "end_char": 961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of the respondent was that he bad obtained the ghee which ho sold from Jodhpur where the Reichert value fixed was only 22 and that the sample must be held not to be adulterated on the basis of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in State v.\n\nMalik Ram, A.I.R. 1962 All."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1096, "end_char": 1116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence of the respondent was that he bad obtained the ghee which ho sold from Jodhpur where the Reichert value fixed was only 22 and that the sample must be held not to be adulterated on the basis of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in State v.\n\nMalik Ram, A.I.R. 1962 All."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1372, "end_char": 1376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision laid down that a distinction should be made between gbee obtained from cattle in the hill districts and gbee obtained from cattle in the plains and that ghce obtained from the hill districts of U.P. cannot be held to be adulterated if its Reiehert value was equal to that prescribed for Himachal Pradesh which is a hilly area."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1465, "end_char": 1481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision laid down that a distinction should be made between gbee obtained from cattle in the hill districts and gbee obtained from cattle in the plains and that ghce obtained from the hill districts of U.P. cannot be held to be adulterated if its Reiehert value was equal to that prescribed for Himachal Pradesh which is a hilly area."}}, {"text": "Art. 134(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2485, "end_char": 2499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2637, "end_char": 2655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was uried by the appellant that tho High Court was wrong in striking down or re-drafting the mies framed by the Central Government in the manner in which the High Court has done purportina to invoke\n\nI964\n\nFtbruary 6,\n\nPradesh\n\nartar Singh\n\nArt."}}, {"text": "artar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2753, "end_char": 2764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was uried by the appellant that tho High Court was wrong in striking down or re-drafting the mies framed by the Central Government in the manner in which the High Court has done purportina to invoke\n\nI964\n\nFtbruary 6,\n\nPradesh\n\nartar Singh\n\nArt.", "canonical_name": "Karta;· Singh"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2766, "end_char": 2773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3229, "end_char": 3236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4255, "end_char": 4262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and C. P. Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and C. P. Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh Chadda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh Chadda and Harbans Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4322, "end_char": 4335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh Chadda and Harbans Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4420, "end_char": 4428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAYYANGAR J.-This appeal which comes before us on a certificate of fitness .granted by the High Court of Allahabad under Art.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR, JJ"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4540, "end_char": 4551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134(1) (c) of the Constitution, is against a judgment of that Court acquitting the respondent Kartar Singh of an offence under s. 7 read withs.", "canonical_name": "Karta;· Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4672, "end_char": 4676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4710, "end_char": 4751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Haldwani", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4898, "end_char": 4906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to the prosecution are briefly these: 1964 The respondent runs a shop at Haldwani and among the State of Uttar products sold by him is ghee."}}, {"text": "19, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 19, 1960 a Pradesh quantity of the ghee was purchased by the Food Inspector Karta;· Singh' of the area and he put samples of the purchase into three - phials which were sealed in the respondent's presence."}}, {"text": "Karta;· Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5052, "end_char": 5065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 19, 1960 a Pradesh quantity of the ghee was purchased by the Food Inspector Karta;· Singh' of the area and he put samples of the purchase into three - phials which were sealed in the respondent's presence.", "canonical_name": "Karta;· Singh"}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5377, "end_char": 5404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the samples was forwarded to the Public Analyst to the Government of Uttar Pradesh for analysis for ascertaining whether the said ghee was adulterated."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5659, "end_char": 5672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The analysis disclosed that in several respects the sample was sub-standard and that in particular it had a Reichert V aluc of 22 5 as against the prescribed minimum of 28 for ghee in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Central Food Laboratory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6189, "end_char": 6212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the second sample was got analysed by the Director, Central Food Laboratory, who reported that his analysis disclosed a Reichert Value of 21·7 as against 22 5 of the Public Analyst."}}, {"text": "State of U liar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of U liar\n\nl'rad,.lt\n\n' v.\n\nKartar Singh\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nwe shall later refer, the minimum Reichert value prescribed for ghee in the Jodhpur area was 21 and that minimum requirement was satisfied by the sample analysed."}}, {"text": "They therefore held that though the rules under the Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8118, "end_char": 8191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8258, "end_char": 8280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They therefore held that though the rules under the Food Adulteration Act prescribed a minimum Reichert value of 28 for ghee for the entire State of Uttar Pradesh, still if ghee from hill areas of the Uttar Pradesh State reached a minimum of 26 Reichert value, such ghee would not be \"adulterated ghee\"."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8319, "end_char": 8338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They therefore held that though the rules under the Food Adulteration Act prescribed a minimum Reichert value of 28 for ghee for the entire State of Uttar Pradesh, still if ghee from hill areas of the Uttar Pradesh State reached a minimum of 26 Reichert value, such ghee would not be \"adulterated ghee\"."}}, {"text": "Kumaon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8933, "end_char": 8939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge Kumaon, and raised the same pleas and defences as he put forward before the learned Magistrate."}}, {"text": "ss. 435 and 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9614, "end_char": 9629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Before considering the point about the standards prescribed under the Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10582, "end_char": 10673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10693, "end_char": 10700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before considering the point about the standards prescribed under the Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Before considering the point about the standards prescribed under the Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11122, "end_char": 11131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before considering the point about the standards prescribed under the Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Before considering the point about the standards prescribed under the Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "Ayyanaar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11499, "end_char": 11507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2 defines the word 'adulterated' as follows :\n\n\"An article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated-\n\n(i) if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescnbed limits of variability;\"\n\nPrade1h\n\nv, Kartar Singh\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nSlate of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nKartar Singh\n\nAyyanaar J.\n\nto read only the portion that is material.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR, JJ"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11555, "end_char": 11564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before considering the point about the standards prescribed under the Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Before considering the point about the standards prescribed under the Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12802, "end_char": 12811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13025, "end_char": 13034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13105, "end_char": 13109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13200, "end_char": 13205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13590, "end_char": 13600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13657, "end_char": 13667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13812, "end_char": 13816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13862, "end_char": 13872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All rules made by the Central Government under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14035, "end_char": 14090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14167, "end_char": 14177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) All rules made by the Central Government under this Act shall as soon as possible after they are made be laid before both Houses of Parliament.\""}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14209, "end_char": 14214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All rules made by the Central Government under this Act", "statute": "All rules made by the Central Government under this Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14220, "end_char": 14263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14842, "end_char": 14854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghee is dealt with in item 14 of A-11 and the standard prescribed for it runs: Ghee means the pure clarified fat derived solely from milk or from curds or from cream to\n\nPrad<sh ..\n\nKartar Singh\n\nA.yyangar I.\n\nPrad••h\n\nKartar Singh\n\nAyyangar J,\n\nwhich, no cok>uring matter or preservative has been added.", "canonical_name": "Karta;· Singh"}}, {"text": "A.yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14856, "end_char": 14865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghee is dealt with in item 14 of A-11 and the standard prescribed for it runs: Ghee means the pure clarified fat derived solely from milk or from curds or from cream to\n\nPrad<sh ..\n\nKartar Singh\n\nA.yyangar I.\n\nPrad••h\n\nKartar Singh\n\nAyyangar J,\n\nwhich, no cok>uring matter or preservative has been added.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR, JJ"}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15043, "end_char": 15049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It shall conform to the following specifications--\n\nIn Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bhopal, ............... ."}}, {"text": "PEPSU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15129, "end_char": 15134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vindhya Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal (except Bishnupur) and PEPSU (except Mahendragarh) :\n\n(a) ............... ."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15234, "end_char": 15240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c)\n\n(d)\n\nIn Madras, Andhra, Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, Mysore, Orissa, Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Madhya Bharat, Bombay, Himachal Pradesh, Mahendragarh District of PEPSU, Madhya Pradesh (except cotton tract areas) and Ra jasthan (except Jodhpur) the specifications will be the same as above except that Reichert value shall be not less than 26·0."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15242, "end_char": 15248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c)\n\n(d)\n\nIn Madras, Andhra, Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, Mysore, Orissa, Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Madhya Bharat, Bombay, Himachal Pradesh, Mahendragarh District of PEPSU, Madhya Pradesh (except cotton tract areas) and Ra jasthan (except Jodhpur) the specifications will be the same as above except that Reichert value shall be not less than 26·0."}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15250, "end_char": 15267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c)\n\n(d)\n\nIn Madras, Andhra, Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, Mysore, Orissa, Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Madhya Bharat, Bombay, Himachal Pradesh, Mahendragarh District of PEPSU, Madhya Pradesh (except cotton tract areas) and Ra jasthan (except Jodhpur) the specifications will be the same as above except that Reichert value shall be not less than 26·0."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15269, "end_char": 15278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c)\n\n(d)\n\nIn Madras, Andhra, Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, Mysore, Orissa, Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Madhya Bharat, Bombay, Himachal Pradesh, Mahendragarh District of PEPSU, Madhya Pradesh (except cotton tract areas) and Ra jasthan (except Jodhpur) the specifications will be the same as above except that Reichert value shall be not less than 26·0."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15280, "end_char": 15286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c)\n\n(d)\n\nIn Madras, Andhra, Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, Mysore, Orissa, Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Madhya Bharat, Bombay, Himachal Pradesh, Mahendragarh District of PEPSU, Madhya Pradesh (except cotton tract areas) and Ra jasthan (except Jodhpur) the specifications will be the same as above except that Reichert value shall be not less than 26·0."}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15574, "end_char": 15584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Saurashtra, Kutch, cotton tract areas of Madhya Pradesh, Jodhpur Division of Rajasthan and Bishnupur Sub-division of West Bengal the Reichert value shall not be less than 21 and the Butyro refractometer reading at 40°C shall be between 41 5 to 45·0."}}, {"text": "Kutch", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15586, "end_char": 15591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Saurashtra, Kutch, cotton tract areas of Madhya Pradesh, Jodhpur Division of Rajasthan and Bishnupur Sub-division of West Bengal the Reichert value shall not be less than 21 and the Butyro refractometer reading at 40°C shall be between 41 5 to 45·0."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15615, "end_char": 15629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Saurashtra, Kutch, cotton tract areas of Madhya Pradesh, Jodhpur Division of Rajasthan and Bishnupur Sub-division of West Bengal the Reichert value shall not be less than 21 and the Butyro refractometer reading at 40°C shall be between 41 5 to 45·0."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15651, "end_char": 15660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Saurashtra, Kutch, cotton tract areas of Madhya Pradesh, Jodhpur Division of Rajasthan and Bishnupur Sub-division of West Bengal the Reichert value shall not be less than 21 and the Butyro refractometer reading at 40°C shall be between 41 5 to 45·0."}}, {"text": "Bishnupur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15665, "end_char": 15674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Saurashtra, Kutch, cotton tract areas of Madhya Pradesh, Jodhpur Division of Rajasthan and Bishnupur Sub-division of West Bengal the Reichert value shall not be less than 21 and the Butyro refractometer reading at 40°C shall be between 41 5 to 45·0."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15691, "end_char": 15702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Saurashtra, Kutch, cotton tract areas of Madhya Pradesh, Jodhpur Division of Rajasthan and Bishnupur Sub-division of West Bengal the Reichert value shall not be less than 21 and the Butyro refractometer reading at 40°C shall be between 41 5 to 45·0."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15902, "end_char": 15908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The limits for free fatty acids and moisture shall be the same as for ghee in Punjab, PEPSU etc."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16284, "end_char": 16291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16748, "end_char": 16752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16778, "end_char": 16783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16906, "end_char": 16918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only question is whether there was Prad••h •• any material placed before the Court for refusing to apply Kartar Singh the rules for determining the standards of quality.", "canonical_name": "Karta;· Singh"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17544, "end_char": 17551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17779, "end_char": 17786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18526, "end_char": 18530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18686, "end_char": 18693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".4.yyangar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18976, "end_char": 18986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\n\n.4.yyangar /,\n\nPradesh\n\nKartar Singh\n\nAyyangar /,\n\nthe absence of a pleading and proof of unreasonableness or arbitrariness the Court cannot accept the statement of a party as to the unreasonableness or unconstitutionality of a ruie and refuse to enforce the rule as it stands merely because in its view the standards are too high and for this reason the rule is unreasonable."}}, {"text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21369, "end_char": 21390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is on the basis oi the conjoint effects of these and other factors which\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RI~.PORTS 689\n\nobtain in the different areas, some pointing to a higher Reichert value and others neutralising it and after extensive survey conducted from samples collected and analysed during various seasons, that the country has been divided into zones under the rule in Appendix 'B' and the minimum Reichert value ascertained and prescribed for each."}}, {"text": "Uttar Praoe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22438, "end_char": 22449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In State v. Malik Ram(') a Division Bench of the High Court held that because certain areas of Uttar Praoe,.., \\\\ere hilly, the Reichert value prescribed for the hilly areas like those in Himachal Pradesh should be adopted and be given effect to notwithstanding there was no ambiguity in the rules .., regards the area where the prescribed standards should be applicable."}}, {"text": "Malik Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22956, "end_char": 22965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The approach adopted by the learned Judges in Malik Ram's case appears to us to be a reversal of the well-recognised principle that it is for those who challenge the constitutionality of a statute or a statutory rule to allege and prove the grounds of invalidity and the adoption of the contrary rule that when a party makes such a challenge it is for those who seek to support it to sustain it by positive evidence of its reasonableness and legality.", "canonical_name": "Malik Rams"}}, {"text": "Malik Rams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24499, "end_char": 24509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find no justification for this eit'1er and, in fact, if the learned Judges in Malik Rams case(') were in error in applying the Himachal standard to hilly areas of Uttar Pradesh, the judgment now under appeal discloses even more error.", "canonical_name": "Malik Rams"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_691_699_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 691\n\nSHREE BAJRANG JUTE MILLS LTD.\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nSales Tax-Goods delivered to places outside State for consumption itt\n\nthose States-Liability .to tax-\"Explanation Salei'-Exprtssion ''Actually delivered\", meaning of-Constitu1ion of India, Art. 286(1)(a)-lndian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, r. 39.\n\nThe appellant, carrying on business as a manufacturer of jute goods with its factory at Guntur, ued to send jute bags by railway to the cement factories of the A.C.C. outside the State of Andhra. Fer securing a regular supply of jute bags, the A.C.C. entered into a contract with the appellant and under the despatch instructions. from that company, the appellant loaded the goods in th!; railway wagons, obtained railway receipts in the name of the A.C.C. as consignee and against payment of the price, delivered the receipts to the Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli, which was for the purpose of receiving the railway receipt and making payment, the agent of the A.C.C. From the amounts shown as gros~ turnover in the return for the assessment year 1954-55, the appellant claimed reductidn of certain amounts in respect of the goods supplied by rail to the A.C.C. outside the State of Andhra Pradesh under its despatch instructions. The Commercial Tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes disallowed the claim and held that as the railway receipts were delivered to the agent of the buyer within the State of Andhra, and price was also realized from the agent of the buyer within the State, goods must be deemed to have been delivered to the buyer in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and the appellant was liable to pay tax on the sales. On appeal, this order was reversed by the Appellate Tribunal. In revision the High Court restored the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.\n\nThe question for determination in this appeal was whether the sales to the A.C.C. by the appellant may be regarded as \"nonExplanation sales\", i.e. falling outside the Explanation to Art. 286(1).\n\nHeld: (i) If the gocxls were delivered pursuant to the contracts of sale outside the State of Andhra for the purpose of consumption in the State into which the gocxls were delivered, the State of Andhra couid have no right to tax those sales by virtue of the restriction imposed by Art. 286(l)(a) read with Explanation.\n\nTo attract the Explanation, the goods had to be actually delivered a' a direct result of the sale, for the purpose of consumption in the State in which they were delivered. The expression \"actually delivered\" in the context in which it occurs, can only mean physical delivery of\n\n.964\n\nFebru1ry 6.\n\n1964 the goods, or such action as puts the goods in the poMOSSion of tho lllrH Ba/rang purchaser; it does not contemplate mere symbolical or notional delivery.\n\nlut• MilLr C. Govindarajulu Naidu cl Co. v. State of Madras, A.l.R. 1953 \"'* .J• Andhro Mad. 116, Mis. Capco Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, A.l.R. 1960 All. 62\n\nPrada/I and Khaitan Minerals v. Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal for Mysor<, A.I.II. • . 1963 Mysore 141, followed.\n\n..,, 1.\n\nPoppat Lal Shah v. State of Madras, [1953] S.C.R. 617, Tata Iron A: Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1958] S.C.R. 1355, Tobacco Man .. facturtrs (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, [1961) 2 S.C.R. 106, Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1961} 2 S.C.R. 276 and State of Kera/a v. Cochin Coal Co. Ltd., [1961] 2 S.C.R. 219. referred to.\n\n(ii) Section 39 of the Indian Sale o! Goods Act will not make mere delivery of -the railway receipts representing title to the goods, act'~11 delivery of goods for the purpose of Art. 286. The rule contained ;,.\n\ns. 39(1) h~ no applicat.ion in dealing with a constitutional provi.sio• which while' imposiJ:\\8 a restriction upon the legislative power of the States entrusts exclusive power to levy sales tax to the State in which the goocjs, have been ly delivered for the purpose of consumption.\n\nCIV~L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 542 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated April 7, 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tax Revision case No. 27 of 1958.\n\nM. C. Seta/vad, K. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal, for the ap; iellant.\n\nA. Ranganadham Chetty and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent.\n\nFebruary 6, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-With certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh this appeal is preferred by Shree Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd.\n\nThe appellant is engaged in the manufacture of jute goods, and is a registered dealer under the Madras General Sales, Tax Act.\n\nFor the assessment year 1954-55 the appellant submitted its return for sales-tax claiming a deduction of Rs. 21,80,118-1-3 from the turnover in respect\n\nof the jute goods supplied by rail to the Associated Cement 1964 Company Ltd.-hereinafter for the sake of brevity called Shr•• Ba/Nlf6 'the A.C.C.' under despatch instructions from that Company.\n\nJt• MW.\n\nThe Commercial Tax Officer rejected the claim of the Stat• , J Andlft\n\nappellant for deduction and that order was confirmed in Pradt1/i appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.\n\nSliah J.\n\nIn appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the order was reversed, the Tribunal holding that the appellant was entitled to exemption in respect of the turnover for the goods supplied to the A.C.C. A revision petition presented against the order to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was heard with a large number of other petitions which raised certain common questions. The High Court reversed the order of the Tribunal and restored the order gassed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.\n\nThe factory of the appellant is situated at Guntur. The A.C.C. owns cement factories at many places (including one at Tadepalli in the State of Andhra called the Krishna Cement Works) and for the purpose of marketing its products it requires jute packing bags. For securing a regular supply of jute bags, the A.C.C. entered into a contract with the appellant of which the following four cnditions are material:\n\n\"1. All the goods are sold F.O.R. Guntur unless otherwise expressly stated in this contract.\n\n2. Goods to be packed. . . . well pressed and marked in . . . . bound bales of . . . . per each.\n\n3. Payments to be made in cash, in exchange for Mills Delivery Order on sellers on due date or for Railway receipts or for Dock receipts, or for Mate's receipts, (which Dock receipts or Mate's receipts are to be handed by a Dock's or Ship's Officer to the seller's representative).\n\n4. The buyers agree that the property in the goods sold shall not pass from the sellers to the buyers so long as the sellers are in possession of any bilh of lading, railway receipts, dock-warrants nr Mat..:'s re.ceipts or any other document of\n\n19M\n\nSlllte of Andhra\n\nJute Mills v. of Andhra Pradesh\n\nSha~ J,\n\ntitle whether such documents are in the names of sellers or buyers, until payment is made in full.\n\n(a) The buyers agree that the risk of loss, deterioration or damage in the goods during transit whether by land or canal or sea or when the goods are in the custody of the seller or any third person in a warehouse, dock or any premises shall be borne by the buyers notwithstanding that the pm; ierty in the goods does not pass to the buyers during such transit or custody.\"\n\nAs and when the gunny bags were needed for packing its products the A.C.C. issued despatch instructions calling upon the appellant to send jute bags by railway to the cement factories of the A.C.C. outside the State of Andhra.\n\nPursuant to those instructions the appellant loaded the goods in the railway wagons, obtained railway receipts in the name of the A.C.C. as consignee and against payment of the rice, delivered the receipts to the Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli-which, it is common ground, was for the purpose of receiving the railway receipts and making payment, the agent of the A.C.C. It is also common ground that the jute bags were sold to the A.C.C. for the purpose of packing cement by the factories of the A.C.C. to which they were sent and not for any other purpose.\n\nThe assessing authority and the Deputy Commissioner held that as the railway receipts were delivered to the agent of the buyer within the State of Andhra, and price was also realized from the agent of the buyer within the State, the goods must be deemed to have been delivered to the buyer in the State of Andhra, and the appellant was liable to pay sales-tax on the price of the goods sold.\n\nWith tnat view the High Court agreed.\n\nUnder the Government of India Act, 1935, the Legislatures of every Province could legislate for levying tax on sales of goods in respect of all transactions, whether the property in tile goods passed within or without the Province, provided the Province had a territorial nexus with one or more elements constituting the transaction of sale : Poppat\n\nLal Shah v. The State of Madras(') and The Tata Iron &: 1964 Steel Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar(2). But this resulted Shm Bo/r1111 in simultaneous levy of sales tax by many Provinces in .\n\nJut• MilU respect of the same transaction each fixing upon one or State of A.ndhro more element constituting the sale, with which it had a Prod., lt territorial nexus. With the dual purpose of maintaining.an Shah J. important source of revenue to the States, and simultaneously preventing imposition of an unduly heavy burden upcn the consumers by multiple taxation upon a single transaction of sale, the Constitution made a special provision imposing restrictions upcn the legislative power of the States in Art. 286 which as originally enacted ran as follows :\n\n\" (I) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place.-\n\n(a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the import of the goods\n\ninto, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a) a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.\n\n{ '.l) Except in so far as Parliament may by law\n\notherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where 1uch\n\nsale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce :\n\nProvided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods whicil -----\n\n(!) [1953] S.C.R. 677.\n\n(2) {!9581 S.C.ll. 1355\n\n5hree Bajranr Jute Mi/iii\n\nState of Andnra.\n\nPrade.h\n\nS;1ali J.\n\nt3)\n\nwas being lawfully levied by the Government of\n\nany State immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day of March, 1951.\n\nNo law made by the Legislature of a State i'llposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essentiai for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.\"\n\nAfter the enactment of the Constitution, by a Presidential Order the Provincial Sales Tax Acts were made to accord with the restrictions imposed by Art. 286 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is manifest that by Art. 286 the legislative authority of the States to impose taxes on sales and purchases was restricted by four limitations-in respect of sales or purchases outside the State, in respect of sales or purchases in the course of imports into or exports out of India, in respect of sales or purchases which take place in the course of inter- State trade or commerce and in respect of sales and purchases of goods declared by Parliament to be essential for the life of the community. These limitations may overlap, but the power of the State to tax sale or purchase transactions may be exercised only if it is not hit by any of the limitations.\n\nThe restrictions are cumulative.\n\nThe sales in the !'\"esent case are not sales, which have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\n\nThe only point of contest is whether they are \"outside the 'State\" of Andhra. It is now well-settled that by Art. 286( 1)\n\n(as it stood before it was amended by the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act, 19 5 6) sales as a direct result oi whlch goods were deliven; d in a State for consumption in SllCb State i.e. the sales falling within the Explanation to Art. 286(1) were fictionally to be regarded as inside that State for the purpose of cl. ( I ) (a) and so within the taxing\n\npower of the State in which such delivery took place and 1964\n\nbeing outside all other States exempt from sales-tax by those Shm Bairat11 other States : Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. The Jute Mills v.\n\nCommissioner of Sales-tax, Bihar, Patna( 1 ): lndzan Copper State of A.ndhra\n\nCorporation Ltd. \"· ::1e State of Bihar and others('): and Pradesh T!te State of Kerala •d others v. The Cochin Coal Com- Shah J. pany Ltd.('). But the Explanation is not exhaustive of what may be called \"inside sales\". Clause (I )(a) excludes from the reach of the power of the States sales outside the State but it does not follow from the Explanation that it localises the situs of all sales. The power of the State under Entry 54 List IT of the Seventh Schedule to tax sales [not falling within els. (l)(b), (2) and (3)] which are outside the Explanation, and which may for the sake of brevity be called 'non-Explanation' sales, remains unim;>aired. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to express an opinion, whether the theory of territorial nexus of the taxing State, with one or more elements which go to make a completed sale authorises since the promulgation of the Constitution the exercise of legislative power under Entry 54, List II of the Sevent!o Schedule to tax sales, where property in goods has not passed within the taxing State.\n\nThe question which then falls to be determined is whether the sales to the A.C.C. by the a;>pellant may be regarded as \"non-Explanation sales\". There can be no doubt that if the goods were delivered pursuant to the contracts of sale outside the State of Andhra for the purpose of consumption in the State into which the goods were delivered, the State of Andhra could have no right to tax those sales by virtue of the restriction imposed by Art. 286 ( 1 )(a) read with the Explanation.\n\nThe facts found by the taxing authorities clearly establish that property in the goods despatched by the appellant passed to the A.C.C. within the State of Andhra when the railway receipts were handed over to ilie agent of the A.C.C. against payment of price. The question still remains : were\n\n\n(2) (1961] 2 S.C.R. 276\n\n\n1964 the transactions 'non-Explanation sales' i.e. falling outside Shr•• Bajrang the Explanation to Art. 286 ( 1)? To attract the Explana- /ut• Mills tion, the goods had to be actually delivered as a direct result &tote of' Andhra of the sale, for the purpose of consumption in the State in Pradesh which they were delivered. It is not disputed that the goods Shah 1. were supplied for the purpose of consumption outside the State of Andhra, and in the States in which they were supplied. It is submitted that the goods were actually delivered within the State, when the railway receipts were handed over to the agent of the buyer. But the expression\n\n\"actually delivered\" in the context in which it occurs, can only mean physical delivery of the goods, or such action as rputs the goods in the possession of the purchaser : it does\n\nnot contemplate mere symbolical or notional delivery e.g. by entrusting the goods to a common carrier, or even delivery of documents of title like railway receipts. In\n\nC. Govindaraiulu Naidu & Company v. State of Madras(1) Venkatarama Ayyar, J., dealing with the concept of actual delivery of goods, so as to attract the application of the Explanation to Art. 28 6 (1 )(a) rightly observed :\n\n\"In the context it can mean only physical delivery and not constructive delivery such as by tran~ fer of documents of title to the goods.\n\nThe whole object of the Explanation is to give a power of taxation in respect of goods actually entering the State for the purpose of use therein and it will defeat such a purpose if notional delivery of goods as by transfer of documents of title to the goods within the State is held tt>\n\ngive the State a power to tax, when the good are actually delivered in another State.\"\n\nA similar view has been expressed in two otlier cases : M Is. Capco Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer and another('): and Khaitan Minerals v. Sales Tax Appeiiate Tribunal for Mysore(').\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 116.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1963 Mysore 141.\n\n---~\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1960 All. i2.\n\nCounsel for the respondent-State relied upon s. 39 of 1964\n\nthe Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which provides in so Shru Ba/Tfl111 Jule Milla far as it is material, by the first sub-section that where, m v. pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorised to State of Andhra send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a Ph carrier, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, is Shah J. prima facie deemed to be delivery of the goods to the buyer.\n\nBut that provision will not make mere delivery of the railway receipts representing title to the goods, actual delivery of goods for the purpose of Art. 286. The rule contained in s. 39(1) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act raises a prima facie inference that the goods have been delivered if the conditions prescribed thereby are satisfied: it has no application in dealing with a constitutional provision which while imposing a restriction upon the legislative power of the States entrusts exclusive power to levy sales tax to the State in which the goods have been actually delivered for the purpose of consumption.\n\nThe High Court was therefore in error in inferring from the fact that •the property had passed within the State of Andhra against delivery of the railway receipts, that the goods were actually delivered within the State. If the inference raised by the High Court that the goods were actually delivered within the State of Andhra cannot be accepted, on the facts found there is no escape from the conclusion that the State of Andhra had no authority to levy tax in respect of those sale transactions in which the goods were sent under railway receipts to places outside the State of Andhra and actually delivered for the purpose of consumption i.n those States.\n\nThe appeal must therefore be allowed.\n\nThe order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Appeliate Tribunal is restored. The appellant to get its costs in this Court and the High Court from the respondent-State.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "691\n\nSHREE BAJRANG JUTE MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHREE BAJRANG JUTE MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 195, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388, "end_char": 402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 410, "end_char": 433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A.C.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 687, "end_char": 693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fer securing a regular supply of jute bags, the A.C.C. entered into a contract with the appellant and under the despatch instructions."}}, {"text": "Krishna Cement Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 977, "end_char": 997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "railway wagons, obtained railway receipts in the name of the A.C.C. as consignee and against payment of the price, delivered the receipts to the Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli, which was for the purpose of receiving the railway receipt and making payment, the agent of the A.C.C. From the amounts shown as gros~ turnover in the return for the assessment year 1954-55, the appellant claimed reductidn of certain amounts in respect of the goods supplied by rail to the A.C.C. outside the State of Andhra Pradesh under its despatch instructions."}}, {"text": "Tadepalli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "railway wagons, obtained railway receipts in the name of the A.C.C. as consignee and against payment of the price, delivered the receipts to the Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli, which was for the purpose of receiving the railway receipt and making payment, the agent of the A.C.C. From the amounts shown as gros~ turnover in the return for the assessment year 1954-55, the appellant claimed reductidn of certain amounts in respect of the goods supplied by rail to the A.C.C. outside the State of Andhra Pradesh under its despatch instructions."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1328, "end_char": 1342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "railway wagons, obtained railway receipts in the name of the A.C.C. as consignee and against payment of the price, delivered the receipts to the Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli, which was for the purpose of receiving the railway receipt and making payment, the agent of the A.C.C. From the amounts shown as gros~ turnover in the return for the assessment year 1954-55, the appellant claimed reductidn of certain amounts in respect of the goods supplied by rail to the A.C.C. outside the State of Andhra Pradesh under its despatch instructions."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1571, "end_char": 1577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commercial Tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes disallowed the claim and held that as the railway receipts were delivered to the agent of the buyer within the State of Andhra, and price was also realized from the agent of the buyer within the State, goods must be deemed to have been delivered to the buyer in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and the appellant was liable to pay tax on the sales."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2135, "end_char": 2146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2431, "end_char": 2445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961) 2 S.C.R. 106", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3406, "end_char": 3425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 219", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3582, "end_char": 3592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3756, "end_char": 3764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Seta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4262, "end_char": 4272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, K. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal, for the ap; iellant."}}, {"text": "K. Srinivasamurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4278, "end_char": 4296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, K. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal, for the ap; iellant."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4301, "end_char": 4311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, K. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal, for the ap; iellant."}}, {"text": "A. Ranganadham Chetty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4361, "end_char": 4378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-With certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh this appeal is preferred by Shree Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd.\n\nThe appellant is engaged in the manufacture of jute goods, and is a registered dealer under the Madras General Sales, Tax Act."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4515, "end_char": 4543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-With certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh this appeal is preferred by Shree Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd.\n\nThe appellant is engaged in the manufacture of jute goods, and is a registered dealer under the Madras General Sales, Tax Act."}}, {"text": "Shree Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4572, "end_char": 4601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-With certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh this appeal is preferred by Shree Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd.\n\nThe appellant is engaged in the manufacture of jute goods, and is a registered dealer under the Madras General Sales, Tax Act."}}, {"text": "Sliah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5281, "end_char": 5286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sliah J.\n\nIn appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the order was reversed, the Tribunal holding that the appellant was entitled to exemption in respect of the turnover for the goods supplied to the A.C.C. A revision petition presented against the order to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was heard with a large number of other petitions which raised certain common questions."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5308, "end_char": 5336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sliah J.\n\nIn appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the order was reversed, the Tribunal holding that the appellant was entitled to exemption in respect of the turnover for the goods supplied to the A.C.C. A revision petition presented against the order to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was heard with a large number of other petitions which raised certain common questions."}}, {"text": "Guntur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5837, "end_char": 5843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The factory of the appellant is situated at Guntur."}}, {"text": "Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7907, "end_char": 7938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to those instructions the appellant loaded the goods in the railway wagons, obtained railway receipts in the name of the A.C.C. as consignee and against payment of the rice, delivered the receipts to the Krishna Cement Works, Tadepalli-which, it is common ground, was for the purpose of receiving the railway receipts and making payment, the agent of the A.C.C. It is also common ground that the jute bags were sold to the A.C.C. for the purpose of packing cement by the factories of the A.C.C. to which they were sent and not for any other purpose."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8696, "end_char": 8725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9737, "end_char": 9745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10071, "end_char": 10076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286 which as originally enacted ran as follows :\n\n\" (I) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place.-\n\n(a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the import of the goods\n\ninto, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10529, "end_char": 10539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "{ '.l) Except in so far as Parliament may by law\n\notherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where 1uch\n\nsale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce :\n\nProvided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods whicil -----\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "5hree Bajranr Jute", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10926, "end_char": 10944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1355\n\n5hree Bajranr Jute Mi/iii\n\nState of Andnra."}}, {"text": "Presidential Order the Provincial Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11665, "end_char": 11712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11767, "end_char": 11775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Presidential Order the Provincial Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Presidential Order the Provincial Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11821, "end_char": 11829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Presidential Order the Provincial Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Presidential Order the Provincial Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12722, "end_char": 12734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12967, "end_char": 12978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13404, "end_char": 13418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I ) (a) and so within the taxing\n\npower of the State in which such delivery took place and 1964\n\nbeing outside all other States exempt from sales-tax by those Shm Bairat11 other States : Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. The Jute Mills v.\n\nCommissioner of Sales-tax, Bihar, Patna( 1 ): lndzan Copper State of A.ndhra\n\nCorporation Ltd. \"· ::1e State of Bihar and others('): and Pradesh T!te State of Kerala •d others v. The Cochin Coal Com- Shah J. pany Ltd.(')."}}, {"text": "Cochin Coal Com- Shah J. pany Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13484, "end_char": 13518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I ) (a) and so within the taxing\n\npower of the State in which such delivery took place and 1964\n\nbeing outside all other States exempt from sales-tax by those Shm Bairat11 other States : Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. The Jute Mills v.\n\nCommissioner of Sales-tax, Bihar, Patna( 1 ): lndzan Copper State of A.ndhra\n\nCorporation Ltd. \"· ::1e State of Bihar and others('): and Pradesh T!te State of Kerala •d others v. The Cochin Coal Com- Shah J. pany Ltd.(')."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13828, "end_char": 13844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14883, "end_char": 14891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1961] 2 S.C.R. 276", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15229, "end_char": 15248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15351, "end_char": 15359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16309, "end_char": 16326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\n\nC. Govindaraiulu Naidu & Company v. State of Madras(1) Venkatarama Ayyar, J., dealing with the concept of actual delivery of goods, so as to attract the application of the Explanation to Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16441, "end_char": 16448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17311, "end_char": 17316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17330, "end_char": 17360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17886, "end_char": 17894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "s. 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17918, "end_char": 17926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17941, "end_char": 17958, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_700_726_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "19M\n\nFcbniary 7.\n\n'700\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64]\n\nLALJI HARIDAS\n\nSTAIB OF MAHARASIITRA AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., A. K. SARKAR, K. N.\n\nWANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYA\"1GAR, JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-False evidence in the proceedings before Incomettu OU•ccr-For the purpose of s. !95(!)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure the proceedings if proceedings in a court-whether Complaint .has to be made by the Income-tax Officer-Indian Incom~ tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 37-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 195(1)(b)-lndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), SS, 193, 228.\n\nThe appellant filed a criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 alleging that he had committed an offence under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by giving false evidence in certain proceedings before the Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nRespondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objectioh that the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the proceedings in which he was alleged to have made a false statement on oath were proceedings before a court within the meaning of s. 195(1)(b) of the Coue of Criminal Procedure. 1898, and since no complaint in writing bad been made by the court of the Income-tax Officer the provision of s. 195(I)(b) created a bar against the competence of the appellant's complaint.\n\nOn the rejection of this preliminary objection respondent No. 2 preferred a criminal revision application before the Bombay High Court impleading the State of Maharashtra as respondent No. I. The High Court allowed the revision application.\n\nThereupon the appellant appealed to this Court on a certificate issued under Art. 134(1 )( c) of the Constitution.\n\nThe short question before this court was whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Income-tax Act can be said.to be a proceeding in any court within the meaning of s. 195(l)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nHeld (per P. B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K. N. Wanchoo and N. Raja gopala Ayyangar JJ.)\n\n(i) While the Income-tax Officer exercises his powers under s. 37(1), (2) and (3), tbe proceedings held by him are judicial proceedings for the purposes of ss. 193, 196 and 228 Indian Penal Code and the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent No. 2 was made in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193, Indian Penal Code.\n\n(ii) It is not necessary to decide the general question whether the 1n,'.omc-tax Officer is a Court or not for s. 37( 4) of the Income-tax\n\nAct makes the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer, judicial pr<>- ceedings for the purposes of s. 193 Indian Penal Code and these judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any court for the purpose of s. 195 (l)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe High Court was right in allowing the revision application on the ground that the condition precedent prescribed by s. 195(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with as no complaint has been filed by the Income-tax Officer.\n\nJagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850 and Puran Chand Maneklal, in re: l.L.R. 38 Bom. 642, distinguished.\n\nPer Sarkar and Das Gupta JI. (dissenting) (i) From the nature of functions under the various provisions of the Income-tax Act it ii clear that the Income-tax Officer is a part and parcel of the executin organ of the State. The fact that for carrying out some of th.- executive functions he will have the powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure wi11 not make him a limb of the judicial organ. Neither does the fact that he is a quasi-judicial authority make him a. court.\n\n(ii) In Jaswant Sugar Mills v., Lakshmi Chand. [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 242 this court has held that the Income-tax Officer is not 'a ', I I ' ' Tribunal and therefore it is obvious tat he cannot be a coul1j.\n\n(iii) To say that the legislature in providing in s. 37(4)' of the Indian Income-tax Act that a proceeding before the specified authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 Indian Penal Code intended also to say that such authority shall be deemed to be a court within the meaninv of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure would be to impute to the legislature an intention of which it itself had no knowledge.\n\n(iv) The words used in s. 37(4) of the Income-tax Act fumishe&·- no reason--to--altei'the legal position that is inescapable on a consideration of the functions of the Income-tax Officer that he is not a court withia the meaning of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTJON: Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated January 30, 1962, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 1142 of 1960.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additiooa/ Solicitor-Genera/, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nLalji Haridlll ...\n\nStal• of MoJte. ·\n\nriuhtro\n\nLalji IJ.arida.r\n\nState of Mahata.Jhtra\n\nGa/endragadkar\n\nC, I.\n\nS. K. Kapur and R. H. Dhebar, for rndent No. 1.\n\nS. T. Desai, J. L. Jain and V. J. Merchant, for respondent No. 2.\n\nFebruary 7, 1964. The Judgment of Gajendragadkar C.J., Wanchoo and Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ. was delivered by Gajendragadkar C.J. The dissenting opinion of Sarkar and Das Gupta JJ. was delivered by Das Gupta J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-The short question of law which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer under section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (No. XI of\n\n1922) (hereinafter called the Act) can be said to be a proceeding in any co.urt within the meaning of s. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThis question arises in this way.\n\nThe appellant Lalji Haridas and respondent No. 2 Mui.ii Manila! Kamdar are businessmen and they carry\n\n<>n their business in Jamnagar and Bombay respectively.\n\nThey have known each other for several years past in the course of their ordinary business activities.\n\nIn the income-tax assessment proceedings of the appellant for the assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51, respondent No. 2 gave evidence on oath before the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar on the 4th December, 1958.\n\nIn his evidence he denied that he had a son named Nihal Chand and that he had done any business in the name of MI s. Nihal Chand & Co. at Jamnagar.\n\nAccording to the appellant, the said statements were false to the knowledge of respondent No. 2 and were made by him to mislead the Income-tax Officer and to avoid the incidence of income-tax on himself.\n\nAs a result of the said false statements, the appellant was heavily taxed.\n\nOn the 24th November, 1959, the appellant filed a criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (No. 452/S of 1959) in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay.\n\nAt the hearing of the said complaint, respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objection that the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the\n\nproceedings in which he was alleged to have made a false statement on oath were proceedings before a Court within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b) Cr. P.C., and since no complaint in writing had been made by the Court of the Income-tax Officer before which the said proceedings were conducted, the provisions of s. 195 ( 1) (b) created a bar against the competence of the appellant's complaint. The learned Presidency Magistrate held that the Income-tax Officer was not a Court within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b), Cr. P.C., and so, he rejected the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2.\n\nAgainst the said decision of the Presidency Magistrate, respondent No. 2 preferred a Criminal Revision Application (No. 1142 of 1960) before the Bombay High Court. The State of Maharashtra was impleaded as respondent No. 1 to the said Revision Application. .A Division Bench of the\n\nilaid High Court reversed the conclusion of the Presidency Magistrate and held that the. Income:tax Officer as a Court within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b), Cr. P.C., and so, it upheld the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2.\n\nIn the result, the complaint filed by the appellant was ordered to be dismissed. The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the Bombay High Court under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution and it is with the said certificate that he has brought the present appeal before us. That is hoj\\'_.the narrow question which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer are proceedings in any Court under s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C.\n\nThe question thus raised is undoubtedly a short one, but its decision is not easy, because the arguments urged in support of the two respective constructi9ns are fairly balanced and the task of preferring one construction to the other presents some difficulty.\n\nThe proceedings before the Income-tax Officer during which, according to the appellant, respondent No. 2 made a false statement on oath, were held by the Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of the Act. Section 37 ( 1) deals with the powers of Income-tax authorities and provides, inter alia, that the Income-tax Officer shall, for the purposes of th~ Act. have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (No. Vof 1908), when trying a suit in\n\nLalji llaridu\n\nState of Mah•\n\nrashtra\n\nGajendragadl\"u\n\nc. J.\n\nLa/ji Haridm\n\nState of Maha\n\nrashtra\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. 1.\n\nrespect of the matters specified by clauses (a) to (d/.\n\nSection 37(2) confers upon the Income-tax Officer certain additional powers which can be exercised subject to any rules made in that behalf, provided the said Officer is specially authorised by the Commissioner iri that behalf, and in exercising these powers, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 relating to searches apply.\n\nSection 37(3) deals with the question of impounding and retaining any books of account or other documents.\n\nThat takes us to s. 37(4) which is relevant for our purpose; this section provides that any proceeding before any authority referred to in this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. It is thus clear that while the Income-tax Officer exercises his powers under s. 37(1), (2) and (3) the proceedings held by him arc judicial proceedings for the purposes of the three sections of the Indian Penal Code mentioned in sub-section (4).\n\nThere fore, the question as to whether the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent No. 2 was made by him at any stage of a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 I.P.C., must be answered in the affirmative. That is the plain effect of s. 37(4) of the Act.\n\nSection 193 of the Indian Penal Cod~ \\l!ith which we are directly concerned in the present appeal provides for punishment for intentionally giving false evidence. It consists of two parts; the first part deals, inter a/ia, with false evidence intentionally given in any stage of a judicial proceeding, and prescribes that the person found guilty of having given such false evidence in a judicial proceeding shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable :o fine; the second part deals with cases where false evidence has been intentionally given in any other case, and it prescribes the maximum sentence of three years as well as fine.\n\nIn other words, if the false evidence has been intentionally given in any judicial proceeding, the sentence awardable is higher than that where false evidence is intentionally given in proceedings which are not judicial.\n\nThere are three explanations to s. 193.\n\nExpln. I provides that a trial before a Court-martial is a judicial proceerling; expln. 2 lays down that an invtigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice; this explanation takes in, for instance, committal proceedings.\n\nUnder expln. 3, an investigation directed by a Court of Justice according to law, and conducted under the authority of a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice.\n\nThis explanation covers enquiries before officers deputed by Courts of Justice to ascertain, for instance, on the spot the boundaries of land. It would thus be seen that having provided for a higher sentence in regard to the offence of giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, the three explanations of~. 193 include within the expression \"judicial proceeding\" certain proceedings which on a strict construction of the said expression may not have been included under it.\n\nFor the purpose of the present appeal, however, the only point to notice at this stage is that s. 37(4) of the Act makes a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer, held under the said section, a judicial proceeding for the purposes of s. 193, I.P.C. and that means that if an offence of giving false evidence is proved to have been committed by a person in a proeeeding before the Income-tax Officer, he would be liable for the higher sentence awardable under\n\nth~ first part of section 193.\n\nThat takes us to section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is well-known that s. 195 provides for an exception to the ordinary rule that any person can make a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence triable under the Cr. P. C. Section 4(h) of this Code defines a \"complaint\" as meaning the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, thut some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does n'ot include the report of a police officer.\n\nThis definition shows that any person can make a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence.\n\nSection 190 requires that the Magistrate to whom a complaint has been made should take cognizance of the said complaint, subject to the provisions of the said section.\n\nThus, the general rule is that any person can make a complaint, and s. 195 provides for an exception.\n\nSection 195(1)\n\n134-159 S.C.-45\n\nLal/I H11rid<u.\n\nStat• of Maha\n\nrt11htra\n\nGa/•ndragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nLa/ji Haridas v.\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nGa/endragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\n<b) with which we are concerned, provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the sections therein mentioned, when such offence is alleged to ?ave been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding\n\nm any Court, except the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate; amongst the sections mentioned are sections 193 and 228 I.P.C. The effect of these provisions is that if an offence is alleged to have been committed either under s. 193 or s. 228\n\nI.P.C., and it appears that the said offence was committed in relation to any proceeding in any Court, it is only if the said Court, or the Court to which it is subordinate, makes a complaint in that behalf that cognizance will be taken of the said c.omplaint.\n\nA person cannot make a complaint 'in respect of the alleged comrilission of any of the offences specified in s. 195(1)(b); that is its plain effect.\n\nSection 195(2) which was added in 1923 when the earlier\n\nsectin 195 was substantially amended, provides that in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term \"Court\" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but it does not\n\ninclde a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.\n\nIt is unnecessary to deal with the effect of this provision. because, as will presently appear we do not propose to base our decision on the ground that the Incometax Officer is a Revenue Court under this sub-section.\n\nThe only point of interest to which we may incidentally refer is that this sub-section gives an inclusive, though not an ex haustive, definition and takes within its purview not only Civil and Criminal Courts, but also Revenue Courts, while excluding a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act.\n\nIn dealing with the question which has been raised in the present appeal what we are required to determine is whether a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer which by virtue of the operation of s.37(4) of the Act, must te held to be a judicial proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C. is a proceeding in any Court under s. 195. Cr. P. C. Section 193 makes a dis tinction between offences committed in any judicial proceed ing and those committed in proceedings other than judicial proceedings, whereas s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P. C. does not refer to judicial proceedit1gs as such, but mentions proceedings in\n\nany Court. That is why the controversy between the parties in the present appeal lies within a very narrow compass. Can it be said that the proceeding which is a judicial proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C., must be held to be a proceeding in any Court under s. !95(1)(b), Cr. P. C.?\n\nIt is on this aspect of the dispute that the arguments on both sides are fairly balanced.\n\nIn dealing with this question, it is unnecessary to con• sider what would have been the position of the Income-tax Officer acting under s. 370), (2) and (3), and what would have been the character of the proceedings taken before him if sub-section ( 4) had not been enacted. In Jagannath Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh('), it has been held by this Court that the Sales•tax Officer functioning under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (No. 15 of 1948) was not a Court within the meaning of s. 195, Cr. P.C., and so, it was not necessary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution of any person against whom it was alleged that he had committed an offence under s. 471 I.P.C. This decision would tend to indicate that in the absence of s. 37(4) it would have become necessary to hold that the Income-tax Officer acting under s. 37(1), (2) and (3), would not be a Court under s. 195, Cr. P.C., and in that sense the provisions of s. 195 could not have been attracted.\n\nThis position is not disputed by Mr. Desai who appears for respondent No. 2.\n\nHe, however, contends that the ; provisions of s. 37 ( 4) which have been inserted in the Act in 1956 make all the difference, and according to him, this sub-section was added in order to makes. !95(J)(b), Cr. P.C., applicable to the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer. On the other hand, the Additional Solicitor-General has strenuously argued that the purpose which the legislature had in mind in inserting sub-section (4) in s. 37 was merely to make the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193, l.P.C., and not to makes. !95(l)(b), Cr. P. C. applicable to them. If the intention of the legislature had been to take the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer within the mischief of the said section of the Cr. P.C., the legislature would have expressly said so in terms. The\n\n- UJT1953J z s.c.R. ssil\n\n19,64\n\nLa/ii Haridiu\n\nState of Malu>-\n\nt08htra\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. J.\n\nLal/i Harida•\n\nState of Maha\n\nra1htra\n\nGafendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nomission to refer to the relevant provision of the Cr. P.C. in s. 37 ( 4) is not accidental, but deliberate, and so, though the proceeding before the Income-ta~ Officer may be nnd has to be regarded as 11 judicial proceeding under s. 193,\n\nI.P.C.,)t cannot be said to be a proceding before a Court, because the Income-tax Officer is not a Court.\n\nIn support of his argument, the Additional Solicitor General has referred us to several statutes where the legis lative intention to extend the provisions of s. 195, Cr. P.C., to specific proceedings has been carried out by making an express provision in that behalf. Section 23 of the Work men's Compensation Act, 1923 (No. 8 of 1923) provides\n\nthat the Commissioner shall have all the powers of a Civil Cou.rt for µie purposes therein indicated, and by an amend inent .inade in 1929, it further lays down that the Commis sioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the pur pqses of s. 195 and Chapter 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument is that where the legislature want eel to extend the provisions of s. 195, Cr. P.C. to the proceed ings before the Commissioner held under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it thought it necessary to make a specific and express provision in that behalf. A similar provision is contained in s. 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (No. 4 of 1936). In the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947), the position is similar to that in the case of the Work men's Compensation Act; section 11 (4) confers on the autho\n\nritie~ therein specified powers as are vested in a Civil Court in respect of the matter mentioned therein.\n\nIn 1950, sub section (8) was added to section 11 by which it was provided that every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be Civil Court for the purposes of sec tions 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This scheme also shows, says the Additional Solicitor-General, that where the legislature wants to make any Tribunal or authority a Court, it uses express and appropriate language in that behalf. Section 45 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (No. 31 of 1950) likewise confers powers of a Civil Court on the Custodian and expressly adds that the proceedings before him shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of t.he Indian Penal Code, and the Custodian shall be deemed\n\nto be a Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same provision is made by s. 17 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act. 1951 (Act 64 of 1951), as well as by section 26 of the Dis- . placed Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. 1954 (No. 44 of 1954).\n\nOn the other hand, s. 51 of the Administrator-General's Act, 1913 (No. 3 of 1913) provides that whoever, during any examination authorised by this Act, makes a false statement on oath knowingly, he shall be deemed to have intentionaJly given false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding.\n\nThe argument is that in this case, the legislature wanted to equate the proceedings under this Act with judicial proceedings under s. 193, I.P.C., and did not intend to make section 195, Cr. P.C., applicable to them, because it does not make the authority under this Act a Court, or does not, in terms, extend the provisions of the said section to the proceedings held before such an authority. The same comment has been made on the provisions of s. l 71A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (No. 8 of 1878).\n\nThus presented, the argument is no doubt attractive and cannot be rejected as without any substance.\n\nThe expression \"judicial proceeding\" is not defined in the Indian Penal Cude, but we have the definition of the said expression under s. 4(m) of the Cr. Procedure Code.\n\nSection 4(m) provides that \"judicial proceeding\" includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath.\n\nThe expression \"Court\" is not defined either by the Cr. P.C. or the I.P.C .. though 'Court of Justice' is defined by s. 20 of the latter Code as denoting a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judi cially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines a \"Court\" as including all Judges and Magistrates and aJI persons except the Arbitrators legaJiy authorised to take evidence.\n\nPrima facie, there is some force in the contention that it would not be reasonable to predicate about every judicial proceeding that it is a proceeding before a Court, and so, it is open to the appellant to urge that though the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer may be a judicial\n\nLtdii Harldu\n\n•• St•I• of Mahartuhtr•\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nLalji Haridas v.\n\nSUttt of Maha\n\nruhtra\n\nGa; endr\"gadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nproceeding under s. 193, I.P.C., it would not follow that the said judicial proceeding is a proceeding in a Court as re quired by s. 195(l)(b), Cr. P.C.\n\nIt is somewhat remarkable that though section 193, I.P.C., refers to a judicial proceeding, section 195, Cr. P.C. refers to a proceeding in any Court; it does not say a judi ciai proceeding in any Court.\n\nMr.\n\nDesai contends that reading section 193 l.P.C. ands. 195(1)(b) Cr. P.C., together. it would not be unreasonable to hold that proceedings which are judicial under the former, should be taken to be proceed ings in any Court under the latter. The whole basis of pro viding for a higher sentence in regard to offences committed at any stage of a judicial proceeding appears to be that the legislature took the view that the said offences were more serious in character, and so, it distinguished the said offences from similar offences committed at any stage of other pro ceedings. The argument is that while providing for a higher sentence in respect of this more serious class of offences com mitted at any stage of judicial proceedings, the legislature intended that there should be a safeguard in respect of com plaint as regards the said offences and that safeguard is provided by s. 195(l)(b), Cr.P.C. In other words, an offence which is treated as more serious by the first paragraph of s. 193, l.P.C. because it is an offence committed during the course of a judicial proceeding should be held to be an offence committed in any proceeding in any Court for the purpose of s. 195(l)(b) Cr.P.C. On this argument, it is not necessary to consider whether the Income-tax Officer is a Court or not, for, in substance, the contention is that as soon as s. 37(4) of the Act was enacted, the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer became judicial proceedings for the purpose of s. 193, l.P.C. and since they are classed under the first paragraph of the said section, they attract the pro tection of s. 195(l)(b), Cr.P.C.\n\nIn our opinion, there is considerable force in this argument, and, on the whole, we are inclined to prefer the construction suggested by Mr. Desai to that pressed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor-General.\n\nIt is true, the Additional Solicitor-General has mainly relied upon the relevant provisions of several statutes in support of his construction and in so far as it appears that.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT I<EPORTS\n\n7II\n\ncertain provisions in some of the said statutes in terms extend the application of s. 195, Cr. P.C. to the proceedings to which they relate, the argument does receive support, but we hesitate to hold that the omission to refer to s. 195 ( 1 )(b), Cr. P.C. in s. 37(4) of the Act necessarily means that the intention of the legislature in enacting s. 37(4) was merely and solely to provide for a higher sentence in regard to the offence under s. 193, I.P.C. if it was committed in proceedings before the Income-tax Officer.\n\nIt is plain that if the argument of the Additional Solicttor-General is accepted, the result would be that a complaint like the present can be made by any person and if the offence alleged is proved, the accused would be liable to receive higher penalty awardable under the first paragraph of s. 193, I.P.C. without the safeguard correspondingly provided by s. 195(l)(b), Cr. P.C.\n\nCould it have been the intention of the legislature in mak ing the offence committed during the course of a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer more serious without affording a corresponding safeguard in respect of the complaints which can be made in that behalf? We are inclined to hold chat the answer to this question must be in the negtive. That is why after careful consideration. we have come to the conclusion that the view taken by the BorJbay High Court 5hould be upheld though for different reasons. Section 37(4) of the Act makes the proceedings before the Jncome-tax Officer judicial proceedings under s. 193 I.P.C. and these judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any Court for the purpose of s. 195(J)(b), Cr. P.C. That. we think, would really carry out the intention of the legislature in enacting s. 37(4) of the Act.\n\nIn this connection. there is another consideration which has weighed in our minds.\n\nWe have already noticed that s. 37(4) makes the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 228 !.P.C.\n\nWhen we turn to the latter section, we notice that the said section deals with the offence of intentionally causing insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding. It is obvious that the offence with which s. 228 deals is an offence committed against a public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding. This section is one of the sections mentioned in s. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C., and so, any complaint in\n\nLa/ji Haridas v.\n\nStat• of Mahartuhtra\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nLalii Harldu ...\n\nStat• of Ma/uJ.\n\nrtUhtra\n\nGaJ•ndragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nrespect of the offence alleged to have been committed under s. 228, I.P.C. has to be made by the Court in question.\n\nThere can be little doubt that if a person offers an insult to a public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding, or causes interruption to him while he is so sitting at any stage of the judicial proceeding, the complaint has to proceed from the public servant himself; that is the effect of s. 195 (I )(b} Cr. P.C. Before s. 37.( 4) of the Act was enacted, an insult given to an Income-tax Officer or interruption caused to his proceedings whilst he was conducting his proceedings, would not have amounted to an offence under s. 228, I.P.C. Section 37(4) makes a proceeding before the Income-tax Officer a proceeding under s. 228 I.P.C. and thus, an interruption in his iproceedings, or an insult given to him, has now become punishable under the said section. Could it have been intended by the legislature in enacting s. 37(4) that whereas an insult offered to a public servant acting judicially, or interruption caused in his proceedings would normally be cognizable only on the complaint of the public servant himself, the same offence, if committed in respect of the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer, should be cognizable at the complaint of a private party? The anomaly which would result if the construction suggested by the Additional Solicitor-General is accepted, is, in our opinion, so glaring that the alternative contention urged by Mr. Desai and upheld by the Bombay High Court which avoids the said anomaly appears to be more reasonable and more consistent with the true intention of the legislature. That is why we are not prepared to accept the appellant's argument that the Bombay High Court was in error in dismissing his complaint on the ground that the condition precedent prescribed by s. 195(1>\n\n(b) Cr. P.C. had not been complied with as no complaint had been filed by the Income-tax Officer.\n\nIt appears that In re: Punam Chand Maneklal(') the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court had taken the view that an Income-tax Collector is a Revenue Court within the meaning of that term as used in clauses (b) and (c) of s. 195, Cr. PC.,\n\n1898. Scott, C. J. who spoke for the Full Bench, observed that it could not be contended that the Income-tax Collector was a Civil or Criminal Court, and so, he addressed himself\n\n(I) I.L.R. 38 Bom. 642.\n\nto the narrow question as to whether he was a Revenue Court. Dealing with the question on that footing, he examin- . ed the functions of the Income-tax Collector under Act II of 1886, and held that he was a Revenue Court. He rejected the contention that he could be treated as a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Registration Act, and so, he found no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that he was a Revenue Court. The Bombay High Court in the present case has substantially based itself on this decision in reversing the conclusion of the Presidency Magistrate and directing that the complaint filed by the appellant should be dismissed.\n\nIt is unnecessary to consider whether the view taken by the Full Bench in in re: P•mam Chand Maneklal(') is right, because the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act have been subsequently modified in 1922 and different considerations have now assumed importance. It is no longer possible to hold that the Income-tax Officer is a Revenue Court, and, indeed, that has not been the contention raised before us by Mr. Desai.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-Is an Income-tax Officer under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, a court within the meaning of cl. (b) in sub-section (1) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? That is the short but difficult question that arises in this appeal against a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. On November 24, 1949, the appellant filed a complaint in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, alleging that when the respondent Mulji Manila! Kamdar was examined on commission by the Income-tax Officer, Jamnagar Circle, Jamnagar, he gave answers which were false to his knowledge. He prayed for the issue of process against the said Mulji Manila! Kamdar, so that he might be dealt with according to law. An objection was raised by the accused that in the absence of a complaint by the Income-tax Officer before whom the false statement was alleged to hve been made the Magistrate was debarred from taking cognizance of the case.\n\nThis contention was based on a submission that the Income-tax Officer was a court within the meaning of s. 195 (1 )(bl.\n\nThis objection was rejected by the Presidency Magistrate. (!) I.LR. 38 Born. 642.\n\nLalji Haridas\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nDu Gupta J,\n\n196/\n\nLalji Haridas\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay was moved against the Presidency Magistrate's order.\n\nBut considering itself bound by a Full Bench decision of the Court in in re: Pwzamclzand Manekla/(1) and the later decision in State v. Nemchand Peshvir(') the High Court held that an Income-tax Officer when holding proceedings under s. 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 is a Revenue Court within the meaning of cl. (b) in sub-section (1) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The correctness of the High Court's view is challenged before us by the complainant on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court under Avt. 134 ( 1 ) ( c) of the Constitution.\n\nSection 195 ( l) (b) is one of the group of sections in the Code of Criminal Procedure which have laid down exceptions to the general rule of criminal law that criminal proceedings can be instituted in a court by any person. To this rules. 195 along with ss. 196, 196A, 197, 197A, 198, l 98A, and 199 provide exceptions. Section 195 mentions in its first sub-section a number of offences of which no coupt shall take cognizance except on the complaint in writing of the persons as indicated. Three classes of offences are dealt with in three els. (a), (b) and ( c) of this subsection. Section 195(1) (a) deals with offences punishable under ss. 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code and provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any of these except <>n the complaint in writing \"of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate.\"\n\nSection 195 (1 )(b) deals with offences punishable under\n\nSS. 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228 .:md provides that when any such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any court, no court shall take cognizance of it except on the complaint in writing of such Court or some other court to which such court is subordinate. Section\n\n195 (1 )( c) deals with offences punishable under ss. 463, 471, 475 and 476 and provides that when any such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of any document produced ---·--- ----\n\n(I) l.L.R. 38 Born. 642. {2) 57 Born. L.R. 1056.\n\n<>r given in evidence in such proceeding, no court shall take cognizance of the same except on the complaint in writing of such court, or some other court to which such court is subordinate.\n\nThe second sub-section of s. 195 runs thus :-\n\n\"'In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1), the term\n\n\"court\" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar, or Sub-\n\nRegistrar, under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.\"\n\nIn this appeal we are concerned directly with cl. (b) of. s. 195 (1). The appellant's com;>laint before the Magistrate alleged the commission of an offence under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code in the course of the examination on oath by the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar . Circle, J amnagar. The examination itself took place in relation to assessment proceedings against the complainant for the years 1949-50, and 1950-51. If the Income-tax Officer is a Court it necessarily follows that the Magistrate was not entitled to take cognizance of this offence except on the complaint of the Income-tax Officer. That is how the question whether the Income-taic Officer is a Court or not falls to be considered.\n\nSection 5 of the Income-taic Act, 1922, mentions six classes of Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act. The primary function of an Income-tax Officer is the assessment of income that is chargeable to taic under s. 3 of the Act and the determination of the tax payable on it.\n\nHe has to rperform other functions under the Act that are subsidiary and ancillary to this main function. Under s. 5(7) the Income-tax Officers are subordinate to the Director of Inspection, the Cmi:tmissioner of Income-tax and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax within whose jurisdiction they perform their functions. Under s. 5 ( 8) they have to observe and follow the orders, instructions and directions of the Central Board of Revenue.\n\nChapter III of the Act in its several sections state what heads of income-profits and gains shall be chargeable to incometaic and indicates the duties which the Income-tax Officer\n\nLalji Harida1\n\nState of Mahorashtra\n\nDas Gupta I.\n\nLalji Haridas v.\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nDas G u:; ta J.\n\nhas to perform for the purpose of his main function of assessing the chargeable income.\n\nFor instance, deductions under s. 7 ( 2 )( iia) in respect of conveyance owned by the assessee or used by him for the purpose of his em; iloyment \"shall be such sum as the Income-tax Officer may estimate . ..... \".\n\nThe allowances permissible under s. 10(2) (i) \"shall be such sum as the Income-tax Officer may determine\"; the allowances under s. 10(2) (ix) also shall be such sum in respect of loans made in the ordinary course of business as the Income-tax Officer may estimate to be irrecoverable. Again, the allowances mentioned in cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 10(4) (a) cannot be made \"if in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer any such allowance is excessive or unreasonable.\" The proviso to s. 10 ( 5) requires the Income-tax Officer to satisfy himself in the cases dealt with there whether the main purpose of the transfer of assets was the reduction of liability to income-tax and provides that where he is so satisfied the actual cost of the assets shall be such amount as the Income-tax Officer may determine. Other sections showing the different matters in which the Income-tax Officer has to be satisfied or to form an opinion for the purpose of assessment are ss. 12 (a), 13 and 17. Chapter IV of the Act which lays down the procedure to be followed in making the assessment, imposes inter alia the duty of calling for returns of income (s. 22); of making assessment of the Income and to determine the sum payable by the assessee ( s. 23) ; the power to assess Companies to super-tax (s. 23A); the power to make provisional assessment in advance of regular assessment (s. 23B).\n\nIt is obvious however that for carrying out these several functions properly it is necessary for the Income-tax Officer to examine documents and persons. Power for this purpose are conferred on the Income-tax Officer (and certain other Income-tax Authorities) in s. 37 of the Act. The first subsection of s. 37 runs thus :-\n\n\"The Income-tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner and Appellate T ribunal shall, for the purposes of this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( 5 of 1908)\n\nwhen trying a suit in respect of the following matiers, namely :-\n\n(a) discovery and inspection.\n\n(b) enforcing the attendance of any person, including any officer of a banking company, and examining him on oath,\n\n( c) compelling the production of books of account and other documents; and\n\n( d) issuing summons.\"\n\nThe second sub-section empowers anv Income-tax Officer specially authorised by the Commissioner to enter and search any building and seize books of account and other documents.\n\nUnder the third sub-section the Income-tax Officer may impound or retain the books of account and other documents after following certain procedure.\n\nThe fourth sub-section of this section which does not confer any powers but has been relied on strongly by the respondent will be dealt with in full detail later in this judgment.\n\nFrom the brief summary of the Income-tax Officer's functions given above it is clear that he is a part and parcel Of the executive organ of the State. The fact that for carrying out some of these executive functions he will have the powersas are vested in a court under the Code of Civil\n\nProcedure has not the effect of converting him into a limb -of the judicial organ. It has been held that he is a quasijudicial authority.\n\nThat is not sufficient however to make him a court. Before we can ca]] him a court, he must be shown to be a part of the judicial organ of the State.\n\nLeaving out for later consideration the effect of s. 37 ( 4) it is clear that an Income-tax Officer is not a court.\n\nWe have not thought it necessary to refer to the numerous decisions of the High Courts in India, of this Court or of the Privy Council in which the question of what is a court has been considered., We have considered this unnecessary in view especially of the fact that most of these were noticed in a recent decision of this Court in Jagannath\n\nf.nlji Haridas v.\n\nStale of Maharashtra\n\nDas Gupta I.\n\nLa/ji Haridas v.\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nPrasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') where the question whether a Sales Tax Officer was a couvt or not within the meaning of s. 195(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code was considered.\n\nThis Court held that the Sales Tax Officer is aot a Court within the meaning of that section.\n\nAll the reasons set out in this judgment which Kapur J. delivered for the Court are apicable to the case of the Income-tax Officer and if the reasoning in that case is taken to be correct, as it must be, the Income-tax Officer also must be held to be not a court-unless any different conclusion is justified from the provisions of s. 3 7 ( 4) of the Act.\n\nIt will not be out of place to mention here what the Constitution Bench of this Court said in Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand( 2 ) as regards the nature of the functions of Income-tax Officers. The question for the court's decision in that case was whether a Conciliation Officer under cl. 29 of the Government Order under ss. 3 and 8 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was a \"Tribunaf\" within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution and the Court held that it was not such a tribunal. As illustrations of other authmities whose primary function is administrative even though they have the duty to act judicially, Shah J. speaking for the Court said :-\n\n\"The duty to act judicially imposed upon an authority by statute does not necessarily clothe the authority with the judicial power of the State.\n\nEven administrative or executive authorities are .:>ften by virtue of their constitution, required to act judicially in dealing with question affecting the tights of citizens. Boards of Revenue, Customs Authorities: Motor Vehicles Authorities, Income-tax and Sales Tax Officers are illustrations prima facie of such administrative authorities, who though under a duty to act iudicially, either by the express provisions of the statutes constituting them or by the rules framed thereunder or by the implication either of the statutes or the powers conferred upon them are ---------- ---------------\n\n(l) [1963] Supp. l S.C.R. 242.\n\n\nstill not delegates of the judicial power of the State. Their primary function is administrative and not judicial.\"\n\nIt is true that the question whether an Income-tax Officer was a ourt or a tribunal was not directly for decision in laswant Sugar Mills' case('). It is clear however that as a part of the reasoning which the court applied for coming to the condusion that the Conciliation Officer is not a Tribunal this Court was of opinion that an Income-tax 'Officer is also not a \"Tribunal\". Obviously, if it is not even a Tribunal it cannot be a court.\n\nIt is not seriously disputed by Mr. Desai who appeared before us for the respondent that looking at the functions of an Income-tax Officer it is not possible to say that the Income-tax Officer is a court specially after this Court's decision in Jagannath Prasad's case(2) mentioneu above.\n\nHis main contention is that even though the Income-tax Officer was not originally a 'court within the nieaning of s. 19 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the deeming provision in s. 37 ( 4) has made him a court. Section 37 ( 4) runs thus:-\n\n\"Any proceeding before any authority referred to in this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of ss. 193 and T28, and for the purposes of s. 196 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).\"\n\nThe authorities mentioned in the section are the Jncometax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. The direct effect of sub-section 4 of s. 37 therefore is that proceedings before an Income-tax Officer \"shall be deemed to be a judicial iproceeding\" within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 and for the purposes of s. 196 of the Indian Penal Code. As we r;:ad the section it at once leaps to the eye that there is no mention in this of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nIn introducing this deeming provision. in 1956\n\n(I) (1963 St•pp. I S.C.R. 242.\n\n(2) [t963] 2 S.C.R. 850.\n\n196f\n\nLa/ii Haridtu\n\nY, State of MalrtJ..\n\nrashtra\n\nDa! '.Jupta I.\n\nLalji Haridas v.\n\nState of Maha\n\nrashtra\n\nDas fTupta. J.\n\nParliament did not think it necessary to extend the deeming provision for the purpose of s. 195. If Parliament intended this provision to produce the consequence that the authorities in the section should be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is reasonable to expect that Parliament would have added the words \"and shall be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure'', or \"shall be deemed to be a court for the purpose of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure\" or some similar phraseology. The omission to use any such words is all the more remarkable when we notice that on several occasions before 1956 Parliament had in expressing an intention that a particular authority should be a court for the purpose of s. 195 added express words to give effect to that intention.\n\nThus, in the Payment of Wages Act, which was enacted in 1936, s. 18 after stating that every authority appointed under sub-s. ( 1) of s. 15 shall have all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure for certain r; mrposes, proceeded to say that \"every such authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of s. 19 5 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898.\" Again, irt s. 23 of the Workmen's Compensation Act which confers on the Commissioner for workmen's compensation all the powers oE a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the legislature added in 1929 the following words :-\"and the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of s. 195 and of Chapter XXXV of , the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898\".\n\nIt is worth noticing also that in several other statutes Parliament after stating that ce1!tain proceeding shall be a judicial rproceeding within <he meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code proceeded to say that for certain purposes it shall also be deemed to be a court. The Evacuee Property Act of 1950 after stating that the enquiry by the custodian shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code, goes on to say \"and the Custodian shall be deemed to lie a court within the meaning of ss. 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898\". Another instance of similar\n\nlegislation is to be found in s. I 7 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951, which after stating that any proceeding before the competent officer or the appellate officer shall be judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code adds \"and the competent Officer or the appellate officer shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of s. 480 and s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898\". The Displaced Persr, ns'\n\n(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 uses exactly similar words in s. 26.\n\nThat section first confers on every officer appointed under the Act the same powers in respect of certain specified matter~ for the purpose of making any enquiry or hearingany <11;>peal under the Act as are vested in a Civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure and then proceeds thus \"any proceeding before any such offier shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code and every such Officer shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of s. 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.\" Similarly, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 after providing in sub-s'ection (3) of section 11 that every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribw1al or National Tribunal, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 22&\n\nof the Indian Penal Code adds in sub-s. (8) of the same oection th~ provision that \"every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of s. 480 and s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1892.\" This sub-section was added in 1950.\n\nIn clear contrast with these are the statutes which after saying that certain proceedings shall be judicial proceeding refrain from adding that the authority will be deemed to be a court.\n\nOne such statute is the Sea Customs Act, which in s. 171 A ( 4) lays down that every enquiry under that section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code and stops there.\n\nA somewhat similar provision, though in ditferent phraseology, appears in s. 51 of the Administrator-General's Act, (III of 1913) which runs thus:-\n\n134-159 S.C.-46\n\n196#\n\nLalli Horida.s ...\n\nStall of Ma/ul.\n\nruhtra\n\nDu Gupta J_\n\nWl# Bllridai ...\n\nSfaU al Jlaluz. ,..,.,,..\n\nDt11 Gurta I.\n\n\"Whoever, during any examination authorised by this Act, makes upon oath a statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, s)l.all be deemed to have intentionally given ' false eYidence in a, stage of a judicial proceeding.\"\n\nThe learned Solicitor-General, who appeared. before us on behalf of the appellant, strongly urged that if the intention of the legislature had ever been that the Income-tax Officer or other authorities mentioned in s. 37 should be deemed to be a court for the purpose of s. 19 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it would have taken care to express that intention in clear phraseology.\n\nIn any case, argues leal'jled counsel, when in 1956 the old section 37 was wholly recast , the Parliament which at least then had before it a well established P!itlern of legislative forms in the numerous statutes mentioned above for expressing an intenion that an authority shall be deemed to be a court for the purpose of s. 195 or any other provision of the Code of Criminal Porcedure, there could be no conceivable reason for the failure to follow that pattern. In our opinion, there is considerable force in this argument.\n\nOn behalf of the accused-respondent Mr. Desai suggests that the words. actually used, viz., \"that proceeding before the authority shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code\" were by themselves sufficient to give effect to an intention that that authority shall also be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure According to the learned Counsel, a judicial proceeding with· in the meaning of s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code can only be before a court.\n\nFor this proposition we can find no support either in principle or authority.\n\nIt seems clear to us on the contrary :that proceedings before tribunals which are quasi judicial and not a court may well be considered to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThough the words \"judicial proceeding\" have been used in numerous sections of the Indian\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURf REPORTS\n\nPenal Code, it has not defined the words, though the words \"court of justice\" as also the words \"a judge\" have been defined.\n\nThe Code of Criminal Procedure in which also the phrase \"judicial proceeding\" occurs in several sections has defined it in s. 4(m) thus: \"Judicial proceeding includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath''. This definition of judicial proceeding was included in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from the very beginning. The fact that for all these years since 1898 Parliament has not thought fit to give any definition of the words \"judicial proceeding\" in the Indian Penal Code is some justification for thinking that the words \"judicial proceeding\" in the Indian Penal Code may reasonably be held to have the same meaning as in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, it would be reasonable to think that i.n the Indian Penal Code also the word\n\n'\"judicial proceeding\" has been used to include \"any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath.\" That would bring within the meaning of tbe words \"judicial proceeding\" proceeding before many quasi-judicial authorities which are not courts, e.g., a Customs Officer or a Sales Tax Officer.\n\nIt is unnecessary for our present purpose to attempt an exact definition of the words \"judicial proceeding\" as used in s. 193 or in any other section of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nEven without any such definition however it appears clear that the phrase \"judicial proceeding\" is wide enough to include not only proceedings before courts but proceedings before certain other tribunals. It is pertinent to point out that if a proceeding before any other authority except a court could not be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, it would not have been necessary for Parliament in the Evacuee Property Act, 1950, in the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1950, and in the Displaced Persons' (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, to add, after laying (fown that the proceedings before certain authorities shall be judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code the further words, that \"the authority shall be deemed to be a civil court\" for certain purposes of the Code of Criminal\n\n1§6t\n\nLaljl HarltJ.\n\n\"· Stat• of 11-. _,,,,.\n\nDtu Gup111 I.\n\nl!ltff\n\n£al/I Harlda1\n\n•• \"\"'' of Maha ruhtra \"- Gupta 1\n\nProcedure. It is especially interesting to note in this connection the rprovisions of s. 11 ( 3) and s. 11 ( 8) of the Industrial Disputes Act to which we have already referred .\n\nUnder s. 11 ( 3) as originally enacted every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court or Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nWhen Parliament added to this section sub-section ( 8) what was enacted was that every tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of s. 480 and s. 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.\n\nAfter the amendment by the Act 36 of 1956 the concluding portion of s. 11 ( 3) ran thus :-\"Every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code.\" The same Act substituted in s. 8 the words \"Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal\" for the words \"Tribunal\".\n\nIn spite of the fact however that every enquiry or investigation by a Board has to be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indiari Penal Code Parliament refrained from saying that a Board shall also be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of s. 480 and s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This emphasises the fact that the\n\nlegislature did not think that the necessary effect of legislat ing that a rproceeding before an authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code would be that that authority shall also be deemed to be a court. To say now that the legislature in providing in s. 3 7 ( 4) of the Indian Income-tax Act that a proceeding before the specified authorities shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code, intended also to say that such authority shall be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be to impute to the legislature an intention of which it itself had no knowledge.\n\nLearned counsel for the accused-respondent then drew our attention to the use of the words \"judicial proceeding\" in s. 476 and s. 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure\n\nand argued that in these sections the words \"judicial pro 1964\n\nceeding\" have been used as equivalent to proceeding in a Lal/I Harlda court. That may well be so. Section 476 lays down proce State 0(· M,,,,._ <lure in cases mentioned in s. 195(l)(b) and (c) of riuhtra offences that appear to have been committed in or in relation Dai Gupta 1, to a proceeding in a court. It was quite correct therefore to refer to such proceeding in a later part of the section as judicial proceeding. Section 479A lays down the procedure in certain cases of offences of giving false evidence in civil, revenue or criminal courts and necessarily speaks of the proceeding before those courts as judicial proceeding.\n\nIt is difficult to see how the use of e words \"judicial proceeding\" in these sections support the contention that \"judicial proceeding\" can only be a proceeding before a court. There can be no doubt that every proceedin.g hcfcre a court is a \"judicial proceeding\". It does not follow however that t very judicial 'proceeding is a proceeding before a court.\n\nMr. Desai drew a grim picture of what would happen if the authority a proceeding before which was deemed to be a judicial iprocced'g within the meaning of s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code was not at the same time considered a court within the meaning of s. 195.\n\nHe rightly points out that one consequence will be that if any person offers any insult or causes any obstruction to a public servant when he is sitting in any such judicial proceeding and thus commits an offence under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code it will be possible for persons other than the public servants to institute a criminal case for such offence. This, says the learned counsel, would be a very undesirable thing.\n\nWe fail to see why this should be considered to be undesirable.\n\nBut assuming this is so, that is not to our mind a consideration which should compel us to give the words \"judicial proceeding\" a meaning which they do not bear.\n\nIt may be mentioned here, as already stated, that under s. 171A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1874, every enquiry before a Custom Officer \"shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the mearung of s. 193 and s. 228 of the\n\n1 al/l Baridas\n\nSof Mahanuhtro\n\nDta O\"plo J.\n\nIndian Pe1tal Code\". In spite of this, the Constitution Bench of this Court held in its recent decision in I ndo-China SteQfTI\n\nNt111ftation Co. Ltd. v. The Additional C()/lector of Cu.ftoms(') that a Customs Omcer is not even a Tribunal.\n\nAfter discussing several previous decisions of this Court Gajendragadkar C.J., speaking for the Court observed thua:-\n\n\"The result therefore is that it is no longer open to doubt that the Customs Officer is not a court or tribunal.\"\n\nIt is difficult to see how if the presence of the words \"shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code\" in s. 171A( 4) have not the effect of making a Customs Officer a court or a tribunal, the presence of similar words in s. 37 ( 4) in the Indian Income-tax Act, can have that effect.\n\nln our opm10n, the words used in s. 3 7 ( 4) of the Income-tax Act furnish no reason to alter the legal position that !s inescapable QD a consideration of the functions of the Income-tax. Officer that he is not a court within the meaning of s. 1115 of the Code of Crimi.Dal Procedure.\n\nWe would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by t!he High Court and direct that the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, should now dispose of the case in accordance with law.\n\nORDER\n\nIn accordance with the opinion of the majority, this appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\n(!) (1964] 6 S.C.R. 594.", "total_entities": 467, "entities": [{"text": "LALJI HARIDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Lalji Haridlll", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STAIB OF MAHARASIITRA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. 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(", "canonical_name": "Das fTupta"}}, {"text": "Is an Income-tax Officer under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32736, "end_char": 32798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32860, "end_char": 32866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Is an Income-tax Officer under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Is an Income-tax Officer under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32874, "end_char": 32900, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32996, "end_char": 33030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is the short but difficult question that arises in this appeal against a decision of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33035, "end_char": 33052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1949, the appellant filed a complaint in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, alleging that when the respondent Mulji Manila!"}}, {"text": "Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33093, "end_char": 33135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1949, the appellant filed a complaint in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, alleging that when the respondent Mulji Manila!"}}, {"text": "Mulji Manila! 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J.\n\nDu Gupta J,\n\n196/\n\nLalji Haridas\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay was moved against the Presidency Magistrate's order.", "canonical_name": "Lalji Haridlll"}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra\n\nGajendragadkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33892, "end_char": 33928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalji Haridas\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nDu Gupta J,\n\n196/\n\nLalji Haridas\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay was moved against the Presidency Magistrate's order.", "canonical_name": "State of Maharashtra\n\nGajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Du Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33937, "end_char": 33945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalji Haridas\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nDu Gupta J,\n\n196/\n\nLalji Haridas\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay was moved against the Presidency Magistrate's order."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34011, "end_char": 34031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalji Haridas\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nDu Gupta J,\n\n196/\n\nLalji Haridas\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay was moved against the Presidency Magistrate's order."}}, {"text": "Pwzamclzand Manekla/(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34163, "end_char": 34185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But considering itself bound by a Full Bench decision of the Court in in re: Pwzamclzand Manekla/(1) and the later decision in State v. Nemchand Peshvir(') the High Court held that an Income-tax Officer when holding proceedings under s. 23 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 is a Revenue Court within the meaning of cl. 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"source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 196, 196A, 197, 197A, 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34913, "end_char": 34942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34979, "end_char": 34990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 195(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35243, "end_char": 35257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "ss. 172 to 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35299, "end_char": 35313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35321, "end_char": 35338, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35534, "end_char": 35545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35935, "end_char": 35947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 463, 471, 475 and 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35994, "end_char": 36019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36454, "end_char": 36460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Registration Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36647, "end_char": 36676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36738, "end_char": 36744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Registration Act, 1877", "statute": "the Indian Registration Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36842, "end_char": 36848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Registration Act, 1877", "statute": "the Indian Registration Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36856, "end_char": 36873, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37395, "end_char": 37404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Registration Act, 1877", "statute": "the Indian Registration Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Income-taic Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37412, "end_char": 37433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37459, "end_char": 37509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37618, "end_char": 37622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act", "statute": "Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37795, "end_char": 37802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act", "statute": "Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38025, "end_char": 38029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act", "statute": "Income-tax Authorities for the purposes of the Act"}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38141, "end_char": 38163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Mahorashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38337, "end_char": 38357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter III of the Act in its several sections state what heads of income-profits and gains shall be chargeable to incometaic and indicates the duties which the Income-tax Officer\n\nLalji Harida1\n\nState of Mahorashtra\n\nDas Gupta I.\n\nLalji Haridas v.\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nDas G u:; ta J.\n\nhas to perform for the purpose of his main function of assessing the chargeable income.", "canonical_name": "State of Maharashtra\n\nGajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38550, "end_char": 38554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38768, "end_char": 38776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38863, "end_char": 38871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39078, "end_char": 39086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39216, "end_char": 39221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39692, "end_char": 39698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39715, "end_char": 39736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39870, "end_char": 39875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39964, "end_char": 39969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40017, "end_char": 40023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 23B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40101, "end_char": 40107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40374, "end_char": 40379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40416, "end_char": 40421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40625, "end_char": 40654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42122, "end_char": 42127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42279, "end_char": 42284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have not thought it necessary to refer to the numerous decisions of the High Courts in India, of this Court or of the Privy Council in which the question of what is a court has been considered.,"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42654, "end_char": 42676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have considered this unnecessary in view especially of the fact that most of these were noticed in a recent decision of this Court in Jagannath\n\nf.nlji Haridas v.\n\nStale of Maharashtra\n\nDas Gupta I.\n\nLa/ji Haridas v.\n\nState of Maharashtra\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nPrasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') where the question whether a Sales Tax Officer was a couvt or not within the meaning of s. 195(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code was considered."}}, {"text": "s. 195(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42768, "end_char": 42777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42968, "end_char": 42973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the reasons set out in this judgment which Kapur J. delivered for the Court are apicable to the case of the Income-tax Officer and if the reasoning in that case is taken to be correct, as it must be, the Income-tax Officer also must be held to be not a court-unless any different conclusion is justified from the provisions of s. 3 7 ( 4) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43252, "end_char": 43256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43330, "end_char": 43348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will not be out of place to mention here what the Constitution Bench of this Court said in Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand( 2 ) as regards the nature of the functions of Income-tax Officers."}}, {"text": "cl. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43568, "end_char": 43574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43605, "end_char": 43616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43629, "end_char": 43652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43692, "end_char": 43700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43901, "end_char": 43905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As illustrations of other authmities whose primary function is administrative even though they have the duty to act judicially, Shah J. speaking for the Court said :-\n\n\"The duty to act judicially imposed upon an authority by statute does not necessarily clothe the authority with the judicial power of the State."}}, {"text": "Jagannath Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45523, "end_char": 45539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not seriously disputed by Mr. Desai who appeared before us for the respondent that looking at the functions of an Income-tax Officer it is not possible to say that the Income-tax Officer is a court specially after this Court's decision in Jagannath Prasad's case(2) mentioneu above."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45682, "end_char": 45687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45697, "end_char": 45723, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45750, "end_char": 45755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45783, "end_char": 45793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45943, "end_char": 45950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 196", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45984, "end_char": 45990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45998, "end_char": 46015, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46204, "end_char": 46213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46217, "end_char": 46222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46351, "end_char": 46357, "source": "regex", 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58783, "end_char": 58788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<lure in cases mentioned in s. 195(l)(b) and (c) of riuhtra offences that appear to have been committed in or in relation Dai Gupta 1, to a proceeding in a court."}}, {"text": "Section 479A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58934, "end_char": 58946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59661, "end_char": 59667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59675, "end_char": 59692, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59759, "end_char": 59765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59987, "end_char": 59993, 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"STATUTE", "start_char": 61484, "end_char": 61498, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61556, "end_char": 61560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61575, "end_char": 61589, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 1115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61764, "end_char": 61771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Presidency Magistrate, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 61912, "end_char": 61941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by t!he High Court and direct that the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, should now dispose of the case in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "(1964] 6 S.C.R. 594", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 62095, 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{"document_id": "1964_6_727_749_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Ci S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nK. J. NATHAN\n\nS. V. MARUTY REDDY AND OTHERS\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO AND J. R. MUDHOLKAB JJ.)\n\nMortgage-Mortgage by depolit of title deeh-No document ezec11t•d\n\non tM day of deposit-<:an intention be infe\"ed flom 4 Md subsequently '1tecuted and registered-Transfer t1f Prarty .4ct (Act No. IV of 1882), 1. 58(/).\n\nThe plaintiff-appellant filed a suit to enforce a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.\n\nThe case of the plaintil! was that on 10th May, 1947, the 1st defendant deposited with the plaintiff al Madras other title deedl\n\nand papers relating to his half share in items specified in Schedule 'B' attached to the plaint with intent to create a security over the same in respect of advances made by the plaintilf. Before the 10th May, 1947, the 1st defendant borrowed from the plaintiff from time to time Rs. J 6, SOO/- on 7 promissory notes. The case of the plaintiff further was that the 1st defendant executed a memorandum of agreement, dated Sth July, 1947, in which the equitable mortgage thus created and the amount borrowed by him till then were acknowledged and he had undertaken to repay the said sum of Rs. 16, SOO/- with interest This memorandum of agreement had been duly registered.\n\nThis suit was for recovery of the principal amount of Rs. 16, SOO/- and interest thereoll- The !st defendant did not file any written statement denying the said\n\nallegations. The 3rd defendant (a subsequent mortgagee), the only contesting defendant, filed a written statement wherein he put the plainlilf to strict proof of the fact tllat the sums claimed in the plaint were due to him from the !st defendant and of the fact that the !st defendant effected a mortgage in his favour by deposit of title deeds. The Trial Court held that the 1st defendant had no intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds on May JO, 1947. On appeal the High Court also affirmed the finding of the trial Court The question for consideration was whether on 10th May, 1947, there was a loan and whether the 1st defendant delivered to the appellant the documents of title of B Schedule properties with the intent to create a security thereon.\n\nHeld: (i) Under the Transfer of the Property Act, a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is one of the forms of mortgap whereunder there is a transfer of interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan. Therefore, such a mortgage of property takes effect against a mortgage deed subsequently executed and registered in respect of the same property under Section S8(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nThe three requisites of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds are, (i) debt,\n\n(ii) deposit of title deeds, and (iii) an intention than the deeds shall be security for the debt. Whether there is an intention that the deedl shall be security for tho debt is a question of fact in each case. 11111\n\n1961 - F1bntt1r7 II.\n\n1961 -·- K. J. Nathan\n\nS. Y. Maruty\n\nlWdy\n\nsaid fact will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence.\n\nTheR> is no presumption of law that the mere deposit of title deeds constitutes a mortgage, for no such presumption has been laid down either in the Evidence Act or in the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nBut a court may presume under section 114 of the Evidence Act that under certain circumstances a loan and a deposit of title deeds constitute a mortgage.\n\nBut that is really an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other fact or facts.\n\nNor the fact that at the time the title deeds were deposited there was an intention to execute a mortgage deed in itself negatives, or is inconsistent with, the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds to be in force till the mortgage deed was executed, On the facts of this case the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be inferred from the document dated 5th July, 1947 which was subsequently registered and in which the deposit of title deeds on May 10. 1947 was duly acknowledged.\n\nNorris v. Wilkinson, (1806) 33 E.R. 73, Keys v. Williams, (1838) 51 Revised Reports, 339, Whitbread, Ex Parte, (1912) 34 E.R. 496, In re. Beetham, Ex Parle Broderick, (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 380, Dayal Jairaj\n\nv. Jivraj Ratai1si, (1875) l.L.R. 1 Born. 237, Jaitha Bhima v. Haji Abdul Vyad Cosman, (1886) I.L.R. 10 Bom. 634, Behram Bashid Irani v.\n\nSorabji Rustomji Ela1ia, (1914) I.L.R. 38 Born. 372 and Y.E.R.M.A.R.\n\nChettyar Fmn v. Ma Joo Teen, (1933) I.L.R. 11 Rang. 239, discussed.\n\n(ii) Physical delivery of documents by the debtor to the creditor is not the only mode of deposit. There may be a constructive deposit.\n\nA court will have to ascertain in each case whether in substance there is a delivery of the title deeds by the debtor to the creditor. If the creditor was already in possession of the title deeds, it would be hyper technical to insist upon the formality Of the creditor delivering the ti.tie deeds to the debtor, and the debtor re-delivering them to the creditor.\n\nWhat would be necessary in these circumstances is whether the parties agreed to treat the documents in the possession of the creditor or his agent as delivery to him for the purpose of the transaction.\n\nIn the present case the plaintiff-the mortgagee-had the physical possession of the title deeds at Madras on f\\..fay 10, 1947. On the facts of this case, though the form of physical delivery of titledecds bad not been gone through, on May 10, 1947, there was constructive delivery of the title deeds coupled with the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Such delivery satisfied the condition laid down by s. SS(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\n(iii) There is nothing unusual in this conduct of the parties either.\n\nIf there was a mortgage by deposit of title deeds at an earlier stage, even though there was at that time an agreement to execute a format document later on, there would be nothing out of the wav in the parties, for their own reasons, giving up the idea of executing a formal document and being satisfied with the memorandum acknowlcag1111 the earlier form .,, ICCW'ity.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 407 of 1962.\n\nK. J. Natlulll ...\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated January 31, >. V. Marut, 1957 of the Madras High Court in A!)?eal No. 969/1952.\n\nReddJ\n\nR. Mamamurthi Aiyar, T. S. Rangarajan and R. Gopala- .krishnan, for the appellant.\n\nV. S. Venkataraman, M. R. Krishna Pillai and M. S. K.\n\nIyengar, for the respondent No. 3.\n\nFebruary 11, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment ofthe Coutt was delivered by-\n\nSu BB A RAO, J .-This appeal on a certificate iSsued by Subba Rao J. the High Court of Judicature at Madras is preferred against the judgment and decree of the said High Court modifying those of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, in a suit filed by the appellant to enforce a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.\n\nThe facts are as follows. . The first defendant borrowed from the plaintiff from time to time on seven promissory notes.\n\nThe plaintiff, alleging that the first defendant had created a mortgage by deposit of title deeds in his favour in respect of his half share in the properties specified in B-Schedule. instituted O.S. No. 45 of 1951 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, for enforcing the said mortgage against the said properties. The suit was for recovery of a sum of Rs. 20.435-15-0. made up of principal amount of Rs. 16,500/- and interest thereon. To that suit six persons were made defendants: defendant I was the mortgagor; defendant 2 was the subsequent purchaser of several of the items of the suit properties subject to plaintiff's mortgage; defendant 3 was the subsequent morgagee; defendant 4 was the subsequent purchaser of one of the plaint-schedule properties; and defendant 5 and 6 were sister and brother of the lst defendant. The plaintiff also alleged that in a partition effected between the 1st defendant and his brother properties described in the C Schedule annexed to the plaint were allotted to the !st defendant.\n\nHe, therefore, asked in the alternative that the C Schedule properties should be sold for the realization of •the amount due to him from the 1st defendant.\n\n1l. /. Nathan\n\n\"· $. Y. Mona,\n\nR6\"'1 IUN Rao I.\n\nAs the only contesting party before us is the 3rd defendant (3rd respondent herein), it is not necessary to notice the defences raised by defendants other than the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant alleged that the 1st defendant had executed a security bond in his favour for a sum of Rs. 15,000/- on October 10, 1947 and that, being a bona fide purchaser for value, he had priority over the plaintiff's security, even if it were true.\n\nHe put the plaintiff to strict proof of the fact that the sum claimed in the plaint under several promissory notes was owing to him and also of the fact that the 1st defendant effected a mortgage of the suit properties by deposit of title deeds in favour of the plaintiff.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge held that the suit Joans were true, that the mortgage by deposit of title deeds was also true, but the plaintiff had a valid mortgage only of items I and 4 of the C Schedule in respect of a sum of Rs. 9,157-5-0 with interest at 6 per cent. per annum thereon.\n\nOn that finding, he gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff against defendants 1 to 3 for the said amount with a charge over items 1 and 4 of the C Schedule properties, and he also gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a ;; um of Rs. 7 ,565-2-0 with further interest at 6 per cent. per annum from July 5, 1947, against the 1st defendant personally.\n\nThe plaintiff preferred an appeal against the decree of the Subordinate Judge, insofar as it went against him, and the 3rd defendant filed cross-objection in respect of that part of the decree which went against him. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, which heard the appeal and the crossobjeotions, held that the 1st defendant did not effect a mortgage by deposit of title deeds on May 10, 1947, in favour of the plaintiff for the entire suit claim, but that he effected such a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff on Jan•\n\nuary 25, 1947, for a sum of Rs. 3,000/- in respect of two of the plaint-schedule items described in Ex. A-8. On that finding, the High Court modified the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge by restricting the mortgage decree given to the plaintiff to the amounts covered by the first three promissory notes and interest thereon and to one half of the properties described in Ex. A-8 and by giving a money decree against the !st defendant for the entire balance of tbe\n\ndecree amount. The plaintiff has preferred the present appeal against the decree of the High Court.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contends, (1) that the finding of both the lower courts that no mortgage by deposit of title deeds was effected for the entire plaint claim was vitiated by the fact that they had ignored Ex. A-19, a\n\nregistered agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant on July 5, 1947, wherein the said fact was clearly and unambiguously recorded; and (2) that, even if such a mortgage was not effected on May 10, 1947, Ex. A-19 proprio vigore effected such a mortgage to come into effect at any rate from the date of the execution of the agreement.\n\nLearned counsel for the contesting 3rd respondent argues that the definite case of the plaintiff was that such a mortgage was effected only on M\\iy 10, 1947, and that both the Courts below on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence concurrently found that no such transaction was effected on that date and that, therefore, this Court should not interfere with such a finding of fact.\n\nHe further contends that in Ex. A-19 the parties only recorded that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds was effected 011 May 10, 1947 and that, if that fact was not true, Ex. A-19 could not be of any help to the plaintiff. If there was no mortgage on May 10, 1947, the argument proceeds, Ex. A-19 by its own\n\nforce could not create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds on July 5, 1947, as in terms it only referred to a mortgage alleged to have been effected on May 10, 1947. That apart, it is argued that as a mortgage by deposit of title deeds could only be effected at Madras and that, as one of the important ingredients of such a mortgage is that the delivery of the said title deeds to the creditor should have been given at Madras, no such mortgage could have been effected in law in the present case, as the delivery of the title deeds was given by the bank to the representative of the plaintiff at Kumbakonam.\n\nBefore we advert to the arguments advanced in the case it would be convenient at this stage to notice the relevant aspects of the law portaining to mortgage by deposit of title deeds.\n\nK. J. Naa-.\n\nv. $. Y. Marul1-\n\nRedd7\n\nSubba R• I.\n\n, g. J. NatloJJn\n\n'$. Y.\n\nMaruty Reddy\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSection 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act defines a mortgage by deposit of title deeds thus: ·\n\n\"Where a person in any of the following towns, namely, the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay ....................... delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immovable property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.\"\n\nUnder this definition the essential requisites of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds are, (i) debt, (ii) deposit of title deeds, and (iii) an intention that the deeds shall be security for the debt.\n\nThough such a mortgage is often described as an equitable mortgage, there is an essential distinction betwee.n an equitable mortgage as understood in English law and th~ mortgage by deposit of title deeds recognised under the Transfer of Property Act in India.\n\nIn England an equitable mortgage can be created either, (I) by actual deposit of title-deeds, in which case parol evidence is admissihie to show the meaning of the deposit and the extent of the security created, or (2) if there be no deposit of tit!edeeds, then by a memorandum in writing, pu11porting to create a security' for money advanced: see White and Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity, 9th edition, Vol. 2, at p. 77. In either case it does not operate as an atual conveyance though it is enforceable in equity; whereas under the Transfer of Property Act a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is one of the modes of creating a legal mortgage whereunder there will be transfer of interest in the property mortgaged to the mortgagee. This distinction will have to be borne in mind in appreciating the scope of the English decisions cited at the Bar.\n\nThis distinction is also the basis for the view that for the purpose of priority it stood on the same footing as a mortgage by deed.\n\nIndeed a proviso has been added to s. 48 of the Registration Act by Amending Act 21 of 1929. It says:\n\n\"Provided that a mortgage by deposit of title deeds as defined in section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,_ shall take effect against any mortgage-deed subsequently executed and registered which relates to the same property.~\n\nTherefore, under the Jaw of India a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, thoygh it is limited to specific cities, is on a par with any other legal mortgage.\n\nThe text-books and the cases cited at the Bar give some valuable guides for ascertaining the intention of parties and also the nature of delivery of the documents of title requisite for constituting such a mortgage Fisher in his book on The Law of Mortgage. 2nd edition, p. 32, suggests how the intention to create such a 5ecurity could be established.\n\nHe says: \"The intent to create such a security may be established by written documents, alone or coupled with parol evidence; by parol evidence only that the deposit was made by way of security; or by the mere inference of an agreement drawn from the very fact of the deposit.\"\n\nIn Norris v. Wilkinson(') the Master of the Rolls in the context of that case where documents were delivered to the Attorney of the creditor for the purpose of enabling the attorney to draw a mortgage which it was alleged that the debtor had agreed to give. made the following observations:\n\n\"It is clear, that these deeds, if voluntarily delivered at all, were not delivered by vov of deposit, in the sense in which that word h~3 been used in the cases : i.e., as a present and immediate security; but were delivered only for the purpose of enabling the attorney •to draw the mortgage, which it is alleged, Wilkinson the father had agreed to give.\" The learned Master of the Rolls distinguished the cases cited before him thus:\n\n\"Now in all the cases, that have been referred to, the deeds were delivered by way of deposit.\n\nSuch deposit was indeed held to imply an obligation to execute a legal conveyance, whenever it should be required. But the primary intention was to execute an immediate pledge; with an implied engagement to do all, that might be necessary to render •the pledge effectual for its\n\npurpose.\" . ·-~-·\n\n(I) ( 1806) 33 E.R. 73, 76.\n\nK. J. Nathan ....\n\nS. Y.\n\nMOJ'ldT Reddy\n\nSubba Raa I.\n\nIC. /. Nat/tan\n\nv. s. Y. Maruty\n\nR1ddy\n\nSubbe Rao I.\n\nThese passages indicate that an intention to create a mortgage deed in the future is not inconsistent with the intention to create in presenting a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds.\n\nBoth may co-exist. In Keys v. Williams(') it was held that an agreement to grant a mortgage for money already advanced and a deposit of deeds for the purpose of preparing a mortgage, was, in itself, an equitable mortgage by deposit.\n\nThough the facts of the case do not appear in the report, this decision indicates that the fact that deposit of title-deeds was given for .the punpose of preparing a mortgage does not in itself without more, exclude the inference to create an equitable mortgage if the requisite conditions for creating thereof are satisfied.\n\nThe decision in Whitbread, Ex Parte(') throws some light on the legal requirements of delivery of title-deeds. There, the petitioner claimed a lien, as an equitable mortgagee, by deposit in 1808 of the lease of a public-house as a collateral security for £ 1,000, lent to the lessee on his promissory note, and a subsequent advance of £ 100 made in January 1810.\n\nOne of the points mooted was whether the subsequent advance of £ 100 was also charged on the property covered by the document. The learned Chancellor in that context made the following observations :\n\n\"If the original bargain did not look to future advances, no subsequent advance can be a charge, unless the subsequent transaction is equivalent to the original transaction. If it is equivalent to a re-delivery of the deed, receiving it back as a security for both sums, that will do; as it cannot depend upon •that mere form : but I shall require them to swear expressly, that when the sum of £ 100 was advanced, it was upon the security of the deposit.\"\n\nThe said observations emphasize the substance of the transaction rather than the form. _It implies that a debtor, who has already affected a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds in respect of an earlier advance, need not go through the forma-\n\n(1) (1838) SI Revised Reports, 339.\n\n(2) (1812) 34 E.R. 496.\n\nlity of receiving back the said documents from the creditor and formally re-delivering them to the creditor as security for further advances taken by him. It would comply with the requirements of law if there was clear evidence that the documents already deposited with the creditor would also be charged by way of deposit of title-deeds in respect of the further advances.\n\nThe doctrine accepted by this decision may, for convenience of reference, be described as the doctrine of constructive delivery.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent attempted to confine the scope of this decision to a case of further advances on the basis of documents already deposited with the creditor in respect of earlier advances. It is , true that the principle was enunciated in the context of the said facts, but it is of wider application. In our view, the same principle will have to be invoked wherever documents of\n\ntitle have already been in the possession of creditor at the time when the debtor seeks to create a mortgage by jeposit of title-deeds. In In re Beetham, Ex Parte Broderick(') the facts were-A, being indebted to a banking company in respect of an overdrawn account, wrote to the directors promising to give them, when required, security over his reversionary interest in one-fifth share of a farm, to come into posses-\n\n1ion on the death of the life tenant; but no formal security was ever executed in accordance with this promise. After the deatb of the life tenant the deeds of the farm came into the possession of A's brother, the manager of the bank, for the purpose of paying the succession duty. As regards A's share therein the brother claimed to hold them for the banking company with the consent of A as security for the overdrawn account.\n\nThere was no memorandum of the deposit in the bank books, nor was the usual printed form of jeposit of title-deeds by way of security made use of with reference to the transaction. A subsequently became bankrupt. The Queen's Bench held that the banking company had no valid equitable mortgage on the bankrupt's share in the farm and that it could not hold the rents as against his trustee in bankruptcy.\n\nOn appeal, the Court of Appeal confirmed the said decision of the Queen's Bench.\n\nIt is contended that this decision negatives the doctrine of constructive deposit. for\n\n(I) (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 380.\n\nIHf\n\nK. /, Nat,,,,.\n\nY, s. Y. Mlll'lll'/\n\nlWJ7\n\nSubbo Rao I.\n\nI!. J. Nathan\n\nS. Y.\n\nMandy &ddy\n\nS11bba Rao 1.\n\nit is said that though the manager of the bank with the consent of A, held the title-deeds as security for the bank, the Court did not accept that fact for holding there was an equitable mortgage. In our view, this decision does not lay down any such proposition.\n\nThe main reason for the aforesaid conclusion of the Court of Appeal is found in the judgment of Lord Esher, M. R. at pp. 768-769 of '.he said Report.\n\nAfter considering the facts of the case, the Master of the Rolls proceeded to state:\n\n\"If this be so, there was nothing but the oral promise of the bankrupt to give the bank security, and that is not enough to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.\n\nIn order to take the case out of the statute it must be shown that there has been performance or part performance of the 0ral\n\npromise.\n\nBut nothing more was done with the deeds; they were left in precisely the same position. Nothing was done, except that the one brother said something, and the other said something in reply.\n\nWas this such a part performance of the original oral promise as will take the case out of. the statute?\"\n\nHis Lordship concluded:\n\n\"I take that proposition to amount to this that where there is a mere oral promise to do something, and nothing takes place afterwards but the speaking of more words by the parties-when nothing more is done in fact-there is no part performance which can exclude the application of the Statute of Frauds.\" The entire judgment was based upon the doctrine of part performance and the Court of Appeal held that the facts established did not constitute part performance of the oral agreement.\n\nThe doctrine of constructive deposit was neither raised nor touched upon in that case.\n\nNow let us consider some of the Indian decisions cited at the Bar. In Dayal Jairai v. Ji1•ra; Ratansi( 1 ), the plaintiff\n\n(I) (1857) I.LR. l Born. 237.\n\nnad advanced to the 1st defendant Rs.· 38,0C3.'-. and had agreed to advance Rs. 27,000/- more, the whole of Rs.\n\n65.000/- to be secured by a mortgage of the !st defendant'~ immovable property.\n\nThe I st defendant had deposited with the plaintiff the title-deeds of his immovable p:operty,\n\nfor the purpose of enabling him to get a mortgage deed prepared, and had agreed to execute such mortgage deed on payment to him by the plaintiff the balance of the amount of Rs. '65,00C/-.\n\nThe title-deeds were afterwards returned by the plaintiff to the !st defendant for the purpose of enabling him to clear up certain doubts as to his title to some of the premises comprised in the deeds, but the said deeds were neither subsequently returned by the 1st defendant, nor were others deposited in lieu• thereof.\n\nThe balance of the Rs. 65,000/- was not paid by the plaintiff to the 1st defenda'lt.\n\nThe Court held that there was an equitable mortgage of the said property to secure the sum of Rs. 38,000:'-. The fact tnat the title-deeds were deposited for the purpose of executing a mortgage deed, which did not fructify, did not in a!\"y way preclude the Court from holding on the facts of the case that a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was created in respect of the amount that had already been paid to the debtor.\n\nThe court relied upon the principle enunciated by earlier English decisions based upon the fact whether amounts were lent before or after the deposit of titldecds.\n\nIn /aitha Bhima v. Haji Abdul Vyad Cosman(') the facts were these: The plaintiff consented to lend Rs. 10,0001to the defendant. The latter deposited with him on April 2,\n\n1883, the title-deeds of a certain property.\n\nOn receiving them the plaintiff told the defendant that he would take them to his ~.ttorney, have a deed drawn and then advance the money. The defendant applied to the plaintilI for the money before the deed was prepared, but the plaintiff refused, saying he would not advance the money until he was satisfied by his attorney, and the deed had been prepared. At the time the deeds were handed over to the plaintiff, there was no existing debt due by the drfendant to the plaintiff.\n\nOn April 6, 1885, the mortgage-deed was executed, and on the .same day the money was advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant.\n\nThe mortgage-deed was not registered. The plaintiff filed a suit for a declaratio; i\n\n(I) (1886) l.L.R. 10 Brun. 634. llt-118 11.C. ..... 7.\n\nIr.. I. NatW\n\nY, S. V. Mfl11111\n\nRldd1\n\nS11bbe Rao /,\n\nthat he was entitled to an equitable mortgage upon the said\n\nproperty and for the sale thereof.\n\nThe court held ihat on the facts no equitable mortgage was created. From the\n\naloresa, id narration of facts it would be obvious that the plaintifi lent the money immediately before the execution of tbe document indicating thereby that it was paid under that document.\n\nFarran, J ., who delivered the judgment, relied upon the following passage from Seton on Decrees, p. 1131:\n\n\"H deeds be delivered to enaple a legal mortgage for\n\nsecuring an existing debt to be prepared, there js an equitable mortgage until the legal mortgae is completed; sec us is to secure a freh ioan yet to be made.\" 1bl'Jl th, c learned I udge cited the following passage from tbc iudgment in Keys v. Williams( 1):\n\nl'Certairily, if, before , the money was advanced. the\n\ndeeds had been deposited with a view to pre pa re a future mortgage, such a transaction could not be considered as an equitable mortgage by deposit; but it is otherwise where there is a present advance, and the deeds are deposited under\n\na promise to forbear suing, although they may be deposited only for the purpose of preparing\n\na mortgage deed.\n\nIn such case the deeds are given in as part of the security, ttnd become pledged from the very nature of the transa.:t:on.\" These two passages also indicate that the fact that title deeds were deposited for the purpose of preparing a futun mortgage is in itself not decisive of the question whether such a mortgage was effected or not.\n\nA Division Bench of the\n\nombay High Court in Behram Bashid Trani v. Sorabji Rustomji Elavia(') held that in that case there wa~ no evide.nce whatever of intention to connect the deposit of\n\ntitl~-d;.cts with the debt.\n\nThe plaintiff therein deposited with the defendant in Bombay title-deeds of his property tituate at Nasik and borrowed a sum from the defendant. Jfe also executed a document but that was held to be f#admissible for w, ant of registration. There was no other\n\n(I) (1838) SI R.V. Rep. 339. '.2) (191•) I.LR. 38 Born. 372, 37•.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURf REPOHTS 739\n\nevidence to si10w under what circumstances the documents lHt were deposited.\n\nBeaman, J ., made the following observa-\n\n1:. 1. NM,,_ tions:\n\n\"The doctrine thus created, amounted at that time to very much what the Jaw now is, as I have just expressed it, although the learned Chancellor, I think, Jent strongly to the supposed leg~!\n\npresumption arising from the fact of indebtedness\\ and the contemporaneous or subsequent deposit of title-deeds.\n\nThen for the better pri . of a century, the Courts in England virtually aJopted this presumption as a presumption of law and the need of proving intention almost disappeared. Latterly, however, the legal doctrine i'l England veered in the opposite direction and the Courts began to insist more and more trong\n\nIy upon the proof of intention as a question of fact, and that has been embodied in our own statute Jaw and that is the law we have to administer.\" This decision only neg?tives the presumption of law, but does not exclude the presumption of fact of a mortgage arising under certain circum'; tances from the very deposit of. titledeeds.\n\nAn elabor3te discussion of the subject is found in V.£.R.M.A.R. Chcflyar Firm v. Ma Joo Teen('). The main question decided i'l that case was, what did the terms\n\n\"documents of title\" and \"title-deeds\" denote?\n\nThe Coul1 held that they denoted such a document or documertts as show a prima facie or apparent title in the depositor to tho\n\nproperty or to some interest therein.\n\nBut what is relevant for the present purpose is that the learned Chief Justice, who spoke for the Co•irt, after considering the leading judgments on the subject, observed:\n\n\"If the form of the documents of tit!~ that h, ave !J~FD\n\ndelivered to the creditor is such that froqi Ui• deposit of such documents alone e Court would he entitled to conclude that the documc:iiis were deposited with the intentio~ . of creating 'a security for the rpayment of the del:it, prima ----------\n\n(1) (1933) 1.L.ll.. 11 Rang. 239, 253.\n\nv . .s . ...\n\nIll~ lf.1d/Jy\n\n.Srdlk llM I.\n\nIHI ·- £ J. N•l'/wm\n\nY. & r. ,.,.,,,,,\n\nRtd\"1\n\nhbbo, IfMI.\n\nfacie a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds would be proved; although, of course, such an infernce would not be irrebuttable, an:i would not ·be drawn if the weight of the evidence as a whole told against it.\"\n\nThe learned Chief Justice accepted the principle that if title-deeds, as defined by him, were deposited and the money was lent, prima facie an inference of a mortgage could be ·\n\ndrawn, though such an inference could be displaced by other evidence. It is not necessary to pursue the matter further.\n\nThe foregoing discussion may be summarized thus: Under the Transfer of Property Act a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is one of the forms of mortgages whereunder there, is a transfer of interest in spocific immovable property\n\ntot, the purpos~ of securing payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of 1oan.\n\nTherefor\", such a mortgae of property takes effect against a mcmgage deed subsequently executed and registered in respect of the same property. The three requisites for such a mortgage are, (i) debt,\n\n(ii) deposit of title-deeds; and (iii) an intention that the deeds 1hall be security for the debt. Whether there is an intention that the deeds shall be security for the debt is a quest ion of fact in each case. The said fact will have to be decided just like any other fact on presumptions and on oral, docu mentary or circumstantial evidence. There is no presumption of law that the mere deposit of title-deeds constitutes a mortgage, for no such presumption has been laid down either in the Evidence Act or in the Transfer of property Act. But a court may presume under s. 114 of the Evidence Act that under certain circumstances a loan and a deposit of. titledeeds constitute a mortgage. But that is really an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other fact or facts.\n\nNor the fact that at the time the title deeds were deposited there was an intention to execute a mortgage deed in itself negatives. or is inconsistent with. the . iriterition to create a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds to be in force till the mortgage deed was executed. The decl 'aion of Enj!lih courts making a ditinction between the debt\n\npreeeding the depqi:it and that following it can at best l.e only a gurtfe: ~,11t the said distinction itself cannot be coo-\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT Rf.PORTS 741\n\nsidered to Ile a rule of law for application under all circumstances.\n\nPhysical delivery of documents by the debtor to the creditor is not the only mode of deposit. There may be a constructive deposit.\n\nA court will have to ascertain in each case whether in substance there is a delivery of titledeeds by the debtor to the creditor. If the creditor YLaS\n\na !ready in possession of the title-deeds, it would be hypertechnical to insist upon the formality of the creditor delivering the title-deeds to the debtor and the debtor re-delivering them to the creditor. What would be necessary in those circumstances is whether the parties agreed to treat the documents in the possession of the creditor or his. agent as delivery to him for the purpose of the transaction.\n\nWith this background we shall now proceed to consider the questions that arise for consideration on the facts of tht present case.\n\nThe first question is whether there was a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds of the 8-Schedule properties on May\n\nJO, 1947. To put it in other words, whether on that date there was a loan and whether the first defendant delivered to the appellant the documents of title of 8-Schedule properties with the intent to create a security thereon.\n\nLearned Subordinate Judge and. on appeal, the Higlll Court. held on . the evidence that there was no such deposit of title-deeds with the requisite intention on May 10, 1947.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent pressed on us to follow the usual practice of this Court of not interfering with concurrent findings of fact. But the question whether on facts found a transaction is a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds ii a mixed question of fact and law .. That apart, both the courll in coming to the conclusion which they did missed the importance of the impact of the terms of Ex. A-19 on the question raised. We, therefore, propose to consider the evidence on the said question afresh, along with Ex. A-19.\n\nIn para S of the plaint, after giving the particulars of the promissory notes executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff, it is stated:\n\n\"On 10th May 1947, the first defendant deposited\n\nwith the plaintiff at Madras other title deeds aiid\n\n\"\"' J[. /. N.i,_ ... s. \"· JI.,.,,, IWl1.\n\nSuhllMt.\n\nIlfil\n\nI(. J. Natlw.11\n\nS. Y Marut-, Reddy\n\nSubbll Raa J,\n\nSHPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n12a;:icrs relating to his half-share in items speci\n\nlied in 'B' schedule hereunder with intent to create a security over the same in respect of advances made and to be made by the plaintiff.\n\nThe first defendant has further executed a memorandum of agreement, dated 5th July 194 7, in which the equitable martgage thus created and the amount borrowed by him till then were acknowledged and he has undertaken to repay the said sum of Rs. 16,500 with interest at 6 per cent. per annum and to obtain a return of the title deeds and documents deposited by him with the plaintiff.\n\nThis memorandum of agreement has been duly registered and the same iS herewith produced. The plaintiff prays that its contents may be read as part and parcel of this plaint.\"\n\nThere is, thereto1e, a clear avennent in the plaint that an equitable mortgage was created on May 10, 1947. and that\n\nwas acknowledged by the agreement dated July 5, 1947. The 1st defendant did not file any written-statement denying the said allegations.\n\nThe 3rd defendant, the only contesting defendant, filed a written-statement wherein he put the plaintiff to strict proof of the fact that the sums claimed in the plaint were due to him from the !st defendant and of the fact that the first defendant effected a mortgage in his favour by deposit of title-deeds.\n\nBefore we consider the oral ed <Jenee, we shall orieny notice the documentary evidence in the case.\n\nExhiliit Al dated January 25, 1947, Ex. A-9 dated February 13, 194'1, Ex. A-12 dated March 2. 1947, Ex. A-14 dated Apn17,1947, Ex. A-15 dated April 13, 1947, Ex. A\n\n17 dated May 10, 1947, and Ex. A-18 dated July 4, 194 7 are the promissory notes executed by the !st defendant in favour of the plaintiff.\n\nThe total of the amounts covered by the said promissory notes is Rs. 16.500/-. It is not disputed that the promissory notes were gaiume and that the said amounts were lent by the plalnti1r to the !st defendant on the dates the promissory notes bear. On 1anuary 26, 1947. i.e., a day\n\na'f'a:r the ftrst protniSIO'ly nore wu executed, a list of titledeedl of the pn)(Jeltle! bi:iollging to the !st defendant in\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOI<TS\n\nTanjore was given to the plaintiff as collateral security and.\n\nby way of equitable mortgage for the loan 0£ Rs. 1,500 borrowed under Ex. A-1. On April 7, 1947, the 1st defendant executed an unregistered agreement in favour of the plaintiff whereunder, as the plaintiff agreed to lend to the 1st defendant a sum of Rs. 15,000/- to discharge his earlier indebtedness and also his indebtedness to the Kumbakonam Bank and to enable him to do business, the 1st dP.fendant agreed to execute a first mortgage of the Tanjore propertie:t as well as of the properties mortgaged to the Kumbakonam Bank.\n\nHe also undertook to bring all the title-deeds from the Kumbakonam Bank and hand them over to the plaintill for preparing the mortgage deed.\n\nThis agreemeut shows that the I st defendant was willing to execute a mortgage deed of his properties to the plaintiff and with that object under took to bring the title-deeds and hand tl1em over to the plaintiff for preparing the mortgage deed. Pursuant to this\n\nagreement, the plaintiff on the same d'a}' advanced to the 1st defendant a sum of Rs. 3,000/- under a promissory note of the same date. On April 13, 1947, the plaintiff lent an other sum of Rs. 3,000 /- under a promissory note tv the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant did not bring the title-deeds, but by a letter dated April 27, 1947, (Ex. B-2), he authorised the Managing Director of the Kumbakonam Bank to hand over the title-deeds and the mortgage deed duly discharged to the plaintiff or his representative on his paying the amount due by him to the Bank.\n\nOn May 5, 1947, .the pta!ntilr wrote a letter, Ex. B-1, to the Kumbakonam J3ank informing it that one S. Narayana Ayyar of Madras would diseharge.\n\nthe mortgage amount due to the Bank from tbe 1st defendant and authorizing the Bank to deliver to th'e said Narayana Ayyar the cancelled mortgage deed ahd the rela. tive title-deeds. The said Narayana Ayyar took tlie lefter.\n\nEx. B-1, to the Bank, paid the amount due to it from tho\n\n1st defendant and took the title-deeds on behalf of the 1st defendant and sent them on to the plaintiff at Madras by registered post.\n\nOn May 10, 1947, the 1st defendant executed another promissory note, Ex. A-17, for a sum of Rs. 7, I 00 /- in favour of the plaintiff in regard to the amount. paid by Narayana Ayyar to the Bank. On July 4, 19lJt, tiio\n\n1st defendant executed another promissory ndte, EJI. A-18, in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 400. Tlie total\n\n196'\n\nX. /. Hallum\n\n•• s. Y. Mrruf1\n\nRnliy\n\nSubba RH I..\n\nn'lff•.·\n\n/l. J. Nathan\n\n\"' I. J'. Maruty\n\n. /Wld7 ...... Rao I.\n\nof the amounts advanced up to that date by tbe plaintiff to\n\nthe !st defendant was Rs. lo.500/-. Ex. A-19 dated July S, l 947, is a registered memorandum of agreement executed between the p1aintiff and the !st defendant. Though it was executed on July S, 1947, it was presented for registration on October 31, 1947 and was eventually registered on June 22, 1948. It is not disputCd that the said agreement was executed on July 5, 1947.\n\nUnder s. 47 of. the Registration Act the said document would have legal effect from the date of execution i.e., July 5, 1947. Under that document the !st defendant, after acknowledging that between January 25, 1947, and July 4, 1947, he had received from the plaintilf a sum of Rs. 16, SOO I under various promissory notes executed in favour of the plaintiff, proceeded to state:\n\n\"The borrower hereby acknowledges having deposited with the lender at Madras on 25th January 1947 the title deeds relating to the borrower's undivided half share in items 17 to 2C mentioned in the B schedule hereunder, and also having deposited with the lender on IOth May 1947 the title-deeds and other papers rehting to th•\n\nborrower's undivided half share in items I to 16 mentioned in B schedule hereunder with interest to create a security over the deposit of title deeds.\" This acknowledgment is couched in clear and unambiguous terms. The !st defendant acknowledges in express terms that a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was effected on May 10,\n\n1947. If there was no oral evidence adduced i,, this r•e. the said documentary evidence prima facie would establish that the Isl defendant borrowed a sum of Rs .. 16.5001from time to time from the p:aintiff and effeoted a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds on May IO. 1947, as security for the repayment of the said amount Exhibit A-19 contains a clear admission by the 1st defendant that he effected a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds in favour of the plaintiff. As tha mortgage deed in favour of the 3rd defendant was executed subsequent to Ex. A-19, he is bound by that admission, un Jess there is sufficient evidence on the record to explain away the said admission. The I st defendant, who .could e'1Cpla1n the circWD$tanccs under which Ex. A-19 was executed was\n\n-0 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RFPORTS 745\n\nnot examined as a witness in this case.\n\nBut it is said that the evidence of P.Ws 1, 2 and 3 displaces the evidentiary value of the recitals of the said document. P.W. I is the {llaintiff. He says in his examination-in-chief:\n\n\"On 10th May 1947 defendant I and Narayana Ayyar met my lawyer at Madras and I was sent for.\n\nExhibit A-17 is the pro-note executed for Rs. 7,100/- for the payment made to the bank.\n\nDefendant 1 then personally hanc\\ed over the documents to me by way of deposit of titledeeds as security, for the advance made and to be made.\n\nDefendant I did not execute any mortgage. In July 1947, defendant I asked for Rs. 400 /- to buy stamps for the mortgage.\n\nI paid Rs. 400 /- under Exhibit A-18.\n\nOn 5th July 1947 the memorandum, Exhibit A-19, wa1\n\nexecuted in my lawyer's house.\n\nMy lawyer attested the document as well as Narayana Ayyar. They saw defendant l sign the document.\" If this evidence is accepted, the plaintiff's case will be esta't>-\n\nllshed to the hilt. But in the cross-examination he deposed:\n\n\"On 5th July 1947, the agreement about executing a simple mortgage was changed into one of equit able mortgage.\n\nDefendant I suggested it und I was advised to accept and I accepted.\" Reliance is placed upon this statement to show that the Idea cf effecting an equitable mortgage dawned on the parties\n\nonly on July 5, 1947, and. therefore. the case that suet•. a mortgage was effected on May 10. 1947, must be untrue.\n\nWe do not see any inconsistency between the statement made by the plaintiff in the examination-in-chief and that made in the cross-examination.\n\nWhat he stated in the cross-exami nation is that though it was agreed earlier that a formal ptortgage deed should be executed, on July 5, 1947, the parties, for one reason or other. were content to have a deed of equitable mortgage. It is too much to expect this vritness to bear in mind the subtle distinction between the\n\neecution of an equitable mortgage on July 5. 1947. and the acknowledgment of an eauitable mortim\"e that had alrendy been effected. In this statement he emphasized more on !M\n\n1961'\n\nK. /. Nat,,,,.\n\nS. Y. M\"\"\"1\n\nRedd1 - Subb• RAo /,\n\nK. J. Nathan v. s. V.\n\nA1aruty RedJy\n\nS;, bba Rao I.\n\ndocument than on the contents of the document. So underswod, this evidence does not run counter to the express recitJ!s fot•nd in Ex. A-19. There is also nothing unusual that en the advice of the advocate the formalities of actual deli- \\ery were comp!ied with in the presence of the advocate.\n\nBut one need not scrutinize the version of this witness meti- Clllously in that regard, if in law a constructive delivery would be as good as a physical delivery. We, therefore, donot see in the ev:dence of P. W. I anything to discountenance tile admission made by the !st defendant in Ex. A 19.\n\nP.W. 2, the advocate, also says in his evidence that he gave the title-deeds to the !st defendant and asked him tohand t'lem over to P.W. l and to state that these and dqcuments already deposited would be security for the loans advanced till that date. There would be r:o:h;:,:; unusual if an advocate, who knew the technicalities of a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, adv:sed his client to conform to the formalities.\n\nEven if the partie; accepted constructive delivery. the evidence given by th:s witness is more an embellishment than a conscious effort to depart from the truth. A> to what happened on July 4, 1947, this witness says that on that date the !st defendant and Narayana Ayyar came to him and 1uggested that the memorandum may be registered instead of\n\neecuting a simple mortgage asthat would be cheaper.\n\nThere is nothing unsual in this conduct of the parties either.\n\nIf there was a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds at an earlier stage, even though there was at that time an agreemerit to execute a formal document later on, there would be nothing out of the way in the parties for their own reasons giving up the idea of executing a formal document and being satisfied with a memorandum acknowledging the earlier form of security.\n\nIn the cross-examination this witness stated that till July 4, 1947, the idea was only to make a simple mortgage over the half-share covered by all the title-deeds given to P.W. 1.· This statement only means that till that date the parties had no idea of executing a document acknowledging the earlier mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, for they want\n\nd a formal document. This answer is in no way inconsistent with the staterr:ent of the advocate at the earlier sta11:e that thl'Fe was a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds on May 10,\n\n1947. So too, Naraya Ayyar, as P.W. 3, supports the evi-\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RF~PORTS 747\n\ndence of P.Ws. 1 and 2.\n\nHe too in his cross-examination savs that it was only on July 4, 1947, the idea of executing an equitable mortgage was suggested by the !st defendant ar.d\n\nthat on May 10, 194 7, he did not suggest to the !st defendant to execute 2ny document.\n\nHere igain, his stateli'Cnt in the cross-examination would not be in:onsistent with that made by him in the examination-in-chief. if the former statcme!'t\n\nwas understood to rc'.ate to Ex. A-19.\n\nThis witness o'dy meant to say that the idea of executing Ex. A-19 c; awned on !ht parties only on July 4, 1947.\n\nTh~ zvidencc C1f iltc; e three witnesses is consistent with the admission mde hy the first defendant in Ex. A-19.\n\nThe videntiary value of the recitals in Ex. A-19 is in no way displaced by the evidence of the said witnesses: indeed, it supp:irts the recitals therein in toto. In the circumstances, we hold that on Mav 10, 194 7, the !st defendant deposited the title-deeds with the plaintiff physically as se:urity for the amounts advanced by the plaintiff •o the I st defendant up to that date. Even if the evidence of the witnesses as reg~.rds the handing over of the dcuments\n\nphysically by the !st defen; lant to the plaintiff was an embellhhment of what took place on that date and that the:e was , only constructive del'very, we think that such delivery satis:\n\ntied the condition laid down by s. 58f) of the Transfer of {'ropcrty Act.\n\nEven so, it is contended by learned counsel for the respondent that the delivery of the title-deeds was to the appellant's representative, Narayam Ayyar, at Kumbakonam and. therefore, the mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, even if true, must be deemed to have been effected at Kumbakonam and that u!lder the law such a mortgage could not be effected at Ku1'!bakonam as it was not one of the places mentioned in s. 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act. But Narayana Ayyar, as P.W. 3, stated in his evidence that he had authority to take the title-deeds on behalf of the I st defendant and that, aftet having taken delivery of them on his behalf, he sent them .to the plaintiff at Madras by registered post.\n\nBut whether Narayana Ayyar received the title-deeds from the Bank a~ agent of the 1st defendant or as that of the plaintiff, it would not affect the question to be decided in the present case.\n\nWe shall assume that Narayana Ayyar was e agent of the p:aintilf. But mere delivery of title-deeds without the\n\n19M\n\nK. J. Nathan\n\nS. V. faruf1 Reddy\n\n'IC. J. Nathan\n\nY. 1/. Y. Marui,\n\nR•ddy\n\nSllbba Rao I.\n\nintention to create a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds would not constitute such a mongage. On May 5,)947, when the title-deeds were received by the plaintif{ through his agent, Narayana Ayyar, at Kumbakonam, they were received only for the purpose of pre par :ng the mortgage deed. The p:ain tiff had the physical possession of the title-deeds at Madras on May 10, 1947. On that date the possession of the title deeds by the plaintiff was as agent of the !st defendant. He\n\nwa~ not holding the said documents, iu his own right on the basis of his title or interest therein.\n\nThe agent's possession was the possession of the 1st defendant, the principal. On May 10, 1947, the creditor and the debtor, i.e., the. plaintiff and the !st defendant, met in the house of P.W. 2 and the 1st defendant agreed to deposit the said title-deeds already in the physical possession of the plaintiff as his agent in order to hold them thereafter as security for the moneys advanced.\n\nFrom May 10, 194 7, the plaintiff ceased to hold the title\n\ndeeds as agent of the I st defendant but held them only as a mortgagee. If the plaintiff physically handed over the title-deeds to , the !st defendant and the 1st defendant immediately handed over the same to the plaintiff with intentio1 to mortgage them, it is conceded that a valid mortgage was created.\n\nTo insist upon such a formality is to ignore the substance for the form.\n\nWhen the:principal tells the agent \"from today you hold my title-deeds as security\", in substance there is a physical delivery. For convenience of reference such a delivery can be described as constructive delivery of title-deeds. The law recognizes such a constructive delivery. we, therefore, hold that, even on the assumption that the form of physical delivery had not been gone through- though we hold that it was so effected on May 10, 194 7there was constructive delivery of the title-deeds coupled with the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title -deeds.\n\nThe last argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that even if there was no mortgage by deposit of title deeds on May 10, 1947, under Ex. A-19 such a morteaee v111 created at any rate from July 5, 1947. It is true-that rhe document in express terms says that the documents of title were deposited on May IO, 1947, with intention to rreate a \"1Ilortgage by deposit of title-deeds.\n\nAssuming it was not so\n\ndone on that date, can such an intention be inferred from the document as on July 5, 194 7 ? Admittedly on July 5,\n\n1947, the title-deeds were in the possession of the plaintiff.\n\nIf on that date the 1st defendant had expressed his intention that from that date he would consider the title-deeds as secu- . r!ly for the loans already advanced to him. all the necessary\n\ncor.dit:o:is of a mortgage by d.posit of title-deeds would be present, name:y, (i) debt, (ii) constructive delivery, and (iii) intention.\n\nThe fact that he had such an intention from an\n\nerlier date could not make any difference in kw, ~.s the intention expressed was a continu:ng one. 0!1 J::ly 5, 1947, according to the 1st defendant, the mortgage by depo5it of tit'c-deeds was in existence and, therefore, on that date the said three necessary ingred; ents of a mortgage by dep0sit of title-deeds were present.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that even if there was no mortgage by dep:isit of title-deeds on }.fay 10, 1947, it was effected '01) July 5, 1947.\n\nIf the mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was effected on May 10, 1947, or on. July 5, i947, the legal p0sit1on 'wo11ld be the same, as the mortgage deed in favour of the 3rd defendant was executed only on October 10, 1947.\n\nTho~1gh Ex.\n\nA-19 was registered on June 22, 1948, under s. 47 of the Registration Act the agreement would take effect from July s. 1947.\n\nIt is not disputed that in the partition that was effected between the 1st defendant and his brother the properties specified in 'C' schedule were allotted to the share of the I st defendant. If so, the plaintiff would be entitled to have a mortgage decree in respect of the said propert:es.\n\nIn the result there will be a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff for the recovery of the sum of Rs. 20,434-15-0 with interest at 6 per cent. per annum thereon till the said amount is paid.\n\nThe period of redemption will be three months from today and in default the 'C' schedule properties will be sold for the realization of the same. Liberty is\n\nreserved to the plaintiff to aoply for persona! decree against the 1st defendant .in case there is any deficiency after the ltypotheca has been sold.\n\nThe decree of the Subordinate Judge and of the High Court are set aside and there will be\n\n11 decree in the said terms.\n\nThe 1st and 3rd defendants wilt pay the costs of the plaintiff throughout.\n\nApptal allowed ..\n\nK. /. Natluilt\n\nS. Y.\n\nMandJ Reddy\n\nSubba RQ,, A", "total_entities": 109, "entities": [{"text": "K. J. NATHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. J. NATHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. V. MARUTY REDDY AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. V. MARUTY REDDY AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "10th May, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 755, "end_char": 769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the 10th May, 1947, the 1st defendant borrowed from the plaintiff from time to time Rs."}}, {"text": "Sth July, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 976, "end_char": 990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the plaintiff further was that the 1st defendant executed a memorandum of agreement, dated Sth July, 1947, in which the equitable mortgage thus created and the amount borrowed by him till then were acknowledged and he had undertaken to repay the said sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "May JO, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court held that the 1st defendant had no intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds on May JO, 1947."}}, {"text": "S8(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2601, "end_char": 2606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2614, "end_char": 2638, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. J. Nathan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2967, "end_char": 2979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1961 -·- K. J. Nathan\n\nS. Y. Maruty\n\nlWdy\n\nsaid fact will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence.", "canonical_name": "K. J. NATHAN"}}, {"text": "S. Y. Maruty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1961 -·- K. J. Nathan\n\nS. Y. Maruty\n\nlWdy\n\nsaid fact will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence.", "canonical_name": "S. Y Marut-, Reddy"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3238, "end_char": 3262, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3295, "end_char": 3306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th July, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor the fact that at the time the title deeds were deposited there was an intention to execute a mortgage deed in itself negatives, or is inconsistent with, the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds to be in force till the mortgage deed was executed, On the facts of this case the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be inferred from the document dated 5th July, 1947 which was subsequently registered and in which the deposit of title deeds on May 10."}}, {"text": "May 10. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4022, "end_char": 4034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor the fact that at the time the title deeds were deposited there was an intention to execute a mortgage deed in itself negatives, or is inconsistent with, the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds to be in force till the mortgage deed was executed, On the facts of this case the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be inferred from the document dated 5th July, 1947 which was subsequently registered and in which the deposit of title deeds on May 10."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5342, "end_char": 5348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case the plaintiff-the mortgagee-had the physical possession of the title deeds at Madras on f\\..fay 10, 1947."}}, {"text": "fay 10, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5356, "end_char": 5368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case the plaintiff-the mortgagee-had the physical possession of the title deeds at Madras on f\\..fay 10, 1947."}}, {"text": "May 10, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5478, "end_char": 5490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the facts of this case, though the form of physical delivery of titledecds bad not been gone through, on May 10, 1947, there was constructive delivery of the title deeds coupled with the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5685, "end_char": 5709, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. J. Natlulll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6216, "end_char": 6230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. J. Natlulll ...\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated January 31, >."}}, {"text": "R. Mamamurthi Aiyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ReddJ\n\nR. Mamamurthi Aiyar, T. S. Rangarajan and R. Gopala- .krishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T. S. Rangarajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6387, "end_char": 6403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ReddJ\n\nR. Mamamurthi Aiyar, T. S. Rangarajan and R. Gopala- .krishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Gopala-", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6408, "end_char": 6418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ReddJ\n\nR. Mamamurthi Aiyar, T. S. Rangarajan and R. Gopala- .krishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. S. Venkataraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6450, "end_char": 6468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Venkataraman, M. R. Krishna Pillai and M. S. K.\n\nIyengar, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. R. Krishna Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6470, "end_char": 6490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Venkataraman, M. R. Krishna Pillai and M. S. K.\n\nIyengar, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. S. K.\n\nIyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6495, "end_char": 6512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Venkataraman, M. R. Krishna Pillai and M. S. K.\n\nIyengar, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Su BB A RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6605, "end_char": 6616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment ofthe Coutt was delivered by-\n\nSu BB A RAO, J .-This appeal on a certificate iSsued by Subba Rao J. the High Court of Judicature at Madras is preferred against the judgment and decree of the said High Court modifying those of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, in a suit filed by the appellant to enforce a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.", "canonical_name": "Su BB A RAO"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6661, "end_char": 6670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment ofthe Coutt was delivered by-\n\nSu BB A RAO, J .-This appeal on a certificate iSsued by Subba Rao J. the High Court of Judicature at Madras is preferred against the judgment and decree of the said High Court modifying those of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, in a suit filed by the appellant to enforce a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.", "canonical_name": "Su BB A RAO"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6678, "end_char": 6712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment ofthe Coutt was delivered by-\n\nSu BB A RAO, J .-This appeal on a certificate iSsued by Subba Rao J. the High Court of Judicature at Madras is preferred against the judgment and decree of the said High Court modifying those of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, in a suit filed by the appellant to enforce a mortgage by deposit of title deeds."}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7259, "end_char": 7298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45 of 1951 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, for enforcing the said mortgage against the said properties."}}, {"text": "IUN Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8263, "end_char": 8270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. Mona,\n\nR6\"'1 IUN Rao I.\n\nAs the only contesting party before us is the 3rd defendant (3rd respondent herein), it is not necessary to notice the defences raised by defendants other than the 3rd defendant."}}, {"text": "October 10, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8575, "end_char": 8591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000/- on October 10, 1947 and that, being a bona fide purchaser for value, he had priority over the plaintiff's security, even if it were true."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9580, "end_char": 9592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "per annum from July 5, 1947, against the 1st defendant personally."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9874, "end_char": 9891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, which heard the appeal and the crossobjeotions, held that the 1st defendant did not effect a mortgage by deposit of title deeds on May 10, 1947, in favour of the plaintiff for the entire suit claim, but that he effected such a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff on Jan•\n\nuary 25, 1947, for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Jan•\n\nuary 25, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10159, "end_char": 10178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, which heard the appeal and the crossobjeotions, held that the 1st defendant did not effect a mortgage by deposit of title deeds on May 10, 1947, in favour of the plaintiff for the entire suit claim, but that he effected such a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff on Jan•\n\nuary 25, 1947, for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kumbakonam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12645, "end_char": 12655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That apart, it is argued that as a mortgage by deposit of title deeds could only be effected at Madras and that, as one of the important ingredients of such a mortgage is that the delivery of the said title deeds to the creditor should have been given at Madras, no such mortgage could have been effected in law in the present case, as the delivery of the title deeds was given by the bank to the representative of the plaintiff at Kumbakonam."}}, {"text": "K. J. Naa-", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12843, "end_char": 12853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. J. Naa-.", "canonical_name": "K. J. NATHAN"}}, {"text": "Y. Marul1-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12862, "end_char": 12872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. Marul1-\n\nRedd7\n\nSubba R• I.\n\n, g. J. NatloJJn\n\n'$."}}, {"text": "Subba", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12881, "end_char": 12886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. Marul1-\n\nRedd7\n\nSubba R• I.\n\n, g. J. NatloJJn\n\n'$.", "canonical_name": "Su BB A RAO"}}, {"text": "Section 58(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12948, "end_char": 12961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12969, "end_char": 12993, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13116, "end_char": 13124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.\n\nMaruty Reddy\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSection 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act defines a mortgage by deposit of title deeds thus: ·\n\n\"Where a person in any of the following towns, namely, the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay ....................... delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immovable property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.\""}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13137, "end_char": 13143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.\n\nMaruty Reddy\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSection 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act defines a mortgage by deposit of title deeds thus: ·\n\n\"Where a person in any of the following towns, namely, the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay ....................... delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immovable property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.\""}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13782, "end_char": 13806, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13810, "end_char": 13815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though such a mortgage is often described as an equitable mortgage, there is an essential distinction betwee.n an equitable mortgage as understood in English law and th~ mortgage by deposit of title deeds recognised under the Transfer of Property Act in India."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13821, "end_char": 13828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England an equitable mortgage can be created either, (I) by actual deposit of title-deeds, in which case parol evidence is admissihie to show the meaning of the deposit and the extent of the security created, or (2) if there be no deposit of tit!edeeds, then by a memorandum in writing, pu11porting to create a security' for money advanced: see White and Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity, 9th edition, Vol."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14352, "end_char": 14376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14839, "end_char": 14844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14852, "end_char": 14868, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14973, "end_char": 14983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14991, "end_char": 15021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "K. J. Nathan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17087, "end_char": 17099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. J. Nathan ....\n\nS. Y.\n\nMOJ'ldT Reddy\n\nSubba Raa I.\n\nIC. /.", "canonical_name": "K. J. NATHAN"}}, {"text": "Subba Raa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17128, "end_char": 17137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. J. Nathan ....\n\nS. Y.\n\nMOJ'ldT Reddy\n\nSubba Raa I.\n\nIC. /.", "canonical_name": "Su BB A RAO"}}, {"text": "Subbe Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17182, "end_char": 17191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nat/tan\n\nv. s. Y. Maruty\n\nR1ddy\n\nSubbe Rao I.\n\nThese passages indicate that an intention to create a mortgage deed in the future is not inconsistent with the intention to create in presenting a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds.", "canonical_name": "Su BB A RAO"}}, {"text": "Whitbread", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17957, "end_char": 17966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Whitbread, Ex Parte(') throws some light on the legal requirements of delivery of title-deeds."}}, {"text": "Beetham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20316, "end_char": 20323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In In re Beetham, Ex Parte Broderick(') the facts were-A, being indebted to a banking company in respect of an overdrawn account, wrote to the directors promising to give them, when required, security over his reversionary interest in one-fifth share of a farm, to come into posses-\n\n1ion on the death of the life tenant; but no formal security was ever executed in accordance with this promise."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21719, "end_char": 21722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22100, "end_char": 22105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main reason for the aforesaid conclusion of the Court of Appeal is found in the judgment of Lord Esher, M. R. at pp."}}, {"text": "nad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23583, "end_char": 23586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nad advanced to the 1st defendant Rs.·"}}, {"text": "April 2,\n\n1883", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25221, "end_char": 25235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter deposited with him on April 2,\n\n1883, the title-deeds of a certain property."}}, {"text": "April 6, 1885", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25763, "end_char": 25776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 6, 1885, the mortgage-deed was executed, and on the .same day the money was advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26072, "end_char": 26075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Farran", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26454, "end_char": 26460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Farran, J .,"}}, {"text": "Seton", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26534, "end_char": 26539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who delivered the judgment, relied upon the following passage from Seton on Decrees, p. 1131:\n\n\"H deeds be delivered to enaple a legal mortgage for\n\nsecuring an existing debt to be prepared, there js an equitable mortgage until the legal mortgae is completed; sec us is to secure a freh ioan yet to be made.\""}}, {"text": "Nasik", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27938, "end_char": 27943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff therein deposited with the defendant in Bombay title-deeds of his property tituate at Nasik and borrowed a sum from the defendant."}}, {"text": "Beaman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28279, "end_char": 28285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beaman, J .,"}}, {"text": "NM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28328, "end_char": 28330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NM,,_ tions:\n\n\"The doctrine thus created, amounted at that time to very much what the Jaw now is, as I have just expressed it, although the learned Chancellor, I think, Jent strongly to the supposed leg~!"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30866, "end_char": 30890, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31845, "end_char": 31869, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31901, "end_char": 31907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th May 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34748, "end_char": 34761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para S of the plaint, after giving the particulars of the promissory notes executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff, it is stated:\n\n\"On 10th May 1947, the first defendant deposited\n\nwith the plaintiff at Madras other title deeds aiid\n\n\"\"' J[. /."}}, {"text": "S. Y Marut-, Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34924, "end_char": 34942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Natlw.11\n\nS. Y Marut-, Reddy\n\nSubbll Raa J,\n\nSHPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n12a;:icrs relating to his half-share in items speci\n\nlied in 'B' schedule hereunder with intent to create a security over the same in respect of advances made and to be made by the plaintiff.", "canonical_name": "S. Y Marut-, Reddy"}}, {"text": "Subbll Raa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34944, "end_char": 34954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Natlw.11\n\nS. Y Marut-, Reddy\n\nSubbll Raa J,\n\nSHPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n12a;:icrs relating to his half-share in items speci\n\nlied in 'B' schedule hereunder with intent to create a security over the same in respect of advances made and to be made by the plaintiff.", "canonical_name": "Su BB A RAO"}}, {"text": "5th July 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35249, "end_char": 35263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first defendant has further executed a memorandum of agreement, dated 5th July 194 7, in which the equitable martgage thus created and the amount borrowed by him till then were acknowledged and he has undertaken to repay the said sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "July 4, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36611, "end_char": 36624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-18 dated July 4, 194 7 are the promissory notes executed by the !"}}, {"text": "April 7, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37297, "end_char": 37310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 7, 1947, the 1st defendant executed an unregistered agreement in favour of the plaintiff whereunder, as the plaintiff agreed to lend to the 1st defendant a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kumbakonam Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37550, "end_char": 37565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000/- to discharge his earlier indebtedness and also his indebtedness to the Kumbakonam Bank and to enable him to do business, the 1st dP.fendant agreed to execute a first mortgage of the Tanjore propertie:t as well as of the properties mortgaged to the Kumbakonam Bank."}}, {"text": "April 13, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38290, "end_char": 38304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 13, 1947, the plaintiff lent an other sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38471, "end_char": 38485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 1st defendant did not bring the title-deeds, but by a letter dated April 27, 1947, (Ex."}}, {"text": "May 5, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38716, "end_char": 38727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 5, 1947, .the pta!ntilr wrote a letter, Ex."}}, {"text": "Kumbakonam J3ank", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38776, "end_char": 38792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-1, to the Kumbakonam J3ank informing it that one S. Narayana Ayyar of Madras would diseharge."}}, {"text": "S. Narayana Ayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38815, "end_char": 38832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B-1, to the Kumbakonam J3ank informing it that one S. Narayana Ayyar of Madras would diseharge."}}, {"text": "Narayana Ayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39447, "end_char": 39461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "paid by Narayana Ayyar to the Bank."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40041, "end_char": 40057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though it was executed on July S, 1947, it was presented for registration on October 31, 1947 and was eventually registered on June 22, 1948."}}, {"text": "June 22, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40091, "end_char": 40104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though it was executed on July S, 1947, it was presented for registration on October 31, 1947 and was eventually registered on June 22, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40186, "end_char": 40191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40200, "end_char": 40216, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 25, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40378, "end_char": 40394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st defendant, after acknowledging that between January 25, 1947, and July 4, 1947, he had received from the plaintilf a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "July 4, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40400, "end_char": 40412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st defendant, after acknowledging that between January 25, 1947, and July 4, 1947, he had received from the plaintilf a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "May 10,\n\n1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41209, "end_char": 41222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st defendant acknowledges in express terms that a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was effected on May 10,\n\n1947."}}, {"text": "May IO. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41478, "end_char": 41490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the said documentary evidence prima facie would establish that the Isl defendant borrowed a sum of Rs .. 16.5001from time to time from the p:aintiff and effeoted a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds on May IO."}}, {"text": "5th July 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42745, "end_char": 42758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th July 1947 the memorandum, Exhibit A-19, wa1\n\nexecuted in my lawyer's house."}}, {"text": "July 5. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43982, "end_char": 43994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is too much to expect this vritness to bear in mind the subtle distinction between the\n\neecution of an equitable mortgage on July 5."}}, {"text": "Naraya Ayyar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46630, "end_char": 46642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So too, Naraya Ayyar, as P.W. 3, supports the evi-\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RF~PORTS 747\n\ndence of P.Ws."}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48093, "end_char": 48098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 58(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48548, "end_char": 48556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48564, "end_char": 48588, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Narayana Ayyar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 48594, "end_char": 48608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Narayana Ayyar, as P.W. 3, stated in his evidence that he had authority to take the title-deeds on behalf of the I st defendant and that, aftet having taken delivery of them on his behalf, he sent them .to the plaintiff at Madras by registered post."}}, {"text": "Sllbba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49231, "end_char": 49241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Nathan\n\nY. 1/. Y. Marui,\n\nR•ddy\n\nSllbba Rao I.\n\nintention to create a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds would not constitute such a mongage.", "canonical_name": "Su BB A RAO"}}, {"text": "May 5,)947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49343, "end_char": 49353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 5,)947, when the title-deeds were received by the plaintif{ through his agent, Narayana Ayyar, at Kumbakonam, they were received only for the purpose of pre par :ng the mortgage deed."}}, {"text": "May 10, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50222, "end_char": 50235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From May 10, 194 7, the plaintiff ceased to hold the title\n\ndeeds as agent of the I st defendant but held them only as a mortgagee."}}, {"text": "May 10, 194", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51091, "end_char": 51102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we, therefore, hold that, even on the assumption that the form of physical delivery had not been gone through- though we hold that it was so effected on May 10, 194 7there was constructive delivery of the title-deeds coupled with the intention to create a mortgage by deposit of title -deeds."}}, {"text": "July 5, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51722, "end_char": 51735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming it was not so\n\ndone on that date, can such an intention be inferred from the document as on July 5, 194 7 ?"}}, {"text": "July 5,\n\n1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51752, "end_char": 51765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly on July 5,\n\n1947, the title-deeds were in the possession of the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "}.fay 10, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52615, "end_char": 52629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, hold that even if there was no mortgage by dep:isit of title-deeds on }.fay 10, 1947, it was effected '01) July 5, 1947."}}, {"text": "July 5, i947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52746, "end_char": 52758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "July 5, i947, the legal p0sit1on 'wo11ld be the same, as the mortgage deed in favour of the 3rd defendant was executed only on October 10, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52949, "end_char": 52954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52962, "end_char": 52978, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 1947", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53021, "end_char": 53028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MandJ Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54073, "end_char": 54084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apptal allowed ..\n\nK. /. Natluilt\n\nS. Y.\n\nMandJ Reddy\n\nSubba RQ,, A"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_750_772_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ":Pebruary 11\n\n750 SUPREfE COURT REPORTS [1g64]\n\nJAGDEV SINGH SID.'IANTI\n\nPRATAP SINGH DAULTA\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JI.)\n\nEl1ctions-A.dvocating the cause of a certain lanuage-lf amount. .. to a corrupt prar:tict-l 1f:ing 'Om Dhwaf'-ll amounts to a corrupt practice-Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act .tf3 of 1951),\n\nI. 123(3),\n\nThe appellant was declared elected to the liou::; e of the l'eo::il~ from a parliamentary constituency. The respondent No. 1 i.:ha:Ienged\n\nthe election of the appellant on the ground that the appellant, hi9 election and other agents cominitted many corrupt practice; falling within s. 123 of the Represen.tation of the People Act, 1951. The main grievance of respondent No. l was thlt the appel1ant and his agents h:id made appeal! to t'.1e electorate to vote for hi1n or to refrain from voting for Daul ta ( Repondent No. l ) ''on t11e ground of his religion and language\", and that the appeJlarit and his agents use l a religious symbol-a fi.:.g called \"Om Dhwaj\" in all 1he election iT'Ceiiags.\n\nThe case cf the appeib.nt was th3t the flag was not a 1eligious symbol and denied that it was used on any O'.::caior by him or hi<> age:i.ts and\n\nsubmitted that it \\Y:t~ usr; d 0;1iy ty o; e }.\".erson who was always accustomed to carry it on h:-; mctor c:-ir.\n\nThe appellant ai.o pleaded that an appeal to the eiector.:tle en the ground of languagf.': or rdigion did not amount to a corrupt practi.:-0 '\"ithin the meaning cf s. 123 of the Act.\n\nThe Tribunril di.c.mi\".\"\"'d the ele.:tion petition of re5pondent No. l but the High Court allo\\ved the appeal and declared the election of\n\nthe appellant void unJ.:r s. l~.J(l)(b) of the Act.\n\nI-fence the appeal.\n\nHeld (i) Th~ use of or appe:il to the national or reiigions symbols to be a corrupt practice mus~ be rnade by the candidate or his electian agent, or by some other person with the consent of the candidate or his election 01gent, before it can be regarded as a £-round for declaring the election void.\n\n(ii) 'Om' is regarded by Hindus as having high spiritual or mystical -efficacy: it is used at the commencement cf the recit:-.tions of religious prayers.\n\nBut the attribute of spiritual sigflificance will not necessarily impart to its use on a :flag the character of a n:ligious symbol within the meaning of s. 123.\n\nA symbol stands for or represents something material or abstract. To be a religious symbol, there must be a visible representation of a thinJ?: of concept hich is religions. To •om• high 'lpiritual or mystical e:f!cacy is undoubtedly ascribed, but its use on\n\n6 S.C.R. . SUPREME COURT Rl<:i'ORTS 751\n\na flag does not symbolise religion or anything religious.\n\nThe High Court err~ in holding that the 'Om' flag \\vas a relicious sytnbol and its use in an election comes within the purview of cl. (3) of 1. 123\n\n-Of. the Ac I.\n\n(iii) Clause (3) of •· 123 of the Act must be read in the light of the fund, mental right which is guaranteed by Art. 29(1) of tho .Constitutio.n; the clause \"annot be read as tresyassing upon the fuoda~\n\nmental right under Art. 29(1).\n\nArtic\\e 29( I) of the Constitution has conferred the right, amona -others, to conse1ve their language upon the citiLCm of India.\n\nRight to conserve the language of the citizens nclndcs the right to agitate\n\nfar protection of the language. Political agitation for conservation of 'the language of a section of the ciuzens cannot therefore he regarde4 \" a corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123(3) of the Act.\n\nlamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Ors. v. Lachhi Ram •nd Ors., [195S]1 S.C.R. 608, distinguished.\n\n(iv) The corrupt practice d•flrted bx cl. (3) of s. 123 ii com1111tted when an appeal is made either' to vote or. refrain from v0ting on tho *round ot a candidate's language! lt is the. appeal to ithe lectorate on a ground personal to the candi'date relating to his laneuage which .attracts tte b!tn of s. 100 read with s. 123(\"l). Therefore it is only when the electcrs are asked to vote or not to vote beca 11se of the particular language of the candidate that a corrupt practice may he deemed to be committed. Where, however, for con3ervation of language of the electorate appeals are made to the electorate and promises are :given thal steps \\Vculd be taken to conserve that language, nlaking af\n\nsuch appeals or promises will not amount to a corrupt practice.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 936 <>f 1963.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated May 31, 1963, ol the Punjab High Court in First Appeal from Order No. 2/3 o.f 1963.\n\nPurshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No. 1.\n\n196#\n\nl41dtv Sii:ll v.\n\nPratop Singh\n\nkgdeY\n\nFebruary 12, 1964. -The J udgrnent of the Court was\n\nSingh delivered by:- ... i.'lrltap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nSHAH, J.-At the general elections held in February- 1962 five candidates contested the election to the House of the People from the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency. 011 February 27, I 962 the appellant Jagdev Singh Sidhanti was declared elected.\n\nPratap Singh Dauila who was one of thccandidates at the election then filed a petition with the Elc tion Commission praying, inter a/ia, that the election of th• appel!ant be declared void on the ground that the appellant-\n\nSLcJhanti-his agents, and other persons with his consent, had committed certain corrupt practices in connection witb. the election. Daulta stated that the appellant Sidhanti w:u set up as a candidate to contest the election by the Hariana _ Lok Samiti, that the appellant and six other persons-\n\nPiare Lal Bhajnik, Ch. Badlu Ram, Pt. . Rudh Dev, Prof.\n\nSher Singh, Mahashe Bharat Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev who were leaders and active workers of the GurukuJ -Section of the Arya Samaj had organised a political movement called \"the Hindi agitation\" in 1957 the real object of which was to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the Sikh and the Hindu communities in the State of Punjab \"on the ground of religion and language\" to promote their prospects in the general elections to be held in 1962. and for that purpose they held meetings in the Hariana region of tho Punjab and appealed to the electorate to vote for Sidhantt\n\n\"on the ground of his religion and language\", and used a religious symbol-a flag called \"Om Dhwaj\" in all the~ meetings, that the _appellant himself made similar appeals le>\n\nthe electorate and appealed to them to refrain from votins for Daulta who was a sitting ipember of the House of th• People from the constituency stating that he-Daulta--wat an enemy of the Arya Samaj and of the Hindi language. that during the election campaign fifteen meetings were held between December JO, 1961 and February 18. 1962 anc! at all these meetings appeals were made to the electorate on th• ground of religion and language of Sidhanti, and attempts were made to promote feelings of enmity and hatred betwee11 Sikhs and Hindus of the Punjab. Allegations about unducinfluence on the voters in the exercise of their free electoral right were also made in the petition, a12d details of th~\n\nalleged corrupt practices were furnished in the schedule annexed to the petition.\n\nSidhanti denied that the six persons who were named as his agents and supporters ever acted as his agents in his election campaign and submitted that they were merely interested\n\nin the success of the candidates set up by the Hariana Lok Samiti and acted throughout \"on their own and not as his agents\".\n\nHe also submitted that the Hariana Lok $qmiti had no connection with the Arya Samaj, it being a political organization started by Prof. Sher Singh who was an important political leader in the Hariana region.\n\nSidhanti admitted that he had participated in the meetings to canvass vntes, but claimed that he was not responsible for convening the meetings or for the speeches made by others in those meet ings, that the Om flag was not a religious symbol and denied that it was used on any occasion by him or his agents or the six persons named by Daulta in his petition, except Bhgwan Dev who was accustomed \"throughout his career\" to carry a pennant with \"Om\" and his own name inscribed thereon on his motor vehicle, but carrying of such a flag or pennant on Bhagwan Dev's vehicle during the election was not with his (Sidhanti's) consent and that it did not amount co commission of a corrupt practice as defined in the Act, that the residents of Hariana area were mainly Hindi-speaking, but the Government of Punjab had made Punjabi languge in Gurmukhi script a compulsory subject at various level~ of school education and this gave rise to a wide-spread agitation against the policy of the Government, that to resist the implementation of the policy and the programme of the Government in the administrative, economic and developmental spheres and to mitigate the hardships of the residents t'f the Hariana region and to secure redress of their grievances the Hariana Lok Samiti was formed, and an appeal to the electorate to secure a reversal of the policies and programme of the Government was not. it was submitted, an appeal on the ground of language or religion and did not amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.\n\nThe Tribunal held, inter alia, that the \"Om flag\" was not a \"religious symbol\" of the Arya Samaj, that no satisfactory proof was adduced that Om flag had been used as a\n\n134-159 S.C.-48\n\n196f\n\nlaf(l1v Sln1h •• Pratap Singh\n\nShah /.\n\n19M\n\nJagdev Slnglt v.\n\nPratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nsymbol of Arya Sarnaj or that an appeal to secure votes with the aid of the flag was made to the electorate by Sidhanti or by any one else with his consent, that there was no satisfactory evidence to establish that appeals were made to the electorate to vote for Sidhanti or to refrain from voting for the other candidates on the ground of religion or language, and that the applicant Daulta failed to prove that an appeal on the ground of caste, community or religion or language had been made to the electorate to further the prospects of Sidhanti or to prejudicially affect the election of the other candidates. On these , and findings recorded on other issues not material in this appeal, the petition filed by Daulta was dismissed by the Election Tribunal.\n\nDaulta prefered an appeal against that order to the High Court of Judicature for Punjab. The High Court held that the word \"Orn\" is a religious symbol of the Hindus in general and of the Hindus belonging to the section known as Arya SamaJ in particular and that the flag bearing the inscription \"Om\" is a religious symbol, that \"Om Dhwaj\" was flown during the election campaign on the election offices of the Hariana Lok Samiti especially at Sampla and Rohtak, that the. Samiti office was used by Sidhanti for his election campaign, that Hariana Lok Samiti was generally using the \"Om Dhwaj\" to further the prospects of its candidates, that out of the agents and supporters of Sidhanti \"Bharat Singh at least once and Bhagwan Dev invariably used\" the Om flag on their vehicles while attending the meetings convened by the Hariana Lok Samiti in furtherance of the election campaign of Sidhanti, that the Om flag was flying \"on the panda! of the meeting\" held at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962 when Sidhanti and his agents and supporters delivered speeches in support of the election campaign and that at the meeting held at Rohtak town, Piare Lal Bhajnik sang a song in the presence of Sidhanti, the purport of which was that the honour of the Om flag should be upheld, that Bhagwan Dev was using the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti and that Piare Lal Bhajnik at the Rohtak town meeting also sang\n\nthe song in honour of the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti.\n\nThe High Court further held that the appellant had delivered speeches at Majra Dubaldhan in the panda/ on which the\n\nOm flag was flying, that as even an isolated act of the use\n\nof or appeal to the Om flag may constitute a corrupt practice under s. 123(3) that corrupt practice by Sidhanti and his agents and by his supporters with his consent was established.\n\nThe High Court also held that Sidhanti had appealed for votes on the ground of his language and hi\\d\n\nasked the electorate to refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of the language of the latter, and such appeals constituted a corrupt practice. The High Court accordingly allowed the appeal and declared the election of Sidhanti void under s. lOO(l)(b) of the Act. Against the order this appeal is preferred with certificate granted by the High Court.\n\nTwo principal questions which survive for determination in this appeal are: ( 1) Whether a religious symbol was used in the course of election by the appellant, his agents or other persons with his consent in furtherance of the prospects of his election; and\n\n(2) Whether appeals were made to the electorate by Sidhanti, his agents or other persons with bi<\n\nconsent to vote in his favour on account of his language and to refrain from voting in favour of Daulta on the ground of his language. 1n order to appreciate the plea raised by counsel for the parties and their bearing on the evidence it may be useful to refer to the political background in the Hariana region and the constituency in particular, in which corrupt practices are alleged to have been committed. The territory of the State of Punjab is divided into two regions-the 'Hindi-speaking region' and the 'Punjabi-speaking region'. The Hindispeaking region is very largely populated by Hindus, while in the Punjabi-speaking region the population is approximately equally divided between the Hindus and Sikhs. In the Punjab before the partition, Urdu and English were the two official languages.\n\nAfter the partition a controversy about the official language arose. The Government of Punjab decided to replace Urdu and English by Hindi in the Hindispeaking region and Punjabi in the Punjabi-speaking region, and for that purpose a scheme called the 'Sachar formula' was devised. the salient feature of which was that every student reading in the Punjab schools, by the time he passed\n\n19M\n\nJagtkv Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nShah /.\n\nhis matriculation examination should be proficient both in Hindi and Punjabi. Under the scheme two Regional Committees were formed-one known as the Hindi Regiona I Committee and the other the Punjabi Regional Committee.\n\nThe function of the Committees was to advise the' local Government in matters of finance and other related matters.\n\nThere was great resentment against the formation of the Regional Committees and the implementation of the Sachar formula which resulted in the launching of a movement called \"the Hindi agitation\". The agitation against the language policy of the Government gained strength and there was a great mass movement in 1957 in the entire State of Punjab.\n\nIn the last week of December 1957 there was a settlement between the organisers of the movement and the State Government and the movement was called off. It appears that some of the leading figures in this agitation attempted to make political capital out of this movement and set themselves up as probable candidates for the next election.\n\nIn the Arya Samaj in the Punjab there are two major sections, one called the 'Gurukul Section' and the other called the 'College Section'. The Gurukul Section is again divided into the Hariana Section and the Mahashe Krishna Section. It is the case of Daulta that it is the Gurukul Section of the Araya Samaj relying upon the religious and linguistic differences which sought to make at the time of the election, appeals to religions and use of religious symbols.\n\nAs we have already observed, Daulta challenged the election on the ground that Sidhanti, his election and other agents committed many corrupt practices. Before the Tribunal he restricted his case to the corrupt practices falling within els. ( 2). ( 3) and (3A) of s. 123 of the Representation of the People Act 1951.\n\nHis plea of undue influence falling within cl. (2) failed before the Tribunal and also before the High Court, and it has not been relied upon before us.\n\nSimilarly his plea that Sidhanti, his election and other agents had promoted or attempted to promote, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens of India on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or language was negatived by the Tribunal and also by the High Court and that plea also does not fall to be deiermined by us.\n\nDauila had also alleged\n\nthat appeals were made by Sidhanti and his election and other agents, to the electorate to vote for him or refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of his--Sidhanti's-religion and language and that Sidhanti and his agents used and appealed to religious symbols such as the Om flag for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of Sidhanti and for prejudicially affecting the election of Dauila. It is on this last question about the use of and appeal to religious symbols and appeal to the language of the two candidates for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of Sidhanti that the Tribunal and the High Court have differed.\n\nIt may be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. before dealing with the matters in dispute.\n\nSection 100(1) sets out the grounds on which an election may be declartd void.\n\nIn so far as that section is material in the present appeal, it provides:\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the Tribunal is of opinion.-\n\n(a)\n\n(b)\n\n(c) (d)\n\n* • • * • that any corrupt practice has been committed by returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent:\n\n• • • • • • • • • * the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.\" By sub-s. (2) if in the opinion of the Tribunal. a returned candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but the Tribunal is satisfied\n\n(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders and without the consent of the candidate or his election agent; (b) • • • * •\n\n(c) that the candidate and his election agent took all\n\nreasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practice at the election; and\n\nJagdev Singh\n\n•• Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nJQld\" Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\n.hah J.\n\n(d) that in all other respects the . election was free from any corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agent, the Tribunal may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void.\n\nSection 123 sets out what shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purpose of the Act.\n\nClause (3) as amended by Act 40 of 1961, which alone is material in this appeal, provides:\n\n\"The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion. race, caste, community or language or the use of, or appeal to, religious symbols, such as the national flag or the national emblem, for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate.\" The clause falls into two parts (i) an appeal by a candidate, his' agents or by other persons with the consent of the candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language; and (ii) use of or appeal to religious symbols, national symbols or national emblem.~ for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of the candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate.\n\nThe first part in terms makes it a condition that the appeal is made by a candidate or his agent or any other person with the consent of the candidate or his agent.\n\nThere is no reference in the second part to the person by whom the use of, or appeal to, the religious or the national symbols, such as the national flag or the national emblem may be made, if such use of or appeal to them has been made to further the prospects of the election of the candidate or to prejudicially affect the election of any candidate.\n\nBut it is implicit in s. 123(3), having regard to the terms of s. 100, that the use of or appeal to the national or religious symbols must be made by the candidate or his election agent or by some other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, before it can be regarded as a ground for declaring the election void. If the evidence on the record fails to establish \\\n\nthe responsibility for the use of or appeal to the religious or national symbols by the returned candidate or by his election agent or by any other person with his consent or his election agent, no ground for setting aside the election may be deemed to be made out.\n\nThe first question to which we must then turn is, whether the \"Om flag\" can be regarded as a \"religious symbol\" within the meaning of s. 123(3).\n\nThis question has to be examined in two branches-(i) whether the word \"Om\" has any special religious significance, and, (ii) whether the use of \"Om\" on a flag or pennant makes it a religious symbol. If the respondent Daulta establishes that the \"Om flag\" is a religious symbol, the que&tion will arise whether the use of or appeal to the Om flag was made in the election campaign for furtherance of his prospects by Sidhanti or by his agents or other persons with his consent or the consent of his election agent.\n\nThe expression \"Om\" is respected by the Hindus generally and has a special significance in the Hindu scriptures.\n\nIt is recited at the commencement of the 1ecitations of Hindu religious works. Macdonell in his A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary states that \"Om\" is the sacred syllable used in invocations, at the commencement of prayers, at the beginning and the end of Vedic recitation, and as a respectful salutation: it is a subject of many mystical speculations.\n\nIn the Sanskrit-English Dictionary by Monier-William it is said that '\"Om\" is a sacred exclamation which may be uttered at the beginning and end of a reading of the Vedas or previol.'s!y\n\nto any prayer; it is also regarded as a particle of auspicious salutation.\n\nBut it is difficult to regard \"Om\" which is a preliminary to an incantation or to religious books as haVing\n\nreligious significance. \"Om\" it may be admitted is regarded as having high spiritual or mystical efficacy: it is used at the commencement of the recitations of religious prayers. But the attribute of spiritual significance will not necessarily impart to its use on a flag the character of a religious symbol in the context in which the .expression religious symbol occur~ in the section with which we are concerned.\n\nA symbol stands for or represents something material or abstract. In order to be a religious symbol, there must be a visible\n\nlagdev Singh v.\n\nPratap Sia1h\n\nShah /.\n\nJ96f\n\nlaff/IV Singh v.\n\nPNIQp Singh\n\nShilli J.\n\nrepresentation of a thing or concept which is religious. To 'Om' high spiritual or mystical efficacy is undoubtedly ascribed; but its use on a flag does not symbolise religion, or anything religious.\n\nIt is not easy therefore to see how the Om flag which merely is a pennant on which is printed the word 'Om' can be called a religious symbol.\n\nBut assuming that the Om flag may be regarded as a religious symbol, the evidence on the record is not sufficient to establish that by Sidhanti, his election agents or any other person with his consent or the consen\\ of his election agent, Om flag was used or exhibited, or an appeal was made by the use of the Om flag to further the prospects of Sidhanti at the election.\n\nIt may be remembered that in the trial of an election petition, the burden of proving that the election of a successful' candidate is liable to be set aside on the plea that he was responsible directly or through his agents for corrupt practice~ 'at the election, lies heavily. upon the applicant to establish his case, and unless it is established in both its branches i.e. the commission of acts which the law regards as corrupt, and the responsibility of the successful candidate directly or through his agents or with his consent for its practice not by mere preponderance of probability, but by cogent and reliable evidence beyond any reasonable doubt, the petition must fail.\n\nThe evidence may be examined bearing this approach to the evidence in mind.\n\nBetween the months of December 10, 1961 and February 18, 1962, fourteen meetings were held in the constituency as a part of the election campaign of Sidhnti.\n\nThese meetings were held at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri Madanpur, Sarnpla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma. Assaudha.\n\nJhajjar, Badlt,. Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh.\n\nThere was, it is claimed by the applicant. one more meeting on February 4, 1962, at Rohtak town which is outside the Jhajjar constituency.\n\nThe Tribunal held that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that in the meetings at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Sampla, Ladpur, Pakasma. Assaudha, Jhajjar, Badli, Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh 'Om' flag was exhibited in furtherance of the election prospects of Sidhanti and with that view the High Court bas agreed.\n\nThe Tribunal\n\nalso held that there was no reliable evidence that at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962, and at Rohtak town on February 4, 1962, 'Om' flag was used as a religious symbol.\n\nOn this part of the case, however, the High Court disagreed with the Tribunal.\n\nRohtak town was not, but Rohtak suburban area was, within the constituency in which Daulta and Sidhanti were contesting the election.\n\nTherefore the only meeting which took place within the constituency where Sidhanti and Daulta contested the election in which according to the High Court the Om flag was used was at Majra Dubaldhan held on January 19, 1962. Six witnesses directly spoke about the details of that meeting, beside Sidhanti.\n\nSidhanti said generally that the evidence given by the witnesses for Daulta regarding what transpired at Majra Dubaldhan and three other meetings was not true.\n\nThe witnesses for Daulta were Roop Ram, Sukhi Ram and Ramdhari Balmiki.\n\nThe witnesses who supported the case of the appellant were Piare Lal, Prof. Sher Singh and Jug Lal. It may be observed that the High Court placed no reliance upon the testimony of Ramdhari Balmiki and no arguments have been advanced before us suggesting that his testimony was reliable.\n\nRoop Ram-a police constable-has deposed that about mid-day on January 19, 1962, a meeting was held at Majra Dubaldhan and that at that meeting Piare Lal sang a bhajan about the Om flag and he saw the Om flag flying on the panda/ of the meeting which was attended by four to five thousand persons.\n\nAccording to the witness Nanhu Ram, Badlu Ram, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, Bhagwan Dev, Ramdhani Balmiki, Attar Singh, Prof. Sher Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev made speeches, that Acharya Bhagwan Dev in the course of his speech asked people not to vote for Daulta but to vote for the candidate who was seeking election on the Hariana Lok Samiti ticket. In cross-examination he admitted that he had been supplied with a copy of the report which he had made to the D.l.G., C.I.D ..\n\nChandigarh, and that he had gone through the report two or three times, before he gave evidence. The Tribunal ref1Jsed to place reliance upon the testimony of this witness and of another police constable Ganesh Dass who claimed to have remained present in the various political meetings. It appears that the witness had memorised the so-called reports and the same were not made available to counsel for Sidhanti\n\nlagdev Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\nhah J.\n\nShah I\n\nto challenge the truth of. the statements made by the witnesses. The High Court has not given any adequate reasons for accepting the testimony of the witness, when the Tribunal which had opportunity of seeing the witness and noting his demeanour had refused to accept the testimony.\n\nSukhi Ram deposed that he was a sarpanch of Dubaldhan Panchayat for about two years, and that he was present at the meeting convened by the Hariana Lok Sarniti on January 19, 1962, for canvassing votes for the candidates of Hariana Lok Sarniti, that Prof. Sher Singh and Sidhanti came in a jeep on which there was flying flag with 'Orn' inscribed thereon, that he saw several other vehicles flying the Orn flag and that the vehicle in which he went to the meeting also was carrying the Om flag. The Tribunal was of the view that the facts elicited in the cross-examination of this witness disclosed that his recollection about other meetings which he had a !tended was poor, whereas his recollection about the meeting held at Ma jra Dubaldhan was very clear, and that the reasons given by the witness for specially remembering the details of the proceedings of the meeting in Majra Dubaldhan and not of other meetings could not be accepted. In the view of the Tribunal the witness was interested in Daulta, and this inference was supported by the fact that Dauila had sent him a copy of his election petition before it was even presented to the Election Commission.\n\nIt also appears that the evidence given by this witness was inconsistent with the summary of the meeting given in Sch. 'D' to the petition and for this reason according to the Tribunal the testimony of the witness \"did not carry conviction\" and \"it was not safe to rely upon it\". The High Court after summarising the effect of the evidence observed that it did not appear from the deposition given by the witness that be was in any manner interested in Dauila. In so observing the High Court appears unfortunately to have lost sight of the grounds given by the Tribunal.\n\nWitness Piare Lal stated that he was present at the meetine held at Majra Dubaldhan and that none of the speakers suggested that the electors should vote on the ground of caste, creed, religion or language.\n\nHe also stated that at\n\nnone of the meetings there was any Om flag either inside or outside the panda! of the meetings. Prof. Sher Singh who was another witness examined on behalf of Sidhanti deposed that slogans shouted in the meetings were political slogans and that he did not see Om flags in any panda/ of the meetings, and that he had instructed all the candidates and the members of the Hariana Lok Samiti not to use any flag or symbol other than the symbol allotted to them.\n\nJug Lal, another witness examined on behalf of Sidhanti, stated that at the meeting at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962, there were no Om flags to be seen anywhere either inside or outside the meeting and that there were no Om flags flying on any of the vehicles. The testimony of the witnesses Piare Lal, Prof. Sher Singh and Jug Lal was discarded by the High Court, because in their view the witnesses were interested in Sidhanti. Even if this view about the evidence of these three witnesses is accepted, the evidence led on behalf of Daulta of witnesses Sukhi Ram, Ramdhari Balmiki is wholly unreliable and the testimony of police constable Roop Ram is also not such that implicit reliance can be placed upon it.\n\nWe are unable, therefore, to agree with the High Court in the conclusion it has reached that it had been proved satisfactorily that Om flag was flown at Majra Dubaldhan where Sidhanti and other speakers delivered peeches in furtherance of the election campaign.\n\nThe only other meeting at which it is found by the High Court that the Om flag was used in the meeting at Rohtak town on February 4, 1962, which town, it is common ground, is not within the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency from which Sidhanti and Daulta were contesting the election.\n\nIt is, however, said that Rohtak suburban area is within the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency and as there is a grain market in Rohtak town and a large number of voters from the Jhajjar constituency assemble in that town a meeting was held by Sidhanti in which Om flag were exhibited.\n\nThe witnesses in support of the case of Daulta are Ram Nath Sapra, Dafedar Singh, K. K. Katya! and Satyavrat Bedi. The principal witnesses who were examined by Sidhanti in respect of this meeting were Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev.\n\nProf. Sher Singh and Bhagwan Dev.\n\n5~•h J.\n\nShah J.\n\nRam Nath Sapra who is a correspondent of several newspapers deposed that he had attended the meeting at Rohtak town at Anaj Mandi 10 or 12 days before the actual polling. According to the witness there was a big procession taken out before the meeting which carried flags either of the symbol of the 'Rising Sun' or of 'Orn', that he had made reports about the proceedings of the Rohtak meeting and had sent the report of the same to all the five papers of which he was the correspondent. The Tribunal was of the view that the testimony of the witness was unreliable, because he did not remember the details of any other meeting convened by the other parties, and that he could not speak about the names of the speakers who took part in the meeting convened by the Hariana Lok Samiti.\n\nThe testimony of the witness therefore was \"far from convincing\" and the testimony of Sidhanti, Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev, Prof. Sher Singh and Bhagwan Dev was more reliable.\n\nIn corning to the conclusion that the evidence of the witness was unreliable the Tribunal referred to the details given in Sch. 'D' annexed to the petition under the heading 'Summary of the meetings' and observed that the summary was at \"complete variance\" with the testimony of the witness. The High Court was of the view that the witness Ram Sapra was \"wholly disinterested\" and therefore his evidence must be accepted. The High Court did not refer to the infirmities disclosed in the testimony of the witness, particularly the discrepancies between the statement of Dauila in his petition and the testimony given by this witness.\n\nWitness Dafedar Singh who is a police constable said that he had been deputed to report about the proceedings of the meeting.\n\nHis version is, also different from the version as given in Sch. 'D' annexed to the petition.\n\nThe High Court has not referred to the testimony of this witness in support of its conclusion and nothing more need be said about him.\n\nK. K. Katya! said that he had attended the meeting at Rohtak town as a special correspondent of the Hindustan Times, Delhi and that he recollected that flags with a symbol of 'Orn' inscribed thereon were seen flying on some\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT H.EPORTS\n\nvehicles but it was not possible for him to say who owned those vehicles, but from the flags and placards carried on the vehicles it appeared that they were of the Hariana Lok Samiti. He also deposed that he had gone to the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti at Rohtak and saw a similar flag flying on the building of the office.\n\nHe admitted in crossexamination that he did not visit any office of the Hariana Lok Samiti either at Bahadurgarh or at Sampla as all his attention was confined to the central office of the Hariana Lok Samiti at Rohtak.\n\nHe also stated that he had seen some shopkeepers in Samp1a and Bahadurgarh flying Om flags on their stalls. In the view of the Tribunal the testimony of this witness was vague and no reliance could be placed thereon.\n\nWhile generally agreeing with this view, the High Court observed that the testimony of the witness Katya! that the Om flag was flying at the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti at Rohtak which was the headquarters ofhce and In the procession which was led by Bharat Singh\n\na number of Om flags were seen may be accepted.\n\nSatyavrat Bedi who is staff correspondent of the Indian Express stated that during his survey of the election campaign he visited Sampla, Bahadurgarh and Rohtak in one day, and made his report about his observations to the newspaper Indian Express, in which he had recorded that religious synibols and religion were being frequently used for damaging the chances of success of Daulta, that he had seen a large number of flags fluttering on many house tops. that the flag on the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti was that of Om and the other organisations had their own flags, that he saw the Om flag fluttering on the office of Sidhanti at Sampla but he did not remember whether there was any flag of 'Om' at his election office at Bahadurgarh.\n\nThe Tribunal declined to accept this testimony. The High Court took a different view and observed that apart from any other infirmity regarding the use of the reports made by the witness, the statement made by him about his observation that he had seen the Om flag flying on the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti and on the motor-vehicle of Bharat Singh could not be ruled out: It must be remembered however that we are concerned at this stage with the\n\nShah J.\n\nJar; dev s; nh •• Pratap Sinpb\n\nShah J.\n\nquestion whether in the meeting at Rohtak on February 4,\n\n1962. Om flags were exhibited. On that part of the case the evidence of Satyavrat Bedi is not of much use .\n\nSri Ram Sharma was a candidate for election on behalf of a political party called \"the Hariana Front\". He deposed that he had never attended any procession or meeting organised by the Hariana Lok Samiti but he had seen the motorvehicles employed by the Hariana Lok Samiti carrying Om flags which were used by the candidates of the Hariana Lok Samiti. He stated that he contributed a number of articles to Hariana Tilak, Rohtak, founded by him in which he had published on January 4, 1962, an article condemning the use of the Om flag for the purpose of elections. The article published on January 4, 1962, can have no bearing on the use of the flag at Rohtak in the meeting dated February 4, 1 \\162.\n\nThe High Court did not place any relian1,-e upon the testimony of this witness.\n\nThis is all the evidence on behalf of Daulta to which our attention was invited by counsel for the parties that at the meeting at Rohtak on February 4, 1962, Om flags were exhibited and appeals were made to the flag as a religious symbol.\n\nApart from the general infirmity of the testimony, the Tribunal refused to accept the evidence of the witnesses on the ground that their statements considerably departed from the summary given in Sch. 'D' by the petitioner Daulta himself. In view of this inconsistency between the evidence given in Court and the allegations made by the applicant Daulta in the petition, it would be difficult, after discarding the evidence with regard to a very large number of meetings, to bold that in the meeting at Majra Dubaldhan which was within the constituency and in the meeting at Rohtak town which was outside the constituency, Om flags were displayed or appeals were made in the name of the Om flag to further the prospects of the election of Sidhanti.\n\nWe are, therefore, unable 'to agree with the conclusion of the High Court that the Om flag was used for election purposes at the time when election speeches were delivered by Sidhanti at Majra Dubaldhan or Rohtak town or that the Om flag was used on the pandals at those meetings.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT KEPORTS\n\nTwo other matters which have a bearing on the use of the Om flag in the course of the election campaign by Sidhanti, and on which the High Court has relied may be referred to. The High Court has found that Sidhanti used the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti at Rohtak town as his election office, but on this part of the case our attention has not been invited to any definite evidence which directly supports this conclusion. The High Court merely observed that it was common ground that Sidhanti did not have any office of his own at Rohtak, and inferred from that circumstance that Sidhanti was using the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti for the election campaign. But the interence in the face of the evidence not justifiable, especially when Rohtak town was not within the constituency.\n\nIt was conceded by Sidhanti that Bhagwan Dev Sharma an Arya Samaj leader had been accustomed for many years past to carry on his motor-vehicle a pennant bearing the Om mark and his name. Witness Bhagwan Dev Sharma stated that he had attended the meetings of the Hariana Lok Samiti and had addressed them because he agreed with their ideology and thought that the institution was for the benefit of the Hindu religion, that he had never been asked to remove the Om flag from his jeep when he reached those meetings and that he had not attended those meetings either on account of Prof. Sher Singh or Sidhanti but \"in his independent capacity as a citizen of India having a right to\n\nvote\", and that he approved of the candidature of Sidhanti in preference to that of his opponent.\n\nBut if the witness wa> accustomed to use a pennant with Om mark on it for many years past, m the absence of clear evidence to show that he was an agent of Sidhanti or that he acted with the consent of Sidhanti and made an appeal to the flag, it would be difficult to hold from the circumstances that during the days of the election campaign the witness did not remove the flag from the motor-vehicle, that S1dhanti made an appeal to the electorate by using a religious symbol to further his prospects at the election. The evidence about the user of the Om !lag by Bharat !singh when he is alleged to have taken out a pr()l;; eSSion does not appear to be reliablr..\n\n19M\n\nJagdev Singh •• Pratap 5ingh\n\nShah J.\n\n• 1961\n\nShah l\n\nOn a careful survey of the testimony of the witnesses we are unable to agree with the conclusions recorded by the High Court that:\n\n(a) Sidhanti \"had used an office of the Hariana Lok\n\nSamiti on which the \"Om flag\" was flying for election purposes and further that he gave election speeches at a panda/ where the Om flag was fluttering in furtherance of his prospects at the election\";\n\n<h) \"the agents and supporters delivered speeches about the \"Om flag\" at the meeting held at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19. 1962, that Piare Lal Bhajnik sang a song, the purport of which was that the honour of the Om flag should be upheld\"; and ( c) \"the Hariana Lok Samiti, the party to which Sidhanti belonged, was using the Om flag for the purpose of election campaign\", and thereby committed corrupt practices. It is true that the use of the Om flag by Bhagwan Dev on his conveyance is admitted but that again is for reasons already set out not sufficient to enable the Court to hold that it was for the purpose of furthering the pro&pects of election of Sidhanti.\n\nIn considering whether appeals were made to the electorate to vote for Sidhanti on the ground of his language or to refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of Danita's language, it is necessary in the first instance lo ascertain the true meaning of the expression \"on the ground of his language\". By s. 123 (3) which was introduced for the first time in its present form by Act 40 of 1961, appeal by a candidate or his agent to vote or refrain from voting for a person on the ground of language is made a corrupt practice.\n\nThis clause must be read in the light of the fundamentai right which is guaranteed by Art. 29(1) of the Constitution, for in ascertaining the true meaning of the corrupt practice, the area of the fundamental right of citizen must be steadily kept in view. The clause cannot be so read as trespassing upon that fundamental right.\n\nArt. 29(1) provides: \"Any section of the citizs residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct\n\nlanguage, script or culture of its own shall have 1961 the right to conserve the same.\" Jagdev Singh ..\n\nThe Constitution has thereby conferred the right, among Pratap Singh others, to conserve their language upon the citizens of India.\n\nShah J.\n\nRight to conserve the language of the citizens includes the right to agitate for the protection of the language. Political agitation for conservation of the language of a section of the citizens cannot therefore be regarded as a corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act.\n\nThat is clear from the phraseology used in s. 123(3) which appears to have been deliberately and carefully chosen.\n\nUnlike Art. 19(1), Art. 29(1) is not subject to any reasonable restrictions. The right conferred upon the section of the citizens residing in the territo_ry of India or any part thereof to conserve their language,\n\ncript or culture is made by the Constitution absolute and therefore the decision of this Court in J umuna Prasad Mukhariya and others v. Lachhi Ram and others(') on which reliance was placed by the High Court is not of much use. In that case ss. 123(3) and 124(5) of the Representation of the People Act as they then stood were challenged as infringing the fundamental freedom under Art. 19 (1 )(a) of the Constitution, and the Court in negativing the contention held that the provisions of the Representation of the People Act did not stop a man from speaking: they merely prescribed conditions which must be observed if a candidate wanted to enter Parliament. The right to stand for an election is, it was observed, a special right created by statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the sta'tute, and if a person wants to stand for an election he must observe the rules. These observations have no relevance to the protection of the fundamental right to conserve language. The corrupt practice defined by cl. (3) of s. 123 is committed when an appeal is made either to vote or refrain from voting on the ground of a candidate's language.\n\nIt is the appeal to the electorate on a ground personal to the candidate relaiing to his language which attracts the ban of s. 100 read with s. 123 ( 3). Therefore it is only when the electors are asked lo vote or not to vote because of the\n\n(!) [1955] I S.C.R. 608.\n\n136-159 S.C.-49\n\n196f\n\nJagdtv Singh 'f, Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nparticular language of the candidate that a corrupt practice may be deemed to be committed. Where however for conservation of language of the electorate appeals are made to the electorate and promises are given that steps would be taken to conserve that language, it will not amount to a corrupt practice.\n\nIt is in the light of these principles, the correctness of the findings of the High Court that Sidhanti was guilty of the corrupt practice of appealing for votes on the ground of his language and of asking the voters to refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of the language of Daulta may be examined.\n\nThe petition filed by Daulta on this part of the case was vague. In paragraph 11 of his petition it was averred that Sidhanti and his agents made a systematic appeal to the audience to vote for Sidhanti and refrain from voting for Dauila \"on the ground of religion and language'', and in paragraph 12 it was averred that in the public meetings held to further the prospects of Sidhanti in the election, Sidhanti and his agents had made systematic appeals to the electorate to vote for him and refrain from voting for Dauila \"on the ground of his religion and language\". A bare perusal of the particulars of the corrupt practice so set out in paragraphs 11 & 12 are to be found in\n\nSchs. 'C' & 'D' clearly shows that it was the case of Dau!ta that Sidhanti had said that if the electorate wanted to protect their language they should vote for the Hariana Lok Samiti candidate. Similar exhortations are said to have been made by the other speakers at the various meeting:..\n\nIt is stated in Sch. 'D' that resolutions were passed at the meetings urging upon the Government to 'abolish Punjabi from Hariana\", that many speakers said that the Hariana Lok Samiti will fight for Hindi for Hariana and that they were opposed to the teaching of Punjabi in Hariana. These exhortations to the electorate to induce the Government to change their language policy or that a political party will agitate for the protection of the language spoken by the residents of the Hariana area do not fall within the corrupt practices of appealing for votes on the: ground of language of the candidate or to refrain from voting on the ground of language of tl1e contesting eanilidate.\n\nSpeeches made at political meetings held for canvassing votes must be examined in the context of the atmosphere of a ipo!itical campaign and the passions which are generally aroused in such a campaign. In adjudging whether an appeal is made to the language of the candidate, a meticulous examination of the' text of the speech in the serene atmosphere of the Court room picking out a word here and a phrase there to make out an offending appeal to vote for or against a candidate on the ground of language would not be permissible. A general and overall picture of the speeches delivered by Sidhanti and other speakers at the meeting disclosed nothing more than a tale of politi ta! promises, exhortations and inducements to vote at the forthcoming election for Sidhanti.\n\nIt is not disputed that in 1957 there was a wide-spread agitation in the State of Punjab agaiiist the enforcement of the education policy of the State, incorporated in the \"Sachar formula\". Many persons were imprisoned or detained in the cause of the agitation for individual acts done by them. But the movement was not and could not be declared illegal. It is common ground that in the Hatiana region, Hindi is the predominant language of the people and if a section of the\n\npeople thought that compelling the students in the Hariana region to learn Punjabi was not in their interest and in the election campaign such a view was advocated and votes were canvassed on the promise that the candidate if elected will take steps to conserve the language of the region, it would be difficult to hold that appeal as amounting to a corrupt practice.\n\nIt is open to a candidate in the course of his election campaign to criticise the policies of the Government including its language policy and to make promises to the electorate that if elected he will secure a reversal of that policy or will take measures in the Legislature to undo the danger, real, apprehended or even fancied, to the language of the people.\n\nThe object of the Hariana Lok Samiti was evidently to resist the imposition of Punjabi in the Hariana region and that object appears to have been made the platform in the election campaign.\n\nThereby it could not be said that the voters were asked not to vote for Daulta on the i:round of his language, assuming that it was other than\n\nJagdtv Sill611 ...\n\nPratap Singh\n\nSita~ J.\n\nIHI Hindi. Nor can it be said that it was an appeal to tho voters ,.,.., Slnth to vote for Sidhanti on the ground of his language . ..\n\nPralap Singh\n\nSlooli J.\n\nThe evidence which has been referred to by the High Court regarding the speeches made by Badlu Ram and Harphul Singh on December IO, 1961, at Beri on the face of it shows that the speeches were an attack against Daulta in respect of his political conduct, behaviour and beliefs.\n\nThe speeches made at the meetings at Sarnpla, Ladpur and Majra Dubaldhan read like political harangues addressed to the electorate to vote for the candidate who would protect the language of the people of Hariana. At Bahadurgarh also Sidhanti is stated to have claimed that he was opposed to the Government and its supporter Daulta in the matter of the language movement.\n\nThe evidence also showed that Sidhanti had appealed to the voters to vote for him because he was actively associated with the Hindi agitation movement and that he was championing the cause of Hindi and resisting the imposition of a rival language Punjabi and thereby suggesting that Daulta was hostile to the cause of Hindi language and was supporting the Punjabi language.\n\nThe criticism by Sidhanti in his appeal to the electorate related to the political leanings of Daulta, and his support to the policyof the Government and wa:s not personally directed against him. Nor did Sidhanti appeal to the voters to vote in his favour on account of his language.\n\nSuch political speeches espousing the cause of a particular language and making promises or asking the people to protest against the Government of the day in respect of its language poHcy is not a corrupt practice within the description of corrupt practice under s. 123 ( 3) of the Act.\n\nWe are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that Sidhanti was guilty of any corrupt practice under s. 123 (3) by appealing for votes on the ground of his language or by asking the voters to refrain from voting for Dauila on the ground of his language.\n\nThe appeal will therefore be allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal restored with costs in this Court and the High Court.\n\nA pp1al allowed.", "total_entities": 185, "entities": [{"text": "JAGDEV SINGH SID.'IANTI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGDEV SINGH SID.'IANTI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRATAP SINGH DAULTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRATAP SINGH DAULTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 341, "end_char": 379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 732, "end_char": 748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1537, "end_char": 1543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2381, "end_char": 2387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3028, "end_char": 3038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3139, "end_char": 3149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3545, "end_char": 3554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3710, "end_char": 3716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3964, "end_char": 3970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(\"l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3981, "end_char": 3991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4427, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Purshotham Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4615, "end_char": 4635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Nath Mitta/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4637, "end_char": 4657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. B.\n\nDatar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4659, "end_char": 4671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4673, "end_char": 4681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "V. Kumar"}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4699, "end_char": 4709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4731, "end_char": 4743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bawa Shiv Charan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4745, "end_char": 4767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4769, "end_char": 4781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "f{ajendra Dhawan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4783, "end_char": 4799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Anand Prakash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Y. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4819, "end_char": 4827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mitta/, R. B.\n\nDatar, V. Kumar, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant,\n\nG. S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, f{ajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "V. Kumar"}}, {"text": "Pratop Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4876, "end_char": 4888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196l41dtv Sii:ll v.\n\nPratop Singh\n\nkgdeY\n\nFebruary 12, 1964.", "canonical_name": "PRATAP SINGH DAULTA"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4992, "end_char": 4996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-The J udgrnent of the Court was\n\nSingh delivered by:- ... i.'lrltap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nSHAH, J.-At the general elections held in February- 1962 five candidates contested the election to the House of the People from the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency.", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5001, "end_char": 5005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-The J udgrnent of the Court was\n\nSingh delivered by:- ... i.'lrltap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nSHAH, J.-At the general elections held in February- 1962 five candidates contested the election to the House of the People from the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency.", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "Jagdev Singh Sidhanti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5206, "end_char": 5227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "011 February 27, I 962 the appellant Jagdev Singh Sidhanti was declared elected.", "canonical_name": "JAGDEV SINGH SID.'IANTI"}}, {"text": "Pratap Singh Dauila", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5251, "end_char": 5270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pratap Singh Dauila who was one of thccandidates at the election then filed a petition with the Elc tion Commission praying, inter a/ia, that the election of th• appel!ant be declared void on the ground that the appellant-\n\nSLcJhanti-his agents, and other persons with his consent, had committed certain corrupt practices in connection witb.", "canonical_name": "PRATAP SINGH DAULTA"}}, {"text": "SLcJhanti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5475, "end_char": 5484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pratap Singh Dauila who was one of thccandidates at the election then filed a petition with the Elc tion Commission praying, inter a/ia, that the election of th• appel!ant be declared void on the ground that the appellant-\n\nSLcJhanti-his agents, and other persons with his consent, had committed certain corrupt practices in connection witb."}}, {"text": "Daulta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daulta stated that the appellant Sidhanti w:u set up as a candidate to contest the election by the Hariana _ Lok Samiti, that the appellant and six other persons-\n\nPiare Lal Bhajnik, Ch.", "canonical_name": "Daulta"}}, {"text": "Sidhanti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5640, "end_char": 5648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daulta stated that the appellant Sidhanti w:u set up as a candidate to contest the election by the Hariana _ Lok Samiti, that the appellant and six other persons-\n\nPiare Lal Bhajnik, Ch.", "canonical_name": "Sidhanti's"}}, {"text": "Piare Lal Bhajnik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5771, "end_char": 5788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daulta stated that the appellant Sidhanti w:u set up as a candidate to contest the election by the Hariana _ Lok Samiti, that the appellant and six other persons-\n\nPiare Lal Bhajnik, Ch.", "canonical_name": "Piare Lal Bhajnik"}}, {"text": "Badlu Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Badlu Ram, Pt. ."}}, {"text": "Rudh Dev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5811, "end_char": 5819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rudh Dev, Prof.\n\nSher Singh, Mahashe Bharat Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev who were leaders and active workers of the GurukuJ -Section of the Arya Samaj had organised a political movement called \"the Hindi agitation\" in 1957 the real object of which was to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the Sikh and the Hindu communities in the State of Punjab \"on the ground of religion and language\" to promote their prospects in the general elections to be held in 1962."}}, {"text": "Sher Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5828, "end_char": 5838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rudh Dev, Prof.\n\nSher Singh, Mahashe Bharat Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev who were leaders and active workers of the GurukuJ -Section of the Arya Samaj had organised a political movement called \"the Hindi agitation\" in 1957 the real object of which was to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the Sikh and the Hindu communities in the State of Punjab \"on the ground of religion and language\" to promote their prospects in the general elections to be held in 1962."}}, {"text": "Mahashe Bharat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5840, "end_char": 5860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rudh Dev, Prof.\n\nSher Singh, Mahashe Bharat Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev who were leaders and active workers of the GurukuJ -Section of the Arya Samaj had organised a political movement called \"the Hindi agitation\" in 1957 the real object of which was to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the Sikh and the Hindu communities in the State of Punjab \"on the ground of religion and language\" to promote their prospects in the general elections to be held in 1962."}}, {"text": "Acharya Bhagwan Dev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5865, "end_char": 5884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rudh Dev, Prof.\n\nSher Singh, Mahashe Bharat Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev who were leaders and active workers of the GurukuJ -Section of the Arya Samaj had organised a political movement called \"the Hindi agitation\" in 1957 the real object of which was to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the Sikh and the Hindu communities in the State of Punjab \"on the ground of religion and language\" to promote their prospects in the general elections to be held in 1962."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6164, "end_char": 6170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rudh Dev, Prof.\n\nSher Singh, Mahashe Bharat Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev who were leaders and active workers of the GurukuJ -Section of the Arya Samaj had organised a political movement called \"the Hindi agitation\" in 1957 the real object of which was to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the Sikh and the Hindu communities in the State of Punjab \"on the ground of religion and language\" to promote their prospects in the general elections to be held in 1962."}}, {"text": "Hariana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6331, "end_char": 6338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and for that purpose they held meetings in the Hariana region of tho Punjab and appealed to the electorate to vote for Sidhantt\n\n\"on the ground of his religion and language\", and used a religious symbol-a flag called \"Om Dhwaj\" in all the~ meetings, that the _appellant himself made similar appeals le>\n\nthe electorate and appealed to them to refrain from votins for Daulta who was a sitting ipember of the House of th• People from the constituency stating that he-Daulta--wat an enemy of the Arya Samaj and of the Hindi language."}}, {"text": "Sidhantt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6403, "end_char": 6411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and for that purpose they held meetings in the Hariana region of tho Punjab and appealed to the electorate to vote for Sidhantt\n\n\"on the ground of his religion and language\", and used a religious symbol-a flag called \"Om Dhwaj\" in all the~ meetings, that the _appellant himself made similar appeals le>\n\nthe electorate and appealed to them to refrain from votins for Daulta who was a sitting ipember of the House of th• People from the constituency stating that he-Daulta--wat an enemy of the Arya Samaj and of the Hindi language.", "canonical_name": "Sidhanti's"}}, {"text": "February 18. 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6906, "end_char": 6923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that during the election campaign fifteen meetings were held between December JO, 1961 and February 18."}}, {"text": "Sidhanti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7029, "end_char": 7037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at all these meetings appeals were made to the electorate on th• ground of religion and language of Sidhanti, and attempts were made to promote feelings of enmity and hatred betwee11 Sikhs and Hindus of the Punjab.", "canonical_name": "Sidhanti's"}}, {"text": "Hariana Lok Samiti", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7599, "end_char": 7617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sidhanti denied that the six persons who were named as his agents and supporters ever acted as his agents in his election campaign and submitted that they were merely interested\n\nin the success of the candidates set up by the Hariana Lok Samiti and acted throughout \"on their own and not as his agents\"."}}, {"text": "Hariana Lok $qmiti", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7705, "end_char": 7723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also submitted that the Hariana Lok $qmiti had no connection with the Arya Samaj, it being a political organization started by Prof. Sher Singh who was an important political leader in the Hariana region."}}, {"text": "Arya Samaj", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7751, "end_char": 7761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also submitted that the Hariana Lok $qmiti had no connection with the Arya Samaj, it being a political organization started by Prof. Sher Singh who was an important political leader in the Hariana region."}}, {"text": "Bhgwan Dev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8254, "end_char": 8264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sidhanti admitted that he had participated in the meetings to canvass vntes, but claimed that he was not responsible for convening the meetings or for the speeches made by others in those meet ings, that the Om flag was not a religious symbol and denied that it was used on any occasion by him or his agents or the six persons named by Daulta in his petition, except Bhgwan Dev who was accustomed \"throughout his career\" to carry a pennant with \"Om\" and his own name inscribed thereon on his motor vehicle, but carrying of such a flag or pennant on Bhagwan Dev's vehicle during the election was not with his (Sidhanti's) consent and that it did not amount co commission of a corrupt practice as defined in the Act, that the residents of Hariana area were mainly Hindi-speaking, but the Government of Punjab had made Punjabi languge in Gurmukhi script a compulsory subject at various level~ of school education and this gave rise to a wide-spread agitation against the policy of the Government, that to resist the implementation of the policy and the programme of the Government in the administrative, economic and developmental spheres and to mitigate the hardships of the residents t'f the Hariana region and to secure redress of their grievances the Hariana Lok Samiti was formed, and an appeal to the electorate to secure a reversal of the policies and programme of the Government was not.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwan Dev Sharma"}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Dev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8436, "end_char": 8447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sidhanti admitted that he had participated in the meetings to canvass vntes, but claimed that he was not responsible for convening the meetings or for the speeches made by others in those meet ings, that the Om flag was not a religious symbol and denied that it was used on any occasion by him or his agents or the six persons named by Daulta in his petition, except Bhgwan Dev who was accustomed \"throughout his career\" to carry a pennant with \"Om\" and his own name inscribed thereon on his motor vehicle, but carrying of such a flag or pennant on Bhagwan Dev's vehicle during the election was not with his (Sidhanti's) consent and that it did not amount co commission of a corrupt practice as defined in the Act, that the residents of Hariana area were mainly Hindi-speaking, but the Government of Punjab had made Punjabi languge in Gurmukhi script a compulsory subject at various level~ of school education and this gave rise to a wide-spread agitation against the policy of the Government, that to resist the implementation of the policy and the programme of the Government in the administrative, economic and developmental spheres and to mitigate the hardships of the residents t'f the Hariana region and to secure redress of their grievances the Hariana Lok Samiti was formed, and an appeal to the electorate to secure a reversal of the policies and programme of the Government was not.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwan Dev Sharma"}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8673, "end_char": 8693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sidhanti admitted that he had participated in the meetings to canvass vntes, but claimed that he was not responsible for convening the meetings or for the speeches made by others in those meet ings, that the Om flag was not a religious symbol and denied that it was used on any occasion by him or his agents or the six persons named by Daulta in his petition, except Bhgwan Dev who was accustomed \"throughout his career\" to carry a pennant with \"Om\" and his own name inscribed thereon on his motor vehicle, but carrying of such a flag or pennant on Bhagwan Dev's vehicle during the election was not with his (Sidhanti's) consent and that it did not amount co commission of a corrupt practice as defined in the Act, that the residents of Hariana area were mainly Hindi-speaking, but the Government of Punjab had made Punjabi languge in Gurmukhi script a compulsory subject at various level~ of school education and this gave rise to a wide-spread agitation against the policy of the Government, that to resist the implementation of the policy and the programme of the Government in the administrative, economic and developmental spheres and to mitigate the hardships of the residents t'f the Hariana region and to secure redress of their grievances the Hariana Lok Samiti was formed, and an appeal to the electorate to secure a reversal of the policies and programme of the Government was not."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9409, "end_char": 9415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9423, "end_char": 9461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Daulta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10128, "end_char": 10134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held, inter alia, that the \"Om flag\" was not a \"religious symbol\" of the Arya Samaj, that no satisfactory proof was adduced that Om flag had been used as a\n\n134-159 S.C.-48\n\n196f\n\nlaf(l1v Sln1h •• Pratap Singh\n\nShah /.\n\n19M\n\nJagdev Slnglt v.\n\nPratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nsymbol of Arya Sarnaj or that an appeal to secure votes with the aid of the flag was made to the electorate by Sidhanti or by any one else with his consent, that there was no satisfactory evidence to establish that appeals were made to the electorate to vote for Sidhanti or to refrain from voting for the other candidates on the ground of religion or language, and that the applicant Daulta failed to prove that an appeal on the ground of caste, community or religion or language had been made to the electorate to further the prospects of Sidhanti or to prejudicially affect the election of the other candidates.", "canonical_name": "Daulta"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature for Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daulta prefered an appeal against that order to the High Court of Judicature for Punjab."}}, {"text": "Sampla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10948, "end_char": 10954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the word \"Orn\" is a religious symbol of the Hindus in general and of the Hindus belonging to the section known as Arya SamaJ in particular and that the flag bearing the inscription \"Om\" is a religious symbol, that \"Om Dhwaj\" was flown during the election campaign on the election offices of the Hariana Lok Samiti especially at Sampla and Rohtak, that the."}}, {"text": "Rohtak", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10959, "end_char": 10965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the word \"Orn\" is a religious symbol of the Hindus in general and of the Hindus belonging to the section known as Arya SamaJ in particular and that the flag bearing the inscription \"Om\" is a religious symbol, that \"Om Dhwaj\" was flown during the election campaign on the election offices of the Hariana Lok Samiti especially at Sampla and Rohtak, that the."}}, {"text": "Sidhanti \"Bharat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11183, "end_char": 11205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Samiti office was used by Sidhanti for his election campaign, that Hariana Lok Samiti was generally using the \"Om Dhwaj\" to further the prospects of its candidates, that out of the agents and supporters of Sidhanti \"Bharat Singh at least once and Bhagwan Dev invariably used\" the Om flag on their vehicles while attending the meetings convened by the Hariana Lok Samiti in furtherance of the election campaign of Sidhanti, that the Om flag was flying \"on the panda!"}}, {"text": "Majra Dubaldhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11467, "end_char": 11482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the meeting\" held at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962 when Sidhanti and his agents and supporters delivered speeches in support of the election campaign and that at the meeting held at Rohtak town, Piare Lal Bhajnik sang a song in the presence of Sidhanti, the purport of which was that the honour of the Om flag should be upheld, that Bhagwan Dev was using the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti and that Piare Lal Bhajnik at the Rohtak town meeting also sang\n\nthe song in honour of the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti.", "canonical_name": "Ma jra Dubaldhan"}}, {"text": "January 19, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11486, "end_char": 11502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the meeting\" held at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962 when Sidhanti and his agents and supporters delivered speeches in support of the election campaign and that at the meeting held at Rohtak town, Piare Lal Bhajnik sang a song in the presence of Sidhanti, the purport of which was that the honour of the Om flag should be upheld, that Bhagwan Dev was using the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti and that Piare Lal Bhajnik at the Rohtak town meeting also sang\n\nthe song in honour of the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti."}}, {"text": "Rohtak town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11634, "end_char": 11645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the meeting\" held at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962 when Sidhanti and his agents and supporters delivered speeches in support of the election campaign and that at the meeting held at Rohtak town, Piare Lal Bhajnik sang a song in the presence of Sidhanti, the purport of which was that the honour of the Om flag should be upheld, that Bhagwan Dev was using the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti and that Piare Lal Bhajnik at the Rohtak town meeting also sang\n\nthe song in honour of the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti."}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12224, "end_char": 12233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13589, "end_char": 13604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The territory of the State of Punjab is divided into two regions-the 'Hindi-speaking region' and the 'Punjabi-speaking region'."}}, {"text": "Jagtkv Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14353, "end_char": 14365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the salient feature of which was that every student reading in the Punjab schools, by the time he passed\n\n19M\n\nJagtkv Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nShah /.\n\nhis matriculation examination should be proficient both in Hindi and Punjabi.", "canonical_name": "JAGDEV SINGH SID.'IANTI"}}, {"text": "Shah J.\n\nShah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14383, "end_char": 14396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the salient feature of which was that every student reading in the Punjab schools, by the time he passed\n\n19M\n\nJagtkv Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nShah /.\n\nhis matriculation examination should be proficient both in Hindi and Punjabi."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16159, "end_char": 16165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16173, "end_char": 16210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16539, "end_char": 16544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly his plea that Sidhanti, his election and other agents had promoted or attempted to promote, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens of India on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or language was negatived by the Tribunal and also by the High Court and that plea also does not fall to be deiermined by us."}}, {"text": "Dauila", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16720, "end_char": 16726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dauila had also alleged\n\nthat appeals were made by Sidhanti and his election and other agents, to the electorate to vote for him or refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of his--Sidhanti's-religion and language and that Sidhanti and his agents used and appealed to religious symbols such as the Om flag for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of Sidhanti and for prejudicially affecting the election of Dauila.", "canonical_name": "Daulta"}}, {"text": "Sidhanti's", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16905, "end_char": 16915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dauila had also alleged\n\nthat appeals were made by Sidhanti and his election and other agents, to the electorate to vote for him or refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of his--Sidhanti's-religion and language and that Sidhanti and his agents used and appealed to religious symbols such as the Om flag for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of Sidhanti and for prejudicially affecting the election of Dauila.", "canonical_name": "Sidhanti's"}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17505, "end_char": 17519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagdev Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18626, "end_char": 18638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a returned candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but the Tribunal is satisfied\n\n(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders and without the consent of the candidate or his election agent; (b) • • • * •\n\n(c) that the candidate and his election agent took all\n\nreasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practice at the election; and\n\nJagdev Singh\n\n•• Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nJQld\" Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\n.hah J.\n\n(d) that in all other respects the .", "canonical_name": "JAGDEV SINGH SID.'IANTI"}}, {"text": "Pratap Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18643, "end_char": 18655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a returned candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but the Tribunal is satisfied\n\n(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders and without the consent of the candidate or his election agent; (b) • • • * •\n\n(c) that the candidate and his election agent took all\n\nreasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practice at the election; and\n\nJagdev Singh\n\n•• Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nJQld\" Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\n.hah J.\n\n(d) that in all other respects the .", "canonical_name": "PRATAP SINGH DAULTA"}}, {"text": "Shah J.\n\nJQld\" Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18657, "end_char": 18677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a returned candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but the Tribunal is satisfied\n\n(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders and without the consent of the candidate or his election agent; (b) • • • * •\n\n(c) that the candidate and his election agent took all\n\nreasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practice at the election; and\n\nJagdev Singh\n\n•• Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nJQld\" Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\n.hah J.\n\n(d) that in all other respects the ."}}, {"text": ".hah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18695, "end_char": 18699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a returned candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but the Tribunal is satisfied\n\n(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders and without the consent of the candidate or his election agent; (b) • • • * •\n\n(c) that the candidate and his election agent took all\n\nreasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practice at the election; and\n\nJagdev Singh\n\n•• Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nJQld\" Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\n.hah J.\n\n(d) that in all other respects the .", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18917, "end_char": 18928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20589, "end_char": 20598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20630, "end_char": 20636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21358, "end_char": 21367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daulta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21587, "end_char": 21593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the respondent Daulta establishes that the \"Om flag\" is a religious symbol, the que&tion will arise whether the use of or appeal to the Om flag was made in the election campaign for furtherance of his prospects by Sidhanti or by his agents or other persons with his consent or the consent of his election agent.", "canonical_name": "Daulta"}}, {"text": "Macdonell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22078, "end_char": 22087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Macdonell in his A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary states that \"Om\" is the sacred syllable used in invocations, at the commencement of prayers, at the beginning and the end of Vedic recitation, and as a respectful salutation: it is a subject of many mystical speculations."}}, {"text": "Monier-William", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22388, "end_char": 22402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Sanskrit-English Dictionary by Monier-William it is said that '\"Om\" is a sacred exclamation which may be uttered at the beginning and end of a reading of the Vedas or previol."}}, {"text": "December 10, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24854, "end_char": 24871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between the months of December 10, 1961 and February 18, 1962, fourteen meetings were held in the constituency as a part of the election campaign of Sidhnti."}}, {"text": "February 18, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24876, "end_char": 24893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between the months of December 10, 1961 and February 18, 1962, fourteen meetings were held in the constituency as a part of the election campaign of Sidhnti."}}, {"text": "Sidhnti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24981, "end_char": 24988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between the months of December 10, 1961 and February 18, 1962, fourteen meetings were held in the constituency as a part of the election campaign of Sidhnti.", "canonical_name": "Sidhanti's"}}, {"text": "Beri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25019, "end_char": 25023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These meetings were held at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri Madanpur, Sarnpla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma."}}, {"text": "Barhana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25025, "end_char": 25032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These meetings were held at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri Madanpur, Sarnpla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma."}}, {"text": "Dighal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25034, "end_char": 25040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These meetings were held at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri Madanpur, Sarnpla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma."}}, {"text": "Akheri Madanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25042, "end_char": 25057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These meetings were held at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri Madanpur, Sarnpla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma."}}, {"text": "Sarnpla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25059, "end_char": 25066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These meetings were held at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri Madanpur, Sarnpla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma."}}, {"text": "Ladpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25068, "end_char": 25074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These meetings were held at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri Madanpur, Sarnpla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma."}}, {"text": "Pakasma", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25093, "end_char": 25100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These meetings were held at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri Madanpur, Sarnpla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma."}}, {"text": "Assaudha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25102, "end_char": 25110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assaudha."}}, {"text": "Jhajjar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25113, "end_char": 25120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jhajjar, Badlt,."}}, {"text": "Dulehra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25130, "end_char": 25137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh."}}, {"text": "Sisana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25139, "end_char": 25145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh."}}, {"text": "Bahadurgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25150, "end_char": 25161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh."}}, {"text": "February 4, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25227, "end_char": 25243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "one more meeting on February 4, 1962, at Rohtak town which is outside the Jhajjar constituency."}}, {"text": "Assaudha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25440, "end_char": 25448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assaudha, Jhajjar, Badli, Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh 'Om' flag was exhibited in furtherance of the election prospects of Sidhanti and with that view the High Court bas agreed."}}, {"text": "Badli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25459, "end_char": 25464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assaudha, Jhajjar, Badli, Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh 'Om' flag was exhibited in furtherance of the election prospects of Sidhanti and with that view the High Court bas agreed."}}, {"text": "Sisana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25475, "end_char": 25481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assaudha, Jhajjar, Badli, Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh 'Om' flag was exhibited in furtherance of the election prospects of Sidhanti and with that view the High Court bas agreed."}}, {"text": "Bahadurgarh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25486, "end_char": 25497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assaudha, Jhajjar, Badli, Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh 'Om' flag was exhibited in furtherance of the election prospects of Sidhanti and with that view the High Court bas agreed."}}, {"text": "Majra Dubaldhan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25690, "end_char": 25705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal\n\nalso held that there was no reliable evidence that at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962, and at Rohtak town on February 4, 1962, 'Om' flag was used as a religious symbol."}}, {"text": "Roop Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26522, "end_char": 26530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses for Daulta were Roop Ram, Sukhi Ram and Ramdhari Balmiki."}}, {"text": "Sukhi Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26532, "end_char": 26541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses for Daulta were Roop Ram, Sukhi Ram and Ramdhari Balmiki."}}, {"text": "Ramdhari Balmiki", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26546, "end_char": 26562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses for Daulta were Roop Ram, Sukhi Ram and Ramdhari Balmiki."}}, {"text": "Piare Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26624, "end_char": 26633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses who supported the case of the appellant were Piare Lal, Prof. Sher Singh and Jug Lal."}}, {"text": "Sher Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26641, "end_char": 26651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses who supported the case of the appellant were Piare Lal, Prof. Sher Singh and Jug Lal."}}, {"text": "Jug Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26656, "end_char": 26663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses who supported the case of the appellant were Piare Lal, Prof. Sher Singh and Jug Lal."}}, {"text": "Piare Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26996, "end_char": 27005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roop Ram-a police constable-has deposed that about mid-day on January 19, 1962, a meeting was held at Majra Dubaldhan and that at that meeting Piare Lal sang a bhajan about the Om flag and he saw the Om flag flying on the panda/ of the meeting which was attended by four to five thousand persons.", "canonical_name": "Piare Lal Bhajnik"}}, {"text": "Nanhu Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27176, "end_char": 27185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the witness Nanhu Ram, Badlu Ram, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, Bhagwan Dev, Ramdhani Balmiki, Attar Singh, Prof. Sher Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev made speeches, that Acharya Bhagwan Dev in the course of his speech asked people not to vote for Daulta but to vote for the candidate who was seeking election on the Hariana Lok Samiti ticket."}}, {"text": "Badlu Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27187, "end_char": 27196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the witness Nanhu Ram, Badlu Ram, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, Bhagwan Dev, Ramdhani Balmiki, Attar Singh, Prof. Sher Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev made speeches, that Acharya Bhagwan Dev in the course of his speech asked people not to vote for Daulta but to vote for the candidate who was seeking election on the Hariana Lok Samiti ticket."}}, {"text": "Jagdev Singh Sidhanti", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27198, "end_char": 27219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the witness Nanhu Ram, Badlu Ram, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, Bhagwan Dev, Ramdhani Balmiki, Attar Singh, Prof. Sher Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev made speeches, that Acharya Bhagwan Dev in the course of his speech asked people not to vote for Daulta but to vote for the candidate who was seeking election on the Hariana Lok Samiti ticket."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Dev", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27221, "end_char": 27232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the witness Nanhu Ram, Badlu Ram, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, Bhagwan Dev, Ramdhani Balmiki, Attar Singh, Prof. Sher Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev made speeches, that Acharya Bhagwan Dev in the course of his speech asked people not to vote for Daulta but to vote for the candidate who was seeking election on the Hariana Lok Samiti ticket."}}, {"text": "Ramdhani Balmiki", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27234, "end_char": 27250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the witness Nanhu Ram, Badlu Ram, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, Bhagwan Dev, Ramdhani Balmiki, Attar Singh, Prof. Sher Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev made speeches, that Acharya Bhagwan Dev in the course of his speech asked people not to vote for Daulta but to vote for the candidate who was seeking election on the Hariana Lok Samiti ticket."}}, {"text": "Attar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27252, "end_char": 27263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the witness Nanhu Ram, Badlu Ram, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, Bhagwan Dev, Ramdhani Balmiki, Attar Singh, Prof. Sher Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev made speeches, that Acharya Bhagwan Dev in the course of his speech asked people not to vote for Daulta but to vote for the candidate who was seeking election on the Hariana Lok Samiti ticket."}}, {"text": "Ganesh Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27831, "end_char": 27842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal ref1Jsed to place reliance upon the testimony of this witness and of another police constable Ganesh Dass who claimed to have remained present in the various political meetings."}}, {"text": "Sidhanti\n\nlagdev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28031, "end_char": 28053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the witness had memorised the so-called reports and the same were not made available to counsel for Sidhanti\n\nlagdev Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\nhah J.\n\nShah I\n\nto challenge the truth of."}}, {"text": "hah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28071, "end_char": 28074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the witness had memorised the so-called reports and the same were not made available to counsel for Sidhanti\n\nlagdev Singh •• Pratap Singh\n\nhah J.\n\nShah I\n\nto challenge the truth of.", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "Sukhi Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28371, "end_char": 28380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukhi Ram deposed that he was a sarpanch of Dubaldhan Panchayat for about two years, and that he was present at the meeting convened by the Hariana Lok Sarniti on January 19, 1962, for canvassing votes for the candidates of Hariana Lok Sarniti, that Prof. Sher Singh and Sidhanti came in a jeep on which there was flying flag with 'Orn' inscribed thereon, that he saw several other vehicles flying the Orn flag and that the vehicle in which he went to the meeting also was carrying the Om flag."}}, {"text": "Dubaldhan Panchayat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28415, "end_char": 28434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukhi Ram deposed that he was a sarpanch of Dubaldhan Panchayat for about two years, and that he was present at the meeting convened by the Hariana Lok Sarniti on January 19, 1962, for canvassing votes for the candidates of Hariana Lok Sarniti, that Prof. Sher Singh and Sidhanti came in a jeep on which there was flying flag with 'Orn' inscribed thereon, that he saw several other vehicles flying the Orn flag and that the vehicle in which he went to the meeting also was carrying the Om flag."}}, {"text": "Hariana Lok Sarniti", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28511, "end_char": 28530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukhi Ram deposed that he was a sarpanch of Dubaldhan Panchayat for about two years, and that he was present at the meeting convened by the Hariana Lok Sarniti on January 19, 1962, for canvassing votes for the candidates of Hariana Lok Sarniti, that Prof. Sher Singh and Sidhanti came in a jeep on which there was flying flag with 'Orn' inscribed thereon, that he saw several other vehicles flying the Orn flag and that the vehicle in which he went to the meeting also was carrying the Om flag."}}, {"text": "Ma jra Dubaldhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29097, "end_char": 29113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tended was poor, whereas his recollection about the meeting held at Ma jra Dubaldhan was very clear, and that the reasons given by the witness for specially remembering the details of the proceedings of the meeting in Majra Dubaldhan and not of other meetings could not be accepted.", "canonical_name": "Ma jra Dubaldhan"}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29516, "end_char": 29535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view of the Tribunal the witness was interested in Daulta, and this inference was supported by the fact that Dauila had sent him a copy of his election petition before it was even presented to the Election Commission."}}, {"text": "Ram Nath Sapra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32411, "end_char": 32425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses in support of the case of Daulta are Ram Nath Sapra, Dafedar Singh, K. K. Katya!"}}, {"text": "Dafedar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32427, "end_char": 32440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses in support of the case of Daulta are Ram Nath Sapra, Dafedar Singh, K. K. Katya!"}}, {"text": "K. K. Katya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32442, "end_char": 32453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses in support of the case of Daulta are Ram Nath Sapra, Dafedar Singh, K. K. Katya!"}}, {"text": "Satyavrat Bedi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32459, "end_char": 32473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Satyavrat Bedi."}}, {"text": "Bharat Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32572, "end_char": 32584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principal witnesses who were examined by Sidhanti in respect of this meeting were Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev."}}, {"text": "Budh Dev", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32586, "end_char": 32594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principal witnesses who were examined by Sidhanti in respect of this meeting were Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev."}}, {"text": "Ram Nath Sapra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32650, "end_char": 32664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5~•h J.\n\nShah J.\n\nRam Nath Sapra who is a correspondent of several newspapers deposed that he had attended the meeting at Rohtak town at Anaj Mandi 10 or 12 days before the actual polling."}}, {"text": "Sidhanti", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33522, "end_char": 33530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The testimony of the witness therefore was \"far from convincing\" and the testimony of Sidhanti, Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev, Prof. Sher Singh and Bhagwan Dev was more reliable."}}, {"text": "Bharat Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33543, "end_char": 33555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The testimony of the witness therefore was \"far from convincing\" and the testimony of Sidhanti, Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev, Prof. Sher Singh and Bhagwan Dev was more reliable.", "canonical_name": "Bharat !singh"}}, {"text": "Ram Sapra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33960, "end_char": 33969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court was of the view that the witness Ram Sapra was \"wholly disinterested\" and therefore his evidence must be accepted."}}, {"text": "K. K. Katya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34612, "end_char": 34623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Katya!"}}, {"text": "Hindustan Times", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34712, "end_char": 34727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "said that he had attended the meeting at Rohtak town as a special correspondent of the Hindustan Times, Delhi and that he recollected that flags with a symbol of 'Orn' inscribed thereon were seen flying on some\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT H.EPORTS\n\nvehicles but it was not possible for him to say who owned those vehicles, but from the flags and placards carried on the vehicles it appeared that they were of the Hariana Lok Samiti."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34729, "end_char": 34734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "said that he had attended the meeting at Rohtak town as a special correspondent of the Hindustan Times, Delhi and that he recollected that flags with a symbol of 'Orn' inscribed thereon were seen flying on some\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT H.EPORTS\n\nvehicles but it was not possible for him to say who owned those vehicles, but from the flags and placards carried on the vehicles it appeared that they were of the Hariana Lok Samiti."}}, {"text": "Samp1a", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35472, "end_char": 35478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also stated that he had seen some shopkeepers in Samp1a and Bahadurgarh flying Om flags on their stalls."}}, {"text": "Katya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35737, "end_char": 35742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While generally agreeing with this view, the High Court observed that the testimony of the witness Katya!"}}, {"text": "Satyavrat Bedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35957, "end_char": 35971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satyavrat Bedi who is staff correspondent of the Indian Express stated that during his survey of the election campaign he visited Sampla, Bahadurgarh and Rohtak in one day, and made his report about his observations to the newspaper Indian Express, in which he had recorded that religious synibols and religion were being frequently used for damaging the chances of success of Daulta, that he had seen a large number of flags fluttering on many house tops."}}, {"text": "Om", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36480, "end_char": 36482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the flag on the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti was that of Om and the other organisations had their own flags, that he saw the Om flag fluttering on the office of Sidhanti at Sampla but he did not remember whether there was any flag of 'Om' at his election office at Bahadurgarh."}}, {"text": "Pratap Sinpb", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37182, "end_char": 37194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court took a different view and observed that apart from any other infirmity regarding the use of the reports made by the witness, the statement made by him about his observation that he had seen the Om flag flying on the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti and on the motor-vehicle of Bharat Singh could not be ruled out: It must be remembered however that we are concerned at this stage with the\n\nShah J.\n\nJar; dev s; nh •• Pratap Sinpb\n\nShah J.\n\nquestion whether in the meeting at Rohtak on February 4,\n\n1962.", "canonical_name": "PRATAP SINGH DAULTA"}}, {"text": "February 4,\n\n1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37250, "end_char": 37267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court took a different view and observed that apart from any other infirmity regarding the use of the reports made by the witness, the statement made by him about his observation that he had seen the Om flag flying on the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti and on the motor-vehicle of Bharat Singh could not be ruled out: It must be remembered however that we are concerned at this stage with the\n\nShah J.\n\nJar; dev s; nh •• Pratap Sinpb\n\nShah J.\n\nquestion whether in the meeting at Rohtak on February 4,\n\n1962."}}, {"text": "Ram Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37376, "end_char": 37386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Ram Sharma was a candidate for election on behalf of a political party called \"the Hariana Front\"."}}, {"text": "Hariana Tilak", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37777, "end_char": 37790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that he contributed a number of articles to Hariana Tilak, Rohtak, founded by him in which he had published on January 4, 1962, an article condemning the use of the Om flag for the purpose of elections."}}, {"text": "January 4, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37844, "end_char": 37859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that he contributed a number of articles to Hariana Tilak, Rohtak, founded by him in which he had published on January 4, 1962, an article condemning the use of the Om flag for the purpose of elections."}}, {"text": "February 4, 1 \\162", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38052, "end_char": 38070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The article published on January 4, 1962, can have no bearing on the use of the flag at Rohtak in the meeting dated February 4, 1 \\162."}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Dev Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40284, "end_char": 40302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was conceded by Sidhanti that Bhagwan Dev Sharma an Arya Samaj leader had been accustomed for many years past to carry on his motor-vehicle a pennant bearing the Om mark and his name.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwan Dev Sharma"}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Dev Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 40446, "end_char": 40464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Witness Bhagwan Dev Sharma stated that he had attended the meetings of the Hariana Lok Samiti and had addressed them because he agreed with their ideology and thought that the institution was for the benefit of the Hindu religion, that he had never been asked to remove the Om flag from his jeep when he reached those meetings and that he had not attended those meetings either on account of Prof. Sher Singh or Sidhanti but \"in his independent capacity as a citizen of India having a right to\n\nvote\", and that he approved of the candidature of Sidhanti in preference to that of his opponent."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41438, "end_char": 41440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bharat !singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41596, "end_char": 41609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lag by Bharat !", "canonical_name": "Bharat !singh"}}, {"text": "Jagdev Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41703, "end_char": 41715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "singh when he is alleged to have taken out a pr()l;; eSSion does not appear to be reliablr..\n\n19M\n\nJagdev Singh •• Pratap 5ingh\n\nShah J.\n\n• 1961\n\nShah l\n\nOn a careful survey of the testimony of the witnesses we are unable to agree with the conclusions recorded by the High Court that:\n\n(a) Sidhanti \"had used an office of the Hariana Lok\n\nSamiti on which the \"Om flag\" was flying for election purposes and further that he gave election speeches at a panda/ where the Om flag was fluttering in furtherance of his prospects at the election\";\n\n<h) \"the agents and supporters delivered speeches about the \"Om flag\" at the meeting held at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19.", "canonical_name": "JAGDEV SINGH SID.'IANTI"}}, {"text": "Danita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42979, "end_char": 42985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In considering whether appeals were made to the electorate to vote for Sidhanti on the ground of his language or to refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of Danita's language, it is necessary in the first instance lo ascertain the true meaning of the expression \"on the ground of his language\"."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43120, "end_char": 43126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43430, "end_char": 43440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43674, "end_char": 43684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagdev Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43884, "end_char": 43896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdev Singh ..\n\nThe Constitution has thereby conferred the right, among Pratap Singh others, to conserve their language upon the citizens of India.", "canonical_name": "JAGDEV SINGH SID.'IANTI"}}, {"text": "Pratap Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43957, "end_char": 43969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdev Singh ..\n\nThe Constitution has thereby conferred the right, among Pratap Singh others, to conserve their language upon the citizens of India.", "canonical_name": "PRATAP SINGH DAULTA"}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44311, "end_char": 44320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44328, "end_char": 44360, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44406, "end_char": 44415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44486, "end_char": 44496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44498, "end_char": 44508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123(3) and 124(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44936, "end_char": 44957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44965, "end_char": 44997, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45077, "end_char": 45084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45189, "end_char": 45221, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45344, "end_char": 45354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 (1 )(a) of the Constitution, and the Court in negativing the contention held that the provisions of the Representation of the People Act did not stop a man from speaking: they merely prescribed conditions which must be observed if a candidate wanted to enter Parliament."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45737, "end_char": 45743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45984, "end_char": 45990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46001, "end_char": 46007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagdtv Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46151, "end_char": 46163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136-159 S.C.-49\n\n196f\n\nJagdtv Singh 'f, Pratap Singh\n\nShah J.\n\nparticular language of the candidate that a corrupt practice may be deemed to be committed.", "canonical_name": "JAGDEV SINGH SID.'IANTI"}}, {"text": "Dau!ta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47542, "end_char": 47548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C' & 'D' clearly shows that it was the case of Dau!ta that Sidhanti had said that if the electorate wanted to protect their language they should vote for the Hariana Lok Samiti candidate.", "canonical_name": "Daulta"}}, {"text": "Hatiana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49627, "end_char": 49634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that in the Hatiana region, Hindi is the predominant language of the people and if a section of the"}}, {"text": "Sita~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50817, "end_char": 50822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereby it could not be said that the voters were asked not to vote for Daulta on the i:round of his language, assuming that it was other than\n\nJagdtv Sill611 ...\n\nPratap Singh\n\nSita~ J.\n\nIHI Hindi."}}, {"text": "Pralap Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50963, "end_char": 50975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pralap Singh\n\nSlooli J.\n\nThe evidence which has been referred to by the High Court regarding the speeches made by Badlu Ram and Harphul Singh on December IO, 1961, at Beri on the face of it shows that the speeches were an attack against Daulta in respect of his political conduct, behaviour and beliefs.", "canonical_name": "PRATAP SINGH DAULTA"}}, {"text": "Slooli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50977, "end_char": 50983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pralap Singh\n\nSlooli J.\n\nThe evidence which has been referred to by the High Court regarding the speeches made by Badlu Ram and Harphul Singh on December IO, 1961, at Beri on the face of it shows that the speeches were an attack against Daulta in respect of his political conduct, behaviour and beliefs."}}, {"text": "Harphul Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51091, "end_char": 51104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pralap Singh\n\nSlooli J.\n\nThe evidence which has been referred to by the High Court regarding the speeches made by Badlu Ram and Harphul Singh on December IO, 1961, at Beri on the face of it shows that the speeches were an attack against Daulta in respect of his political conduct, behaviour and beliefs."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52564, "end_char": 52570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52697, "end_char": 52703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_773_780_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "fi S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 773\n\nHIRALAL PRABHUBHAI AND OTHERS\n\nNAGINDAS ATMARAM KHATRI\n\nIK. SUBBA RAo AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nBombay T<nancy Agricultural Lands Act (Bom. LXV/l of 1948), ss. 88 and 89-Suit for eviction-Agricultural land within two miles of the limir.r of Municipalily-Applicubility of Act.\n\n'fhe respondent gave aotice to the appellants terminating the lease of agricultural land situated within two miles of the limits of the Municipality and filed a suit for eviction. The suit was contested, inter alia, on the ground that under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, the defendants had acquired tenancy rights.\n\nThe civil Judge, inter alia, held that the 1939 Act was repealed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948, which did not apply to the suit land, as it was within two n1iie~ of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality and decreed the suit.\n\nOn appeal, the District Judge held that the 1948 Act applied to the Suit land and set aside tpe decree of the trial Court.\n\nIn second appeal by the plaintiff, the High Court held that the suit land was within two miles of the limit:. of the Municipality and therefore, the 1948 Act did not :.tppJy to the suit land. On appeal by Special Leave the appellants contended that their rie; hts under the 1939 Act were saved and preserved under s. 89(2) of the 1948 Act with the result that the lease extended to IO years under the 1939 Act was saved thereunder, and by reason of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment} Act, 1952, which brought the suit land within the scope of the 1948 Act, their rights so preserved came to be governed by the provisions of rhe 1948 Act and, therefore, they could not be evicted except in the manner prescribed tiy the provisions of the Act. The respondent contended that\n\nthe savin& provi•ion in s. 89(2) of the 1948 Act operates only if there is no express provision to the contrary and that the saving of the appellant'• right would be otiose, as he could not enforce his right under the 1948 Act.\n\nHeld: (i) Before the suit was disposed of, the 1952 Act came into force, and by reason of the extension of the 1948 Act to the suit land, the respondent could not evict the appellants except in the manner prescribed by the 1948 Act.\n\n(ii) The respondent's contention must be rejected.\n\nThere is an express provision found in s. 88(1) of the 1948 Act, in as much as it says that the provisions of ss. 1 to 87 will not apply to the area in question.\n\n(iii) As there was a right recognized by law there was a remedy and, therefore. in the absence of any special provisions indicating a\n\nl!lfl\n\nFebrw,., If.\n\n1961 particular forum for enforcing a particular right the general law of the HINlalP bh land would naturally take its course. The High Court. therefore, was bhai ra U• wrong in holding that the appellants could not claim the benefit of the \"· provisions of the 1948 Act.\n\nNagindtU .A.Ima. ram.\n\nSakharam (a) Bapusaheb Nara)'an Sanos v. Manikchand Morichand Shah [1962] 2 S.C.R. S9, relied on.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 120/62.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 23, 1959, of the former Bombay High Court in Second Appeal No. 1359 of 1955.\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for the appellants.\n\n0. C. Mathur, I. B. Dadachanii and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.\n\nFebruary 14, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n'llubba Rao 1. 'SuBBA RAo J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question of the applicability of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. 1948 (Born. Act No. 67 of 1948), hereinafter called the '1948 Act', to the tenancy of the land in dispute.\n\nThe appellants are the legal representatives of one Prabhubhai Ratanji. The suit property is agricultural land situate within two miles of the limits of the Surat Municipal Borough. It was rpart of the erstwhile Sachin State.\n\nOn May 7, 1946, Nagindas Atmaram Khatri, the respondent herein, who was the owner of the said land, gave a lease of the same in favour of the said Prabhubhai Ratanji for a period of six years.\n\nOn July 28, 1948, Sachin State became part of the State of Bombay. From that date the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, heremafter called the \"1939 Act\", was made applicable to the said area.\n\nOn April 23, 1951, Nagindas Atmaram Khatri, the landlord, gave a notice to the defendant terminating the lease from March 31, 1952.\n\nAfter givfog the said notice, he filed Reg. Suit No. 403 of 1952 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Surat, for eviction of the lessee Parbhubhai Ratanji.\n\nThe suit was contes.ted on various grounds, the main contention being that under the provisions of the 1939 Act, the defendant\n\nhad acquired tenancy rights therein. As the defendant died on September 30, 1955, his legal representatives were Hlralal Prabhu brought on record in his place. The learned Civil Judge, bhal inter alia, held that the 1939 Act was repealed by the 1948 Nagindu•· Allfllloo Act and that the latter Act did not ply to the suit land, ram as it was within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough subba Rao J.\n\nMunicipality. On that finding, he gave a decree for possession, arrears of rent and mesne profits. Against the said decree, the defendant preferred an appeal to the District Judge.\n\nThe learned District Judge held that the landlord failed to prove that the suit property was within a distance of two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality and, on that finding, he came to the conclusion that the 1948 Act applied to the suit land and set aside the decree of the trial court awarding possession to the plaintiff, but maintained the decree for arrears of rent. Thereupon, the plaintiff preferred a second appeal to the High Court insofar as the decree of the District Court went against him. The said appeal came up before a Division Bench of that High Court. The High Court held that the suit land was within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municiipality and that, therefore, the 1948 Act did not apply to the suit land.\n\nOn that finding, it set aside the decree passed by the learned District Judge and restored that passed by the learned Civil Judge. The legal representatives of the defendant have preferred the present appeal.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants contended that the High Court should have held that tbe rights of the pellants under the 1939 Act were saved by the 1948 Act. He contended broadly that the right of the appellants under the 1939 Act were preserved under s. 89(2) of the 1948 Act, with the result that the lease extended to 10 years under the 1939 Act was saved thereunder, and that by reason of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1952 (Born. Act 33 of 1952), hereinafter called the \"1952 Act'', which brought the suit land within the scope of the 1948 Act, their rights so preserved came to be governed by the provisions of the 1948 Act and, therefore, the respondent could not evict them except in the manner prescribed by the provisions of that Act.\n\n196# To appreciate the contentions of the parties it is neces fi1ralal-Prabhusary to trace briefly the history of the relevant provisions. bhai Section 23 ( 1 ) of the 1939 Act, as amended by the 1946 Naginda:· Atma- Aot, read : ram\n\nSubba Rao I \"(a) No lease of any land situated in any area in which this section comes into force made after the date of the coming into force of this section in such area, shall be for a period of less than\n\n10 years; and\n\n(b) every lease subsisting on the said date or made after the said date in respect of any land in such area sha!J be deemed to be for a period of not less than l 0 years.\"\n\nThe 1939 Act was repealed by the 1948 Act. Section 88 ( 1) of the 1948 Act, as it stood before the amendment by the\n\n1952 Act, read:\n\n\"Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply-\n\n{ a)\n\n(b)\n\n( c) to any area within the limits of Greater Bombay or within the limits of the Municipal Borough of. ..... Surat. ; .... and within a distance of 2 miles of the limits such boroughs.\"\n\nSection 89 thereof read :\n\n\"(I ) The enactment specified in the schedule is\n\nhereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the fourth column thereof.\n\n(2) But nothing in this Act or any repeal effected thereby-\n\n( a)\n\n(b) shall save as expressly provided in this Act affect or deemed to affect,\n\n( i) any right, title, interest, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or Hiralal Pro,..,._ incurred before the commencement hhal\n\nV, of this Act; ........ \".\n\nNagindas\n\nA.-\n\nSCHEDULE I\n\n-~-·------- ----------------\n\nYear No.\n\nShort Title Extent of repeal\n\n1 2 3 4 -----------------------\n\nXXIX The Bombay Ten- The whole except sections ancy Act, 1939. 3, 3-A and 4 as modified in the following manner . ..\n\n~--------------------- Section 88 of the 1948 Act was amended by the 1952 Act.\n\nThe relevant part of the amended section reads :\n\n\" ( I) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply-\n\n( a)\n\n(b)\n\n( c) to any area within the limits of Greater Bombay within the limits of the Municipal Corporations constituted under tli.e Bombay Provincial Municipal Co!ipOration Act, 1949, within the limits of the Municipal Boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, and within the limits of any cantonment; ......... \".\n\nThe gist of the provisions in their application to a lease of agricultural land situated within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality may be stated thus : Such a lease subsisting on the date of the amending Act of 1946, which came into force on April 11, 1946, shall be deemed to be for a period of not less than I 0 years. The 1939 Act was repealed by the 1948 Act. Under s. 88(1) (c)\n\nram\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nt06f ot the 1948 Act, the provisions of that Act were not applic- Rirt11al-Prt1bhu able to any area within the municipal limits of the said\n\nbhal borough of Surat and within a distance of two .miles of the Nailnd.;· Atma limits of the said borough; but the right, title and interest\n\n•am of a lessee in such area was preserved under s. 89(2) (b) (i)\n\n.ubba Rao 1. of the said Act.\n\nSection 8 8 ( 1) of the 1948 Act, among other things, was amended by the 1952 Act, which came into force on January 12, 1953.\n\nBy the said amendment the 1948 Act was extended to any area within a distance . of two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality.\n\nWith the result. all the provisions of the 1948 Act would be applicable to a lease of agricultural land subsisting in such an area after the amendment came into force. If so, . such a lease can be terminated only in the manner prescribed by s. 14 thereof.\n\nWhat is the effect of this legal position on the facts of the present case? The relevant facts on which there is really no dispute may now be stated.\n\nThe lease deed between the appellants' predecessor and the respondent w:is executed on May 7, 1946, for a period of six years commencing from May 3, 1946; that is to say,\n\nit would expire in the ordinary course on May 2, 1952.\n\nSachin State became part of the Bombay State from July 28.\n\n1948. After it became part of the Bombay State, the 1939 Act, as amended by the 1946 Act, was extended to that State; with the result the lease which would have expired in May 1952 was statutorily extended by another 4 years, that is, till May 1956. On December 28, 1948, the 1948 Act came into force.\n\nThat Act repealed the 1939 Act. It also exempted the lands within , the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality and also lands within two miles of the limits of the said Municipality from the operation of the provisions of the said Act.\n\nBut, it saved the right or interest of the lessee which he had acquired under the 1939 Act. When the 1952 Act came into force on January 12,\n\n1953, the said lease, protected under the saving clause, was subsisting. By the said amendment, the 1948 Act was made applicable to the land in question which is within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality.\n\nWith the result, the interest of the appellants could be terminated\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RI<; P(JRTS 779\n\nonly under s. 14 of the 1948 Act. On April 23, 1951, the respondent gave a notice to the appellants terminating the Hiralal Prabhulease from March 31, 1952, and filed the suit for eviction bliai .. on April 21, 1952. But before the suit was dis.posed of, the Nagindas At,,,... 1952 Act came into force, and by reason of the extension ram of the 1948 Act to the said land, ¢he respondent could not Subba Rao J. evict the appellants except in the manner prescribed by the 1948 Act. The High Court, therefore, was wrong in holding that the appellants could not daim the benefit of the provisions of the 1948 Act\n\nAt this stage another argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondent may also be noticed. The argument is that the saving provision in s. 89 (2) operates only if there is no express provision to the contrary, but such an express provision is found in s. 88 (1), inasmuch as it says that the provisions of ss. 1 to 87 will not apply to the area in question.\n\nIt is further contended that the saving of the appellant's right would be otiose, as he could not enforce his right under the Act. . A similar argument was advanced but was repelled by this Court in Sakharam alias Bapusaheb Narayan Sanas v.\n\nManikchand Motichand Shah ( 1 ).\n\nThere the lands in dispute were situ3!te within two miles of the limits of the Poona Municipal Borough.\n\nThe question was whether the rights of the appellants as protected tenants were affected by the repeal. This Court held that the provisions of s. 88 ( 1) were entirely prospective and that they applied to lands of the description contained in the said Set\"tion from the date on which the Act came into force and that they were not intended, in any sense, to beof confiscatory character. When it was further contended that the right would be illusory, as it could not be enforced under the Act, this Court pointed out that as there was a right recognized by law there was a remedy and, therefore,_ in the absence of any special provisions indicating a particular forum for enforcing a particular right the general law of the land would naturally take its course.\n\nThis decision is binding on us. We, therefore, reject this contention.\n\n----···---\n\nl I) [1962] l S.C.R. 59.\n\nIPM Even so, learned counsel for the resflondent contended Hiralal-Prabhuthat in the view taken by the High Court it had become bhai unnecessary for it to give its findings on two of the important Nagind:· Atmaissues that arose in the case, namely, issues 3 a.'!d 4, which ram are as follows :\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nIssue 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that he wants\n\nFebruary 14.\n\npossession for bona fide personal cultivation.\n\nIssue 4. Whether the defendant proves that he had not damaged the suit property in view of the decision in Reg. C. Suit No. 619 of 1950 by the Joint Civil Judge (J.D.J, Surat;\n\nHe, therefore, pointed out that the matter would have to be remanded to the High Court for its decision on the said two points.\n\nIn view of the supervening circumstances, it is not possible to accede to this argument. As pointed out earlier, on April 23, 1951, the respondent issued the notice on the ground that the tenancy of six years would expire on March 31, 1952. But by reason of the 1939 Act the tenancy was statutorily extended till 1956. So the said notice had become ineffective and the respondent would not be entitled to any relief on its basis.\n\nIt would be open to him to take any appropriate proceedings, which the law allows, m a proper tribunal. In the circumstances the only course open to us is to set aside the decree of the High -Court and to restore that of the Dirstict Judge. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nS. M. KARIM v.\n\nMST. BIBI SAKINA\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)\n\nBenami Transaction-Protection under s. 66-lf available to transfertt-\n\nSub-s. (2) applies to creditors-Suit for adverse possession, if lie.r- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), •· 66.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "773\n\nHIRALAL PRABHUBHAI AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HIRALAL PRABHUBHAI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NAGINDAS ATMARAM KHATRI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAGINDAS ATMARAM KHATRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IK. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Agricultural Lands Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 88 and 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Lands Act", "statute": "Agricultural Lands Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 578, "end_char": 602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act was repealed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 697, "end_char": 767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Surat Borough Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 856, "end_char": 882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The civil Judge, inter alia, held that the 1939 Act was repealed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948, which did not apply to the suit land, as it was within two n1iie~ of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality and decreed the suit."}}, {"text": "s. 89(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1344, "end_char": 1352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was repealed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948", "statute": "Act was repealed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 89(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1846, "end_char": 1854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2376, "end_char": 2384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 1 to 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2447, "end_char": 2458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3035, "end_char": 3037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3250, "end_char": 3265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. S. Narasimhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3270, "end_char": 3286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3312, "end_char": 3321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, I. B. Dadachanii and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "I. B. Dadachanii", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3323, "end_char": 3339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, I. B. Dadachanii and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3344, "end_char": 3359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, I. B. Dadachanii and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "'llubba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n'llubba Rao 1. '"}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3462, "end_char": 3471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SuBBA RAo J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question of the applicability of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "Prabhubhai Ratanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3755, "end_char": 3773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are the legal representatives of one Prabhubhai Ratanji.", "canonical_name": "Prabhubhai Ratanji"}}, {"text": "Surat Municipal Borough", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3860, "end_char": 3883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit property is agricultural land situate within two miles of the limits of the Surat Municipal Borough."}}, {"text": "May 7, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3933, "end_char": 3944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 7, 1946, Nagindas Atmaram Khatri, the respondent herein, who was the owner of the said land, gave a lease of the same in favour of the said Prabhubhai Ratanji for a period of six years."}}, {"text": "Nagindas Atmaram Khatri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3946, "end_char": 3969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 7, 1946, Nagindas Atmaram Khatri, the respondent herein, who was the owner of the said land, gave a lease of the same in favour of the said Prabhubhai Ratanji for a period of six years.", "canonical_name": "NAGINDAS ATMARAM KHATRI"}}, {"text": "July 28, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4127, "end_char": 4140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 28, 1948, Sachin State became part of the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Sachin State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4142, "end_char": 4154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 28, 1948, Sachin State became part of the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4174, "end_char": 4189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 28, 1948, Sachin State became part of the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "From that date the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4191, "end_char": 4234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 23, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4312, "end_char": 4326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 23, 1951, Nagindas Atmaram Khatri, the landlord, gave a notice to the defendant terminating the lease from March 31, 1952."}}, {"text": "Nagindas Atmaram Khatri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4328, "end_char": 4351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 23, 1951, Nagindas Atmaram Khatri, the landlord, gave a notice to the defendant terminating the lease from March 31, 1952.", "canonical_name": "NAGINDAS ATMARAM KHATRI"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Surat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4527, "end_char": 4551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "403 of 1952 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Surat, for eviction of the lessee Parbhubhai Ratanji."}}, {"text": "Parbhubhai Ratanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4580, "end_char": 4598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "403 of 1952 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Surat, for eviction of the lessee Parbhubhai Ratanji.", "canonical_name": "Prabhubhai Ratanji"}}, {"text": "September 30, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4791, "end_char": 4809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the defendant died on September 30, 1955, his legal representatives were Hlralal Prabhu brought on record in his place."}}, {"text": "Hlralal Prabhu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4842, "end_char": 4856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the defendant died on September 30, 1955, his legal representatives were Hlralal Prabhu brought on record in his place."}}, {"text": "Allfllloo Act and that the latter Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4989, "end_char": 5026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Civil Judge, bhal inter alia, held that the 1939 Act was repealed by the 1948 Nagindu•· Allfllloo Act and that the latter Act did not ply to the suit land, ram as it was within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough subba Rao J.\n\nMunicipality.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "Surat Borough Municiipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 6018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the suit land was within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municiipality and that, therefore, the 1948 Act did not apply to the suit land."}}, {"text": "s. 89(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6551, "end_char": 6559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7218, "end_char": 7228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7308, "end_char": 7317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bhai Section 23 ( 1 ) of the 1939 Act, as amended by the 1946 Naginda:· Atma- Aot, read : ram\n\nSubba Rao I \"(a) No lease of any land situated in any area in which this section comes into force made after the date of the coming into force of this section in such area, shall be for a period of less than\n\n10 years; and\n\n(b) every lease subsisting on the said date or made after the said date in respect of any land in such area sha!J be deemed to be for a period of not less than l 0 years.\"", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "Section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7748, "end_char": 7758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8100, "end_char": 8110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "XXIX The Bombay Ten- The whole except sections ancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8695, "end_char": 8756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8836, "end_char": 8846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "XXIX The Bombay Ten- The whole except sections ancy Act, 1939", "statute": "XXIX The Bombay Ten- The whole except sections ancy Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Oration Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9181, "end_char": 9198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipal Boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 11, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9623, "end_char": 9637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The gist of the provisions in their application to a lease of agricultural land situated within two miles of the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality may be stated thus : Such a lease subsisting on the date of the amending Act of 1946, which came into force on April 11, 1946, shall be deemed to be for a period of not less than I 0 years."}}, {"text": "s. 88(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9751, "end_char": 9759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Municipal Boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Municipal Boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9770, "end_char": 9779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 88(1) (c)\n\nram\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nt06f ot the 1948 Act, the provisions of that Act were not applic- Rirt11al-Prt1bhu able to any area within the municipal limits of the said\n\nbhal borough of Surat and within a distance of two .miles of the Nailnd.;·", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "Surat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9941, "end_char": 9946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 88(1) (c)\n\nram\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nt06f ot the 1948 Act, the provisions of that Act were not applic- Rirt11al-Prt1bhu able to any area within the municipal limits of the said\n\nbhal borough of Surat and within a distance of two .miles of the Nailnd.;·"}}, {"text": "s. 89(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10117, "end_char": 10125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Municipal Boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Municipal Boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": ".ubba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10135, "end_char": 10144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atma limits of the said borough; but the right, title and interest\n\n•am of a lessee in such area was preserved under s. 89(2) (b) (i)\n\n.ubba Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10166, "end_char": 10175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Municipal Boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Municipal Boroughs constituted under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "January 12, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10274, "end_char": 10290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 8 8 ( 1) of the 1948 Act, among other things, was amended by the 1952 Act, which came into force on January 12, 1953."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10677, "end_char": 10682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 3, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10986, "end_char": 10997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease deed between the appellants' predecessor and the respondent w:is executed on May 7, 1946, for a period of six years commencing from May 3, 1946; that is to say,\n\nit would expire in the ordinary course on May 2, 1952."}}, {"text": "May 2, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11058, "end_char": 11069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease deed between the appellants' predecessor and the respondent w:is executed on May 7, 1946, for a period of six years commencing from May 3, 1946; that is to say,\n\nit would expire in the ordinary course on May 2, 1952."}}, {"text": "Sachin State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11072, "end_char": 11084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin State became part of the Bombay State from July 28."}}, {"text": "July 28.\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11122, "end_char": 11136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin State became part of the Bombay State from July 28."}}, {"text": "December 28, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11385, "end_char": 11402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 28, 1948, the 1948 Act came into force."}}, {"text": "Surat Borough Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11521, "end_char": 11547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also exempted the lands within , the limits of the Surat Borough Municipality and also lands within two miles of the limits of the said Municipality from the operation of the provisions of the said Act."}}, {"text": "January 12,\n\n1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11803, "end_char": 11820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the 1952 Act came into force on January 12,\n\n1953, the said lease, protected under the saving clause, was subsisting."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12166, "end_char": 12171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 21, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12356, "end_char": 12370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 23, 1951, the respondent gave a notice to the appellants terminating the Hiralal Prabhulease from March 31, 1952, and filed the suit for eviction bliai .. on April 21, 1952."}}, {"text": "s. 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12909, "end_char": 12914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13025, "end_char": 13030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 1 to 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13079, "end_char": 13090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Poona Municipal Borough", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13487, "end_char": 13510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There the lands in dispute were situ3!te within two miles of the limits of the Poona Municipal Borough."}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13656, "end_char": 13661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hiralal-Prabhuthat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14445, "end_char": 14463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IPM Even so, learned counsel for the resflondent contended Hiralal-Prabhuthat in the view taken by the High Court it had become bhai unnecessary for it to give its findings on two of the important Nagind:· Atmaissues that arose in the case, namely, issues 3 a.'!d 4, which ram are as follows :\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nIssue 3."}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15898, "end_char": 15913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIBI SAKINA\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15918, "end_char": 15932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIBI SAKINA\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15975, "end_char": 15980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16081, "end_char": 16110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_780_784_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nIPM Even so, learned counsel for the resflondent contended Hiralal-Prabhuthat in the view taken by the High Court it had become bhai unnecessary for it to give its findings on two of the important Nagind:· Atmaissues that arose in the case, namely, issues 3 a.'!d 4, which ram are as follows :\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nIssue 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that he wants\n\nFebruary 14.\n\npossession for bona fide personal cultivation.\n\nIssue 4. Whether the defendant proves that he had not damaged the suit property in view of the decision in Reg. C. Suit No. 619 of 1950 by the Joint Civil Judge (J.D.J, Surat;\n\nHe, therefore, pointed out that the matter would have to be remanded to the High Court for its decision on the said two points.\n\nIn view of the supervening circumstances, it is not possible to accede to this argument. As pointed out earlier, on April 23, 1951, the respondent issued the notice on the ground that the tenancy of six years would expire on March 31, 1952. But by reason of the 1939 Act the tenancy was statutorily extended till 1956. So the said notice had become ineffective and the respondent would not be entitled to any relief on its basis.\n\nIt would be open to him to take any appropriate proceedings, which the law allows, m a proper tribunal. In the circumstances the only course open to us is to set aside the decree of the High -Court and to restore that of the Dirstict Judge. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nS. M. KARIM v.\n\nMST. BIBI SAKINA\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)\n\nBenami Transaction-Protection under s. 66-lf available to transfertt-\n\nSub-s. (2) applies to creditors-Suit for adverse possession, if lie.r- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), •· 66.\n\nThe appellant K claimed certain property alleging that he had purchased it from one A, who had purchased it benami in the name of one H, and H in turn had sold it to S the respondent.\n\nHeld: (i) The protection available by s. 66 of the Code of Civil l'rocedure is not only against the certified purchaser but atso against anyone claiming through him and s. 66 bars the claim.\n\nThe second sub-section refer to the claims of creditors and not of transferees, 'vhich is dealt with in the first sub-section.\n\n(ii) If the possession of the real owner ripens into title under the Limitation Act and he is dispossessed, he ..::an sue to olS'tain possession, for he does not then rely on th'.::: benan1i nature of the transaction.\n\nBut the alternative claim must be clearly made and proved.\n\nAdverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found.\n\nSukan v. Krishnand, l.L.R. 32 Pat. 352, Sri Bhagwan Sbigh v. Ram Basi Kuer, A.J.R. 1957 Pat 157 and Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasud, A.l.R. 1940 P .C. 202, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 647 of 1962.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 3, 1959 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 642 of 1957.\n\nS. P. Varma, for the appellant.\n\nS. P. Sinha, Shahzadi Mohiuddin and Shaukat Hussain, for the respondent.\n\nFebruary 14, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBibi Sakina.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal by special leave Hidayat•l/ah J. against the judgment of the High Court of Patna reversing the concurrent judgments of the two courts below, and ordering the dismissal of the suit of the appellant.\n\nThe appellant is Syed M. Karim, son of one Syed Aulad Ali and the respondent Mst. Bibi Saldna (defendant No. 11) is transferee of the properties in dispute from !fakir Alam (defendant No. 2), son-in-law of Syed Aulad Ali.\n\nThe appellant, in his turn, is a transferee of the same properties frpm his father Syed A ulad Ali. ·\n\nJ9M\n\nS. M. Karim •.\n\nBibi Sakina.\n\nHidayatullah J,\n\nThe suit was brought for declaration of atle and confirmation of possession or in the alternative for delivery thereof against several defendants in respect of this and otl1er properties. We are not concerned in this appeal with the other defendants or the oilier properues. This part of the appellant's suit was based on tlle allegation that Syed Aulad Ali had purchased the suit properties on May 28, l914 at a couPt sale, benami in the name of his son-in-law Hakir Alam. The reason for the benami purchase was that under the rules of the Darbhanga Raj where Syed Au!ad Ali was employed, persons serving in certain capacities were prohibited from purchasing at court sales. The sale certificate was issued in the name of Hakir Alam who was then living with Syed Aulad Ali.\n\nOn January 6, 1950, Syed Aulad Ali sold the property to his son the present appellant and Hakir Alam sold the property in his turn to Bibi Sakina and the present suit was filed for the above reliefs.\n\nIn this appeal, it has been stressed by tlie appellant that lhe findings clearly establish the benami nature of the transaction of 1914.\n\nThis is, perhaps, true but the appellant cannot avail himself of it. The appellant's claim based upon the benami nature of the transaction cannot stand because s. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure bars it. That section provides that no suit shall be maintained against any person claiming title under a purchase certified by the Court on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of the plaintiff or on behalf of someone through whom the plaintiff claims. Formerly, the opening words were, no suit shall be maintained against a certified purchaser. and the change was made to protect not only the certified purchaser but any person claiming title under a purchase certified by the Court.\n\nThe protection is thus available not only against the real purchaser but also against anyone claiming through him. In the present case, the appellant as plaintiff was hit by the section and the defendants were protected by it.\n\nIt is contended that the case falls wi.thin tlie second subsection under which a suit is possible at the instance of a third person who wishes to proceed against the i; iroperty. though ostensibly sold to the certified purchaser, on the ground that it is liable to satisfy a claim of such third person\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT F.EPORTS\n\nagainst the real owner. Reliance is placed upon the transfer by Syed Aulad Ali in favour of the appellant which is described as a claim by the transferee against the real owner.\n\nThe words of the second sub-section refer to the claim of creditors and not to the claims of transferees.\n\nThe latter are dealt with in first sub-section, and if the meaning sought to be placed on the second sub-section by the appellant were to be accepted, the entire policy of the law would be defeated by the real purchaser making a transfer to another and the first sub-section would become almost a dead letter.\n\nIn our opinion, such a construction cannot be accepted and the plaintiff's suit must be held to be barred under s. 66 of the Code.\n\nAs an alternative, it was contended before us that the title of Hakir Alam was extinguished by long and uninterrupted adverse possession of Syed Aulad Ali and after him oI the plaintiff.\n\nThe High Court did not accept this case.\n\nSuch a case is, of course, open to a plaintiff to make if his possession is disturbed. If the possession of the real owner ripens into title under the Limitation Act and he is dispossessed, he can sue to obtain possession, for he does not then rely on the benami nature of the transaction.\n\nBut the alternative claim must be clearly made and proved.\n\nThe High Court held that the plea of adverse possession was not raised in the suit and reversed the decision of the two courts below.\n\nThe plea of adverse possession is raised here.\n\nReliance is placed before us on Sukan v. Krishanand(') and Sri Bhagwan Singh and others v. Ram Basi and others(\") to sumit that such 1! plea is not necessary and alternatively, that if a plea is required, what can be considered a proper plea. But these two cases can hardly help the appellant. No doubt, the plaint sets out the fact that after the purchase by Syed Aulad Ali, benami in the name of his son-in-law Hakir Alam Ali continued in possession of the property but it does not say that this possession was at any time adverse to that of the certified purchaser.\n\nHakir Alam was the son-in-law of Syed Aulad Ali and was living with him.\n\nThere is no\n\n(I) I.L.R. 32 Pat. 353.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 157.\n\nS. M. Karim\n\n•• Bibi aki11a\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\n•• Bibi Sakinri\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nFebruary 14.\n\nsuggestion that Syed Aulad Ali ever aserted any hostile title against him or thitt a dispute with regard to ownership and possession had ever arisen.\n\nAdverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found.\n\nThere is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for \"several 12 years\" or that the plaintiff had acquired \"an absolute title\" was not enough to raise such a plea.\n\nLong possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea.\n\nThe cited cases need hardly be considered, because each case must be determined upon the allegations in the plaint in tl1at case.\n\nIt is sufficient to point out that in Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasad and another [A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 202], the Judicial Committee did not accept an alternative case based on possession after purchase without a proper plea.\n\nReading the plaint as a whole, we agree with the High Court that a case based on possession after the purchase was not stated in the plaint and the decision of the High Court in the circumstances of this case was therefore proper.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nR. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)\n\nLand Acquisition Act-Acquisition for company engaged in industry for public purpose-Provision if hit by Ari. 31(2) and Art. 19(1) of the Constitution-lnterprttation-Disthiction made be.tween Government companies, Public companies and Prtvatt companie1", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "Hiralal-Prabhuthat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IPM Even so, learned counsel for the resflondent contended Hiralal-Prabhuthat in the view taken by the High Court it had become bhai unnecessary for it to give its findings on two of the important Nagind:· Atmaissues that arose in the case, namely, issues 3 a.'!d 4, which ram are as follows :\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nIssue 3."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 869, "end_char": 883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out earlier, on April 23, 1951, the respondent issued the notice on the ground that the tenancy of six years would expire on March 31, 1952."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 978, "end_char": 992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out earlier, on April 23, 1951, the respondent issued the notice on the ground that the tenancy of six years would expire on March 31, 1952."}}, {"text": "MST. BIBI SAKINA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1516, "end_char": 1532, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MST. BIBI SAKINA", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1535, "end_char": 1550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIBI SAKINA\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1555, "end_char": 1569, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1612, "end_char": 1617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1718, "end_char": 1747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1996, "end_char": 2001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2127, "end_char": 2132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2347, "end_char": 2361, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2958, "end_char": 2986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3169, "end_char": 3180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Varma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3202, "end_char": 3213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha, Shahzadi Mohiuddin and Shaukat Hussain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shahzadi Mohiuddin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3215, "end_char": 3233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha, Shahzadi Mohiuddin and Shaukat Hussain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Shaukat Hussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3238, "end_char": 3253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha, Shahzadi Mohiuddin and Shaukat Hussain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bibi Sakina", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3340, "end_char": 3351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBibi Sakina.", "canonical_name": "Bibi Sakina"}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal by special leave Hidayat•l/ah J. against the judgment of the High Court of Patna reversing the concurrent judgments of the two courts below, and ordering the dismissal of the suit of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3450, "end_char": 3469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal by special leave Hidayat•l/ah J. against the judgment of the High Court of Patna reversing the concurrent judgments of the two courts below, and ordering the dismissal of the suit of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Syed M. Karim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is Syed M. Karim, son of one Syed Aulad Ali and the respondent Mst."}}, {"text": "Syed Aulad Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3631, "end_char": 3645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is Syed M. Karim, son of one Syed Aulad Ali and the respondent Mst.", "canonical_name": "Syed A ulad Ali"}}, {"text": "Bibi Saldna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3670, "end_char": 3681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bibi Saldna (defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Bibi Sakina"}}, {"text": "fakir Alam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3750, "end_char": 3760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fakir Alam (defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Hakir Alam Ali"}}, {"text": "Syed A ulad Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3894, "end_char": 3909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, in his turn, is a transferee of the same properties frpm his father Syed A ulad Ali. ·", "canonical_name": "Syed A ulad Ali"}}, {"text": "S. M. Karim", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3919, "end_char": 3930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J9M\n\nS. M. Karim •.\n\nBibi Sakina.", "canonical_name": "S. M. Karim"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3949, "end_char": 3961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah J,\n\nThe suit was brought for declaration of atle and confirmation of possession or in the alternative for delivery thereof against several defendants in respect of this and otl1er properties.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "May 28, l914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4361, "end_char": 4373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This part of the appellant's suit was based on tlle allegation that Syed Aulad Ali had purchased the suit properties on May 28, l914 at a couPt sale, benami in the name of his son-in-law Hakir Alam."}}, {"text": "Hakir Alam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4428, "end_char": 4438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This part of the appellant's suit was based on tlle allegation that Syed Aulad Ali had purchased the suit properties on May 28, l914 at a couPt sale, benami in the name of his son-in-law Hakir Alam.", "canonical_name": "Hakir Alam Ali"}}, {"text": "Darbhanga Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4507, "end_char": 4520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason for the benami purchase was that under the rules of the Darbhanga Raj where Syed Au!ad Ali was employed, persons serving in certain capacities were prohibited from purchasing at court sales."}}, {"text": "Syed Au!ad Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4527, "end_char": 4541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason for the benami purchase was that under the rules of the Darbhanga Raj where Syed Au!ad Ali was employed, persons serving in certain capacities were prohibited from purchasing at court sales.", "canonical_name": "Syed A ulad Ali"}}, {"text": "January 6, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4745, "end_char": 4760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 6, 1950, Syed Aulad Ali sold the property to his son the present appellant and Hakir Alam sold the property in his turn to Bibi Sakina and the present suit was filed for the above reliefs."}}, {"text": "Bibi Sakina", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4876, "end_char": 4887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 6, 1950, Syed Aulad Ali sold the property to his son the present appellant and Hakir Alam sold the property in his turn to Bibi Sakina and the present suit was filed for the above reliefs.", "canonical_name": "Bibi Sakina"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5241, "end_char": 5246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5250, "end_char": 5277, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7050, "end_char": 7055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7451, "end_char": 7465, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hakir Alam Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8247, "end_char": 8261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, the plaint sets out the fact that after the purchase by Syed Aulad Ali, benami in the name of his son-in-law Hakir Alam Ali continued in possession of the property but it does not say that this possession was at any time adverse to that of the certified purchaser.", "canonical_name": "Hakir Alam Ali"}}, {"text": "S. M. Karim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8543, "end_char": 8554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Karim\n\n•• Bibi aki11a\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\n•• Bibi Sakinri\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nFebruary 14.", "canonical_name": "S. M. Karim"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8572, "end_char": 8584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Karim\n\n•• Bibi aki11a\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\n•• Bibi Sakinri\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nFebruary 14.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "R. L. ARORA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10058, "end_char": 10069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10071, "end_char": 10093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10135, "end_char": 10148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10150, "end_char": 10159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10171, "end_char": 10178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10183, "end_char": 10205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10213, "end_char": 10233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10332, "end_char": 10342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_784_813_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "& M. Karim\n\n•• Bibi Sakinri\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nFebruary 14.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nsuggestion that Syed Aulad Ali ever aserted any hostile title against him or thitt a dispute with regard to ownership and possession had ever arisen.\n\nAdverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found.\n\nThere is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for \"several 12 years\" or that the plaintiff had acquired \"an absolute title\" was not enough to raise such a plea.\n\nLong possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea.\n\nThe cited cases need hardly be considered, because each case must be determined upon the allegations in the plaint in tl1at case.\n\nIt is sufficient to point out that in Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasad and another [A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 202], the Judicial Committee did not accept an alternative case based on possession after purchase without a proper plea.\n\nReading the plaint as a whole, we agree with the High Court that a case based on possession after the purchase was not stated in the plaint and the decision of the High Court in the circumstances of this case was therefore proper.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nR. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)\n\nLand Acquisition Act-Acquisition for company engaged in industry for public purpose-Provision if hit by Ari. 31(2) and Art. 19(1) of the Constitution-lnterprttation-Disthiction made be.tween Government companies, Public companies and Prtvatt companie1\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REfORTS\n\nIf hit by Art. 14-Conitltution of India, ATll. 14, 19(1), 31(2)- Land Acqui1itloit (Amtndmtnl) Act, 1962 (Act 31 of 1962), 1t. 1, 40 and 41.\n\nIHI\n\nIt. I.. A,.,,.\n\n' The petitioner i.o the owner of certain land in Kanpur, U.P. On 81•1• 01 Ull• a previous occasion land acquisition proceedings were taken regardin1 ,,,__,, this land for acquiring it for an industrialist. The petitioner ques.oned\n\nthe validity of these proceedings and this Comt by its judgment reported as R. L. Arora v. State of U.P., (1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. J49, quashed the notification made under s. 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thereafter certain amendments were made to ss. 40 and 41 of that Act by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1961. The petitioner thereupon filed before this Co\\Jrt a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the amended ss. 40, 41 and s. 7 ol Ille\n\namending Act The petitioner contended that the said sections violated Art. 31(2) and Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution inasmuch as cl. (aa) ol the amended s. 40 provided that ail acquisitions made for a company for construction of some building arc permissible even though the building may not be for a public purpose. The validity ol s. 7 of tile amending Act was challenged on the ground' that it contravened Art. 31(2) inasmuch as it makes acquisition for a company before !uly 20, 1962 as being for a public purpose even though it may not be so ill fact.\n\nSection 7 was also challenged on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14 inasmuch as it makes an unreasonable discrimination in the matter of acquisition for a company before July 2n. 1962 and after that date insofar as the former acquisitions are validated on thl basis of their being deemed to be for a public purpose while the latter acquisitions are not so deemed and have to satisfy the test of public purpose.\n\nHeld (ptr P. B. GAJENDRAOADKAR, CJ., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. Du GuPTA and J. C. SHAH JI.): (i) If the language of a provision of law is capable of only one construction and if according to that construction the provision contravenes a constitutional provision it must be struck down.\n\nA literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to loot at the setting in which the words arc used and the circumstances in wlti~ the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal mcsnina of the words used.\n\nThe Mysore State Elctricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen, Cottor1 and Silk Mills, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127; followed.\n\n(ii) It is well settled that if certain provisions ol law construed in one way will be consistent with the Constitution and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional the court would bear\n\nin favour of the former construction.\n\nKedar Nath Singh v. Stalt of 811\"\", [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.JL 78, followed.\n\n134-159 S.C.-50\n\nB 1- Arora ...\n\nState nf Utta1\n\nl'rad61h\n\n(iii) Applying the above principles of constn1ction it cannot be •aid that •· 40(aa) contravenes Art. 31(2), for the public purpose required therein is present v.here land is acquired for the construction of a building or work which must subserve the public purpose of the indllstry or work in which a company is engaged or is about to be engaged. Nor can it be said that the provision is hit by Art. 19(1)(f) for it would be a reasonable restriction on the right to hold property.\n\nThe amendments to s. 41 are only consequential to the insertion of\n\ncl. (aa) in s. 40(1) and would therefore be equally valid.\n\n(iv) The first of the two fictions introduced by s. 7 of the Amend, ment Act merely laysdown that where a notification under s. 6 of\n\nthe Act cannot be justified under cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40(1) it will be judged in accordance with the provisions contained in cl. (aa) and if it satisfies those provisions the acquisition will be deemed for the purpose of that clause as if that clause existed at the relevant time, though in actual fact it did not. The first fiction does not provide that. even though the purpose of the acquisition does not fall within cl. (aa) it will still be deemed to be a public purpose.\n\nTherefore s. 7 dOCB not violate Art. 31(2).\n\n(v) '.fhe acquisition made before July 20, 1962 as well as the acquisitions. nlade thereafter have to satisfy the conditions of cl. (aa) ot, s. 40 and s. 7 of the Amendment Act validates only acquisitions before July 20, 1962 which actually satisfy the provisions in cl. (aa).\n\nTherefore it cannoi be said that s. 7 v.iolates Art. 14.\n\n(vi) 'Section T specifically validates acqui•ition made before July 20, 1962 .. nc'twithstanding any judgment. decree or orders of any court'' and therefore the petitioner's contention that the acquisition of the petitioner's land declared to be invalid by reason of the judgment of\n\nthis Court reported as R. L. Arora v. State of U.P., [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149 is bad is rejected.\n\n(vii) The various pi\"ovisions in the agreement between the GovemR ment and the industrialist for whom the ]and in question bas been acquire'd: conclusively etablish that the acquisition is for a public purpose within the meanin~ of cl. (aa) of •· 40.\n\nProvince of Bombay v. KusaldaJ 1. Advanl, [1950] S.C.R 621, distinguished.\n\n(viii) A distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and .private companies on the other is justified considering the object behind cl .. (aa) of s. 40 of the Act and therefore it does not violate Art. 14.\n\nPer Ayyangar J. (dissent1'ng) '(i) The wording of cl. (aa) of\n\n1. 40 is not capable of two interpretatiom and there is no ; imbiguity In the wording. It is a well established principle of construction that\n\nIt is only when there b an ambiguity and the words are capable ot\n\nmore than one construction that any extrinsic nid in the shape of tbe purpose of the legislature or the object of the legislation come in for consideration. Where -the language of an Act is clear and explcit the court must give effect to it wbateVer may be the consequences. for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature.\n\nThe intention of the legislature is -not a matter to be speculated upon. lnterpret?.tion or construction cannot mean thaL a Court first reaches a conclusion as to what in its opinion the legislature\n\nintended, even though this involves attributing a meaning divorced from lhe words used and then adjust the meaning to the conclusio3 fl baa reached.\n\nWarburton v. Loveland, 2 D. & Cl.\n\nSalomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 and Cox followed.\n\n(H.L.) 480. Salomon v. A.\n\nv. II akes, 15 App. caa. '06,\n\n(iv) The only way cl. (aa) could be read is to relate te \"ordl .. public purpose\" to the nature of the industry carried on , by\\ tha company and by no rule of construction with or without extrinsic 'aid1 or with reference to the context, not to speak of rules of grammer, can the reference t~ public purpose he related to the building or _wort for which the acquisition is permitted to be n1ade.\n\n( v) Where the provisions, as in the present case, gives a carte blanche to Government to acquire land for any purpose it Is not possible to sustain the validity of such law and strike down merely the parti~ cular acquisition where land is acquired for a purpose which is .C a public purpose, for here the vice is in the law itself and not mlftly in its application.\n\nClause (aa) of s. 40 is iolative of Art. 21(2) of the Constitution.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 137 of 1962.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of th: Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fum.Jental Rights.\n\nC. B. Agarwala and Naunit Lal, for the petitioner.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and C. P. Lal, for respondent No. 1.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. !Jindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 2.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, M. S. Devendra Swamv and l. P. Guyal, for resrondent No. 3.\n\nI. M. Nanavati, 0. C. Mathur, l. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain. for Intervener No. 1.\n\n- JI. L , t,.,,. ...\n\nState of Uttar\n\nPrad61~\n\n1,,, - a.LA.rON\n\n•• llMI of Utt°'\n\nl'roddh -\n\nWanchoo 1.\n\nRajani Pa~/ and /. N. Shroff, for Intervener No. 2.\n\nFebruary 14, 1964. The Judgment of P. B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K. N. Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Shah JJ. was delivered by Wanchoo J. Rajagopala Ayyangar J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.\n\nWANCHOO . 1.-This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution is a sequel to the judgment of this Court in R. L. Arora v. State of U.P.('). The petitioner is the owner of certain lands in village Nauraiya Khera, in the district of Kanpur.\n\nHe got information in May 1956 that steps were being taken to acquire nine acres of his land for an industrialist in Kanpur. He therefore wrote to the Collector of Kanpur .in that connection. On June 25, 1956, however, a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, No. I of 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), stating that the land in dispute was required for a company for the construction of textile machinery parts factory by Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Limited, Kanpur. This order was followed on July 5, 1956, by a notification under s. 6 of the Act, which was in similar terms.\n\nThis notification also provided for the Collector to take possession of any waste or arable land forming part of the land in the Schedule to the notification immediately under the powers conferred by s. 17(1) of the Act.\n\nOn July 31, 1956, the Collector took possession of the land and handed it over to the company along with some constructions standing on it. In the meantime, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court on July 31, 1956, praying that the notification under s. 6 of July 1956 be quashed and also applied for interim stay.\n\nAs however possession had already been taken on July 31, 1956, the application for interim stay became infructuous.\n\nOne of the main grounds in support of the writ petition of July 31, 1956 was that ss. 38 to 42 of the Act had not been complied with.\n\nThereafter steps were taken by the State Government to comply with the provisions of ss. 3 8 to 42 of the Act and an agreement was entered into between the Government and the company in August 1956 and wa,\n\n(I) [1962) upp. 2 S.C.IL 1-49.\n\npublished in the Government gazette on August 11, 1956.\n\nThis was done without making any enquiry either under s. 5-A or s. 40 of the Act.\n\nTherefore on Septen•ber 14, 1956 an inquiry was ordered by the Government under s. 40.\n\nThe inquiry was accordingly made and the inquiry officer submitted a report on October 3, 1956. This was followed by a fresh agreement between the Government and the company on December 6, 1956.\n\nOn December 7, 1956, a fresh notification was issued under s. 6 of the Act after the formalities provided under ss. 38 to 42 had been complied with.\n\nThereafter a fresh notice was issued under s. 9 of the Act and it appears that possession was formally taken again after January 2, 1957.\n\nA fresh writ petition was filed by the petitioner before the High Court on January 29, 1957 in view of the fresh action taken by the State Government and the main ground taken in this petition was that the notification was invalid as it was not in compliance with s. 40(1 ){b) of the Act read with the fifth clause of the matters to be provided in the agreement under s. 41.\n\nThe petitioner failed in the High Court.\n\nThereafter he came by special leave to this Court. This Court decided on a construction of s. 40 ( 1 )(b) read with the fifth clause of the matters to be provided in the agreement under s. 41 that these provisions had to be read together and required that the work should be directly useful to the public and that the agreement should contain a term as to how the public will have the right to use the work directly.\n\nThe provision as to access to land or works for those having business with the company or the fact that the product would be useful to public was not considered sufficient to bring the acquisition for a company within the meaning of the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41. The appeal therefore was allowed on December 1, 1961 and the last notification under s. 6 was quashed: see R. L. A rortl 11 case(').\n\nOn July 20, 1962, the Lal'.d Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962 (No. 3 of 1962) was promulgated by the\n\nPresident of India.\n\nBy that Ordinance, ss. 40 and 41 the Act were amended and certain acquisitiom of lml\n\n(I) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.Jl. 149.\n\nR. L. dtDN\n\n\"· :Stott 01 Uti.\n\nl'rad•m\n\nWane/loo I.\n\nR. L. Arora\n\nState of Uttar\n\nPrade1h\n\n'Wanchoo I.\n\nmade before the date of the Ordinance were validated notwithstanding any judgment, decree or ord'r of any court.\n\nThe Ordinance was replaced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, No. 31 of 1962, (hereinafter referred to as the Amendme.nt Act), which was made retrospective from July 20, 1962, the date on which the Ordinance was promulgated. This Act made certain amendments in ss. 40 and 41 of the Act and validated certain acquisitions. The pn:sent petition challenges the validity of the amendments to ss. 40 and 41 ::tn•1 also the validity of s. 7 of the Amendment Act by which certain acquisitions made before July 20,\n\n1962 were validated. It is therefore necessary to read the amendments made in ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as well as\n\nll. 7 of the Amendment Act. In s. 40 ( 1) of the Act a new clause was inserted in these terms:-\n\n\"(aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construe·\n\ntion oi some building or work for a company which is engaged or is takinr, steps for engr.ging itseli in any industry or work which is for a public purpose;\"\n\nSection 41 was lmended to read as below:-\n\n\"41. If the appropdatc Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, of the Collector, under section SA, sub-section (2), or on the report of the officer making an inquiry under section 40 that the proposed acquisition is for any of the purposes referred to in clause (a) or clause ( aa) or claU3e (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 40, it shall require tlie company to enter into an. agreement with the appropriate Government providing to the satisfaction of the appropriate Government for the following matters, namely:-\n\n(1) • • • • •\n\n(2) • • • • •\n\n(3) • • * • •\n\n(4) • * * * • ( 4A) Where the acquisition is for the construetion of any builcfing or work for a company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, the time within which, and the conditions on which, the building or work shall be constructed or executed; and\n\n(5) • • • • .,,\n\nSection 7 of the Amendment Act, which validated certain acquisitions reads as fo!lows:-\n\n\"Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, every acquisition of land for a company made or purporting to have been made under Part VlI of the principal Act before 20th day of July 1962, shall, insofar as such acquisition is not ior any of the purposes mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 40 of the principal Act, be deemed to have been made for the purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said sub-secti.on. and accordingly e\\'ery such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, were in force at all \\naterial times when such acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken.\n\nExplanation • • • • . ..\n\nBesides these amer.dments which require consideration in the present petition, ss. 44A and 44B were also inserted in the Act providing for restriction on transfer, etc. (s. 44A) and making certain provisions forbidding acquii'ion of land for a private company other than a government company (s. 44B). It is however not necessary to set out the terms of these new sections.\n\nR. L Arora ...\n\nState of U ttar\n\nPrade1h\n\nWane/zoo /,\n\nIHI\n\nJl. L. A.101• ... of Ulk:t hade1h\n\nWanchoo /.\n\nThe present petition challenges the validity of the amendments to ss. 40 and 41 of the Act and also of s. 7 of the Amendment Act, and the challenge is made in this way.\n\nIt is submitted that the amendments made to ss. 40 and 41 of the Act are ultra vires, as they contravene Art. 31(2) and Art. !9(l){f) of the Constitution.\n\nThe argument is that on a construction of the amendment to s. 40 by which cl. (aa) has been introduced therein, it is provided that aJI acquisitions made for a company for construction of some building or work are permissible even though the building or work for the construction of which the acquisition is made may not be for a public punpose, as the new\n\ncl. ( aa) ll\\erely requires that the company which is applying for acquisition is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work, which is for a public purpose.\n\nIt is urged that all that this clause requires is that tha company for which the acquisition is being made should be engaged in any industry or work which is for a public purpose and in that case it can acquire land under this clause even though the particular building or work for thct\n\nconstruction of which land is acquired may not be for a public purpose.\n\nTherefore the new clause ( aa) which permits such acquisition contravenes Art. 31( 2) which lays down that no property shaJI be compulsorily acquired save for a public purpose, and also Art. 19 ( 1) ( f), as such acquisition would amount to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to hold property. ·\n\nThe validity cif s. 7 of the Amendment Act is attacked on the ground that it contravenes Art. 31 ( 2) and Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it makes acquisition for a company before July 20, 1962 as being for a public purpose even though it may not be so in fact and thus raises 'J:I irrebuttable presumption of public purpose by fiction of . ltlw and so contrvenes Art. 31 (2) which requires that\n\nthere muiiJ: be an actual public purpose before land can be compulsorily acquired.\n\nAnd it also contravenes Art. 14 inasmuch as it makes a discrimination in the matter of acquisitions for a company before July 20, 1962 and after July 20, 1962 insofar as the former acquisitions .are validated on the basis of their being deemed to be for a public\n\npurpose while the latter acquisitions are not so deemed and have to satisfy the test of public purpose.\n\nR. L. Aroto\n\nY, Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act, it is urged that the rights of the petitioner cannot be affected by the validating provision in the Amendment Act as s. 7 of the Amendment Act does not re-open decided cases and does not revive notifications or acquisitions struck down by courts.\n\nLastly, it is urged that the acquisition in the present case cannot be said to be for a public purpose inasmuch as (firstly) the agreement between the company and the Government does not regulate or control the products of the company in the interest of the public, and (secondly) the petitioner's land which was intended to be used for one public purpose is being taken away for another such purpose. We shall deal with these contentions seriatim.\n\nState of Ullal\n\nPradt1h\n\nThe first question that falls for consideration is the construction of cl. ( aa) of sub-s. (1) of s. 40 of the Act.\n\nThe amendments to s. 41 are consequential and will stand or fall with cl. (aa) inserted ins. 40(1). It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that on a literal construction of this clause (which, it is urged, is the only possible construction) it requires that the company which is acquiring the land should be engaged or should be taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work, which is for a public purpose. If a company satisfieS that requirement it can acquire land for the construction of some building or work, even though that building or work may not itself subserve such public purpose. Therefore, the argument runs that cl. ( aa) permits compulsory acquisition of land for a purpose other than a public purpose and is hit by Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution, whereunder land can be compulsorily acquired only for a public purpose.\n\nIt may be conceded that on a literal construction the adjectival clause, namely, \"which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose\", qualifies the word \"company\" and not the words \"building or work\" for the construction of which the iand is needed.\n\nSo prima facie it can be argued with some force that all that cl. ( aa) requires is that the company for which land\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nR. L. Arora ...\n\nState of U ttor\n\nPraderh\n\nWonchoo /.\n\nis being acquired should be engaged or about to be engaged in any industry or work which is for a public purpose and it is not required that the building or work, for the construction of which l&lld is acquired should be for such public purpose.\n\nIn approaching the question of construction of this clause, it cannot be forgotten that the amendment was made in consequence of the decision of this Court in R. l,.\n\nArora's case(') and the intention of Parliament was to fill the lacuna, which, according to that decision, existed in the Act in the matter of acquisitions for a company; nor can it be forgotten that Parliament when it enacted the Amend ment Act was aware of Art. 31 ( 2) of the Constitution which provides that land can only be acquired compulsorily for a pt!blic purpose and not otherwise. It could not therefore be the intention of Parliament to make a provision which would be in contravention of Art. 31 (2), though it may be admitted that if the language used is capable of only one construction and fails to carry out the intention of Parliament when making the amendment, the .amendment may have to be struck down if it contravenes a constitutional prov1s10n.\n\nFurther, a literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to lpok at the setting in which the words are used and the circumstances in which the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal meaning of the words used in a provision of the statute. It is permissible to control the wide language used in a statute if that is. possible by the setting in which the words are used and the intention of the law-making body which may be apparent from the circumstances in which the particular provision came to be made. Therefore, a literal and mechanical inteqiretation is not the only interpretation which courts are bound to give to the words of a statute; ?nd it may be possible to control the wide language in which a provision is made by ta!>ing mto account what is implicit in it in view. of the setting in which the provision appears and the circumstances in which it might have been enacted.\n\n(I) [!962] Supp. 2 S.C.R 149.\n\nWe may in this connection refer to a decision of this Court in The Mysore State Eln; tricity Board v. The Bangalore\n\nWoollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd.('), where the wide words used ins. 76(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 fell for interpretation, and this Court held that even though the words used were of wide amplitude, it was implicit in the sub-section that the question arising thereunder w:is one which arose under the Electricity (Supply)\n\nt\\ct.\n\nTherefore, we have to see whether the provision in\n\ncl. ( aa) bears another construction also in the setting in which it a;:ipears and in the circumstances in which it was put on the statute book and also in viow of the lang!lage used in the clause. The circumstances in which the amendment came to be made have already been mentioned by us and the intention of Parliament clellrty was to fill up the lacuna in the Act which became evident on the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora's case(2 ). Parliament must also be well aware of the provision of Art. 31( 2) which lays down that compulsory acquisition of property can only be made for a public purpose. Clause ( aa) was insertd between cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40(1). Section 40(1) as it stood before the amendment prohibited consent being given to acquisition of land by a company unless the acquisition was for one of the two reasons mentioned in els. (a) and (b). Those two clauses clearly showed that acquisition for a company was for a public purpose and sach acquisition could not be made for any purpose other than public purpose. Between the existing cl. (a) and cl. (b) . of s. 40(1 ), we find cl. (aa) bc!ng inserted. We also find thr.t\n\ncl. ( aa) specifically uses the words \"public purpose\" and indicates that the company for which land is required should be engaged or about to be engaged in some industry or work of a public purpose. It was only for such a company that land was to be acquired compulsodly and the acquisition w.1s for the construction of some building or work for such a company, i.e. a company engaged or about fo be engaged in some industry or work wl1ich is for. a public purpose. .Jn this setting it seems to us r°'uoonble to hold that the intention of Parliament could only have\n\n(1) [1963} Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127.\n\n(2) (1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149.\n\nR. L. Arora ...\n\nState of Uttat\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo ].\n\n\"· L. A.1010 ...\n\nStat• of Uf/01\n\nl'tath1ll\n\nWanchoo /.\n\nbeen that land should be acquired for such building or work for a company as would subserve the public purpose of the company; it could not have been intended, considering the setting in which cl. ( aa) was introduced, that land could be acquired for a building or work which would not subserve the public purpose of the company. In the circumstances it seems to us clear that the literal construction of the clause based on rules of grammar is not the only construction of it and it is in our opinion legitimate to hold that the public purpose of the industry of the company, which is imperative under the clause, also attaches to the building or work for the construction of which land is to be acquired.\n\nFurther, acquisition is for the construction of some building or work for a company and the nature of that company is that it is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a rpublic purpose. When therefore the building or work is for such a company it seems to us that it is reasonable to hold that the nature of the building or work to be constructed takes colour from the nature of the company for which it is to be constructed.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the literal and mechanical construction for which the petitioner contends is neither the only nor the true construction of cl. ( aa) and that when\n\ncl. (aa) provides for acquisition of land needed for construction of some building or work it implicitly intends that the building or work which is to be constructed must be such as to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged or is about to be engaged.\n\nIn short, the words \"building or work\"· used in cl. ( aa) take their colour from the adjectival clause which governs the company for which the building or work is being constructed and acquisition undet this clause can only be made where the comrpany is engaged or is taking steps to engage itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, and the building or work which the company is intending to construct is of the same nature, namely, that it is a building or work which is meant to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work for which it is being constructed. It is only in these cases where the company is engaged in an industry or work of that kind and where the buildin& or work is also constructed for a purpose of\n\nthat kind, which is a public purpose, that acquisition can be made under cl. ( aa) .\n\nAs we read the clause we are of opinion that lthe public purpose of the company for which acquisition is to be made cannot be divorced from the purpose of the building or work and it is not open for such a company to acquire land under cl. (aa) for a building or work which will not subserve the public purpose of the company. We are therefore of opinion that in the setting in which cl. ( aa) appears and in the circumstances in which it came to be enacted, a literal and mechanical construction for which the petitioner contends is nonhe only construction of this clause and that there is another construction which in our opinion is a better construction, and which is that the public pul'ljlose of the company is also implicit in the purpose of the building or work which is to be constructed for the company and it is only for such work or building which subserves the public purpose of the company that acquisition under cl. ( aa) can be made.\n\nThus there are two possible constructions of this clause, one a mere mechanical and literal construction based on rules of grammar and the other which emerges from the setting in which the clause appears and the circumstances in which it came to be enacted and also from the words used therein, namely, acquisition being for a company which has a public purpose behind it, and therefore the building or work which is to be constructed and for which land is required must also have the same public purpose behind it, that animates the company making the construction.\n\nWe are therefore clearly of opinion that two constructions are possible of this clause of which the second construction which is other than literal is .the better one.\n\nIt is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way will be consistent with the Constitution, and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction: [see Kcdar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar(') ].\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that cl. (aa) does not permit acquisition of land for construction of some building or work for a company engaged or to be engaged in an industry or work, which\n\n<I) (1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 769\n\nIHI\n\nR. L. AroN ...\n\nState of Utw\n\nPradtlll\n\nWancltoo /.\n\n1961 - R.. L. A.rqra\n\nv. \\late of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nis for a public purpose unless the building or work for which the land is acquired also subservcs the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged.\n\nThis is in our ophion the better construction of cl. ( aa) taking into account the setting in which it appears and the circumstances in which it came to be enacted and the words used. therein. lf that is the t:-ue construction of cl. (aa) it cannot be said to contravene At. 31 (2), for the public purpose required therein is present where land is required for the construction of a building or work which must subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which a company i~ engaged or is about to be engaged.\n\nNor can it be said that tile provision is hit by Art. 19 (1 ) ( f), for it would in our opi; lion be a reasonable restriction on the right to hold property. We hold therefore that the clause so interpreted is not unconstitutional. We have already said that the amendments in s. 41 are only consequential to the insertion of cl. ( aa) in s. 40 (1) and would therefore be equally valid and constitutional.\n\nWe now come to the cons ti tu tionality of s. 7 of the Amendment Act, which is attacked on the ground that it contravenes Art. 31 ( 2) and Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nLet us therefore see what exaotly s. 7 validates and under what conditions. It first provides that the acquisition to be validated must have been made before July 20, 1962.\n\nSecondly it provides where suoh acquisition is not for any of the purposes mentioned in cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1) of the Act, it shall be deemed to be for the purpose mentioned in cl. ( aa) introduced by the Amendment Act. Thirdly it provides that every such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by the Amendment Act, were in force at all material times when such acquisition was made or rproceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken. Lastlv, it provides that such acquisition shall be valid notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court. Therefore before s. 7 can validate an acquisition made before July 20,\n\n1962, it must first be shown that the acquisition is complete and the land acquired has vested in Government. , This\n\nmeans that the larid acquired has vested in Government either under s. 16 or s. 17 (1) of the Act. Thus s. 7 of the Amendment Act vnlidates such acquisitions in which property has vested absolutely in Government either under s. 16 or s. 17 ( 1). Secondly s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that where acquisition has been made for a company before July 20, 1962 or purported to have been made under cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 40 (1) and those clauses do not apply in view of the interpretation put thereon in R. L. Aroras case ('), it shall be deemed that the acquisition was for the purpose mentioned in cl. ( aa) as inserted in s. 40 (1) of the Act by the Amendment Act. Thirdly s. 7 of the Amendm nt Act provides that every such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have ben, as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act were in force at all material times when any action was taken for such acquisition.\n\nFinally, this validity is given to such acquisitions and to all acHons taken in connection therewith notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court.\n\nThis is what s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides. The attack on it on th~ basis of Art. 31 ( 2) is that it makes an irret 1ttable presumption that the acquisition was for a putlic purpose, though it may not be actually so and therefore contravenes Art. 31 ( 2) inasmuch as the result of this irrcbuttable presumption is that acquisitian which may not have been for a public purpose, is validated.\n\nWe do not think that there is any force in this contention in view of the interpretation we have given to cl. ( aa) introduced in s. 40 ( 1). The fim fiction i.n s. 7 is that it shall be presumed that acquisitions before July 20, 1962, if they do not fall within cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1 ), shall be deemed to fall within cl. ( aa). That means that building or work for which acquisition was made was required for a public purpose of the kind indicated in cl. (aa).\n\nIt does not however follow from this that if the purpose was not of the kind indicated in cl. ( aa) it will still be presumed !hat the\n\nacquisitian was for the purpose mentioned in cl. ( aa). All\n\n(I) [19,2J Supp. 2 S.C:R. 149.\n\n196'\n\nR. L. Arora\n\n\"· State of Uttar\n\nPrade1/a\n\nWanchoo ].\n\n... L. Arora\n\nY • . :State of Uttar\n\nhad<1h\n\nWlwo J.\n\nthat the first deeming provision lays down is that where the public purpose does not come within cl. (a) or cl. (b) it should be deemed to come within cl. (aa), provided it is of a kind which can come within this clause. The intention behind this deeming provision clearly is to make the punpose of an acquisition made before July 20, 1962 which does not fall within cl. fa) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1) to be judged in accordance with the provisions contained in cl. ( aa). On a reasonable interpretation, this deeming provision therefore only provides that where the purpose does not fall within els. (a) and (b), it shall be deemed to fall under cl. (aa) and to be judged in accordance therewith. If in fact the purpose of any acquisition made before July 20, 1962, is such as does not fall within cl. (aa), the deeming provision would be of no avail.\n\nThus the first of the two fictions introduced by s. 7 of the Amendment Act merely lays down that where a notification under s. 6 of the Act cannot be justified under cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40 ( I), it will be judged in accordance with the iprovisions contained in\n\ncl. ( aa) and if it satisfies those provisions, the acquisition will be deemed for the purpose of that clause, as if that clause existed at the relevant time, though in actual fact it did not.\n\nThe first fiction therefore in our opinion goes no further than this and does not provide that even though the purpose of acquisition does not fall within cl. (aa), it will still be deemed to be a public purpose. Ln this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the attack on s. 7 on the basis of Art. 31 (2) must fail.\n\nNext it is urged that s. 7 of the Amendment Act is hit by Art. 14 inasmuch as it discriminates between acquisition for a company before July 20, 1962 and after that date.\n\nW c do not think that there is any force in this contention either. Jn the view we have taken of the meaning of cl. (aa) and the meaning of the first fiction introduced in s. 7 of the Amendment Act, all that the second fiction in s. 7 of the Amendment Act says is .that when the first fiction is satisfied the second fiction will come into force and every such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisiODB\n\nof ss. 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by the Amendment Act, were in force at all material times. In effect therefore s. 7 provides that even though acquisitions made before July 20, 1962 do not satisfy the conditions of cl. (a) and\n\ncl. (b) of s. 40(1), they will be valid if they satisfy the conditions of cl. ( aa) as introduced by the Amendment Act, as if that clause was in existence when the acquisition was made before July 20, 1962.\n\nJn this view we are of opinion that there is no discrimination in the matter of acquisition for a company before July 20, 1962 and after that date because in either case the conditions of cl. ( aa) have to be actually satisfied whether the acquisition was before July 20, 1962 or thereafter, as the validation by s. 7 of the Amendment Act is only of such acquisition before July 20, 1962 which actually satisfy the provisions in cl. (aa).\n\nWe may in this connection refer to .the words \"as valid as if' appearing in s. 7 of the Amendment Act, because they are in our opinion the key words for the purpose of intenpreting the extent of the validity conferred on acquisitions before July 20, 1962. What the second fiction provides is that an acquisition made before that date shall be as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act were in force at all material times.\n\nThe force of the words \"as valid as if\" clearly is that the validity of acquisitions made before July 20, l 962, has to be judged on the basis that cl. ( aa) was in force at the material time and in accordance therewith.\n\nThe validity therefore is not absolute; it is conditioned by the fact that it will be as valid as if cl. ( aa) was in force; so that if it could not be valid even if cl. ( aa) was in force and could not be justified under the terms of that clause, the validity conferred by s. 7 of the Amendment Act will not attach to it. This in our opinion is the force of the words \"as valid as if\" and the validity it has conferred is not absolute as contended on behalf of the petitioner and will not apply to those acquisitions which would not be valid if they could not be justified on the basis of cl. ( aa) assuming it to be in force at the material time. In this view the attack under Art. 14 as well as Art. 31 ( 2) fails, for in neither case can acquisition be valid whether made before July 20, 1962 or thereafter unless the conditions of cl. ( aa) are satisfied.\n\n134-159 S.C.-51\n\nR. L. A.rOnl\n\nSt11e of Ull•\n\nProdah\n\nWonchoo /.\n\nR. L. .A.roro\n\nStai. of Uttar\n\nPrad11h\n\nWanchoo /.\n\nNext it is urged that even if s. 7 is intra vires, it does not reopen decided cases and does not revive notifications and acquisitions actually struck down by courts.\n\nWe see no force in this contention. Section 7 opens with the words \"notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court\" and the validity conferred by it on acquisitions made before July 20, 1962 is thus notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court. These are the usual wo1 Js to be found in validating legislation where the intention is to validate some action which would otherwise be invalid and which may have been declared invalid by any court.\n\nThe rpurpose of such words in a validating leg1slat1on is to declare valid what has been held invalid by courts and once the legislature declares such action valid all steps aken in connection therewith are validated to the extent of validation.\n\nThe result of the validation is that notifications or other steps taken which may otherwise have been invalid become valid.\n\nFurther an acquisition also even though it may have been struck down by a court would be validated if it has been made in the sense that property in the land to be acquired has vested in Government either under s. ) 6 or s. 17 (1) of the Act. It is not in dispute in this case that the property has vested in Goverrunent under s. 17 ( 1) ot the Act. It is also not ID dispute that the purpose of the company was a rpublic purpose, namely, manufacture of textile machinery parts and that the acquisition was aiso for the construction of works for that purpose. In the circumstances we fail to see how it can be said that the rights of the petitioner have not been affected at all by the validating provision in s. 7 of the Act. The contention under his head also fails.\n\nThen it is urged that the acquisition in the pre>ent case cannot be said to be for a public purpose inasmuch as the agreement between the company and the Government does not regulate or control the rproducts of the company in the interest of the public. We have not been able to understand exactly what is meant by this.\n\nAs we have already said, it is not in dispute that the purpose of the company is a public purpose, namely, production of textile machmery parts, and the land is acquired for the cor truction of works\n\nfor that pm1pose.\n\nThe agreement shows that the land is required for the construction of a work, namely, a factory for the manufacture of textile machinery and parts and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. One term of the agreement is that the company, its successors and assignees will use the said land for the aforesaid purpose and for no other purpose without the previous sanction in writing of the State Government.\n\nAnother term provides that if the said land or any ipart or parts thereof shall no longer be required by the company, then the company will forthwith relinquish and restore the same, alter removing all buildings and structures, to the Governor at a price equal to the amount paid by it under the Act. It is clear therefore that the land cannot be used for any other purpose and it will have to be restored to the Government if it is not used for the purpose for which it was acquired. Jn this connection reference may be made to s. 44-A introduced by the Amendment Act which lays down that \"no company for which any land is acquired under this Part shall be entitled to transfer the said land or any part thereof by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise except with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government\".\n\nThis provision also provides a safeguard that the land will only be used for the public purpose for which it is acquired and not otherwise. The aforesaid terms in the agreement in our opinion satisfy the condition that the land will be used for the public purpose for which it was being acquired and for no other.\n\nTherefore the acquisition is for a public purpose as provided in cl. ( aa). We do not think it is the purpose of the Act that the agreement should provide for regulation or control of the products of a company, which probably means that Government should control the quantum of production and distribution or the price of the produced articles. This in our opinion is foreigr to the purpose of the Act All that the Act requires is that before land is transferred to the company by the Government, the agreement should provide that land would be used for the purpose for which it was acquired and for no other. The Act has nothing to do with the control or regulation of the products of the company and gives no power to Government in that behalf. Nor do we think it was necessary in order that the public purpose\n\nR. L. A.ION\n\n\"· State of U-\n\nP1ade1h - Wane/Joo/.\n\n1964 mentioned in cl. (aa) is carried out to have any further R. L. Arora term in the agreement besides those which have been pros \",· u vided in the agreement in this case. The contention that tale o ttar h . . . . th f bli Pratk1h t e acqu1S1t1on m e present case was not or a pu c\n\nW=M<> /. purpose as the agreement does.not provide for the control and regulation of the product of the company must therefore fail.\n\nLastly it is urged that the petitioner who was a businessman was intending to use the land for erecting a factory.\n\nHe could not do so because certain rules did not permit him to build a factory adjacent to the military installations which had been put up by the Defence Department on adjoining land. It is urged that it could not be the purpose of the Act that land which was intended to be used for one public purpose should be acquired for another public purpose.\n\nWe see no force in this contention either.\n\nAll that the Act requires is that the land should be required for a public purpose. The intention of the previous owner whatever it may be does not in our opinion enter into the question at all, so far as the validity of the acquisition Is concerned provided the acquisition is for a public purpose.\n\nWhether the land should be acquired or not is a matter which may be urged under s. 5-A of the Act, which gives the owner of the land the right to object to the acquisition, and it is for Government to decide whether the objection should be allowed or rejected.\n\nOnce the Government decides that the objection should be rejected and that the acquisition is needed for a public purpose the validity of the notification under s. 6 and the subsequent action thereafter cannot be challenged on the ground that the previous owner himself intended to use the land for some public purpose. In this connection our attention is invited to the observations of this Court in Province of Bombay \"· Kusaldas S. Advani(1 ), where it was observed that \"under certain circumstances even securing a house for an individual may be in the interests of the community, but it cannot be to the general interest of the community to requisition the property of one refugee for the benefit of another refugee\". These observations in our opinion have no\n\n(!) (1950] S.C.R. 621. 687.\n\nrelevance to the matter under consideration. We are concerned here with acquisition for a public purpose, which is undisputed. This is not a case of a house of one person being requisitioned for another; this is a case of constructing some work which will be useful to the public and will subserve the public purpose of the production of textile machinery and its parts for the use of the general public.\n\nIn these circumstances we are of opinion that there being a definite public purpose behind the acquisition in the present case, the acquisition would be justified under the Act irrespective of the intention of .the previous owner of the land to use it for some other public purpose. The contention under this head must also fail.\n\nIt now remains only to consider the argument on behalf of the intervener that cl. ( aa) violates Art. 14 inasmuch as it permits acquisition of land for a company but not for an individual or a private company, though the individual or the private company may also be engaged in or taking steps to engage himself or itself in an industry or work which is for a public purpose. Reference was also made to\n\ns. 44-B, introduced by the Amendment Act, which lays down that \"notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no land shall be acquired under this Part, except for the purpose mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 40, for a private company which is not a Government company\". It is said that there is discrimination between a public company and a Government company for which land can be acquired under cl. ( aa) o~ the one hand and a private company or an individual on the other. It is true that acquisition for the purpose of cl. ( aa) can only be made for a Government company or a public company and cannot be made for a private company or an individual; but there is in our opinion a clear classification between a public company and a Government company on the one hand and a private company and an individual on the other, which has a reasonable nexus with the objects to be achieved under the law.\n\nThe intention of the legislature clearly is that private individuals and private companies which really consist of a few private individuals banded together should not have the advantage of acquiring land even though they\n\nR. L. Aron\n\nState of Uttlll'\n\nPrade1h\n\nWonchoo /.\n\nR. L. Arora\n\n\"· Stai. of Utlllr\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo /.\n\nA71angar I.\n\nmay be intending to engage in some industry or work which may be for a public ipurpose inasmuch as the enrichment consequent on such work goes to private individuals or to a group of them who have formed themselves into a private company.\n\nPublic companies on the other hand are broad based and Government companies are really in a sense no different from Government, though for convenience of administration a Government company may be formed, which thus becomes a separate legal entity. Thus in one case the acquisition results i.n private enrichment while in the other it is the public which gains in every way. Therefore a distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between ipublic companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and private companies on the other is in our opinion justified, considering the object behind cl. ( aa) as introduced into the Act. The contention under this head must the, eforc also fail.\n\nThe petition therefore fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.\n\nAYYANGAR J. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by Wanchoo, J. but regret my inability to agree with it. In my opinion this writ petition has to be allowed.\n\nThe facts of the case and the relevant statutory provisions whose construction is involved in the petition, have been set out in full in the judgment just now pronounced and it is therefore unnecessary for me to recapitulate them.\n\nThe principal ipoints on which learned counsel for the petitioner rested his case were mainly two: (1) that s. 40(1)(aa) introduced by s. 3 of the Land Acquisition Amending Act (Act XXXI of 1962) which I shall hereafter refer to as the Act, was unconstitutional, in that it authorised the compulsory acquisition of land for purposes which might not at all be public purposes and was therefore violative of Art. 31 (2l of the Constitution, and (2) that s. 7 of the Act by which acquisitions of land made prior to July 20, 1962 for the purposes mentioned in s. 40(l)(aa) were purported to be validated 'did not on its proper construction cover the present Cllie and further, even if it did that the said provision was\n\ninvalid as ultra vires for the very same reason for which\n\ncl. (aa) was.\n\nI shall first take up the submission made to us by M.r. Agarwal about the amendment effected to s. 40(1) by the introduction of the new clause (aa).\n\nThat clause reads \"that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some building or work for a company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose\", so that after the amendment land may be compulsorily acquired by the State for a company for being utilised for the purpose above set out. It was not disputed by Mr. Setalvad who, appearing for the first and 3rd respondents, addressed to us the main arguments on behalf of the respondent, nor by the learned Attorney-General appearing for the Union of India that if on a proper construction of\n\ncl. (aa) power was reserved to compulsorily acquire land for a purpose other than a public purpose, the same would infringe Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution and would, therefore. be void. The scope of the inquiry in the petition is therefore narrowed down and it would be sufficient to consider merely the construction of this clause and ascertain whether the purpose for which authority is conferred by it for making an acquisition, is a public purpose.\n\nThe clause starts with the words that the acquisition is needed fo~ the construction of a building or work. It goes without saying that if the power to acquire here conferre<! is related to the construction of a building or work which is essential for starting an industry or for carrying on an industry which is necessary to be carried on in the public interest, the acquisition would be for a public purpose and undoubtedly the provision would be valid. The question is whether the words of the clause are capable of this construction. The words of the clause may be thus split up: (!) the land is needed for the construction of \"a building\" or \"work\", and\n\n(2) that \"building\" or \"work\" is for a company which is engaged (omitting the immaterial words) in an industry or work which is for a public purpose. Therefore, if a company which is engaged inan industry which industry is invested with a public purpose i.e., if the industry itself serves a public purpose, that the land is needed for the construction of a building or work for such a company is made sufficient\n\nR. L. Arora\n\nY, StGtt of U-\n\nPradult\n\nR. L. Arora\n\n\"· $1111• of Uttar\n\nPraduh - A11M1t•r I.\n\nto enable the acquisition to be made. In other words, the criterion of the justification for the acquisition is, that it is for a company of a designated nature, not that the land acquired is needed for a building or work which is essenlial for the carrying on of an industry which serves a public purpose. The company might be engaged in an industry which might be informed by a public purpose or whose products might be essential for the needs of the community, but under the clause as enacted it is not necessary that the land acquired is needed for being used for the purpose of that industry but may be needed for any purpose of the company, the only qualification being that the company answers the description set down in the clause.\n\nThus, to take the present case, the third respondent-company intends to start a factory for the manufacture of textile machinery, in the present state of the country's industrial development.\n\nThere oould be no dispute that the industry in which the third\n\nresl'ondent is engaged or would be engaged, would serve a national need and therefore a public purpose. But, as was put during the course of the argument, the land acquired might be needed not for the putting up of the factory premises or essential buildings connected with it for its operational needs, if one might use that expression, but say for a swimming pool or a tennis court in the compound of the Directors' residence for whom the company might consider it proper to provide accommodation. To take a more extreme case, the company's factory may be in city A, and if the company wants to provide a guest house, a holiday home or accommodation for its Directors at city B, the clause will enable the acquisition to be made for the purpose.\n\nIt cannot be contended that the use of the land for such a purpose was invested with a public purpose so as to permit compulsory acquisition of land having regard to the terms of Art. 31 (2).\n\nThe question, therefore, arises whether an acquisition for a purpose of this type is or is not permitted on cl. (aa) as it now stands. I am clearly of the opinion that an acquisition for such a purpose would be covered, for the only two tests that are prescribed in it as conditions to be satisfied before an acquisition could .be made under this clause are ( 1) that the land is needed for the construction of a building or\n\nwork for a company i.e., the acquisition of the land and the construction are intra vires of the memorandum of association of the company, and (2) that that company for which the acquisition is being made is one engaged or is to be engaged in an industry which is for a public purpose.\n\nThe first, and I would say the primary submission of Mr. Setalvad was that the words \"for a public purpose\" at the end of the clause ought to be read as governing and qualifying the words \"building or work for a company\" which occur earlier, so that under the clause not merely has the company to be one of the type described i.e. engaging in an industry which serves a public purpose but su<rh a company needs the land for the construction of a building or work which is essential for that industry to be commenced or carried on.\n\nI feel unable to accept this as a possible construction of the words used. For that construction to be adopted even the transposition of the words \"for a public purpose\" to an earlier point after the words \"for a company\" would not be sufficient assuming the rules of grammer permitted such a course; for, then it would leave out the description or categorisation of the company for which the land is needed .• and in such a situation the entire object of the amendment would be frustrated, as it would not be a condition that the industry in which the company is engaged is one which is required in public interest.\n\nEven if the clause were rewritten so as to introduce the words \"for a public purpose\" earlier and also retain them where it occurs now, the construction for which Mr. Setalvad contends cannot result, for then it would not make much sense, for the words \"for a public purpose\" if transposed earlier would not convey the meaning which Mr. Setalvad says they convey, because the construction which learned counsel suggests is that the clause means that the land is needed for the construction of the factory and other essential buildings for a company engaged in an industry which serves the national interest. By no transposition of the words actually used in the clause can such a transformation be achieved.\n\nThe position as regards the construction of cl. (aa) is not improved when one turns to the consequential amendment effected in s. 4 I of the Land Acquisition Act where a new\n\ncl. 4(a) has been introduced by s. 4 of the Act. If in this\n\nR. L. A\"\"\"\n\nState of UllM\n\nPrade1h - Ayyangar I.\n\n1961 provision at least, which deals with the agreements which the Government is directed to enter into, it is clear that the ' R. L. Arora ... acquisition could be made only for a public purpose and not State of Uttar for what one might term \"the private purposes\" of a com- Pradesh d . . d h. h . . 1 f h bl. _ pany engage m an m ustry w 1c 1s essentia or t e pu 1c, A.yyangar J. then one could read cl. (aa) together with this provision and use the terms of s. 41 for construing the scope and purpose of s. 40(l)(aa). Clause 4(a) reads:\n\n\"Where the acquisition is for the construction of any building or work for a company which is engag\n\ned or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose the time within which, and the conditions on .which, the building or work shall be constructed or executed; \"\n\nIf anything, therefore, cl. 4(a) emphasizes that what Parliament considered essential was the nature of the company for whose benefit the acquisition was being made and not the nature of the use to which the property acquired may be put and that it would not matter if a company of the type described used the land acquired for the pleasure of it~ Directors or for its private purposes unrelated to the purpose of the industry in which it was engaged.\n\nLastly, some attempt was made to show that the rules framed under the Land Acquisition Act themselves threw light on the purpose for which the acquisition was to be made but it was, however, conceded that the rules afforded no assistance either way on the matter.\n\nIt was then submitted that there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality and that the clause ought to be so read, if that were possible so as to sustain its validity. I quite agree that if the language were flexible in the sense that it could be read so as to make it refer only to cases of acquisition for a public purpose, this could and ought 'o be done. But this assumes that the clause is reasonably capable of two interpretations: one which would render it unconstitutional and the other which even though it be a little strained, would make it constitutional. then the Court would lean in favour of the latter construction.\n\nThe question therefore is whether the clause is capable of more than one interpretation.\n\nI would be stating only a truism if I said that there is no scope for interpretation here.\n\nWith profound respect for my learned brethren, I consider that the words are capable only of one meaning.\n\nRules of construction are merely aids to resolving ambiguity. if any exists. The first and primary rule, if those rules have to be invoked, is to take the words themselves and then arrive at their true meaning, for if they disclose an intelligible meaning, then the process of interpretation stops unless the words are reasonably capable of being understood in more than one way and rules of interpretation are then invoked to\n\nr~,1lve that ambiguity. It was not suggested that the words do not, as they stand, make sense. They do, only the sense which they convey makes the clause unconstitutional.\n\nNo doubt, the meaning of a word may vary with the setting or context, but that is not the position here. One asks in vain \"which is the word which is said to bear a different meaning from the natural normal, dictionary sense, because of the context or setting\"?\n\nIt was, however, urged that it could not have been the intention of Parliament to have intended the clause to mean what appears to be meaning which I have said the words bore.\n\nBut this argument ignores the basic principle , mderlying all rules of statutory construction that the intention of the legislature has to be gathered only from the meaning of the. words used, for they are the only means by which the intention of the law-maker could be ('.nthcred. It is only where there is an ambiguity and the words are capable of more than one construction that any extrinsic aid in the shape of the purpose of the legislature, or the object of the legislation come in for consideration. \"Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit,\" said Tindal, C.J. in Warburton v. Loveland('), \"we must give effect to it, whatver be <he -consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the lcgisbture\". Authority is not needed for the proposition that the intention of the legislatffre is not a matter to be speculated upon. Interpretation or construction cannot mean that a Court first reaches conclm, ion as to what in its opinion the legislature intended,\n\n(I) 2 D. & Cl. (H.L.) 480 at p. 489.\n\nR. L. Arora ...\n\nState ct U ttar\n\nPraduh\n\nA.11angar /.\n\nR. L. Arora v.\n\nStat• of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nAyyangar I.\n\neven though this involves attributing a meaning divorced from the words used, and then adjust the meaning to the conclusion it has reached. As was observed by Lord Watson in an oft quoted passage in Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co.(');\n\n\"Intention of the legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood. may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. . In a court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from what it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication. ' It was the same principle that was explained by Lord Herschell in Cox v. Hakes( 2 ) when he said:\n\n\" .......... It must be admitted that if the language of the legislature interpreted according to the recognised canons of construction involves this result, your Lordships must frankly yield to it,\n\neven if you should be satisfied that it was not ie the contemplation of the legislature.\" The only way in which I am able to read the clause is to relate the words \"public purpose\" to the nature of the industry carried on by the company and by no rule of construction with or without extrinsic aids or with reference to the context, not to speak of rules of grammar, can the reference to public purpose be related to the building or work for which the acquisition is permitted, to be made.\n\nThe learned Attomey-Oeneral submitted that the provision could and ought to be read down and confined in its operation to acquisition for public purposes as properly understood; in other words, to sever the constitutional from the unconstitutional portions and uphold the former. I do not find it possible to adopt this approach in a clause worded like the one before us.\n\nOn the construction of the clause which I hold is the only possible one to adopt, it means the\n\n(I) [1897] A.C. 22 at p. 38.\n\n(2) 1' A.C. 506 at p. S28.\n\nState is empowered to compulsorily acquire land for com panies which satisfy the description of being engaged in an industry which is essential for the life of the community whether or not the purpose for which the company proposes to use the land acquired is a public purpose.\n\nWhere the purpose for which the acquisition could be made is indicated by the enactment and that purpose is one which is primarily constitutionally permissible, but the words employed for indicating the purposes might possibly include some oul5ide the power of the legislature, an argument about reading down would require consideration. But in the clause now impugned, there is no purpose indicated at all, except thar it is needed for a company which falis within a particular category.\n\nFor such a situation I consider that there is no scope at all for invoking the principle of reading down.\n\nAgain, where the provision gives a carte blanche to Government to acquire land for any purpose it is not possible to sustain the validity of such a law and strike down merely the particular acquisition where land is acquired for a pur pose which is not a public purpose, for here the vice is in the law itself and not merely in the application.\n\nI am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that cl. (aa) introduced by the Amending Act XXXI of 1962 is unconstitutional as violative of Art. 31(2).\n\nIn this view it is unnecessary for me to consider the proper construction of s. 7 of the Amending Act.\n\nUnder the terms of s. 7 of the Act, all acquisitions of land made prior to June 20, 1962, even accepting the construction which Mr. Setalvad pressed upon us, are deemed to have been made for a purpose falling within cl. (aa).\n\nTf, as I have held.\n\ncl. (aa) is unconstitutional and void, it was not contended that s. '/ would be of any assistance to the respondents to sustain the acquisition of the petitioner's land.\n\nI would, therefore, allow the petition and grant the reliefs prayed for therein.\n\nORDER In a.::cordance with the opinion of the majority this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nPetition dismisud.\n\nR. L. Arora\n\n•• Stlllt of Utt<ll'\n\nPrade1h\n\nAyyang\"1' 1.", "total_entities": 263, "entities": [{"text": "M. Karim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 10, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "& M. Karim\n\n•• Bibi Sakinri\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nFebruary 14."}}, {"text": "Bibi Sakinri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 27, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "& M. Karim\n\n•• Bibi Sakinri\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nFebruary 14."}}, {"text": "Syed Aulad Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "suggestion that Syed Aulad Ali ever aserted any hostile title against him or thitt a dispute with regard to ownership and possession had ever arisen."}}, {"text": "R. L. ARORA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1504, "end_char": 1515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. ARORA\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "R. L. 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B. GAJENDRAOADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3812, "end_char": 3832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held (ptr P. B. GAJENDRAOADKAR, CJ.,", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "K. C. Du GuPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3854, "end_char": 3868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. Du GuPTA and J. C. 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Agarwala and Naunit Lal, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9685, "end_char": 9695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and Naunit Lal, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9718, "end_char": 9732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. P. Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9737, "end_char": 9746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and C. P. Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9771, "end_char": 9785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. !"}}, {"text": "N. S. !Jindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9805, "end_char": 9818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. !"}}, {"text": "R. H. 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Rajagopala Ayyangar J. delivered a dissenting Opinion."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10404, "end_char": 10411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nauraiya Khera", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10566, "end_char": 10580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner is the owner of certain lands in village Nauraiya Khera, in the district of Kanpur."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10601, "end_char": 10607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner is the owner of certain lands in village Nauraiya Khera, in the district of Kanpur."}}, {"text": "June 25, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10805, "end_char": 10818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 25, 1956, however, a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, No."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10861, "end_char": 10865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11058, "end_char": 11097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I of 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), stating that the land in dispute was required for a company for the construction of textile machinery parts factory by Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Limited, Kanpur."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11134, "end_char": 11146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was followed on July 5, 1956, by a notification under s. 6 of the Act, which was in similar terms."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11172, "end_char": 11176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11418, "end_char": 11426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 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L Arora ...\n\nState of U ttar\n\nPrade1h\n\nWane/zoo /,\n\nIHI\n\nJl.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHER"}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18152, "end_char": 18165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18189, "end_char": 18193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18300, "end_char": 18313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18361, "end_char": 18371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18471, "end_char": 18476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31( 2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19391, "end_char": 19402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19503, "end_char": 19510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19649, "end_char": 19653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19721, "end_char": 19728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19738, "end_char": 19745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20004, "end_char": 20011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20145, "end_char": 20152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. L. Aroto", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20490, "end_char": 20501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. Aroto\n\nY, Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act, it is urged that the rights of the petitioner cannot be affected by the validating provision in the Amendment Act as s. 7 of the Amendment Act does not re-open decided cases and does not revive notifications or acquisitions struck down by courts.", "canonical_name": "R. L. Aroras"}}, {"text": "Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20506, "end_char": 20581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20700, "end_char": 20704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act", "statute": "Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "State of Ullal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21281, "end_char": 21295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Ullal\n\nPradt1h\n\nThe first question that falls for consideration is the construction of cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21404, "end_char": 21409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act", "statute": "Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21441, "end_char": 21446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act", "statute": "Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22171, "end_char": 22178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of U ttor\n\nPraderh\n\nWonchoo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22734, "end_char": 22767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aa) requires is that the company for which land\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nR. L. Arora ...\n\nState of U ttor\n\nPraderh\n\nWonchoo /.\n\nis being acquired should be engaged or about to be engaged in any industry or work which is for a public purpose and it is not required that the building or work, for the construction of which l&lld is acquired should be for such public purpose.", "canonical_name": "State of U ttor\n\nPraderh\n\nWonchoo"}}, {"text": "Arora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23186, "end_char": 23191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arora's case(') and the intention of Parliament was to fill the lacuna, which, according to that decision, existed in the Act in the matter of acquisitions for a company; nor can it be forgotten that Parliament when it enacted the Amend ment Act was aware of Art."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23223, "end_char": 23233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arora's case(') and the intention of Parliament was to fill the lacuna, which, according to that decision, existed in the Act in the matter of acquisitions for a company; nor can it be forgotten that Parliament when it enacted the Amend ment Act was aware of Art."}}, {"text": "Parliament when it enacted the Amend ment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23386, "end_char": 23431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23445, "end_char": 23452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament when it enacted the Amend ment Act", "statute": "Parliament when it enacted the Amend ment Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23687, "end_char": 23694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament when it enacted the Amend ment Act", "statute": "Parliament when it enacted the Amend ment Act"}}, {"text": "Mysore State Eln", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25093, "end_char": 25109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may in this connection refer to a decision of this Court in The Mysore State Eln; tricity Board v. The Bangalore\n\nWoollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd.('), where the wide words used ins."}}, {"text": "R. L. Arora", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25966, "end_char": 25977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstances in which the amendment came to be made have already been mentioned by us and the intention of Parliament clellrty was to fill up the lacuna in the Act which became evident on the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora's case(2 ).", "canonical_name": "R. L. Aroras"}}, {"text": "Art. 31( 2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26045, "end_char": 26056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26208, "end_char": 26216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26218, "end_char": 26231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26634, "end_char": 26643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttat\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27347, "end_char": 27379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. L. Arora ...\n\nState of Uttat\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo ].", "canonical_name": "State of U ttor\n\nPraderh\n\nWonchoo"}}, {"text": "R. L. AroN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32136, "end_char": 32146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 S.C.R. 769\n\nIHI\n\nR. L. AroN ...\n\nState of Utw\n\nPradtlll\n\nWancltoo /.\n\n1961 - R.. L. A.rqra\n\nv. \\late of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nis for a public purpose unless the building or work for which the land is acquired also subservcs the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged.", "canonical_name": "R. L. Aroras"}}, {"text": "State of Utw", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32152, "end_char": 32164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 S.C.R. 769\n\nIHI\n\nR. L. AroN ...\n\nState of Utw\n\nPradtlll\n\nWancltoo /.\n\n1961 - R.. L. A.rqra\n\nv. \\late of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nis for a public purpose unless the building or work for which the land is acquired also subservcs the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHER"}}, {"text": "L. A.rqra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32200, "end_char": 32209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 S.C.R. 769\n\nIHI\n\nR. L. AroN ...\n\nState of Utw\n\nPradtlll\n\nWancltoo /.\n\n1961 - R.. L. A.rqra\n\nv. \\late of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nis for a public purpose unless the building or work for which the land is acquired also subservcs the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32239, "end_char": 32246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 S.C.R. 769\n\nIHI\n\nR. L. AroN ...\n\nState of Utw\n\nPradtlll\n\nWancltoo /.\n\n1961 - R.. L. A.rqra\n\nv. \\late of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nis for a public purpose unless the building or work for which the land is acquired also subservcs the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32996, "end_char": 33003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33222, "end_char": 33227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33284, "end_char": 33289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33395, "end_char": 33399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33474, "end_char": 33481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33491, "end_char": 33498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33555, "end_char": 33559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33805, "end_char": 33813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34054, "end_char": 34067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34407, "end_char": 34411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 20,\n\n1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34452, "end_char": 34466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore before s. 7 can validate an acquisition made before July 20,\n\n1962, it must first be shown that the acquisition is complete and the land acquired has vested in Government. ,"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34648, "end_char": 34653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34657, "end_char": 34662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34684, "end_char": 34688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34805, "end_char": 34810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34814, "end_char": 34819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34835, "end_char": 34839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35001, "end_char": 35006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. L. Aroras", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35087, "end_char": 35099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b) of s. 40 (1) and those clauses do not apply in view of the interpretation put thereon in R. L. Aroras case ('), it shall be deemed that the acquisition was for the purpose mentioned in cl. (", "canonical_name": "R. L. 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L. Arora", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36896, "end_char": 36907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196'\n\nR. L. Arora\n\n\"· State of Uttar\n\nPrade1/a\n\nWanchoo ].", "canonical_name": "R. L. Aroras"}}, {"text": "s. 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37393, "end_char": 37401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37903, "end_char": 37907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37978, "end_char": 37982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38043, "end_char": 38048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38594, "end_char": 38598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38615, "end_char": 38622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38661, "end_char": 38665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38697, "end_char": 38704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38983, "end_char": 38987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39041, "end_char": 39045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39352, "end_char": 39365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39468, "end_char": 39472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39595, "end_char": 39603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40105, "end_char": 40109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40308, "end_char": 40312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40608, "end_char": 40621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 20, l 962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40800, "end_char": 40814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The force of the words \"as valid as if\" clearly is that the validity of acquisitions made before July 20, l 962, has to be judged on the basis that cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41199, "end_char": 41203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41604, "end_char": 41611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41623, "end_char": 41630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41935, "end_char": 41939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42109, "end_char": 42118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43138, "end_char": 43143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Goverrunent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43226, "end_char": 43237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not in dispute in this case that the property has vested in Goverrunent under s. 17 ( 1) ot the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43244, "end_char": 43249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43627, "end_char": 43631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45182, "end_char": 45187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of U-\n\nP1ade1h - Wane/Joo/.\n\n1964", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46622, "end_char": 46661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor do we think it was necessary in order that the public purpose\n\nR. L. A.ION\n\n\"· State of U-\n\nP1ade1h - Wane/Joo/.\n\n1964 mentioned in cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47969, "end_char": 47973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48312, "end_char": 48316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48564, "end_char": 48570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection our attention is invited to the observations of this Court in Province of Bombay \"· Kusaldas S. Advani(1 ), where it was observed that \"under certain circumstances even securing a house for an individual may be in the interests of the community, but it cannot be to the general interest of the community to requisition the property of one refugee for the benefit of another refugee\"."}}, {"text": "Kusaldas S. Advani(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48574, "end_char": 48594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection our attention is invited to the observations of this Court in Province of Bombay \"· Kusaldas S. Advani(1 ), where it was observed that \"under certain circumstances even securing a house for an individual may be in the interests of the community, but it cannot be to the general interest of the community to requisition the property of one refugee for the benefit of another refugee\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49780, "end_char": 49787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50087, "end_char": 50092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50311, "end_char": 50321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. L. Aron", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51236, "end_char": 51246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The intention of the legislature clearly is that private individuals and private companies which really consist of a few private individuals banded together should not have the advantage of acquiring land even though they\n\nR. L. Aron\n\nState of Uttlll'\n\nPrade1h\n\nWonchoo /.\n\nR. L. Arora\n\n\"· Stai.", "canonical_name": "R. L. Aroras"}}, {"text": "State of Uttlll", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51248, "end_char": 51263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The intention of the legislature clearly is that private individuals and private companies which really consist of a few private individuals banded together should not have the advantage of acquiring land even though they\n\nR. L. Aron\n\nState of Uttlll'\n\nPrade1h\n\nWonchoo /.\n\nR. L. Arora\n\n\"· Stai."}}, {"text": "A71angar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51341, "end_char": 51349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Utlllr\n\nPradesh\n\nWanchoo /.\n\nA71angar I.\n\nmay be intending to engage in some industry or work which may be for a public ipurpose inasmuch as the enrichment consequent on such work goes to private individuals or to a group of them who have formed themselves into a private company."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52418, "end_char": 52426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AYYANGAR J. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by Wanchoo, J. but regret my inability to agree with it.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 40(1)(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52939, "end_char": 52951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52966, "end_char": 52970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53237, "end_char": 53244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53283, "end_char": 53287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(l)(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53387, "end_char": 53399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.r. Agarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53673, "end_char": 53685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I shall first take up the submission made to us by M.r."}}, {"text": "s. 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53718, "end_char": 53726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54161, "end_char": 54169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not disputed by Mr. Setalvad who, appearing for the first and 3rd respondents, addressed to us the main arguments on behalf of the respondent, nor by the learned Attorney-General appearing for the Union of India that if on a proper construction of\n\ncl. ("}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54338, "end_char": 54352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not disputed by Mr. Setalvad who, appearing for the first and 3rd respondents, addressed to us the main arguments on behalf of the respondent, nor by the learned Attorney-General appearing for the Union of India that if on a proper construction of\n\ncl. ("}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54514, "end_char": 54521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57939, "end_char": 57946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60652, "end_char": 60656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60700, "end_char": 60708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60732, "end_char": 60736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of UllM", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60773, "end_char": 60786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If in this\n\nR. L. A\"\"\"\n\nState of UllM\n\nPrade1h - Ayyangar I.\n\n1961 provision at least, which deals with the agreements which the Government is directed to enter into, it is clear that the ' R. L. Arora ... acquisition could be made only for a public purpose and not State of Uttar for what one might term \"the private purposes\" of a com- Pradesh d . ."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61015, "end_char": 61029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If in this\n\nR. L. A\"\"\"\n\nState of UllM\n\nPrade1h - Ayyangar I.\n\n1961 provision at least, which deals with the agreements which the Government is directed to enter into, it is clear that the ' R. L. Arora ... acquisition could be made only for a public purpose and not State of Uttar for what one might term \"the private purposes\" of a com- Pradesh d . ."}}, {"text": "A.yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61180, "end_char": 61189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pany engage m an m ustry w 1c 1s essentia or t e pu 1c, A.yyangar J. then one could read cl. (", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61272, "end_char": 61277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(l)(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61318, "end_char": 61330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61332, "end_char": 61343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61684, "end_char": 61692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tindal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64915, "end_char": 64921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit,\" said Tindal, C.J. in Warburton v. Loveland('), \"we must give effect to it, whatver be <he -consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the lcgisbture\"."}}, {"text": "Watson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65666, "end_char": 65672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was observed by Lord Watson in an oft quoted passage in Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co.(');\n\n\"Intention of the legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood."}}, {"text": "Herschell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66308, "end_char": 66317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was the same principle that was explained by Lord Herschell in Cox v. Hakes( 2 ) when he said:\n\n\" .......... It must be admitted that if the language of the legislature interpreted according to the recognised canons of construction involves this result, your Lordships must frankly yield to it,\n\neven if you should be satisfied that it was not ie the contemplation of the legislature.\""}}, {"text": "Attomey-Oeneral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67057, "end_char": 67072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Attomey-Oeneral submitted that the provision could and ought to be read down and confined in its operation to acquisition for public purposes as properly understood; in other words, to sever the constitutional from the unconstitutional portions and uphold the former."}}, {"text": "S28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67566, "end_char": 67569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amending Act XXXI of 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68866, "end_char": 68891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68928, "end_char": 68938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act XXXI of 1962", "statute": "Amending Act XXXI of 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69018, "end_char": 69022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act XXXI of 1962", "statute": "Amending Act XXXI of 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69064, "end_char": 69068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act XXXI of 1962", "statute": "Amending Act XXXI of 1962"}}, {"text": "June 20, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69120, "end_char": 69133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the terms of s. 7 of the Act, all acquisitions of land made prior to June 20, 1962, even accepting the construction which Mr. Setalvad pressed upon us, are deemed to have been made for a purpose falling within cl. ("}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_814_826_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Ftbruary 17.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAMCHANDRA RAMBUX\n\nCHAMPABAI AND OTIIERS\n\n(K. SusBA RAo AND J. R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nWill-G-enuineness-Credibility of wit11esses-..f)urrounding circumsta~ ces and probabilities, if court can look into--Re11zoval of tu.vpiciom circumstances, if propounder has to satisfy the court.\n\nThe appellant filed a suit claiming the property of one R which was in possession of R's widow on the allegation that R had executed a will bequeathing almost his entire property to the appellant and practically excluding his widow and daughters.\n\nThe ground on which the widow and the daughters were excluded is said to be the strained relations which had developed between R and his wife. The widow denied the execution of the alleged will ana challenged the genuineness.\n\nThe Trial Court holding that the will was genuine decreed the suiL On appeal, the High Court dismissed the suit. holding that the will was not genuine. The finding of the High Court was based on the evidence and the attending circumstances appearing in the case.\n\nOn appeal to this Court by a certificate granted:\n\nHeld: (i) In order to judge the credibility of the witness, the Court is not confined only to the way in which the witnesses have tdeposed or to the demeanour of the witnesses, but it is open to it to look into the surrounding circumstances as well as the probabilities, so that it may be able to form a correct idea of the trustworthiness of the witnesses. This issue cannot be determined by considering the evidence adduced in the Court separately from the surrounding circumstances brought out in the evidence, or V.'hich appear from the nature and the contents of the do.:ument itself.\n\n(ii) It is necessary for the propounder to satisfy the court about the genuineness of the will by removing all suspjcions which naturally flow from the various circumstances.\n\nSurat Kumar Bibi v. Sakti Chand, (1928). L.R. 56 f.A. 62, Kri.rhto Gopal v. Baidyanath, A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 87, Chotey Narain Singh \\'.\n\nMt. Ratan Kaer, (1894) L.R. 22 I.A. 12, Ii. Venkachala Iyengar v.\n\nB. N. Thaimmajam1na, [1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 426, Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, C.A. No. 295 of 1960. dt. Sept. 13, 1963 (Nonreportable and Tyrell v. Painton, (1894) P. 151, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuR1smcnoN: Civil Appeal No. 758 of 1963.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated February 14, 15, of the former Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 516 of 1957 from original Decree.\n\nJ. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and 0. C. Mathur, for the appellant.\n\nGirish Chandra and Sardar Bahadur, for respondents Nos. 1, 2(i) to 2(iv), 3 and 4.\n\nFebruary 17, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by:-\n\nMUDHOLKAR, J.-The question which arises for consideration in this appeal by a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay is whether a will alleged to have been executed by one Ramdhan on May 23, 1947 is genuine or is a fabrication.\n\nBy this will. Ramdhan is alleged to have bequeathed almost his entire property consisting of 16 fields assessed to land revenue at Rs. 425 /- per annum. five hou•es, a shop and movables consisting of 800 tolas of gold, I.COO tolas of silver, Rs. 50,000/- cash and Rs. 15,000/- due trom debtors as well as cattle, agricultural implements, utensils. etc., to the appellant, and practically excluded his widow.\n\nSitabai and his three married daughters. The appellant is the grandson of one of the three predeceased uncles of Ramdhan, and the ground on which the widow and the daughters were practically excluded by Ramdhan is said to be the strained relations which developed between Ramdhan and his wife during his last days.\n\nRamdhan died on October 31. 1948. and Sitabai, who was all along living with him, came into possession of Ramdhan 's property.\n\nAdmittedly, the appellant did not trv to disturb her possession. According to him, he allowed Sitabai to remain in possession on his behalf, and that for some time she was managing the estate in a satisfactory way.\n\nLater on, however, she, in utter disregard of the appellant's interests, began to give away some portions of the property to her daughters and strangers, even though she knew that the property had been bequeathed to him by Ramdhan. and that she was entitled to receive only a maintenance of Rs. 40 /- per month under the will of Ramdhan. It may be mentioned that Ramdhan was a resident of Peepalgaon in the district of Parbhani, and the entire property, movable as well as immovable, is at Peepalgaon itself.\n\nUpon these allegations, the plaintiff instituted the suit Out of which this appeal arises, in the District Court at\n\nRamcluurtlnr\n\nRambta\n\nChampaboi\n\nM11dlwlkar J.\n\nllamchandra\n\nR.ambUJ<\n\nChampabal\n\n'Mudlrolkar I.\n\nParbbani. Sitabai denied the execution of the alleged will by Ramdban, and also denied the relationship claimed by the appellant with Ramdhan. According to her, after Ramdhan's death she was in exclusive possession of the property, that she is a helpless widow without a male issue, 1nd that the appellant taking advantage of this fact has set up a false will and laid claim to Ramdhan's property. While admitting that the immovable property had been correctly set out in the plaint, she challenged the correctness of some of the items of the movable property.\n\nDuring the pendency of the suit, one Madanlal was joined as a party to it on !he basis of his claim to be the adopted son of Ramdhan. He also challenged the genuineness of the will.\n\nAccording to him, he was adopted by Ramdhan in the month of Chait, Samvat, 1999 according to the prevailing custom in the State of Udaipur.\n\nSitabai died during the pendency of the suit, and her daughters, Champabai, Rambhabai, and Rajubai as also Ram Pershad, one of Sitabai's sons-in-law, who was alleged to have obtained possession of the property after the death of Sitabai. were brought on record as the legal representatives of Sitabat.\n\nThe trial Court held in favour of the appellant that he was related to Ramdhan, as alleged by him, and that the will executed by Ramdhan was genuine. It also negatived Madanlal's claim of having been adopted by Ramdhan. On\n\nthese findings, that Court decreed the appellant's suit. The legal representatives of Sitabai thereupon preferred an appeal before the High Court. which held that the will set up by the appellant is not genuine, and on that ground, dismissed his suit.\n\nIn support of the will, the appellant examined himself, the scribe, Venkat Rajaram and three of the attesting witnesses, Raja Kaniahprasad, Rashecduddin Ahmed and Wamanlal.\n\nThe appellant also examined some witnesses in support of his contention that the property bequeathed to him under the will was entrusted by him to Sitabai after the\n\ndeath of Ramdhan.\n\nOn the other hand, the respondents have led evidence to show that Ramdhan could not have been at Hyderabad where the will is alleged to have been executed, on May 23, 1947, because till the afternoon of the\n\nprevious day he was at a village nearly 300 miles distant from Hyderabad.\n\nThe High Court. on a consideration of the entire evidence adduced by the parties, came to the conclusion that th<.: will was prepared under highly suspicious circumstances, and that the evidence adduced by the appellant was not such as to satisfy it that the alleged will was a genuine one. Accord ing to the High Court, the circumstances appeaiing in the case indicate that the alleged will was \"in all probability\" a false document brought into existence without the knowledge of Ramdhan. The High Court rightly pointed \"Out that the nature of proof which was required in a case of this kind was that laid down by the Privy Council in Sarai Kumari Bibi v. Sakhi Chand('), where it has been stated that in all\n\n.:ases in which a will is prepared under circumstances which arouse the suspicion of the Court that it does not express the mind of the testator, it is for the propounder of the will to remove that suspicion. According to the High Court, the evidence led by the appellant was so unsatisfactory tlfat it 'Vas impossible to give any effect to the alleged will.\n\nMr. Dadachanji's grievance, however, is that the entire approach of the High Court to the evidence in this case was wrong, because it first took into consideration the various circumstances, and then judged the credibility of the wit nesses in the light of those circumstances. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the following observation ot Biswas, J. in Kristo Gopal v. Baidya Nath( 2):\n\n\"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the learned Judges for some reason or other must have formed the idea that the will was not a genuine document. and that having formed such an idea, he looked at the evidence of each of the wit\n\nnesses with a suspicious eye.\n\nOn no other hypothesis is it possible to explain the criticism which he has led himself to make.\"\n\nThe learned Judge has supported his observation by quoting the following observations of Lord Watson in Chotey Narain Singh v. Mt. Ratan Koer(1 ):\n\n(I) (1928) L.R. S6 I.A. 62.\n\n(3) 22 I.A. l2, 21.\n\n\\34-159 S.C.-52\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 87.\n\nRamchaatltrl\n\nRamba\n\nChampal>al\n\nM11dhu/kar I.\n\n19M\n\nBlllnclrandro\n\nRambllll\n\nCiampabol\n\nlllldholkt11 I.\n\n\"The theory of improbability remains to be considered; and the first observation which their Lordships' have to make is that, in order to prevail against such evidence as has been adduced by the respondent in this case, an improbability must be clear and cogent.\n\nIt must approach very nearly to, if it does not altogether constitute, an impossibility.\"\n\nThe learned Judge has then observed as follows:\n\n\"In a case where .. attesting witnesses are produced and they give clear and cogent testimony regarding execution, one should require very strong circumstances to repel the effect of such testimony. It will not do to talk airily about circumstances of suspicion. It is no doubt true that a person who takes it upon himself to dispute the genuineness of a will cannot be expected to prove a negative in many cases.\n\nAt the same time, the difficulty in which, on his own seeking, he places himself, will not relieve him of the burden-it may be a heavy burden-of displacing the positive testimony on the other side. If he rests his case on suspicion, the suspicion must be a suspicion inherent in the transaction itself which is challenged and cannot be a suspicion arising out of a mere conflict of testimony.\"\n\nThen the learned Judge went on to observe that if there was evidence to show that the will was actually made, it would not be relevant to enquire whether there was any occasion or motive for the execution of the will, and that if such a test were to be applied in every case, no will could probably be .proved at all.\n\nThe questions which we have to consider are whether there was, in fact, a will, that is to say, whether Ramdhan did execute a will during his lifetime, and if so, whether the docu. ment •upon which the appellant relies is a will executed by Ramdhan and duly attested by witnesses. The appellant can prove these facts only by adducing evidence of the due cxecu. tion of the will by Ramdhan and of its attestation.\n\nThe challenge before us is as to the credibility of the witnesses\n\nwho have come forward to say that the document upon which the appellant relies not merely bears the signature of Ramdhan but represents the disposition made by Ramdhan, that is it was executed by Ramdhan, and that the attesting witnesses attested the execution of the will by Ramdhan. In order to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the Court is not confined only to the way in which the witnesses have deposed or to the demeanour of witnesses, but it is open to it to look into the !urrounding circumstances as well as the probabilities, so that it may be able to form a correct idea of the trustworthiness of I.he witnesses. This issue cannot be determined by consider. ing the evidence adduced in the Court separately from the imrrounding circumstances which have also been brought out :in the evidence, or which appear from the nature and ror.tenls of the document itself. We do not understand the observa tions of Lord Waston to mean that the testimony as to the execution of the document has to be considered independently of the attendant circumstances. All that he says is that where there is a large and consistent body of testimony tending to show the execution of a will by the testator, that evidence should not be lightly set aside on the theory of improbability.\n\nDealing with the mode of proof of a will, this Court has observed in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmaiamma and Others('):\n\n\"As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters.\n\nHowever, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents.\n\nUnlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator, who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally intro\n\nduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document pro. pounded is proved to be the last will and testa•\n\n(I) [t9S9] S.C.R. Supp. I. 426. 443.\n\n'Ramchandl'll\n\nRambu.r\n\nChampabal\n\nMwlholar }.\n\nRmncltaNW\n\nRmnbra\n\nCluzmpabal\n\nMudholkar I.\n\nment of the departed testator. Even so. in dealing with the proof of the wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of lhe proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory eyidence that the will was signed by the testator, that lhe testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature\n\nand effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will.\n\nOrdinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder.\n\nIn other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated.\n\nThere may, however, be cases in which the execution\n\nof the will may be surrounded by .uspicious circumstances.\n\nThe alleged signature of the testator may be shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; . . . . the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light .of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind.\n\nIn such cases the court would naturally expect\n\nthat all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator.\"\n\nThis Court also pointed out that apart from suspicious circum. stances of this kind, where it appears that the propounder has\n\ntaken a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers substantial benefits on him, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will, and the propounder is required to remove the suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. In other words, the propounder must satisfy the conscience ot the Court that the document upon which he relies is the last will and testament of the testator.\n\nThis decision has been recently referred to in a Judgment of this Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee and others v.\n\nSubodh Kumar Banerjee(') (Civil Appeal No. 295 of 1960 decided on September 13, 1963). There, Wanchoo J. who spoke for the Court, has observed as follows :\n\n\"The mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by s. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the will as genuine. Where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. Even where there are no such pleas but the circumstances give rise to doubt it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's\n\nmind, the dispositions made in the will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or there might be other indications in the will to 'show that the testator's\n\n(I) C.A. No. 295 of 1960, D. Sept. 13, 1963 (Non-reportable).\n\n196#\n\nRmnchandro\n\nRambw:\n\nChampabal\n\nM1uthulkar I.\n\n~1\"indra\n\nRambwc\n\nChampabai\n\nM11dhnlkar J.\n\nmind was not free.\n\nIn such a case the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicion should be completely removed betore the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes part in the execution of the will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate, even if the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations. It is in the light of these settled principles that we have to consider whether the appellants have succeeded in establishing that the will was duly executed and attested.\"\n\nIn Sarat Kumari Bibi's case(') on which the. High Court has relied and which is also relied upon in Venkatachala lyengar's case(') just cited, it.was found that one Jamaluddin who took benefit under the will, had taken an active part in the preparation of the will, and, therefore, the rule made by Lindley and Davey L.JJ. in Tyrrell v. Painton( 3 ) that where\n\ncircumstances exist which would excite the suspicion of the Court. the burden is upon the propounder of the will to remove such suspicion and prove affirmatively that the testator 1'11ew and approved of the contents of the document, was applied.\n\nThe High Court has analysed the entire evidence adduced by the propounder of the will to prove its due execution by Ramdhan, and along with that evidence, it has also consider. ed certain attendant circumstances. One is the fact that the will is said to have been executed at Hyderabad, which is a place where the appellant resides and carries on his profes sion as a medical pmctitioner and not at Peepalgaon, where Ramdhan resided. The evidence adduced in the case shows that on the day prior to the one on which the will purports\n\nto have been executed, Ramdhan was at Ghanegaon till the\n\n~moon. This place is 8 miles distant from Peepa lgaon, and\n\n(!) [1928] L.R. 56 I.A. 62.\n\n(2) [1959] Supp. l, S.C.R. 426, 443.\n\n(3) [18941 P. 151, 157, 159.\n\nthe nearest railway station is 20 miles distant from Peepal gaon. The will is said to have been executed at about noon, and though it is not impossible, it is highly improbable that Ramdban could have been present at the place of execution by that time. The third thing is that the will was executed in the house of the appellant. One of the circumstances is that there was no particular reason why the will should have been executed at that time, because there is no suggestion that Ramdban was not keeping good health.\n\nThen again, the property is very considerable, and instead of employing the services of a trained lawyer to draw up the will, a layman like Venkat Rajaram, who has given his profession as \"Jagirdari\" had been enlisted.\n\nThe scribe as well as the attesting witnesses are not the personal friends of Ramdhan, though they say they knew him, but appear to be either the friends or neighbours of the appellant.\n\nYet, the appellant wants the Court to believe that all these persons were collected by Ramdhan after his arrival at Hyderabad on the morning of May 23. This, in itself, would be an improbable thing indeed, because Ramdban would not have had enough time at his disposal for doing it.\n\nAgain, th.ere is no explanation why he should collect only the friends and acquaintances of the appellant rather than persons, who were his own friends.\n\nThe High Court has further pointed out that the document is inscribed on a flimsy paper. It is in high-flown Urdu, and is alleged to have been dictated by him in that language. No doubt, the evidence indicates that Ramdhan could speak in\n\nUrdu, but it also indicates that he cannot read or write in Urdu. It would, therefore, be legitimate to infer that the language which he could speak was the unlettered man's Urdu and not high-flown Urdu. which contains an admixture of Persian words.\n\nIndeed. such words have actually been used in this document. The signature of Ramdhan is itself in Modi script, which would not have been the case if he were well-versed in Urdu. When we turn to the reverse of the sheet on which the document is inscribed, we find that as we go lower down, more and more words seem to be crammed in each line and the spacing between two lines tends to decrease, even though there appears to have been plenty of room for the signature of Ramdhan to be scribed lower down\n\n1q6~\n\nRanu:handnl\n\nRalllbuz\n\nChampabal\n\nM rtdlwlP<r J,\n\n196'\n\nBamchandro\n\nRJJlnbuz\n\nChampabal\n\nJl.udho/kar J.\n\non the paper. It would be legitimate to infer from this that the signature was already there before the will was scribed.\n\nThis feature of the document as well as the quality of the paper used would suggest that a piece of paper bearing Ramdhan's signature has been utilised by the sclibe for engrossing what purports to be a will.\n\nFinally, there is the circumstance that the will is unnatural in the sense that though Ramdhan left property worth several lakhs, he made no provision for a residence for his wife but gave her only Rs. 40 /-per month as her maintenance,\n\nund lnade only paltry bequests to his daughters. It is true that the daughters are married in affiuent families, but in the absence of a male issue, a father is normally expected to give at least substantial bequests to his daughters. Instead, the wiil gives almost the entire property to a distant relative, who, it may be noticed, was neither brought up by the testator, nor was a person who looked after the testator during his declining years. All this is said to have been due to the fact that Ramdhan's relations with his wife had become strained.\n\nIndeed, the relationship between Ramdhan and his wife had become so bad that Ramdhan, according to the appellant, suspected that she was trying to poison him. Curiously enough, in spite of this, Ramdhan continued to live with Sitabai right till his death, and had made no arrangement for a person other than her to take charge of the cash and the gold and silver ornaments of the value of a couple of lakhs of rupees or so, in the event of his dying suddenly. There is nothing to suggest that Ramdhan's food was cooked by any one other than Sitabai.\n\nTo prove the appellant's allegations that Ramdhan and Sitabai were not getting on well, the main evidence is that of the appellant himself, who is the person who has obviously taken an active part in procuring the execution of the document which he has set up as the will of Ramdhan. He must be held to have taken an active part, even though, according to him, he did not do so, because the will was written not only al Hyderabad where he lives and carries on his profession but also in his own house, and the persons who played one part or the other in this connection are either his friends or his neighbours. It is these circumstances which have to be borne i.n mind while evaluating the testimony of the witnesses bearing on the execution of the will. Further, it is necssary for the appellant to satisfy the conscience of the Court about the genuineness of this will by removing all suspicions which naturally flow from the various circumstances, which we have set out above. There is not an iota of evidePce in this regard, and we are not satisfied that the suspicion created by the circumstances referred to by us has been removed.\n\nLearned counsel has taken us through the evidence of the appellant, the scribe and three attesting witnesses examined . by him. All this evidence has been critically examined by the High Court but for reasons given by it in its judgment, not accepted by it. We find no reasons for viewing the evidence differently.\n\nWe have already adverted to the fact that no particular reason has been even indicated by the appellant as to why Ramdhan thought of executing a will long before his death.\n\nIf his idea in doing so was to make certain that his property does not fall in Sitabai's hands after his death one would have expected him to make some arrangement for keeping the movables out of her reach.\n\nHe, however, made no such arra11i; ement. Further, he would have also taken the precaution of regiMering the will, so that any challenge to its genumeness could not have been successfully made.\n\nFunner, there is no unimpeachable evidence to show that the will was brought to light immediately after Ramdhan's death, which would have been the case if it were a genuine will.\n\nOn the other hand, there is one circumstance which suggests that the claim on the basis of Ramdhan's will was not even thought of by the appellant till long after Ramdhan 's death.\n\nThe circumstance is the continuance of Sitabai in . possession of the cash, gold and silver articles and other movables, even subsequent to Ramdhan's death. Of course, the appellant has given the explanation that he allowed her to remain in possession on his behalf, but his evidence is wholly incredible.\n\nIndeed, the appellant has said that he instituted the suit because he found Sitabai parting with portions of Ramdhan's movables in favour of her daughters and strangers after the death of Ramdhan. At least, one thing will follow from this that according to him Sitabai was more interested in her daughters than in him.\n\nIf, therefore, he had a _genuine claim to Ramdhan's property, he would not have\n\nRamchandrt1\n\nRambw:\n\nChampabal\n\nM11dholkar I.\n\nRlllnclumdra Rambu\n\nClunnpabal\n\nMudholkar J.\n\n, Fcbr1111TY 19.\n\nallowed Sitabai to remain in possession of Ramdhan's movables.\n\nAt least, he would have obtained from her a document containing the list and description of the movables and also an admission to the effect that she was entrusted with them by the appellant and that she had no right in them.\n\nHad she refused to execute such a document, one would have naturally expected the appellant to institute a suit for their possession immediately. There is no explanation for the absence of such a document, and thus this is also a circumstance which militates against the genuineness of the will.\n\nIn the circumstances, we hold that the High Court was right in rejecting the evidence of the attesting witnesses and the scribe as well as of the appellant with regard to the execution of the will by Ram4han. ·\n\nWe accordingly uphold the judgment of the High Court, and dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nK. S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Proceedings under s. 34(1A}-Applicability of other relevant provisions of the Act-Slction 34( 1.A.) whether contravenu Art. 14 of the Constitution-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), rs. 34(1), 34(1A)-Constitution of India, Art. 14.\n\nThe validity of s. 34(1A) of the Income-tax Act was challenged by the assessees as contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was contended, that th'e remedy by way of appeals and revisions availablo in cases under s. 34( 1) was denied to the assessees against whom proceedings were taken under s. 34(1A), and that while under s. 34(1)(a), as it then stood, the assessing authority could not act beyond 8 years, this protection was not available to assessees against whom action was taken under s. 34(1A).", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "RAMCHANDRA RAMBUX", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRA RAMBUX", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHAMPABAI AND OTIIERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHAMPABAI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SusBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MuDHOLKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Chotey Narain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1982, "end_char": 2001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "87, Chotey Narain Singh \\'."}}, {"text": "Ratan Kaer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2011, "end_char": 2021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mt. Ratan Kaer, (1894) L.R. 22 I.A. 12, Ii."}}, {"text": "(1894) L.R. 22 I.A. 12", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2023, "end_char": 2045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2477, "end_char": 2493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2495, "end_char": 2510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and 0."}}, {"text": "0. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2515, "end_char": 2527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and 0."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2549, "end_char": 2563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girish Chandra and Sardar Bahadur, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2568, "end_char": 2582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girish Chandra and Sardar Bahadur, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "February 17, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 17, 1964."}}, {"text": "MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2699, "end_char": 2708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:-\n\nMUDHOLKAR, J.-The question which arises for consideration in this appeal by a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay is whether a will alleged to have been executed by one Ramdhan on May 23, 1947 is genuine or is a fabrication.", "canonical_name": "MUDHOLKAR"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2804, "end_char": 2824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:-\n\nMUDHOLKAR, J.-The question which arises for consideration in this appeal by a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay is whether a will alleged to have been executed by one Ramdhan on May 23, 1947 is genuine or is a fabrication."}}, {"text": "Ramdhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2880, "end_char": 2887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:-\n\nMUDHOLKAR, J.-The question which arises for consideration in this appeal by a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay is whether a will alleged to have been executed by one Ramdhan on May 23, 1947 is genuine or is a fabrication.", "canonical_name": "Ramdhan"}}, {"text": "May 23, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2891, "end_char": 2903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:-\n\nMUDHOLKAR, J.-The question which arises for consideration in this appeal by a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay is whether a will alleged to have been executed by one Ramdhan on May 23, 1947 is genuine or is a fabrication."}}, {"text": "Sitabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3346, "end_char": 3353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sitabai and his three married daughters.", "canonical_name": "Sitabai"}}, {"text": "October 31. 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3678, "end_char": 3694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramdhan died on October 31."}}, {"text": "Peepalgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4395, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that Ramdhan was a resident of Peepalgaon in the district of Parbhani, and the entire property, movable as well as immovable, is at Peepalgaon itself."}}, {"text": "Parbhani", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4425, "end_char": 4433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that Ramdhan was a resident of Peepalgaon in the district of Parbhani, and the entire property, movable as well as immovable, is at Peepalgaon itself."}}, {"text": "M11dlwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4666, "end_char": 4676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon these allegations, the plaintiff instituted the suit Out of which this appeal arises, in the District Court at\n\nRamcluurtlnr\n\nRambta\n\nChampaboi\n\nM11dlwlkar J.\n\nllamchandra\n\nR.ambUJ<\n\nChampabal\n\n'Mudlrolkar I.\n\nParbbani.", "canonical_name": "M11dlwlkar"}}, {"text": "Ramdban", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4793, "end_char": 4800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sitabai denied the execution of the alleged will by Ramdban, and also denied the relationship claimed by the appellant with Ramdhan.", "canonical_name": "Ramdhan"}}, {"text": "Madanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5330, "end_char": 5338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the suit, one Madanlal was joined as a party to it on !"}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to him, he was adopted by Ramdhan in the month of Chait, Samvat, 1999 according to the prevailing custom in the State of Udaipur."}}, {"text": "Champabai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5682, "end_char": 5691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sitabai died during the pendency of the suit, and her daughters, Champabai, Rambhabai, and Rajubai as also Ram Pershad, one of Sitabai's sons-in-law, who was alleged to have obtained possession of the property after the death of Sitabai.", "canonical_name": "Champabai"}}, {"text": "Rambhabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5693, "end_char": 5702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sitabai died during the pendency of the suit, and her daughters, Champabai, Rambhabai, and Rajubai as also Ram Pershad, one of Sitabai's sons-in-law, who was alleged to have obtained possession of the property after the death of Sitabai."}}, {"text": "Rajubai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5708, "end_char": 5715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sitabai died during the pendency of the suit, and her daughters, Champabai, Rambhabai, and Rajubai as also Ram Pershad, one of Sitabai's sons-in-law, who was alleged to have obtained possession of the property after the death of Sitabai."}}, {"text": "Ram Pershad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5724, "end_char": 5735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sitabai died during the pendency of the suit, and her daughters, Champabai, Rambhabai, and Rajubai as also Ram Pershad, one of Sitabai's sons-in-law, who was alleged to have obtained possession of the property after the death of Sitabai."}}, {"text": "Sitabat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5910, "end_char": 5917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were brought on record as the legal representatives of Sitabat.", "canonical_name": "Sitabai"}}, {"text": "Venkat Rajaram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the will, the appellant examined himself, the scribe, Venkat Rajaram and three of the attesting witnesses, Raja Kaniahprasad, Rashecduddin Ahmed and Wamanlal."}}, {"text": "Raja Kaniahprasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6518, "end_char": 6535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the will, the appellant examined himself, the scribe, Venkat Rajaram and three of the attesting witnesses, Raja Kaniahprasad, Rashecduddin Ahmed and Wamanlal."}}, {"text": "Rashecduddin Ahmed", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6537, "end_char": 6555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the will, the appellant examined himself, the scribe, Venkat Rajaram and three of the attesting witnesses, Raja Kaniahprasad, Rashecduddin Ahmed and Wamanlal."}}, {"text": "Wamanlal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6560, "end_char": 6568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the will, the appellant examined himself, the scribe, Venkat Rajaram and three of the attesting witnesses, Raja Kaniahprasad, Rashecduddin Ahmed and Wamanlal."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6853, "end_char": 6862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the respondents have led evidence to show that Ramdhan could not have been at Hyderabad where the will is alleged to have been executed, on May 23, 1947, because till the afternoon of the\n\nprevious day he was at a village nearly 300 miles distant from Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8115, "end_char": 8125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Dadachanji's grievance, however, is that the entire approach of the High Court to the evidence in this case was wrong, because it first took into consideration the various circumstances, and then judged the credibility of the wit nesses in the light of those circumstances."}}, {"text": "Biswas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8467, "end_char": 8473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention, he has relied upon the following observation ot Biswas, J. in Kristo Gopal v. Baidya Nath( 2):\n\n\"It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the learned Judges for some reason or other must have formed the idea that the will was not a genuine document."}}, {"text": "Watson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8980, "end_char": 8986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge has supported his observation by quoting the following observations of Lord Watson in Chotey Narain Singh v. Mt. Ratan Koer(1 ):\n\n(I) (1928) L.R. S6 I.A. 62.", "canonical_name": "Watson"}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9050, "end_char": 9052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Waston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12175, "end_char": 12181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not understand the observa tions of Lord Waston to mean that the testimony as to the execution of the document has to be considered independently of the attendant circumstances.", "canonical_name": "Watson"}}, {"text": "Ramchandl'll", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13428, "end_char": 13440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Ramchandl'll\n\nRambu.r\n\nChampabal\n\nMwlholar }."}}, {"text": "September 13, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16169, "end_char": 16187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "295 of 1960 decided on September 13, 1963)."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16197, "end_char": 16204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, Wanchoo J. who spoke for the Court, has observed as follows :\n\n\"The mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by s. 63 of the Indian Succession Act."}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16443, "end_char": 16448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16456, "end_char": 16477, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Champabal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17563, "end_char": 17572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196Rmnchandro\n\nRambw:\n\nChampabal\n\nM1uthulkar I.\n\n~1\"indra\n\nRambwc\n\nChampabai\n\nM11dhnlkar J.\n\nmind was not free.", "canonical_name": "Champabai"}}, {"text": "Champabai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17607, "end_char": 17616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196Rmnchandro\n\nRambw:\n\nChampabal\n\nM1uthulkar I.\n\n~1\"indra\n\nRambwc\n\nChampabai\n\nM11dhnlkar J.\n\nmind was not free.", "canonical_name": "Champabai"}}, {"text": "M11dhnlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17618, "end_char": 17628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196Rmnchandro\n\nRambw:\n\nChampabal\n\nM1uthulkar I.\n\n~1\"indra\n\nRambwc\n\nChampabai\n\nM11dhnlkar J.\n\nmind was not free.", "canonical_name": "M11dlwlkar"}}, {"text": "Sarat Kumari Bibi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18442, "end_char": 18459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sarat Kumari Bibi's case(') on which the."}}, {"text": "Venkatachala lyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18539, "end_char": 18559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court has relied and which is also relied upon in Venkatachala lyengar's case(') just cited, it.was found that one Jamaluddin who took benefit under the will, had taken an active part in the preparation of the will, and, therefore, the rule made by Lindley and Davey L.JJ."}}, {"text": "Jamaluddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18604, "end_char": 18614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court has relied and which is also relied upon in Venkatachala lyengar's case(') just cited, it.was found that one Jamaluddin who took benefit under the will, had taken an active part in the preparation of the will, and, therefore, the rule made by Lindley and Davey L.JJ."}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18738, "end_char": 18745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court has relied and which is also relied upon in Venkatachala lyengar's case(') just cited, it.was found that one Jamaluddin who took benefit under the will, had taken an active part in the preparation of the will, and, therefore, the rule made by Lindley and Davey L.JJ."}}, {"text": "Davey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18750, "end_char": 18755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court has relied and which is also relied upon in Venkatachala lyengar's case(') just cited, it.was found that one Jamaluddin who took benefit under the will, had taken an active part in the preparation of the will, and, therefore, the rule made by Lindley and Davey L.JJ."}}, {"text": "Ghanegaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19620, "end_char": 19629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence adduced in the case shows that on the day prior to the one on which the will purports\n\nto have been executed, Ramdhan was at Ghanegaon till the\n\n~moon."}}, {"text": "L.R. 56 I.A. 62", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19711, "end_char": 19726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Peepal gaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19850, "end_char": 19861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the nearest railway station is 20 miles distant from Peepal gaon."}}, {"text": "Venkat Rajaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20459, "end_char": 20473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then again, the property is very considerable, and instead of employing the services of a trained lawyer to draw up the will, a layman like Venkat Rajaram, who has given his profession as \"Jagirdari\" had been enlisted."}}, {"text": "Bamchandro", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22220, "end_char": 22230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When we turn to the reverse of the sheet on which the document is inscribed, we find that as we go lower down, more and more words seem to be crammed in each line and the spacing between two lines tends to decrease, even though there appears to have been plenty of room for the signature of Ramdhan to be scribed lower down\n\n1q6~\n\nRanu:handnl\n\nRalllbuz\n\nChampabal\n\nM rtdlwlP<r J,\n\n196'\n\nBamchandro\n\nRJJlnbuz\n\nChampabal\n\nJl.udho/kar J.\n\non the paper."}}, {"text": "Champabal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27070, "end_char": 27079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, therefore, he had a _genuine claim to Ramdhan's property, he would not have\n\nRamchandrt1\n\nRambw:\n\nChampabal\n\nM11dholkar I.\n\nRlllnclumdra Rambu\n\nClunnpabal\n\nMudholkar J.\n\n, Fcbr1111TY 19.", "canonical_name": "Champabai"}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27128, "end_char": 27137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, therefore, he had a _genuine claim to Ramdhan's property, he would not have\n\nRamchandrt1\n\nRambw:\n\nChampabal\n\nM11dholkar I.\n\nRlllnclumdra Rambu\n\nClunnpabal\n\nMudholkar J.\n\n, Fcbr1111TY 19.", "canonical_name": "MUDHOLKAR"}}, {"text": "Ram4han", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27948, "end_char": 27955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances, we hold that the High Court was right in rejecting the evidence of the attesting witnesses and the scribe as well as of the appellant with regard to the execution of the will by Ram4han. ·", "canonical_name": "Ramdhan"}}, {"text": "K. S. RASHID", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28069, "end_char": 28081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28149, "end_char": 28169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28177, "end_char": 28190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28192, "end_char": 28201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J.C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28210, "end_char": 28219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28224, "end_char": 28246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28383, "end_char": 28390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28398, "end_char": 28438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28471, "end_char": 28492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28494, "end_char": 28501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28520, "end_char": 28529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28537, "end_char": 28551, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28600, "end_char": 28607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28721, "end_char": 28730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28801, "end_char": 28810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28833, "end_char": 28844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29001, "end_char": 29010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_826_837_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Rlllnclumdra Rambu\n\nClunnpabal\n\nMudholkar J.\n\n, Fcbr1111TY 19.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nallowed Sitabai to remain in possession of Ramdhan's movables.\n\nAt least, he would have obtained from her a document containing the list and description of the movables and also an admission to the effect that she was entrusted with them by the appellant and that she had no right in them.\n\nHad she refused to execute such a document, one would have naturally expected the appellant to institute a suit for their possession immediately. There is no explanation for the absence of such a document, and thus this is also a circumstance which militates against the genuineness of the will.\n\nIn the circumstances, we hold that the High Court was right in rejecting the evidence of the attesting witnesses and the scribe as well as of the appellant with regard to the execution of the will by Ram4han. ·\n\nWe accordingly uphold the judgment of the High Court, and dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nK. S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Proceedings under s. 34(1A}-Applicability of other relevant provisions of the Act-Slction 34( 1.A.) whether contravenu Art. 14 of the Constitution-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), rs. 34(1), 34(1A)-Constitution of India, Art. 14.\n\nThe validity of s. 34(1A) of the Income-tax Act was challenged by the assessees as contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was contended, that th'e remedy by way of appeals and revisions availablo in cases under s. 34( 1) was denied to the assessees against whom proceedings were taken under s. 34(1A), and that while under s. 34(1)(a), as it then stood, the assessing authority could not act beyond 8 years, this protection was not available to assessees against whom action was taken under s. 34(1A).\n\nHeld: Section 34(1A) was valid and did not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIt could not have been the intention of the legislature when it enacted s. 34( IA) that the procedure prescribed by the relevant provisions of the Act beginning with s. 22 sho11ld not be applicable to proceedings taken under s. 34(1A), and that the procedure to be followed in the said proceedings and the powers to be exercised by the Incometax Officers dealing with them should be, what is vaguely described as \"the inherent or incidental powers\" of such officers. The words \"thereupon\" and \"accordingly\" in s. 34(1A) seems to emphasise the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Act to the proceedings taken under s. 34(1A). ·\n\nThe object of the legislature being to catch income which had escaped assessment, it would be legitimate for the legislature to deal with the class of assessees in whose cases the income which had escaped assessment was much larger, because that would be a basis for rational classification which has an intelligible connection with the object intended to be achieved by the statute.\n\nJai Kishan Srivastava v. lncOmel(u Officer, Kanpur, l.L.R. [1959] II All. 451, approved.\n\nSura; Mull Mohta v. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448 and Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.. Madurai v. Sri A. V. Yiswanatha Sastri, [1955]1 S.C.R. 787 referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 37-40 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated August 13, 11, 1259 .. of. the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petitions Nos. 870 to 873 and 349 of 1956 respectively.\n\nWITH\n\nPetitions Nos. 335 to 345 of 1960.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nG. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 37-40 of 1963).\n\n-- M. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and P. L. Vchra, for the aq:>pellant (in C.A. No. 589/63).\n\n('. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N. Rajagopa/ Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the apPeals and petitions).\n\nK. S. Rasl!U\n\nCJ.T.\n\nK. S. Rashid\n\nC.J.T.\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nF\"ebruary 19, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.-These civil appeals and wn; petitions !wvc been placed before us for hearing in a group, because all of them raise a common question of law about the validity of section 34(TA) of the Income-tax Act (No. XI of 1922) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). M/s. K. S.\n\nRashid & Son, and its partner, Rashid Ahmad, arc the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 37 to 40/1963, and petitioners in W.Ps. Nos. 335-345 /1960. The appeals arise out of the four writ petitions (Nos. 870-873 of 1956) filed by the firm and its partner in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the validity of the notices served upon them under s. 34 (IA) of the Act in respect of their income for the years 1941-42 to 1946-47. These writ petitions have been dismissed by the said High Court and it is with the certificate issued by it that the firm and its partner have come to this Court in appeal. The writ petitions Nos. 335-345/1960 have been filed by the same parties in this Court under Art. 32 of ti ' Constitution in respect of the notices served on them on tile 19th March. 1956 and the order of excess profit tax kicd on them. In these petitions, the same point is urged b} the parties; and that is that the notices are invalid, becau.; e s. 34(IA) is itself ultra vires. The respondents to the appeals are : the Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.. Lucknow, and the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Delhi. The respondents to the writ petitions are : the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle IV, New Delhi, the Income-tax Officer, 'A' Ward, Meerut, the Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P., Lucknow, and the Central Board of Revenue, New Delhi.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 589 of 1963 has bee.n brought to this Court in similar circumstances by the appellant, M/s.\n\nBhawani Prasad Girdharlal. The appellant had challenged the validity of the notices issued to it on the 16th August, 1955 under s. 34(1A) of the Act. The writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed bv th~ Allahabad High Court and it is with the certificate issued by the said High Court that the present appeal has been brought to\n\nthis Court. That is how the only question which arises for our decision in this group of matters relates to the validity of s. 34(IA) of the Act.\n\nThe argument urged in support of the challenge to the validity of the impugned section is that it suffers from the vice of contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is urged that whereas under s. 34 (1) which deals with similar cases of assessees, the remedy by way of appeals and revisions under the relevant provisions of the Act is available to the assessees, that remedy is denied to the assessees against whom proceedings are taken under the impugned section.\n\nSection 34 ( 1) thus gives a preferential treatment to the assessees who are similarly placed with the assessees dealt with under s. 34(1A); and that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. It is also urged that in regard to cases falling under s. 34(1) (a) as it stood at the relevant time, a period of limitation of 8 years had been prescribed beyond which the assessing authority could not act, and this protection of the prescribed period of limitation is not available to the assessees against whom action is taken under the impugned section.\n\nIt is on these two grounds that the validity of s. 34 (IA) is challenged before us.\n\nSection 34 deals with income which has escaped assess- 01ent. Section 34(1) (a) deals with cases where income has,\n\ninter alia, escaped assessment, owing to the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a return of his income under s. 22 for any year, or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, whereas s. 34( 1 )(b) refers to cases where income has escaped assessment notwithstanding that there bas been no omission of failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the assessee. In respect of the first category of cases,\n\ns. 34 ( 1) had provided at the relevant time that the Incometax Officer may, in cases falling under cl. (a) at any time within eight years, and in cases falling under clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the assessee \"a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in the notice under subsection (2) of s. 22, and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains, or recompute the loss or\n\nK. S. Riuh/4\n\nC.1.T.\n\nGaj•ndragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nJ[. s. Rmhid\n\n. v.\n\nCJ.T.\n\nGaiendragadk111\n\nc. J.\n\ndepreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section\" .\n\nLet us now read the relevant portion of s. 34 (1 A). This provision lays down, inter alia, that if, in any case of an assc, see. the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe:\n\n(i) that income has escaped assessment for any year in respect of which the relevant previous yea1 falls wholly or partly within the period beginning on the 1st day of September, 1939, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1946; and\n\n(ii) that the said income amounts, or is likely to amount, to Rs. 1 lakh or more, he may, notwithstanding that the period of eight years or. as the case may be, four years specified in subsection ( 1) has expired, in respect thereof, serve on the assessee, or, if the assessee is a company, on the ; principal officer thereof, a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22, and may proceed to assess or reassess the income, profits or gains of the assessee for all or any of the years referred to in clause (i), and thereupon the provisions of this Act [excepting those contained in clauses ( i) and (iii) of the proviso to sub-section (1) and in sub-sections (2) and (3)' of this section J shall, so far as may be,\n\napply accordingly :\n\nProvided that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice under this sub-section unless he bas recorded bis reasons for doing so, and the Central Board of Revenue is satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice :\n\nProvided further that no such notice shall be issued after the 31st day of March, 1956.\n\nIt is urged that whereas in cases falling under s. 34(1), the Income-tax Officer has to deal with the matter on the footing that the notice issued against the assessee is a notice under s. 22 ( 2), that obligation is not imposed on the Income-tax Officer while he deals with cases falling under s. 34(IA), because the words \"as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section\" which are found in s. 34(1) are omitted in s. 34(IA). It is not seriously disputed that if the notice issued under s. 34 (IA) is not deemed to be a notice under s. 22(2), the remedies by way of appeals and revisions which are prescribed by sections 30, 31, 32, 33, 33A and 33B of the Act would not be available to the assessee, and so, the main basis for the attack against the validity of s. 34{IA) rests on the hypothesis that the omission of the relevant words in s. 34 (IA) in substance deprives the assessee of the said remedies prescribed by the relevant provisions of the Act. If the assumption on which this challenge proceeds is well-founded, s. 34 (IA) may suffer from the infirmity that it contravenes Art. 14. Though, as we will later point out, there is a rational classification between the assessees fallin11: under s. 34 ( 1), and those falling under s. 34(IA), thit rational classification would not justify the denial of the right of appeal to the persons included in s. 34(IA). The question thus presented is one of construction.\n\nBefore dealing with the construction of s. 34 (IA), it would be necessary to refer very briefly to the background of the enaotment of the said section. This section was introduced by an amendment in the Act on the 17th July, 1954, and that was because s. 5 ( 4) of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act (No. 30 of 1947) was struck down by this Court as unconstitutional on May 28, 1954, in Suraj Mall Mohta and Another v. A. V.\n\nViswanatha Sastri and Another(1 ). In that case, while examining the validity of s. 5 ( 4) of the Investigation Commission Act. this Court held that the persons brought within the mischief of the said section belong to the same class of persons who fall within the ambit of s. 34 of the Act and are dealt with by s. 34 ( 1 ) , and in view of the\n\n(I) [19SS) I S. C. R. 448.\n\nK. S. Radl4\n\n.v.\n\nCJ.T.\n\nGaf•ndragadl:ar\n\nc. 1.\n\nJC,. s. Rashid\n\nv. c.i.r.\n\nGa/endragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nfact that tlle procedure prescribed by S; 5 ( 4) of the Jnvesiigation Commission Act was very much less favourable to the assessees than the one available to them if action was taken against them under s. 34 (1), the conclusion reached was that the impugned s. 5 ( 4) was unconstitutional. It is unnecessary to refer to the several grounds mentioned by Mahajan C.J. who spoke for the Court in striking down the impugned section.\n\nAfter this judgment was pronounced, the legislature intervened and enacted s. 34 (IA). That, however, was not the end of the matter.\n\nWhen s. 34(1A) was introduced in the Act, there remained two statutory provisions dealing with substantially the same subject-matter, section 5 (1) of the Investigation Commission Act and s. 34 (1) of the Act.\n\nIn Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. Sri A. V.\n\nViswanatha Sastri and Another('), a point was raised before this Court as to whether it was open to the Income-tax Department to invoke s. 5 ( 1) of the Investigation Commission Act after s. 34 (IA) of the Act was enacted, and this Court held that it was not, because on comparing the two relevant provisions, s. 5 ( 1), according to the decision of this Court, contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. That is bow, s. 5 ( 1) became a dead letter and the Investigation Commission, in consequence, ceased to function. The cases which bad been referred to that Commission and which had not been completed had, therefore, to be taken up under s. 34(1A) of the Act.\n\nThus. it would be noticed that the present controversy bas bad a somewhat chequered career.\n\nThe first challenge was to s. 5 ( 4) of the Investigation Commission Act; when the challenge succeeded and the said section was struck down in the case of Suraj Mall l\\1ohta(2) the legislature intervened and s. 34(IA) was added in the Act.\n\nNevertheless, the cases pending before the Investigation Commission were sought to be continued before the said Commission under s. 5 ( 1) and this section was struck down in the case of Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.('); and, now, that proceedings against the same class of assessees are sought to be continued under s. 34(1A), it is urged thats. 34(1A) of the Act itself is invalid. It is in\n\n(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 787.\n\n(2) [1955) I. S.C.R. 441.\n\nthe light of this background that the controversy between the parties in the present proceedings has to be judged.\n\nReverting then to the question of construction, the narrow point which needs to be examined is, what is the effect of the omission to include in s. 34(IA) the clause \"as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section\" which is to be found in s. 34 (1)?\n\nIn dealing with this question, we think it would not be unreasonable to bear in mind that when the legislature enacted s. 34(IA), it must have desired to remove the infirmities which had rendered s. 5 ( 4) of the Investigation Commission Act invalid.\n\nIn other words, the legislature must have presumably wanted to afford to the assessees in respect of whom s. 34(IA) was intended to be invoked, the same remedies that were available to .the assessees covered by s. 34 (1). Though the importance or significance of this consideration cannot be unduly emphasised, it cannot be said that •this consideration is altogether irrelevant.\n\nWe have already read the relevant portion of s. 34(IA) and. we have seen that it requires that a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in the notice under s. 22, sub-section (2) has to be issued. In other word~. the notice which is required to be issueA. is, in terms, in a sense referable to s. 22(2), because the legislature has provided that it must contain all or any of the requirements which would be included in such a notice.\n\nThen, s. 34(JA) provides that after issuing the notice on the r.ssessee in the manlier prescribed by it, the Income-tax Officer may proceed to assess or reassess the income, profits or gains of the assessee for the relevant years. In the context, it would, we think, be reasonable to hold that the assessment or reassessment which has to follow the issue of the notice, must be assessment or reassessment in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act, and this is made very clear by the clause that follows, because the said clause begins with the word \"thereupon\" which indicates that when the process of assessment or reassessment commences, the clause beginning with the word \"thereupon\" comes into operation and this clause requires that the nrovisions of the\n\n134-159 S.C.-53\n\nK. s. Ra11dtl ..\n\nCJ.T.\n\nGaiendra1adw\n\nc. I.\n\n/C. 8. l!Juhld\n\nCJ.T.\n\nGof*ndragadkar\n\nc. /.\n\nAct shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly.\n\nThe word \"accordingly\" like the word \"thereupon\" seems to emphasise the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Act to the proceedings taken under s. 34(IA); otherwise there is no particular reason which would have justified the further provision in the section excepting certain provisions of the Act which are held to be inapplicable to the proceedings under s. 34(IA).\n\nIt is true that s. 34( I) uses the clause \"as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section\" and s. 34(IA) does not; but the two provisions were not inserted in the Act at the same time; s. 34( I) in the present form was enacted in 1948, whereas s. 34(IA) was enacted in 1954.\n\nIt is quite likely that the draftsman who drafted s. 34(IA) took the view that the last clause in question which occurred in s. 34 (1) was really superfluous and that may account for its omission in s. 34(IA).\n\nIn our opinion, therefore. construing the relevant words in s. 34(IA), it would be difficult to accede to the argument that the said omission was deliberate and significant, and its consequence is that the provisions of s. 22 and all other provisions consequent upon the application of s. 22 become irrelevant in dealing with cases under s. 34(IA).\n\nIf s. 22 is held to be inapplicable to proceedings under s. 34(IA), fue consequence would be entirely irrational and fantastic. The powers conferred on th~ Income-tax Officer under s. 23 (2) to take evidence would then not be available to him, and, indeed, all the powers prescribed and the procedure laid down by s. 23 would become irrelevant.\n\nLikewise, the provisions in regard to appeals and revisions contained in sections 30, 31, 33, 33A and 33B would also be inapplicable. As we have already seen, the inapplicability of these provisions is , the main foundation of the attack against the validity of s. 34(IA).\n\nIt is, however, urged that though the specific powers conferred by s. 23 may not be available to the Income-tax Officer, be may, nevertheless, exercise similar powers, because the authority to assess must itself include such powers as incidental to assessment. The best judgment assessment which is authorised by s. 23 ( 4) may, it is suggested, be made even in cases falling under\n\n1. 34(IA) under the inherent authority of the Income-tax Officer.\n\nIn our opinion, this approach is wholly misconceived.\n\nWe are satisfied that it could not have been the intention of the legislature when it enacted s. 34(IA) that the procedure prescribed by the relevant provisions of the Act beginning with s. 22 should not be applicable to proceedings taken under s. 34(1A), and that the procedure to be followed in the said proceedings and the powers to be exercised by the Income-tax Officers dealing with th'.llil\n\nshould be what is vaguely described as 'the inherent or incidental powers' of such officers. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the challenge made to the validity of s. 34 (IA) on the ground that the remedy by way of appeals or revisions which is ayailable to the assessees against whom proceedings are taken under s. 34(1) is not available to the assessees who are covered by s. 34(IA), cannot be sustained.\n\nThe other contention raised against the validity of s. 34(1A) is based on the fact that at the relevant time, s. 34(1 )(a) dealt with cases similar to those falling under\n\n1. 34(1A), and yet. whereas in the former category of cases a period of limitation was prescribed as eight years there is no such limitation in regard to the latter, and that, it is urged, means unconstitutional discrimination. We are not impressed by this argument. It is true that in a broad sense both s. 34(1 )(a) and s. 34(IA) deal with cases of income which has escaped assessment. and in that sense, the assessees against whom steps are taken in respect of their income which has escaped assessment can be said to form a similar class; but the similarity between the two categories disappears when we remember that s. 34(1A) is intended to deal with assessees whose income has escaped assessment during a specified period between 1st of September, 1939 and the 31st of March. 1946.\n\nIt is well-known that that is the period in which as a result of the War, huge profits were made in business and industry.\n\nThe second point which is very important is that in regard to the cases falling under s. 34(IA), action can be taken only where the income which has escaped assessment is likely to amount to Rs. 1 lakh or more. In other worcb.\n\n1:. s. &u~\n\nCJ.T.\n\nGajendragadklu\n\nc. J.\n\nlfllf .t. If. Ro.JtiJ\n\nCJ.T.\n\nOa/tndratadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nit is only in regard to cases where the escaped income is of a high. magnitude that the restriction of the period of limitation has been removed.\n\nIt is difficult to accept the argument that the legislature was not justified in treating this smaller class of assessees differently on the ground that the profits made by this class were higher and the income which had escaped assessment was correspondingly of a much larger magnitude. The object of the legislature being to catch income which had escaped assessment, it would be legitimate for the legislature to deal with the class of assessees in whose cases the income which had escaped assessment was much larger, because that would be a basis for rational classification which has an intelligible connection with the object intended to be achieved by the statute.\n\nIt was suggested that as a result of the provisions contained in s. 34(l)(a) and s. 34(1A) one year would overlap; and that may be true. But the argument of overlapping has no significance because it makes no difference whether action is taken under s. 34( 1), or s. 34(1A) in respect of that year. Once the notice is served under s. 34(1) or s. 34(1A), the rest of khe procedure is just the same and all the remedies available to the assessees are also just the same. Therefore, we see no substance in the argument that the absence of the restriction as to period of limitation under s. 34(1A) introduces any infirmity in the said provision. In the result, we must hold that s. 34(1A) is valid and has not contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThat is the effect of the majority view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Jai Kishan Srivastava v. lncome-tax Officer,\n\nKanpur and Another(').\n\nThere is one minor additional point which has been argued before us by 'Mr. Setalvad in Civil Appeal No. 589 of 1963, and that point is based upon tbe requirement prescribed by the proviso , to s. 34(1A) that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice unless he has recorded his reasons for doing so, and the Central Board of Revenue is satisfied on such reasons recorded that it is a fit case for the issue of such notice. The argument is that the require-\n\n( I) I. L. R. (19591 Il All. 451.\n\nment prescribed by the proviso constitutes a condition precedent for the exercise of the authority conferred on the Income-tax Officer by s. 34(1A) and since that requirement is not shown to have been satisfied in his case, the appellant in C.A. No. 589 of 1963 must succeed even if s. 34(1A) is held 'to be valid.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument.\n\nWhat was urged before the High Court by the appellant was not that no reasons had been recorded by the Income-ta1 Officer as required by the proviso; the argument was that the appellant had not been given a copy of the said reasons and it appears to have been urged that the appellant wa' entitled to have such a copy.\n\nThis latter part of the case has not been pressed before us by Mr. Setalvad, and rightly.\n\nNow, when we look at the pleadings of the parties, it is clear that it was assumed by the appellant that reasons had been recorded and in fact, it was positively affirmed by the respondent that they had been so recorded; the controversy being, if the reasons are recorded, is the assessee entitled to have a copy of those reasons? Therefore, we do not sec how Mr. Setalvad can suggest that no reasons had in fact been recorded, and so, the condition rprecedent prescribed by the proviso had not been complied with.\n\nThe result is, all the Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions in this group fail and are dismissed.\n\nThere would be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeals and Writ Petitioru diJmisud.\n\nMEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)\n\nvacuee Property-Money deposited wlth an Indian by u ptron wi'lo\n\nmigrated to Pakistan-Liability to pay that amount to tM Cllltl>' dia-Admlniltration of E•ocw• Pro~1f1 Act, 1950 (31 al\n\nJ:., I. Railil ...\n\nC./.T.\n\nGai•ndragodklir\n\nc. J.\n\nltlH", "total_entities": 189, "entities": [{"text": "Sitabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "allowed Sitabai to remain in possession of Ramdhan's movables."}}, {"text": "Ramdhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "allowed Sitabai to remain in possession of Ramdhan's movables.", "canonical_name": "Ramdhan"}}, {"text": "Ram4han", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 882, "end_char": 889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances, we hold that the High Court was right in rejecting the evidence of the attesting witnesses and the scribe as well as of the appellant with regard to the execution of the will by Ram4han. ·", "canonical_name": "Ramdhan"}}, {"text": "S. RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1006, "end_char": 1034, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.S.RASHID & SONS AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1036, "end_char": 1080, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1083, "end_char": 1109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1111, "end_char": 1124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1137, "end_char": 1145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1146, "end_char": 1153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1158, "end_char": 1184, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1317, "end_char": 1324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1332, "end_char": 1372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1405, "end_char": 1426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1428, "end_char": 1435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1454, "end_char": 1463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1471, "end_char": 1485, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1655, "end_char": 1664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1735, "end_char": 1744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1935, "end_char": 1944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1953, "end_char": 1967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2001, "end_char": 2008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34( IA)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2103, "end_char": 2113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2197, "end_char": 2202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2256, "end_char": 2265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2541, "end_char": 2550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2657, "end_char": 2666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jai Kishan Srivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3056, "end_char": 3077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Kishan Srivastava v. lncOmel(u Officer, Kanpur, l.L.R. [1959] II All."}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 448", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3191, "end_char": 3210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3316, "end_char": 3344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3455, "end_char": 3475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3610, "end_char": 3617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3625, "end_char": 3646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3691, "end_char": 3703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the appellants (in C.As."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3705, "end_char": 3717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the appellants (in C.As."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3719, "end_char": 3733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the appellants (in C.As."}}, {"text": "P. L.\n\nVohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3738, "end_char": 3750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the appellants (in C.As.", "canonical_name": "P. L.\n\nVohra"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and P. L. Vchra, for the aq:>pellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vchra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3855, "end_char": 3866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and P. L. Vchra, for the aq:>pellant (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "P. L.\n\nVohra"}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3915, "end_char": 3926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N. Rajagopa/ Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the apPeals and petitions)."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopa/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3946, "end_char": 3961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N. Rajagopa/ Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the apPeals and petitions)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3973, "end_char": 3987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N. Rajagopa/ Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the apPeals and petitions)."}}, {"text": "K. S. Rasl!U", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4046, "end_char": 4058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Rasl!U\n\nCJ.T.\n\nK. S. Rashid\n\nC.J.T.\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nF\"ebruary 19, 1964.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Rasl!U"}}, {"text": "K. S. Rashid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4067, "end_char": 4079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Rasl!U\n\nCJ.T.\n\nK. S. Rashid\n\nC.J.T.\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nF\"ebruary 19, 1964.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Rasl!U"}}, {"text": "C.J.T.\n\nGaiendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4081, "end_char": 4103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Rasl!U\n\nCJ.T.\n\nK. S. Rashid\n\nC.J.T.\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nc. 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S.\n\nRashid & Son, and its partner, Rashid Ahmad, arc the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Rashid Ahmad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. K. S.\n\nRashid & Son, and its partner, Rashid Ahmad, arc the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4717, "end_char": 4740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "870-873 of 1956) filed by the firm and its partner in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the validity of the notices served upon them under s. 34 (IA) of the Act in respect of their income for the years 1941-42 to 1946-47."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5153, "end_char": 5160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "tile 19th March. 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5226, "end_char": 5247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of ti ' Constitution in respect of the notices served on them on tile 19th March."}}, {"text": "s. 34(IA)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5409, "end_char": 5418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.. Lucknow", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5483, "end_char": 5524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents to the appeals are : the Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.. Lucknow, and the Income-tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Delhi.", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P. AND\n\nOTHERS"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5534, "end_char": 5578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents to the appeals are : the Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.. 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S. Riuh/4", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8584, "end_char": 8596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a) at any time within eight years, and in cases falling under clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the assessee \"a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in the notice under subsection (2) of s. 22, and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains, or recompute the loss or\n\nK. S. Riuh/4\n\nC.1.T.\n\nGaj•ndragadkar\n\nc. 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14384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Suraj Mall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14508, "end_char": 14518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first challenge was to s. 5 ( 4) of the Investigation Commission Act; when the challenge succeeded and the said section was struck down in the case of Suraj Mall l\\1ohta(2) the legislature intervened and s. 34(IA) was added in the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 34(IA)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14561, "end_char": 14570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14723, "end_char": 14727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14781, "end_char": 14807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nevertheless, the cases pending before the Investigation Commission were sought to be continued before the said Commission under s. 5 ( 1) and this section 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 23110, "end_char": 23119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23124, "end_char": 23133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23191, "end_char": 23199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23203, "end_char": 23212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23445, "end_char": 23454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23536, "end_char": 23545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23579, "end_char": 23586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23832, "end_char": 23840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is one minor additional point which has been argued before us by 'Mr. Setalvad in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23950, "end_char": 23959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24393, "end_char": 24402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24538, "end_char": 24547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25709, "end_char": 25774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25789, "end_char": 25815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J."}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25850, "end_char": 25860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25865, "end_char": 25888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_837_846_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nment prescribed by the proviso constitutes a condition precedent for the exercise of the authority conferred on the Income-tax Officer by s. 34(1A) and since that requirement is not shown to have been satisfied in his case, the appellant in C.A. No. 589 of 1963 must succeed even if s. 34(1A) is held 'to be valid.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument.\n\nWhat was urged before the High Court by the appellant was not that no reasons had been recorded by the Income-ta1 Officer as required by the proviso; the argument was that the appellant had not been given a copy of the said reasons and it appears to have been urged that the appellant wa' entitled to have such a copy.\n\nThis latter part of the case has not been pressed before us by Mr. Setalvad, and rightly.\n\nNow, when we look at the pleadings of the parties, it is clear that it was assumed by the appellant that reasons had been recorded and in fact, it was positively affirmed by the respondent that they had been so recorded; the controversy being, if the reasons are recorded, is the assessee entitled to have a copy of those reasons? Therefore, we do not sec how Mr. Setalvad can suggest that no reasons had in fact been recorded, and so, the condition rprecedent prescribed by the proviso had not been complied with.\n\nThe result is, all the Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions in this group fail and are dismissed.\n\nThere would be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeals and Writ Petitioru diJmisud.\n\nMEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)\n\nvacuee Property-Money deposited wlth an Indian by u ptron wi'lo\n\nmigrated to Pakistan-Liability to pay that amount to tM Cllltl>' dia-Admlniltration of E•ocw• Pro~1f1 Act, 1950 (31 al\n\nJ:., I. Railil ...\n\nC./.T.\n\nGai•ndragodklir\n\nc. J.\n\nltlH\n\nJlnnon Abdul\n\nLlrim\n\nD7 C111todl1111 General\n\n' 19SO) Amended 1. 48 (Act No. 91 of 19S6)-Limitation Act, 1908 (9 o/ 1908), Art. 60.\n\nRupees 8S, OOO/· was deposited with the appellant by his sister in January 1946. The appellant's sister migrated to Pakistan sometimes between June to August 1949. The Assistant Custodian called upon the appellant to pay this sum lying in deposit under s. 48 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The appellant pleaded that the amount could not be recovered from him because the money bad 1Jecn given to him as a loan and its recovery was barred in January\n\n194S. The Assistant Custodian rejected the contention of the appellant and directed him to pay the amount under s. 48 of the Act, as it then stood. This decision was affirmed . in appeal as well as in revision.\n\nThen the appellant moved a writ petition before the High ourt which was dismissed by the single Judge. On Latten Patev.t Appeal the High Court held that the amount was not recoverable under s. 48 of the\n\nAct as it stood at the relevant time. This decision was given oo December 9, ,1957, In the meantime, s. 48 had been amended on October', 22, 195'6. On January' 22, 1958 another notice of demand was sl:rved on the appellant by the Assistant Custodi•n, The Assistant Custpdian again directed the amount to be rccoyered. 1hc appc!Jaot preferrpd an appeal before 'the Custodian-General. 'The Custodian General allowed the appeal and remanded the proeedings for further enquiry a.s directed by him. After the remand further evidence wa.t taken and it was held that the amount in question was payable by the appellant as it was a deposit and was still recoverable when th&\n\nproperty vested in the Custodian. Thereupon the appellant preferred an appeal to the Custodian-General and that appeal was di5missed.\n\nThen the appellant applied to this Court for special leave which wu sranted. Hence the appeal.\n\nH<ld: (i) Sub-ss. I and 2 of the amended ' 48 of the Administn>- tion of Evacuee Property Act are clearly procedural and would apply to all cases which have to be investigated in accordance therewith after October 22, 1956, even though the claim may have arisen before the amended section was inserted in the Act. It is well-settled that procedural amendments to a Jaw apply, in the absence of anything to the contrary, retrospectively in the sense that they apply to all actions after the date they come into force even though the actions may have begun earlier or the claim on which the action may be based may be of an anterior date. In the present case when the Assistant Custodian issued notice to the appellant on January 22, 1958, claiming the amount from him, the recovery could be dealt with under sub-ss, (I) and (2) et the amended 1. 48, as they are merely procedural provisions.\n\n(ii) ID the present case the property which vested in the Custodian was not the actual money in specie lying with the appellant who must be treated as a banker with respect to the property with him; on the other band the property which vested in the Custodian would be tbt riaht of the appellant's sister to recover the amount from the appel18111\n\nand that would be incorporeal property in the form of an actionable claim. It is in respect of that actionable claim that the Custodian can proceed under s. 48 sub-ss. (I) and (2), to recover the sum payable lo him in respec: o< illat property, namely, the actionable claim.\n\nThe Custodian. could not take action under s. 9 by physically seizing the amount because the amount cannot be treated as specific property which is liable to be seized under that section.\n\n(iii) As this amount was a deposit, limitation would run at the earliest from the date of demand and there is no evidence that any demand was made by the appellant's sister for the return of the money before she migrated to Pakistan. Therefore, the period of limitation had not even begun to run on the date the appellant's sister migrated to Pakistan, assuming Art. 60 of the Limitation Act No. 9 of 1901 •rrlied. Consequently the right o! the appellant's sister to recover the amount vested in the Custodian and was not barred by limitation al tbe time \"'hen she became an evacuee.\n\nCrvIL APPELLATE JURiso1cnoN: Civil Appeal No. 119 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 16, 1961 of the Deputy Custodian-General, New Delhi in Appeal No. 172-AI SUR/ 1960.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, A(iqur Rehman and K. L. Hathi, for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. S. Chawla and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents.\n\nFebruary 19, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delm:red by\n\n1'64 M•mo';;'\"Aw\n\nKJJrlM\n\nD7. !:1111\"\"'-\n\nG•Mrol -\n\nW ANCHOO, J .-This is an appeal by special leave against w~ J, the order of the Deputy Custodian General, and the question involved is whether the appellant is liable to pay Rs. 85.000/- to the Custodian. The matter has a long history behind it which it is necessary to set out in order to understand the point now in dispute in the present appeal. The money in question was deposited with the appellant by his sister as far back as January 1946.\n\nThe total amount deposited was Rs. 90,000/-, but the appellant's sister took back Rs. 5,000/-, with the result that the balance of Rs. 85,000/ • remained deposited with the appellant The appellant's sister theroafter migrated to Pakistan sometimes between June to Augull\n\n196'\n\nMmon Abdul\n\nK\"'im\n\nIb Ciutodian General\n\nWanchoo J.\n\n1949. Sometime later, the Assistant Custodian General called upon the appellant to pay this sum lying in deposit under s. AS of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, No. XXXI of 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The _appellant contested the matter on the ground that the money had been given to him as a loan and its recovery was barred in January 1949 long before his sister had migrated to Pakistan, and therefore the amount could not be recovered from him. The Assistant Custodian however directed the recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue under s. 48 of the Act. as it then stood. The matter was taken in appeal before the Custodian, Saurashtra, but the appeal failed. The appellant then went in revision to the Custodian General, and the revision also failed.\n\nThen followed a writ petition by the appellant before the Saurashtra High Court in 1955.\n\nThe writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge; but on Letters Patent Appeal the appellant succeeded, the High Court holding that the amount was not recoverable under s. 48 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time. This decision was given on December 9, 1957. In the meantime, s. 48 had been amended on October 22, 1956 and we shall refer to this amendment in due course.\n\nAfter the appellant had succeeded in the High Court, another .notice of demand was served on him by the Assistant Custodian on January 22, 1958, and after hearing the objections of the appellant, the Assistant Custodian again directed the amount to be recovered.\n\nThe appellant then took the matter in appeal to the Custodian General. The Custodian General allowed the appeal in August I 958 and remanded the proceedings for further enquiry as directed by him. The Custodian General then held that s. 48 as amended applied to the fresh proceedings which began on the notice issued by the Assistant Custodian in January 1958.\n\nHe further held that the amount was recoverable under the amended s. 48 provided it was due to the evacuee on the date the property of the evacuee vested in the Custodian. He was therefore of opinion that it would have to be determined when the sister o.{ the appellant migrated and whether the amount was due to her on the date of her migration and had not become barred by the law of limitation on that date. He was further\n\nof opinion that the question whether the transaction amounted to a Joan or a deposit had to be determined as there were different periods of limitation for these two types of transactions. He therefore remanded the matter for disposal after finding the facts in accordance with the directions given by hi.t<1.\n\nAfter the remand further evidence was taken and it was held that the amount in question was payable by the appeilant as it was a deposit and was still recoverable when the property vested in the Custodian. Thereupon the appellant again went in appeal to the Custodian General and \\hat appeal was dismissed on February 6, 1961. Then the appellant applied to this Court for special leave which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us.\n\nTwo questions have been urged befo; e us oa behalf of the appellant. The first is whether the amended s. 48 can be applied to the present case. The second is whether the claim of the Custodian is barred •wen on the basis of the, trans.action between the appellant and his sister being a deposit and not a loan.\n\nThe amended s. 48 came into the Act by Act No. 91 of 1956 from October 22, 1956 and runs as follows: -\n\n\" 48. Recovery of certain sums as arrears of land\n\nrevenue: -m Any sum payable to the Government or to the Custodian in respect of any evacuee property, under any agreement, express or implied, lease or other document or otherwise howsoever, may be recovered in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.\n\n(2) If any question arises whether the ; um is payable to the Government or to the Custodian within the meaning of sub-section (I), the Custodian shall, after making such inquiry as he may deem fit, and giving to the person by whom the sum is alleged to be payable an opportunity of being heard, decide the question; and the decision of the Custodian shall, subject to any appeal or revision under this Act, be final and shall not be called in question bv any court or other authority.\n\nMemon Abdul Karim\n\nDy.\n\nCun0<liall General\n\nWanchoo /,\n\n19/H\n\nMemon Abdul Karim\n\n(3) For the purpose of this section, a sum shall be deemed to be payable to the Custodian notwith-\n\n0,.\n\nCustodlll11 General\n\nstanding that its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force relating to limi- Wanchoo J. tation of action.\" It will be seen that this is mainly a procedural section replacing the earlier s. 48 and lays down that sums payable to the Government or to the Custodian can be recovered thereunder as arrears of land revenue. The section also provides that where there is any dispute as to whether any &um is pay- .able or not to the Custodian or to the Government, the\n\nCustodian has to make an inquiry into the matter and give the person raising the dispute an opportunity of being heard and thereafter decide the question.\n\nFurther, the section makes the decision of the Custodian final subject to any appeal or revision under the Act and not open to question by any court or any other authority. Lastly the section provides t1:Jat the sum shall be deemed to be payable to the Custodian notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to limitation of action. Sub-sections (!) and\n\n(2) are clearly procedural and would apply to, all cases which have to be investigated in accordance therewith after October 22, 1956, even though the claim may have arisen before the amended section was inserted in the Act. It is well settled that procedural amendments to a law apply, in the absence of anything to the oontrary, retrospectively in the sense that they apply to all actions after the date they come into force even though the actions may have begun earlier or the claim on which the action may be based may be of an . anterior date. Therefore, when the Assistant Custodian issued notice to the appellant on January 22, 1958 claiming the amount from him, the recovery could be dealt with under sub-ss. (I) and (2) of the amended s. 48, as they are merely procedural provisions.\n\nBut it is urged on behalf of the appellant that sub-s. (!) in terms does not apply to the present case, and if so, sub-s. (2) would also not apply. The argument is that under sul>-s. (!) it is only any sum payable to the Government or to the Custodian in respect of any evacuee :property which can be recovered as arrears of land revenue.\n\nTherefore, the argument runs, , wacuee property itself cannot be recovered under sub-s. (!), for that sub-section only provides for recovery of any sum payable in respect of any evacuee property. In this connection reference has been made to s. 9 of the Act, which lays down that if any person in possession of any evacuee property refuses or fails on demand to surrender possession thereof to the Custodian, the Custodian may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for taldng possession of such property and may, for this purpose, after giving reasonable warning and facility to any woman not appearing in public to withdraw, remove or break open any lock, bolt or any door or do any other act necessary for the said purpose. The argument is that the Custodian can only take action for recovery of evacuee property under this section. We are of opinion that the argument is misconceived. Section 9 deals with the recovery of immovable property or specific movable property, wliich can be physii; ally seized; It does not deal with incorpc;>real evacuee property which, 'may vest in the Custodian and which, for xample, may be of the nature of an actionable claim. \" So far as actionable clllims are concerned, they are dealt with by s. 48 as amended read with\n\n1. 10 (2) (i). It is also a misconception to think that the amount of Rs. 85.000/- which is involved in this case is actually evacuee property. It is true that under s. 48 as amended, the Custodian can take action for recovery of such sums as may be due in respect of any evacuee property and\n\nif the sum of Rs. 85,000/· which was deposited with the appellant is actually evacuee property, the Custodian may not be able to take action under s. 48 (I) and (2) in respect of the same. But the property which vested in the Custodian was not the actual money in specie lying with the appellant who must be treated as a banker with respect to the property with him; on the other hand the property which vested in the Custodian would be the right of the appellant's sister to recover the amount from the appellant and that would be incorporeal iproperty in the form of an actionable claim. It -is in respect of that actionable claim that the Custodian can proceed under s. 48, sub-ss. (I) and (2), to recover the sum payable to him in respect of that property, namely, the action. able claim. The contention of the appellant that s. 48 (!) will not apply to the recovery of this sum of money must\n\nJlemon Abdul Karim\n\nDy.\n\nCUJtodia General\n\nff' IUICitOO /.\n\nMe\"'o\" Abdul ~\n\nDy.\n\nCu81oditJ11 General\n\nWonchoo J.\n\ntherefore fail and the Custodian would have the right to recover this sum of money as it is payable in respect of the evacuee property of the appellant's sister, namely, the right which she had to recover the sum from the appellant, and it is this right which vested in the Custodian. The Custodian could not take action under s. 9 by physically seizing the amo!lnt because the amount cannot be treated as specific property which is liable to be seized under that section. If the <!ppellant's sister had the right to recover this amount from the appellant that right would be incorporeal property which would vest in the Custodian and in respect of which action could be taken under s. 48 as amended and not under s. 9 of the Act. The contention of the appellant that s. 48,\n\n(t) and (2) do not apply to this case must therefore fail.\n\nThe next contention is that in any case treating the amount as a deposit the right to recover it had become barred and therefore the Custodian could not recover it under this section and that sub..s. (3) of s. 48 would not apply as it affects vested rights and is not procedural in nature and therefore could not be applied retrospectively.\n\nSome dates would be relevant in this connection. On the findings of the authorities concerned, it appears that the deposit was made sometime in January 1946. The appellant's sister migrated sometimes between June to August 1949.\n\nAccording to the law in force in that area at the relevant time, on the date of migration of the appellant'!\n\nsister, she became an evacuee and her property would vest in the Custodian on such date. So her right to recover this amount from the appellant would vest in the Custodian sometime between June to Augut 1949, if it was still alive under the law of limitation, even apart from the que\"tion that in such cases only the remedy is barred though the right remains.\n\nFurther as this was a deposit, limitation would run at the earliest from the date of demand and there is no evidence that any demand was made by the appellant's sister for the return of the money before she migrated to Pakistan. Therefore, the period of limitation had not even begun to run on the date the appellant's sister migrated to Pakistan, assuming art. 60 of the Limitation Act, No. 9 of 1908 applied. C011Sequently the right of the appel-\n\n!ant's sister to recover the amount vested in the Custodian and was not barred by limitation at the time when she became an evacuee. The demand was made for the first time on January 10, 1952 by the Assistant Custodian and time would run from that date, at the earliest.\n\nThen it is urged that even if the actionable claim vested in the Custodian, the demand in this case was made for the first time on January 10, 1952, and therefore under art. 60 of the Limitation Act, the right to recover the amount would be barred in January 1955, and consequently no proceeding could be taken under s. 48 to recover the same after January 1955. It is further urged that the amended Act came into force. on October 22, 1956 and su!J..s. (3) would only apply to such cases where the limitation had not expired before that date. We do not think it necessary for purposes of the present appeal to decide the effect of su!J..s. (3) of s. 48, for the appellant never contested before the authorities concerned that recovery could not be made under s. 48 even if the omount was treated as a deposit. What the appellant had contended before the authorities concerned was that the recovery would b~ barred as the amount was given to him as a loan. The appellant therefore cannot now for the first time in this Court take the plea that recovery could not be made under s. 48 and sub-s. (3) thereof would not apply even if the amount is treated as a deposit. This contention thus raised in this Court for the first time raises a question as to the effect of sub.s. (3) of s. 48. Besides the effect of s. 48 (3), it is contended for the respondent that if this question had been raised before the proper authorities evidence might have been led to show that the recovery was not barred, for the case proceeded on the assumption that Art. 60 of the Limitation Act applied and proper defences could have been raised as for example the conditions on which the eposit was made i.e. whether on demand or otherwise and acknowledgements of liability made by the appellant. Such defence would have raised questions of fact which have never been investigated. Therefore it is urged that the appellant should not be allowed to raise the point that the recovery would be barred even if the amount was treated as a deposit and should be confined to his case\n\nIHI\n\nMtntQn Abdul Karim\n\nVy.\n\nCwtodian General\n\nW llllC/wo I.\n\nM•mpn Abdul Karim\n\nv. \"1 Ciutodla11 G•noral\n\n'WIUIChoo /.\n\nthat this was a loan and not a deposit, for he never pleaded at any time before the authorities concerned that even if it was a deposit the recovery would be barred by time. We are of opinion that there is force in this contention on behalf of the respondents and we are not prepared to allow the appellant to raise the questfon whether the recovery would be barred eve.n if the amount is treated as a deposit.\n\nIn this view of the matter, it would not be necessary to consider the exact effect of s. 48 ( 3) and to decide whether it will apply even to cases where the recovery had become barred under the Limitation Act before October 22, 1956.\n\nWe therefore do not allow the appellant to raise the point that the recovery would be barred even if the amount was\n\na deposit.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is hereby clismWed witll cos ta.\n\nAppeal. dismissed.\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nBHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES LTD.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll AND s. M. S!KRI JJ.)\n\n.Iqua/ Protection of Lllw......Oeographical clas•ification du• to hiSlorical\n\nttOIOn.t whethef valid-II upheld-Time-limit for adjustments, .ii pos1il!le-Difierential trlatment-Mere plea not su/ficient-Coriitlfution oi India, A.rt. 14--Bhopal State Agricultural Income-tax A.ct,\n\n!9S3 (Bhopal A.ct 11 of 1953) .\n\nThe respondent, a company incorporated in the former State .of.\n\nBhopal, presented a petition in August 1960 under Art. 226 of Iha Constitution \"in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for a writ restraini111 the Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953, claiming that the Act contravened Iha respondent's right under Art. 14 of. the Constitution. lly the Stater lleorganisation Act, 1956 the territory of tho State of BhOPal ..,.", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 316, "end_char": 325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 776, "end_char": 784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This latter part of the case has not been pressed before us by Mr. Setalvad, and rightly."}}, {"text": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1487, "end_char": 1515, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1595, "end_char": 1608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1610, "end_char": 1626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1628, "end_char": 1638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1643, "end_char": 1666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB\n\nDEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, NEW DELHI AND\n\nOTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,'C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2005, "end_char": 2025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2039, "end_char": 2046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2315, "end_char": 2359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2634, "end_char": 2639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2924, "end_char": 2929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "December 9, ,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3003, "end_char": 3016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was given oo December 9, ,1957, In the meantime, s. 48 had been amended on October', 22, 195'6."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3039, "end_char": 3044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "October', 22, 195'6", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was given oo December 9, ,1957, In the meantime, s. 48 had been amended on October', 22, 195'6."}}, {"text": "January' 22, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3089, "end_char": 3106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January' 22, 1958 another notice of demand was sl:rved on the appellant by the Assistant Custodi•n, The Assistant Custpdian again directed the amount to be rccoyered."}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3910, "end_char": 3930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 22, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4043, "end_char": 4059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 2 of the amended ' 48 of the Administn>- tion of Evacuee Property Act are clearly procedural and would apply to all cases which have to be investigated in accordance therewith after October 22, 1956, even though the claim may have arisen before the amended section was inserted in the Act."}}, {"text": "January 22, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4557, "end_char": 4573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case when the Assistant Custodian issued notice to the appellant on January 22, 1958, claiming the amount from him, the recovery could be dealt with under sub-ss, (I) and (2) et the amended 1."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5231, "end_char": 5236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5396, "end_char": 5400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5766, "end_char": 5774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) As this amount was a deposit, limitation would run at the earliest from the date of demand and there is no evidence that any demand was made by the appellant's sister for the return of the money before she migrated to Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Art. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5904, "end_char": 5911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5919, "end_char": 5933, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6338, "end_char": 6352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, A(iqur Rehman and K. L. Hathi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A(iqur Rehman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6354, "end_char": 6367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, A(iqur Rehman and K. L. Hathi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6372, "end_char": 6383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, A(iqur Rehman and K. L. Hathi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6405, "end_char": 6419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. S. Chawla and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "K. S. Chawla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6439, "end_char": 6451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. S. Chawla and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6456, "end_char": 6473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. S. Chawla and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6612, "end_char": 6620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1111\"\"'-\n\nG•Mrol -\n\nW ANCHOO, J .-This is an appeal by special leave against w~ J, the order of the Deputy Custodian General, and the question involved is whether the appellant is liable to pay Rs.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7379, "end_char": 7386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "85,000/ • remained deposited with the appellant The appellant's sister theroafter migrated to Pakistan sometimes between June to Augull\n\n196'\n\nMmon Abdul\n\nK\"'im\n\nIb Ciutodian General\n\nWanchoo J.\n\n1949.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7968, "end_char": 7973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8057, "end_char": 8067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was taken in appeal before the Custodian, Saurashtra, but the appeal failed."}}, {"text": "Saurashtra High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8243, "end_char": 8264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then followed a writ petition by the appellant before the Saurashtra High Court in 1955."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8453, "end_char": 8458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8540, "end_char": 8547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was given on December 9, 1957."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8566, "end_char": 8571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9160, "end_char": 9165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9354, "end_char": 9359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 6, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10335, "end_char": 10351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the appellant again went in appeal to the Custodian General and \\hat appeal was dismissed on February 6, 1961."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10584, "end_char": 10589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10806, "end_char": 10811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Memon Abdul Karim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11694, "end_char": 11711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Memon Abdul Karim\n\nDy.", "canonical_name": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB"}}, {"text": "standing that its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11901, "end_char": 11972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12158, "end_char": 12163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General\n\nstanding that its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "General\n\nstanding that its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12912, "end_char": 12926, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13773, "end_char": 13778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jat the sum shall be deemed to be payable to the Custodian notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act", "statute": "Jat the sum shall be deemed to be payable to the Custodian notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14405, "end_char": 14409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15068, "end_char": 15077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15413, "end_char": 15418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15607, "end_char": 15612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15882, "end_char": 15887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16405, "end_char": 16410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16565, "end_char": 16570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jlemon Abdul Karim", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16633, "end_char": 16651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "will not apply to the recovery of this sum of money must\n\nJlemon Abdul Karim\n\nDy.", "canonical_name": "MEMON ABDUL KARIM HAJI TAYAB"}}, {"text": "Wonchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16735, "end_char": 16742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cu81oditJ11 General\n\nWonchoo J.\n\ntherefore fail and the Custodian would have the right to recover this sum of money as it is payable in respect of the evacuee property of the appellant's sister, namely, the right which she had to recover the sum from the appellant, and it is this right which vested in the Custodian.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17074, "end_char": 17078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17430, "end_char": 17435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17461, "end_char": 17465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17515, "end_char": 17520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17790, "end_char": 17795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18983, "end_char": 18990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18998, "end_char": 19012, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 10, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19251, "end_char": 19267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The demand was made for the first time on January 10, 1952 by the Assistant Custodian and time would run from that date, at the earliest."}}, {"text": "art. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19517, "end_char": 19524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19532, "end_char": 19546, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19665, "end_char": 19670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19996, "end_char": 20001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20108, "end_char": 20113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20425, "end_char": 20430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20627, "end_char": 20632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20656, "end_char": 20661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20887, "end_char": 20894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20902, "end_char": 20916, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22021, "end_char": 22026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22129, "end_char": 22143, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nBHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22384, "end_char": 22436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nBHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES LTD."}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22440, "end_char": 22460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll AND s. M. S!KRI JJ.)", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22496, "end_char": 22519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll AND s. M. S!KRI JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAJl"}}, {"text": "s. M. S!KRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22524, "end_char": 22535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll AND s. M. S!KRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22969, "end_char": 22977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23006, "end_char": 23034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of Iha Constitution \"in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for a writ restraini111 the Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953, claiming that the Act contravened Iha respondent's right under Art."}}, {"text": "Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23063, "end_char": 23154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23219, "end_char": 23226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953", "statute": "the Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Stater lleorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23257, "end_char": 23289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "BhOPal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23320, "end_char": 23326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lly the Stater lleorganisation Act, 1956 the territory of tho State of BhOPal ..,."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_846_857_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "M•mpn Abdul Karim\n\nv. \"1 Ciutodla11 G•noral\n\n'WIUIChoo /.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nthat this was a loan and not a deposit, for he never pleaded at any time before the authorities concerned that even if it was a deposit the recovery would be barred by time. We are of opinion that there is force in this contention on behalf of the respondents and we are not prepared to allow the appellant to raise the questfon whether the recovery would be barred eve.n if the amount is treated as a deposit.\n\nIn this view of the matter, it would not be necessary to consider the exact effect of s. 48 ( 3) and to decide whether it will apply even to cases where the recovery had become barred under the Limitation Act before October 22, 1956.\n\nWe therefore do not allow the appellant to raise the point that the recovery would be barred even if the amount was\n\na deposit.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is hereby clismWed witll cos ta.\n\nAppeal. dismissed.\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nBHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES LTD.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll AND s. M. S!KRI JJ.)\n\n.Iqua/ Protection of Lllw......Oeographical clas•ification du• to hiSlorical\n\nttOIOn.t whethef valid-II upheld-Time-limit for adjustments, .ii pos1il!le-Difierential trlatment-Mere plea not su/ficient-Coriitlfution oi India, A.rt. 14--Bhopal State Agricultural Income-tax A.ct,\n\n!9S3 (Bhopal A.ct 11 of 1953) .\n\nThe respondent, a company incorporated in the former State .of.\n\nBhopal, presented a petition in August 1960 under Art. 226 of Iha Constitution \"in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for a writ restraini111 the Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953, claiming that the Act contravened Iha respondent's right under Art. 14 of. the Constitution. lly the Stater lleorganisation Act, 1956 the territory of tho State of BhOPal ..,.\n\nincorporated from November I, 1956 into the newly formed State of 1964 Madhya Pradesh. The States Reorganisation Act by s. 119 continued Still , Mad..__ the operation of the laws in force in the territories in which they were 1 ,.';;,., ui ~,.... previously in force until the competent legislature or rtuthority amended,\n\n'Y. altered or modified these laws. Shortly after the reoraanisation. the B/torxll s.,..\n\nMadhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956 was issued so as to lndiutrln make certain laws applicable uniformly to the entire State and later the Lrg:slatnre by the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958 made other alterations in the laws applicable to the State. But llhopal Act 11 of 1953 remained unamended or unaltered: nor was its Operation extended to the other areas or regions in the State with the result\n\nthat Agrii:ultural lncome-tru< was levied within the territory of tho former State of Bhopal and not in the rest of the territory of the Stato\n\nof Madhya Pradesh. The High Court held that tho provisions of Bhopal Act .11 of 1953 contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution and observed that though the State had removed diversity in some of tho laws of the component regions, no attempt was made to remove discrimination between the territory of the former Bhopal ltate and the rest of the territories of the State of Madhya Pradesh with respect lo this law.\n\nHeld: (i) Where application of unequal laws is reasonably ju.•tifietl for historical reasons, a geographical classification founded on tboso\n\nhistorical reasons would be upheld. The legislature bas always Ibo power to make special laws to attain particular objects and for that purpose has authority to select or classify persons, objects or trans. llClions upon which the law is intended to operate. Differential treaiment becomes unlawful only when it is arbitrary or not supported by • rational relation with the object of the statute.\n\nBhaiyalal Shukia v. S!ate of MadhY.a Pradesh, [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 257, The State of Madhya Pradesh v. The Gwalior Sugar Co., [1962] 2 S.C.R. 619, Maharaj Kumar Prithivi Raj v. State of Rajasthan, C.A.\n\nNos. 327-328, dated 2-11-1960 and Anand Prasad Lakshminiv., Ganeriwal v. State of A1ulhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 853. relied on.\n\nState of Raja1than Y. Rao Manohar Singhji, [1954] S.C.ll. 996, Kplained.\n\n(ii) It would be impossible to lay down any definite time-limit within which the State had to make necessary adjustments so as to olfectuate the equality clause of tho Constitution. It cannot be said lllat because a certain number of years have elapsed or that tho Stale llas mallo other laws uniform. tho State has achld improperly in continuing an impost which operates upon., a class of citizens more barsblJ lbln upon other.. ··\n\n(iii) To make oot a case of denial of the equal protection of lawo. 1111der Art. 14, a plea of differentbl trea!M•nl is by itself not ru111ciont.\n\nAn applicant plcadins sucb denial must make out tbal not on)1 he.·\n\n1116I bad been treated differently from otbcn but he has been oo treated .State of Madhya from ersons. similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and\n\nPtade1h i1uzh differential treatment is unjustifiably rnade. v.\n\nIlhopal ,,,,,,, l \"41111ric• CIVIL APPELLATE JtJRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 491 of 1963.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated January I 7, I 96 I of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 226 of 1960.\n\nB. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nS. T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Nnmi•'l, for the respondent.\n\nFebruary I 9, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was\n\ndeliverd by\n\nSHAH, J.-Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the Cornpany'-was incorporated under the Companies Act of the former lndian State of Bhopal. In I 953 the State of Bhopal whkh was then a Part 'C' State under the Comtitution of India enacted \"The Bhopal State\n\nAgricultural Income-tax Act, IX of 1953\" providing for imposition and levy of tax on agricultural income. The Act was '1pplied to the. territory of the entire State of Bhopal and was brought into force on July 15, 1953.\n\nBy the States Reorganisation Act, I 956 (No. 67 of 1956), territory of the Part 'C' State of Bhopal was incorporated with effect from November l, 1956, into the newly formed State cf Madhya Pradesh. Section 119 of the States Reorgani<, ation Act, 1956, enacted that by the constitution of the reorganized State, no change in the Jaws in force which immediatelv before November I, 1956, extended or applied to any constituent regions, was effected, and cerritorial references in the laws to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before November 1, 1956.\n\nBy the Madhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1956, promulgated by the\n\nGovernent of the State, all laws in force in the regions 1~ which were newly incorporated into the reorganised State state of Mad,.,._. of Madhya Pradesh were, with certain adaptations and Pradeih modifications specified in the Order, to remain in force in Bhopal v. s,,,., those areas until altered, repealed or amended, and by that lndrutrln Order the Bhopal Act IX of 19 5 3 continued to remain Shah /. applicable in the territory of the former Bhopal State, in the new State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nLater the Legislature of the Madhya Pradesh State enacted the Madhya Pradesh\n\nExtension of Laws Act, 1958, extending several Acts-- Central as well as State-to the entire territory of the State, but no alteration was made in the territorial operation of Bhopal Act IX of 1953. It is common ground that in tbs remainipg territory of the State of Madhya Pradesh there was no law providing for levy of tax on agricultural income.\n\nThe Company paid and continued to pay tax assessed under the Bhopal State Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1953, till some time in 1960.\n\nOn August 4, 1960, the Company presented a petition undi::r Art. 226 of the Constin1tion m the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur for a wrtt declaring that Bhopal Act IX of 1953 was unconstitutional and void as being discriminatory and for appropriats directions, writs or orders restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from giving effect to the Act. It was claimed by\n\nthe Company that Bhopal Act IX of 1953 deprived the residents of the territory to which H applied, of the protection of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court upheld the plea of the Company and issued a writ restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the provisions ')f\n\nBhopal Act IX of 1953, observing that the Act was \"in clear contravention of the petitioner's right under Art. 14 of the Constitution and must be declared void\".\n\nAuthority of the Part C State of Bhopal to enact tbs Act, as it originally stood, is not in dispute, nor are tbs provisions of s. 119 of the Stat'18 Reorganisation Act and the Madhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1956, challenged as incompetent.\n\nThe plea that there is infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution is advanced on the sole ground that in the\n\nreorganiied State of Madhya Pradesh formed under the\n\n134-159 S.C.-54\n\nfg61 States Reorganisation Act, 1956, agricultural income-tax is ...,. of Madhya levied within the territory of the former State of Bhopal\n\nPradalt and not in the rest of the territories of Madhya Pradesh. llTwpaJ v. Suglll' Prima facie, a differential treatment is accorded by the State\n\nlndrutrl•• of Madhya Pradesh to persons carrying on agricultural Shall 1. operations in the Bhopal region, because the State subjects them to pay tax on agricultural income, which is not imposed upon agricultural income earned in the rest of the State. But that by itself cannot be a ground for declaring the Act ultra vires. The State is undoubtedly enjoined by Art. 14 of the Constitution not to deny to any person equal protection of the laws within the territory, but a proper classification bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute does not on that account become impermil>sible.\n\nAll persons who are similarly circumstanced as regards a subject matter are entitled to equal protection of the laws, but it is not !Predicated thereby that every law must have universal application irrespective of dissimilarity of objects or transactions to which it applies, or of the nature or attainments of the persons to whom it relates.\n\nThe Legislature has always the power to make special laws to attain particular objects and for that purpose has authority to select or classify persons, objects or transactions upon which the law is intended to operate. Differential treatment becomes unlawful only when it is arbitrary or not supported by a rational relation with the object of the statute. This Court has held in several cases, that where application of unequal laws is reasonably justified for historical reasons, a geographical classification founded on those historical reasons would be upheld : Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh('): The State of Madhya Pradesh v. The Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. and others(2 ): Maharaj Kumar Prithvi Raj and another v. The State of Rajasthan and others(•) and Anand Prasad Lakshminiwas Ganeriwal v. State of Andhra Pradesh( 4 ). The decision of this Court in The State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singhji(\") does not lay down\n\n(I) [1962] Suppl. 2 S. C. R. 257.\n\n(2) [1962] 2 S. C. R. 619.\n\n(3) C.A. Nos. 327-328 of 1956 decided on Nov. 2, 1960.\n\n(4) AIR 1963 S. C. R53.\n\n(S) [1954] S. C. R. 996.\n\nany contrary principle. In that case the Court accepted that I91ff historical reasons may justify differential treatment of Stat< otMad'llY!!i separate geographical regions provided it bears a reasonable Prlllluh and just relation to the matter in respect of which it is Bhopal\"· S\"IJ\"i' proposed, but the differentiation in that case was regarded lnd:Lilrll!b as infringing the equal protection of the laws because Shah ;. members of the same class were treated in a manner ex facie discriminatory, and no attempt was made by the State to justify the treatment as founded upon a rational basis having a just relation to the impugned statute.\n\nIt is necessary to bear in mind that the various administrative units which existed in British lndia were the result of acquisition of territory by the East India Company from time to time. The merger t>f Indian States since 194 7 brought into the Dominion of India numerous Unions or States, based upon arrangements ad hoc, and the constitutional set up in 1950 did not attelllJPt, on account of diverse reasons mainly political, to make any rational rearrangement of administrative units.\n\nUnder the Constitution as originally promulgated there existed three categories of States, beside the centrally administered units of the Andaman and Nicobar islands.\n\nPa.rt 'A' States were the former Governors' Provinces, with which were merged certain territories of the former Indian States to make geographically homogeneous units : Part 'B' States represented groups formed out of 275 bigger Indian States by mutual arrangement into Unions : Part 'C' States were the former Chief Commissioners' Provinces.\n\nThese units were continued under the Constitution merely because they formerly existed.\n\nLater an attempt was made under the States Reorganisation Act to rationalize the pattern of administration by reducing the four classes of units into two-States, and Union territories-and by making a majority of the States homogeneous linguistic units.\n\nBut in the States so reorganized were incorporated regions governed by distinct laws, and by the mere process of bringing into existence reorganized administrative units, uniformity of laws could not immediately be secured.\n\nAdministrative reorganization evidently could not await adaptation of laws, so as to make them uniform, and\n\n1961 immediate abolition of laws which gave distinctive character \"'* ofMadhya to the regions brought into the new units was politically\n\nPradesh inexpedient even if theoretically possible.\n\nAn attempt to Bliopa/\"· su11ar secure uniformity of laws before reorganisation of the units\n\nIndustri•• would also have considerably retarded the process of Shah J. reorganisation.\n\nWith the object of effectuating a swift transition, the States Reorganisation Act made a blanket provision in s. 119 continuing the operation of the laws in force in the territories in which they were previously in force notwithstanding the territorial reorganisation into different administrative units until the qompetent Legislature or authority amended, altered or modified those laws.\n\nThe reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh was formed by combining territories of four different regions.\n\nShortly after reorganisation, the Governor of the State issued the Madhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1956, so as to make certain Jaws applicable uniformly to the entire State and later the Legislature by the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958, made other alterations in the laws aipplicable to the State.\n\nBut Bhopal Act IX of 1953 remained unamended and unaltered : nor was its operation extended to other areas or regions in the State. Continuance of the laws of the old region after the reorganisation by s. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act was by itself not discriminatory even though it resulted in differential treatment of persons, objects and transactions in the new State, because it was intended to serve a dual purpose-facilitating the early formation of homogeneous units in the larger interest of the Union, and maintaining even while merging its political identity in the new unit, the distinctive character of each region, till uniformity of laws was secured in those branches in which it was expedient after ful! enquiry to do so. The laws of the regions merged in the new units had therefore to be continued on grounds of necessity and expediency. Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act was intended to serve this temporary purpose, viz., to enable the new units to consider the fljlecial circumstances of the diverse units, before launching upon a process of adaptation of laws so as to make them reasonably uniform, keeping in view the special needs\n\nof the component regions and administrative efficiency. 1964 Differential treatment arising out of the application of the State of Madiry,.. laws so continued in different regions of the same reorga- Praduh nised State, did not therefore immediately attract the clause Bhopal v. su,.. of the Constitution prohibiting discrimination. But by the Industri•• passage of time, considerations of necessity and expediency Shah J. would be obliterated, and the grounds which justified classification of geographical regions for historical reasons may cease to be valid.\n\nA purely temporary provision which because of compelling forces justified differential treatment when the Reorganisation Act was enacted cannot obviously be permitted to assume permanency, so as to perpetuate that treatment without a rational basis to support it after the initial expediency and necessity have disappeared.\n\nThe High Court observed that even though the State had enacted the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958, and had removed diversity in some of the laws of the component regions, no attempt was made to remove discrimination between the territory of the former Bhopal State and the rest of the territories of the State of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of levy of agricultural income-tax.\n\nThis in the view of the High Court was unlawful because the State had since the enactment of the States Reorganisation Act sufficient time and opportunity to decide whether the continuance of the Bhopal State Agricultural Incometax Act in the Bhopal region would be consistent with Art. 14 of the Constitution. We are unable to agree with the view of the High Court so expressed.\n\nIt would be impossible to lay down any definite time-limit within which the State had to make necessary adjustments so as to effectuate the equality clause of the Constitution. That initially there was a valid geographical classification of regions in the same State justifying unequal laws when the State was formed must be accepted. But whether the continuance of unequal laws by itself sustained 1the plea of unlawful discrimination in . view of changed circumstances could only be ascertained after a full and thorough enquiry into the continuance of the grounds on which thi: inequality could rationally be founded, and the change of circumstances, if anv. which obliterated the compulsion of expediency\n\n~ and necessity existing at the time when the Roorganisation Stal• of Madhya Act was enacted.\n\nPradesh\n\nBhopal Sugar lndllllriu\n\nSWJ.\n\nUnfortunately there was no clear perception by the parties of what has to be pleaded and proved to establish a plea of denial of equal protection of the laws. The Company merely assumed that the existence of a law relating to taxation which imposed agricultural income-tax in the Bhopal region, there being no similar levy in the rest of the State, was in law discriminatory.\n\nThat is clear from the petition of the Company which merely asserted that the Act discriminated between the Company and other ownets . of sugarcane farms in the State of Madhya Pradesh, because it singled out the Company and other agriculturists in the Bhopal region from other agriculturists and sugarcane farm owners in the State of Madhya Pradesh and subjected them to liability without any reasonable basis for classification.\n\nThe Company therefore baldly submitted that after the incorporation of the Bhopal region in the reorganised State, the State of Madhya Pradesh ought to have suitably modified the Act so as to make it applicable t9 all residents alike and by allowing the Act to operate without any modification, the State had violated the fundamental right of the Company under .Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh did not file any affidavit in reply before the High Court, and chose to defend the petition as if its decision depended on a pure question of law, that if for historical reasons the Act in operation in a region incorporated in the new State was not discriminatory at the date when the reorganisation took place, it can never become discriminatory thereafter. The assumptions made by both the parties appear to be erroneous. The High Court was of the view that after expiry of a reasonable period during which the State has the opportunity of making necessary adaptations so as to make the Act applicable to the entirety of the new State, if the State fails to adapt the law, historical considerations which initially justified the classification must be deemed to have disappeared. That assumption without further enquiry may not be accepted as correct.\n\nIt was necessary for the High Court to investigate whether. at the date when the petition was filed, special treatment of the\n\nBhopal region in the matter of levy of agricultural income- 1~ tax had a rational basis. That necessitated an enquiry into Stat• of Mall.,._ the structure of tax burden imposed directly or indirectly Pradalt Y. on or in respect of agricultural land or income from it in Blwpol s,,,.,\n\nthe different regions constituting the State. If for instance, Inllllltrl# on account of disparity in the impost of land revenue and .fW /. related taxes on land and income from land in other regions, the ultimate burden on persons in the Bhopal region who were subjected to agricultural income-tax and agricultural land owners in the rest of the State did not disclose a pattern of wide variations, the mere existence of agricultural income impost in one region, and absence of such impost in another region may not necessarily justify an inference of unlawful discrimination. It was therefore necessary to ascertain the difference in the overall tax liability between persons similarly situated in the State of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of levy of agricultural tax. For that purpose an investigation was necessary whether the incidence of total burden on agriculturists was so desparate that an inference of unlawful discrimination may reasonably be made.\n\nThe High Court had to ascertain the impact of diverse land taxes imposed on agricultural land in the four regions of the State, and whether the burden between persons similarly circumstanced was substantially dissimilar, and whether continuance of dissimilar levies was justified. If upon a thorough examination of the pattern of land taxes in different regions of the State, it appeared to the Court that an unreasonably larger burden was sought to be continued upon this region, without any apparently justifiable ground, an inference of discrimination may arise.\n\nIn adjudging reasonableness of classification for the purpose of taxation, the Courts recognise greater freedom in the Legislature and if the statute discloses a permissible policy of taxation, the Courts will uphold it. The Courts undoubtedly lean more readily in favour of the presumption of constitutionality of a taxing statute, but that is not to say that they will not strike down a statute unless it appears that the tax was imposed deliberately with the object of differentiating between persons similarly circumstanced.\n\nWe may state that the observations to the contrary that in\n\n1961 matters of taxation a statute may not be struck down \"unless '- ofMadh a the Court finds that\" the tax \"has been imposed with a . Pradesh 1 deliberate intention of differentiating between individual •11o,,,, i v. Sugar and individual\" in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. The lndrutrlu Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. and another(') was not strictly\n\nSltah J. necessary for deciding that case, and was not intended to lay down any special test applicable to taxing statutes in their relation to Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nTo arrive at a conclusion adverse to the State it was therefore necessary to decide whether the differentiation arising from the continuation of the levy of the agricultural income-tax was unfair and not supported by a reasonable standard, and the State having the requisite information and opportunity to make the imposts reasonably uniform, had failed or neglected to do so.\n\nNo set formula can be devised for solving a problem of this character. It cannot be said that because a certain number of years have elaipsed or\n\nat. the State has made other laws uniform, the State has acted improperly in continuing an impost which operates upon a class of citizens more harshly than upon others.\n\nThe petition filed by the Company was singularly deficient in furnishing particulars which would justify the plea of infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of. the equal protection of the laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient. An applicant pleading that equal protection of the laws has been denied to him must make out that not only he had been treated differently from others but he has been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced wfihout any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment iS unjustifiably made. A mere plea that the Company and other agriculturists within the region of the former Bhopal State had to pay the agricultural income-tax, whereas the agriculturists elsewhere had not to pay such tax, is not sufficient to make out a case of infringement of the fundamental right under Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe State also did not place evidence before the High Court, which would in the very nature of things be in its\n\n\npossession, showing a rational relation between the differ- 1964\n\n1ential treatment and the classification and has also not State of Madlqfi,\n\nplaced any material before the Court throwing light on the Pradult v. question whether the continuance of the tax was justified : Bhopal s,,,., it merely chose to plead its case as on a demurrer. Both lndunriu the State and the Company have by inadequate appreciation Shah 1. of the true position in law contributed to the manner in which the trial of the petition has proceeded.\n\nWe would in the circumstances not be justified in dismissing the peti\n\ntion on a technical view of the burden of proof. , We think that this is a case in which the iparties should be given an opportunity to plead their respective cases adequately and to go to trial after the requisite evidence which has a bearing is brought before the Court.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order and remand the case for retrial to the High Court.\n\nThe High Court, will, if the Company so desires, give oppor tunity to the Company to amend its petition .so as to adequately iplead its case of infringement of the fundamental right to equal protection of the laws supported by necessary particulars.\n\nThe High Court will also give opportunity to the State to file its affidavit in reply and to place all such materials as it may rely upon the plea set up by the Com- 1>any. After the pleadings are completed and the evidence is brought on the record, the High Court will proceed to\n\ndecide the case according to law.\n\nCosts in this Court will be the costs in the petition before the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nHUKUMCHAND MILLS LID.\n\n1HE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nfudustrial Tax-Assessment under the Tax Rults-A.mendment- Yalidity-AsJtnm•nt under the old law if validated by the Yal1datin1 Act-Validating Act if, hit b1 Art. 14-lndore Industrial T~\n\nFebruary 20'..", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 580, "end_char": 585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 688, "end_char": 702, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "October 22, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 710, "end_char": 726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the matter, it would not be necessary to consider the exact effect of s. 48 ( 3) and to decide whether it will apply even to cases where the recovery had become barred under the Limitation Act before October 22, 1956."}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 943, "end_char": 966, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 968, "end_char": 995, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHOPAL SUGAR INDUSTRIES LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1025, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1027, "end_char": 1044, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1049, "end_char": 1053, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1528, "end_char": 1536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1565, "end_char": 1593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of Iha Constitution \"in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for a writ restraini111 the Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953, claiming that the Act contravened Iha respondent's right under Art."}}, {"text": "Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1622, "end_char": 1713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1778, "end_char": 1785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953", "statute": "the Stale of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agri cliltural Income-tax Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Stater lleorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1816, "end_char": 1848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1983, "end_char": 2008, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2012, "end_char": 2018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Stater lleorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Stater lleorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2473, "end_char": 2515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2968, "end_char": 2975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3180, "end_char": 3186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of the Constitution and observed that though the State had removed diversity in some of tho laws of the component regions, no attempt was made to remove discrimination between the territory of the former Bhopal ltate and the rest of the territories of the State of Madhya Pradesh with respect lo this law."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3232, "end_char": 3255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of the Constitution and observed that though the State had removed diversity in some of tho laws of the component regions, no attempt was made to remove discrimination between the territory of the former Bhopal ltate and the rest of the territories of the State of Madhya Pradesh with respect lo this law."}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2-11-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4047, "end_char": 4056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "327-328, dated 2-11-1960 and Anand Prasad Lakshminiv.,"}}, {"text": "State of Raja1than Y. Rao Manohar Singhji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4160, "end_char": 4201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Raja1than Y. Rao Manohar Singhji, [1954] S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4744, "end_char": 4751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5331, "end_char": 5337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5345, "end_char": 5354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5376, "end_char": 5387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5392, "end_char": 5405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5410, "end_char": 5419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Nnmi•'l, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Nnmi•'l", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5424, "end_char": 5440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Nnmi•'l, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was\n\ndeliverd by\n\nSHAH, J.-Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd.-hereinafter called 'the Cornpany'-was incorporated under the Companies Act of the former lndian State of Bhopal.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5627, "end_char": 5640, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5810, "end_char": 5824, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 15, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "territory of the entire State of Bhopal and was brought into force on July 15, 1953."}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6025, "end_char": 6050, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November l, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6152, "end_char": 6168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "67 of 1956), territory of the Part 'C' State of Bhopal was incorporated with effect from November l, 1956, into the newly formed State cf Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6201, "end_char": 6215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "67 of 1956), territory of the Part 'C' State of Bhopal was incorporated with effect from November l, 1956, into the newly formed State cf Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Section 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6217, "end_char": 6228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6691, "end_char": 6707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 119 of the States Reorgani<, ation Act, 1956, enacted that by the constitution of the reorganized State, no change in the Jaws in force which immediatelv before November I, 1956, extended or applied to any constituent regions, was effected, and cerritorial references in the laws to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before November 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "Order the Bhopal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7160, "end_char": 7180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Later the Legislature of the Madhya Pradesh State enacted the Madhya Pradesh", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7315, "end_char": 7391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhopal Act IX of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7830, "end_char": 7844, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "August 4, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7880, "end_char": 7894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 4, 1960, the Company presented a petition undi::r Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7937, "end_char": 7945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Company paid and continued to pay tax assessed under the Bhopal State Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1953", "statute": "The Company paid and continued to pay tax assessed under the Bhopal State Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7972, "end_char": 8012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constin1tion m the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur for a wrtt declaring that Bhopal Act IX of 1953 was unconstitutional and void as being discriminatory and for appropriats directions, writs or orders restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from giving effect to the Act."}}, {"text": "Bhopal Act IX of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8039, "end_char": 8060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8179, "end_char": 8202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constin1tion m the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur for a wrtt declaring that Bhopal Act IX of 1953 was unconstitutional and void as being discriminatory and for appropriats directions, writs or orders restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from giving effect to the Act."}}, {"text": "Bhopal Act IX of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8270, "end_char": 8291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8373, "end_char": 8380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhopal Act IX of 1953", "statute": "Bhopal Act IX of 1953"}}, {"text": "Bhopal Act IX of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8542, "end_char": 8563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8648, "end_char": 8655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhopal Act IX of 1953", "statute": "Bhopal Act IX of 1953"}}, {"text": "Authority of the Part C State of Bhopal to enact tbs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8705, "end_char": 8761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8832, "end_char": 8838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Authority of the Part C State of Bhopal to enact tbs Act", "statute": "Authority of the Part C State of Bhopal to enact tbs Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9027, "end_char": 9034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Authority of the Part C State of Bhopal to enact tbs Act", "statute": "Authority of the Part C State of Bhopal to enact tbs Act"}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9175, "end_char": 9206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9822, "end_char": 9829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S. C. R. 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11416, "end_char": 11437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12343, "end_char": 12361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is necessary to bear in mind that the various administrative units which existed in British lndia were the result of acquisition of territory by the East India Company from time to time."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12439, "end_char": 12456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The merger t>f Indian States since 194 7 brought into the Dominion of India numerous Unions or States, based upon arrangements ad hoc, and the constitutional set up in 1950 did not attelllJPt, on account of diverse reasons mainly political, to make any rational rearrangement of administrative units."}}, {"text": "Andaman", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12821, "end_char": 12828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Constitution as originally promulgated there existed three categories of States, beside the centrally administered units of the Andaman and Nicobar islands."}}, {"text": "Nicobar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12833, "end_char": 12840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Constitution as originally promulgated there existed three categories of States, beside the centrally administered units of the Andaman and Nicobar islands."}}, {"text": "Later an attempt was made under the States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13284, "end_char": 13345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14220, "end_char": 14224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An attempt to Bliopa/\"· su11ar secure uniformity of laws before reorganisation of the units\n\nIndustri•• would also have considerably retarded the process of Shah J. reorganisation.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14301, "end_char": 14326, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14355, "end_char": 14361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhopal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15097, "end_char": 15107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15295, "end_char": 15301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But Bhopal Act", "statute": "But Bhopal Act"}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15309, "end_char": 15334, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15956, "end_char": 15967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But Bhopal Act", "statute": "But Bhopal Act"}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15975, "end_char": 16000, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Madiry", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16389, "end_char": 16404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 Differential treatment arising out of the application of the State of Madiry,.. laws so continued in different regions of the same reorga- Praduh nised State, did not therefore immediately attract the clause Bhopal v. su,.. of the Constitution prohibiting discrimination."}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17643, "end_char": 17668, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17828, "end_char": 17835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The High Court observed that even though the State had enacted the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958", "statute": "The High Court observed that even though the State had enacted the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19943, "end_char": 19950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23875, "end_char": 23882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24732, "end_char": 24739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24875, "end_char": 24882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25551, "end_char": 25558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HUKUMCHAND MILLS LID", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27332, "end_char": 27352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HUKUMCHAND MILLS LID."}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27359, "end_char": 27381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1HE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH"}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27439, "end_char": 27455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1HE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J.C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27457, "end_char": 27466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1HE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27471, "end_char": 27493, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27656, "end_char": 27663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_857_867_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 857\n\npossession, showing a rational relation between the differ- 1964\n\n1ential treatment and the classification and has also not State of Madlqfi,\n\nplaced any material before the Court throwing light on the Pradult v. question whether the continuance of the tax was justified : Bhopal s,,,., it merely chose to plead its case as on a demurrer. Both lndunriu the State and the Company have by inadequate appreciation Shah 1. of the true position in law contributed to the manner in which the trial of the petition has proceeded.\n\nWe would in the circumstances not be justified in dismissing the peti\n\ntion on a technical view of the burden of proof. , We think that this is a case in which the iparties should be given an opportunity to plead their respective cases adequately and to go to trial after the requisite evidence which has a bearing is brought before the Court.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order and remand the case for retrial to the High Court.\n\nThe High Court, will, if the Company so desires, give oppor tunity to the Company to amend its petition .so as to adequately iplead its case of infringement of the fundamental right to equal protection of the laws supported by necessary particulars.\n\nThe High Court will also give opportunity to the State to file its affidavit in reply and to place all such materials as it may rely upon the plea set up by the Com- 1>any. After the pleadings are completed and the evidence is brought on the record, the High Court will proceed to\n\ndecide the case according to law.\n\nCosts in this Court will be the costs in the petition before the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nHUKUMCHAND MILLS LID.\n\n1HE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nfudustrial Tax-Assessment under the Tax Rults-A.mendment- Yalidity-AsJtnm•nt under the old law if validated by the Yal1datin1 Act-Validating Act if, hit b1 Art. 14-lndore Industrial T~\n\nFebruary 20'..\n\nSUPREMJ; COURT REPORTS\n\nRules. 1927: rr. 17. 18-Finilnce Act No. 2S of 19SO-Madhy•\n\nBharat Taxs on Income (Validation) Act No. 38 of 1954- Constitution of India. Art. 14 •\n\n.8111# or Madhya The appellant, a Cotton Mill in Indore in Holkar State was taxed Bharat in respect of profits, gains and income under the Indore Industrial Tax Ru!OI, 1927 by the then Ruler of Indore. The Holkar State merged into the State of Madhya Bharat which acceded to India. Tho Rajpramukh of the new State promulgated an Ordinance No. I of 1948 to provide for peace and good Government of the State. This Ordinance\n\nwas superseded by Act I of 1948. Thereafter on December 28, 1949, me Government issued a Notification under r. 18 of the Tax Rules purporting to make rules under r. 17 thereof. These rules made certain amendments in the Tax Rules. The State of Madhya Bharat became ono of the Part B States on January 26, 19SO. From April I, 19SO, Finance Act No. 25 of 1950 came into force and applied to Madhya Bharat also. According to its provision, the Tax Rules came to be repealed from after the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949 and assessments could only be made under the Tax Rules upto the end of the accounting period ending on or before March 31, 1949.\n\nIt further provided that even the assessments for the years previous to the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949 could only be made by the corresponding authorities under the Income-tax: Act, and that appeals would lie to the corresponding authorities under the Income-tax Act; no levy and assessment could be made by the authorities under the repealed law and no appeal would lie to the authorities or Court under that law.\n\nThis provision as to the authorities competent to make assessments was lost sight of with the result that assessments were made for the years in dispute which were all before the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949 by the authorities under the Tax Rules, as they were before their repeal. When this mistake was discovered, Parliament passed the Madhya Bharat Taxes on Income (Validation) Act, No. 38 of 1954. The appellant then challenged tho validity of the assessments under the Tax Rules, on the grounds: (I) that the amendments of the Tax Rules on December 28, 1949 were invalid as such amendments could not be made under r. 17 of the Tax Rules, as was purported to be done; (2) even if the amendments were goo'd, they could not have retroactWe effect and could not ta.kc away the vested right of appeal; ()) as after the Finance Act, 1950, assessments were made by the old officers appoinred under the Tax Rules and not by the corresponding officers under the Income-tax Act, the assessments were invalid and the Validating Act could not validate them because, (i) the Validating Act itself was discriminatory and was hit by Art. 14, and (ii) because in any case it did, not apply to the present assessments.\n\nThe High Court repelled all these contentions and dismissed the writ petition. On appeal by certificate this Court,\n\nHeld: (i) The amendments which were made in the Tax Rules on December 28, 1948, could be justified on the basis of Act I of 1948.\n\nAll that s. S of Act I of 1948 requires is the publication of tho\n\nregulation made thereunder and their being made by Government, and 1964 that has been complied with in this case. There is no other formality required for making regulations and therefore, even though there was Hu~ltand a mistake in the opening part of the Notification of December 28, 1949, v. the amendments made in the Tax Rules can be upheld under s. S of Stat• of Madlrya Act I of 1948 as regulations.\n\nBharat\n\n(ii) Even a vested right of appeal can be taken away by express legislation or by legislation which, though it may not expressly repeal the vested right of appea~ has the effect of such repeal by necessary implication. Though the right of second appeal on facts is taken away by the new rule 13 inserted in the Tax Rules, such right is taken away by legislation by neceS5ary intendment Therefore, the right of second appeal after the amendment mnst be confined in all cases by necessary intendment to questions of law only.\n\n(iii) The Validating Act is not hit by Art. 14. The present cases are with reference to years 1940-48, that is before the accounting year ending on March 31. 1949. The assessments in these cases were carried on by the ~Id officers under the old law and the Validating Act specifically validates such assessments.\n\nJn these circumstances it cannot be said tb'at these assess'ments 'have not been validated by the Validating Act.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 316 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated January 2, 1959 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) at Indore in Civil Misc. Case No. 20 of 1955.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta,!. B. Dadachanji,\n\n0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nB. Sen and I. N. Shroff, for the respondents.\n\nFebruary 20, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave Wanchoo I. against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. It raises the question of the validity of certain provisions of the Indore Industrial Tax Rules, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Tax Rules) and assessments made thereunder for the years 1940 to 1948. The appellant is a cotton mill and in 1927 a tax was imposed on cotton mills in Indore in Holkar State by the then Ruler in respect of profits, gains and in come of such mills. This was done under the Tax Rules promulgated by the Ruler of Indore. The procedure under\n\nIrM the Tax Rules provided for a board of assessing c:tlicers.\n\nHukamchand The orders of the board were open to appeal to the Member Mill.r in-charge of Commerce and Industry Department. There\n\nStat• 0 , V-Madhya after a second appeal was provided to the Government. Rule Bharat J 7 of the Tax Rules further provided that the power of mak Wanchoo J. ing; rules was vested in the Government and such power shall.\n\nxcept on the first occasion of exercise thereof, be subject to the! condition of previous publication. Rule Ill provided that Rules made under r. 17 shall be published in the State Gazette and thereafter shall have the force of law.\n\nRule 19 prqvided that the Member in-charge of Commerce and Indus tr] Department shall have power to make subsidiary rules not inconsistent with the Tax Rules. On May 28, 1948, the\n\nIfolkar State merged to form the State of Madhya Bharat.\n\nOn July 19. 1948, the State of Madhya Bharat acceded to India. Ordinance No. 1 of 1948 was promulgated by the Rajpramukh of the new State of Madhya Bharat to provide for the peace and good government of the State. This Ordi\n\nnance was superseded by Act 1 of 1948 which came into force on December 13, 1948. Section 4 of the Act provided for the continuance of the existing laws of any covenanting State's or of any State which merged in the State of Madhya Bharat until repealed or amended under the provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 5 of the Act provided that the Government may by notification published in the Government Gazette make regulations for the peace and good government of all the territories which had already been included in the new State or which may be included in it under the provisions of s. 3 of the Act.\n\nSuch regulations were to have the force of law unless they were repugnant to any Act or law or Ordi nance made by the Rajpramukh, in which case to the e\"<tent of their repugnancy they would be void.\n\nFurther it was provided that such regulations may repeal or amend any law already in force in any State before its administration was taken over or before it was, as the case may be, merged in the new State. Finally the section provided that the right of the Rajpramukh to make Ordinances for the peace and good government of the new State or of the States which may become merged in the said State would remain u11affec-ted.\n\nIn view of the mcr(!Cr of the Holkar State into the State of Madhya Bharat, some of the provisions of the Tax Rules\n\nhad to be changed to bring them into line with the new set- 1961 up. Consequently, on December 28, 1949, the Government Hukamchand of Madhya Bharat issued a notification under r. 1 of the Mills Tax Rules purporting to make rules under r. 17 thereof. Stat• 0, V-Matlhy11\n\nThese rules made certain amendments in the Tax Rules. It Bharat is not necessary to refer to all the amendments as we are conwanchoo 1. cemed here only mth three amendments. The first amendment was that instead of the board making the assessment. the assessment was to be made by an assessing officer.\n\nThe second amendment was that the appeal from the assessing officer was to be heard by an officer appointed from time to time by the Minister in-charge of the Finance Department in place of the Member in-charge of Commerce and Industry Department. The third amendment was with respect to second appeals.\n\nThe amendment provided that instead of the Government hearing second appeals which under the old provision lay both on facts and law, second appeals there. after were to be heard on a point of law by the High Court.\n\nThen came the Constitution of India on January 26, 1950 and the State of Madhya Bharat became one of Part B States.\n\nIn the Finance Act No 25 of 1950, which <'ame into force from April I, 1950 and applied to Madhya Bharat also, a provision was made that any, law relating to income-tax or super-tax or tax on profits of business in any part B State shall cease to have effect except for the purpose of levy, assessment and collection of income-tax and super.tax in respect of any period not included in the previous year for the purpose of assessment under the Indian Income Tax Act, No. XI of 1922 for the year ending on March 31, 1951 or for any sub- , sequent year or, as the case may be, the levy, assessment and collection of the tax on profits of business for any chargeable accounting period ending on or before March 31, 1949. The effect of this was that the Tax Rules came to be repealed from after the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949. and assessment could only be made under the Tax Rules upto the end of the accounting period ending on or before March 31, 1949. A further provision was also made in the Finance Act, 1950, that any reference in any such law to an officer, authority, tribunal or court shall be construed as a reference to the corresponding officer, authority, tribunal or court appointed or constituted under the Income Tax Act.\n\nThe result of this provision was that even the assessments\n\n1961 for the years previous to the accounting year ending on B1lkamclumd March 31, 1949 could only be made by the corresponding Milb authorities under the Income Tax Act, and the appeals would Stat• 0, V-Madhya lie to the corresponding authorities under the Income Tax\n\nBharat Act; no levy and assessment could be made by the authorities Wanchoo 1. under the repealed law and no appeal would lie to the authorities or court under that law. It seems however that this provision of the Finance Act as to the authorities competent to make assessments was lost sight of with the result that assessments were made for the years in dispute in the present appeal which are all before the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949, by the authorities under the Tax Rules, as they were before their repeal. Consequently when this mistake was discovered, Parliament passed the Madhya Bharat Taxes on Income (Validation) Act, No. 38 of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Validating Act), s. 3 of which provided that \" notwithstanding anything contained in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Finance Act, all proceedings taken, assessments made and other acts and things done (including orders. made) by or before any officer, authority, tribunal or court acting or purporting to act under the relevant Madhya Bharat law in connection with the levy, assessment and collection of any tax due, under any such law in respect of the relevant period shall be deemed always to have been valid and shall not be called in question on the ground only that such proceedings were not taken, assessments were not made or acts or things were not done by or before the corresponding officer, authority, tribunal or court referred to in the said proviso.\" Section 4 of the Validating Act further provided that \"if immediately before the commencement of this Act, any proceedings of the nature referred to in section 3 are pending before any officer, authority, tribunal or court acting or purporting to act under the relevant Madhya Bharat law, such proceedings may, notwithstanding anything contained in the first proviso to sub-section\n\n(1) of section 13 of the Finance Act, be continued and completed in accordance with the provisions of the relevant Madhya Bharat law, and the provisions of the said proviso shall not apply, and shall be deemed never to have applied, in relation to any such proceedings.\" What had happened in the present case and in some other cases relating to laws which corresponded to the Indian Income-tax\n\nAct was that the authorities under the Tax Rules made assess- 1961 ments in spite of the provisions in the Finance Act by which Huh~ such assessments should thereafter have been made by the Milla corresponding authorities under the Indian Income-Tax Act, State otv • .,...,_ and that is why the Validating Act had to be passed.\n\nBhatol\n\nThe appellant challenged the validity of the assessments made against it under the Tax Rules by a writ petition filed in the Madhya Bharat High Court in 1955, on the following l!rOunds:-\n\n(1) The amendments of the Tax Rules on December 28, 1949 were invalid as such amendments could not be made under r. 17 of the Tax Rules, as was purported to be done.\n\n(2) Even if the amendments made on December 28, 1949 were good, they could not have retroactive effect -and could not take away the vested right of appeal.\n\n13) As after the Finance Act, 1950, assessments were made by the old officers appointed under the Tax Rules and not by the corresponding officers under the Indian Income Tax Act, the assessments were invalid and the Validating Act C<'uld\n\nnot validate them (firstly) because the Validating Act itself was discriminatory and was hit by Art. 14 and (secondly) because in any case it did not apply to the present assessments. '\n\nThe High Court repelled all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and dismissed the writ petition. Thereupon the appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate of fitness, which was granted; and that is how the appeal has come up before us. We propose to deal with the points raised in the order in which they have been set out above.\n\nRe. (1):.\n\nThe first question is about the validity of the amendments made in the Tax Rules on December 28, 1949. It is true that the notification by which amendments were made purports to have been published under r. 18 of the Tax Rules read with r, 17. The argument on behalf of the appellant\n\nWancllao J.\n\n1961 is that r. 17 of the Tax Rules must be treated on a par with Bukamchand provisions in a statute which provide for framing of rules, Milli and these rules are subordinate legislation made fC'f carrying ·• Sor Madhya out the purposes Of the Statute, and the power to frame such\n\nBharat rules does not include the power to modify the parent law waclloo 1. under which the rules have to be framed. We do not think it necessary for present purposes to consider thIS argument, for we are of opinion that the amendments which were made in the Tax Rules on December 28, 1949 can be justified on the basis of Act I of 1948, which was passed on Decembr\n\n13, 1948 by the Rajpramukh.\n\nThat Act, as already indicated, provided by s. 5 that the Government, by notification published in the Government gazette. may make rrgulations for the peace and good government of all \"the: territories which had been included in the State of Madhya Bharat or which may be included in it under the provisions of s. 3 of the Act. It also provided for the repeal or amendment by regulation of any law already in force in any State before its administration was taken over or before it was. ar the case may be. merged in the United States. The Government had therefore the power to amend the Tax Rules under s. 5 (I) read with s. 5 (3) of Act I of 1948. The notification of December 28, 1949 by which the amendment5 were made was published in the gazette of the Madhya Bharat State and the amendments were made by the Government. It is true that in the opening part of the notification it is said that the amendments were made under r. 17 of the Tax Rules; bvt that in our opinion would not conclude the matter, for if the Government had the power to make amendments under Act I of 1948, the amendment5 in the Rules could be justified under that power in spite of the wrong words used in the opening part of the notification of December 28, 1949. It is well settled that merely a wrong reference to the power under which certain actions are taken by Government would not per se vitiate the actions done if they can be justified under some other power under which the Government could lawfully do these acts.\n\nIt is quite clear that the Government had the power under 5. 5 (I\\ and (3) of Act 1 of 1948 to amend the Tax Rules, for that was a law in force in one of the merged States. The only mistake that the Government made was that in the opening p?.rt of the notification s. 5 of the Act was not referred to and the notification did not specify that the Government was making a 1961 regulation under Act 1 of 1948. But that in our opinion Hukamc/rand would make no difference to the validity of the amendments, Milla if the amendments could be validly made under s. 5 of Act Stat• or Madh,. l of 1948. It is not disputed that the amendments could be Bharat validly made under s. 5 of Act I of 1948.\n\nWe are therefore wanchoo 1. of opinion that the mere mistake in the opening part of the notification in reciting the wrong source of power does not\n\naffect the validity of the amendments made.\n\nIt is urged that the Government knew that it could only make regulations\n\nunder s. 5 and it had made regulations under s. 5 of Act I of 1948 in certain cases. Even if that be so, !here can in our opinion be no doubt about the validity ot the amendments made if the Government had power to make them. even though there was a mistake in the opening part of the notification publishing the amendments.\n\nAll that ~. 5 of Act 1 of 1948 requires is the publication of th.: regulation made thereunder and its being made by Government; and that has been complied with in this case.\n\nTh,, re is no other formality required for making a regulation and we are there> . fore of opinion that even though there was ; i mitake in the opening part of the notification of December 28. I \\149, the amendments made in the Tax Rules can be upheld under s. 5 of Act 1 of 1948 as a regulation.\n\nWe therefore reject the contention under this head.\n\nRe; (2):\n\nThen it is urged that even if the amendments to the Tax Rules are good, they could not affect vested rtghts l'f appeaJ provided under the old law before the amendments and therefore insofar as the amendments affect this vested right, they are of no effect. Now it is well settled that even a vested right of appeal can be taken away by express legislation or by legislation which, though it may not expressly repeal tho vested right of appeal, has the effect of such repeal by neceS- 1ary implication.\n\nWe have already pointed out that in view of the coming into existence of the new State of Madhya Bharat, amendments to the Tax Rules had become necessary In order to bring them into line with the structure of the new State. The three main amendments made in the Tax Rules have already been set out by us.\n\nLearned counsel for the\n\n134-159 S.C.-115\n\n1964 appellant does not attack two of them, namely, those relata,,.,;;;',_,,, ing to the assessment officer and the first appeal provided\n\nNW. by the amendments.\n\nThe attack is on the amendment of ._ J Mtul\"7o r. 13 of the Tax Rules providing for a second appeal. Under\n\nBlulrol the old Rules, a second appeal lay to the Government both lJl'llllCJw, 1• on fact and Jaw; under the new law, it lay to the High Court only on a question of law.\n\nThe quarrel is not with the .'.orum of the second appeal; what is urged is that the ne'I\\ rule does not allow a second appeal on a question of fact while the old rule did.\n\nThat is undoubtedly so. But considering the set up in which the amendments had to be made, it seems to us that even if the new rule cannot be read as an express provision taking away the right of second appeal on facts, it must in the circumstances be held that it does take away that right by necessary intendment. The new rule provided for a second appeal like the old rule but confined it to a question of law.\n\nThe necessary implication of the new rule therefore was that though a second appeal will continue to lie as before its scope was cut down only to questions of law. We are therefore of opinion that though the right of second appeal on facts is , taken away by the new rule 13 inserted in the Tax Rules, such right is taken away by legislation by necessary intendment. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the right of second appeal after the amendment must be confined in all cases by necessary intendment to questior:ts of law only.\n\nThe contention under this head also fails.\n\nRe. (3):\n\nComing now to the last point with respect to the VElidating Act, we have not been able to understand how the Validating Act can be said to be discriminatory in nature.\n\nA Validating Act is passed only when certain things have\n\nbeen done which requite validation. This is exactly what the present Validating Act has done and we fail to see on what grounds it can be said to be discriminatory. Even when the Finance Act of 1950 was passed it would have been open to Parliament to leave the old assessments to be carried on under the old procedure and by ollicers appointed under the old law and such action could not be called discriminatory, for the simple reason that the old assessments\n\nllllnd on a different footing from new assessments after the l9tll new law comes into force.\n\nIt is true that Parliament provid-\n\nB•\"'\"\"'•' ed otherwise in this case and the Finance Act of 1950 said Milb that the old assessments would be carried on by the cnrress1au ofv. Modlryl. ponding officers under the Indian Income Tax Act. l; Jy mis- Bltarrd take however that provision was overlooked and the old W011Choo 1. assessments were made by the old officers under the ofd law.\n\nAll that Parliament did by the Validating Act was to allow the old assessments to be made under the procedure provided under the old law and we can see no discrimination in the Validating Act on account of this fact.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the Validating Act is not hit by Art. 14.\n\nFurther we have not been able to understand how the validation is of no effect so far as the present cases are concerned.\n\nThe present cases are with reference to years I 940-48, that is before the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949. The assessments in these cases were carried on by the old officers under the old law and the Validating Act specifically validates such assessments. In these circumstances we havo not been able to understand how it can be sa td that these assessments have not been validated by the Validating Act.\n\nThe contention under this head must therefore also fail.\n\nThe appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissM.\n\nR. ABDUL QUADER AND CO.\n\nSALES TAX OFFICER, HYDERABAD\n\nIP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.1., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)\n\nklt1 Taz-Taz Collected otherwise than In accordance wltls tlae A.cl-\n\nProvi1ion enabling the Government to recover 1uch tax collt!ct6d- Not within tM competence of State Legisl01urt'--Connitlllion II/ India, Schedule VII, Entry 26 and 54 of List 11-Hyd•robad 0.IWllll\n\nSalei Taz Act, 1950 (XII' of 1950), 1. 11.\n\nF•bTllOrJ Ile", "total_entities": 99, "entities": [{"text": "State of Madlqfi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "possession, showing a rational relation between the differ- 1964\n\n1ential treatment and the classification and has also not State of Madlqfi,\n\nplaced any material before the Court throwing light on the Pradult v. question whether the continuance of the tax was justified : Bhopal s,,,.,"}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "possession, showing a rational relation between the differ- 1964\n\n1ential treatment and the classification and has also not State of Madlqfi,\n\nplaced any material before the Court throwing light on the Pradult v. question whether the continuance of the tax was justified : Bhopal s,,,.,"}}, {"text": "the Company have by inadequate appreciation Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 404, "end_char": 452, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. 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C. Setalvad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6846, "end_char": 6860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta,!."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6862, "end_char": 6874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta,!."}}, {"text": "B. Dutta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6876, "end_char": 6884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta,!."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6888, "end_char": 6901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6907, "end_char": 6916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6921, "end_char": 6936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6958, "end_char": 6964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and I. N. Shroff, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6969, "end_char": 6981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and I. N. Shroff, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7069, "end_char": 7076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave Wanchoo I. against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "raises the question of the validity of certain provisions of the Indore Industrial Tax Rules, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7185, "end_char": 7283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indore in Holkar State by the then Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7468, "end_char": 7507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rule Ill provided that Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8172, "end_char": 8200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Department shall have power to make subsidiary rules not inconsistent with the Tax Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8372, "end_char": 8460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 28, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8465, "end_char": 8477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 28, 1948, the\n\nIfolkar State merged to form the State of Madhya Bharat."}}, {"text": "Ifolkar State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8484, "end_char": 8497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 28, 1948, the\n\nIfolkar State merged to form the State of Madhya Bharat."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8526, "end_char": 8539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 28, 1948, the\n\nIfolkar State merged to form the State of Madhya Bharat."}}, {"text": "July 19. 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8545, "end_char": 8558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 19."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8598, "end_char": 8603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1948, the State of Madhya Bharat acceded to India."}}, {"text": "December 13, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8830, "end_char": 8847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Ordi\n\nnance was superseded by Act 1 of 1948 which came into force on December 13, 1948."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8849, "end_char": 8858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Department shall have power to make subsidiary rules not inconsistent with the Tax Rules", "statute": "Department shall have power to make subsidiary rules not inconsistent with the Tax Rules"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9066, "end_char": 9075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State which merged in the State of Madhya Bharat until repealed or amended under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "State which merged in the State of Madhya Bharat until repealed or amended under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9350, "end_char": 9354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State which merged in the State of Madhya Bharat until repealed or amended under the provisions of the Act", "statute": "State which merged in the State of Madhya Bharat until repealed or amended under the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9486, "end_char": 9496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such regulations were to have the force of law unless they were repugnant to any Act or law or Ordi nance made by the Rajpramukh, in which case to the e\"<tent of their repugnancy they would be void."}}, {"text": "Finally the section provided that the right of the Rajpramukh to make Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9776, "end_char": 9855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government Hukamchand of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10221, "end_char": 10259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently, on December 28, 1949, the Government Hukamchand of Madhya Bharat issued a notification under r. 1 of the Mills Tax Rules purporting to make rules under r. 17 thereof."}}, {"text": "These rules made certain amendments in the Tax Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10383, "end_char": 10435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11222, "end_char": 11243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11247, "end_char": 11263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then came the Constitution of India on January 26, 1950 and the State of Madhya Bharat became one of Part B States."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11830, "end_char": 11844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XI of 1922 for the year ending on March 31, 1951 or for any sub- , sequent year or, as the case may be, the levy, assessment and collection of the tax on profits of business for any chargeable accounting period ending on or before March 31, 1949."}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12331, "end_char": 12348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Milb authorities under the Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12762, "end_char": 12803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bharat Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12904, "end_char": 12914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13612, "end_char": 13616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya lie to the corresponding authorities under the Income Tax\n\nBharat Act", "statute": "Madhya lie to the corresponding authorities under the Income Tax\n\nBharat Act"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13720, "end_char": 13730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya lie to the corresponding authorities under the Income Tax\n\nBharat Act", "statute": "Madhya lie to the corresponding authorities under the Income Tax\n\nBharat Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14387, "end_char": 14396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14539, "end_char": 14548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14777, "end_char": 14787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15404, "end_char": 15418, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "appellant challenged the validity of the assessments made against it under the Tax Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15506, "end_char": 15594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "As after the Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16018, "end_char": 16048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16349, "end_char": 16356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "As after the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "As after the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Wancllao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17091, "end_char": 17099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument on behalf of the appellant\n\nWancllao J.\n\n1961 is that r. 17 of the Tax Rules must be treated on a par with Bukamchand provisions in a statute which provide for framing of rules, Milli and these rules are subordinate legislation made fC'f carrying ·• Sor Madhya out the purposes Of the Statute, and the power to frame such\n\nBharat rules does not include the power to modify the parent law waclloo 1."}}, {"text": "Decembr\n\n13, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17744, "end_char": 17761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not think it necessary for present purposes to consider thIS argument, for we are of opinion that the amendments which were made in the Tax Rules on December 28, 1949 can be justified on the basis of Act I of 1948, which was passed on Decembr\n\n13, 1948 by the Rajpramukh."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17826, "end_char": 17830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18094, "end_char": 18098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18304, "end_char": 18317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "merged in the United States."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18387, "end_char": 18391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18406, "end_char": 18410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18541, "end_char": 18560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification of December 28, 1949 by which the amendment5 were made was published in the gazette of the Madhya Bharat State and the amendments were made by the Government."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19553, "end_char": 19557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19844, "end_char": 19848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19957, "end_char": 19961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20255, "end_char": 20259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20294, "end_char": 20298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21008, "end_char": 21012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Then it is urged that even if the amendments to the Tax Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21111, "end_char": 21172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Coming now to the last point with respect to the VElidating Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23588, "end_char": 23651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Even when the Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23980, "end_char": 24005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "are therefore of opinion that the Validating Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24977, "end_char": 25025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25040, "end_char": 25047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are therefore of opinion that the Validating Act", "statute": "We are therefore of opinion that the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "R. ABDUL QUADER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25719, "end_char": 25734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissM.\n\nR. ABDUL QUADER AND CO."}}, {"text": "IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25774, "end_char": 25795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SALES TAX OFFICER, HYDERABAD\n\nIP.", "canonical_name": "IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25818, "end_char": 25834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA"}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25836, "end_char": 25846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "J. C. SHAH"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25851, "end_char": 25874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll"}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26090, "end_char": 26102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Salei Taz Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26151, "end_char": 26170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_867_876_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nllllnd on a different footing from new assessments after the l9tll new law comes into force.\n\nIt is true that Parliament provid-\n\nB•\"'\"\"'•' ed otherwise in this case and the Finance Act of 1950 said Milb that the old assessments would be carried on by the cnrress1au ofv. Modlryl. ponding officers under the Indian Income Tax Act. l; Jy mis- Bltarrd take however that provision was overlooked and the old W011Choo 1. assessments were made by the old officers under the ofd law.\n\nAll that Parliament did by the Validating Act was to allow the old assessments to be made under the procedure provided under the old law and we can see no discrimination in the Validating Act on account of this fact.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the Validating Act is not hit by Art. 14.\n\nFurther we have not been able to understand how the validation is of no effect so far as the present cases are concerned.\n\nThe present cases are with reference to years I 940-48, that is before the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949. The assessments in these cases were carried on by the old officers under the old law and the Validating Act specifically validates such assessments. In these circumstances we havo not been able to understand how it can be sa td that these assessments have not been validated by the Validating Act.\n\nThe contention under this head must therefore also fail.\n\nThe appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissM.\n\nR. ABDUL QUADER AND CO.\n\nSALES TAX OFFICER, HYDERABAD\n\nIP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.1., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)\n\nklt1 Taz-Taz Collected otherwise than In accordance wltls tlae A.cl-\n\nProvi1ion enabling the Government to recover 1uch tax collt!ct6d- Not within tM competence of State Legisl01urt'--Connitlllion II/ India, Schedule VII, Entry 26 and 54 of List 11-Hyd•robad 0.IWllll\n\nSalei Taz Act, 1950 (XII' of 1950), 1. 11.\n\nF•bTllOrJ Ile\n\n1961 The appellant collected sales tax from the purchasers of betel leaves R. Abdul Quader in connection with the sales made by iL But it did not pay the amount .\n\nv. collected to the Government. The Government directed the appellant Saki Taz Officer to pay the amount to the Government and it thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court questioni112 the validity of s. 11(2) of tho Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act. 1950.\n\nTho main contention ot the appellant before the High Court waa that s. 11 (2) of the Act which authorises the Government to recover a tax collected without the authority of law was beyond the competence of the Stale Legislature because a tax collected without the authority of law would not be a tax levied under the )aw and it would therefore Dot be open to the State to collect under the authority of a Jaw enacted under the Entry 54 of List II of the VII Schedule to the Constitution\n\nany such amount as it was not a tax on sale or purchase of good•.\n\nThe High Court held that s. 11 (2) was good as an ancillary provision with regard to the collectiqp of sales or purchase tax and therefore incidental to tho power under Entry 54, List II. The High Court also beld that even if s. 11(2) cannot be justified under that entry it could bo justified under Entry 26, List II and in the result the writ petition was dismissed. The present appeal is bY way of special leave granted by this Court.\n\nHeld: (i) It cannot bo said that the State Legislature was directly legislating for the imposition of sales or purchase tax under Entry 54, List II when it made the provisions of s. 11 (2) for on tho face of tho provisions the amount, though collected bY way of tax was Dot\n\neiigible as tax under tho law.\n\n(ii) II Is trno that the heads of legislation in tho varions li•b In tho Seventh Schedule should be interpreted widely so as to tato in all maltero which are ot a character incidental to tho topic mentioned therein. Even so there is a limit to ouch incidents! or ancillary powen.\n\nThese have to be exercned in aid of the i'nain topic of legi•lation, which in the present case n a tax on sale or purchase ot goods. 'Ilic ambit of ancillary or incidental power> does not go to the eitent of permitting the legislature to provide that though the amount collected, may be wrongly, by way of tax is Dot exigib!e under the Jaw as made UDder the relevant taxing entry, it shall still be paid over to the Goven>o moot as if it were a tax. Therefore the provision contained in 1. 11(2) ....,,, ot be made under Entry 54, List II and cannot be justified evea\n\nas incidental or ancillary provisions permitted under that l!nby.\n\n(iii) Section 11 (2) cannot be justified as providing for a penaltJ for tho breach of any provision of the Act.\n\n(Iv) Entry 26, I.isl II deals with trade and commerce and II\" aothing to do with taxing or te<lc>Vering amounb realised wrongly 11 tax. There is no element of regulalion of trade and commerce in a prm•nion lite s. 11(2) and therefore that oectlo11 cannot be IUl1illl4 ander Entry 26, List n.\n\n1961 (Y) Tho provision in •· 20(c) is also innlid as ii ii merely consequential to 1. 11(2).\n\nR. .A.bdu/ Qllllllrr The Orient Papers Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1962] 1 S.C.R. S49, S 1\n\nT;;, 0 ,,,_ .,_,_ . b d ... uw.uugws e .\n\nState of Bombay v. United Motor1 (India) Ltd., [1953] S.C.R. 1069, referred to.\n\nIndian Aluminium Co. v. State of Madra1, (1962) XIII Sales Tu Cases 967, held to be wrongly decided.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE 'JURISDICTION: Civil Aippeal No. 760 of 1962.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 16, 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 1123 of 1956.\n\nK. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.\n\nA. Ranganadham Chetty and B. R. G. ~- Achar, for the respondent.\n\nFebruary 21, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHoo J.-This'is an appeal by special leave against Wane/loo 1. the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court questioning the validity of s. 11 (2) of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, No. XIV of 1950, (hereinafter referred to a~ tbe Act).\n\nThe material facts on which the petition was bsed were these.\n\nThe appellant acted as agent in the tlwn Stdte of Hyderabad to both resident and non-resident principals in regard to sale of betel leaves.\n\nUnder the Act betel lea, es were taxable at the purchase point from May I, 1953, by virtue of a notification in that behalf. We are here concerned with the a5sessment period from May I, 1953 to March 31, 1954, covered by the assessment year 1953-54.\n\nThe appellant collected sales tax from the purchasers in connection with the sales made by it on the basis that the incident of the tax lay on the sellers and assured the purchasers that after paying the tax to the appellant, there would be no further liability on them. After realising the tax. however, the appellant did not pay the amount realised to the Government but kept it in the suspense account of its principals, namely,\n\nSUPREME COURT RE!>ORTS [rQ64~\n\n.1'64 the purchasers.\n\nWhen the accounts were scrutinii.ed by the .. Abd;; Quad., Sales Tax Department, this was discovered and thereupon the\n\n•· appellant was called upon to pay the amounts realised to the ..,_ T!:..._Offi\"r Government. The appellant however objected to the pay-\n\nIPaclloo I. ment on the ground that it was the seller and the relevant notification for the relevant period imposed tax at the purchase point, i.e. on the purchaser.\n\nThis objection was over-ruled and the appellant was directed to pay the amount to Government.\n\nThe main contention raised on behalf of the appellant in the High Court was that s. II (2) of the Act, which authorised the Government to recover from any person, who had collected or collects, after May I, 1950, any amount by way of tax otherwise than in accordance with !he provisions of the Act, as arrears of land revenue, was beyond the legislative Ci>mpetance of the State legislature. The argument was that the Act was passed under Entry 54 of List IJ of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which eflables the State legislature to enact a law taxing transactions of sale or purchase of goods.\n\nThe entry therefore vests power in the State legislature to make a law for taxing sales and purchases of goods and for making all necessary incidental provisions in that behalf for the levy and collection of sales or purchase tax. But it was urged that that entry did not empower the State legislature to enact a Jaw by which a dealer who may have collected a tax without authority is required to hand over the amount to Government, as any collection without the authority of law would not be a tax levied under the law and it would therefore not be open to the State to collect under the authority of a law enacted under Entry 54 of List II any such amount as it was not a tax on sale or purchase of goods.\n\nThe High Court held s. 11 (2) good as an ancillary provision with regard to the collection of sales or purchase tax and therefore incidental to the taxing power under Entry 54 of List II. Further the High Court took the view that assuming that Entry 54 of List II could not sustain s. 11 ( 2), it could be sustained under Entry 26 of List II. Consequently the writ petition was djsmissed.\n\nThe High Court having refused a certificate to appeal to this Court, the appellant obtained special leave and that is how the matter has come up before us.\n\nIt is necessary to read s. 11 of the Act in order to appre- 1964 elate the point urged on behalf of the appellant.\n\nSection R. .tbdM'\"\"i°QU4d 11 is in these terms:- •· Sah1 Ta ()6ica \"ll(l) No person who is not registered as a dealer - •hall collect any amount by way of tax under Wanchoo I. this Act' nor shall a registered dealer make any such collection before the 1st day of May, 1950. except in accordance with such conditions and restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed : Provided that Government may exempt persons who are not registered dealers from the provisions of this sub-section until such date, not being later than the lst day of June, 1950, as Government may direct.\n\n12) Notwithstanding to the contrary contained in any\n\nnrder of an officer or tribunal or judgment, decree or order of a Court, every pe1son who has collected or collects on or before 1st May, 1950,\n\nany amount by way of tax otherwise than in accordance. with the provisions of this Act shall pay over to the Government within such time and in such manner as may be prescrihed the amount so collected by him, and in default of such payment the said amount shall be i:!covered from him as if it were arrears of land reveoue.\"\n\nIt will be seen that s. ll (l) forbids an unregistered dealer from collecting any amount by way of tax under the Act That provision however does not apply in the present case, for the appellant is admittedly a registered dealer. Further s. 11 (l) lays down that a registered dealer shall not make any such collection before May 1, 1950, except in accordance with such conditions and restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed.\n\nThis provision again does not apply, for we are not concerned here with any collection made by the appellant before May l, 1950. The prohibition therefore of s. It (l) did not apply to the appellant. Then comes s. 11 (2). It applies to collections made after May I, 1950 by any person whether a registered dealer or otherwise and lays down that any amount collected by way of tax otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act &ball be paid over to\n\n1~ the Government and in default of such payment, the said R. Abdul Quader amount shall be recovered from such person as if it were\n\n• / v. Offe arrears of land revenue.\n\nIt is clear from the words \"other-' ., a., iax cer . th . d .th th . . ti. A \" th _ . wise an m accor ance w1 e prov1S1ons of\n\n!IS ct at Wanchoo I. though the amount may have been collected by way of tax it was not exigible as tax under the Act. Section 11 (2) thus provides that amounts collected by way of tax though not exigible as tax under the Act sha!l be paid over to (jovernment, and if not paid over they shall be recovered from such person as if they were arrears of land revenue.\n\nClearly therefore s. 11 (2) as it stands provides for recovery of an amount collected by way of tax as arrears of land revenue though the amount was not due as tax under the Act.\n\nThe first question therefore that falls for consideration is whether it was open to the State legislature under its powers under Entry 54 of List II to make a provision to the effect that I11oney co!leeted by way of tax, even though it is not due as a tax under the Act, shall be made over to Government.\n\nNow it is clear that the sums so collected by way of tax are not in fact tax exigible under the Act. So it cannot be said that the State legislature was directly legislating for the imposition of sales or purchase tax under Entry 54 of List II when it made such a provision, for on the face of the provision, the amount, though collected by way of tax, was not exigible as tax under the law. The provision however is attempted to be justified on the ground that though it may not be open to a State legislature to make provision for the recovery of an amount which is not a tax under Entry 54 of List II in a law made for that purpose, it. would still be open to the legislature to provide for paying over all the amounts collected by way of tax by persons, even though they really are not exigible as tax, as part of the incidental and ancillary power to make provision for the levy and collection of such tax. t.: ow there is no dispute that the heads of legislation in the various Lists in the Seventh Schedule should be interpreted widely so as to take in all matters whkh ari: of a 'haracter incidental tt> the topics mentioned tho:rein.\n\nEven so, there is a limit to such incidental or ancillary power flowing from the legislative entries in the various Lists in the Seventh Schedule. These incidental and ancillary powers have to be exercised in aid of the main topic of legislation.\n\nwhich in the pn:sent case, is a tax on sale or purchase of 1961 g0ods. All powers necessary for the levy and collection of R. Abdul Qll<llkr\n\nthe tax concerned and for seeing that the tax is not evaded are v. comprised within the ambit of the legislative entry as ancillary Salea Tax Of!icA or incidental. But where the legislation under the relevant Wanchoo J. entry proceeds on the basis that the amount concerned is not a tax exigible under the law made under that entry, but even so lays down that though it is not exigible under the law, it shall be paid over to Government, merely because some dealers by mistake or otherwise have collected it as tax, it is difficult to see how such provision can be ancillary or incidental to the collection of tax legitimately due under a law made under the relevant taxing entry. We do not think that the ambit of ancillary or incidental power goes to the extent ot permitting the legislature to provide that though the amount collected- may be wrongly-by way of tax is not exigible under. the law as made under the relevant taxing entry, it sba!l still be paid over to Government, as if it were a tax. Tbe legislature cannot under Entry 54 of List II make a provision to the effect that even though a certain amount collected is not a tax on the sale or purchase of goods as laid down by the law, it will still be collected as if it was such a tax.\n\nThis is what s. 11 (2) has provided. Such a provision cannot in our opinion be treated as coming within incidental or ancillary powers which the legislature has got under the relevant taxing entry to ensure that the tax is levied and collected and that its evasion becomes impossible. We are therefore of opinion that the provision contained in s. 11 (2) cannot be made under Entry 54 of List Il and cannot be justified even as an incidental or ancillary provision permitted under that\n\nemry.\n\nAn attempt was made to justify the provision as providing for a penalty.\n\nBut as we read s. 11 ('.\\) we cannot find anything in it to justify that it is a penalty for breach of any prohibition in the Act.\n\nPenalties imposed under taxing 'tatutes are generally with respect to attempts at evaion of\n\ntr:xes or to default in the payment of taxes properly levied lscc ss. 28 and 46 of the Indian Income Tax Act. 1922). The Act also provides for penalties, for example s. 19 and s. 20.\n\nThe latter section makes certain acts or omissions of an\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~ [1964]\n\n~ assessee offences punishable by a magistrate subject to com- It. Abdul Quader position under s. 21. Section 11 (2) in our opinion has nothla/U T~ 06icn ing to do with penalties and cannot be justified as a penalty - on the dealer. Actually s. 20 makes provision in cl. (bl for Wanchoo J. penalty in case of breach of s. 11 (!) and makes the person committing a breach of that provision liable, on conviction by a Magistrate of the first class, to a fine. We are therefore of opinion that s. 11 (2) cannot be justified under Entry 54 of List II either as a provision for levying the tax or as an incidental or ancillary provision relating to the collection of tax.\n\nIn this connection we may refer to cl. (cl of s. 20, which provides that any person who fails \"to pay the amounts specified in sub-section (2) of section 11 within the prescribed\n\ntime\" shall on a conviction by a Magistrate be liable to fine.\n\nIt is remarkable that this provision makes the person punishable for his failure to pay the amount which is not authorised as a tax at all under the law, to Government. It does not provide for a penalty collecting the amount wrongly by way of tax from purchasers which may have been justified as a penalty for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the taxing legislation. If a dealer has collected anything from a purchaser which is not authorised by the taxing law, that Is a matter between him and the purchaser, and the purchaser may be entitled to recover the amount from the dealer. But unless the money so collected is due as a tax, the State cannot by law make it recoverable simply because it has been wrongly collected by the dealer. This cannot be done directly for it is not a tax at al! within the meaning of Entry 54 of List II, nor can the State legislature under the guise of incidental or anci!lary power do indirectly what it cannot do directly. We are therefore of opinion that s.11 (21 is not within the competence of the State legislature under Entry 54 of List II.\n\nThe respondent in this connection relies on the decision of this Court in The Orient Paper Mills Limited v. The State of Orissa ( 1). That case in our opinion has no application to the facts of the present case.\n\nIn that case the dealer had been assessed to tax and had paid the tax.\n\nLater in view of the judgment of this Court in State of Bombay v.\n\nThe United Motors (India) Limited( 2) the amounts paid in\n\n(l) [1962] 1 S. C. R. 549.\n\n(2) [1953] S. C. R. 1069.\n\nrespect of goods despatched for consumption outside the 1964 State were held 'to be not taxable. The dealer then applied R. Abd:i\"Quod., for refund of tax, which was held to be not exigible. The Sak •· Of/br refund was refused and and the dealer went to the High Wanc\":oo 1.\n\nCourt by a writ petition claiming that it was entitled to refund under s. 14 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act (which was the law under consideration in that case). The High Court allowed the petition in part and there were appeals to this Court both by the dealer and the State. In the meantime, the Orissa legislature amended the law, by introducing s. 14A, in the principal Act, which provided that refund could be claimed only by a person from whom the dealer had actually realised the amount as tax. That provision was challenged in this Court but was upheld on the ground that it came within the incidental power arising out of Entry 54 of List II. That matter dealt with a question of refund and it cannot be doubted that refund of the tax collected iS aiways a matter covered by incidental and ancillary powers relating to the levy and collection of tax.\n\nWe are not dealing with a case of refund in the present case. What s. 11 (2) provides is that something collected by way of tax, though it iS not really due as a tax under the law enacted under Entry 54 of List II must be paid to the Government.\n\nThis situation in our opinion is entirely different from the situation in the Orient Paper Mills Limited's case(').\n\nThe respondent further relies on a decision of the Madras High Court in Indian Aluminium Co. v. The State of Madras(2).\n\nThat decision was with respect to s. 8-B of the Madras General Sales Tax Act of 1939 as amended by Madras Act I of 1957. Though the words in s. 8-B (2) were not exactly the same as the words in s. 11 (2), with which we are concerned here, the provision in substance was to the same effect as s. 11 (2).\n\nIn view of what we have said above, that decision must be held to be incorrect.\n\n_Lastly, we come to the contention of the repondent that s. 11 (2) is within the legislative competence of the State legislature in view of Entry 26 of List II.\n\nTht entry deals with \"trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III\". It is well settled that\n\n(I) [1962] I S.C.R. S49.\n\n(2) [1962] XIII S.T.C. 967.\n\n1964 taxing entries in the legislative Lists I and II of the Seventh R. Abuad., Schedule &re entirely separate from other entries. Entry 26\n\nS I T v. Offi of List II deals with trade and commerce and has nothing a 81 aJ: ca to d h · I' gl _ o wit taxIJJg or recovermg amounts rea 1sed wron y Wanchoo J. as tax.\n\nIt is said that s. 11 (2) regulates trade and commerce and the State legislature therefore was competent under Entry 26 of List II to enact it.\n\nWe have not been Ahle to understand what such a provision has to do with the regulation of trade and commerce; it can only be justified as a provision ancillary to a taxing statute. If it cannot be so justified-as we hold that it cannot-we are unable to uphold it as regulating trade and commerce under Entry 26 ot List II. There is in our opinion no element of regulation of trade and commerce in a provision like s. 11 (2).\n\nFebruary 24.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the State legislature was Incompetent to enact a provision likes. 11 (2).\n\nWe may also add that the provision contained in s. 20(c), being consequen tial to s. 11 (2) will fall along with it. In consequence it was not open to the Sales Tax Officer to ask the appellant to make ov~ what he had collected from the purchasers wrongly as sales tax. It is not disputed, as appears from the final assessment order of the Sales Tax Officer, that the appellant was not liable to pay the amount as sales tax for the relevant period. We therefore allow the appeal and quash the assessment order dated sptember 27, 1956 insofar as it is based on s. 11 (2).\n\nTh~ appellant will get his costs in this Court as well as in the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nRAF1QUENNESSA\n\nLAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS\n\nREPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. S!KRI JJ.)\n\nRetroactivity-Enactment of the A.ct pcndinr: apptal-Apptal if governed by the A.ct-Allam NonAgricultural Urhan Arecu Ttnanq Act, 19SS (Assam Act No. 12 of 19SS), •· S.", "total_entities": 91, "entities": [{"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that Parliament provid-\n\nB•\"'\"\"'•' ed otherwise in this case and the Finance Act of 1950 said Milb that the old assessments would be carried on by the cnrress1au ofv."}}, {"text": "are therefore of opinion that the Validating Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 733, "end_char": 781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 796, "end_char": 803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are therefore of opinion that the Validating Act", "statute": "We are therefore of opinion that the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1030, "end_char": 1044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present cases are with reference to years I 940-48, that is before the accounting year ending on March 31, 1949."}}, {"text": "R. ABDUL QUADER AND CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1475, "end_char": 1497, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. ABDUL QUADER AND CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SALES TAX OFFICER, HYDERABAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1500, "end_char": 1528, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SALES TAX OFFICER, HYDERABAD", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.1.,", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1559, "end_char": 1572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1574, "end_char": 1590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1592, "end_char": 1602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll"}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1846, "end_char": 1858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Salei Taz Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1907, "end_char": 1926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Saki Taz", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2200, "end_char": 2208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government directed the appellant Saki Taz Officer to pay the amount to the Government and it thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court questioni112 the validity of s. 11(2) of tho Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act."}}, {"text": "s. 11(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2339, "end_char": 2347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IWllll\n\nSalei Taz Act, 1950", "statute": "IWllll\n\nSalei Taz Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2355, "end_char": 2386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2463, "end_char": 2468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2975, "end_char": 2980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 11(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3176, "end_char": 3184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3568, "end_char": 3573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3769, "end_char": 3785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4619, "end_char": 4629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4937, "end_char": 4945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5199, "end_char": 5202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5204, "end_char": 5207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5434, "end_char": 5449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE 'JURISDICTION: Civil Aippeal No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5638, "end_char": 5653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. Ranganadham Chetty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5675, "end_char": 5696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and B. R. G. ~- Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. G.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5701, "end_char": 5709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and B. R. G. ~- Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "WANCHoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5804, "end_char": 5811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHoo J.-This'is an appeal by special leave against Wane/loo 1.", "canonical_name": "WANCHoo"}}, {"text": "Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5894, "end_char": 5912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5996, "end_char": 6001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6215, "end_char": 6224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant acted as agent in the tlwn Stdte of Hyderabad to both resident and non-resident principals in regard to sale of betel leaves."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6500, "end_char": 6514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are here concerned with the a5sessment period from May I, 1953 to March 31, 1954, covered by the assessment year 1953-54."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8031, "end_char": 8047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8901, "end_char": 8906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9163, "end_char": 9168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9452, "end_char": 9457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "of May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9804, "end_char": 9816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section R. .tbdM'\"\"i°QU4d 11 is in these terms:- •· Sah1 Ta ()6ica \"ll(l) No person who is not registered as a dealer - •hall collect any amount by way of tax under Wanchoo I. this Act' nor shall a registered dealer make any such collection before the 1st day of May, 1950."}}, {"text": "1st May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10299, "end_char": 10312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12) Notwithstanding to the contrary contained in any\n\nnrder of an officer or tribunal or judgment, decree or order of a Court, every pe1son who has collected or collects on or before 1st May, 1950,\n\nany amount by way of tax otherwise than in accordance."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10878, "end_char": 10883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 1, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10965, "end_char": 10976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further s. 11 (l) lays down that a registered dealer shall not make any such collection before May 1, 1950, except in accordance with such conditions and restrictions, if any, as may be prescribed."}}, {"text": "May l, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11185, "end_char": 11196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This provision again does not apply, for we are not concerned here with any collection made by the appellant before May l, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11280, "end_char": 11285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11949, "end_char": 11959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12213, "end_char": 12218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13678, "end_char": 13694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13954, "end_char": 13970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. Abdul Qll", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14196, "end_char": 14208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All powers necessary for the levy and collection of R. Abdul Qll<llkr\n\nthe tax concerned and for seeing that the tax is not evaded are v. comprised within the ambit of the legislative entry as ancillary Salea Tax Of!icA or incidental."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15480, "end_char": 15485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15812, "end_char": 15817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16050, "end_char": 16055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 28 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16326, "end_char": 16339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16426, "end_char": 16431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16436, "end_char": 16441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORT~ [1964]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16502, "end_char": 16530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter section makes certain acts or omissions of an\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~ [1964]\n\n~ assessee offences punishable by a magistrate subject to com- It."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16627, "end_char": 16632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16634, "end_char": 16644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16774, "end_char": 16779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16811, "end_char": 16818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bl for Wanchoo J. penalty in case of breach of s. 11 (!)", "canonical_name": "WANCHoo"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16851, "end_char": 16856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17022, "end_char": 17027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17245, "end_char": 17250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17345, "end_char": 17355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18444, "end_char": 18448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 1 S. C. R. 549", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18950, "end_char": 18971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19348, "end_char": 19353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19572, "end_char": 19590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, the Orissa legislature amended the law, by introducing s. 14A, in the principal Act, which provided that refund could be claimed only by a person from whom the dealer had actually realised the amount as tax."}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19623, "end_char": 19629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20202, "end_char": 20207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orient Paper Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20460, "end_char": 20486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This situation in our opinion is entirely different from the situation in the Orient Paper Mills Limited's case(')."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20550, "end_char": 20567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent further relies on a decision of the Madras High Court in Indian Aluminium Co. v. The State of Madras(2)."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20654, "end_char": 20658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Act I of 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20719, "end_char": 20739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20761, "end_char": 20765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act I of 1957", "statute": "Madras Act I of 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20814, "end_char": 20819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act I of 1957", "statute": "Madras Act I of 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20912, "end_char": 20917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act I of 1957", "statute": "Madras Act I of 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21062, "end_char": 21067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act I of 1957", "statute": "Madras Act I of 1957"}}, {"text": "S49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21322, "end_char": 21325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act I of 1957", "statute": "Madras Act I of 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21685, "end_char": 21690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act I of 1957", "statute": "Madras Act I of 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22229, "end_char": 22234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22411, "end_char": 22419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22445, "end_char": 22450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sptember 27, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22879, "end_char": 22896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We therefore allow the appeal and quash the assessment order dated sptember 27, 1956 insofar as it is based on s. 11 (2)."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22923, "end_char": 22928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RAF1QUENNESSA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23030, "end_char": 23043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAF1QUENNESSA\n\nLAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS\n\nREPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS."}}, {"text": "LAL BAHADUR CHETRI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23045, "end_char": 23063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAF1QUENNESSA\n\nLAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS\n\nREPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS."}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23113, "end_char": 23133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAF1QUENNESSA\n\nLAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS\n\nREPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23169, "end_char": 23191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "M. S!KRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23198, "end_char": 23206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S!KRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Allam NonAgricultural Urhan Arecu Ttnanq Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23296, "end_char": 23340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_876_884_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64)\n\n1964 taxing entries in the legislative Lists I and II of the Seventh R. Abuad., Schedule &re entirely separate from other entries. Entry 26\n\nS I T v. Offi of List II deals with trade and commerce and has nothing a 81 aJ: ca to d h · I' gl _ o wit taxIJJg or recovermg amounts rea 1sed wron y Wanchoo J. as tax.\n\nIt is said that s. 11 (2) regulates trade and commerce and the State legislature therefore was competent under Entry 26 of List II to enact it.\n\nWe have not been Ahle to understand what such a provision has to do with the regulation of trade and commerce; it can only be justified as a provision ancillary to a taxing statute. If it cannot be so justified-as we hold that it cannot-we are unable to uphold it as regulating trade and commerce under Entry 26 ot List II. There is in our opinion no element of regulation of trade and commerce in a provision like s. 11 (2).\n\nFebruary 24.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the State legislature was Incompetent to enact a provision likes. 11 (2).\n\nWe may also add that the provision contained in s. 20(c), being consequen tial to s. 11 (2) will fall along with it. In consequence it was not open to the Sales Tax Officer to ask the appellant to make ov~ what he had collected from the purchasers wrongly as sales tax. It is not disputed, as appears from the final assessment order of the Sales Tax Officer, that the appellant was not liable to pay the amount as sales tax for the relevant period. We therefore allow the appeal and quash the assessment order dated sptember 27, 1956 insofar as it is based on s. 11 (2).\n\nTh~ appellant will get his costs in this Court as well as in the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nRAF1QUENNESSA\n\nLAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS\n\nREPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. S!KRI JJ.)\n\nRetroactivity-Enactment of the A.ct pcndinr: apptal-Apptal if governed by the A.ct-Allam NonAgricultural Urhan Arecu Ttnanq Act, 19SS (Assam Act No. 12 of 19SS), •· S.\n\nThe appellant sued the lessee, the predecesoor of the respondents. for ojcctment on the latter's failure to deliver possession of a leased land at the expiration of the stipulated period. Under the covenant the lessee was entitled to build a house for residential purposes. The trial Court decreed the appellant's claim whereupon the lessee filed an appeal.\n\nWhile the appeal was pending the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act was passed, and thereafter the lessee prayed for permis sion to take an additional ground under •· S of the Act. Before lhat date, the High Court\" had taken the view that this provision of the Act was applicable to pending procee'dings. The lower appellate court allow .. ed the lessee's plea and ultimately allowed the appeal and set oside , ho\n\ndecree passed by the trial Judge in favour of the appellant, concluding that the two houses had been constructed by the lessee within five years after the taking of the lease and that entitled the lessee to claim the benefit of s. S of the Act. The High Court on appeal. following its earlier decision about the applicability of the provisions of •· 5 to pending proceedings, summarily dismissed the appeal, but granted a certifi~ cate for leave to appeal to this Court.\n\nHeld: (i) A statutory provision is retroactive either when it is so declared by express terms. or the intention to make it retroactive clear1y follows from the relevant words and the context in which they O\"..cu1.\n\nRe. Athlumney Ex parte Wilson, (1898) 2 Q.B.D. 541, referred to.\n\n(ii) The provisions of the Act clearly indicate that the legislature wanted the beneficient provisions enacted by it to take within their protection not only leases executed after the Act came into iorce, but also leasei executed prior to the operation of the Act.\n\nThe plain object of s. 5 is to protect tho tenants who have built a permanent structure either for business oi' for residence, provided it bu been built within S years from the date of contract of tenancy, even though those constructions had been malle before the date of tho AcL\n\n(iii) A suit which was pending when the Act came into force would be governed by s. S(I) (a) and an appeal arising from a suit which had been decided before the Act came into force, would likewise bo governed by s. S(I) (a), provided it is pending after the date when\n\nthe Act came into force, for an appeal pending in a continuation of the suit.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 549 of 1962.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and orders dated August 1, 1958 and March 13, 1959 of the Assam High Court in S.A.\n\nNos. 86 of 1958 and 14 of 1959 respectively.\n\nN. C. Chatter; ee, K. P. Sen and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 549 of 1962).\n\nRafiquenneua\n\nLal Bahadur\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nB. P. Maheshwari, for respondents Nos. l(a) to l(e) (in C.A. No. 549 of 1962).\n\nBehrul Islam and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 569 of 1963).\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 569/ 63).\n\nFebruary 24, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was d; iivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-These two appeals which have been brought to this Court with a certificate issued by the Assam High Court, raise a short question about the construction and effect of section 5 of the Assam Non Agricultural Urban Area Tenancy Act, 1955 (No. 12 of\n\n1955) (hereinafter called 'the Act').\n\nThe relevant and material facts which have led to the suits from which these two appeals respectively arise, are similar, and so, it would not be necessary to state them in detail in regard to both the matters. We would, therefore, mention the facts broadly in C.A. No. 549/1962, in dealing with the common point raised for our decision. The appellant in this case is Mst. Rafiquennessa who sued the predecessor of the respondents for ejectment. It appears that Lal Bahadur Chetri has executed a registered lease-deed in favour of the aqipellant on the 14th February, 1946. The lease covered an open plot of land and under the covenant the leasee was entitled to build a house for residential purposes.\n\nIn the ordinary course, the lease was due to expire on the 12th February, 1952, and the lessee had agreed to deliver vacant possession of the land at the expiration of the stipulated period. Accordingly, a notice to quit was served on him to vacate on the 12th February, 1952. He, however, did not comply with the notice and that led to the present suit by the appellant for eviction (No. 149 of 1952).\n\nIn support of her claim, the appellant alleged that the lessee had contravened the terms of the lease inasmuch as he had sublet the premises built by him, and so, that was an addi tional gtound for evicting the lessee.\n\nThe sub-lessees were accordingly joined as defendants to the suit.\n\nThe lessee Chetri alone resisted the suit The sub-tenants let into possession by him did not join issue with the appellant. The trial Judge decreed the appellant's claim whereupon the lessee Chetri filed an appeal in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Lower Assam District, Gauhati, challenging the validity and the correctness of the decree passed against him (Civil Appeal No. 24/1953).\n\nWhile the appeal was pending, the Act was passed and was published in the Assam Gazette on the 6th July, 1955.\n\nThereafter, when the appeal came on for hearing before the lower appellate Court, the tenant filed an application praying that he should be permitted to take an additional ground under s. 5 of the Act.\n\nBefore that date, the Assam High Court had taken the view that the said provision of the Act was applicable to the pending proceedings between landlords and tenants for eviction and that was the basis on which the temint Chetri wanted to support his appeal. The lower appellate Court allowed the tenant's plea, framed an 11dditional issue in pursuance of it and sent the matter back to the trial Court for a finding.\n\nOn remand, the trial Court took evidence and after local inspection, made a finding that the two houses proved to have been built by the tenant must be regarded as permanent in relation to the locality of the plot. He, however, found that there was no evidence to show when the said houses were constructed. Part of the finding was challenged by the tenant before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court ultimately allowed the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the trial Judge in favour of the appellant.\n\nThe conclusion of the lower appellate Court was that the two houses had been constructed by the tenant within five years after the taking of the lease and that entitled the lessee to claim the benefit of s. 5 of the Act\n\nThe appellant then preferred a second appeal in the High Court of Assam (No. 86/ 1958).\n\nFollowing its earlier decision about the applicability of the provisions of s. 5 to pending proceedings, the High Court summarily dismissed the said appeal.\n\nThereafter, the appellant applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and with the said certificate the present appeal has been brought before us.\n\nPending these proceedings, the tenant Chetri died and his\n\nbcirs and legal representatives Mst Tulsa Devi and othm\n\nRafill.utv.\n\nLal Bahotblr\n\nGafendraaadJ; ar-\n\nC. 1.\n\nRaflquennt1m\n\nLal Baliadur\n\nGa/endragadkar\n\nc. /.\n\nhave been brought on the record and will be described as respondents hereafter. Thus, the only point which arises for our decision is whether the Assam High Court was right in taking the view that the provisions of s. 5 applied to the proceedings between the parties which were pending at the relevant time before the lower appellate Court.\n\nAppeal No. 569 of 1963 arises from a suit filed by the\n\nappellan~ Wahedulla against his tenant, the respondent Abdul Hamid. The relevant facts are similar to those in C.A. No. 549I1962.\n\nIn this case also, the Act came into force while the appeal was pending before the lower appellate Court and by the application of s. 5 respondent's claim to continue in possession has been upheld and the appllant's claim for ejecting the respondent has been rejected.\n\nThe High Court granted certificate to the appellant when it was toid that the appellant proposed to challenge the correctness of its earlier decision holding that s. 5 of the Act applied to the pending proceedings.\n\nThe Act was passed by the Assam Legislature in order to regulate in certain respects the relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of non-agricultural lands in the urban areas of the State of Assa'I!. It contains fourteen sections and the scheme which is evident in the operative provisions of the Act is to afford protection to tbe tenants by regulating in certain respects the relationship between them and their landlords in respect of the lands covered by the Act.\n\nSection 3 (c) defines a 'landlord' as meaning a person immediately under whom a tenant holds but does not include the Government. While s. 3(d) defines a 'permanent structure' in relation to any locality as meaning a structure which is regarded as permanent in that locality, the 'tenant' and 'urban area' are defined by clauses (g) and (h) respectively.\n\nSection 4 imposes an obligation on the tenant to pay rent for his holding at fair and equitable rates, and the proviso prescribes that in case of any dispute as to fair rent between the parties, the rent which was paid by the tenant immediately before the dispute shall be deemed to be fair and equitable unless a competent court decides to the contrary. Section 6 provides for compensation for improvements; s. 7 provides for enhancement of rent by contract; s. 8 deals with enhancement of rent without contract; s. 9\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:&rtl; COURT REPORTS 881\n\nauthorises the Court to make an order as to enhancement of rent; s. IO prohibits illegal realisation beyond the prescribed amount; s. 11 provides for notice for ejectment; s. I 2 prescribes the procedure in which the notice has to be sNved;\n\nand s. 13 confers rule-making power on the State Govern ment. Section 14 repeals the earlier Tenancy Act. --\n\nHaving thus broadly considered the scheme of the Act, it 1' necessary to read s. 5, the effect of which is the main point of controversy between the parties before us. Section\n\n5( 11 rends thus:-\n\n\"N otwithstanding anything in any contract or in any law for the time being in force-(a) where under the terms of a contract entered into be!ween a landlord and his tenant whether before or <Jter the commencement of this Act, a tenant is entitled to build, and has in pursuance of_ such terms actually built within the period of five years from the date of such contract, a permanent structure on the land of the tenancy for residential or business purposes, or where a tenant not being so entitled to build, has actually built any such structure on the land of the tenancy for any of the purposes aforesaid with the knowledge and acquiescence of the landlord, the tenant shall not be ejected hv the landlord from the tenancy except on the eround of non-payment of rent; (b) where a tenant has effected improvements on the land of the tr.na ncv under the terms whereof he is not entitled to effect such improvements, the tenant shall not he\n\nejected by the landlord from the land of the tenancy unless compensation for reasonable improvements has been paid to the tenant\".\n\nSub-section (2) prohibits the ejectment of any tenant from the land or the tenancy except in execution of a decree for ejectment passed by a competent civil Court; and sub-section\n\n(3) prohibits the execution of a decree for ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent within a period of 30 days from the date of the decree, and allows the tenant to pay into the executing Court the entire amount due from him under\n\n134--159 S.C.-56\n\nIllM\n\nRafiquennnM\n\nLal Bafuuhlr\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\n196-f\n\nRafiqutnnessa\n\nLal Bahadur\n\nGaitndragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nthe decree within the said period, whereupon the decree has to be entered as satisfied.\n\nMr. Chatterjee contends that the Assam High Court v. as in error in coming to the conclusion that the proceedings which were pending between the parties at the appellate stage on 6th July, 1955 when the Act came into force. fell to be governed by the provisions of s. 5.\n\nHe argues that at the relevant date when the suit was filed by the appellant, he had acquired a right to eject the tenant under the terms of the tenancy, and he contends that where vested rights are affected by any statutory provision, the said provision shou!rl normally be construed to be prospective in operation and not retrospective, unless the provision in question relates merely to a procedural matter.\n\nIt is not disputed by him that the legislature is competent to take away vested rights by means of retrospective legislation. Similarly, the legislature is undoubtedly competent to make laws which over-ride and materially affect the terms of contracts between tk parties; but the argument is that unless a clear and unambiguous intention is indicated by the legislature by adopting suitable express words in that behalf, no provision of a statute should be given retroactive operation if by such operation vested rights are likely to be affected. These principles are unexceptionable and as a matter of law, no objection can be taken to them.\n\nMr. Chatterjee has relied upon the well known observations made by Wright J. in in re Athlumney Ex parte Wilson('), when the learned Jmle said that it is a general rule that when the Legislature aiters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action. its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them.\n\nHe added that there was one e1\\ception to that rule, namely, that, where nactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action, they have been held to apply to existing rights.\n\nIn order to make the statement of the law relating to the relevant rule of construction which has to be adopted in dealing with the effect of statutory provisions in this connection, we ought to add that retroactive operation of a statutory provision can be inferred even in cases where such retroactive operation appears to be clearly implicit in the\n\n(I) [1898] 2 Q. B. D. 547.\n\nprovision construed in the context where it occurs. In other words, a statutory provision is held to be retroactive either when it is so declared by express terms, or the intention to make it retroactive clearly follows from the relevant words and the context in which they occur.\n\nBearing in mind these principles, let us look at s. 5.\n\nBefore doing so, lt is necessary to consider s. 2 which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in al!y contract or in any law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all non-agricultural tenancies whether created before or after the date on which this Act comes into force. This provision clearly indicates that the legislature wanted the beneficent provisions enacted by it to take Within their protection not only leases executed after the Act came into force, but also leases executed prior to the operation of the Act. In other words, leases which had been created before the Act applied are intended to receive the benefit of the provisions of the Act, and in that sense, the Act clearly affects vested rights of the landlords who had let out their urban properties to the tenants prior to the date of the Act.\n\nThat is one important fact which is material in determining the scope and effect of s. 5.\n\nNow, s. 5 itself gives an unmistakable indication of the legislative intention to make its provisions retrospective.\n\nWhat does s. 5 provide?\n\nIt provides protection to the tenants who have actually built within five years from the date of leases executed in their favour, permanent structures on the land let out to them for residential or business purposes, and this protection is available either when the construction of the permanent structure has been made by the tenant in pursuance of the terms of the lease, or even without any term of that kind and the landlord had knowledge of it and had acquiesced in it. Thus, the plain object of s. 5 is to protect the tenants who have built a permanent structure either for business or for residence, provided it has been built within 5 years from the date of contract of tenancy.\n\nTherefore, cases where permanent structures had been built within 5 years of the terms of contract, would fall within s. 5 ( 1 )(a), even though those constructions had been rriade before the date of the Act. Thus, the very scheme of fl 5 ( 1) (a) clearly postulates the extension of its protection to\n\n19M\n\nRafiquennes5a\n\nLal Bahadut\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\na.fiquennn•\n\n•• Liii Bahlldar\n\nG•irndraadk11r\n\nc. J.\n\nconstructions already made. That is another point which is significant in dealing with the controversy between the\n\npartie~ before us .\n\nThere is yet another point which is relevant in this connection. S. 5\\l)(a) provides that the tenant shall not be evicted by the landlord from the tenancy except on the ground of non-payment of rent, provided, of course, the conditions prescribed by it are satisfied. If the legislature had . intended that this protection should operate prospectively. it would have been easy to say that the tenant shall not be sued in ejectment; such an expressio11 would have indicated that the protection is afforded to the suits brought after the Act came into force, and that might have introduced the element of prospective operation; instead, what is prohibited by s. 5 (!)(a) is the eviction of the tenant, and so, inevitably, the section must come into play for the protection of the tenant even at the appellate stage when it is clear that by the proceedings pending before the appellate court, the landlord is seeking to evict the tenant, arid that obviously indicates that' the pending proceedings are governed bys. 5(])(a), though they may have been initially instituted before the Act came into force.\n\nIncidentally, an appeal pending before the lower appellate court is a continuation of the suit, and so, there is no difficulty in holding that a suit which was pending when the Act came into force would be governed by s. 5(1)(a) and an appeal arising from a suit which had been decided before the Act came into force, would likewise be governed by s. 5(1)(a), provided it is pending after the date when the Act came into force. Therefore, we are satisfied that the Assam High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the dispute between the parties in the present case must be governed by the provisions of s. 5(1)(a). It is common ground that if s. 5(])(a) is held to apply, the decrees passed against the appellants in both the appeals cannot be successfully cha.Jlenged.\n\nThe result is, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "has nothing a 81 aJ: ca to d h · I' gl _ o wit taxIJJg or recovermg amounts rea 1sed wron y Wanchoo J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 230, "end_char": 332, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 902, "end_char": 907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1084, "end_char": 1092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sptember 27, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1552, "end_char": 1569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We therefore allow the appeal and quash the assessment order dated sptember 27, 1956 insofar as it is based on s. 11 (2)."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1596, "end_char": 1601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RAF1QUENNESSA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1703, "end_char": 1716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAF1QUENNESSA\n\nLAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS\n\nREPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS.", "canonical_name": "RAF1QUENNESSA"}}, {"text": "LAL BAHADUR CHETRI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1718, "end_char": 1736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAF1QUENNESSA\n\nLAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS\n\nREPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS.", "canonical_name": "LAL BAHADUR CHETRI"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1786, "end_char": 1806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAF1QUENNESSA\n\nLAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS\n\nREPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1814, "end_char": 1827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAF1QUENNESSA\n\nLAL BAHADUR CHETRI (DEAD) THROUGH HTS\n\nREPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS."}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1842, "end_char": 1864, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "M. S!KRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1871, "end_char": 1879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S!KRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Allam NonAgricultural Urhan Arecu Ttnanq Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1969, "end_char": 2013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "While the appeal was pending the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2414, "end_char": 2493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3880, "end_char": 3884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4704, "end_char": 4717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatter; ee, K. P. Sen and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "K. P. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4723, "end_char": 4732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatter; ee, K. P. Sen and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4737, "end_char": 4753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatter; ee, K. P. Sen and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Rafiquenneua", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rafiquenneua\n\nLal Bahadur\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nB. P. Maheshwari, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "RAF1QUENNESSA"}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rafiquenneua\n\nLal Bahadur\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nB. P. Maheshwari, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Behrul Islam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4931, "end_char": 4943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Behrul Islam and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4948, "end_char": 4965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Behrul Islam and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5013, "end_char": 5028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5137, "end_char": 5151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was d; iivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.-These two appeals which have been brought to this Court with a certificate issued by the Assam High Court, raise a short question about the construction and effect of section 5 of the Assam Non Agricultural Urban Area Tenancy Act, 1955 (No.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5324, "end_char": 5333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assam Non Agricultural Urban Area Tenancy Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5341, "end_char": 5392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rafiquennessa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5817, "end_char": 5830, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAF1QUENNESSA", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Lal Bahadur Chetri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5906, "end_char": 5924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Lal Bahadur Chetri has executed a registered lease-deed in favour of the aqipellant on the 14th February, 1946.", "canonical_name": "LAL BAHADUR CHETRI"}}, {"text": "14th February, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5997, "end_char": 6016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Lal Bahadur Chetri has executed a registered lease-deed in favour of the aqipellant on the 14th February, 1946."}}, {"text": "12th February, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6404, "end_char": 6423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, a notice to quit was served on him to vacate on the 12th February, 1952."}}, {"text": "Chetri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6851, "end_char": 6857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lessee Chetri alone resisted the suit The sub-tenants let into possession by him did not join issue with the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sub-Judge, Lower Assam District, Gauhati", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7074, "end_char": 7114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Judge decreed the appellant's claim whereupon the lessee Chetri filed an appeal in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Lower Assam District, Gauhati, challenging the validity and the correctness of the decree passed against him (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "6th July, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7318, "end_char": 7332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the appeal was pending, the Act was passed and was published in the Assam Gazette on the 6th July, 1955."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7520, "end_char": 7524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assam High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7560, "end_char": 7576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before that date, the Assam High Court had taken the view that the said provision of the Act was applicable to the pending proceedings between landlords and tenants for eviction and that was the basis on which the temint Chetri wanted to support his appeal."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8687, "end_char": 8691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Assam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8756, "end_char": 8775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conclusion of the lower appellate Court was that the two houses had been constructed by the tenant within five years after the taking of the lease and that entitled the lessee to claim the benefit of s. 5 of the Act\n\nThe appellant then preferred a second appeal in the High Court of Assam (No."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8869, "end_char": 8873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lal Bahotblr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9243, "end_char": 9255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Bahotblr\n\nGafendraaadJ; ar-\n\nC. 1."}}, {"text": "Lal Baliadur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9297, "end_char": 9309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raflquennt1m\n\nLal Baliadur\n\nGa/endragadkar\n\nc. /.\n\nhave been brought on the record and will be described as respondents hereafter."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9549, "end_char": 9553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Abdul Hamid", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9787, "end_char": 9798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "569 of 1963 arises from a suit filed by the\n\nappellan~ Wahedulla against his tenant, the respondent Abdul Hamid."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9994, "end_char": 9998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10296, "end_char": 10300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assam Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10375, "end_char": 10392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act was passed by the Assam Legislature in order to regulate in certain respects the relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of non-agricultural lands in the urban areas of the State of Assa'I!."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10829, "end_char": 10838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10965, "end_char": 10972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11185, "end_char": 11194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11540, "end_char": 11549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11594, "end_char": 11598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11645, "end_char": 11649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11699, "end_char": 11703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11877, "end_char": 11882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11992, "end_char": 11997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12050, "end_char": 12060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12176, "end_char": 12180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14014, "end_char": 14024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee contends that the Assam High Court v. as in error in coming to the conclusion that the proceedings which were pending between the parties at the appellate stage on 6th July, 1955 when the Act came into force."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14275, "end_char": 14279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15405, "end_char": 15411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee has relied upon the well known observations made by Wright J. in in re Athlumney Ex parte Wilson('), when the learned Jmle said that it is a general rule that when the Legislature aiters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16612, "end_char": 16616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16664, "end_char": 16668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17561, "end_char": 17565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17573, "end_char": 17577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17696, "end_char": 17700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18212, "end_char": 18216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18517, "end_char": 18521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lal Bahadut\n\nGajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18722, "end_char": 18749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the very scheme of fl 5 ( 1) (a) clearly postulates the extension of its protection to\n\n19M\n\nRafiquennes5a\n\nLal Bahadut\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\na.fiquennn•\n\n•• Liii Bahlldar\n\nG•irndraadk11r\n\nc. J.\n\nconstructions already made."}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19014, "end_char": 19018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19606, "end_char": 19610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20269, "end_char": 20279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20399, "end_char": 20409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20666, "end_char": 20676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(])(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20706, "end_char": 20716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_885_903_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 885\n\nTATA ENGINEERING AND LOCOMOTIVE CO. LTD.\n\n.,,\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .. K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. S!KRI JJ.)\n\nCorporation-Position of-Whether citizen-Whether petition under Art. 32 by Corporation claiminR a fundamental right guarante1d under Art. 19 competent-Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil -Exceptions to rule that Corpor.; J,',_-'; i has a separate legal ntity\n\nLevy of Sales Tax challenged-Constitution of India, Arts. 19. 32 and 286(1} (a).\n\nThe petitioners were ordered to pay salC!tu. on account of certain transactions made by them in the State of Bihar. Their contention wu that th~ sales in question took place outside the state and hence the1 were entitled to the protection of Art. 286(l)(a). Their plea was rejected by the Sale3-tax authoritie3 and it was held that Art. 286(1 )(a) di'd not apply to them. The peti1ioners challenged the orders of tho sales-tax authorities by writ petitions filed by them under Art. 32 of tho Constitution.\n\nA preliminary objection was taken on behalf of respondents that the petitions were not competent as those were filed by corporations or companies and -the provisions of Art. 19 did not apply to them u corporations were not citizens. Dismissing the writ petitions.\n\nH </J.-The petitions under Art. 32 were incompetent although in each of them one or two Of the share-holders of the petitioning companies or corporations had also joined. Article 19 guarantees ri&hts to citizens as such and associations cannot Jay claim to the fundamental rights guaranteed by that Article solely on the basis of their bein& rm aggregation of citizens. Once a company or a corporation is formed. the business which is carrictl on by the said company or corporation is the business of the company or corporation and is not the busin .. of the citizens who got th: company or corporation formed or incorporated and the rights of the incorporated body must be judged on that footing and cannot be judged on the assumption that they are the right&\n\nattributable to the business of individual citizens. The petitioners cannot be heard to say that their share-holders should be allowed to file tho present petitions on the grountt that in substance. the corporatiom and companies arc nothing more than association of shue-holOen and members thereof.\n\nIf their contention is accepted, it would really mean that what the corporations or companies cannot achieve directly, they can achieve indirectly by relying upon the doctrine of lifting the \"feil.\n\nIf the corporations and companies are not citizens, (t means diat the Constitution intended that they should not aet tho l; cneftt of Art. 1'.\n\n' 1,64\n\nl'druary 2J\n\nTata Engineering v.\n\nStace 01 Biha1\n\nThe position of a corporation is that it is in law equal to a natural person and has a legal entity of its own.\n\nThat entity is entirely separate from that of its shareholders. It bears its own name and has a seal of its own. Its assets are separate and distinct from those of its members. It can sue and be sueCI exclusively for its own purpose.\n\nIts creditors cannot obtain satisfaction from the assets of its members.\n\nThe liability of the mmbers or share holders is limited to the capital invested by them. The creditors of the members have no right to tho assets of the corporation. HoWever. there are some exceptions to the rule that the corporation or a company has a juristic or legal entity and the doctrine of lifting the veil of a corporation and examining its faco in substance has been applied in many cases but the same docs not apply in the present case.\n\nState of Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. The Commercial TaE Officer & Ors. A.l.R. 1963 S.C. 1811, Smt. Ujjam Bui v. Stule of Uttar Pradesh. [1963] I S.C.R. 778, Inda-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v.\n\nAdditional Collector of Customr. [1964]\n\n6 S.C.R. 594, Kailash Nath v. State of UP. A.1.R. 1951 S.C. 790, Thakur .Amar .Singhji v.\n\nState of Rajasthan, fl955l 2 S.C.R. 303. Mis. Mohanlal HarROVind v.\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh. [1955] 2 S.C.R. 509. Y. Mahahoob ShuiO v.\n\n\nS.C.R. 852, Universal Imports Agency v. Chit/ Controller of Imports\n\n\nv. State of Jt.fysore, 14 S.T.C. 188, Statt Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. State of Mysore. 14 S .. T.C. 416, Salomon v. Salomon & Co.\n\n[1897] A.C. 22, H.L.\n\n\nCRIMINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 112 and 113 of 1961 etc.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental rights.\n\nN. A. Palkhiva/a, J. B. Dadachan; i, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioners (in W.P. Nos. 112 and 113 of 61 and 79 to 80 of 1962).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. IC.\n\nGarg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondents (in W.P.\n\nNos. 112 and 113 of 1961).\n\n~·\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in W.P. Nos. 79 and 80 of 62).\n\nG. S. Pathak, B. Dutta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioners (in W.P. Nos. 202-204/1961).\n\nA. Ranganadham Chetty and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the respondents (in W.P. Nos. 202 and 203 of 1961).\n\nLal Narain Sinha, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondent (in W.P. 204 of 1961).\n\nFebruary 25, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, CJ .-These writ petitions have been placed for hearing before us in a group, because they raise a common question of Jaw in regard to the validity of the demand for sales tax which has been made against the respective petitioners by the Sales-tax Officers for different areas. The facts in respect of each one of the writ petitions are not the same and the years for which the demand is made are also different; but the pattern of contention is uniform and the arguments urged in each one of them are exactly the same. Broadly stated. the case for the petitioners is that the appropriate authorities purporting to act under the different Sales Tax Acts are attempting to recover from the petitioners sales-tax in respect of transactions to which the petitioners were parties, though the said transactions are not taxable under Art. 286 of the Constitution. Art. 286(1 )(a) provides that no law of a Sales shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State; and the argument is that the sales in question are all sales which took place outside the State and as such, are entitled to the protection of Art. 286(1 )(a). The authorities under the respective Sales Tax Acts have rejected the petitioners' contention that the transactions in question are inter-State sales and have held that Art. 286(1)(a) is not applicable to them.\n\nA similar finding has been recorded against the petitioners under Art. 286(2). The petitioners' grievallllO\n\nTata Eng1_,,,,\n\nStat• t Bl/uir\n\nGaf•ndragadlar\n\nc. J.\n\nTata Enginee1; ng\n\nSlilu ~1 Bihar\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nis that by cJming to this erroneous conclusion, a tax is being levied against them in respect of transactions protected by Art. 286(l)(a) and that constitutes a breach of their fundamental rights under Art. 31 ( 1 ) . It is this alleged infringement of their fundamental rights that they seek to bring before this Court under Art. 32 (I).\n\nIt has been urged on their behalf that the right to move this Court under Art. 32 ( 1) is itself a fundamental right, and so, under Art. 32(2) an appropriate order should be passed setting aside the directions issued by the Sales-tax Authorities calling upon the petitioners either to pay the sales-tax, or to comply with other directions issued by them in that behalf.\n\nFor dealing with the points raised by these writ petitions, 1t is not necessary to set out the facts in respect of each one of them.\n\nFor convenience we will refer lo the facts set out by 1the Tata En'gineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd., !he pe\\itloner in W1Ps. Nos. 112 and 113 of 1961. The petitioner is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act: 1913 and carries on the business of manufacturing, inter alia, Diesel Truck and Bus chassis and the spare part~ and accessories thereof at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar.\n\nThe company sells these products to dealers, State Transport\n\nOrganisations and others doing business in various Stat~ of India.\n\nThe registered office of the petitioner is in Bombay. In order to promote its trade throughout the country, the petitioner has entered into Dealership Agreements with different persons.\n\nThe modus adopted by the petitioner in carrying on its business in different parts of India is to sell its products to the dealers by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Dealership Agreements. Accordingly, the petitioner distributes and sells its vehicles to dealers, State Transport Organisations and consumers in the manner set out in the petition.\n\nThe petitioner contend! that the sales in respect of which the present petitions have been filed were effected in the course of inter-State trade and as such, were not liable to be taxed under the relevant provisions of the Sales Tax Act. The Sales-tax Officer, on the other hand, has held that the sales had taken place within the State of Bihar and were intra-State sales and as 1uch, were liable to assessment under the Bihar Sales Tax\n\nAct.\n\nIn accordance with this conclusion, further steps are 1961 threatened against the petitioner in the matter of recovery Tata Engineering of the sales-tax calculated by the appropriate authorities.\n\nStot• ;; Bilw The petitioner is a company and a majority of its shareholders are Indian citizens, two of whom have joined the Gaiendragadkor\n\nc. /. present petitions.\n\nThe petitioners in W.Ps. Nos. 79 and 80/1962 are the Auwmob1Je Products of India Ltd. and Another. The majority of the share-holders of this company are also citizens of lnd; a and one of them has joined the petitions.\n\nWrit petitions Nos. 202-204/1961 have been filed by the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.\n\nThe shareholders of this Corporation arc the President of India, and two Additional Secretaries, . Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India; one of these Secretaries, has joined the petitions.\n\nIt may incidentally be stated at this stage that these writ petitions were heard by a Special Bench of this Court on the 26th July, 1963 in order to determine the constitutional question as to whether the State Trading Corporat:on Ltd. can claim to be a citizen within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution. The majority decision rendered in these writ petitions on the preliminary issue referred to the Special Bench was that the rpetitioner as a State Trading Corporation is not a citizen under Art. 19, and so, could not claim the protection of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the said Article [vide State Trading Corporation of llldia Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer and Others( 1 ) ]. That is why this petitioner along with other petitioners have made the petitions in the names of the companies as well as one or two of their shareholders respectively. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that though the company or the Corporation may not be an Indian citizen under Art. 19, that should not prejudice the petitioners' case, because, in substance, the Corporation is no-more than an instrument or agent appointed by its Indian shareho:ders and as such, it should be open to the petitioners either acting themselves as companies or acting through\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1963 S.C 181 l.\n\n1951 their. shareholders to claim the relief for which the present Tata Engineering petitions have been filed under Art. 32.\n\nStai. of Bihnr\n\nGajtndragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nThese petitions are resisted by the respective States on the ground that the petitions are not competent under Art. 32.\n\nThe respondents contend that the main attack of the petitioners is against the findings of the Sales-tax Officers in regard to the character of the impugned sale transactions and they urge that even if the said findings are wrong, that cannot attract the provisions of Art. 32.\n\nThe validity of the respective Sales-tax Acts is not challenged and if pur porting to exercise their powers under the relevant provisions of the said Acts, the appropriate authorities have, during the course of the assessment proceedings, come to the conclusion that the impugned transactions are intra-State sales and do not fall under Art. 286(1) (a), that is a decision which is quasi-indicial in character and even an erroneous decision rendered in such assessment proceedings cannot be said to contravene the fundamental rights of a citizen which would justify recourse to Art. 32. In other words, the alleged breach of the petitioners' fundamental rights being referable to a quasi-judicial order made by a Tribunal appointed under a valid Sales-tax Act, does not bring the case within Art. 32.\n\nThat is the first preliminary ground on which the competence of the writ petitions is challenged.\n\nIn support of this plea, reliance is placed by the respondents on a recent decision of a Special Bench of this Court in Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh('>.\n\nThere is another preliminary objection raised by the respondents against the competence of the writ petitions, and that is based upon the decision' of this Court in the case of the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.( 2 ). It is urged that the decision of this Court that the State Trading Corporation is not a citizen, necessarily means that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 which can be claimed only by citizens cannot be claimed by such a Corporation, and so, there can be no scope for looking at the substance of the matter and giving to the shareholders\n\nindirectly the right which the Corporation as a sep'l!ate\n\n(I) [1963] 1 S.r..R. 778.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1963 S.C. 1811.\n\nlegal entity is not directly entitled to claim.\n\nThe respond-\n\n1~ (:nts have urged that in dealing with the plea of the peti- Tata Engineering tioners that the veil worn by the Corporation as a separate legal entity should be lifted and the substantial character of\n\nthe Corporation should be determined without reference to the technical position that the Corporation is a separae entity, we ought to bear in mind the decision of this Court in the case of the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.(').\n\nBasing themselves on this contention, the respondents have also argued that if the f11nda111ental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 are no: available to the tJet!tioners, then their plea that the sales-tax is being collected from them contrary to Art. 31 (I) must fail and in support of this contention reliance is placed upon a recent decision of this Court in the case of Inda-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. The Additional Collector of Customs and Others(').\n\nLogically, the second preliminary objection would come first, because if the petitioners cannot claim the status of citizens and are not, therefore, entitled to base their petitions en the allegation that their fundamental rights under Art. 19 have been contravened, that would be the end of the petitions. It has been conceded before us by all the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that it is only if both the preliminary objections raised by the respondents are over-ruled that the hearing of the writ petitions would reach the stage of considering the merits of their pleas that the sales which are sought to be taxed fall under Art. 28611 )(a) of the Constitution.\n\nIf the respondents succeed in either of the two preliminary objections raised by them, the writ petitions would fail and there would be no occasion to consider the merits of the pleas raised by them. Since we have come to the conclusion that the second preliminary objection raised by the respondents must be upheld, we do not propose to pronounce any decision on the first preliminary objection. However, as the point covered by the said objection has been elaborately argued before us, we would prefer to indicate briefly the broad arguments urged by both the parties in that behalf.\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1963 S.C. 1811.\n\n(2) [19641 6 s.c.R. 594.\n\nState of Bihar\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\n196f\n\nT41a Bngin~ring\n\nStatt of Bihar\n\nGajendrogadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nThe controversy between the parties as to the scope and effect of the provision> contained in Art. 32 on which the va, idity of the first preliminary objection rests, substantially centres round the question as to what is the e!Iect of the decision of this Court in Smt. Ujjam Bai's case(1).\n\nThe petitioners argue that though the majo ity view in that case was that the writ petition filed by Ujjam Bai was incompetent, it would appear that the reasons given in most of the judgments support the petitioners' case that where the fundament3l rights of a citizen are contravened, may be by a quasi-judicial order, in pursuance of wh'ch a tax is attempted to be recovered from a citizen, the erroneous conclusion in regard to the 11ature of the transaction must be held to contravene the fundamental right of the citizen, and as such, would justify the petitioners in moving thi'l Court under Art. 32.\n\nOn the other hand, the respondents urge that the effect of the decision in Ujjam Rai's cae plainly tends to show\n\nthat if a quasi-judicial dcision has determined a matter in regard to the taxability of a given transaction, there can be no question about the breach of fundamental rights which would .iustify an application under Art. 32.\n\nThe argument is that th~ intervention of a quasi-judicial order chanes the complexion of the dispute between the parties, and in cases of that character, the only remedy available to an a.ggrieved citizen is to take recourse to the appeals and other , proceedings prescribed by the taxing statute in question.\n\nArt. 32 is not intended to confer appellate jurisdiction on this Court so as to review or examine the propriety of quasi-iudicial orders passed by appropriate authorities purpoi:ting to exercise their powers and iuriscjictions under the several taxing statutes. It mav be that after exhausting the remedies by way of appeals and revisions prescribed by the statute, the party may come to this Court under Art. 136. but Art. 32 is inapplicable in such cases.\n\nIn Ujjam Bai's case('), the first issue which was referred to the Special Bench was whether an or<ler of\n\nassessment made by an authoritv under a taxing statute which is intra vires is open to challenge as repugnant to\n\n(II [1963] I S.C.R. 778.\n\nArt. 19(l)(g), on the sole ground that it was based on a m ; sconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification\n\niil.ued thereunder; and the second question was, can the validity of such an order be questioned in a petition under Att. 32 of the Constitution? The majority view expressed in this case was against the petitioner.\n\nS. K. Das J. who delivered the main judgment on behalf of the majority view observed that where a quasi-judicial authority makes an order in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in pur- 1u ance of a provision of law which is intra vi res, an error of law or fact committed by that authority cannot be impeached otherwise than on appeal, unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends; and so, he held that if the impugned order of assessment is made by an authority under a valid taxing statute in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction, it cannot be challenged under Art. 32 on the sole ground I.hat it is passed on a misconstruction of a provision of the\n\n.ct or of a notification issued thereunder.\n\nSubba Rao J., on the other hand, took the view that Art. 32 confers wide jurisdiction on this Court to enforce the fundamental rights, and he held that it is the duty of this Court to entertain a writ petition wherever a fundamental right of a citizen is alleged to have been contravened, Irrespective of whether the question raised involves a question of jurisdiction, law, or fact; this is the minority view pronounced in Ujjam Bai's case.\n\nHidayatullah J., who agreed broadly with the majority view, expressed the opinion that if a quasi-judicial tribunal embarks upon an action wholly outside the pale of the law he is enforcing, a question of jurisdiction would be involved and that would justify an application under Art. 32.\n\nAyyangar J. held that if it appeared that the impugned order of assessment was based upon a plain and patent misconstruction of the provisions of the taxing statute, that itself would give rise to a plea that the auth0rity was acting beyond its jurisdiction and in such a case, a petition under Art. 32 may be justified.\n\nProceeding on this view, the learned Jud<re held that the construction placed by the taxing authority was not shown to be patently erroneous.\n\nT al• Bng1n,~1in1 ..\n\nSt\"'4 of Bilw\n\nGajendroradkar\n\nC. I.\n\nTata Engi11eering\n\nState of Bil1ar\n\nan~ so, he. was not prepared to grant any relief to Ujjam Bai: . That 1s how the learned Judge agreed with the majority dec1s10n.\n\nGaiendragadkar Mudholkar J., who also agreed with the majority\n\nc. J. decision, was disposed to make an exception in cases where an erroneous construction of the Jaw would lead to the recovery of a tax which is beyond the competence of the legislature, or is violative of the provisions of Part III or of any other provisions of the Constitution.\n\nIt would, thus, be seen that though the majority decision was that Ujjam Bai's petition should be dismissed, tbe reasons given in the judgments pronounced by the learned Judges who agreed with the majority decision are not all uniform and do not disclose an identity of approach or of reasons, and that naturally has given rise to. the arguments in the present writ petitions, both parties suggesting that the majority decision in the case of Ujjam Bai supports the rival views for which they contend.\n\nMr. Setalvad has strongly urged that if a misconstruction of the notification on which Ujjam Bai rested her case. was not held to justify a petition under Art. 32, that would necessarily mean that the misconstruction of the nature of the transaction would be no heller, even though in this latter case, the wrong dec:sion on the question as to the character of the sale transaction may involve taxing a transaction which is protected by Art. 286(1 )(a). One can understand the argument, said Mr. Setalvad, that a breach of the fundamental rights, however it is caused would justify recourse to Art. 32; that would be consistent and logical; but once it is held that a breach of the fundamental rihts\n\nalleged to have been caused by a misconstruction of a notification or a statute placed by an anpropriate authority acting under the provisions of a valid taxing law does not attract Art. 32, it is not logically possible to urge that another kind of breach alleged to have been caused by a\n\nmisappreciation of the nature of the transaction and an erroneous conclusion as to its taxable character would make any difference. In the first case, the erroneous construction of the, notification violates the provisions of Art. 265 of the Constitution and therebv brings in the breach of Art.\n\n31 ( 1 ) ; in the other case, the misconstruction as to the taxable character of the transaction violates Art. 28 6 ( l ) (a) and thereby brings in Art. 31 ( l). Therefore, it is urged that ; he necessary consequence of the decision in Ujjam Bai is that even if the Sales-tax Officer has held wrongly that the impugned transactions are not inter-State transactions, the remedy of petition under Art. 32 is not open to the agi; rieved citizen.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Palkhivala has strenuously urged that the decision in Ujjam Bai rested on the basis that the misinterpretation of the notification did not involve the violation of any constitutional limitations or prohibitions and he has referred us to some passages in the judgments of Das, Kapur and Mudholkar JJ.\n\nIn support of his argument that where an erroneous decision of a salestax officer results in the violation of a constitutional prohibition or limitation, different considerations would arise and 11n aggrie¥ed citizen would be entitled to move this Court under Art. 32, Mr. Palkhivala has emphasised the fact that whereas Das J. expressly held that the view taken in Kai/ash Nath v. State of U.P. (1) was not right, he approved of the other decisions which were cited at the Bar and exhaustively discussed on the ground that those decisions \"fall under the category in which an executive authority acts without authority of law, or a quasi-judicial authority acts in transgression of a constitutional prohibition and \"''ithout jurisdiction\"('). These decisions are: Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan(3); M/s. Mohan/al Hargnvind Dass v. The State of Madhya Pradesh('); Y. Mahaboob Sheriff v. Mysore State Transport Authority('); J. V. Gokar & Cn. (Private) Ltd. v. The Assistant Collector of Sales-tax (Inspection)('); and Universal Imports Agency v. Chief 1<:ontrol/er of Imports and Exports('). To the same effect is the observation made by Kapur J. when the learned Judge fttated that in the case of M Is. Mohan/al Hargovind Dass(')\n\n~.he dispute did not turn upon a misconstruction of any\n\ntatute by any quasi-judicial authority, but that was a case ----------\n\n(1) A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 790.\n\n\n(4; [19551 2 S.C.R. 509.\n\n\n(7) [1961] I S.C.R. 305.\n\nTata Eng1neerl•t\n\nState of Bihar\n\nGajendragadkfll'\n\nc. J.\n\nJIM\n\n7ata Enginering •.\n\nStlll• of Bilw\n\nin which the very transaction was outside the taxing powers of the State and any action taken by the taxing authorities was one without authority of law .\n\nGai•ndragadkar In support of the same argument, both Mr. Pathak and\n\nc. J.\n\nMr. Palkhivaia strongly relied upon the two subsequent\n\ndecisions of this Court where writ petitions filed under Art. 32 were entertained on grounds 1omrwh8t <imibr to those on which the present writ petitions are founded, The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. and Another\n\nv. The State of Mysore and Another(') and The Srare Trading Corporation of India Ltd. and Others v. The State of Mysore and Another(').\n\nBasing himself on these decisions, Mr. Pathak has argued that the question as to whether a particular transaction of sale attracts the protection of Art. 286(1) (a) is a collateral fact the decision of which confers jurisdiction on the Sa!es-tax Officer; and he contends that the decision of the Sales-tax Officer, who is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, on a collateral jurisdictional point can always be challe\"nged under Art. 32 of the Constitution if the said decision impinges upon the citizen's right protected by Art. 286(1) (a).\n\nMr. Palkhivala urged the argument of jurisdiction in a slightly different way.\n\nHe contended that the concept of jurisdiction on which he relied was not based on the view that jurisdiction means authority to decide.\n\nAccording to him, the concept of jurisdiction was of a different category and was of a vital character when constitutional limitations or prohibitions were involved in the decision of any case brought before a Sales-tax Officer.\n\nOn the other hand, Mr. Setalvad has urged that the Sales-tax Officer is not a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction and the charging sections in the respective Sales-tax Acts leave it to the Sales-tax Officer and the heirarchy of officers contemplated by them to decide the question about the tirxability of any given transaction and impose a tax on it in accordance with the provisions of the Acts.\n\nWhere a tribunal is entitled to deal with transactions which fall\n\n(1) 14 S.T.C. 188.\n\n(2) 14 S.T.C. 416.\n\nunder the charging sections of the statute, it would be erroneous to contend that the decision of the Tribunal on the said question about the taxability of the transaction is the decision on a collateral jurisdictional fact. If the said argument is accepted, logically, it may mean that all questions the decision of which inevitably precedes the imposition of the tax, would be collateral jurisdictional fact; and that clearly cannot be the effect of the charging sections of the different Acts.\n\nIn regard to the point of constitutional limitations and prohibitions raised by Mr. Palkhivala, Mr. Setalvad contends that if the provisions of Art. 286(1)(a) makes the decision of the Sales-tax Officer on the character of the sale transaction one of jurisdiction, then it is difficult to see why his decision on other points should also not partake of the same character. In that connection, he emphasised the fact that the provisions of Art. 286(l)(a) cannot be distinguished from the provisions of Art. 265.\n\nAs we have already indicated, having regard to the fact that we have come to the conclusion that the other preliminary objection urged by the respondents must be upheld, we do not propose to express any opinion on this part of the controversy between the parties.\n\nThat takes us to the question as to whether the petitioners, some of whom are companies registered under the Indian Companies Act and one of whom is the State Trading Corporation, can claim to file the present writ petitions under Art. 3 2 having regard to the decision of this Court In the case of the State Tradlng Corporatlon of India Ltd. (1).\n\nThe petitioners argue that the said decision merely held that the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. was not a citizen. The quetion as to whether the veil of the Corporation can be lifted and the rights of the shareholders of the said Corporation could be recognised under Art. 19 or not, was not decided. and it is on this aspect of the question that arguments have been urged before us in the present writ petitions.\n\nThe true legal position in regard to the character of a corporation or a company which owes its incorporation to\n\n(1) A.l.R. 1%3 S.C. 1g11.\n\n134-159 S.C.-57\n\nTata Engineerillr\n\nSlall of BU.\n\nGajendra,,,, a,, r\n\nC.J.\n\n. 1961 a statutory authority, is not in doubt or dispute. The T• B; ii\"nurlng corporation in law is equal to a natural person and has a\n\n\"*' f Blhar legal entity of its own.\n\nThe entity of the corporation is\n\n• 0\n\nntirely separate from that of its shareholders; it bears its <h/lndragadkar own name and has a seal of its own; its assets are separate\n\nc. I. and distinct from those of its members; it can sue and be sued exclusively for its own purpose; its creditors cannot obtain satisfaction from the assets of its members; the liability of the members or shareholders is limited to the capital invested by them; similarly, the creditors of the members have no right to the assets of the corporation.\n\nThis position has been well-established ever since the decision in the case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. (1 ) was pronounced in 1897; and indeed, it has always been the wellrecognied principle of common law. However, in the course of time, the doctrine .that the corporation or a company has a legal and separate entity of its own has been subjected to certain txceptions by the application of the fiction that the veil of the corporation can be lifted and its face examined in substance. The doctrine of the lifting of the veil thus marks a change in the attitude that law had originally adopted towards the concept of the separate entity or personality of the corporation. As a result of the impact of the complexity of economic factors, juidical deci sions have sometimes recognised exceptions to the rule about the juristic personality of the corporation.\n\nIt may - be that in course of time these exceptions may grow in number and to meet the requirements of different economic problems, the theory about the personality of the corporation may be confined more and more.\n\nBut the question which we have to consider is whether in the circumstances of the present petitions, we would be justified in acceding to the argument that the veil of the petitioning corporations should be lifted and it should be held that their shareholders who are Indian citizens should be permitted to invoke the protection of Art. 19, and on that basis, move this Court under Art. 32 to challenge tbe validity of the orders passed by the Sales-tax Officers in respect of transactions which, it is alleged, are not taxable. ,\n\n(I) [1897] A. C. 22. H.T.\n\nMr. Palkhivala has very strongly urged before us that having regard to the fact that the controversy between the parties relates to the fundamental rights of citizens, we should not hesitate to look at the substance of the matter and disregard the doctrinaire approach which recognises the existence of companies as separate juristic or legal persons. If all the shareholders of the petitioning companies are Indian citizens, why should not the Court look at the substance of the matter and give the shareholders the right to challenge that the contravention of their fundamental rights should be prevented.\n\nHe does not dispute that the shareholders cannot claim that the property of the companies is their own and cannot plead that the business of the companies is their business in the strict legal sense. The doctrine of lifting of the veil postulates the existence of dualism between the corporation or company on the one hand and its members or shareholders on the other.\n\nSo, it is no good emphasising that technical aspect of the matter in dealing with the question as to whether the veil should be lifted or not. In support of his plea, he has invited our attention to the decision of the . Privy Council in The English and Scottish Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Assam (1), as\n\nwell as the decision of the House of Lords in Daimler Company Lrd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Company\n\n(Great Britain) Ltd.(').\n\nIt is unnecessary to refer to the facts in these two case& and the principles enunciated by them, because it is not disputed by the respondents that some exceptions have been recognised to the rule that a C011pofation or a company has a juristic or legal separate entity. The doctrine of the lifting of the veil has bee.n applied in the words of Palmer in five categories of cases : where companies are in the relationship of holding and subsidiary (or sub-subsidiary) companies; where a shareholder has lost the privilege of limited liability and has become directly liable to certain creditors of the company on the ground that, with his\n\nknowledge, the company continued to carry on business six months after the number of its members was reduced\n\n(I) [1948] l.T.R. 270.\n\n(2) [1916] A.C. 307.\n\nJ!IM\n\nTata Eniinurina ...\n\nStai. of Bllw\n\nGajtndragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\n1961 below the legal minimum; in certain matters pertaining to :rw ..-;;;;.., Ing the law of taxes, death duties and stamps, particularly where\n\n,_ :; B,.. the question of the \"controlling interest\" is in issue; in the \\. ' ' law relating to exchange control; and in the law relating \"\"1-iragadkar to trading with the enemy where the test of control is\n\nc. J. adopted ( 1). In some of these cases, judicial decisions have no doubt lifted the veil and considered the substance of the matter.\n\nGower has similarly summarised this position with the observation that in a number of important respects, the legislature has rent the veil woven by the Salomon case.\n\nParticularly is this so, says Gower, in the sphere of tJxati 'n and in the steps which have been taken towards the recognition of enterprise-entity rather than corporate-entity.\n\nIt is, significant, however, that according to Gower, the courts have only construed statutes as \"cracking open the corporate shell\" when compelled to do so by the clear words of the statute; indeed they have gone out of their way to avoid this construction whenever possible. Thus, at rpresent, the judicial approach in cracking open the corporate shell is somewhat cautious and circumspect.\n\nIt is only where the legislative provision justifies the adoption of such a course that the veil has been lifted.\n\nIn exceptional cases where courts have felt \"themselves able to ignore the corporate entity and to treat the individual shareholders as liable for its acts\",( 2 ) the same course has been adopted.\n\nSummarising his conclusions, Gower has classified seven categories of cases where the veil of a corporate body has been lifted. But it would not be possible to evolve a rational, consistent and inflexible principle which can be invoked in determining the question as to whether the veil of the corporation should be lifted or not. Broadly stated. where fraud is intended to be prevented, or trading with an enemy is sought to be defeated. the veil of a corporation is lift 0 d by judicial decisions and the shareholders are held to be the persons who actually work for the corporation.\n\nThat being the position with regard to the doctrine of the veil of a corporation and the principle that the said\n\n(1) Palmer's Company Law 20th Ed. p. 136.\n\n(2) Gower, Modtrn Company Law, 2nd Ed. pp. 193 & 195.\n\n, '\n\n.. '\n\n' •\n\nveil can be lifted in some cases, the question which arise& for our decision is; can we lift the veil of the petitioners and say that it is the sareholders who are really moving the Court under Art. 32, and so, the existence of the legal and juristic separate entity of the petitioners as a corporation or as a company should not make the petitions filed by them under Art. 32 incompetent? We do not think we can answer this question in the affirmative.\n\nNo doubt, the complaint made by the petitioners is that their fundamental rights are\n\ninfringed and it is a truism to say that this Court as the guardian of the fundamental rights of the citizens will always attCIIl!l>t to safeguard the said fundamental rights; but having regard to the decision of this Court in State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.(') we do not see how we can legitimately entertain the petitioners' plea in the present petitions, because if their plea was upheld, it would really mean that what the corporations or the companies cannot achieve directly, can be achieved by them indirectly by relying upon the doctrine of lifting the veil. If the corporations and companies are not citizens, it means that the Constitution intended that they should not get the benefit of Art. 19. It is no doubt suggested by the petitioners that though Art. 19 is confined to citizens, the Constitution-makers may have thought that in dealing with the claims of corporations to invoke the provisions of Art. 19, courts would act upon the doctrine of lifting the veil and would not treat the attempts of the corporations in that behalf as falling outside Art. 19.\n\nWe do not think this argument is well-founded. The effect of confining Art. 19 to citizens as distinguished from persons to whom other Articles like 14 apply, clearly must be that it is only citizens to whom the rights under Art. 19 are guaranteed. If the legislature intends that the benefit of Art. 19 should be made available to the corporations, it would not be difficult for it to adopt a proper me\"asure in that behalf by enlarging the definition of 'citizen' prescribed by the Citizenship Act passed by the Parliament by virtue of the powers conferred on it by Articles 10 and 11. On the other hand, the_fact\n\nthat the Parliament has not chosen to make any such provision indicates that it was not the intention of the (') A.l.R. 1963 S.C. 1811.\n\nJP6'\n\nTale ..........\n\ny, St.i. al ....\n\nGaj1n\"\"'-4Ur\n\nc. 1. ..\n\n~ Parliament to treat corporations as citizens.\n\nTherefore, it Tm BrlfiMlrinl seems to us that in view of the decision of this Court m a- :; Bilrar the case of the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (1) - the petitioners cannot be heard to say that their shareholders\n\nGtil~\"'f,'1kar should be allowed to file the present petitions on the ground\n\n that, in substance, the corporations and companies are nothing more than associations of shareholders and members thereof. In our opinion, therefore, the argument that in the present petitions we would be justified in lifting the veil cannot be sustained.\n\nMr. Palkhivala sought to draw a distinction between the right of a citizen to carry on trade or business which is contemplated by Art. 19(l)(g) from his right to form associations or unions contemplated by Art. 19 (1 )( c). He argued that Art. 19 (1 )( c) enables the citizens to choose their instruments Qr agents for carrying on the business which it is their fundamental right to carry on. If citizens decide to set up a corporation or a company as their agent for the ipurpose of carrying on trade or business, that is a right which is guaranteed to them under Art. 19 ( 1 ) ( c) .\n\nBasing himself on this distinction between the two rights guaranteed by Art. 19 ( 1 ) ( g) and ( c) respectively, Mr. Palkhivala somewhat ingeniously contended that we should not hesitate to lift the veil, because by looking at the substance of the matter, we would really be giving effect to the two fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 ( 1).\n\nWe. are not impressed by this argument either. The fundamental right to form an association cannot in this manner be coupled with the fundamental right to carry on any trade or business. As has been held by this Court in All India Bank EmplO}ees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal and Others( 2 ), the argument which is thus attractively presented before us overlooks the fact that Art. 19, as contrasted with certain other articles like Arts. 26, 29 and 30, guarantees rights to the citizens as such, and associations cannot lay claim to the fundamental rights guaranteed by that Article solely on the basis of their being an aggregation of citizens, that is to say, the right of the citizens composing the body. Th\\l respective rights guaranteed by Art. 19 (1)\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1811. <•> £19621 3 s.c.R. 269.\n\ncannot be combined as suggested by Mr. Palkhivala, but must be asserted each in its own way and within its own limits; the sweep of the several rights is no doubt wide, but the combination of any of those two rights would not justify a claim such as is made by Mr. Palkhivala in the present petitions.\n\nAs soon as citizens form a company, the right guaranteed to them by Art. 19 ( 1 )( c) has been exercised and no restraint has been placed on that right and no infringement of that right is made.\n\nOnce a company or a corporation is formed, the business which is carried on by the said company or corporation is the business of the company or corporation and is not the business of the citizens who get the company or corporation formed or incorporated, and the rights of the incorporated body must be judged on that footing and cannot be judged on the assumption that they are the rights attributable to the business of individual citizens.\n\nTherefore, we are satisfied that the argument based on the distinction between the two rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (c) and (g) and the effect of their combination cannot take the petitioners' case very far when they seek to invoke the doctrine that the veil of the corporation should be lifted. That is why we have come to the conclusion that the petitions filed by the petitioners are incompetent under Art. 32, even though in each of these petitions one or two of the shareholders of the petitioning companies or corporation have joined.\n\nThe result is, the second preliminary objection raised by the respondents is upheld and the writ petitions are dismissed as being incompetent under Art. 32 of the Constitution. There would be no order as to costs.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN v.\n\nMUKANCHAND AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAIAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SJKRI JJ.)\n\n/agirdar's Debt Reduction Act (Rajasthan Act 9 of 1931)-Mortgagtl\n\ndecree against tllagirdar-Whether <Jecutable-u. 2(e) and 7(2)\n\nValidity of--Conttitutlon of India, Art. t•.\n\nTat.~\n\nStat• D/ B!Mr\n\nGa/endrogadkar\n\nc. 1.\n\nFebruary 26", "total_entities": 170, "entities": [{"text": "885\n\nTATA ENGINEERING AND LOCOMOTIVE CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TATA ENGINEERING AND LOCOMOTIVE CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 167, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 276, "end_char": 283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 505, "end_char": 526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 528, "end_char": 536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 667, "end_char": 672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on account of certain transactions made by them in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 800, "end_char": 814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 890, "end_char": 905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1035, "end_char": 1042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1234, "end_char": 1241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1357, "end_char": 1364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1501, "end_char": 1511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2725, "end_char": 2731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1964]\n\n6 S.C.R. 594", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3904, "end_char": 3924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 509", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4097, "end_char": 4116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4460, "end_char": 4467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4475, "end_char": 4496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhiva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4537, "end_char": 4551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhiva/a, J. B. Dadachan; i, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4558, "end_char": 4569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhiva/a, J. B. Dadachan; i, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4577, "end_char": 4586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioners (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4591, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioners (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4684, "end_char": 4698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. IC."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4700, "end_char": 4711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. IC."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. IC.", "canonical_name": "M. K. Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4748, "end_char": 4761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondents (in W.P.\n\nNos.", "canonical_name": "S. C. Agarwal"}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4825, "end_char": 4836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~·\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4868, "end_char": 4880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~·\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4885, "end_char": 4897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~·\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4952, "end_char": 4964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "0. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4994, "end_char": 5006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, B. Dutta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "A. Ranganadham Chetty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5078, "end_char": 5099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the respondents (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "T. V. R. Tatachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5104, "end_char": 5122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the respondents (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5181, "end_char": 5197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondent (in W.P. 204 of 1961)."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5199, "end_char": 5215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondent (in W.P. 204 of 1961).", "canonical_name": "M. K. Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondent (in W.P. 204 of 1961)."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5232, "end_char": 5245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondent (in W.P. 204 of 1961).", "canonical_name": "S. C. Agarwal"}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5354, "end_char": 5368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, CJ .-These writ petitions have been placed for hearing before us in a group, because they raise a common question of Jaw in regard to the validity of the demand for sales tax which has been made against the respective petitioners by the Sales-tax Officers for different areas."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6197, "end_char": 6205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6227, "end_char": 6242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6562, "end_char": 6577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6748, "end_char": 6762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6857, "end_char": 6868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7136, "end_char": 7150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7215, "end_char": 7222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7339, "end_char": 7346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7485, "end_char": 7495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tata En'gineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7917, "end_char": 7956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For convenience we will refer lo the facts set out by 1the Tata En'gineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd., !"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8064, "end_char": 8077, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jamshedpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8218, "end_char": 8228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act: 1913 and carries on the business of manufacturing, inter alia, Diesel Truck and Bus chassis and the spare part~ and accessories thereof at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8375, "end_char": 8380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company sells these products to dealers, State Transport\n\nOrganisations and others doing business in various Stat~ of India."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8429, "end_char": 8435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The registered office of the petitioner is in Bombay."}}, {"text": "Tata Engineering", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9492, "end_char": 9508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with this conclusion, further steps are 1961 threatened against the petitioner in the matter of recovery Tata Engineering of the sales-tax calculated by the appropriate authorities."}}, {"text": "Auwmob1Je Products of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9791, "end_char": 9823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "79 and 80/1962 are the Auwmob1Je Products of India Ltd. and Another."}}, {"text": "State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10014, "end_char": 10053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "202-204/1961 have been filed by the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.\n\nThe shareholders of this Corporation arc the President of India, and two Additional Secretaries, ."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10154, "end_char": 10208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India; one of these Secretaries, has joined the petitions."}}, {"text": "26th July, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10384, "end_char": 10399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may incidentally be stated at this stage that these writ petitions were heard by a Special Bench of this Court on the 26th July, 1963 in order to determine the constitutional question as to whether the State Trading Corporat:on Ltd. can claim to be a citizen within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "State Trading Corporat:on Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10468, "end_char": 10498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may incidentally be stated at this stage that these writ petitions were heard by a Special Bench of this Court on the 26th July, 1963 in order to determine the constitutional question as to whether the State Trading Corporat:on Ltd. can claim to be a citizen within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10547, "end_char": 10554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10765, "end_char": 10772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11255, "end_char": 11262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11679, "end_char": 11686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11839, "end_char": 11846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12118, "end_char": 12125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12465, "end_char": 12476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12706, "end_char": 12713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tribunal appointed under a valid Sales-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12841, "end_char": 12887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12920, "end_char": 12927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tribunal appointed under a valid Sales-tax Act", "statute": "Tribunal appointed under a valid Sales-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13579, "end_char": 13586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tribunal appointed under a valid Sales-tax Act", "statute": "Tribunal appointed under a valid Sales-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Trading Corporation of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14352, "end_char": 14385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respond-\n\n1~ (:nts have urged that in dealing with the plea of the peti- Tata Engineering tioners that the veil worn by the Corporation as a separate legal entity should be lifted and the substantial character of\n\nthe Corporation should be determined without reference to the technical position that the Corporation is a separae entity, we ought to bear in mind the decision of this Court in the case of the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd.(')."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14510, "end_char": 14517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14633, "end_char": 14640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15088, "end_char": 15095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 28611", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15496, "end_char": 15506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16175, "end_char": 16189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Bihar\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\n196f\n\nT41a Bngin~ring\n\nStatt of Bihar\n\nGajendrogadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nThe controversy between the parties as to the scope and effect of the provision> contained in Art.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16370, "end_char": 16377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ujjam Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16547, "end_char": 16556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ujjam Bai's case(1).", "canonical_name": "Ujjam Bai"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17167, "end_char": 17174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ujjam Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17252, "end_char": 17261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the respondents urge that the effect of the decision in Ujjam Rai's cae plainly tends to show\n\nthat if a quasi-judicial dcision has determined a matter in regard to the taxability of a given transaction, there can be no question about the breach of fundamental rights which would .iustify an application under Art.", "canonical_name": "Ujjam Bai"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17506, "end_char": 17513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17827, "end_char": 17834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18232, "end_char": 18240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18246, "end_char": 18253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18532, "end_char": 18545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18871, "end_char": 18880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Das J. who delivered the main judgment on behalf of the majority view observed that where a quasi-judicial authority makes an order in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in pur- 1u ance of a provision of law which is intra vi res, an error of law or fact committed by that authority cannot be impeached otherwise than on appeal, unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends; and so, he held that if the impugned order of assessment is made by an authority under a valid taxing statute in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction, it cannot be challenged under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19504, "end_char": 19511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19639, "end_char": 19648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao J., on the other hand, took the view that Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19691, "end_char": 19698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20082, "end_char": 20094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah J., who agreed broadly with the majority view, expressed the opinion that if a quasi-judicial tribunal embarks upon an action wholly outside the pale of the law he is enforcing, a question of jurisdiction would be involved and that would justify an application under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20362, "end_char": 20369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20372, "end_char": 20380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyangar J. held that if it appeared that the impugned order of assessment was based upon a plain and patent misconstruction of the provisions of the taxing statute, that itself would give rise to a plea that the auth0rity was acting beyond its jurisdiction and in such a case, a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20667, "end_char": 20674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bil1ar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20916, "end_char": 20931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T al• Bng1n,~1in1 ..\n\nSt\"'4 of Bilw\n\nGajendroradkar\n\nC. I.\n\nTata Engi11eering\n\nState of Bil1ar\n\nan~ so, he.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Gaiendragadkar Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21064, "end_char": 21088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gaiendragadkar Mudholkar J., who also agreed with the majority\n\nc. J. decision, was disposed to make an exception in cases where an erroneous construction of the Jaw would lead to the recovery of a tax which is beyond the competence of the legislature, or is violative of the provisions of Part III or of any other provisions of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21919, "end_char": 21927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setalvad has strongly urged that if a misconstruction of the notification on which Ujjam Bai rested her case."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22070, "end_char": 22077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22352, "end_char": 22367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22509, "end_char": 22516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22798, "end_char": 22805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23132, "end_char": 23140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23197, "end_char": 23205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23309, "end_char": 23316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23351, "end_char": 23358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23598, "end_char": 23605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Palkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23670, "end_char": 23680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. Palkhivala has strenuously urged that the decision in Ujjam Bai rested on the basis that the misinterpretation of the notification did not involve the violation of any constitutional limitations or prohibitions and he has referred us to some passages in the judgments of Das, Kapur and Mudholkar JJ.", "canonical_name": "Palkhivala"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23941, "end_char": 23944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. Palkhivala has strenuously urged that the decision in Ujjam Bai rested on the basis that the misinterpretation of the notification did not involve the violation of any constitutional limitations or prohibitions and he has referred us to some passages in the judgments of Das, Kapur and Mudholkar JJ."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23946, "end_char": 23951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. Palkhivala has strenuously urged that the decision in Ujjam Bai rested on the basis that the misinterpretation of the notification did not involve the violation of any constitutional limitations or prohibitions and he has referred us to some passages in the judgments of Das, Kapur and Mudholkar JJ."}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23956, "end_char": 23965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Mr. Palkhivala has strenuously urged that the decision in Ujjam Bai rested on the basis that the misinterpretation of the notification did not involve the violation of any constitutional limitations or prohibitions and he has referred us to some passages in the judgments of Das, Kapur and Mudholkar JJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24231, "end_char": 24238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tata Eng1neerl•t\n\nState", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25424, "end_char": 25447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Eng1neerl•t\n\nState of Bihar\n\nGajendragadkfll'\n\nc. J.\n\nJIM\n\n7ata Enginering •.\n\nStlll• of Bilw\n\nin which the very transaction was outside the taxing powers of the State and any action taken by the taxing authorities was one without authority of law ."}}, {"text": "7ata Enginering", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25488, "end_char": 25503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Eng1neerl•t\n\nState of Bihar\n\nGajendragadkfll'\n\nc. J.\n\nJIM\n\n7ata Enginering •.\n\nStlll• of Bilw\n\nin which the very transaction was outside the taxing powers of the State and any action taken by the taxing authorities was one without authority of law ."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25737, "end_char": 25743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gai•ndragadkar In support of the same argument, both Mr. Pathak and\n\nc. J.\n\nMr. Palkhivaia strongly relied upon the two subsequent\n\ndecisions of this Court where writ petitions filed under Art.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "Palkhivaia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25760, "end_char": 25770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gai•ndragadkar In support of the same argument, both Mr. Pathak and\n\nc. J.\n\nMr. Palkhivaia strongly relied upon the two subsequent\n\ndecisions of this Court where writ petitions filed under Art.", "canonical_name": "Palkhivala"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25869, "end_char": 25876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26212, "end_char": 26218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basing himself on these decisions, Mr. Pathak has argued that the question as to whether a particular transaction of sale attracts the protection of Art.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26322, "end_char": 26333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26600, "end_char": 26607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26696, "end_char": 26707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28306, "end_char": 28320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28601, "end_char": 28615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28663, "end_char": 28671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29055, "end_char": 29068, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29170, "end_char": 29176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State Tradlng Corporatlon of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29242, "end_char": 29281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 2 having regard to the decision of this Court In the case of the State Tradlng Corporatlon of India Ltd. (1)."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29566, "end_char": 29573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tata Engineerillr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29871, "end_char": 29888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134-159 S.C.-57\n\nTata Engineerillr\n\nSlall of BU."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32042, "end_char": 32049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32092, "end_char": 32099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Palmer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34092, "end_char": 34098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The doctrine of the lifting of the veil has bee.n applied in the words of Palmer in five categories of cases : where companies are in the relationship of holding and subsidiary (or sub-subsidiary) companies; where a shareholder has lost the privilege of limited liability and has become directly liable to certain creditors of the company on the ground that, with his\n\nknowledge, the company continued to carry on business six months after the number of its members was reduced\n\n(I) [1948] l.T.R. 270."}}, {"text": "Tata Eniinurina", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34549, "end_char": 34564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J!IM\n\nTata Eniinurina ...\n\nStai."}}, {"text": "Gower", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35100, "end_char": 35105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gower has similarly summarised this position with the observation that in a number of important respects, the legislature has rent the veil woven by the Salomon case."}}, {"text": "Gower", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36902, "end_char": 36907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Gower, Modtrn Company Law, 2nd Ed."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37163, "end_char": 37170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37338, "end_char": 37345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38217, "end_char": 38224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38282, "end_char": 38289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38432, "end_char": 38439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38583, "end_char": 38590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38664, "end_char": 38671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38818, "end_char": 38825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38889, "end_char": 38896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Citizenship Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39077, "end_char": 39092, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39107, "end_char": 39117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 should be made available to the corporations, it would not be difficult for it to adopt a proper me\"asure in that behalf by enlarging the definition of 'citizen' prescribed by the Citizenship Act passed by the Parliament by virtue of the powers conferred on it by Articles 10 and 11."}}, {"text": "Articles 10 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39161, "end_char": 39179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39414, "end_char": 39424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ Parliament to treat corporations as citizens."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40152, "end_char": 40165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40228, "end_char": 40235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40261, "end_char": 40268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40587, "end_char": 40594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40681, "end_char": 40688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40943, "end_char": 40950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41350, "end_char": 41357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 26, 29 and 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41406, "end_char": 41425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41719, "end_char": 41726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42156, "end_char": 42163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42837, "end_char": 42847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43137, "end_char": 43144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43422, "end_char": 43429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43603, "end_char": 43610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN v.\n\nMUKANCHAND AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAIAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SJKRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAIAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43613, "end_char": 43635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN v.\n\nMUKANCHAND AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAIAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SJKRI JJ.)", "canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "S. M. SJKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43640, "end_char": 43651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN v.\n\nMUKANCHAND AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAIAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SJKRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Debt Reduction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43669, "end_char": 43687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_903_912_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\ncannot be combined as suggested by Mr. Palkhivala, but must be asserted each in its own way and within its own limits; the sweep of the several rights is no doubt wide, but the combination of any of those two rights would not justify a claim such as is made by Mr. Palkhivala in the present petitions.\n\nAs soon as citizens form a company, the right guaranteed to them by Art. 19 ( 1 )( c) has been exercised and no restraint has been placed on that right and no infringement of that right is made.\n\nOnce a company or a corporation is formed, the business which is carried on by the said company or corporation is the business of the company or corporation and is not the business of the citizens who get the company or corporation formed or incorporated, and the rights of the incorporated body must be judged on that footing and cannot be judged on the assumption that they are the rights attributable to the business of individual citizens.\n\nTherefore, we are satisfied that the argument based on the distinction between the two rights guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (c) and (g) and the effect of their combination cannot take the petitioners' case very far when they seek to invoke the doctrine that the veil of the corporation should be lifted. That is why we have come to the conclusion that the petitions filed by the petitioners are incompetent under Art. 32, even though in each of these petitions one or two of the shareholders of the petitioning companies or corporation have joined.\n\nThe result is, the second preliminary objection raised by the respondents is upheld and the writ petitions are dismissed as being incompetent under Art. 32 of the Constitution. There would be no order as to costs.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN v.\n\nMUKANCHAND AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAIAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SJKRI JJ.)\n\n/agirdar's Debt Reduction Act (Rajasthan Act 9 of 1931)-Mortgagtl\n\ndecree against tllagirdar-Whether <Jecutable-u. 2(e) and 7(2)\n\nValidity of--Conttitutlon of India, Art. t•.\n\nTat.~\n\nStat• D/ B!Mr\n\nGa/endrogadkar\n\nc. 1.\n\nFebruary 26\n\nJHI R .. polldcnt No. I obtained a mortiioge dccrcc for Rs. 1,14.581/14/6 ,...., 6f Rttlast/um asaint one Rao Raja ID<ler Singh (the jndi!Dent debtor). The mo~\n\nv. money was advanced under three mortgages, and the mortgaaed properties llabndi.,1d coruistcd of Jagjrs an<! some non-Jagir immovable property. The latter property ,..... sold in exe<:ution and Rs. 33,75-0/- paid to the dee,.. holder i1l pertial satisr.ction of the decree.\n\nThen the decree bolder filed an execution petition in the Court of the District Judge for the balance amount i.e. Rs. 99,965/3/6, prayiog for attachment of the amount of compensation and rehabilitation grant which would be paid to the jutlgmcnt debtor on account of resumption of his Jagir. The jadJ!llllmcnt debtor 1ubmittcd two applicationa in which be claimed relief\n\nunder '\"· 5 and 7 of the Rajasthan Jagjrdan' Debt Reduction Act. The decree holder, in bis reply. to thOBC petitions urged that the provisions relied in were ultra vires the Constitution of India, being in contravention of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Thereafter the decree holder movecf a petition undeT Art. 228 of the Constitution before the Hi1rh Court, praying that the execution cue pending in the Court of the District Judge, be withdrawn from that court to the High Court. The Hisb\n\nCourt transferred the case to its file.\n\nBy its judgment the High Court could held that apart from the later part of s. 2(e) excluding certain debts and s. 7(2) of the Act, the rest of the Act was valid. The High Cottrt granted a certificate under Art. 13 3 (I )( c) of the Constitution to\n\nthe Slate of Rajasthan to file an appeal to this Court. Hence the appeal:-\n\nHeld:-(i) That the' impugned part of s. 2(e) infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution for the reason that no reasonable classification is disclosed for the pnrpooe at sustaining the impugned part of s. 2(e). It is now well-settled that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (I) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes persons or things that are to be put together from others left out of the group. and (2) that the dilferential must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The said condition No. 2 above has clearly not been satisfied in this case. The object sought to be achieved by the, Impugned Act was to reduce the debts secured on the Jagir lands which had been resumea under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. The fact that the debts are owed to a Government or local autho rity or other bodies mentioned in the impugned part of s. (2}(e) has no rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.\n\nFurther, no intelligible principle underlies the exempted categories ol debts. The reason why a debt advancetl on behalf of a person by the Court of Wards is clubbed with a debt due to a State or a scheduled bank and why a debt due to a non-scheduled bank is not excluded from the purview of the Act is not discernible.\n\nManna Lal v. Collector of Iha/war. [1961] 2 $.C.R. 962, Nand Ram ChhoteY Lal v. Kishore Raman Singh, A.l.R.\n\n(1962) All 521 and\n\nJam11t1lal Ram/al Kimt<e v. Kish<ndas and State of Hyd<rabad,\n\nA.LR.\n\n(1955) Hyd. 194, distinguished.\n\nStat1 of IIJJJlulM\n\n(ii) Section 7(2) is valid as it impooes reasonable restrictions, in Muk;.h•llll the interests of general public. on the rishts of a secured creditor. This subsection has been designed with the object of rehabilitating a Jagirdar whose Jagir prop<rties have been taken onr by the State for a public purpose at a low valuation. H this provision was not e, the Jogir~ dar would fiDI it dilfcult to start life afresh became his future income and acquired properties would be liable to auachment and sale for lbe purpose of satisfying the demands of such creditors.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 507 of 1961.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated February 18, 1959 of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Misc. Case No. 10 of 1959.\n\nS. K. Kapur and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\nFebruary 26, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSIKRI J .-This is an appeal directed against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, which granted a certificate under Art. 133(l)(c).\n\nOne Mukanchand, respondent No. 1 in this appeal (hereinaner referred to as the decree-holder) obtained a mortgage decree on February 12, 1954, for Rs. 1,14,581-14.6, with future interest at 6 per cent per annum, against one Rao Raja Inder Singh (hereinafter referred to as the judgment-debtor).\n\nThe mortgage money was advanced under three mortgages, and the mortgaged properties consisted of 2 J agirs and some nonrjagir immovable property. The latter property was sold in execution and Rs. 33,750 /- paid to the decree-holder in partial satisfaction of the decree. On December 14, 1956, the decree-holder filed an execution petition in the Court of the District Judge, Jodhpur, for Rs. 99,965·3-6, praying for attachment of the amount of compensation and rehabilitation grant which would be paid to the judgment debtor on account of resumption of his jagir. This case was registered\n\nSikri I\n\n1961 as Execution Case No. 12/57. On July 29; 1957, the judg ,..,.. of EIJl/111tha11 ment-debtor made an application before the District Judge,\n\nM,,,;;.\"411d Jodhpur, to the effect that the decretal amount should be reduced in accordance with s. 5 of the Rajas than J agirdars' Debt Reduction Act (Rajasthan Act IX of 1957). On Jaly\n\n31. 1957, the judgment-debtor submitted another application claiming that only half of his total jagir compensation and rehabilitation grant money was liable to attachment under s. 7 of the said Act. The decree-holder, in his reply to those petitions, urged that the provisions relied on were ultra vires the Constitution of India, being in contravention of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.\n\n~II.\n\nOn December 3, 1957, the decree-holder filed a petition under Art. 228 of the Constitution, praying that the execution case No. 12 of 1957, pending in the Court of the District Judge, Jodhpur, be withdrawn from that Court to the Rajasthan High Court The High Court transferred the case to its file, and thereafter issued notice to the State of Rajasthan, a5 the constitutionality of the said Act had been challenged.\n\nBy its judgment, the High Court held that apart from the latter part of s. 2(e) excluding certain debts-hereinafter referred to as the impugned part and s. 7(2) of the Act, the rest of the Act was valid. The State applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and so did the decree-holder.\n\nOn the certificates being granted, two appeals were filed in this Court.\n\nThe appeal of Mukhanchand (Civil Appeal No. 508/61) was, by order dated April 23, 1962, of this Court, held to have abated. Therefore, we are not concerned with the validity of the other provisions of the Act\n\nAlthough the validity of the other provisions is not now in question, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act, because they have a bearing on the question of the validity of the impugned part of s. 2(e) ands. 7(2) of the .Act; and these are reproduced below:\n\n\"Preamble-To provide for the scaling down of debts of jagirdars whose jagir lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 .....\n\nS. 2(e)-\"debt\" means an advance in cash or in kind 1961 and includes any transaction which is in substau of ,, • ..._ stance a debt but does not include an advance as Y. aforesaid made on or after the first day of Mukalle,,_ January, 1949 or a debt due to:- Slbl I.\n\n(ii the Central Government or Government of any State;\n\n(ii) a local authority;\n\n(iii) a scheduled bank;\n\n(iv) a co-operative society; and\n\n(v) a waqf, trust or endowment for a charitable or religious purpose only; or\n\n(vi) a person, where the debt was advanced on hi&\n\nbehalf by the Court of Wards ...\n\nS. 3. Reduction of secured debt at the time of passing of decree.-(1) Nothwithstanding anything in any law, agreement or document, in any suit to which this Act applies relating to a secured debt, the court shall, after the amount due has been ascertained, but before passing a decree, proceed as hereinafter stated.\n\n(2)(a) Where the mortgaged property consists exclu\n\nsively of jagir lands and such lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Act, the court shall first ascertain whether the mortgagor had the right, under the jagir law in force at the time the mortgage-deed was executed, to mortgage the jagir lands, or failing that, whether specific permission for effecting the mortgage was obtained from the competent authority, and whether the mortgage was validly subsisting on the date of resumption of the jagir iands.\n\n(b) if the mortgage was legally and properly made and was validly subsisting on the aforesaid date, the court shall reduce the amount due in accordance with the fonnula given in Schedule I.\n\n1961 ..., of Rfl/01ll111n\n\n\"· Jl..t.ndialll/\n\nlljft '\n\n(3) Where the mortgaged property consists partly of jagir lands as aforesaid and partly of property other than such lands, the court shall after taking action in accordance with the provisions of subclause (a) of sub-section (2), proceed to distribute the amount due on the two properties separately in accordance with the principles contained in section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882) as if they had been properties belonging separately to two persons with separate and distinct rights of ownership; and after the amount due has been so distributed, reduce the amount due on the jagir lands in accordance with the formula given in Schedule I.\n\nS. 4-Powers to reduce secured debt after passing of decree.-\n\n(1) Nothwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other Jaw, the court which passed a decree to which this Act applies relating to a secured debt shall, on the application either of the decree-holder or judgment-debtor, proceed as hereinafter stated.\n\n<2) Where the mortgaged property charged under the decree consists exclusively of jagir lands and such lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Act, the court shall reduce the amount due in accordance with the formula given in Schedule I.\n\n13) Where the mortgaged property charged under the decree consists partly of jagir lands and partly of property other than jagir lands, the court shall determine the amount due on the first day of January, 1949, and distribute the same on the two properties separately in accordance with the principles contained in section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882), as if they had been properties belonging to two persons with separate and distinct rights of ownership and after tbe\n\namount due as respect the jagir lands has been Jffi so calculated, reduce it in accordance with the Stat• 0'jR; j.,,,,_ formula given in Schedule I.\n\nMulc;,;., ltlllltl\n\nS. 6-Satisfaction of the decree-after the amount due has been reduced under and in accordance with the provisions of section 4, the decree shall, to the extent of the reduction so effected, be deemed, for all purposes and on all occasions, to have been duly satisfied.\n\nS. 7(2)-Notwithstanding anything in any law, the reduced amount found in the case of a mortgagor or judgment-debtor as the case may be, under section 3 or section 4 as respects mortgaged jagir lands shall not be legally recoverable otherwise than out of the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to such mortgagor or judgment debtor in respect of such jagir lands.\"\n\nWe may mention that respondent No. I has not entered appearance in this Court. The learned counsel for the State, Mr. S. K. Kapur, has urged that the High Court erred in holding that these two provisions, i.e. impugned part of s. 2( e) and s. 7(2), were void.\n\nRegarding the impugned part of s. 2(e), he contended that the debts mentioned in sub-els. (i) to (vi) of s. 2(e) have been placed on a different footing from debts due to other creditors, because the bodies and the authorities mentioned therein serve a public purpose or a public cause. He urged that this provided a reasonable basis for differentiating between private creditors and creditors mentioned in els. (i) to (vi) above. Regarding s. 7(2), he urged that it imposed reasonable restrictions. in the interest of general public, on the creditors.\n\nBefore examining the validity of the impugned provisions, it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act.\n\nAs the preamble states in plain terms, the object of the Act is to scale down debts of Jagirdars whose ; agir lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. Clause (e) of s. 2 defines 'debt' to mean an advance in cash or in kind. The definition does not embrace dues of Government or a local authority\n\nSikrl I.\n\nl!W in respect of taxes, land revenue, etc. The definition then St•i. of Rajasthan excludes from the purview of the Act debts due fo Central\n\nJlhand Government and other authorities and bodies mentioned in the clause. We shall advert to them later when discmsing Slkri I. the validity of this exclusion.\n\nSection 3 provides for reduction of secured debts in accordance with the formula given in Schedule I at the time of passing a decree, and their apportionment where necessary, between ; agir and non-; agir property. Section 4 provides for reductjon of secured debts after a decree has been passed.\n\nSection 5 directs a court to pass a fresh decree after reduction of the secured debts.\n\nSection 6 provides that after reduction of the secured debt in accordance with the provisions of s. 4, the decree shall, to the extent of the reduction so effected, be deemed for all purposes and on all occasions to have been duly satisfied. Clause (!) of s. 7 provides for the execution of the decree against the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable in respect of the ; agir lands of the judgment-debtor.\n\nClause (2) of s. 7, which has been struck riown by the High Court, prohibits the recovery of the reduced amount with respect to jagir property from any pr~ perty other than the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to a ; agirdar. The effect of this provision is that the other properties of the jagirdar, existing or which he may acquire hereafter, are immune from being proceeded against in execution or otherwise.\n\nWe think that the High Court was right in holding that the impugned part of s. 2(e) infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is now well-settled that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two c0nditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes persons or things that are to be put together from others left out of the group, and (2) that the differentia must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statuto in question. In our opinion, condition No. 2 above has clearly not been satisfied in this case. The object sought to be achieved by the impugned Act was to reduce the debts secured on ; agir lands which had been resumed under the prcmsions of the Ra jasthan Land Reforms and Resumptioa of •\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREM.2 COURT REPORTS\n\n9II\n\nJagirs Act. The Jagirdar's capacity to pay debts had been\n\n19M reduced by the resumption of his lands and the object of the State of Rll/llllllM Act was to ameliorate his condition. The fact that the debts M k \"c1wtt1 are owed to a government or local authority or other bodies \" an mentioned in the impugned part of s. 2(e) has no rational Slkrl I. relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Further, no intelligible principle underlies the exempted categories of debts. The reason why a debt advanced on behalf of a person by the Court of Wards is clubbed with a debt due to a State or a scheduled bank and why a debt due to a non-scheduled bank is not excluded from the purview of the Act is not discernible.\n\nIn this connection, Mr. Kapur has relied on the decision of this Court in Manna Lal vs. Collector of lhalwar ('). This case is clearly distinguishable because there a law giving special facility for the recovery of dues to a bank owned by the Government was held not to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is clear that the government can be legitimately put in a separate category for the purpose of laying down the procedure for the recovery of its dues. Mr. Kapur further relied on Nand Ram Chhotey Lal vs.\n\nKishore Raman Singh (2). The judgment of the High Court undoubtedly supports him, but, with respect, we are unable to agree with the ratio of the case. The High Court was concerned with the U.P, Zamindars Debt Reduction Act (U.P. Act XV of 1953), which is substantially similar to the impugned Act.\n\nThe ratio of the High Court is: \"It appears to us that the legislature had to make a distinction between debts due from the ex-zamindars to private individuals and the debts due to scheduled banks or to Government or semi-Government authorities.\n\nThe obvious reason appears to be that the private money-lenders were considered to be a bane to rural economy and perpetrating agricultural indebtedness.\n\nIt was to save the cultivators from such unscrupulous moneylenders that such laws had to be enacted, the last in series beirig the Zamindars Debt Reduction Act.\" We consider there is no force in these observations. No such reason is apparent from the tenhs of the Act. Non-scheduled banks ·-.--------\n\n(l) [1961) 2 S.C.\"R. 962. <') AIR (1962) All. 521.\n\n19M and all other private creditors cannot be said to be a bane Stat• of Raiaotharz to rural economy.\n\nMukaclumd The third case relied on by Mr. Kapur-Jamnalal\n\n$ikri I.\n\nRamlal Kimtee v. Kishendas and State of Hyderabad(') d~ not contain any discussion.\n\nThe High Court supported the exclusion on the ground that \"exclusion of certain class of debts under s. 3 of the impugned Act also is not without substantial justification for public demands do not stand in the same position as ordinary demands.\" Apart from the fact that all the exempted categories are not public demands, the High Court does not seem to have considered whether the differentia had any rational relationship sought to be achieved by the Act.\n\nIn conclusion, agreeing with the High Court, we hold that no reasonable classification is disclosed for the purpose of sustaining the impugned part of s. 2(e).\n\nNow, coming to the question of the validity of s. 7(2). we consider that this sub-section is valid as it imposes reasonable restrictions, in the interest of general public, on the rights of a secured creditor. A secured creditor, when he advanced money on the security of jagir property, primarily looked to that property for the realisation of his dues. Further, this sub-section has been designed with the object of rehabilitating a jagirdar whose jagir properties have been taken over by the State for a public purpose at a low valuation.\n\nIf this provision was not made, the jagirdar would find it difficult to start life afresh and look to other avocations, for not only his existing non-jagir property but his future income and acquired properties would be liable to attachment and sale for the P\\ITPOSe of satisfying the demands of such secured creditors.\n\nAccordingly, we hold that s. 7(2) imposes reasonable restrictions in the interest of general public.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly partly accepted, the decision of the High Court in regard to s. 2(e) is confirmed and that in regard to s. 7(2) is reversed. As the respondent was not represented and that appeal has only partly succeeded, we -0rder the parties to bear theit own costs in this Court.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.", "total_entities": 101, "entities": [{"text": "Palkhivala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 82, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cannot be combined as suggested by Mr. Palkhivala, but must be asserted each in its own way and within its own limits; the sweep of the several rights is no doubt wide, but the combination of any of those two rights would not justify a claim such as is made by Mr. Palkhivala in the present petitions."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 404, "end_char": 411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1085, "end_char": 1095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1385, "end_char": 1392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1670, "end_char": 1677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1759, "end_char": 1777, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "MUKANCHAND AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1782, "end_char": 1803, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKANCHAND AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "P. 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K. Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6274, "end_char": 6285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6290, "end_char": 6307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6425, "end_char": 6430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSIKRI J .-This is an appeal directed against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, which granted a certificate under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6546, "end_char": 6560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukanchand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6567, "end_char": 6577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Mukanchand, respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Mukhanchand"}}, {"text": "February 12, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6687, "end_char": 6704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in this appeal (hereinaner referred to as the decree-holder) obtained a mortgage decree on February 12, 1954, for Rs."}}, {"text": "Rao Raja Inder Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6787, "end_char": 6807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,14,581-14.6, with future interest at 6 per cent per annum, against one Rao Raja Inder Singh (hereinafter referred to as the judgment-debtor)."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7133, "end_char": 7150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 14, 1956, the decree-holder filed an execution petition in the Court of the District Judge, Jodhpur, for Rs."}}, {"text": "Court of the District Judge, Jodhpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7205, "end_char": 7241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 14, 1956, the decree-holder filed an execution petition in the Court of the District Judge, Jodhpur, for Rs."}}, {"text": "July 29; 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7495, "end_char": 7508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 29; 1957, the judg ,..,.. of EIJl/111tha11 ment-debtor made an application before the District Judge,\n\nM,,,;;.\"411d Jodhpur, to the effect that the decretal amount should be reduced in accordance with s. 5 of the Rajas than J agirdars' Debt Reduction Act (Rajasthan Act IX of 1957)."}}, {"text": "District Judge,\n\nM,,,;;.\"411d Jodhpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7586, "end_char": 7623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 29; 1957, the judg ,..,.. of EIJl/111tha11 ment-debtor made an application before the District Judge,\n\nM,,,;;.\"411d Jodhpur, to the effect that the decretal amount should be reduced in accordance with s. 5 of the Rajas than J agirdars' Debt Reduction Act (Rajasthan Act IX of 1957)."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7701, "end_char": 7705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Debt Reduction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7736, "end_char": 7754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Act IX of 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7756, "end_char": 7780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jaly\n\n31. 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7786, "end_char": 7800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Jaly\n\n31."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7970, "end_char": 7974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rajasthan Act IX of 1957", "statute": "Rajasthan Act IX of 1957"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8101, "end_char": 8122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8150, "end_char": 8169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 3, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8201, "end_char": 8217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 3, 1957, the decree-holder filed a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8260, "end_char": 8268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8533, "end_char": 8551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 of 1957, pending in the Court of the District Judge, Jodhpur, be withdrawn from that Court to the Rajasthan High Court The High Court transferred the case to its file, and thereafter issued notice to the State of Rajasthan, a5 the constitutionality of the said Act had been challenged."}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8688, "end_char": 8695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8769, "end_char": 8776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8865, "end_char": 8878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and so did the decree-holder."}}, {"text": "Mukhanchand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8999, "end_char": 9010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal of Mukhanchand (Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Mukhanchand"}}, {"text": "April 23, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9057, "end_char": 9071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "508/61) was, by order dated April 23, 1962, of this Court, held to have abated."}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9412, "end_char": 9419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9670, "end_char": 9677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10241, "end_char": 10245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11258, "end_char": 11268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11673, "end_char": 11683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11691, "end_char": 11721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11981, "end_char": 11991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11994, "end_char": 11998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12093, "end_char": 12122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12582, "end_char": 12592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "day of January, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12785, "end_char": 12805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<2) Where the mortgaged property charged under the decree consists exclusively of jagir lands and such lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Act, the court shall reduce the amount due in accordance with the formula given in Schedule I.\n\n13) Where the mortgaged property charged under the decree consists partly of jagir lands and partly of property other than jagir lands, the court shall determine the amount due on the first day of January, 1949, and distribute the same on the two properties separately in accordance with the principles contained in section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882), as if they had been properties belonging to two persons with separate and distinct rights of ownership and after tbe\n\namount due as respect the jagir lands has been Jffi so calculated, reduce it in accordance with the Stat• 0'jR; j.,,,,_ formula given in Schedule I.\n\nMulc;,;.,"}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12911, "end_char": 12921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12929, "end_char": 12959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13229, "end_char": 13239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "S. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13262, "end_char": 13266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13379, "end_char": 13388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "S. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13532, "end_char": 13539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13674, "end_char": 13683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13687, "end_char": 13696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882", "statute": "the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "s. 2( e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14134, "end_char": 14142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14147, "end_char": 14154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14199, "end_char": 14206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14273, "end_char": 14280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14609, "end_char": 14616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15060, "end_char": 15064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central\n\nJlhand Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15335, "end_char": 15361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Rajasthan excludes from the purview of the Act debts due fo Central\n\nJlhand Government and other authorities and bodies mentioned in the clause."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15507, "end_char": 15516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15597, "end_char": 15607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15722, "end_char": 15731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15805, "end_char": 15814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15893, "end_char": 15902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15990, "end_char": 15994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16149, "end_char": 16153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16323, "end_char": 16327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16811, "end_char": 16818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16829, "end_char": 16836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jagirs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17610, "end_char": 17620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17927, "end_char": 17934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II\n\nJagirs Act", "statute": "II\n\nJagirs Act"}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18367, "end_char": 18372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, Mr. Kapur has relied on the decision of this Court in Manna Lal vs. Collector of lhalwar (')."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18620, "end_char": 18627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II\n\nJagirs Act", "statute": "II\n\nJagirs Act"}}, {"text": "Zamindars Debt Reduction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19052, "end_char": 19080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raiaotharz", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19986, "end_char": 19996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19M and all other private creditors cannot be said to be a bane Stat• of Raiaotharz to rural economy."}}, {"text": "Kapur-Jamnalal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20058, "end_char": 20072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukaclumd The third case relied on by Mr. Kapur-Jamnalal\n\n$ikri I.\n\nRamlal Kimtee v. Kishendas and State of Hyderabad(') d~ not contain any discussion."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20270, "end_char": 20274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20781, "end_char": 20788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20838, "end_char": 20845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21681, "end_char": 21688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21844, "end_char": 21851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21887, "end_char": 21894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_913_920_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "o ::>.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 913\n\nBA~A NT KUMAR SARKAR AND OTHERS\n\nEAGLE ROLLING MILLS LTD. AND OTHERS\n\n(P. B.) GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI JJ.)\n\nEmployees State Insurance Act (XXXlV of 1948)J'. 1(3) Constitutional validity--Central Government empowered to apply provision1 of Act by notification-If excessive delegation.\n\nThe appellants as workmen of respondent No. 1 in all the three respondent concerns were getting free medical benefits of a very high order in a well furnished hospital maintained by respondent No. 1.\n\nRespondent No. 3. the Union of India issued a notification under s. 1 (3) of the Employees State Insurance Act appointing 28th August. 1960 as the date on which some provisions of the Act should come into force. in certain areas of the State of Bihar and the area in which the i\\ppellants were working came within the scope of the Act. In pursuance of the said notification, the Chief Executive Officer of Respondent No. 1 issued notices to the appellants that the me'dical benefits upto the extent admissible under the Act will cease to be provided to insurable persons from the appointed day and the medical benefits would thereafter be governed by the relevant provisions of the Act. The appellants in a writ petition to the High Court challenged the validity of s. 1 (3) of the Act and legality of thenotifications issued under it, inter alia, on the ground that it contraveneli Art. 14 of the Constitution and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. The High Court rejected the plea and dismissed the writ petitions.\n\nOn appeal by special leave the appellants contende.d that s. 1 (3) of the Act suffers from excessive delegation and is, therefore. invalid.\n\nHeld: (i) S. 1(3) of the Act is not an illustration of delegated legislation at all, it can be described as coiiditional legislation. It purports to authorise the Central Government to establish a corporation for the a'dministration of the scheme of Employees' State Insurance by a notification. As to when the notification should be issued and in respect of what factories it should be issued, has been left to the dis .. cretion of the Central Government and that is precisely what is usually done by conditional legislation.\n\nQueen v. Burah, 5. I.A. 178, relied on.\n\n(ii) Assuming there is an element of delegation, the plea is equally unsustainable. because there is enough guidance given by the relevant provisions of the Act and the very scheme of the Act itself. In the very nature of things, it would have been impossible for the legislature to decide in what areas and in respect of which factories the Employees' State Insurance Corporation shoufd be established. It is obvious that a scheme of this kind, though very beneficent, could not be introduced\n\n34 -159 S.C.-58\n\n,,_nt Kumar v. ..,,, Rollin1\n\nlllilb\n\nQa/endragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nin the whole of the country all at once. Such . beneficial measures which need careful experimentation have sometimes to be adopted by stages and in different phases, and so, inevitably, the question of extend~ ing the statutory benefits contemplated by the Act has to be left to the discretion of the appropriate Government. That cannot amount to excessive delegation.\n\nEdward Mills Co. Ltd. Beawar v. The State of Ajmer, [1955] I S.C.R. 735, Mis Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya v. Sangamner Ako/a Taluka Bidi Kamgar Union, [1963] Supp, I S.C.R. 524 and Bhikusa Yamasa Kahtriva v. Union of India, [1964] I S.C.R. 860 followed:\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 721-723 uf 1962.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 1, 1961, of the Patna High Court in Misc.\n\nJudicial Cases Nos. 1167, 1122 and 1235 of 1960.\n\nN,. 'c. Chatteriee, Ra; Behari Singh and Udai Pratap Singh,' for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\n' I( P. Singh, N. P. Singh and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent No. 1 (in al! the appeals).\n\nDaphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. Bindra, V. D. Maha; an and B. R. G. K. Achor, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3.\n\nFebruary 26, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR. C.J.-The short question which arises in these appeals by special leave is whether section 1 ( 3) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (No. 34 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act) is invalid. By their\n\nwrit petitions filed before the Patna High Court, the .ippellants who are the workmen of the three respondent .,; oncerns, the Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., the Kumardhubi Engineering Works Ltd., and Kumardhubi Fire Clay ane1 Silica Works Ltd., respectively, alleged that the impugned 8ection has contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution, and suffers from the vice of excessive delegation, and as such ts invalid.\n\nThese employers were impleaded as respondent No. 1. respectively in the three writ petitions.\n\nThe High Court has rejected the plea and the writ petitions filed by\n\nthe appellants have accordingly been dismissed. It is against this decision of the High Court that the appellants have come to this Court and have impleaded the three employers respectively.\n\nThe three appeals proceed on similar facts and raise an identical question of law and have, therefore, been heard together.\n\nIt appears that respondents No. 1 in all the three appeals are under the management of Mfs. Bird & Co. Ltd., through a General M.mager, and the appellants are their workmen.\n\nAs such workmen, the appellants were getting satisfactory medical benefits of a very high order free of any charge.\n\nRespondent No. 1 in each appeal maintained a wellfurnished hospital with provision for 60 permanent beds for the workmen, their families and their dependents. The main grievance made by the appellants is that as a result of s. 1 ( 3) of the Act, the appellants have now to be content with medical benefits of a less satisfactory nature. That is why they challenged the validity of the impugned section and contest the propriety and legality of the notification issued under it.\n\nTo these writ petitions as well as to the appeals, the Employees' State Insurance Corporation and the Union of India have been impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 respectively.\n\nOn the 22nd August, 1960, respondent No. 3 issued a notification under section 1, sub-section ( 3) appointing the 28th August, 1960 as the date on which some provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar. By this notification, the area in which the appellants are working came within the scope of tne Act.\n\nIn pursuance of the said notification, the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No. 1 informed the appellants on the 25th August, 1960 that the medical benefits including indoor and outdoor treatment upto the extent admissible under the Act will cease to be provided to insurable perso11~ from the appointed day. A notice in that behalf was duly issued and published by the said Officer.\n\nSimilar notices were issued indicating to the appellants that medical benefit• .r.• would thereafter be governed by the relevant provisions of the Act and not by the arrangements which had been made\n\n196'\n\nB, unm Kra111r\n\nY. &tit J!olU..\n\nM/116\n\nGajendra[llUIJ; ar\n\nc. J.\n\nB,..ant Kumar\n\nearlier by respondent No. 1 in that behalf.\n\nThat', in brief, is $.e genesis of the present writ petitions and the nature of the dispute between the parties.\n\nT • ..,,, Rolling\n\nMilli\n\nGo/endragadkar\n\nc. /.\n\nThe first point which Mr. Chatterjee has raised before us is that s. 1 (3) of the Act suffers from excessive delegation and is, therefore, invalid.\n\nIn order to consider the validity of this argument, it is necessary to read section l, sub-section (3) :-\n\n\"The Act shall come into force on such date or dates as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act and for different States or for different parts thereof'.\n\nThe argument is that the power given to the Central Government to apply the provisions of the Act by notification, confers on the Central Government absolute discretion, the exercise of which is not guided by any legislative provision and is, therefore, invalid.\n\nThe Act does not prescribe any considerations in the light of which the Central Government can proceed to act under s. 1( 3) and such uncanalised power conferred on the Central Government must be treated as invalid.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument.\n\nSection 1 ( 3) is really not an illustration of delegated legislation 11t all; it is what can be , properly described as conditional legislation. The Act has prescribed a self-contained code in regard to the insurance of the employees covered by it; several remedial measures which the Legislature thought it necessary to enforce in regard to such workmen have beep specifically dealt with and appropriate provisions have been made to. carry out the policy of the Act as laid down in its relevant sections. Section 3 ( 1) of the Act purports to authoris.: the Centr11! Government to establish a Corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees' State Insurance by a notification. In other words, when the notification should be issued and in respect of what factories it should be issued, has been left to the discretion of the Central Government and that is •a precisely what is usually done by conditional legislation.\n\nWhat Lord Selbome said about the powers conferred on the Lieutenant-Governor by virtue of the relevant provisions <if Act 22 of 1869 in Queen v. Burah('), can be said with equal justification about the powers conferred on the Central Government by s. 1 ( 3).\n\nSaid Lord Selborne in that case :\n\n\"Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor (large as they 1H1doubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority than that of the Governor-General in Council. Their whole operation is directly and immediately under\n\nand by virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself. The proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things.\n\nThe conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute''.\n\nThat 1s the first answer to the plea raised by Mr. Chatterjee.\n\nAssuming that there is an element of deleg11tion, the plea is equally unsustainable, because there is enough guidance given by the relevant provisions of the Act and the very scheme of the Act it11elf. The preamble to the Act shows that it was passed because the legislature thought it expedient to provide for certain benefits to employee! in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto.\n\nSo, the policy of the Act is unambiguous and clear.\n\nThe material definillons of \"ben$fil Qeriod'', \"P-mployee\", \"factory\", \"insured person'', \"sickness'', \"wages\" and other terms contained in s. 2 give a clear idea as to the nature of the factories to which the Act is intended to be applied, the class of ersons for whose benefit it has been passed and the nature of the benefit which is intended to be conferred on them.\n\nChapter II of the Act deals with the\n\n(I) 5 J.A. 178 at p. 195.\n\n19M\n\n/Ja!a ... t Kumar\n\n\"· Eagle Rollln,\n\nMilli\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\n1961 a-Ill Kumar ... \"'1fl• Ro/lint\n\nMilli\n\n 0./endragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nCorporation, Standing Committee and Medical Benefit Council and their constitution; Chapter Ill deals with the problem of finance and audit; Chapter IV makes provisions for contribution both by the employees and the employer, and Chapter V prescribes the benefits which have to be conferred on the workmen; it also gives general provisions in respect of those benefits. Chapter V-A deals with transitory provisions; Chapter VI deals with the adjudication of disputes and claims; and Chapter VII prescribes penalties.\n\nChapter VIII which is the last Chapter, deals with miscellaneous matters. In the very nature of things, it would have been impossible for the legislature to decide in what areas and in respect of which factories the Empioyees' State Insurance Corporation should be estal.Jiished. It is obvious that a scheme of this kind, though very beneficient, could not be introduced in the whole of the country all at once.\n\nSuch beneficial measures which need careful experimentation have sometimes to be adopted by stages and in different phases, and so, inevitably, the question of extending the statutory benefits contemplated by the Act has to be left to the discretion of the appropriate Government. \"Appropriate Government\" under s. 2 (1) means in respect of establishments under the control of the Central Government or a railway administration or a major iport or a mine or oilfield, the Central Government, and in ali other cases, the State Government. Thus, it is clear that when extending the Act to different establishments, the relevant Government is given the power to constitute a Corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees' State Insurance.\n\nThe course adopted by modern legislatures in dealing with\n\nWtllfare schemes has uniformly conformed to the same pauem. The legislature evolves a scheme of socio-economic welfar.,, makes elaborate provisions in respect of it and\n\nleaves it to the Government concerned to decide when, how and in what manner the scheme should be introduced.\n\nThat, in our opinion, cannot amount to excessive delegation.\n\nThe question of excessive delegation has been frequently considered by this Court and the approach to be adopted in dealing with it is no longer in doubt.\n\nIn the Edward 1 Mills Co. Ltd., Beawar and Others v. The State of Aimer\n\nand Another('), this Court repelled the challenge to tnc validity of s. 27 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (No. XI of 1948), whereby power had been given to the appropriate Government to add to either part of the schedule any employment in respect of which it was of opinion that minimum wages shall be fixed by giving notification -in a particular manner, and it was provided that on the issue of the notification, the scheme shall, in its application to the State, be deemed to be amended accordingly.\n\nIn dealing with this problem, this Court observed that there was an element of delegation implied in the provisions of s. 27, for the legislature, in a sense, authorised another body specified by it to do something which it might do itself; but it was held that such delegation was not unwarranted and unconstitutional and it did not exceed the limits of permissible delegation.\n\nTo the same effect are the recent decisions of this Court in M / s. Bhikusa Y amasa Kshatriya and Another v. Sangamner Ako/a Taluka Bidi Kamgar\n\nUnion and Others( 2 ), and Bhikusa Yamasa Khatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Another('). Therefore, we must hold that the impugned section 1 (3) of the Act is not shown to be constitutionally invalid.\n\nBefore we part with these appeals, there is one more point to which reference must be made. We have already mentioned that after the notification was issued under s. 1 ( 3) by respondent No. 3 appointing August 28, 1960 as the date on which some of the provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar, the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No. 1 issued notices giving effect to the State Government's notification and intimating to the appellants that by reai.on of the said notification, the medical benefits whicli were be 'ing given to them in the past would be received by tl.•:n under the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nIt wa.1 11rl :id by the appellants before the High Court that these notices were invalid and should be struck down.\n\nThe ar1 ument which was urged in support of this contention wa~ that espondent\n\n(1)[19551 I S.C.R. 735.\n\n(2) [19631 Supp. I S.C.R. ~24.\n\n(3) [1964] I S.C.R. 860.\n\nBa.sant Kimi#\n\nEagl• Roi/inf\n\nMi/Lr\n\nGajtndrag..0.-\n\nC. /,\n\n19M\n\nBa1ant Kumar\n\nv. llark RoWng\n\nMills\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nFebruary 26\n\nNo. 1 in all the three appeals were not entitled to curtail the benefits provided to the appellants by them and that the said benefits were not similar either qualitatively or quantitatively to the benefits under the Scheme which had been brought into force under the Act.\n\nThe High Court has held that the question as to whether the notices and circulars issued by respondent No. 1 were invalid, could not be considered under Art. 226 of the Constitution; that is a matter which can be appropriately raised in the form of a dispute by the appellants under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nIt is true that the powers conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 are very wide, but it is not suggested by Mr. Chatterjee that even these powers can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the contention, we would contirm the finding of the High Court that the proper remedy which is available to the appellants to ventilate their grievances in respect of the said notices and circulars is to take recourse to s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, or seek relief, if possible, under sections 74 and 75 of the Act.\n\nThe result is, the appeals fail and are dismiBsed. There would be no order as to costs.\n\nA ppea/s dismissed.\n\nSHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND\n\nJ. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Whether the person must be physically present at the\n\n1.1ctual commission of the crime-Acts done by several person.t in 1u11,'1erance of common intention-Essence of-lndia11 Penal Code,\n\n!KllO ( 4S of 1860), •· 34.\n\nIn a trial by jury the appellants were jointly charged along witlt accused No. 1 with an offence punishable under ss. 471 and 467 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The first charge was that in", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "913\n\nBA~A NT KUMAR SARKAR AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BASANT KUMAR SARKAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "EAGLE ROLLING MILLS LTD. AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EAGLE ROLLING MILLS LTD. AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B.) GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 189, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 209, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Employees State Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 212, "end_char": 241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 291, "end_char": 309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1(3) Constitutional validity--Central Government empowered to apply provision1 of Act by notification-If excessive delegation."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 655, "end_char": 659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Employees State Insurance Act", "statute": "Employees State Insurance Act"}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 687, "end_char": 700, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "28th August. 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 712, "end_char": 729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Union of India issued a notification under s. 1 (3) of the Employees State Insurance Act appointing 28th August."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 835, "end_char": 840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in certain areas of the State of Bihar and the area in which the i\\ppellants were working came within the scope of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1356, "end_char": 1360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1473, "end_char": 1480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1678, "end_char": 1682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1771, "end_char": 1778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "nt Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2846, "end_char": 2854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is obvious that a scheme of this kind, though very beneficent, could not be introduced\n\n34 -159 S.C.-58\n\n,,_nt Kumar v. ..,,, Rollin1\n\nlllilb\n\nQa/endragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nin the whole of the country all at once."}}, {"text": "Behari Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3775, "end_char": 3787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. Chatteriee, Ra; Behari Singh and Udai Pratap Singh,' for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Udai Pratap Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3792, "end_char": 3809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. Chatteriee, Ra; Behari Singh and Udai Pratap Singh,' for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3859, "end_char": 3867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' I( P. Singh, N. P. Singh and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3869, "end_char": 3880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' I( P. Singh, N. P. Singh and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3885, "end_char": 3897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' I( P. Singh, N. P. Singh and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3947, "end_char": 3955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. Bindra, V. D. Maha; an and B. R. G. K. Achor, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3975, "end_char": 3987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. Bindra, V. D. Maha; an and B. R. G. K. Achor, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "V. D. Maha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3989, "end_char": 3999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. Bindra, V. D. Maha; an and B. R. G. K. Achor, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4008, "end_char": 4025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. Bindra, V. D. Maha; an and B. R. G. K. Achor, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "February 26, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4058, "end_char": 4075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 26, 1964."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4122, "end_char": 4136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4220, "end_char": 4229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Insurance Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4253, "end_char": 4278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4379, "end_char": 4395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By their\n\nwrit petitions filed before the Patna High Court, the .ippellants who are the workmen of the three respondent .,;"}}, {"text": "Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "oncerns, the Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., the Kumardhubi Engineering Works Ltd., and Kumardhubi Fire Clay ane1 Silica Works Ltd., respectively, alleged that the impugned 8ection has contravened Art."}}, {"text": "Kumardhubi Engineering Works Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4504, "end_char": 4537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "oncerns, the Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., the Kumardhubi Engineering Works Ltd., and Kumardhubi Fire Clay ane1 Silica Works Ltd., respectively, alleged that the impugned 8ection has contravened Art."}}, {"text": "Kumardhubi Fire Clay ane1 Silica Works Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "oncerns, the Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., the Kumardhubi Engineering Works Ltd., and Kumardhubi Fire Clay ane1 Silica Works Ltd., respectively, alleged that the impugned 8ection has contravened Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4652, "end_char": 4659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act, 1948", "statute": "State Insurance Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Mfs. Bird & Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 in all the three appeals are under the management of Mfs."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd August, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6192, "end_char": 6209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 22nd August, 1960, respondent No."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6256, "end_char": 6265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28th August, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6299, "end_char": 6316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 issued a notification under section 1, sub-section ( 3) appointing the 28th August, 1960 as the date on which some provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "25th August, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6648, "end_char": 6665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 informed the appellants on the 25th August, 1960 that the medical benefits including indoor and outdoor treatment upto the extent admissible under the Act will cease to be provided to insurable perso11~ from the appointed day."}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7442, "end_char": 7452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T • ..,,, Rolling\n\nMilli\n\nGo/endragadkar\n\nc. /.\n\nThe first point which Mr. Chatterjee has raised before us is that s. 1 (3) of the Act suffers from excessive delegation and is, therefore, invalid."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7482, "end_char": 7486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1( 3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8319, "end_char": 8327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8460, "end_char": 8469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8967, "end_char": 8976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Selbome", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9405, "end_char": 9412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What Lord Selbome said about the powers conferred on the Lieutenant-Governor by virtue of the relevant provisions <if Act 22 of 1869 in Queen v. Burah('), can be said with equal justification about the powers conferred on the Central Government by s. 1 ( 3).", "canonical_name": "Selborne"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9643, "end_char": 9647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Selborne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9665, "end_char": 9673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Said Lord Selborne in that case :\n\n\"Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor (large as they 1H1doubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority than that of the Governor-General in Council.", "canonical_name": "Selborne"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11081, "end_char": 11085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11313, "end_char": 11334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12761, "end_char": 12765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13902, "end_char": 13907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13915, "end_char": 13938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14456, "end_char": 14461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14998, "end_char": 15007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15232, "end_char": 15236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 28, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15273, "end_char": 15288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 appointing August 28, 1960 as the date on which some of the provisions of the Act should come into force in certain areas of the State of Bihar, the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ba1ant Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16081, "end_char": 16093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ba.sant KimiEagl• Roi/inf\n\nMi/Lr\n\nGajtndrag..0.-\n\nC. /,\n\n19M\n\nBa1ant Kumar\n\nv. llark RoWng\n\nMills\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nFebruary 26\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Gaiendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16118, "end_char": 16132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ba.sant KimiEagl• Roi/inf\n\nMi/Lr\n\nGajtndrag..0.-\n\nC. /,\n\n19M\n\nBa1ant Kumar\n\nv. llark RoWng\n\nMills\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nFebruary 26\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16581, "end_char": 16589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16711, "end_char": 16716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16724, "end_char": 16747, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16812, "end_char": 16820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17282, "end_char": 17287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17295, "end_char": 17318, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 74 and 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17355, "end_char": 17373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17554, "end_char": 17566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND\n\nJ. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17568, "end_char": 17582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND\n\nJ. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. R. MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17588, "end_char": 17603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND\n\nJ. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17798, "end_char": 17808, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 471 and 467", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17954, "end_char": 17969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17980, "end_char": 17985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17993, "end_char": 18010, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_920_935_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "19M\n\nBa1ant Kumar\n\nv. llark RoWng\n\nMills\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nFebruary 26\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nNo. 1 in all the three appeals were not entitled to curtail the benefits provided to the appellants by them and that the said benefits were not similar either qualitatively or quantitatively to the benefits under the Scheme which had been brought into force under the Act.\n\nThe High Court has held that the question as to whether the notices and circulars issued by respondent No. 1 were invalid, could not be considered under Art. 226 of the Constitution; that is a matter which can be appropriately raised in the form of a dispute by the appellants under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nIt is true that the powers conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 are very wide, but it is not suggested by Mr. Chatterjee that even these powers can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the contention, we would contirm the finding of the High Court that the proper remedy which is available to the appellants to ventilate their grievances in respect of the said notices and circulars is to take recourse to s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, or seek relief, if possible, under sections 74 and 75 of the Act.\n\nThe result is, the appeals fail and are dismiBsed. There would be no order as to costs.\n\nA ppea/s dismissed.\n\nSHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND\n\nJ. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Whether the person must be physically present at the\n\n1.1ctual commission of the crime-Acts done by several person.t in 1u11,'1erance of common intention-Essence of-lndia11 Penal Code,\n\n!KllO ( 4S of 1860), •· 34.\n\nIn a trial by jury the appellants were jointly charged along witlt accused No. 1 with an offence punishable under ss. 471 and 467 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The first charge was that in\n\n19M\n\nShiv Prasad Chunilal v.\n\nfurtherance of their common intention to cheat the railway administration, accused No. 1 had fraudulently or dishonestly used the forge'd railway receipt.\n\nThe sl.!cond ch .. rge v.:as framed in the alternative. Firstly it charged all the .accused under s. 467 read with s. 34 l.P.C. on account of accused No. I having forged the bill portion. In the alternative, accused No. 1 was charged under s. 467 I.P.C. and the appellant.~ were charged under s. 467 read with s. 109 I.P.C. for having abetted accused No. 1 in the ..:ommission of that offence. Similarly charges\n\nlos. 3 to 6 were framed in the alternative. The jury returned a unanin1ous verdict of guilty against all the accused for the various offencrs\n\nread with s. 34 I.P.C. The verdict of the jury was not recorded with respect to the five alternative charges against accused No. 1 regarding substantive offences and against appellants with respect to various offences read with s. 109 I.P.C. The Sessions Judge accepted the verdict of the jury and convicteO them of the various offences read with s. 34 J.P.C. Their appeals to the High Court also failed. On appeal by Special Leave the appellants mainly contended that the learned Sessions Judge misdirected the jury with respect to the requirements of s. 34\n\nT.P .C. tt was urged that the various offences were actually committed by accused No. l, that the appellants were not present when accused t.J o. 1 presented the forged railway receipts, did other criminal acts and took Uelivery of the goods and that therefore even if they had agreed\n\nV1ith accused No. I for the cheating of the railway by obtaining the ioods dishonestly by presenting the forged receipt. they might have a.betted the commission of the various offences, but could not be guilty of those offences with the aid of s. 34 J.P.C. whose provisions do not 1.pply in the circumstances of the case. For the applicability of s. 34 against an accused, it is necessary that that accused had actually partiicipated in the commission of the crime either by doing something which forms part of the criminal act or by at least doing something which 'Vfould indicate that be was a participant in the commission of that criminal act at the time it was committed.\n\nStai. of MaMrashtra\n\nHeld: In the present case, accused No. 1 alone did the various acts which constituted the offences of which he was convicted. The oppellants took no part in the actual commission of those acts. Whatever they might have done prior to the doing of those acts, did not form an ingredient of the offences committed by accused No. 1.\n\nThey 1:ould not be said to have participated in the commission of the criminal act which amounted to those various offences. They could not be therefore held liable, by virtue of s. 34 I.P.C., for the acts committed by accused No. 1 alone, even if those acts bad been committed in further ance of the common intention of all the three accuse([. Therefore. the conviction of the appellants, for the various offences read with s. 34 I.P.C. must be set aside.\n\nBarendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King Emperor, (1929) L.R. 52 I.A. 40, Shree Kantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay [1955] I S.C.R. 1177 and Jaikrishnadas Manohardlll Duai v. State of Bombay [1960)\n\n3 S.C.R. 319, referred to.\n\nShiv Pra•ad\n\nChunilal v.\n\nState of Maha\n\nrashtra\n\n922 SlTPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 150 and 185 of 1961.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated Jun~ 19, 1961 of the former Bombay High Court in Crimin31 Apneals Nos. 218 and 242 of 1961 respectively.\n\nS. Mohan Kumarmanga/am, R. K. Garg and M. K.\n\nRamamurthi. for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 150/61).\n\nB. M. Mistry, Ravinder Narain and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appe1lant (in Cr. A. No. 185 of 1961 ).\n\nB. K. Khanna, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent (in both the appeals).\n\nFebruary 26, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n&, hubar v111al J.\n\nRAGHUBAR\n\nDAYAL J.-Shiv Prasad Chunilal Jain, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1961 was accused No. 3 and Pyarelal Jshwardas Kapoor, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 185 of 1961 was accused No. 2, at the Sessions Trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay.\n\nAlong with them was a third accused, Rameshwarnath Brijmohan Shukla who was accused No. l at the trial.\n\nAs the two appeals arise from a common judgment. we would dispose of them by one judgment.\n\nThe appellapts would be referred to as accused No. 3 and accused No. 2 respectively.\n\nThe facts leading to the conviction of the appellants are that a large quantity of iron angles was consigned early in February 1959 from Gobind Garb to Raypuram under railway receipt No. 597 481.\n\nThey were despatched in an open wagon bearing E.R. No. 69667.\n\nThe labels of the wagon were changed at Jtarsi railway station and it was diverted to Wadi Bunder under a label showing that the iron angles had been despatched from Baran to Wdi Eunder under railway receipt No. 43352 dated February 6,\n\n,;59, This wagon reached Wadi Bunder on February 16,\n\nB59.\n\nOn February 17 it was unloaded by Ilaburao\n\nGawade, P.W. 1 and Shridhar. P.W. 14. On February 18, 1964\n\naccused No. 1 obtained the delivery sheet of the bill and Shiv J:riuad signed it in the name of Shri Datta.\n\nHe also obtained Chunii.J ... delivery of the iron angles from the railway and signed the state of Mahi>-· Railway Delivery Book in the name of Shri Datta.\n\nThe r~ railway authorities delivered these on the presentation ;;~ Raghubar Dayal J; the forged receipt No. 43352 and on payment of the charges amounting to Rs. 1,500/-.\n\nThese iron angles were then transported to the godown of the National Transport Company at Sewri and stored there.\n\nThe entries in the book showed their receipt in the account of accused No. 3 and also contained a further entry indicating the goods to be received in the account of accused No. 2.\n\nThe latter entry was made on the receipt of a chit, Exhibit ZS, from accused No. 1 saying that the goods be entered in the name of accused No. 2.\n\nOn Febrnary 24, 1959 the accused No. 2 signed an application, Exhibit K, addressed to the head office of the National Transport Company for delivering the goods. Accused No. 1 obtained the goods from the godown of that company on February 26 and March 3, 1959.\n\nA complaint by the original consignee about iile nonreceipt of the iron angles sent from Gobind Garb led to an enquiry and eventual prosecution of the three accused.\n\nSix charges were framed. The first charge was against all the accused for an offence punishable under ss. 471 and 467 read with s. 34 l.P.C. and stated that in furtherance of their common intention to cheat the railway administration, accused No. 1 had fraudulently or dishonestly used the forged railway receipt No. 43352.\n\nThe second charge was framed in the alternative.\n\nFirstly it charged all the accused for an offence under s. 467 read with s. 34 l.P.C. on account of accused No. 1 having forged the bill portion. In the alternative, accused No. 1 was charged with the offence under s. 467 l.P.C. and the other accused Nos. 2 and 3 were charged under s. 467 read with s. 109 l.P.C. for having abetted accused No. I in the\n\ncommissiC1n of that offence.\n\n1961 Charges Nos. 3 to 6 were similarly framed in the Shiv Prasad alternative, i.e., in the first instance all the three accused Chunilal were charged with certain offences read with s. 34 LP .C.\n\nStak 0j Mahawhile in the alternative accused No. 1 was charged of .the\n\nTfJ8htra specific offence and the other two accused were charged\n\nJl11i/iubar DayalJ. with that offence read with s. 109 l.P.C.\n\nThe accused were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, with the aid of a jury. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty against all the accused for the various offences read with s. 34 I.P.C. The verdict of the jury was not recorded with respect to the five alternative charges against accused No. 1 regarding substantive offences and. against accused Nos. 2 and 3 with respect to the various offences read with s. 109 I.P.C. The Sessions Judge accepted the verdict of the jury and convicted them of the various offences read with s. 34 I.P.C.\n\nTheir appeals to the High Court were unsuccessful and therefore accused Nos. 2 and 3 have preferred these appeals after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nThe main contention for the appellants is that the learned Sessions Judge misdirected the jury with respect to the requirements of s. 34 l.P.C.\n\nThe contention is that the various offences were actually committed by accused No. 1 on February 18, that neither accused No. 2 nor accused No. 3 was present when he presented the forged railway receipt, did other criminal acts and took delivery of the iron angles and that therefore even if they had agreed with accused No. 1 for the cheating of the railway administration by obtaining the iron angles dishonestly by presenting the forged receipt, they might have abetted the commission of the various offences, but could not be guilty of those offences with the aid of s. 34 I.P.C. whose provisions, it is contended, do not apply in the circumstances of the case.\n\nIt is contended that for the applicability of s. 34 against an accused, it is necessary that that accused had actually participated in the commission of the crime either by doing something which forms part of the criminal act or by at least doing something which would indicate that \" he was a participant in the commission of that criminal act at the time it was committed.\n\nReliance is placed on the\n\ncases reported as Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King Emperor(') and Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay(2 }.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge in the instant case had told the jury:\n\n\"In case you come to the conclusion that there was a common intention in the minds of all the three accused and accused No. 1 was acting in furtherance of that common intention, all the accused would be answerable for the cffences proved against accused No. 1 by virtue of the provisions of s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and it would be no answer to the charge to say that the acts were done by accused No. 1 alone.\n\nTherefore, you have first, to consider for yourselves what offences are proved against accused No. 1.\n\nYou have next to ask yourselves whether it is proved (and it can also be proved by circumstantial evidence) that there was a common intention in the minds of all the three accused and the acts done by accused No. l were done in furtherance of that common intention. If your answer is 'yes' all the three accused would be guilty of the oharges proved against accused No. 1 by virtue of s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.\"\n\nIt is contended that in thus ptitting the case to the jury the learned Sessions Judge was in error as he did not take into consideration the fact that accused Nos. 2 and 3 were not present at all at the time when the various offences were actually committed by accused No. 1. The two cases relied upon by the appellants support their contention.\n\nIn Shreekantiah's case( 2 ), three persons were convicted Oil.several charges under s. 409 read with s. 34 I.P.C. for committing criminal breach of trust of certain goods entrusted to them as government servants in charge of the stores depot\n\n(I) L.R. 52 I.A. 40.\n\n(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1177.\n\nShiv Praltlll\n\nChunllal\n\nStat• of M.m.\n\nrashtra\n\nRaghubar D111al I.\n\n1964 at Dehu Road near Poona. The stores had illegally passed\n\nShiv PraMd out of the depot and were handed over to a person who was Chuni1411 not authorised to get them from the depot. It was alleged Stat• 0/· Mahathat those accused had conspired to defraud the Government rashtra of those properties and that it was in pursuance of that llaghubar Dayal J. conspiracy that they had arranged to sell the goods to the other person. Accused No. 1 in that case was not present when the goods were loaded nor was he present when they were allowed to pass out of the gates, that is to say, he was not present when the offence was committed.\n\nBose J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said at p. 1189 :\n\n\"If he was not present, he cannot be convicted with\n\nthe aid of section 34. He could have been convicted of the abetment had the jury returned a verdict to that effect because there is evidence of abetment and the charge about abetment is right in law. But the jury ignored the abetment part of the charge and we have no means of knowing whether they believed this part of the evidence or not.\" In considering the misdirection in the charge to the jury and the requirements of s. 34 I.P.C. the learned Judge said at p. 1188 :\n\n\"The essence of the misdirection consists in his direction to the jury that even though a person 'may not be present when the offence is actually committed' and even if he remains 'behind the screen' he can be convicted under section 34 provided it is proved that the offence was committed in furtherance of the common intention.\n\nThis is wrong, for it js the essence of the section that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime.\" Shreekantiah's case(') is practically similar to the present case. Both accused No. 2 and accused No. 3 deny their presence at the railway station on February 18 when the various offences were committed.\n\nNone deposed that accused No. 3 was then present. The presence of accused No. 2 was, however, stated by Babu Rao Gawade, P.W. 1.\n\n(!) [1955] I S.C.R. 1177.\n\nHe had not stated so in his slatement before tlr T'dice during 1964 investigation and the summmg up by the learned Sessions Shi• PraJtUl Judge was that, under tho>e circumstances, it was for the Chunilal jury to consider whether tc believe the statement of the Stat• of. Ma/ut. witness in Court or not. It cannot be said as there was other ras/Jtra evidence against accused No. 2 as well about his connection R.aghubar Dayal 1. with this criminal transaction whether the jury believed his presence at the railway station on February 18 or not.\n\nIn Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai v. The State of Bombay('), Shreekantiah's ca.1e(') came up for consideration and was distinguished, on facts. In that case, the two accused, who were directors of a company, were convicted of an offence under s. 409 read with s. 34 l.P.C. for committing criminal breach of trust with respect to certain cloth supplied to them.\n\nIt was alleged that one of the accused was not working at that factory. during the period when the goods must have been removed and that therefore he could not be made liable for the misappropriation of the goods by taking recourse to the provisions of s. 34 I.P.C. Shah J ., delivering the judgment of the Court, said at p. 326 :\n\n\"But the essence of liability under s. 34 is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the offenders leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of the common intention and presence of the offender sought to be rendered liable under s. 34 is not, on the words of the statute, one of the conditions of its applicability. . ..... A common intentiona meeting of minds-to commit an offence and participation in the commission of the offence in furtherance of that common intention invite the application of s. 34. But this participation need not in all cases be by physical presence.\n\nIn offences involving physical violence, normally presence at the scene of offence of the offenders sought to be rendered liable on the principle of joint Iiabi 1ity may be necessary, but such is not the case in respect of other offences where the offence consists of diverse acts which may be\n\n(I) 11960] 3, S.C.R. 319.\n\n(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 1177.\n\nShiv Pr@tld\n\nChun/la/ v.\n\nStat• of Maharashtra\n\nRoghubar Dayal J.\n\ndone at different times and places.\n\nIn Shree Kantiah's case( 1 ), misappropriation was committed by removing the goods from a Government depot and on the occasion of the removal of the goods, the first accused was not present.\n\nIt was therefore doubtful whether he had participated in the commission of the offence, and this Court in those circumstances held that participation by the first accused was not established.\n\nThe observations in Shree Kantiah' s case (1) in so far as they deal with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code must, in our judgment, be read in the light of the facts established and are not intended to Jay down a principle of universai application.\"\n\nAccused No. 1, in the present case, alone did the various acts on February 18, 1959 which constituted the offences of which he was convicted. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 took no part in the actual commission of those acts. Whatever they might have done prior to the doing of those acts, did not form an ingredient of the offences committed by accused No. 1.\n\nThey cannot be said to have participated in the commission of the criminal act which amounted to those various offences. They cannot be therefore held liable, by virtue of s. 34 I.P.C., for the acts committed by accused No. 1 alone, even if those acts had been committed in furtherance of the common intention of all the three accued.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the conviction of the appellants, viz., accused Nos. 2 and 3, for the various offences read with s. 34 I.P.C. is to be set aside.\n\nWe did not hear, at first, the learned counsel for the appellants, on the alternative offences of abetmcnt being made out against the appellants and with respect to which the verdict of the jury was not recorded by the Sessions Judge. We did not consider it necessary to remit the case for further proceedings with respect to those charges and preferred to dispose of the case finally after giving a further hearing to the learned counsel for the appellants. We accordingly heard them on the charges relating to the appellants abetting accused No. I in the commission of the\n\n\\IJ [19551 I S.C.R. 1177.\n\n' ..\n\n' '\n\nvarious offences, subjt'Ct mtter of charges Nos. 2 to 6 and now deal with that matter.\n\nWe need not discuss the evidence on the record and would just note the various facts which are established from the evidence or which are admitted by lhe accused.\n\nThe relevant facts having a bearing on the question of accused No. 2 abetting the commission of the offences committed by accused No. I are :\n\n1. Accused No. 1 is the servant of accused No. 3 at whose shop accused No. 2, who is a broker, sits.\n\n2. Accused No. 2 deals in non-ferrous goods.\n\n3. Accused No. 2 went with Baburam Gavade, P.W. 1, a clearing agent, on February 17, 1959, to see the goods.\n\n4. The godown register showed the angle irons to be received in the account of Shiv Prasad Bimal Kumar and Pyare Lal, accused No. 2.\n\n5. Accused No. 2 wrote the letter Exhibit K to the National Transport Company for issuing the delivery order with respect to the angle irons in order to enable him to take delivery thereof.\n\n6. Accused No. 2 was in possession of the note Exhibit Z-7 which he delivered to the police during the investigation.\n\nThe relevant facts having a bearing on the alleged abetment of the offences by accused No. 3 are :\n\n1. Accused No. 1 is an employee of accused No. 3.\n\n2. The angle irons were stored at the depot of the National Transport Company at the instance of accused No. 1.\n\n3 . The hooks of the godown noted their receipt in the account of accused No. 3, though the account showed further that they were received in the account of accused No. 2. This further entry was made on receipt of Exhibit Z-8 from\n\n134-159 S.C-59\n\n196~\n\nShiv Prarad\n\nChunilal\n\nv .• State of MaJrt..\n\nrashtra\n\nRaghubar Dayal I.\n\nShiv Pruad\n\nCh1111illll\n\nS•t• of Jlahara1htra\n\naccused No. 1 when the last lot was delivered at the godown on February 18.\n\na., hubar D•yal J,\n\n4. The entire writing on Exhibit Z-7 except the signature of an unknown person and the date below it, was written by accused No. 3. That document reads :\n\n\"To, Piaraya Lal c/ o M/s. Sheopershad Bimal Kumar, Bombay.\n\nl. RR. No. 43351, dated 4-2-59 Ashoknagar to Carnac Bridge.\n\n2. RR. No. 43352, dated 6-2-59 Baran to Wadi Bunder.\n\nI have received the material of the above RR which I have handed over to you for clearance.\n\nSd./- Y ashwant ....\n\n24-2-1959.\"\n\nBesides these circumstances, it is urged for the State that the effect of the diversion of the wagon from its right course at !tarsi railway station indicates that the people responsible for it must have a fairly large and influential organization with funds and that such a diversion could noi have been merely at the instance of accused No. 1, an employee of accused No. 3, who is a substantial merchant.\n\nAbout Rs. 1,500/- were paid as charges to the railway authorities before the angle irons could be taken delivery of.\n\nAccused No. 1 could not have been in a position to make that payment.\n\nIt is further urged that accused No. 1 would not ha~ stored the goods with the National Transport Company unless the storage was on account of his master, accused No. 3.\n\nAccused No. 2 admits his going to see the goods on February 17, but states that he lost his interest in the goods i. u they were iron angles and his line of business was in non-ferrous goods. He explains his signing the letter Exhibit\n\nK by saying that he did so at the instance of accused No. 3 who represented to him that accused No. 1 had, by mistake, 11tored the goods in the name of accused No. 2 and of accused No. 3 showing him the document Exhibit Z-7 which he retained with himself.\n\nAccused No. 3 states that he had nothing to do with this matter and that he wrote Exhibit Z-7 at the instance of accused No. 2 who asked him to do so, he himself being unable to write in English or Hindi.\n\nWe now discuss the evidence to determine whether the accused Nos. 2 and 3 abetted the commission of the offences committed by accused No. 1.\n\nExhibit Z-7, as originally written, does not, appear to have had the first line, viz., the writing of 'To, Piaraya Lal C/o'. This was written subsequently. This is clear, as urged for accused No. 2, from the facts that it appears to have been written with a different pen and, possibly, with different ink also, and because the word 'C/ o' has been written at an unusual place. In ordinary writing, it should have been in line with the latter expression 'M / s. Sheopershad Bimal Kumar'. It follows therefore that this document was first written by accused No.· 3 to show that a third person had entrusted him with the railway receipt No. 43352, <luJed February 6, 1959, and that that person had received the material to which the railway receipt related. In this original form, the only conclusion possible from the original contents of the document can be that M/ s. Sheopershad Bimal Kumar, of which accused No. 3 is the proprietor, received this receipt from the third person in order to clear the goods from the railways. This would amply explain accused No. 1 taking delivery of the goods on February 18 and storing them with the National Transport Company in the account of accused No. 3 and the entries in the godown register.\n\nHimmatlal, P.W. 13. is the godown-keeper. He issued the receipt Exhibi~ Pl which records :\n\n'We have today received the under-mentioned goods for storage with us in our godown No. IPL on behalf of and under lien to Shiv Prasad Bimal Kumar.\"\n\n196/\n\nShiv Pras'ad\n\nChunilal\n\nStal• of Ma,,.\n\nrashtra\n\nRaghubar Dayol }.\n\n1961 This is a clear indication of the fact that the goods were 911• Priuad stored on behalf of Sheoper&had Bimal Kumar, i.e., accused Chunilal No. 3. The words 'under lien' are of great significance in y. 1141• of Mahathis respect and show that the storage was not shown to be\n\nra.rhtra on behalf of accused No. 3 merely because the angle irons llJJghub;; iiayal 1. were sent by accused No. I who was an employee of nccused\n\nNo. 3.\n\nThe expression 'under lien' points to there being some specified transaction between accused No. 3 and the National Transport Company for the storing of the articles.\n\nThis note further confirms the statement of Himmatlal that he had at first written in the accounts that the goods were received on account of Sheopershad Bimal Kumar and that it was on receipt of Exhibit Z-8 from accused No. 1 that he noted the words 'Account Pyare Lal' in the entries with respect to those goods .\n\n. The circumstance that accused No. 3 was in a better position to finance the transaction than accused No. I, is\n\nalo consistent with the aforesaid conclusion from the original contents of Exhibit Z-7.\n\nApart from the apparent later noting of the first line in this document, Exhibit Z-7, there appears no good reason why the receipt should have been writ'..en in this form if it was to be written at the instance of accused No. 2. There was no reason to give the address of Pyare Lal 8S c/o M/s. Sheopcrshad Bimal Kumar.\n\nThe later entry in this document must have been therefore for a purpo:; e nd that could have onlv been to show that the railway receipt No. 43352 was d:alt with by accused No. 2 and not by accused No. 3.\n\nMention may be made bere of the fact that certain witnesses who had, during their police statements, referred to certain actions of accused No. 3, stated in Court that those acts were committed by accused No. 2. No reliance can be placed on any of the statements of those witnesses and this fact.is just mentioned to show that it fits in with the very first attempt in converting the document originally prepared to, show that accused No. 3 had dealt with this forged railway receipt into a document showing that it was\n\n' '\n\n. -\n\nnot accused No. 3 but accused No. 2 who dealt with that receipt.\n\nShiv Prasad\n\nChullilll/ Accused No. 2 has been acting as a broker. He signed v.\n\nE h.b. K H b . h h I .\n\nStat• of Moht>- x 1 1t . e must e conversant wit t e anguage Ill r03htra which he signed. It was not necessary that the receipt R h b D al 1 Exhibit Z-7 should have been written in English or in Hindi ag \" ar 01 • even if accused. No. 2 did not know any of those languages.\n\nWe are therefore not prepared to accept the explanation of accused No. 3 with respect to his recording the document Exhibit Z-7.\n\nWe hold, as admitted by him, that he had written this document.\n\nIt .makes reference to the forged receipt of which advantage was taken in getting delivery of the iron angles.\n\nAccused No. 3, writing such a receipt, clearly points to his being concerned with the taking delivery of the iron angles, by accused No. 1, his employee. Once the forged receipt is traced to accused No. 3, from his own writing, the natural conclusion is that it was he who passed it on to his employee accused No. 1 for the purpose of getting delivery of those goods from the railway authorities.\n\nHe thus aided accused No. 1 in obtaining delivery of those goods, and in his committing the various offences for achieving that object. The further fact that the receipt was endorsed in the name of Datta and not in the name of accused No . .1, also proves that accused No. 3 must have known that the receipt he was dealing with was not a genume receipt for the goods which were to be taken delivery of.\n\nIf he had believed the Teceipt to be a genuine one, he would have endorsed it . or got it endorsed in the true name of his employee. 'His employee too would not have taken c.lelivery\n\nunder a false name. We are therefore of opinion that it is established from these various circumstances and facts that accused No. 3 had abetted the commission of the offences, the subject matter of ch'!rges Nos. 2 to 6, by accused No. I •\n\nThe points in favour of accused No. 2 are that he does not deal in non-ferrous metals and therefore he would not have taken any interest in the transaction after he Jiad found out on February 17 that the goods were ferrous and not non-ferrous. The fact that the goods were not stored in his\n\nname in the accounts of the godown of the National Trans-\n\n1961 port Company, but were stored in the first instance in the Shiv Prasad name of No. 3, also goes in his favour. If accused No. 3 Chunilal had nothing to do with it and accused No. 1 was simply State of Mahaacting for accused No. 2, he would have sent instructions\n\nrashtra in the very first instance to Himmatlal that goods were to Rarhubir Dayal 1. be stored in the account of accused No. 2. He did not do so. He sent intimation for storing the goods in the name of Pyarelal with the last lorry transporting the iron angles to the godown. Pyarelal bad no previous dealings with the National Transport Company.\n\nIn this connection, the exact direction given by accused No. 1 is of some significance.\n\nThe direction given by him in Exhibit Z-8 was 'Please give a receipt in the name of a/ c Py are Lal'.\n\nThe request was not that the goods were of Pyare Lal and so be stored on his account. That should have been the natural direction. The receipt would have then been issued in the name of Pyare Lal and of nobody else. The direction given by accused No. 1 therefore indicates that for certain purposes he desired the receipt alone to be in the name of Pyare Lal. Naturally, Himmatlal bad to make some entry in the books of the godown which would be consistent with a receipt issued in the name of Pyare Lal. Himmatlal therefore noted the words 'account Pyare Lal' below the original note 'account Sheopersbad Bimal Kumar', but saw no reason to make a statement in the receipt Exhibit P that the goods were stored on behalf of Pyare Lal and noted in it that they were stored on behalf and under lien to Sheopershad Bimal Kumar.\n\nAccused No. 2 signed the letter Exhibit K for the issue of the delivery order.\n\nHis explanation is that he did so when accused No. 3 insisted and told him that his employee had by mistake stored the goods in bis name. Ordinarily, this should not have been believed by accused No. 2 as there\n\nwa~ no reason why accused No. 1 should store the goods in bis name by mistake. He could have and might have suspected something not straight, but could shake off such su&picion by his being shown the receipt Exhibit Z-7, which showed that the goods had been cleared by A-3 on behalf of certain person who had passed on that receipt. He was under an o\\lligation to accused No. 3 and it is possible that he oould\n\n' '\n\nnot have strongly resisted the request of accused No. 3 to sign the letter Exhibit K.\n\nAccused No. 3 had necessarily to obtain a letter signed by Pyare Lal when the goods had not been shown to be stored in his account but were noted in the account of Pyare Lal or of both Sheopershad Birnal Kumar and Pyare Lal.\n\nIt is significant that accused No. 2 himself did not go to take delivery of the goods. It was accused No. 1 who took the delivery in two lots and each time signed the receipt in the name of Pyare Lal.\n\nIf accused No. 2 was also a party to the dishonest obtaining of the goods from the railway, there would not have been any occasion for such duplication of names on whose behalf the goods were stored with the National Transport Company or for such a document as Exhibit Z-7 coming into existence or for accused No. 2 keeping the document with himself. He kept it with himself for his protection and produced it for that purpose during investigation. It may be that when accused No. 3 tried to dispel his doubts when he was requested to sign the Jetter Exhibit K, accused No. 2 himself suggested the receipt Exhibit Z-7 to be addressed in his name, as only then that receipt could be of any help to him.\n\nJn these circumstances, we are of opinion that the complicity of accused No. 2 in the commission of the various offences by accused No. 1 is not established beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nWe therefore allow the appeal of Pyare Lal and acquit him of the offences he was convicted of.\n\nWe dismiss the appeal of accused No. 3, Shiv Prasad Chunilal Jain, but alter his conviction for the various offences read with s. 34 l.P.C. to those offences read with s. 109 I.P.C., and maintain the sentences.\n\nAppeal No. 185 allowed cmti Appeal No. 150 dismissed.\n\nConviction altered and sentence maintained.\n\nlf64\n\nSltiY l'rlllllll\n\nCllllnlW\n\n•• Stat1 of JI..,.\n\nr111htr•\n\nRaghubar Dqlll 1.", "total_entities": 144, "entities": [{"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 528, "end_char": 536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 658, "end_char": 663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 671, "end_char": 694, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 759, "end_char": 767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 814, "end_char": 824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 are very wide, but it is not suggested by Mr. Chatterjee that even these powers can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1229, "end_char": 1234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1242, "end_char": 1265, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 74 and 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1302, "end_char": 1320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1444, "end_char": 1469, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1474, "end_char": 1498, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. 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"start_char": 7197, "end_char": 7214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 18, 1964\n\naccused No."}}, {"text": "Shiv", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7274, "end_char": 7278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 obtained the delivery sheet of the bill and Shiv J:riuad signed it in the name of Shri Datta."}}, {"text": "Datta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7317, "end_char": 7322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 obtained the delivery sheet of the bill and Shiv J:riuad signed it in the name of Shri Datta."}}, {"text": "state of Mahi>-· Railway Delivery Book", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7415, "end_char": 7453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J ... delivery of the iron angles from the railway and signed the state of Mahi>-· Railway Delivery Book in the name of Shri Datta."}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7549, "end_char": 7563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The r~ 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{"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16319, "end_char": 16325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16336, "end_char": 16341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16691, "end_char": 16696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16697, "end_char": 16702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16806, "end_char": 16811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17032, "end_char": 17037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17302, "end_char": 17307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Shiv Pr@tld", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17729, "end_char": 17740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Pr@tld\n\nChun/la/ v.\n\nStat• of Maharashtra\n\nRoghubar Dayal J.\n\ndone at different times and places."}}, {"text": "Stat• of Maharashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17755, "end_char": 17775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Pr@tld\n\nChun/la/ v.\n\nStat• of Maharashtra\n\nRoghubar Dayal J.\n\ndone at different times and places."}}, {"text": "Roghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17777, "end_char": 17791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Pr@tld\n\nChun/la/ v.\n\nStat• of Maharashtra\n\nRoghubar Dayal J.\n\ndone at different times and places."}}, {"text": "Shree Kantiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17836, "end_char": 17849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shree Kantiah's case( 1 ), misappropriation was committed by removing the goods from a Government depot and on the occasion of the removal of the goods, the first accused was not present.", "canonical_name": "Shree Kantiah"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18292, "end_char": 18297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18305, "end_char": 18322, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 18, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18531, "end_char": 18548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, in the present case, alone did the various acts on February 18, 1959 which constituted the offences of which he was convicted."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18989, "end_char": 18994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18995, "end_char": 19000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19281, "end_char": 19286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19287, "end_char": 19292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Baburam Gavade", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20499, "end_char": 20513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 went with Baburam Gavade, P.W. 1, a clearing agent, on February 17, 1959, to see the goods."}}, {"text": "February 17, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20544, "end_char": 20561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 went with Baburam Gavade, P.W. 1, a clearing agent, on February 17, 1959, to see the goods."}}, {"text": "Shiv Prasad Bimal Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20661, "end_char": 20684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The godown register showed the angle irons to be received in the account of Shiv Prasad Bimal Kumar and Pyare Lal, accused No."}}, {"text": "Pyare Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20689, "end_char": 20698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The godown register showed the angle irons to be received in the account of Shiv Prasad Bimal Kumar and Pyare Lal, accused No.", "canonical_name": "Pyare Lal"}}, {"text": "National Transport Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20767, "end_char": 20793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 wrote the letter Exhibit K to the National Transport Company for issuing the delivery order with respect to the angle irons in order to enable him to take delivery thereof."}}, {"text": "Shiv Prarad\n\nChunilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21544, "end_char": 21565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This further entry was made on receipt of Exhibit Z-8 from\n\n134-159 S.C-59\n\n196~\n\nShiv Prarad\n\nChunilal\n\nv .• State of MaJrt..\n\nrashtra\n\nRaghubar Dayal I.\n\nShiv Pruad\n\nCh1111illll\n\nS•t• of Jlahara1htra\n\naccused No.", "canonical_name": "SHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN"}}, {"text": "State of MaJrt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21572, "end_char": 21586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This further entry was made on receipt of Exhibit Z-8 from\n\n134-159 S.C-59\n\n196~\n\nShiv Prarad\n\nChunilal\n\nv .• State of MaJrt..\n\nrashtra\n\nRaghubar Dayal I.\n\nShiv Pruad\n\nCh1111illll\n\nS•t• of Jlahara1htra\n\naccused No."}}, {"text": "Piaraya Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23937, "end_char": 23948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the writing of 'To, Piaraya Lal C/o'."}}, {"text": "Sheopershad Bimal Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24292, "end_char": 24315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In ordinary writing, it should have been in line with the latter expression 'M / s. Sheopershad Bimal Kumar'.", "canonical_name": "Sheopershad Birnal Kumar"}}, {"text": "Himmatlal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25066, "end_char": 25075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Himmatlal, P.W. 13."}}, {"text": "Shiv Pras'ad\n\nChunilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25314, "end_char": 25336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196/\n\nShiv Pras'ad\n\nChunilal\n\nStal• of Ma,,.", "canonical_name": "SHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN"}}, {"text": "Himmatlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26028, "end_char": 26037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This note further confirms the statement of Himmatlal that he had at first written in the accounts that the goods were received on account of Sheopershad Bimal Kumar and that it was on receipt of Exhibit Z-8 from accused No."}}, {"text": "Sheopcrshad Bimal Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26798, "end_char": 26821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no reason to give the address of Pyare Lal 8S c/o M/s. Sheopcrshad Bimal Kumar.", "canonical_name": "Sheopershad Birnal Kumar"}}, {"text": "Shiv Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27626, "end_char": 27637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Prasad\n\nChullilll/ Accused No.", "canonical_name": "SHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN"}}, {"text": "rashtra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30160, "end_char": 30167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, he would have sent instructions\n\nrashtra in the very first instance to Himmatlal that goods were to Rarhubir Dayal 1."}}, {"text": "Rarhubir Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30227, "end_char": 30241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, he would have sent instructions\n\nrashtra in the very first instance to Himmatlal that goods were to Rarhubir Dayal 1."}}, {"text": "Pyarelal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30362, "end_char": 30370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He sent intimation for storing the goods in the name of Pyarelal with the last lorry transporting the iron angles to the godown.", "canonical_name": "Pyare Lal"}}, {"text": "Sheopersbad Bimal Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31293, "end_char": 31316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Himmatlal therefore noted the words 'account Pyare Lal' below the original note 'account Sheopersbad Bimal Kumar', but saw no reason to make a statement in the receipt Exhibit P that the goods were stored on behalf of Pyare Lal and noted in it that they were stored on behalf and under lien to Sheopershad Bimal Kumar.", "canonical_name": "Sheopershad Birnal Kumar"}}, {"text": "Sheopershad Birnal Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32505, "end_char": 32529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 had necessarily to obtain a letter signed by Pyare Lal when the goods had not been shown to be stored in his account but were noted in the account of Pyare Lal or of both Sheopershad Birnal Kumar and Pyare Lal.", "canonical_name": "Sheopershad Birnal Kumar"}}, {"text": "Shiv Prasad Chunilal Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33770, "end_char": 33795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, Shiv Prasad Chunilal Jain, but alter his conviction for the various offences read with s. 34 l.P.C. to those offences read with s. 109 I.P.C., and maintain the sentences.", "canonical_name": "SHIV PRASAD CHUNILAL JAIN"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33857, "end_char": 33862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33898, "end_char": 33904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33905, "end_char": 33910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_936_947_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "March, 3\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nD. NAMASIVAYA MUDALIAR AND OTIIERS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C,\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND s. M. SIKRI, JJ.)\n\nMadras Lignite (Acquisition of Land) Act (XI of 1953). ss. 2 and 3 -Acquisition of lignite lands-Compensation to be assesed on market value prel'ailing on April 28, 1947-Va/ue of nvnagricul-\n\nJ... tural improvements after that date not to be taken into consideration-Act passed before Constitution (Fonrth Amend1nent)- Validity of Ac:--Compensations now fixed-Constitution of India, Art. 31 PTior to the Constitution (Fourth Amend111e11t) Act, 1955.\n\nThe respondents in the above appeals are owners of certain lands which are to be compulsorily acquired untler Madras Lignite (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1953. This Act came into force on August 20, 1953 before Art. 31 of the Constitution was amended by the Constitu tion (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. By the saia Act substantially two provisions which are material to the present appeals were made.\n\nThe first was that compensation for acquisition of lignite-bearing lands under the Land Acquisition Act is to be assessed on the market value of the land prevailing on August 28, 1947 and not on the date on which notification is,/issued under s. 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition AcL Secondly it was provided that in awarding compensation the value of non-agricultural improvements commenced since April 28, 1947 will no& be taken into consideration.\n\nIn accordance with the above provisions, after issuing the notices u required under ss. 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act the Land Acquisition Officer made awards regarding the lands of the respondents.\n\nThe respondents thereupon filed petitions under Art. 226 of the Consti• tution before the High Court of Madras challenging the validity of tho award on the ground that the provisions of the i\\ct relating to tho award of compensation violate Art. 31(2) of the Constitution [as ii\n\nstood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. 1955]. Tho High Court upheld the contention. In appeal,\n\nHeld: (i) The validity of the Act impugned in the present appeal has to be examined in the light of the provisions of Art. 31 of tho Coristitution as they stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.\n\nChiranjit Lal Chuwdhuri ii. Union of India, [1950] S.C.R. 869, State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopa/ Bose, [1954] S.C.R. 587, ao'd State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Baneriee, [1954] S.C.R. 558, relied.\n\n(ii} The principle laid down in Bela Ban ; rjee's case, that the ceilj :1 ... on the compensation without reference to the value of the land at the time of the acquisition is arbitrary and cannot be regarded as due com .. pensation in letter and spirit \\Vithin the reliuircrnent of Art. 31(2), would apply to the impugned Act.\n\nFixation of compensation for C.:\"11pulsory acquisition of land notified many years after that date on the market value prevailing on the date on which lignite was discovereCl is wholly arbitrary and inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Art. 31(2) as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.\n\n(iii) Any principle for determination of compensation denying to the owner all increments in value between a fixed date and the date of issue of the notice under s. 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act must prilna facie, be regarded as denying him the true equiv:ilent of the land which is ex propriatcd and it is for the State to show that fixation of compensation on the market value on an anterior date does not amount to a viofo.tion of the Constitutional guarantee. In the present appeals no materials have been placed by the State which would support any such case.\n\n(iv) Denial of compensation for the value of non-agricultural im~ provements would be denying to him just compensation for the loss suffered by him on account of compulsory acquisition of his holding and would amount to infringement of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.\n\nCIVIL APl'ELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 6 to 12 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated February 2, 1959 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1, 2, 202, 203, 204, 309 and 373 of 1958.\n\nA. Rang1N1adham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nR. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 11/63).\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-Genera/ and R. H.\n\nDhebar, for interveners Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dlzebar, for intervener No. 3.\n\nG. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, Rajasthan, R. , H.\n\nDhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for intervener No. 4.\n\nStall of Madr\"' •\n\nD. N•111D1ivaya\n\nMudaliJJT\n\n.State of Madra.r\n\nD. Namalivayo\n\nMudaliar\n\nShah /.\n\nMarch 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-\"Whether ss. 2 and 3 of the Madras Lignite (Acquisition of Land) Act XI of 1953 which eek to amend the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 in their application to acquisition of lignite-bearing lands are invalid because they infringe the fundamental right under Art. 31 of the Constitution of owners of lands whose property is to be compulsorily acquired is the only question which falls to be determined in this group of appeals.\n\nInvestigations conducted by the Geological Survey of India in 194 7 revealed deposits of lignite in the South Arcot District of the State of Madras, and exploratory mining operations were commenced by the Government of M2-dras.\n\nDiscovery of deposits of lignite led to speculation in lands.\n\nOn October 6, 1948, the Government of Madras issued a\n\n\"Pres~-Note\" announcing that the Government proposed to undertake legislation reserving power to compel any person who had purchased land on or after a date to be prescribed in 1947 in the !ignite-bearing areas to sell such lands to the Government at. the rate at which it was purchased. The Government also advised the owners of the lignite-bearing lands in the Vriddhachalam ancl Cuddalore taluks not to sell their lands to speculators.\n\nOn January 7, 1953, the Government of Madras published a Bill to amend the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 in certain respects.\n\nThe Bill was duly passed by the State Legislature on June 2, 1953 and received the assem of the President.\n\nIt was published as an Act on June 10, 1953 and came into force on August 20, 1953.\n\nBy this Act substantially three provisions are made: ·\n\n( 1) that compensation for acquisition of lignitebearing lands under the Land Acquisition Act as amended, is to be assessed on the market value of the land prevailing on.April 28, 1947, and not on the date on which the notification is issued under s. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition , Act;\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\n(2)\n\npower is reserved under s. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act to take possession in cases of urgency of lands for the purpose of working lignite mines in the areas in which the Madras Lignite (Acquisition of Land) Act XI of 1953 extends; and\n\n(3) in assessing the market value of the land on April 28, 194 7, value of any non-agricultural improvements on the land commenced, made or effected after that date are not to be taken into account, even if such improvements were made before the date of publication of the notification under s. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nl'ursuant to this Act, notifications under s~ 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act were issued between the months of January and May 1957 notifying for acquisition certain lands in Vriddachalam taluk of the South Arcot District.\n\nThese notifications were followed by notifications under\n\n' 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Between the months of May and November 1957 the Land Acquisition Officer made his awards under s. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act assessing compensation on the basis of market value of the lands on April 28, 1947 and ignoring in the computation\n\nof compensation the value of houses built or other non- 11gricultural improvements made on the land since that date.\n\nThe owners of the lands affected by these awards submitted petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution to the High •Court of Judicature at Madras challenging the validity of the awards on the ground that the provisions of Madras Act XI of 1953 violated the fundamental right of the owners of the lands under Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nThey claimed that the Land Acquisition Officer was bound to award compensation for acquisition of their lands and buildings at the market value prevailing on the respective dates of the notifications under s. 4 (1), and that awards valuing the lands at the market rate prevailing on April 28, 1947, and excluding the value of buildings constructed after that date and trees thereon were without jurisdiction. The petitioners accordingly claimed that writs of mandamus be\n\nState uf Jillllru ...\n\nD. Ntlllfllliwt1c\n\nJludJJliar\n\nSllllh /.\n\nstol• of Madraa ...\n\nD. Nan11uiwq11\n\nMudaliar\n\nShl.h J.\n\nissued directing the State of Madras and the Land Acquisition Officers to refrain from taking rpossession of the lands and buildings from the petitioners without payment of adequate compensation and for other appropnate 1elief.\n\nThe High Court upheld the contention of the petitioners. and declared that the awards made on the basis of the provisions of Madras Act XI of 1953 could not be sustained.\n\nAgainst the order passed by the High Court, these appeals have been preferred by the State of Madras, with certificate of fitness granted by the High Court under Art. 132 1Jf the\n\nConstitution.\n\nThe Madras Act XI of 1953 makes an important departure from the scheme of the Land Acquiition Act I of 1894.\n\nUnder the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, a person interested in any land compulsorily acquired is entitled to the market value of his interest in the land at the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4 (1), and this compensation includes the value of all improvements agricultural and non-agricultural made in the land upto the date of the notification.\n\nBy Ma:dras Act XI of 1953, compensation made payable for compulsory acquisition of.Jand is the value of the land on April 28, 1947, together with the value of any agricultural improvements ma•e thereon after that date and before publication of the notification under s. 4( 1). The result of the Madras Act is therefore to freeze for the purpose of acquisition the prices of land in the area to which it applies, and the owners are deprived of the benefit of appreciation of land values since April 28, 1947, whenever the notification wider s. 4( 1) may be issued and also of non-agricultural improvements made in the land after April 28, 1947.\n\nDeparture from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is challenged as illegal on the ground that it deprives the owner of the land of just compensation for cCJmpulsory acquisition of hii. property.\n\nMadras Act XI of 1953 was passed before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 was enacted, and we have to deal with the question of the validity of the Act in the light of the constitutional provisions contained in Art. 31 before the constitutional amendment. We may\n\n. \"\n\nake it clear that for the purpose of this judgment, we 196! express no opinion on the question whether it is possible State al Mfidrtu\n\nby enacting legislation after the amendment of Art. 31 ( 2)\n\nY • . by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 D. ~\",; d~\n\n(which is not given any retrospective operation) to provide that compensation for compulsory acquisition of land may\n\nSW .J. be fixed on the basis of market value prevailing on a date\n\nterior to the date of the issue of the notification under :s. 4 (1) . Article 31 before it was amended by the Consti\n\ntion (Fourth Amendment) Act 1955, by its els. ( 1) and\n\n(2) provided:\n\n\"( 1) N0 person shali be depnved of his property save by authority of Jaw.\n\n(2) No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, .shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the takmg of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifics the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given.\"\n\n1t wa.s hdd by this Court in Chiraniit Lal Clwwdhuri v.\n\nUnion of India and others(') and The State of West Bengal\n\nv. S!1bhodh Go pal Bose and others( 2 ) that els. (1) aAu (2) of Art. 31 relate to the same subject of \"eminent domain\".\n\nBy Art. 31 therefore every person was protected against deprivation of his property save by authority of law, and the law authorising taking possession or acquisition of property for public purposes had io fix the quantum of compensation, or to specify principles on which compensa tion was to be determined for the property taken possession .of or acquired. Power to legislate in respect. of compensa\n\ntion for acquisition and requisitioning of property was\n\n(I) [19SO) S.C.R. 869.\n\n(2) [19,4) S.C.R. S81.\n\n19'1\n\nStld• .t Madr111 ...\n\nD. Nlll1WlYtr1• ltllldalilr\n\nShoh J.\n\ncontained in Entry 42 List ill of the Seventh Schedule and read as follows :\n\n\"Principles on which compensation for iproperty\n\nacquired or requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given.\"\n\nThe Constitution therefore conferred by Art. 31 (2) a fundamental right upon every person, protecting his property against compulsory acquisition otherwise than by authority of law, and without just indemnification for Joss suffered by him. In The State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee and others ( ') this Court observed that when under Emry 42 List III the Legislature was given discretionary power to lay down the principles which should govern determination of the amount to be given to the owner of the property appropriated, such principles must ensure that what i~ determined as payable must be a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of, and that subject to this basic limitation the Constitution allowed free play to the legislative judgment as to what principles should guide the determination of the amount payable. The Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, which was enacted primarily for the settlement of immigrants who had migrated into West Bengal due to communal disturbances in East Bengal and which by s. 8' provided that the compensation to be awarded for com\n\npulsory acquisition to the owner of the land was not to• exceed the market value on December 31, 1946, was 11/tra vires the Constitution and void under Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. It was observed at p. 564 :\n\n\"Turning now to the provisions relating to compensation under the impugned Act, it will be seen that the latter part of the proviso to section 8 limits the amount of compensation so as not to exceed the market value of the land\n\n(I) [19S4] S.C.lt. HI.\n\n. '\n\n' '\n\non December 31, 1946, no matter when the land is acquired.\n\nConsidering that the impugned Act is a permanent enactment and lands may be acquired under it many years after it came into force, the fixing of the market value on December 31, 1946, as the ceiling on compensation, without reference to the value of the land at the time of the acquisition is arbitrary and cannot be regarded as due compensation in letter and spirit with the requirement of article 31 ( 2).\"\n\nThat principle must apply in adjudging the validity of Madras Act XI of 1953.\n\nIt may be assumed that April 28, 1947, was the date on which lignite deposits were discovered in the areas to which the Act is extended. But there fa no true relation between the acquisition of the lands in these cases and fixation of compensation based on their value on the market rate prevailing on April 28, 1947. Fixation of compensation for compulsory acquisition of lands notified many years after that date. on the market value prevailing on the date on which lignite was discovered is wholly arbitrary and inconsistent with the letter and pirit of Art. 31 (2) as it stood before it was amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. 1955. If the owner is by a constitutional guarantee protected against expropriation of his property otherwise than for a just monetary equivalent, a law which authorises acquisition of land not for its true value, but for value frozen on some date anterior to the acquisition, on the assumption that all appreciation in its value since that date is attributable to purposes for which the State may use the land at some time in future, must be regarded as infringing the fundamental right.\n\nCounsel for the State of Madras relying upon the following observation of Patanjali Sastri, CJ., in Mrs. Bela\n\nBanerjee's case(') at p. 564:\n\n\"The fixing of an anterior date for the ascertainment of value may not, in certain circumstances, be\n\n(I) [19541 S.C.R. SSB.\n\nState of MadrtU v.\n\nD. Namruiva1fll.\n\nMUllaliar\n\nShah I.\n\n'1141• of MadrlU\n\nv. ;/J, Na'llltl8ivaya\n\nMlldali4'\n\n,.,,,,,. /.\n\na violation of the constitutional requirement as, for instance, when the proposed scheme of acquisition becomes known before it is launched and prices rise sharply in anticipation of the benefits to be derived under it, but the fixing of an anterior date, which might have no relation to the value of the land when it is acquired, may be, many years later, cannot but be regarded as arbitrary\",\n\nsubmitt!!d that a law which merely fixes the market value on a date anterior to the da, te on which the owner is expropriated of his land, as determinative of the market value on which the compensation is to be based, cannot without further enquiry be regarded as infringing Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nIn our view this observation cannot assist the State of Madras in saving the provisions of Madras Act XI of 1953 from the vice of infringing the constitutional guarantee under Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. The right which is guaranteed is undoubtedly the right to a just indemnification for loss, and appreciation in the m.arket value of the land because of the proposed acquisition may in assessing compensation be ignored.\n\nEven the Land Acquisition Act provides for assessment of C01111Jlcnsation on the basis of market value of the land noi on the date on which interest of the owner of land is extinguished under s. 16, but on the basis of market value prevailing on the date on which the notification under s. 4 (1) is issued.\n\nWhether this rule in all cases irrespective of subsequent developments ensures just indemnification of the expropriat ed owner so as to be immune from attack, does not call for comment in this case.\n\nBut any principle for determination of compensation denying to the owner all mcrements in value between a fixed date and the date of issue of the notification under s. 4( l ), must prima facie, be regarded as denying io him the true equivalent of the land which is expropriated and it is for the State to show that fixation of compensation on the market value on ; m anterior date <foe not amount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee No m:a1erials. have been placed by the State before this Court which would support any such case.\n\nIt is true that the Province of Madras had issued a \"Press-Note\" in 1948 announcing that the Government proposed to undertake legislation reserving the power to compel any person who had purchased land in the lignite bearing areas to sell such land to them at the rate at which it was purchased. The only intimation given thereby to the owners of lands was that the Government may undertake legislation for the purpose of purchasing lands at the price at which the speculators in land may have purchased them.\n\nThere is no evidence that any scheme for acquisition of land for mining of lignite was prepared in 1947 by the Government of Madras.\n\nThe mining operations in 1947 must, in the very nature of things, have been exploratory.\n\nThe statement of objects and reasons for the Act clearly discloses that initially mining operations were started by the Government on a small area.\n\nAssuming that in appropriate cases, fixation of a date anterior to the publication of the notification under s. 4 ( l) for ascertainment of market value of the land to be acquired, may not always be regarded as a violation of the constitutional guarantee, in the absence of evidence that . compensation assessed on the basis of market value on such anterior date, awards to the expropriated owner a just monetary value of his property at the date on which his interest is extinguished, the provisions of the Act arbitrarily fixing compensation based on the market value at a date many years before the notificatkm under s. 4 ( l) was issued, cannot be regarded as valid. It is a matter of common knowledge that since the termination of hostilities in the last World War there has been an upward tendency in land va'ues resulting in appreciation In some areas many times the original value of lands. No attempt\n\nha~ been made by the State to prove that appreciation in the market value of lands in the area since April 1947 was solely attributable to a scheme of land acquisition of lignite bearing lands. To deny to the owner of the land compensation at rates which justly indemnify him for his loss by awarding him compensation at rates prevailing ten years before the date on whic)l the notification under s. 4 (1) was .issued amounts in the circumstances to a flagrant infringement of the fundamental right .of the owner of the land\n\nunder Art. 31 ( 2) as it stood when the Act was enacted.\n\n134-159 S.C.-60\n\n196#\n\nSt•t1 of Madra1\n\nD. Namam~\n\nMudalUir\n\nShall I.\n\n.196#\n\nState of Madtm\n\nD. NamtUivtI'I•\n\nMudalinr\n\nShah /.\n\nThe validity of the provision relating to fixation of compen.ation had to be adjudged in the light of the constitutional protection guaranteed at the date when the Act was brought into operation, and any restriction oi\n\nthe constitutional protection by subsequent amendment of Art. 31 ( 2) which has not been given retrospective effect, must be entirely ignored.\n\nThe provision which denies to the owner of land compensation for non-agricultural improvements made by him since April 28, 1947, also infringes the protection of Art. 31 ( 2). Under s. 3 (a) of the Land Acquisition Act \"land\" is defined as including benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth, and when under s. 4(1) land is notified for acquisition, the acquis:tion is of the entityty of the interest of the owner in the land including underground rights if any, crops, trees and superstructures.\n\nBy the Madras Act the owner is deprived of the value of all non-agricultural improvements including the value of non-agricultural buildings, erected on the land after April 28, 194 7. It is not clear whether the non-agricultural buildings constructed after the specified date are forfeited to the\n\nState on acquisition, or the owner is entitled to remove them. In either case the owner is deprived of just value of his land including the uperstructure, of which he is expropriated. Denial to the owner of the land of the value of the structures constructed by him (even of those put up after April 28, 1947, with the knowledge that the Government may undertake legislation for the purpose of compulsory acquisition of the land) would still be denying to him just compensation for the loss suffered by him on account ·\n\nof compulsory acquisition of his holding, and would amount to infringement of Art. 31( 2) of the ConStittnlon.\n\nWe are therefore of the view that the provisions which require the Land Acquisition Officer and the Court to assess compensation of the land compulsorily acquired only on the market value of the land on April 28, 1947, together with the value of agricultural improvements on the land commenced, made or effected after that date, and before the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4(1),\n\nwithout taking into consideration the value of non-agricultural improvements made after that date, must be regarded as invalid.\n\nWe are not called upon to express any opinion on the question whether the power reserved under s. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by s. 2 of Madras Act XI of . 1953 to take possession of lands under the emergency clause for the purpose of working lignite mines in the areas to which the Madras Lignite (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1953, extends is invalid.\n\nNo argument has been advanced by either side before us on this question.\n\nNor was the High Court called upon to consider the validity of that provision.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are dismissed.\n\nThe respondents in this group of appeals, except in appeal No. 11 of 1963. have not appeared in this Court.\n\nTherefore in appeal No. I 1 of 1963 alone, the State of Madras will pay the costs of the respondent. There will be no order as to costs in other appeals.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nTHE TOWN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRAVATI\n\nI'.\n\nRAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND\n\nANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADICAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)\n\nTerminal Tax-Imposition of ttrminal tax by Municipality on silver ond\n\n•ilvtr i•w•ll•ry, gold and told i•w•ll•ry and pr.cioiu llon.. In 1960-Th•\" tax\" not l<vi•d b•for. by Municipality-Wh•lhtr 1aved by Art. 277 of the COMtitution-''Continut to bt levied and to b• applitd to th• 111m• purposd'-Mtaning of--C.P. and Btrar Municipalititt Act, 1922, •· 55-Gov•rnmtnt of InJia Act, 1935, 1. 143(2)--ColUlitutlon of India, Art. 277.\n\n' 196#\n\nSt•l1 of Madra3\n\n\"· D. Nam°'iwrfo\n\nMudaliar\n\nShah J.\n\n196#\n\nMarch 3", "total_entities": 126, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": ".State of Madra.r", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. NAMASIVAYA MUDALIAR AND OTIIERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. NAMASIVAYA MUDALIAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 186, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 244, "end_char": 255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 549, "end_char": 570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 572, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August 20, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 826, "end_char": 841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act came into force on August 20, 1953 before Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 849, "end_char": 856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August 28, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1207, "end_char": 1222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was that compensation for acquisition of lignite-bearing lands under the Land Acquisition Act is to be assessed on the market value of the land prevailing on August 28, 1947 and not on the date on which notification is,/issued under s. 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition AcL Secondly it was provided that in awarding compensation the value of non-agricultural improvements commenced since April 28, 1947 will no& be taken into consideration."}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1282, "end_char": 1290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 28, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1433, "end_char": 1447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was that compensation for acquisition of lignite-bearing lands under the Land Acquisition Act is to be assessed on the market value of the land prevailing on August 28, 1947 and not on the date on which notification is,/issued under s. 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition AcL Secondly it was provided that in awarding compensation the value of non-agricultural improvements commenced since April 28, 1947 will no& be taken into consideration."}}, {"text": "ss. 4(1) and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1571, "end_char": 1585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744, "end_char": 1752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1786, "end_char": 1806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Consti• tution before the High Court of Madras challenging the validity of tho award on the ground that the provisions of the i\\ct relating to tho award of compensation violate Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1937, "end_char": 1947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2205, "end_char": 2212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chiranjit Lal Chuwdhuri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2303, "end_char": 2326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chiranjit Lal Chuwdhuri ii."}}, {"text": "Bela Ban", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2537, "end_char": 2545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii} The principle laid down in Bela Ban ; rjee's case, that the ceilj :1 ... on the compensation without reference to the value of the land at the time of the acquisition is arbitrary and cannot be regarded as due com .. pensation in letter and spirit \\Vithin the reliuircrnent of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2787, "end_char": 2797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3075, "end_char": 3085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3315, "end_char": 3323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3959, "end_char": 3969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4127, "end_char": 4144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the judgment and decree dated February 2, 1959 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos."}}, {"text": "A. Rang1N1adham Chetty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4210, "end_char": 4232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Rang1N1adham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Rang1N1adham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4353, "end_char": 4364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-Genera/ and R. H.\n\nDhebar, for interveners Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4445, "end_char": 4459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dlzebar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4461, "end_char": 4473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dlzebar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dlzebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4478, "end_char": 4491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dlzebar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "G. C. Kasliwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4516, "end_char": 4530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, Rajasthan, R. , H.\n\nDhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "H.\n\nDhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4566, "end_char": 4576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, Rajasthan, R. , H.\n\nDhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4581, "end_char": 4598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, Rajasthan, R. , H.\n\nDhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": ".State of Madra.r", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4670, "end_char": 4687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stall of Madr\"' •\n\nD. N•111D1ivaya\n\nMudaliJJT\n\n.State of Madra.r\n\nD. Namalivayo\n\nMudaliar\n\nShah /.\n\nMarch 3, 1964.", "canonical_name": ".State of Madra.r"}}, {"text": "ss. 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4800, "end_char": 4811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4899, "end_char": 4924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5048, "end_char": 5055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "statute": "Acquisition Act I of 1894"}}, {"text": "Arcot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5328, "end_char": 5333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Investigations conducted by the Geological Survey of India in 194 7 revealed deposits of lignite in the South Arcot District of the State of Madras, and exploratory mining operations were commenced by the Government of M2-dras."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5359, "end_char": 5365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Investigations conducted by the Geological Survey of India in 194 7 revealed deposits of lignite in the South Arcot District of the State of Madras, and exploratory mining operations were commenced by the Government of M2-dras."}}, {"text": "October 6, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5513, "end_char": 5528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 6, 1948, the Government of Madras issued a\n\n\"Pres~-Note\" announcing that the Government proposed to undertake legislation reserving power to compel any person who had purchased land on or after a date to be prescribed in 1947 in the !"}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5534, "end_char": 5554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 6, 1948, the Government of Madras issued a\n\n\"Pres~-Note\" announcing that the Government proposed to undertake legislation reserving power to compel any person who had purchased land on or after a date to be prescribed in 1947 in the !"}}, {"text": "Cuddalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5947, "end_char": 5956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government also advised the owners of the lignite-bearing lands in the Vriddhachalam ancl Cuddalore taluks not to sell their lands to speculators."}}, {"text": "January 7, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 7, 1953, the Government of Madras published a Bill to amend the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 in certain respects."}}, {"text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6085, "end_char": 6110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 2, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6186, "end_char": 6198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bill was duly passed by the State Legislature on June 2, 1953 and received the assem of the President."}}, {"text": "June 10, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6271, "end_char": 6284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was published as an Act on June 10, 1953 and came into force on August 20, 1953."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6630, "end_char": 6634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "statute": "Acquisition Act I of 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6710, "end_char": 6715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "statute": "Acquisition Act I of 1894"}}, {"text": "April 28, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6974, "end_char": 6989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 28, 1947, and not on the date on which the notification is issued under s. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition , Act;\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\n(2)\n\npower is reserved under s. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act to take possession in cases of urgency of lands for the purpose of working lignite mines in the areas in which the Madras Lignite (Acquisition of Land) Act XI of 1953 extends; and\n\n(3) in assessing the market value of the land on April 28, 194 7, value of any non-agricultural improvements on the land commenced, made or effected after that date are not to be taken into account, even if such improvements were made before the date of publication of the notification under s. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7217, "end_char": 7221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vriddachalam taluk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7434, "end_char": 7452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'ursuant to this Act, notifications under s~ 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act were issued between the months of January and May 1957 notifying for acquisition certain lands in Vriddachalam taluk of the South Arcot District."}}, {"text": "Arcot District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7466, "end_char": 7480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'ursuant to this Act, notifications under s~ 4( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act were issued between the months of January and May 1957 notifying for acquisition certain lands in Vriddachalam taluk of the South Arcot District."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7669, "end_char": 7674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8012, "end_char": 8020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8246, "end_char": 8253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court of Judicature at Madras challenging the validity of the awards on the ground that the provisions of Madras Act", "statute": "Court of Judicature at Madras challenging the validity of the awards on the ground that the provisions of Madras Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8486, "end_char": 8490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court of Judicature at Madras challenging the validity of the awards on the ground that the provisions of Madras Act", "statute": "Court of Judicature at Madras challenging the validity of the awards on the ground that the provisions of Madras Act"}}, {"text": "D. Nan11uiwq11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8838, "end_char": 8852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners accordingly claimed that writs of mandamus be\n\nState uf Jillllru ...\n\nD. Ntlllfllliwt1c\n\nJludJJliar\n\nSllllh /.\n\nstol• of Madraa ...\n\nD. Nan11uiwq11\n\nMudaliar\n\nShl.h J.\n\nissued directing the State of Madras and the Land Acquisition Officers to refrain from taking rpossession of the lands and buildings from the petitioners without payment of adequate compensation and for other appropnate 1elief."}}, {"text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9228, "end_char": 9249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9360, "end_char": 9375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order passed by the High Court, these appeals have been preferred by the State of Madras, with certificate of fitness granted by the High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9437, "end_char": 9445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "statute": "Madras Act XI of 1953"}}, {"text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9474, "end_char": 9495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Acquiition Act I of 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9553, "end_char": 9577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9595, "end_char": 9620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9793, "end_char": 9797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "statute": "Acquisition Act I of 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10218, "end_char": 10226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "statute": "Acquisition Act I of 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10491, "end_char": 10499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act I of 1894", "statute": "Acquisition Act I of 1894"}}, {"text": "Departure from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10596, "end_char": 10653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10800, "end_char": 10821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11023, "end_char": 11030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "statute": "Madras Act XI of 1953"}}, {"text": "State al Mfidrtu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11199, "end_char": 11215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "express no opinion on the question whether it is possible State al Mfidrtu\n\nby enacting legislation after the amendment of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11264, "end_char": 11271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "statute": "Madras Act XI of 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11589, "end_char": 11593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "statute": "Madras Act XI of 1953"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11600, "end_char": 11610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "statute": "Madras Act XI of 1953"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12500, "end_char": 12507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12560, "end_char": 12567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13059, "end_char": 13062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shoh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13122, "end_char": 13126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19'1\n\nStld• .t Madr111 ...\n\nD. Nlll1WlYtr1• ltllldalilr\n\nShoh J.\n\ncontained in Entry 42 List ill of the Seventh Schedule and read as follows :\n\n\"Principles on which compensation for iproperty\n\nacquired or requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given.\""}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13169, "end_char": 13185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13493, "end_char": 13500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Joss", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13672, "end_char": 13676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 (2) a fundamental right upon every person, protecting his property against compulsory acquisition otherwise than by authority of law, and without just indemnification for Joss suffered by him."}}, {"text": "Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14303, "end_char": 14384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14513, "end_char": 14524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, which was enacted primarily for the settlement of immigrants who had migrated into West Bengal due to communal disturbances in East Bengal and which by s. 8' provided that the compensation to be awarded for com\n\npulsory acquisition to the owner of the land was not to• exceed the market value on December 31, 1946, was 11/tra vires the Constitution and void under Art."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14538, "end_char": 14542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948", "statute": "The Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "December 31, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14682, "end_char": 14699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, which was enacted primarily for the settlement of immigrants who had migrated into West Bengal due to communal disturbances in East Bengal and which by s. 8' provided that the compensation to be awarded for com\n\npulsory acquisition to the owner of the land was not to• exceed the market value on December 31, 1946, was 11/tra vires the Constitution and void under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14750, "end_char": 14760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948", "statute": "The Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14946, "end_char": 14955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948", "statute": "The Court therefore held that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15525, "end_char": 15535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15599, "end_char": 15620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16180, "end_char": 16187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "statute": "Madras Act XI of 1953"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16834, "end_char": 16850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the State of Madras relying upon the following observation of Patanjali Sastri, CJ.,"}}, {"text": "Bela\n\nBanerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16865, "end_char": 16879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Mrs. Bela\n\nBanerjee's case(') at p. 564:\n\n\"The fixing of an anterior date for the ascertainment of value may not, in certain circumstances, be\n\n(I) [19541 S.C.R. SSB."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17823, "end_char": 17830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17948, "end_char": 17969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18033, "end_char": 18040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act XI of 1953", "statute": "Madras Act XI of 1953"}}, {"text": "Even the Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18286, "end_char": 18315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18478, "end_char": 18483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Even the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18573, "end_char": 18577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Even the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4( l )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18959, "end_char": 18968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Even the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Province of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19357, "end_char": 19375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the Province of Madras had issued a \"Press-Note\" in 1948 announcing that the Government proposed to undertake legislation reserving the power to compel any person who had purchased land in the lignite bearing areas to sell such land to them at the rate at which it was purchased."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20330, "end_char": 20334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20841, "end_char": 20845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21529, "end_char": 21533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21664, "end_char": 21671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22123, "end_char": 22130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22372, "end_char": 22379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22392, "end_char": 22396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22598, "end_char": 22605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31( 2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23685, "end_char": 23696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24113, "end_char": 24120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24347, "end_char": 24352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24395, "end_char": 24399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "TOWN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRAVATI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25107, "end_char": 25141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE TOWN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRAVATI\n\nI'."}}, {"text": "RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25148, "end_char": 25174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND\n\nANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADICAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADICAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25190, "end_char": 25211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND\n\nANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADICAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J."}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25234, "end_char": 25250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND\n\nANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADICAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J.C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25252, "end_char": 25261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND\n\nANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADICAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25498, "end_char": 25506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Btrar Municipalititt Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25611, "end_char": 25641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "InJia Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25663, "end_char": 25678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25714, "end_char": 25722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "InJia Act, 1935", "statute": "InJia Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "D. Nam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25753, "end_char": 25759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' 196St•l1 of Madra3\n\n\"· D. Nam°'iwrfo\n\nMudaliar\n\nShah J.\n\n196March 3"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25778, "end_char": 25782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' 196St•l1 of Madra3\n\n\"· D. Nam°'iwrfo\n\nMudaliar\n\nShah J.\n\n196March 3", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_947_961_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 947\n\nwithout taking into consideration the value of non-agricultural improvements made after that date, must be regarded as invalid.\n\nWe are not called upon to express any opinion on the question whether the power reserved under s. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by s. 2 of Madras Act XI of . 1953 to take possession of lands under the emergency clause for the purpose of working lignite mines in the areas to which the Madras Lignite (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1953, extends is invalid.\n\nNo argument has been advanced by either side before us on this question.\n\nNor was the High Court called upon to consider the validity of that provision.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are dismissed.\n\nThe respondents in this group of appeals, except in appeal No. 11 of 1963. have not appeared in this Court.\n\nTherefore in appeal No. I 1 of 1963 alone, the State of Madras will pay the costs of the respondent. There will be no order as to costs in other appeals.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nTHE TOWN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRAVATI\n\nI'.\n\nRAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND\n\nANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADICAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)\n\nTerminal Tax-Imposition of ttrminal tax by Municipality on silver ond\n\n•ilvtr i•w•ll•ry, gold and told i•w•ll•ry and pr.cioiu llon.. In 1960-Th•\" tax\" not l<vi•d b•for. by Municipality-Wh•lhtr 1aved by Art. 277 of the COMtitution-''Continut to bt levied and to b• applitd to th• 111m• purposd'-Mtaning of--C.P. and Btrar Municipalititt Act, 1922, •· 55-Gov•rnmtnt of InJia Act, 1935, 1. 143(2)--ColUlitutlon of India, Art. 277.\n\n' 196#\n\nSt•l1 of Madra3\n\n\"· D. Nam°'iwrfo\n\nMudaliar\n\nShah J.\n\n196#\n\nMarch 3\n\nIfM\n\nTown Mu..tn,.I\n\nCOlflMltltt'\n\nv. . a-cfNllllN\n\nA terminal tu oa 1ood1 imported by road or rail w11 imposed by the AmraTati Municipality by virtue of a notification dated August 10,\n\n1916. This notification exempted silver, bullion and coins from th• operation of this tax. When terminal taxes on 1oods imported by rail\n\nwere assigned exclusively lo the Federal Centre under the Government of India Act. 1935. the municipality was authorised by s. 143 to con~ tinue lo levy the terminal taxeo which were actually levied before the enforcement of the Act. Likewise, the terminal taxes imposed by the pre-Constitution notification were allowed to be lnied and collected even after the Constitution came into force by virtue of Art. 277 of the Constitution. In 1960, the Municipality levied terminal taxes on three new items, v; z., sill'er and silver jewellery, gold and' gold jewellery and precious stonea.\n\nIn a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the newly imposed terminal tax was challengell by the respondent who was carrying on business, within the limits of the Municipality, in gold, silYer and precious stones on the ground of legislative incompetence.\n\nThe writ petition was granted by the High CofJrt and the appellant came to this court after obtainina a certificate of fitness from the Hiah Court.\n\nDismissing . the appeal:\n\nHeld: The newly imposed terminal taxes on silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery and precious stones had never been imposed\n\nby the Municipality and hence it could not be said that those were \"being lawfully levied\" by the Municipality and \"•pplied to the same purposes\" before the commencement of the Constitution a! required by Art. 277 of the Constitution. Ari. 277 was not intended to confer an\n\nunlimited legislative power to impose what in effect were new taxes, though of the same type or nature as existed before the Constitution.\n\nRama Krishna Ramanath v. The Janpad Sabha, Gandia, f1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 70 and Chutti/al v. Bagmal and Ba/wantrai, l.L.R. [1956) M.B. 339. referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 598 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated March 18, 1961 of the Maharashtra High Court (Nagpur Bench) at Nagpur in Special Civil Application No. 30 of 1960.\n\nWITH\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 695 and 700 of 1962.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and orders dated October 12, 1961 and March 18, 1961 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petitions Nos. 122 of 1961 and 319 of t 960 , respectively,\n\n1961 M. C. Setalvad and S. Shaukat Hussain, for the appellant _ (in C.A. No. 598/62).\n\nTerrn MunlcitMI J Committn W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 598 of 1962).\n\nS. G. Patwardhan, Udai Pratap Singh and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 695/62). ·\n\nA. N. Goyal, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 695/ 62).\n\nI. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 695/ 62).\n\nM. C. Setalvad and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 700/62).\n\nG. S. Pathak, I. B. Dadachan1i, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 9 (in C.A. No. 700/62).\n\nI. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 10 (in C.A. No. 700/ 62).\n\nMarch 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nA YYANGAR, J.-These three appeals which are on A11•nftll 1. certificates of fitness granted by the High Courts-the first by the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur and the two others by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh-raise a common question as regards the construction of Art. 277 of the Constitution and the validity of certain terminal taxes imposed by the respective appellant-municipal authorities under notifications issued under Ch. IX of the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, subsequent to the coming into force of the Constitution, and so have been heard together.\n\nCivil Appeal 598 of 1962 is an appeal from the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur and has been filed by the Municipal Committee of Amravati against a decision of the High Court allowing the 1st respondent's petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Municipal Committee of Amravati has been established under the\n\n19fl C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (C.P. & Berar Act Il r ... 11 -; j,; nlclpal of 1922) hc:reinafter referred to as the Act.\n\nChapter IX c_,.,,,., of the Acf deals with the imposition, assessment and 111...eh'..- collection of 'taxes which might be imposed by the Municipal Committee. ' Section 66 specifies the taxes which, subject Ayy.,,..r /, to the provjsions of the Chapter, the Committee may from time to tinie impose.\n\nIts first sub-section specifies in its several clauses 15 varieties of taxes and among them is\n\ncl. ( o) which reads :\n\n''The terminal tax on goods or animals imported into or exported from the limits of tho municipality provided that terminal tax under this clause and an octroi under cl. ( e) shall not be in force in any municipality at the same time;\"\n\nThe other sub-clauses which are relevant for the consider&• tion of the question arising in the appeal are sub-els. (2),\n\n(3) and ( 4) of s. 66 and they read :\n\n(2) The State Government may, by rules made under this Act, regulate the imposition of taxes under this section, and impose maximum amounts of rates for any tax.\n\n( 3) The first imposition of any tax specified in subsection ( 1) shall be subject to the previmL' sanction of the State Government.\n\n( 4 J Subject to the control of the State Government, a committee may abolish any tax already imposed and specified in sub-section ( 1) clauses\n\n(a) to (m) inclusive, or may, within the limits imposed under sub-section ( 2), vary the amount or rate of any such tax :\n\nProvided that in the case of any municipality indebted to the Government, the abolition of anv tax or a reduction in the amount or rate thereof shall be subject to the previous sanction of. the\n\nState Government.\"\n\nSection 67 lays down the procedure for the imposition of \"\" taxes and it provides : Tn11 MIUlid,.,\n\nCommiltu \"67. (l) A committee may, at a special meeting, •· pass a resolution to propose the imposition of Riunclrandta any tax under section 66. \"'\".,,,,.,. 1.\n\n(2) When such a resolution has been passed, the\n\ncommittee shall publish, in accordance with rules made under this Act, a notice defining the class of persons or description of property proposed to be taxed, the amount or rate of the tax to be imposed and the system of assessment to be adopted.\n\n(3) ................... . (4) (5)\n\n(6)\n\n(7)\n\n(8)\n\n....................\n\nThe State Government, on receiving sue~ proposals, may sanction or refuse to sanction the same, or sanction them subject to such modifications as it may think fit, or return them to the committee for further consideration.\n\nNo modification affecting the substance shall be made under sub-section ( S), unless and until the modification has been accepted by the committee at a special meeting.\n\nA notification of the imposition of a tax under this section shall be conclusive evidence that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.\"\n\nThe procedure for the variation of the taxes is to be found in s. (18 and it reads :\n\n\"68. (1) A committee may, at a special meeting, pass a resolution to propose the abolition of any tax already imposed, or a variation in tho amount or rate thereof.\n\n(2) .......•........\n\nT \"rn ,14uniclpal\n\nGomtnitue\n\nv. ' l!umchandra\n\nAyyan1ar J.\n\n( 3) If the proposal is to increase the amount or rate of any tax, the committee shall pttblish, in the manner prescribed by rules made under this Act, a notice showing in detail the effects\n\n(4)\n\n(5)\n\n( 6)\n\n(7) (8) (9)\n\nof the proposal.\n\nAny inhabitant of the municipality objecting to the proposed increase may, within thirty days from the publication of the notice, submit his objection in writing to the committee.\n\nThe committee shall take the proposal and all objections received thereto Jinto consideration at a special meeting, and may modify the proposals as it may think fit, and may pass a final resolution on the proposal.\n\nIf the proposal requires the previous sanction of the State Government under the provisions of section 66, sub-section ( 4) or sub-section (5), the committee shall forward it to the State Government and it shall be dealt whh in the manner provided in section 67, sub-sections (4), (5) and (6).\n\nThe publication in the manner prescribed of the abolition or variation of any tax under this section shall be conclusive proof that such abolition or variation has been made in accordance with the provisions of this Act.\" From even before the constitution of the municipality under the Act and at a time when the municipal committ~ was governed by the Berar Municipal Law of 1886 which wa; in force prior to the Act and whose taxation provisions were continued by the Act of 1922, a terminal tax on goods imported by road or rail had been !ffiposed by the Municipality by virtue of a notification dated August 10, 1916 on several specified kinds of goods. This notification exempted silver, bullion and coin from the operation of this tax. This was superseded by a notification of June 2, 1921 under which the Schedules were modified and the terminal tax\n\n19M imposed was confined to goods imported into or exported out of the Municipal area by rail. The notification of June 1921 was amended from ume to time by other items being added and the rates being mcreased but no change was effected in the taxes imposed after 1936. Under the scheme of the distribution of taxing powers between the provinces and rhe Central Government under the Government of India Act, 1935 terminal taxes on goods carried by rail were assigned i; xdusively to the Federal Centre under item 53 of List 1 to Sch. VII, but the validity of the levy and coilect10n of the terminal tax in force, before the 1st April, 1937 was continued by s. 14J of the Government of India Act, 1935 and it was by virtue of this continuance that the; e taxes were continued to be levied after April 1, 1937.\n\nTheir continuance after January 26, 1950 when after the\n\nrepe; ii oi the Government of India Act, 1935, the Constitution c3me into force with the same scheme of distribution of taxing power on the relevant item identical with that under the Government of India Act, was by reason of Art. 277 which was practically in .!he same terms as s. 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThe taxes imposed by the pre-Constitution notification could, therefore, be legaLy levied and collected even after the Constitution came into force.\n\nTown Municia!·\n\nCom11'11tte~\n\nSubsequent to January 26, 1950 there was a notification on December 1, 1959, under which to the list of goods liable to terminal tax imported into or exported out of the Municipal area, not merely by rail, but also by road were added three new items-silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery, and precious stones, and these three specified items were subjected to the tax at the same rates as had been imposed on other articles by the notifications which were in force from before the Constitution.\n\nBefore the notification was issued the procedure indicated by s. 67 was gone through and the Government accorded their sanction to the rules made by the Municipal Committee for the imposition of the tax on the newly added articles.\n\nThe validity of the tax imposed by this notification was challenged by the 1st respondent who was carrying on business within Amravati municipality in gold, silver and precious stones\n\nY. 1lwn•cha11dra\n\nAnangar J,\n\n1961 on the ground of legislative incompetency which had not row• M_u\"'\"\"\"1 been saved by Article 277 of the Constitution, in a petition Commllt•• under Article 226. The learned Judges of the High Court '¥ ,, Y. b Rt.mchandrt1 y a majority accepted the contention raised by the respond- Ayyonpr J. ent and allowed the petition but granted a certificate of fitness and hence this appeal. The facts of the other two appeals are nearly similar but we shall refer to them after dealing with the. common question which arises in these appeals.\n\nIt is common ground that the right to levy a terminal tax is now vested in the Union Parliament under Entry 89 of the Union List which reads :\n\n\"Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights\",\n\nso that if the levy by the appellant of the terminal tax on the newly added items, and the same principle would apply to an increase in the rate of the duty, had to rest on the independent taxing power of the State, the same would have to be struck down for want of legislative competence.\n\nBesides it is necessary to add that whereas under the notifications in force prior to 1st April 1937-when Part III of the Government of India Act was brought into force, articles importeg into or exported out of the municipal area by road were not subject to the tax, and that state of affairs continued till long after the Constitution came into force, a terminal tax was imposed by the impugned notification of December 1959 on goods imported or exported by roada tax which it was not open to the State to impose even with the aid of Art. 277. But ignoring this feature of the impugned notification, insofar as it brought in goods carried by road within the scope of the terminal tax, it is admitted that the validity of the imposition cannot be justified if it was a fresh imposition. What is, however, urged in support of the validity of the imposition is that the same is saved by Art. 277 which mos:\n\n\"277. Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which. immediately before tl>e commencement of this Constitution, were being lawfully levied by the\n\nGovernment of any State or by any municipality or other local authority or body for the TawN MuNfl'i,.I\n\npurposes of the State, municipality, district or Calltlft111u other local area may, notwithstanding that those bM<'tlldra taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Union List. continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law.\" If learned Counsel for the appellant is right in his contention that the impugned tax which he is now seeking to sustain, was the tax which \"was being lawfully levied\" by the municipality before the commencement of the Constitution he would certainly be well-founded in the submission that the fact that the terminal taxes are under the distribution <>f taxing powers under the Constitution assigned to the\n\nUnion would make no difference for the valid continuance of the levy.\n\nThe question, therefore, is whether this was 1he tax which was being levied by the municipal authority before the Constitution and for whose continuance the Article provides.\n\nThe first submission of Mr. Setalvad for the appellants was that this condition would be satisfied whenever a terminal tax (without reference either to the article on which it was Iev'ed or the rate) was being lawfully levied by the municipality prior to the commencement of the Constitution and as in this case admittedly a terminal tax was being levied on certain articles that condition was satisfied.\n\nHis argument was that the words 'tax or duty' in the opening part of Art. 277 should be read as meaning a tax or duty under a' specified legislative Entry, and if such a tax or duty was being levied before the commencement of the Constitution other duties of the same type or falling within the same category might be imposed after the Constitution notwithstanding that such duties or taxes were mentioned in the Union Li<t by reason of the words \"shall\n\ncontinue to be levied\".\n\nSecondly, he said that the word 'levy' meant not merely the ascertainment, i.e., assessment \\ and collection of the tax hut included its imposition, i.e., also the charging a,11d i{ that exllression were understood in that wide sense it would comprehend a case where other\n\n196'\n\nTown M11nuip4il\n\nComm1tt1•\n\n•• Rmnchandra\n\nAyyang4r 1.\n\nitems than those originally specified were brought into the fold of the taxing provision.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General who appeared for the State and supported Mr. Setalvad, however, went a step further and submitted that it was not even necessary that a terminal tax should be actually imposed and was being collected prior to the Constitution, but that it was sufficient if the State enactment had vested in the municipality a power to levy such a tax. The argument of the learned Attorney-General has to be rejected as lacking any substance, for on no construction, wide or narrow, of the expression 'levy' in the rphrase 'continue to be levied' can such a case be comprehended.\n\nFrom the mere fact that a State enactment has authorised a municipa:ity to levy a tax it cannot be said that a tax which had never been imposed was \"being lawfully levied\" by the municipality, not to speak of the tax etc. collected being \"applied to the same purposes\" before the commencement of the Constitution as contemplated by the concluding portion of the Article.\n\nComing next to what one might term the narrower submission of Mr. Setalvad we do not find it possible to agree with it either. His first submission may be expanded thus : The expression \"taxes, duties, cesses\" with which Art. 277 opens, ha-s to be read in the context of Part XU in which the Article occurs and so read has to be understood as referring to the class or category of taxes which were levied and collected by the State, municipality etc. before the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nIn other words, the reference here is to the entries in the legislative lists which permit such taxes to be levied, and so read and taken in conjunction with the circumstance that the Article is one designed to prevent the dislocation of the finances of the State or other local authorities, the terms of the Article would be satisfied and the legislative power to continue to levy the tax would be conferred \"notwithstanding that the tax, etc. are mentioned in the Union List\". This argument, in our opinion, proceeds on ignoring the terms\n\n.....\n\nof Art. 277.\n\nIf, as is admitted, the sole object sought to I be achieved by this provision for \"continuance\" is to avoid dislocation of the finances of the State and local authorities,\n\nby depriving them of the revenues which they were deriving at the commencement of the Constitution, it would mean that the intention was to permit the existing range of taxes to be continued, not that the Article conferred on them authority to expand the range of their taxation by subjecting new items to taxation or by increasing the rates of duty.\n\nThis consideration apart, it is not possible to read the words \"notwithstanding that the taxes etc. are mentioned in the Union List\" as conferring an unlimited legislative power to impose what in effect the argument involves new taxes, thougl1 of the same type or nature as existed before the Constitution.\n\nThe question of the proper construction of s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which is for all practical purposes identical with Art. 277 came up for consideration before this Court in Rama Krishna RamanaJh v. The Janpad Sabha, Gandia('). There it was submitted on behalf of the respondent-local authority that by virtue of s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act the Provincial Legislature was vested with a plenary power to legislate in respect of every tax which was being lawfully levied by local authorities prior to the commencement of the Government of J ndia Act.\n\nThis Court rejected that contention and observed :\n\n\"Section 143 ( 2) which is a saving clause and obviously designed to prevent a dislocation of the finances of Local Governments and of local authorities by reason of the coming into force of the provisions of the Government of India Act distributing heads of taxation on lines different from those which prevailed before that date, cannot be construed as one conferring a plenary power to legislate on those topics till such time as the Central Legislature intervened.\n\nSuch a construction would necessarily involve a power in the Provincial Legislature to enhance the rates of taxation-a result we must say from which Mr. Sanyal did not shrink, but having regard to the language of the section\n\n(I) [1962) Supp. 3 S.C.R. 70,\n\nTow• Municipal Committee\n\n\"· Ramc/candra\n\nA.yyan1u I.\n\nTown Municip4d\n\nCommittte\n\nRmnchandra\n\n.Ayyangar /,\n\nproviding for a mere continuity and its manifest purpose this construction must be rejected.\"\n\nNo doubt, even the words \"continue to be levied and to be applied to the same purposes\" might import and imply a limited legislative power i!1 the State. The scope of this limited power was also examined by this Court in the same case and it was stated :\n\n\"In the context the relevant words of the sub-section could only mean 'may continue to be levied if so desired by the Provincial Legislature• which is indicated by or is implicit in the use of the expression 'may' in the clause 'mav be continued until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature.' This would therefore ipOsit a limited legislative power n the Province to indicate or express a desire to continue or not to continue the levy. If in the exercise of this limited power the Province desires to discontinue the tax and effects a repeal of the relevant statute the repeal would be effective.\n\nOf course, in the absence of legislation indicating a desire to discontinue the tax, the effect of the provision of the Constitution would be to enable the continuance of the power to levy the tax but this does not alter the fact that the provision by its implication confers a limited legislative power to desire or not to desire the continuance of the levy subject to the overriding power of the Central Legislature to, put an end to its continuance and it is on the basis of the existence of this limited legislative power that the right of the Provincial Legislature to repeal the taxation provision under the Act of 1920 could be rested.\n\nSuppose for instance, a Provincial Legislature desires the continuance of the tax but considers the rate too high and wishes it to be reduced and passes an enactment for that purpose, it cannot be that the legislation is incompetent and. that the State Government\n\n. .\n\nmust permit the local authority to levy tax at the same rate as prevailed on April 1, 1937 if the latter desired the continuance of the tax.\n\nIf such a legislation were enacted to achieve a reduction of the rate of the duty, its legis lative competence must obviously be traceable to the power contained in words 'may continue to be levied' in s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act.\"\n\nDealing next with the import ot the words 'may continue to be levied' the same was summarised in these terms : ( 1) The tax must be one which was lawfully levied by a local authority for the purpose of a local area, ( 2) the identity of the body that collects the tax, the area for whose benefit the tax is to be utilised and the purposes for which the utilization is to take place continue to be the same, and ( 3) the rate of the tax is not enhanced nor its incidence in any manner altered, so that it continues to be the same tax.\n\nIt is obvious that if these tests were applied the submission on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted.\n\nBut authority apart, we cannot, even if this decision were put aside, accede to the construction for which Mr. Setalvad contends. lt is not disputed that in ultimate analysis the answer to the question raised should turn on the meaning of the word 'levied' in the phrase 'continue to be levied' which is the operative word conferring a power.\n\nMr. Setalvad submits that 'levied' is a word of wide and varying import and includes in its denotation not merely the actual coilection of the tax, but the imposition in the sense of the creation of the charge by the statute, as well as the ascertainment of the amount due from the tax payer.\n\nMr. Setalvad is right, for before a tax can be collected from any tax payer, its quantum must be ascertained and assessed, and for this to be lawfully done there must be legislative sanction-in other words an imposition of the chargebecause it is the charge under the Statute that is quantified by the authorities acting under the taxing enactment. The acceptance of this construction however does not lead to the result desired, for what can \"continue to be levied\" is what \"was being lawfully levied\" in the same sense of the\n\nT\"\"'\" Munidl\"'l'\n\nCommittt~\n\nRamchandra\n\nA.yyangar /,\n\n196~ word \"levied\", prior to the Constitution. Admittedly, there Town Muntci, ol was no imposition of the charge now sought to be recovered Committ.. prior to the Constitution, i.e., the Act did not impose the P.amc\";;,.ndr• charge by s. 66 but merely enabled the Municipal Committee by appropriate procedure to impose the tax. If, of A.yyangu /, course, this power had been availed of and a charge had been imposed it would be a different matter.\n\nSo long as the Municipal Committee did not pass the necessary resolutions and impose the tax there was no charge levied on the commodity, so that it could not be said that the tax \"was being lawfully levied\" before the commencement of the Constitution. The words \"was being lawfully levied'' obviously mean \"was actually levied\" and it would not be sufficient to satisfy those words that the Municipal authority could lawfully levy the tax, but had not availed itself of that power.\n\nThere is another circumstance to which also i; ofere.nce - 1 may be made. The last portion of Art. 277 uses the words\n\n\"continue to be levied\" and \"to be applied to the same purposes''.\n\nBy reason of this collocation between the concept of the levy and of application of the proceeds of the tax. the Constitution makers obviously intended the word 'levy' to be understood as including the collection of the tax, for it is only when a tax is collected that any question of its application to a particular purpose would arise. It is apparent that if the word \"levied\" were understood in the sense which Mr. Setalvad contends, there could be no \"application\" of the proceeds of the tax to the same purposes as at the commencement of the Constitution.\n\nFor ex concessis at that date there were no proceeds to be applied.\n\nIn this connection learned Counsel for the respondent referred us to the decision in Chuttilal v. Bagmal and Balwantrai (1) where the relationship between the levy and the application of the tax has been referred to as an aid to the construction of the expression \"continue to be levied\" in Art. 277. We find ourselves in agreement with the views there expressed.\n\nThe decision of the High Court is, therefore, correct and '.he appeal fails. ;'\n\n(I) I.LR. [1956! Madhya Bharat 339.\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURt REPORTS 9\"!\n\nCIVIL APPEAL No. 695 OF 1962.\n\nIn this appeal a notificatiolt was issued under sub-ss. (5) and (7) of s. 67 of the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, on December 9, 1960 imposing a terminal tax on gun-powder imported into or exported out of the munici!lal\n\narea by rail. It is admitted that previous to the Constitution there was no tax imposed on gun-powder.\n\nThe position in this case is, therefore, identical with that in Civil Appeal No. 598 of 1962 which we have just disposed of and it follows that this appeal also fails and should be dismisseJ.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL No. 700 OF 1962.\n\nIn Civil Appeal 700 of 1962 the original notification imposing terminal taxes in respect of goods coming into or going out of the municipal area by rail was one dated March 17, 1926 which was operative from April 1, 1926.\n\nThis was amended by a notification under s. 67(5) of the C.P.\n\nBerar Municipal Act, 1922 dated Septetnbet 23, 1960 by which new articles were inci uded to the list of items imported into or exported from the municipal area by rail subject to the terminal tax and besides the rate of tax on the previously existing items was also increased.\n\nIt was this inclusion of new articles for the levy of terminal tax by the notification of 1960 and the increase in the rate of duty on articles already subjected to tax, that was impugned in the writ petition filed by the respondent before the High Court.\n\nOn our reasoning on the basis of which we have dismissed Civil Appeal 598 of 1962 it would follow that this appeal should also fail. We can see no difference between the inclusion of new items and the increase in the rate of duty because if there is an increase it would not be a mere continuance of the duty which had been lawfully levied which is the only purpose and function of Art. 217.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court allowing the writ petition of the respondent was therefore correct.\n\nIn the result, all the three appeals fail and are dismissed with costs of the contesting respondent or respondents in each appeal.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n134-159 S. C.-61\n\nl!llH\n\nTown M......,\n\nCommi,,_.\n\n\"· Ramchandna\n\nAyY••gar I.", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 261, "end_char": 266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 309, "end_char": 313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 889, "end_char": 904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 1 of 1963 alone, the State of Madras will pay the costs of the respondent."}}, {"text": "THE TOWN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRAVATI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1017, "end_char": 1055, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE TOWN MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, AMRAVATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND\n\nANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1062, "end_char": 1101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRA VASUDEO CHIMOTE AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. 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RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1412, "end_char": 1420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Btrar Municipalititt Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1525, "end_char": 1555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "InJia Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1577, "end_char": 1592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1628, "end_char": 1636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "InJia Act, 1935", "statute": "InJia Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1692, "end_char": 1696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' 196St•l1 of Madra3\n\n\"· D. Nam°'iwrfo\n\nMudaliar\n\nShah J.\n\n196March 3\n\nIfM\n\nTown Mu..tn,."}}, {"text": "a-cfNllllN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1756, "end_char": 1766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a-cfNllllN\n\nA terminal tu oa 1ood1 imported by road or rail w11 imposed by the AmraTati Municipality by virtue of a notification dated August 10,\n\n1916."}}, {"text": "s. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2165, "end_char": 2171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "InJia Act, 1935", "statute": "InJia Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2445, "end_char": 2453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "InJia Act, 1935", "statute": "InJia Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2658, "end_char": 2666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3437, "end_char": 3445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4253, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "122 of 1961 and 319 of t 960 , respectively,\n\n1961 M. C. Setalvad and S. Shaukat Hussain, for the appellant _ (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "S. Shaukat Hussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4272, "end_char": 4290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "122 of 1961 and 319 of t 960 , respectively,\n\n1961 M. C. Setalvad and S. Shaukat Hussain, for the appellant _ (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Terrn MunlcitMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Terrn MunlcitMI J Committn W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4382, "end_char": 4399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Terrn MunlcitMI J Committn W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. G. Patwardhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4450, "end_char": 4466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. G. Patwardhan, Udai Pratap Singh and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Udai Pratap Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4468, "end_char": 4485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. G. Patwardhan, Udai Pratap Singh and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "M. S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. G. Patwardhan, Udai Pratap Singh and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "A. N. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4546, "end_char": 4557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Goyal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4736, "end_char": 4748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, I. B. Dadachan1i, 0."}}, {"text": "I. B. Dadachan1i", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4750, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, I. B. Dadachan1i, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4769, "end_char": 4780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, I. B. Dadachan1i, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4785, "end_char": 4800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "A YYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4987, "end_char": 4996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nA YYANGAR, J.-These three appeals which are on A11•nftll 1."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay at Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5115, "end_char": 5145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "certificates of fitness granted by the High Courts-the first by the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur and the two others by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh-raise a common question as regards the construction of Art."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5172, "end_char": 5200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "certificates of fitness granted by the High Courts-the first by the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur and the two others by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh-raise a common question as regards the construction of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5440, "end_char": 5470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipal Committee of Amravati", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Civil Appeal 598 of 1962 is an appeal from the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur and has been filed by the Municipal Committee of Amravati against a decision of the High Court allowing the 1st respondent's petition under Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5781, "end_char": 5798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922", "statute": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5900, "end_char": 5930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6184, "end_char": 6194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922", "statute": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6818, "end_char": 6823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922", "statute": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7621, "end_char": 7631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7855, "end_char": 7865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyan1ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9137, "end_char": 9145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) .......•........\n\nT \"rn ,14uniclpal\n\nGomtnitue\n\nv. ' l!umchandra\n\nAyyan1ar J.\n\n( 3) If the proposal is to increase the amount or rate of any tax, the committee shall pttblish, in the manner prescribed by rules made under this Act, a notice showing in detail the effects\n\n(4)\n\n(5)\n\n( 6)\n\n(7) (8) (9)\n\nof the proposal."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9881, "end_char": 9891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10037, "end_char": 10047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 10, 1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10684, "end_char": 10699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ffiposed by the Municipality by virtue of a notification dated August 10, 1916 on several specified kinds of goods."}}, {"text": "June 2, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10862, "end_char": 10874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was superseded by a notification of June 2, 1921 under which the Schedules were modified and the terminal tax\n\n19M imposed was confined to goods imported into or exported out of the Municipal area by rail."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11561, "end_char": 11576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VII, but the validity of the levy and coilect10n of the terminal tax in force, before the 1st April, 1937 was continued by s. 14J of the Government of India Act, 1935 and it was by virtue of this continuance that the; e taxes were continued to be levied after April 1, 1937."}}, {"text": "s. 14J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11594, "end_char": 11600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the scheme of the distribution of taxing powers between the provinces and rhe Central Government under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Under the scheme of the distribution of taxing powers between the provinces and rhe Central Government under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11608, "end_char": 11637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11731, "end_char": 11744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VII, but the validity of the levy and coilect10n of the terminal tax in force, before the 1st April, 1937 was continued by s. 14J of the Government of India Act, 1935 and it was by virtue of this continuance that the; e taxes were continued to be levied after April 1, 1937."}}, {"text": "26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11779, "end_char": 11787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their continuance after January 26, 1950 when after the\n\nrepe; ii oi the Government of India Act, 1935, the Constitution c3me into force with the same scheme of distribution of taxing power on the relevant item identical with that under the Government of India Act, was by reason of Art."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11820, "end_char": 11849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12030, "end_char": 12038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12083, "end_char": 12089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12097, "end_char": 12126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12323, "end_char": 12339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Com11'11tte~\n\nSubsequent to January 26, 1950 there was a notification on December 1, 1959, under which to the list of goods liable to terminal tax imported into or exported out of the Municipal area, not merely by rail, but also by road were added three new items-silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery, and precious stones, and these three specified items were subjected to the tax at the same rates as had been imposed on other articles by the notifications which were in force from before the Constitution."}}, {"text": "December 1, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12368, "end_char": 12384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Com11'11tte~\n\nSubsequent to January 26, 1950 there was a notification on December 1, 1959, under which to the list of goods liable to terminal tax imported into or exported out of the Municipal area, not merely by rail, but also by road were added three new items-silver and silver jewellery, gold and gold jewellery, and precious stones, and these three specified items were subjected to the tax at the same rates as had been imposed on other articles by the notifications which were in force from before the Constitution."}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12882, "end_char": 12887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Amravati municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13179, "end_char": 13200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the tax imposed by this notification was challenged by the 1st respondent who was carrying on business within Amravati municipality in gold, silver and precious stones\n\nY. 1lwn•cha11dra\n\nAnangar J,\n\n1961 on the ground of legislative incompetency which had not row• M_u\"'\"\"\"1 been saved by Article 277 of the Constitution, in a petition Commllt•• under Article 226."}}, {"text": "Anangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13256, "end_char": 13263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the tax imposed by this notification was challenged by the 1st respondent who was carrying on business within Amravati municipality in gold, silver and precious stones\n\nY. 1lwn•cha11dra\n\nAnangar J,\n\n1961 on the ground of legislative incompetency which had not row• M_u\"'\"\"\"1 been saved by Article 277 of the Constitution, in a petition Commllt•• under Article 226."}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13358, "end_char": 13369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13421, "end_char": 13432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyonpr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13555, "end_char": 13562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the High Court '¥ ,, Y. b Rt.mchandrt1 y a majority accepted the contention raised by the respond- Ayyonpr J. ent and allowed the petition but granted a certificate of fitness and hence this appeal."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13893, "end_char": 13903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that the right to levy a terminal tax is now vested in the Union Parliament under Entry 89 of the Union List which reads :\n\n\"Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights\",\n\nso that if the levy by the appellant of the terminal tax on the newly added items, and the same principle would apply to an increase in the rate of the duty, had to rest on the independent taxing power of the State, the same would have to be struck down for want of legislative competence."}}, {"text": "1st April 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14439, "end_char": 14453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides it is necessary to add that whereas under the notifications in force prior to 1st April 1937-when Part III of the Government of India Act was brought into force, articles importeg into or exported out of the municipal area by road were not subject to the tax, and that state of affairs continued till long after the Constitution came into force, a terminal tax was imposed by the impugned notification of December 1959 on goods imported or exported by roada tax which it was not open to the State to impose even with the aid of Art."}}, {"text": "Part III of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14459, "end_char": 14498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14889, "end_char": 14897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Government of India Act", "statute": "Part III of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15239, "end_char": 15247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Government of India Act", "statute": "Part III of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16498, "end_char": 16506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first submission of Mr. Setalvad for the appellants was that this condition would be satisfied whenever a terminal tax (without reference either to the article on which it was Iev'ed or the rate) was being lawfully levied by the municipality prior to the commencement of the Constitution and as in this case admittedly a terminal tax was being levied on certain articles that condition was satisfied."}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16945, "end_char": 16953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18969, "end_char": 18977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19797, "end_char": 19805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 143(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20684, "end_char": 20693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20701, "end_char": 20730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20782, "end_char": 20790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 143(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20977, "end_char": 20986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21280, "end_char": 21291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sanyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21902, "end_char": 21908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a construction would necessarily involve a power in the Provincial Legislature to enhance the rates of taxation-a result we must say from which Mr. Sanyal did not shrink, but having regard to the language of the section\n\n(I) [1962) Supp."}}, {"text": "s. 143(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24344, "end_char": 24353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26490, "end_char": 26495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.yyangu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26590, "end_char": 26598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, of A.yyangu /, course, this power had been availed of and a charge had been imposed it would be a different matter."}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27282, "end_char": 27290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28297, "end_char": 28305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28628, "end_char": 28633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28648, "end_char": 28678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 9, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28683, "end_char": 28699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5) and (7) of s. 67 of the C.P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, on December 9, 1960 imposing a terminal tax on gun-powder imported into or exported out of the munici!lal\n\narea by rail."}}, {"text": "March 17, 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29282, "end_char": 29296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Civil Appeal 700 of 1962 the original notification imposing terminal taxes in respect of goods coming into or going out of the municipal area by rail was one dated March 17, 1926 which was operative from April 1, 1926."}}, {"text": "s. 67(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29379, "end_char": 29387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922", "statute": "Berar Municipalities Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Berar Municipal Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29401, "end_char": 29426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Septetnbet 23, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29433, "end_char": 29452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was amended by a notification under s. 67(5) of the C.P.\n\nBerar Municipal Act, 1922 dated Septetnbet 23, 1960 by which new articles were inci uded to the list of items imported into or exported from the municipal area by rail subject to the terminal tax and besides the rate of tax on the previously existing items was also increased."}}, {"text": "Art. 217", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30318, "end_char": 30326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Municipal Act, 1922", "statute": "Berar Municipal Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Ramchandna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30635, "end_char": 30645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"· Ramchandna\n\nAyY••gar I."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_962_978_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Morch, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nC. RAJAGOPALACHARI\n\nCORPORATION OF MADRAS\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C.\n\nSHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND s. M. S!KRJ JJ.)\n\nCity Munici_nality Act 1919 (Act No. 4 of 1919), 1. lll(b), Government ; f India Act, 1935, ss. 142A(l), 143(2), 292, Constitution of India, Art. 271-Drawing pension-If amounts to employment or profession within the meaning of Act-Whether taxable.\n\nThe appellant held office as the last Governor-General of India.\n\nHe bas been drawing Rs. 15,000 prr annum as pension while residing Jn the city of Madras. The Corporation of Madras demaaded profession tax from him under section lll(i)(b) of the City Municipal Act, 191~ for the year 1958-59 on the ground of his residence tJeing within J\\.fadras city and his drawing the pension to which he wa3 entitlei:I.\n\nThe ap.. pellant addressed a communication to the Corporation asserting that this derpand was illegal as the Corporation was empowered by the rele- Yant constitutional provisions merely to levy a tax \"on a profession, trade calling or employment\" and that as he as a pensioner did not fall under any of these classes, the said demand was illegal. The Corporation diCl not accept the contention of the appellant and therefore, the appellant filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. The High Court dismisse'd the writ petition of the appellant.\n\nThe High Court granted a certificate under Art. 133(J)(c) of the'\" constitution to the appellant to file on appeal t'J the Supreme Court.\n\nHencl! tho appeal.\n\nThe question before the Supreme Court was whether the Corporation was entitled to levy a tax on pensioners in respect of the pensions received by them in Madras City.\n\nHtld: (l) that the power of the Corporation Lo levy the tax is dependent on the subject of the tax being within the State Legislative power under the Constitution. The present levy comes within the purview of item 60 in the State list in Schedule VII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:...:.\n\nHJ'axcs on profeMion, tra'<IC8, callings and employments.\"\n\nBeina a \"pensioner\" cannot be a \"profession, trade, business or calling\", nor could a tax on a person because he is in receipt of a pension be said to be a tax on ''employments\".\n\nThe tax. therefore,. under the last portion of sec. I 11 (I )(b) reading-profession tax on persons' .. in receipt of any pension or income from investments\"-is aothina but a 011 income fallina wilhin EntJy 32 of the Union List.\n\n. ,\n\n' -\n\nThe taxes specified in item 60 are taxes on the carryiDi on of a pro- 1116' fcssion, trade etc., and would, therefore, apply only to a case of present -- employment. Tho mere fact that a person has previously been in a C. &jagopalac,..,_ profession or carried on trade etc. cannot justify a tax under this entry. Corpor:i;011 •I The tax on the receipt of pension or on the income from investments Madru which is referred to in the last part of sec. 111 ( 11 is in truth and substance a tax on income. At the time the tax is levied the appellantpenaioner is in no employment but is only in receipt of income.\n\n(ii) The present levy of tax cannot be saved by Art. 277 of the Constitution because the tax was a new levy and nut a continuance of a tax which had been levied just prior to April 1, 1937. On thC facts of this case it was held that if the statutory charge to profession tax imposed on pensioners by the Act of 1919, was lifted by the Act of 1936, and the trix again came into operation only on April I, 1937. it would follow that there was no \"ievy of the tax\" immediately before the commencement of P1rt Ill of the Government of India Act. 1935. so as to bring it within the saving in s. 143(2) of that Act. Besides. the two circumt\"nces, viz., that residence within the city for a specified\n\nriod was 11'!' .... IC a condition of the liability to the tax, as well as the increase in tht .:'ltes would both serve to emphasise that the levy was a nc\\v one, wilh a different texture and not a continuation of the tax\n\nwhich \\Vas le·ed just prior to April 1, 1937.\n\n(iii) \"['he mere fact that prior to 1st April, 1937 the Corporation had under Act of 1936 the power to bring the tax into force by a resolution does not on a proper construction of s. 143(2) bring it within the range of those taxes or duties which \"were being lawfully levied\" prior to the ..:ommencement of Part Ill of the Government ot India Act 1935, which alone are permitted to be continued to be levied notwithstanding that these duties were in the Federal Legislative List.\n\nThe mere existence of a power to bring a tax into operation, cannot be equated \\Vith \"a tax \\vhich was bing lawfully levied\" before Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThe High Court erred in holding that s. 292 of the Government ot India Act applies to this case.\n\nThe Town Municipal Committee, Amravati 'f. Ramchandra Yo.Judeo Chimor., [1964] 6 S.C.R. 947, South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. The\n\nSecretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum, A.LR. 1964 S.C. 207, relied on.\n\n(il') Under s. 111(1) as amende\\1, the tax could be levied only in accordance with the rules in Schedule IV and as those rules did not make a provision for the leyY of a tax on pensioncn. it would follow that the tax \"was not being lawfully levied\" on them. The High Court erred\n\nin holding that such defect would be removed by s. 18 of the Madras General Clauses Act.\n\n'-I\n\n(v) S. 142-A(l) of the Government of India Act, 1935 would assist the respontlent's case only if tax imposed were on a profCMion, trade, callina or cmplovment. In the present cue, the tax la beitlll impooed\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOkTS [:tg64]\n\nIHI ott &11 ii'IMll!t C!t Ii pj:mionet and so thia provision hu no application: c . ..,.,,,.Jao11arl lt IS bot the illtenllon of f'ariiamcnt that Slate miibl levy a tax on\n\ny, i.tlCOllle and call it \"ptofessiott\" tu. °\"\"\"\"\"'°\" ,,,\n\nlllMl'll CIVIL APPELLATE JtrRISDICTIO!ll: Civll Appeal No. 580 - of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated May 1, 1961, of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 975 of 1959.\n\nR. M. Seshadri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.\n\nR. Ganapathy lyer, for respondent No. 1.\n\nA. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No. 2.\n\nMarch 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was .. ' delivered by\n\nA170n1ar I.' AYYANGAR, J.-This appeal comes before us by virtue of a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Madras under Art. 133 (1 )( c) of the Constitution against its judgment dismissing a petition filed by the appellant under Art. 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of prohibition against the Corporation of Madras challenging the constitutional validity of a notice requiring the appellant to pay profession tax.\n\nThe appellant held office as the last Governor-General of Irtdia.\n\nUnder s. 3 of Central Act XXX of 1951 the appellant is entitled to a pension of Rs. 15,000/- per annum and has been drawing this sum residirtg in the city of Madras.\n\nThe Corporation of Madras-the first respondent before us demanded profession tax from the appellant under s. lll(l)(b) of the City Municipal Act, 1919 hereinafter called the Act for the year 1958-1959 on the ground of the 11ppellant's residence within the city for the period therein specified and his drawing the pension to which he was entitled. The appellant addressed a communicatiort to tlie Corporation asserting that this demand was illegal as the Corporation was empowered by the relevant constitutional provisions merely to levy a tax \"on a profession,\n\n' ..\n\n' .\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE1'4E COURT REPORTS\n\ntrade, calling or employment\" and that as he as a pensioner JHf did not fall under ny of these clll$ses, the said demand was c. R.,;;;;._,_,, illegal. 1'4e authorities of the Corporation, however, v: insisted on cQmpHance with the demand on the ground that 00'1,, i:.J:: of\n\nunder the express terms of the Act persons in receipt of pensions were also liable to the tax. The appellant thereupon Ayon,., r 1• filed a writ petition for the relief already set out, and as the validity of the State Act was impugned impleaded the State of Madras also as a respondent.\n\nIt would be seen from tbe foregoing that the question\n\nor consideration is whether the 1st respondent Corporation !S entitled to levy a tax on pensioners in respect of the pensions received by them. In order tQ appreciate the submissions made to us by learned Counsel for the appellant it would be ncessary to set out the history of the legislation in relation to profession tax and the impugned tax on\n\niperns in receipt of pensions applicable to the City of\n\nadras because it is on a construction of these provisions lhat the learned Judges of the liigh Court have upheld the validity of the levy and dismissed the appellant's writ petition.\n\nFor this purpose it is not necessary to travel to any period anterior to the enactment of the Madras City Municipal Act (Madras Act IV of 1919) which with certain\n\nmendments to br. referred to presently is still in force. The A.ct received the assent of the Governor on March 26, 1919, of the Governor -General in June, 1919 and came into force on publication in the Gazette which was in the same month. Having been enacted while the powers of the Local Legislatures were governed by the Government of India Act, 1915, the constitutional validity of the legislation is not '.)pen to any challenge. Section 111 ( 1) of this enactment ran:-\n\n\"Every person not liable for the companies' ta,:,\n\nwho, within the city and for the period prescril>- ed in Sec. 113, exercises a profession, art, trade\n\nor calling or holds an appointment, public or private, bringing him within one or morr of the classes of persons specified in the tµadon rules in Schedule IV, shall ipay by way of Iicnce\n\nfee and in addition to any other licence fee\n\nJHI\n\nC. Rll/aropalaclurrl ...\n\nCorpo•atio\" of\n\nII ...\n\nil.17_,., I.\n\nthat may be Jeviable under this Act a tax as determined under the said rules but in no rase exceeding rupees five hundred in the half year and such tax may be described as the profession tax.\"\n\nThe Section had two explanations of which the second i& material and thi& reada : ' Explanation 2 :\n\n\"A person in receipt of a pension paid from any\n\nsource shall be deemed to be a person holding an appointment within the meaning of this section.\"\n\nThe .next change in the relevant provision was effected by Madras City Municipal Amendment Act, 1936 (Madras Act X of 1936) which came into force on 14th April 1936.\n\nBy this amendment a new section-s. 111 was substituted for the old one just set out, and under this Explanation (2) was deleted and the substituted provision ran :\n\n\"111 (1). If the Council by a resolution determines that a profession tax shall be levied, every person not liable to the tax, on companies, who after the date specified in the notice published under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 98-A in any half year-\n\n( a) exercises a profession, art or calling or transacts business or holds any appointment, public or private-\n\n( i) within the city for not less than sixty days in the aggregate, or\n\n(ii) outside the city but who resides in the city for not less than sixty days in the aggregate; or\n\n( b) resides in the city for not Jess than sixty days in the aggregate and is in receipt of any pension or income from investments, shall pay in addition to any licence fee that may\n\n- ,\n\n. '\n\n' ..\n\nbe leviable under this Act, a half yearly tax 1961 assessed in accordance with the rules in c. &Jaro~ Schedule IV in no case exceeding rupees five c •1 at h d d ,, orporat on un re .\n\nMadru\n\nAlong with this was added a new section-s. 98-A which\n\n_.,,.,.,,,, I. ran:\n\nSec. 98-A(l):\n\n\"Before the council passes any resolution imposing a tax or duty for the first time it shall direct the Commissioner to publish a notice in the Fort St. George Gazette and in the local papers of its intention and fix a reasonable period not being less than one month from the date of publication of such notice in the Fort St. George Gazette for submission of objections. The Council may, after considering the objections, if any, received within the period specified, determine by resolution to levy the tax or duty.\n\nSuch resolution shall specify the rate at .vhich,\n\nthe date from which and the period of levy, if any, for which suc!lfax or duty shall be levied.\n\n(2) When the Council shall have determined to levy any tax or duty for the first time or at a new rate the Commissioner shall forthwith publish a notice in the manner laid down in sub-section ( 1) specifying the date from which the rate at which and the period of levy, if any, for which such tax or duty shall be levied.\"\n\nAt this stage it is necessary to refer to Schedule IV in accordance with which the tax has to be assessed under the terms of s. 111 ( I ) .\n\nIn the Act as enacted in 1919 the relevant rule in Schedule IV divided persons assessed to profession tax etc. into 8 classes, based upon the amount of monthly salary received in the case of those ho!ding appointments, and income derived in the case of those in trade, ; irt. calling etc. Each of these classes was again sub-divlded into two-the first sub-class comprising \"persons holding appointl'Jents upon a monthly salary\" and the other of\n\n1964 \"persons exercising any profession, trade, art, calling or c;;. R.i/agopalacliari transacting business\". It would be seen that having regard v. to Explanation 2 to s. 111, as it stood in 1919, before its Corporation of d X Uadrm amen ment by Act of 1936 by reason of the provision which enacted that \"persons in receipt of pension\" were\n\nA1YIJll80• 1• deemed to be \"persons holding appointments\" when the rule in :'icheduk IV referred to \"persons holding appointments\"\n\nit included by the statutory fiction-pensioners who on the basis of the amount of pension which they derived were classilied as \"persons holding appointments\" under the various classes.\n\nBut when this Explanation to s. 111 was deleted by the Amending Act X of 1936 and when the new s. 111 ( 1) ( b) referred to the \"half-yearly tax assessed in accordance with rules in Schedule IV, 1t was urged that there could not have been an assessment of persons in receipt of pension unless they could be comprehended as within the category of persons holding appointments, or of persons exercising any profession, trade, or art or calling\"- as these were the only classes-relevant to the present purpose who were within the scope of the rules under Schedule\n\nIV.\n\nWe shall refer to the ubmission based on this feature as regards the terminology employed in Schedule IV in its proper place. The Corporation of Madras availed itself of the provisions of s. 98-A and after the issue of the notices prescribed by it passed a resolution at a meeting held on March 31, 1937 to levy inter a/ia \"profession tax\" for the\n\nyr 1937-38 at the rates which were specified in the resolution. As regards \"profession tax\", the resolution read:\n\n\"Resolved that the profession tax in respect of\n\nclauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 be fixed at the maximum rate and 25 per cent over and above the minimum rates prescribed in Schedule IV of the Act in respect of clauses 7, 8 and 9.\"\n\nThis resolution further specified thqt the tax at the rates therein set out which were higher than what prevailed before, were to have effect from April 1, 19~7. Notwithstam!ing tbe apparent inapplicability of the rules in Schedule JY to t!te le\\'Y of profession ta:i: on pensioners, the Corporation continued to assess pensioners to the said tax and\n\n. (\n\ncollected the same.\n\nThe lacuna in the enactment was 1964 apparently noticed in 1942 when by a notification in the c. Ra;;;;;;;;;;,1ac1um official gazette the Schedule was amended in exercise of the v .. powers conferred on Government by s. 34 7 ( 3) of the Act.\n\nCorp;:~';';; \"\" Under the amendment instead of the words \"Persons holding any appointment or persons exercising profession, trade or Ayyangar 1• calling etc. \"the classes were divided on the basis of \"the half yearly income received by the individual specified in s. 111 (Ii''. This amendment to the Schedule was directed to come into force from April I, 1942. The relevant terms of Schedule IV have continued up to date in the same from as amended in 1942-oniy the rate of tax has been progressiveiy increased; first in 1950, then in 1958 and again in 1961, but in the view we take of the principal contention raised by the appellant it is not necessary to set out or deal with these ir.crcases.\n\nPausing heie the ground upon which the demand for \"profession tax\" made by the Corporation was impugned may be briefly stated.\n\nThe power of the Corporation to levy the tax is dependent on the subject of the tax being within State legislative power under the Constitution. The relevant entry in the Legislative Lists conferring taxing power on the State under which alone, if possible, the present levy could be supported was item 60 in the State List in Schedule VII of the Constitution reading :\n\n\"Taxes on profession, trades, callings and employments.\"\n\nBeing a \"pensioner\" cannot be a \"profession, trade, business or calling\", nor could a tax on a person because he is in\n\n1 , receipt of a pension be said to be a tax on \"employments\".\n\nThe tax therefore under the last portion of s. 111 (1 )(b) reading-Profession tax on persons \"in receipt of any pension or income from investments\"-is nothing but a tax on income falling within Entry 82 of the Union list.\n\nIf, therefore, the Corporation could not justify the tax as being within the State legislative power the only manner in which it could be done would be by reference to Art. 277 of the C'.onstiturion by which \"taxes, duties, etc.\" which \"were\n\nbeing lawfully levied\" prior to the commencement of the\n\n!!!!_ Constitution were permitted to be levied \"notwithstanding C. RA;.11opa/txhari that the tax was in the Union List\" and \"to be applied to\n\nCorpor; iion of the same purposes\" as before. Unless therefore the Madrt11 Corporation could make out that the tax now impugned wa!\n\nA.yyanllJr J. being lawfully levied from before the Constitution the levy would be illegal and besides there was the complication introduced by the enhancement of the rates of tax which, as stated earlier, were effected in April, 1950, April 1958 and in 1961. Leaving aside for the moment the question of the effect of the enhancement of the rate, we have to see whether it has been established that the duty was lawfully levied by the Corporation prior to the Constitution.\n\nThe answer to the question whether it was \"lawfully levied\" prior to 26th January, 1950 when the Constitution came into force would depend upon the effect of certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under that enactment, as under the Constitution, the State legislative power as regards taxes of the nature now in controversy was couched in terms identical with that employed in entry 60 of the State List in the Constitution. Entry 46 in the Provincial Legislative List under the Government of India Act, 1935 ran :\n\n\"Taxes on profession, trades, callings and employments\" : and \"taxes on income\" fell within the exclusive Federal Legislative power under Entry 54 of List I. By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940 the Parliament of the U.K. enacted s. 142-A to whose terms we shall advert later and by the same enactment entry 46 was amended and the words :\n\n\"Subject, however, to the provisions of s. 142-A\" : were added at the end of entry 46. Here, again, it would be seen that if the right of the Corporation to levy profession tax on the pension received by a pemioner had to rest on the legislative entries it would fail because it was outside the legislative power of the Province under the Lists read with s. 100 of that Act corresponding to Art. 246 of the Comtitution. The validity of the levy during the period when the GoYernment of India Act was in force i.e. between 1st April, 1937 and 25th January, 1950 was dependent on\n\nits falling within the saving contained in s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act which ran :\n\n\"Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act, were being lawfully levied by any Provincial Government, municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of the Province, municipality, district or other local - area under a law in force on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Federal Legislative List, continue to be levied and to .be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature.\"\n\nNo doubt the Amending Act was not in force on 1st January, 1935 having been passed in April 1936, but this would not take it out of s. 143(2) because para 3 of the Indo-Burma (Transitory Provisions) Order, 1937, being an Order in Council by His Majesty in Council authorised by s. 310 of the Government of India Act, provided :\n\n\"Para 3 (I): For a period of two yea~ from the commencement of Part III of the Indian Act, the provisions of sub-section ( 2) of section one hundred and forty-three of that Act (which authorises the continuance until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature. of certain provincial taxes falling within the Federal List) shall have effect as if the reference to the first of January nineteen hundred and thirty-five were a reference to the commencement of the said Part III.\"\n\nIt would follow, therefore, that for the present demand to be sustained as valid it would be sufficient if it was shown that the tax was lawfully levied immedhtely prior to the commencement of Part HI of the Government of India Act, 1935, i.e., on 31st March. 1937.\n\nThe learned Judes of the High Court held that this condition was satisfied and on this basis they have dismissed the appellant's petition.\n\n1''4\n\nC. Ra/agopaloclwf\n\nCorporotio• O!\n\nJladra\n\nA.yya,.. I.\n\n1ffl Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted four points C. JWJugopQ/ri in support of the appeal : ( l) That the amending Act X\n\n,.__ .• ·. ,, of 1936 was not validly passed by reason of its contravening .,.,.por..,•on 9, . Modr(lf. the Devolutmn Rules framed under s. 45-A of the Govern-\n\n, fyyqfllw: ,. ment of India Act, 1919 by which Local Governments were given legislative power inter alia to )evy taxes on professions, trades, etc. but that the present tax which is really a \"tax on income\" was a Central subject outside the competence of the Local Legislature, ( 2) Even assuming that Act X of 1936 was valid, the tax which was peniT!tted to be levied under it was, having regard to the terms of s. 111 (1) a new tax which was levied for the first time by the resolution of the Corporation only on and from April 1, 193 7 and, therefore, the present tax was not in operation prior to the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935 and not therefore saved by s. 143(2) of that Act, ( 3) Besic!es, between 1st April, 193 7 to 1st April, 1942 it was not lawfully levied by reason of the lacuna created by the words of the rules in Schedule IV being inapplicable to the levy of a tax on pensioners, ( 4) The increase in the rates from 193 7 onwards could not be justified even under s. 143 ( 2) or Art. 277 and by reason of these changes in rates the tax became virtually a new tax and could not continue to be lawfully levied to any extent after the increases.\n\nThe first point need not detain us long. Prima facie it would seem that there being no rigid distribution of legislative power between the Central and Local Governments under the Government of India Act, 1919 any inf.raction of the rules made under the Devolution Rules framed under s. 45-A would be validated by s. 80-A(3) and s. 84(2) of the Government of India Act, 1919. The learned Judges of the High Court before whom this contention was urged rejected it, and the learned counsel submitted that the decision on this point was not correct. But in the view that we took of the other submissions made to us, we die! not hear learned counsel fully on this point and therefore do not , propose to express any final opinion on the tenability of tbe argument on this head.\n\n,..\n\n<i S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COtJRT REPORTS 973\n\nAs preliminary to the consideration of the second point 1961 it would be necessary to advert to one feature of the change c. Raia;;;;;, lac,.,,,,\n\neffected by the Amending Act of 1936 to the tax levy. v ..\n\nUnder s. 111, as it originally stood, the liability to pay the Corp;$~':: of tax, i.e., the charge for the tax, was imposed by virtue of .ti.yyangar I. the statute itself, on persons who for the period prescribed \"exercised a profession or trade or calling or held an\n\nappointment\", persons in receipt of pensions being deemed to be persons holding appointments.\n\nThis structure as regards the imposition of liability was altered by the Amending Act.\n\nUnder the provision, as recast, before a liability to pay the tax could arise the Council had to determine by a resolution that profession tax shall be levied and it was only that resolution which brought the charge into operation. Thus, the resolution of the Council was substituted for the statute itself as the mode by which the charge was to be imposed.\n\nThere was also a second change that was introduced by rendering residence for six months within the city, hesides the receipt of pension in the city, a necessary ingredient of the chargeability of the \"profession tax\" on pensioners.\n\nThe effect of these two changes now calls for consideration.\n\nOn the amendment of s. 111 by the Act of 1935 coming into force in April 1936, the statutory imposition of the charge to tax laid on persons in receipt of pensions within the city of Madras ceased, and the liability to tax as regards the period after that date was dependent on the passing of a resolution by the Council in terms of the amended s. 111 (I ) of the Act. In this connection it has to be pointed out that though recourse to the procedure as respects previous publication .etc. prescribed by s. 98-A was necessary only in the case of taxes newly levied, and might have been adopted in the present case because of the enhancement of the rates, still, a resolution of the Council was necessary to impose the tax as without it, no liability to profession tax would arise.\n\nThe charge to tax was imposed, as stated earlier by the resolution of the Council which was to have effect from April I, 1937.\n\nIn other words by reason of the repeal of the original section 111, the statutory charge to tax on pensions ceased in April 1936.\n\nA charge was imposed again under. the resolution of the Council effective from !st Aprir,-'1937, so that\n\n974 SURREME cou~~ REPQRTS [r~4]\n\n19~ between ~J?ril f936 to 31st\"Marc)l, 19~7, nq., charg!' was '<· RaJagopalachflri imposed by :virtue of any \"ll\\W\". 1,-e<uned Counsel fo{ the\n\nC v.. / Appellant submits that this is in effect., a new Jevy,-a levy\n\n°'I.. orporat1on o f h\" h' I II : ·\n\n31 M h Madrm o a tax \";\" !C wa~ nqt ega X 1D ex1stei; ice on st arc , 1931, and if this levy could not be supported as being .A.yyangar 1 • sa11ctionecl by s. 1~3 (2) pf the, Gpvern.mt of India Act,. 1935, it is comm, on ground Jhat th~ Jawfu)ness of the levy ', cannot be, .sv.tained. We consider this. _.ubmissiop. :well\n\nfounded. f the statutql)( charge to profes.sion tax imposed on pensioni:rs by the Act. of 1919. wa~ lifted by \\he Act ..._ of 1936, and the' tax again came , into operatipn .only on 1st Aprii, 1937, it wol; lld,. follO\\v tat tee i.vas no \"levy of 1 the., tax\" \"imrl')ediate/y _before\" , the cprr.11/!\"ncment of Part III, of the Governmenf p, f India Al<t .. 19.35, so as to bring it within the saving in s. 143 ('.?.) of 'that Act.\n\nBesides, the two ci!cumstances. viz. : that residence within the city for a specified period was, made a condition of the )iability to / < the tax, as well as the increase in the rates would' both serve .to emphasise that the\n\nlevy was a new one, with a differen, t texture and not n continuance of the tax ':Vhich was le'l'.ied just prior to the 1st April, 1937.\n\nLearned Counsel , for the respondents the Corporation of Madras and the State have ur.ged that it was in substance the old levy.\n\nWe are unable to agree. The mere fact that prior to 1st April, 1937 the Corporation had unaer Act X of 1936 the power to bring the, tax into force by. a resolution does not on a woper coqs'truction of s. 14~ (2) bring it within the range of those taxes or duties which \"were being. !awfully levied\" prior ; o the commencement .of Part III of the Government o( ndfa Act Which alone are permitted to be continued to be lyvied notwit)1standing that these duties ; were 'in the Federal LegislaJive List.\n\nThis question has been considered , by us , in great detail in Tlie Town Municipal Committee~ Amravati v. Ram Ch.andra Vasudeo Chimote and A.not her, etc.(') in .yhich ]udgment has been pronounced today and 'it is u!1necessary to re-examine the same. The mere exisence of a power to bring a tax into operation, cannot, as p<;>inted out,. be equa!~.d with \"a ta~.\n\n\nwhich was being lawfully levied\" before Part III of the 1964 Government of India AC!, 1935.\n\nc. Rajagopalac/tan\n\nThe 3rd submission of learned Counsel for the appellant is also well-founded.\n\nThe conclusion we have reached as to the effect of the amendment to s. 111 by Act X of 193 6, and of the tax being imposed by resolution of the Council from 1st April, 1937 not being a tax which was being lawfully levied immediately prior to !st April, 1942, is reinforced by reference to the rules in Schedule IV which remained unamended till 1942. Under s. 111 ( 1) as amended, the tax could be levied only in accordance with the rules in Schedule IV and as those rules did not make a provision for the levy of a tax on pensioners. it would follow that the tax \"was not being lawfully levied\" on them.\n\nAs already painted out, the relevant rules in that Schedule ...., were framed at a time when Explanation 2 formed part of s. 111 and \"pemioners\" were deemed to \"hold appointments\".\n\nWith the deletion of the Explanation, the fiction created by the origin:il Madras Act IV of 1919 ceased and thereafter if the rules in Schedule IV had to be applied to them these had to be suitably modified. This, as we have pointed out earlier, was done only from April 1, 1942, so that in reality taxes on pensioners were \"lawfully\" levied upto 1936 and then after a break from April 1, 1942, we\n\n~ use the wo:d \"lawfully\" on the assumption that this could have been legally done under the Government of India Act, 1935, a point already discussed. The learned Judges of the High Court have rejected the argument addressed to them under this head by reference to s. 18 of the Madras General Clause Act corresponding to s. 24 of the General Clauses _, Act (Central Act X of 1897). With great respect to the learned Judges we do not see how this provision affords any assistance in the matter. The Schedule and the rules continued without repeal or amendment when the new s. 111 ( 1) was substituted in 1936, and when tliis section made a reference to the rules in Schedule IV it could only be a reference to the rules in the Schedule IV which stood ,. unaltered. If the phraseology employed in the Schedule was inappropriate to a class which fell within s. 111 ( 1 ) , the only effect would be that the tax could not be levied, because\n\nCorporation DI\n\nMadrtz1\n\n.A.yyan1ar I.\n\n1961 of the defect in the law imposing the tax, but such a situation • C. RJijagopalacltari is not remedied by reference to the provision in the General Corpor; i;011 of Clauses Act on which the learned Judges have relied.\n\nMadrai\n\n.A.yyangar I.\n\nIf, therefore, the tax was one not lawfully levied just prior to April 1, 1937 and was one brought in after the Government of India Act, 1935 came into force, and really only from April l, 1942 assuming this to be lawful-it is obvious that the validity of this tax could not be sustained as a continuation of a lawful pre-existing levy under s. 143(2).\n\nIn this view it is not necessary to consider the last of the points urged by learned Counsel and examine whether in case of an increase of rate, the entire tax would become a new tax and so unconstitutional or whether it is only the increase in the rate that would become unenforcenble.\n\nLearned Counsel for the respondent-Corporation submitted that the tax could not be deemed to be a tax on income, as was suggested by the appellant, but was really a tax on employment because it was in consideration of past services during employment that pension was payable.\n\nThis argument was admittedly not urged before the learned Judges of the High Court and is obviously untenable. The\n\ntaxes specified in item 60 are taxes on the carrying on of a profession, trade, etc. and would, therefore, apply only to a case of present employment.\n\nThe mere fact that a person has previously been in a profession or carried on a trade, etc. cannot justify a tax under this Entry. The tax on the receipt of pension or on the income from investments which is referred to in the last part of s. 111 ( I) 1s in truth and substance a tax on income and in fact the argument before the High Court proceeded on this basis, so have the learned Judges. At the time the tax is levied the pensioner is in no employment but is only in receipt of income though it might be for past services, in an employment.\n\nHe next submitted that Act X of 1936 which had been enacted prior to the Government of India Act, 1935 was continued as an existing law by s. 292 of the Government of India Act and as there was nothing in the Government <Of India Act against its continuance it would have effect\n\neven if the terms of s. 143 (2) were not satisfied by the 1964 present levy. The learned Judges of the High Court accepted c. Rai,;;;;, lachtJr. ,. this submission. In our opinion, they were in order. The question of the correlation between Art. 372 corresponding to s. 292 of the Government of India Act and Art. 277 corresponding to s. 143 ( 2} of the Government of India Act was considered by this Court in South India Corporation\n\n(P) Ltd. v. The Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum ( 1) and this Court said:\n\n\"It is settled law that a special provision should be given effect to the extent of its scope, leaving the general provision to control cases where the special provision does not apply.\n\nThe earlier discussion makes it abundantly clear that the Constitution gives a separate treatment to the subject of finances, and Art. 277 saves the existing taxes etc. levied by States, if the conditions mentioned therein are complied with.\n\nWhile Art. 372 saves all pre-Constitution valid laws, Art. 277 is confined only to laxes, duties, cesses or fees lawfully levied immediately before the Constitution.\n\nTherefore, Art. 372 cannot be construed in such a way as to enlarge the scope of the saving of taxes, duties, cesses .:.. . or fees.\n\nTo state it differently, Art. 372 must be read subject to Art. 277.\"\n\nLearned Counsel next drew our attention to s. 142-A(l) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and faintly suggested that it might afford him some assistance.\n\nThis provision. again, was not adverted to before the learned Judges of the , l High Court and for a proper reason.\n\nS. 142-A(l) which corresponds to Art. 276(1) of the Constitution enacted:\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything in section one hundred of this Act, no Provincial law relating to taxes for the benefit of a Province or of a municipality, district board, local board or other local authority therein in respect of professions, ___ ._ _____ _\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 207.\n\n134-159 S.C.~2\n\nCorporalio11 af\n\nMadras\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nJGM trades, callings or employments shall be invalid\n\nc. RaJagopalacllari on the ground that it relates to a tax on income.\"\n\nCorpoTinn of Thi~ section would assist the respondent only if tax imposed\n\nJ.ladrtU were one on a profession, trade, calliµg, or employment and in that event the section provides that such a tax shall\n\n\"\"\"\"\"\" J.\n\nMarch J.\n\nnot be deemed to be a tax on income, but where the tax imposed is one not on a profession,. etc. at all, it does not mean that the State might levy a tax on income and call it\n\n\"profession tax\".\n\nThis is sufficient to dispose of a similar argument as regards the scope of the amended Entry 46 in the Provincial Legislature List (List II) to which we have advened earlier.\n\nThe appeal accordingly succeeds and the appellant is held entitled to the relief prayed by him in the petition he filed in the High Court, viz., a writ of Prohibition against the respondent-Corporation from enforcing the demand.\n\nThe appellant will be entitled to his costs from the respondents here and in the High Coun.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nMATIULLAH SHEIKH\n\nTHE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUllAR\n\nDAYAL JJ.)\n\nCriminal Law-Murder not actually committed-If conviction poJsiblt\n\nunder s. 449-\"ln order to\", meaning of-Charge under s. 307 with s. 34, if sustainable in /aw-Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of\n\n1860) \"· 34. 307, 449.\n\nThe appellants. were alleged to have entered the house of one E with the common intention of killing him. One of the appellants injured E with a dagger while the other three held him. E's injury did not prove fatal.\n\nThe Sessions Judge convicted them under ss. 449 and 307 with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. which on appeal was upheld by the Hif1i Co111'1. On appeal by certificate, ii was contended 11181 there can", "total_entities": 179, "entities": [{"text": "C. RAJAGOPALACHARI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. RAJAGOPALACHARI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CORPORATION OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CORPORATION OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 142A(l), 143(2), 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 271, "end_char": 295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 297, "end_char": 318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 271", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 320, "end_char": 328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 576, "end_char": 582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000 prr annum as pension while residing Jn the city of Madras."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1305, "end_char": 1313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(J)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1463, "end_char": 1477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1543, "end_char": 1556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133(J)(c) of the'\" constitution to the appellant to file on appeal t'J the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Madras City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1733, "end_char": 1744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Corporation was entitled to levy a tax on pensioners in respect of the pensions received by them in Madras City."}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1985, "end_char": 1997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2972, "end_char": 2980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3185, "end_char": 3193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3312, "end_char": 3325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "277 of the Constitution because the tax was a new levy and nut a continuance of a tax which had been levied just prior to April 1, 1937."}}, {"text": "April I, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3532, "end_char": 3545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On thC facts of this case it was held that if the statutory charge to profession tax imposed on pensioners by the Act of 1919, was lifted by the Act of 1936, and the trix again came into operation only on April I, 1937."}}, {"text": "Ill of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 143(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3724, "end_char": 3733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ill of the Government of India Act", "statute": "Ill of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "1st April, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4138, "end_char": 4153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) \"['he mere fact that prior to 1st April, 1937 the Corporation had under Act of 1936 the power to bring the tax into force by a resolution does not on a proper construction of s. 143(2) bring it within the range of those taxes or duties which \"were being lawfully levied\" prior to the ..:ommencement of Part Ill of the Government ot India Act 1935, which alone are permitted to be continued to be levied notwithstanding that these duties were in the Federal Legislative List."}}, {"text": "s. 143(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4283, "end_char": 4292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ill of the Government of India Act", "statute": "Ill of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Part Ill of the Government ot India Act 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4410, "end_char": 4454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4716, "end_char": 4761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 S.C.R. 947", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 111(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5082, "end_char": 5091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5166, "end_char": 5177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5398, "end_char": 5403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5418, "end_char": 5437, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5449, "end_char": 5455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part Ill of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5468, "end_char": 5497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6053, "end_char": 6070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated May 1, 1961, of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "R. M. Seshadri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6106, "end_char": 6120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Seshadri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6125, "end_char": 6142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. M. Seshadri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy lyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6164, "end_char": 6181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy lyer, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. Ranganadham Chetty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6206, "end_char": 6227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6232, "end_char": 6244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "I.' AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6342, "end_char": 6354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was .. ' delivered by\n\nA170n1ar I.' AYYANGAR, J.-This appeal comes before us by virtue of a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Madras under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6467, "end_char": 6475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6577, "end_char": 6585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Irtdia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6828, "end_char": 6834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant held office as the last Governor-General of Irtdia."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6843, "end_char": 6847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Act XXX of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6851, "end_char": 6874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Corporation of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7008, "end_char": 7029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Corporation of Madras-the first respondent before us demanded profession tax from the appellant under s. lll(l)(b) of the City Municipal Act, 1919 hereinafter called the Act for the year 1958-1959 on the ground of the 11ppellant's residence within the city for the period therein specified and his drawing the pension to which he was entitled.", "canonical_name": "CORPORATION OF MADRAS"}}, {"text": "City Municipal Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7130, "end_char": 7154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ayon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8007, "end_char": 8011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant thereupon Ayon,.,"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8138, "end_char": 8153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r 1• filed a writ petition for the relief already set out, and as the validity of the State Act was impugned impleaded the State of Madras also as a respondent."}}, {"text": "adras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8638, "end_char": 8643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order tQ appreciate the submissions made to us by learned Counsel for the appellant it would be ncessary to set out the history of the legislation in relation to profession tax and the impugned tax on\n\niperns in receipt of pensions applicable to the City of\n\nadras because it is on a construction of these provisions lhat the learned Judges of the liigh Court have upheld the validity of the levy and dismissed the appellant's writ petition."}}, {"text": "Madras Act IV of 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8943, "end_char": 8964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 26, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9092, "end_char": 9106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The A.ct received the assent of the Governor on March 26, 1919, of the Governor -General in June, 1919 and came into force on publication in the Gazette which was in the same month."}}, {"text": "Section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9420, "end_char": 9431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having been enacted while the powers of the Local Legislatures were governed by the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Having been enacted while the powers of the Local Legislatures were governed by the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Sec. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9570, "end_char": 9578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having been enacted while the powers of the Local Legislatures were governed by the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Having been enacted while the powers of the Local Legislatures were governed by the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9762, "end_char": 9773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Having been enacted while the powers of the Local Legislatures were governed by the Government of India Act, 1915", "statute": "Having been enacted while the powers of the Local Legislatures were governed by the Government of India Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Madras City Municipal Amendment Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10421, "end_char": 10462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act X of 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10464, "end_char": 10484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "14th April 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10511, "end_char": 10526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .next change in the relevant provision was effected by Madras City Municipal Amendment Act, 1936 (Madras Act X of 1936) which came into force on 14th April 1936."}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10561, "end_char": 10567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act X of 1936", "statute": "Madras Act X of 1936"}}, {"text": "Sec. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10910, "end_char": 10917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act X of 1936", "statute": "Madras Act X of 1936"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11525, "end_char": 11536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11654, "end_char": 11659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11690, "end_char": 11697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12738, "end_char": 12749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12821, "end_char": 12827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12888, "end_char": 12899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13452, "end_char": 13458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Corporation of d X Uadrm amen ment by Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13492, "end_char": 13533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13974, "end_char": 13980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corporation of d X Uadrm amen ment by Act", "statute": "Corporation of d X Uadrm amen ment by Act"}}, {"text": "Amending Act X of 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14000, "end_char": 14022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14040, "end_char": 14046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act X of 1936", "statute": "Amending Act X of 1936"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14127, "end_char": 14138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act X of 1936", "statute": "Amending Act X of 1936"}}, {"text": "Schedule\n\nIV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14497, "end_char": 14509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act X of 1936", "statute": "Amending Act X of 1936"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14605, "end_char": 14616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act X of 1936", "statute": "Amending Act X of 1936"}}, {"text": "Corporation of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14642, "end_char": 14663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Corporation of Madras availed itself of the provisions of s. 98-A and after the issue of the notices prescribed by it passed a resolution at a meeting held on March 31, 1937 to levy inter a/ia \"profession tax\" for the\n\nyr 1937-38 at the rates which were specified in the resolution."}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14700, "end_char": 14705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act X of 1936", "statute": "Amending Act X of 1936"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14801, "end_char": 14815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Corporation of Madras availed itself of the provisions of s. 98-A and after the issue of the notices prescribed by it passed a resolution at a meeting held on March 31, 1937 to levy inter a/ia \"profession tax\" for the\n\nyr 1937-38 at the rates which were specified in the resolution."}}, {"text": "Schedule IV of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15145, "end_char": 15167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 19~7.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15351, "end_char": 15365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This resolution further specified thqt the tax at the rates therein set out which were higher than what prevailed before, were to have effect from April 1, 19~7."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15799, "end_char": 15804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule IV of the Act", "statute": "Schedule IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16089, "end_char": 16095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule IV of the Act", "statute": "Schedule IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16208, "end_char": 16219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16978, "end_char": 16990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17308, "end_char": 17314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17655, "end_char": 17663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.yyanllJr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18063, "end_char": 18073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.yyanllJr J. being lawfully levied from before the Constitution the levy would be illegal and besides there was the complication introduced by the enhancement of the rates of tax which, as stated earlier, were effected in April, 1950, April 1958 and in 1961."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18608, "end_char": 18626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The answer to the question whether it was \"lawfully levied\" prior to 26th January, 1950 when the Constitution came into force would depend upon the effect of certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "Provincial Legislative List under the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18998, "end_char": 19065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19231, "end_char": 19284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament of the U.K.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19289, "end_char": 19311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Entry 46 in the Provincial Legislative List under the Government of India Act, 1935 ran :\n\n\"Taxes on profession, trades, callings and employments\" : and \"taxes on income\" fell within the exclusive Federal Legislative power under Entry 54 of List I. By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940 the Parliament of the U.K. enacted s. 142-A to whose terms we shall advert later and by the same enactment entry 46 was amended and the words :\n\n\"Subject, however, to the provisions of s. 142-A\" : were added at the end of entry 46."}}, {"text": "s. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19320, "end_char": 19326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940", "statute": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19470, "end_char": 19476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940", "statute": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19785, "end_char": 19791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940", "statute": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19821, "end_char": 19829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940", "statute": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "25th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19972, "end_char": 19990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the levy during the period when the GoYernment of India Act was in force i.e. between 1st April, 1937 and 25th January, 1950 was dependent on\n\nits falling within the saving contained in s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act which ran :\n\n\"Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act, were being lawfully levied by any Provincial Government, municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of the Province, municipality, district or other local - area under a law in force on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Federal Legislative List, continue to be levied and to .be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature.\""}}, {"text": "s. 143(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20052, "end_char": 20061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940", "statute": "By the Indo- Burma Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Part III of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20187, "end_char": 20207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20419, "end_char": 20469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the levy during the period when the GoYernment of India Act was in force i.e. between 1st April, 1937 and 25th January, 1950 was dependent on\n\nits falling within the saving contained in s. 143(2) of the Government of India Act which ran :\n\n\"Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act, were being lawfully levied by any Provincial Government, municipality or other local authority or body for the purposes of the Province, municipality, district or other local - area under a law in force on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, may, notwithstanding that those taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned in the Federal Legislative List, continue to be levied and to .be applied to the same purposes until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature.\""}}, {"text": "No doubt the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20716, "end_char": 20741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st January, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20762, "end_char": 20779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt the Amending Act was not in force on 1st January, 1935 having been passed in April 1936, but this would not take it out of s. 143(2) because para 3 of the Indo-Burma (Transitory Provisions) Order, 1937, being an Order in Council by His Majesty in Council authorised by s. 310 of the Government of India Act, provided :\n\n\"Para 3 (I): For a period of two yea~ from the commencement of Part III of the Indian Act, the provisions of sub-section ( 2) of section one hundred and forty-three of that Act (which authorises the continuance until provision to the contrary is made by the Federal Legislature."}}, {"text": "s. 143(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20848, "end_char": 20857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No doubt the Amending Act", "statute": "No doubt the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 310", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20994, "end_char": 21000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No doubt the Amending Act", "statute": "No doubt the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Part III of the Indian Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21108, "end_char": 21134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part HI of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21734, "end_char": 21778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st March. 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21789, "end_char": 21805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would follow, therefore, that for the present demand to be sustained as valid it would be sufficient if it was shown that the tax was lawfully levied immedhtely prior to the commencement of Part HI of the Government of India Act, 1935, i.e., on 31st March."}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22280, "end_char": 22285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part HI of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part HI of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "India Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22327, "end_char": 22342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22718, "end_char": 22724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1919", "statute": "India Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "April 1, 193 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22829, "end_char": 22843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but that the present tax which is really a \"tax on income\" was a Central subject outside the competence of the Local Legislature, ( 2) Even assuming that Act X of 1936 was valid, the tax which was peniT!tted to be levied under it was, having regard to the terms of s. 111 (1) a new tax which was levied for the first time by the resolution of the Corporation only on and from April 1, 193 7 and, therefore, the present tax was not in operation prior to the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935 and not therefore saved by s. 143(2) of that Act, ( 3) Besic!es, between 1st April, 193 7 to 1st April, 1942 it was not lawfully levied by reason of the lacuna created by the words of the rules in Schedule IV being inapplicable to the levy of a tax on pensioners, ( 4) The increase in the rates from 193 7 onwards could not be justified even under s. 143 ( 2) or Art."}}, {"text": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22926, "end_char": 22971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 143(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22999, "end_char": 23008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "1st April, 193 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23045, "end_char": 23061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but that the present tax which is really a \"tax on income\" was a Central subject outside the competence of the Local Legislature, ( 2) Even assuming that Act X of 1936 was valid, the tax which was peniT!tted to be levied under it was, having regard to the terms of s. 111 (1) a new tax which was levied for the first time by the resolution of the Corporation only on and from April 1, 193 7 and, therefore, the present tax was not in operation prior to the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935 and not therefore saved by s. 143(2) of that Act, ( 3) Besic!es, between 1st April, 193 7 to 1st April, 1942 it was not lawfully levied by reason of the lacuna created by the words of the rules in Schedule IV being inapplicable to the levy of a tax on pensioners, ( 4) The increase in the rates from 193 7 onwards could not be justified even under s. 143 ( 2) or Art."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23065, "end_char": 23080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but that the present tax which is really a \"tax on income\" was a Central subject outside the competence of the Local Legislature, ( 2) Even assuming that Act X of 1936 was valid, the tax which was peniT!tted to be levied under it was, having regard to the terms of s. 111 (1) a new tax which was levied for the first time by the resolution of the Corporation only on and from April 1, 193 7 and, therefore, the present tax was not in operation prior to the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935 and not therefore saved by s. 143(2) of that Act, ( 3) Besic!es, between 1st April, 193 7 to 1st April, 1942 it was not lawfully levied by reason of the lacuna created by the words of the rules in Schedule IV being inapplicable to the levy of a tax on pensioners, ( 4) The increase in the rates from 193 7 onwards could not be justified even under s. 143 ( 2) or Art."}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23169, "end_char": 23180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23320, "end_char": 23326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23335, "end_char": 23343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23783, "end_char": 23788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23813, "end_char": 23818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 84(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23828, "end_char": 23836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23844, "end_char": 23873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24531, "end_char": 24537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1919", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1919"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25652, "end_char": 25658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25977, "end_char": 25983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26136, "end_char": 26141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26597, "end_char": 26608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27221, "end_char": 27225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27793, "end_char": 27799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28518, "end_char": 28523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29443, "end_char": 29449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29677, "end_char": 29688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29731, "end_char": 29737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29816, "end_char": 29827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30102, "end_char": 30108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Act IV of 1919", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30237, "end_char": 30258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30297, "end_char": 30308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act IV of 1919", "statute": "Madras Act IV of 1919"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30427, "end_char": 30440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, as we have pointed out earlier, was done only from April 1, 1942, so that in reality taxes on pensioners were \"lawfully\" levied upto 1936 and then after a break from April 1, 1942, we\n\n~ use the wo:d \"lawfully\" on the assumption that this could have been legally done under the Government of India Act, 1935, a point already discussed."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30654, "end_char": 30683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30826, "end_char": 30831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30882, "end_char": 30887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Central Act X of 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30919, "end_char": 30940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31133, "end_char": 31139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act X of 1897", "statute": "Central Act X of 1897"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31226, "end_char": 31237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act X of 1897", "statute": "Central Act X of 1897"}}, {"text": "Schedule IV", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31287, "end_char": 31298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act X of 1897", "statute": "Central Act X of 1897"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31416, "end_char": 31422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act X of 1897", "statute": "Central Act X of 1897"}}, {"text": "C. RJijagopalacltari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31610, "end_char": 31630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the phraseology employed in the Schedule was inappropriate to a class which fell within s. 111 ( 1 ) , the only effect would be that the tax could not be levied, because\n\nCorporation DI\n\nMadrtz1\n\n.A.yyan1ar I.\n\n1961 of the defect in the law imposing the tax, but such a situation • C. RJijagopalacltari is not remedied by reference to the provision in the General Corpor; i;011 of Clauses Act on which the learned Judges have relied."}}, {"text": "Madrai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31763, "end_char": 31769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madrai\n\n.A.yyangar I.\n\nIf, therefore, the tax was one not lawfully levied just prior to April 1, 1937 and was one brought in after the Government of India Act, 1935 came into force, and really only from April l, 1942 assuming this to be lawful-it is obvious that the validity of this tax could not be sustained as a continuation of a lawful pre-existing levy under s. 143(2)."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31898, "end_char": 31927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 143(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32128, "end_char": 32137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33213, "end_char": 33219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33594, "end_char": 33623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33660, "end_char": 33666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33822, "end_char": 33828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34042, "end_char": 34050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34068, "end_char": 34074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34110, "end_char": 34118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34136, "end_char": 34142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34636, "end_char": 34644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34755, "end_char": 34763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34803, "end_char": 34811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34927, "end_char": 34935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35075, "end_char": 35083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35108, "end_char": 35116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35163, "end_char": 35169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35182, "end_char": 35211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35394, "end_char": 35400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 276(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35427, "end_char": 35438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "RaJagopalacllari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35861, "end_char": 35877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134-159 S.C.~2\n\nCorporalio11 af\n\nMadras\n\nAyyangar /.\n\nJGM trades, callings or employments shall be invalid\n\nc. RaJagopalacllari on the ground that it relates to a tax on income.\""}}, {"text": "MATIULLAH SHEIKH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36866, "end_char": 36882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MATIULLAH SHEIKH\n\nTHE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUllAR\n\nDAYAL JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36912, "end_char": 36924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MATIULLAH SHEIKH\n\nTHE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUllAR\n\nDAYAL JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36926, "end_char": 36941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MATIULLAH SHEIKH\n\nTHE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUllAR\n\nDAYAL JJ.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUllAR\n\nDAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36946, "end_char": 36962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MATIULLAH SHEIKH\n\nTHE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUllAR\n\nDAYAL JJ.)"}}, {"text": "s. 449", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37042, "end_char": 37048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37088, "end_char": 37094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37100, "end_char": 37105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37129, "end_char": 37152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 449 and 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37446, "end_char": 37461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37467, "end_char": 37472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37480, "end_char": 37497, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_6_978_983_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\nJGM trades, callings or employments shall be invalid\n\nc. RaJagopalacllari on the ground that it relates to a tax on income.\"\n\nCorpoTinn of Thi~ section would assist the respondent only if tax imposed\n\nJ.ladrtU were one on a profession, trade, calliµg, or employment and in that event the section provides that such a tax shall\n\n\"\"\"\"\"\" J.\n\nMarch J.\n\nnot be deemed to be a tax on income, but where the tax imposed is one not on a profession,. etc. at all, it does not mean that the State might levy a tax on income and call it\n\n\"profession tax\".\n\nThis is sufficient to dispose of a similar argument as regards the scope of the amended Entry 46 in the Provincial Legislature List (List II) to which we have advened earlier.\n\nThe appeal accordingly succeeds and the appellant is held entitled to the relief prayed by him in the petition he filed in the High Court, viz., a writ of Prohibition against the respondent-Corporation from enforcing the demand.\n\nThe appellant will be entitled to his costs from the respondents here and in the High Coun.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nMATIULLAH SHEIKH\n\nTHE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUllAR\n\nDAYAL JJ.)\n\nCriminal Law-Murder not actually committed-If conviction poJsiblt\n\nunder s. 449-\"ln order to\", meaning of-Charge under s. 307 with s. 34, if sustainable in /aw-Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of\n\n1860) \"· 34. 307, 449.\n\nThe appellants. were alleged to have entered the house of one E with the common intention of killing him. One of the appellants injured E with a dagger while the other three held him. E's injury did not prove fatal.\n\nThe Sessions Judge convicted them under ss. 449 and 307 with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. which on appeal was upheld by the Hif1i Co111'1. On appeal by certificate, ii was contended 11181 there can\n\nbe no conviction under s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code unless murder had actually been committed: and that a charge under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code was not sustainable in law.\n\n1l1dd: There was no substance in either of these contentions.\n\nAn act can be sai'd to be committed \"in order to the committing of an offence\" even though the offence may not be completed. The words \"in order to\" have been used in s. 449 l.P.C. to mean uwith the purpose or'. Whether or not the purpose was actually accomplished t. quite irrclevanL\n\nOnce it is decided that the act is so done by a number of persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, the legal position that results is each person shall be held to have committed the entire criminal act.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal.\n\nNo. 111 of 1961.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated March 2, 1961 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 269 of 1961.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants.\n\nP. K. Chakravarthy for P. K. Bose, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n1961 ' .lfatiulluh Sh<1kh\n\nY. 'i; tate n/ We., t Be1111al\n\nDAS GUPTA J.-The appellants were tried by the Das Gupta J.\n\nAdditional Sessions Judge, Birbhum, on charges under s. 449 and s. 307 /34 of the Indian Penal Code. Tiie prosecution case was that on the night of the 14th November,\n\n1950 when Haji Ebrar Ali was sleeping on the Verandah of his hut, these appellants came there and while one of them Abdul Odud pressed his knees and Ekram and Habibullah pressed his chest and hands, Matiullah inflicted an injury on his neck with a dagger. Ebrar Ali woke up and raised a 'shout at the same time catching hold of Odud.\n\nThe other three assailants made good their escape.\n\nInformation about the occurrence was lodged at the Thana by Ebrar Ali who was then sent to Rampurhat hospital for treatment. It is alleged by the prosecution that these four appellants entered Ebrar Ali's house with the common intention of killing him, and that in furtherance of that\n\n19~ common inten11on, Matiullah injured him with a dagger Matiutw; Sheikh while the other three held him down.\n\nFortunately, the v. injury inflicted on Ebrar Ali did not rprove fatal.\n\nStale of West\n\nBengal\n\nDm Gupta I.\n\nThe jury returned an unanimous verdict of guilt against all the appellants on both charges.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge accepted that verdict, and convicted them all under ss. 449 and 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nHe sentenced the appellant Matiullah to rigorous imprison ment for four years under s. 307 /34 and to rigorous imprisonment for two years under s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nHe sentenced the other three appellants to rigorous imprisonment for three years under s. 307 /34 of the Indian Penal Code and for two years under s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code. All the four appealed to the High Court. of Calcutta.\n\nBut, the appeal was summarily dis missyd.\n\nA Bench of the High Court however gave the appellants a certificate that this was a fit case for appeal to this Court, under Art. 134 (l )( c) of the Constitution. On the basis of that certificate this appeal has been preferre<!.\n\nTwo points are urged before us on behalf of the appel !ants.\n\nThe first is that there can be no conviction under s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code unless murder has actually been committed. The second is that a charge under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable in law. In our opinion, there is no substance in either of these contentions.\n\nSection 449 of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever commits house trespass in oriler to the committing of any offence punishable with death, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with rigorous imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. and shall also be liable to fine. Mr. Mukherjee, who appeared before us on behalf of the appellants, argued that unless murdtr has been committed it is not possible to say that any house trespass was committed \"in order to the committing\" of an offence punishable with death. Accordin!! to the learned Counsel, from the fact that the purpose of the house trespass was to .. commit the murder it is not right to predicate that the house trespass was committed \"in order to the committing of\n\n.,.\n\nmurder\". We are unable to agree. In our opinion, an act 1964 can be said to be committed \"in order to the committing Matiul/ah Shlikh of an offence\" even though the offence may not be completv.\n\nState of W11t ed.\n\nThus, if a person commits a house trespass with the Bengal purpose of the committing of theft but has failed to accom- D 6 - 1 plish the purpose, it will be proper to say that he has as upta committed the house trespass in order to the committing of theft. It has to be noticed that the words \"in order to\" have been used by the legislature not only in s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code but in the two succeeding sections 450, 451 and again in s. 454 and s. 457 of the Indian Penal\n\nCode.\n\nSection 450 prescribes the punishment for house trespass if it is done \"in order to\" the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment for life. Section 451 makes punishable the commission of an offence of house trespass if it is committed \"in order to\" the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment.\n\nSection_ 454 makes punishable, lurking house trespass or house breaking, if committed \"in order to\" the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment.\n\nSection 457 prescribes the punishment for lurking house trespass by night or house breaking by night, if committed, \"in order to\" the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment.\n\nIt is worth noticing also that house trespass, apart from anything else is made punishable under s. 448 of the Indian Penal Code, the punishment prescribed being imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or both.\n\nHigher punishment is prescribed where house trespass is committed \"in order to\" the commission of other offences.\n\nAn examination of ss. 449, 450, 451, 454 and 457 show that the penalty prescribed has been graded according to the nature of the offence \"in order to\" the commission of which house trespass is committed.\n\nIt is quite clear that these punishments for house trespass are prescribed quite independent of Lile question whether the offence \"in order to\" the commission of which the house trespass was committed has been actually committed or not. In our opinion, there can be no doubt that the words \"in order to\" have been used\n\n1964 to mean \"with the purpose of'. If the purpose in commit-\n\nMa11ullah Sheikh ting the house trespass is the commission of an offence v. punishable with death the house trespass becomes punish- Staze of West lien; ai able under s. 449 of the Indian Penal t::ode. If the purpose\n\nDaJ Gupta J. in committing the house trespass is the commission of an\n\noffence punishable with imprisonment for life the house trespass is punishable under s. 450 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSimilarly, ss. 451, 454 and 457 will apply if the house trespass or lurking house trespass, or lurking house trespass by night or house breaking by night are committed for the purpose of the offence indicated in those sections. Whether or not the purpose was actually accomplished is quite irrelevant in these cases.\n\nOur conclusion therefore is that the fact that the murder was not actually committed will not affect the applicability of s. 449 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nfhe second contention that no charge under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is sustainable in law appears to proceed on a misreading of the effect of the provisions of s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSection 307 of the Indian Penal Code runs thus :-\n\n\"Whoever doe\" any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished wjth imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life. or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.\"\n\nAccording to Mr. Mukherjee, what is made punishable by this section is the individual act of a person when that individual has a particular intention or knowledge referred to in the section and so, where the act is done by a number of persons jointly it can have no application.\n\nThis argument ignores the legal position that the act committed by a number of persons shall in the circumstances mentioned in s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code be held to be the act ot\n\neach one individual of those persons. Section 34 runs thus:-\n\n'\"When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done byhim alone.\"\n\nIt may, in many cases, be difficult to decide whether the crimi.nai act in question has been done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. But, once it is decided that the act is so done by a number of persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, the legal. position that results is that each person shall be held to have committed the entire criminal act. Thus, in the present case, when it is found that the four appellants attacked Haji Ebrar Ali in furtherance of the common intention of all of them to kill him and some of them held him down while one used the dagger on him, each of the four is in law considered to have done the entire act of holding Ebrar Ali down and applying the dagger. If Matiullah by himself had held Ebrar Ali down and struck him with the dagger, with the intention of causing his death and the injury had actually resulted in his death, he would have been guilty of murder, except in some special circumstances as mentioned_ in s. 300\n\nof the Indian Penal Code. The act did not result in death.\n\nSo, he becomes punishable under s. 307 of the Indian Penal Code. The position is in no way different when Matiullah is not acting alone but he and several others are acting jointly in furtherance of the common intention of all of them to kill Ebrar Ali.\n\nEach of the other three who did not use the dagger must in law be considered to have done this act of using the dagger; and so, each of them becomes punishable under s. 307 of the Indian Penal Code for injuring Ebrar Ali with the dagger on the neck as if the act had been done by himself alone.\n\nThe contention that a charge under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable in law, must therefore be rejected.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nMatiullalt Sh•ikh\n\nStal• of Wut\n\n!ltnfOl\n\nDu Gupta I.", "total_entities": 94, "entities": [{"text": "MATIULLAH SHEIKH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1092, "end_char": 1108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MATIULLAH SHEIKH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STA TE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1110, "end_char": 1135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. 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{"document_id": "1964_6_984_1001_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "March 3.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nKARAMSHI JETHABHAI SOMA YY A\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. 'c. DAS GUPTA AND\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)\n\nAgreement-Concluded by Superintending Engineer-If hit by •· 17'(3)\n\nof Government of India A.ct-SuPply of Irrigation water-Trall6fer\n\nof right-If permission needed-Government of India A.ct, 1935\n\n(26 Geo. v. Ch. 2), s. 175(3). Bombay Irrigation A.ct, 1879 (Bom. of 1879), ss. 3(6), 4, 27-30.\n\nOne K had obtained sanction to irrigate certain lands from a canal.\n\nThe same year the Government proposed to reserve certain area along the canal as factory area. According to the appellant after some correspondence between the Government and K, the Superintending Engi~ neer agreed to exclude K's land from the factory area and also to &ive water perpetually on the condition that he concentrated all his holding on the tail outlet of the canal an'd to take the supply of water on volumetric basis. Pursuant to that arrangement, K concentrated his hold ings and shifted his operations to that area and he was supplied water on the agreed basis. Later the appellant and K entered into a partnership in respect of exploiting this area.\n\nDisputes arose between the appellant and K which culminated in a consent decree whereunder the appellant became the full owner of the land including the right to use this canal water. When the appellant applied for the recognition of the transfer the canal officer refused to llo so. On appeal he was inform• ed that his request for supply of the canal water could not be granted.\n\nThe supply was stopped. After giving them statutory notice under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant filed a suit against the State for a declaration of his right to water from the canal and for consequential reliefs. The State contested the suit contending, inter alia, that there was no concluded agreement between the Government and K, that even so, the agreement was void inasmuch as it ttid not comply with the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act. 1935 and in any view the appellant could not les:ally get the benefit of the agreement under s. 30 of the Bombay Irrigation Act. The Civil Judge held that there was a concluded agreement between the Government and K. but the transfer by K of the said right in favour of the appellant was in violation of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the High Court held that there was neither a conclu\\led agreement between K and the Government nor did it comply with the requirements of law, and the appeal was dismissed. On appeal by special leave:\n\nHeld: (i) The documents in the instant case record a concluded agreement between the Superintendent Engineer, acting on the order of\n\nthe Minister of Public Works Department, on the one band and K on the oiber agreeing lo supply water so long as K bad cane cultivation in the conccntrate'd area.\n\n196~\n\nKaramshi Jetlia\n\nbhai\n\n(ii) The provisions of Bombay Irrigation Act establishes that St 1 of vBomba every person desiring to have supply of water from a canal shall apply a • Y in the prescribed manner to the Canal Officer and that person to whom water is supplied cannot transfer bis right to another without the pennission of the Canal Officer. But if the land in respect whereof the waler is supplied is transferred, the agreement for the supply of water also 1ball be presumed to have .. been transferred alona with it •\n\n(iii) The comiuct on the part of the Government as well as that on the part of K and the appellant also establishes that the agreement was not under the Bombay Irrigation Act, but between the Government and K. .. • (iv J The asreement is void. as it bas not complied with the provisions of s. 17S (3) of the Government of India Act. The contract was not either entere\\I into by the person legally authorised by the Government to do so or expressed to be made in the name of Governor.\n\nSeth Bikhraj laipuria v: Union of lndia, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 860 and New Marine Coal Co. v. Union of India, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 8S9, referred to.\n\nUnion of India v. Rallia Ram, A.l.R. 1963 S.C. !68S, referred 10.\n\nSemble: While it is the duty of a private paity to a litigation to place all the relevant matters before the court, a higher responsibility rests upon the Government not to withhold such document from the Court.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 552 of 1962.\n\nAppeal by special leave\\ from the judgment and decree dated August 22, 1960 of the former Bombay High Coun in appeal No. 432 of 1954 from Original Decree.\n\nM. K. Nambiar, I. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. MaJhur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nD. R. Prem, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-. This appeal by special leave is directed Subba Rao I. against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay confirming those of the Civil Judge, Senior Division,\n\n1964 Ahmednagar, in Special Civil Suit No. 6 of 1953 illed by Karamshi Jetliathe appellant against the State of Bombay for a deciaration\n\nbhni of his right to water from a particular source, and for State or Bombay consequential reliefs.\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nThe appellant is the owner of Shankar Tukaram Karale Rampur Farm, situated at the tail-outlet of the Godavari Right Bank Canal Distributary No. 17. The lands comprised in the said Farm originally belonged to Shankar Tukaram Karale, hereinafter called Karale.\n\nIn the year 1935 the said Karale had a farm for raising sugarcane consisting of 35 acres owned by him and about 65 acres of land taken on lease by him in Ahmednagar District. He obtained sanction to irrigate his lands on the outiet No. 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal. In or about the same year the Government of Bombay proposed to rese:ve certain area along the said Distributary Canal as \"factory area\". After some correspondence between the said Karale and the Government of Bombay, it was the appellant's case, the Superintending Engineer agreed on July 14, 1939, to exclude Karale's lands from the factory area and also to give him water penpetually on condition that he concentrated all his holdings on the tail outlet of Distributary No. 17 and to take the supply of water on volumetric basis. Pursuant to that arrangement, Karale, by purchase or otherwise, concentrated his holdings and shifted his operations to that area and he was supplied water on the agreed basis. In or about April 1948, the appellant and Karale entered into a partnership for explc; iiting the said area whereunder the appellant had three-fourths share and the said Karale had one-fourth share. Later on disputes arose between the appellant and Karale in respect of the partnership which culminated in a consent decree dated Februarv 7, 1951, whereunder the appellant became the full oer of the .partnership business with all its assets and liabilities, including the lands and the compact block and the right to use the canal water. When the appellant applied for the recognition of the transfer, the Canal Officer refused to do so.\n\nOn appeal, he was informed that his request for supply of canal water could not be granted. From April 1952 the supply was stopped. After giving the statutory notice under\n\ns. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant filed 1964 Special Civil Suit No. 6 of 1953 in the Court of the Civil K•ramsh1 1'tha Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar, against the State of bha• Bombay for a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to state of\" Bombay the supply and use of water from the tail outlet of Distri- Subba Rao I. butary No. 17 of the Canal to irrigate 100 acres of basic cane land in the concentrated area described in Schedule II at the rates prescribed by the Government under the Irrigation Act on a volumetric basis, for specific performance of the aforesaid agreement between Karale and the Government, for recovery of damages, and for other incidental reliefs.\n\nThe State of Bombay filed a written-statement contending, inter alia, that there was no concluded agreement between the Government and Karale embodying the alleged terms stated in the plaint, that even if there was such an agreement, it was void inasmuch as it did not comply with the provisions of s. 17 5 ( 3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that, in any view, the appellant could not legally get the benefit of the agreement under s. 30 of the Bombay lrrization Act, 1879. On the pleadings as many as seven issues were framed reflecting the contentions of the parties. The learned Civil Judge held that there was a concluded agreement between the Government and Karale on the terms alleged by the appellant, but the transfer by Karaie of the said right in favour of 'the appellant was in violation of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and, therefore, there was no legal transfer of Kara!e's right of water in favour of the appellant. In that view, he dismissed the suit. On appeal, the High Court held that there was neither a concluded agreement between Karale and the Government nor did it comply with the requirements of law. In the result the appeal was dismissed. Hence the present appeal.\n\nThe arguments of Mr. M. K. Nambiar, learned counsel for the appellant, may be summarized under the following heads : ( 1 ) There was a concluded agreement between\n\nKarale and the statutory authority, the Canal Officer, whereunder the said Karale was entitled 'to get water to his 1'.0mpact block permanently from the tail outlet of IJistributary No. t 7 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal so long\n\n1964 as he was willing to pay the rates for such supply on volu- ICara,,..hi Jethametric basis. (2) As under the compromise decree between\n\nbhai Karale and the appellant the aid bloclc of land was trans-\n\nS1a1• ol\" Bombay ferred to the appellant, the right under the agreement for\n\nSubba Rao 1. the supply of canal water was also transferred to him under s. 30 of the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879 (Bombay Act No. 7 of 1879), hereinafter called the Act.\n\n(3) Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, does not apply to the agreement in question for the following reasons : (i) once the Legislature covers any matter by the enactment of any statute, any functional power assigned to the Government or any other authority under the said statute is exercisable only under that statute and in virtue of the statutory authority and not in the. exercise of the executive authority of the Province within the meaning of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935; (ii) the agreement contemplated by s. 30 of the Act is an agreement entered into under the Act by a statutory authority in pursuance of a statutory power with the statutory consequences and, therefore, such an agreement is outside the provisions of s. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935; and\n\n(iii) that apart, the expression \"agreement\" in s. 30 of the Act does not mean a formal contract, but only a sanction, permission or consent given by the Canal Officer pursuant to the authority given to him under the Act, and, therefore, such sanction, permission or consenl is not a contract within the meaning of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThis appeal raises a question ct far-reaching importance as regards the scope of the executive authority exercised by the Governor under the Government of India Aci, 1935; but, we are relieved of the duty to express our opinion on that question in this appeal in view of our finding that the agreement in question was arrived at outside the provisions of the Act and, therefore, it squarc.ly falls within the scope of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nWe shall at the outset address ourselves to the said <e agreement, namely, (i) who are the parties to the said agreement; and (ii) what are the terms thereof?\n\nWhen the suit was pending decision of thl! Civil Court, 1964 the appellant filed an application therein for directing the Karamshi Jetha- Govemment to produce, among others, the applications bhai made to the Government from time to time by Karale in state of\" Bombay respect of supply of water to his farm in the yar 1935 and Subba Rao J. subsequent thereto and the office copies of the replis sent to the said applications, the Government documents and papers, water-bills and the records in respect of the supply\n\nof water to the land belonging to Karale from the year I 935, and the correspondence that passed between Karale and the Government between I 935 and I 939 in respect of consolidation of his lands.\n\nObviously these papers were required by the appellant for establishing the case that there was a concluded agreement between Karale and the Government or the Canal-officer. But, unfortunately, the said documents were not produced.\n\nIt is not clear from the record why and under what circumstance~ th~ Government withheld the documents from the court, but in appeal the High Court in its judgment remarked: \"In the trial Court no attempt was made to have this endorsement produced in Court which could have been done if the plaintiff's Counsel had so desired by a proper application to the Court\". But the High Court felt that it was absolutely necessary in the interests of justice to call upon the learned \" Government Pleader to produce the fiJe with reference to that particular endorsement, namely, Endorsement No.\n\n3033 /36-I dated 28th April I 939, and directed him to do so. It disposed of the appeal after receiving the said relevant document.\n\nThough the High Court thre\"v the blame for this lapse on the appellant, we do not think there was any justification for it.\n\nApart from the fact that the appellant asked for the production of all the relevanc documents, the Government, being the defendant in this case, should have produced the documents relevant to the question raised.\n\nWhile it is the duty of a private party to a litigation to place all the relevant matters before the Court. a higher responsibility rests upon the Government not to withhold such documents from the court.\n\nBe !hat at it may, the documen\\s were finally produced before the court, and the High Court considered the same in arriving at its conclusion.\n\nThough Mr. Nambiar suggested that the said documents\n\n1964 related to some other party,. as we will indicate in the course Karam•hi 1e1110• of the judgment, the said file dealt also with the agreement bhai alleged to have been entered into between Karale and the State or Bombay Government. . . . '\"?·\"\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nExhibits Nos. D-67 and D-68 are the documents on\n\nwhich strong reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant.\n\nExhibit D-67 reads thus : Below Government endorsement No. 3033 /36-1 dated the 28th April 1939 :\n\nReturned with compliments.\n\nNo. 4223 of 1939 Poona, 14th July, 1939.\n\n2. The applicant has already been allowed to continue his present cane irrigation of 93 acres on outlets 2 and Tail of Distributary 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal for one year from 15-2-1939 pending consideration of his case in detail, in relation to the demand of the Sugar Company formed by Messrs. Jagtap & Khilari on this canal and lately named the \"Changdeo Sugar Factory\".\n\n3. In view however of the orders issued verbally by the Hon'ble Minister, Public Works Department on 12-7 -1939 the applicant is being allowed to concentrate all his cane irrigation to the extent of 100 acres on the tail outlet of Dy 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal by 15-2-1940 and to continue it permanently there if he so wish¥' provided he agrees to take water by measurement on 'volumetric basis of 112\" at the ou9et head and pay the water rates that may heFtafter be sanctioned by Governplent in this rpect. The applicant has since signified his .\"lillingness to these conditions. He will be charged, till then on the area basis as is done at present.\n\n4. The area thus allowed to the applicant will be excluded from the Sugar Factory area while\n\n6 S.C.R\n\nD.A.\n\nfixing the boundaries of the allotted factory area of the \"Changdco Sugar Factory\" on this canal.\n\nKaram.i; hi Jcthabhai v.\n\nMarathi petition. (Sd.) W. H. E. GARROD, State '!....!!ombay\n\nSuperintending Engineer, D.l.C.\n\nCopy, with compliments, to the Executive Engineer, Nasik Irrigation Division, for information and guidance with reference to the correspondence ending with this office\n\n11 No. 3686 dated 22-6-1939.\n\nExhibit D-68 is a Jette•· written by the Superintendmg Engineer to Karale. It reads : No. 4224 of 1939 Poona, 14th July 1939.\n\n\" To\n\nShankar Tukaram Karale, Esquire, at Belapur.\n\nDear Sir,\n\nContinuation of cane irrigation on Distributary No. 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal.\n\nIr continuation of this office No. 3686 dated 23rd June 1939, I have to inform you that under orders of the .. Honourable Minister, Public Works Department, you will be aJlQwed to irrigate came to the extent of I 00 acres on the tail outlet of Distributory No. 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal permanently, so long as you may wish to do so, on condition . that you agree to take canal water by measurement on volumetric basis of 112\" depth at the outlet head at the rate which may be sanctioned by Government ' hereafter.\n\n•· .,\n\n(2) This will apply to new cane plantation from 15-2-H•40 onwards. Till then, you may continue your cane irrigatirn on outlets 2 and tail as at present.\n\nYours faithfully, (Sd.) W. H. E. Garrod, Superintending Engineer, Deccan Irrigation Circle.\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\n1964 Copy, with compliments, to the Executive Engineer, Karamshi Jetlla- Nasik Irrigation Division, for information.\n\nblrai\n\nA fair reading of these two documents leaves no room for Stat< ombay doubt that a firm agreement was entered into between the\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nGovernment and Karale in respect of the supply of water to his land to the extent of 100 acres on the tail outlet of Distributary No. 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal.\n\nThese two letters show that there was previous correspondence between the Engineering Department and Karale and that the Minister of Public Works Department intervened and settled the terms of the agreement, and that the terms were communicated to Karale, who accepted the same. The terms of the agreement were, ( i) Kar ale was allowed to concentrate all his cane irrigation to the extent of 100 acres on the tail outlet cif Distributary No. 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal by February 15, 1940, and to continue it permanently, if he so wished; (ii) Karale agreed to take water by measurement on volumetric basis of 112\" at the outlet head and to pay water rates that might thereafter be sanctioned by the Government in that respect; (iii) the said area will be excluded from the sugar factory area while fixing the boundaries of the allotted sugar factory area of Chang:deo Sugar Factory; and (iv) the terms will apply to new cane plantation from February 15, 1940 onwards. It is said that the word \"permanently\" refers to cultivation. but not to supply of water. This interpretation makes the entire contract meaningless. Sugar cultivation can be done only with the permission of the department, for sugarcane crop cannot be raised without supply of . water from the canal.\n\nWhen the Superintending Engineer allowed Karale to concentrate all his cane . irrigation in the said area permanently on condition he paid the prescribed rates, it was necessarily implied in the said agreement that he would supplv water permanently, if the said rates were paid.\n\nCultivation and supply of water are so inextricably connected that one cannot be seoarated from the other. The permission to have cane irrigation permanently on the basis of a particular rate implies that the supply for irrigation is co-terminous with irrigation. In this view we must hold that Bxs. D-67 and D-68. read together. record a concluded\n\n...\n\nagreement between the Superintending Engineer, acting on 1961 the orders of the Minister of Public Works Department, on Karam;;;;- Jdhathe one hand and Kara le on the other, agreeing to supply . bhai water so Jong as Karale had cane cultivation in the con- State 0f' Bombay centrated area. The other documents, read along with the Subba Rao I. documents filed for the first time, in the High Court, also do not detract from this conclusion. Exhibit D-78, which is not dated, was the application filed by Karale to the Chief Minister, P.W.D. and Irrigation Department, Bombay.\n\nTherein Karale represented to the Chief Engineer that Distributary No. 17 was permanently closed prior to 1935, that he was responsible for starting the said Distributary by commencing plantation. that the \"Prime Minister's\" consent gave him an assurance that while declaring the factory area. the area of the previous gardeners would be excluded from the said area, that he had invested a capital of about Rs. 75,000/- for raising the plantation and that in the circumstances he prayed that while declaring the factory area. his land should be excluded therefrom. This application was considered by the concerned office under G.L.\n\nNo. 3033/36 dated April 27, 1939. In the note put up by\n\nthe office the contents of the said application are summarized. Thereafter the following note is found :\n\n\"With reference to the H.M.R.D.'s note dated 3-4-1939 it may be observed that Government has already accepted the principle that no ordinary irrigators should be allowed to operate in the sugar factory area.\n\nUnder the general orders issued on the sub.iect owner irrigators are to be allowed to continue irrigation, on yearly basis.\n\nIt is for consideration whether this fact may be brought to the notice of the H.M.R.n.\n\nIf it is decided to do so the papers may be submitted to the H.M.. P.W.D. and the H.M.R.D. after the drafts put up are issued.\"\n\n'The Revenue Minister accepted the endorsement.\n\nThis is only an office note and the suggestion that the irrigat<m should be allowed to continue on the yearly basis was onlv to prevent further applications after the factory area was declared.\n\nThis endorsement had nothing to do with the\n\n134--159 S.C.-63\n\n1964 exclusion of any particular area from the sugar factory area.\n\nKnramshi Jethn The endorsement \"should see\" below the endorsement made\n\nMiai by the Revenue Minister perhaps meant that the papers v State of Bombay should be submitted to the Minister concerned.\n\nExhibit\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nD-79 is a letter written by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Changdeo Sugar Mills.\n\nThis letter also refers to the office endorsement No. 3033 /36-1.\n\nThough we arc not directly concerned with this letter, it may be mentioned that the application of Karale is connected with the proposal to declare certain area as factory area and to give water to Changdeo Sugar Factory in respect of the lands in that area, for his application was to exclude his area from the factory area. Both the matters obviously were dealt together.\n\nExhibit D 79A is again part of the file relevant to the factory area. But a reference is made again to the office No. 3033 '36- ! and in the same file Karale's letter is also no1.iced.\n\nExhibit D-81 is an endorsement at page ,133 of the same file. which also deals with the subject \"sugar factories''.\n\nIt contains a copy of the letter written to the Superintending Engineer requesting him to submit at a very car:y date a draft agreement for the supply of water to the company's area on the Godavari Right Bank Canal on the terms embodied in the margin thereof. Exhibit D-82 is also another endorsement on the same file.\n\nThe endorsement reads thus :\n\nEndorsement at 191.\n\nDiscussed with the Secy.\n\n3033/36\n\nIn addition to his written requests, Mr. Karate had also interviewed the late H.M.R.D. During the discussions, H.M. had made it clear that Mr. Karnlc can only be allowed to continue if he WJs willing to consolidate his holdings in an independent block so that the Co.'s cultivation be carried on undisturbed.\n\nThis is net rccn; ckd on this file as H.M. did not pass any orders in Bombay or at the Secretariat but instructed\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COlJB.T REPORTS 995\n\n(Presumably after discussion with Mr. Sule) the S.E.D.l.C. in the matter.\n\nKaramJhi Jethabhai Please see P. 107 ante. That Mr. Karale's cane has to v. be shifted to one block is clear from the wordings of the Stare of Bombav S.E.S. letter. \"The applicant is allowed to concentrate ail Subba Rao I. his cane. . ..... on the tail outlet of D.17\". This is the onlv record of the orders passed. ·\n\nMoreover Mr. Karale is to have his supply on a volumetric basis as soon as that can be arranged for. This would necessitate the concentration of his cane areas.\"\n\nThis endorsement notices the contents of Ex. D-67 and, therefore, it must have been made only after April 28, 1939.\n\nThe said documents do not carry the matter further. They only show what we have already noticed, namely, the Government wanted to create a factory area and that Karale filed an application to have his area excluded therefrom.\n\nThe notings of the department are not in any way inconsistent either with Ex. D-67 or with Ex. D-68. Exhibits D-67 and D-68 refer to Office No. 3686 dated June 23, 1939, and that letter must have been iri some other file and that file was not produced and, if produced, it might have thrown ome more light.\n\nIn the circumstances we must proceed on the basis that Exhibits D-67 and D-68 embodied the terms of the agreement entered into between the Government and Karale pursuant to the application, Ex. D-78, made by him to the Chief Engineer, P.W.D. We have already held that the said documents record the completed agreement between the Government and Karale in respect of supply of water to his land.\n\nEven so, the question arises whether the said agreement is enforceable, if it has not complied with the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The premises on which Mr. Nambiar built his argument is that the said agreement was entered into between the parties under the provisions of the Act. If it was not made under the provisions of the Act, but outside the Act, the foundation for this argument would disappear.\n\nWe would. therefore. proceed to consider now whether the said agreement was under the provision of the Act.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS !!!!\n\nThe relevant provisions of the Act may now be read.\n\nKaramrhi Jetha Section 3 ( 6) defines \"C.1nal-Officer\" to mean any officer\n\nb~ ' lawfully appointed or invested with powers under section 4. .._ Stat1 of Bombay Under s. 4, such officer can exercise powers and discharge\n\nSubba~ 1 duties that may be assigned to him by the State Government. ' It is said that the Superintending Engineer was one of the officers so appointed by the Government and that the powers under ss. 27 to 30 of the Act were assigned to him. Under s. 27, \"Every person desiring to have a supply of water from a canal shall submit a written application to that effect to \"' a Canal-Officer duly empowered to receive such applications, in such terms as shall from time to time be prescribed bv the State Government in this behalf\". Under s. 29, \"When canal-water is supplied for the irrigation of one or more crops only the permission to use such water shall be held to continue only until such crop or crops shall come to maturity, and to apply only to such crop or crops\".\n\nUnder s. 30, \"Every agreement for the supply of canal-water to any land, building or other immovable property shall be transferable therewith. and shall be presumed to have been so transferred whenever a transfer of such land, building or the other immovable property takes place.\" But under the second limb of the section, \"except in the case of any such agreement as aforesaid, no person entitled to use the water of any canal, shall sell or sub-let, or otherwise transfer, this right to such use without the permission of a Canal-Officer duly \" empowered to grant such permission\". A combined reading of these provisions establishes that every person desiring to have supply of water from a canal shall apply in the prescribed manner to the Canal-Officer and that the person to who~ water is supp!ie? cannot transfer his right t.o another without the perrmss10n of the Canal-Officer. But 1f .-, the land in respect whereof the water is supplied is trans ferred, the agreement for the si, ipply of water also shall be presumed to have been transferred along with it. The expression \"agreement\" in s. 30 of the Act, it is contended. does not connote a contract as understood in la;,, but only a convenient mode of expression to indicate the sanction or permission given by the Canal-Officer. This meaning of 1' the expression \"agreement\" is sought to be supported by a reference to the Bombay Canal Rules, 1934. made in\n\nexercise of the powers conferred on the State Government 1964 under s. 70(e) of the Act. Part II of the Rules deals with Karamshi fetha swpply of water. lt provides for the filing of applications, blwi the manner of their disposal and the persons entitled to State 0f' Bombay dispose of the same, and also the mode oi supply of water - f l · f d'ff 'fh f 'b d Subba Rao J. or cu uvauon o 1 erent crops. e orms prescn e columns under different heads for giving the necessary particulars.\n\nThe forms contain the instructions as well as conditions on which permission will be granted.\n\nRule 7 says that an application for supply of water for the irrigation of land for any period may be sanctioned, indicating thereby that there is no maximum period fixed for which application for supply of water can be made. Assuming without deciding that \"agreement\" under s. 30 of the Act means only sanction, the Act and the Rules provide for an application to be made to the Executive Engineer, who, subject to the Rules, can give the sanction.\n\nRule 36 provides for an appeal from the order of the Executive Engineer to the Superintending Engineer, and from that of the Executive Engineer's order under r. 18 or r. 19 to the Collector. But there is no provision either in the Act or in the Rules made thereunder enabling any party to make an application to the Chief Engineer to exclude his land from factory area, and to give him supply of water for irrigating the said land permanently, or a power to the Government to enter into an agreement or make an order in respect of such an aipplication. Such an order or agreement is entirely outside the scope of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. We are not called upon in this case to decide whether the Govern ment has any such power outside the Act; but, we shali assume for the purpose of this case that it has such power and to proceed to consider the legal arguments on that basis.\n\nThe documentary evidence adduced in this case, which we have already considered, discloses that the application was made to the Chief Engineer; that the Government, through the relevant ministry, considered the application and that on the instructions given by the concerned Minister, • the Superintending Engineer wrote the letter Ex. D-68 to Karale.\n\nIt was, therefore, in effect and substance, an agreement entered into between the Government and Karale.\n\nKaramJhi lethabhai v,\n\ni11te uj Bombay\n\nSubba Rao /.\n\nSuch an agreement fell outside the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe parties to the agreement also understood that it was an agreement made between the Government and Karale. The Government in or about February 1942 sent a draft agreement to Karale for execution regarding the supply of canal water to his farm, but the said Karale did not execute the agreement.\n\nThe parties did not agree in regard to some of the conditions found in the draft, but Karale did not contest the position of the Government that a formal agreement in compliance with the provisions of law was necessary.\n\nAgain during the continuance of the partnership between Karale and the appellant, in or about 1950, the Government of Bombay sent another draft agreement to the said Karale for execution. Though Karale signed the agreement, he insisted upon a proviso that the agreement should be without prejudice to the permission already granted to him.\n\nThe Bombay Government did not execute the said agreement.\n\nSo too, Karale and the appellant were making yearly applications under the Act and getting supply of water lo their plantation. That procedure was presumably followed because, though there was an agreement between Karale and the Government, for one reason or other, a formal document, though intended to be executed, was not executed. This conduct on the part of the Government as well as that on the part of Karale and the appellant also estaolishes that the agreement was not under the Act, but between the Government of Bombay and Karale. If so, it follows that the contract entered into between the Government and Karate was a contract made in the exercise of the executive authority of the Province within the meaning of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The relevant part of s. 175 ( 3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, read :\n\n\"All contracts made in the exercise of the executive authority of a Province shall be expressed to be made ...... by the Governor of the Province ...... and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that authority shall be executed on jiehalf of the ..... .\n\nGovernor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise.\"\n\nThis section laid down two conditions for the validity of 1964 such a contract, namely, (i) it should be expressed to be Karamshi J<tha made by the Governor of the Province, and (ii) it should bhai be executed on behalf of the Governor by such persons and State 0 {\" Bombay in such manner as he might direct or authorize. We have - nothing on the record to disclose whether the Superintend- Subba Rao 1 ing Engineer, though he acted under oral instructions of the Minister, was authorized by the Governor or under relevant rules to enter into such a contract.\n\nThat apart, even if Exs. D-67 and D-68 together were treated as forming part of a contract entered into between the Government and Karale, can it be said that the said contract was expressed to be made in the name of the Governor? Ex facie it cannot be said so.\n\nBut it is contended that on a liberal construction, which we should adopt in a case where the Government is trying to go back on its solemn' promise, such a formality can easily be read into the said documents. Before we construe the said two documents in order to ascertain whether such a formality has been complied with or not, it would be convenient to notice some of the decisions of this Court.\n\nThe question of construction of s. 17 5 ( 3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, directly arose for decision in Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Union of India('). There, the Divisional Superintendent, East Indian Railway, placed certain orders with the appellant for the supply of foodgrains for the employees of the said Railway.\n\nThe orders were not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor- General and was not executed on behalf of the Govcrnor- General as required by s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThey were signed by the Divisional Superintendent either in his own hand or in the hand of his Personal Assistant. This Court held that the contracts, not having been expressed to be entered into by the Governor-General and not having been executed on his behalf, were void.\n\nThis Court held that the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, were mandatory and. therefore, the contracts were void.\n\nThis decision was followed by this Court in New Marine Coal Co. v. The Union of India('). Reliance is placed by the\n\n-~~=~- ·---~- -\n\n\n(') [1964) 2 S.C.R. 859.\n\n1964 learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of this Karamshi J<tha- Court in Union of India v. Rallia Ram(') in support ot his bhal contention that though ex facie Exs. D-67 and D-68 do not v.\n\nStaie of Bombay show that the contract was expressed to be made in the\n\nSubba Rao J. name of the Governor, the said fact could be inferred from the recitals. There, the goods offered to be sold belonged to the Government of India.\n\nA tender notice was issued by the Government of India, Department of Food (Division III), in the name of the Chief Director of Purchases. The Chief Director of Purchases agreed to sell the goods on certain conditions to the respondent and incorporated them in the acceptance note, which was also headed \"Government of India, Department of Food (Division III), New Delhi\".\n\nThe general conditions of contract, which accompanied the letter of acceptance, defined Government as meaning the Governor-General for India in Council. On the said facts this Court held that the correspondence between the parties ultimately resulting in the acceptance note amounted to a contract expressed to be made by the Government and, therefore, by the Governor-General, \"because it was the Governor-General who invited tenders through the Chief Director of Purchases and it was the Governor-General who, through the Chief Director of Purchases, accepted the tender of the respondent subject to the conditions prescribed therein\". Though in the acceptance note it was not expressly stated that the contract was executed on behalf of the Governor-General, on a fair reading of the contents of the letter in the light of the obligations undertaken thereunder, it was held that the contract was executed on behalf of the Governor-General. This decision does not depart from the principle accepted in Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria's case('). On a fair reading of the correspondence this Court construed that the contract was entered into on behalf of the Governor- General and expressed to be made in his name. Can it be said that in the present case Exs. D-67 and D-68 disclose that the Superintending Engineer was authorized to enter into a contract of the nature mentioned therein on behalf of the Provincial Government and that the contract was ex !ITessed to be made in the name of the Governor?\n\n(1) [1964] 3 $.C.R. 164.\n\n(2) (1962] 2 S.C.R. 880.\n\nNothing has been placed before us to establish that the 1961 Superintending Engineer was legally authorized to enter into Karamshi l•thasuch a contract on behalf of the Government; nor do the bhai d\n\n~ ocuments ex facie show that the agreement was expressed Stat< of Bombay to be made in the name of the Provincial Government. The Subba Rao J. letters mentioned the name of the Minister of the Public Works Department and also the Government, in the context of the rates that might be fixed thereafter, but the said documents did not purport to emanate from the Governor.\n\nAt best they were issued under the directions of the Ministe_r.\n\nWe find it difficult to stretch the point further, as such a construction will make the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, nugatory. We cannot, therefore, hold that either the contract was entered into by the person legally authorized by the Government to do so or expressed to be made in the name of the Governor. The agreement is void, as it has not complied with the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nIn this view, it is not necessary to express our opinion\n\n'111 other interesting questions raised in this case.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nI>HIRENDRA NA TH GORAi AND SUBAL CHANDRA\n\nSHAW AND OTHERS\n\nSUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nMarch 4.\n\n~ Execution-Court salt of property in execution of a decree in respect o/ a loan-Judgment-debtor not objecting to valuation even after 1ervict of notice-Application for selling asidt tht 1al• on tht vourul of", "total_entities": 132, "entities": [{"text": "KARAMSHI JETHABHAI SOMA YY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KARAMSHI JETHABHAI SOMAYY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. 'c. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. 'c. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3(6), 4, 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 414, "end_char": 429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1619, "end_char": 1624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1628, "end_char": 1655, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2000, "end_char": 2009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2135, "end_char": 2140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karamshi Jetlia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2950, "end_char": 2965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196~\n\nKaramshi Jetlia\n\nbhai\n\n(ii) The provisions of Bombay Irrigation Act establishes that St 1 of vBomba every person desiring to have supply of water from a canal shall apply a • Y in the prescribed manner to the Canal Officer and that person to whom water is supplied cannot transfer bis right to another without the pennission of the Canal Officer.", "canonical_name": "Karamshi Jetliathe"}}, {"text": "s. 17S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3766, "end_char": 3772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 860", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4002, "end_char": 4021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 2 S.C.R. 8", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4065, "end_char": 4082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. K. Nambiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4597, "end_char": 4610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, I. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "I. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4612, "end_char": 4628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, I. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. MaJhur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4631, "end_char": 4642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Nambiar, I. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4647, "end_char": 4662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. MaJhur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. R. Prem", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4684, "end_char": 4694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4696, "end_char": 4713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4718, "end_char": 4730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "March 3, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4753, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 3, 1964."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4812, "end_char": 4821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4869, "end_char": 4878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal by special leave is directed Subba Rao I. against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay confirming those of the Civil Judge, Senior Division,\n\n1964 Ahmednagar, in Special Civil Suit No.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "Karamshi Jetliathe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5059, "end_char": 5077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of 1953 illed by Karamshi Jetliathe appellant against the State of Bombay for a deciaration\n\nbhni of his right to water from a particular source, and for State or Bombay consequential reliefs.", "canonical_name": "Karamshi Jetliathe"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5100, "end_char": 5115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of 1953 illed by Karamshi Jetliathe appellant against the State of Bombay for a deciaration\n\nbhni of his right to water from a particular source, and for State or Bombay consequential reliefs."}}, {"text": "Shankar Tukaram Karale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5458, "end_char": 5480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands comprised in the said Farm originally belonged to Shankar Tukaram Karale, hereinafter called Karale."}}, {"text": "Ahmednagar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5664, "end_char": 5683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1935 the said Karale had a farm for raising sugarcane consisting of 35 acres owned by him and about 65 acres of land taken on lease by him in Ahmednagar District."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In or about the same year the Government of Bombay proposed to rese:ve certain area along the said Distributary Canal as \"factory area\"."}}, {"text": "Karale", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some correspondence between the said Karale and the Government of Bombay, it was the appellant's case, the Superintending Engineer agreed on July 14, 1939, to exclude Karale's lands from the factory area and also to give him water penpetually on condition that he concentrated all his holdings on the tail outlet of Distributary No.", "canonical_name": "Karale"}}, {"text": "July 14, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6067, "end_char": 6080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some correspondence between the said Karale and the Government of Bombay, it was the appellant's case, the Superintending Engineer agreed on July 14, 1939, to exclude Karale's lands from the factory area and also to give him water penpetually on condition that he concentrated all his holdings on the tail outlet of Distributary No."}}, {"text": "Februarv 7, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6821, "end_char": 6837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on disputes arose between the appellant and Karale in respect of the partnership which culminated in a consent decree dated Februarv 7, 1951, whereunder the appellant became the full oer of the .partnership business with all its assets and liabilities, including the lands and the compact block and the right to use the canal water."}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7304, "end_char": 7309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7313, "end_char": 7340, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Civil K•ramsh1 1'tha Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7420, "end_char": 7475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of 1953 in the Court of the Civil K•ramsh1 1'tha Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar, against the State of bha• Bombay for a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to state of\" Bombay the supply and use of water from the tail outlet of Distri- Subba Rao I. butary No."}}, {"text": "State of bha• Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7489, "end_char": 7509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of 1953 in the Court of the Civil K•ramsh1 1'tha Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar, against the State of bha• Bombay for a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to state of\" Bombay the supply and use of water from the tail outlet of Distri- Subba Rao I. butary No."}}, {"text": "Schedule II at the rates prescribed by the Government under the Irrigation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7759, "end_char": 7837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8012, "end_char": 8027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bombay filed a written-statement contending, inter alia, that there was no concluded agreement between the Government and Karale embodying the alleged terms stated in the plaint, that even if there was such an agreement, it was void inasmuch as it did not comply with the provisions of s. 17 5 ( 3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that, in any view, the appellant could not legally get the benefit of the agreement under s. 30 of the Bombay lrrization Act, 1879."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8307, "end_char": 8312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II at the rates prescribed by the Government under the Irrigation Act", "statute": "Schedule II at the rates prescribed by the Government under the Irrigation Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8327, "end_char": 8356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8452, "end_char": 8457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Bombay lrrization Act, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8465, "end_char": 8492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karaie", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8749, "end_char": 8755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Civil Judge held that there was a concluded agreement between the Government and Karale on the terms alleged by the appellant, but the transfer by Karaie of the said right in favour of 'the appellant was in violation of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and, therefore, there was no legal transfer of Kara!e's right of water in favour of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Karale"}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8844, "end_char": 8891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kara!e", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8940, "end_char": 8946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Civil Judge held that there was a concluded agreement between the Government and Karale on the terms alleged by the appellant, but the transfer by Karaie of the said right in favour of 'the appellant was in violation of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and, therefore, there was no legal transfer of Kara!e's right of water in favour of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Karale"}}, {"text": "Karale", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9418, "end_char": 9424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arguments of Mr. M. K. Nambiar, learned counsel for the appellant, may be summarized under the following heads : ( 1 ) There was a concluded agreement between\n\nKarale and the statutory authority, the Canal Officer, whereunder the said Karale was entitled 'to get water to his 1'.0mpact block permanently from the tail outlet of IJistributary No.", "canonical_name": "Karale"}}, {"text": "bhai Karale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9790, "end_char": 9801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) As under the compromise decree between\n\nbhai Karale and the appellant the aid bloclc of land was trans-\n\nS1a1• ol\" Bombay ferred to the appellant, the right under the agreement for\n\nSubba Rao 1."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9855, "end_char": 9857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9932, "end_char": 9941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) As under the compromise decree between\n\nbhai Karale and the appellant the aid bloclc of land was trans-\n\nS1a1• ol\" Bombay ferred to the appellant, the right under the agreement for\n\nSubba Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10005, "end_char": 10010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10018, "end_char": 10045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10129, "end_char": 10158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10572, "end_char": 10581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10589, "end_char": 10618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10655, "end_char": 10660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10869, "end_char": 10875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10887, "end_char": 10916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10971, "end_char": 10976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11238, "end_char": 11247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11255, "end_char": 11284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11705, "end_char": 11714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11722, "end_char": 11751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karamshi Jetha- Govemment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12036, "end_char": 12061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Civil Court, 1964 the appellant filed an application therein for directing the Karamshi Jetha- Govemment to produce, among others, the applications bhai made to the Government from time to time by Karale in state of\" Bombay respect of supply of water to his farm in the yar 1935 and Subba Rao J. subsequent thereto and the office copies of the replis sent to the said applications, the Government documents and papers, water-bills and the records in respect of the supply\n\nof water to the land belonging to Karale from the year I 935, and the correspondence that passed between Karale and the Government between I 935 and I 939 in respect of consolidation of his lands."}}, {"text": "28th April I 939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13465, "end_char": 13481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3033 /36-I dated 28th April I 939, and directed him to do so."}}, {"text": "Nambiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14281, "end_char": 14288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though Mr. Nambiar suggested that the said documents\n\n1964 related to some other party,."}}, {"text": "Bombay Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14542, "end_char": 14559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as we will indicate in the course Karam•hi 1e1110• of the judgment, the said file dealt also with the agreement bhai alleged to have been entered into between Karale and the State or Bombay Government. . . . '\"?·\""}}, {"text": "15-2-1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15054, "end_char": 15063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applicant has already been allowed to continue his present cane irrigation of 93 acres on outlets 2 and Tail of Distributary 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal for one year from 15-2-1939 pending consideration of his case in detail, in relation to the demand of the Sugar Company formed by Messrs. Jagtap & Khilari on this canal and lately named the \"Changdeo Sugar Factory\"."}}, {"text": "Jagtap & Khilari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15174, "end_char": 15190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applicant has already been allowed to continue his present cane irrigation of 93 acres on outlets 2 and Tail of Distributary 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal for one year from 15-2-1939 pending consideration of his case in detail, in relation to the demand of the Sugar Company formed by Messrs. Jagtap & Khilari on this canal and lately named the \"Changdeo Sugar Factory\"."}}, {"text": "Changdeo Sugar Factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15227, "end_char": 15249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applicant has already been allowed to continue his present cane irrigation of 93 acres on outlets 2 and Tail of Distributary 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal for one year from 15-2-1939 pending consideration of his case in detail, in relation to the demand of the Sugar Company formed by Messrs. Jagtap & Khilari on this canal and lately named the \"Changdeo Sugar Factory\"."}}, {"text": "12-7 -1939 the", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15354, "end_char": 15368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view however of the orders issued verbally by the Hon'ble Minister, Public Works Department on 12-7 -1939 the applicant is being allowed to concentrate all his cane irrigation to the extent of 100 acres on the tail outlet of Dy 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal by 15-2-1940 and to continue it permanently there if he so wish¥' provided he agrees to take water by measurement on 'volumetric basis of 112\" at the ou9et head and pay the water rates that may heFtafter be sanctioned by Governplent in this rpect."}}, {"text": "15-2-1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15526, "end_char": 15535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view however of the orders issued verbally by the Hon'ble Minister, Public Works Department on 12-7 -1939 the applicant is being allowed to concentrate all his cane irrigation to the extent of 100 acres on the tail outlet of Dy 17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal by 15-2-1940 and to continue it permanently there if he so wish¥' provided he agrees to take water by measurement on 'volumetric basis of 112\" at the ou9et head and pay the water rates that may heFtafter be sanctioned by Governplent in this rpect."}}, {"text": "15-2-H•40", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17305, "end_char": 17314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) This will apply to new cane plantation from 15-2-H•40 onwards."}}, {"text": "W. H. E. Garrod", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17435, "end_char": 17450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W. H. E. Garrod, Superintending Engineer, Deccan Irrigation Circle."}}, {"text": "Kar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18273, "end_char": 18276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The terms of the agreement were, ( i) Kar ale was allowed to concentrate all his cane irrigation to the extent of 100 acres on the tail outlet cif Distributary No."}}, {"text": "February 15, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18438, "end_char": 18455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal by February 15, 1940, and to continue it permanently, if he so wished; (ii) Karale agreed to take water by measurement on volumetric basis of 112\" at the outlet head and to pay water rates that might thereafter be sanctioned by the Government in that respect; (iii) the said area will be excluded from the sugar factory area while fixing the boundaries of the allotted sugar factory area of Chang:deo Sugar Factory; and (iv) the terms will apply to new cane plantation from February 15, 1940 onwards."}}, {"text": "Chang:deo", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18826, "end_char": 18835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 of the Godavari Right Bank Canal by February 15, 1940, and to continue it permanently, if he so wished; (ii) Karale agreed to take water by measurement on volumetric basis of 112\" at the outlet head and to pay water rates that might thereafter be sanctioned by the Government in that respect; (iii) the said area will be excluded from the sugar factory area while fixing the boundaries of the allotted sugar factory area of Chang:deo Sugar Factory; and (iv) the terms will apply to new cane plantation from February 15, 1940 onwards."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20441, "end_char": 20447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit D-78, which is not dated, was the application filed by Karale to the Chief Minister, P.W.D. and Irrigation Department, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Therein Karale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20450, "end_char": 20464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therein Karale represented to the Chief Engineer that Distributary No."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21101, "end_char": 21115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3033/36 dated April 27, 1939."}}, {"text": "3-4-1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21291, "end_char": 21299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the following note is found :\n\n\"With reference to the H.M.R.D.'s note dated 3-4-1939 it may be observed that Government has already accepted the principle that no ordinary irrigators should be allowed to operate in the sugar factory area."}}, {"text": "Knramshi Jethn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22172, "end_char": 22186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Knramshi Jethn The endorsement \"should see\" below the endorsement made\n\nMiai by the Revenue Minister perhaps meant that the papers v State of Bombay should be submitted to the Minister concerned."}}, {"text": "Miai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22244, "end_char": 22248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Knramshi Jethn The endorsement \"should see\" below the endorsement made\n\nMiai by the Revenue Minister perhaps meant that the papers v State of Bombay should be submitted to the Minister concerned."}}, {"text": "Changdeo Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22472, "end_char": 22492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nD-79 is a letter written by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Bombay to Changdeo Sugar Mills."}}, {"text": "Karate", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23687, "end_char": 23693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3033/36\n\nIn addition to his written requests, Mr. Karate had also interviewed the late H.M.R.D. During the discussions, H.M. had made it clear that Mr. Karnlc can only be allowed to continue if he WJs willing to consolidate his holdings in an independent block so that the Co.'s cultivation be carried on undisturbed.", "canonical_name": "Karale"}}, {"text": "H.M.R.D.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23724, "end_char": 23732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3033/36\n\nIn addition to his written requests, Mr. Karate had also interviewed the late H.M.R.D. During the discussions, H.M. had made it clear that Mr. Karnlc can only be allowed to continue if he WJs willing to consolidate his holdings in an independent block so that the Co.'s cultivation be carried on undisturbed.", "canonical_name": "H.M.R.D."}}, {"text": "Karnlc", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23789, "end_char": 23795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3033/36\n\nIn addition to his written requests, Mr. Karate had also interviewed the late H.M.R.D. During the discussions, H.M. had made it clear that Mr. Karnlc can only be allowed to continue if he WJs willing to consolidate his holdings in an independent block so that the Co.'s cultivation be carried on undisturbed."}}, {"text": "Sule", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24148, "end_char": 24152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is net rccn; ckd on this file as H.M. did not pass any orders in Bombay or at the Secretariat but instructed\n\n6 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COlJB.T REPORTS 995\n\n(Presumably after discussion with Mr. Sule) the S.E.D.l."}}, {"text": "KaramJhi Jethabhai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24185, "end_char": 24203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KaramJhi Jethabhai Please see P. 107 ante."}}, {"text": "April 28, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24767, "end_char": 24781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D-67 and, therefore, it must have been made only after April 28, 1939."}}, {"text": "June 23, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25166, "end_char": 25179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3686 dated June 23, 1939, and that letter must have been iri some other file and that file was not produced and, if produced, it might have thrown ome more light."}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25833, "end_char": 25842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25850, "end_char": 25879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karamrhi Jetha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26345, "end_char": 26359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karamrhi Jetha Section 3 ( 6) defines \"C.1nal-Officer\" to mean any officer\n\nb~ ' lawfully appointed or invested with powers under section 4. .._", "canonical_name": "Karamshi Jetliathe"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26360, "end_char": 26369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26475, "end_char": 26484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26512, "end_char": 26516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "ss. 27 to 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26762, "end_char": 26774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26814, "end_char": 26819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27102, "end_char": 27107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27346, "end_char": 27351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28439, "end_char": 28444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Canal Rules, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28727, "end_char": 28751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 70(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28830, "end_char": 28838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Canal Rules, 1934", "statute": "the Bombay Canal Rules, 1934"}}, {"text": "Part II of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28851, "end_char": 28871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29619, "end_char": 29624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Rules", "statute": "Part II of the Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32906, "end_char": 32915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32923, "end_char": 32952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32975, "end_char": 32981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32994, "end_char": 33023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34659, "end_char": 34664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34679, "end_char": 34708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35103, "end_char": 35112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35120, "end_char": 35149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35467, "end_char": 35476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35484, "end_char": 35513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964) 2 S.C.R. 859", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 35711, "end_char": 35730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karamshi J<tha- Court", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35796, "end_char": 35817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of this Karamshi J<tha- Court in Union of India v. Rallia Ram(') in support ot his bhal contention that though ex facie Exs."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36148, "end_char": 36167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the goods offered to be sold belonged to the Government of India."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36530, "end_char": 36539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Director of Purchases agreed to sell the goods on certain conditions to the respondent and incorporated them in the acceptance note, which was also headed \"Government of India, Department of Food (Division III), New Delhi\"."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36678, "end_char": 36683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The general conditions of contract, which accompanied the letter of acceptance, defined Government as meaning the Governor-General for India in Council."}}, {"text": "Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37547, "end_char": 37568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision does not depart from the principle accepted in Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria's case(')."}}, {"text": "(1962] 2 S.C.R. 880", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 38070, "end_char": 38089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38832, "end_char": 38841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38849, "end_char": 38878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39141, "end_char": 39150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39158, "end_char": 39187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "I>HIRENDRA NA TH GORAi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39414, "end_char": 39436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I>HIRENDRA NA TH GORAi AND SUBAL CHANDRA\n\nSHAW AND OTHERS\n\nSUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "SUBAL CHANDRA\n\nSHAW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39441, "end_char": 39460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I>HIRENDRA NA TH GORAi AND SUBAL CHANDRA\n\nSHAW AND OTHERS\n\nSUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "SUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39473, "end_char": 39493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I>HIRENDRA NA TH GORAi AND SUBAL CHANDRA\n\nSHAW AND OTHERS\n\nSUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39521, "end_char": 39536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I>HIRENDRA NA TH GORAi AND SUBAL CHANDRA\n\nSHAW AND OTHERS\n\nSUDHIR CHANDRA GHOSH AND OTHERS\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. 'c. DAS GUPTA"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_103_111_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSHRI MITHOO SHAHAN! AND ORS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. S!KRI JJ.]\n\nEvacuee Property-Land Allotted to respondents-Subsequently the same lad allotted to appellants-Sanad issued to appellants under the Act-Allotment in favour of the appella;1t s2t aside-Can sanad subsist when allotment set aside- Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (Act XLIV of 1954), s. 33.\n\nThe appellants and the five raspondents were displaced persons. The Deputy Custodian of Nizamabad District allotted about 60 acres of lrnd to the five respondents. The allotment was by way of lease. There \\Vas no condition imposed upon them that they should cultivate the lands personally. While the lease \\Vas continuing in force, the Government of India issued a Press Note on November 13, 1953 by which they announced that they had decided to allot evacuee agricultural land in Hyderabad State to displaced persons whose claims for agricultural land had been verified under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950.\n\nThe appellants made an application in pursuance of this notification and on May 4, 1954 the land now in dispute, though under a subsisting lease in favour of the respondents, was allotted to them.\n\nIn the rnean time the Displaced Persons (Compensation Jnd Rehabilitation) Act, came into force on October 9, 1954.\n\nUnder Section 20 of this Act, the Regional Settlement Com\n\nmissioner issued Sanads in favour of appellants in respect of these lands. Both the appellants and the respondents claimed these disputed plots. The matter went up to the Deput,· Chief Settlement Commissioner. He referred the case of both parties to the Government of India for action under s. 33 of the Act.\n\nThe matter was considered under s. 33 of the Act b,· tho Deputy Secretary in the Rehabilitation Ministry \"'r.o upheld\n\nthe contentions of these respondents. The result was 'that the allotment made in favour of the appellants was set aside. It is the legality of this or<ler that is challenged in this appeal.\n\nHeld-(i) The order of the Central Government was covered by s. 33 of the Act as one dealing with and rectif~; ing an error committed in relation to a \"thing done or aclion taken'' \\vith respect to a rehabilitation grant to a displaced person. Not merely the order of the R\"gional Settlement Commi, sioner but the entire question as to whether the respondents as origional allottees by way of lease were entitl\"d to the relief of restoration was referred to the Central Government bv reason of the order of the Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner.\n\nBoth }he parties were heard on all the points by the Central Government before the orders were passed and it would not therefore be right to consider that the matter in issue before the Central Government was namely the correctness of the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner, which read in vacuo might not be comprehended within s. 39 of the Act.\n\n(ii) It is manifest that a Sanad can be lawfully issued only on the basis of a valid order of allotment. If an order of allotment wh'ch is the ba•l'.s upon which a grant is made\n\n.larclt 10\n\nl964 is set aside it would follow, and the conclusion is inescapable Mitlwo Shaha . that the grant cannot survive, because in order that grant and Othe\" n• should be valid, it should have been etrected by a competent v. o'.licer under a valid order. If the validity of that order is Union of India and effectively put an end to, it would be impossible to maintain\n\nOthera unless there were any express provision in the Act or in the rules, that the grant still stands. On the facts of this case it was held) that where an order making any allotment was set aside the title which was obtained on the basis of the continuance of that order also fell with it.\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nPartuma! v. Managing Officer, Jaipur, I.L.R. 11 Raj. 1121, distinguished.\n\nBalu; ant Kaur v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (Lands), I.L.R. [1964] Punjab 36, approved.\n\nav1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 552 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the order dated April 28, 1960 of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation, New Delhi, purporting to exercise the powers of Revision under s. 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation of Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 in Case No. 38(894) / 59 Neg. A.\n\nWith\n\nWrit Petition No. 108 of 1960.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nAchhru Ram and N. N. Keswani, for the appellants and the petitioners.\n\nN. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in both the appeal and petition).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, K. Jairam and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondents Nos. 3 to 7 (in both the appeal and petition).\n\nMarch 10, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR, J.-The appeal, by special leave, is directed to question the correctness of an order passed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation under s. 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, J 954 (Central Act XLIV of 1954) which for convenience will be referred to hereafter as the Act.\n\nThe facts necessary to appreciate the points urged before us are briefly these : The property in dispute is agricultural land of an extent of about 60 acres situated at Nizamabad in the former State of Hyderabad and now in the State\n\nof Andhra Pradesh. On September 7, 1950 the Deputy Cus- 1964 todian of Nizamabad District allotted 44 acres of this land Shri Mithoo Shahllni to five persons who are the respondents before us. All these and Othtra five were displaced persons and were entitled to this allotu . 1v1. d' , nion o n ia a11\"i ment. By a further order dated July 21, 1951 the balance Othtra of the 16 acres and odd was also allotted to them. The allotment was by way of lease and one of its stipulations was Ayyangar, J. that the terms of the lease would be revised only after five years. The only point that needs to be stated about the terms of this lease is, that there was no condition imposed upon the lessees that they should cultivate the lands personally.\n\nWhile the lease was continuing in force, the Government of India issued a press note on November 13, 1953 by which they announced that they had decided to allot evacuee agricultural land in Hyderabad State to displaced persons whose claims for agricultural lands had been verified under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950. It further stated that the allotments would be towards the settlement of claims in respect of their agricultural lands. The allotment was to be on the same terms as under the quasi-permanent allotment scheme in the Punjab and applications for allotment were invited from persons residing inter-a/ia in Hyderabad State whose verified claims included a claim for agricultural lands.\n\nThe press note prescribed the 31st of December as the last date for the receipt of these applications. The appellants made an application in pursuance of this notification and on May 4, 1954 the land now in dispute, though under a subsisting lease in favour of the respondents, was allotted to them on quasi-permanent tenure. It is not disputed that the appellants satisfied the qualifications for making applications under the press note and for being allotted evacuee property thereunder. The order of allotment, a copy of which was forwarded to the Collector of Nizamabad district, contained a request that the allottees may be put in possession of the land and the fact intimated to the office of the Regional Settlement Commissioner. The revenue authorities acting on this request or direction dispossessed the respondents from the lands leased to them and put the appellants in possession thereof.\n\nThereafter, the respondents made a representation to the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Bombay pointing out that they were displaced persons who having been rehabilitated by the allotment by way of lease .were now being uprooted. They also pointed out that they had incurred large expenses in improving the land and bringing it into proper cultivation. These applications were considered by the Regional Settlement Commissioner who by his order dated July 10, 1954 rejected their application. It is not necessary\n\n1964 to set out the reasons for making this order except to say\n\nS' . ,,.1,\n\nS' , . that one of them was the failure on the part of the lessees r&TI ... u 1 noo , 1ULF1ani • auJ 01\"\"\" to personally cultivate the lands. The respondents, then,\n\nv. moved the Regional Settlement Commissioner requesting him Uaiun \"f Iadia and to review his order and they also sought relief from the Gov- 01JiPr8\n\nAy!Jangar, ,/, ernment of India seeking intervention in their favour.\n\nSubsequent to this date the Act was enacted and it came into force on October 9, 1954. Section 12 of the Act empowered the Central Government to acquire evacuee property for rehabilitation of displaced persons and in pursuanoe thereof the properties now in dispute were acquired by Government by a notification dated January 18, 1955. During the pendency of the proceedings by which the respondents sought to obtain a reversal of the order dated July 10, 1954 and without reference to them, the Regional Settlement Commissioner issued sanads in favour of appellants 1 to 4 on January 12, 1956 acting under s. 20 of the Act.\n\nThe Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner who dealt with the representations made by the respondents passed an order on August 22, 1958 after obtaining .a report from the Regional Settlement Commissioner. He pointed out in his order that there was no indication from the papers on the file that the land was originally leased to the respondents on condition that they should cultivate the lands personally. He therefore set aside the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner dated July 10, 1954 and remanded it for further enquiry directing the passing of fresh orcjers after a thorough enquiry. Thereafter a report was called for and obtained from the Collector who conducted this enquiry and in his report dated June 13, 1959 he recorded a finding that there had been personal cultivation of the lands by the respondents. He pointed out that of the 60 acres comprising the entire extent, 26 guntas were allotted on a quasi-permanent basis to other displaced persons in 1954 and this extent was therefore out of the controversy. It ought to be mentioned that the order of the Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner which was of the date August 22, 1958 was apparently by inadverlance passed without notice to the appellants. When this was brought to his notice after the remand he issued notice to them and after hearing them, referred the case to 'the Government of India for action under s. 33 of the Act.\n\nThe matter was considered by the Deputy Secretary in the Rehabilitation Ministry who heard all the parties and recorded the following findings: (]) that the order dated July 10,\n\nJ 954 refusing to transfer the lands to the respondents was wrong, and (2) that there was no justification for t:rminating the lease and depriving the respondents of possession of the\n\nproperty now in dispute and on these findings directed the ~6_!_ sanads granted to the appellants to be revoked and te res- Slui .llilhoo .<hah•ni\n\npondents be put in possession of the yrop_erty. lt IS the an:, Oflu1s legality of this order that is challenged m this appeal.\n\nUnio,, of i,,,/i,, a11d\n\nThree points were urged by Mr. Achhru Ram-learned Counsel for the appellant: (1) that the Central Government had no power under s. 33 of the Act to revise the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner dated July 10, 1954,\n\n(2) that even assuming that that order was capable of revision, the land in dispute had been transferred to the appl lants irrevocably by way of quasi-permanent allotment and sanads issued and that thereafter the title under the sanads which had been granted in the name of the President of India could not be disturbed except in accordance with the terrns of the sanads, (3) that the Deputy Secretary in the Government of India had no materials before him on the basis of which he could find that the order dated July 10, 1954 was erroneous and required to be revised.\n\nWe shall deal with these points in the same order. Section 33 under which the order under appeal was made reads:\n\n\"The Central Government may at any time call for the record of any proceeding under this Act and may pass such order in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case require and as is not inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder.\"\n\nIn considering the argument addressed to us under this head there are two points to be borne in mind. If the order dated July 10, 1954 passed by the Regional Settlement Commissioner was \"a proceeding under this Act\" thn obviously there is no limitation on the power of the Central Government to pass \"such order as in the circumstances of the case was required\". Of course, the Central Government cannot pass an order which is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in the Act or the Rules made thereunder and subject to the objection made that after the transfer of pr<;>perty and the grant of a sanad under s. 20 of the Act read with r. 91(8) in the forrn speoified in Appendix, XXIV to the Rules which is the second point raised by learned Counsel, it was not suggested that the order now impugned was inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. Whether the opinion which the Central Government entertained was correct or incorrect on the evidence would, of course, not fall for consideration by this Court in an appeal under Art. 136 but as regards the contention that\n\nUt/iers\n\n1964 the order is iljegal or invalid as distinct from its being in-\n\nBlwl Jlitlwo Shahuni correct, we shal! deal with it in considering the last of the\n\nand Othm arguments submitted to us by learned Counsel. v. lJnion of Jnaia an'!.\n\n'Othtrs\n\nA.yyangar, J.\n\nIt was urged that the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner which the Central Government revised under s. 33 was not \"a proceeding under the Act\" having been passed before the Act came into force and was therefore outsi:lc its jurisdiction under s. 33 of the Act. The answer to this is, however furnished by s. 39 of the Act. Thal section deals with orders passd prior to the commencement of the Act and renders \"all things done\" or \"action taken\" in the exercise of powers conferred by or under this Act as if the Act were in force on the date when such thing was done or action taken. Section 39 enacts:\n\n\"Anything done or any action taken (including any order made) by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Additional Settlement Commissioners or Settlement Officers for the purposes of payment of compensation or rehabilitation grants or other grants to displaced persons shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act as if this Act were in force on the date on which such thing was done or action was taken.\" It was then suggested that since the order dated July IO, 1954 had merely rejected an application filed by the respondents for restoring them to possession of lands from which they complained they had been unjustly dispossessed, it was not \"a thing done\" or \"action taken for the purpose of payment of compensation or rehabilitation grants to displaced persons\" so as to be deemed to be taken under the provisions of this Act. The same point was urged in a slightly different form by saying that even if the Central Government could interfere and set aside the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner <lated July 10. I 954 still they could not direct the cancellation of the sales and grants of sanad.1 to the appellants and that as this was not a matter pending before them, the order in so far as it directed the cancellation of the rnnads and the dispossession of the appellants from the disputed property was without jurisdiction.\n\nWe do not sec any substance in the points stated in either form. Jn the first place, even if learned Counsel is right in submitting that the Central Government should have stopped with setting aside the order dated July 10, I 954 the result would have been the same, because the prayer which was re\n\njected by the Regional Settlement Commissioner when he\n\np1ssed that order was that contained in an application by the 1964 respondents that they should be restored to the possession Shri Mi!Two Slwhani of the lands from which they had been dispossessed. If that and Oth£r. prayer had to be granted on the reversal of the order dated u . if I\" a d July 10, 1954 it would inevitably have meant that the appel \"'°\"ou.e~•\"\"\" !ants should have been deprived of possession which is exactly what the order now impugned has directed. As the Ayyangar, J. dispossession of the appellants was consequential on the setting aside of the order dated July IO, 1954 the appellants do not obtain any advantage by raising the contention that the Central Government should have confined itself to setting aside that order and doing nothing more. Besides, this submission proceeds from not appreciating the matters that were the subject of consideration before the Central Government and were considered by them at the time when the\n\nimpugnd order was passed. The facts were that there had been an a!Iotment by way of lease as a rehabilitation grant to persons who were admittedly displaced persons in 1950-\n\n51. It was \"th:s thing done\" that had been upset in 1954 and which was restored by the order of July, 1954 being set aside by the order under s. 33 of the Act. In substance and effect therefore the impugned order was dealing with and rectifying an error committed in relation to a \"thing done or action taken\" with respect to a rehabilitation grant to a displaced person. Not merely the order dated July 10, 1954 but the entire question as to whether the respondents as original allottees by way of lease were entitled to the relief of restoration was referred to the Central Government by reason of the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner dated November 3, 1959 .. Both the parties were heard Qn all the points by the Central Government before the orders were passed and it would not therefore be right to consider that the matter in issue before the Central Government was technically merely the correctness of the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner dated July IO, 1954, which read in vaC110 might not be comprehended within s. 39.\n\nThe next point that was urged was that the appellant had been granted sanads on January 12, 1956 and that their sanads could not be cancelled and the title acquired thereunder displaced except in accordance with the terms of the sanads. The term of the simad which is relevant and which was referred to as the sole ground on which it could be set aside and the title of the appellants displaced reads:\n\n\"It shall be lawful for the President to resume the whole or any part of the said property if the Central Government is, at any time, satisfied and records a decision in writing to that effect (the decision of the Central Government in this behalf\n\n(1964}\n\nShri Mithoo 8hahani\n\nand Others\n\nbeing final) that the transferee or his predecessorin-interest had obtained or obtains any other compensation in any form whatsoever under the said Act by fraud or misrepresentation.\" v.\n\nUnion of India and\n\nOthers It is not disputed that this condition has not been fulfilled but the question, however, is whether when the order of allotment on the basis of which the property was granted to the appellant and the sanad issued, is itself reversed or set aside can the sanad and the title obtained thereunder survive? On this point there are two decisions to which our attention was invited-the first is a decision of the High Court of Rajasthan in Partumal v. Managing Officer, Jaipur('), being a decision of a Full Bench of that Court. That case was concerned with the construction of s. 24 of the Act which deals with the power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to revise orders passed by a Settlement Officer.\n\nAssistant Settlement Officer, Assistant Settlement Commissioner, Additional Settlement Commissioner etc. The relevant part of the head-note brings out the point of the decision.\n\nIt reads:\n\n-.- .Ayyangar, J.\n\n\"Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, no doubt confers very wide powers of revision on the Chief Settlement Commissioner, but it does not authorise cancellation of sales after they are completed.\n\nNo doubt, allotments can be set aside under s. 24 of the Act, but after such allotments ripen into sales, they cannot be cancelled. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, but it does not authosioner exercising his power has no authority to cancel sale of property and an order of cancellation of sale of property is without jurisdiction and invalid. It would be too much to read in s. 24 of the Act to hold that it extends to cancellation of sales by expressly providing for cancellation of allotments. The execution of a sale deed cannot be regarded as only a formal expression of an order of allotment dependent on its subsistence.\"\n\nSubsequent to this decision a case arose before the High Courttof Punjab: Bal want Kaur v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (Lands)(') and a Full Bench of that Court by a majority dissented from this view and held that where an order making an allotment was set aside the title which was obtained on the basis of the continuance of that order also fell with it. We are clearly of the opinion that the judgment\n\n(') I.L.R. 11 Rajasthan 1121. (') 1.L.R. [1964] Punjab 36.\n\nof the Punjab High Court is correct. The relevant provisions of 1964 the Act and the Rules have all been set out in the decision of Skri M'llShaha the Punjab High Court and we do not consider it necessary ndOthera •• to refer to them in any detail. It is sufficient to say that they . ' . ml do not contain any provision which militates against the posi- Union f;~·· a tion which is consistent with principle and logic. It is manifest that a sanad can be lawfully issued only on the basis of Ayyan9ar, J. a valid order of allotment. If an order of allotment which is the basis upon which a grant is made is set aside it would follow, and the conclusion is inescapable that the grant cannot survive, because in order that that grant should be valid it should have been effected by a competent officer under a valid order. If the validity of that order is effectively put an end to it would be impossible to maintain unless there were any express provision in the Act or in the ruks that the grant still stands. It was not suggested that there was any provision in the Act or in the rules which deprives the order, setting aside an order of allotment, of this effect. We do not therefore consider that there is any substance in the second point urged by learned Counsel. ·\n\nThe last of the points urged was that the Deputy Secretary who passed the impugned order had no materials upon\n\nwhih he could find that the order dated July 10, 1954 was erroneous or justified being set aside. Learned Counsel is not right in this submission because if the respondents were entitled to remain in possession of the property originally leased to then\\ by way of allotment and their leasehold interest had not been validly terminated-a fact which on the materials the Deputy Secretary was competent to find-the order that he passed restoring them to possession could not be said to lack material. We consider therefore that there is no merit in this submission.\n\nThe result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nWrit Petition 108 of 1960:\n\nThis petition under Art. 32 of the ConstitLl'tion has been filed by the appellants in Civil Appeal 552 of 1963 and seeks the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the same order of the Deputy Secretary to the Union Government as that whose legality is challenged in the appeal. Both the Writ Petition as well as the application for special leave came on for preliminary hearing on November 30, 1960 and while the leave prayed for was granted, rule nisi was also issued in the petition and the two matters have been heard together. In view of our decision in the appeal, the writ petition will stand dis missed, but there will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal and Writ petition dismissed.\n\n~--", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "MITHOO SHAHAN! AND ORS.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MITHOO SHAHAN! AND ORS.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 167, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 363, "end_char": 365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property-Land Allotted to respondents-Subsequently the same lad allotted to appellants-Sanad issued to appellants under the Act", "statute": "Evacuee Property-Land Allotted to respondents-Subsequently the same lad allotted to appellants-Sanad issued to appellants under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 499, "end_char": 504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property-Land Allotted to respondents-Subsequently the same lad allotted to appellants-Sanad issued to appellants under the Act", "statute": "Evacuee Property-Land Allotted to respondents-Subsequently the same lad allotted to appellants-Sanad issued to appellants under the Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 843, "end_char": 862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the lease \\Vas continuing in force, the Government of India issued a Press Note on November 13, 1953 by which they announced that they had decided to allot evacuee agricultural land in Hyderabad State to displaced persons whose claims for agricultural land had been verified under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "November 13, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 886, "end_char": 903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the lease \\Vas continuing in force, the Government of India issued a Press Note on November 13, 1953 by which they announced that they had decided to allot evacuee agricultural land in Hyderabad State to displaced persons whose claims for agricultural land had been verified under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 988, "end_char": 997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the lease \\Vas continuing in force, the Government of India issued a Press Note on November 13, 1953 by which they announced that they had decided to allot evacuee agricultural land in Hyderabad State to displaced persons whose claims for agricultural land had been verified under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1203, "end_char": 1214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants made an application in pursuance of this notification and on May 4, 1954 the land now in dispute, though under a subsisting lease in favour of the respondents, was allotted to them."}}, {"text": "October 9, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1423, "end_char": 1438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the rnean time the Displaced Persons (Compensation Jnd Rehabilitation) Act, came into force on October 9, 1954."}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1447, "end_char": 1457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1791, "end_char": 1796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1842, "end_char": 1847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2146, "end_char": 2164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held-(i) The order of the Central Government was covered by s. 33 of the Act as one dealing with and rectif~; ing an error committed in relation to a \"thing done or aclion taken'' \\vith respect to a rehabilitation grant to a displaced person."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3008, "end_char": 3013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mitlwo Shaha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If an order of allotment wh'ch is the ba•l'.s upon which a grant is made\n\n.larclt 10\n\nl964 is set aside it would follow, and the conclusion is inescapable Mitlwo Shaha ."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3876, "end_char": 3884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyangar, J.\n\nPartuma!", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4320, "end_char": 4325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4481, "end_char": 4488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4496, "end_char": 4517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4562, "end_char": 4572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram and N. N. Keswani, for the appellants and the petitioners.", "canonical_name": "Achhru Ram"}}, {"text": "N. N. Keswani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4577, "end_char": 4590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram and N. N. Keswani, for the appellants and the petitioners."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4633, "end_char": 4645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4650, "end_char": 4667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4734, "end_char": 4748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, K. Jairam and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "K. Jairam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4750, "end_char": 4759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, K. Jairam and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4764, "end_char": 4781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, K. Jairam and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "March 10, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 10, 1964."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4910, "end_char": 4918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR, J.-The appeal, by special leave, is directed to question the correctness of an order passed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation under s. 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, J 954 (Central Act XLIV of 1954) which for convenience will be referred to hereafter as the Act.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5097, "end_char": 5102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Act XLIV of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5174, "end_char": 5198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nizamabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5434, "end_char": 5443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts necessary to appreciate the points urged before us are briefly these : The property in dispute is agricultural land of an extent of about 60 acres situated at Nizamabad in the former State of Hyderabad and now in the State\n\nof Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5502, "end_char": 5516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts necessary to appreciate the points urged before us are briefly these : The property in dispute is agricultural land of an extent of about 60 acres situated at Nizamabad in the former State of Hyderabad and now in the State\n\nof Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "September 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5521, "end_char": 5538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 7, 1950 the Deputy Cus- 1964 todian of Nizamabad District allotted 44 acres of this land Shri Mithoo Shahllni to five persons who are the respondents before us."}}, {"text": "Nizamabad District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5570, "end_char": 5588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 7, 1950 the Deputy Cus- 1964 todian of Nizamabad District allotted 44 acres of this land Shri Mithoo Shahllni to five persons who are the respondents before us."}}, {"text": "Mithoo Shahllni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5625, "end_char": 5640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 7, 1950 the Deputy Cus- 1964 todian of Nizamabad District allotted 44 acres of this land Shri Mithoo Shahllni to five persons who are the respondents before us.", "canonical_name": "MITHOO SHAHAN! AND ORS."}}, {"text": "July 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5835, "end_char": 5848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a further order dated July 21, 1951 the balance Othtra of the 16 acres and odd was also allotted to them."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6786, "end_char": 6792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allotment was to be on the same terms as under the quasi-permanent allotment scheme in the Punjab and applications for allotment were invited from persons residing inter-a/ia in Hyderabad State whose verified claims included a claim for agricultural lands."}}, {"text": "Nizamabad district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7518, "end_char": 7536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of allotment, a copy of which was forwarded to the Collector of Nizamabad district, contained a request that the allottees may be put in possession of the land and the fact intimated to the office of the Regional Settlement Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7949, "end_char": 7955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the respondents made a representation to the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Bombay pointing out that they were displaced persons who having been rehabilitated by the allotment by way of lease .were now being uprooted."}}, {"text": "July 10, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8312, "end_char": 8325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These applications were considered by the Regional Settlement Commissioner who by his order dated July 10, 1954 rejected their application."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8927, "end_char": 8937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 18, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9157, "end_char": 9173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 12 of the Act empowered the Central Government to acquire evacuee property for rehabilitation of displaced persons and in pursuanoe thereof the properties now in dispute were acquired by Government by a notification dated January 18, 1955."}}, {"text": "January 12, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9416, "end_char": 9432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the proceedings by which the respondents sought to obtain a reversal of the order dated July 10, 1954 and without reference to them, the Regional Settlement Commissioner issued sanads in favour of appellants 1 to 4 on January 12, 1956 acting under s. 20 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9446, "end_char": 9451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 22, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9584, "end_char": 9599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner who dealt with the representations made by the respondents passed an order on August 22, 1958 after obtaining .a report from the Regional Settlement Commissioner."}}, {"text": "June 13, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10183, "end_char": 10196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter a report was called for and obtained from the Collector who conducted this enquiry and in his report dated June 13, 1959 he recorded a finding that there had been personal cultivation of the lands by the respondents."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10858, "end_char": 10863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 10,\n\nJ 954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11046, "end_char": 11061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was considered by the Deputy Secretary in the Rehabilitation Ministry who heard all the parties and recorded the following findings: (]) that the order dated July 10,\n\nJ 954 refusing to transfer the lands to the respondents was wrong, and (2) that there was no justification for t:rminating the lease and depriving the respondents of possession of the\n\nproperty now in dispute and on these findings directed the ~6!"}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11573, "end_char": 11583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unio,, of i,,,/i,, a11d\n\nThree points were urged by Mr. Achhru Ram-learned Counsel for the appellant: (1) that the Central Government had no power under s. 33 of the Act to revise the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner dated July 10, 1954,\n\n(2) that even assuming that that order was capable of revision, the land in dispute had been transferred to the appl lants irrevocably by way of quasi-permanent allotment and sanads issued and that thereafter the title under the sanads which had been granted in the name of the President of India could not be disturbed except in accordance with the terrns of the sanads, (3) that the Deputy Secretary in the Government of India had no materials before him on the basis of which he could find that the order dated July 10, 1954 was erroneous and required to be revised.", "canonical_name": "Achhru Ram"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11670, "end_char": 11675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12060, "end_char": 12065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unio,, of i,,,/i,, a11d\n\nThree points were urged by Mr. Achhru Ram-learned Counsel for the appellant: (1) that the Central Government had no power under s. 33 of the Act to revise the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner dated July 10, 1954,\n\n(2) that even assuming that that order was capable of revision, the land in dispute had been transferred to the appl lants irrevocably by way of quasi-permanent allotment and sanads issued and that thereafter the title under the sanads which had been granted in the name of the President of India could not be disturbed except in accordance with the terrns of the sanads, (3) that the Deputy Secretary in the Government of India had no materials before him on the basis of which he could find that the order dated July 10, 1954 was erroneous and required to be revised."}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12391, "end_char": 12401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13375, "end_char": 13380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13832, "end_char": 13840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14129, "end_char": 14138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Othtrs\n\nA.yyangar, J.\n\nIt was urged that the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner which the Central Government revised under s. 33 was not \"a proceeding under the Act\" having been passed before the Act came into force and was therefore outsi:lc its jurisdiction under s. 33 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14255, "end_char": 14260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14398, "end_char": 14403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14460, "end_char": 14465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14739, "end_char": 14749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July IO, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15364, "end_char": 15377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was then suggested that since the order dated July IO, 1954 had merely rejected an application filed by the respondents for restoring them to possession of lands from which they complained they had been unjustly dispossessed, it was not \"a thing done\" or \"action taken for the purpose of payment of compensation or rehabilitation grants to displaced persons\" so as to be deemed to be taken under the provisions of this Act."}}, {"text": "July 10. I 954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15929, "end_char": 15943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same point was urged in a slightly different form by saying that even if the Central Government could interfere and set aside the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner <lated July 10."}}, {"text": "July 10, I 954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16472, "end_char": 16486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the first place, even if learned Counsel is right in submitting that the Central Government should have stopped with setting aside the order dated July 10, I 954 the result would have been the same, because the prayer which was re\n\njected by the Regional Settlement Commissioner when he\n\np1ssed that order was that contained in an application by the 1964 respondents that they should be restored to the possession Shri Mi!Two Slwhani of the lands from which they had been dispossessed."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17888, "end_char": 17893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 3, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18402, "end_char": 18418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not merely the order dated July 10, 1954 but the entire question as to whether the respondents as original allottees by way of lease were entitled to the relief of restoration was referred to the Central Government by reason of the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner dated November 3, 1959 .. Both the parties were heard Qn all the points by the Central Government before the orders were passed and it would not therefore be right to consider that the matter in issue before the Central Government was technically merely the correctness of the order of the Regional Settlement Commissioner dated July IO, 1954, which read in vaC110 might not be comprehended within s. 39."}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18794, "end_char": 18799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mithoo 8hahani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19467, "end_char": 19481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The term of the simad which is relevant and which was referred to as the sole ground on which it could be set aside and the title of the appellants displaced reads:\n\n\"It shall be lawful for the President to resume the whole or any part of the said property if the Central Government is, at any time, satisfied and records a decision in writing to that effect (the decision of the Central Government in this behalf\n\n(1964}\n\nShri Mithoo 8hahani\n\nand Others\n\nbeing final) that the transferee or his predecessorin-interest had obtained or obtains any other compensation in any form whatsoever under the said Act by fraud or misrepresentation.\"", "canonical_name": "MITHOO SHAHAN! AND ORS."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19683, "end_char": 19697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nUnion of India and\n\nOthers It is not disputed that this condition has not been fulfilled but the question, however, is whether when the order of allotment on the basis of which the property was granted to the appellant and the sanad issued, is itself reversed or set aside can the sanad and the title obtained thereunder survive?", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS"}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20117, "end_char": 20140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this point there are two decisions to which our attention was invited-the first is a decision of the High Court of Rajasthan in Partumal v. Managing Officer, Jaipur('), being a decision of a Full Bench of that Court."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20282, "end_char": 20287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20607, "end_char": 20616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads:\n.- .Ayyangar, J.\n\n\"Section 24 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, no doubt confers very wide powers of revision on the Chief Settlement Commissioner, but it does not authorise cancellation of sales after they are completed.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20623, "end_char": 20633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20907, "end_char": 20912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21241, "end_char": 21246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Courttof Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21547, "end_char": 21567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequent to this decision a case arose before the High Courttof Punjab: Bal want Kaur v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (Lands)(') and a Full Bench of that Court by a majority dissented from this view and held that where an order making an allotment was set aside the title which was obtained on the basis of the continuance of that order also fell with it."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21970, "end_char": 21987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Punjab High Court is correct."}}, {"text": "M'llShaha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22100, "end_char": 22109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant provisions of 1964 the Act and the Rules have all been set out in the decision of Skri M'llShaha the Punjab High Court and we do not consider it necessary ndOthera •• to refer to them in any detail."}}, {"text": "Ayyan9ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22455, "end_char": 22463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is manifest that a sanad can be lawfully issued only on the basis of Ayyan9ar, J. a valid order of allotment.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24025, "end_char": 24032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 30, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24387, "end_char": 24404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the Writ Petition as well as the application for special leave came on for preliminary hearing on November 30, 1960 and while the leave prayed for was granted, rule nisi was also issued in the petition and the two matters have been heard together."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_112_122_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "MarcA 11\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nRAJKUMAR NARSINGH PRATAP SINGH DEO\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA AND ANR.\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.)\n\nKhorposh Allowance-Sanad granted by Ruler of State- Discontinuance of cash allowance by Government of Orissa after merger-Validitv-Sanad, if law or executive act-Constitution of India), Arts. 366(10), 372--0rder 31 of 1948 issued by Government of Orissa, cl. 4{b ).\n\nThe Ruler of Dhenkanal State granted a sanad by way. of Khorposh allowance to his younger brother, the appellant giving certain lands and a maintenance allowance, under the customary law of the State. After the merger of that State to the Dominion of India which became effective on January 1, 1948, the Government of Orissa took over the administration of the State and discontinued the cash allowance. The appellant challenged the validity of the order of discontinuance by a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge. The suit was dismissed. On appeal to this Court it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the sanad issued by an absolute monarch was law, and was continued by Arts. 366(10), 372(1) of the Constitution and cl. 4(b) of the Order 31 of 1948 issued by the Orissa Government in exercise of the power delegated to it by the Central Government under s. 3(2) of the Extra Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947.\n\nHeld: (i) It was not correct to say that in dealing with a grant m, ade by an absolute monarch any enquiry as to whether the grant was the result of an executive or legislative act was altogether irrelevant. This Court did not lay down any inflexible rule that the weli\"I1eCClgnised jurisprudential distinction between legislative and executive acts was wholly irrelevant or inapplicable to such a case.\n\nAmeer-un Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 352, Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad .v.\n\nAkram Ali, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 60, Madhaorao Phalke v. State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 957, Promode Chandra Deb v.\n\nState of Orissa, [1962] Supp_ 1 S.C.R. 405, Tilkauat Shri Govindlalii Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, [1964] 1 S.c:R. 561, Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AI.R. 1963 S.C. 953 and State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Nithibarwala. [1964] 6 S.C.R 461, considered.\n\nIn such an enquiry it was necessary to consider such relevant factors as the nature of the order, its scope and effect, general setting and context and tire method adopted by the Ruler in promulgating it.\n\nSo judged, the Sanad in question had no legislative element in any of its provisions and was a gift pure and simple made in pursuanoe of the custom of the family and customai; r law of the State. The gift therefore, was an executive act of the Ruler and did not amount to law although the Ruler was discharging it his obligation under personal or customary law.\n\nThe gift being an executive act of the Ruler could be modifi- 1961 ed or cancelled by an executive act of the successor to the Ruler. R .k --;;- . 1 Th d. t' f t\" h 11 ld t ff t th aJ umar .. arsmg' e iscon inuance o ue cas a o'\\\\oance cou no a ec e Pratap Singh Deo continuance of the customary law under cl. 4(b) of the Order of v. 1948 and Art. 372 of the Constitution. Nor could the plea of pay-State of or;\"\" and ment of such allowance even after the merger invalidate the Another discontinuance.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 133/\n\n1963. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated November 17, 1960, of the Orissa High Court in First Appeal No. 45 of 1955.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, M. K. Ra111a11111rthi, D. P.\n\nSingh and S. C. Agarwala, for the appellant.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General of lndia, Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.\n\nMarch 9, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.-The principal point of iaw Gajendragad!w, C.J;. which arises in this appeal is whether the Sanad iSsued in favour of the appellant, Rajkumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo, by his elder brother, the Ruler of Dhenkanal State, on March 1, 1931, is existing law within the meaning of Art. .372 of the Constitution read with cl. 4(b) of Order No. 31 of 1948 issued by the respondent State of Orissa on January 1, 1948. This question arises in this way. The State of Dhenkanal which was an independent State prior to 1947 merged with the Province of Orissa in pursuance of a Merger Agreement entered into between the Ruler of Dhenkanal and the Dominion of India on December 15. 1947. This Agreement came into force as from January 1, 1948. In consequence of this Agreement the entire administration' of the State of Dhenkanal was taken over by the State of Orissa pursuant to the authority confered on it by the Central Government under s. 3 (2) of the Extra Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (No. 47 of 1947). After the Sanad in question was issued in favour of the appellant, he was getting a monthly allowance of Rs. 500 /- from the Dhenkanal District Treasury on the authority of a permanent Pay Order which had been issued in his favour by the Ruler of Dhenkanal on the basis of the said Sanad. This payment was discontinued by the respondent from !st of May, 1949 and the several representations made by the appellant to the various authorities of the respondent to reconsider the matter failed.\n\nThat is why he filed the present suit on September 26, 1951 in the Court of the subordinate Judge, Dhenkanal, alleging that the .act of discontin.uing te apellant's pension was illegal, and askmg for appropnate rehefs m that behalf. It is from this suit that the present appeal arises.\n\n1964 The appellant's case is that in the family of the appellant,\n\nRajkumar Naraingh it has been recognied as a ustomary right .of the junior Pratap Singh Deo members of the family to receive adeqnate maintenance cons 10v. d sistently with the status of the family. Indeed, the appellant's '\"''\n\n0 A:,;;;:, an allegation is that this custom was recognised in Dhenkanal and . - enforced as customary law in the State. The grants made to GaJendraaadkar, C.J. the members of the Royal Family for their maintenance consisted of lands and cash allowances. These latter were described as Kharposh allowances and they were charged and paid out of the revenue of the former State of Dhenkanal. It was in accordance with this customary law that the Sanad in question was issued by the Ruler of Dhenkanal in favou~ of the appellant. By this Sanad, certain lands were granted to the appellant and a cash allowance of Rs. 500 /- per month was directed to be paid to him for life. The appellant's grieva.nce is that this grant of Rs. 500/- allowance has been discontinued by the respondent and that, according to the appellant, is an illegal and unconstitutional act. In support of his plea that the respondent was bound to continue the payment of the cash allowance, the appellant urged in his suit that the grant was a law within the meaning of Art. 372 and as such, it had to be continued. He also alleged that after the merger of Dhenkanal with Orissa, his right to receive the grant was recognised by the respondent and acted upon; and that is another reason why he claimed an appropriate relief in the form of an injunction against the respondent. Several other pleas were also taken by the appella.nt in support of his claim, but it is not necessary to refer to them for the purpose of the present appeal.\n\nThe respondent denied the appellant's claim and urged that having regard to the nature of the grant on which the appellant has rested his case, it was competent to the respondent to discontinue the grant. The grant in question is not law under Art. 372 and just as it could be made by the Ruler in 1931 by an executive act. it can be discontinued by the respondent by a similar executive act since the respondent is the successor of the Ruler. It was also urged by the respondent that the appellant's allegation that the respondent had recognised and agreed to act upon the grant of cash allowance, was not well-founded. Both the learned trial Judge who tried the appellant's case, and the High Court of Orissa before which the appellant took his case in appeal, have, in the main, rejected the appellant's contention, with the result that the appellant's suit has been dismissed. The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and it is with the certificate thus granted to him that he has come to this Court in appeal.\n\nThe first. and the main point which Mt. Setalvad for the appellant has urged before us is that the Sanad on which the appellant's claim is founded, is la.w. At t!ie time when the -\n\nSanad was granted, the Ruler of Dhenkanal was an absolute 1964 monarch and in him vested full sovereignty; as such absolute Rajkumar N arsingh sovereign, he was endowed with legislative, judicial and exe- Pratap Singh Dea cutive powers and authority and whatever order he passed v. d 1 I h f b 1 h h Stateo/Orissaand amounte to aw. n t e case o an a so ute monarc w ose AnotMr word is literally law, it would be idle, says Mr. Setalvad, to -- distinguish between binding orders issued by him which are Gajendragadkar, C.J. legislative from other binding orders which are executive or administrative. All binding orders issued by such a Ruler are, on the ultimate analysis, law, and the Sanad in question falls under the category of such law.\n\nIn support of this argument, Mr. Setalvad has referred us to the definition of the words \"existing law\" prescribed by Art. 366(10) of the Constitution. Art. 366(10) provides that \"existing law\" means any law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a, law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation. Basing himself on this definition, Mr. Setalvad also relies on the provisions of Art. 372(1) which provides for the continuance in force of existing laws; this continuance is, of course, subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and it applies to such laws as were in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, until they are altered, repealed or amended by a, competent Legislature or other competent authority.\n\nThese provisions are invoked by Mr. Setalvad primarily by virtue of cl. 4(b) of Order 31 of 1948 issued by the respondent on the lst'of January, 1948. It is well-known that by s.3(1) of the Extra Foreign Jurisdiction Act, the Central Government was given very wide powers to exercise extra provincial jurisdiction in such manner as it thought fit. Section 3(2) provided that the Central Government may delegate any such jurisdiction as aforesaid to atiy officer or authority in such manner and to such extent as it thinks fit. The width of the powers conferred on the Central Government can be properly appreciated if the provisions of s. 4 are taken into account.\n\nUnder s. 4(1Y: the Central Government was authorised by Jlotification in the Official Gazette to make such orders as may seem to it expedient for the effective exercise of the extraforeign jurisdiction of the Central Government. Section 4(2) indicates oy els. (a) to (d) the categbries of orders which can be passed by the Central Government in exercise of its jurisdiction. The sweep of these powers is very wide and they had to be exercised in the interests of the proper governance of the areas to which the said Act applied. Under s. 3(2), the Central Government had delegated its powers to the Province of Oriss.1 in respect of States which had merged with it, and it was in exercise of its powers as such delegated that Order 3 I of 1948\n\n1964 was issued by the Province of Orissa (now the respondent).\n\nllajkuma-; N,,,.1ngh Cl. 4 of the Order dealt with the question of the laws to be Pmtap Singh Deo applied to the merging areas. Cl. 4(a) referred to the enact-\n\n0•·. d ments specified in the first column of the Schedule annexed to Stale of \"\"\"'an d d h l\" bl . d' d . \"t CJ 4(b) Anoth.r the Order an ma e t em app 1ca e as m 1cate m 1 . • . - provided that as respects those matters which are not covered Oa1endrag.•dkar, C.J. by the ena.ctments applied to\" the Orissa States under sub-para (a), all Jaws in force in any of the Orissa States prior to the commencement of this Order, whether substantive or procedural and whether based on custom and usage, or statutes, shall, subject to the provisions of this Order, continue to remain in force until altered or amended by an Order under the Extra. Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947. There is a proviso to this sub-clause to which it is unnecessary to refer. The argument is that by virtue of cl. 4(b) of this Order, \\h•! customary law prevailing in the State of Dhenkanal prior to its merger continued to operate as law in the territory of Dhenkanal and that is how it is operative even now, beca.use it has not been repealed or amended. Since the Sanad issued in favour of the appellant is, according to the appellant's case. law, there would be no authority in the respondent to cancel the payment of cash allowance to the appellant merely by an executive order.\n\nIf the respondent wants to terminate the payment of the cash allowance to the appellant, the only way which the respondent can legitimately adopt is to fllake a Jaw in that behalf, or issue an order under cl. 4(b) of the Order. That, broadly stated, is the argument which has been pressed before us by Mr. Setalvad.\n\nWe do not think that the basic assumption made by Mr. Setalvad in presenting this argument is sound. It would be noticed that the basic assumption on whiCh the argument is based is that in the case Of an absolute monarch, there can be no distinction between executive and legislative orders. In other words, it is assumed that all orders which are passed by an absolute monarch, are binding, and it is idle to enquire whether they are executive or legislative in character, because no uch distinction can be made in regard to orders issued by an absolute monarch. It is true that the legislative. executive and judicial powers are all vested in an absolute monarch; he is the source or fountain of all these powers and any order made by him would be binding within the territory under his rule without examining the question as to whether it is legislative, executive or judicial; but though all the three powers are vested in the same individual, that does not obliterate the difference in the character of those powers. The jurisprudential distinction between the legislative and the exe<; utive powers still remains, though for practical purposes, an examination about the character of these orders may serve no useful purpose. It is not as if where absolute monarchs have sway in\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REFORTS 117\n\ntheir kingdoms, the basic principles of jurisprudenc~ whic~ 1964 distinguish between the ~re~ categories of powers are mapph- Rajkumar Nar<ingh cable. A careful exammatlon of the orders passed by an Pratap Singh Deo absolute monarch would disclose to a jurist whether the power v •. . . . . · d · d\" ·, 1 Slateo/Orisaaand exercised m a given case by 1ssumg a giyen or er 1s JU c1~ , Another legislative or executive, and the conclusion reached on Juns- - prudential grounds about the nature of the order and the Gl\\iendragadk.,, O.J. source of power on which it is based would nevertheless be true and correct. That, indeed, is the approach which must be adopted in considering the question as to whether the grant in the present case is law within the meaning of Art. 372 as well as cl. 4(b) of Order 31 of 1948; and so, prima facie, it does not seem sound to suggest that in the case of an absolute monarch, that branch of jurisprudence which makes a distinction between three kinds of power is entirely inapplicable.\n\nIn dealing with this aspect of the matter, it is hardly necessary to examine and decide what distinguishes a la~ from an executive order. A theoretical or academic discuss10n of this problem would not be necessary for our present purpose, because all that we are considering at this stage is whether or not it would be possible to consider by reference to the character of the order, its provisions, its context and its general setting whether it is a legislative order or an executive order.\n\nThough theorists may not find it easy to define a law as distinguished from executive orders, the main features and characteristics of law are well recognised. Stated broadly, a law generally is a body of rules which have been laid down for determining legal rights and legal obligations which are recognised by courts. In that sense, a law can be distinguished from a grant, because in the case of a grant, the grantor and the\n\ngrantee both agree about the making and the acceptance of the grant; not so in the case of law. Law in the case of an absolute monarch is his. command which has to be obeyed by the citizens whether they agree with it or not. Therefore, we are incline~ to hold tht Mr. Setalvad is not right in making the unqualified content10n that while we are dealing with a grant made by abs?lute monarch, it is irrelevant to enquire\n\nwhthe~ the !!1'1nt 1s the result of an executive action, or a legJSlative a.ctlon. On Mr. Setalvad's contention, every act of the absolute monarch and every order passed by him would ome la':\" though the act or order may have relation exclu- SJVely to his personal matters and may have no impact on the\n\npu, hc at lage. h~.t i~ why it is unsound to suggest that the 1unsp.rudent1al d1stinchon between orders which are judicial executive or legislative or in relation to purely individual and personal matters should be treated as irrelevant in dealing with Acts or orders passed even by an absolute monarch.\n\nRealisi_ng the dculty in his way, Mr. Setalvad has\n\ntrongly. relied on certain decisions of this Court which accordm11 to him, support the broad point which he has raised before\n\n1964 us. It is, therefore, necessary to examine these dech:ions. The Rajk,.mar Narsinqh first case on which Mr. Setalvad relies is that of Ameer-un- Pratap Singh Deo Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum('). In that case, this Court State of~;;,,,. and was called upon to consider the validity of the Firman issued\n\nAnoth.r by the Nizam of Hyderabad on the 19th February, 1939, by\n\n0 . nd odk 0 J which a Special Commission had been constituted to investi-\n\n•J' rag •r, gate and submit a report to him in the case of succession to a deceased Nawab which was transferred to the commission from the file of Darul Quaza Court. Dealing with the question as to whether the Firman in question was passed by the Nizam in exercise of his legislative power or judicial power, Mukherjea, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed that the Nizam was the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities. He also observed that the Firmans were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were binding in th•~ same way as any other law; therefore so long as a particular firman held the field, that alone would govern or regulate the rights of the parties concerned, though it could be annulled or modified by a later Firman at any time that the Nizam willed. It appears, however, that the learned counsel appearing in that case did not argue this point, and so, the question as to whether it would be possible or useful to draw a line of demarcation between a Firman which is legislative and that which is exf:cutive, was neither debated before the Court, nor has it been examined and decided as a general proposition of law.\n\nIn The Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad v. Akram Ali('), similar observations were repeated by Bose, J., who spoke for the Court on that occasion. Dealing with the Firman issued by the Nizam on the 30th December,\n\n1920, which directed the Department to supervise the Dargah until the rights of the parties were enquired into and decided by the Civil Court, it was observed that the Nizam was an absolute sovereign regarding all domestic matters at the time when the Firman was issued and his word was law. That is how the validity of the Firman was not questioned and it was held that its effect was to deprive' the respondent before the Court and all other claimants of all rights to possession pending enquiry of the case.\n\nIn this case again, as in the case of Ameer-un-Nissa Begum('), the point does not appear to have been argued and the observations are, therefore, not intended to lay down a broad or general proposition as contended by Mr. Setalvad.\n\nThat takes us to the decision in the case of Madhaorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat('). On this occasion, this Court was called upon to consider the question as to\n\n(') A.LR. 1955 S.C. 352.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 60\n\n(') [1961] I S.C.R. 957.\n\nwhether the relevant Kalambandis issued by the Ruler of 1964 Gwalior constituted law, 'Or amounted merely to executive Rajkumar NaT<iog~ orders. In the course of the judgment, the passages in the two Pratap Singh Deo cases to which we have just referred were, no doubt, quoted; State of Ori\"a and. but the ultimate decision was based not so much on any gene Another ral ground as suggested by Mr. Setalvad, as on the examina . wJ - tion of the character of the Kalambandis themselves and other GaJe 'O!Jrsdkar, O.J relevant factors. If Mr. Setalvad's argument be well-founded and the Kalambandis had to be treated as law on the broad ground that they were orders issued by an abso_lute monarch, it would have been hardly necessary to consider the scope and effect of the Kalambandis, the manner in which they were passed, and the object and effect of their scheme. In fact, these matters were considered in the judgment and it was ultimately held that \"having regard to the contents of the two orders and the character of the provisions made by them in such a detail ed manner, it is difficult to distinguish them from statutes or Jaws; in any event, they must be treated as rules or regulations having the force of law\". That was the finding made by the High Court ahd the said finding was affirmed by this Court.\n\nTherefore, though this judgment repeated the general observa lions made by this Court on two earlier occasions, it would be noticed that the decision was based not so much on the said observations, as on a' careful examination of the provisions contained in the Kalambandis themselves.\n\nIn Promod Chandra Deb v. The State of Orissa('), this Court has held that the grant with which the Court was con cerned, read in the light of Order 31 of the Rules, Regulations and Privileges of Khanjadars and Khorposhdars, was law. Jn discussing the question, Sinha, C.J., has referred to Order 31 of the Rules and Regulations and has observed that like the Kalambandis in the case of Phalke('), the said Rules has the force of law and would be existing law within the meaning of\n\nrt. 372 of the Constitution. This case does not carry the posi t1on any further except that the same general observations are reproduced. In the case of Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. Stat• of Rajasthan('), while dealing with the question as to whether the Firman issued by the Udaipur Darbar in 1934 was law or not, this Court examined the scheme of the said Firman C'Onsidered its provisions, their scope and effect and came t~ the -onclusion tha~ it was law. Having thus reached the co!\\- clus1on that the Frrman, considered as a whole, was Jaw the general observtions on which Mr. Setalvad relies were rpro ..\n\nuced. But as m the case of Phalke('), so in this case, the decis10n. does , not apix:ar. to be based on any general or a priori\n\nCO~Jderation, but It IS J>ased more particularly Oll the exami nation of the scheme of the Firman and its provisions.\n\n((') [1962] Supp. I S.C.R 405, 410.\n\n(') [1961] 1 SC R 957\n\n') [1964) 1 S.C.R 561. . . .\n\n1964 In the case of Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union Rajk,.mar Nars; ng1, of India('), a similar question arose for the decision of this_\n\nPratap Singh Deo Court in regard to an agreement made on the 17th of April, State of i\"a and 1941. The point urged efore the Court was that the said agree-\n\nAnoter ment was law, and rehance was placed on the several general -- observations to which we have alreadv referred. S. K Das. J.\n\nGajendragadkar, C.J. who spoke for the Court examined the said observations and the context in which they were made and rejected the plea that the said observations were intended to lay down a general proposition that in the case of an absolute monarch, no distinction can be made between his legislative and his executive acts.\n\nIn the result, the agreement in question was held to be no more than a contract which was an executive act and not a law within the meaning of Art. 372.\n\nThe same view has been recently expressed by Hidayatullah, Shah and Ayyangar, JJ. in the judgments respectively delivered by them in The State of Gujarat v. Vora Fidda/i Badruddin Mithibarwala(').\n\nTherefore, a close examination of the decisions on which Mr. Setalvad relies does not support his argument that this Court has laid down a general proposition about the irrelevance or inapplicability of the well-recognised distinction between legislative and executive acts in regard to the orders issued by absolute monarchs like the Raja of Dhenkanal in the present case. The true legal position is that whenever a dispute arises as to whether an order passed by an absolute monarch represents a legislative act and continues to remain operative by virtue of cl. 4(b) of the Order, all relevant factors must be considered before the question is answered; the nature of the order, the scope and effect of its provisions, its general setting and context, the method adopted by the Ruler in promulgating legislative as distinguished from executive orders, these and other allied matters will have to be examined before the character of the order is judicially determined, and so, we arc satisfied that Mr. Setalvad is not right in placing his argu ment as high as to say that the Sanad issued in favour of the appellant by the Raja of Dhenkanal must be held to be law without considering the nature of the grant contained in it and other relevant circumstances and facts. We must, therefore. proceed to examine these relevant facts. ,..._\n\nLet us then examine the Sanad. It consists of three clauses_ The first clause refers to the practice in the State of Dhenkanal under which the Rajas made grants in hereditary rights to their relatives. and it adds that there exists a patent necessity for making an adequate provision for the .grantee.\n\n<'> A.LR. 1963 s_c. 953.\n\n(') [19&)] 6 S.C.R. 461.\n\nthe appellant, to enable him to maintain his dignity as a Raj- 1964 knmar of the Stat~ and to maintain imsel~. his famy. his .eirs Rajkumar Naraingh and descendants m a manner befittmg his and therr pos1tton. Pratap Si09h Deo\n\nTht is w.hY out o~ love and affection for him, the grantor made BtaJe 0\";;.,. ana the khan1a grant m the shape of a monthly cash allowance of >/Another Rs. 500 Ifor his life time and also an assignment of land . - measuring 6942-71-5 acres specified in the Schedule attached Gaienrlragadkar, C.J. to the Sanad. The grant of the said land has been made heritable and the grantee has been authorised to enjoy it from generation to generation. The extent of the grant is also clarified by additional clauses which it is unnecessary to mention.\n\nClause 2 of the Sanad imposes the condition of loyalty on the grantee and bis heirs; and by cl. 3 the State undertook to bear all costs for reclaiming the land covered by the grant with a view to render it fit for cultivation.\n\nNow, it is plain that there is no legislative element in any of the provisions of this grant. It does not contain any command which has to be obeyed by the citizens of the State; it is a gift pure and simple made by the Ruler in recognition of the fact that under the custom of the family and the customary law of the State, he was bound to maintain his junior brother.\n\nThe grant, therefore, .represents purely an executive act on the part of the Ruler intended to discharge his obligations to his junior brother under the personal law of the family and the customary law of the State. It would, we think be idle to suggest that such a grant amounts to law. It is true that partly it is based on the requirement of personal and customary law; but no a, ction taken by the Ruler in discharging his obligations under such personal or customary law can be assimilated to an order issued by him in exercise of his legislative authority.\n\nTherefore, we have no diflj.culty in holding that the Sanad in question is a purely executive dCt and cannot be regarded as la.w as contended by Mr. Setalvad.\n\nIt was then faintly argued by Mr. Setalvad that the obligation undertaken by the Ruler was recognised by the respondent, and so, it could not lie cancelled by the respondent merely by an executive act. In our opinion, there is no substance in this argnment. If the act by which the grant was made was a purely executive act on the part of the then Ruler of the State of Dhenkanal, we do not see how it can be legitimatelv urged that the terms of the grant cannot either be modified, or the grant cannot be cancelled altogether by ail executive act of the respondent which is the successor of the Ruler. As we have just indicated, the customary law which required the\n\nRler to provide maintenance for his junior brother, can be said to have been continued by cl. 4(b) of the Order of 1948 and t. 372 of the onstit.ution; ut to say that the customary law m that behalf 1s continned 1s very different from saying that the amount of maintenance fixed by the grant cannot be\n\n1964 varied or altered. Wha.t the respondent has done is to stop the\n\nRojkamar s .. rsingh payment of cash alloance of Rs. 500/- per month _and that\n\nPratap Singh Dro does not mean alteration of the Jaw. It 1s common ground that\n\n8 . the grant of the land covered by the Sanad has not been distatc ~\";,~::: \"'\"1 turbed, and so, all that the impugned action of the respondent - amounts to is to reduce the total maintenance allowance grant- Gajendrngadkar. C.J. ed to the appellant by the Ruler in 1931. It is plain that though the customary law requiring provision to be made for the maintenance of the appellant is in force, the respondent has the right to determine what would be adequate and appropriate maintenance, and this part of the right is purely executive in character. It would, we think, be unreasonable. to suggest that though the Sanad is not law, the amount granted by the Sanad cannot be modified by an executive act of the respondent, and that the respondent must file a suit for that purpose. All that the customary law requires is the making of a suitable provision for the maintenance of the junior members of the family. But wha.t is adequate provision in that behalf will always be a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of several relevant factors; the number of persons entitled to receive maintenance, the requirements of the status of the members of the family, the total income derived by the family, and other commitments, may all have to be weighed in deciding the quantum of maintenance which should be awarded to anyone of the junior members. In fact, both the Courts below have agreed in holding that having regard to the relevant fact~. the grant of the land made by the Sanad would be adequate and appropriate for the maintenance of the appellant. ·\n\nBut apart from this aspect of the matter, we do not see how the appellant can seriously quarrel with the validity of the respondent's action in discontinuing the payment of cash allowance to him. The plea tha.t payment was made for some time after the merger can hardly avail the appellant in contending that the discontinuance is invalid. In the very nature of things, the respondent could not have decided whether the cash allowance should be continued to the appellant or not without examining the merits of the case, and since a large number of such cases had to be examined after merger, if the payment continued to be made in the meantime, that cannot give any valid ground to the appellant to challenge the legality of the ultimate decision of the respondent to diswntinue the payment of the said allowance.\n\nThe result is, we confirm the decision of the High Court, though on somewhat different grounds. The appeal according' ly fails and is dismissed. 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["}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 S.C.R. 957", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1985, "end_char": 2004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 S.C.R 461", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2284, "end_char": 2302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pratap Singh Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Th d. t' f t\" h 11 ld t ff t th aJ umar .. arsmg' e iscon inuance o ue cas a o'\\\\oance cou no a ec e Pratap Singh Deo continuance of the customary law under cl.", "canonical_name": "Pratap Singh Deo"}}, {"text": "cl. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3192, "end_char": 3200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3229, "end_char": 3237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3583, "end_char": 3593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, M. K. Ra111a11111rthi, D. P.\n\nSingh and S. C. Agarwala, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ra111a11111rthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, M. K. Ra111a11111rthi, D. P.\n\nSingh and S. C. Agarwala, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. P.\n\nSingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3618, "end_char": 3630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, M. K. Ra111a11111rthi, D. P.\n\nSingh and S. C. Agarwala, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, M. K. Ra111a11111rthi, D. P.\n\nSingh and S. C. Agarwala, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3671, "end_char": 3682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General of lndia, Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3723, "end_char": 3737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General of lndia, Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3742, "end_char": 3754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General of lndia, Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3837, "end_char": 3851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.-The principal point of iaw Gajendragad!w, C.J;.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "iaw Gajendragad!w", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3881, "end_char": 3898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.-The principal point of iaw Gajendragad!w, C.J;."}}, {"text": "Rajkumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3990, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which arises in this appeal is whether the Sanad iSsued in favour of the appellant, Rajkumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo, by his elder brother, the Ruler of Dhenkanal State, on March 1, 1931, is existing law within the meaning of Art.", "canonical_name": "RAJKUMAR NARSINGH PRATAP SINGH DEO"}}, {"text": "cl. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4174, "end_char": 4182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Dhenkanal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4306, "end_char": 4324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Dhenkanal which was an independent State prior to 1947 merged with the Province of Orissa in pursuance of a Merger Agreement entered into between the Ruler of Dhenkanal and the Dominion of India on December 15."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4398, "end_char": 4404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Dhenkanal which was an independent State prior to 1947 merged with the Province of Orissa in pursuance of a Merger Agreement entered into between the Ruler of Dhenkanal and the Dominion of India on December 15."}}, {"text": "December 15. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4513, "end_char": 4530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Dhenkanal which was an independent State prior to 1947 merged with the Province of Orissa in pursuance of a Merger Agreement entered into between the Ruler of Dhenkanal and the Dominion of India on December 15."}}, {"text": "State of Dhenkanal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4655, "end_char": 4673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence of this Agreement the entire administration' of the State of Dhenkanal was taken over by the State of Orissa pursuant to the authority confered on it by the Central Government under s. 3 (2) of the Extra Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (No."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4696, "end_char": 4711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence of this Agreement the entire administration' of the State of Dhenkanal was taken over by the State of Orissa pursuant to the authority confered on it by the Central Government under s. 3 (2) of the Extra Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (No."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4785, "end_char": 4789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Extra Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dhenkanal District Treasury", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4981, "end_char": 5008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 /- from the Dhenkanal District Treasury on the authority of a permanent Pay Order which had been issued in his favour by the Ruler of Dhenkanal on the basis of the said Sanad."}}, {"text": "!st of May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5198, "end_char": 5214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This payment was discontinued by the respondent from !"}}, {"text": "September 26, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5389, "end_char": 5407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why he filed the present suit on September 26, 1951 in the Court of the subordinate Judge, Dhenkanal, alleging that the .act of discontin.uing te apellant's pension was illegal, and askmg for appropnate rehefs m that behalf."}}, {"text": "Rajkumar Naraingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5702, "end_char": 5719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 The appellant's case is that in the family of the appellant,\n\nRajkumar Naraingh it has been recognied as a ustomary right .of the junior Pratap Singh Deo members of the family to receive adeqnate maintenance cons 10v.", "canonical_name": "Rajkumar N arsingh"}}, {"text": "GaJendraaadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6071, "end_char": 6085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grants made to GaJendraaadkar, C.J. the members of the Royal Family for their maintenance consisted of lands and cash allowances.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6969, "end_char": 6977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dhenkanal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7056, "end_char": 7065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also alleged that after the merger of Dhenkanal with Orissa, his right to receive the grant was recognised by the respondent and acted upon; and that is another reason why he claimed an appropriate relief in the form of an injunction against the respondent."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7071, "end_char": 7077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also alleged that after the merger of Dhenkanal with Orissa, his right to receive the grant was recognised by the respondent and acted upon; and that is another reason why he claimed an appropriate relief in the form of an injunction against the respondent."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7680, "end_char": 7688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8126, "end_char": 8146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the learned trial Judge who tried the appellant's case, and the High Court of Orissa before which the appellant took his case in appeal, have, in the main, rejected the appellant's contention, with the result that the appellant's suit has been dismissed."}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8529, "end_char": 8537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the main point which Mt. Setalvad for the appellant has urged before us is that the Sanad on which the appellant's claim is founded, is la.w."}}, {"text": "Rajkumar N arsingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8795, "end_char": 8813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At t!ie time when the -\n\nSanad was granted, the Ruler of Dhenkanal was an absolute 1964 monarch and in him vested full sovereignty; as such absolute Rajkumar N arsingh sovereign, he was endowed with legislative, judicial and exe- Pratap Singh Dea cutive powers and authority and whatever order he passed v. d 1 I h f b 1 h h Stateo/Orissaand amounte to aw.", "canonical_name": "Rajkumar N arsingh"}}, {"text": "Pratap Singh Dea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8876, "end_char": 8892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At t!ie time when the -\n\nSanad was granted, the Ruler of Dhenkanal was an absolute 1964 monarch and in him vested full sovereignty; as such absolute Rajkumar N arsingh sovereign, he was endowed with legislative, judicial and exe- Pratap Singh Dea cutive powers and authority and whatever order he passed v. d 1 I h f b 1 h h Stateo/Orissaand amounte to aw.", "canonical_name": "Pratap Singh Deo"}}, {"text": "Art. 366(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9532, "end_char": 9544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 366(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9566, "end_char": 9578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9931, "end_char": 9942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10154, "end_char": 10159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "372(1) which provides for the continuance in force of existing laws; this continuance is, of course, subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and it applies to such laws as were in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, until they are altered, repealed or amended by a, competent Legislature or other competent authority."}}, {"text": "cl. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10388, "end_char": 10396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10496, "end_char": 10502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10668, "end_char": 10680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10956, "end_char": 10960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jlotification", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11042, "end_char": 11055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 4(1Y: the Central Government was authorised by Jlotification in the Official Gazette to make such orders as may seem to it expedient for the effective exercise of the extraforeign jurisdiction of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11521, "end_char": 11528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11817, "end_char": 11822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11924, "end_char": 11932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12595, "end_char": 12628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12739, "end_char": 12747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "statute": "Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "cl. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13418, "end_char": 13426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "statute": "Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15616, "end_char": 15624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15636, "end_char": 15644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajk,.mar Narsinqh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18074, "end_char": 18092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rajk,.mar Narsinqh first case on which Mr. Setalvad relies is that of Ameer-un- Pratap Singh Deo Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum(').", "canonical_name": "Rajkumar N arsingh"}}, {"text": "Nizam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18701, "end_char": 18706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the question as to whether the Firman in question was passed by the Nizam in exercise of his legislative power or judicial power, Mukherjea, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed that the Nizam was the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18763, "end_char": 18772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the question as to whether the Firman in question was passed by the Nizam in exercise of his legislative power or judicial power, Mukherjea, C.J., speaking for the Court, observed that the Nizam was the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19860, "end_char": 19864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad v. Akram Ali('), similar observations were repeated by Bose, J., who spoke for the Court on that occasion."}}, {"text": "30th December,\n\n1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19963, "end_char": 19983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the Firman issued by the Nizam on the 30th December,\n\n1920, which directed the Department to supervise the Dargah until the rights of the parties were enquired into and decided by the Civil Court, it was observed that the Nizam was an absolute sovereign regarding all domestic matters at the time when the Firman was issued and his word was law."}}, {"text": "Ameer-un-Nissa Begum", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20529, "end_char": 20549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case again, as in the case of Ameer-un-Nissa Begum('), the point does not appear to have been argued and the observations are, therefore, not intended to lay down a broad or general proposition as contended by Mr. Setalvad."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22838, "end_char": 22843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn discussing the question, Sinha, C.J., has referred to Order 31 of the Rules and Regulations and has observed that like the Kalambandis in the case of Phalke('), the said Rules has the force of law and would be existing law within the meaning of\n\nrt."}}, {"text": "Udaipur Darbar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23343, "end_char": 23357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. Stat• of Rajasthan('), while dealing with the question as to whether the Firman issued by the Udaipur Darbar in 1934 was law or not, this Court examined the scheme of the said Firman C'Onsidered its provisions, their scope and effect and came t~ the -onclusion tha~ it was law."}}, {"text": "Phalke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23707, "end_char": 23713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as m the case of Phalke('), so in this case, the decis10n."}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 SC R 957", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23969, "end_char": 23986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964) 1 S.C.R 561", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23991, "end_char": 24009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. K Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24440, "end_char": 24448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K Das."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24454, "end_char": 24468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nGajendragadkar, C.J. who spoke for the Court examined the said observations and the context in which they were made and rejected the plea that the said observations were intended to lay down a general proposition that in the case of an absolute monarch, no distinction can be made between his legislative and his executive acts.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24927, "end_char": 24935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24983, "end_char": 24995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view has been recently expressed by Hidayatullah, Shah and Ayyangar, JJ."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24997, "end_char": 25001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view has been recently expressed by Hidayatullah, Shah and Ayyangar, JJ."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25006, "end_char": 25014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view has been recently expressed by Hidayatullah, Shah and Ayyangar, JJ."}}, {"text": "cl. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25697, "end_char": 25705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gaienrlragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27332, "end_char": 27347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "measuring 6942-71-5 acres specified in the Schedule attached Gaienrlragadkar, C.J. to the Sanad."}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27599, "end_char": 27607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27691, "end_char": 27696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 4(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29680, "end_char": 29688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rojkamar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29963, "end_char": 29971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wha.t the respondent has done is to stop the\n\nRojkamar s .. rsingh payment of cash alloance of Rs."}}, {"text": "Pratap Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30043, "end_char": 30055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500/- per month _and that\n\nPratap Singh Dro does not mean alteration of the Jaw.", "canonical_name": "Pratap Singh Deo"}}, {"text": "Gajendrngadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30333, "end_char": 30347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the grant of the land covered by the Sanad has not been distatc ~\";,~::: \"'\"1 turbed, and so, all that the impugned action of the respondent - amounts to is to reduce the total maintenance allowance grant- Gajendrngadkar.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_123_136_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.U.R\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 123\n\nMANIPUR ADMINISTRATION\n\nTHOKCHOM, BIRA SINGH IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.] Criminal Trial-Accused acquitted in previous trial-On same facts a subsequent !rial initiated-Subsequent court whether debarred from receiving the same evidence on the principle of issue-estoppe!-<.::ode of Criminal Procedure 1898, (Act 5 of 1898) s. 403.\n\nIn the present case, the trial coµrt held the respondent guilty ~1' the o'fences under ss. 333, 3123 and 440 all read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code. It was alleged by the prosecution that the respondent Bira Singh was a member of the unlawful assembly which was formed between 3 and 5 p.m. on 25th April 1960, in contravention of the promulgation of the order under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a member of the mob he was alleged to have pelted stoll€s at police officers. The respondent pleaded in his defence that the present trial was barred by s. 403, Criminal Procedure Code by reason of the acquittal of the accused under s. 188, Indian Penal Code on July 30, 1960. The Trial court did not accept his defence and convicted him. On appeal, the Judicial Commissioner accepted the defence of the. respondent and acquitted him on the bas's of the decision of this court in Pritam Singh v. Stat~ of Punjab. Before the trial of the present case, a complaint was filed against the .respondent on May 12, 1960 und€r s. 188 I.P.C. In that complaint the District Magistrate alleged that the respendent had disobeyed the order passed under s. 144 by forming himself alongwith other persons into an unlawful assembly between the hours of 3 and 5 p.m. on April 25, 1960. In that case the trial court convicted him of the offence charged and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 6 months.\n\nOn appeal the Sessions Judge by his judgment dated July 30, 1960 acquitted the respondent, on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish that the respondent was present at the place and at the time where the occurrence took place.\n\nThis acquittal was confirmed by the Judicial Commissioner.\n\nHeld-Sub-ss. (1) to (3} of s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deal with the trial of an accused for an offence and his conviction therefor. The question raised for decision in Pritam Singh's case however was different and was whether where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution not as a bar to the tI1ial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that findi'lg of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms oI s. 403(2).\n\nIt would not be correct to say that the principle underlying in Sambasivan's case was dissented from in R. v. Connelly. Besides. it should be pointed out that the principle\n\nMarek 11\n\nManipur .Adminia\n\ntration\n\nThokcham, Bira\n\nSi1111h\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nunderlying the decision in Pritam Singh's case d'd come up for consideration before this Court on several occasions, but it was never dissented from though in some of them it was distinguished on facts.\n\nPritam Singh v. State of Punjab, A.LR. 1956, S.C. 415, R. v. Connelly, (1963) 3 All E.R. 510 and Sambasivam v .. Pub!ic Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya, 1950 A.C. 458, relied on.\n\nGurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.LR., 1963 S. C. 340, referred to.\n\nState of Bombay v. S. L. Apte, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 107, Banwari Godara v. The State of Rajasthan, Cr. A. No. 141 of l!M'O dated February 7, 1961, Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab, A.LR. 1965 S.C. 79, Kharkan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.LR. 1965 S.C. 83, Yusofalli mulla v. The King. 76 I.A. 158, referred to.\n\n(ii) The rule of issue-estoppel does not prevent tile trial of an offence as does autre fois acquit but only precludes evidence being led to prove a. fact in issue as regards which evidence had already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a court of competent jurisdiction.\n\nThe rule of issue-estoppel is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit is also clear from the statement of the law by Lord Mac Dermott in Samb\"sivam's\n\ncase.\n\n(iii) It is clear that s. 403 of the Criminal Procedu:re Code does not preclude the applicability of this rule of issue-estoPpel. The rule being one which is in accord with sound principle and supported by high authority and there being a decision of this court in Pritam Singh's case which has accepted it as a proper one to be adopted, there is no reason for discarding it.\n\nThe Queen v. O!!is, (1900) 2 Q.B. 758. The King v. Wi!kes, 77 C.L.R. 511, Marz v. The Queen, 96 C.L.R. 62 and Manickchand Agarwal! v. The State, A.LR. 1952 Cal. 730 relfod on.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June I, 1961 of the Judicial Commis.ioner's Court for Manipur in Criminal Appeal Case No. 7 of 1961.\n\n0. P. Rana and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nS. C. Agarwal, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 11, 1964. The judgment:of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR, J.-This appeal •vhich comes before us by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Judicial Commissioner of Manipur acquitting the respondent and setting aside the conviction and sentence passed against him by the learned Sessions Judge.\n\nThis appeal was originally heard before a Bench of two Judges but has been directed to be placed before this Bench by reason of the learned Counsel for the appellant seeking\n\nto. questiun the correctness of the judgment of this Court in the case of Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab(') in view of the decision of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Connelly(') and the subsequent decision of this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab(').\n\nThe facts giving rise to the appeal are in brief as follows: There was an agitation by certain political parties and groups in Manipur in April, 1960 for establishing responsible Government in the Manipur area. The agitation took the form of picketing of Government offices and the residences of Government servants and blocking roads in order to paralyse the administration. After this form of agitation continued for some time, the District Magistrate of Manipur promulgated orders under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code on the morning of April 25, I 960 banning public meetings a.nd processions and these orders were proclaimed and communicated to the public through loudspeakers. Notwithstanding this order, crowds continued to collect and move on the streets shouting slogans. Bira Singh-the respondent-was said to have been leading this mob. A lathi charge by the police took place but it is stated that because of this the crowd moved a little away and began to pelt stones. The crowd was thereupon directed to disperse, its attention being drawn to the promulgation of the order under s. 144, Criminal Procedm~ Code and to the fact that the gathering in a public place in violation of the order made it an unlawful assembly; but this command was not heeded and the stone-throwing continued. There was firing by the police which resulted in injuries to certain persons including some of the police personnel. The first information report in regard to the incident and the offences committed during its course was lodged at the Imphal Police station at about 7 p.m. that day in which the informant specified the name of the respondent-Bira Singh as the leader of this mob. On this a case was registered under ss. 114/149/332/342 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, and a few days later the respondent was arrested.\n\nCharges were framed against the respondent who was placed before the Magistrate and the charge sheet stated that the respondent was in the crowd between 3 and 5 p.m. on that day, that the crowd was an unlawfu) assembly, that he was among those who pelted stones which caused grievous hurt to one person and simple hurt to others and also caused damage to the Inter-State Police Wireless Station. Along with\n\n(') A.LR. 1956 S.C. 415. (') [1963] 3 All E.R. 510.\n\n(') A.LR. 1963 S.C. 34-0.\n\nT, Tlwkckom., Bint\n\nSingk\n\nAyyangar, ./.\n\nJ.lfl'lnipur\n\n~4tlmi11i..ilrafion\n\nThokclt0Yf/, fe, Bira\n\n,'3ingh\n\nthe respondent. certain others were included as accused but we are now concerned only with the respondent. The learned Sessions Judge convicted all of them of the offences with which they were charged and sentenced them to varying terms of imprisonment but into the details of these it is not necessary to enter.\n\nThe question of law that arises in this case is by reason of a prior prosecution of the respondent in which he was\n\nacquitted. That prosecution was founded on a complaint against him filed on May J 2, J 960 under s. 188, Indian Penal Code in connection with his participation as .a member of the same crowd in regard to which the charge which is the subject-matter of the present proceedings is concerned. In that complaint the District Magistrate alleged that the respondent had disobeyed the order passed under s. 144 by forming himself along with 2,000 other persons into an unlawful assembly between the hours of 3 and 5 p.m. on April 25,\n\n1960 by shouting slogans and pelting stones at police officers and this was stated to be on the road in front of the Police Wireless station. This complaint by the District Mag:strate was registered and taken cognizance of by the Magistrate. The respondent pleaded in his defence that he was not present at the scene of the occurrence at all and that he had been falsely implicated by the police. The Magistrnte rejected the defence and accepting the prosecution case that the respondent was present as the head of the mob on that ocosion convicte:I him of the offence charged and sentenced him by his order dated July 8, 1960 to rigorous imprisonment for six months. Ten days thereafter on July 18, 1960 the charge sheet in the present case was filed.\n\nDuring the pendenoy of the prosecution from which the present appeal arises the respondent appealed to th(i learned Sessions judge against his conviction by the Magistrate on the charge under s. 188, Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the appeal holding that the prosecution had not established that the respondent was present at the place and at the time where the occurrence took place at which he was said by the prosecution to have been present or that he disobeyed the order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code. In the course of his judgment delivered on July. 30, 1960 the learned Sessions Judge observed after referring to the delay in the filing of the complaint after the occur rence:\n\n\"This delay in the filing of the complaint and in the naming of the appellant.. ................ throws considerable doubt on the presence of the appellant among the agitators on 25-4-60 .............. .if the P. Ws. did not know the appellant from before no\n\nreliance can be placed on their identification of the appellant during the trial because that identification was not tested in a test identification parade. This also confirms my suspicion that the appellant might not have been present in the incident of 25-4-60 ......... The important position which the appellant had in organising the agitation in my opinion, afforded sufficient motive for the P.Ws. to come to a conclusion that the appellant might have been present in the agitation. But that erroneous impression on conclusion would not prove the presence of the appellant among the agitators on 25-4-60 .........\n\nFor reasons given above the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence of the appellant under s. 188 I.P.C. are set aside and he is acquitted.\"\n\nThis acquittal was confirmed by the Judicial Commissioner on April 29, 1961. Meanwhile, to proceed with the narrative of the proceedings which has given rise to the present appeal, the learned Magistrate committed the respqndent and 5 others to take their trial before the Sessions Judge, Manipur on a charge in respect of the offences we have set out earlier. Before the learned Sessions Judge an objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that the trial was barred by s. 403, Criminal Procedure Code by reason of the acquittal of the accused under s. 188, Indian Penal Code on July 30, 1960. The learned Sessions Judge, however, held, that the terms of the section were not satisfied, in that the ingredients of the two offences with which the accused was charged in the two prosecutions were different and rejected that submission. On the evidence adduced before him he found that it had been established to his satisfaction that the respondent as well as the others were present at the scene of the occurrence and held the accused guilty of the offences under ss. 333, 323 and 440 all read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to 4 years R.I. All the six accused filed appeals against their conviction and sentences before the Judicial Commissioner, Manipur and the learned Judicial Commissioner after making some variations in the sentences as regards certain of the accused directed the acquittal of the respondent on the ground that the finding o.f fact recorded by the learned Sessions Judge in his trial for the offence under s. 188, Indian Penal Code that he was not present at the scene of the occurrence on April 25, 1960 between the hours of 3 and 5 p.m. was final and conclusive and binding upon the prosecution and that no evidence could be led to\n\nManipur Admini.Jlratio11v.\n\nTlwkckom, Bira.\n\nSi\"!lh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nlrfanipur Admi.nistration\n\nv. 1'/wkclwni, Bira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyanqar, J.\n\nestablish a contrary state of affairs in the present proceedings. In so holding the learned Judicial Commissioner followed the decision of this Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab(') and certain other decisions and held that the principle of res judicata applicable to criminal proceedings was not confined to cases falling within the bar of s. 403, Criminal Procedure Code but was of wider application. It is the correctness of this view of the Jaw that calls for consideration in this appeal.\n\nBefore referring to the decision of this Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab(') it would be convenient to refer to arid put aside one point for clearing the ground. Section 403, Criminal Procedure Code embodies in statutory form the accepted English rule of autre fois acquit. This section runs:\n\n\"403 (]) A person who has been once tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under s. 236, or for which he might have been convicted under section 237.\n\n(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a, separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under section 235, sub-section (!).\n\n(3) A person convictec:l of 'any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted may be afterwards tried for such last mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time When he was convicted.\n\n(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be sebsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged.\n\n(') A.LR. 1956 S.C. 415.\n\n' ,\n\n(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, or section 188 of this Code.\n\nExplanation-The dismissal of a complaint, the stop\n\nping of proceedings under section 249, the discharge of the accused or any entry made upon a charge under section 273, is not an acquittal for the purposes of this section.\" Section 26 of the General Clauses Act which is referred to in s. 403 enacts:\n\n\"26. Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, fthen the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.\" We might also, in this connection, refer to Art. 20(2) of the Constitution since it makes provision for a bar against a second prosecution in an analogous case. That provision reads:\n\n\"20(2). No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.\" As has been pointed out by this Court in State of Bombay\n\nv. S. L. Apte('), both in the case of Art. 20(2) of the Constitution as well as s. 26 of the General Clauses Act to operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequeniial punishment thereunder, must be for \"same offence\" i.e., an offence whose ingredients are the same. It has been pointed out in the same decision that the V Amendment of the American Constitution which provides that no person shall be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, proceeds on the same principle.\n\nIt is common ground that the respondent cannot bring his case within the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 403 and it was also common ground that the trial of the respondent would be permitted by sub-s. (2). It should, however, be noticed that sub-ss. (!) to (3) of this section deal with the trial of an accused for an offence and his conviction therefor. The question raised for decision in Pritam Singh's(') case however was different and was whether where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence but as\n\n\n(') A.LR. 1956 S.C. 415.\n\nL_1'P(D)IRCI-5 \"\n\nTkockclunn, Mira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nTkokchom, Bira\n\nSi'/l{/k -· Aggangar, J.\n\nprecluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of s. 403(2).\n\nAs Pritam Sing h's(') case was based wholly on the decision of the Privy Council in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya(') it would be necessary to examine the basis of the latter decision. The appellant-an Indian Tamil-was travelling on foot in the company of two. Chinese.\n\nThey met a party of three Malays. A fight ensued between the two groups in the course of which one of the Chinese was killed. The Malays alleged that they had been fired on by the Chinese and that the appellant had with him a revolver which he had held .out and pointed at one of them.\n\nIn connection with this incident the appellant was charged with carrying a fire-arm and being in possession of ten rounds of ammunition. Two charges were framed against the appellant: (!) of carrying a fire-arm, and (2) of being in possession of ammunition. He was acquitted of the second charge of being in possession of ammunition and that acquittal becaine final. He was, later convicted of the offence of •; arrying a fire-arm and the appeal before the Privy Council related to the legality of this convictjon. Diverse objections branching into several fields of law were raised before the Privy Council in support of the appeal but what is, however, of relevance now, is the one which related to the admissibility of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who spoke of the revolver carried by the appellant being loaded with bullets and of the appellant carrying four more bullets in a bag.\n\nTheir Lordships rejected all the other contentions raised on behalf of the appellant but allowed the appeal on the ground that this evidence regarding the revolver being loaded and of the appellant carrying a bag containing some bullets was inadmissible in Jaw. In dealing with this Lord MacDermott speaking for the Board said :\n\n\"The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication.\" After pointing out that the prosecution witm:sses were permitted to depose regarding the possession of ammunitim1 by the appellant and that it was not possible to exclude the\n\n(') A.I.R. 1956 s.c. 415.\n\n(') [1950] A.C. 458.\n\neffect of this evidence on the prosecution case, their Lordships held that the appellant was seriously prejudiced by the reception of this evidence and therefore allowed the appeal and directed his acquittal. The point in regard to which the observations in Sambasivam's(') case was applied by this Court related to the use of the recovery of a revolver from the accused to sustain his conviction of the offence of murder. Previous to the prosecution for an offence under s. 302, Indian Penal Code the appellant before this Court had been tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Faridpur under s. 19<0 of the Indian Arms Act of an offence for possession of that revolver and had been acquitted. This Court speaking through Bhagwati, , J. extracted the observations we have quoted from the judgment of Lord MacDermott and pointed out that on the basis of this decision the evidence relating to the recovery of the revolver from the accused should have been excluded.\n\nIt was not contended by learned Counsel for the appellant that if the principle laid down by this decision was correct, the acquittal of the respondent by the learned Judicial Commissioner by the order now under appeal was erroneous. The argument, however, was that the observations in Pritam Singh's(') case required reconsideration. This sul)mission was rested on two separate lines of reasoning: (!) That the rule in Sambasivam's(') case on which Prita11J; Singh's(') case was based had been dissented from by the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Connelly(') and that, similarly that principle had been departed from by this Court in Gur charan Singh v. State of Punjab(\"'). (2) That the principle of Common law which was applied by the Privy Council in Sambasivam's(') case could have no application in a jurisdiction like ours where the principle of autre fois acquit is covered by a statutory provision framed on the lines of s. 403 occurring in a Code which is exhaustive.\n\nAs regards the first ground, it must be pointed out that learned Counsel for the State admitted that there was nothing a Gurcharan Singh's(') case which militated against the acceptance of the rule laid down in Pritam Singh's(') case.\n\nComing next to the point mad!? regarding the decision of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in 'R. v. Connelly('), we should make it clear that the decisions of the English Courts\n\nbeing merely of persuasive authority, decisions of such a\n\n(') [1950] A.C. 458. (') (1963] 3 All E.R. 510\n\nL P(D)ISC!-5(a)\n\n(') A.LR. 1956 S.C. 415.\n\n(') A.LR. 1963 S.C. 34-0.\n\nManipur Adminiatration\n\nThokchom, Bira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nJllunipur\n\nAl111i11i1J!n1lion\n\nv. 1'/iokc/10111, Bir1i\n\nSingh\n\nAyyanyrir, , J,\n\ncourt even if at variance with one of this Court do not by themselves justify an application to reconsider an earlier decision of this Court. Besides. a close examination of the judgment in R. v. Connelly(') through which learned Counsel for the State has taken us, does not disclose any dissent from the principle stated by Lord MacDermott. The entire case before the Court turned upon whether there had been a specific finding on 3n issue of fact-an issue directly raised regarding an ingredient of the offence charged at the later trial, when the uccused was acquitted by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the former proceeding. Except that the Court did not expressly rule that the principle of issue-estoppel applied in England, no exception was taken to its soundness and the decision proceeded on the basis of the facts not justifying the application of the principle, the conditions not being fulfilled. Learned Counsel is, therefore, not well-founded in his submission that the principle underlying Sambasivam's('! case was dissented from in R. v. Con11e/ly('). Besides• it should be pointed out that the principle underlying the decision in Pritam Sing/i's(') case did come up for consideration before this Court on several occasions, but it was never dissented from though in some. of them it was distinguished on facts. (See Bamvari Godara v. The State of Rajastlwn('),\n\nMohiniler Singh v. State o.f Punjab(') and Kht1rkan v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh(').\n\nThese two decisions in R. v. Connelly(') and Gurclwran Singh v. State of Punjab(') being out of the way, we shall address ourselves to the question as to whether what is termed \"issue estoppel\" which has been held by this Court in Pritam Singh's(') case to be applicable to criminal proceedings is excluded by reason of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. For this purpose learned Counsel invited our attention to s. 5(1) which enacts:\n\n\"All offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, otherwise dealt ,_ with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.\" This, however, in our opinion, does not afford any assistance to the argument because Pl'itam Singh's(\") case\n\n)II did not introduce any variation in the Code as regards either\n\n(') [1963] 3 All E.R. 510.\n\n(') (1950] A.C. 458.\n\n(') A.LR. 1956 S.C. 415. (') G.A. No. 141 of 1960, ct/February 7, 1961.\n\n(') AI.R. 1965 S.C. 79.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 83. (') A.LR. i963 S.C. 3,10.\n\ninvestigation, enquiry or trial. As we have pointed out earlier, issue-estoppel does not prevent the trial of any offence as docs autre fois acquit but only precludes evidence being l; J to pr:we a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a court of competent jurisdiction. Learned Counsel next drew our attention to the observations bf the Privy Council in Yusofalli Mu/la v. The King(') at page 169 ' where the following observations occur:\n\n\"The last point urged by Mr. Page was that even if the case did not fall within the terms of s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the appellant could nonetheless rely on the common law rule that no man should be placed twice in jeopardy.\"\n\nAfter stating that even for the application of the Common Law rule of double jeopardy the earlier order had to be by a court competent to pass a valid order of acquittal or conviction the judgment proceeded:\n\n\"This argument therefore fails on the facts, and it is not necessary for their Lordships to consider whether s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes a complete code in India on the subject of autre fois acquit and autre fois convict, or whether in a proper case the common law can be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the section.\"\n\nAs we have pointed out, we are not now concerned with any extension of the principle of autre fois acquit but as to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent court at a previous trial. The reasoning of Lord MacDermott in Sambasivam's(') case was not the first occasion when this rule as to issueestoppel in a criminal trial was formulated or given effect to.\n\nThat it is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit is also clear from the statement of the law by Lord MacDermott himself. The distinction between autre fois acquit and the objection to the reception of evidence to prove an identical fact which has been the subject of an earlier finding between the parties is brought out in the following passage from the judgment of Wright, J. in The Queen v. Ollis('):\n\n\"The real question is whether this relevant evidence of the false pretence on July 5 or 6 ought to have been excluded on the ground that it was part of\n\n(') 76 I.A. 158.\n\n(') [1950] A.C. 458.\n\n(') (1900) 2 Q.B. 758, 763-769.\n\nManipur Admini&trati011\n\nTlwlccMm, Bira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nThokchom, Bi1ll\n\nSing II\n\nAyyangar, , f.\n\nthe evidence given for the prosecution at !the former trial, at which the prisoner was charg1ed with having obtained money from Ramsey on that false pretence, and was acquitted of that charge.\"\n\nThe learned Judge then went on to point out that if the acquittal at the first trial was based on the negativing of this fact the evidence would be inadmissible but if that acquittal was based on other circumstances the evidence would be admissible. That is why he said:\n\n\"An objection in the nature of a plea of \"autre fois\n\nacquit\" cannot of course be maintained, because on either indictment the prisoner could not have been convicted of the offences, or any of them, which were alleged in the other indictment. Nor can there be an estoppel of record or quasi of record, unless it appears by record of itself, or as explained by proper evidence, that the same point was determined on the first trial which was in issue on the. second trial.\"\n\nSpeaking of this type of estoppel Dixon, J. said in The King v. Wilkes('):\n\n\"Whilst there is not a great deal of authority upon the subject, it appears to me that there is .nothing wrong in the view that there is an issue estoppel, if it appears by record of itself or as explained by proper evidence, that the same point was determined in favour of a prisoner in a previous criminal trial which is brought in issue on a second criminal trial of the same prisoner. That seems to be implied in the ' language used by Wright, J. in R. v. Ollis which in effuct I have adopted in the foregoing statement.. ......... There must be a prior proceeding determined against the Crown necessarily involving an issue which again arises in a subsequent proceeding by the Crown against the same prisoner. The allegation of the Crown in the subsequent proceeding must itself be inconsistent with the acquittal of the prisoner in the previous proceeding. But if such a condition of affairs arises I see no reason why the ordinary rules of issue-estoppel should not apply. Such rules are not to be confused with those of res judicata, which in criminal proceedings are expressed in the pleas of autre fois acquit and autre fois convict. They are pleas which are\n\n(') C.L.R. 511 at pp. 518-519.\n\n7 S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT REI'ORTS 135\n\nconcerned with the judicial determination of an alleged criminal liability and in the case of conviction with the substitution of a new liability.\n\nJssue-estoppel is concerned with the judicial establishment of a proposition of law or fact between parties. It depends upon well-known doctrines which control the relitigation of issues which are settled by prior litigation.\"\n\nThis decision was rendered in 1948. The matter was the subject of consideration by the High Court of Australia after the decision in Sambasil'wn's(') case in Mar~ v. The Queen('). The question concerned the validity of a conviction for rape after the accused had been acquitted on the charge of murdering the woman during the commission of the act. In an unanimous judgment by which the appeal of the accused was allowed, the court said:\n\n\"The Crown is as rn uch precluded by an estoppel by judgment in criminal proceedings as is a subt ject in civil proceedings ......... The Jaw which gives effect to issue-estoppels is nbt concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of the finding which amounts to an estoppcl, still less with the process of reasoning by which the finding was reached in fact. ........... lt is enough that an issue or issues have been distinctly raised or found.\n\nOnce that is done, then, so long as the finding stands, if there be any subsequent litigation between the same parties, no allegations legally inconsistent with the finding may be made by one of them against the other.\"\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that s. 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not preclude the applicability of this rule of issue-estoppel. The rule being one which is in accord with sound principle and supported by high authority and there being a decision of this Court which has accepted it as a proper one to be adopted, we do not see any reason for discarding it. We might also point out that even before the de- -· cision of this Court this rule was applied by some of the High Courts and by way of illustration we might refer to the decision of Harries, C. J. in Manickchand Agarwala v. The State('). Before parting, we think it proper to make one observation. The question has sometimes been mooted as to whether the same principle of issue-estoppel could be raised\n\n(') [1950] A.C. 458.\n\n(') 96 C.L.R. 62, 68-69. (') A.LR. 1952 Cal. 730.\n\nJlanipu1 . id ministration\n\nThol:rliom, Bira\n\n,')'lngh\n\n.lyyanga.t, J,\n\nNanir\"'r Administration\n\nPholu:Jwm, Bira\n\nSinqli\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\nagainst an accused, the argument against its application being that the prosecution cannot succeed unless it proves to the satisfaction of the Court trying the accused by evidence Jed before it that he is guilty of the offence charged. We prefer to express no opinion on this question since it does not arise for examination. .\n\nAs stated earlier, if Pritam Singh's(') case was rightly decided, it was conceded that the decision of the Judicial Commissioner was right.\n\nThe appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\n(') A.I.R. 1956 s.c. 415.", "total_entities": 137, "entities": [{"text": "123\n\nMANIPUR ADMINISTRATION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANIPUR ADMINISTRATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BIRA SINGH IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 185, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 435, "end_char": 441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 333, 3123 and 440", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 531, "end_char": 552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 567, "end_char": 573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 575, "end_char": 592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "25th April 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 738, "end_char": 753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged by the prosecution that the respondent Bira Singh was a member of the unlawful assembly which was formed between 3 and 5 p.m. on 25th April 1960, in contravention of the promulgation of the order under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 811, "end_char": 817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 825, "end_char": 851, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1009, "end_char": 1015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1017, "end_char": 1040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1089, "end_char": 1095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1097, "end_char": 1114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "July 30, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent pleaded in his defence that the present trial was barred by s. 403, Criminal Procedure Code by reason of the acquittal of the accused under s. 188, Indian Penal Code on July 30, 1960."}}, {"text": "May 12, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1456, "end_char": 1468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the trial of the present case, a complaint was filed against the .respondent on May 12, 1960 und€r s. 188 I.P.C. In that complaint the District Magistrate alleged that the respendent had disobeyed the order passed under s. 144 by forming himself alongwith other persons into an unlawful assembly between the hours of 3 and 5 p.m. on April 25, 1960."}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1475, "end_char": 1481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1482, "end_char": 1487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1596, "end_char": 1602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "April 25, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1709, "end_char": 1723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the trial of the present case, a complaint was filed against the .respondent on May 12, 1960 und€r s. 188 I.P.C. In that complaint the District Magistrate alleged that the respendent had disobeyed the order passed under s. 144 by forming himself alongwith other persons into an unlawful assembly between the hours of 3 and 5 p.m. on April 25, 1960."}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2181, "end_char": 2187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2195, "end_char": 2221, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pritam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2336, "end_char": 2348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question raised for decision in Pritam Singh's case however was different and was whether where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution not as a bar to the tI1ial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that findi'lg of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms oI s. 403(2).", "canonical_name": "Pritam Sing h"}}, {"text": "s. 403(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2893, "end_char": 2902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sambasivan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2969, "end_char": 2979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would not be correct to say that the principle underlying in Sambasivan's case was dissented from in R. v. Connelly.", "canonical_name": "Sambasil'wn"}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3141, "end_char": 3149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it should be pointed out that the principle\n\nMarek 11\n\nManipur .Adminia\n\ntration\n\nThokcham, Bira\n\nSi1111h\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nunderlying the decision in Pritam Singh's case d'd come up for consideration before this Court on several occasions, but it was never dissented from though in some of them it was distinguished on facts.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.C.R. 107", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3644, "end_char": 3663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mac Dermott", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4387, "end_char": 4398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule of issue-estoppel is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit is also clear from the statement of the law by Lord Mac Dermott in Samb\"sivam's\n\ncase.", "canonical_name": "Mac Dermott"}}, {"text": "Samb\"sivam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4402, "end_char": 4412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule of issue-estoppel is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit is also clear from the statement of the law by Lord Mac Dermott in Samb\"sivam's\n\ncase.", "canonical_name": "Sambasil'wn"}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4446, "end_char": 4452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5204, "end_char": 5211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5216, "end_char": 5230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5252, "end_char": 5265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5347, "end_char": 5355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment:of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR, J.-This appeal •vhich comes before us by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Judicial Commissioner of Manipur acquitting the respondent and setting aside the conviction and sentence passed against him by the learned Sessions Judge.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "Manipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6203, "end_char": 6210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to the appeal are in brief as follows: There was an agitation by certain political parties and groups in Manipur in April, 1960 for establishing responsible Government in the Manipur area."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Manipur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this form of agitation continued for some time, the District Magistrate of Manipur promulgated orders under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code on the morning of April 25, I 960 banning public meetings a.nd processions and these orders were proclaimed and communicated to the public through loudspeakers."}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6566, "end_char": 6572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6574, "end_char": 6597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 25, I 960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this form of agitation continued for some time, the District Magistrate of Manipur promulgated orders under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code on the morning of April 25, I 960 banning public meetings a.nd processions and these orders were proclaimed and communicated to the public through loudspeakers."}}, {"text": "Bira Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6857, "end_char": 6867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bira Singh-the respondent-was said to have been leading this mob.", "canonical_name": "Bira Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7168, "end_char": 7174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Imphal Police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7609, "end_char": 7630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first information report in regard to the incident and the offences committed during its course was lodged at the Imphal Police station at about 7 p.m. that day in which the informant specified the name of the respondent-Bira Singh as the leader of this mob."}}, {"text": "Bira Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7716, "end_char": 7726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first information report in regard to the incident and the offences committed during its course was lodged at the Imphal Police station at about 7 p.m. that day in which the informant specified the name of the respondent-Bira Singh as the leader of this mob.", "canonical_name": "Bira Singh"}}, {"text": "ss. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7790, "end_char": 7797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7825, "end_char": 7842, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7847, "end_char": 7851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7859, "end_char": 7885, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Inter-State Police Wireless Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8297, "end_char": 8332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charges were framed against the respondent who was placed before the Magistrate and the charge sheet stated that the respondent was in the crowd between 3 and 5 p.m. on that day, that the crowd was an unlawfu) assembly, that he was among those who pelted stones which caused grievous hurt to one person and simple hurt to others and also caused damage to the Inter-State Police Wireless Station."}}, {"text": "May J 2, J 960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9041, "end_char": 9055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That prosecution was founded on a complaint against him filed on May J 2, J 960 under s. 188, Indian Penal Code in connection with his participation as .a member of the same crowd in regard to which the charge which is the subject-matter of the present proceedings is concerned."}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9062, "end_char": 9068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9070, "end_char": 9087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9362, "end_char": 9368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "April 25,\n\n1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9482, "end_char": 9497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that complaint the District Magistrate alleged that the respondent had disobeyed the order passed under s. 144 by forming himself along with 2,000 other persons into an unlawful assembly between the hours of 3 and 5 p.m. on April 25,\n\n1960 by shouting slogans and pelting stones at police officers and this was stated to be on the road in front of the Police Wireless station."}}, {"text": "July 8, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Magistrnte rejected the defence and accepting the prosecution case that the respondent was present as the head of the mob on that ocosion convicte:I him of the offence charged and sentenced him by his order dated July 8, 1960 to rigorous imprisonment for six months."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10184, "end_char": 10197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ten days thereafter on July 18, 1960 the charge sheet in the present case was filed."}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10439, "end_char": 10445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10447, "end_char": 10464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10752, "end_char": 10758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10760, "end_char": 10783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July. 30, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10828, "end_char": 10842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of his judgment delivered on July."}}, {"text": "25-4-60", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11142, "end_char": 11149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30, 1960 the learned Sessions Judge observed after referring to the delay in the filing of the complaint after the occur rence:\n\n\"This delay in the filing of the complaint and in the naming of the appellant.. ................ throws considerable doubt on the presence of the appellant among the agitators on 25-4-60 .............. .if the P. Ws."}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11945, "end_char": 11951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11952, "end_char": 11957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April 29, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12057, "end_char": 12071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This acquittal was confirmed by the Judicial Commissioner on April 29, 1961."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Manipur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12269, "end_char": 12292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, to proceed with the narrative of the proceedings which has given rise to the present appeal, the learned Magistrate committed the respqndent and 5 others to take their trial before the Sessions Judge, Manipur on a charge in respect of the offences we have set out earlier."}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12472, "end_char": 12478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12480, "end_char": 12503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12552, "end_char": 12558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12560, "end_char": 12577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 333, 323 and 440", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13066, "end_char": 13086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13101, "end_char": 13107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13109, "end_char": 13126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Judicial Commissioner, Manipur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13245, "end_char": 13275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "333, 323 and 440 all read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to 4 years R.I. All the six accused filed appeals against their conviction and sentences before the Judicial Commissioner, Manipur and the learned Judicial Commissioner after making some variations in the sentences as regards certain of the accused directed the acquittal of the respondent on the ground that the finding o.f fact recorded by the learned Sessions Judge in his trial for the offence under s. 188, Indian Penal Code that he was not present at the scene of the occurrence on April 25, 1960 between the hours of 3 and 5 p.m. was final and conclusive and binding upon the prosecution and that no evidence could be led to\n\nManipur Admini."}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13549, "end_char": 13555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13557, "end_char": 13574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ayyanqar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13900, "end_char": 13908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Si\"!lh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nlrfanipur Admi.nistration\n\nv. 1'/wkclwni, Bira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyanqar, J.\n\nestablish a contrary state of affairs in the present proceedings.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14261, "end_char": 14267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14269, "end_char": 14292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14585, "end_char": 14596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14598, "end_char": 14621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15092, "end_char": 15098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15148, "end_char": 15159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15350, "end_char": 15361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16199, "end_char": 16209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16217, "end_char": 16242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16247, "end_char": 16258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section 249", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16352, "end_char": 16363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section 273", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16432, "end_char": 16443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16500, "end_char": 16510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16518, "end_char": 16537, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16562, "end_char": 16568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16879, "end_char": 16889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17204, "end_char": 17214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17246, "end_char": 17251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17259, "end_char": 17278, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17787, "end_char": 17793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tkockclunn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18502, "end_char": 18512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L_1'P(D)IRCI-5 \"\n\nTkockclunn, Mira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nTkokchom, Bira\n\nSi'/l{/k -· Aggangar, J.\n\nprecluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of s. 403(2)."}}, {"text": "Tkokchom, Bira", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18541, "end_char": 18555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L_1'P(D)IRCI-5 \"\n\nTkockclunn, Mira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nTkokchom, Bira\n\nSi'/l{/k -· Aggangar, J.\n\nprecluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of s. 403(2)."}}, {"text": "Aggangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18569, "end_char": 18577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L_1'P(D)IRCI-5 \"\n\nTkockclunn, Mira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nTkokchom, Bira\n\nSi'/l{/k -· Aggangar, J.\n\nprecluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of s. 403(2)."}}, {"text": "s. 403(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18761, "end_char": 18770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pritam Sing h", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18776, "end_char": 18789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Pritam Sing h's(') case was based wholly on the decision of the Privy Council in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya(') it would be necessary to examine the basis of the latter decision.", "canonical_name": "Pritam Sing h"}}, {"text": "MacDermott", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20542, "end_char": 20552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with this Lord MacDermott speaking for the Board said :\n\n\"The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence.", "canonical_name": "Mac Dermott"}}, {"text": "Sambasivam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21426, "end_char": 21436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point in regard to which the observations in Sambasivam's(') case was applied by this Court related to the use of the recovery of a revolver from the accused to sustain his conviction of the offence of murder.", "canonical_name": "Sambasil'wn"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21640, "end_char": 21646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21648, "end_char": 21665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Faridpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21724, "end_char": 21759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Previous to the prosecution for an offence under s. 302, Indian Penal Code the appellant before this Court had been tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Faridpur under s. 19<0 of the Indian Arms Act of an offence for possession of that revolver and had been acquitted."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21766, "end_char": 21771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21788, "end_char": 21796, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21895, "end_char": 21903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court speaking through Bhagwati, , J. extracted the observations we have quoted from the judgment of Lord MacDermott and pointed out that on the basis of this decision the evidence relating to the recovery of the revolver from the accused should have been excluded."}}, {"text": "MacDermott", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21978, "end_char": 21988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court speaking through Bhagwati, , J. extracted the observations we have quoted from the judgment of Lord MacDermott and pointed out that on the basis of this decision the evidence relating to the recovery of the revolver from the accused should have been excluded.", "canonical_name": "Mac Dermott"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22599, "end_char": 22604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the rule in Sambasivam's(') case on which Prita11J; Singh's(') case was based had been dissented from by the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Connelly(') and that, similarly that principle had been departed from by this Court in Gur charan Singh v. State of Punjab(\"'). ("}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23080, "end_char": 23086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurcharan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23250, "end_char": 23265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the first ground, it must be pointed out that learned Counsel for the State admitted that there was nothing a Gurcharan Singh's(') case which militated against the acceptance of the rule laid down in Pritam Singh's(') case."}}, {"text": "Ayyanyrir", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23849, "end_char": 23858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manipur Adminiatration\n\nThokchom, Bira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nJllunipur\n\nAl111i11i1J!n1lion\n\nv. 1'/iokc/10111, Bir1i\n\nSingh\n\nAyyanyrir, , J,\n\ncourt even if at variance with one of this Court do not by themselves justify an application to reconsider an earlier decision of this Court."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24589, "end_char": 24596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Except that the Court did not expressly rule that the principle of issue-estoppel applied in England, no exception was taken to its soundness and the decision proceeded on the basis of the facts not justifying the application of the principle, the conditions not being fulfilled."}}, {"text": "Pritam Sing", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25015, "end_char": 25026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides• it should be pointed out that the principle underlying the decision in Pritam Sing/i's(') case did come up for consideration before this Court on several occasions, but it was never dissented from though in some.", "canonical_name": "Pritam Sing h"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25760, "end_char": 25767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All offences under the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25784, "end_char": 25824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pl'itam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26032, "end_char": 26045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, however, in our opinion, does not afford any assistance to the argument because Pl'itam Singh's(\") case\n\n)II did not introduce any variation in the Code as regards either\n\n(') [1963] 3 All E.R. 510.", "canonical_name": "Pritam Sing h"}}, {"text": "Page", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26885, "end_char": 26889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Counsel next drew our attention to the observations bf the Privy Council in Yusofalli Mu/la v. The King(') at page 169 ' where the following observations occur:\n\n\"The last point urged by Mr. Page was that even if the case did not fall within the terms of s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the appellant could nonetheless rely on the common law rule that no man should be placed twice in jeopardy.\""}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26949, "end_char": 26955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26963, "end_char": 26989, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27418, "end_char": 27424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27432, "end_char": 27458, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27490, "end_char": 27495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After stating that even for the application of the Common Law rule of double jeopardy the earlier order had to be by a court competent to pass a valid order of acquittal or conviction the judgment proceeded:\n\n\"This argument therefore fails on the facts, and it is not necessary for their Lordships to consider whether s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes a complete code in India on the subject of autre fois acquit and autre fois convict, or whether in a proper case the common law can be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the section.\""}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28478, "end_char": 28484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The distinction between autre fois acquit and the objection to the reception of evidence to prove an identical fact which has been the subject of an earlier finding between the parties is brought out in the following passage from the judgment of Wright, J. in The Queen v. Ollis('):\n\n\"The real question is whether this relevant evidence of the false pretence on July 5 or 6 ought to have been excluded on the ground that it was part of\n\n(') 76 I.A. 158."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28790, "end_char": 28798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manipur Admini&trati011\n\nTlwlccMm, Bira\n\nSingh\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nThokchom, Bi1ll\n\nSing II\n\nAyyangar, , f.\n\nthe evidence given for the prosecution at !"}}, {"text": "Ramsey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28974, "end_char": 28980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the former trial, at which the prisoner was charg1ed with having obtained money from Ramsey on that false pretence, and was acquitted of that charge.\""}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31565, "end_char": 31588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was the subject of consideration by the High Court of Australia after the decision in Sambasil'wn's(') case in Mar~ v. The Queen(')."}}, {"text": "Sambasil'wn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31611, "end_char": 31622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was the subject of consideration by the High Court of Australia after the decision in Sambasil'wn's(') case in Mar~ v. The Queen(').", "canonical_name": "Sambasil'wn"}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32618, "end_char": 32624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33136, "end_char": 33143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We might also point out that even before the de- -· cision of this Court this rule was applied by some of the High Courts and by way of illustration we might refer to the decision of Harries, C. J. in Manickchand Agarwala v. The State(')."}}, {"text": "Jlanipu1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33432, "end_char": 33440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jlanipu1 ."}}, {"text": ".Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33554, "end_char": 33563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "id ministration\n\nThol:rliom, Bira\n\n,')'lngh\n\n.lyyanga.t, J,\n\nNanir\"'r Administration\n\nPholu:Jwm, Bira\n\nSinqli\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\nagainst an accused, the argument against its application being that the prosecution cannot succeed unless it proves to the satisfaction of the Court trying the accused by evidence Jed before it that he is guilty of the offence charged.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_137_147_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R SUl'HE'.\\rn COURT REl'OHTS 137\n\nK JOSEPH AUGUSTHI AND TWO ORS.\n\nM. A. NARAYANAN, OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR.\n\nPALA! CENTRAL BANK LTD .\n\nIP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ:]\n\nBanking Companies Act-Banking Company under liquida lion-Public examination of directors ordered-Section 45G oj the Act does not violate Art. 20(3)-Elements of self incrimina 1i.on-:4cts and oniissions of directors need not be crim1.nal-It is\n\nsuffic'ent if they are commercia!lv rmsound-Ordinarv public e:i.:ani:nation-Covrt has to see only that a prima facie case is est•lb!ished--Constitution oj l udia, Art. 20(3)-Ban'dng Companies Act, 1949 (X of 1949). s. 45G. The appellants were directors of Palai Central Bank Ltd. On an applicat10n made by the Reserve Bank of India the High Court of Kerala ordered the winding up of the Bank and appointed an Official Liquidator whc filed a number of reports under s. 45G(l) of Banking Corn;)anics Act, 19~9. The appellants filed their objections and the learned single Judge after hearing the parties made an order directing ihe puhlic exa1nination of the appellants under s. 15G(2) of the Act. After appealing without success to a Division Bench the appellants filed the present appeals on a certificate granted by the High Court.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellants that the provision of s. 45G(2) in as ni.uch as it '.vould compel a person ordered to be publicly examined to be a 'vitness against himself is violative of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution and therefore bad. It was further contended that the acts or omissions alleged as contemplated by s. 45G(l) should be acts or omissions which are prohibited by law or enjoined by law and on this basis the reports of the Liquidator have not made out a case for public examination.\n\nThe third contention was that the High Court has misconstrued the effect of the provisions of s. 45G and hc:.s refused to gve an opportunity to the appellants.\n\nHeld: A person examined publicly under s. 45G may in some cases be compelled to be a witness against himself and thus one element of Art. 20(3) is satisfied. But it is only when a person can be said to have been accused of an offence that the prohibition prescribed by Art. 20(3) comes into operation. If a person who is not accused of any offence, is compelleci.to give evidence and it ultimately leads to an accusation against him, that would not be a case which would attract the provisions of Art. 20(3).\n\nAfter the examination under s. 45G is over and materials adduced before the court have been examined by the court an occasion may or may not arise to take £•.n/ a:-tioD. In such a case, \\Vhat mair conceivably follow canaot said to be existing before the order is passed under s. 45G; an accusation may follow the enquiry but an accu£ation is not in existence at the time when public exarilination is ordered. Hence the appellant cannot be said to have been accused. Since the essential condition nrecedent for the application of Art. 20(3) is ;:bsent in all cases -covered by s. 45G it cannot be said that s. 45G is violative of Art. 20(3) of the :Constitution. ·\n\nll!arch 11\n\nK. Joseph Auguathi\n\nand two others\n\nMa!la1a Suryanarayana v. Viiaya Commercial Bank Ltd. decided on 26-10-61 (C.A. No. 286/59) and Raia Narayan!a! Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry and Anr., A.LR. 1961 S.C. 29, referred to. v.\n\nM.A. Narayanan,\n\n(ii) The acts or omissions contemplated under s. 45G need\n\nOiai Liquidalor, not necessarily be criminal, they may even include acts or Pala• Central Bank omissions which are commercially unsound or unwise. The court Ltd. has only to see whether the acts or omissions \"as to the promo- Gajendragadkar c J tion or formation or the conduct of the business of the banking ' · company or as to his conduct and dealings in so far as they relate to the affairs of the banking company\" have led to loss to the banking company. For this, what the court can and should do is to read the report submitted by the Official Liquidator, consider whether the opinion expressed in the report appears to be prima facie reasonable, hear the explanation of the persons concerned; and find out prima facie whether the explanation tendered by the person is sufficient to reject the liquidator's request for such person's public examination and whether on the whole it is just and beneficial to the interest of the banking company that public examination should be held. The. High Court has dealt with the matter precisely in this way in the present case and hence the appellants cannot have any gTievance.\n\nEx parte George Stapylton Barnes, (1896) A.C. 146, Sir Fazal Ibrahim Rahimtoola v. Appabhai C. Desai, A.LR. 1949 Born. 339 and The Ahmedabad Advance Spiwning and Weaving Co. v.\n\nLakshmishankar, I.L.R. 30 Born. 173, distinguished.\n\n(iii) Applying the above principles and examining the reports submitted by the Official Liquidator it is clear that the courts below have taken into account those reports and after considering the objections raised by the appel1ant, they havE> come to the right conclusion that the appellants should face a public examination.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 254 to 256 of 1963.\n\nV. A. S. Muhammad, for the appellant (in C.A. No- 254/ 63) J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the apJ:lellants (in C.A. Nos. 255 and 256 of 1963).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Atiqur Rehman, Shureshta Kumari and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\nMarch II, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-Two questfons of law have been raised' before us by Dr. Seyid Muhammad on behalf of K. Joseph Augusthi, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 254 /\n\n1963. Both of them are related to section 45G of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 (No. X of 1949) (hereinafter called the Act). The first question raised has reference to the validity of the said section and the second to its true scope and effect.\n\nDr. Seyid Muhammad contends that the answers given by the Kerala High Court to both these questions are erroneous\n\nAccording to him, s. 45G is unconstitutional inasmuch as it 1964 contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizensK / h , th' h C . .\n\nH ls .. osep aU{JU6 • of this country by Art. 20(3) of t e onst1tut10n. e a o argues and two oth\"' that in making an order for the public examination of the T. ll h H. h C 1 t d th d 11/. A. Narayanan. appe ant, t e 1g our.t. ms m1scons. rue . e scope an Ufficial Liquidator, effect of the relevant prov1S1CJ111S of the said sect10n. l'olai Central Bank\n\nLtd.,, The appellant Joseph Augusth~ as the Managing Direc- Gujwdrag-;; dlar, C.J, tor of the Palai Central Bank L1m1ted from 26-1-1927 to\n\n8-8-1960; K. George Thomas and George Joseph who are the appellants in the two other appeals Nos. 255 and 256 of 1963 respectively, were the Directors of the said Bank; the first of them was the Directoc from 14-1-1935 to 8-8-1960 and the latter from 26-1-1927 to 8-8-1960.\n\nAn application for the winding up of the said Bank was made before the Kerala High Court by the Reserve Bank under section 38(3)(b)(iii) of the Act. The said provision justifies the making of an application by the Reserve Bank in case in the opinion of the Reserve Bank, the continuance <?f the banking company in question is prejudicial to the interests of the depositors. On the 8th August, 1960, an order was passed on the said application appointing the Official Liquidator of the High Court the Provisional Liquidator of the Bank. The order of winding up then followed on the 5th December, 1960, ' and on the 8th December, 1960, an Official Liquidator was appointed under s. 39 of the Act. After the Official Liquidator came on the scene, he made three reports to the High Courtreport No. 192 on the 17th August, 1961; report No. 242 on the 29th September, 1961 and report No. 350 on the 4th December 1961. All these reports were made under s. 45G(l) of the Act. The appellants filed their objections on the 23rd November, 1961 to the first two reports. The matter was then considered by the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court and after hearing the parties, he made an order directing the public examination of the three appellants under s. 45G(2).\n\nThis order was challenged by the appellants by preferring three appeals before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench agreed with the view taken by the learned single Judge and dismissed the three appeals. The appellants then applied for and obtained certificates from the High Court and it is with the said certificates that they have come to this Court by the present three appeals.\n\nThe. first point whi<; h has been arg:oed before us by Dr. Seyid Muhammad IS that s. 45G 1s unconstitutional because it contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 2013). In order to appreciate this argument, it is necessary to read s. 45G(l) & (2).\n\nK. J., tph Augwthi\n\nand two others\n\nM . ..4.. Narayanan, Official Lifvidalot',\n\nPalai Central Bank\n\nLid.\n\n\"(!) Where an order has been made for the winding U!)\n\nof a banking company, the official liquidator shall submit a report whether in his opinion any loss has. been caused to the banking company since its formation by any act or omission (whether or not a fraud has been committed by such act or omis-\n\nGajendragadl:ar, O.J.\n\nsion) of any person in the promotion or formation of the banking company or of any director or auditor of the banking company.\n\n(2) H, on consideration of the report submitted under sub-section (!), the High Court is of opinion that any person who has taken part in the promotion or formation Clf the banking company or has been a director or an auditor of the banking company should be publicly examined, it shall hold a' public sitting on a date to be appointed for that purpose and direct that such person, director or auditor shall attend thereat and shall be publicly examined as to the promotion or formation or the c:onduct of the business of the banking company. or as to his conduct and dealings, in so far as they relate to the affairs of the banking company: Provided that no such person shall be publicly examined unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause why he should nC1t be so examined.\" The other sub-sections of this section need not be' cited. because it would be enough for our purpose to nolice, in substance, what their effect is. Sub-section (3) allows the Official Liquidator to take part in the examination and to 'employ such legal assistance as may be sanctioned by the High Court, if he is specially authorised by the High Court in that behalf.\n\nSub-section (4) permits the creditor or contributory to take part in the examination either personally or by any person entitled to appear in the High Court. Sub-section (5) gives authority to the High Court to put questions to the person who is being examined; sub-section (6) empowers oath to be administered to the said person and compels him to answer questions as may be put to him by the High Court, or as the High Court may allow to be put to him. Under sub-section (7), such a person is entitled to appear by a lawyer and the lawyer so appointed shall be at liberty to put to him such questions as the High Court may deem fit just for the purpose of enabling him to explain or qualify any answer given by him; there is a proviso to this sub-section which authorises the High Court to make an order of costs in its discretion in case the person under examination is exculpated from any charges made gr suggested against him. Sub-section (8) deals with the procedure to be followed in keeping a record of the examination. Subsection (9) provides that where after the examination of the\n\nperson, the High Court is satisfied that a person, who has been 1964 a Director of the banking company, is not fit to be a director K. Joseph Augusthi of a company, or an auditor, or a partner who bas been acting and two othm as such auditor. is not fit to be such an auditor or partner, the M N v.\n\nHigh Court may make an order that that person shall not, off; ciat'Zl~'!d:ior, without the leave of the High Court, be a director of, or in any PalaiCentral Bank, way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part Ltd:_ in the management orf, any company, or, as the case may be, Gajendragadkar, O.J. act as an auditor of, or be a partner of a firm acting as auditors of, any company for such period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the order.\n\nThus, it will be clear that the scheme of s. 45G is first to decide whether, prima facie, there is a. case for the public examination of a person; then in deciding this question, give an opportunity to the person concerned; if it is decided to bold a public examination of the said person, proceed to bold that examination; if suggestions made against the person examined are found to be unwarranted, make an order of costs in his favour; and if the person concerned is found to have been responsible for acts or omissions which caused loss to the banking company, to make a penal order disqualifying such person from acting as a director or an auditor as indica.ted by subsection (9). It is in the light of this scheme that the argument about the contravention of Art. 20(3) falls to be examined.\n\nArticle 20(3) provids that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It may be conceded that when a person is compelled to submit to a public examination, that itself,.prima facie, looks like pillorying him in the public gaze. It is also true that s .. 45G(6) compels the person to answer questions which the High Court may put to him, or which the High Court may allow to be put to him, and it is quite likely that in cases where public examination is ordered to be held, some suggestions and even some charges may be levelled against the person examined by reference to his acts or omissions in relation to the promotion, formation or conduct of the banking company of which he was a director or an auditor. Therefore, there is no difficulty in holding that a person examined publicly under s. 45G may, in some cases, be compelled to be a witness against himself. Thus, one element of Art. 20(3) is satisfied; but the question still remains whether the other essential element is satisfied or not.\n\nArticle 20(3) guarantees to every citizen the fundamental right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, provided the person who is being compelled in that way, is accused of any offence. In other words, it is only when a person can be said to have been accused of any offence that the prohibition prescribed by Art. 20(3) comes into operation. If a person who is not accused of any offence, is compelled to give\n\n1964 evidence, and evidence taken from him under compulsion ult.- mately leads to an accusation against him, that would not be K. Jo$eph .d.Ut}wthi\n\nan<i lwo 01,..,. a case which would attract the provisions of Art. 20(3). The\n\n\"· main object of Art. 20(3) is to give protection to an a.ccusea \"[j/: f 1'!'.i~~'J:i\";,. person not to-be compelled to incriminate himself andl that is Palai 'O:ntrl Bank 'in consonance with the basic principle of criminal law accept-\n\nLid. ed in our coqntry that an accused person is entitled to rely on Gaj .. drllfl-;; dk:,, 0 J the presumption of innocence in his favour and cannot be ' compelled to swear against himself. Therefore, unless it is shown tha.t a person ordered to be publicly examined under s. 45G is, before, or at the time when the order for examining him publicly is passed, an accused person, Art. 20(3) will not apply. What then is the position with regard to a person against whom an order for public examination is made by tl1e High Court as done against the appellants? All that has happened at the relevant time is that the official liquidator has submitted reports indicating that in his opinion, loss has been caused to the banking company under liquidation by the acts or omissions of the appellants, and the High Court, on considering the reports and taking into account the explanation given by the appellant, has come to the conclusion that, prima facie, a case has been made out for their public examination.\n\nIn such a case, how can it be said that the appellants have been accused of any offence? The whole object of the enquiry is to collect evidence and decide whether any acts or omissions caused loss to the banking company. It may be that as.a result of the enquiry, the court may reach the conclusion tllat the alleged acts or omissions did not cause any loss; in such a case, nothing further has to bedone. On the other hand, it is likely that the opinion formed by the liquidator may be vindica.ted and the court may come to the conclusion that some or all of the acts or omissions on which the liquidator's opinion was based did cause loss to the banking company; and in tliat case, some action may conceivably be taken against the persons examined in addition to the action contemplated by s. 45G(9).\n\nThat. however, only means that after the examination is over and the material adduced before the court has been e:rnmined by the court, an occasion may or may not arise to take any action. In such a case, what may conceivably follow cannot be said to be existing before the order is passed under s. 45G; an a.ccusation may follow the enquiry, but an accusation was not in existence at the time when the public examination was ordered; and so, the appellants cannot contend that they were accused of any offence at the time when the order for their public examination was passed by the High Court. The accu- . sation of any offence which is an essential condition for the application of Art. 20(3) is a condition precedent for the application of the principle prescribed by the said Article, and since this essential condition is lacking in all cases covered by section 45G, it is difficult to sustain the argument that the said 1964 section contravenes Art. 20(3). Therefore, we do not think K. Joseph Aug,., tM Dr. Seyid Muhammad is right in contending that. s. 45G is and two othera invalid on the ground that it contravenes Art. 20(3) of the .M. A. ; rayanan Constitution. It appears that m the case of Malla/a Suryana- Official LiquidatM, yana v. The Vijaya Commercial Bank Ltd.('), the same view Palai Central Bank has been expressed by this Court, though it may be added that Ltd. this question does not appear to have been then elaborately Gajendragadkar, O.J. argued.\n\nIn this connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry and Anr.('), where a somewhat similar provision contained in s. 240 of the old Companies Act fell to be considered and it was held that it did not contravene Art. 20(3) of the Constitution.\n\nThat takes us to the question of the construciion of s. 45G.\n\nDr. Seyid Muhammad contends that s. 45G requires that the acts or omissions alleged against a person should be acts which are prohibited by law, or omissions in relation to acts the performa-nce of which is enjoined by law, and he suggested that if this interpretation is put on the words \"acts or omissions\", it would appear that the reports made by the liquidator in the present case have not made out any case for the public examination of tbe appellants. We are not impressed by this argument. It is significant that the acts or omissions to which s. 45G(l) refers need not be fraudulent acts or omissions. because, in terms, the section provides that the act or omission would attract s. 45G(l) if it has led to any loss to the banking company even though fraud may not have been committed b} such act or omission. The context also shows that what the Court has to consider, is whether any act or omission on the part of the director or the aud_itor of the banking company\n\nas caused any loss to the company. Now, such an act or omiss10n need not necessarily be criminal; it may even include acts or omissions which are commercially unsound or unwise. In this con_nection, it may be rclled tliat s. 478 of the Companies Act which deals with a similar problem, requires that the\n\nrepot of the Official Liquidator should disclose his opinion that .a. fraud has be_en committed. To the same effect is the provis10n contamed m s. 268 of the English Companies Act (11 & 12 Geo. 6, c 38). Therefore, it would, we think, be unreasonable to put a narrow and restricted construction on the words \"acts or omissions\" used by s. 45G(l).\n\n. Dr. Seyid Muhanimad ha~ then contended that in dealing\n\nwth the reports made .by the hquidator in the present case. the High Court has not given effect to the provision contained in\n\n(') Civil Appeal No. 286 of 1959 decided on 26:-10-1961.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 29.\n\n1964 the proviso to s. 450(2). The said proviso requites that no K. Joatph Augu•lhi person shall be publicly examined unless he has been given an\n\nand two Dlh<ra opportunity to show cause why he should not be so examined, JI A ;~•ayanan and Dr. Seyid Muhammad argues that unle.ss the matter is offi,;,;;[L; quidator; fully examined and an opportunity is given to him to show Palai Oen;;;:/ B•nk tha.t the facts alleged in the reports are untrue, the require-\n\n- ments of the proviso will not have been satisfied and his grie- Gajendrugadkar, o.J. vance is that no such opportunity was given to the appellants in the present case. There is no substance even in this argument. What the Court has to do in exercising its power under s. 450(2) is to consider the report made by the liquidator and decide whether it can reasonably entertain the opinion that any person who has taken part in the promotion or formation or conduct of the banking company should be publicly examined. In other words. it is a preliminary stage of the enquiry and the point which the Court has to consider is whether, prima facie, a case has been made out to hold a public examination of the person concerned. It cannot be the object of s. 450(2) read with the proviso that the Court should allow the appellants to lead evidence rebutting the allegations made by the liquidator in 11is reports, for if such a course was adopted, it would itself develop into a full-fledged enquiry a.nd the very object cf a limited enquiry at the initial stage would be defeated. What the Court can and should do in such cases is Ito read the report submitted by the Official Liquidator, consider whether the opinion expressed in the report appears to be, prima facie, reasonable; hear the explanation of the person concerned; and find out prima fade whether the explanation tendered by the person is sufficient to reject the liquidator's request for such person's public examination and whether, on the whole, it is just and beneficial to the interest of the banking company that public examina.tion should be held. The subjectmatter of this preliminary investigation is not the whole of the enquiry on the merits; it is an enquiry as to whether the director or the auditor should be publicly examined. Therefore. we do not think Dr. Seyid' Muhammad is justified in contending that the High Court has ignored the safeguard afforded to the appellants by the proviso s. 450(2).\n\nThe question about the construction of s. 450(1) & 12) does not present any serious difficulty. What must be disclosed by the report of the Official Liquidator is the act or omission of the person there specified which has led to loss to the banking company since its formation. The acts or omissions to which s. 450(1) refers, when considered in the light of s. 450\n\n(2), are acts or omissions \"as to the promotion, or formation, or the conduct of the business of the banking company, or s to his conduct and dealings in so far as they relate to the affairs of the banking company\", so that after the report is made, the. court takes a broad and overall view of the state of\n\naffairs disclosed by the report and considers prima facie 1964 whether a case has been made out for the public examination K. Jo\" ;; hA.,<!l,., tM of the director or the auditor. We are satisfied that the High ana '\"~ othe\" Court has dealt with the matter precisely in this way, and no ftf 1 ;·, grievance can be made against its decision on the ground that off;,~~' Jq~1/;~\":.~:\n\nthe provisions of the proviso to s. 45G(2) have been ignored. Fa:ai Central Bank\n\n.Lf{l,\n\nIn support of his argument that the High Court has mis-uajendr09adknr, C.J. construed the effect of the provisions of s. 45G(l), Dr. Seyid Muhammad referred to two decisions which may be mentioned at this stage. The first of these is the decision of the House of Lords in Ex parte George Stapylton Barnes('). In that case, the question which fell to be considered was the scope and effect of s. 8(3) of the Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1890; Lord Halsbury observed that he entertained not the smallest doubt that the meming of this legisbtion is that. in order to give the Court jurisdiction to make an order for public examination, there must be a finding of fraud, and a finding of fraud against an individual who is thereby made subject to being summoned before the Court, and is compelled to answer, whether the answer incriminates him or not, but, being exculpated, receives his costs. He further observed: \"I confess I am unable, looking at the whole of the legislation qn the subject, to entertain the least doubt that that was what the Legislature intended, and I am a little surprised, I confess, that there should have been any doubt that fraud must be found.\" In our opinion, this passage i~ hardly relevant for our purpose, because as we have already indicated, s. 45G(I) expressly provides that the act or omission complained of need not necessarily be fraudulent, and so, there can be no question, under s. 45G(]). of corning to a conclusion that fraud has been committed before directing public examination of a person.\n\nThe other decision on which Dr. Seyid Muhammad has relied is the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sir Fazal\n\nIbrahim Rahimtoola v. Appabhai C. Desai('). fn that case, dealing with the provisions contained ins. 196 of the old Companies Act. Chag]a C.J. disapproved of the practice of ordering ex parte public examination of persons. In that connection, he quoted with approval the warning sounded by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in the Ahmedabad Advance Spinning and Weaving Company v. Lf!kshm!shanker('), that the practice of passing\n\nx parte orders mvolvmg the person affected in serious liability 1s much to be deprecated. In tht case, the Bombay High Court was. called uon to consider whether the allegations made agamst the d1rector were vague and indefinite. As we will\n\n(') [1896] A.C. 146 at p. 152.\n\n(') I.L.R. 30 Born. 173. (')A.LR. 1949 Born. 339.\n\nSUPRE~1E COURT REPORTS\n\n[1964 J\n\n1964 presently point out, that difficulty does not arise in the present K. J0>ephAugu, thi appeals. The allegations ma.de by the liquidator in his reports\n\nand two others against the appellants are clear, precise and definite. v.\n\nM. A. lforaanan, Let us now refer to the reports submitted by the liquidator Official L•quidator. • h' fi h 1 'd h d Palai Central Bank m the present case. In ts rst report, t e 1qm ator as state Ltd. that in carrying out the affairs (}f the bank, the Directors, with\n\n0 . d -:u; . u J the help of officers appointed by them out of their own rela-\n\n\"J'n \"'II\"· \"\" · tives, have not properly conducted the affairs of the bank. He has also stated that in his opinion, loss had been caused to the bank since its formation by the acts and omissions of the Directors and of the auditor of the bank. The report then proceeds to specify the extent of the loss and the causes for the said loss. It appears from the report that loans were advanced by the bank without regard to the question of any adequate security. In many cases, loans were advanced without any security at all and the inevitable consequence has been that a large number of debts have become barred by time long before the winding up proceedings were started. The bank appears to have paid dividends without earning profits. Similarly, though it did not earn any profits between 1936 to 1958, it submitted reports showing substantial amO'Unts as net income and so, it has paid income-tax on the said amounts. A large amount of advances appears to be irrecoverable. At the end of his report, the liquidator has mentioned IO persons, including the three appellants before us, whose acts and omissions, in his opinion, contributed to loss to the banking company. Two further reports were made by the liquidator and they support the opinion expressed by him in his first report. The third of these reports was filed after this matter was heard by the learned Single Judge but the first twCI reports themselves fully justify the order made by him, and so, the third report can well be left out of consideration.\n\nWhen we turn to the objections filed by the appellants, it is clear that some of the facts are not seriously disputed. Take, for instance, the allegation that dividends were declared without earning profits. The appellant Joseph Augusthi contended before the High Court that the bank used to treat interests accrued on advances, though not received, as income, and so, income-tax and super-tax were paid on such income and dividends were also paid on the same basis. He suggested that the Reserve Bank had noticed these facts and had waived its objection. In other words, he relied on a practice which is obviously unsound in a commercial sense and pleaded that at this stage the Reserve Bank cannot challenge the correctness or propriety of the said practice. This practice has been described by the appellant as mercantile system of accounting. It would thus be seen that some of the facts alleged by the liquidator in his report are not disputed; the effect of those facts was a matter of argument between the parties before the High Court. In such\n\na. case, we do not see how the appellants can successfully 1964 challenge the correctness of the view taken by the High Court K. Jo\"ph Augusll•i\n\nthat a case had been made out for the public examination of and tuo other• the apellants. That is why we do not think there !8 any sub- M. A. ; rayanan, stance m the argument urged before us by Dr. Seyid Muham- <Nfic.; a/ Mqa,-dator, mad that on the facts, an opportunity had not been given to Pa'a; C'\"'\"\" Bank the appellants to show that their public examination should\n\nL1'.::._ not be ordered. We are satisfied that in dealing with the factscajendragadkar, C.J. of this case, the Courts below have taken into account the reports made by the liquidator and after considering the objections raised by the appellants, they have come to the right conclusion that the appellants should face a public examination.\n\nThe rsult is ihe appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne set of hearing fees.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 135, "entities": [{"text": "137\n\nK JOSEPH AUGUSTHI AND TWO ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K JOSEPH AUGUSTHI AND TWO ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. A. NARAYANAN, OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR.\n\nPALA! CENTRAL BANK LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. A. NARAYANAN, OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR. PALAI CENTRAL BANK LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 183, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 235, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Banking Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 239, "end_char": 260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 336, "end_char": 347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Banking Companies Act", "statute": "Banking Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376, "end_char": 386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Banking Companies Act", "statute": "Banking Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 646, "end_char": 656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Banking Companies Act", "statute": "Banking Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 665, "end_char": 684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 698, "end_char": 704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1949", "statute": "Companies Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Palai Central Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 739, "end_char": 762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. 45G. The appellants were directors of Palai Central Bank Ltd. On an applicat10n made by the Reserve Bank of India the High Court of Kerala ordered the winding up of the Bank and appointed an Official Liquidator whc filed a number of reports under s. 45G(l) of Banking Corn;)anics Act, 19~9."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 793, "end_char": 814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. 45G. The appellants were directors of Palai Central Bank Ltd. On an applicat10n made by the Reserve Bank of India the High Court of Kerala ordered the winding up of the Bank and appointed an Official Liquidator whc filed a number of reports under s. 45G(l) of Banking Corn;)anics Act, 19~9."}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 819, "end_char": 839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. 45G. The appellants were directors of Palai Central Bank Ltd. On an applicat10n made by the Reserve Bank of India the High Court of Kerala ordered the winding up of the Bank and appointed an Official Liquidator whc filed a number of reports under s. 45G(l) of Banking Corn;)anics Act, 19~9."}}, {"text": "s. 45G(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 948, "end_char": 957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1949", "statute": "Companies Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 15G(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1157, "end_char": 1166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1949", "statute": "Companies Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 45G(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1384, "end_char": 1393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1949", "statute": "Companies Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1518, "end_char": 1528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1949", "statute": "Companies Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 45G(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1647, "end_char": 1656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1949", "statute": "Companies Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1924, "end_char": 1930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2030, "end_char": 2036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2124, "end_char": 2134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2260, "end_char": 2270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2488, "end_char": 2498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2529, "end_char": 2535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2777, "end_char": 2783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3030, "end_char": 3040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3077, "end_char": 3083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3107, "end_char": 3113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Joseph Auguathi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3178, "end_char": 3196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll!arch 11\n\nK. Joseph Auguathi\n\nand two others\n\nMa!la1a Suryanarayana v. Viiaya Commercial Bank Ltd. decided on 26-10-61 (C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "K. Joseph Auguathi"}}, {"text": "26-10-61", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3278, "end_char": 3286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll!arch 11\n\nK. Joseph Auguathi\n\nand two others\n\nMa!la1a Suryanarayana v. Viiaya Commercial Bank Ltd. decided on 26-10-61 (C.A. No."}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3468, "end_char": 3474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5166, "end_char": 5194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "V. A. S. Muhammad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5236, "end_char": 5253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. S. Muhammad, for the appellant (in C.A. No- 254/ 63) J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5295, "end_char": 5311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. S. Muhammad, for the appellant (in C.A. No- 254/ 63) J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5316, "end_char": 5325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the apJ:lellants (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5330, "end_char": 5345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the apJ:lellants (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5405, "end_char": 5419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Atiqur Rehman, Shureshta Kumari and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Atiqur Rehman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Atiqur Rehman, Shureshta Kumari and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Shureshta Kumari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5436, "end_char": 5452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Atiqur Rehman, Shureshta Kumari and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5457, "end_char": 5468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Atiqur Rehman, Shureshta Kumari and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5571, "end_char": 5585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-Two questfons of law have been raised' before us by Dr. Seyid Muhammad on behalf of K. Joseph Augusthi, the appellant in Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Seyid Muhammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5649, "end_char": 5663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-Two questfons of law have been raised' before us by Dr. Seyid Muhammad on behalf of K. Joseph Augusthi, the appellant in Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Seyid Muhanimad"}}, {"text": "K. Joseph Augusthi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5677, "end_char": 5695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-Two questfons of law have been raised' before us by Dr. Seyid Muhammad on behalf of K. Joseph Augusthi, the appellant in Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "K. Joseph Auguathi"}}, {"text": "section 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5772, "end_char": 5783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banking Companies Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5791, "end_char": 5818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Seyid Muhammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 6005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Seyid Muhammad contends that the answers given by the Kerala High Court to both these questions are erroneous\n\nAccording to him, s. 45G is unconstitutional inasmuch as it 1964 contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizensK / h , th' h C . .", "canonical_name": "Seyid Muhanimad"}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6045, "end_char": 6062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Seyid Muhammad contends that the answers given by the Kerala High Court to both these questions are erroneous\n\nAccording to him, s. 45G is unconstitutional inasmuch as it 1964 contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizensK / h , th' h C . ."}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Banking Companies Act, 1949", "statute": "the Banking Companies Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6289, "end_char": 6299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Banking Companies Act, 1949", "statute": "the Banking Companies Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "A. Narayanan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6436, "end_char": 6448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e a o argues and two oth\"' that in making an order for the public examination of the T. ll h H. h C 1 t d th d 11/. A. Narayanan."}}, {"text": "Joseph Augusth~", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6624, "end_char": 6639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'olai Central Bank\n\nLtd.,, The appellant Joseph Augusth~ as the Managing Direc- Gujwdrag-;; dlar, C.J, tor of the Palai Central Bank L1m1ted from 26-1-1927 to\n\n8-8-1960; K. George Thomas and George Joseph who are the appellants in the two other appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Joseph Augusth~"}}, {"text": "K. George Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6753, "end_char": 6769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'olai Central Bank\n\nLtd.,, The appellant Joseph Augusth~ as the Managing Direc- Gujwdrag-;; dlar, C.J, tor of the Palai Central Bank L1m1ted from 26-1-1927 to\n\n8-8-1960; K. George Thomas and George Joseph who are the appellants in the two other appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "George Joseph", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6774, "end_char": 6787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'olai Central Bank\n\nLtd.,, The appellant Joseph Augusth~ as the Managing Direc- Gujwdrag-;; dlar, C.J, tor of the Palai Central Bank L1m1ted from 26-1-1927 to\n\n8-8-1960; K. George Thomas and George Joseph who are the appellants in the two other appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "14-1-1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6952, "end_char": 6961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "255 and 256 of 1963 respectively, were the Directors of the said Bank; the first of them was the Directoc from 14-1-1935 to 8-8-1960 and the latter from 26-1-1927 to 8-8-1960."}}, {"text": "26-1-1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6994, "end_char": 7003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "255 and 256 of 1963 respectively, were the Directors of the said Bank; the first of them was the Directoc from 14-1-1935 to 8-8-1960 and the latter from 26-1-1927 to 8-8-1960."}}, {"text": "8-8-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "255 and 256 of 1963 respectively, were the Directors of the said Bank; the first of them was the Directoc from 14-1-1935 to 8-8-1960 and the latter from 26-1-1927 to 8-8-1960."}}, {"text": "section 38(3)(b)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7133, "end_char": 7154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8th August, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7399, "end_char": 7415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 8th August, 1960, an order was passed on the said application appointing the Official Liquidator of the High Court the Provisional Liquidator of the Bank."}}, {"text": "5th December, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7599, "end_char": 7617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of winding up then followed on the 5th December, 1960, ' and on the 8th December, 1960, an Official Liquidator was appointed under s. 39 of the Act."}}, {"text": "8th December, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7632, "end_char": 7650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of winding up then followed on the 5th December, 1960, ' and on the 8th December, 1960, an Official Liquidator was appointed under s. 39 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7695, "end_char": 7700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th December 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7911, "end_char": 7928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "350 on the 4th December 1961."}}, {"text": "s. 45G(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7964, "end_char": 7973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23rd November, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8031, "end_char": 8050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants filed their objections on the 23rd November, 1961 to the first two reports."}}, {"text": "s. 45G(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8272, "end_char": 8281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8768, "end_char": 8774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 2013", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8855, "end_char": 8864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8929, "end_char": 8938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8947, "end_char": 8949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. J., tph Augwthi\n\nand two others\n\nM . .."}}, {"text": "Narayanan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8993, "end_char": 9002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4.. Narayanan, Official Lifvidalot',\n\nPalai Central Bank\n\nLid."}}, {"text": "PalaiCentral Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12202, "end_char": 12219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is not fit to be such an auditor or partner, the M N v.\n\nHigh Court may make an order that that person shall not, off; ciat'Zl~'!d:ior, without the leave of the High Court, be a director of, or in any PalaiCentral Bank, way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part Ltd:_ in the management orf, any company, or, as the case may be, Gajendragadkar, O.J. act as an auditor of, or be a partner of a firm acting as auditors of, any company for such period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the order."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12350, "end_char": 12364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is not fit to be such an auditor or partner, the M N v.\n\nHigh Court may make an order that that person shall not, off; ciat'Zl~'!d:ior, without the leave of the High Court, be a director of, or in any PalaiCentral Bank, way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part Ltd:_ in the management orf, any company, or, as the case may be, Gajendragadkar, O.J. act as an auditor of, or be a partner of a firm acting as auditors of, any company for such period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the order.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12572, "end_char": 12578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13295, "end_char": 13305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13329, "end_char": 13342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14165, "end_char": 14171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14259, "end_char": 14269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14373, "end_char": 14386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14697, "end_char": 14707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15010, "end_char": 15020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15045, "end_char": 15055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15539, "end_char": 15545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15645, "end_char": 15655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17066, "end_char": 17075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17374, "end_char": 17380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17764, "end_char": 17774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17939, "end_char": 17950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18031, "end_char": 18041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Joseph Aug", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18070, "end_char": 18083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, we do not think K. Joseph Aug,.,", "canonical_name": "K. Joseph Auguathi"}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18138, "end_char": 18144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18205, "end_char": 18215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palai Central Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18379, "end_char": 18397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that m the case of Malla/a Suryana- Official LiquidatM, yana v. The Vijaya Commercial Bank Ltd.('), the same view Palai Central Bank has been expressed by this Court, though it may be added that Ltd. this question does not appear to have been then elaborately Gajendragadkar, O.J. argued."}}, {"text": "s. 240", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18729, "end_char": 18735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18747, "end_char": 18760, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18826, "end_char": 18836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18912, "end_char": 18918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18954, "end_char": 18960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19473, "end_char": 19482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19611, "end_char": 19620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 478", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20122, "end_char": 20128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20136, "end_char": 20149, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 268", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20349, "end_char": 20355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20371, "end_char": 20384, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 45G(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20541, "end_char": 20550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seyid Muhanimad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20559, "end_char": 20574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Seyid Muhanimad ha~ then contended that in dealing\n\nwth the reports made .by the hquidator in the present case.", "canonical_name": "Seyid Muhanimad"}}, {"text": "s. 450(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20842, "end_char": 20851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Joatph Augu•lhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20887, "end_char": 20905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said proviso requites that no K. Joatph Augu•lhi person shall be publicly examined unless he has been given an\n\nand two Dlh<ra opportunity to show cause why he should not be so examined, JI A ;~•ayanan and Dr. Seyid Muhammad argues that unle.ss the matter is offi,;,;;[L; quidator; fully examined and an opportunity is given to him to show Palai Oen;;;:/ B•nk tha.t the facts alleged in the reports are untrue, the require-\nments of the proviso will not have been satisfied and his grie- Gajendrugadkar, o.J. vance is that no such opportunity was given to the appellants in the present case."}}, {"text": "Palai Oen;;;:/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21197, "end_char": 21211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said proviso requites that no K. Joatph Augu•lhi person shall be publicly examined unless he has been given an\n\nand two Dlh<ra opportunity to show cause why he should not be so examined, JI A ;~•ayanan and Dr. Seyid Muhammad argues that unle.ss the matter is offi,;,;;[L; quidator; fully examined and an opportunity is given to him to show Palai Oen;;;:/ B•nk tha.t the facts alleged in the reports are untrue, the require-\nments of the proviso will not have been satisfied and his grie- Gajendrugadkar, o.J. vance is that no such opportunity was given to the appellants in the present case."}}, {"text": "Gajendrugadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21348, "end_char": 21362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said proviso requites that no K. Joatph Augu•lhi person shall be publicly examined unless he has been given an\n\nand two Dlh<ra opportunity to show cause why he should not be so examined, JI A ;~•ayanan and Dr. Seyid Muhammad argues that unle.ss the matter is offi,;,;;[L; quidator; fully examined and an opportunity is given to him to show Palai Oen;;;:/ B•nk tha.t the facts alleged in the reports are untrue, the require-\nments of the proviso will not have been satisfied and his grie- Gajendrugadkar, o.J. vance is that no such opportunity was given to the appellants in the present case.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 450(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21552, "end_char": 21561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 450(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22032, "end_char": 22041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seyid' Muhammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23113, "end_char": 23128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we do not think Dr. Seyid' Muhammad is justified in contending that the High Court has ignored the safeguard afforded to the appellants by the proviso s. 450(2).", "canonical_name": "Seyid Muhanimad"}}, {"text": "s. 450(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23244, "end_char": 23253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 450(1) & 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23295, "end_char": 23309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 450(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23566, "end_char": 23575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 450", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23616, "end_char": 23622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24347, "end_char": 24356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24522, "end_char": 24531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seyid Muhammad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24537, "end_char": 24551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fa:ai Central Bank\n\n.Lf{l,\n\nIn support of his argument that the High Court has mis-uajendr09adknr, C.J. construed the effect of the provisions of s. 45G(l), Dr. Seyid Muhammad referred to two decisions which may be mentioned at this stage.", "canonical_name": "Seyid Muhanimad"}}, {"text": "George Stapylton Barnes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24685, "end_char": 24708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of these is the decision of the House of Lords in Ex parte George Stapylton Barnes(')."}}, {"text": "s. 8(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24796, "end_char": 24803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24850, "end_char": 24858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the question which fell to be considered was the scope and effect of s. 8(3) of the Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1890; Lord Halsbury observed that he entertained not the smallest doubt that the meming of this legisbtion is that."}}, {"text": "s. 45G(I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25677, "end_char": 25686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45G(])", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25821, "end_char": 25830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26020, "end_char": 26037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other decision on which Dr. Seyid Muhammad has relied is the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sir Fazal\n\nIbrahim Rahimtoola v. Appabhai C. Desai(')."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26168, "end_char": 26181, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lawrence Jenkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26346, "end_char": 26362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that connection, he quoted with approval the warning sounded by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in the Ahmedabad Advance Spinning and Weaving Company v. Lf!kshm!shanker('), that the practice of passing\n\nx parte orders mvolvmg the person affected in serious liability 1s much to be deprecated."}}, {"text": "M. A. lforaanan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27058, "end_char": 27073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nM. A. lforaanan, Let us now refer to the reports submitted by the liquidator Official L•quidator. •"}}, {"text": "Joseph Augusthi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29148, "end_char": 29163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Joseph Augusthi contended before the High Court that the bank used to treat interests accrued on advances, though not received, as income, and so, income-tax and super-tax were paid on such income and dividends were also paid on the same basis.", "canonical_name": "Joseph Augusth~"}}, {"text": "K. Jo\"ph Augusll•i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30105, "end_char": 30123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In such\n\na. case, we do not see how the appellants can successfully 1964 challenge the correctness of the view taken by the High Court K. Jo\"ph Augusll•i\n\nthat a case had been made out for the public examination of and tuo other• the apellants."}}, {"text": "Seyid Muham-", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30323, "end_char": 30335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 any sub- M. A. ; rayanan, stance m the argument urged before us by Dr. Seyid Muham- <Nfic.;", "canonical_name": "Seyid Muhanimad"}}, {"text": "factscajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30565, "end_char": 30584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are satisfied that in dealing with the factscajendragadkar, C.J. of this case, the Courts below have taken into account the reports made by the liquidator and after considering the objections raised by the appellants, they have come to the right conclusion that the appellants should face a public examination."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_148_173_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "March 11\n\n148 SUPREl\\JE COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\nINCOME-TAX OFFICER, KOLAR AND ANOTHER v.\n\nSEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY\n\n(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.)\n\nInco'me-iax-Order' of assessment revised in appea!- Recovery of tax-Proceeding& based on original order of assess. ment-Continuaiion, witholit fresh notice of demand-·-Lega!iiu -Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922). ss. 29, 45, 4.6.\n\nThe respondent was assessed to income-tax for the years. 1953-54 and 1954-55 on estimatled incomes of Rs. 61,000/- and Rs. 1,21,000/- respectively and notices of demand under s. 29 of the Indian Income-tax Act; 1922, were served on him by the Income-tax Officer for the tax due. On the respondent failing to comply with the notices of demand within the period specified, the Income-tax Officer issued certificates under s. 46(2) of the Act and sent them to the Collector for recovery of the tax, treating the respondent as in default. In appeals filed by the respondent against the orders of assessment, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner reduced the income assess<cd for the year 1953-54 to Rs. 28,000 and for the year 1954-55 to Rs. 46,000.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer did not issue fresh notices of demand pursuant to the modification in the orders of assessr.1ent made by the .Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but by a letter informed the respondent that he had to pay tax as reduced by the appellate order. The respondent did not pay the amount of tax demanded, but applied to the High Court of Mysore under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the certificates issued by tl:e Income-tax Officer.\n\nThe High Court. hel<' that the Income-tax Officer could not, without issuing fresh notices of demand, after the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax reduced the taxable income, treat the respondent as a defaulter and that the proceedings of the Collector based on the certificates issued by the Income-tax Officer were illegal.\n\nHeld: (per Sarkar and Hidayatullah, JJ.). The dcision of the High Court was right.\n\nPer Sarkar, J.-On the Income-tax Officer's order being revised in appeal, the default based on it and all consequential proceedings must be taken to have been superseded and fresh proceedings have to be started --to realise the dues as found by the revised order.\n\nPer Hidayatullah, J.-In view of the terms of s. 29 of the Act, where an order is passed in appeal and the amount of tax reduced, the Income-tax Officer must intimate to the assessee the reduced amount of tax and make a demand and give him an opportunity to pay befoye treating him as a defaulter.\n\nPer Shah, J. (dissenting)-In the absence of any provision imposing an obligation upon the Income-tax Officer to issue successive notices of demand from time to time for recovery of the arrlount due during the process of assessment, it must be held that the notices of demand issued by th\" Income-tax Officer in exercise of the power under s. 29 must b\" enforced in the manner provided by s. 46 and within the period of limitation\n\nprovided in cl. (7) of s. 46, even after the appeal against th7 lfJG.J order of assessment by the Income-tax Officer is isposed. of, 1,, .. ·,, mllaa: O.fiicer,. subject to adjustment of the amount to be recovered m the hght J;,, f, tr an<l Anoth\" of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. v.\n\nS1:1i, '' B11c'1ial1 Set.ty CIVIL APPELLATE JUl\\lSDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. -- 221 & 222 of 1963. Appeals by special leave from the iu?g Sarka,, J. ment and order dated April 16, 1959 of the Mysore High\n\nCourt in Writ Petitions NDs. 138 and 139 of 1956.\n\nN. D. Kharkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants (in both the appeals).\n\nK. Srinivasan and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondent (in the appeals).\n\nMarch 11, 1964. SARKAR J. and HIDAYATULLAH J. de livered separate opinions dismissing the appeals. SHAH J. de livered a dissenting opinion allowing the appeal.\n\nSARKAR J.-The question in these two appeals is whether certain proceedings for the recovery of tax from the assessee under the Income-tax Act, 1922, were invalid and should be quashed as the assessment order on which they were based had been revised in appeal. The High Court of Mysore held them to be invalid and quashed them. The revenue authorities have now appealed to this Court agajnst that decision.\n\nI think it will be helpful to set out the facts chronologi cally. The tax sought to be realised became due under two assessment orders passed by an Income-tax Officer on March 23, 1955. in respect of the years 1953-54 and 1954-55 finding that the assessee's income for the earlier year was Rs. 61,000/· on which a tax of Rs. 19,808-1-0 was due and that for the other year was Rs. 1.21,000/- creating a tax liability of Rs. 66,601-3-0. Notices of demand under s. 29 of the Act were issued in respect of these dues .. The assessee filed appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the assessment orders but did not pay the tax as demanded by the notices.\n\nOn such failure to pay, the Income-tax Officer sometime in September 1955 sent certificates to the Deputy Commissioner, Kolar -under s. 46(2) of the Act far recovery of the tax as arrears of land revenue and the latter in the course of the same month attached various properties of the assessee under the Revenue Recovery Act. Thereafter on December 17, 1955, the appeals filed by the assessee which were till then pending were decided by the Appellate Commissioner. He reduced the assessable income of the assessee to Rs. 27,000/- for the year 1953-54 and to Rs. 45,000/- for the year 1954-55 and directed the Income-tax Officer to recompute the tax on the basis of the reduced income and to refund the excess if any collected. It appears. that thereafter on February 19, 1956, the Income-tax Officer mformed the assessee that his tax liability for 1953-54\n\n1961 had been reduced to Rs. 4,215-9-0 and for 1954-55 to\n\nlncomclax Officer, Rs. 13,346-8-0 and called upon him to pay these amounts at Kolm and .4nother once into the local treasury. The assessee filed further appeals Se h\" Bu; h; ah 8,11. against the orders of the ppellte Commissioner aid aske?\n\ng _ / that the recovery proceedmgs might be stayed pendmg dec1- Sarkar. J. sion of these appeals and on that request being rejected, moved the High Court of Mysore by two petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the recovery proceedings as invalid with the result earlier mentioned. We are not concerned with the appeals filed by the assessee from the appellate orders and no further reference to them will be made in this judgment.\n\nThe contention of the assessee is that in view of the orders of the Appellate Commissioner the earlier orders, notices of demand and certificates must be deemed to have been superseded and the attachments therefore ceased to be effec:tive from the elate of the appellate orders and could no longer be proceeded with. He contends that the Income-tax Offia:r had to start afresh by serving a new notice of demand and taking the necessary further steps thereon foc realisation of the tax which then was clue only under the appellate orders. These contentions were accepted by the High Court. The revenue authorities on the other hand, contend in short that the Act does not provide for any such supersession.\n\nNow, the scheme of the Income-tax Act far realisation of moneys becoming due under it appears to be this. The tax becomes due on the making of an assessment order or an order imposing penalty or requiring interest to be paid. Thereafter a notice of demand in respect of that amount has to be served. This is provided by s. 29 which is set out below:\n\nS. 29. When any tax, penalty or interest is due in consequence of any order passed under or in pursuance of this Act, the Income-tax Officer shall serve upon. the assessee or other person liable to pa, y such tax, penalty or interest a notice of demand in the prescribed form specifying the.- sum so payable.\n\nThe form mentioned contains directions as to the time within which, the person to whom and the place at which the payment , is to be made. • The consequences that follow a non-<:<>mpliance with a notice of demand served under s. 29 are set out in s. 45 which so far as material is in the following terms :\n\nSection 45. Any amount specified as payable in a notice of demand under sub-section (3) of section 23A or under section 29 or an order under section 31 or section 33, shall be paid within the time, at the place and to the person mentioned in the\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:lIE COURT REPORTS ·---l51\n\nnotice or order, or if a time'is not so mentioned. 1964 then on or before the first day of the seconct Incometax Officer;. month following the date of the service of the Kolar and Another . notice or order. and any_ assessee failing _so to pay S•ahu Bu:hiah s, 111' shall be deemed to be m default. provided that, _ when an assessee has presented an appeal under Sarkar, J. section 30, the Income-tax Officer may in his discretion treat the assessee as not being in default as. long as such appeal is undisposed of.\n\nIt will be noticed that this section is not confined to the effect of a failure to comply with the terms of a notice of demand issued under s. 29 but makes the same consequenc\" arise on the failure to carry out the terms of a notice under s. 23A(3) and orders under ss. 31 and 33. That consequence is that the assessee is to be deemed to be in default. It is after an assessee is so.in default that coercive processes for realisation of the amount due start. Provision for this is made in s. 46 to which I will immediately come. Before doing so. however. I wish to observe that s. 45 gives an Income-tax Officer on an appeal being filed, a discretion to trea.t an assessee as not in default. An argument has been founded on this aspect of the section and to it I will later refer.\n\nPassing on now to s. 46, it will be enough for the purposes. of these appeals to refer only to sub-s. (2) of that section. This provides that \"The Income-tax Officer may forward to the Collector a certificate under his signa.ture specifying the amount of arrears due from an assessee. and the Collector on receipt of such certificate. shall proceed to recover from such assessee the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue.\" It was under this provision that in the present case the Income-tax Officer sent the certificates to the Deputy Commissioner and the latter effected the attachment thereafter under the Revenue Recovery Act.\n\nNow there is no dispute that all steps taken in the present case by .the revenue authorities were valid when taken for the appellate orders had not till then been made. The only question is as to the effect of the appellate orders. It is contended on behalf of the revenue authorities that the Act does not provide that the consequences of a default incurred under the Act cease to be available to the revenue authorities for realisation of the amount due in case the order which was the basis of the default was later revised in appeal. It is. therefore. said that those consequences are not affected by the revision of the order except where it is annulled and hence all notices and attachments remain in force and can be acted upon for recovering the tax due. ·\n\nI am unable to agree with this proposition. It may be that the Act contains no express provision stating what would\n\nI I '\n\n.- I '\n\n'-~'.-:'11-'--::.-:- -~ \\ \\ \\, '! ' ._.. . .._\n\n152'\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\n1961 happen to the default already incurred when the order under Jncom<tax Offiur, which it was incurred was later revised in appeal.. But I think .Kola.and Anoth\" there is enough in the Act to indicate that in some of these cS h B v;, h s cases at least the default comes to an end. If it does. it seems ' 9 u ·~ eny to me to follow inevitably that the consequences of the default\n\nSarkar, J. also disappear.\n\nI would first refer to s. 45 which says that when an order under s. 31 specifies an amount as payable and the amount is not paid within the time, at the place and to the person mentioned in the order or where no time is mentioned in it, within the time specified in the section itself, the assessee so failing to pay shall be deemed to be in default. The order under s. 31 is an order by the Appellate Commissioner. If he specifies an amount as payable in his order and mentions the time when, the place where and the person to whom the payment is to be made, then non-compliance with that order would create a, default. Now this order is made in an appeal from an order made by the Income-tax Officer. Suppose there is already a default as a result of non-compliance with a, notice under s. 29 given in respect of the Income-tax Officer's order. As clearly there could not be two defaults for there was one liability, the Act must in such a case be taken to have provided by necessary implication that the default incurred as a result of noncompliance with the notice to pay the amount mentioned in the Income-tax Officer's. order must be deemed to have been superseded by the appellate . order. The contention that the Act does not contemplate a default ceasing to be so except when an assessment order is annulled by the appellate order,\n\n1s, therefore, unfounded. Take another case. Suppose the appellate order says only that a different amount from that mentioned in the Income-tax Officer's order shall be payable on income for a certain period without specifying the person to whom or the place where it is to be paid. The effect of it must be to wipe out the Income-tax Officer's order since the two cannot exist together. In such a case along with the superseded order the default if any incurred in connection with it must also disappear. There will ha, ve to be a fresh notice under s. 29 in respect of the amount due under the appellate order on breach of which a fresh default may arise.\n\nIt was, however, said that the Act nowhere requires the appellate order to state the amount payable or to specify the time when, the place where and the person to whom it is to be paid. That may be so but that does not affect what I have said.\n\nSection 45 clearly contemplates the appellate order setting out these things and there is nothing in the Act to prevent the Appellate Commissioner from setting them out. Since s. 45 cannot be read as contemplating an impossibility. it must be held that the Appellate Commissioner may in his order specify the amount payable and state the other particulars about time of\n\npayment etc. If he can do so, that would be enough for my 1964 present purpose and it .is not necessary for it that the Act must J.comct;;; Officer, m every case reqmre him to do so. In case where the appellate Kolar and Another order specifies an amount as payable, the Income-tax Officer's 8 hu B\"hiah 8, 11 order must be deemed to have been superseded. \"J _ w\n\nOne other argument to which I have to refer at this stage is that if the assessee's contention be correct, then the discretion given to the Income-tax Officer by s. 45 not to treat an assessee in default becomes infructuous for then in every case on the making of the appellate order the default earlier incurred must disappear. This does not seem to me to put the position accurately. It is not in dispute tht the filing of an appeal does not stay the operation of the original order. So if before the appellate order is made, the amount dl!e is realised by the coercive process following the default, then those steps do not become invalid. There may be a, liability to refund but none the Jess what was done was legal when done. Again it would, in my view, depend on the terms of the appellate order whether the earlier default was wiped out or not. If, for example, the appellate order confirms the original order, then the default already incurred may not be affected. In both these cases the discretion to treat the assessee as a defaulter was effectively exercised. The argument that the acceptance of the assessee'!\\ contention would render part of s. 45 nugatory and should, therefore, not be accepted, is in my opinion unsound.\n\nHow then doe.s the matter stand? It seems to me tha.t the crux of it is the effect of the appellate order on the original order. If the original order has been destroyed or replaced by the appellate order, then the notice of demand and all other steps based upon the original order must be deemed to have become ineffective.\n\nIn such a case the default earlier incurred must be taken to have disappeared and cannot support further action for recovery of any tax. Now the general proposition is that an original order merges in the appella.te order: cp. Madan Gopa/ Rungta v. Secretary to the Government of Orissa('). But in the present case. it is not necessary to rely on that proposition. Section 31(3) of the Act seems to me to make express provision on the subject. It states that in the case of an appeal from an order of assessment, which is the kind of order with which we are now concerned, the Appellate Commissioner may \"(a) confirm, reduce, or enhance or annul the assessment, or (b) set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making such further enquiry as the Incometax Officer thinks fit or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may direct, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed\n\n(') [1962] Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 906.\n\nSarkar, J.\n\n196l to make such fresh assessment and determine where necessary Incometax Officer, the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh asscss- Kolar awi Another ment.\" There will, of course, be no occasion to determine the Beghu Buj, iah Setty amount of the tax payable on the basis of the fresh asse&sment\n\n- if the income on that assessment appears to be below lhe tax- Rark'\"• J. able level. I will consider the various orders contemplated by s. 31(3)(a) & (b) and their effect.\n\nIt may be that when an appellate order confirms the original order, the default earlier incurred and aII steps taken pursuant thereto remain unaffected, for such an order may maintain intact the original order. Now it is not in dispute that when the 'appeIIate order pnnuls the earlier order, the default disappears. It is said that that is because the debt ceases to exist. I do not quite follow this. It has never been questioned that the debt becomes due when demand is made under s. 29 and s. 45 of the Act: see Doorga Prosad Chamaria v .. Secretary of State('). Therefore if a debt is 'to cease to exist it must be because the source from which it sprang, namely. the original order, has been annihilated by the appeIIate order annulling it.\n\nIn fact s. 31 (3)(a) contemplates an annulment of the original assessment order itself; the demand under s. 29 or s. 45 is not annulled directly by i~. Therefore, in the case of an order of annulment under s. 31 the original order of assessrpent is itself destroyed. If it disappears, I cannot conceive the default based on it continuing in force. Likewise, where under cl. (b) of s. 31(3) the appeilate order sets aside the assessment, the same result must clearly follow. There is not )llUCh difference between annulling an order and setting it aside; both wipe out the original order.\n\nI now come to an appellate order enhancing the assessment. With regard to it, it has not been disputed that a fresh notice of demand must issue. If this notice has to be in respect of the entire amount, then clearly the default earlier incurred for the smaller amount found due by the original order must have gone for the liability was one and there could not be two defaults in tespect of it. But it was said that the notice has to be issued in respect of the enhanced amount only. Indeed in some of the cases cited at the bar it has been so said. I have very grave doubts about the correctness of this view. The notice of demand can only issue in respect of the amount due fa consequence of an order. Unless, therefore, the appellate order specifies only the enhanced amount as due I do not see how a notice in respect of that amount can be issued under s. 29. The appellate order has to specify an amount due. If it specifies the entire amount due including the enhancement, then it cannot be said that under it the amount of the enhancement only is due and no notice demanding such an amount\n\n(') 72 I.A. 114.\n\nonly under s. 29 can be issued. If the appellate order specifies 1961 only the amount of the enhancement, it will be making an Incometax Officer, additional or supplementary assessment. Apart from s. 34 of Kolar and Another the Act with which we are not now concerned, I am not aware se91,. Bnehiah Setfy of any other provision which permits such an assessment. n any case s. 31 (3)(a) does not seem to me to contemplate tt.\n\nTherefore, in my view when an order of enhancement of assessment is made under s. 31 the notice must be in respect of the entire amount and in such a case the earlier notice issued in respect of original order must be deemed to have been superseded.\n\nBut assume I am wrong in this. Assume that an appellate order cf enhancement ma.y be confined to the amount of the enhancement only. Even so I am wholly unable to agree that the appellate order cannot specify the entire enhanced amount due. There is nothing in the Act to prevent this being done.\n\nWhen this is done then at least the original order and the notice must be deemed to have been put out of existence along with the default arising from the non-compliance with the latter and all its consequences.\n\nThat leaves only the aase of an appellate order reducing the amount. It seems to me that it would be somewhat curious if in all other cases excepting the case of a confirmation, the appellate order destroys the original order it does not do so in the case of a reduction. An order confirming may be different for it confirms a, nd, therefore, does not destroy. It has, however, been said that \"if subsequently the demand is modified on appeal and the amount of the tax payable is reduced, all that happens is that the liability sought to be imposed by the notice of demand, in respect of the amount by which the assessment is reduced is found to have never been a liability at all but the liability in respect of the remainder which stands unaffected by the appellate order remains\" and also that \"where a notice of the demand has, in fact, been issued in respect of a larger amount as determined by the assessment order, it has been issued even in respect of the smaller amount\n\nwich is ultimately found to be the tax properly payable. That bemg so, the assessee was under an obligation to pay it by the date fixed and if he did not pay it by that date, he became a, defaulter\": see Ladhuram Taparia v. D. K. Ghosh and Ors.(') With great respect I am unable to accede to this proposition and the conclusion based thereon that the default and its consequences continue even after the appellate order reducing the original assessment. How does the assessee know before the\n\napllate order the smaller amount which he might ultimately be liable to pay? It would be curious if he did not know what he had to pay and could still ha, ve defaulted in paying it.\n\n(') 33 I.T.R. 407, 423, 424.\n\nSarkar, J.\n\n1901 The order of reduction must, in my opinion, necessarily\n\n.lncometax Officer, have the effect of setting aside the original order as a whole . .Kolar and Aiwtlier It does not simply strike out a few of the figures appearing in\n\n8 h B •;. 1\n\n~ . the original order. That would really be a case of rectification eg \" ·~~· ' elly for which provision is made ins. 35 of the Act. What an appel SarJ, at, J. late order does in a case of reduction is, as in the present case, to go into all the figures and arrive afresh at the assessable income which replaces the amount of the income arrived at by the Income-tax Officer. Therefore it seems to me that in all cases of an appellate order reducing the assessment the original order goes and if it goes, of course the notice of demand also falls to the ground and the default based thereupon also ceases to be default anymore. Suppose the appellate order itself stated that a smaller amount of tax was payable after it had reduced the figure of the assessable income at which the Income-tax Officer had arrived. Indeed I cannot imagine how else it can be expressed. After such an order the original order must go for the debt being one the two cannot exist together. If that order goes, all default arising out of it must also go.\n\nTherefore I think that on the Income-tax Officer's order being revised in appeal, the default based on it and all consequential proceedings must be taken to have been superseded and fresh proceedings have to be started to realise the dues as found by the revised order.\n\nComipg now to the present case, in view of the order made in it, it seems to me impossible to contend that the original default continued. What happened in the present case was that on December 17, 1955 the Appellate Commissioner reduced the assessable income of the assessee as found by the Income-tax Officer by a large sum and directed him 110 recompute the tax due on the basis of the assessable income stated in the appellate order. The assessee was not informed about the recomputed amount of tax till February 14, 1956. The assessee had not paid the tax mentioned in the Income-tax Officer's order. If he had done that then he would under the express terms of the appellate order have become entitled to a refund. What then was the position between these two dates?\n\nIf the revenue authorities are right, then the assessee continued to be in default even after the appellate order. But what was the amount in respect of which he was so in default? Clearly he could not have continued to be in default in respect of the amount found due by the Income-tax Officer in his original order for that amount was no longer due. He could not have been in default in respect of the amount which was found due on recomputation by the Income-tax Officer according to the direction of the Appellate Commissioner because he did not know that amount. It would be absurd if the Act contemplated a default without the assessee knowing the amount in respect of which the default occurred and without his having; a chance '\n\nto pay it. It would be impossible to construe the Act in a way 1964 to produce that result. It has, therefore. to be held that between I\"\"\"\"1dax OJ!i<er the date of the appellate order and the communica.tion of the Kolar and AMlhe; , recomputed amount of the tax to the asessee by the Income- Seghu B.0.iah Saty\n\ntax Officer there could be. no default. Smee the Act does not _ provide for a default being in suspension for a period it must Sarkar, J. be held that the original default ceased to exist after the appellate order was made. Proceedings initiated on the original default before the appellate order could not, therefore, be .continued any more. Indeed the appellate order superseded the original order and its consequences.\n\nIf the effect of an appellate order reducing the assessment :as in the present case did not wipe out the original order, a most anomalous situa.tion would, in my view, arise. Under s. 46(1) of the Act after a default has been committed in terms -0f s. 45(1) the Income-tax Officer may impose a penalty not exceeding the amount of the tax due in respect of which the default has occurred. This penalty may be recovered in the same way as the tax due, tha.t is to say, by a notice under s. 29 and thereafter by a certificate issued under s. 46(2). Now suppose the penalty for the full amount of the tax found due by the Income-tax Officer has been imposed and thereafter the appellate order reduces the amount of the tax. What happens to the order of penalty then? Obviously it does not automati- <:ally stand reduced to the reduced amount of the tax. It would again be absurd if the penalty could be recovered for the full original amount. The only sensible view to take in such a case would be that the order of penalty falls to the ground and the only logical way to support that conclusion would be to say that the original default has disappeared.\n\nFor these reasons I have come to the conclusion tha.t the decision of the High Court was right and I would, therefore, dismiss the appeals.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-These appeals by special leave arise Hid!Jyatullalt, J from a common order in two writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution passed by the High Court of Mysore on April ·\n\n16. 1959. The Income-tax Officer, Kolar and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore are the appellants before us. The assessee Seghu Buchiah Setty, who is the respondent, is a merchant of Srinivaspur, Kolar pistrict. The appeals relate to the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55 in respect of which assessments were made under s. 23(4) of the Incometax Act. For the assessment year 1953-54; the assessee's income was estimated to be Rs. 61,000 /- and the tax levied was Rs. 19,808-1-0. For the second year, his income was estimated to be Rs. 1,21,000 and the tax levied was Rs. 66,601-3-0. The assessee applied under s. 27 of the Income-tax Act for the cancellation of these assessments but his applications were\n\n1!!64 rejected. It was stated before us that other proceedings were• Inwmetax Officer, pending in this behalf; but I am not concerned with them ex- Kolar \"ad Annt1'a cept in so far as a preliminary objection based on those and\n\n8,91,,, n,, i,;0 1, &tty some other proceedings was made before us to which 1 shall -- refer presently. After the assessment was made, the Income- Hidayni•llah, J. tax Officer sent notices of demand asking the assessee to pay Rs. 86,409-4-0 as tax, and on default, issued a certificate under s. 46(2) of the Act to the Collector of Kolar District to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue.\n\nOn December 17, 1955, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, \"A\" Range, Bangalore, before whom the assessments were challenged by appeal, passed his order and assessed the income for the two years to be Rs. 28,000/- and Rs. 46,000/- respectively. The 1 ncome-tax Officer did not issue any fresh notices of demand under s. 29 of the Act but wrote a letter. demanding the reduced tax for the two years which now stood reduced to Rs. 4.215-9-0 and Rs. 13,346-8-0 respectively. It is significant that the reduction in the tax was from eighty-six thousand rupees to seventeen thousand rupees. It appears that the assessee took further appeals to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the matter was said to be pending there.\n\nThe assessee then applied to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the old certificates issued under s. 46(2) by the Income-tax Officer on the ground that as. no fresh notices of demand were issued against him in respect of the reduced tax, he was not in default. The High Court accepted this contention and the necessary writs quashing the proceedings were issued. After the decision of the High Court, fresh notices of demand for the reduced tax were isswd to the assessee on May 8, 1959 and those proceedings were also pending. The preliminary objection which is based on the pendency of the other proceedings and particularly the last fact is really of great force, because these appeals do not now appear to serve any tangible purpose. However, the appeals were heard at length and I must express my decision on the poinil mooted before us.\n\nJn these appeals. the Department contends that the original notices of demand issued in September 1955 had not become inoperative after the order of the Appellate Ass; stant Commissioner. The reason advanced is that there is nothing in the J ncome-tax Act which requires that a fresh notice of demand must issue every time the amount of tax is reduced in appeal. It is pointed out that if a previous notice of demand is not compiied with. the assessee becomes a defaulter and it is submitted that he continues to be a defaulter, in respect of the balance. It is however conceded that where the Appellate Assistant Commissioner incrnases the assessment, a fresh notice\n\n7 S.C.R\n\nSUPRE:'.\\IE COURT REPORTS 159\n\nof demand must issue. It is urged that proceedings for recovery 19'\" which may have commenced are likely to become useless if1,,,0,,,,,;;()fficer, fresh notices were compulsory, and it is submitted that all that Koh11 and Anoth\" is necessary is to inform the assessee and the Collector bys ghu 8,,~;. .. ,,,, >'elfy letters what the reduced amount is and as the default still -- - continues, the reduced amount can straightaway be realised mJay•dulloh, J. on the old certificates and a refund can be ordered if excess amount has already been recovered. The assessee contends that the original notice of demand lapses and with it the default and the certificate, and that the Income-tax Officer is bound to issue a fresh n.otice of demand.\n\nThe High Court accepted the asses.see's contention following a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Metropolitan Structural Works Ltd. v. Union of Tndia('). The' appellants contend that the true view of the law is contained in a later decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Ladhuram Taparia v. D. K. G/u; sh and others('), where the earlier case was explained. The appellants rely further on The Municipal Board, Agra v. Commissioner of Income-tax, United Provinces: No. 2('), Auto Transport Union (Private) Ltd. v. Tncometax Officer, Alwaye(') and Hiralal v. Tncome-tax Officer(\") for support.\n\nIn Metropolitan Structural Works Ltd. v. Union of.\n\nTndia(') there were successive demand notices after the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal reduced the assessment and the Income-tax Officer finally sent a certificate under s. 46(2) of the Act. The assessee in that case, relying upon the seventh sub-section of s. 46, claimed that the proceedings were barred as according to it, the period of one year could only be calculated from the last day of the financial year in which demand was made and this could only be the first demand. It was contended by the assessee that the Act did not provide that a fresh notice should issue after revision of assessment. though it was admitted that there was no prohibition. Chakravartti, C. J. and Lahiri, J. observed:\n\n\"The real point, however, is whether a second or a third notice of demand is at all permissible under s. 29, even when an assessment is altered in a first or a second appeal. It appears to me that the necessity of issuing a fresh notice of demand in such circumstances is beyond argument.\"\n\n(') (1955) 28 I.T.R. 432.\n\n(\") (1951) 19 I.T.R. 63.\n\n(\") (1962) 45 I.T.R. 317.\n\n(Italics supplied)\n\n(') (1958) 33 I.T.R. 407.\n\n(') (1962) 45 I.T.R. 103.\n\n1964 The learned Chief Justice gave illustrations of those cases' in Jncomeu.. Ojficer, which the earlier notice becomes \"inappropriate\". Addressing KJlar and Anoth<r himself to the necessity of a new notice, the learned Chief\n\nSeqhu Bu\"a.iah Setty Justice observed :\n\nHidayalullal1, J. \"In my view the answer to that could only be in the\n\naffirmative.\"\n\n(Italics supplied~\n\nThe difference between the word~ 'in consequenc<: of any order' used in the Act and 'in consequance of any o:; sessment order in pursuance of this Act' which, he pointed out, could have easily been used, ws next stressed and he held that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal answered the former description. He expressed his conclusion thus:\n\n\"If so, when there is some tax due in consequence of an order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or in consequence of an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, a clear occasion arises under the words of the section to serve a notice of demand upon the assessee. That such fresh notice should be issued when the assessment is altered is but common sense and I see no reasori to construe the section against reason and against the actual necessities of realisation.\"\n\nIn the next case, Ladhuram Taparia v. D. K. Ghosh and others(') the facts were the converse. There a demand notice was issued and then the tax was reduced. The assessee con-· tended that there should be a fresh notice of dem2, nd before\n\nhe was deemed to be in default. Chakravartti, C. J. and Das Gupta, J. held that on reduction of assessment nothing further was required beyond an intimation to the assessee and the Collector of the reduction of the tax. The reason given was that the demand in respect of the excess stood 'eliminated' and the demand for the balance remained. It was held tha.t a case of enhancement was different and it needed a fresh notice of demand. It was however not pointed out whether the fresh demand should be for the excess amount or the whole of the amount. Nor was it shown why a letter to the assessee and the Collector would not do in that case also. In either case, speaking arithmetically, a portion of the demand is saved, but speaking legally, the demand notice, to quote the words of the earlier judgment, 'becomes inappropriate'.\n\nWhether the learned Chief Justice was right on the first occasion or on the second can only be said after discussing the relative sections of the Income-tax Act, but this much I must\n\n(') (1958) 33 I.T.~7.\n\nsay (and I say it with considerable hesitation and diffidence ' 1964 since 1 have always held the learned Chief Justice in high lneomrtnx Officer, esteem) that he has not been able to get clear of the words Kata',,.,,, Another used by him on the earlier occasion. It seems anomalous that 8 , B \"i. h-8 11 if the tax is increased from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 10,010/- a fresh '9\"' '.'.'.'.'.'~ ... ' 11 notice of demand must go, that is to say me earner default 1s m.z,,,1a1u11n1,; J. wiped off; but if it is reduced from Rs. 10,010 /- to Rs. I 0 !- a fresh notice is not required and the assessee must be deemed to be in default for Rs. IO with all the evil consequences of cjefault because he did not pay an extra ten thousand rupees with the ten rupees. But it may be said, there is no room for logic and mathematics if the Act so requires and the true answer can only be furnished by what the law requires. Before dealing with the pertinent sections to determine how the matter stands there, I may say that the other cases of the other High Courts cited earlier do not add to the discussion, but mention must be made of The Municipal Board Agra v. Commissioner of Income-tax, United Provinces:No. 2('). In that case, though a fresh notice of demand was served after 1eduction of tax under s. 35 of the Income-tax Act, calculation of limitation from the date of service of that notice was 11ot allowed because the clauses relating to right of appeal, period of limitation etc. were pencilled through. The reason given was that s. 35(4) makes it compulsory to serve a notice of demand only when there is enhancement and as no fresh notice is made compulsory when the tax is reduced, none need issue.\n\nAn assessee might, on such construction, lose his limitation for appeal in a case under s. 27 of the Income-tax Act even before the order Under s .• 27 determining the amount of ta::. is passed.\n\nIt is contended that there is no provision that a second or third notice of demand must issue. There is no need that the Act must expressly authorise the issue of fresh notices of demand. Even if such a power is not expressly included, it flows from s. 14 of the General Clauses Act under which a power can be exercised as often as the occasion demands. I am, however, of the opinion, that (except in cases of de minimis) the Act does contemplate that a fresh notice of demand shall issue. There are two reasons for it. The first is the language of s. 29 and the other is the consequences following the issuance of a notice of demand. I shall deal first with the second ground.\n\nAfter the demand is made, the tax, penalty and intere>t become a debt due to the Government. This was decided a long time ago by the Privy Council in Doorga Prasad v. Secretary of State('). Further, by issuing a notice of demand, the\n\n(') (1951) 19 I.T.R. 63. (') (1945) I.T.R. 285 at 289.\n\nLtP(D)!SCI--6 •\n\n1964 period of !imitation for appeals under s. 30 of the Act starts Incometax Officer in many cases. Further still, when the notice of demand is not Kolar and Anot,.; r complied with, the assessee can be treated as a person in de- 8 h B vi.. h s tt fault and he is liable to pay a penalty equal to the tax debt\n\n'II u ~· ' Y under s. 46(1) of the Income-tax Act. Lastly, on the failure of\n\nBidayatollah, J. the assessee to pay after a notice of demand is issued, the recovery proceedings can be started within a time limit and the amount of tax can be treated as an arrear of land revenue.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the notice of demand is a vital document in many respects. Disobedience to it makes the assessee a defaulter. It is a condition precedent to the trrntment of the tax as an arrear of land revenue. It is th1: starting point of limitation in two ways and the breach of obedience to the notice of demand draws a heavy penalty. The notice of demand which is issued must be in a form prescribed by r. 20 and the form includes the following particulars: it shows the amount which has to be paid and indicates the person to whom, the place where and the time within which it has to be so paid. Compare with it s. 45 of the Income-tax Act which provides:-\n\n\"Any amount specified as-payable in a notice of demand . . . . . . under section 29 or an order under section 31 or section 33 shall be paid within the time, at the place and to the person mentioned in the notice or order, or if a time is not so mentioned, then on or before the first day of the second month following the date of the service of the notice or order, and any assessee failing so to pay shall be deemed to be in default, proided that,·\n\nwhen an assessee has presented an appeal under section 30, the Income-tax Officer may in his discretion treat the assessee as not being in default as long as such appeal is nndisposed of: \"\n\n(Proviso and Explanation omitted).\n\nFrom this section, it follows that\" an assessee is deemed to be in default if he disobeys either a notice of demand under s. 29 or an order under ss. 31 and 33. The contents of the notice of demand may be included in these orders and the order then serves the purpose of a notice of demand as well. In both cases, if time is not mentioned, the assessee must pay the tax on or before the first day of the second month following the date of the service of the notice or order. Once a default is - incurred, it continues and the filing of an appeal does r:ot sav:e the assessee from the default. The Income-tax Officer can start and continue the proceedings for recovery of the tax not.withstanding the filing of the appeal. It is however to be\n\n...\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE1\\1E COURT REPORTS 163\n\nseen that he has been given the power to treat the assessee as 1964 not in default as long as the appeal is undisposed of. This Incometax Offictr, power is conferred, because s. 46(1) provides: Kolar awl AflOther\n\nv. \"When an assessee is in default in making a payment Seglm BucMah s.uy\n\nof income-tax, the Income-tax Officer may in his Hirlayalullah, J. discretion direct that, a sum not exceeding that amount shall be recovered from the assessee by way of penalty.\" To save an assessee from penalty, the Income-tax Officer may treat him as not in default but if he does not, he is within his rights.\n\nNow take a case in which an assessee is considered to be in default after a notice of demand is served. Assume that the tax which is due is Rs. 10,010. The Income-tax Officer, can, in his discretion, add another Rs. 10,010 by way of penalty and issue a certificate against him for recovery as arrears of land revenue of a sum of Rs. 20,020. Suppose the assessment is then reduced and his tax liability is found to be Rs. i 0. To say that the old proceedings for the recovery of Rs. 20,020\n\ncan still be pursued in respect of Rs. 20 and the petty amount re;:overcd as arrears of land revenue, when, if a notice of demand for Rs. l 0 were sent the assessee would have paid the sum readily, is to make the law operate very harshly without any advantage. To say again that the assessee whose tax is enhanced must receiv\" a fresh notice of demand because the old notice becomes inappropriate is to make the lot of a person whose tax is reduced worse than that of a person whose tax is increased. At least the contumacy of the latter is the same if not greater than that of the former.\n\nIt is said that all that is necessary is that the Income-tax Officer should write a letter informing the assessee that the tax is reduced from Rs. I 0,010 to Rs. 10. The question ~- why not send him a fresh noti_ce of demand? If there is no provision in the Income-tax Act to send a fresh notice there is none authorising the sending of letters. No doubt, the old proceedings for recovery of the tax might become out of date and inappropriate, but it is one thing to use coercion to recover an amount which the assessee did not but probably could not pay, and another to recover an amount which the assessee could and would pay readily. However, if the law requires that a notice of demand need not go, that would be the end --Of the matter; but, in my opinion, s. 29 in its terms is extremely clear 11nd indicates that a notice of demand must always issue.\n\nIt reads:\n\n\"When any tax, penalty or interest is due in consequence of any order passed under or in pursuance of this Act, the Income-tax Officer shall serve\n\nL.'P(D)!SCI---0\n\n.. _\n\n• ~, 5 eY l,.J.\n\n11!4 SUPRE.'lli COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nupon the assessee or other person liable to pay such tax. penalty or interest a notice of demand in the prescribed form specifying the sum so payable.\"\n\nThe learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court • if I may say respectfully. was pedectly right in pointing out its meaning in his first case. 1 cannot add to what he said and I adopt all he said. But I would add a few words. The mandatory part of the section is quite clear. \"The Income-tax Officer shall serve a notice of demand upon the assessee\", are emphatic words and the earlier part shows that he has to do it when tax is due in consequence of \"a11y order\". Any order means rot only an order passed by himself, but also an order passed by reason of the success of an appeal which the assessee may file and in which the old assessment is set aside. In view of the consequences that ensue. it is clear to me that when an assessment is gone through a second time and the amount of tax is reduced. the Income-tax Officer must intimate .to the assessee the reduced amount of tax and make a demand and t?ive him an opportunity to pay before treating him as a defaulter. This is incmnbent because the assessment resulting in the tax is itself set aside or modified and as assessee is entitled to a proper assessnu;:nt and ascertainment of tax bc:fore a demand can be made on him.\n\nIt is said that the Income-tax Officer can send a letter but the law says that he 'shall serve upon the assessee a iwtice of demand in the prescribed form'. When the law requin:s that a notice of demand should issue. the mode of compliance by a letter is excluded. It may be that the letter is a good substitute for a notii:e of demand but the section demands that it shou:d be 'in the pt\"escribed form'. If a letter is to be: written, why not a notice of demand? In other words. when the a~; essment\n\nis altered. whether it is reduced or it is increased, by reason of any ortkr under the Act. it is the duty of the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice of demand in the prescribed form and serve it upon the assessee. The learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court clearly was of the view in, the first case Jhat there was only one answer to the question and I respectfully agree with him. He could only depart from his earlier view by finding fault with the drafting of s. 45. 1 regret I cannot agree with him there. Section 45 intends that the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal may in some cases also serve as notices of demand. Further it is not clear from the later decision whether on the enhanamient of the tax. a fresh notice of demand is required for the excess only or fOI\" the whole of the sum. That answer is not furnished in any of the other cases to which reference was made at the bar. lf default is sa'YOO in respect of the redu!::!d amount. a -\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRKUE L'OURT REPORTS 165\n\ndefault would also be saved in respect of the original amount .!!!!!.__ when the demand is increased. If a notice of demand were to 1-()#t:lr. issue in respect of the excess only, there will be two notices K~-AM#a of demand and two starting points of limitation. both for the St9'tr &-.\n\nPurpose of coercive action under s. 46(7) as well as for pur- H~ J. poses of any appeal th'.lt might lie. If. however, a fresh notice of demand is lo go in respect of the composite sum. the question to ask wmld be. what happens to the default which was incurred already? How does it disappear\"! In my opinion. there is only oe possible answer and it was given by the learned Chief Justice in the earlier case.\n\nI would therefore dismiss these appeals and all the more readily because a fresh notice of demand has issued in this case. If it is disobeyed. the Income-tax Officer would be able to recall th~ old certificate issued to the Revenue Officer, amend it and bring it in line with the tax now demandable and return it to him for continuing the recovery proceedings.\n\nr would dismiss the appeals but in the circumstances of the C'.lse, I would make no order about costs.\n\nSHAH, J.-The Income-tax Officer. Kolar Cude, Kolar, ·•hi, J. assessed Seghu Buchiah Setty-respondent in this appeal-to income-tax under s. 23(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act. 1922 for the year 1953-54 on an estimated income of Rs. 61.000 and for the year 1954-55 on an estimated income of Rs. 1,21.000 and served notices of demand under s. 29 of the Act for the tax due tinder the two onlers of assessment. On the respondent failing to comply with the notices of demand within the period specified, the Income-tax Officer treated the respondent as in default and sent certificates under s. 46(2) of the Act to the Deputy Commissioner. Kolar. for recovery of the tax determined by the orders of assessment. The Deputy Commissioner attached certain properties belonging to the respondent. In appeals filed by the respondent against the orders of assessment the Appellate Assistant Commissioner reduced the income assessed for the year 1953-54 to Rs. 28.000 and for the year 1954-55 to Rs. 46.000. The Income-tax Officer did not issue fresh notices of demand pursuant to the modification in the orders of assessment made by the Appellate Assistant Comm•ssioner, but by his letter dated February 14, 1956 infonned the respondent that he had to pay tax as reduced by the appellate order. The respondent did not pay the amount of tax demanded, and applied to the High Court of Mysore under Art. 226. of the. Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the urt1ficates ISSUed by the Income-tax Officer treating him as in default and a writ of prohibition prohibiting the lncilllle-tax {)flicer frcm enforcing the certificates under s. 46(2) of the Income-tax Act. The High Court of Mysore relying upon the\n\n~ judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Metropolitan 1-tazOJli,,.r, Structural Works Ltd. v. Union of India(') held that the In-\n\nKo1ar Giid Another come-tax Officer could not, without issuing fresh notices of\n\n8.,,.,.-B.:Aioh seuy demand, after the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax reduced the taxable income, setting out the tax pay- Shao, J. able by him for the two years in question, treat the respondent as a defaulter and that the proceedings of the Collector based on the certificates issued pursuant to the order of assessment by the Income-tax Officer were illegal.\n\nAgainst th<~- orders passed by the High Court, the Income-tax Officer has appealed to this Court, with special leave.\n\nThe question which falls to be determined in this appeal is about the legal effect of the reduction of the assessable income by the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the notices of demand previously issued by the Income-tax Officer. The respondent contends that by the modifications made in the orders of assessment the notices of demand issued by the Income-tax Officer must be deemed cancelled or superseded, and he cannot be regarded as in default, unl<ess fresh notices of demand are issued by the Income-tax Officer specifying the amount payable pursuant to the appellate order. The respondent says that there was at the material time no outstanding demand notice or order specifying the amount payable failure to comply with which may be regarded as constituting a default. The respondent strongly relies upon the observations made by Chakravartti, C. J., in his judgment in Metropolitan Structural Works Ltd's case(') that where the income assessed by the Income-tax Officer is reduced in appeal. the notice of demand issued by the Income-tax Officer in respect of the income assessed by him will on such reduction cease to be appropriate, such being the meaning of the statute and any interpretation !O the contrary is \"against reason\" and \"against the actual necessities of realization\".\n\nThe respondent therefore submits that an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissionerin appeal not only supersedes the order of assessment against which the appeal is carried, but also the notice of demand issued by the Incometax Officer and _all proceedings taken for recovery of tax in pursuance of the notice of demand, and therefore default which has resulted from the failure to comply with the notice of demand becomes inoperative, when the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passes his order in appeal against the order of assessment, whether such order is of confirmation or variance.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer may, submits the respondent. issue a certificate under s. 46 if there be a fresh default resulting from non-compliance of the order of the Appellate authority. If this submission is true, the demand notices must be issue.ct and all\n\n(') (1955) 28 I.T.R., 432.\n\n-steps pursuant to an order of assessment for recovery must be\n\ncompleted before the appeal. against the order of assessmnt Jncomet\"\" qffi ....\n\n. d\" d f If .h d\" l d h \"ll Kolar and and,..,. 1s 1spose o . t e procee mgs are not comp ete , t ey w1 v. be superseded by the order passed by the appellate authority. Seghu Buchiah B<llJ\n\nWe may examine the correctness of the piea raised by the respondent in the iight ot the scheme for recovery of tax, penalty or interest due under the provisions of the Act. After the income of an assessee is computed, and liability to pay lax, penalty or interest is determined in the manner provided by the Act, proceedings for recovery of the amount commence.\n\nA notice of demand is the foundation of such proceedings and -0f the jurisdiction to collect the tax. It is the notice of demand which converts the liability determined by the order of assessment into a debt due by the assessee to the State. There must therefore be a valid order of assessment, on which a notice of demand may be founded. Section 29 invests the [ncome-tax Officer alone with jurisdiction to issue a notice of demand, and no other officer out of the hierarchy of Revenue Oflicers bas that jurisdiction. It provides:\n\n\"When any tax, penalty or interest is due in consequence of any order passed under or in pursuance of this Act, the Income-tax Officer shall serve Ppon the assessee or other person liable to pay such tax, penalty or interest a notice in the prescribed from specifying the sum so payable.\"\n\nThe notice of demand has to be in the form prescribed under rule 20 which requires that the amount demanded, and the person to whom together with the place where it is to be paid, must be stated in the notice. Section 45 of the Act provides that the amount specified as payable in the notice of demand or an order under s. 31 ors. 33 shall be paid within the time, at the place and to the person mentioned therein, or if no time\n\nbe so mentioned, then on or before the first day of the second month following the date of the service of the notice or order and if the assessee fails to pay the tax he shall be deemed to be in default, unless the assessee has presented an appeal under s. 30 of the Income-tax Act and the Income-tax Officer in his discretion treats the assessee as not being in default as long as such appeal is undisposed of. Section 45 therefore prescribes the conditions under which a person may be treated as in default. Section 46 provides the mode and time pf recovery of the amount due by an assessee. Sub-sections (2) to\n\n(6) of s. 46 lay down the method which may be adopted for recovery of the dues. Sub-section (2) authorises the Income-tax\n\nOfficer to forward to the Collector a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears due from an asessee.\n\nThe Collector, on receipt of such certificate has to proceed to\n\nSllah, J.\n\n1964 recover from such assessee the amount specified therein as if Jncometax Officer, it were an arrear of land revenue. Sub-sections (3) to (6) deal Kolar anll Anot1\"r with other modes of recovery. But resort to the modes of re-\n\n8,91,,. B;; hiah Setty covery is subject to sub-s. (7) which provides that save in ac- - cordance with the provisions of sub-s. (!) of s. 42, or of the Shah, J. proviso to s. 45, (which are for the purposes of this case not material) no proceedings for recovery of any sum payable under the Act shall e commenced after the expiration of one year from the last day of the financial year in which a demand is made under the Act. The Act therefore provides that if an assessee makes default in complying with the notice of demand or order under ss. 31 or 33, proceedings may be taken in the manner provided in s. 46 for recovery of the: tax clue but such proceedings shall not be commenced after the expiration of the period specified in sub-s. (71.\n\nBy the determination of tax under s. 23, or imposition of penalty in circumstances mentioned in s. 28, or liability for payment of interest in circumstances mentioned in s. l.8-A(4), (6), (7) or (8) obligation to pay tax, penalty or interest arises, and upon service of a notice of demand under s. 29 or an order under s. 31 or s. 33, the tax, penalty or interest become due and payable, and if the tax is not paid within the time specified, the assessee must, unless the Income-tax Officer otherwise directs, be treated as in default. Against the assessee in default, the Income-tax Officer may take appropriate steps for recovery of tax as prescribed in els. (2) to (6) of s. 46. But the Legislature has not enacted that steps taken by the Incometax Officer for recovery of tax will lapse or be superseded when the appeal against the order of assessment passed by the Income-tax Officer is disposed of by the appellate authority.\n\nSection 45 in terms provides that when an assessee is served with the notice of demand and has failed to comply with the notice, he shall, unless otherwise ordered, be deemed to be a defaulter. The Act provides a right of appeal against the order of assessment, but on the presentation of the appeal the power of the I ncometax Officer to take steps for recovery of tax is not suspended, The Income-tax Officer is obliged by the statute to issue a notice of demand for payment of tax, penalty or interest due in consequence of any order passed under or in pursuance of the Act. Lodging of an appeal does not c, prate as a stay and would not entitle the assessee to withhold payment of tax till the appeal is decided. The Income-tax Officer may in his discretion treat the assessee as not in default as long as such appeal is not disposed of, but unles:> such an order is passed the assessee would, on failure to comply with the order, be a defaulter and proceedings for recovery of tax I may be initiated and continued during the pendency of the, appeal.\n\n7 S.C.H.\n\nSUPHEME COUHT REPORTS 169\n\nIt is clear therefore that when tax, penalty or interest is\n\ndetermined and demanded, proceedings shaU be commenced Incom•ta• Oifi<er, Kolar and Anolhe~ for recovery, and these proceedings may be commenced and ... continued, notwithstanding the presentation of an appeal. By Seghu Buchiah. Selig\n\nfailing to comply with the demand the assessee becomes a defaulter, and it is not provided that he shall cease to be a defaulter on the disposal by the appellate authority of the appeal against the order of assessment. In the absence of such a provision, it is difficult to perceive any ground' for holding that the proceedings commenced against a defaulting tax-payer for recovery of tax must be abandoned, and fresh proceedings commenced for recovery of tax pursuant to the order of the appellate authority. If on the passing of an order by the zppellate authority, the notice of demand previously issued is deem ed to be cancelled or superseded, an assessee must be treated as absolved from the consequences of his default even if the appellate authority confirms the order of the Income-tax Officer, because the earlier default by the tax-payer will in every case go by the board, and the proceedings must be commenced again after service of a fresh notice of demand. The discretion vested in the Income-tax Officer to treat or not to treat an assessee pending appeal in default will, in all cases be valueless. The provisions of the Act do not indicate any such legislative intent and express enactment conferring upon the Incometax Officer, in his exercise of discretion, power not to treat a person who has preferred an appeal as a defaulter, contains strong indication to the contrary. Therefore, in my view a person who has failed to comply with a notice of demand would continue to be a defaulter notwithstanding the reduction of liability by order of the appellate authority. There would be only one exception to this rule i.e. when the order of assessment is wholly set aside. But that is not a real exception, for against the assessee no steps can be taken because there is no debt due by him.\n\nIt was urged that a person can be said to be in default in payment of tax, when he fails to comply with a demand. for a specific amount, and when the amount payable by him is reduced in appeal, he is no longer in default because he has had no opportunity to meet the reduced demand. But the status of a defaulter under the Act is a condition for initiation of proceedings for recovery, and by the reduction of liability in appeal the status is not altered. Even if the amount due is. modifie~, the status persists, but th~ process for recovery will. be a~1sted accordmg to the modified demand including the 1mpos1t10n of penalty under s. 46(1). It is true that the Act contains no express. provision which enables the Income-tax Officer to modify the certificate which is issued to the Collector, but the absence of such a provision does not detract from\n\nBhai, J.\n\n1964 the duty of the Income-tax Officer to give information to the 1\"\"'11U1ax Offiaer, recovering authority about the reduction in the liability for Kola'\"ntl Another tax, penalty or interest made by the appellate authority and Beghu s:Chiah seuy to request such authority to adjust his proceeding to the modified demand. Such a duty must necessarily be implied. An Skah, J. error in the certificate can always be clarified by an amendment and if that power be granted, there is no reason to suppose that a demand which is reduced because of subsequent events, such as modification of the assessment by the appellate authority, or payment made by the tax-payer as directed by the notice of demand may not be enforced in a manner consistent with the outstanding demand. If in an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner enhances the tax, the Income-tax Officer may give intimation to the recovering authority about the enhanced demand. No fresh notice is contemplated to be given by the Act in the case either of reduction of assessment or enhancement. The plea that a fresh notice of demand may have to be issued when the assessment is enhanced is not warranted by the statute, and the argument that against the assessee two notices of demand may in certain cases be issued, failure to comply with which may make him doubly a defaulter has no valid basis.\n\nCounsel for the respondent urged that it is open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to specify by his order the time and place at which the tax determined by him is to be paid, and the person to whom it is to be paid. If the Appellate Assistant Commissioner does so specify the amount, the person to whom and the place at which the payment is to be made, the order of the Income-tax Officer would be deemed to be superseded and it would be the duty of the assessee then to pay the tax determined pursuant to the order of the Appellate Authority after a fresh notice is served upon him and he cannot be deemed to be in default unless he has failed to comply with the directions of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner within the period prescribed by that order. Section 45 does undoubtedly refer to the amount specified in an order passed under s. 31--which deals with the procedure and the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner hearing an appeal from the order .of the Income-tax Officer, and to the amount specified in an order under s. 33 dealing with the procedure and the power of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in appeal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and provides that default in payment of the amount so specified can only arise if it is not paid within the time at the place and to the person mentioned in the order under s. 31 or s. 33 or in the demand notice under s. 29. But ss. 31 & 33 do not provide that in making their respective orders the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal shall determine the\n\ntax, penalty or interest, and shall also prescribe the time with- 196' in which, the person to whom, and the place at which the - 0 amount specified shall be paid, and it would be difficult to k°:~~~'::;; ~,;;,. accept the contention that the Legislature in enacting s. 45-a v .. provision relating to recovery of tax intended to provide thatScghu Buchiah Bd/f in exercise of the appellate powers, the Appellate Assistant Bltal, J.\n\nCommissioner and the Income-tax Tribunal shall comply with certain requirements. In certain exceptional cases ; uch HS those in which an appeal is filed only against the amount of tax determined under s. 23 or against imposition of penalty under s. 28 or against orders specifying the amount of interest payable\n\nunder s. 18-A, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal may, in their final orders, specify the amount to be paid and also the time within which and the place at which and the person to whom the amount is to be paid. Such a direction is intended only to effectuate in appropriate cases the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal. It does not take the place of a notice of demand, but if made, may operate if not complied with to make the person liable to pay the amount specified a defaulter. An Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in an appeal against the order of the Income: tax Officer, either confirm the assessment or modify it by reducing or increasing it. Similarly the Tribunal may confirm the assessment of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or may reduce the assessment. But the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal are not required by statute to specify the amount as payable in their order, nor are they required to direct payment to be made in their order.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal have power to impose penalty in the conditions specified in els. (a), (b) or (c) of sub-s. (!) of s. 28 of the Income-tax Act.\n\nBut these orders are passed in exercise of their appellate jurisdiction conferred by ss. 31 and 33 of the Act and where the Appellate Assistant Commissioner imposes penalty he may specify the amount thereof. Similarly the Tribunal imposing penalty may specify the amount of penalty. To such cases the provision relating to default arising on failure to comply with the direction to pay may apply if the person to whom. and the place rat which, it is to be paid are specified.\n\nThe assumption. that s. 45 ?f the Income-tax Act requires the appellate authonty to specify the amount payable in the order therefore seems to be unwarranted and the fact that under certain circumstances, having regard to the nature of !he order appealed froi; n. the appellate uthority may specify\n\n'':1 the. order such parttculars, does not iustify the interpreta !ton e1ter that the Income-tax Officer bas the power to issue the nottce of demand only in those cases where by inadvertence the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal\n\n1964 have failed to specify the amount payable or that the passing of orders by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Jnwmetax Officer, .. -...1 • h Kolar and .4no11\"' Tribunal deciding the appeal has the effect of super.icumg t e\n\nv. . notices of demand issued by the Income-tax Offici:r. In the S1a\"11 Bw; Tnali Silly absence of any provision imposing an obligation upon the\n\ns1,.1,, J.\n\nIncome-tax Officer to issue successive notices of demand from time to time for recovery of the amount due during the process of assessment, it must be held that the notices of demand issued by the Income-tax Officer in exercise of the power under s. 29 may be enforced in the manner provided by s. 46 and within the period of limitation provided in cl. (7) of s. 46, even after the appeal against the order of assessment by th1~ Incometax Officer is cjisposed of, subject to adjustment of the amount io be recovered in the light of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nObservations made by Chakravartti, C. J., in the case in Metropolitan Structural Works Ltd's case(') do lend support, to the argument that the issue of a fresh notice on modification by the appellate authority was a \"matter of reason\" and \"based on the actual necessities of realisation\" and that it is obligatory upon the Income-tax Officer to issue such a notice on every occasion when the assessment was modified. But the learned Chief Justice himself explained the observations in his judgment in Ladhuram Taparia v. D. K. Ghosh and others(') and pointed out that in Metropo/ita11 Stmctural Works Ltd's . case(') the sole question which fell to be determined was as to the commencement of the period of limitation under s. 46(7) for enforcement of a notice of demand when successive notices of demand were in fact issued by the Income-tax Officer, and that the earlier judgment was not intended to lay down and did not lay down that the Income-tax Officer was under an obligation to issue a fresh notice of demand merely because the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had modified the assessment. Chakravartti, C. J., after referring to the contention which was advanced and his observations regarding the necessity of issuing a fresh notice of demand where the earlier notice Jiad become inappropriate by reason of reduction in the amount of the tax payable observed at p. 422:\n\n\"To say that was not to say that a necessary modification of the demand could only be made by issuing a second notice under section 29 and could not be made in any other way, or to put it in other words, it was not to say that the necessity of issuing a\n\nfresh notice of demand was an invariable and imperative necessity\n\n(') 28 I.T.R. 432.\n\n(') 33 I.T.R 407.\n\nI am altogether unable to see how that decision 1964 can be construed as having laid down that when- 1 d od. . b nc<>mttax OJfiCRr, ever an assessment or er was m tfied Y an Kolar awl AMllur appellate order, an obligation arose to issue a sev .. cond notice of demand under section 29, if the Beghu BucT11ah SeUy modified amount was sought to be made payable s11a/1, J. and if it was sought to establish that a default in respect of the modified demand has beeh. committed.\"\n\nThe observations of Chakravartti, C. J., in the Metropolitan Structural Works Ltd's case(') relating to the necessity of issuing a fresh notice on the modification of the assessment were somewhat wide and literally read may support the argu ment advanced by the counsel for the respondent in this case, but they were, in my judgment, unnecessary for the purpose of deciding the case and did not correctly interpret the provisions of ss. 29, 45 and 46. The view which has been expressed by Chakravartti, C. J., in Ladhuram Taparia's case(') has been adopted in other cases as well: Auto Transport Union (Private) Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Alwaye (3) and Hirata/ v.\n\nIncome-tax Officer and Mali Ram v. Collector Bhilwara (4).\n\nIn my view the validity of a certificate issued under s. 46(2) to the Collector for recovery of tax must depend upon the power of the Income-tax Officer to issue that notice. That power may be exercised only if the assessee is a defaulter, and the proceedings are commenced within the period provided in s. 46(71. If because of failure to comply with the notice of demand issued by the Income-tax Officer the assessee is in default, I fail to appreciate how such a person can be regarded as not in de-fault, merely because the order of assessment is modified but is not vacated. The High Court was, therefore, in error in holding that it was neessary to issue a fresh notice of demand. if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner modified the assessment so as to reduce the amount of tax due and unless such a notice was issued, the assessee could not be regarded as in default.\n\nThe appeal will therefore be allowed and the petition filed by the respondent will stand dismissed with costs in this Court and the High Court.\n\nORDER\n\nBy order of the majority. the appeals are dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs.\n\n(') 28 LT.R. 432.\n\n(') 45 I.T.R. 103.\n\n(') 33 I.T.R. 407.\n\n(')45 I.T.R. 317.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 216, "entities": [{"text": "March 11\n\n148 SUPREl\\JE", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 11\n\n148 SUPREl\\JE COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\nINCOME-TAX OFFICER, KOLAR AND ANOTHER v.\n\nSEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY\n\n(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, KOLAR AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, KOLAR AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 339, "end_char": 366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 29, 45, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 381, "end_char": 394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 574, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 594, "end_char": 608, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 819, "end_char": 827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1484, "end_char": 1504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent did not pay the amount of tax demanded, but applied to the High Court of Mysore under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1511, "end_char": 1519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1527, "end_char": 1548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1965, "end_char": 1971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (per Sarkar and Hidayatullah, JJ.).", "canonical_name": "Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1976, "end_char": 1988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (per Sarkar and Hidayatullah, JJ.).", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2348, "end_char": 2353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Per Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2601, "end_char": 2609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Shah, J. (dissenting)-In the absence of any provision imposing an obligation upon the Income-tax Officer to issue successive notices of demand from time to time for recovery of the arrlount due during the process of assessment, it must be held that the notices of demand issued by th\" Income-tax Officer in exercise of the power under s. 29 must b\" enforced in the manner provided by s. 46 and within the period of limitation\n\nprovided in cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2940, "end_char": 2945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2989, "end_char": 2994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3055, "end_char": 3060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3338, "end_char": 3340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore High\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3531, "end_char": 3549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the iu?g Sarka,, J. ment and order dated April 16, 1959 of the Mysore High\n\nCourt in Writ Petitions NDs."}}, {"text": "N. D. Kharkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. D. Kharkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3616, "end_char": 3630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. D. Kharkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. Srinivasan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3675, "end_char": 3688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Srinivasan and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondent (in the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3693, "end_char": 3700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Srinivasan and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondent (in the appeals)."}}, {"text": "March 11, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3750, "end_char": 3764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 11, 1964."}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3766, "end_char": 3772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR J. and HIDAYATULLAH J. de livered separate opinions dismissing the appeals.", "canonical_name": "Sarkar"}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR J. and HIDAYATULLAH J. de livered separate opinions dismissing the appeals.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3849, "end_char": 3853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH J. de livered a dissenting opinion allowing the appeal.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4038, "end_char": 4052, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4778, "end_char": 4783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The question in these two appeals is whether certain proceedings for the recovery of tax from the assessee under the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "The question in these two appeals is whether certain proceedings for the recovery of tax from the assessee under the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Kolar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5105, "end_char": 5110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On such failure to pay, the Income-tax Officer sometime in September 1955 sent certificates to the Deputy Commissioner, Kolar -under s. 46(2) of the Act far recovery of the tax as arrears of land revenue and the latter in the course of the same month attached various properties of the assessee under the Revenue Recovery Act."}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5118, "end_char": 5126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Revenue Recovery Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5290, "end_char": 5310, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "December 17, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on December 17, 1955, the appeals filed by the assessee which were till then pending were decided by the Appellate Commissioner."}}, {"text": "February 19, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5745, "end_char": 5762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that thereafter on February 19, 1956, the Income-tax Officer mformed the assessee that his tax liability for 1953-54\n\n1961 had been reduced to Rs."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6331, "end_char": 6339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7325, "end_char": 7339, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7653, "end_char": 7658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8189, "end_char": 8194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8210, "end_char": 8215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8270, "end_char": 8280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8361, "end_char": 8372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8382, "end_char": 8392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8411, "end_char": 8421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8425, "end_char": 8435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8934, "end_char": 8944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16050, "end_char": 16055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16823, "end_char": 16836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17880, "end_char": 17891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18401, "end_char": 18406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18411, "end_char": 18416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18673, "end_char": 18678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18770, "end_char": 18775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18779, "end_char": 18784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18871, "end_char": 18876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19046, "end_char": 19054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20111, "end_char": 20116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20381, "end_char": 20386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20567, "end_char": 20572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kolar and Another the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20576, "end_char": 20601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bnehiah Setfy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20661, "end_char": 20674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bnehiah Setfy of any other provision which permits such an assessment."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20743, "end_char": 20748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kolar and Another the Act", "statute": "Kolar and Another the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20875, "end_char": 20880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kolar and Another the Act", "statute": "Kolar and Another the Act"}}, {"text": "February 14, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25313, "end_char": 25330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee was not informed about the recomputed amount of tax till February 14, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27234, "end_char": 27242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27302, "end_char": 27310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27538, "end_char": 27543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27589, "end_char": 27597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hid!Jyatullalt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28400, "end_char": 28414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HIDAYATULLAH, J.-These appeals by special leave arise Hid!Jyatullalt, J from a common order in two writ petitions under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28466, "end_char": 28474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April ·\n\n16. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28533, "end_char": 28550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution passed by the High Court of Mysore on April ·\n\n16."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Officer,", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28556, "end_char": 28575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer, Kolar and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore are the appellants before us.", "canonical_name": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, KOLAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax,", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28590, "end_char": 28617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer, Kolar and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore are the appellants before us."}}, {"text": "Seghu Buchiah Setty", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28671, "end_char": 28690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee Seghu Buchiah Setty, who is the respondent, is a merchant of Srinivaspur, Kolar pistrict.", "canonical_name": "SEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY"}}, {"text": "Srinivaspur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28732, "end_char": 28743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee Seghu Buchiah Setty, who is the respondent, is a merchant of Srinivaspur, Kolar pistrict."}}, {"text": "Kolar pistrict", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28745, "end_char": 28759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee Seghu Buchiah Setty, who is the respondent, is a merchant of Srinivaspur, Kolar pistrict."}}, {"text": "s. 23(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28872, "end_char": 28880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29162, "end_char": 29167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29175, "end_char": 29189, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29779, "end_char": 29787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kolar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29819, "end_char": 29833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "86,409-4-0 as tax, and on default, issued a certificate under s. 46(2) of the Act to the Collector of Kolar District to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue."}}, {"text": "Bangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29956, "end_char": 29965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 17, 1955, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, \"A\" Range, Bangalore, before whom the assessments were challenged by appeal, passed his order and assessed the income for the two years to be Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30203, "end_char": 30208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30655, "end_char": 30663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30731, "end_char": 30739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 8, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31108, "end_char": 31119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the decision of the High Court, fresh notices of demand for the reduced tax were isswd to the assessee on May 8, 1959 and those proceedings were also pending."}}, {"text": "mJay•dulloh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32626, "end_char": 32637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">'elfy letters what the reduced amount is and as the default still -- - continues, the reduced amount can straightaway be realised mJay•dulloh, J. on the old certificates and a refund can be ordered if excess amount has already been recovered."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33005, "end_char": 33024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court accepted the asses.see's contention following a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Metropolitan Structural Works Ltd. v. Union of Tndia(')."}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33774, "end_char": 33782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33862, "end_char": 33867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chakravartti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34263, "end_char": 34275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chakravartti, C. J. and Lahiri, J. observed:\n\n\"The real point, however, is whether a second or a third notice of demand is at all permissible under s. 29, even when an assessment is altered in a first or a second appeal."}}, {"text": "Lahiri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34287, "end_char": 34293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chakravartti, C. J. and Lahiri, J. observed:\n\n\"The real point, however, is whether a second or a third notice of demand is at all permissible under s. 29, even when an assessment is altered in a first or a second appeal."}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34411, "end_char": 34416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KJlar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34903, "end_char": 34908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Addressing KJlar and Anoth<r himself to the necessity of a new notice, the learned Chief\n\nSeqhu Bu\"a.iah Setty Justice observed :\n\nHidayalullal1, J. \"In my view the answer to that could only be in the\n\naffirmative.\""}}, {"text": "Seqhu Bu\"a.iah Setty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34982, "end_char": 35002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Addressing KJlar and Anoth<r himself to the necessity of a new notice, the learned Chief\n\nSeqhu Bu\"a.iah Setty Justice observed :\n\nHidayalullal1, J. \"In my view the answer to that could only be in the\n\naffirmative.\""}}, {"text": "Hidayalullal1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35023, "end_char": 35036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Addressing KJlar and Anoth<r himself to the necessity of a new notice, the learned Chief\n\nSeqhu Bu\"a.iah Setty Justice observed :\n\nHidayalullal1, J. \"In my view the answer to that could only be in the\n\naffirmative.\"", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36276, "end_char": 36285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chakravartti, C. J. and Das Gupta, J. held that on reduction of assessment nothing further was required beyond an intimation to the assessee and the Collector of the reduction of the tax."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37200, "end_char": 37214, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38549, "end_char": 38554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38562, "end_char": 38576, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 35(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38786, "end_char": 38794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39047, "end_char": 39052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39060, "end_char": 39074, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39405, "end_char": 39410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39418, "end_char": 39437, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39704, "end_char": 39709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40186, "end_char": 40191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40473, "end_char": 40481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40489, "end_char": 40503, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bidayatollah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40532, "end_char": 40544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly, on the failure of\n\nBidayatollah, J. the assessee to pay after a notice of demand is issued, the recovery proceedings can be started within a time limit and the amount of tax can be treated as an arrear of land revenue."}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41363, "end_char": 41368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41376, "end_char": 41390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41482, "end_char": 41492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41511, "end_char": 41521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41525, "end_char": 41535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41908, "end_char": 41918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42210, "end_char": 42215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 31 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42234, "end_char": 42247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43050, "end_char": 43058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44817, "end_char": 44831, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45321, "end_char": 45326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jhat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47809, "end_char": 47813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court clearly was of the view in, the first case Jhat there was only one answer to the question and I respectfully agree with him."}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47972, "end_char": 47977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48019, "end_char": 48029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48851, "end_char": 48859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Officer. Kolar Cude", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49708, "end_char": 49738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH, J.-The Income-tax Officer.", "canonical_name": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, KOLAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Seghu Buchiah Setty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49765, "end_char": 49784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kolar Cude, Kolar, ·•hi, J. assessed Seghu Buchiah Setty-respondent in this appeal-to income-tax under s. 23(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act.", "canonical_name": "SEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY"}}, {"text": "s. 23(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49831, "end_char": 49839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49854, "end_char": 49868, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50032, "end_char": 50037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50282, "end_char": 50290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51079, "end_char": 51087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51323, "end_char": 51331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51339, "end_char": 51353, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Metropolitan Structural Works Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53004, "end_char": 53037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent strongly relies upon the observations made by Chakravartti, C. J., in his judgment in Metropolitan Structural Works Ltd's case(') that where the income assessed by the Income-tax Officer is reduced in appeal."}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54092, "end_char": 54097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seghu Buchiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54611, "end_char": 54624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seghu Buchiah B<llJ\n\nWe may examine the correctness of the piea raised by the respondent in the iight ot the scheme for recovery of tax, penalty or interest due under the provisions of the Act.", "canonical_name": "SEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY"}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55334, "end_char": 55344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56028, "end_char": 56038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56138, "end_char": 56143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56502, "end_char": 56507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56515, "end_char": 56529, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56660, "end_char": 56670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56758, "end_char": 56768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56870, "end_char": 56875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sllah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57176, "end_char": 57181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector, on receipt of such certificate has to proceed to\n\nSllah, J.\n\n1964 recover from such assessee the amount specified therein as if Jncometax Officer, it were an arrear of land revenue."}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57553, "end_char": 57558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57570, "end_char": 57574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of s. 42, or of the Shah, J. proviso to s. 45, (which are for the purposes of this case not material) no proceedings for recovery of any sum payable under the Act shall e commenced after the expiration of one year from the last day of the financial year in which a demand is made under the Act.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57590, "end_char": 57595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57960, "end_char": 57966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58025, "end_char": 58030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58200, "end_char": 58205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58262, "end_char": 58267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58461, "end_char": 58466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58485, "end_char": 58490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58494, "end_char": 58499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58841, "end_char": 58846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59099, "end_char": 59109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kolar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60327, "end_char": 60332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 S.C.H.\n\nSUPHEME COUHT REPORTS 169\n\nIt is clear therefore that when tax, penalty or interest is\n\ndetermined and demanded, proceedings shaU be commenced Incom•ta• Oifi<er, Kolar and Anolhe~ for recovery, and these proceedings may be commenced and ... continued, notwithstanding the presentation of an appeal."}}, {"text": "Anolhe~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60337, "end_char": 60344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 S.C.H.\n\nSUPHEME COUHT REPORTS 169\n\nIt is clear therefore that when tax, penalty or interest is\n\ndetermined and demanded, proceedings shaU be commenced Incom•ta• Oifi<er, Kolar and Anolhe~ for recovery, and these proceedings may be commenced and ... continued, notwithstanding the presentation of an appeal."}}, {"text": "Seghu Buchiah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 60467, "end_char": 60480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Seghu Buchiah.", "canonical_name": "SEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY"}}, {"text": "s. 46(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62932, "end_char": 62940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63153, "end_char": 63157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "provision which enables the Income-tax Officer to modify the certificate which is issued to the Collector, but the absence of such a provision does not detract from\n\nBhai, J.\n\n1964 the duty of the Income-tax Officer to give information to the 1\"\"'11U1ax Offiaer, recovering authority about the reduction in the liability for Kola'\"ntl Another tax, penalty or interest made by the appellate authority and Beghu s:Chiah seuy to request such authority to adjust his proceeding to the modified demand."}}, {"text": "Beghu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63391, "end_char": 63396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "provision which enables the Income-tax Officer to modify the certificate which is issued to the Collector, but the absence of such a provision does not detract from\n\nBhai, J.\n\n1964 the duty of the Income-tax Officer to give information to the 1\"\"'11U1ax Offiaer, recovering authority about the reduction in the liability for Kola'\"ntl Another tax, penalty or interest made by the appellate authority and Beghu s:Chiah seuy to request such authority to adjust his proceeding to the modified demand."}}, {"text": "Chiah seuy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63399, "end_char": 63409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "provision which enables the Income-tax Officer to modify the certificate which is issued to the Collector, but the absence of such a provision does not detract from\n\nBhai, J.\n\n1964 the duty of the Income-tax Officer to give information to the 1\"\"'11U1ax Offiaer, recovering authority about the reduction in the liability for Kola'\"ntl Another tax, penalty or interest made by the appellate authority and Beghu s:Chiah seuy to request such authority to adjust his proceeding to the modified demand."}}, {"text": "Skah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63529, "end_char": 63533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An Skah, J. error in the certificate can always be clarified by an amendment and if that power be granted, there is no reason to suppose that a demand which is reduced because of subsequent events, such as modification of the assessment by the appellate authority, or payment made by the tax-payer as directed by the notice of demand may not be enforced in a manner consistent with the outstanding demand."}}, {"text": "Assistant Commissioner", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 63962, "end_char": 63984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If in an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner enhances the tax, the Income-tax Officer may give intimation to the recovering authority about the enhanced demand."}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65289, "end_char": 65299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65372, "end_char": 65377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65571, "end_char": 65576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65897, "end_char": 65902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65906, "end_char": 65911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65942, "end_char": 65947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 31 & 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65953, "end_char": 65964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66371, "end_char": 66376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bltal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66526, "end_char": 66531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "accept the contention that the Legislature in enacting s. 45-a v .. provision relating to recovery of tax intended to provide thatScghu Buchiah Bd/f in exercise of the appellate powers, the Appellate Assistant Bltal, J.\n\nCommissioner and the Income-tax Tribunal shall comply with certain requirements."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66738, "end_char": 66743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66783, "end_char": 66788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66856, "end_char": 66861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68026, "end_char": 68031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68039, "end_char": 68053, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 31 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68141, "end_char": 68154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68554, "end_char": 68559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68567, "end_char": 68581, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69381, "end_char": 69383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69462, "end_char": 69464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69721, "end_char": 69726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69769, "end_char": 69774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69834, "end_char": 69839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70782, "end_char": 70790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71564, "end_char": 71574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72075, "end_char": 72085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72160, "end_char": 72163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 29, 45 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72710, "end_char": 72727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ladhuram Taparia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72790, "end_char": 72806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view which has been expressed by Chakravartti, C. J., in Ladhuram Taparia's case(') has been adopted in other cases as well: Auto Transport Union (Private) Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Alwaye (3) and Hirata/ v.\n\nIncome-tax Officer and Mali Ram v. Collector Bhilwara (4)."}}, {"text": "s. 46(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73058, "end_char": 73066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_174_184_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Marrh 12\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1901 l\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN v.\n\nSHYAM LA)'.,\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]\n\nState-Liability of-Merger of one State into another-- Liability incurred before merger-Merger agreement providing\n\nfor taking over liability of the merging State- Whether suit against new State maintainable-Constitution of India, Art. 295(2).\n\nIn 1947, the Dholpur State acceded to the Dcminion of India.\n\nLater on, it was merged with other States and as a result of that merger, the Matsya Union was formed on March 18, 1948. One of the provisions of the merger agreement was that the existing laws in the Covenanting States were to be continued till such time as they were modified or repealed by the new State ·•nd that all the assets and liabilities of the Covenanting States were taken over by the new State. Later on, the Matsya\n\nUnion was merged with the United State of Rajasthan which had come into existence from April 7, 1949. A similar provision with regard to the recognition of the liabilities of tbe Covenanting States by the new State was also provided. On January 26, 1950, Part B State of Rajasthan came into existence.\n\nIn the four appeals the respondents secured permits from the Dholpur State for the export of certain commodities and they had to pay export duties in advance. As the respondents could not export the full quantity for which they had secured permits they asked the appellant to refund the excess export duty and when the latter refused to do so, filed suits for refund of the same with interest. The defence taken up by the appellant was that it was not bound by any liability which might have arisen against the former State of Dholpur. lt was \" new Sovereign and was not bound by any liability of the former State of Dholpur unless it .chose to recognise the obligation but no such obligation was recognised in the present case. One suit was dismissed by the trial court and other three were decreed.\n\nThe appeals of the State to the District Judge were substantially dismissed while the appeal in the first suit by the plaintiff was substantially allowed. The State filed appeals to the High Court . . After referring the matter to the Full Bench, a Division Bench 'of the High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the State. The appellant came to this Court after obtaining certificate of fitness from the High Court.\n\nThe only question raised before this Court was about the liability of the State of Rajasthan under Art. 295(2) of the Constitution in respect of the obligations of the former State of Dholpur which came to be included in the State of Rajasthan.\n\nDismissing the appeals, Held, that the new State by continuing the old laws without change till they were repealed or altered, recogirised that it was liable in the same way as the merging State would have been in any case. Throughout the process of integration from 1948 to 1950, the new Sovereign must be taken to have recognised the rights of the subjects and lindertaken the liabilitil!tl\n\nof the old State. So under Art. 295(2) of the Constitution, the State of Rajasthan was liable to meet the liabilities of all old States which eventually were merged into it. Moreover, there was nothing to show that the right to claim the refund was taken away by any law competently passed.\n\nM / s Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Limited v. The Commissioner of Income-tax [1959], S.C.R. 729 and Maharaj a Shree Umaid Mil!\n\nLimited v. Union of India, A.LR. 1953, S.C. 953 referred to.\n\nCiv1L APPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 884-887 of 1962.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated May 2, 1960, of the Ra.jasthan High Court in Civil Second Appeal Nos. 268 of 1954, 203 of 1955, 4 of 1954 and 27 of 1954.\n\nS. K. Kapur and B. R. G. ](. Achar, for the appellant (in all the appeals).\n\nR. P. Modi and R. K. Garg, for the respondents (in C.A.\n\nNo. 887I1962).\n\nMarch 12, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nWAN CHOO, J .-These four appeals arise out of four certificates granted by the High Court of Rajasthan and raise a common question. We therefore, propose to set out facts in one of the present appeals (No. 887), as the facts in other appeals are similar, except that the commodity involved was different and so was the amount in dispute. The suit out of which appeal No. 887 has arisen was filed by the respondent against the State o1' Rajasthan. The respondent was a resident of the former Dholpur State and the dispute which led to the suit related to a time before the merger of former Dholpur State into the Matsya Union. The cse of the respondent was that in 1947 certain commodities including chuni with which appeal No. 887 is concerned could only be exported from the former Dholpur State on export permits issued by the customs department of the said State. It was also the practice in that State that when permits for export were issued, xport duties had to be paid in advance, though the actual export was made later. Consequently, in June 1947 the respondent applied for and was granted a permit for export of 15,000 maunds of chuni, and in connection therewith he deposited Rs. 30,0001a.s export duty in advance. This permit had been granted on June 28, 1947 and remained in force upto December 2. 1947.\n\nThe respondent however was not able to export the entire quantity of 15,000 maunds for which the permit was granted; he could only export 4.572 maunds and 20 seers of chuni before December 2, 194 7. Thereafter he could not export further as his permit was not extended. It was alleged on behalf of the respondent that the reason why he failed to export the entire\n\nStale of Raj\"'IAa•\n\nShya\"' Lal\n\nWanckoo, J ..\n\nState of Rajculhan\n\nShyr...m Lal\n\nWanclwo, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHTS [1964]\n\nquantity of the commodity before December 2, 1947 was due to market conditions and inability to get allotment. of railway wagons. The respondent's case further was that as he could not exprt the entire quantity of 15,000 maunds for which he had paid export duty in advance at the rate of Rs. 2 /- per maund, he ws entitled to refund of the proportionate export duty for the quantity of 10,427 maunds and 20 seers, which he could not export. His case further was that though he asked the State for refund of this advance duty, the State did not .pay back the same to him. In the meantime, rapid constitutional changes took place after August 15, 1947. By May 15, 1949, the United State of Rajasthan was formed including the Matsya Union into which the former State of Dholpur had merged on March 17, 1948. The United State of Rajasthan eventually became the Part B State of Rajasthan on January 26, 1950 wheJ1 the Constitution came into force. Eventually when the State refused to refund the amount, the suit was filed, out of which appeal No. 887 has arisen, in January 1952. The respondent claimed refund of Rs. 20,855 /- along with interest and costs.\n\nThe suits were resisted by the State of Rajasthan on various grounds; but we are concerned now only with one ground which alone has been urged before us, namely, that\n\nt!ie State of Rajasthan was not bound by any liability which might have arisen against the former State of Dholpur. It was a new sovereign and was not bound by any obligation against the old sovereign of the former State of Dholpur unless it chose to recognise the obligation. As the United State of Rajasthan into which the former State of Dholpur came to be merged in 1949 never recognised the obligations of the former State of Dholpur it was not bound to refund the amount due to the respondents.\n\nJn reply to this contention of the State, the respondent relied on Art. 295(2) of the Constitution and other provisions made during the period when mergers were taking place after August 15, 1947 and contended that in view of Art. 295(2) of the Constitution the State of Rajasthan was bound by the obligation of the former State of Dholpur.\n\nBefore we refer to the decisions of the courts below with regard to this controversy it would be convenient to clear the ground by indicating the admitted position, which resulted in the inclusion of the former Dholpur State into the Part B State of Rajasthan, which came into existence on January 26,\n\n1950 and which would be bound by Art. 295(2) of the Constitution. The former Dholpur Sta.le remained a separate entity till March 17, 1948, though it had acceded to the Dominion of India after August 15, 1947 with respect to three subjects, namely, communications, defence and external allairs. In 1948, however, the process of merger in Rajasthan began and the\n\nfirst merger that took place was of the former States of Alwar,\n\n19G.J- Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli, which formed the Matsya 81,,1, of Raj,.athan Union as from March 18, 1948 by a Covenant entered on '\"· February 28, 1948. It is not in dispute that on this merger, Shyaml.<•l provision was made for the continuance of the laws in the Jl'mi:hoo, J. covenanting State till such time as they were modified by the new State. Provision was also made in the Covenant that all\n\ntht> assets and liabilities CJf the covenanting States shall be the assets and liabilities of the new State of Matsya. Then came another union of certain other Rulers in Rajasthan in March 1948 by which these Rulers united under the Ruler of Udaipur to form what later came to be known as the Former State of Rajasthan. Tn March 1949, the United State of Rajasthan was formed by Covenant entered into by fourteen Rulers of Rajasthan, including these who had formed the Former State of Rajasthan, and this State came into existence from April 7.\n\n1949. It may be mentioned here that when this State came into existence on April 7, 1949, it provided for the continuance of all laws till they were repealed or amended by the new State. There was also a provision in the Covenant by which. the assets and liabilities of the covenanting States became the assets and liabilities of the new State. In this State of United State of Rajasthan, the State of Matsya. merged in May 1949. and thus the former State of Dholpur came to be included in the United State of Rajsthan through the Matsya Union.\n\nWhen this merger took place it is not in dispute that the existing laws were to continue till they were repealed or altered by the new State. It is also not in dispute that the assets and liabilities of the Matsya Union were taken over as the assets and liabilities of the United State of Rajasthan in which the Matsya Union merged. Finally the United State of Rajasthan in which the State of Sirohi was also merged became the Part B State of Rajasthan on January 26, 1950. At this time also Art. 372 of the Constitution continued the existing laws subject to their being altered or repealed by the new State. Further Art. 295(2) provided that the Government of each State specified in Part B of the First Schedule shall, as from the commencement of the Constitution, be the successor of the Government of the corresponding Indian State as regards all property ai:i~ assets and all rights, liabilities and obligations, whether ansmg out of any contract or otherwise, other than those ref_erre~ to in cl. (!). This was subject to any agreement entered into m that behalf by the Government of India with the G?vernment o~ _the State concerned. This completes the narrallon of the pohtical changes that took place till the Constitution came into force on January 26, 1950.\n\nWe have already indicated that a number of defences were raised on behalf of the State of Rajasthan and these defences were negatived by the trial court in three suits. One\n\nSUPREJ\\IIE COURT REPORTS\n\n[1964J\n\n1964 of the suits, out of which appeal No. 886 has arisen, was dis- Slate of Rojasthan missed by the trial Court. The State went in appeal in two of .v. the suits to the District Judge and in one (out of which appeal Shyam Lal No. 887 has arisen) to the High Court direct in view of the Wanchoo, J. valuation. In the fourth suit, the plaintiff went in appeal to the District Judge. The appeals of the State to the District Judge were substantially dismissed while the appeal in the fourth suit by the plaintiff was substantially allowed. Then followed. three second appeals to the High Court by the State.\n\nThese second appeals were heard along with the first appeal in the High Court. It seems that in the High Court for the first time a point was raised that the liability of the former Dholpur State did not fasten on the State of Rajasthan as it emerged on January 26, 1950. The High Court permitted the point to be raised as it was a pure question of law. AU the appeals came before a Division Bench of the High Court. The two learned Judges composing the Division Bench disagreed on this question of. the' liability of the State of Rajasthan under Art. 295(2) in respect of the liability of the former State of Dholpur. Thereupon there was a reference to a Full Bench on the question of liability which was formulated by the learned Judgesthus:-\n\n\"Whether the expression 'Government of the corresponding State' used in Art. 295(2)_ of the Constitution with reference to Rajasthan properly means the Government of the United State of Rajasthan which was the only Indian State in existence at the time of the commencement of the Constitution or it also includes the Government of any of the Covenanting States which had integrated with the United State before the Constitution came into operation.\" The three learned Judges who heard the reference were unanimously of the opinion that the expression \"Government of the corresponding State\" used in Art. 295(2) of the Constitution with reference to Rajasthan meant not only the Government of the United State of Rajasthan, but also the United State of Rajasthan including its component units. The matter thel)' went back to the Division Bench. The three second appeals were dismissed by the High Court. The first appeal out of which appeal No. 887 had arisen was also dismissed except that no interest was allowed upto the date of decree and the amount was reduced to the actual excess export duty, which had been deposited in advance ancl it was ordered to be re-· funded.\n\nThe only question that has been raised before us on be- ., half of the appellant is about the liability of the State of Rajasthan under Art. 295(2) of the Constitution in respect of the\n\nobligatibns of the former Sta.te of Dholpur, which came to be\n\n• \"\"'\n\nincluded in the State of Rajasthan on account of political 19u changes to which we have already referred. In this connection, - the appellant relies on the decision of this Court in M / s. Dal- State of aja111\"'\" mia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income- Shyam Lal tax. (')That case dealt with the Covenant creating the State of Pepsu and particularly Art. VI thereof. The covenant in the\n\nState of Pepsu was more or less similar in terms to the Covenant in the United State of Ra jasthan. This Court reviewed certain cases relating to the acquisition of territory by cession or by conquest, and held that it made no difference whether acquisition of new territory was by an existing State by conquest or by cession or a new State came into existence by agreement out of territories belonging to some former States. In either case, it was held that there was establishment of new sovereignty over the territory in question and that was an act of State. In consequence this Court further held that the Covenant by which the new State of Pepsu came into existence was in its entirety an act of State and that Art. VI therein could not operate to confer any righfon the company as against the new State, for the principle was well settled that clauses in treaties entered into by sovereigns of independent States whereunder sovereignty in territories passed from one to the other providing for the recognition by the new sovereign of the existing rights of the residents of those territories must be regarded as invested with the character of an act of State and no claim based thereon could be enforced in a court of law. This Court also negatived the argument which was urged in that case that part of the Covenant was an interim Constitution and held that the Covenant was in whole or in part an act of State and could not be treated as an interim Constitution. Strong reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant on that decision in support of the contention that even if there was any liability of the former State of Dholpur to refund the amoUI\\t of tax collected in advance for no export was made, that liability did not devolve on the Part B State of Rajasthan under Art. 295(2) of the Constitution, as there was no recognition of this li'ability by the new State at any time and in that respect the present case was on all fours with that decision.\n\nAfter laying down the above principles, this Court proceeded to consider in that decision the particular point raised before it. That point was with respect to a clause in an agreement between the Ruler of the former Jind State and the Dalmia Dadri Cement Company with respect to income-tax and certai.n concessions given to the company in that behalf. The question that arose in that connection was whether there had been ay recognition of the concessions by the new sovereign; and this Court held that there was no recognition of the concessions. In that connection reference was made to Pepsu Ordinance No. I of 2005. dated August 20, 1948 by s. 3 of which\n\n(') [1959] S.C.R. 729. ·\n\n,,.anclwo, J.\n\n1964 all la.ws in all Covenanting States were repealed and the laws Rha in force in the State of Patiala were to apply mutatis mutan- Stale ofv. \"J\"'1 n dis to the entire territories of the new State. This Ordinance\n\nShyam Lal was repealed and replaced by Ordinance XVI of Samvat 200!) which came into force on February 5, 1949 and which contain- Wanchoo, J, ed an exactly similar provision. This Court therefore held that if the agreement was treated as a special law, it must be deemed to have been repealed by s. 3 of Ordinance No. I. It further held that the repeal of all laws in the covenanting States other tha:n Patiala and their replacement by the Patiala laws showed that the new sovereign did not recognise the rights of the subjects of the covenanting States arising from any law in force thereafter the State of Pepsu came into existence. Therefore it was held in that case that the concessions in the agreement came to an end when Ordinance No. 1 was passed as they were never recognised by the new sovereign and could not be availed of by the company.\n\nIt would be noticed that the decision that the new sovereign had not recognised the rights in Sta.tes other than Patiala was 'based on the fact that Ordinance No. 1 repealed all laws in all States other than Patiala and applied the Patiala laws to the entire territory. This was the basis of the particular decision arrived at in that case (apart from the general principles laid down in connection with the cession of territory to which we have already referred), and we shall refer to it when dealing with the facts in the present cae. Further though in that case it was held that Art. VI could not be enforced by citizens against the new sovereign as it was part of the Covenant, which was an act of State, this Court went on to point out that Art. VI of the Covenant would be valuable evidence from which affirmance of the rights mentioned therein cauld be inferred and added tha.t such inference must relate to act or conduct of the new State after it came into existence. If there were any acts of the new State which were equivocal in character, it would have been possibfo to hold in the light of Art. VI of the Covenant that its intention was to assume the liabilities. In tha.t case, however, this Coun refused to treat Art. VI even as. evidence because it pointed out that the first act of the new sovereign was the application of the Patiala State laws, including the Patiala Income-tax Act, to .the territories of Jind involving negation of the rights claimed m that case. But apart from the particular decision in that case, we have to proceed on the basis of the general proposition enunciated in that case as to the effect of the com .. ing into existence of a new State even in the manner in which the State of Pepsu or the United State of Rajasthan came into existence after their respective Covenants, and it is to this aspect of the matter we shall now turn.\n\nWe have already indicated when dealing with the history of the political changes which eventually culminated in the\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 181\n\nPart B State of Rajasthan after the coming into force of the Constitution that two matters were always provided for there\n\ndurin\" all this process of merger. The first was that each time a merger took place the new State by a provision in the Cove nant took over the assets and liabilities of the merging States.\n\nThis provision in the Covenant could not be availed of by the subjects of the new State as, in view of the decisions in Dalmia Dadri Cement Co.'.1 case(') the Covenant in whole or in part was a.n act of State. But according to the same decision the presence of such a clause in the Covenant throughout would be valuable evidence which would show that the new State assumed the liabilities of the merging State, if there are any acts of the new State which are equivocal in character.\n\nNow we find from the history we have already narrated above that every time there was a merger and formation of a new State, the old laws were always to continue till they were repealed, amended or altered by the new State. We are of opinion that when the new State continued all the old laws till they were altered or repealed, and there was specific provision in each Covenant that the assets and liabilities of the Covenanting States were to be the assets and liabilities of the Union, the new State must have intended to respect all the rights \"flowing from laws so continued and assume all liabilities arising from the existence of those laws. Otherwise we see no sense or purpose in continuing the old laws till they are altered or repealed if the intention was that the obligations and liabilities flowing from the continuance of the old bws would notwithstanding the Covenant not be assumed by the new State.\n\nIf the intention was otherwise. we should have found a provision s; milar to that in the Pepsu case by which all the old laws were repealed in the merging States except Patiala and the Patiala laws were to continue in the entire territory giving rise to such rights only as the Patiala Laws recognised or conferred. But where1s in the present c~.se the old laws were to continue till they were repealed or altered it follows in our opinion that the rights arising under the old laws in the subjects of the merging States would cont'nuc and these subjects would have the same rights against the new State as they would have under the old laws against the merging State. Thus by continuing the old laws, till they are repealed, altered or modified, the new State in effect undertook the liability which might arise against it by virtue of the continuance of the old Jaws.\n\nEven if there was some doubt about the new State undertaking the liabilities of the old State in view of the continuance of the old laws, we can in accordance with the decision irt the Dalmia Dadri Cement Co.'s case(') look to Art. VI of the Covenant to come to the conclusion that on continuing the old laws, until they were altered, repealed or modified, the\n\n(') [1959] S.C.R. 729.\n\nState of Rujr18tl1an ,., Rltyam Lal\n\nJl'anclioo, J.\n\n.State of .lfaja&than\n\nShyam Lal\n\nWanchoo, J,\n\nnew State intended to affirm the rights of the subjects which they had against the merging State and to assume itself the liability if any arising against the merging State. This is the basic difference between the Dalmia Dadri Cement Company's case(') and thepresent case, for in that case the old laws were repealed and thus repudiated in areas other than Patiala State while in the present case-the old laws were continued till they were repealed or altered; and in view of that basic difference between that case and the present case we can legitimately call in aid Art. VI of the Covenant and similar provisions which were always made throughout this process of merger in Rajasthan and treat them as evidence from which to come to the conclusion that the new State, by continuing the old laws, without change till they were repealed or altered, recognised that it was liable in the same' way as would have been the merging State if there was any liability on the merging Sta.tc.\n\nBut this was of course subject to any law made by the new State repealing the old laws and the liabilities arising thereunder or even otherwise, provided the law so made was within the competence of the new State and after the Constitution came into force it did not transgress the constitutional limitations. The result would be that the new State would be bound by the liabilities of the merging States and as similar provisions were there always throughout till we reach the Part B State of Rajasthan, it follows that there was always recognition of the rights of the subjects and that the new State assumed liabilities of the old State, throughout this process. This was of course subject to any law passed by the New State provided that law was within its competence and after the Constitution came into force did not transgress the limitations contained therein. In these circumstances we are of opinion that the new sovereign throughout this process of integration from 1948 to 1950 must be taken to have recognised the rights of the subjects and undertaken the liability, if any, of the old States.\n\nIt follows therefore that the State of Rajasthan will be liable under Art. 295(2) of the Constitution to meet the liabilities of all old States which eventually were included in it subject always to this tliat if the new State passed any law repealing the old law which would affect the liability or even otherwise that law would prevail and the liability may disappear provided the new law is within the competence of the State legislature and does not transgress the constitutional limitations after the Constitution came into force. We are therefore of opinion t)lat there was recognition of liability by the new State throughout this process and under the circumstances the suit was maintainable against the Part B State of Rajasthan in view of Art. 295(2) of the Constitution. In this view of the matter we consider that it is unn, ecessary to decide whether the. particular words used in Art. 295(2) include not only the United State of Rajasthan as it was iust before January 26. 1950 but also the\n\nold States which came to be merged into it through the process 196~ to which we have already referred. Whether that is so or not, State of Rajasthat> it follows in view of the history to which we have referred v. that ther~ was always recognition by the new State of its liab!- Shyoin L<ility in the manner already referred to with respect to the hab1- Wan<hoo, J. lities of the merging States, and if there is any doubt about it that doubt in our opinion is resolved by the existence of Art.\n\nVI or similar provision throughout the process of these political changes.\n\nIn this connection we may also refer to s. 3 of the Rajasthan Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 1949, which continued existing laws of the old States till they were altered by the competent legislature or other competent authority in the new State. Section 3 further said that the old laws will continue in )'orce in the State concerned subject to the modification that reference therein to the Ruler or Government of that 5tate shall be construed as a reference to the Ra jpramukh or, as the case may bi<. to the Government of Rajasthan. These words also indicate that whatever could be enforced under the laws in force in a State against the Ruler or the Government ot the merging State could be enforced against the Rajpramukh or the Government of the new State. This further bears out the conclusion that the new State recognised the rights of the subjects of the old States flowing from the old laws and was prepared to undertake the liability that may lie on it in consequence thereof. We therefore agree with the Full Bench that the liability lay upon the State of Rajasthan because there was recognition of the liability even on the principles enunciated in the Da/mia Dadri Cement Company's case('). !n this view of the matter we need not express any view on the question whether the expression \"Government of the corresponding Indian State\" used in Art 295(2) would mean only the United State of Rajasthan as it was on January 26, 1950 or would also include all the former States which came to be mern:ed in the United State of Rajasthan as it was on January 26,-1950.\n\nIt _only remai.ns now tl refr to .anote~ decision of this Court m Mahara1a Shree Ummd Mt// Ltmlfed v. Union of India('). In that case there was an agreement between the Ruler of the former State of Jodhpur and the Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Limited by which certain exemptions from income-tax and excise duty were granted to the Mills. Two questions arose for decisiQn there. The first was whether excise could be levied on the cloth manufactured and the second was whether income-tax could be levied on the income of the Mills, in view of the agreement between the Mills and the former Ruler of Jodhpur. The first question that was raised in that case was . whether the agreement was a law; and this Court held that\n\n(') (1959] S.C.R. 729.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 953.\n\nBlatt of Raja-9than\n\nShyam Lal\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nthe agreement was not a Jaw,. With that aspect of the matter we are not concerned in the present appeals. The next question that arose was whether the agreement had been recognized by thr new sovereign and reliance was placed on the continuance of laws and Art. VI of the Covenant in that connection, and it was urged that in view of Art. 295 of the Constitution the exemption as provided in the agreement continued. In that case, however, there was one vital difference; even thryugh the old Jaws were continued for the time being by Rajasthan Ordinance No. 1 of 1949 the new State passed the Rajasthan Excise Duties Ordinance 1949 some time after. That Ordinance clearly applied to the Mills and there was no doubt as to the State's competence to enact it. In view of that Jaw, the exemption in the agreement was held not to have been affirmed by the new State of Rajasthan. The facts of that case are thus different from the facts in the present case, for there was a competent law which clearly negatived the recognition of such an agreement and which clearly provided for excise duties. So far as income-tax was concerned it was imposed as from April 1, 1950 after the Constitution had come into force.\n\nHere again we find a law which was competently passed by Parliament and which did not transgress any of the constitutional limitations. Such a Jaw therefore must prevail and in the presence of such a Jaw there can be no question of recognition by the Union of the right to exemption, if any, under the agreement with the Ruler of the former Jodhpur State.\n\nTherefore, with respect to both the claims raised in that case there was a law which clearly applied to the Mills and it was held that there was no recognition by the new sovereign. In the present case we have only the continuance of the old laws and the valuable evidence afforded by Art. VI of the Covenant and there is nothing to show that the right to claim refund was taken away by any Jaw competently passed. In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the appellant can derive no assistance from the case of Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills(').\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed. Respondent in Appeal No. 887 will get his costs from the appellant.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n('),...I.R. 1963 s.c. 953.", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "l\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v.\n\nSHYAM LA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHYAM LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 179, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 389, "end_char": 410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 412, "end_char": 423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Matsya\n\nUnion", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 910, "end_char": 923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, the Matsya\n\nUnion was merged with the United State of Rajasthan which had come into existence from April 7, 1949."}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 944, "end_char": 969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, the Matsya\n\nUnion was merged with the United State of Rajasthan which had come into existence from April 7, 1949."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1005, "end_char": 1018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, the Matsya\n\nUnion was merged with the United State of Rajasthan which had come into existence from April 7, 1949."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1155, "end_char": 1171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 26, 1950, Part B State of Rajasthan came into existence."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1189, "end_char": 1198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 26, 1950, Part B State of Rajasthan came into existence."}}, {"text": "Dholpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1282, "end_char": 1289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the four appeals the respondents secured permits from the Dholpur State for the export of certain commodities and they had to pay export duties in advance."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2516, "end_char": 2534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only question raised before this Court was about the liability of the State of Rajasthan under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2541, "end_char": 2552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3109, "end_char": 3120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3793, "end_char": 3804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and B. R. G. ](."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. ](. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3809, "end_char": 3827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and B. R. G. ](."}}, {"text": "R. P. Modi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3870, "end_char": 3880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. P. Modi and R. K. Garg, for the respondents (in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3885, "end_char": 3895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. P. Modi and R. K. Garg, for the respondents (in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3943, "end_char": 3957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 12, 1964."}}, {"text": "WAN CHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4004, "end_char": 4012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nWAN CHOO, J .-These four appeals arise out of four certificates granted by the High Court of Rajasthan and raise a common question.", "canonical_name": "WAN CHOO"}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4083, "end_char": 4106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nWAN CHOO, J .-These four appeals arise out of four certificates granted by the High Court of Rajasthan and raise a common question."}}, {"text": "June 28, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5262, "end_char": 5275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This permit had been granted on June 28, 1947 and remained in force upto December 2."}}, {"text": "December 2. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5303, "end_char": 5319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This permit had been granted on June 28, 1947 and remained in force upto December 2."}}, {"text": "December 2, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5502, "end_char": 5519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent however was not able to export the entire quantity of 15,000 maunds for which the permit was granted; he could only export 4.572 maunds and 20 seers of chuni before December 2, 194 7."}}, {"text": "Lal\n\nWanckoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5714, "end_char": 5726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged on behalf of the respondent that the reason why he failed to export the entire\n\nStale of Raj\"'IAa•\n\nShya\"' Lal\n\nWanckoo, J ..\n\nState of Rajculhan\n\nShyr...m Lal\n\nWanclwo, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHTS [1964]\n\nquantity of the commodity before December 2, 1947 was due to market conditions and inability to get allotment."}}, {"text": "State of Rajculhan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5734, "end_char": 5752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged on behalf of the respondent that the reason why he failed to export the entire\n\nStale of Raj\"'IAa•\n\nShya\"' Lal\n\nWanckoo, J ..\n\nState of Rajculhan\n\nShyr...m Lal\n\nWanclwo, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHTS [1964]\n\nquantity of the commodity before December 2, 1947 was due to market conditions and inability to get allotment."}}, {"text": "Wanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5768, "end_char": 5775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged on behalf of the respondent that the reason why he failed to export the entire\n\nStale of Raj\"'IAa•\n\nShya\"' Lal\n\nWanckoo, J ..\n\nState of Rajculhan\n\nShyr...m Lal\n\nWanclwo, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOHTS [1964]\n\nquantity of the commodity before December 2, 1947 was due to market conditions and inability to get allotment.", "canonical_name": "Wanclwo"}}, {"text": "August 15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6445, "end_char": 6460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, rapid constitutional changes took place after August 15, 1947."}}, {"text": "May 15, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By May 15, 1949, the United State of Rajasthan was formed including the Matsya Union into which the former State of Dholpur had merged on March 17, 1948."}}, {"text": "Matsya Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6534, "end_char": 6546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By May 15, 1949, the United State of Rajasthan was formed including the Matsya Union into which the former State of Dholpur had merged on March 17, 1948."}}, {"text": "March 17, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6600, "end_char": 6614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By May 15, 1949, the United State of Rajasthan was formed including the Matsya Union into which the former State of Dholpur had merged on March 17, 1948."}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7703, "end_char": 7714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7862, "end_char": 7873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 26,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8268, "end_char": 8285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we refer to the decisions of the courts below with regard to this controversy it would be convenient to clear the ground by indicating the admitted position, which resulted in the inclusion of the former Dholpur State into the Part B State of Rajasthan, which came into existence on January 26,\n\n1950 and which would be bound by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8314, "end_char": 8325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8450, "end_char": 8467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The former Dholpur Sta.le remained a separate entity till March 17, 1948, though it had acceded to the Dominion of India after August 15, 1947 with respect to three subjects, namely, communications, defence and external allairs."}}, {"text": "Alwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1948, however, the process of merger in Rajasthan began and the\n\nfirst merger that took place was of the former States of Alwar,\n\n19G.J- Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli, which formed the Matsya 81,,1, of Raj,.athan Union as from March 18, 1948 by a Covenant entered on '\"· February 28, 1948."}}, {"text": "Karauli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8739, "end_char": 8746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1948, however, the process of merger in Rajasthan began and the\n\nfirst merger that took place was of the former States of Alwar,\n\n19G.J- Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli, which formed the Matsya 81,,1, of Raj,.athan Union as from March 18, 1948 by a Covenant entered on '\"· February 28, 1948."}}, {"text": "March 18, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8807, "end_char": 8821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1948, however, the process of merger in Rajasthan began and the\n\nfirst merger that took place was of the former States of Alwar,\n\n19G.J- Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli, which formed the Matsya 81,,1, of Raj,.athan Union as from March 18, 1948 by a Covenant entered on '\"· February 28, 1948."}}, {"text": "Matsya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9229, "end_char": 9235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provision was also made in the Covenant that all\n\ntht> assets and liabilities CJf the covenanting States shall be the assets and liabilities of the new State of Matsya."}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9360, "end_char": 9367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then came another union of certain other Rulers in Rajasthan in March 1948 by which these Rulers united under the Ruler of Udaipur to form what later came to be known as the Former State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "April 7.\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9654, "end_char": 9668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn March 1949, the United State of Rajasthan was formed by Covenant entered into by fourteen Rulers of Rajasthan, including these who had formed the Former State of Rajasthan, and this State came into existence from April 7."}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10026, "end_char": 10051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this State of United State of Rajasthan, the State of Matsya."}}, {"text": "United State of Rajsthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10158, "end_char": 10182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and thus the former State of Dholpur came to be included in the United State of Rajsthan through the Matsya Union."}}, {"text": "Sirohi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10603, "end_char": 10609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally the United State of Rajasthan in which the State of Sirohi was also merged became the Part B State of Rajasthan on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10702, "end_char": 10710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10828, "end_char": 10839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10910, "end_char": 10924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11287, "end_char": 11306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was subject to any agreement entered into m that behalf by the Government of India with the G?vernment o~ the State concerned."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11976, "end_char": 11983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "887 has arisen) to the High Court direct in view of the Wanchoo, J. valuation.", "canonical_name": "WAN CHOO"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12843, "end_char": 12854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13114, "end_char": 13125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of the United State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13194, "end_char": 13237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "295(2)_ of the Constitution with reference to Rajasthan properly means the Government of the United State of Rajasthan which was the only Indian State in existence at the time of the commencement of the Constitution or it also includes the Government of any of the Covenanting States which had integrated with the United State before the Constitution came into operation.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13641, "end_char": 13652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14353, "end_char": 14364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pepsu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15525, "end_char": 15530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence this Court further held that the Covenant by which the new State of Pepsu came into existence was in its entirety an act of State and that Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16662, "end_char": 16673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dalmia Dadri Cement Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17082, "end_char": 17109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That point was with respect to a clause in an agreement between the Ruler of the former Jind State and the Dalmia Dadri Cement Company with respect to income-tax and certai.n concessions given to the company in that behalf."}}, {"text": "August 20, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17473, "end_char": 17488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dated August 20, 1948 by s. 3 of which\n\n(') [1959] S.C.R. 729. ·"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17492, "end_char": 17496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".anclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17535, "end_char": 17542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",,.anclwo, J.\n\n1964 all la.ws in all Covenanting States were repealed and the laws Rha in force in the State of Patiala were to apply mutatis mutan- Stale ofv. \"", "canonical_name": "Wanclwo"}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17645, "end_char": 17652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",,.anclwo, J.\n\n1964 all la.ws in all Covenanting States were repealed and the laws Rha in force in the State of Patiala were to apply mutatis mutan- Stale ofv. \""}}, {"text": "Shyam Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17765, "end_char": 17774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Ordinance\n\nShyam Lal was repealed and replaced by Ordinance XVI of Samvat 200!)", "canonical_name": "Shyam Lal\n\nWanchoo"}}, {"text": "February 5, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17859, "end_char": 17875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which came into force on February 5, 1949 and which contain- Wanchoo, J, ed an exactly similar provision."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18061, "end_char": 18065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20004, "end_char": 20018, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dalmia Dadri Cement Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21086, "end_char": 21109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This provision in the Covenant could not be availed of by the subjects of the new State as, in view of the decisions in Dalmia Dadri Cement Co.'.1 case(') the Covenant in whole or in part was a.n act of State."}}, {"text": "State of Rujr18tl1an", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23626, "end_char": 23646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Rujr18tl1an ,.,"}}, {"text": "Rltyam Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23651, "end_char": 23661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rltyam Lal\n\nJl'anclioo, J.\n\n.State of .lfaja&than\n\nShyam Lal\n\nWanchoo, J,\n\nnew State intended to affirm the rights of the subjects which they had against the merging State and to assume itself the liability if any arising against the merging State."}}, {"text": ".State of .lfaja&than", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23679, "end_char": 23700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rltyam Lal\n\nJl'anclioo, J.\n\n.State of .lfaja&than\n\nShyam Lal\n\nWanchoo, J,\n\nnew State intended to affirm the rights of the subjects which they had against the merging State and to assume itself the liability if any arising against the merging State."}}, {"text": "Shyam Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23702, "end_char": 23711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rltyam Lal\n\nJl'anclioo, J.\n\n.State of .lfaja&than\n\nShyam Lal\n\nWanchoo, J,\n\nnew State intended to affirm the rights of the subjects which they had against the merging State and to assume itself the liability if any arising against the merging State.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Lal\n\nWanchoo"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25889, "end_char": 25900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26568, "end_char": 26579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26713, "end_char": 26724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 26. 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26794, "end_char": 26810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "295(2) include not only the United State of Rajasthan as it was iust before January 26."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26955, "end_char": 26973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether that is so or not, State of Rajasthat> it follows in view of the history to which we have referred v. that ther~ was always recognition by the new State of its liab!- Shyoin L<ility in the manner already referred to with respect to the hab1- Wan<hoo, J. lities of the merging States, and if there is any doubt about it that doubt in our opinion is resolved by the existence of Art."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27435, "end_char": 27439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27644, "end_char": 27653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27909, "end_char": 27932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Government of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Rajpramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28114, "end_char": 28124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These words also indicate that whatever could be enforced under the laws in force in a State against the Ruler or the Government ot the merging State could be enforced against the Rajpramukh or the Government of the new State."}}, {"text": "Da/mia Dadri Cement Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28565, "end_char": 28592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We therefore agree with the Full Bench that the liability lay upon the State of Rajasthan because there was recognition of the liability even on the principles enunciated in the Da/mia Dadri Cement Company's case('). !"}}, {"text": "Art 295(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28754, "end_char": 28764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These words also indicate that whatever could be enforced under the laws in force in a State against the Rule", "statute": "These words also indicate that whatever could be enforced under the laws in force in a State against the Rule"}}, {"text": "January 26,-1950.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28956, "end_char": 28973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n this view of the matter we need not express any view on the question whether the expression \"Government of the corresponding Indian State\" used in Art 295(2) would mean only the United State of Rajasthan as it was on January 26, 1950 or would also include all the former States which came to be mern:ed in the United State of Rajasthan as it was on January 26,-1950."}}, {"text": "Jodhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29173, "end_char": 29180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case there was an agreement between the Ruler of the former State of Jodhpur and the Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Limited by which certain exemptions from income-tax and excise duty were granted to the Mills."}}, {"text": "Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29189, "end_char": 29223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case there was an agreement between the Ruler of the former State of Jodhpur and the Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Limited by which certain exemptions from income-tax and excise duty were granted to the Mills."}}, {"text": "Shyam Lal\n\nWanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29765, "end_char": 29783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Blatt of Raja-9than\n\nShyam Lal\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nthe agreement was not a Jaw,.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Lal\n\nWanchoo"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30123, "end_char": 30131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jaws were continued for the time being by Rajasthan Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30282, "end_char": 30343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State passed the Rajasthan Excise Duties Ordinance 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30366, "end_char": 30421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30939, "end_char": 30952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as income-tax was concerned it was imposed as from April 1, 1950 after the Constitution had come into force."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31055, "end_char": 31065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here again we find a law which was competently passed by Parliament and which did not transgress any of the constitutional limitations."}}, {"text": "Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31876, "end_char": 31902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this view of the matter we are of opinion that the appellant can derive no assistance from the case of Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills(')."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_17_31_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION\n\nTHE INCOME-TAX OFFICER AND ANR.\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI JJ.]\n\nIncome-tax-Income of State Road Transport Corporation whether income of the State-Whether exempt-Constitution of India, Art. 289-Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 22.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer (respondent No. 1) served a notice under s. 22 of the Income-tax Act on the appellant. Upon the receipt of the notice, the appellant appeared before the Incometax Officer. The appellant pleaded before the Income-tax Officer that it did not fall under any of the five categories of assessees under s. 3 of the Income-tax Act. The appellant also raised the contention that it was a local authority exempt from incometax. All these contentions were rejected by respondent No. 1 with the result that the impugned orders of assessment came to be passed.\n\nThe appellant filed Writ Petitions before the High Court in which it challenged the impugned orders of assessment passed by respondent No. 1. In its Writ Petitions, the appellant claimed an order, writ or other appropriate direction quashing the assessment orders passed by respondent No. 1. The High Court dismiss.. ed these \\vrit petitions. The High Court held that the appellant could not claim theexemption under Art. 289(1) because it was not a state-owned Corporation. The High Court grante-d a certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution and hence the appeal.\n\nHeld: (i) Art. 289 of the Constitution cons'sts of three clauses.\n\nThe first clause confers exemption from union taxation on the property and income of a State.\n\nClause (2) then provides that the income from trade or business carried on bv the Government of a State or on its behalf which would not have been taxable under cl. (1), can be taxed, provided a I aw is made by Parliament in that behalf. In other words cl. (2) is an exception to cl. (1 ).\n\nClause (3) then empowers Parliament to declare by law that any trade or business would be taken out of the purview of cl. (2) and restored to the area covered by cl. (1) by declaring that the said trade or business is incidental to the ordinarv functions of Government. In other words, cl. (3) is an exception to the exception prescribed by cl. (2).\n\n(ii) A trading activity carried on by the corporation (ap.J)el- Iant) is not a trading activity carried on by the State departmentlly, nor is it a trading activity carried on by a State through its agents appointe-d in that behalf because according to statute the Corporation has a personalitv of its own and this personality i• distinct from that of the State or other shareholders. ·\n\nAli the relevant provisions of the impugned Act also emphatically bring out the separate personality of the Corporation. Section 30 of the Act also does not suggest that the income of the\n\nMarch 5\n\n18 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\n1964 Corporation is the income of the State. All that s. 30 requires is Andhra Pradesh that a part of that income may be entrusted to the State Gov- State Road Tra\"8porternment for a specific purpose of road development. Therefore,\n\nOorporation the income derived by the appellant from its trading activity Th 1 v.\n\nT cannot be said to be the income of the State either under cl (1) o.ffic,;\".':J.'An:\" or cl. (2) of Art. 289.\n\nThe American doctrine of the immunity of State agencies or instrumentalities from Federal taxation has no application to the present case.\n\nAkadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa [1963) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 691, distinguished.\n\nMark Graves, John J. Merrill and John P. Hennessy v. People of the State of New York Upon the Relation of James B.O'kefe, 83 Law. Ed. 927 and Clallan County v. United States of America, 68 Law Ed. 328, no application.\n\nState of West Bengal v. Union of India [1964) 1 S.C.R. 371, relied on.\n\nM'Culloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat 316, Bank of Toronto\n\nv. Lambe \"(1887) 12 A.C. 575 and Webb v. Outrim [1907) A.C. 81, referred to.\n\nTamlin v. Hansaford, (1950] K.B. 18, relied on.\n\n(iii) It is hardly necessary fur the Act to make a provision that tax, if chargeable would be paid. In fact, the Companies Act which deals with companies does not make such a specific provision, though no one can seriously suggest that there would be repugnancy between the provisions of the Companies Act and the Income-tax Act. There is no repugnancy between the charging section of the Income-tax Act and ss. 29 and 30 of the Act. All that ss. 29 and 30 of the impugned Act purport to do is to provide for the administration of the funds vesting in the Corporation and their disposal. These provisions are not inconsistent with the liability to pay tax which is imposed by the Income-tax Act.\n\nC!vrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.475- 478 of 1963.\n\nAppeal from the order dated July 14, 1961 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 516 to 519 of 1960.\n\nD. Narsaraju, Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, P. R.\n\nRamchandra Rao and T: V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant (in all the appeals).\n\nK. N. Rajagopala Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the appeals).\n\nRajeshwari Prasad and S. P. Varma, for lhtervener No. 1 (in all the appeals).\n\nB. Sen, S. C. Bose and P. K. Bose, for Intervener No. 2 (in all the appeals).\n\n, M. C. Setalvad, S. C. Bose and P. K. Bose, for Intervener No. 3 (in all the appeals).\n\nMarch 5, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered 1964 by-- Andhra Praduh GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .-These four appeals arise from four State Road Trnsporl writ petitions filed by the appellant, the Andhra Pradesh State Corllan Road Transport Corporation, in the High Court of Andhra The Incom< Tax .\n\nPradesh against the Income-tax Officer, and the Appellate Officer and Anr.\n\n~ Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad, respon- Gajendragadl\"w, c.J. dents l and 2 respectively, in which it claimed a writ of pro hi- • bition restraining them from collecting any tax, or taking any proceedings under the Indian Income Tax Act against them.\n\nIn its writ petitions, the appellant further claimed an order, writ, or other appropriate direction quashing the assessment orders passed by respondent No. l on the 29th February, 1960. for the years 1958-59 and 1959-60. For the .first year, a tax of Rs. 13,60,963.86 nP. has been imposed for the period 11-1-1958 to the 31-3-1958, and for the latter year, a tax of P Rs. 34,44,430.48 nP. has been levied for the period 1-4-1958 to 31-3-1959. After hearing the parties, the High Court has dismissed the appellant's writ petitions with costs. The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and it is with the said certificate that these four appeals have been brought to this Court.\n\nIt appears that the appellant was established under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (No. 64 of 1950) (hereinafter called the Act) by a notification issued by the Andhra Pradesh Government arid it has been functioning with effect from the 11th January, 1958. Before the formation of the appellant Corporation, the road transport was a department of the Government of Hyderabad and after integration of Hyderabad with Andhra Pradesh, it was run by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. During the whole of this period, the road transport was treated as exempt from incometax. After the appellant Corporation was, however, formed the Income-tax Department took the view that the income made by the appellant was liable to tax, and so, a notice under s. 22 of the Income-Tax Act was served on the appellant on the 29th January, 1959. In pursuance of the proceedings which were taken after service of the notice, the impugned orders of assessment were passed. Before the Income-tax Officer, it was urged by the appellant that since the appellant was an inde- ndent body carrying on the business of road transport, it did not fall under any of the five categories of assessees under s. 3 of the T ncome-tax Act; it was neither an individual nor a Hindu undivided family, nor a firm, nor a company, or an association of persons, and as it was outside the said five categories of assessees, no tax could be levied against it. It was • further argued that the net income of the appellant ultimately goes to the State of Andhra Pradesh under s. 30 of the Act a.nd as such it was immune from Union taxation unde;\n\n1964 Art. 289 of the Constitution. Yet, another contention was raised Andhra Prwleah in support of the plea that the noice issued by respondent No. 1 State Road T~\"'P\"'' was invalid, and that was that the appellant was a local autho-\n\nCorporation rity exempt from income-tax, All these contentions were re- T1\" 1.,;;,., Tar jected by respondent No. 1, with the result that the impugned Officer and Anr. orders of assessment came to be passed. It is the validity of Gajendraqwlkar, c.J. these orders that the appellant challenged before the Andhra\n\n Pradesh High Court.\n\nThe High Court has held that the appellant is not a Stateowned Corporation and that it is not carrying on business on behalf of the Government. It has also observed that the trade or business which the appellant was carrying on was not incidental to the ordinary functions of government, and since no declaration had been made to that effect under Art. 289(3), the appellant could not rely oh Art. 289(1). The contention that the appellant was a local authority which was urged before the High Court was rejected, and the argument that the charging section of the Income-tax Act was repugnant with the matedal provisions of the Act, such as sections 28, 29 and 30, was also held to be without any substance by the High Court.\n\nThus, since none of the arguments urged by the appellant before the High Court was accepted, the writ petitions filed by it were dismissed.\n\nThe main point urged before us by the learned Advocate- General of Andhra Pradesh on bhalf of the appellant is that the income in respect of which th~ impugned order of assess ment has been passed by respondent No. I. is exempt from Union taxation under Art. 289(]) of the Constitution, and that raises the question about the construction and effect df the provisions of the three clauses of Art. 289. Let us. thirefore. read the said article: /\n\n\"289. (I) The property and income of a State shall be exempt from Union taxation.\n\n(2! Nothing in clause (I) shall prevent the Union from imposing, or authorising the imposition of, any tax to such extent. if any. as Parliament may by law provide in respect of a trade or business of any kind carried on by. or on behalf of, the Government of a State, or any operations connected therewith, or any property used or occupied or any income accruing or arising in connection therewith. ·\n\n(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall apply to any trade 1111 or business, or to any class of trade or business, which Parliament may by law declare to be incidental to the ordinary functions of government.\"\n\nThe learned Advocate-General concedes that the trans- 1964 port activity carried on by the appellant is strictly not inci- Andhra Pradesh dental to the ordinary functions of government. It is true that State Road T~118pQt1 in a modern democratic Welfare State, Government has to c ... poration undertake several economic 'activities some of which are trade The 1:;,,., T\"\" activities, while others are commercial activities, because the Officer and Anr. pursuit of the welfare policies inevitably .req.uires that Goven- Gajendragadkar, c.J. ment should help the process of economic IIllprovement of its citizens. However desirable these socio-economic activities may be and however legitimate may be the attempt of the State . Government to undertake them, there is no denying the fact that the ordinary functions of the Government to which clause\n\n(3) of Art. 289 refers must be distin$uished from these socioeconomic activities. The Advocate-General, however, urges that though the trade activities of the appellant may thus be distinguishable from the ordinary functions of government, they are nevertheless included in Art. 289(1) and income derived by the appellant from the said activities falls within the protection of Art. 289(1).\n\nThis argument proceeds on the assumption that clause (2) • of Art. 289 is an exception or proviso to clause (!) and as such, whatever is included in clause (2) must be deemed to have been included also in clause (I); otherwise, the proviso cannot be logically explained. It is because the trading or commercia:I activities of the government of a State to which the said clause refers were originally included in clause (l) that it became necessary to provide by clause (2) that the said trading or commercial activities carried op by the Government of a State would not claim the benefit of exemption prescribed by clause (1). That is how the Advocate-General seekS to include trading or business activities mentioned in cl. (2) in cl. (I) itself. Loglcally, no exception can be taken to this approach.\n\nThe next stage in the argument urged by the Advocate- General is that clause (2) is wide enough to include the trading activities carried on by the appellant and as a result of the width of its scope, the appellant's activities can be treated as the commercial activities carried on by the Government of Andhra Pradesh itself. It will be noticed that clause (2) refers to a trade or business of any kind carried on by or on behalf of. the Government of a State. The argument is that the first part of the clause refers to the trade or business carried on by the Government and that means, carried on by the Government either departmentally or by agents appointed by the Government in that behalf. Whether the department carried on the business or an agent specifically and exclusively appointed for that purpose carries it on, it is the business carried on by the State. The latter part of the clause refers to trade or business carried on on behalf of the Government of a State and it is\n\n_, l\n\n1964 suggested that this part of the clause is intended to take in Andhra p,..d.,, trade or business carried on by a Corporation like the appel- 8tate RoadTmnaport !ant which is either State-owned. or State-controlled. The\n\n0•ix:twn appellant Corporation, says the Advocate-General, is un- Tke Income Tax doubtedly State-controlled and he would suggest that it iS • Officer and Anr. also owned by the State of Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, the\n\nGajendragaa!Jar o.J. commercial activity carried on by the appellant must be deem- ' ed to be an activity carried on on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh, and it is with this postulate that the argument reverts to clause (!)of Art. 289 and urges that the income received by the appellant in respect of commercial activities carried on by it on behalf of the Government of Andhra Pradesh is exempt from Union taxation.\n\nIn support of this argument, the Advocate-General has relied on a recent decision of this Court in Akadasi Padhan\n\nv. State of Orissa & Others.(') In that case, this Court had occasion to consider the scope and effect of the provisions contained in Art. 19(6). It will be recalled that Art. 19(6) authorises the State, inter alia, to make any Jaw relating to the carrying on by the State or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. One of the points which fell to be considered in the Akadasi Pad/tan case was the effect of the words \"a Ja:w relating to the carrying on by the State of any trade or business.\" Dealing with this question, this Court held that though normally, the trade specified in the clause would be carried on by the State departmentally or with the assistance of public servants appointed in that behalf, there may be cases of some trades or business in which it would be open to the State to employ the services of agents, provided the agents work on behalf of the State and not for themselves. Relying upon this decision, the Advocate-General argues that when clause (2) of Art. 289 refers to trade or business carried on by the Government of a State, it includes trade or business carried on by the Government either departmentally or with the assistance of agents appointed in that behalf, and so, he argues that these two categories of carrying on business. hving been includ~ in the first part, what the second part 1s mtended to cover 1s trade or business carried on by the Government of a State through the instrumentality of a corporation like the appellan~, and so, the trade or business cart1ed on by the appellant IS trade or business carried on on behalf of the Government of Andhra Pradesh within the meaning of Art. 289(2) and that makes the income earned out of the said trade or businesa income of the State under Art. 289(1).\n\n(') [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R 691.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 23\n\nIn substance, this argument is really based on the Ameri- 1961 can doctrine of the immunity of State agencies <ir instru- Andh;;; Pradesh mentalities from Federal taxation. When this doctrine was ac-StateRoadTransporl. cepted by American decisions, it was normally confined to Gorporatfon such State agencies as were concerned with functiol)s which The In; me Ta, were essentially governmental in character. But, says the Advo- Officer and Ant. cate-General, since Art. 289(2) takes in trade activities carriedaajendraaadkar, G.J, on by a corporation like the appellant, the question as to whether the trade is a function which is essentially governmental in character is irrelevant. In support of his contention, the Advocate-General has relied upon two American decisions; first of these is the decision in the case of Mark Graves. John J. Merrill and John P. Hennessy v. People of the State of New York Upon the Relation of James B. O'keefe('). In tha.t case Stone J. who spoke for the Supreme Court of America, has observed that when the national government lawfully acts • through a corporation which it owns and controls, those activities are governmental functions entitled to whatever tax immunity attaches to those functions when carried on by the government itself through its departments. In other words, this observation shows that the Court was inclined to take the view that for the purpose of claiming exemption from taxation, it did not make a material difference whether the operation was carried on by the State departmentally or with the assistance of a corporation.\n\nIn Clallan County v. United States of America, (') it was held by the Supreme Court of America that a State cannot tax the property of a corporation or.ganised by the Federal government to produce material for war purposes, the property of which is conveyed to it by, or bought with the money of, the United States, and used solely for the purposes of its creation.\n\nHolmes J. who delivered the opinion of the Court emphasised the fact that in the case before the Court not only the agent was created, but all the agent's property was acquired and used for the sole purpose of producing a weapon for the war. \"This is not like the case of a corporation,\" added the learned Judge. \"having its own purposes as well as those of the United Sta.tes, and interested in profit on its own account. The incorporation and formal erection of a new personality was only for the convenience of the United States, to carry out its ends and so,. it is unnecessary to consider wh.ether the fact that the\n\nUrnted States °'.vned all the stck and furnished all the property to the corporation, taken by itself, would be enough to bring the cas~ within the policy of the rule that exempts property of the Urnted States.\" ·\n\n(') 83 Law. Ed. 927. (') 68 Law. Ed. 328, 331.\n\n1961 Both these decisions would not_ assist us in determining Alldhra Pradesh the question as to whether the income received by the appell- -State Road Transpon ant is the incomeof the State of Andhra Pradesh within the\n\nCarpo; atian meaning of Art. 289(1), because the decision of the problem The 1,.,,,,;., Ta• raised before us by the appellant must be reached not on :!ny OfficerandAnr;·--academic considerations of the claims for exemption from aajendragadkar, c.J. taxation which the State instrumentalities can put forward, but on the construction of Art. 289 itself. Art. 289(1) exempts from Union taxation the property and income of a State, and the Advocate-General can succeed only if he is able to establish that the income derived by the appellant in respect of which the impugned assessment order has been passed is the income of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, the American doctrine on which -strong reliance was placed by the Advocate-General would be of.no assistance to his case. If the trading activity carried on by the appellant is sought to be brought into Art. 289(1) solely as a result of the construction of Art. 289(2), the test on which the validity of the Advocate-General's argument must necessarily be judged, is whether or not the requirement of Art. 289(1) is satisfied and that requirement clearly is that the income like the property for which exemption from Union taxation is claimed must be the income or property of a State.\n\nBesides, there is another reason why the Advocate- General cannot derive any assistance from the American doctrine of the exemption from taxation in regard to State instrumentalities.· The saiddoctrine has been categorically rejected by this Comt .in State of West Bengal v. Union of India(') Speaking for the majority of the Court, Sinha C. J. observed that ''it was futile to attempt the resuscitation of the now exploded doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities which originating from the observations of Marshall, C. J., in M' Cu/loch v. Maryland,(') has been decisively rejected by the Privy Council as inapplicable to the interpretation of the respective powers of the States and the Centre under the Canadian and Australian Constitutions (vide Bank ofTormzto\n\nv. Lambe,(') and Webb v. Outrim(') and has practically been given up even in the United States.\" Thus, it.is necessary to revert to the construction of Art. 289 _in deciding whether the appellant is right in claiming immunity from Union tax- _ -ation. -\n\nWe have already seen that Art. 289 consists of three clauses, the first clause confers exemption from Union taxation on the property and income of a State. In Special Refer-\n\n:ence No. 1 cf 1962. In re. Sea Customs Act (1878), Section\n\n(') [1964] 1 S.C.R. 371, 407.\n\n_ (') (1887) 12 A.C. 575. (') (1819) 4 Wheat, 316 at p. 436. (') [1907]c A.C. 81\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSOPRBl\\IE COURT REPORTS 25\n\n20(2),(') a Special Bench of this Court by a majority has held 1964 that the immunity granted to the States. in respect of Union Andhra Pra, resh taxation, under Art. 289(1) does not extend to duties of cus-Statc Road Tranaporl tom> including export duties or duties of excise. In that case, Oorpomtion the question which directly arme for decision, was to determine 1'he 1.,;~\" Tax the scope and effect of the nature of taxation from which ex- Officer and Anr. emption could be claimed by the property and income of a Gajendr(l!Jadko.r, o.J.\n\nState under Art. 289(]). With that aspect of the matter, however, we are not concerned in the present appeals.\n\nThe scheme of Art. 289 appears to be that ordinarily, the income derived by a State both from governmental and nongovernmental or commerc:al activities shall be immune from income-tax levied by the Union, provided, of course, the income in question can be said to be the income of the State.\n\nThis general proposition flows from clause (1). '\n\nClause (2) then provides an exception and authorises the Union to impose a tax in respect of the income derived by the Government of a State from trade or business carried on by it, or on its behalf; that is to say, the income from trade or business carried on by the Government of a State or on its behalf which would not have been taxable under clause (!), can be taxed, provided a law is made by Parliament in that behalf.\n\nIf clause (I) had stood by itself, it may not have been easy to •. 'include within its purview income derived by a State from commercial activities, but since clause (2), in terms, empowers Parliament to make a law levying a tax ort commercial activities carried on by or on behalf of a State, the conclusion is inescapable that these activities were deemed to have been included in cl.(!) and that alone can be the justification for the words in which cl. (2) has been adopted by the Constitution.\n\nIt is plain that cl. (2) proceeds on the basis that but for its provision, the trading activity which is covered by it would have claimed exemption from Union taxation under cl. (!).\n\nThat is the result of reading clauses (1) and (2) together.\n\nClause (3) then empowers Parliament to declare by law that any trade Qlr business would be taken out of the purview of cl. (2) and restored to the area covered by cl. (1) by declaring that the said trade or business is incidental to the ordinary functions of government. In 'other words, cl. (3) is an exception to the exception prescribed by cl. (2). Whatever trade or business is declared to be incidental to the-ordinary functions of government, would cease to be governed by cl. (2) and --\" would then be exempt from Union taxation. That, broadly\n\nted, appears to be the result of the scheme adopted by the three clauses of Art. 289.\n\n(') [1964] 3 C.S.R. 787.\n\nJ964 Reading the three clauses together, one consideration\n\nAndh Pad h emerges beyond all doubt and that is that the property as well .state R::a Tranpvrt as the income in respect of which exemption is claimed under\n\nCorporation\n\ncl. (!), must be the property and income of the State, and so, The In;~'\"' Tax the same question faces us again: is the income derived by O.fficer an4 Anr. the appellant from its transport activities the income of the ,-; . n4~ 0 J State? If a trade or business is carried on by the State departaJ• r, mentally and income is derived from it, there would be no difficulty in holding that the said income is the income of the State. If a trade or business is carried on by a State through its agents appointed exclusively for that purpose, and the agents carry it on entirely on behalf of the State and not on their own account, there would be no difficulty in holding that the income made from such trade or business is the income of the State. But difficulties arise when we are dealing with trade or business carried on by a corporation established by a State by issuing a notification under the relevant provisions of the Act. The corporation, though statutory, has a personality of its own and this personality is distinct from that of the State or other shareholders. It cannot be said that a shareholder owns the property of the corporation or carries on the business with which the corporation is concerned. The doctrine that a corporation has a separate legal entity of its own is so firmly rooted in our notions derived from common law that it -is hardly necessary to deal with it elaborately; and so, primiz\n\nfacic, the income derived by the appellant from its trading activity cannot be claimed by the State which is one of the shareholders of the corporation. It may that the statute under which the notification has been issued constituting the appellant corporation may provide expressly or by necessary implication that the income derived by the corporation from its trading activity would be the income of the State. The doctrine of the separate entity or personality of the corporation is always subject to the exceptions which statutes may create, and if there is a statutory provision which clearly indicates that despite the concept of tire separate personality of the corporation, the trade carried on by it belongs to the shareholders who brought the corporation into existel1ce and the income, received from the said trade likewise belongs to them, that' would be another matter. It would then be possible to hold that as a result of the specific statutory provisions the income received from the trade carried on by the corporation belongs to the shareholders who have constituted the said corporation, and so, we must look to the Act to determine whether the income in the present case can be said to be the income of the State of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nIn this connection, we may usefully refer to the observations made by Lord Denning in Tamlin v. Hansaford: tl. \"In\n\n(') [1950] K.B. 18.\n\nthe eye of the law,\" said Lord Denning. \"the corporation is its l9G4 own master and is answerable as fully as any other person or Andhra Pr., desh corporation. It is not the Crown and has none of the immunities Slate Road T\".'nsport .. , f h c It t t . 1 a t Corpora/wn or pnv1 eges o t e rown. s servan s are no c1v1 serv n s, v. and its property is not Crown property. It is as much bound 7'hc Income Tax by Acts of Parliament as any other subject of tbe King. It is, Offic\" and Anr. of course, a public authority and its purposes, no doubt, are Gajcndragadkar, c.J. public purposes, but it is not a government department nor do its powers fall within the province of government.\" These observations tend to show that a trading activity carried on by the corporation is not a trading activity carried on by the State departmentally, nor is it a trading activity carried on by a State through its agents appointed in that behalf.\n\nThat takes us to the provisions of the ct which will assist us in determining the question as to whether the income in question can legitimately be held to be the income of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Act was passed to provide for the incorporation and regulation of Road Transport Corporations. Section 3 authorises the State Government to issue a notification in the Official Gazette establishing a Road Transport Corporation for the whole or any part of the State under such name as may be specified in the notification, after taking into account considerations specified by clauses (a), (b) and. (c). Section 4 then provides that every corporation shall be a body corporate by the name notified under s. 3 having perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall sue or be sued by the said name. Section 5 deals with the constitution of Road Transpot Corporation; sub-section (3) provides for the representation both of the Central Government and of the State Government in the Corporation in such proportion as may be agreed to by both the Governments and of nomination by each Government of its own representatives therein; it also contemplates that if capital is raised by the issue of shares to other parties, provision has to be made for the representation of such shareholders. Section 17 authorises the appointment of Advisory Councils. Section 18 prescribes the general duty of the corporation. Section 23(1) provides for the capital of the corporation; under this sub-section, the capital contributed by the Central Government and the State Government is in the proportion of 1 : 3. Sub-section (3) authorises the division of the capital of the corporation into such number of shares as the State Government may determine; and it provides that the number of shares which shall be subscribed by the State Government, the Central Government and other parties shall also be determined by the State Government in consultation with the ~~tral Government. This provision contemplates the poss1b1hty of other shareholders joining the State Government and_ the Central Government. Section 24 permits additional capital of the corporation to be raised. Section 25 requires that\n\n1964 the shares of the corporation shall be guaranteed by the State Andh'a bade&h Government as to the payment of the' principal and the pay- S1ate Rowl Trm., port ment of the annual dividend at such minimum rate as mav be CorpDralion .., • J v. fixed by the State Government. Section 26 confers powers of The I=m• Tax borrowing on the corporation. Section 27 constitutes a fund\n\nOffice,· and Anr. of the Corporation. Section 28 provides for the payment of Oajendragadkar, O.J. interest and dividend. Section 29(1) requires the Corporation to make such provisions for depreciation and for reserve and other funds as the State Government may, from time to time, direct. Section 29(2) provides that the management of the said funds, the sums to be carried from time to time to the credit thereof and the applicaon of the moneys comprised therein shall be dete1mined by the Corporation. There is a proviso to this sub-section which prohibits the utilisation of these funds for any purpose other than that for which it was created without the previous approval of the State Government. Section 30 deals with the disposal of net profits: it says that after provision is made as required by sections 28 and 29, the Corporation may utilise such percentage of its net annual profits as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government for the purposes therein specified, and it adds that out of the balance, such amount as may, with the previous approval of the State Government and the Central Government, be specified in this behalf by the Corporation, may be utilised for financing the expansilln programmes of the Corporation and the remainder, if any, shall be made over to the State Government for the purpose of road development. Section 31 gives power to the Corporation to spend such sums as it thinks fit on objects authorised by the Act. Section 32 deals with the budget; s. 33 with accounts and audit; and s. 34 provides that the directions issued by the State Government after consultation with the Corporation shall be followed by the Corporation, and it adds that such directions may include instructions relating to the recruitment, conditions of service and training of its employees, wages to be paid to the employees, reserves to be maintained by it itnd disposal of its profits or stocks.\n\nUnder Section 38, power is conferred on the State Government to supersede the Corporation for reasons specified by s. 38(1). On supersession, all property vested in the Corporation vests during the period of supersession, in the State Government; that is the effect of s. 38(2)(c). Section 39 deals with the liquidation of a Corporation and clause (2) of this section provides that in the event of such liquidation, the assets of the Corporation, after meeting the liabilities, if any, shall be divided among the Central and the State Government and such other parties, if any, as may have subscribed to the capital in proportion to the contribution made by each of them to the total capital of the Corporation. That, in brief, is the position -of the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nThere is no doubt that the bulk of the capital is contribut- 1964 ed by the State Government and a small proportion by the Andhra Prad\"h Central Government, and in that sense, the majority of sharesH1ateRoadTrn.•p0rt .are at present owned by the State Government. There is also Corpo~w• no doubt that the Corporation is a State-controlled corpora- Thr Income Tax tion in the sense that at all material stages and in all material Officer and Anr. particulars, the activity of the Corporation is controlled by a,, jrndrogadkar, G.J. the State; but it is c:ear that other citizens may be admitted to the group of shareholders, and from that point of view, the Act contemplates contribution of the capital for the Corporation not only by the Central and the State Governments, but .also by the citizens. The main point which we are examining at this stage is: is the income derived by the appellant from its trading activity, income of the State under Art. 289(1)? In our opinion, the answer to this question must be in the negative.\n\nFar from making any provision which would make the income of the Corporation the income of the State, all the relevant provisions emphatically bring out the separate personality of the corporation and proceed on the basis that the trading activity is run by the corporation and the profit and los that would be made as a result of the trading activity would be the profit and loss of the corporation. There is no provision in the Act which has attempted to lift the veil from the face of the corporation and thereby enable the shareholders to claim that despite the form which the organisation has taken, it is the shareholders who run the trade and who can claim the income coming from it as their own. Section 28 which provides for the payment of interest clearly brings out the duality between the Corporation on the one hand, and the State and Central Governments on the other. Take, for instance, the case of supersession of the corporation authorised by s. 38. Section 38(2)(c) emphatically brings out the fact that the property really vests in the Corporation, because it provides that during the period of supersession, it shall vest in the State Government. Similarly, s. 39(2) which deals with the distribution of assests in case of liquidation, brings out t!le same feature. Jt has been urged before us by the Advocate-General that s. 50 contemplates that after provision is made as required by sections 28 and 29 and funds are utilised as prescribed by s. 30, the balance has to. be given to the State Government for the purpose of road development, and that, it is suggested, indicates that the income belongs to the State Government. This argument is clearly not well-founded. When w~ are deciding the question as to whether the income derived by the Corporation is the income of the State, the provision made by s. 30 for making over to the State Governmnt the balance that may remain as indicated therein, is of no assistance. The. income is undoubtedly the income of the Corporation. All that s. 30 requires is that a part of that income may be entrusted to the\n\n19~ 4 State Government for a specific purpose of road development.\n\nAndhra Prad\"'' It is not suggested or shown that .when such income is made Stale Road Tan<pvrt over to the State, it becomes a part of the general revenue of\n\nOor~a1wn the State. It is income which is impressed with an obligation Tiie lnwm< Tax and which can be utilised by the State Government only for Officer and Anr. the specific purpose for which it is entrusted to it. Therefore.\n\n11aj<ndr\"1J!J<lkar, o.J. we are satisfied that the income derived by the appellant from its trading activity cannot be said to be the income-'Of the State under Art. 289(1), and if that is so, the fact that the trading activity carried on by the appellant may be covered by Art. 289(2), does not really assist the appellant's case. Even if a trading activity falls under cl. (2) of Art. 289, it can sustain a claim for exemption from Union taxation only if it is shown that the income derived from the said trading activity is the income of the State. That is how ultimately, the crux of the problem is to determine whether the income in question is the income of the State, and on this vital test, the appellant fails.\n\nThere is one more point which was faintly argued before us by the learned Advocate-General. He frankly told us that he did not propose to challenge the correctness of the conclusion recorded by the High Court that the appellant is not a local authority; but he was not prepare.d to give up his contention that there is repugnancy between the charging section of the Income-tax Act and sections 29 and 30 of the Act. He suggested that in view of the repugnancy on which he relied, the Act which is Act No. 64 of 1950 should prevail over the Income Tax Act which is an enactment of 1922. None of the assumptions' made by the learned Advocate-General in support of this plea can be said to be valid. Though the original Income-tax Act was passed in 1922, as is well-known, every year a fresh Finance Act is passed and it is by virtue of such successive Finance Acts that income-tax is assessed from year to year, and so, the argument that the Act on which the appellant relies is later in point of time must fail. Besides, there is really no repugnancy at all. Basing himself on the provisions 'of sections 29 and 30, the Advocate-General contends that these two prO:. visions show that the Act did not contemplate the pa)1nent of income-tax. This argument is entirely misconceived. It is hardly necessary for the Act to make a provision that tax, if chargeable, would be paid. In fact, the Companies Act which deals with companies does not make such a specific provision, though no one can seriously suggest that there would be repugnancy between the provisions of the Companies Act and the Income Tax Act. All that sections 29 and 30 purport to do is to provide for the administration of the funds vesting in the Corporation and their disposal. It is clearly far-fetched, if not fantastic, to suggest that these provisions are inconsistent with the liability to pay tax which is imposed by the Income Tax Act. The Advocate-General, no doubt, attempted to derive some support\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 31\n\nto his argument by relying on section 43 of the State Financial 1964 Corporations Act, 1951(No.63of1951), as well ass. 43 of the AndhraPradesh Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 (No. 14 of 1948). Sec-State Road Tr.anspOl'I tion 43 which occurs in both the said Acts provides that the Cmp-0~~· 0 • Corporation shall be liable to pay any taxes on income levied Tlw Income Tax by the Central Government in the same manner and to the Officer and Anr. same extent as a company. It is urged that where the legislaaajendragadkar, O.J. ture wanted to provide for the liability of the Corporation to pay the taxes on income levied by the Central Government, it has made specific provisions in that behalf and since no such provision has been made in the Act, it follows that the legislature intended that no tax should be levied on the income earned by the Corporation established under the Act. We do not think there is any substance in the argument. The whole object which section 43 is presumably intended to achieve is to prov, ide that the tax should be levied on the basis that the Corporation is a company and nothing more. If no such provision was made. in the Act, that has no bearing on the liability of the Corporation to pay the tax on its income. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court was right in rejecting the argument that by virtue of the repugnancy between the materiaryrovisions of the Act and the charging section of the Income Tax Act, it should be held that the appellant was not liable to pay tax on its income.\n\nThe result is, the appeals fail and are dismissed with .costs. One hearing fee.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 169, "entities": [{"text": "ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. 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Merrill and John P. Hennessy v. People of the State of New York Upon the Relation of James B.O'kefe, 83 Law."}}, {"text": "John J. Merrill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3615, "end_char": 3630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mark Graves, John J. Merrill and John P. Hennessy v. People of the State of New York Upon the Relation of James B.O'kefe, 83 Law."}}, {"text": "[1964) 1 S.C.R. 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3860, "end_char": 3879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4193, "end_char": 4206, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4372, "end_char": 4385, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4394, "end_char": 4408, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "is no repugnancy between the charging section of the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4416, "end_char": 4483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 29 and 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no repugnancy between the charging section of the Income-tax Act", "statute": "There is no repugnancy between the charging section of the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 29 and 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4523, "end_char": 4536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no repugnancy between the charging section of the Income-tax Act", "statute": "There is no repugnancy between the charging section of the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4760, "end_char": 4774, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4893, "end_char": 4918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the order dated July 14, 1961 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos."}}, {"text": "D. Narsaraju", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4962, "end_char": 4974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsaraju, Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, P. R.\n\nRamchandra Rao and T: V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. R.\n\nRamchandra Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5010, "end_char": 5031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsaraju, Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, P. R.\n\nRamchandra Rao and T: V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "T: V. R. Tatachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5036, "end_char": 5054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsaraju, Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, P. R.\n\nRamchandra Rao and T: V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopala Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5097, "end_char": 5120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopala Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5122, "end_char": 5133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopala Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5138, "end_char": 5152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopala Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Rajeshwari Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5197, "end_char": 5214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajeshwari Prasad and S. P. Varma, for lhtervener No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5219, "end_char": 5230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajeshwari Prasad and S. P. Varma, for lhtervener No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5276, "end_char": 5282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, S. C. Bose and P. K. Bose, for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "S. C. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5284, "end_char": 5294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, S. C. Bose and P. K. Bose, for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5299, "end_char": 5309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, S. C. Bose and P. K. Bose, for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5357, "end_char": 5371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", M. C. Setalvad, S. C. Bose and P. K. Bose, for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "Andhra Praduh GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5509, "end_char": 5537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered 1964 by-- Andhra Praduh GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .-These four appeals arise from four State Road Trnsporl writ petitions filed by the appellant, the Andhra Pradesh State Corllan Road Transport Corporation, in the High Court of Andhra The Incom< Tax ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra The Incom< Tax .\n\nPradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5707, "end_char": 5753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered 1964 by-- Andhra Praduh GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .-These four appeals arise from four State Road Trnsporl writ petitions filed by the appellant, the Andhra Pradesh State Corllan Road Transport Corporation, in the High Court of Andhra The Incom< Tax ."}}, {"text": "11-1-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6396, "end_char": 6405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13,60,963.86 nP. has been imposed for the period 11-1-1958 to the 31-3-1958, and for the latter year, a tax of P Rs."}}, {"text": "31-3-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13,60,963.86 nP. has been imposed for the period 11-1-1958 to the 31-3-1958, and for the latter year, a tax of P Rs."}}, {"text": "1-4-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6512, "end_char": 6520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34,44,430.48 nP. has been levied for the period 1-4-1958 to 31-3-1959."}}, {"text": "31-3-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6524, "end_char": 6533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "34,44,430.48 nP. has been levied for the period 1-4-1958 to 31-3-1959."}}, {"text": "appears that the appellant was established under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6809, "end_char": 6899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6978, "end_char": 7003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "64 of 1950) (hereinafter called the Act) by a notification issued by the Andhra Pradesh Government arid it has been functioning with effect from the 11th January, 1958."}}, {"text": "11th January, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7054, "end_char": 7072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "64 of 1950) (hereinafter called the Act) by a notification issued by the Andhra Pradesh Government arid it has been functioning with effect from the 11th January, 1958."}}, {"text": "Government of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7168, "end_char": 7191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the formation of the appellant Corporation, the road transport was a department of the Government of Hyderabad and after integration of Hyderabad with Andhra Pradesh, it was run by the Government of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Government of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7266, "end_char": 7294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the formation of the appellant Corporation, the road transport was a department of the Government of Hyderabad and after integration of Hyderabad with Andhra Pradesh, it was run by the Government of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7559, "end_char": 7564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It appears that the appellant was established under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "statute": "It appears that the appellant was established under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7572, "end_char": 7586, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "29th January, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the appellant Corporation was, however, formed the Income-tax Department took the view that the income made by the appellant was liable to tax, and so, a notice under s. 22 of the Income-Tax Act was served on the appellant on the 29th January, 1959."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7989, "end_char": 7993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8344, "end_char": 8349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8420, "end_char": 8428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andhra Prwleah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yet, another contention was raised Andhra Prwleah in support of the plea that the noice issued by respondent No."}}, {"text": "Gajendraqwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8880, "end_char": 8894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the validity of Gajendraqwlkar, c.J. these orders that the appellant challenged before the Andhra\n\n Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "Andhra\n\n Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8955, "end_char": 8982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the validity of Gajendraqwlkar, c.J. these orders that the appellant challenged before the Andhra\n\n Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "Art. 289(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9333, "end_char": 9344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9378, "end_char": 9389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9549, "end_char": 9563, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 28, 29 and 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9626, "end_char": 9648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 289(])", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10245, "end_char": 10253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Goven- Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11502, "end_char": 11523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "pursuit of the welfare policies inevitably .req.uires that Goven- Gajendragadkar, c.J. ment should help the process of economic IIllprovement of its citizens."}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11845, "end_char": 11853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12112, "end_char": 12123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12216, "end_char": 12227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12292, "end_char": 12300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14097, "end_char": 14103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter part of the clause refers to trade or business carried on on behalf of the Government of a State and it is\n\n_, l\n\n1964 suggested that this part of the clause is intended to take in Andhra p,..d.,, trade or business carried on by a Corporation like the appel- 8tate RoadTmnaport !"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14431, "end_char": 14454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "also owned by the State of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14703, "end_char": 14711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15144, "end_char": 15154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15181, "end_char": 15191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16120, "end_char": 16128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16770, "end_char": 16781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16875, "end_char": 16886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17423, "end_char": 17434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "carriedaajendraaadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17461, "end_char": 17482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "289(2) takes in trade activities carriedaajendraaadkar, G.J, on by a corporation like the appellant, the question as to whether the trade is a function which is essentially governmental in character is irrelevant."}}, {"text": "James B. O'keefe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17885, "end_char": 17901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "John J. Merrill and John P. Hennessy v. People of the State of New York Upon the Relation of James B. O'keefe(')."}}, {"text": "Stone", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17920, "end_char": 17925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In tha.t case Stone J. who spoke for the Supreme Court of America, has observed that when the national government lawfully acts • through a corporation which it owns and controls, those activities are governmental functions entitled to whatever tax immunity attaches to those functions when carried on by the government itself through its departments."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17947, "end_char": 17971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In tha.t case Stone J. who spoke for the Supreme Court of America, has observed that when the national government lawfully acts • through a corporation which it owns and controls, those activities are governmental functions entitled to whatever tax immunity attaches to those functions when carried on by the government itself through its departments."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18566, "end_char": 18579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Clallan County v. United States of America, (') it was held by the Supreme Court of America that a State cannot tax the property of a corporation or.ganised by the Federal government to produce material for war purposes, the property of which is conveyed to it by, or bought with the money of, the United States, and used solely for the purposes of its creation."}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18912, "end_char": 18918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Holmes J. who delivered the opinion of the Court emphasised the fact that in the case before the Court not only the agent was created, but all the agent's property was acquired and used for the sole purpose of producing a weapon for the war. \""}}, {"text": "Alldhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19859, "end_char": 19874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1961 Both these decisions would not_ assist us in determining Alldhra Pradesh the question as to whether the income received by the appell- -State Road Transpon ant is the incomeof the State of Andhra Pradesh within the\n\nCarpo; atian meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20042, "end_char": 20053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20354, "end_char": 20362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20371, "end_char": 20382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20883, "end_char": 20894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20937, "end_char": 20948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21081, "end_char": 21092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21600, "end_char": 21605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The saiddoctrine has been categorically rejected by this Comt .in State of West Bengal v. Union of India(') Speaking for the majority of the Court, Sinha C. J. observed that ''it was futile to attempt the resuscitation of the now exploded doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities which originating from the observations of Marshall, C. J., in M' Cu/loch v. Maryland,(') has been decisively rejected by the Privy Council as inapplicable to the interpretation of the respective powers of the States and the Centre under the Canadian and Australian Constitutions (vide Bank ofTormzto\n\nv. Lambe,(') and Webb v. Outrim(') and has practically been given up even in the United States.\""}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21780, "end_char": 21788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The saiddoctrine has been categorically rejected by this Comt .in State of West Bengal v. Union of India(') Speaking for the majority of the Court, Sinha C. J. observed that ''it was futile to attempt the resuscitation of the now exploded doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities which originating from the observations of Marshall, C. J., in M' Cu/loch v. Maryland,(') has been decisively rejected by the Privy Council as inapplicable to the interpretation of the respective powers of the States and the Centre under the Canadian and Australian Constitutions (vide Bank ofTormzto\n\nv. Lambe,(') and Webb v. Outrim(') and has practically been given up even in the United States.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22191, "end_char": 22199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22320, "end_char": 22328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22497, "end_char": 22512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1964] 1 S.C.R. 371", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22534, "end_char": 22553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22843, "end_char": 22854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 289(])", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23237, "end_char": 23248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23351, "end_char": 23359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sea Customs Act", "statute": "Sea Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25481, "end_char": 25489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28394, "end_char": 28417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would then be possible to hold that as a result of the specific statutory provisions the income received from the trade carried on by the corporation belongs to the shareholders who have constituted the said corporation, and so, we must look to the Act to determine whether the income in the present case can be said to be the income of the State of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28495, "end_char": 28502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, we may usefully refer to the observations made by Lord Denning in Tamlin v. Hansaford: tl. \""}}, {"text": "Income Tax by Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28953, "end_char": 28970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29790, "end_char": 29799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax by Act", "statute": "Income Tax by Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30099, "end_char": 30108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30199, "end_char": 30203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30294, "end_char": 30303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Road Transpot Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30335, "end_char": 30360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 5 deals with the constitution of Road Transpot Corporation; sub-section (3) provides for the representation both of the Central Government and of the State Government in the Corporation in such proportion as may be agreed to by both the Governments and of nomination by each Government of its own representatives therein; it also contemplates that if capital is raised by the issue of shares to other parties, provision has to be made for the representation of such shareholders."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30422, "end_char": 30440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 5 deals with the constitution of Road Transpot Corporation; sub-section (3) provides for the representation both of the Central Government and of the State Government in the Corporation in such proportion as may be agreed to by both the Governments and of nomination by each Government of its own representatives therein; it also contemplates that if capital is raised by the issue of shares to other parties, provision has to be made for the representation of such shareholders."}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30782, "end_char": 30792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30842, "end_char": 30852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30901, "end_char": 30914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "~~tral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31438, "end_char": 31455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section (3) authorises the division of the capital of the corporation into such number of shares as the State Government may determine; and it provides that the number of shares which shall be subscribed by the State Government, the Central Government and other parties shall also be determined by the State Government in consultation with the ~~tral Government."}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31580, "end_char": 31590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31651, "end_char": 31661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31819, "end_char": 31821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31954, "end_char": 31964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32026, "end_char": 32036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32095, "end_char": 32105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oajendragadkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32134, "end_char": 32148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 28 provides for the payment of Oajendragadkar, O.J. interest and dividend."}}, {"text": "Section 29(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32178, "end_char": 32191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32346, "end_char": 32359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32759, "end_char": 32769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 28 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32862, "end_char": 32880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33413, "end_char": 33423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33525, "end_char": 33535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33559, "end_char": 33564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33594, "end_char": 33599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33992, "end_char": 34002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 38(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34101, "end_char": 34109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 38(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34255, "end_char": 34266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34268, "end_char": 34278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Prad\"h Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34894, "end_char": 34926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt that the bulk of the capital is contribut- 1964 ed by the State Government and a small proportion by the Andhra Prad\"h Central Government, and in that sense, the majority of sharesH1ateRoadTrn.•p0rt .are at present owned by the State Government."}}, {"text": "jrndrogadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35283, "end_char": 35295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "particulars, the activity of the Corporation is controlled by a,, jrndrogadkar, G.J. the State; but it is c:ear that other citizens may be admitted to the group of shareholders, and from that point of view, the Act contemplates contribution of the capital for the Corporation not only by the Central and the State Governments, but .also by the citizens."}}, {"text": "Art. 289(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35719, "end_char": 35730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36506, "end_char": 36516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36762, "end_char": 36767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 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{"document_id": "1964_7_185_191_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREJ\\lE COURT REPORTS 185\n\nEPARI CHINNA KRISHNA MOORTHY. PROPRIETOR,\n\nEPARI CHINNA MOORTHY AND SONS,\n\nBERHAMPUR. ORISSA\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA\n\n(With Connected Petition)\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c J,, K N. WANCHOO, J, c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S, M. S!KRI, JJJ Fundamental Rights-Notification by Government exempting certain articles from sales tax-Petitioner claiming exemption under the notification-Validation Ac.t coming into force- Retrospective operation-Validity-Enactment, if unconstitutional-Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, (14 of 1947), s. 6-Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961 (7 of 1961) s, 2-Cor.s:titution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1)(g).\n\nThe petitioner, a merchant, carrying on business in. \"bullion and specie'' and gold and silver ornaments was a registered 'dealer' under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, The Government purporting to exercise its authority under s. 6 of the said Act issued a notification on July 1, 1949 exempting certain articles from the operation of the charging section of that Act. Under the notification gold ornaments were ordered to be exempted from sales tax when the manufacturer selling them charges separately for the value of gold and the cost of manufacture.\n\nThe petitioner filed his returns before the Sales-tax Officer and claimed exemption of sales-tax under the said notification, Up to June 1952, the claim for exemption was upheld. Subsequently, however, these assessments were reopened under s. 12(7) of the Act and it was claimed tha.t the deductions made on certain sale transactions of gold ornaments were not justified and the petitioner had escaped assessment. The petitioner pleaded that he was entitled to exemption, because he belonged to the class of manufacturers to which the notification referred. The Sales-tax Officer disallowed the petitioner's contention, The petitioner then challenged the said decision by preferring appeals, but the said appeals were also dismissed.\n\nPending these appeals, similar assessments made in respect of other dealers including the petitioner were challenged by writ petitions before the High Court, The High Court upheld the petitioner's case and issued writs directing the Sales-tax Officer to allow the petitioners' claim for exemption, After this judgement was pronounced, the impugned Act was passed by the legislature on August 1, 1961 and was published on September 18, 1961, containing one operative provision in s, 2, It provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgement, decree or order of any court, the word 'manufacturer' occuring against item 33 in the schedule . to the notification of the Government dated July 28, 1947 as amended by another notification of the 1st July, 1949 shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant a person who by his own Jabour works up materials into suita.ble forms and a person who owns or runs a manufactory for the PUI1lose of business with respect to the articles manufactured therem, The validity cf this section was challenged m the present writ petition,\n\nJlard. n\n\n1964 It was urged (i) that since the \\xemption was granted by the State Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it Epari Ohinna by s. 6, it was not open to the legislature to take away that Kriakna Moorthy, h Proprietor, Epari exemption retrospectively; (ii) t at the provision in s. 2 of the <Jhinna Jfoorthy .i. impugned Act was discriminatory and as such contravened the\n\nSOM, B\"hampur, equallty before the law guaranteed by Art. 14 and (iii) that\n\nOris.a the retrospective operation of the impugned section sh6uld be v. struck down as unconstitutional, because it imposes an unreason- Sta!e- 01 Orissa able restriction on the petitioner's fundamental right under Art. <Jajendragadkar, O.J.19 (1) (g) ·\n\nHe!d: (i) What the legislature had purported to do. by s. 2 of the impugned Act, was to make the intention of the notification clear. And, if the State Government was given the power either to grant or withdraw the exemption, that could not possibly affect the legislature's competence to make any provision in that behalf either prospectively or retrospectively.\n\n(ii) The notification as interpreted by s. 2 of the impugned Act benefits the artisans who produce ornaments thems., lves and who run manufactories. That is why the main object of granting exemption can be said to be achieved by holding that 'manufacturer' means either a manufacturer properly so called or one who engages artisans to manufacture gold ornamnts. In the present case the petitioners were not directly concerned with the production of ornaments, and admittedly, they did not produce the said ornaments themselves. Therefore, the persons who get the benefit of the exemption notification as a result of the provisions of s. 2 of the impugned Act cannot be said to belong to the same class as that of the petitioners. The two categories are distinct and there is no sameness or similarity between them, and if that is so, the main argument on the basis of Art. 14 does not subs'st.\n\n(ii) It would be difficult to accept the argument that because the retrospective operation may operate harshly in some cases, therefore, the legislation itself is invalid. In the circumstances of the present case it would not be possible to hold that by making the provision of s. 2 of the impugned Act retrospective the legisla.ture has imposed a restriction on the petitioner's fundamental rights under Art. 19.(1) (g) which is not reasonable and is not in the interest of the general public.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 125--135. and 233 of 1963.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nA. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, T. A. Ramachandran, B. Parthasarathy, 0. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioner (in W. P. Nos. 125-135; 1963).\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the respondents (in W. P. Nos. 125_:135 / 63).\n\n0. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioner (in W. P. No. 233/ 1963).\n\nR. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in W.P. No. 233 I 63).\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\'IE COURT REPORTS 187\n\nMarch 12, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was deliver- 1964 ed by- Epa1i Ohinna GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-This group of 12 writ peti- Kiishn:• J.foorlh~. . b h J\"d\"t f th P1opmlor, EpaN tions raises a common queshon a out t e. va t I Y o e Ohinno Moorthy \"' Orissa Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961 (Act No. 7 of 1961) Sons, B'; hampv.r,\n\n(hereinafter referred to as the Act). The facts on which the Onssa v, petitioners rely are similar, and so, we shall mention the facts s:ote of 01issa in the first group consisting of writ petitions Nos. 125-135 . d ad OJ of 1963. The petitioner in this group is Shri Epari Chinna GaJen rO{J kar, • • Krishna Moorthy, Proprietor, Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy & Sons, Berhampur, Orissa. He is a merchant who carries on business in \"bullion and specie\" and gold and silver ornaments at Berhampur and as such merchant, he has been registered as 'dea, ler' under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Act No. 14 of 1947). After the said Act came into force, the Government of Orissa purporting to exercise its authority under s. 6 of the 'said Sales Tax Act issued a notification exempting certain articles from the operation of the charging section of that Act. Under this notification, gold ornaments were ordered to be exempted from sales-tax 'when the manufacturer selling them charges separately for the value of gold and the cost of manufacture.' This notification was issued on July !, 1949 During the course of his business. the petitioner manufactures gold ornaments by supplying the gold to the artisans and getting ornaments prepared by them under his supervision and when the ornaments are so prepared, he sells them in his shop and has been showing the value of gold and the cost of manufacture separately. That is why the petitioner alleges that he is entitled to claim the benefit of the exemption notification.\n\nConsistently with this plea, the petitioner filed his returns before the Sales-tax Officer at Berhampur and had been claiming exemption of Sales-tax on the sales as being entitled to exemption under the said notification. Upto June. 1952, the claim for exemption made by him was upheld and the amount represented by sales of the said gold ornaments was deducted from the taxable turnover shown by the peti: tioner in his returns. Subsequently, however, these assessments were re-opened under s. 12(7) of the Act and it was claimed that the deductions ad~ on certain sales transactions of gold ornaments were not 1ustified and to that extent, the petitioner had escaped assessment. The petitioner resisted this attempt to re-open the assessment and he pleaded that he was entitled to claim exemption under the notification, because he belonged to the class of manufacturers to which the notification referred. ·\n\n'.fh~ Sales-tax Officer; .however, disallowed the petitioner's c_onten_t10n an~ proceeded to levy tax on the sales transac• hons m question.\n\nThe petitioner then challenged the said\n\n188 SUPREME COURT lll~PORTS [1964]\n\n1964 decisien by preferring appea]s, but the said appeals were also\n\nEp<\"i Chinna dismissed. While the appeals were '?endin_g similar asess KrishM .lloortk11, ments made m respect of other dealers mcludmg the pellt1oner\n\nPrp'\"\"10' Epari were challenged by them by writ petitions before the High\n\n~:~;~~;!~;;;';,~;;,,~ Cort of Orissa. (Nos. 151, 161, 162, 204-209 and 110 of Oris·• 1957 respectively\\. v.\n\nState of Ori.\"a The Division Bench of the Orissa HigJ; i Court which Gajwd.;;0-;;.,,, c.J. heard the writ petitions upheld the petitioner's case and issued\n\n ' appropriate writs directing the Sales-tax Officer lo allow the petitioner's claim for .exemption under the notification in question. The main controversy before the High Court was about the precise denotation of the word 'manufacturer' used in the notification. The High Court held that the expression 'manufacturer' meant the first owner of the finished products fer whom it was made either by his paid employee or even by independent artisans on receipt of raw materials and labour charges from him. According to this view, the petitioners before the High Court were found to be manufacturers and as such entitled to claim exemption in respect of snle of gold ornaments made by them. This judgement was pronounced en March 13, 1959. Against this judgement the State of Orissa has filed appeals to this Court and they are numbereJ as Civil Appeals Nos. 92 to 94 of 1963. These appeals are till pending disposal.\n\nAfter the Orissa High Court pronounced its judgement in the writ petitions to which reference has been made, the i, mpugned Act was passed by the Orissa Legislature on August 1, 1961. This Act received the assent of the Governor on September 10. 1961, and was published en September 18,\n\n1961. It contains one operative provision in s. 2. Section 2 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, the word 'manufacturer' occurring against item 33 in the schedule to the notification of the Government of Orissa dated July 28, 1947 as amended by another notification of the I st July, 1949 shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant a person who by his own Jabor works up materials into suitable forms and a person who owns or runs a manufactory for the purpese of business with respect to the articles manufaetured therein.\n\nIt is the va]idity of this section which is challenged before us by the petitioners in the present writ petitions.\n\nIt is clear that the object of s. 2 of the impugned Act is lo make it clear that the legislature's intention was not, as the High Court had held, tc i11clude within the notification all persons who are first owners of the finished product of gold.\n\nSection 2 shows that the legislative intention was to give benefit of the said exemption only to persons who themselves work and prcduce gold ornaments or who run or own a manufactory for the purpose of business with respect to the articles\n\n1 s.c.R.\n\nRUPREME COURT REPORTS 189\n\nmanufactured therein. In other words, the intention of the 1964 Government in issuing the notification was not to give the Epari Ghinna benefit of the exemption to traders or shop-keepers who were Krisha Moorthy •. no more than commission agents and who did not personally f,,;~~~'';:x:ffy'l\n\nwork for making gold ornaments or who did not own a manu- SoM, Berhampur, factory employing artisans for that purpose. If this section is Orwsa valid, it is common ground that the petitioners are not entitled State ,\"j 0 ,;,, a to claim the exemption. On the other hand, if this section is - invalid, the petitioners would be the first owners of gold orna- Gajendragadkar, O.J. ments and may be entitled to claim exemption.\n\nThe first argument which has been urged before us by Mr. Sastri is that since the exemption was granted by the State Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it by s. 6, it was not open to the legislature to take away that exemption retrospectively. Section 4 of the parent Sales-tax Act is the charging section and s. 6 is the section which confers on the State Government power to issue a notification exempting from the tax the sale of any. goods or class of goods and likewise withdraw any such exemption subject to such conditions and exceptions as it may deem fit. The argument is, the power to grant exemption having been conferred on the State\n\nGovernment, it was validly exercised by the State Government and though the legislature may withdraw such exemption, it cannot do ss retrospectively. It is obvious that if the State Government which is the delegate of the legislature can withdraw the exemption granted by it, the legislature cannot be denied such right. But it is urged that once exemption was validly granted, the legislature cannot withdraw it retrospectively, because that would be invalidating the notification itself. We are not impressed by this argument. What the legislature has purported to do by s. 2 of the impugned Act is to make the intention of the notification clear. Section 2 in substance declares that the intention of the delegate in issuing the notification granting exemption was to confine the benefit\n\nof the said exemµtion only to persons who, actually produce gold ornaments or employ artisans for that purpose. We do not see how any question of legislative incompetence can come In !!le present discussion. And, if the State Government was\n\ngiven the power either to grant or withdraw the exemption that cannot possibly affect the legislature's competency to make any provision in thaVbehalf either prospectively or retrospectively. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument that the retrospective operation of s. 2 of the impugned Act is invalid.\n\nThen Mr. Sastri contends that this provision is discriminatory and as such, contravenes the equality before the law guaranteed by Art. 14. This argument is also misconceived. It is not seriously disputed that the petitioners belong to the\n\n1664 class of traders or shopkeepers who are like commission agents.\n\nEpari Ohinna They give gold to the artisans, paying the artisans their Kri•hna Noorth1, labour charges and when the ornaments are thus produced,\n\nP0 hrpriet~, Epari they charge commission before they are sold to the customers.\n\n•••• oorthy.J. I h . d d h h' l f s00,, &rhampur, n sue a case, 1t JS not easy to un erstan ow t 1s c ass o Ori\"• traders can be said belong to same class of persons who produce\n\nStal\n\n~; 0 . gold ornaments themselves or run manufactories where artisans e o; nssa . . _ are engaged for producmg them. The counter-affidavit filed on <Ja.iendragadkar, O.J. behalf of the respondent-State has also averred that the petitioners sometimes sell goods manufactured by firms outside the State of Orissa and in no case had they manufactured ornaments themselves. Whether the gold which they give to the artisans is their own or is supplied to them by customers is not a matter of any significance, because what is important in this connection is that they are not directly concerned with the production of ornaments, and admittedly, they do not produce the said ornaments themselves. Therefore, the persons who get the benefit of the exemption notification as a result of the provisions of s. 2 of the impugned Act cannot be said to belong to the same class as that of the petitioners. and if that is so, the main argument on the basis of Art. 14 does not subsist.\n\nBesides, one of the objects of the impugned Act appears . to be to make it clear that the legislature intends to benefit the gold-smiths who actually make gold ornaments and that object can be carried out only if exemption is granted to persons who keep in their continuous employment artisans wh<:l' produce gold ornaments. If a person produces gold ornaments himself and if a person employs artisans to produce gold ornaments for him, they faJI within the protection of the exemption. In the case of the petitioners, however, they do not keep any artisans in their continuous employment, and so, if the legislature thought it was not necessary to give them the benefit of the exemption, it cannot be said that the classification made by the legislature has no rational connection with the object intended to be achieved by it. This argument assumes that the petitioners belong to the same class as the persons to whom the benefit of the exemption is available. But as we have already stated, these two categories are distinct and there is no sameness or similarity between them.\n\nIt was also suggested by Mr. Sastri that the result of the impugned provision is to deny the benefit of the exemption to the poorer classes of persons who are engaged in the business of manufacturing gold ornaments, and in that connection, he has commented on the fact that the notification gives the benefit of the exemption to persons who run manufactories but it denies that benefit to persons who carry on the work of producing gold ornaments on a smaller scale, and\n\n:so, are unable to run a manufactory. This argument is fa!- 1964 lacious. The notification as interpreted by s. 2 of the impugn- Epari Ohinna ed Act benefits the artisans who produce ornaments them- Kris/•~· Moorthy, selves and that obviously covers a very large section of inde- P0 hrprietMor, ~Ph•\".. . h h \"fi .\n\nI tnna oo .. y w pendent artisans engaged m t e trade. T e nott cation a so Sons, B!rhampur, benefits persons who run manufactories and that ensures the Orisaa -continuous employment of artisans. That is why it seems to State ; j orissa us that the main object of granting exemption can be said to - be achieved by holding that 'manufacturer' means either a Gajendragadkar, O.J. manufacturer properly so called or one who engages artisans to manufacture gold ornaments.\n\nMr. Sastri also argued that the retrospective operation vf the impugned section should bestruck down as unconstitutional, because it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' fundamental right under Art. l?(l)(g). It is true that in considering the question as to whether legislative power to pass an Act retrospectively has been reasonably exercised or not. it is relevant to enquire how the retrospective operation operates. But it would be difficult to accept the argument that because the retrospective operation may operate harshly in some cases. therefore, the legislation itself is invalid. Besides, in the present case, the retrospective opera-. tion does not spread over a very long period either. Incidentally, it is not clear from the record that the petitioners did not recover sales tax from their customers when they sold the :gold ornaments to them. The counter-affidavit filed by the respondent-State alleges that een where sales-tax has not been charged separately, the price charged included sales-tax because it was the usual practice of every registered dealer doing similar business to collect sales-tax either by showing\n\nit as such separately and thereby claiming deduction of the :sales-tax from the gross turnover to arrive at the taxable turnover shown separately or by including it in the price and thereby collecting it as a part of the price 'charged. In any event, we do not think that in the circumstances of this case it would 'be possible to hold that by making the provision of s. 2 of the impugned Act retrospective the legislature has imposed :a restriction on the petitioners' fundamental right under Art.\n\n19(1)(g) which is not reasonable and is not in the interest of the general public.\n\nThe result is, the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees.\n\nPetitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "185\n\nEPARI CHINNA KRISHNA MOORTHY. PROPRIETOR,\n\nEPARI CHINNA MOORTHY AND SONS,\n\nBERHAMPUR. 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{"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "July 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 931, "end_char": 943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bullion and specie'' and gold and silver ornaments was a registered 'dealer' under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, The Government purporting to exercise its authority under s. 6 of the said Act issued a notification on July 1, 1949 exempting certain articles from the operation of the charging section of that Act."}}, {"text": "s. 12(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1454, "end_char": 1462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "August 1, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2334, "end_char": 2348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending these appeals, similar assessments made in respect of other dealers including the petitioner were challenged by writ petitions before the High Court, The High Court upheld the petitioner's case and issued writs directing the Sales-tax Officer to allow the petitioners' claim for exemption, After this judgement was pronounced, the impugned Act was passed by the legislature on August 1, 1961 and was published on September 18, 1961, containing one operative provision in s, 2, It provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgement, decree or order of any court, the word 'manufacturer' occuring against item 33 in the schedule ."}}, {"text": "September 18, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2370, "end_char": 2388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pending these appeals, similar assessments made in respect of other dealers including the petitioner were challenged by writ petitions before the High Court, The High Court upheld the petitioner's case and issued writs directing the Sales-tax Officer to allow the petitioners' claim for exemption, After this judgement was pronounced, the impugned Act was passed by the legislature on August 1, 1961 and was published on September 18, 1961, containing one operative provision in s, 2, It provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgement, decree or order of any court, the word 'manufacturer' occuring against item 33 in the schedule ."}}, {"text": "July 28, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2645, "end_char": 2658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the notification of the Government dated July 28, 1947 as amended by another notification of the 1st July, 1949 shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant a person who by his own Jabour works up materials into suita.ble forms and a person who owns or runs a manufactory for the PUI1lose of business with respect to the articles manufactured therem, The validity cf this section was challenged m the present writ petition,\n\nJlard."}}, {"text": "1st July, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2701, "end_char": 2715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the notification of the Government dated July 28, 1947 as amended by another notification of the 1st July, 1949 shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant a person who by his own Jabour works up materials into suita.ble forms and a person who owns or runs a manufactory for the PUI1lose of business with respect to the articles manufactured therem, The validity cf this section was challenged m the present writ petition,\n\nJlard."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3185, "end_char": 3189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kriakna Moorthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3244, "end_char": 3259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n\n\n1964 It was urged (i) that since the \\xemption was granted by the State Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it Epari Ohinna by s. 6, it was not open to the legislature to take away that Kriakna Moorthy, h Proprietor, Epari exemption retrospectively; (ii) t at the provision in s. 2 of the <Jhinna Jfoorthy .i.", "canonical_name": "Kriakna Moorthy"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3335, "end_char": 3339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3482, "end_char": 3489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3727, "end_char": 3741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<Jajendragadkar, O.J.19 (1) (g) ·\n\nHe!d: (i) What the legislature had purported to do.", "canonical_name": "Ja.iendragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3816, "end_char": 3820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4166, "end_char": 4170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4760, "end_char": 4764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4994, "end_char": 5001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5299, "end_char": 5303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5426, "end_char": 5433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5602, "end_char": 5609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5617, "end_char": 5638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5679, "end_char": 5703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, T. A. Ramachandran, B. Parthasarathy, 0."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5705, "end_char": 5723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, T. A. Ramachandran, B. Parthasarathy, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Parthasarathy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5725, "end_char": 5741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, T. A. Ramachandran, B. Parthasarathy, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5744, "end_char": 5755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, T. A. Ramachandran, B. Parthasarathy, 0."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5757, "end_char": 5773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioner (in W. P. Nos."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5778, "end_char": 5793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioner (in W. P. Nos."}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5846, "end_char": 5858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the respondents (in W. P. Nos."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5879, "end_char": 5891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the respondents (in W. P. Nos."}}, {"text": "R. N.\n\nSachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5896, "end_char": 5911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, N. S. Bindra and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the respondents (in W. P. 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J.-This group of 12 writ peti- Kiishn:• J.foorlh~. ."}}, {"text": "Orissa Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6418, "end_char": 6455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6826, "end_char": 6854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in this group is Shri Epari Chinna GaJen rO{J kar, • • Krishna Moorthy, Proprietor, Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy & Sons, Berhampur, Orissa."}}, {"text": "Berhampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6863, "end_char": 6872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in this group is Shri Epari Chinna GaJen rO{J kar, • • Krishna Moorthy, Proprietor, Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy & Sons, Berhampur, Orissa."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6874, "end_char": 6880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in this group is Shri Epari Chinna GaJen rO{J kar, • • Krishna Moorthy, Proprietor, Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy & Sons, Berhampur, Orissa."}}, {"text": "Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7059, "end_char": 7085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7148, "end_char": 7168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the said Act came into force, the Government of Orissa purporting to exercise its authority under s. 6 of the 'said Sales Tax Act issued a notification exempting certain articles from the operation of the charging section of that Act."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7212, "end_char": 7216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "July !, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7571, "end_char": 7583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This notification was issued on July !,"}}, {"text": "s. 12(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8506, "end_char": 8514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Ori", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9550, "end_char": 9562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "151, 161, 162, 204-209 and 110 of Oris·• 1957 respectively\\. v.\n\nState of Ori.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF ORISSA"}}, {"text": "March 13, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10429, "end_char": 10443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This judgement was pronounced en March 13, 1959."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10472, "end_char": 10487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this judgement the State of Orissa has filed appeals to this Court and they are numbereJ as Civil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF ORISSA"}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10634, "end_char": 10651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Orissa High Court pronounced its judgement in the writ petitions to which reference has been made, the i, mpugned Act was passed by the Orissa Legislature on August 1, 1961."}}, {"text": "September 10. 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10856, "end_char": 10874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act received the assent of the Governor on September 10."}}, {"text": "September 18,\n\n1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10897, "end_char": 10916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1961, and was published en September 18,\n\n1961."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10957, "end_char": 10961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10963, "end_char": 10972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11653, "end_char": 11657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11871, "end_char": 11880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles\n\n1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12103, "end_char": 12114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Krisha Moorthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12347, "end_char": 12361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the intention of the 1964 Government in issuing the notification was not to give the Epari Ghinna benefit of the exemption to traders or shop-keepers who were Krisha Moorthy •. no more than commission agents and who did not personally f,,;~~~'';:x:ffy'l\n\nwork for making gold ornaments or who did not own a manu- SoM, Berhampur, factory employing artisans for that purpose.", "canonical_name": "Kriakna Moorthy"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12800, "end_char": 12814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, if this section is - invalid, the petitioners would be the first owners of gold orna- Gajendragadkar, O.J. ments and may be entitled to claim exemption."}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12925, "end_char": 12931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first argument which has been urged before us by Mr. Sastri is that since the exemption was granted by the State Government by virtue of the powers conferred on it by s. 6, it was not open to the legislature to take away that exemption retrospectively."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13039, "end_char": 13043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13125, "end_char": 13134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13191, "end_char": 13195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", 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manufactured by firms outside the State of Orissa and in no case had they manufactured ornaments themselves.", "canonical_name": "Ja.iendragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16396, "end_char": 16400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16545, "end_char": 16552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18235, "end_char": 18239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Epari Ohinna ed Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18255, "end_char": 18274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20439, "end_char": 20443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20565, "end_char": 20579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_192_196_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Jlareh 12\n\nSUPRRME COURT REPORTS [l!Jc4 I\n\nBIHARI LAL BATRA\n\nTHE CHIEF .SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER '& ORS\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J.C., SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.J\n\nEvacuee property-Land allotted to a refugee in urban area-Allotment is invalid under the rules-Displaced Persons Compensatwn and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955, Rule 2(h).\n\nThe father of the appellant owned considerable agricultural property in Pakistan and he with the members of his family moved over to India on partition. The appellant's father had some unsatisfied claim for allotment and on December 29, 1955 he wasanotted some plots in Urban area within a certain rrunicipality. The appellant's father died in 1952 and the allotment made was actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim of his father. On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued to the appellant by the Managing Officer. When the appellant tried to take possession of these lands, disputes were raised by respondents Nos. 4 and 5. These respondents moved the Assistant\n\nSettlement Commissioner for cancellation of the allotment on the ground that these disputed plots were within an \"urban area\" within the meaning of r. 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 and, therefore, the allotment to the appellant was contrary to law. The Assistant Settiement Commissioner accepted the contention of the respondents and allowed the appeal and cancelled the allotment.\n\nThe appellant then applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner in revision. He rejected the petition. Then the appellant moved a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court. This petition was also dismissed.\n\nThe High Court granted certificate of fitness under Art. 133 of the Constitution and hence the appeal.\n\nHeld:\n\n(i) Where an order mking an allotment was set aside by the Assisfant Commissioner or Settlement Commissioner the title which was obtained on the basis of the continuance of that sanad or order also fell with it.\n\nShri Mithoo Shahani v. Union nf India, [1964] 7 S.C.R. 103, relied on.\n\n(ii) The contention of the appellant that r. 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules. 1955, was unconstit~_t_ional as contravening Art. 14 of the constitution must fail.- This contention is based on the basis of the proviso to Rule 2(h). Rule 2(h} was framed under s. 40 of the Act. This rule along with other rules came into fo.rce on May 21, 1955. The allotment was made to the appellant on December 29, 1955 and the Sanad was issued two days later. In other words the allotment in favour of the appellant was after the rule came into force and was not one \"already made\" as stated in the proviso to r. 2(h). Therefore, if on the date of the allotment the land was in an urban area, the allotment would b~ governed by the main para of the definition and the proviso had no application.\n\nThe discrimination is said to consist in the rule having 1961 drawn a dividing line at the date when it came into force, for Bihari Lal Balra determining whether the allotment was valid or not. Such a v. contention is patently self-contradictory. Every law must have The Chief Settlem.nl a beginning or time from which it operates, and no rule which Commissioner end seeks to change the law can be held invalid for the mere reason Olhera that it effects an alternation in the law .. It is sometimes possible to plead injustice in a rule which is made to operate with retrospective effect, but to say that a rule which operates prospectively is invalid because thereby a difference is made between the past and the future, is one which cannot be accepted.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil , Appeal No. 543 of 1962! Appeal from the judgement and order dated November 26, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 678/ 1957. .\n\nBishan Narain and N. N. Keswani, for the appellant.\n\n8. K. Khanna and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondent Nos. 1 to 3.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 4.\n\nR. V. S. Mani and T. R. V. Sastri, for respondent No. 5.\n\nMarch 12, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of fit- Ayyangar, J. ness granted under Art. 133 by the High Court of Punjab against the order of that Court dismissing the appellant's petition to it under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe point in controversy lies within a narrow compass and hence of the voluminops facts we propose to set out only those which are relevant for appreciating the contentions urged before us.\n\nThe father of the appellant owned considerable agricultural property in Pakistan and he with the members of his family moved over to Iµdia on partition. The appellant's father was allotted a considerable extent of land in village Kharar, District Ambala, but we are not concerned with that. He had still some unsatisfied claim. for allotment and on December 29, 1955 he was allotted by the Managing\n\nOfficer on quasi-permanent tenure Khasra Nos. 880, 881 and 882 which were within the municipal area of Kharar with the regularity of which allotment alone this appeal is concerned.\n\nIt may be mentioned that the appellant's father had died in 1952 and the allotment made was actually to the appellant in lieu of the claim of his father. On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued to the appellant on December 31, 1955 by the Managing Officer. When the appellant tried to take possession of these lands, disputes were raised by respondents\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-7\n\nBihari Lal Batra rh• OhiefSettlemenl Nos. 4 and 5. They wer~ not displced pers?ns but they claim-\n\nCommissioner and ed that they had been m possession of this property from a\n\nOthers long anterior date from which they could not be disturbed Ayyanyar, J. and also that the property could not be the subject of a valid lillotment. These respondents moved the Assistant Settlement Commissioner for cancellation of the allotment and this appeal was allowed by the officer who found that the land comprised in these three khasra numbers were within an \"urban area\" within the meaning of r. 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 and consequently that the allotment to the appellant was contrary to law. He, therefore, cancelled the allotment. The appellant thereafter applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner in cevision and not being successful there moved the High Court by a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. As stated earlier, this petition was dismissed and it is the correctness of this dismissal that is challenged in the appeal before us.\n\nMr. Bishan Narain, learned Counsel for the appellant urged in the main two contentions in support of the appeal.\n\nThe first was (1) that after the Managing Officer granted a sanad on December 31, 1955 in the name of the President of India, the appellant obtained an indefeasible title to the property and that this title could not be displaced except on grounds contained in the sanad itself even in the event of the order of allotment being set aside on appeal or revision. We have considered this point in Shri Mithoo Shahani and Ors. v.\n\nThe Union of India and Ors.(') which was pronounced on March JO, 1964 and for the reasons there stated this submission has to be rejected.\n\nThe second point that he urged was, and this was in fact the main contention raised before the High Court, that rule 2(h) of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 was unconstitutional as contravening Art. 14 of the Constitution and so the original allotment to the appellant must be held to be lawful. We consider that there is no substance in this argument ln fact, we are unable to appreciate the ground on which the contention is being urged.\n\nSection 40 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 enables the Central Government by Notification in the Official Gazette to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, and in particular on an elaborately enumerated list of matters. It was not suggested that the rules of 1955 were not competently made under s. 40. These rules were published on May 21. 1955 when they came into force.\n\nRule 2(h) the validity of which is impugned in these proceedings is a rule containing the definitions. Rule 2(h) reads, to extract what is material:\n\n\n\"2. In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires- 1964\n\nBi/iari Lal Batra\n\n(a) to (g)..................................\n\nT. , b , . h\" h 1. . • Tl\" CMtJ Stltltm<il\n\n(h) Ur an area means any area wit m t e 1m1ts or Commi .. iowr and\n\na corporation,' a municipal committee, a notified \"'\"\"' area committee, a towt;1 area committee, a mall town committee, a cantonment or any other area notified as such by the Central Government from time to time;\n\nProvided that in the case of the quasi-permanent allotment of rural agricultural lands already made in the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union, the limits of an urban area shall be as they existed on the 15th August, 1947.\" The words. 'of rural agricultural lands' occurring in the proviso to this rule were replaced by an amending Notification of 1957 by the words 'in rural area', but this amendment is obviously of no significance. \"Rural area\" is defined by rule 2(f) to mean 'any area which is not an urban area'.\n\nPausing here, it would be useful to state two matters which are not in dispute: (]) that the allotment to the appellant was made on December 29, 1955, the sanad being issued two days later. It was theref9re an allotment which was made &fter May 21, 1955 when the rules came into force; (2} the other matter is that Khasra Nos. 880, 881 and 882 were included in urban limits on February 10, 1951 by the municipal\n\nara of Kharar being extended to cover these plots. It would, therefore, be obvious that on the date when the allotment was made, the allotted land was in an \"urban area\" and therefore it could not have been validly allotted.\n\n' We must confess our inability to comprehend what orecisely was the discrimination which the rule enacted which rendered it unconstitutional as violative of Art. 14. So far as we c; mld understand the submission, the unreasonable discri miuation was said to exist because of the operation of the proviso. Under the proviso in regard to quasipermanent allotments 'already made', i.e. made before May 21, 1955 in the States of Punjab and PEPSU, the test of w?at was to be considered an \"urban area\" was to be determillecl on the basis of the state of circumstances which obt'lincd on 15th August, 1947. The allotment in favour of the a.,_ pellant was af~; r the rules came into force and was not o; e\n\n, already ade . Therefore if on the date of the allotment the land was 1~ an urban area, the allotment would be governed by the am para of the definition and so could not have been validly made an<i that was the reason why it was set Ll'(D)ISCI-'(•) ..\n\n1964 aside. The discrimination is said to consist in the rule having Bih!Jri Lal Batra drawn a dividing line at the date when it came into force, for v. determining whether the allotment was valid or not.. It is the 2'11t Of ettle~ discrimination that is said to be involved in this prospective\n\nComm;:;::• operation of the rule that we find it difficult to appreciate. It is possible that before the rules were framed the land now in .dwangar, J. dispute cou, ld have been allotted, but beca, use of this it is not possible to suggest that the rule altering the law in this respect which ex concessis is within the rule-making power under the Act, is invalid. Such a contention is patently self-contradi•; tory. Every law must have a beginning or time from which it operates, and no rule which seeks to change the law can be held invalid for the mere reason that it effects an alteration in tbe law. It is sometimes possible to plead injustice in a rule which is made to operate with retrospective effect, but to say that a rule which operates prospectively is invalid because thereby a difference js made between the past and the future, is one which we are unable to follow.\n\nThere are no merits in this appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "I\n\nBIHARI LAL BATRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIHARI LAL BATRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE CHIEF .SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER '& ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 204, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 449, "end_char": 457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The father of the appellant owned considerable agricultural property in Pakistan and he with the members of his family moved over to Iµdia on partition."}}, {"text": "Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1217, "end_char": 1278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1626, "end_char": 1643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "statute": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1774, "end_char": 1782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "statute": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955"}}, {"text": "[1964] 7 S.C.R. 103", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2085, "end_char": 2104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2277, "end_char": 2284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "statute": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2411, "end_char": 2416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 21, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2482, "end_char": 2494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule along with other rules came into fo.rce on May 21, 1955."}}, {"text": "December 29, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2539, "end_char": 2556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allotment was made to the appellant on December 29, 1955 and the Sanad was issued two days later."}}, {"text": "Bihari Lal Balra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3060, "end_char": 3076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The discrimination is said to consist in the rule having 1961 drawn a dividing line at the date when it came into force, for Bihari Lal Balra determining whether the allotment was valid or not.", "canonical_name": "Bihari Lal Balra"}}, {"text": "November 26, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgement and order dated November 26, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3820, "end_char": 3837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgement and order dated November 26, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3870, "end_char": 3883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and N. N. Keswani, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. N. Keswani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3888, "end_char": 3901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishan Narain and N. N. Keswani, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Khanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3926, "end_char": 3935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Khanna and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3940, "end_char": 3957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Khanna and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3988, "end_char": 4003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. V. S. Mani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4028, "end_char": 4041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani and T. R. V. Sastri, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "T. R. V. Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4046, "end_char": 4061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani and T. R. V. Sastri, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4146, "end_char": 4154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of fit- Ayyangar, J. ness granted under Art.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4202, "end_char": 4210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of fit- Ayyangar, J. ness granted under Art.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4234, "end_char": 4242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4351, "end_char": 4359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kharar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4803, "end_char": 4809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's father was allotted a considerable extent of land in village Kharar, District Ambala, but we are not concerned with that."}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4820, "end_char": 4826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's father was allotted a considerable extent of land in village Kharar, District Ambala, but we are not concerned with that."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5377, "end_char": 5394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the allotment being made, a sanad was issued to the appellant on December 31, 1955 by the Managing Officer."}}, {"text": "Bihari Lal Batra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5531, "end_char": 5547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the appellant tried to take possession of these lands, disputes were raised by respondents\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-7\n\nBihari Lal Batra rh• OhiefSettlemenl Nos.", "canonical_name": "Bihari Lal Balra"}}, {"text": "Ayyanyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5772, "end_char": 5780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They wer~ not displced pers?ns but they claim-\n\nCommissioner and ed that they had been m possession of this property from a\n\nOthers long anterior date from which they could not be disturbed Ayyanyar, J. and also that the property could not be the subject of a valid lillotment.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6128, "end_char": 6189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6458, "end_char": 6475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "statute": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6866, "end_char": 6871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was (1) that after the Managing Officer granted a sanad on December 31, 1955 in the name of the President of India, the appellant obtained an indefeasible title to the property and that this title could not be displaced except on grounds contained in the sanad itself even in the event of the order of allotment being set aside on appeal or revision."}}, {"text": "March JO, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7229, "end_char": 7243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which was pronounced on March JO, 1964 and for the reasons there stated this submission has to be rejected."}}, {"text": "Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7443, "end_char": 7504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7542, "end_char": 7549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "statute": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7789, "end_char": 7799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "statute": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7881, "end_char": 7899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 40 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 enables the Central Government by Notification in the Official Gazette to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, and in particular on an elaborately enumerated list of matters."}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8132, "end_char": 8137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "statute": "the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955"}}, {"text": "May 21. 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8169, "end_char": 8181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These rules were published on May 21."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8934, "end_char": 8940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl\" CMtJ Stltltm<il\n\n(h) Ur an area means any area wit m t e 1m1ts or Commi .. iowr and\n\na corporation,' a municipal committee, a notified \"'\"\"' area committee, a towt;1 area committee, a mall town committee, a cantonment or any other area notified as such by the Central Government from time to time;\n\nProvided that in the case of the quasi-permanent allotment of rural agricultural lands already made in the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union, the limits of an urban area shall be as they existed on the 15th August, 1947.\""}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8945, "end_char": 8952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl\" CMtJ Stltltm<il\n\n(h) Ur an area means any area wit m t e 1m1ts or Commi .. iowr and\n\na corporation,' a municipal committee, a notified \"'\"\"' area committee, a towt;1 area committee, a mall town committee, a cantonment or any other area notified as such by the Central Government from time to time;\n\nProvided that in the case of the quasi-permanent allotment of rural agricultural lands already made in the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union, the limits of an urban area shall be as they existed on the 15th August, 1947.\""}}, {"text": "East Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8957, "end_char": 8968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl\" CMtJ Stltltm<il\n\n(h) Ur an area means any area wit m t e 1m1ts or Commi .. iowr and\n\na corporation,' a municipal committee, a notified \"'\"\"' area committee, a towt;1 area committee, a mall town committee, a cantonment or any other area notified as such by the Central Government from time to time;\n\nProvided that in the case of the quasi-permanent allotment of rural agricultural lands already made in the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union, the limits of an urban area shall be as they existed on the 15th August, 1947.\""}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9043, "end_char": 9060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl\" CMtJ Stltltm<il\n\n(h) Ur an area means any area wit m t e 1m1ts or Commi .. iowr and\n\na corporation,' a municipal committee, a notified \"'\"\"' area committee, a towt;1 area committee, a mall town committee, a cantonment or any other area notified as such by the Central Government from time to time;\n\nProvided that in the case of the quasi-permanent allotment of rural agricultural lands already made in the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union, the limits of an urban area shall be as they existed on the 15th August, 1947.\""}}, {"text": "February 10, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9736, "end_char": 9753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "880, 881 and 882 were included in urban limits on February 10, 1951 by the municipal\n\nara of Kharar being extended to cover these plots."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10156, "end_char": 10163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PEPSU", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10435, "end_char": 10440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the proviso in regard to quasipermanent allotments 'already made', i.e. made before May 21, 1955 in the States of Punjab and PEPSU, the test of w?at was to be considered an \"urban area\" was to be determillecl on the basis of the state of circumstances which obt'lincd on 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "Bih!Jri Lal Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11022, "end_char": 11039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The discrimination is said to consist in the rule having Bih!Jri Lal Batra drawn a dividing line at the date when it came into force, for v. determining whether the allotment was valid or not.. It is the 2'11t Of ettle~ discrimination that is said to be involved in this prospective\n\nComm;:;::• operation of the rule that we find it difficult to appreciate."}}, {"text": ".dwangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11388, "end_char": 11396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is possible that before the rules were framed the land now in .dwangar, J. dispute cou, ld have been allotted, but beca, use of this it is not possible to suggest that the rule altering the law in this respect which ex concessis is within the rule-making power under the Act, is invalid."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_197_204_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 197\n\nD. S. CHELLAMMAL ANNI\n\nNASANAN SAMBAN\n\nfP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SJKRI, JJ.J\n\nMadras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955), JI. 3 and Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act (XXIV of 1950), s. 7-Scope of.\n\nPractice-High Court-Revisional jurisdiction-Interference by Supreme Court under Art. 136 of Constitution.\n\nThe respondent is a cultivating renant of the appellant.\n\nAfter harvesting he gathered the crops and brought the grain to the threshing floor. He measured the crops and offered 40 per cent of it to the Landlord as rent as provided by the. law but the landlord wanted 60 !J<'r cent as his share. On the failure of the landlord or his agent to take his legally due share after repeated requests and after information and complaint to the police and revenue authorities the respondent removed and sold the cropS when he found that the crops would be spoiled by rain. Thereafter he sent by money order fo the landlord the market value of the 40 !J<'r cent of the crops.\n\nThe landlord refused to receive the amount and he filed a petition under s. 3(4)(a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 for the ejectment of the respondent before the Revenue Divisional Officer. The Revenue Division.al Officer held that though the respondent was right in insisting on determining only 40 per cent of the produce he was not justified in removing the crops. He held that he should have deposited the rent in court or paid it to the landlord as provided by law. Since he had not done these he held that he was not entitled to invoke the discretionary power of the Revenue Divisional Officer to get an extension of time for the deposit of rent and the officer . therefore ordered the ejection of the respondent.\n\nA revision petition filed by the respondent before the High Court was allowed and the order of ejectment was set aside.\n\nThe present appeal was filed on special leave granted by this Court.\n\nThe appellant contends that since the respondent has transgressed s. 7 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956 by removing the produce from the threshing floor he cannot claim the protection of that Act.\n\nSecondly it was submitted that since the respondent did not pay the rent as contemplated by s. 3(3) of the Protection Act he was not entitled to the protection• of the Act. It was further contended that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion by the Revenue Divisional Officer.\n\nHeld: (i) S. 7 can be transgressed in two ways viz., (1) when the tenant does not bring the crop to the threshing floor or (2) having brought it to the threshing floor he removes any portion of it at such time or in such manner as to prevent the division thereof at the proper time. In the present case it is admitted that the respondent brought the crop to the threshing floor. From the proved facts of this case that the respondent\n\nD.8. OMllGmmal\n\n.!Mi\n\nNGaGf&G• Sanaba•\n\nwas always prepared for the division of the crops. and that it was te insistence of the appellant for 60 per cent of the crops and his refusal to accept his due share that prevented division and that, the crops were actually measured by Revenue Inspector and it was to prevent deterioration of the crops that the respondent removed it, it is clear that the respondent has not removed the crops to prevent division. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a transgressi0n of s. 7 on the part of the respondent. '\n\n(ii) Since the respondent did not pay the rent within the time and in the way contemplated by s. 3(3) of the Protection Act the case is covered by s. 3(2) of the Act. That gave the appellant a cause of action to apply for the ejectment of the respondent under s. 3(4} of the Protection Act. But even though the ' appellant was entitled to apply, the Revenue Divisional Officer was not bound to evict the tenant for cl. (b) of s. 3(4) gives him a discretion to give time to the tenant to Pav the arrears taking into consideration the various circumstances of the case. The Revenue Divisional Officer refused to exercise the discretion in favour of the respondent on the ground that he had not deposited the rent under s. 3(3l. The discretion under cl. (b) of s. 3(4) comes into play only when the tenant has not deposited the rent under s. 3(3) and therefore the Revenue Divisional Officer was wrong in refusing to exercise his discretion.\n\n(iii) The Revenue Divisional Officer having been patently wrong in his view of the law if the High Court interfered in the wrong exercise of his discretionacy pOWer, this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 will not interfere with the order of the High Court which is clearly in the interest of justice.\n\nSecondly the Revenue Divisional Officer had failed to exercise his jurisdiction and the High Court would be justified in interfering with his order even under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Proeedure.\n\nOvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION-Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 1960 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 966 of 1960. M. C. Setalvad and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellant.\n\nT. S. Venkataraman, for the r!!spondent.\n\nMarch 13, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Madras High Court. The appellant is a landlord in village Idaikkal, and the respondent is her tenant. The land in dispute was let by the appellant to the respondent and the rent was fixed partly in kind and partly in cash, the tenancy having been created somtimes before the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Farr Rent) Act, No. XXIV of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Fair Rent Act) came into force. The agreement as to the payment of rent in kind was that the appellant would get 60 per cent of the gross produce, the remainder going to the respondent.\n\nThe dispute out of which this appeal has arisen arose in 1959 when the crop for that year was reaped. The respondent harvested the crop and brought it to the threshing floor of the appellant for division and claimed that the appellant was only entitled to 40 per cent of the crop as provided in the Fair Rent Act. The appellant's agent however demanded 60 per cent as provided in the agreement of tenancy. The dispute went on about for ten days while the harvested crop was lying in the threshing floor. Consequently, the respon- . dent made an application to the Circle Inspector of Police\n\ncomplaining that the appellant was delaying the division of the produce and preventing the removal of the respondent's share, and that there was likelihood of a breach of the peace.\n\nThereupon the police made inquiry into the matter and reported to the Tehsildar that the harvested crop was lying in the threshing floor and the agent of the appellant was not prepared to divide the produce in accordance with the provisions of law and was insisting on the division being made according to the agreement. It was also reported that the crop was deteriorating and the seeds had begun to germinate as the crop was exposed to rain. Thereupon the Tehsildar directed the Revenue Inspector to look into the matter° and measure the quantity of the produce and note the gross yield and report. The Revenue Inspector thereupon visited the spot on September 27, 1959 after issuing notice to the appellant's agent to be present at the spot for the purpose of measuring the quantity and determining the yield.\n\nThe appellant's agent was however absent and the Revenue Inspector made measurements in the presence of the respondent and some prominent persons of the village in spite of the absence of the appellant's agent. He then sent a report to the Tehsildar giving the result of his measurements. As however, the appellant's agent was not present, the crop could not be divided and the Revenue Inspector gave instruction to the respondent that the crop should not be removed.\n\nIt appears however that the respondent removed the crop soon after the Revenue Inspector left. Thereafter the respondent sent a money order to the appellant for the amount representing the value of the appellant's share, namely, 40 per cent. It appears that soon after the appellant filed a criminal complaint of theft against the respondent and that was dismissed. Then followed the present petitiOn under s. 3 (4)(a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, No. XXV of 1955, (hereinafter referred to as the Protection Act) for the ejectment of the respondent before the Revenue Divisional Officer.\n\nThe Revenue Divisional Officer held that though the respondent was justified in insisting that the appellant should take only 40 per cent of the produce as provided by law he\n\nD.S. Ohellammal\n\nAnnt\n\nNasanan Sam.ban\n\nWanehoo, J.\n\n1964 was not justified in removing the crop and that he should D.S. Olldlammal have proceeded to enforce his rights in the manner provided\n\n.A.,...; by law. As however the respondent had not chosen to pro- N\n\nv. Sam/J ceed in that manner, the Revenue Divisional Officer ordered -~ an his ejectment refusing to exercise the discretion which lay in WaodooiJ. him to give time to the respondent to deposit the arrears of rent in court. The respondent then went in revision to the High Court. The High Court held that in the circumstances of the case, the Revenue Divisional Officer should have exercised his discretion in favour of the respondent. The High Court therefore set aside the order of ejectment in view of the fact that the rent had been deposited in the High Court.\n\nThereupon the appellant applied for and obtained special leave to appeal from this Court, and that is how the matter has come up before us.\n\nIn the special leave petition the appellant raised the contention that the Fair Rent Act and the Protection Act were unconstitutional as they placed unreasonable restrictions on the appellant's fundamental rights to hold her property. But in the arguments before us, learned counsel for the appellant has abandoned the attack on the constitutionality of the two Acts and has only. contended that the High • Court had no jurisdiction under s. 6-B of the Protection Act to interfere with the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer.\n\nBefore we cmlsider the contention raised on behalf of the appellant we may briefly refer to the provisions of the two Acts, which bear on the question raised before us. The Protection Act was, as its title shows, passed for protection from eviction of cultivating tenants. It is not in dispute that the respondent was a cultivating tenant. Section 3(1) of the Protection Act lays down that \"subject to the next succeeding sub-sections, no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding or any part thereof, during the continuance of this Act, by or at the instance of his landlord, whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise\". The following sub-sections then lay down the conditions under which ejectment can be ordered. Sub-section (2) of s. 3 inter alia lays down that a tenant will not enjoy the protection of sub-s. (!), if he is in arrears of rent and has not paid the arrears within the time specified therein. Sub-section (3) of s. 3 provides that a cultivating tenant may deposit in court the rent or, if the rent be payable in kind, its market v; tlue on the date of the deposit, to the account of the landlord. A notice of deposit is given by the Court (in which is included the Revenue Divisional Officer), and an enquiry is then made whether the amount deposited is correct after hearing the ' landlord and the tenant. If there is any deficiency, the tenant is ordered to make good the deficiency; and if he fails to pay the sum due, the landlord is entitled to ask the court\n\nfor eviction in the manner as provided by sub-s. (4). Section 3(4)(a) lays down the procedure for evicting a tenant. Under this clause a landlord has to apply to the Revenue Divisional Officer and on receipt of such application, the Revenue Divisional Officer, after giving reasonable opportunity both to the landlord and the tenant to represent their case, holds a summary enquiry into the matter and decides whether eviction should be ordered or not. Clause (b) of sub-s. (4) of s. 3 further gives discretion to .the Revenue Divisional Offioer to allow the cultivating tenant such iime as he considers just and reasonable having regard to the relative circumstances of the landlord and the cultivatin~ tenant for depositing the arrears of rent payable under the Act, including such costs as he may direct. It is further provided_ that if the cultivating tenant deposits the sum as directed, he shall be deemed to have paid the rent. If however the cultivating tenant fails to deposit the sum as directed, the Revenue Divisional Officer shall pass an order for eviction.\n\nThen we tum to the provisions of the Fair Rent Act, which are material for present purposes. We have already pointed out that the fair rent in the case of wet land with which we are concerned in the present appeal is 40 per nt of the normal gross produce or its value in money: (see s. 4 (!)). Then comes s. 7, which provides that \"where the produce to be shared is grain the sharing shall be done at the threshing floor on which the threshing took place; and no portion of the produce shall be removed therefrom at such time or in such manner as to prevent the due division thereof at the proper time.\"\n\nA combined reading of these provisions of the two Acts shows that in the case of a tenant whose rent is payable in kind, such tenant has to take the crop to the threshing floor for division and such division has to be made at the threshing floor and no portion of the produce can be removed therefrom so as to prevent the due division thereof. But it is open to a tenant under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act to deposit in court to the account of the landlord where the rent is payable in kind, its market value on the date of deposit; and this obviously postulates that though the tenant has taken the produce to the threshing floor, the landlord has not co-operated in its division. Clearly if the landlord does not co:aperate in. the division of the crop, the tenant cannot allow 1t to remam on the threshing floor to deteriorate and\n\ntat seems to. be the reason why under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act he 1s allowed to deposit the market value of the rent payable in kind in court, and it is then for the court to see whether the rent deposited is correct or not.\n\nD.S. Ohd!ammal A1'ni\n\nv, N.,.11M1Samka\n\nWan.c:Mo, J.\n\nI>.S. Chel./4mmal\n\nAnni\n\nNatJanatt. Samban\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nThe first question that arises therefore is whether the respondent has acted in any manner prohibited by law; and the main contention of the appellant is that the respondent has transgressed the provisions of s. 7 of the Fair Rent Act and so cannot take advantage of the Protection Act. It is further contended that the respondent has also transgressed s. 3(2) of the Protection Act inasmuch as he did not deposit the arrears of rent within the time allowed thereunder and was therefore liable. to eviction under s. 3(4) of the Protection Act. Section 7 of the Fair Rent Act Jays down that the sharing of the crop shall be done at the threshing floor on which the threshing takes place and no portion of the produce shall be removed therefrom at such time or in such manner so as to prevent due division thereof. It is clear that s. 7 can be transgressed in bne of two ways; viz., (I) when the tenant does not bring the crop to the threshing floor at all, or (2) having brought it to the threshing floor he removes any portion of it at such time or in such manner as to prevent the due division thereof at the proper time. In the present case it is not in dispute that the respondent brought the crop to the threshing floor with the intention that it may be divided between him and the appellant and it is also not in dispute that the tenant was entitled to have the crop divided according to the Fair Rent Act and had therefore to give only 40 per cent to the appellant as provided thereunder. It was the appellant who was insisting all along through her agent that she should get 60 per cent as provided in the agreement of tenancy. What happened thereafter has been narrated by us above. The respondent approached the police, and the re\" port of the Police Inspector shows that he went to the spot twice; on the first day the appellant's agent told the Police Inspector that he would settle the matter after consulting the appellant and the agent was asked to come back next day with the appellant's instructions. When the Police Inspector came the next day, no settlement could be arrived at. Later when the Revenue Inspector was sent by the Tehsildar, the agent of the appellant did not appear in spite of notice, and the Revenue Inspector took measurements of the crop and made a report thereof to the Tehsildar. It was after the crop had been measured by the Revenue Inspector that it was removed by the respondent. In these circumstances we are of opinion that it cannot be said that the crop was rei; n?ed from the threshing floor in order to prevent due d1v1S1on thereof at the proper time; the respondent was always prepared for the division of the crop as provided by law'. and the removal by him cannot in the circumstances be said to be for the purpose of preventing due division of the crop particularly when the measurements had ~Is? taken pla.ce.\n\nRemoval of crop by the tenant can fall w1thm the meamng\n\nof the section only if it is done for the purpose therein specified; and it is plain that the removal in the present case was clearly not for that purpose. We are therefore of opbion that on the facts of this case it cannot be said that there was any transgression of s. 7 of the Fair Rent Act.\n\nIt is further urged on behalf of the appellant that even though the respondent might have been justified in removing 60 per cent of the crop which was his share, his removal of the appellant's share was a transgression of s. 7 of the Act.\n\nWe cannot accept this. Section 7 forbids removal of any portion of the crop. There is no question therefore of the share of the appellant or the respondent, eitlier the removal as a whole will transgress s. 7 or it will not; and that will depend upon the fact whether the removal was in order to prevent due division of the crop at the proper time. In the present case we have already indicated that the removal was not to prevent due division. The respondent was always prepared for due division and it was the appellant's agent who did not agree to division according to Jaw. In these circumstances, this is not a case of removal of the crop (particularly after it had been measured by the Revenue Inspector) with a view to prevent its due division. There was therefore no transgression of s. 7 of the Fair Rent Act, even if the appellant's share was removed.\n\nThen it is urged that even if there was no transgression of s. 7 of the Fair Rent Act, the respondent was not entitled to the protection of s. 3 of the Protection Act, as he did not pay rent within the time specified therein and had taken no steps under s. 3(3) of the Act. There is no doubt that strictly speaking the case is covered by s. 3(2) of the Protection Act inasmuch as the rent was not paid within the time allowed, therein and was not even deposited in court under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act. What !he respondent did in the present case was to send a money order to the appellant instead of depositing the money in court under s. 3(3) as he should have done. Even though the appellant was not agreeing to the division of the crop, the respondent did not act under s. 3(3) as he should have and instead sent a money order.\n\nTht gave the appellant a cause of action to make an application under s. 3(4) o_f the Protection Act. But even though the appellant was entitled to make apolication under s. 3(4) of the Protection Act, the Revenue Divisional Officer was not _boun_d to evit the. tenant for cl. (b) of s. 3(4) gives him a d!scretmn to give tlffie to the tenant to pay the arrears havmg Tegad t_o the relative circumstances of the landlord and th~ ~':1lhvatmg tenant. This clearly means that the Revenue D1v1S1ona! Officer has to take into account the circumstances of ech ase and then exercise his discretion whether be should give hme to the tenant or riot. In the present case\n\nD.S. ClieUammal\n\nAnni\n\nT, l{asanan Samba•\n\nWanckoo, J.\n\n1964 the Revenue Divisional Officer did not consider that ques- D.S. Oliellammal tion as he took the view that he should not exercise the dis-\n\nAn.U cretion in favour of the respondent because he had not acted N.....,:;. Sam/Jan as he should have acted and deposited the amount under s. 3(3) in court. This view of the Revenue Divisional Officer W anclioo, J. is in our opinion patently incorrect. Now if the respondent had acted as he should have acted and made a deposit under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act, the matter would have been dealt thereunder. The court (which includes the Revenue Divisional Officer) would then have to consider whether the amount deposited was correct and if it was deficient the court was bound to give time to the tenant to make up the deficiency. It is only when the deficiency is not made good within the time allowed that the landlord would have the right to make an application under s. 3(4) for eviction. It is clear therefore that the discretion allowed under cl. (b) of s. 3(4) only comes into play where the tenant for some reason or the other has not made a deposit under s. 3(3). To hold therefore,-as the Revenue Divisional Officer seems to have held-that the discretion will not be exercised in favour of the tenant because he had failed to make a deposit under s. 3(3) of the Act is a patent violation of the provision in\n\ncl. (b) of s. 3(4) as to the exercise of discretion.\n\nIt is however urged that even if the Revenue Divisional Offii; er had misunderstood cl. (b) of s. 3(4), the High Court could not interfere with the exercise of the discretio, Q by the Revenue Divisional Officer under s. 6-B of the Protection Act, inasmuch as this provision gives revisional jurisdiction to the High Court to the extent to which such jurisdiction is conferred on it by s. II 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThere are two answers to this contention. The first is that the Revenue Divisional Officer was patently wrong in his view of the law and therefore if the High Court interfered with the wrong exercise of discretion, this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 will not interfere with the order of the High Court, which is clearly in the interest of justice.\n\nSecondly by taking the view that he cannot and should not exercise his discretion where a tenant has failed to take action under s. 3(3) of the Protection Act, the Revenue Divisional Officer has in our opinion failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him under the law, and the High Court would be justified in interfering with its order even under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that there is no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismiued.", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "197\n\nD. S. CHELLAMMAL ANNI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. S. CHELLAMMAL ANNI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NASANAN SAMBAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Nasanan Sam.ban\n\nWanehoo", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "fP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 316, "end_char": 320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act", "statute": "Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 392, "end_char": 405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Practice-High Court-Revisional jurisdiction-Interference by Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 412, "end_char": 420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act", "statute": "Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3(4)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1179, "end_char": 1189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act", "statute": "Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act"}}, {"text": "Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1197, "end_char": 1244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2108, "end_char": 2112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955", "statute": "the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2366, "end_char": 2373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2603, "end_char": 2607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "OMllGmmal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3033, "end_char": 3042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OMllGmmal\n\n.!Mi\n\nNGaGf&G• Sanaba•\n\nwas always prepared for the division of the crops."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3545, "end_char": 3549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3678, "end_char": 3685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4010, "end_char": 4017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3l. The discretion under cl. (b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4301, "end_char": 4338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4342, "end_char": 4349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4420, "end_char": 4427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4993, "end_char": 4999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5214, "end_char": 5228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5233, "end_char": 5250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T. S. Venkataraman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5272, "end_char": 5290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Venkataraman, for the r!!spondent."}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5375, "end_char": 5382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Madras High Court.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Idaikkal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5505, "end_char": 5513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a landlord in village Idaikkal, and the respondent is her tenant."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7441, "end_char": 7459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Revenue Inspector thereupon visited the spot on September 27, 1959 after issuing notice to the appellant's agent to be present at the spot for the purpose of measuring the quantity and determining the yield."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8478, "end_char": 8482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nasanan Sam.ban\n\nWanehoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8880, "end_char": 8904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Revenue Divisional Officer held that though the respondent was justified in insisting that the appellant should take only 40 per cent of the produce as provided by law he\n\nD.S. Ohellammal\n\nAnnt\n\nNasanan Sam.ban\n\nWanehoo, J.\n\n1964 was not justified in removing the crop and that he should D.S. Olldlammal have proceeded to enforce his rights in the manner provided\n\n.A.,...; by law.", "canonical_name": "Nasanan Sam.ban\n\nWanehoo"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10266, "end_char": 10270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10699, "end_char": 10711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11128, "end_char": 11132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11324, "end_char": 11328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(4)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11931, "end_char": 11946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12358, "end_char": 12362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Then we tum to the provisions of the Fair Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12950, "end_char": 13000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13233, "end_char": 13237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then we tum to the provisions of the Fair Rent Act", "statute": "Then we tum to the provisions of the Fair Rent Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13255, "end_char": 13259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then we tum to the provisions of the Fair Rent Act", "statute": "Then we tum to the provisions of the Fair Rent Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13932, "end_char": 13939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then we tum to the provisions of the Fair Rent Act", "statute": "Then we tum to the provisions of the Fair Rent Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14429, "end_char": 14436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D.S. Ohd!ammal A1'ni\n\nv", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14622, "end_char": 14645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.S. Ohd!ammal A1'ni\n\nv, N.,.11M1Samka\n\nWan.c:Mo, J.\n\nI>.S. Chel./4mmal\n\nAnni\n\nNatJanatt."}}, {"text": "NatJanatt. Samban", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14701, "end_char": 14718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.S. Ohd!ammal A1'ni\n\nv, N.,.11M1Samka\n\nWan.c:Mo, J.\n\nI>.S. Chel./4mmal\n\nAnni\n\nNatJanatt."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14720, "end_char": 14727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Samban\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nThe first question that arises therefore is whether the respondent has acted in any manner prohibited by law; and the main contention of the appellant is that the respondent has transgressed the provisions of s. 7 of the Fair Rent Act and so cannot take advantage of the Protection Act.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14942, "end_char": 14946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15086, "end_char": 15093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15246, "end_char": 15253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15277, "end_char": 15286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15563, "end_char": 15567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17923, "end_char": 17927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18173, "end_char": 18177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18214, "end_char": 18223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18395, "end_char": 18399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18983, "end_char": 18987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19114, "end_char": 19118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19194, "end_char": 19198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19308, "end_char": 19315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19392, "end_char": 19399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19531, "end_char": 19538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19696, "end_char": 19703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19833, "end_char": 19840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19962, "end_char": 19969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20063, "end_char": 20070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20176, "end_char": 20183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D.S. ClieUammal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20554, "end_char": 20569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case\n\nD.S. ClieUammal\n\nAnni\n\nT, l{asanan Samba•\n\nWanckoo, J.\n\n1964 the Revenue Divisional Officer did not consider that ques- D.S. Oliellammal tion as he took the view that he should not exercise the dis-\n\nAn."}}, {"text": "Wanckoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20597, "end_char": 20604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case\n\nD.S. ClieUammal\n\nAnni\n\nT, l{asanan Samba•\n\nWanckoo, J.\n\n1964 the Revenue Divisional Officer did not consider that ques- D.S. 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{"document_id": "1964_7_1_16_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "...\n\nTHE SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nB. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU . v • .\n\nSTATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL & ORS. [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J.,. K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH.\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. S!KRI JJ.J\n\nMotor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), s. 43A (as inserted by Madras Amending Act 20 of 1948} Madras G.O. No. 1298, elated April 28, 1956-Government order prescribing the aware! of marks-If direction to Regional Transport Authority in the discharge of its quasi-judicial function-Section 43A-Scope ofif authorises only administrative directions. - --, - ·-~~.\n\nThe appellant is a bus operator in the State of Madras. On an invitation. for applications for the grant of two stage. carriage permits he submitted his applications along with many others.\n\nThe State Transport Authority considered the merits of the application a.warding marks in accordance with the principles prescribed by Madras G.O. No. 1298, dated April 28, 1956 issued under s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act,,1939 inserted by the Madras Amending Act 20 of 1948. The Transport Authority on this basis granted the two permits to the appellant. Against this crder a number of appeals were filed by some of the unsuccessful 2pplicants including respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in the present apl\"\"al. The Appellate Tribunal re-allotted marks in accordznce v.rith the above G.0.- and respondents 2 and 3 having secured the maximum number of marks were granted the permits. On the rejection of a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and after appealing without success to a Division Bench the appellant applied for a certificate to appeal to this Court wh'ch rejected. The present appeal was filed on special leave granted by this Court. ' It was contended on behalf of the appellant.before this Court that since Madras G.O. No. 1298, dated April 28, 1956, purports to issue direction to the Transport Authority in the discharge of its quasi-judicial functions it is beyond the powers conferred by s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act which authorises only the issue of directions to the said authority in the discharge of its administrative functions and therefore it is bad.\n\nHeld, (i) Section 43A confers power on the State Government to issue orders and directions to the State Transport Authority only in relation to its administrative functions.\n\nM/s. Raman and Raman v. The State of Madras [1959] 2 S.C.R. 227, relied on. _\n\n(ii) It is well settled that ss. 47, 48, 57, 60, 64 and 64A deal with quasi-judicial functions and when the transport authorities are dealing with applications for permits and evaluating the respective claims of the parties, the transport authorities are discharging quasi-judicial functions and their orders are quasijudicial orders subject to the jurisdiction of the High court under Art. 226. ·-\n\nL/P(D) ISCI-1\n\nMarc; IJ 5\"\n\n\nState TV.:..nspvrt port Appellate Tribunal, Madras, A.LR. 1959, S.C. 896, relied Appellate Tribunal on.\n\nand Otlters\n\n(iii) In interpreting s. 43A it is legitimate to assume that the legislature intended to respect the basic and elementary postulate of the rule of law that in exercising their authority and discharging their quasi-judicial functions, the tribunals constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgement. It is of Jhe essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of judges or tribunals must be absolutely unfettered by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State.\n\n(iv) The impugned order is outside the purview of s. 43A inasmuch as it purports to give directions in respect of matters which have been entrusted to the tribunals constituted '411 under the Act and which have to be dealt with by them in quasijudicial manner.\n\n(v) The decision of the appellate Tribl!nal is solely based on the provisions of the impugned order and since the said order is invalid, the decision is also bad.\n\naVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1964.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order da, ted October 29, 1963, of the Madras 'High Court in Writ Appeal No. 214 of 1962.\n\nS. Mohan Kumaramagalam, M. N. Rangachari, R. K.\n\nGarg, M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3.\n\nA. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No. 4.\n\nM. C. Seta/vad, N. C. Krishna Iyengar and O. C.\n\nMathur, for Intervener.\n\nMarch 5, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nGaj-1..agadkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .-The short but important point of law which has been raistd for our decision in this appeal by special leave is whether G.O. No. 1298 issued by the Government of Madras on April 28, 1956 in exercise of its powers conferred bys. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of I 939) (hereinafter called the Act) inserted by the Madras Amending Act 20 af 1948, is valid. Mr . . Mohan Kumaramangalam who appears for the appellant' contends that the impugned Government order is invalid for the simple reason that it is outside the purview of s. 43A. The impugned order was issued as early as 1956 and since then, its validity\n\nhas never been impeachedi in judicial proceedings. Litiga- 1964 tion in rea_rd to the grant of permits under. the rel~- n. Rajagopala Naidu vant prov1S1ons of, the Act has figured prommently m v. the Madras High Court in the form of writ petitions invoking }1atl1aTr~••g:,!, i the said High Court's jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Cons- PP~.J'o1£:rs titution and several aspects of the impugned order have come . - to be examined. The echoes of such litigation have frequently G\"J\"14ragadkar, O.J. been heard in this Court and this Court has had occasion to deal with the impugned order, its character, its scope and its effect; but on no occasion in the past, the validity of the order appears to have been questioned. The legislative and judicial background of the order and the course of judicial decisions in regards to the points raised in the enforcement of this order would prima facie and at the first blush suggest that the attack against the validity of the order may not be wellfounded and that would tend to make the initial judicial response to the said challenge more hesitant and reluctant. But Mr. Kumaramangalam contends tha.t s. 43A under which the order purports to have been passed would clearly show that the said order is outside the purview of the authority conferred on the State Government and is therefore invalid. It is obvious that if this contention is upheld, its impact on the administration of the system adopted in the State of Madras for granting permits under the Act would be very great and so though the question lies within a narrow compass, it needs to be very carefully examined. The facts which lead to the present appeal conform to the usual pattern of the permit litigation in which the grant or refusal to grant a permit is challenged under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226.\n\nThe appellant B. Rajagopala Naidu is a bus operator in the State of Madras and he runs a number of buses on various route5. On June 26, 1956, the State Transport Authority by a notification invited applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits on the route Madras to Krishnagiri. The buses on this route were to be run as express service. The appellant and 117 bus operators including respondents 2 and 3 D. Rajabahar Mudaliar, proprietor of Sri Sambandamoorthy Bus Service and K. H. Hanumantha Rao, proprietor of Jeevajyoti Bus Service respectively, submitted applications for th~ two permits in question. The State Transport Authority considered the said applications on the merits. In doing so, it proceeded to award marks in accordance with the principles prescribed by the impugned order and came to the conclusion that the appellant satisfied the requirements enunciated by the State Transport Authority for running an efficient bus service on this long route, and so, it granted the two permits to the appellant on May 8, 1958.\n\nLIP(D)tllCI-1(•)\n\n1964 Against this decision, 18 appeals were preferred by the B. Rai6f!o-pala Naidu unsuccessful applicants incluqing respondents 2 and 3. All v. these appeals were heard together by the State Transport Ap-\n\nS'4kf'~~F' 1 pellate Tribunal, Madras in June 1959. It appears that before Ap~~ Oth::a una the appeals were thus heard, the State Government had super- - seded the principles enunciated in the order in so far as they Gajenaragadkar, O.J.related to the grant of stage carriage permits and had issued another direction under s. 43A known as G.O. 2265 on August 9, 1958. Incidentally, it may be added that by this order, different criteria had been prescribed for selection and a different marking system had been devised. The Appellate Tribunal considered the claims of the rival bus operators ant! allotted marks in accordance with the principles laid down by the earlier order. As a result, respondents 2 and 3 secured the highest marks and their appeals were allowed, the order under appeal was set aside and two permits were granted to them. This order was passed on July 4, 1959.\n\nThe appellant then invoked the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution by his writ petition No. 692 of 1959. In his writ petition the appellant challenged the validity of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal on several grounds. One of them was that the impugned order on which the decision of the Appellate Tribunal was based. was invalid. This plea along with the other contentions raised by the appellant failed and the learned Single Judge who heard his writ petition dismissed the petition, on October 18, 1962. The appellant then challenged the correctness of this decision by a Letters Patent Appeal No.· 214 of 1962 before a Division Bench of the said High Court. The Division Bench, however, agreed with the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed the Letters Patent\n\nAppeal preferred by the appellant. The appellant then moved the said High Court for leave, but failed to secure it, and that brought him here with an application for special leave which was granted on November 14, 1963. It is with this special leave that the appellant has brought this appeal before us for final disposal.\n\nBefore dealing with the points raised by the appellant, it is necessary to consider the background of the impugned order, and that takes us to the aecision of the Madras High Court in Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd. v. The Road Traffic Board, Madras, by its Secretary('). In that case. the appellant had challenged the validity of a Government order No. 3898 which had been issued by the Madras Government on December 9, 1946. This order purported to direct the transport authorities to issue only temporary permits as the Government intended to nationalise motor transport. Accordingly, instruction No. 2 in the said order had provided that when\n\n(1) (1948) 1 M.L.J. 85.\n\napplications were made for new routes or new timings in 1964 existing routes, then small units should be preferred to _old B. Rajagopala Naidu\n\nones. In accordance with this instruction, when the apphcav. tion for permit made by the appellant, Sri Rma Vilas A~';!11J;~';\"lr:.!, i Service was rejected, the order stated that it so reand Othera jected in the interests of the public generally under . - s. 47(l)(a) of the Act. The appellant preferred :ln GaJendragadkar, G.J. appeal against the order to the Central Board namelr th~ Provincial Transport Authority which had been constituted\n\nby the Government under s. 44 of the Act. His appeal failed and so, he moved the Madras High Court under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act for an order directing the respondent-the Road Traffic Board, Madras-to consider the application of the appellant in accordance with the prnvisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder for renewal of the permit for plying buses. The High Court held that G. 0. No. 3898 was in direct conflict with the proviso to s. 58 sub-s. (2) of the Act, and so, was invalid. This decision showed that there was no authority or right in the State Government to issue instructions such as were contained in the said Government order.\n\nIn reaching this decision, the High Court emphasised the fact that the Central Transport Board and the Regional Transport Board were completely independent of the Government except that they must observe the notifications made pursuant to s. 43 of the Act. It was conceded that if and when the Government acted as an Appellate Tribunal, it had judicial functions to discharge. But these functions did not include the power to give orders to any Board which was seized of an application for renewal of permits. That is how it was established by this decision that as the Act stood, the State Government had no authority to issue directions as to how applications for permits or their renewal should be dealt with by the Tribunals constituted under the Act. This judgment was pronounced on November 19, 1947.\n\nAs a result of this judgment, the Madras Legislature amended the Central Act by Act XX of 1948 which came into force on December 19, 1948. Amongst the amendments made by this Act was the insertion of s. 43A with which we are concerned in the present appeal.. This section clothed the State Government with powers to issue certain directions and orders. As we have already indicated, the point which we are considering in the present appeal is whether the impugned order falls within the purview of the power and authority conferred on the State Government by this section. We will read this section later when we address ourselves to the question of its construction. The amendment of the Central Act led to the next round of controversy between the bus operators and the State Government and that resulted in the decision of the Madras High\n\n1961 Court in C.S.S. Motor Service Tenkasi v. The State of Madras B.Ra; agopa1a Naidu and another('). In that case, the validity of several provisions\n\n. v. of the Act including the provisions introduced by the Madras ~- Trapr!b'' 1Amendment Act were challenged. It will be recalled that at\n\n\"!'~he,'.; una the time when this challenge was made, the Constitution had . come into force and the appellant C.S.S. Motor Service urged Oajendmgadkar, O.J. before the High Court that under Art. 19(i)(g) it had a fundamental right to ply motor vehicles on the public pathways and the impugned provisions of the Act invaded its aforesaid fundamental right and were not justified by Art. 19(6).\n\nThe High Court elaborately considered the first part of the contention and it took the view, and we think rightly, that a citizen has a fundamental right to ply motor vehicles on the public pathways for hire or otherwise and that if any statutory provision purports or has the effect of abridging sµch fundamental right, its validity would have to be judged under the relevant clause of Art. 19. Proceeding to deal with the dispute on this basis, the High Court examined the validity of the several impugned provisions of the Act. In regard to s. 43A, the High Court came to the conclusion that the said section was valid thou_gh it took the precaution of adding that the orders passed thereunder might be open to challenge as unconstitutional. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that the main reason which weighed with the High Court in upholding the validity of this section was tha( the High Court was satisfied that the said section was \"intended to clothe the Government with authority to issue directions of an administrative character.\" Thus, s. 43A was held to be valid in this case and the correctness of this conclusion is not disputed before us. In other words, we are dealing with the appellant's challenge against the validity of the impugned order on the basis that s. 43A itself is valid. This judgment was pronounced on April 25, 1952.\n\nSome years after this judgment was pronounced, the impugned Government order was issued on April 28, 1956.\n\nThis order purported to issue instructions or directions for the guidance of the Tribunals constituted under the Act. In fact, it rclers to the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case cf C.S.S. Motor Service. It would appear that the Madras Government wanted to give effect to the said decision by issuing appropriate directions under its authority derived from s. 43A which was held to be valid. The impugned order deals with five topics. The first topic has relation to the instructions which had to be borne in mind whilst screning the applicants who ask for permits. This part of the order provides that the applicanis may be screened and disqualified on one or more of the principles enunciated in els. I to 4 in that part.\n\nThe second part deals with the system of assigning marks to\n\n(') A.L.R. (1953) Mad. 304.\n\nthe several claimants, under four columns. In laying down these 1961 principles, the impugned order intended to secure precision inn. RajagopalaNaidu the disposal of claims for permits and to enable quick consiv. deration of the merits of such claimants. This part of the order, ASta1e 11 •• TrTanspbl h d .l h\" h h f kppeeriu,- owever, ma e 1t c ear t at m cases w ere t e system o mar' and Othtrs ing worked unfairly the Regional Transport Authority may . -\n\n0 J ignore the marks obtained for reasons to be stated. It is this GaJendragadkar, • • part of the order which has introduced the marking system whic!J has been the special feature of adjudication of claims for permits in the State of Madras. These two parts are described as \"A\" in the Government order. Part 3 deals with the variation or extension of routes granted under the permits.\n\nPart 4 deals with the revision of timings and Part 5 bas reference to suspension or cancellation of permits. That in brief is the nature of the directions issued by the impugned order.\n\nAfter this order was issued and the Tribunals constituted under the Act began to deal with applications for permits in accordance with the principles prescribed by it, the decisiom of the said Tribunals came to be frequently challenged before the Madras High Court and these disputes have, often been brought before this court as well. In these cases, the character of the order passed by the Tribunal was examined, the nature of the instructions issued by the impugned order was considered and the rights of the parties aggrieved by the quasi-judicial decisions of the tribunals also fell for discussion and decision. A question which was often raised was whether . it was open to a party aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal to contend that the said decision was based either on a misconstrui:tion of the impugned order or in contravention of it. and the consensus of judicial opinion on this part of the co:itroversy appears to be that the proceedings before the Tribunals constituted under the Act are quasijudicial proceedings and as such liable to be corrected under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It also appears to be well established that the impugned order is not a statutory rule and has therefore no force of law. It is an administrative or execu• tive direction and it is binding on the tribunals; it does not, however, confer any right on the citizen and that means, that a citizen cannot be allowed to contend that a misconstruction of the order or its contravention by any decision of the Tri bunal functioning under the Act should be corrected under Art. 226.\n\nIn M Is Raman and Rainan Ltd. v. The State of Madras and others('), this Court by a majority decision held thats. 43A -0f the Act as amended by the Madras Amendment Act, 1948 must be given a restricted meaning and the jurisdicti0n it conferred on the State Government to issue orders alld directions must be confined to administrative functions.\n\nAn order or\n\n\n1964 direction made thereunder by the State Government was con- R • --,;; N 'd sequently denied the status of law regulating rights of parties.\n\naJlllJi \"' \"and was treated as partaking of the character of an adminis- Btate Pra••porl trative order., Similarly, in R. Abdulla Rowther v. The State. .it~bunal Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and others(') this Court - . held by a majority decision that the orders and directions OaJ•ndrlllJadkar, O.J. issued under s. 43A were merely executive or administrative in character and their breach, even if patent, would not justify the issue of a. writ of certiorari.\n\nIt was also observed that though the orders were executive and did not amount to statutory rules, they were rules binding on the transport authorities for whose guidance they have been issued, but that did not confer any right on the citizen and so a plea that a contravention of the orders should be corrected by the issue of an appropriate writ was rejected. Such contravention, it was held, might expose the Tribunal to the risk of disciplinary or other appropriate action, but cannot entitle a citizen to make a complaint under Art. 226. It is necessary to emphasise that in both these cases, no argument was urged that the impugned order was itse!Vinvalid and should have been ignored by the Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial authority under the relevant provisions of the Act. The Court was no doubt called upon to consider the character of the impugned order and some of the reasons given in support of the conclusion that the impugned order is administrative or executive seem to suggest that the said order would. prima faeie, be inconsistent with the provisions of s. 43A which received a narrow and limited construction from the court. Nevertheless, since the point about the validity of the impugned order was not raised before the court, this aspect of the question was not examined and the discussion and decision proceeded on the basis that the impugned order was valid. Now that the question has been raised before us, it has become necessary to examine the validity of the impugned order.\n\nBefore proceeding to examine the scope and effect of the provisions of s. 43A, it is necessary to bear in mind two general considerations. The first broad consideration which is relevant has relation to the scheme of the Act in general and the scheme of Ch. IV in particular. The Act consists of 10 chapters and deals mainly with administrative problems in relation to motor vehicles. Chapter II deals with licensing of drivers of motor vehicles. Chapter IIA deals with licensing of conductors of State carriages and Chapter 111 with registration of motor vehicles. Chapter IV fs concerned with the control of transport vehicles and in this chapter are included the relevant provisions for the applications for grant of permits, the consideration of those applications and other allied topics. Chapter IV A includes the provisions relating to\n\n(') A.I.R. (1959) S.C. 896.\n\nState Transport Undertakings. Chapter V addresses itself t? 19e4 the construction, l!quipment and maintenance of motor veh1 B. RajagapaU. Naidu\n\ncles, Chapter VI deals with the control of traffic, Chapter v.\n\nVII has reference to motor vehicles temporarily leaving or State Transport Appellate Tribunal visiting India, Chapter VIII with the question of insurance and Othera of motor vehicles against third party risks, Chapter IX pres- , .\n\n0 J cribes offences, penalties and procedures to try the offences Ga1endragadkar, • and Chapter X contains miscellaneous provisions .\n\nThis scheme shows that the hierarchy of transport a.uthorities contemplated by the relevant provisions of the Act is dothed both with administrative and quasi-judicial functions and powers. It is well settled that ss. 47, 48, 57, 60,\n\n64 and 64A deal with quasi-judicial powers and functions. In -0ther words, when applications are made for permits under the relevant provisions of the Act and they are considered on the merits, particularly in the light of the evaluation of the claims of the respective parties, the transport authorities are exercising quasi-judicial powers and are discharging quasijudicial functions, and so, orders passed by them in exercise of those powers and in discharging those functions a, re quasijudicial orders which are subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226, vide New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd.\n\nv. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd.(') and MI s Raman and Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras and others(') and R.\n\nAbdulla Rowther v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal Madras and others(') so that when we examine the question about the validity of the impugned order, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the impugned order is concerned with matters which fall to be determined by the appropriate transport authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial powers and in discharge of their quasi-judicial functions.\n\nThe other broad consideration relevant in dealing with the present controversy is that there are three sets of provisions under the Act which confer legislative, judicial and administrative powers respectively on the State Government.\n\nSection 67 which confers on the State Government power to make rules as to stage carriages and contract carriages and s. 68 which confers power on the State Government to make rules for the purposes of Ch.\n\nIV are obviously legislative powers, and in exercise of these powers, when the rules are framed, they become statutory rules which have the force of law: Naturally, the exercise of these legislative powers is controlled by the safeguard provided by s. 133 of the Act. This latter section requires that when power is exercised by the State Government to make rules, it is subject to the condition that the rules must be previously published before they are\n\n(') f1957] S.C.R. 98 p. 118. (') (1959] 2 S.C.R. p. 227.\n\n(') A.LR. (1959) S.C. 896.\n\n\n196' made. That is the effect of s. 133(i). Sub-cl. (2) of s. 133 pro- B R . opala Naidu vides that all rules made under this Act shall be published in\n\n• aJ•U v. the Offici<tl Gazette after they are made and shall, unless some State Tr.n'1\"\"t 1 later date is appointed, come into force on the date of such\n\n.11ppe1:; a1e0~,;:::•• publication. Clause 3 is important. It provides that all rules.\n\n\" made under the Act shall be laid for not less than fourteen GaJ•n<iragadkar, O.J. days before the appropriate Legislature as soon as possible 4 after they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications: as the appropriate Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid. So that if statutory rules are made by the Government in.exercise of legislative powers conferred on it by ss. 67 and 68, they are subject to the control of the appropriate legislature which can make changes or modifications in the said rules if it is thought necessary or expedient to do so. Publication before the rules are made and publication after they are made also afford another statutory safeguard in that behalf. That is the nature of the legislative power conferred on the State Government.\n\nSection 64A confers judicial power on the State Transport Authority, because the said authority is given revisionaI jurisdiction to deal with orders therein specified, subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed by the two provisos. to the said section. This is a clear provision conferring judicial power on the State Transport Authority.\n\nAlong with the legislative and judicial powers. which have thus been conferred, there is the administrative' power conferred on the State Government by s. 43A. Section 43A readsthus:\n\n\"The State Government may issue such orders ancf directions of a general character as it may consider necessary, in respect of any matter relating to road transport, to the State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority; and such Transport Authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions\".\n\nIt is the construction of this section which is the basis: of the challenge to the validity of the impugned rules in the present appeal. It may be conceded that there are some words in the section which are against the construction for which Mr. Kumaramangalam contends. The words \"in respect of any matter relating to road transport\" are undoubtedly wide enough to take in not merely administrative matters but also matters which form the area of the exercise of quasi-judicial authority by the Tribunals constituted under the Act.\n\nPrima facie, there are no words of limitation irl this clause and it would, therefore, be possible to take the view that these are matters which are scrutinised by the appropriate authorities in exercising their quasi-judicial jurisdiction. Similarly, the State Transport Authority and the Regional Transport\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nHUPREME COURT REPORTS 11\n\nAuthority to which reference is made in this section are cloth- 1964 ed not only with administrative power but also with q~si- B. RajQ{Jopola Naitlv\n\njudicial jurisdiction so that reference to the two authontles v. . and reference to any matter relating to road transport would la1ii:i:'T':l\"\"na1.\n\nindica.te that both administrative and quasi-judicial matters Pi.;'nd IJIMr•\" <:ome within the sweep of s. 43A. .\n\n1 th \"d . h. h Gajendragadkar, O.J.\n\nBut there are. severa o er cons1 eratlons w 1c support Mr. Kumaramangalam's construction. The first is the setting and the context of the section. As we have already seen, this section has been introduced by the Legislature in response to the decision of the Madras High Court in C.S.S. Motor Service case(') and that would indicate that the Madras Legislature intended to confer on the State Government power to issue administrative orders or directions of a general character. Besides, the two preceding sections s. 42 and s. 43 and s. 44 which follows support the argument that the field covered by s. 43A like that covered by ss. 42, 43 and 44 is administrative and does not include the area which is the subjectmatter of the exercise of quasi-judicial authority by the relevant Tribunals.\n\nThen again, the use of the words 'orders and directions' would not be appropriate in regard to matters which fall to be considered by authorities exercising quasi-judicial powers; These words would be appropriate if they have reference to executive matters.\n\nAnd lastly, the provision that the relevant transport authority shall give effect to all orders and directions issued under s. 43A would be clearly inappropriate if the instructions issued under the said section are meant for the guidance of quasi-judicial bodies. If the direction is issued by the appropriate Government in exercise of its powers under s. 43A and it is intended for the guidance of a tribunal discharging its quasi-jwlicial functians, it is hardly necessary to say that the authority shall give effect to such directions. Section 43A being valid, if the orders and directions of a general character having the force of law can be issued within the scope of the said section, then such orders tit directions would by ' them,-\n\nselves be binding on the transport authorities for whose guidace they are made; and it would be superfluous to make a speciJi<: provision that they are so binding. On the other hand, if the orders and directions are in the nature of adminiStrative orders and directions, they do not have the force of statutory rules and cannot partake of the character of provisions of law, and so, it may not be inappropriate to provide that the said orders and directions shall be followed by the appropriate tribunals. Therefore. it seems to us that on a fair and reasonable construction of s. 43A; it ought to be l>eld that the saia section authorises the State Government\n\n( 1) IL.R. [1953] Mad. 304.\n\n:!!!_ to issue orders and directions of a general character only B. RajagopalaNaidu in respect of administrative matters which fall to be dealt with\n\nS v. by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport taie Trans]JOrt h d h 1 · f h A h ' Appellate Tribunal Aut. o'.1ty 1;1n er t e. re evant prov1s10ns o t e ct m t err and 011,,,., admm1strat1ve capacity.\n\nGajendraga.dk<ir, C.J.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion, we have been influenced by certain other considerations which are both relevant and material. In interpreting s. 43A, we think, it would be legitimate to assume that the legislature intended to respect the basic and elementary postulate of the rule of law, that in exercising their authority and in discharging their quasi-judicial function, the tribunals constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgment. It is of the essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of the Judge or the Tribunal must be 'absolutely unfettered by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State. If the exercise of discretion conferred on a quasi-judicial tribunal is controlled by any such direction, that forges fetters on the exercise of quasi-judicial authority and the presence of such fetters would make the exercise of such authority completely inconsistent with the well-accepted notion of judicial process. It is true that law can regulate the exercise of judicial powers. It may indicate by specific provisions on what matters the tribunals constituted by it should adjudicate. It may by specific provisions lay down the principles which have to be followed by the Tribunals in dealing with the said matters.\n\nThe scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals constituted by statute can well be reglilated by the statute and principles for guidance of the said tribunals may also be prescribed subject of course to the inevitable requirement that these provisions do not contravene the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. But what law and the provisions of law may legitimately do cannot be permitted to be done by administrative or executive orders. This position is so well established that we are reluctant to hold that in enacting s. 43A the Madras Legislature intended to confer power on the State Government to invade the domain of the exercise of judicial power. In fact. if such had been the intention of the Madras Legislature and had been the true effect of the provisions of s. 43A, s. 43A itself would amount to an unreasonable con-· travention of fundamental rights of citizens and may have to be struck down as unconstitutional. That is why the Madras High Court in dealing with the validity of s. 43A had expressly observed that what s. 43A purported to do wa~ to clothe the Government with authority to issue directions of an ad ministrative character and nothing more. It is somewhat unfortunate that though judicial decisions have always emphasised this aspect of the matter, occasion did not arise so long\n\nI ..\n\nto consider the validity of the Government order which on the ~~ construction suggested by the respondent would clearly invade B. Rajagopafa Naidu the domain of quasi-judicial administration.\n\nState ;,.~,., pori Appellate Tribu•al There is another consideration which is also important. and Oth•rs If s. 43A authorises the State Government to issue directions Gajendragadkar, G.J. or orders in that wide sense. s. 68 would become redundant and safeguards so elaborately provided by s. 133 while the State Government purports to exercise its authority under s. 68, would be meaningless. If orders and directions can be issued by the State Government which are not distinguishable from statutory rules, it is difficult to see why s. 68 would have dealt with that topic separately and should have provided safeguards controlling the exercise of that power by s. 133.\n\nIt is likewise significant that the directions and orders issued under s. 43A are not required to be published nor are they required to be communicated to the parties whose claims are affected by them. Proceedings before the Tribunals which deal with the applications for permits are in the nature of quasijudicial proceedings and it would, indeed, be very strange if the Tribunals are required to act upon executive orders or directions issued under s. 43A without conferring on the citi-. zens a right to know what those orders are and to see that they are properly enforced. The very fact that these orders and directiom; have been consistently considerc; d by judicial decisions as administrative or executive orders which do not confer any right on the citizens emphatically brings out the true position that these orders and directions are not statutory rules and cannot therefore seek to fetter the exercise of quasi-judicial powers conferred on the Tribunals which deal with applicaions for permits and other cognate matters.\n\nIt is, however, urged that the principles laid down in the impugned order are sound principles and no challenge can be made to the validity of the order when it is conceded that the order enunciates very healthy and sound principles. This order, it is argued, can be considered as expert opinion the assistance of which is afforded by the State Government to the Tribunals dealing with the question of granting permits. We are not impressed by this argument. It is not the function of\n\nte eecut.ive to assit quasi-judicial Tribunals. by issuing drrechons m the exercise of its powers c!onferred under s. 43A.\n\nBesides, if s. 43A is valid and an order which is issued under it does not fall outside its purview, it would beopen to the State Government to issue a direction and require the Tribunal to foll.ow that direction unqestionably, in every case. It is true that m regard to the markmg system evolved by the impugned rule, liberty is left to the Tribunal not to adopt that system for reasons to be recorded by it. This liberty in pr.ictice\n\n1964 may not mean much; but even theoretically, if the impugned B. Rajagopala Naidu order is valid, nothing can prevent the State Government from\n\nSta•• ;;.,..'!!\"\" issuing another order requiring that the marking system pres- Appellai. Tnbuoal cribed by it shall always be followed. We have already seen\n\nanti Others that s. 43A itself provides that effect shall be given to the\n\nGajentlr<J{J(Ulkar o.J. orders issued under it, and so, if an order issued under s. 43A ' itself were to prescribe that it shall be followed, it will have ' to be followed by the Tribunal and no exception can be made . in that behalf. Therefore, we cannot accept the argument strongly pressed before us by Mr. Ganapathy Iyer on behalf of respondent No. 1 that the validity of the order cannot be challenged on the ground that the principles laid down by it are sound and healthy. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the impugned order is outside the purview of s. 43A inasmuch as it purports to give directions in respect of matters which have been entrusted to the Tribunals constituted under the Act and which have to be dealt with by these Tribunals in a quasi-judicial manner. We cannot overlook the fact that the validity of the Act particularly in reference to its provisions prescribing the grant and refusal of permits, has been sustained substantially because this important function has been left to the decision of the Tribunals constituted by the Act and these Tribunals are required to function fairly and objectively with a view to -exercise their powers quasijudicially. and so, any attempt to trespass on the jurisdiction of these Tribunals must be held to be outside the purview of\n\n8. 43A.\n\nWe are conscious of the fact that the impugned order was issued after and presumably in response to the decision of 1he Madras High Court in the case of C.S.S. Motor Service(') though it would appear qiat what the High Court had suggested was presumably the making of the rulesunder s. 68 of the Act. It cannot also be disputed that the main object of the State Government in issuing this order was to avoid vagaries, and introduce an element of certainty and objectivity, in the decision of rival claims made by applicants in respect of their applications for permits. It may have been thought by the State Government that if the Tribunals are allowed to exercise their discretion without any guidance, it may lead to inconsistent decisions in different areas and that may create dissatisfaction in the public mind. It does appear, however, that in some other States the problem of granting permits has been resolved without recourse to the marking system. But apart from that, even if it is assumed that the marking system, if properly applied, may make the decisions in regard to the grant of permits more objective, fair and con- . , sistent. we do not see how that consideration . can assist the decision of the problem raised before us If the State Government thinks that the application of some kind of marking {') I.L.R. [1953] Mad. 304.\n\n1964 system is essential for a fair administration of the Act, it may _ adopt such course as may be permissible under the law. Sec-B. Rajagopala Said• tion 47(l)(a} requires inter alia that the interests of the public s Tv. b · d b h R ·\n\n1 T tole ran<port generally have to be orne m mm y t e eg1ona rans- App'1/a1' 7', ibmial port Authority in considering applications for stage carriage aod Otl\"'\" permits. The said section refers to other. matters which have GajewlrMadlar, C.J. to be borne m mmd. It 1s unnecessary to indicate them for our present purpose. The Legislature may amend s. 47 by indicating additional considerations which the Transport Authority has to bear in mind; c•r the Legislature may amend s. 47 by conferring on the State Government expressly and specifically a power to make rules in that behalf or the State Government may proceed to make rules under s. 68 without amending s.\n\n47. These are all possible steps which may be taken if it is thought that some directions in the nature of the provisions made by the impugned order must be issued. That, however, is a matter with which we are not concerned and on which we wish to express no opinion. As this court has often emphasised, in constitutional matters it is of utmost importance that the court should not make any obiter observations on points not directly raised before it for its decision. Therefore, in indicating the possible alternatives which may be adopted if the Stat~ .Government thinks that the marking system helps the administration of the Act, we should not be taken to have expressed any opinion on the validity of any of the courses specified.\n\nThat leaves only one point to be considered. Mr. Ganapathy Iyer urged that even though the impugned order may be valid. that is no reason why the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal which has been confirmed by the High Court in the present writ proceedins should be reversed. He ;.rgues that what the Appellate Tribunal has done is to act upon the principles which are sound and .the fact that these prindples have been enunciated by an invalid order should not nullify the decision of the Appellate Tribunal itself. Thus presented. the argument is no doubt plausible; but a closer examination of the argument reveals the fallacy under-lying it. If the Appellate Trunsport Authority had considered these matters on its own without the compulsive force of the impugned order. it would have been another matter; but the order pronounced by the Appellate Alllhority clearly and unambiguously indicates that it held and in a sense rightly, that it was bound to follow the impugned order unless in the exercise of its option it decided to depart from it and was prepared to record its reasons for adopting that course. It would, we think. be idle tri suggest that any Transport Authority\n\nfunctionin~ in the State would normally refuse to comply with the order 1SSued by the State Government itself. Therefore,\n\n1964 we have no hesitation in holding that the decision of the Ap- B. Rajogopala Naidu pellate Tribunal is based solely on the provisions of the imsl •• T v. 1 pugned order and since the said order is invalid, the decision •ra., por 'If b db h' f . f ..\n\nAppllate TribWtal 1tse must e correcte y t e issue o a wnt o certwran. and Others . - In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order Ga; eadragadkar, O.J. passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 692 of 1959 and direct that the said Writ Petition be allowed. There would be no order as to costs throughout. In accordance with this decision a writ of certiorari shall be issued setting aside the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal and remanding the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for disposal in accordance with law.\n\nA ppea/ allowed", "total_entities": 153, "entities": [{"text": "SUPREME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 22, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nTHE SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nB. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU ."}}, {"text": "B. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. 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RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 206, "end_char": 230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 244, "end_char": 250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Madras Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 267, "end_char": 286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 485, "end_char": 496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Amending Act", "statute": "Madras Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 614, "end_char": 620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-~~.\n\nThe appellant is a bus operator in the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 948, "end_char": 954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Amending Act", "statute": "Madras Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 962, "end_char": 980, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1471, "end_char": 1479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 28, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1808, "end_char": 1822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1298, dated April 28, 1956, purports to issue direction to the Transport Authority in the discharge of its quasi-judicial functions it is beyond the powers conferred by s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act which authorises only the issue of directions to the said authority in the discharge of its administrative functions and therefore it is bad."}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1965, "end_char": 1971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 1997, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2151, "end_char": 2162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1959] 2 S.C.R. 227", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2360, "end_char": 2379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 47, 48, 57, 60, 64 and 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2424, "end_char": 2454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2781, "end_char": 2789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2824, "end_char": 2829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L/P(D) ISCI-1\n\nMarc; IJ 5\"\n\nState TV.:..nspvrt port Appellate Tribunal, Madras, A.LR."}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2964, "end_char": 2970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3572, "end_char": 3578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Mohan Kumaramagalam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4144, "end_char": 4166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mohan Kumaramagalam, M. N. Rangachari, R. K.\n\nGarg, M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. N. Rangachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4168, "end_char": 4184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mohan Kumaramagalam, M. N. Rangachari, R. K.\n\nGarg, M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K.\n\nGarg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4186, "end_char": 4197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mohan Kumaramagalam, M. N. Rangachari, R. K.\n\nGarg, M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4199, "end_char": 4215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Mohan Kumaramagalam, M. N. Rangachari, R. K.\n\nGarg, M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "A. Ranganadham Chetty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4287, "end_char": 4308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4313, "end_char": 4325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Seta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, N. C. Krishna Iyengar and O. C.\n\nMathur, for Intervener."}}, {"text": "N. C. Krishna Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4366, "end_char": 4387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, N. C. Krishna Iyengar and O. C.\n\nMathur, for Intervener."}}, {"text": "O. C.\n\nMathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4392, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Seta/vad, N. C. Krishna Iyengar and O. C.\n\nMathur, for Intervener."}}, {"text": "agadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4491, "end_char": 4498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nGaj-1..agadkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .-The short but important point of law which has been raistd for our decision in this appeal by special leave is whether G.O. No.", "canonical_name": "iragadkar"}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nGaj-1..agadkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .-The short but important point of law which has been raistd for our decision in this appeal by special leave is whether G.O. No.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4766, "end_char": 4790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mohan Kumaramangalam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4911, "end_char": 4931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Kumaramangalam who appears for the appellant' contends that the impugned Government order is invalid for the simple reason that it is outside the purview of s. 43A. The impugned order was issued as early as 1956 and since then, its validity\n\nhas never been impeachedi in judicial proceedings."}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5074, "end_char": 5080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5477, "end_char": 5485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Kumaramangalam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6276, "end_char": 6290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Mr. Kumaramangalam contends tha.t s. 43A under which the order purports to have been passed would clearly show that the said order is outside the purview of the authority conferred on the State Government and is therefore invalid."}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6306, "end_char": 6312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6993, "end_char": 7001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Rajagopala Naidu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7018, "end_char": 7037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant B. Rajagopala Naidu is a bus operator in the State of Madras and he runs a number of buses on various route5.", "canonical_name": "B. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU"}}, {"text": "June 26, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7131, "end_char": 7144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 26, 1956, the State Transport Authority by a notification invited applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits on the route Madras to Krishnagiri."}}, {"text": "Krishnagiri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7282, "end_char": 7293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 26, 1956, the State Transport Authority by a notification invited applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits on the route Madras to Krishnagiri."}}, {"text": "D. Rajabahar Mudaliar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7420, "end_char": 7441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and 117 bus operators including respondents 2 and 3 D. Rajabahar Mudaliar, proprietor of Sri Sambandamoorthy Bus Service and K. H. Hanumantha Rao, proprietor of Jeevajyoti Bus Service respectively, submitted applications for th~ two permits in question."}}, {"text": "Sambandamoorthy Bus Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7461, "end_char": 7488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and 117 bus operators including respondents 2 and 3 D. Rajabahar Mudaliar, proprietor of Sri Sambandamoorthy Bus Service and K. H. Hanumantha Rao, proprietor of Jeevajyoti Bus Service respectively, submitted applications for th~ two permits in question."}}, {"text": "H. Hanumantha Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7496, "end_char": 7513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and 117 bus operators including respondents 2 and 3 D. Rajabahar Mudaliar, proprietor of Sri Sambandamoorthy Bus Service and K. H. Hanumantha Rao, proprietor of Jeevajyoti Bus Service respectively, submitted applications for th~ two permits in question."}}, {"text": "Jeevajyoti Bus Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7529, "end_char": 7551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and 117 bus operators including respondents 2 and 3 D. Rajabahar Mudaliar, proprietor of Sri Sambandamoorthy Bus Service and K. H. Hanumantha Rao, proprietor of Jeevajyoti Bus Service respectively, submitted applications for th~ two permits in question."}}, {"text": "May 8, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8037, "end_char": 8048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In doing so, it proceeded to award marks in accordance with the principles prescribed by the impugned order and came to the conclusion that the appellant satisfied the requirements enunciated by the State Transport Authority for running an efficient bus service on this long route, and so, it granted the two permits to the appellant on May 8, 1958."}}, {"text": "Gajenaragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8493, "end_char": 8507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that before Ap~~ Oth::a una the appeals were thus heard, the State Government had super- - seded the principles enunciated in the order in so far as they Gajenaragadkar, O.J.related to the grant of stage carriage permits and had issued another direction under s. 43A known as G.O. 2265 on August 9, 1958.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8599, "end_char": 8605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 9, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8628, "end_char": 8642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that before Ap~~ Oth::a una the appeals were thus heard, the State Government had super- - seded the principles enunciated in the order in so far as they Gajenaragadkar, O.J.related to the grant of stage carriage permits and had issued another direction under s. 43A known as G.O. 2265 on August 9, 1958."}}, {"text": "July 4, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9145, "end_char": 9157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was passed on July 4, 1959."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9211, "end_char": 9228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then invoked the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9235, "end_char": 9243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 18, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9697, "end_char": 9713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This plea along with the other contentions raised by the appellant failed and the learned Single Judge who heard his writ petition dismissed the petition, on October 18, 1962."}}, {"text": "November 14, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10181, "end_char": 10198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then moved the said High Court for leave, but failed to secure it, and that brought him here with an application for special leave which was granted on November 14, 1963."}}, {"text": "Madras Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10688, "end_char": 10705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3898 which had been issued by the Madras Government on December 9, 1946."}}, {"text": "December 9, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10709, "end_char": 10725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3898 which had been issued by the Madras Government on December 9, 1946."}}, {"text": "Rma Vilas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11221, "end_char": 11230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion for permit made by the appellant, Sri Rma Vilas A~';!11J;~';\"lr:.!,"}}, {"text": "s. 47(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11374, "end_char": 11385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GaJendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11426, "end_char": 11440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred :ln GaJendragadkar, G.J. appeal against the order to the Central Board namelr th~ Provincial Transport Authority which had been constituted\n\nby the Government under s. 44 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Central Board namelr th~ Provincial Transport Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11479, "end_char": 11534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred :ln GaJendragadkar, G.J. appeal against the order to the Central Board namelr th~ Provincial Transport Authority which had been constituted\n\nby the Government under s. 44 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11587, "end_char": 11592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11668, "end_char": 11673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11681, "end_char": 11700, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12017, "end_char": 12022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Transport Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12296, "end_char": 12319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reaching this decision, the High Court emphasised the fact that the Central Transport Board and the Regional Transport Board were completely independent of the Government except that they must observe the notifications made pursuant to s. 43 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12464, "end_char": 12469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 19, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13013, "end_char": 13030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This judgment was pronounced on November 19, 1947."}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13067, "end_char": 13085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of this judgment, the Madras Legislature amended the Central Act by Act XX of 1948 which came into force on December 19, 1948."}}, {"text": "December 19, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13153, "end_char": 13170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of this judgment, the Madras Legislature amended the Central Act by Act XX of 1948 which came into force on December 19, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13233, "end_char": 13239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High\n\n1961 Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13863, "end_char": 13886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment of the Central Act led to the next round of controversy between the bus operators and the State Government and that resulted in the decision of the Madras High\n\n1961 Court in C.S.S. Motor Service Tenkasi v. The State of Madras B.Ra; agopa1a Naidu and another(')."}}, {"text": "C.S.S. Motor Service", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14279, "end_char": 14299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "come into force and the appellant C.S.S. Motor Service urged Oajendmgadkar, O.J. before the High Court that under Art."}}, {"text": "Oajendmgadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14306, "end_char": 14319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "come into force and the appellant C.S.S. Motor Service urged Oajendmgadkar, O.J. before the High Court that under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(i)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14359, "end_char": 14372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14550, "end_char": 14560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14950, "end_char": 14957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15107, "end_char": 15113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15617, "end_char": 15623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15847, "end_char": 15853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 25, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15903, "end_char": 15917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This judgment was pronounced on April 25, 1952."}}, {"text": "C.S.S. Motor Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16221, "end_char": 16241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, it rclers to the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case cf C.S.S. Motor Service."}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16396, "end_char": 16402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "After this order was issued and the Tribunals constituted under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17889, "end_char": 17960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18967, "end_char": 18975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19460, "end_char": 19468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act as amended by the Madras Amendment Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19597, "end_char": 19645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20300, "end_char": 20306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act as amended by the Madras Amendment Act, 1948", "statute": "the Act as amended by the Madras Amendment Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20981, "end_char": 20989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21526, "end_char": 21532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vinvalid and should have been ignored by the Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial authority under the relevant provisions of the Act", "statute": "Vinvalid and should have been ignored by the Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial authority under the relevant provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22029, "end_char": 22035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vinvalid and should have been ignored by the Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial authority under the relevant provisions of the Act", "statute": "Vinvalid and should have been ignored by the Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial authority under the relevant provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "State Transport Undertakings", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22831, "end_char": 22859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State Transport Undertakings."}}, {"text": "ss. 47, 48, 57, 60,\n\n64 and 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23621, "end_char": 23652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24211, "end_char": 24219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25012, "end_char": 25022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25130, "end_char": 25135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25468, "end_char": 25474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25796, "end_char": 25805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25822, "end_char": 25828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26107, "end_char": 26115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "iragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26227, "end_char": 26236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" made under the Act shall be laid for not less than fourteen GaJ•n<iragadkar, O.J. days before the appropriate Legislature as soon as possible 4 after they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications: as the appropriate Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid.", "canonical_name": "iragadkar"}}, {"text": "ss. 67 and 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26563, "end_char": 26576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26959, "end_char": 26970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27461, "end_char": 27467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27469, "end_char": 27480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Transport Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28601, "end_char": 28626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, the State Transport Authority and the Regional Transport\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nHUPREME COURT REPORTS 11\n\nAuthority to which reference is made in this section are cloth- 1964 ed not only with administrative power but also with q~si- B. RajQ{Jopola Naitlv\n\njudicial jurisdiction so that reference to the two authontles v. ."}}, {"text": "B. RajQ{Jopola Naitlv", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28818, "end_char": 28839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, the State Transport Authority and the Regional Transport\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nHUPREME COURT REPORTS 11\n\nAuthority to which reference is made in this section are cloth- 1964 ed not only with administrative power but also with q~si- B. RajQ{Jopola Naitlv\n\njudicial jurisdiction so that reference to the two authontles v. ."}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29094, "end_char": 29100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29120, "end_char": 29134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h. h Gajendragadkar, O.J.\n\nBut there are.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29657, "end_char": 29662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29667, "end_char": 29672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29677, "end_char": 29682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29744, "end_char": 29750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 42, 43 and 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29772, "end_char": 29789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30320, "end_char": 30326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30550, "end_char": 30556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30736, "end_char": 30747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31518, "end_char": 31524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. RajagopalaNaidu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31696, "end_char": 31714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to issue orders and directions of a general character only B. RajagopalaNaidu in respect of administrative matters which fall to be dealt with\n\nS v. by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport taie Trans]JOrt h d h 1 · f h A h ' Appellate Tribunal Aut.", "canonical_name": "B. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU"}}, {"text": "Gajendraga.dk<ir", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31996, "end_char": 32012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendraga.dk<ir, C.J.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion, we have been influenced by certain other considerations which are both relevant and material.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32159, "end_char": 32165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33903, "end_char": 33909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34154, "end_char": 34160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34162, "end_char": 34168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34377, "end_char": 34383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34417, "end_char": 34423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Rajagopafa Naidu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34827, "end_char": 34846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is somewhat unfortunate that though judicial decisions have always emphasised this aspect of the matter, occasion did not arise so long\n\nI ..\n\nto consider the validity of the Government order which on the ~~ construction suggested by the respondent would clearly invade B. Rajagopafa Naidu the domain of quasi-judicial administration.", "canonical_name": "B. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU"}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35001, "end_char": 35007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35111, "end_char": 35116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35182, "end_char": 35188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35257, "end_char": 35262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35428, "end_char": 35433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35556, "end_char": 35562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35636, "end_char": 35642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36016, "end_char": 36022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37201, "end_char": 37207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37222, "end_char": 37228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Rajagopala Naidu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37711, "end_char": 37730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This liberty in pr.ictice\n\n1964 may not mean much; but even theoretically, if the impugned B. Rajagopala Naidu order is valid, nothing can prevent the State Government from\n\nSta•• ;;.,..'!!\"\"", "canonical_name": "B. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU"}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37970, "end_char": 37976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38109, "end_char": 38115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38338, "end_char": 38352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, we cannot accept the argument strongly pressed before us by Mr. Ganapathy Iyer on behalf of respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 43A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38601, "end_char": 38607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39632, "end_char": 39637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GajewlrMadlar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41159, "end_char": 41172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "matters which have GajewlrMadlar, C.J. to be borne m mmd."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41284, "end_char": 41289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41411, "end_char": 41416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41575, "end_char": 41580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41598, "end_char": 41604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_205_209_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 205\n\nGULRAJ SINGH\n\nMOTA SINGH\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR. c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RA.IAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.J\n\nDeCTee-Pre-emption suit by illegitimate son and daughter of a female vendor-Whether the words \"son or daughter of\n\nsuch female\" used in Punjab Pre-emption Act, as amended, inc!ude an illegitimate son or daughter of such femalie-Puniab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (1 of 1913), as amended by Act X of 1960, s. 15(2)(b).\n\nThe appellants-illegitimate son and daughter of one Sardarni-filed a suit to pre-empt the sale made by her of agricultural land to the respondents. Both the trial court as well\n\nas the District Court on appeal granted to the appellants a decree for pre-emption, though to a limited extent. On second appeal by the respondents, the High Court directed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the appellants were not comprehended within the class of persons who were entitled to pre-emption under s. 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act as amended by Act X of 1960. On appeal by Special Leave the appellants contended that the provision in s. 15 of the Preemption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which made provision for the devolution of property belonging to a female owner and that as under the latter enactment illegitimate children of the Hindu female were entitled to succeed to her property, it must be held that when the Punjab legislature used in 1960 the expression 'son or daughter' it meant a son or a daughter who would be entitled to succeed as an heir of a Hindu female.\n\nHeld: The normal rule of construction of the words \"child\" \"son\" or udaughter\" in a statute would include only legitimate children. No doubt, there might be express provision iri the statute itself to give these words a more extende<' meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of tl Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a goo<. illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate lhat the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy. Section 15 contains no \"\"Press provision and the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words\n\n\"Son or daughter\" occur more than once in that section. It was fairly conceded on behalf of the appellant that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15(1) the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If\n\nso, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2}(a)(i) to the brother's son of such vendor. It could hardly be argued that a brother's illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. Therefore, it must be held that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words \"son or daughter\" it meant only a legitimate son and legitimate daughter of the female vendor.\n\nMarch 18\n\nGult-aj Singh\n\nv. .Mota Sin1h\n\nA!!Y\"ngar, J.\n\nCIVIL . APPELLATE JURISDICTION-Civil Appeal No. 467 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated February 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 837 of 1960.\n\nBishan Narain and Naunit Lal, for the appellants.\n\nYashpa/ Gandhi and S. D. Goswami, for the respondents.\n\nMarch 13, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-Do the words \"son or daughter of such female\" occurring in s., 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 as amended by Act X of 1960 include an illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter of such female is the only question that arises in this appeal by special leave.\n\nThe appellants are the illegitimate son and daughter of one Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur. By a registered deed of sale dated December 1, 1956 the said lady sold 18 bighas, ·\n\n1 biswas and 5! biswansis of agricultural land for a sum of Rs. I 0,000 /- to the respondents. The appellants filed a suit to pre-empt this sale. There was some dispute about the consideration actually paid but we are not now concerned with it. Both the trial court as well as the District Court on appeal granted to the appellants a decree for pre-emption, though to a limited extent. The respondents filed a second appeal to the High Court and the learned Judges, by the judgment now under appeal, directed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the appellants were not comprehended within the class of persons who were entitled to pre-emption under s. 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act as it now stands under the amendment effected by Act X of 1960. It is from this judgment that, by special leave, the present appeal has been brought.\n\nMr. Bishan Narainlearned Cmmsel for the appellants submitted to us that the provision in s. 15 of the Pre-emption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which made provision for the devolution of property belonging to a female owner and that as under the latter enactment illegitimate children of a Hindu female were entitled to succeed to her property, it must be held that when the Punjab legislature used in 1960 the expression 'son or daughter' it meant a son or a daughter who would be entitled to sucteed as an heir of a Hindu female. We are unable to accept this submission of learned Counsel.\n\nSection 15 whose construction calls for consideration reads as follows:\n\n\"15. Persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in respect of sales of agricultural land and village\n\nimmovable property.-(1) The right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and village immovable property shall vest-\n\n(a) where the sale is by a sole owner: - First, in the son or daughter or son's son or daughter's son of the vendor; Secondly, in the brother or brother's son of the vendor; Thirdly, in the father's brother or father's brother's son of the vendor; Fourthly, in the tenant who holds under tenancy of the vendor the land or property, sold or a part thereof;\n\n(b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land or property and is not made by all the cosharers jointly: - First, in the sons or daughters or son's sons or daughter's sons of the vendor or vendors; Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; Thirdly, in the father's brothers or. father's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; Fourthly, in the other co-sharers; Fifthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy _ of the vendor or vendors the land or property sold or a part thereof;\n\n(c) where the sale is of land or property owned jointly and is made by all the co-sharers jointly: - First, in the sons or daughters or son's sons or daughter's sons of the vendors; Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the vendors; Thirdly, in the father's brothers or father's brother's sons of the vendors; Fourthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendors or any one of them the land or property sold or a part thereof.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-seotion (1)-\n\n(a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her father or brother or the sale in respect of such\n\nGulraj Sin.gh\n\nMota Singh _,, Ayyongar, J,\n\nGtdraj Singh\n\nMota Singh\n\nAwangar, J.\n\n208 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [196!l]\n\nland or property is by the son or daughter of such female after inheritance, the right of preemption shall vest: -\n\n(j) if the sale is by such female, in her brother or brother's son;\n\n(ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such female, in the mother's brothers or the mother's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; {bl where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her husband, or through her son in case the son has inherited the land or property sold from his father, the right of pre-emption shall vest:- First, in the son or daughter of such female; Secondly, in the husband's brother or husband's brother's son of such female.\" The submission of learned Counsel virtually amounts to this that in order to construe the words used .in s. 15 one ; should travel beyond the enactment and ascertain the class of persons who are entitled under the Hindu Succession Act to succeed as heirs of the intestate vendor. Even a. cursory examination would show that this construction is untenable and that the framers of the Act did not proceed on any such theory. Take, for instance, the case where a female succeeds to property through her father or brother dealt with in s. 15(2)(a) of the Pre-emption Act Her heirs under the Hindu Succession Act would be, if the property was inherited from her father; her son or daughter (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and in their absencethe heirs of the father. If, however, the property was inherit- ed from her brother, the devolution is different (vide s. 15(1) and (2)). The devolution provided by s. 15(2)(a)(i) of the Pre-emption Act is different and confers the right to pre-emot on her brother or her brother's son. The theory, therefore, that we should resort to the line of heirs as in an intestate succession under the Hindu Succession Act or, for the matter of that, to any other system of Common Law or statute applicable to the vendor is obviously untenable. Pursuing this line of reasoning a little, it was not disputed that if the female vendor were a Christian by religion, only her legitimate issue would be denoted by these words. As it is common ground that the statutory right.of pre-emption conferred by s. 15 is as much applicable to a Christian owner of property as to a Hindu, it would be seen that the construction -of the words of this statute of general application would be\n\nmade to depend on the religion to which the vendor belonged, and in fact would vary with any change made by statute in the law of intestate succession as applicable to different communities. The .position that would arise on a conversion of the vendor to a different faith, with a different personal law as to succession would bring out in bold relief the unsustainability of the submission based on the peculiarities of the personal law as to intestate succession applicable to the vendor.\n\nWe have, therefore, to ascertain whether by the expression 'son or daughter' only the legitimate issue of such female is comprehended or whether the words are wide enough to include illegitimate children also. That the normal rule of construction of the words \"child'', \"son\" or\n\n\"daughter\" occurring in a statute would include only legitimate children i.e., born in wedlock, is too elementary to require authority. No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these words a more extend ed meaning as to include also illegitimate children and s. 3(j) of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a good illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate that the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy .. Section 15 wit1J which we are concerned contains no express provision and the coritext,\n\nso far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words \"son or daughter\" occur more than . once in that section. It was fairly conceded by Mr. Bishan Narain that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15(1), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in s. 15(2)(a)(i) to the brother's son of such vendor. It could hardly be open to argument that a brother's illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. The matter appears to us to be too clear for argument that when s. 15(2)(b)(i) uses the words \"son or daughter\" it meant only a legitimate son and a legitimate daughter of the female vendor.\n\nThe appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nGolraj 8ing1'\n\nMota Singh\n\nAyyangar, J.", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "205\n\nGULRAJ SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GULRAJ SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOTA SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": ".Mota Sin1h", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. 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Goswami, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3555, "end_char": 3563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-Do the words \"son or daughter of such female\" occurring in s., 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 as amended by Act X of 1960 include an illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter of such female is the only question that arises in this appeal by special leave.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "Punjab Preemption Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3647, "end_char": 3674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3898, "end_char": 3924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are the illegitimate son and daughter of one Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur."}}, {"text": "December 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3961, "end_char": 3977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a registered deed of sale dated December 1, 1956 the said lady sold 18 bighas, ·\n\n1 biswas and 5!"}}, {"text": "s. 15(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4669, "end_char": 4680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913", "statute": "the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Bishan Narainlearned Cmmsel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4866, "end_char": 4893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bishan Narainlearned Cmmsel for the appellants submitted to us that the provision in s. 15 of the Pre-emption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which made provision for the devolution of property belonging to a female owner and that as under the latter enactment illegitimate children of a Hindu female were entitled to succeed to her property, it must be held that when the Punjab legislature used in 1960 the expression 'son or daughter' it meant a son or a daughter who would be entitled to sucteed as an heir of a Hindu female."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4951, "end_char": 4956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pre-emption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 5043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5493, "end_char": 5503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Pre-emption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Pre-emption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Gulraj Sin.gh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7315, "end_char": 7328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-seotion (1)-\n\n(a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her father or brother or the sale in respect of such\n\nGulraj Sin.gh\n\nMota Singh _,, Ayyongar, J,\n\nGtdraj Singh\n\nMota Singh\n\nAwangar, J.\n\n208 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [196!l]\n\nland or property is by the son or daughter of such female after inheritance, the right of preemption shall vest: -\n\n(j) if the sale is by such female, in her brother or brother's son;\n\n(ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such female, in the mother's brothers or the mother's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; {bl where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her husband, or through her son in case the son has inherited the land or property sold from his father, the right of pre-emption shall vest:- First, in the son or daughter of such female; Secondly, in the husband's brother or husband's brother's son of such female.\"", "canonical_name": "Gult-aj Singh"}}, {"text": "Mota Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7330, "end_char": 7340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-seotion (1)-\n\n(a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her father or brother or the sale in respect of such\n\nGulraj Sin.gh\n\nMota Singh _,, Ayyongar, J,\n\nGtdraj Singh\n\nMota Singh\n\nAwangar, J.\n\n208 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [196!l]\n\nland or property is by the son or daughter of such female after inheritance, the right of preemption shall vest: -\n\n(j) if the sale is by such female, in her brother or brother's son;\n\n(ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such female, in the mother's brothers or the mother's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; {bl where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her husband, or through her son in case the son has inherited the land or property sold from his father, the right of pre-emption shall vest:- First, in the son or daughter of such female; Secondly, in the husband's brother or husband's brother's son of such female.\"", "canonical_name": ".Mota Sin1h"}}, {"text": "Ayyongar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7345, "end_char": 7353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-seotion (1)-\n\n(a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her father or brother or the sale in respect of such\n\nGulraj Sin.gh\n\nMota Singh _,, Ayyongar, J,\n\nGtdraj Singh\n\nMota Singh\n\nAwangar, J.\n\n208 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [196!l]\n\nland or property is by the son or daughter of such female after inheritance, the right of preemption shall vest: -\n\n(j) if the sale is by such female, in her brother or brother's son;\n\n(ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such female, in the mother's brothers or the mother's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; {bl where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her husband, or through her son in case the son has inherited the land or property sold from his father, the right of pre-emption shall vest:- First, in the son or daughter of such female; Secondly, in the husband's brother or husband's brother's son of such female.\""}}, {"text": "Gtdraj Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7359, "end_char": 7371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-seotion (1)-\n\n(a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her father or brother or the sale in respect of such\n\nGulraj Sin.gh\n\nMota Singh _,, Ayyongar, J,\n\nGtdraj Singh\n\nMota Singh\n\nAwangar, J.\n\n208 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [196!l]\n\nland or property is by the son or daughter of such female after inheritance, the right of preemption shall vest: -\n\n(j) if the sale is by such female, in her brother or brother's son;\n\n(ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such female, in the mother's brothers or the mother's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; {bl where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her husband, or through her son in case the son has inherited the land or property sold from his father, the right of pre-emption shall vest:- First, in the son or daughter of such female; Secondly, in the husband's brother or husband's brother's son of such female.\""}}, {"text": "Awangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7385, "end_char": 7392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-seotion (1)-\n\n(a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her father or brother or the sale in respect of such\n\nGulraj Sin.gh\n\nMota Singh _,, Ayyongar, J,\n\nGtdraj Singh\n\nMota Singh\n\nAwangar, J.\n\n208 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [196!l]\n\nland or property is by the son or daughter of such female after inheritance, the right of preemption shall vest: -\n\n(j) if the sale is by such female, in her brother or brother's son;\n\n(ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such female, in the mother's brothers or the mother's brother's sons of the vendor or vendors; {bl where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has succeeded through her husband, or through her son in case the son has inherited the land or property sold from his father, the right of pre-emption shall vest:- First, in the son or daughter of such female; Secondly, in the husband's brother or husband's brother's son of such female.\""}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8221, "end_char": 8226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8330, "end_char": 8350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8648, "end_char": 8659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8703, "end_char": 8723, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9000, "end_char": 9008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(2)(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9046, "end_char": 9060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9274, "end_char": 9294, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9670, "end_char": 9675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10911, "end_char": 10918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10926, "end_char": 10946, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11247, "end_char": 11257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11535, "end_char": 11548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was fairly conceded by Mr. Bishan Narain that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to, as in s. 15(1), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor."}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11619, "end_char": 11627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(2)(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11860, "end_char": 11874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(2)(b)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12082, "end_char": 12096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12315, "end_char": 12323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Golraj 8ing1'\n\nMota Singh\n\nAyyangar, J.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_210_227_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "1§61\n\nMarch 1.3\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR\n\nDALMIA INVESTMENT CO. LTD.\n\n[AK. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. C. SHAH, JJ.]\n\nIncome-tax Act-Business-Investment company-Dealing in shares-Bonus shares-Valuation.\n\nThe assessee company dealt in shares and also held investments of shares on January 1, 1948. The assessee held 1,10,747. shares of Rohtas Industries at a book value of Rs. 15,57,902/-.\n\nOf these shares 31,909 were bonus shares issued by Rohtas Industries in 1945 at the face value of Rs. 10/- each and the assessee had debited the investment account in respect of the bonus shares by Rs. 3,19,090 with a corresponding entry in the capital reserve account on its credit side for the same amount. The. assessee acquired these bonus shares at a cost of Rs. 5,84,283 in\n\n1944. On January 29, 1948, the assessee sold the entire lot of 1,10,747 shares for Rs. 15,50,458. The assessee deducted the sale price from the book value of Rs. 15,57,902 and claimed a loss of Rs. 7,444 on the sale of shares. The appellate Tribunal valued the bonus shares at nil and held that the assessee had made a profit of Rs: 3,11,646/-. On a reference the High Court held that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the assessee had made a profit of Rs. 3,11,646/-.\n\nHeld (per Hidayatullah and Shah, JJ.): (i) The Income-tax Act defines \"dividend\" and also extends it in some directions but not so as to make the issue of bonus shares a release of reserves as profits so that they could be included in the term.\n\nThe face value of the shares cannot therefore be taken to be dividend by reason of anything in the definition. The shares certific\n\ncate which is issued as bonus entitles the holder to a share in the assets of the company and to participate in future profits.\n\nThe bonus share when sold may fetch more or may fetch less than the face value, and this shows. that the certificate is not a voucher to receive the amount mentioned on its face. The market price is affected by many impcmderables, one such being the yield or the expected yield. The detriment to the share holder, if any, must therefore be calculated on some principle, but the method of computing the cost of bonus shares at their face value does not accord either with fact or business accountancy.\n\nSwan Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Rex (1914) AC. 231, disapproved Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. John Blott, 8 Tax Cases 101, approved.\n\nBouch v. Sproule, (1887) 12 A.C. 385, referred to.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Mercantile Bank of India Ltd., 1936 A.C. 478 and Nicholas v. Commissioner of Taxes of'the State of Victoria, 1940 A.C. 744, referred to.\n\n(ii) The bonus sh.ares cannot be said to have cost nothing to the share holder because on the issue of its bonus shares, there is an instant loss to him in the value of his original holding. The earning capacity of the capital employed remains the same, even after the reserve is converted into bonus shares. By the iS5ue of the bonus shares there is a corresponding fall in the divicinds\n\nactual or expected and the market price moves accordingly.\n\nThe method of calculation which places the value of bonus shares, at nil cannot be correct.\n\n(iii) The bonus shares can be valued by spreading the cost of the old shares over the old shares, and the new issue taken together, if the shares rank pari passu: When they d.o not, the price may have to be adiusted either m the proport10n of the face value they bear (if there is no other circumstances differentiating them) or on equitable considerations based on the market price before and after the issue taking the middle price not that represented by any unusual fluctuations. On the facts of this case it was held that since the bonus shares in this case rank pari passu with the old shares there is no difficulty in spreading. the original cost over the old and the new shares.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax v. Maneklal Chunilal and Sons, Income-tax Reference No. 16/1948, dt. 23-3-1949, disapproved.\n\nEmerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, (1956) 29 I.T.R. 814, distinguished.\n\nEisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189-64 L.Ed. 521, referred to.\n\nPer Sarkar, J. (dissenting): (i) The view taken by the majority of Judges in Blott's case is a correct one. In that case the learned Judges held that when the articles of a company authorise the issue of bonus shares and the transfer of a sufficient amount out of the accumulated profits in its hands representing their face value to the share capital account, what happens when the articles are acted upon is a capitalisation of the profits and the bonus shares issued are not in the hands of the snare holder income liable to tax. Following the majority opinion in Blott's case it was held that the High Court was in error in the'\\iiew it took in the present case. There is no foundation for proceeding on the basis as if the bonus shares had been acquired by the assessee at their face value. Its profits cannot be computed on that basis.\n\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue v. Blott (1921)2 AC. 171, relied on.\n\nSwan Brewery Co. Ltd. v. King (1914) A.C. 231, disapproved.\n\nOsborne (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Steel Blzrrel Co. Ltd., 24 T.C. 293, inapplicable.\n\nCommissioner of Inland Revenue v. Fisher's Executors\n\n(1926) AC. 395 and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Mer~ cantile Bank of India Ltd., (1936) A.C. 478, referred to.\n\nCommissioner of Income-taxv. Maneklal Cliunilal and Sons LM ... I.T. Ref. No. 16 of 1948 and Emerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Incomg-tax, Bombay City, 29 I.T.R. 814, referred to .\n\n. (Iii) Bai Shirinbai Kooka's case is the authority for the proposit!on. that where .it cannot be shown what was paid for the acqmsit10n of a tradmg asset by a trader, it has for tax purpose• to be deem<;<! to have b.een acquired at the market value of the date when it was cqmred. On the basis of this authority the Ijonu.s shares must m the present case be deemed to have been acqmred at the market value of the date of their issue.\n\n(iii) On the basis of the same authority, it would not be correct to say that the bonus shares had been acquired for nothlng.\n\nCommiBsianera of I ncometax, Bihar\n\nDalmia lnveatment\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\n1964 The view taken by the Appellate Commissioner and the Tribal CmnmUJaioner of cannot be supported.\n\nJnwmetax, Bihar v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax v. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka, Dolmia Inveatmen• [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 391, relied on.\n\nGo. Lid.\n\nSarkar, J,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE fuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 780 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated November 28, 1960, of the Patna High Court, in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 724 of 1958.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nS; K. Kapur and B. N. Kirpal, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 13, 1964. The judgment of HIDAYATULLAH and SHAH, JJ. was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR J., delivered a dissenting opinion.\n\nSARKAR, J .-This matter has come before us on a case stated by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The question is how to determine the cost of acquisition of bonus shares for ascertaining the profits made ona sale of them. The assessment year concerned is 1949-50 for which the accounting year is the calendar year 1948. ·\n\nThe assessee held shares by way of investment and also as stock in trade of his business as a share dealer. We are concerned in this case only with its holdings of ordinary shares in Rohtas Industries Ltd .. In 1944 the assessee acquired 31,909 of these shares at a cost of Rs. 5,84,283 /- and was holding them in January 1945. In that month the Rohtas Industries Ltd. distributed bonus shares at the rate of one ordinary bonu~ share for each original share and so the assessee got 31,909 bonus shares. Between that time and December 31, 1947, the assessee sold 14,650 of the original shares with the result that on January 1, 1948 it held the following shares:-(a) 17,259 original shares acquired in 1944, (b) 31,909 bonus shares issued in January 1945, (c) 59,079 newly issued shares acquired in the year 1945 after the issue of the bonus shares and (d) 2,500 further shares acquired in 1947. The total holding of the assessee on January 1, 1948 thus came to 1,10,747 shares which in its books had been valued at Rs. 15,57.902/-. In arriving at this figure the assessee had valued the bonus shares at the face value of Rs. JO/- each and the other shares at actual cost. On January 29, 1948, the assessee sold all these shares for the total sum of Rs. 15,50,458/-, that is, at Rs. 14/- per share and in its return for the year 1949-50 claimed a loss of Rs. 7,444/- on the.sale. It is this return which has led to this. appeal.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREJ\\ffi COURT REPORTS 213\n\nThe Income-tax Officer held that the assessee was not en- 1964 titled to charge as the cost of acquisition of the bonus shares Commissioner of a sum equivalent to their face value for nothing had in fact Inwmetax, Biha• been paid and he computed their cost a.t Rs. 6-8-0 per share. Dalmi• Ivestment He arrived at this price by the following method, which has oo. Lid. been called as the method averaging: 584283 x Face value of bonus shares: 319090 x 1 /31909.\n\nIn adopting this procedure the Income-tax Officer purported to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maneklal Chunilal and Sons Ltd.('). The Bombay High Court later followed this case in Emerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City. Bombay('). On that basis he held that the assessee had made a profit of Rs. 2,39.317 by way of capital gains and levied tax on it accordingly. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that these shares were not investmept shares but formed the assessee's stock in trade on which it was liable to pay income-tax and not capital gains tax. He also held that the assessee having adopted the method of valuing the stocks at cost and no price having actually been paid for the bonus shares, it must be held that there was an inflation in the opening stock by Rs. 3,19,090. This figure, it may , be observed, represented the cost of the bonus shares at their face value. In his opinion the bonus shares had to be valued at nil.\n\nThe appellate Commissioner's conclusion was that the 'assessee was liable to be taxed on a trading profit of Rs. 3, 1 L646 /- in respect of the sale of shares. Thise view was confirmed on a further appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. It is however not clear whether the Tribunal held that there had been a trading profit or capital gains. This matter does not seem to have been raised at any stage after the Appellate Commissioner's order and is not material to the real question that has to be decided.\n\nAfter the Tribunal's judgment the asessee got an order from the High Court directing the Tribunal to refer the following question to it:\n\n\"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the profit computed at Rs. 3,11,646/- on the sale of shares in Rohtas Industries Ltd. was in accordance with law?\"\n\nThe ~~wer !O this question admittedly depends on the cost of acqu1s1tion, 1f any, to be properly attributed to the bonus shares. If the Appellate Commissioner's method of valuing\n\n(') (I.T. Ref. No. 16 of 1948, unreported). {') 29 l.T.R. 814.\n\nSarkar, J.\n\n1964 them at nil was wrong. the .question had to be answered in the\n\noommiS&iom:r of negative. The High Court, following the judgment of Lord Incometax, Bihm Sumner in Swan Brewery Company Limited v. The King('), ~-· . v1. , , held that the real cost of the bonus shares to the assessee was 4/U-mia nvu men . . co. LtrJ. the face value of the shares and answered the quest10n m the\n\nSarkar J. negative. The observations of Lord Sumner which he la.ter expressed more fully in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v.\n\nBlott('), no doubt, lend support to the High Court's view. I shall consider the view expressed by Lord Sumner later. Now, [ wish to notice another case on which the High Court also relied and that was Osborne (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Steel\n\nBarrel Co. Ltd('). I do not think that the observations of Lord Greene M. R. in this case to which the High Court referred, are of any assistance. All that was there said was that when fully paid shares were properly issued for a consideration other • than cash, the consideration must be at the least equal in value to the par value of the shares and must be based on an honest estimate by the directors of the value of the assets acquired.\n\nIn that case fully paid shares had been issued in lieu of stocks and the question was as to how the stocks were to be valued.\n\nThat case had nothing to do '.vith the issue of bonus shares or the ascertainment of_ the cost of their acquisition. •\n\nAs I have said earlier, Lord Sumner's observation in Blott's case(') certainly supports the view taken by the High Court but in that case Lord Sumner was in a minority. The other learned Judges, excepting Lord Dunedin, who took a somewhat different view to which reference is not necessary\n\nbeca.use it has not been relied upon, held that when the articles of a company authorise the issue of bonus shares and the transfer of a sufficient amount out of the accumulated profits in its hands representing their face value to the share capital account what happens when the articles are acted upon is a capitalisation of the profits and the bonus shares issued are not in the hands of the share-holder income liable to tax. In Blott's case(') the articles gave the power which had been acted upon. Lord Sumner on the other hand held that since a com pany could not issue shares for nothing nor pay for them out of its profits, it must be held that what happened in such a case was as if the company had issued cash dividend to the shareholder and had set it off against the liability of the share holder to pay for the bonus share issued to him.\n\nI think the preferable view is that taken by the majority of the Judges. When the articles permit the issue of bonus shares and the transfer of undivided profits direct to the share capital account, it cannot be, said that a cash dividend must be\n\n(') (1914) A.C. 231.\n\n(') 24 T.C. 293.\n\n(') (1921) 2 A.C. 171.\n\n' )\n\ndeemed to have been declared which could be set off against 1964 the liability to pay for the shares. This is not what was done Commis_;;;;;;;, of in fact. What in fact was done, and legally done, was to trans-Incometax. Bihar fer the profits to the share capital account by a resolution pass- Dalinia 1~; estment'\n\ned by the majority of the shareholders so that the shareholders Co. Ltd. never acquired any right to any part of it. The view taken by the majority has since been followed unanimously, and even if it was open to doubt, for myself, at this distance of time, I would not be prepared to depart from it: Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Fisher's Executors(') and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Mercantile Bank of India Limited(').\n\nIt is of some significance to observe that the latter is a case from India.\n\nIn the present case the record does not contain any reference to the resolutions resulting in the issue of the bonus shares nor to the provisions of the articles but the case has proceeded before us on the basis that the bonus shares had been legally issued under powers contained in the articles and the profits had been equally legally transferred to the share capital account without the shareholders having acquired any right in them. Following the majority opinion in Blott's case(\") I think I must hold that the High Court was in error in the view it took in the present case. There is no foundation for proceeding on the basis as if the bonus shares had been acquired by the assessee at their face value. Its profits cannot be computed on that basis.\n\nTwo other methods of ascertaining the cost of acquisition of the bonus shares for computing the profits made on their sale have been suggested. One of them is the method of a.veraging which is the method adopted by the Bombay High Court in the cases earlier mentioned. The other is the method of finding out Jhe fall in the price of the original shares on the issue of the bonus shares and attributing to the latter shares that fall and to value them thereby. The object of these methods seems to me to find out what the bonus shares actually cost the assessee. But this would be an impossible task for they actually cost the assessee nothing; it never paid anything for them. There would be more reason for saying that it paid the face value of the bonus shares because the profits of the Company of a similar amount which might otherwise have come to it had been directly appropriated to the share capital account on the issue of the bonus shares. But this method I have rejected already and, for the reason that no amount was actually paid for the bonus shares by the assessee. For the samereasons the two suggested methods for ascertaining the actual\n\n(') (1926) A.C. 395.\n\n(') (1921) 2 A.C. 171.\n\n(') (1936) A.C. 478.\n\nSarkar, J,\n\n1964 cost of these shares have also to be rejected. If however it -. -. were to be said that these methods were for finding out the\n\nf:C~::!~J;; i:;;, market value of the bonus shares-:--the importance of which\n\nv. ' value for the present purpose will soon be seen-I would say lJalmia lnv<Btment that the only way to find out the market value is from the\n\nCo. Ltd. k t \"ts If mar e I e .\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nHow then is the cost of the bonus shares to be determined? We start with this that nothing in fact was paid for them.\n\nBut if the cost of acquisition is nil, the whole of the sale proceeds of the shares would be taxable profits. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka(') this Court has approved of the Bombay High Court's view tha.t \"obviously, the whole of the sale proceeds or receipts could not be treated as profits and made liable to tax, for that would make no sense\" (p. 397). So the profits cannot be ascertained on the basis that the bonus shares had been acquired for nothing. The view taken by the Appellate Commissioner and the Tribunal cannot be supported.\n\nIt seems to me that the cost price of the bonus shares has to be decided according to the principle laid down in Bai Shirinbai Kooka's case('). The assessee in that case had purchased shares many years ago by way of investment a.t a comparatively lower price. She started trading with them from April I, 1945. The question was how the profits on the sale of these shares were to be ascertaiued. The sale price was known but what was the cost price? The High Court said that in order to arrive at real profits one must consider the accounts of the business on commercial principles and construe profits in .their normal and natural sense, a sense which no commercial man would misunderstand. The High Court's conclusion was this: When the assessee purchased the shares at a lesser price, that is what they cost her and not the business; but s<Y far as the business was concerned, the shares cost the business nothing more or less than their market value on April I, 1945. This date, it will be remembered, was the date when the business was started. These observations were fully approved by this Court.\n\nBai Shirinbai Kooka's case(') therefore is authority for the proposition that where it cannot be shown what was paid for the acquisition of a trading asset by a trader, it has for tax - purposes to be deemed to have been acquired at the market value of the date when it was acquired. I think on the authority of this case, the bonus shares must in the present case be deemed to have been acquired at the market value of the date of their issue.\n\nL would, therefore, answer the question framed in the negative.\n\ni'~)~[~19~6~2J;::-Su_p_p_.~3~S~.c~.=R-.~39~1-. ~~~~~~~~~-\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-This appeal by the Commissioner of 1964 Income-tax, Bombay raises the important question how bonus Gommi&Bioner of shares must be valued by an assessee who carries on business Incometax, Bihar in shares. The assessee here is Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd. D 1 . I\" 1 1 (now Shri Rishab Investment Co. Ltd.) which is a public a m•00. \"t:J. men limited company and the bonus shares were issued in the calendar year 1945 by Rohtas Industries Ltd. in the propor- Hidayatullah, J. tion of one bonus share for one ordinary share already held by the shareholders. In this way, the assessee company received 31,909 bonus shares of the face value of Rs. 10 /- per share which shows that its previous holding was 31,909 ordinary shares. The existing ordinary shares were purchased by the assessee company for Rs. 5,85,283 /- We now come to the assessment year 1949-50 which corresponded to the accounting period of the assessee companythe calendar year\n\n1948. The assessee company was holding shares as investment and was also dealing in shares. The shares in the trading account, being the stock-in-trade, were valued at the beginning of the year and also at the end of the year and the book value was based on cost. Between December 31, 1945 and January 1, 1948, the assessee company sold some shares of Rohtas Industries Ltd. and . bought others. Its holding on the first day of January 1948 was 1,10,747 shares which were valued in its books at Rs. 15,57,902/-. The assessee company sold these shares 0n January 29, 1948 to Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Company Limited for Rs. 15,50,458 /-. This date, it may be pointed cut, fell within the period in which capital gains were taxable. The assessee company returned a loss of Rs. 7,444/- on this sale. In its books it had valued these shares as follows:\n\nExist.ing 11hares\n\n(l) 17.259 (out of3l,909 original\n\ns1ar£s).\n\n(2) 31,909 Bonus shares ..\n\n(3) 59,079 NClw Issue she.res\n\n(4) 2,500 Ne'v purehase shares\n\nTotsi 1,10,747 shares ..\n\nBook valuo\n\n3,10,951 00 Proportionate cost from Rs.\n\n5,84,283.\n\nRs. !>.;:; 3,19,090·00 at face v:i.Jue of Rs. 10 per\n\naha.re. 8,88,561 00 at cost.\n\n39,300 00 at tlost.\n\nl5,57,902·0C\n\nThe amount of Rs. 3,19,090/- which represented the cost of the bonus shares in the above account was debited to the investment account and an identical amount was credited to a capital reserve account. The loss which was returned was the difference between Rs. 15,57,902/- claimed to be the cost price ofl,10,747 shares and their sale price of Rs.15,50,458/-.\n\nThe return Was not accepted by the Income-tax Officer.\n\nSpecial Investigation Circle, Patna. In his assessment order, the Income-tax Officer held that the market value of the existing\n\n1964 -Sb:at'es when bonus shares were issued, was Rs. 18 /- per share\n\nOonimi8'ioner of and the value of the shares was Rs. 5,74,362/- (3I,909 x\n\nIncometax, Bihar Rs. 18). He held that the sale of the shares took place at .iial . ;· Rs. 14/- per share. To this data he purported to apply a deci- . m•~0.\"£:J'.mcn1 sion of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of lncometax v. Maneklal Chunnilal and Sons(') and held that there was Hidayutidiah, J. profit of Rs. 7 /8/0 per bonus share and thr otal profit was Rs. 2,39,317 /- which he held was capital gain. He brought Rs. 2,39,317 /-to tax as capital gains.\n\nBefore the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Patna, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Emerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncometax, Bombay City(') and it was argued that by applying the principle laid down in that case, the average cost was Rs. 9/10/0 per share and total ]lfofit Rs. 1,49,355/-. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not accept the above calculation. According to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the bonus shares ha.d cost nothing to the assess1:e company. He omitted Rs. 3,19,090/- from the book valuation and held that the actual cost of 1,10,747 shares was Rs. 12,38,812/- and that the assessee company instead of suffering a Joss of Rs. 7,444 /- on the sale of the shares had actually made profit of Rs. 3. 11,646 /-. He issued a notice to the asoessee company and enhanced the assessment.\n\nOn further appeal to the Tribunal, the ass.ssee company submitted again on the strength of the ruling of the Bombay High Court in Emerald and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncome-tax, Bombay City(') that the actual profit was Rs. 1.57,326 /-. This was done by spreading the cost of the 31,909 ordinary shares over those shares and bonus shares taken together and adding to half the cost attributable to the old ordinary shares the cost of new purchases in the same year and finding out the average cost of shares other than bonus shares.\n\nThe Tribunal did not accept this calculation. According to the Tribunal it was not possible to put a valuation upon shares for which nothing was paid. The Tribunal held that the old shares and bonus shares could not be \"clubbed together\" and the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was right. The Tribunal, however, stated a case under s. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act at the instance of the assessee company suggesting the question for the opinion of the High Court:\n\n\"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the profit computed at Rs. 3.11,646/- on the sale of shares in Rdhtas Industries Ltd. was in accordance with law?\"\n\n(') Income-tax Reference No. 16 of 1948 dt. 23-3-1949.\n\n(') (1956) 29 I.T.R. 814.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTff 219\n\nThe reference was heard by V. Ramaswamy, C.J. and Kan- 1964 haiya Singh, J. They held that the Income-tax authorities were commissioner of wrong in holding that profit should be computed at lncom<tax. B;/1ar Rs. 3,11,646/- or at any other amount. According to them, D 1 . 1v. , • h a mia nres 11tenP t ere was no profit on the sale of 31,909 shares and they co. Ltd. answered the question in favour of the assessee. Before the ' High Court it was contended by the assessee company that the Ilidayatullah, J .. bonus shares must be valued at their face vafue of Rs. 10 I per share and the Department contended that they should be valued at nil. It appears that the other methods of calculation of the cost price of bonus shares were abandoned at that stage.\n\nRamaswami, C.J. and Kanhaiya Singh, J. held that the issue of bonus shares was nothing but a capitalisation of the company's reserve account or the profits and the bonus shares could not be considered to be issued free. According to them, the payment for the shares must be found in the bonus which was declared from the undistributed profits and the face value of the bonus shares represented the detriment to the assessee company in respect of the undistributed reserves. The present appeal was brought against the decision of the High Court by special leave granted by this Court.\n\nIt will be seen from the above that there are four possible methods for determining the cost of bonus shares. The first method is to take the cost as the equivalent of the face value of the bonus shares. This method was followed by the assessee company in making entries in its book)l. The second method adopted by the Department is that as the shareholder pays nothing in cash for the shares, cost should be taken at nil. The third meth9d is to take the cot of the original shares and to spread it over the original shares and bonus shares taken collectively. The fourth method is to find out the fall in the price of the original shares on the stock exchange and to attribute < this to the bonus shares. Before us the assessee company presented for our acceptance the first method and the Department the third method. We shall now consider which is the proper way to value the bonus shares.\n\nIt is convenient to begin with the contention that the cost' of bonus shares must be taken to be their face value. The argument requires close attention, because support for it is sought in certain pronouncements of Lord Sumner to which reference will be made presently. Mr. Kapur contends that a company cannot ordinarily issue shares at a discount, and argues that a. fortiori it cannot issue shares for nothing. He submits therefore that the issue of bonus shares involves a twofold operation-the creation of.new shares and the declara.tion of a dividend or bonus which dividend or bonus must be deemed to be paid to the shareholder and to be returned by him to acquire the new shares. Since the amount credited in\n\nI 1961 the books of the company as contribution of capital by the shareholder is the face value of the bonus shares, he, contends\n\nf~::;::;:n;; t;;, that the cost to the shareholder is equal to the face vahie of the . v. ' bonus shares. He relies upon the decision of the Privy Council C>alm\"!J/\"J'.:J.'.me\"' in Swan Brewery Company Ltd. v. Rex('). In that case, Lord\n\nSumner observed: HidayatuUah, J.\n\n\"True, that in a sense it was all one transaction, but that is an ambiguous expression. In business, as in contemplation of law, there were two transa1:tions, the creation and issue of new shares on the company's part, and on the allottees' part the satisfaction of the liability to pay for them by acquiescing in such a transfer from reserve to share capital as put an end to any participation in the sum of £101,450 in right of the old shares, and created instead a right of general participation in the company's profits and assets in right on the new shares, without any further liability to make a cash contribution in respect of them.\"\n\nLord Sumner adhered to his view later in the House of Lords in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. John Blott(') but Lord Dunedin and he were fu a minority. and this view was not accepted by the majority. In view of this conflict, it is necessary to state what really happens when a company issues bonus shares.\n\nA limited liability company must state in its memorandum of association the amount of capital with which the company desires to do business and the number of shares into which tha.t capital is to be divided. The company need not issue all its capital at the same time. It may issue only a part of its capital initially and issue more of the unissued capital on a later date.\n\nAfter the company does business and profits result, it may distribute the profits or keep them in reserve. When it does the latter, it does not keep the money in its coffers; the mouey is used in the business and really represents an increase in the capital employed. When the reserves increase to a considerable extent, the issued capital of the company ceases to bear a true relation to the capital employed. The company may then decide to increase its issued capital and declare a bonus and issue to the shareholders in lieu of bonus, certificates entitling them to an additional share in the increased capital. As a matter of accounting the original shares in a winding up before the increase of issued capital would have yielded to the shareholder the same return as the old shares and the new shares taken together. What was previously ownell by the slweholder by virtue of the original certificates is after the issue of bonus\n\n(') (1914) A.C. 231. (') 8 Tax Cases 101.\n\n.shares, held by them on the basis of more certificates. In point 1964 of fact, however, what the shareholder gets is not cash but Commi .. w.er of. property from which income in the shape of money may be Incometa.:, Bi/iar derived in future. In this sense, there is no payment to him Dal . ~; \"\"\"\"\"' but an increase of issued capital and the right of the sharemoo. '1u. holder to it is evidenced not by the original number of certificates held by him but by more certificates. There is thus no Hidayalullah, J. payment of dividend. A dividend in the strict sense means a share in the profits and a share in the profits can only be said to be paid to the shareholder when a part of the profits is released to him in cash and the company pays that amount and the shareholder takes it away. The conversion of the reserves into capital does nol involve the release of the profits to the shareholder; the money remains where it was, that is to say, employed in the business. Thereafter the company employs that money not as reserves of profits, but as its proper capital issued to and contributed by the shareholders. If the shareholder were to sell his bonus shares, as shareholders often do, the shareholder parts with the right to participation in the capital of the company, and the cash he receives is not dividend but the price of that right The bonus share when stYld may fetch more or may fetch less than the face value and this shows that the certificate is not a voucher to receive the amount mentioned on its fa:ce. To regard the certificate as cash or as representing cash paid by the shareholder is to overlook the internal process by which that certificate comes into being.\n\nWe may now see what was decided in the Swem Brewery's(') case. In that case the company had not distributed all its profits in the past. As a result, .it had a vast reserve fund. The company increased its capital and from the reserve fund, issued shares pro rata. These shares, it was held by Lord Sumner, were dividend. It was claimed in that case that there was no dividend and no distribution of dividend, because nothing had been distributed and nothing given. Where formerly there was one share, after the declaration of bonus there were two but the right of participation was the same. This argument was not accepted and the face value of the shares was taken to be dividend. Section 2 of the Act of Western Australia, howevr, .defined dividend to include \"every profit, advantage <ilr gam mtended to be paid or credited to or distributed among the l!lembers of any company.\" It is obvious that it was impossible to hold that the bonus shares were outside the extend- ed definition . . Swan Brewery'~(') case has been ccepted. as rightly dec1Jed on the special terms of the sect10n, as indeed it was.\n\nIn Blott's(') case, Rowlatt, J. observed that the bonus shares were included in the expressio~ \"advantage\" occurring in the\n\n(') (1914) AC. 231. (') 8 Tax Cases,101.\n\n1964 highly artificial definition of the word \"dividend\".\n\nIn the\n\n0 . .\n\nCourt of Appeal. Lord Sterndale, M. R. and Warrington and: ;:::::,:;,,\":'J{;;:J,, Scrutton, L. JJ. distinguished the case on the same ground . . v.\n\nIt was, however, pointed out by the Master of Rolls that in.\n\nDalmo/\"t,~'\"\"nt Bouch v. Sproule(') Lord Herschell had observed that in such a case, the company does not pay or mtend to pay any sum HidayatuUah, J. as dividend but intends to and does appropriate the undivided profits and deals with them as an increase of the capital stock in the concern.\n\nBlott's(') case then reached the House of Lords. It may be pointed out at this stage that it involved a question whether super-tax was payable on the amount represented by the face value of the bonus share. For purposes of assessment of supertax which was (as it is in our country) a tax charged in respect • of income of an individual the total of ail income from all sources had to be taken into account and the tax was exigible if the total increased a certain sum. Such additional duty is really nothing but additional income-tax and is conveniently described as super-tax. Viscounts Haldane, Finlay and Cave held that an amount equal to the face value of the shares could not be regarded as received by the tax payer and that there was no more than the capitalisation of the profits of the company in respect of which certificates were issued to the shareholders entitling them to participate in the amount of the reserve but only as part of the capital. Lords Dunedin and Sumner, however, held .that the word \"capitalisation\" was. somewhat \"hazy\" and the issue of the shares involved a dual operation by which an amount was released to the shareholder but was retained by the company and applied in payment of those shares. In our opinion, and we say it respectfully, the better view is that of the majority and our conclusions set out earlier accord substantially with it.\n\nIt follows that though profits are profits in the hands of the company but when they are disposed of by converting them into capital instead of paying them over to the shareholders, no income can be said to accrue to the shareholder because the new shares confer a title to a larger proportion of the surplus assets at a general distribution. The floating capital used in the company which formerly consisted of subscribed capital and the reserves now becomes the subscribed capital. The amount said to be payable to the shareholders as income goes merely to increase the capital of the company and in the hands of the shareholders the certificates are property from which income will be derived. Lord Dunedin did not rely upon Swan_ Brewery's(') case. He held that as the company could not pay for another, the shareholder must be taken to have paid for the bonus shares himself and the payment was;\n\n(') (1887) 12 A.C. 385.\n\n(') (1914) A.C. 231. (') 8 Tax Cases 101.\n\nI S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME 00URT REPORTS 223\n\nthe amount which came from the accumulated profits as profits. Lord Sumner, however, stated that in Swan Brewery's(') .case, he did not rely upon the extended definition of dividend in the Australian Statute, but upon the principle involved. He observed that as a matter of machinery, what was done was to keep back the money released to the shareholder for application towards payment for the increased capital.\n\nLord Sumner had already adhered to his view in an earlier case of the Privy Council, but Swan Brewery's(') case and'\n\nBlott's(') case were considered by the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. and others('). Lord Thankerton distinguished Swan Brewery's(') case and followed Blott's(') case, though in Nicholas\n\nv. Commissioner of Taxes of the State of Victoria('), B/ott's(') .case was distinguished on the ground that the definition in the Unemployment Relief Tax (Assessment) Act, 1933 also, included within a person's assessable income \"any dividend, interest, profit or bonus credited, paid or distributed to him by the company from any profit derived in or from Victoria or elsewhere by it\", and that bonus shares must be regarded as dividend under that definition.\n\nThe Indian Income-tax Act defines \"dividend\" and also •extends it in some directions but not so as to make the issue of bonus shares a release of reserves as profits so that they could be included in the term. The face value of the shares cannot therefore be taken to be dividend by reason of anything in the definition. The share certificate which is issued as bonus entitles the holder to a \"Share in the assets of the company and to participate in future profits. As pointed out above, if sold, it may fetch either more or less. The market price is affected by many imponderables, one such being the yield or the expected yield. The detriment to the shareholder, if any, must therefore be calculated on some principle. but the method of computing the cost of bonus shares at their face value does not accord either with fact .or business accounta'.ncy. .\n\nCan we then say that the bonus shares are a gift and are acquired for nothing? At first sight, it looks as if they are so but the impact of the issue of bonus shares has to be seen to realise that there is an immediate detriment to the shareholder in respect of his original holding. The Income-tax Officer, in this case, has shown that in 1945 when the price of shares became stable it was Rs. 91per share, while the value of the shares before the issue of bonus shares was Rs. 18 /- per share.\n\nIn other words, by the issue of bonus shares pro rat a, which Tanked pari passu with the existing shares, the market price was exactly halved, and divided between the old and the bonus .-shares. This will ordinarily be the case but not when the shares\n\n(') (1914) A.C. 231. ' (') 8 Tax Cases 101.\n\n(\") (1936) AC. 478.\n\n(') (1940) AC. 744.\n\nC'ommis, qioner of Jncometax, Bihar\n\nDalmia Jnvcst1nent\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nOommi., siontr of lncomdex, Bikar\n\nDam1\"a Jnt'l.'8lmtnt\n\nOo.LtJ.\n\nHidayatuUah, J.\n\ndo not rank pari passu and we shall deal with that case separately. When the shares rank pari passu the result may be stated by saying that what the shareholder held as a whole rupee coin is held by him, after the issue of bonus shares, in two 50 nP coins. The total value remains the same, but the evidence of that value is not in one certificate but in two. This was expressed forcefully by the Supreme Court of United States of America, quoting from an earlier case, in Eisner v.\n\nMacomber(') thus:\n\n\"A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of the shareholders. Its property is not diminished, and their interests are not increased . . . . . . . . . . . . . The proportional interest of each shareholder remains the same. The only change is in the evidence which represents that interest, the new shares and the original shares together representing the same . proportional interest that the lll original shares represented before the issue of the new ones ............. In short. the corporation is no poorer and the stock-holder is no richer than they were before ............. If the plaintiff gained any small advantage by the change, it certainly was not an advantage of $417,450 the sum upon which he was taxed ............ What has happened is that the plaintiff's old certificates have been split up in effect and have diminished in value to the extent of the value of the new .\n\n.. . ......... if a shareholder sells dividend stock. he necessarily disposes of a part of his capital interest, just as if he should sell a part of his old stock, either before or after the dividend. What he retains no longer entitles him to the same proportion of future dividends as before the sale. His part in the control of the company likewise is diminished.\"\n\nSwan Brewery's('! case, it may be pointed out, was distinrnishcd\n\nhere also on the basis of the extended definition. It follows that the bonus shares cannot be said to have cost nothing to the shareholder because on the issue of the bonus shares, there is an instant loss to him in the value of his original holding.\n\nThe earning capacity of the capital employed remains the same, eveq after the reserve is converted into bonus shares. By the issue of the bonus shares there is a corresponding fall in the dividends actual or expected and the market price moves accordingly. The method of calculation which places the value of bonus shares at nil cannot be correct.\n\n(') 252 U.S. 189-64 L.Ed. 521.\n\n(') (1914) A.C. 231.\n\nThis leaves for consideration the other two methods.\n\nHere we may point out that the new shares may rank pari passu with old shares or may be different. The method of cost accounting may have to be different in each case but in essence and principle there is no difference. One possible method is to ascertain the exact fall in the market price of the shares already held and attribute that fall to the price of the bonus shares.\n\nThis market price must be the middle price and not as represented by any unusual fluctuation. The other method is to take the amount spent by the shareholder in acquiring his original shares and to spread it over the old and new shares treating the new as accretions to the old and to treat the cost price of the criginal shares as the cost price of the old shares and bonus shares taken together. This method is suggested by the Department in this case. Since the bonus shares in this case rank pari passu with the old shares there is no difficulty in spreading the original cost over the old and the new shares and the contention of the Department in this case is right. But this is not the end of the present discussion. This simple method may present difficulties when the shares do not rank pari passu or are of a different kind. In such cases, it may be necessary to compare the resultant price of the two kinds of shares in the market to arrive at a proper cost valuation. In other words, if the shares do not rank pari passu, assistance may have to be taken of other evidence to fix the cost price of the bonus shares. It may then be necessary to examine the result as reflected in the market to determine the equitable cost. In England paragraph IO of Schedule Tax to the Finance Act, 1962 provides for such matters and for valuing Rights issue but we are not concerned with these matters and need not express an opinion.\n\nIt remains to refer to three cases to which we have already referred in passing and on which some reliance was placed. In The Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Bombay v. M / s A1a11ck/a/ Chunilal and Sons Ltd., Bombay('), the assessee held certain ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 100/- in Ambica Mills Ltd. and Arvind Mills Ltd. These two companies then declared a bonus and issued preference shares in the proportion of two to one of the face value of Rs. !00 /- each. These preference shares were sold by the assessee and if the face value was taken as the cost, there was a small profit. he Department contended that the entire sale proceeds were hable to be taxed. because the assessee had paid nothing for the bons s.hares and everything received by it was profit. The assessee s view was .that the cost was equal to the face value of the shares. The High Court rejected both these contentions a~~ held that the cost of the shares previously held must bti d1v1ded between those s and the bonus shares in the same\n\n(') I.T. Ref. No. 16 of 1948 d. 23rd March ID49 L'PID)lSCl-.S .\n\nCommissioner of Income.tax, Bihar\n\nDalniia Jnvelmetd\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nHiilayalullah, J.\n\n226 SUPRE.ME COURT REPOR'l'S [196i]\n\n19G4 proportion as their face value, and the profit or loss should\n\nCommfasioncr of then be found out by comparin~ the cost price calculated on Income-fax, Bilmr this basis with the sale price. In our opinion, there is difficulty\n\nDaJ . 1v. , , in the High Court's decision. The preference shares and the m•a \"\"''m'-· d\" h Id h di b I d h . f .Co. Ltd. or mary s ares cou ar y e va ue m t e proport10n o their face value. The ordinary shares and the preference shares Hfrluyatullah, J. do not rank part passu.\n\nThe next case is Emerald Co. Ltd. v. C.l.T., Bombay City('). Jn that case, the assessee had, at the beginning of the year, 350 shares of which 50 shares were bonus shares and all were of the face value of Rs. 250 /- each. The assessee sold 300 shares and claimed a loss of Rs. 35,801/- by valuing the bonus shares at face value. The Department arrived at a loss of Rs. 27,766/- by the method of averaging the cost, following the earlier case of the Bombay High Court just referred to.\n\nThe Tribunal suggested a third method. It ignored the 50 shares and the less was calculated by considering the cost of\n\n300 shares and their sale price. The loss worked out at Rs. 27,748/-, but the Tribunal did not disturb the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in view of the small difference. The High Court held that the method adopted by the Department was proper but this Court, on appeal, held that in that case the method ndopted by the Tribunal was correct.\n\nThis Court did not decide which of the four methods was the proper one to apply, leaving that question open. The reason was that the assessce originally held 50 shares in 1950; in 1951, it received 50 bonus shares. It sold its original holding three days later and then purchased another JOO shares after two months. In the financial year 1950-51 (assessment year 1951-52), the Income-tax Officer averaged the price of 150 shares and found a profit of Rs. 1,060 /-on the sale of 50 shares instead of a loss of Rs. 1.365 /- which was claimed. The asscssee did not appeal. In the financial year 1951-52 (assessment year 1952-53). the assessee started with 150 shares (JOO purchased and 50 bonus). It then purchased 200 shares in two lots and sold 300 shares, leaving 50 shares. The assessee company claimed a loss of Rs. 35,801 /-. The Income-tax Officer computed the loss at Rs. 27,766/- and the Tribunal computed the loss at Rs. 27,748/-. The Tribunal, however. did not chturb the loss as computed by te Income-tax Officer in view of the slender difference of Rs. 18 /-. The High Court's decision was reversed by this Court, because the High Court ignored all intermediate transactions and averaged the 300 shares with the 50 bonus shares. The shares in respect of which the bonus shares were issued were already averaged with the bonus shares. This was not a case of bonus shares issued in the year of account. It involved purchase and sale of some of the shares.\n\nThe average cost price of the original and bonus shares was\n\n(') (1956) 29 I.T.R. 814.\n\n'1 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRK'IIE COURT REPORTS 227\n\nalready fixed in an earlier year by the Department and this 1964 fact should have been taken into account. No doubt, Chagla, Gommi,.ioner of CJ. observed that it was not known which of the several Income tax, Bilrar\n\nshares were sold in the year of account, but in the Statement Dnlmia n•ulmtK\n\nof the Case it was clearly stated that bonus shares were un- Go. Lld. touched.\n\nThe decision of this Court in Emerald Company's(') case. however, lends support to the view which we have expressed here. The bonus shares can be valued by spreading the cost of the old shares over the old shares and the new issue taken together, if the shares rank pari passu. When they do not, the price may have to be adjusted either in the proportion of the face value they bear (if there is no other circumstance differentiating them) or on equitable considerations based on the market price before and after the issue.\n\nApplying the principles to the present case, the cost of 3L909 shares, namely, Rs. 5,84,283/- must be spread over those shares and the 31,909 bonus shares takentogether. The cost price of the bonus shares therefore was Rs. 2,92,141 /- because the bonus shares were to rank equal to the original shares. The account would thus stand as follows: -\n\nShare in Rohtas Industries Ltd.\n\nRs.\n\nI. Old issue of 17 ,259 shares brought forward\n\nfrom 1945, at (proportionate) cost 1.58,035\n\n2. Bonus shares 31,909 received in 1945, at (proportionate, spread out) cost 2,92,141\n\n3. New issue 59,079 shares brought forward from 1945 \". 8,88,561\n\n4. New purchases 2,500 shares brought forward from 1947 39,300\n\nTotal 1.10,747 shares 13.78,037\n\nSales of all the above shares in 1948 15.50.458\n\nProfit 7.444\n\nProfit to be added to the income returned 1,79,865\n\nThe answer to the question given by the High Court was therefore erroneous and the right answer wou!d be that the p, rofit computed at Rs. 3.11,6461was not in accordance with law. The appeal is therefore allowed with costs here and in the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed. ---------------~\n\n(') (1956) 29 I.T.R. 814.\n\nJ, p (n)SCI-8(\")\n\nHiJaya!ullah, J.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DALMIA INVESTMENT CO. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DALMIA INVESTMENT CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AK. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 175, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 323, "end_char": 338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee company dealt in shares and also held investments of shares on January 1, 1948."}}, {"text": "Rohtas Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 378, "end_char": 395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "shares of Rohtas Industries at a book value of Rs."}}, {"text": "January 29, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 823, "end_char": 839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 29, 1948, the assessee sold the entire lot of 1,10,747 shares for Rs."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1336, "end_char": 1350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "23-3-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3984, "end_char": 3993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23-3-1949, disapproved."}}, {"text": "S. 189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4138, "end_char": 4144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Per Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4173, "end_char": 4183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Sarkar, J. (dissenting): (i) The view taken by the majority of Judges in Blott's case is a correct one."}}, {"text": "Blott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4250, "end_char": 4255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Sarkar, J. (dissenting): (i) The view taken by the majority of Judges in Blott's case is a correct one."}}, {"text": "Bai Shirinbai Kooka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5606, "end_char": 5625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iii) Bai Shirinbai Kooka's case is the authority for the proposit!on."}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6470, "end_char": 6476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar, J,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE fuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6694, "end_char": 6716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6721, "end_char": 6735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6760, "end_char": 6768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S; K. Kapur and B. N. Kirpal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. N. Kirpal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6773, "end_char": 6785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S; K. Kapur and B. N. Kirpal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6840, "end_char": 6852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of HIDAYATULLAH and SHAH, JJ.", "canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR"}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6857, "end_char": 6861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of HIDAYATULLAH and SHAH, JJ."}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6884, "end_char": 6906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR J., delivered a dissenting opinion.", "canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Rohtas Industries Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7451, "end_char": 7472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned in this case only with its holdings of ordinary shares in Rohtas Industries Ltd .. In 1944 the assessee acquired 31,909 of these shares at a cost of Rs."}}, {"text": "Rohtas Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7614, "end_char": 7636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that month the Rohtas Industries Ltd. distributed bonus shares at the rate of one ordinary bonu~ share for each original share and so the assessee got 31,909 bonus shares."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7793, "end_char": 7810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between that time and December 31, 1947, the assessee sold 14,650 of the original shares with the result that on January 1, 1948 it held the following shares:-(a) 17,259 original shares acquired in 1944, (b) 31,909 bonus shares issued in January 1945, (c) 59,079 newly issued shares acquired in the year 1945 after the issue of the bonus shares and (d) 2,500 further shares acquired in 1947."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9289, "end_char": 9306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In adopting this procedure the Income-tax Officer purported to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maneklal Chunilal and Sons Ltd.(')."}}, {"text": "Incometax, Bihm Sumner", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11432, "end_char": 11454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, following the judgment of Lord Incometax, Bihm Sumner in Swan Brewery Company Limited v. The King('), ~-· ."}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11718, "end_char": 11724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations of Lord Sumner which he la.ter expressed more fully in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v.\n\nBlott('), no doubt, lend support to the High Court's view.", "canonical_name": "Sumner"}}, {"text": "Greene", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12109, "end_char": 12115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not think that the observations of Lord Greene M. R. in this case to which the High Court referred, are of any assistance."}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12945, "end_char": 12952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other learned Judges, excepting Lord Dunedin, who took a somewhat different view to which reference is not necessary\n\nbeca.use it has not been relied upon, held that when the articles of a company authorise the issue of bonus shares and the transfer of a sufficient amount out of the accumulated profits in its hands representing their face value to the share capital account what happens when the articles are acted upon is a capitalisation of the profits and the bonus shares issued are not in the hands of the share-holder income liable to tax."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15018, "end_char": 15023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is of some significance to observe that the latter is a case from India."}}, {"text": "April I, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19066, "end_char": 19079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court's conclusion was this: When the assessee purchased the shares at a lesser price, that is what they cost her and not the business; but s<Y far as the business was concerned, the shares cost the business nothing more or less than their market value on April I, 1945."}}, {"text": "Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20026, "end_char": 20052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee here is Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd. D 1 ."}}, {"text": "Rishab Investment Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20076, "end_char": 20102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\" 1 1 (now Shri Rishab Investment Co. Ltd.) which is a public a m•00. \""}}, {"text": "December 31, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21013, "end_char": 21030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between December 31, 1945 and January 1, 1948, the assessee company sold some shares of Rohtas Industries Ltd. and ."}}, {"text": "Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21315, "end_char": 21364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee company sold these shares 0n January 29, 1948 to Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Company Limited for Rs."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21654, "end_char": 21656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22411, "end_char": 22416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special Investigation Circle, Patna."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22836, "end_char": 22856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "m•~0.\"£:J'.mcn1 sion of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of lncometax v. Maneklal Chunnilal and Sons(') and held that there was Hidayutidiah, J. profit of Rs."}}, {"text": "Hidayutidiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22944, "end_char": 22956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "m•~0.\"£:J'.mcn1 sion of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of lncometax v. Maneklal Chunnilal and Sons(') and held that there was Hidayutidiah, J. profit of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24866, "end_char": 24874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24882, "end_char": 24896, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rdhtas Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25113, "end_char": 25135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3.11,646/- on the sale of shares in Rdhtas Industries Ltd. was in accordance with law?\""}}, {"text": "V. Ramaswamy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25314, "end_char": 25326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTff 219\n\nThe reference was heard by V. Ramaswamy, C.J. and Kan- 1964 haiya Singh, J. They held that the Income-tax authorities were commissioner of wrong in holding that profit should be computed at lncom<tax."}}, {"text": "haiya Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25347, "end_char": 25358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTff 219\n\nThe reference was heard by V. Ramaswamy, C.J. and Kan- 1964 haiya Singh, J. They held that the Income-tax authorities were commissioner of wrong in holding that profit should be computed at lncom<tax."}}, {"text": "Ilidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25777, "end_char": 25790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the ' High Court it was contended by the assessee company that the Ilidayatullah, J .. bonus shares must be valued at their face vafue of Rs.", "canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26045, "end_char": 26054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramaswami, C.J. and Kanhaiya Singh, J. held that the issue of bonus shares was nothing but a capitalisation of the company's reserve account or the profits and the bonus shares could not be considered to be issued free."}}, {"text": "Kanhaiya Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26065, "end_char": 26079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramaswami, C.J. and Kanhaiya Singh, J. held that the issue of bonus shares was nothing but a capitalisation of the company's reserve account or the profits and the bonus shares could not be considered to be issued free."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27799, "end_char": 27804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kapur contends that a company cannot ordinarily issue shares at a discount, and argues that a. fortiori it cannot issue shares for nothing."}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28612, "end_char": 28618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, Lord\n\nSumner observed: HidayatuUah, J.\n\n\"True, that in a sense it was all one transaction, but that is an ambiguous expression.", "canonical_name": "Sumner"}}, {"text": "HidayatuUah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28629, "end_char": 28640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, Lord\n\nSumner observed: HidayatuUah, J.\n\n\"True, that in a sense it was all one transaction, but that is an ambiguous expression.", "canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Hidayalullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31449, "end_char": 31461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is thus no Hidayalullah, J. payment of dividend.", "canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Swem Brewery", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32679, "end_char": 32691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may now see what was decided in the Swem Brewery's(') case."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33322, "end_char": 33331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Western Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33346, "end_char": 33363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2 of the Act of Western Australia, howevr, .defined dividend to include \"every profit, advantage <ilr gam mtended to be paid or credited to or distributed among the l!lembers of any company.\""}}, {"text": "Swan Brewery'~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33632, "end_char": 33646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Swan Brewery'~(') case has been ccepted."}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33768, "end_char": 33775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Blott's(') case, Rowlatt, J. observed that the bonus shares were included in the expressio~ \"advantage\" occurring in the\n\n(') (1914) AC."}}, {"text": "Sterndale", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34011, "end_char": 34020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Sterndale, M. R. and Warrington and: ;:::::,:;,,\":'J{;;:J,, Scrutton, L. JJ."}}, {"text": "Warrington", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34032, "end_char": 34042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Sterndale, M. R. and Warrington and: ;:::::,:;,,\":'J{;;:J,, Scrutton, L. JJ."}}, {"text": "Scrutton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34071, "end_char": 34079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Sterndale, M. R. and Warrington and: ;:::::,:;,,\":'J{;;:J,, Scrutton, L. JJ."}}, {"text": "Herschell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34241, "end_char": 34250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dalmo/\"t,~'\"\"nt Bouch v. Sproule(') Lord Herschell had observed that in such a case, the company does not pay or mtend to pay any sum HidayatuUah, J. as dividend but intends to and does appropriate the undivided profits and deals with them as an increase of the capital stock in the concern."}}, {"text": "Swan_ Brewery", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36602, "end_char": 36615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Dunedin did not rely upon Swan_ Brewery's(') case."}}, {"text": "Swan Brewery", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36981, "end_char": 36993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Sumner, however, stated that in Swan Brewery's(') .case, he did not rely upon the extended definition of dividend in the Australian Statute, but upon the principle involved."}}, {"text": "Thankerton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37557, "end_char": 37567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Thankerton distinguished Swan Brewery's(') case and followed Blott's(') case, though in Nicholas\n\nv. Commissioner of Taxes of the State of Victoria('), B/ott's(') .case was distinguished on the ground that the definition in the Unemployment Relief Tax (Assessment) Act, 1933 also, included within a person's assessable income \"any dividend, interest, profit or bonus credited, paid or distributed to him by the company from any profit derived in or from Victoria or elsewhere by it\", and that bonus shares must be regarded as dividend under that definition."}}, {"text": "ott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37620, "end_char": 37623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Thankerton distinguished Swan Brewery's(') case and followed Blott's(') case, though in Nicholas\n\nv. Commissioner of Taxes of the State of Victoria('), B/ott's(') .case was distinguished on the ground that the definition in the Unemployment Relief Tax (Assessment) Act, 1933 also, included within a person's assessable income \"any dividend, interest, profit or bonus credited, paid or distributed to him by the company from any profit derived in or from Victoria or elsewhere by it\", and that bonus shares must be regarded as dividend under that definition."}}, {"text": "Victoria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37696, "end_char": 37704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Thankerton distinguished Swan Brewery's(') case and followed Blott's(') case, though in Nicholas\n\nv. Commissioner of Taxes of the State of Victoria('), B/ott's(') .case was distinguished on the ground that the definition in the Unemployment Relief Tax (Assessment) Act, 1933 also, included within a person's assessable income \"any dividend, interest, profit or bonus credited, paid or distributed to him by the company from any profit derived in or from Victoria or elsewhere by it\", and that bonus shares must be regarded as dividend under that definition."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38127, "end_char": 38141, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C'ommis", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39812, "end_char": 39819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C'ommis, qioner of Jncometax, Bihar\n\nDalmia Jnvcst1nent\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nOommi.,"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of United States of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40359, "end_char": 40400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was expressed forcefully by the Supreme Court of United States of America, quoting from an earlier case, in Eisner v.\n\nMacomber(') thus:\n\n\"A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of the shareholders."}}, {"text": "S. 189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42468, "end_char": 42474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England paragraph IO of Schedule Tax to the Finance Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44180, "end_char": 44241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ambica Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44677, "end_char": 44694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "100/- in Ambica Mills Ltd. and Arvind Mills Ltd. These two companies then declared a bonus and issued preference shares in the proportion of two to one of the face value of Rs. !"}}, {"text": "Arvind Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44699, "end_char": 44716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "100/- in Ambica Mills Ltd. and Arvind Mills Ltd. These two companies then declared a bonus and issued preference shares in the proportion of two to one of the face value of Rs. !"}}, {"text": "Hiilayalullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45536, "end_char": 45549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner of Income.tax, Bihar\n\nDalniia Jnvelmetd\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nHiilayalullah, J.\n\n226 SUPRE.ME COURT REPOR'l'S [196i]\n\n19G4 proportion as their face value, and the profit or loss should\n\nCommfasioncr of then be found out by comparin~ the cost price calculated on Income-fax, Bilmr this basis with the sale price."}}, {"text": "Hfrluyatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46060, "end_char": 46073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ordinary shares and the preference shares Hfrluyatullah, J. do not rank part passu."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 48778, "end_char": 48784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, Chagla, Gommi,.ioner of CJ."}}, {"text": "Emerald Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49066, "end_char": 49081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of this Court in Emerald Company's(') case."}}, {"text": "HiJaya!ullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50736, "end_char": 50748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, p (n)SCI-8(\")\n\nHiJaya!ullah, J.", "canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH J. SARKAR"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_228_236_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "March 16\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\nRAM SHARAN\n\nTHE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE.\n\nAJMER RANGE AND OTHERS\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH.\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.J\n\nPolice Act, 1861 (Act 5 of 1861) s. 2-Rajasthan P&lice- Divisic:;:i of State into range1'-Promotions rangewise-If denying equality before law or equality in matters of public employment-Constitution of India, Arts. 14 and 16.\n\nThe system prevailing in the State of Rajasthan for the purpose of promotion of head•constable to the post of Sub- Inspectors of Police was challenged as violative of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. The petitioner, who was promoted to the rrnk of Sub-Inspector of Police from the rank of head constable, was reverted when a permanent Sub-Inspector returned to the range as he was the junior most approved headconstable in that range, though in other ranges of the State there were many approved head-constables who were junior /to him but they continued to officiate as Sub-Inspectors. The petitioners grievance was that if the whole State had been treated as one unit for purpose of promotion to and reversion from the rank of Sub-Inspectors, the petitioner would not have been reverted. He conl'imded, inter alia, that the whole police force being one, the practice of promotion of -head-constables to officiate as Sub-Inspectors rangewise amounted to denial of equal opportunity before the law and was hit by Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution; and that the practice of confining promotions and reversions to officers serving at a particular point of time in one particular range and at the same time making inter-range transfers freely and frequently and as a: matter of official routine was bound to produce S€rious inequalities in promotions and reversions and also very haphazard changes in seniority amongst the officers inter se.\n\nHeld: (i) The system of giving promotions as evolved in the State cannot be struck down as denying equality before the law or denying equality in the matter of employment in public service, on the ground that the police force being deemed one for the whole State, promotion throughout from constable upw£rds should be on the bas!s of the whole State or simply on the ground of possible cases of hardship. The system has been evolved for the efficiency of the police in the State as \\vell as for administrative convenience.\n\n(ii) If there is wholesale abuse of the power of transfer by the Inspector-General of Police, (for he alone can transfer Sub-Inspectors from one range to another), a case of glaring -\"' denial of equality before the law or glaring denial of equal opportunity for employment in the serviee of the State may arise. But a system like this cannot be struck down on the ground that it may be abused. In case of abu~ in this wholesale manner a case may arise for striking down the abuse and not the system.\n\n(iii) In the face of Government Order of March 1955. directing not to ordinarily transfer officers drawing less than\n\nRs. 250/- p.m. outside their home district, it cannot be accept- 1964 ed tat free and frequent transfers are made as a matter of routme by the Inspector-General of Police in violation thereof Ram Sharaa Further the material that has been placed on the record by •· the petitioner is insufficient to come to the conclusion that along TGM. IJ.puty 1\"'11\"\"\"' WI.th th\" t f t• h . eneml of Po\"'' is sys em o promo ion, t ere 1s also a prac1ce of free .Aj R .d and frequent transfers in Rajasthan as a matter of routine of me'ot,::;:• a Sub-Inspectors from one range to another.\n\n. ~RIGINAL JURISDICTION-Writ Petition No. 175 of 1963.\n\nPet1t10n under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nB. D. Sharma, for the petitioner.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, State of Rajasthan and B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar, for the respondents.\n\nMarch 16, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nW ANCHOO, J .-This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenges the system prevailing in the State of Rajasthan for the purpose of promotion of head-constables to the post of Sub-Inspectors of Police as violative of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. The petitioner was a headconstable in the former State of Ajmer and was duly included in the approved list of head-constables to be promoted to the rank of Sub-Inspectors of Police in 1955 and was appointed on July 14, 1956 as officiating Sub-Inspector of Police. On November 1, 1956, the former State of Ajmer merged in the State of Rajasthan under the States Reorganisation Act. The petitioner was absorbed in the police service of the State of Rajasthan and a fresh order posting him as officiating Sub-Inspector in Rajasthan was passed on November 1, 1956. According to the petitioner, the practice of Police administration in Rajasthan is that the whole police force of the State is generally under the administrative control of the Inspector General of Police. who is assisted by six Deputy Inspectors General of Police, each Deputy Inspector General of Police being in-<:harge or administration in one of the six ranges into which the whole State has been divided for administrative convenience. The petitioner however contends that though the State of Rajasthan is divided into six ranges, the Sub-Inspectors in different ranges belong to one cadre and one service and are governed by the same rules and regulations and the same conditions of service as regards pay, leave, pension, promotion, disciplinary action etc. The Sub-Inspectors of Police are also transferable from one range to another. It is usual for the Inspector General of Police to pass )orders of transfer from one range to another of three or four Sub-Inspectors every day on an\n\nWanchoo, J •\n\n1964 average and thus the Sub-Inspectors in the different ranges s.m Sharan are similarly situated and similarly circumstanced in all resv. pects. The same is the case with head-constables serving in P0h• Dopu1 ·~ lp\"'1J'd0' different ranges of the State. The petitioner further contends\n\n'\"''\"\n\n0 ' ofice, h h h h 1. f Ajmer Ra11f1• arui t at even t oug t e po ice orce 1s one for the entire State Othera in view of s. 2 of the Police Act, No. 5 of 1861, (hereinafter wanrkoo J. referred to as the Act) a practice grew up. in the State of Rajasthan of treating the members of police force serving at a particular point of time in each range as a separate and distinct unit for purposes of making promotions and reversions. In consequences of this practice, if a vacancy in the cadre of Sub-Inspectors of Police arose in one range, only the seniormost head-constables in that range were considered for promotion to that vacancy, even though there might be more senior head-constables in other ranges who had also been approved for promotion. These head-constables of other ranges were not considered and promotion was made on the basis of the head-constables in the particular range where the vacancy occurred. Similar was the case where reversion had to be made on account of exigency of public service. In view of this practice, the petitioner was reverted in April 1957 when a permanent Sub Inspector returned to the range as he was the juniormost approved head-constable in the Ajmer range, though in other ranges there were many approved head-constables who were junior to \"him but they continued to officiate as Sub-Inspeetors.\n\nThe petitioner's grievance is that if the whole State had been treated as one unit for purposes of promotion to and reversion from the rank of Sub-Inspectors, the petitioner would not have been reverted. He contends that the whole police force being one, the practice of promotion of head-constables to officiate as Sub-Inspector rangewise amounts to denial of equal opportunity before the law and is hit by Arts. 14 and 16 of tlie Constitution. It is contended that the practice of confining promotions and reversions to officers serving at a particular point of time in one particular range (i.e. where the vacancy or the surplusage of posts actually occurred) and at the same time making inter-range transfers freely and frequently and as a matter of official routine is bound to produce serious inequalities in promotions and reversions and also very haphazard changes in seniority amongst the officers inter se.\n\nThe practice according to the petitioner allowing free transfers produces results which are violative of the equal protection of law and of equal opportunity to public servants in the matter of employment and thus violates Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nThe petition has been opposed on behalf of the State and the system of promotion within the range is justified on\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 231\n\nthe basis of the administrative organisation of the police 1964 force in the State and efficiency of administration for police Ram Sharan purposes. The organisation of the police force in the State v. 1 h h h 1 f d I G 1 £The D-:puty nspeclor 1s t at t e w o e orce IS un er an nspector enera o Gener<U of Police, Police; but for administrative efficiency the entire area of Ajmer Range and the State is divided into four ranges each under one Deputy Othtrs Inspector General of Police. Besides these four ranges there Wan<hoo, J. are two other units of the force which are separate administrative units, each under the charge of a Deputy Inspector General of Police, though they are not ranges. These two units are (!) Criminal Intelligence Department and Intelligence Branch, and (2) Railway and Crime Branch. Under the four ranges are the various district organisations of police under Superintendents of Police. The initial recruitment to the police force is made within a district in the rank of constable. These constables are posted in their respective districts after training. This is done with a view to administrative efficiency. as such constables are well acquainted with the conditions, topography, fairs, festivals and customs of their districts. From these constables approved lists are prepared for promotion to head-constable and these lists are prepare:! districtwise by the Superintendent of Police, who has the power to promote a constable to a head-constable within his district Once a constable has been confirmed as a heac0r.stablc, his further promotion as a Sub-Inspector is by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. For this purp;:ise, all the head-constables in the range consisting of a number of districts of which the Deputy Inspector General of Police is the administrative head are considered as one\n\ngroap for prnmotion to the rank of Sub-Inspectors. Consequently the Deputy Inspector General of Police prepares an\n\napprovd list of head-constables on the basis of senioritycum-merit. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the range, the Deputy Inspector General of Police concerned makes promotion from this approved list according to seniority and if reversion is to take place it is the juniormost head-constable officiating as a Sub-Inspector who reverts. The Inspector General of Police only keeps a list of confirmed Sub- Inspectors as he is the officer who has the power to promote Sub-Inspecto:s to the. rank of Inspectors. Thus, according to the State, this thee tier system has always been prevalent in the State; promot10n from constable to head-constable is made by te Superinndent of Police and is confined to the d1stnct, promot10n from head-constable to Sub-Inspector is made by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. and is\n\ncofined to the range, or, as the case may be, within the two umts already referred to, and finally promotion from the rank of Sub-Inspector to the rank of Inspector is on a State-wise basis made by the Inspector .General of Police\n\nl964 The case of the State is that this system, has been evolved Ram Sharan for administrative efficiency and there is in the circumstances v. no inequality before the law and no denial of equality in the The Deputy Inspector f 1 f b f h J' f f h' General of Police, matter ? emp oyment o mem ers o t e po ice orce o t is Ajmer Range and descnpt10n. It 1s also contended on behalf of the State that\n\nOthm this system, is necessary not only in the interest of good ad- Wanchoo, J. ministration but also in the interest of efficiency as there are about 20,000 constables, 3,000 head-constables and 1,000\n\nSub-Inspectors of Police in the whole of the State. It is therefore an extremely difficult job for the Inspector General of Police to order promotion of a constable to the rank of headconstable, and thereafter promote a head-constable to the rank of Sub-Inspector. Apart from that, it is averred that officers on the spot, like the Superintendent of Police who promotes a constable to the rank of head-constable within his district and the Deputy Inspector General of Police who promotes a head-constable to the rank of a Sub-Inspector within his range, or within the two units, know the staff and that is why the rules hav~ provided that promotions would be made either by the Superintendent of Police or the Deputy Inspector General of Police, as the case may be\n\nIt is not denied that sometimes on account of administrative reasons or exigencies of service, transfers are made from onL district to another or from one range to another; but it is urged that these are rare. The State has emphatically denied the statement of the petitioner that three or four Sub- Inspectors on an average are transferred everyday from one range to another. It is said that the policy of the Government is that transfers of subordinate staff even from one district to another should be rare. In that connection, the\n\nState has referred to the Government Order issued to all Heads of Department in March 1955 in which it was said that it had come to the notice of the Government that officers were generally transferred outside their home districts, and sometimes even outside their divisions, thereby causing great hardship to the low paid employees. The Government had therefore decided to order that all officers drawing less than Rs. 250/- p.m. may not ordinarily be transferred outside their home districts, and if the transfer is unavoidable it should, as far as possible, be confined to the division. It may be mentioned that the revenue division would ordinarily be of the same extent as a police range, though not necessarily so. The State therefore contends that transfers of 'subordinate staff are not freely made as alleged by the petitioner from one district to another or from one. range to another and therefore the system of promotion of head-constables angewise does not ordinarily result in any hardship due to promotion being confined from head-constables to\n\nSub-Inspectors within the range and does not result in any 1964 inequality before the law or the denial of equal opportunity Ram Shara• in the matter of employment in the service of the State. v.\n\nThe Deputy Jmpedot\n\nGeneral of Pc1ict, It is true that under s. 2 of the Police Act, the entire Ajmer Range and police establishment under a State Government is for the Other• purposes of the Act, deemed to be one police force, and Wanchoo, J, pay and all other conditions. of service of members of. the subordinate ranks of any pohce force have to be detemuned by the State Government. Even so, the Act envisages the organisation of police administration under the Inspector General of Police by creation of ranges under Deputy Inspectors General of Police and districts under District Superintendents of Police. Such organisation is obviously necessary for the efficient functioning of the police force and that is why in practically all the States we find that the administration of the police force, though under one Inspector General of Police, is further sub-divided into ranges under Deputy Inspectors General of Police and districts under Superintendents of Police. Further it cannot be denied that local knowledge is generally speaking conducive to administrative efficiency in the police force and that is the reason for recruiting constables on districtwise basis and providing for their promotion as head-constables also on districtwise basis by the Superintendent of Police who is expected to know their work. The same idea is apparent in the second tier of the system by which head-constables in a range consisting of a number of districts are treated as one for promotion to the rank of Sub-Inspectbr which is vested in the Deputy Inspector General of Police. By providing promotion within the range, the area is a little widened as compared to a district: Even so, the advantage of local knowledge is still available when such selections are made on a rangewise basis. It is only when we reach third tier and come to promotion of Sub-Inspectors of Police as Inspectors of Police that local knowledge is not insisted upon so much as the work of Inspectors of Police and those above them is more of a supervisory nature. On the other hand so far as the work of a constable, head-constable and Sub-Inspector is concerned they deal with the public directly and in such a situatio; local kno\"\".ledge certainly plays an important part in the matter of efficiency of these ranks of the police force. If the State has evolved the three tier system of giving promotion from constables to head-constables, from head-constables to Sub-\n\nInspetors ad from Sub-Il)sl?ectors to Inspectors, which is done 11) the mterst of ad~11)1strative efficiency of the police force, 1t cannot m our opm1on be said that such a system sh?uld be. strnck down on the ground that the police force bemg deemed one for the whole State, promotion throughout\n\n1964 from constable upwards should be on the basis of the whole Ram Sllaran State. Apart from administrative difficulties which may arise v. if all promotion of members in the police force is concen-\n\nT~,;::!i\"~} ~r;;: 0'!rated in the ha!1s of !he lnspec!or Geneal of Police which Ajmer Ran, q• and 1s what the pe!It10ner IS contendmg for, 1t seems to us that\n\nOth<r• there is a good deal of force in the contention of the State Wanchoo, J. that the three tier system works for the efficiency of the police force of these ranks and is designed with that object.\n\nIt is not denied that it may sometimes happen that in one range a head-constable may be promoted who may be junior to a head-constable in another range who does not get promotion at the same time because the promotion is rangewise.\n\nBut it is urged that this has to be balanced against considerations of efficiency which have led to the evolving of the three tier system of promotion already referred to and therefore the system should not be struck down, simply because at times it may happen that a junior head-constable may get promotion while a senior head-constable in another range may have to wait. Balancing the various considerations mentioned above therefore it seems to us that the system in force in the State of Rajasthan evolved as it has been for the efficiency of the police in the State as well as for administrative convenience cannot be said of itself to deny equality before the iaw or to deny equality in the matter of employment in public service, even though at times it may happen, because of the system that a junior head-constable in one range may get promotion as officiating Sub-Inspector while in another range a senior head-constable may have to wait for some time. We are therefore not prepared to strike down this system as denying equality before the law or denying equality in the matter of employment in the public service, simply on the ground of these possible cases of hardship. \\ It is however urged that the system is capable of abuse and it is possible for the Inspector General of Police to transfer some Sub-Inspectors from one range to another with a view to deprive head-constables of a particular range of their due promotion and also with a view to favour head-constables of another range who might otherwise be junior on the basis of length of service. Now it is not and cannot be disputed on behalf of the petitioner that transfers from one district to another or from one range to another even in these ranks of the police force may have to be made in the exigencies of public service or for reasons peculiar to a particular of!icer; nor has it been contended that such transfers can be m any way illegal under the provisions of the Polic~ ct. W.hat is contended is that by means of such transfers 1t 1s possible to create conditions in which equality before the_ law or equality of opportunity in the matter of employment m publie service may be denied to a head-<:onstable of a particular 19114 range. It is true that if there is wholesale abuse of the power Rom 8hara3 of transfer by the Inspector General of Police, (for it is he v. alone who can transfer Sub-Inspectors from one range to T; D'!'i\"'~ ~\"'~\"°' another), a case of glaring denial of equality before the law Aj;:;';,,. i!:,, ig: ~:.d or glaring denial of equal opportunity for employment in the Oth\"'' service of the State may arise. But we cannot strike down w -h- J anc , w, • a system on the supposition that an Inspector General of Police may abuse his power and create glaring instances of denial of equality before the law or of the equal opportunity of employment in the service of the State. A system like this cannot be struck down on the ground that it may be abused.\n\nIn case of abuse in this wholesale manner a case may arise for striking down the abuse and not the system.\n\nThis brings us to the allegation made in the petition that inter-range transfers have been freely and frequently made as a matter of official routine and this therefore has resulted in serious inequalities in promotions and reversions.\n\nThe petitioner also stated in this connection that the Inspector General of Police was making three to four transfers of Sub-Inspectors on an average everyday. The State has emphatically denied this allegation. It is also brought to our notice that the policy of the State Government is that subordinate staff who get less than Rs. 250 /- per mensem should not generally be transferred outside their home district, and if the transfer is essential it should as far as possible be confined to the division. Constables, head-<:onstables and Sub Inspectors generally do not receive more than Rs. 250 /- per mensem as pay and therefore the policy of the Government is that such officers should not as far as possible be transferred outside the district and certainly not outside the division as far as possible.. In view of this Government Order\n\ntransfers of Sub-Inspectors should rarely take place , outside the range. We are therefore not prepared to accept that there is a policy of free and frequent transfers of-Sub-Inspectors as a mat!er of routine from one range to another, and that makes this _system result in serious inequalities in promotions and revers10ns. In the face of the Government Order of March 1955 we cannot accep_t free and frequent transfers are\n\nmae s a mtter of routme by the Jnspector General of Pohce m v1ola!Jon thereof. Further the material that has been placed on the record by the petitioner is insufficient to com_e to the onclusion that along with this system of proi_not10!!, there is also a practice of free and frequent transfers m Raiasthan as a matter of routine of Sub-Inspectors from\n\nme range. to another. In this view of the matter, the petition fads and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs.\n\n1964 Before we part with this petition we should like to sound Ba• s1w.... a note of warning that the system of promotion of head-con- '\" stables to Sub-Inspectors within a range can be rationally\n\nT~::.:r:t~/';.f1:.~' supported on the basis that inter-range transfers of Sub\n\nAj\"\"' Ranu• and Inspectors would be a matter of rare occurrence and would\n\nOthtr1 not be effected liberally or for ulterior motives; this is an wanclwo, J. important aspect of the matter which should always be borne in mind by the authorities concerned in Rajasthan in order to avoid any further challenge to the system.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "RAM SHARAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM SHARAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE.\n\nAJMER RANGE AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE. AJMER RANGE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 196, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Police Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253, "end_char": 257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Act, 1861", "statute": "Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 406, "end_char": 427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 429, "end_char": 444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 614, "end_char": 632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1467, "end_char": 1482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Sharaa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3232, "end_char": 3242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "250/- p.m. outside their home district, it cannot be accept- 1964 ed tat free and frequent transfers are made as a matter of routme by the Inspector-General of Police in violation thereof Ram Sharaa Further the material that has been placed on the record by •· the petitioner is insufficient to come to the conclusion that along TGM.", "canonical_name": "RAM SHARAN"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3522, "end_char": 3531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "eneml of Po\"'' is sys em o promo ion, t ere 1s also a prac1ce of free .Aj R .d and frequent transfers in Rajasthan as a matter of routine of me'ot,::;:• a Sub-Inspectors from one range to another."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3686, "end_char": 3693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3701, "end_char": 3722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3802, "end_char": 3813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, State of Rajasthan and B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "G. C. Kasliwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3845, "end_char": 3859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, State of Rajasthan and B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, State of Rajasthan and B. R. G. K.\n\nAchar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4004, "end_char": 4012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nW ANCHOO, J .-This petition under Art.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4038, "end_char": 4045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ajmer", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4327, "end_char": 4332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was a headconstable in the former State of Ajmer and was duly included in the approved list of head-constables to be promoted to the rank of Sub-Inspectors of Police in 1955 and was appointed on July 14, 1956 as officiating Sub-Inspector of Police."}}, {"text": "July 14, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was a headconstable in the former State of Ajmer and was duly included in the approved list of head-constables to be promoted to the rank of Sub-Inspectors of Police in 1955 and was appointed on July 14, 1956 as officiating Sub-Inspector of Police."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4536, "end_char": 4552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1956, the former State of Ajmer merged in the State of Rajasthan under the States Reorganisation Act."}}, {"text": "State of Ajmer merged in the State of Rajasthan under the States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4565, "end_char": 4648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4707, "end_char": 4725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was absorbed in the police service of the State of Rajasthan and a fresh order posting him as officiating Sub-Inspector in Rajasthan was passed on November 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5825, "end_char": 5832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is usual for the Inspector General of Police to pass )orders of transfer from one range to another of three or four Sub-Inspectors every day on an\n\nWanchoo, J •\n\n1964 average and thus the Sub-Inspectors in the different ranges s.m Sharan are similarly situated and similarly circumstanced in all resv.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6256, "end_char": 6260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6268, "end_char": 6278, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "wanrkoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6308, "end_char": 6315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 of 1861, (hereinafter wanrkoo J. referred to as the Act) a practice grew up."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7882, "end_char": 7897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8615, "end_char": 8630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Wan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9326, "end_char": 9329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides these four ranges there Wan<hoo, J. are two other units of the force which are separate administrative units, each under the charge of a Deputy Inspector General of Police, though they are not ranges."}}, {"text": "hoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9330, "end_char": 9333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides these four ranges there Wan<hoo, J. are two other units of the force which are separate administrative units, each under the charge of a Deputy Inspector General of Police, though they are not ranges."}}, {"text": "Ram Shara•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14897, "end_char": 14907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "range to another and therefore the system of promotion of head-constables angewise does not ordinarily result in any hardship due to promotion being confined from head-constables to\n\nSub-Inspectors within the range and does not result in any 1964 inequality before the law or the denial of equal opportunity Ram Shara• in the matter of employment in the service of the State.", "canonical_name": "RAM SHARAN"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15030, "end_char": 15034, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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{"document_id": "1964_7_237_250_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "'1 S:C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 237\n\nHARIDAS DAS AND ANR. v.\n\nSTA TE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.\n\n[A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR,\n\nJJ.]\n\nPenal Code-Bringing a false charge of a commission of an offence-The offence charged need not be a crimi., a!\n\noffence-It may be an offence under a special !aw like Contempt of Court Act-Whether a proceedi.\"g under Contempt Court Act a criminal proceeding-Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), ss. 40, 41 and 211.\n\nThe appellants were ordered to be proceeded against und:er ss. 193, 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. They\n\napvealed to this Court against that order under certificate granted under Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution.\n\nIt was contended before this Court that for a person to be charged and Vied under s. 211 Penal Code he must either have instituted a criminal proceeding or caused such proceeding to be instituted or he must have falsely charged a person with having committed a criminal offence and since what the appellants did was to initiate a proceeding for committal for contempt of court they cannot be proceeded against under s. 211 Penal Code.\n\nHeld: (per Sarkar, J.) Assuming that a proceeding for committal for contempt of court is not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of s. 211 Penal Code, falsely charging a person with commission of an offence would be an offence under that section. When that section .says that an offence under it may be committed by falsely charging a person with the commission of an offence it does not intend that the offence must be one whiCh gives rise to a criminal proceeding. Offence is defined by s. 40 of the Penal Code meaning an offence under the Code or under any special law and taking the definition of the special law contained in s. 41 as meaning a law applicable to particular subject it will be seen that an offence under Contempt of Court Act is an offence within the ambit of s. 211. The appellants have by falsely bring a cHarge of Contempt of Court made themselves liable to be prcceeded against under s. 211 Penal Code.\n\nEmpress v. Jamoona, (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620, Karim Buksh\n\nv. Queen Empress, (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574 and Queen Empress\n\nv. Karigowda, (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bombay 51, distinguished.\n\n(per Hidayatullah, J.}: There can be no doubt that the institution of contempt of court proceedings is institution of criminal proceedings because a contempt of court can be punished by imprisonment and fine and that brings an accusation charging a man with contempt of court within the expression \"cri'!)inal proceedngs\" in s. 211 Penal Code. Such proce<; dings wee described . as quasi riminal proceedings by Privy o:unc1l because with proceedmgs are not tried under the Cnmmal Procedure Code. That Code is not exhaustive of criminal proceedings and punishments of contempt by summary proceure bef!'re the superior courts are special criminal proceedmgs which the Code of Criminal Procedure does\n\nMarcA 16\n\n1961 not even regulate. The High Court has therefore acted with\n\nB \"da -dA jurisdiction to order a prosecution under s. 211 Pl'!nal Code. an a Das an nr. v. (per Mudholkar, J.): Making a false charge before any S1a1e of w .. i Bengal person, whosoever he may be is covered by s. 499 Indian Penal\n\nuntl Others Code. Section 211 Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case where a false charge is made by the accused person against another before a person competent to enquire into it and either take proceedings himself or cause proceedings to be initiated. It is not limited to false charges made to a person whoalso has the power to try the accused or commit him for trial by other court.\n\n8arkar, J.\n\n(iil It would not be right to read the words or \"falsely charges\" as being in any way restricted by the words \"institute or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding\". The Legislature has clearly prpvided for two kinds of acts, one the institution of proceedings and the other of making a false charge and there is no compelling reason for reading the section as if it is limited to institution of a complaint upon a false charge.\n\n(iii) The word offence under s. 211 would also include a thing punishable under a special law and the law of contempt being a special law an offence under Contempt of Court Act wou!CI be an offence under s. 211 and therefore th\" order of the High Court was right.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION-Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1961. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 5, 1959 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Revision No. 3 of 1957.\n\nSarjoo Prasad and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellants.\n\nNiharendu Dutt Majumdar, P. K. Chakravarty and P. K.\n\nBose, for respondent No. I.\n\nS. C. Majumdar, for respondents Nos. 2 to 4.\n\nMarch 16, 1964. The following judgments were delivered.\n\nSARKAR, J.-The High Court at Calcutta made an order directing the Registrar of the Court to file a complaint in the Court of a magistrate against the appellants under ss. 211, 199 and other appropriate sections of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe Registrar thereupon filed a complaint against the appellants under ss. 193, 199 and 211 of the Code. The appellants have appealed against ihe order of the High Court under a certificate granted under Art. 134(l)(c) of the Constitution.\n\nIt appears that the appellants had moved the High Court for committal for contempt of court of certain respondents. whom I will call the Monda! respondents, for breach of an injunction issued in a suit. That injunction prohibited the respondents from disturbing the appellants' possession of some property. It was said by the appellants. that the Mondl re.spondents attempted to enter forcibly into the properties m\n\n. ..\n\n'.1 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRElllE COURT REPORTS 239\n\nbreach of the injunction and \"in the course of such attempt 1961 .broke open the gate, cut down one tree and also broke down Harida.-! ~; n<I Anr.\n\nthe gate\". The High Court ieferred the matter to the Subv. ordinate Judge for a report on the allegation about breach State\n\n01 J:!'•Ot•t1Bengal 'd . f h ••• \"'' .of injunction and on a cons1 eratJon o t at report came to\n\nthe conclusion that the appellants \"could not reasonably be Sarkar, J. believed\" and expressed its agreement with the Subordinate Judge's view that \"the allegations made by the petitioners are not true\". The petitioners referred to are the appellants.\n\nThe petition for committal for contempt of court was thereupon dismissed. Thereafter the Monda! respondents moved the High Court and obtained the order directing a complaint to be lodged as earlier mentioned. Their case was that deliberate false statements had been made in affidavits used by the appellants in connection with their application for the committal of the Monda! respondents for contempt of court.\n\nMr. Sarjoo Prasad appearing for the appellants has first said that the order in so far as it directed a complaint under ss. 193 and 199 of the Code could not be supported as there was no definite finding in the order dismissing the application for contempt of court that any false statement had been made. I have earlier set out the relevant parts of that order and I think that it contains such a finding. The High Court held that \"the allegations ............ are not true\". It is unnecessary to pursue this question further for Mr: Sarjoo Prasad's contention is obviously unsustainable.\n\nAnother point made by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad was that there was no case for lodging a complaint under s. 211 of the Code. He said that in order that an offence under that section might be committed by a person, he must either have instituted a criminal proceeding or caused such proceeding to. be intituted o~ he must have falsely charged a person with havmg committed an offence. It was said that the appellants culd not be said to have done any of these things. His conkt1tlon was that, what they had done was to start a proceed!ng for committa.l or contempt of court and such proceedmg was not a crunmal proceeding.\n\nI will assume that a proceeding for committal for con- !Cmpt of court is nt a criminal proceeding within the meanmg of that expression as used in s. 211. On this basis no doubt, it cannot be said that the appellants had instituted or c:iusect to be instituted any criminal. proceeding. But the sect1n . also says that falsely charging a person with the comm1ss1on of an offence would be an offence under it and it seems to me that the appellants did so charge the Monda! respondents. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad's answer was that the charge\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'.L'S [19641\n\n1964 contemplated by the section had to be a charge which would Haricltu Daaand A.-. give rise to a criminal proceeding. I am unable to agree. v.\n\nBtate of West Ben_qal Mr. Sarjoo Prasad based his contention on three cases, and Others none of which, in my opinion, supports him. The first case\n\nJ was of Express v. Jamoona('). There it was held that the Sarkar, . charge had to be made to a person competent to act upon it, a person having the power to investigate and send up for trial. The next case was Karim Buksh v. The Queen Empress(') and it held that the making of a false complaint to the police of a cognizable offence was the instituting of a criminal proceeding within the meaning of that expression in the second paragraph in s. 211 which entailed a higher punishment. The last case referred to was Queen Empress v.\n\nKarigowda(') where it was held that the words 'falsely charging' in s. 211 were used in a technical sense and the making of an imputation of the commission of an offence in evidence given in a departmental enquiry was not the making of a charge in that sense. Quite clearly we are not concerned with any of the questions discussed in these cases or the view there taken.\n\nAs, however, in all these cases the charge alleged to have been made related to an offence triable in a criminal proceeding, all the judgments incidentally referred to institution of criminal proceedings in connection with the charge. In none of them, however, was the question with which we are con~ cerned, namely, whether a false charge can be made in respect of an offence which could be tried by a proceeding which was not a criminal proceeding, raised. It was not, and could not have been, intended in these cases to say that the offence in respect of which a false charge had been brought must be one which was triable by a criminal proceeding only. Therefore, I have said that these cases do not support the proposition for which Mr. Sarjoo Prasad contends.\n\nAs a matter of construction, and that is all that we have to go by in the absence of any authority, I agree with the view of the High Court that when the section says that arr offence under it may be committed by falsely charging a person with the commission of an offence, it does not intend that the offence must be one which gives rise to a criminal proceeding. There is no warrant for a contrary view. Inrked the definition of the word offence in s. 40 of the Code shows that such a contrary view would be wrong. Under that definition the word 'offence' in s. 211 means an offence punishable under the Code or under any special or local law\n\n(') (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620. ('l (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574. (') (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 51.\n\nas defined in it. Section 41 defines a special law as a law 1964 applicable to a particular subject. Now the Contempt of Barillas n.;.,.u ..\n\nCourts Act is an Act dealing with the subject of contempt v. of courts and is, therefore, a special law. It also. proides\n\n81• 1•.d ~:;:,~•ayal for punishment for contempt of court by simple 1mpnson- - ment up to six months. subject to certain conditions men- Sa.r!-ar, J. tioned: see ss. 3 and 4. A charge of having committed a contempt of court is, therefore, a charge of having committed an offence within the meaning of s. 211. Such a charge was admittedly brought in this case and that charge was furthermore preferred to the only person who could act upon it, namely. the High Court, for without its sanction no complaint for lodging a false charge of contempt of court could have been made. The order to lodge the complaint in regard to an offence under s. 211 was unobjectionable.\n\nI. therefore. think that there is no substance in this appeal and would dismiss it.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-The High Ccurt of Calcutta has mdayat1dla1',.I. ordered the Registrar of that Court to make a complaint in writing against the appellants for their prosecution under ss. 193, 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court, however, certified the case as fit for appeal under Art. 134(1)\n\n(c) of the Constitution and the present appeal is the result.\n\nThe appellants had obtained a temporary injunction from the High Court against respondents 2 to 4 restraining them from disturbing possession of the appellants over certain properties. The appellants made an application to the High Court alleging that the respondents in defiance of the order tresspassed on the property breaking down a gate and cutting down a tree. In that application they asked for action under the Contempt of Courts Act. The High Court remitted the case for enquiry. It was reported that the allegation was false. The High Court came to a like conclusion and ordered the Registrar to file a complaint for the prosecution of the appellants. At the hearing, preliminary objections were raised about the competency of the appeal, but were subrnquently withdrawn when we intimated that we were not disposed to interfere with the order of the High Court on merits.\n\nThis Court will not ordinarily do more than examine in such cases whether the High Court has fairly considered a case to reach the conclusion that prima facie there is good reason to launch the prosecution, that there is reasonable prospect of conviction and that it is expedient'in the interest of justice to order a prosecution. Judged from this angle, I am satisfied that the High Court correctly viewed the case. . It is, however, contended that s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code cannot apply because no offence under s. 211 can\n\nSUPRE:.\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\n1964 prima facie be held to be committed by the appellants when Harid., DasarnlAnr they made the application which has led to their prosecuv. tion. S. 211 reads as follows: - State of ~Vest Bengal\n\narnl OtA.\" \"211. False charge of offence made with intent to - injure- HidayatuUah, J.\n\nWhoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with.imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and sliall also be liable to fine.\" It is quite clear that prima facie the intention of the appellant would be to cause injury to the respondents if their / report to the High Court was false. The only question really is whether they instituted a criminal proceeding. An application to take proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act .. undoubtedly can be regarded as causing a criminal proceeding to be instituted. There is no substance in the contention that the application neither charged the respondents with any offence, nor instituted a criminal proceeding against them.\n\nThere may be some dispute as to whether it charged the respondents with an offence and as to that I say nothing, but, in my judgment there can be no doubt that it amounted to the insitution of a criminal proceeding because a contempt of court can be punished by imprisonm_11nt and fine and that brings an accusation charging a man with contempt of court within the wide words 'criminal proceedings'. Such proceedings were descJibed as quasi criminal proceedings by the Privy Council because such proceedings are not tried under the Criminal Procedure Code. That does not render it any the less a criminal proceeding because the Criminal Procedure Code is not exhaustive of criminal proceedings and punishments of contempts by summary procedure before the superior courts are special criminal proceedings which the Criminal Procedure Code does not even seek to regulate. If there was no just or lawful ground for commencing this proceeding for contempt in the High Court (and it is held by the High Court that there was none) then the requirements of\n\ns. 211 of the Indian Penal Code must be taken to be prima 1964 facie satisfied. In my opinion, the High Court acted withHariclaallaaandA.,. jurisdiction to order a prosecution under s. 211 of the Indian v.\n\nPenal Code in the present case. Of course, the appellants State~ h! will be entitled to raise any plea of law or fact in the case and • • I will only say that what has been said by the High Court Hidayatullah, J. or by this Court in relation to the facts, should not stand in their way of substantiating any plea or pleas. I agree for these reasons that the appeal be dismissed.\n\nMUDHOLKAR, J.-The question raised before us in this appeal by a certificate granted by the Calcutta High Court is whether that Court was right in directing a complaint Mu'11wlkar, Ji to be filed against the appellants for offences under ss. 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe matter arose like this. The respondents 2, 3 and 4 purchased at a sale held for the realization of rent, plot No. 365 of village Jagdispur, district 24 Parganas on or about April 7, 1951 and obtained delivery of possession through court. But apparently they were able to get only paper possession. On September 25, 1951 the appellant No. I Haridas Das instituted a suit in the court of Munsif at Sealdah for a declaration that his. right, title and interest had not been effected by the sale, for confirmation of his possession over the land and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents 2 to 4 from disturbing his possession. He also made an application for a temporary injunction restraining the respondents from disturbing his possession. The application was, however, dismissed by the Munsif ancl his order wa.s affirmed in appeal by the Third Additional District Judge at Alipore. The appellant thereupon preferred an. application for revision before the High Court from the order of the Additional District Judge. By order dated May 3, 1954 B. K.\n\nGulla, J., granted temporary injunction to the appellant No.\n\nI restraining the respondents 2 to 4 from disturbing his possession till the disposal of the suit and observed in his order that no serious inconvenience would be caused to them if they were asked in substance to possess the property jointly with the appellant No. I.\n\nOn or about June 12, 1956 the appellant No. I filed an .,. application in the High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act; 1926 alleging, inter alia, that on June 7, 1956 respondents 2 to 4, along with others, attempted to enter forcibly into the plot with respect to which an injunction had been granted by the High Court. In the course of that ; ittempt they broke open the gate and cut down a tree standing on the plot.\n\nHe further averred that the police then arrived on the scene and restored peace. According to him the respondents 2 to 4 had by this action mmmittP.d a breach of the injunction\n\n1964 granted by the High Court. This application was verified by Barida.DasanclAnr.an affidavit affirmed py the second appellant Jyotish Kumar v.\n\nSeal who said that the facts set out in all the paragraphs lilal•\n\n0~:;-:i:fe::ga1 of the application were true to his knowledge.\n\nAfter the application was made the Court issued a rule calling upoa MudTwlkar, J. the respondents 2 to 4 to show cause why they should not be committed and punished for contempt of court for violating the order of injunction. The parties were heard on July 25, 1956 and the Bench which heard it directed the Subordinate Judge, Alipore to make an enquiry and submit a repo(t. In accordance with this direction the Subordinate Judge examined the witnesses named by the appellants and in addition examined as court witness the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station, Rajarhat, to whom a report of tlle incident had also been made by the .appellants. The Subordinate Judge then submitted his report to the High Court. After its receipt the High Court heard the parties, considered the report on August 30, 1957 and made an order discharging the rule. In the course of the order the High Court observed • as follows: -\n\n\" .................. in the opinion of the learned Subordinate Judge, the allegations made by the petitioner are not true. We have ourselves gone through the evidence and agree with the view obviously taken by the learned Subordinate Judge. It may be, as stated by Jyotish Kumar Seal, that some persons of the opposite parties did go to the garden and enquire -who authorised him to construct the hut, which he was doing, but the story that the members of the opposite parties broke open the gate, and cut down the tree, cannot reasonably be believed.· Inspite of what the witnesses have spoken, it is worth remembering, as pointed by the learned Subordinate Judge that in the report to the Officer-in-charge, Rajarhat, nothing was said about any golmal or any looting or any damage done to the garden or to the trees.\"\n\nOn September 17, 1957 the respondents 2 to 4 filed an application under s. 466 read with s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court for making a complaint against appellants under s. 211. I.P.C. and/or any other appropriate section in relation to the proceeding in the contempt matter before the High Court. The High Court issued a rule to the appellants, heard them in answer to the application and come to the conclusion that. it )'Vas expedient in the interests of justice that a complaint should be made. The High Court, therefore, made the rule absolute and directed the Registrar, Appellate Side to file a complaint against the appellants under ss. 211 and 199 l.P.C. 1961 and/or ariy other appropriate section to the Chief Presidency Haridallla<-;;.i..! , Magistrate, Calcutta. In pursuance of this direction the Rev. • • gistrar lodged a complaint on January 16, 1959 under ss. 193, State 01 Weal Be•1al\n\n199 and 211, I.P.C. in the court of the Chief Presidency •n<I °'~'\n\nMagtrate, Calcutta. The appellants made an application Mudlwlkar, J. before :tie High Court under Arts. 133(1)(c) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution for grant of a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court. By Order dated May 8, 19N the High Court granted the certificate, overruling the objections made on behalf of the respondents. The ground on which the High Court granted the certificate was that the decision in The 'Empress v. Jamoona(') where it was held that for a conviction under s. 211 of the Penal Code it was necessary that the false charge should have been made to a Court or an officer having jurisdiction to investigate and send it up for trial, was not noticed by the High Court. With regard to the objection raised on behalf of the respondents that the order of the High Court directing that a complaint be lodged was not a final order, the High Court held that whether it is a final order or not is not free from doubt and that the benefit of that doubt ought to be given to the appellants.\n\nBefore us Mr. Sarjoo Prasad has. placed reliance upon the decision referred to in the order of the High Court granting certificate and also on the decision of Ranade, J., in Queen Empress v. Karigowda('). In the first of these cases one Jamoona appeared before Captain Simpson, Adjutant, 11th M.N.I., and Station Stall Officer and charged a noncommissioned officer with rape. An enquiry was held by Captain Simpson and the charge was found to be false. The Commanding Officer caused the appellant to be prosecuted in a criminal court under s. 211 l.P.C. She was committed for trial and was convicted by the Judicial Commissioner with respect to that offence. On appeal the High Court held that the Station Stall Officer having neither magisterial nor police powers, s. 211 was not attracted. In the course of his judgment Mitter, J., observed:\n\n\"We do not think it unduly refining the words to say that the false charge must be made to a Court or to an officer who has. powers to investigate and send up for trial.\"\n\nSection 211, I.P.C. reads thus:\n\n\"Whoeyer •. with intent to cause jury to any person, mstitutes or causes to be mstituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely\n\n(') (1881) IL.R. 6 Cal. 620. (') (1895) l.L.R. 19 Bom. 5L\n\nHarifaa [)(Uand.A.nr.\n\ncharges any person with having committed an office, knowing that there fa no just or Ia wfal gr'!und for such proceeding or charge against v.\n\nState of W.., Bengal\n\nand Others\n\nMudholkar, J.\n\nthat person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.\"\n\nBreaking up the section, it is clear that before it can be invoked three things have to be proved: (a) that the accused had intended to cause injury to any person; (b) that with that object he instituted or caused to be instituted a criminal proceeding against that person or in the alternative falsely charged him with having committed an offence and (c) that he did so with the knowedge that there may be no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person. Does the section mean that a false charge made before any person is punishable thereunder or is it restricted to such charge being made to a person holding a particular position? It seems to me that since making of l!- false charge before any person, whosoever he may be, is covered by s. 499.\n\nI.P.C., it would be appropriate to construe this section as being applicabe only to a case where a false charge is made by the accused person against another before a person who is competent to enquire into it and , either take proceedings himself or cause proceedings to be initiated. I do not, however, think that it is limited to false charges made to a person who also has the power to try the accused or commit him for trial by another court Such an interpretation is sufficient to prevent any overlapping of the provisions of this section with those of s. 500 and it is not necessary to go further than this.\n\nIn the other case the facts were these:\n\nOne Karigowda was tried for an offence under s. 211.\n\nIndian Penal Code for having falsely deposed in an enquiry into bribery by a District Magistrate that he had paid bribe of Rs. 300 to a Magistrate in the District of Bijapur, named Jehangir. After the conclusion of the enquiry Jehangir obtained permission from the Government to pro8ecute Karigowda for an offence under s. 500, I.P.C. A complaint was also made against him of an offence under s. 211, l.P.C.\n\nThe trying magistrate, at the end of the trial, struck out the\n\n...\n\ncharge under s. 500 and convicted him of an offence under 1964 s. 211 only. On appeal the Joint Sessions Judge reversed Haridaalla8antlAnr.\n\nthe conviction under s. 211. The Government then preferred v. f H. h C Th H' h C t d State of Wut R,.gaJ an appeal be ore the 1g ourt. e 1g our !everse and OthD• the acquittal of Karigowda under s. 500 and maintamed the - conviction under s. 211, I.P.C. Jardine, J., one of the two Mudlw/1-, J.\n\nJudges who heard the case, referring to Jamoona's case(') said that that case was inapplicable and then observed:\n\n\"The present case, however, seems to me to be taken out of section 211 by the fact that Karigowda did not apparently intend to set the criminal law in motion. He had been produced before Mr.\n\nMonteath against his will; and though what he said is 'information' under section 191, clause\n\nc. of the Procedure Code, and 'defamation' under the Penal Code, I am of opinion, after considering the Full Bench case(') that the imputations do not make up a 'false charge'.\" (p. 61-62).\n\nRanade J., however, has made certain observations upon which Mr. Sarjoo Prasad has placed strong reliance. Those observations are :\n\n\"The words 'falsely charging' used in that section must be construed along with the words which speak of the 'institution of proceedings'. These latter words are obviously used in a technical and exclusive sense, and by parity of reasoning. the same restricted sense must be given to the words which relate to a false charge.\" (p. 69).\n\nHe also agreed with Jardine, J., that Karigowda had not made a complaint of his own accord and what he said was simply in answer to certain question put to him at the departmental enquiry. In my judgment it would not be right to read .the words \"or falsely charges\" as being in any\n\nway restricted by the words \"institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding\". The legislature has clearly provided for two kinds of acts: one the institution of prcr ceedings and the other of making a false charge and I see. no q>mpelling reason for reading the section as if it is limited t? the instition of a complaint upon a false charge. Such an mterpretation would completely shut out criminal prcr ceedings in which no charge of an offence has been made. !• therfore, agree with the view taken by the Full Bench m Kanm Bux's case('), to which Jardine, J., had referred.\n\n(') (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620. (') I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574.\n\n~ With regard to the interpretation to be placed upon the BaridiiaDa•\"\"4Anr. two phrases used .in s. 211 Wilson, J., who delivered judg-\n\nB ,, w•· ment of the court m that case observed, inter alia tat-e oJ eat Bengal and Ot,,.r \"I agree that we must take it that the legislature did Mudholkar, J. not regard the two phrases (that is, 'institutes criminal proceedings' and 'falsely charges') as coextensive in meaning but considered that there were or might be cases to which one would apply and not the other.\" (p. 578).\n\nAs illustrations of proceedings in which no charge of an offence is made Wilson, J., has referred to proceedings under s. 107 and s. 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nAs an illustration of a false charge which does not amount to institution of a criminal proceeding, he has 1 eferred to a charge made to a judge of civil court in order to obtain sanction to prosecute another (which was a prerequisite for prosecution before the amendment by Act 18 of 1923) and pointed out that this would not be. the institution of a criminal proceeding. In my opinion, therefore, the point raised by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad must fail.\n\nApart from the offence under s. 211, the complaint against the appellants embraces two more offences: one is for giving false evidence which is punishable under s. 193 and the other of making a false statement in a declaration which is by law receivable as evidence under s. 199, I.P.C.\n\nThere could be no impediment to a complaint being made with regard to these two offences. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, however, says that the High Court, after it received the report of the Subordinate Judge, did not find that it was wholly false but found that it was partly false and in this connection draws our attention to the following observations of the High Court:\n\n\"It may be, as stated by Jyotish Ktimar Seal, that some persons of the opposite parties did go to the garden and enquire who authorised him to construct the hut, which he was doing, but the story that the members of the opposite parties broke open the gate, and cut down the tree, cannot reasonably be believed.\" It is true that the High Court has not said that the respondents 2 to 4 di_d not visit the po_t at all; but the injunction did not restrain them from VISltmg the plot. What they were restrained from doing was to disturb the possess!on of the appellant No. 1 and, therfore, there was no question .of their rendering themselves hable for contempt, because they visited the plot. Indeed that was not t!te p-avamen of the charge against him in the contempt apphcat10n made by\n\nthe appellant No. I. The gravamen of the charge was that ~~ they in fact disturbed his possession and caused damage tOHaridasDas...aA,.,. property. This was the crucial allegation nd this allegation State of W.;,.1 Bengal\n\nhas not been found to be true by the Htgh Court. In the and Other. circumstances there was clearly a prima facie case for proceeding against the appellants not only under s. 211 but also Mwlhollcar, J. under ss. 193 and 199, l.P.C.\n\nMr. Sarjoo Prasad, however, said that he would be able to show by reference to the evidence recorded by the Subordinate Judge during the enquiry made by him that the statement of the Station Officer upon which the High Court has placed reliance is not correct and that his statement to the effect that in the report made to him nothing was said about \"any golmal or any looting or any damage done to the garden or to the trees.\" It is sufficient to say that we are not sitting in judgment over the order of the High Court by which the rule for committing the respondents 2 to 4 for contempt was discharged. The appeal before us is against another order and that is the order directing a complaint to be filed against the appellants.\n\nMr. Sarjoo Prasad then contended that the false charge referred to in s. 211 must be with respect to an offence under the Indian Penal Code and that by making an application of the kind which the appellant No. 1 made he had not charged the respondents 2 to 4 with any offence under the Penal Code. The word 'offence' is described in s. 40 of the Indian Penal Code. The relevant part of the definition runs thus:\n\n\"Except in the chapters and sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section. the word 'offence' denotes a thing made punishable by this Code.\n\nIn chapter IV. chapter VA and in the following sections, namely, sections 64, 65 ........ ., 211, 213, . . . . . . . . . the word 'offence' denotes a thing punishable under this Code, or under any special or local law as hereinafter defined ...... .\n\n\" It will thus be clear that the word offence used in s. 211 woul? also include a thing punishable under a special law.\n\nSpecial la:v is defined in s. 41 as a law applicable to a particular subiect. The law of contempt is a particular subject an:l the High Court has inherent power to punish a person for .th_e offnce_ of conten:ipt co.mmittd by him by disobeying a.n m1unct1on issued gamst h1~. Disobedience of an injunction is.sued b!' the High Court 1s not something with respect to which action under s. 24 or s. 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure could alone be taken but being contempt of the\n\n1964 . - Htgh Court's order, is punishable by it in its discretion in Hor;, Z...DasondAnr.exercise of its inherent powers. The only limitation which\n\nState of ;., t Bengal the statute has placed is with regard to the punishment that\n\nand Ot.v,., the High Court can meet out to the contemner. I am, therefore, satisfied that the Order of the Hi.h Court was right and, Murlholkar, J. - accordingly, I dismiss the appeal.\n\nUpon the view which I have taken, it is not necessary to consider whether the proceeding before the High Court was a criminal proceeding. In support of the contention that it is not a criminal proceeding, Mr. Sarjoo Prarnd has placed reliance upon the decision of the Privy Council in S. N.\n\nBa•inerjee v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co., Ltd.('). In that case, their Lordships held that a committal for contempt for breach of an injunction was not criminal in its nature, and referred to the decisions in Radha Krishna Das v. Rai Krishn Chand(') and Scott v.\n\nScott('). Since we did not hear full arguments upon this question, I do not feel called upon to express any opinion on the point.\n\nBefore parting with the appeal, I would like to point out that two preliminary objections were raised before usone by Mr. Niharendu Dutt Majumdar on behalf of respondent No. I and the other by Mr. S. C. Majumdar on behalf of respondents 2 to 4. Mr. Dutt Ma.iumdar's preliminary objection was that the order of the High Court was not a final order and he addressed a long 1rgument in support of it. The objection of Mr. S. C. Majumdar was that the appellants had failed to prefer their appeal within the time allowed by the rules of the Court and that they had made false allegations in support of their application for condoning the delay and, therefore, the condonation be revoked. We have heard both at considerable length on these points. At the conclusion of Mr. Sarjoo Prasad's arguments we made it clear to the respondents that we did not want to call upon them to reply on merits and enquired whether in the circumstances they pressed their preliminary objections.\n\nBoth of them said that in the circumstance.s they did not want to press those objections. No order on these two preliminary objections is, therefore, necessary.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(') I.L.R. 17 Pat. 770.\n\n(') 28 I.A. 182. 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HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15380, "end_char": 15402, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16699, "end_char": 16705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16713, "end_char": 16730, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16881, "end_char": 16887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16906, "end_char": 16916, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "MUDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17286, "end_char": 17295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUDHOLKAR, J.-The question raised before us in this appeal by a certificate granted by the Calcutta High Court is whether that Court was right in directing a complaint Mu'11wlkar, Ji to be filed against the appellants for offences under ss.", "canonical_name": "Mudholkar"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17377, "end_char": 17396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUDHOLKAR, J.-The question raised before us in this appeal by a certificate granted by the Calcutta High Court is whether that Court was right in directing a complaint Mu'11wlkar, Ji to be filed against the appellants for offences under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 199 and 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17523, "end_char": 17538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17546, "end_char": 17563, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jagdispur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17699, "end_char": 17708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "365 of village Jagdispur, district 24 Parganas on or about April 7, 1951 and obtained delivery of possession through court."}}, {"text": "Parganas", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17722, "end_char": 17730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "365 of village Jagdispur, district 24 Parganas on or about April 7, 1951 and obtained delivery of possession through court."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17743, "end_char": 17756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "365 of village Jagdispur, district 24 Parganas on or about April 7, 1951 and obtained delivery of possession through court."}}, {"text": "September 25, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17871, "end_char": 17889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 25, 1951 the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Haridas Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17910, "end_char": 17921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Haridas Das instituted a suit in the court of Munsif at Sealdah for a declaration that his."}}, {"text": "Sealdah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17966, "end_char": 17973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Haridas Das instituted a suit in the court of Munsif at Sealdah for a declaration that his."}}, {"text": "Third Additional District Judge at Alipore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18425, "end_char": 18467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was, however, dismissed by the Munsif ancl his order wa.s affirmed in appeal by the Third Additional District Judge at Alipore."}}, {"text": "May 3, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18618, "end_char": 18629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order dated May 3, 1954 B. K.\n\nGulla, J., granted temporary injunction to the appellant No."}}, {"text": "B. K.\n\nGulla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18630, "end_char": 18642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order dated May 3, 1954 B. K.\n\nGulla, J., granted temporary injunction to the appellant No."}}, {"text": "June 12, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18980, "end_char": 18993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nOn or about June 12, 1956 the appellant No."}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19067, "end_char": 19089, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June 7, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19126, "end_char": 19138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "application in the High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act; 1926 alleging, inter alia, that on June 7, 1956 respondents 2 to 4, along with others, attempted to enter forcibly into the plot with respect to which an injunction had been granted by the High Court."}}, {"text": "Jyotish Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19699, "end_char": 19712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was verified by Barida.DasanclAnr.an affidavit affirmed py the second appellant Jyotish Kumar v.\n\nSeal who said that the facts set out in all the paragraphs lilal•\n\n0~:;-:i:fe::ga1 of the application were true to his knowledge.", "canonical_name": "Jyotish Ktimar Seal"}}, {"text": "upoa MudTwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19911, "end_char": 19925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the application was made the Court issued a rule calling upoa MudTwlkar, J. the respondents 2 to 4 to show cause why they should not be committed and punished for contempt of court for violating the order of injunction."}}, {"text": "July 25, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20100, "end_char": 20113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The parties were heard on July 25, 1956 and the Bench which heard it directed the Subordinate Judge, Alipore to make an enquiry and submit a repo(t."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Alipore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20156, "end_char": 20182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The parties were heard on July 25, 1956 and the Bench which heard it directed the Subordinate Judge, Alipore to make an enquiry and submit a repo(t."}}, {"text": "Police Station, Rajarhat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20397, "end_char": 20421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with this direction the Subordinate Judge examined the witnesses named by the appellants and in addition examined as court witness the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station, Rajarhat, to whom a report of tlle incident had also been made by the .appellants."}}, {"text": "30, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20647, "end_char": 20655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After its receipt the High Court heard the parties, considered the report on August 30, 1957 and made an order discharging the rule."}}, {"text": "Jyotish Kumar Seal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21029, "end_char": 21047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be, as stated by Jyotish Kumar Seal, that some persons of the opposite parties did go to the garden and enquire -who authorised him to construct the hut, which he was doing, but the story that the members of the opposite parties broke open the gate, and cut down the tree, cannot reasonably be believed.·", "canonical_name": "Jyotish Ktimar Seal"}}, {"text": "Rajarhat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21474, "end_char": 21482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inspite of what the witnesses have spoken, it is worth remembering, as pointed by the learned Subordinate Judge that in the report to the Officer-in-charge, Rajarhat, nothing was said about any golmal or any looting or any damage done to the garden or to the trees.\""}}, {"text": "September 17, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21588, "end_char": 21606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 17, 1957 the respondents 2 to 4 filed an application under s. 466 read with s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court for making a complaint against appellants under s. 211."}}, {"text": "s. 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21657, "end_char": 21663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21674, "end_char": 21680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21688, "end_char": 21714, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21785, "end_char": 21791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21793, "end_char": 21798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 211 and 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22256, "end_char": 22271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22487, "end_char": 22494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22531, "end_char": 22536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mudlwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22641, "end_char": 22650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants made an application Mudlwlkar, J. before :tie High Court under Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 133(1)(c) and 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22684, "end_char": 22713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "May 8, 19N", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22813, "end_char": 22823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Order dated May 8, 19N the High Court granted the certificate, overruling the objections made on behalf of the respondents."}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23082, "end_char": 23088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23096, "end_char": 23106, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23617, "end_char": 23630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before us Mr. Sarjoo Prasad has.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "Ranade", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23762, "end_char": 23768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "placed reliance upon the decision referred to in the order of the High Court granting certificate and also on the decision of Ranade, J., in Queen Empress v. Karigowda(')."}}, {"text": "Jamoona", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23840, "end_char": 23847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first of these cases one Jamoona appeared before Captain Simpson, Adjutant, 11th M.N.I., and Station Stall Officer and charged a noncommissioned officer with rape."}}, {"text": "Simpson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23872, "end_char": 23879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first of these cases one Jamoona appeared before Captain Simpson, Adjutant, 11th M.N.I., and Station Stall Officer and charged a noncommissioned officer with rape."}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24143, "end_char": 24149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24369, "end_char": 24375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24425, "end_char": 24431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of his judgment Mitter, J., observed:\n\n\"We do not think it unduly refining the words to say that the false charge must be made to a Court or to an officer who has."}}, {"text": "Section 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24620, "end_char": 24631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24633, "end_char": 24638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Harifaa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24858, "end_char": 24865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5L\n\nHarifaa [)(Uand.A.nr."}}, {"text": "State of W.., Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25024, "end_char": 25044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "charges any person with having committed an office, knowing that there fa no just or Ia wfal gr'!und for such proceeding or charge against v.\n\nState of W.., Bengal\n\nand Others\n\nMudholkar, J.\n\nthat person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.\"", "canonical_name": "State of ;., t Bengal"}}, {"text": "s. 499", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26290, "end_char": 26296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26299, "end_char": 26304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26858, "end_char": 26864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Karigowda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26960, "end_char": 26969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the other case the facts were these:\n\nOne Karigowda was tried for an offence under s. 211."}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27001, "end_char": 27007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27010, "end_char": 27027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bijapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27176, "end_char": 27183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "300 to a Magistrate in the District of Bijapur, named Jehangir."}}, {"text": "Jehangir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27191, "end_char": 27199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "300 to a Magistrate in the District of Bijapur, named Jehangir."}}, {"text": "s. 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27330, "end_char": 27336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27338, "end_char": 27343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27403, "end_char": 27409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27501, "end_char": 27507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27551, "end_char": 27557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27650, "end_char": 27656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "State of Wut R,.gaJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27714, "end_char": 27733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government then preferred v. f H. h C Th H' h C t d State of Wut R,.gaJ an appeal be ore the 1g ourt."}}, {"text": "s. 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27824, "end_char": 27830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27868, "end_char": 27874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27876, "end_char": 27881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28099, "end_char": 28110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Monteath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28232, "end_char": 28240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had been produced before Mr.\n\nMonteath against his will; and though what he said is 'information' under section 191, clause\n\nc. of the Procedure Code, and 'defamation' under the Penal Code, I am of opinion, after considering the Full Bench case(') that the imputations do not make up a 'false charge'.\" ("}}, {"text": "section 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28306, "end_char": 28317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28380, "end_char": 28390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jardine", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29008, "end_char": 29015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also agreed with Jardine, J., that Karigowda had not made a complaint of his own accord and what he said was simply in answer to certain question put to him at the departmental enquiry."}}, {"text": "Kanm Bux", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29807, "end_char": 29815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "therfore, agree with the view taken by the Full Bench m Kanm Bux's case('), to which Jardine, J., had referred."}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30017, "end_char": 30023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wilson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30515, "end_char": 30521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As illustrations of proceedings in which no charge of an offence is made Wilson, J., has referred to proceedings under s. 107 and s. 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30561, "end_char": 30567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30572, "end_char": 30578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30586, "end_char": 30612, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31093, "end_char": 31099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 193", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31225, "end_char": 31231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31336, "end_char": 31342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31344, "end_char": 31349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jyotish Ktimar Seal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31742, "end_char": 31761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, however, says that the High Court, after it received the report of the Subordinate Judge, did not find that it was wholly false but found that it was partly false and in this connection draws our attention to the following observations of the High Court:\n\n\"It may be, as stated by Jyotish Ktimar Seal, that some persons of the opposite parties did go to the garden and enquire who authorised him to construct the hut, which he was doing, but the story that the members of the opposite parties broke open the gate, and cut down the tree, cannot reasonably be believed.\"", "canonical_name": "Jyotish Ktimar Seal"}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32897, "end_char": 32903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mwlhollcar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32913, "end_char": 32923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "circumstances there was clearly a prima facie case for proceeding against the appellants not only under s. 211 but also Mwlhollcar, J. under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 193 and 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32934, "end_char": 32949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33763, "end_char": 33769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33815, "end_char": 33832, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33979, "end_char": 33989, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34026, "end_char": 34031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34039, "end_char": 34056, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 64, 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34320, "end_char": 34335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34560, "end_char": 34566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34654, "end_char": 34659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35011, "end_char": 35016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35020, "end_char": 35025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure could alone be taken but being contempt of the", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35033, "end_char": 35103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of ;., t Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35255, "end_char": 35276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only limitation which\n\nState of ;.,", "canonical_name": "State of ;., t Bengal"}}, {"text": "Murlholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35472, "end_char": 35482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am, therefore, satisfied that the Order of the Hi.h Court was right and, Murlholkar, J. - accordingly, I dismiss the appeal."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prarnd", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35734, "end_char": 35747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the contention that it is not a criminal proceeding, Mr. Sarjoo Prarnd has placed reliance upon the decision of the Privy Council in S. N.\n\nBa•inerjee v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co., Ltd.(').", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "Niharendu Dutt Majumdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36334, "end_char": 36357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before parting with the appeal, I would like to point out that two preliminary objections were raised before usone by Mr. Niharendu Dutt Majumdar on behalf of respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Niharendu Dutt Majumdar"}}, {"text": "S. C. Majumdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36409, "end_char": 36423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and the other by Mr. S. C. Majumdar on behalf of respondents 2 to 4.", "canonical_name": "S. C. Majumdar"}}, {"text": "Dutt Ma.iumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36461, "end_char": 36475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Dutt Ma.iumdar's preliminary objection was that the order of the High Court was not a final order and he addressed a long 1rgument in support of it."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_251_266_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "• '7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 251\n\nBONDADA GAJAPATHY RAO\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n[A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.]\n\nCriminal Trial-Appellant sentenced to imprisonment for life-Death during the pendencu of appeal-Heirs whether can prosecute appeal-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (Act 5 of 1898), s. 431, 435, 439-Constitution of India, Art. 136.\n\nThe appellant was convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the High Court for the offence of the murder of his wife. He was granted special leave to appeal by this Court. During the pendency of the hearing of this appeal the appellant died. After his death his sons and daughter applied to this Court for permission to continue to prosecute the appeal.\n\nIt was pleaded by the legal representatives of the appellant that though that sentence of imprisonment could no longer be executed, it still affected the property of the deceased and the legal representatives were, therefore, interested in the appeal and should be permitted to continue it. The appellant, who held a high office in the Government of Andhra Pradesh had been Sl/spended during the investigation of the charge against him arid he was dismissed from serv1ce under certain service rules on his conviction. During this time the appellant had only been given a smti.11 allowance. On these facts it was pleaded that if the conviction was set aside, the estate of the deceased would be entitled to receive the full salary from the Government.\n\nHeld (Per Sarkar, J.): (i) Neither s. 431 nor the cases mentioned can be said to apply to the present case proprio vigore, for the present is not an appeal under the code of criminal procedure which is dealt with by s. 431 nor is it a revisional application like the one which came up for consideration in Pranab Kumar Mitra's case, while as for the English case, it is only of persuasive value.\n\nPranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal, [1959] S:uP.P 1 S.C.R. 63 and Hodgson v. Lakeman, [1943] L.R. K.B. 15, d1stmguished.\n\n(ii) The principle on which the hearing of a proceeding may be continued after the death of an accused would appear to be the effect of the sentence on his property in the hands of his legal representat!ves. If ! '.:e sentence affects that property, the legal representatives can be said to be interested in the proceeding and_ ~!lowed t<;> cont_ii:ue it. This principle applies in appeals, revlS!ons, and m petitions under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nA sentence of fine no doubt affects the property. In the present case, however, the sentence was not of fine but of imprisonment which on the death of the accused has become in- !ruct?ous. In te present. case the effect of the sentence imposed m this case. bemg set aside would not directly entitle the legal representatives to the salary. They will have to obtain necessary orders from the Government for the purpose.\n\nMarch 16\n\nBotodada Gajapathy\n\nRao v.\n\nStale of Amihra\n\nPrade•h\n\nHeld (Per Hidayatullah, J.): (i) This was an appeal against a sentence of imprisonment and an appeal of this character would normally abate on the death of the appellant because a criminal prosecution is concerned primarily with the punishment of rn offender and not with the trial of an abstract issue about the truth or falsity of a prosecution case. The same principle must apply to appeals after conviction, except in so far as .a judgment already rerdered touches assets which would come to the legal representative. In so far as personal punishment (other than a fine) is concerned that stands dissolved by the death of the offender and an appeal to get that punishment set aside becomes infructuous and abates.\n\nPranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal, [1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 63, Pritam Singh v. State, [1950] S.C.R. 453, distinguished.\n\nHodgson v. Lakeman, [1943] L.R.K.B. 15, Baghis v. Rowes [1955] 1 Q.B.D. 573, referred to.\n\n(ii) The prlinciple laid down in Pranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal and Another and in Pritam Singh v. The State has no application to the present matter because there is no analogy between an appeal by special leave and a revision under the. code. The present case is not a case where the legal representatives after the death of the offender have to meet the liability of a fine or are required to protect the assets which they claim should reach them. In the present case no claim of the petitioners is jeopardized directly, by the judgment. Their claim is dependent upon the administrative action of Government which may not proceed upon the result of criminal prosecution. This appeal was only concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the conviction and not with any monetary claims depending upon the result of the appeal. In such a situat:on the ordinary rule that a criminal proceeding against a person comes to an end on his demise must apply also to special appeals in this court, such as this, even though the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code may not be directly applicable.\n\nHeld (Per MudhqJkar, J.): (i) The decision of this court in Pranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal has no bearing upon an appeal brought to this court by special leave. It is no doubt true that the power conferred by section 435 of the Code on the High Court and certain other courts and by Article 136 of the Constitution on this Court is discretionary, Under section 439 of the Code the High Court can exercise any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a court by s. 338 and has also the power to enhance the sentence. Under Section 435 of the Code, the High Court can suo motu call for the record of any inferior court but this power cannot be exercised by this court under article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore there is a fundamental difference between the power of the High Court in revision and the power of this Court in Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nPranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 63, distinguished.\n\n(ii) In a criminal matter the issue is personal between the accused person and the State rnd the right of appeal is also personal to the appellant. There is admittedly no express provision permitting the substitution of legal representatives of a deceased appellant in a criminal appeal brought to this Court by\n\nspecial leave. The policy of the law discernible from s. 431 of the 1964 Code has to he borne in mind. The policy under section 431 of B --: ,~, the Code is that evecy criminal appeal under chapter XXXI will °\"'4daR°:j•,..-• abate except an appeal from a sentence of fine. There is no proviv. sion which prescribes the continuation of the appeal on the Stal• of All<IAN death of the appellant in cases where the sentence is of impri- Praduh sonment.\n\nThe interest of the legal representatives in the present case is not a direct interest in the sense that it cannot arise out of the decision of this court even if it is in favour of the appellant. The only interest which the applicants have is a contiruient <me and is not one which could flow directly out of the ultimate decision of this Court.\n\nHodgson v. Lakeman, (1943) L.R.K.B. 15, Regina v. Rowe,\n\n(1955) (1) Q.B.D. 573, Hesketh v. Atherton, Leach v. Wanstead School Board, Siberry v. Connolly, Constantine v. Hlingworth, Jones v. Gallowfield, Rivers v. Glasse, (a!J cited in Short and Mellor, Practice on the Crown Side of the King's Bench Division 2nd Ed. at p. 425), United States v. Mook, 125 F2d 706, The State of Kerala v. Narayani Amma Kamala Devi, (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 943 and lmperatrix v. Dongali Andaji, (1879) I.L.R. Born. 064, referred to and discussed.\n\n(iii) The Legislature has by limiting in section 431 of the Code the survival of appeals to appeals against sentences of fine has chosen to recognise only one kind of interest and no other.\n\nThis Court in exercise of its inherent powers or discretionary powers would not be acting according to correct legal principles in recognising a kind of interest which the legislature has not chosen to recognise. In the circumstances the applicants ought not to he granted special leave to prosecute the appeal.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 179 of 1961. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 31, 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 161 of 1960.\n\nK. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.\n\nA. S. R. Chari, B. R. G. K. Achar, and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 16, 1964. The following judgments were delivered-\n\nSARKAR, J.-This is an appeal from a sentence of impri- Sarw, J. sonment for life imposed on the appellant upon his conviction for tile offence of the murder of his wife. The appeal was filed with the special leave of this Court granted under Art. 136 of the ConstitutiO'n but the appellant died pending the appeal.\n\nHis legal representatives now seek leave to continue the appeal.\n\nThere would seem to be authority for the proposition that revision petitions and some appeals from sentences of fine might be continued by his legal representatives on the death\n\nSUPHEME COUHT REPOHTS [1964]\n\n111a1 of the accused pending the proceeding: see s. 431 of the Code\n\nlB _,_d aa th of Criminal Procedure and Pranab Kumar Mitra v. The State Orw.u a 'J<tpa. Y . · J f Rao of West Bengal('). It appears that m England appea s rom v. similar sentences are permitted to be continued by the execu- .Stat•pt0; J:';!.hra tors of the deceased appellant: see Hodgson v. Lakeman('). It is true that neither s. 431 nor the cases mentioned can be said .Yarkar, J. to apply to the present case proprio vigore, foe the present is not an appeal under the Code which is dealt with bys. 431 nor is it a revisional application like the one which came up for consideration in Pranab Kumar Mitra's case, while as for the English case, it is only of persuasive value. All the same however I think it must now be held that appeals from sentences of fine may be permitted to be continued by the legal representatives of the deceased appellant. First, I find no provision making such appeals abate. If they can be continued when arising under the Code, there is no reason why they should not be continued when arising under the Constitution. If revision petitions may be allowed to be continued after the death of the accused so should appeals, for between them no distinction in principle is possible for the purpose of continuance. It is true that the Code of Criminal Procedure which creates the revisional powers of a Court provides that such powers ma.y be exercised suo motu but it does not seem to me that Pranab Kumar Mitra's case(') was based on this for on that ground all revision cases should have been permitted to be continued and the permission should not have been confined to cases of fine. Indeed in that case this Court proceeded on the basis that there was no statutory provision applying to the case. It observed, \"even in the absence of any statutory provisions, we have held, ............ that the High Court has the power to determine the case even after the death of the convicted person, if there was a sentence of fine also imposed on him, because that sentence affects the property of the deceased in the hands of his le1; al representative\".· A sentence of fine affects property equally when the case is taken further up in appeal or in revision. If it is just and proper to continue the hearing in one case after the death of the accused, it would be equally so in the other case.\n\nThe principle on which the hearing of a proceeding may be continued after the death of an accused would appear to be the effect of the sentence on his property in the hands of his legal representatives. If the sentence affects that property, the legal representatives can be said to be interested in the proceeding and allowed to continue it.\n\nA sentence of fine no doubt affects the property. In the present case, however, the sentence was not of fine but of imprisonment which on the death of the accused has become\n\n(') [1959] 1 S.C.R. 6:t.\n\n(') [1943] L.R.K.B. 15.\n\ninfructuous. There is no one now who can be imprisoned. It is, 1964 however, said that though that sentence can no longer be exe- Bowlada Gajopalh~ cuted. it still affects the property of the deceased and the legal Rao representatives re, therefor~. interested in the. appe~ an~ State 0JA.ndhra should be permitted to continue 1t. The matter 1s put m this Pradesh way. The appellant, who held a high office in the Government of Andhra Pradesh had been suspended during the investiga- Sa, kar, J tion of the charge against him and he was dismissed from service under certain service rules on his conviction. During this time the appellant had only been_given a small allowance.\n\nIt was said that if the conviction wasset aside, the estate would be entitled to receive the full salary from the Government.\n\nIt seems to me that this contention is not accurate. It may be that if the sentence is set aside that may assist the legal representatives in their effort to obtain the full salary to which the deceased's estate would have been entitled. But the effect of the sentence imposed in this case being set aside would not directly entitle the legal representatives to the salary. They will have to obtain necessary orders from the Government for the purpose. It has not been shown to us that such order will .automatically follow the setting aside of the conviction.\n\nNeither has it been shown that the legal representatives cannot move the Government to pass such orders on the ground that the Correctness cl the conviction could not be tested because cf the death of the appellant. For these reasons I am unable to hold th<t the justice of the case requires that the legal representatives of the deceased should be permitted to continue the appeal. It wo:ild be extending the principle applied to the case of a sentence of fine, if on the basis of it this appeal was aliowed to be continued by the legal representatives after the death of the appellant and for such an extension I find no warrant. , ·\n\nIn my view, for these reasons the legal representatives are not entitled to continue the appeal. That being so and as the sentence was one of imprisonment which would not affect any: one after the death of the accused, it cannot be said that there is anyone interested in the appeal. There is nc question, therefore, in such a case for proceeding further with the appeal. /\n\nHloAYATULLAH, J.-The appellant was convicted urider Hida.vatullah, J, s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nHe was granted special leave to appeal by this Court. During the .pendency of this appeal the appellant died on August 30,\n\n1963. After his death his sons and daughters applied to this Court on October 5, 1963 for permission to continue to prosecute the appeal. Their petition is all that we are concerned wit!\\ at the present moment.\n\nThe appellant was working as Superintending Engineer (Electricity) in the service of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The case against him was that on August IO, 1959 he\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPORTS [1964]\n\n!964 committed the murder of his wife by shooting her in the back Bo.dada Gajapathy with a revolver. He was acquitted by the Sessions Judge of Rao Krishna Division, Masulipatnam but, on appeal by the State v.\n\nGovernment the order of acquittal was set aside and he was State of Andh.ra I • Pradesh convicted and sentenced as above. In view of the appe !ants death we are of course not interested any further in consider-· HirlayatuUah, .T. ing the details of the offence, if any, unless we allow the heirs of the appellant to prosecute the appeal after his death and this is precisely what the present petitioners claim they are entitled to do. It is admitted, however, that no analogous contention was ever raised in this Court, though appeal on the death of a sole appellant were, before this, treated as abaled.\n\nOne would expect that an appeal of this character would normally abate on the death of the appellant because a criminal prosecution is concerned primarily with the punishment of an offender and not with the trial of an abstract issue about the truth or falsity cf a prosecution case. The maxim actio persona/is moritur cum persona is often invoked in this behalf. The Criminal Procedure Code in s. 431 also provides that all appeals filed under s. 411-A sub-s. 2 or s. 417 shall finally abate on the death of the accused and every other appeal under Chapter XXXI shall finally abate on the death of the appeflant, except an appeal against a sentence of fine. The section cannot cover a. case such as the present because this appeal was not filed under any of the sections mentioned in s. 431 or under Chapter XXXI.\n\nIt is contended that without the aid of a provision like s. 431, Criminal Procedure Code, the appeal must be treated as continuing and it is pointed out that for this reason and for the additional reason that the powers of revision can be exercised suo motu this Court allowed legal representatives to continue to prosecute criminal revisions under s. 439 of the Code in Pranab Kumar Mitra v .. The State of West Bengal and Another(') and Pritam Singh v. The State('). It is urged that on ·~· a parity of reasoning this appeal can be continued by the heirs.\n\nIt is not my purpose to consider, whether in the absence of any direct injury to the living every criminal proceeding must come to an end after the death of the accused whether before his conviction or after. But there must always be some discernible reason for permitting another person to continue an appeal whether civil or criminal after the death of the appellant. An appeal is not a heritable asset and does not revolve as a matter of course upon an executor or heir. Even under the civil law an express provision is required for substitution of another person in the place of the person deceased before the. appeal can be continued and this is again subject to whether the cause of action survives or not. The same principle is again to the\n\n(') [1959] (I) S.C.R. 63.\n\n(')° [1950] S.C.R. 453.\n\n~-.--7 I'.,,.,--,,-._-..\n\n' .. \"· -\n\n, .. .. \\\n\n-----·------ --\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS 257\n\nforefront in s. 431 when it allows an appeal in respect of fine !!_64 to be continued but not appeals involving imprisonment. The Bondada a ajapatky intention there too appears to be to afford only those persons Rao a right whose interests are directly. jeopardized by the judg- State ofAnd/mJ ment. In so far as personal punishment (other than a fine) is Praduh concerned that stands dissolved by the death of the offender and an appeal to get that punishment set aside ecomes . b HidayalullaA, J. infructuous and abates. ·\n\n. .\n\nThe only question in\"this case. is .whether the principle laid down in the two cases of this Court cited above should govern special appeals or the principle underlying s. 431. It may be said at once that the former is not a direct precedent applicable to the present matter because there is no analogy between an appeal by special leave and a revision under the . Code. The latter can be suo motu but not the former. The petitioners claim that the father, if he were acquitted, would have .been entitled to claim his pay for the period upto his death since on his conviction he was removed from service by the Government and the amount thu5 involved is Rs. 40,000 /-.\n\nThe petitioners' say tha.t if the( appeal were now allowed. they would be able to ask for this amount and in this way claim an interest in the appeal. This is nota case where the legal representatives after the death of the offender have to meet the liability of a fine or are required to protect the assets which they claim should reach them. This is a case where the petitioners claim to have the judgment of the' High Court reexamined so that they may be able to prefer a claim to the salary to which their father would have been entitled if he had been a.cquitted of the criminal charge .. In my judgment, no claim of the petitioners is jeopardized directly by the judgment.\n\nTheir claim is dependent upon the administrative action of Government which may not proceed upon the_ result of the criminal prosecution. In other words, the claim' on the strength of which the present petitioners seek to join in this appeal is too remote and not directly consequential. upon the issue to be tried. The appeal was only. concerned With the correctness or otherwise of the conviction and not with any monetary claims depending upon the result of the appeal: In such a . situation the ordinary rule that a criminal proceeding against a person comes to an end on his demise must apply also to . special appe:ils in this Court, such as this,· even though the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code may not be directly applicable. · ·\n\nAt the hearing counsel cited . cases. from . the English Courts and the Supreme Court of the United States. The English cases referred to are collected in Short & Mellor's Practice of the Crown Office and Griffith's Guide to Crown Practice and the cases of the United States are referred to in Annotations\n\nL/P(D)!SCI-9 ..\n\n'..,.- '.-..~,, '_...<· ~\"': '. \\- ' \\,' i \\\n\n, ' ~· ' '-. -·-- 1 -/,\n\n' -\n\nI \\ .\n\n'..:·~196' in 87 Lawyer's Edition 1234 and 1 Lawyer's Editin II Series ..;.JJo;.,;;.aaaajaPdhy 1879. The English-practice-appears to be that there must be a. ·\n\n• .. R\"\" direct monetary 1iabilit~ attaching to the living by reascns of siai; ~/A;,, ihra the impugned judgment before they can be allowed to continue Prade•h an appeal filed by a dead person. See Hodgson v. Lakeman(') .:-- -- and Regina v. Rowe('). The American practice also appears to Hid=\",,.llak J. b h · . · '7 ' et esame. .· .\n\nThere is good reason for holding. that a criminal prosecu- . tion in which the State is anxious to bring an offender to book _with-a view to getting him punished for.a_crime comes to an -end-on the death of the person arraigned;· The same principle\n\nmust apply also to appeals after conviction, except .in so far as a judgment already rendered touches assets which would come to the -legal representatives or the executor as the case may be.· Beyond this it is not. possible to conceive of remoter interests because if the law were to take into account such ; remote interests every appeal would have to be continued after c the death of the appellant. In my judgment, the present peti-_\n\n- tioners do not claim any direct interest and the appeal must, _ theref()re, be taken to have abated.- I agree that the petition be '-dismissed. and the appeal hdd to.have abated. .. . . .'. -\n\nMwlholkar, J. :- . \"MuDHOLKAR,.J;.::_This° appeal raises an friteresting and\n\n- important qtiestiOn~ It is whether _the heirs at law of a deceased petson who had .brought an appeal to this Court. by special\n\n- leave in which he. had challenged his conviction and sentence\n\n~-for an offence, aie entitled to prosecute the appeal after his ; death during' the pendericy of the appeaL The applicants are the children of the decea5ed who was a Superintending Engi- ' neer (Electricity) in the service of the Government of Andhra ; Pradesh; He was charged with an offence_ under s.-302; Indian\n\n; Pi:\"aJ .Code for having committed -the ~µrder of his wife by : shooting lier~ with a revolver. During the investigation of the offence he was placed under suspension with effect from -. August 10. ]959 and was allowed subsistence allowance for . some time. His defence at'the. trial was that while his wife was picking _up the revolver from the teapoy on which he had kept it, suspecting that.he would shoot himself with it, it went off ; accidently and killed her\" This defence was a.ccepted by the Sessions Judge and he was acquitted. On appeal by the State : tl)e , High. Court of Andhra Pradesh set aside the acquittal and ·\n\nconvictd'him of an'offencc under s. 302, I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. He thereupon sought and obtained special leave from this Court to prefer an appeal.\n\nDuring the pend_ericy of the appeal he died. According to the -_applicants a sum of Rs. 40,000 /- would be due to the. deceas- : ed, being -the difference between 'the ' Subsistence allowance\n\n'actually paid _by the Government to him and the total emolu- . : ments that would have been payable to him from the da.te of\n\n(') [1943] K.B. 15.\n\n(') [1955] 1 Q.B.D. 573\n\nsuspension till his death and that they as his legal heirs would 1964\n\nb~ entitled to get this amount in case the conviction and sen- Bondada Gajapaih11 tence are set aside by this Court.\n\nRao v.\n\nIn supper! of his contention that the appeal has not aba.t- State 01 Andhra Pradesh ed by reason of the death of the appellant Mr. K. R. Chaudhuri points out thats. 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Jfudholkar, J. (hereafter referred as the Code) which speaks about appeals is limited in its application to appeals under Ch. XXXI of the Code and would not fetter the powers of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution to hear an appeal brought before it by special leave even though the person who brought it is no longer alive. It is no doubt true that s. 431 of the Code only says that appeals under s. 411A, sub-s. (2) ands. 417 shall finally abate on the <lea.th of the accused and every other appeal under Chapter XXXI except an appeal from a sentence of fine shall fina!ly abate on the death of the appellant. It does not, therefore, in terms apply to an appeal permitted to be preferred by this Court in exercise of its discretion under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The argument of Mr. Chaudhuri is that the power conferred upon this Court by Art. 136 is wide and discretionary and is analogous to that conferred upon the High Court by s. 439 read with s. 435 of the Code. Therefore, upon an analogy of the decision cf this Court in Pranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal and another(') this Court has the power to hear the appeal and to permit the applicants to prosecute it. He does not contend that the applicants have a right to be brought on the record in place of the deceased appellant but submits that to meet the ends of justice it would be right and proi>er to permit the applicants to prosecute the appeal because if it succeeds they will be able to claim from the Government the arrears with respect to salary due to their deceased father from the Government.\n\nIt seems to me that the decision upon which reliance has been placed has no bearing upon an appeal brought to this Court by special leave. It is no doubt true that the power conferred by s. 435 of the Code on the High Court and certain other courts and by Art. 136 of the Constitution on this Court is discretionary. In so far as the High Court and certain other courts are concerned the discretion is to call for and examine any record of any proceeding before an inferior criminal court situate within the local limits of its jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order passed by the inferior court and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such court. Under s. 435 these courts have power to act in this manner suo motu and s. 440 provides that no party has a right to be heard either\n\n(') (1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R 63.\n\nL'd)D)ISCl-9 a) /\n\n1964 personally or by a pleader before such court, with one excep- a- 'Pfllh tion. That exception is that the High Court cannot make an\n\nR:;,\" Y order under s. 439 of the Code to the prejudice of an accused\n\nT. person unless he is given an opportunity of being heard either stm;:!,, i1,\"J!'lwa personally or by pleader in his defence. When the record comes before the High Court it may in its discretion exercise any of MU<Jlwlkar. J. the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a Court by s. 338 and has also the power to enhance the sentence. Article 136 of the Constitution confers discretion upon this court whether to grant special leave or not. But this Article does not confer any power upon this Court to call for the record of any court or tribunal suo motu for the purpose of examining it and making an appropriate order. It only empowers this Court to grant leave to a person to bring his appeal before it and afford him an opportunity of showing such error as may be existing in the judgment or order appealed from. There is a fundamental difference bet, ween a power which is exercisable by a Court suo motu and a power which can be exercised only when it is moved in that behalf by a party. For the exercise of suo motu power the appearance of a, party before the Court concerned is not a prerequisite. Indeed as s. 440 provides, it is for the Court to decide whether or not to allow the party to appear before it and be heard. But of course the principle of natural justice would preclude a court even in such a case from making an order to the prejudice of a party without giving the party an opportunity to be heatd. In so far as an appeal is concerned, by whichever way it is brought, whether as of right conferred by a prdVision in the Constitution or by any other law or by special leave the appellant has a right to be heard and a right to prosecute the appeal. A Court exercising suo motu powers may choose at any stage to drop the proceeding and not proceed to examine the records at all. But as long as an appeal is pending before a Court and there is a person legally competent to prosecute it and there is no legal impediment to its being heard, the Court has no discretion to refuse to go on with the appeal even though initially it may have been brought before it by its leave. As soon as the leave is granted a right accrues in favour of the party who has been granted leave. It may be that where this Court finds that leave has been improperly. obtained or given it may revoke the leave. But that is quite different from saying that without revoking the leave it can drop the appeal.\n\nThis distinction between revisional powers and appellate powers has been adverted to in the decision relied upon(') at p. 70. Sinha, J. (as he then was) has observed:\n\n\"The revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by s. 439 of the Code, read with s. 435, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court to see that justice is\n\n(') [1959] Supp. l S.C.R. 63.\n\ndone in accordance with the recognized rules of 1964 Criminal Jurisprudence, and that subordinate BOfltlMa llajapallr criminal courts do not exceed their jurisdiction, or Rao abuse their powers vested in them by the Code.\n\nStat ; f°.<111<1Ma On the other hand, as already indica.ted, a right of ;:m,.h appeal is a statutory right which has got to be recognized by the courts, and the right of appeal, Mudholkar, J. where one exists, cannot be denied in exercise of the discretionary powers even of the High Court.\"\n\nThus, when the special leave granted by this Court has not been revoked it can exercise with respect to the appeal before it what may be called appellate powers. While hearing an appeal from the decision of a High Cburt, this Court will, therefore, be competent to exercise only such powers as the High Court itself could exercise in relation to the appeal. In so far as the procedure for hearing a criminal appeal by special leave is concerned this Court has framed certain rules. Order XXI of Supreme Court Rules, 1950 contains those rules. Rule 23 of that Order provides for the entering of appearance by parties in the aepeal. Rule 24 provides for the filing of statements of case by the parties. Rule 25 provides for setting down the appeal for hearing. Rule 26 empowers the Court to direct the engagement of an Advocate at the cost of the Government in a proper case where the accused person is not represented by an Advocate on record of his choice. Rule 27 provides for giving notice to the accusd where he is not represented on the date fixed for the hearing of the appeal and permits the accused person if he so wishes to present his case by submitting his argument in writing and provides for the consideration of the written argument at the hearing. Sub-rule (2) of that rule dispenses with necessity of production of the accused person in custody at the hearing of the appeal. There is no express rule which states as to what has to be done where the accused person who is an appellant is not present or represented at the hearing of the appeal. Order XLV, rule 5, however, preserves the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Thus this Court has the power to prevent the abuse of its process and it will be an abuse - of its process if the appellant despite service of notice of the\n\nate of hearing chooses to remain absent at the hearing. Now, 1ust as the Court can, under r. 18 of 0. XXI dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution where the appellant refuses to take the necessary steps f?r ringing the appeal to hearing, it must be eemed to have s1.milar power to dismiss it where the appellant is not preent or 1s not represented. Where the absence of the appellant is due to t!Je fact that he is dead it would still be a case ?f non-prosecution and, therefore, this Court would have the nght and the duty to dismiss the appeal. Since the power\n\n1964 to prosecute the appeal inhered in the appellant alone, no one BOllllada Gadapathy else can claim to exercise it unless the law conferred such a\n\nRao right upon that other person. This the law may do expressly as v. it has done in 0. XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure or State f .Aoohra f h Praduh impliedly as it has done ins. 431 of the Code. Apart rom t e fact that in a criminal matter the issue is personal between the Mudlwlhar, J. accused person and the State the fact remains that the right of appeal is also personal to the appellant. It cannot be allowed to be exercised by another unless there is some provision in Jaw which would permit it to be xercised or unless such a course is permissible by reference to a principle. There is admittedly no express provision permitting the substitution of the legal representatives 'of a deceased appellant in a criminal appeal brought to this Court by special leave. We ha.ve, however, to bear in mind the policy ofihe Jaw as enacted ins. 431 of the Code. The policy is that every criminal appeal under chapter XXXI will abate except an appeal from a sentence of fine. Thus, instead of there being any principle on the strength of which the legal heirs of a person could be allowed to prosecute after his death an appeal brought by him challenging his conviction and sentence of imprisonment the policy of the Jaw is definitely opposed to it. Moreover, only a person who can properly represent a deceased appellant can be allowed to be brought on record in his pla.ce and prosecute the appeal. That is the principle upon which the provisions of 0. XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure are based. That again is the principle followed by the Courts in England in allowing appeals in which the challenge was to a fine imposed upon the appellant to be continued by the executors and administrators of the deceased appellant. As an instance of this would first refer to Hodgson v. Lakeman('). In that case Viscount Caldecote C.J.. permitted the executors of the deceased appellant claiming an interest in the appeal against his conviction and sentence of fine to prosecute the appeal. The fine, though a small one, would have been a burden on the estate and thus the executors could be said to have had an interest in having that burden removed. This case was distinguished in Regina v. Rowe(') In that case the widow of thl' deceased appellant sought lea.ve to prosecute the appeal in which he had challenged his conviction on four counts of obtaining money by false pretences and the sentence of imprisonment to 18 months. The ground on which the widow's application was supported was that the conviction against her husband affected her chances of employment and her position among her friends and that if interest is the test, then the widow also had an interest. This argument was repelled by Lord Goddard C.J. who said that the Court cannot take notice of that because the interest she\n\n(') [1943] 1 K.B. 15.\n\n(') [1955] 1 Q.B.D. 573.\n\nhas was not a pecuniary one. It was further urged before the 1964 Court that where any person might be prejudiced b)' a convic Bondada GaJapaJhy tion against a deceased person, and an appeal was lodged RM before the death of that person, the Court should allow the St t vAndhra appeal to be continued by tha.t person so that if there had been \"~:£i .. h a miscarriage of justice and the heirs of the deceased were living under the shadow of the fact that their relative had died Mwlholkar, J. a convict, the interests of justice would require that the appeal be heard. To this argument the answer of the learned Chief Justice was that this would be a case for making an application for a free pardon. In the course of the judgment he observed:\n\n\" ............... we cannot allow a widow or an executor\n\nor an administrator of a deceased person to appeal to this court unless they can show a legal interest.\n\nIf a person is sentenced to pay a fine and dies having appealed, or even if he dies after payment of the fine-it might be immediately afterwards-it may be that the court would allow executors or administrators to appeal merely on the ground that if the conviction were quashed they could recover the fine for the benefit of the esta, te of the deceased which they are bound to administer. In Hodgson\n\nv. Lakeman(') to which our attention was called, which was a case before the Divisional Court, but the principle would be the same, the appellant was dead, and the court allowed the executors to continue the . appeal because there was a . pecuniary interest. Supposing, as sometimes happens, a man is convicted on indictment and fined £500; the money has to be paid, and the Crown can recover that money whether he is alive or dead, for it can recover it against his estate, and, therefore, it would be an injustice if the executors were not allowed to appeal and to say tha.t the conviction was wrong, because, if it was wrong, the money would be saved.\n\nIt may be. that it is artificial to say that if there is a pecumary pe1:1aity an appeal might lie, whereas if corporal pumshment or imprisonment is imposed\n\nthre cannot be an appeal, but at the same time I do not see any ground on which we can say in the present case that anybody has an interest. It may be tha.t the widow would be very glad to have her\n\nhusand's name ~!eared, ut we cannot take any vot1ce of that sentunental mterest. There is nobody affected now by the judgment of the court because\n\n(') (1943] K. B. 15.\n\n&, v.la, da Gajapalhy\n\nRao\n\nBiol< of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nMudholTcar, J.\n\nthe judgment was a sentence of imprisonment and the prisoner has died. It would be a very novel step if, in these circumstances, we said that the court would entertain an appeal.\"\n\nIn Short and Mellor's (The Practice on the Crown Side of the King's Bench Division, second edition) it is stated at p. 425 that the practice does not seem to be uniform and reference is made to some cases. In one of them-Hesketh v. Atherton(') the counsel was allowed to argue an appeal after the death of one of the parties. But in Leach v. Wanstead School Board('f\n\nwherein a conviction against the father of a child for not sending the child to school was challenged in appeal and the father and the child had died in the meanwhile, the Court refused to allow the case to be argued on the ground that there was no interest surviving. In Siberry v. Connolly(') where there was a claim for seaman's wages, the appellant's executors were allowed to take the place of the deceased appellant. In Constantine v. Illingworth(') where the defendant in a criminal case had died, the Court ordered the case to be struck ont. The same was done in Jones v. Fallowfield('). In Rivers v. Glasse(') where the respondent had died and the appellant had given notice to the executors to support the conviction, the Court heard and determined the case and gave costs to the respondent's executors. The position so far as the United States is concerned 'is set out as follows('):\n\n\"The death of an accused ordinarily abates a criminal action, including review proceedings pending. at that time.\n\nThe interest of the deceased's representatives or next of kin in clearing his good name was held in United States v. Mook(') not to be sufficient to allow the appellate court, after the defendant's death pending his appeal from a conviction of violating the Interstate Commerce Act, to decide the appeal on the merits. The court however, added: 'we think it may not be amiss to say that it seems to us that the next-of-kin of a convicted person who dies pending an appeal have an interest in clearing his good name, which Congress might well believe would justify a change in the law.\"'\n\nThus in that jurisdiction also the basis of intervention, when permitted, is a survival of an interest in the heirs or executors of the deceased. That interest would only be a pecuniary one\n\n(')Short and Mellor at p. 425. (') ibid. (') ibid. (') 1 L.Ed. 2nd Series, p, 1879.\n\n(') ibid.\n\n(') ibid. (') ibid. (') 125 F2d. 706.\n\n. ff edb h 't' th 1164 .and where the estate 1s not a ect y t e conv1c ion ere __ would be no ground for allowing the intervention of the heir Bondada Gajapathv -0r executor. It may be that the interest of the heirs of the Raa deceased convict to clear his name should be recognised and State ofA..U.ra .they ought to be allowed an opportunity to clear it. But unless Pra4ulo it is recognised by the legislature the court cannot take notice . .\n\nMudlioll:a, J. of it. So far as the Court is concerned. the only question arising in the appeal before us is whether the conviction and sentence of imprisonment are correct in law. The only person who had an interest in the appeal before the Court in showing :that both were not justified was the appellant and since he is dead, the interest which he had ceases to exist and cannot pass to anyone.\n\nAnother case which was referred to at the bar was The State of Kera/a v. Narayani Amma Kamala Devi(') in which the decision in Pranab Kumar Mitra's case(') was relied upon and reference was made to Imperatrix v. Dongaji Andaji('\\ In that case also the question was whether the High Court <:ould exercise its revisional powers against an accused person even after his death. There the Court was not concerned with its own powers with respect to a criminal appeal brought before it by special leave.\n\nIt is then said that the applicants have an interest inas much as the estate of the deceased appellant would be enrich ed by Rs. 40,000 /. if this Court ultimately finds the appellant innocent and if the Government, acting on the basis of the decision of this Court which is binding upon it, rscinds the suspension order passed against the appellant and in conformity with it pays the arrears of salary due to the appellant.\n\nThis interest is not a direct interest in the sense that it cannot arise out of the decision of this Court even if it is in favour of the appellant. The only interest which the applicants have is a contmgmt one a~~ is not ne which could flow directly out of the ultimate dec1s10n of this Court. If we may mention, the argument advanced in Rowe's case(') before Lord Goddard C.J., that by clearing her deceased husband's name the widow's chances of secur!ng employment would improve was not accep.ted as creahg. a pecuniary interest such as to justify grantmg her perm1ss10n to prosecute the appeal.\n\nIndeed, te legislature has, by , limiting in s. 431 of the Code the SUM.val of appeals to appeals against sentences of fine has chosen to recognise only OIJle kind of interest and no <>th er There ould be several other kinds o( interest, as was suggested durmg the arguments at the bar. But this Court, in\n\n(') [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 943. (') [1959] Supp, 1 S.C.R. 63. (') (1879) I.L.R. Born. 564.\n\n(') [1955] 1 Q. B.D. 573.\n\n' [1964)\n\n1964 exercise of its inherent powers or discretionary powers, would &nilada Gajapathy not be acting according to correct legal principles in recog-\n\nRoo nising a kind of interest which the legislature has not chosen to - BtoJe o/A..ihra recoise. In the circumstances, therefore, I am clear that the Pradeah applicants ought not to be granted Iea.ve to prosecute the appeal.\n\nJlwlholkar, J.\n\nLeave to prosecute appeal refused.", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "RAO\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 277, "end_char": 309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 431, 435, 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 328, "end_char": 344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 368, "end_char": 376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 413, "end_char": 424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 432, "end_char": 449, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1123, "end_char": 1151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, who held a high office in the Government of Andhra Pradesh had been Sl/spended during the investigation of the charge against him arid he was dismissed from serv1ce under certain service rules on his conviction."}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1574, "end_char": 1580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "code of criminal procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1705, "end_char": 1731, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1755, "end_char": 1761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pranab Kumar Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1845, "end_char": 1863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held (Per Sarkar, J.): (i) Neither s. 431 nor the cases mentioned can be said to apply to the present case proprio vigore, for the present is not an appeal under the code of criminal procedure which is dealt with by s. 431 nor is it a revisional application like the one which came up for consideration in Pranab Kumar Mitra's case, while as for the English case, it is only of persuasive value."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2494, "end_char": 2502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3019, "end_char": 3031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 16\n\nBotodada Gajapathy\n\nRao v.\n\nStale of Amihra\n\nPrade•h\n\nHeld (Per Hidayatullah, J.): (i) This was an appeal against a sentence of imprisonment and an appeal of this character would normally abate on the death of the appellant because a criminal prosecution is concerned primarily with the punishment of rn offender and not with the trial of an abstract issue about the truth or falsity of a prosecution case.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "MudhqJkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5075, "end_char": 5084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held (Per MudhqJkar, J.): (i) The decision of this court in Pranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal has no bearing upon an appeal brought to this court by special leave.", "canonical_name": "MuDHOLKAR,"}}, {"text": "section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5290, "end_char": 5301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5364, "end_char": 5375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5434, "end_char": 5445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 423, 426, 427 and 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5538, "end_char": 5568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 338", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5586, "end_char": 5592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5647, "end_char": 5658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5797, "end_char": 5808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5953, "end_char": 5961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6441, "end_char": 6447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6507, "end_char": 6518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7755, "end_char": 7766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8430, "end_char": 8445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Chaudhuri"}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8467, "end_char": 8481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, B. R. G. K. Achar, and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8483, "end_char": 8500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, B. R. G. K. Achar, and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8506, "end_char": 8520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, B. R. G. K. Achar, and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8600, "end_char": 8606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following judgments were delivered-\n\nSARKAR, J.-This is an appeal from a sentence of impri- Sarw, J. sonment for life imposed on the appellant upon his conviction for tile offence of the murder of his wife."}}, {"text": "Sarw", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8655, "end_char": 8659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following judgments were delivered-\n\nSARKAR, J.-This is an appeal from a sentence of impri- Sarw, J. sonment for life imposed on the appellant upon his conviction for tile offence of the murder of his wife."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8842, "end_char": 8850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPHEME COUHT REPOHTS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9161, "end_char": 9182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There would seem to be authority for the proposition that revision petitions and some appeals from sentences of fine might be continued by his legal representatives on the death\n\nSUPHEME COUHT REPOHTS [1964]\n\n111a1 of the accused pending the proceeding: see s. 431 of the Code\n\nlB ,d aa th of Criminal Procedure and Pranab Kumar Mitra v. The State Orw.u a 'J<tpa."}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9240, "end_char": 9246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9588, "end_char": 9594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Yarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9631, "end_char": 9638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that neither s. 431 nor the cases mentioned can be said .Yarkar, J. to apply to the present case proprio vigore, foe the present is not an appeal under the Code which is dealt with bys."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10521, "end_char": 10547, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1959] 1 S.C.R. 6", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12102, "end_char": 12119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "HloAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14528, "end_char": 14540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HloAYATULLAH, J.-The appellant was convicted urider Hida.vatullah, J, s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "urider Hida.vatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14573, "end_char": 14593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HloAYATULLAH, J.-The appellant was convicted urider Hida.vatullah, J, s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14598, "end_char": 14604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14612, "end_char": 14629, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14676, "end_char": 14704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HloAYATULLAH, J.-The appellant was convicted urider Hida.vatullah, J, s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "August 30,\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14819, "end_char": 14835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the .pendency of this appeal the appellant died on August 30,\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "October 5, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14901, "end_char": 14916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After his death his sons and daughters applied to this Court on October 5, 1963 for permission to continue to prosecute the appeal."}}, {"text": "State of Andh.ra I • Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15514, "end_char": 15542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was acquitted by the Sessions Judge of Rao Krishna Division, Masulipatnam but, on appeal by the State v.\n\nGovernment the order of acquittal was set aside and he was State of Andh.ra I • Pradesh convicted and sentenced as above."}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16456, "end_char": 16462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16506, "end_char": 16512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16519, "end_char": 16523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16527, "end_char": 16533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16846, "end_char": 16852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16934, "end_char": 16940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16942, "end_char": 16965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17226, "end_char": 17232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18353, "end_char": 18359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HidayalullaA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18822, "end_char": 18834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b HidayalullaA, J. infructuous and abates. ·", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19040, "end_char": 19046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21043, "end_char": 21077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the English Courts and the Supreme Court of the United States."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21232, "end_char": 21245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The English cases referred to are collected in Short & Mellor's Practice of the Crown Office and Griffith's Guide to Crown Practice and the cases of the United States are referred to in Annotations\n\nL/P(D)!SCI-9 ..\n\n'..,.- '.-..~,, '_...<· ~\"': '. \\- ' \\,'"}}, {"text": "Mwlholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22759, "end_char": 22768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mwlholkar, J. :- . \""}}, {"text": "MuDHOLKAR,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22779, "end_char": 22789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MuDHOLKAR,.", "canonical_name": "MuDHOLKAR,"}}, {"text": "Government of Andhra ; Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23263, "end_char": 23293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had challenged his conviction and sentence\n\n~-for an offence, aie entitled to prosecute the appeal after his ; death during' the pendericy of the appeaL The applicants are the children of the decea5ed who was a Superintending Engi- ' neer (Electricity) in the service of the Government of Andhra ; Pradesh; He was charged with an offence_ under s.-302; Indian\n\n; Pi:\"aJ .Code for having committed -the ~µrder of his wife by : shooting lier~ with a revolver."}}, {"text": "August 10. ]959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23537, "end_char": 23552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "August 10. ]"}}, {"text": "High. Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23920, "end_char": 23949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the State : tl)e , High."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24014, "end_char": 24020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24022, "end_char": 24027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24860, "end_char": 24875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of his contention that the appeal has not aba.t- State 01 Andhra Pradesh ed by reason of the death of the appellant Mr. K. R. Chaudhuri points out thats. 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Jfudholkar, J. (hereafter referred as the Code) which speaks about appeals is limited in its application to appeals under Ch.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Chaudhuri"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24905, "end_char": 24931, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jfudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24932, "end_char": 24942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of his contention that the appeal has not aba.t- State 01 Andhra Pradesh ed by reason of the death of the appellant Mr. K. R. Chaudhuri points out thats. 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Jfudholkar, J. (hereafter referred as the Code) which speaks about appeals is limited in its application to appeals under Ch."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25127, "end_char": 25135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25292, "end_char": 25298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 411A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25340, "end_char": 25347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25682, "end_char": 25690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chaudhuri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25732, "end_char": 25741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument of Mr. Chaudhuri is that the power conferred upon this Court by Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25789, "end_char": 25797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25882, "end_char": 25888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25899, "end_char": 25905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26714, "end_char": 26720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26783, "end_char": 26791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27277, "end_char": 27283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 440", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27343, "end_char": 27349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27611, "end_char": 27617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jlwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27877, "end_char": 27884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the record comes before the High Court it may in its discretion exercise any of MU<Jlwlkar.", "canonical_name": "Jlwlholkar"}}, {"text": "sections 423, 426, 427 and 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27934, "end_char": 27964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 338", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27982, "end_char": 27988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28037, "end_char": 28048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 440", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28819, "end_char": 28825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30233, "end_char": 30238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sinha, J. (as he then was) has observed:\n\n\"The revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by s. 439 of the Code, read with s. 435, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court to see that justice is\n\n(') [1959] Supp."}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30332, "end_char": 30338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30362, "end_char": 30368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30913, "end_char": 30922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stat ; f°.<111<1Ma On the other hand, as already indica.ted, a right of ;:m,.h appeal is a statutory right which has got to be recognized by the courts, and the right of appeal, Mudholkar, J. where one exists, cannot be denied in exercise of the discretionary powers even of the High Court.\"", "canonical_name": "MuDHOLKAR,"}}, {"text": "Order XXI of Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31510, "end_char": 31548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33196, "end_char": 33198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BOllllada Gadapathy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33565, "end_char": 33584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the power\n\n1964 to prosecute the appeal inhered in the appellant alone, no one BOllllada Gadapathy else can claim to exercise it unless the law conferred such a\n\nRao right upon that other person."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33744, "end_char": 33771, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mudlwlhar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33928, "end_char": 33937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart rom t e fact that in a criminal matter the issue is personal between the Mudlwlhar, J. accused person and the State the fact remains that the right of appeal is also personal to the appellant."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35112, "end_char": 35139, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35205, "end_char": 35212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That again is the principle followed by the Courts in England in allowing appeals in which the challenge was to a fine imposed upon the appellant to be continued by the executors and administrators of the deceased appellant."}}, {"text": "Viscount Caldecote", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35456, "end_char": 35474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Viscount Caldecote C.J.. permitted the executors of the deceased appellant claiming an interest in the appeal against his conviction and sentence of fine to prosecute the appeal."}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36353, "end_char": 36360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument was repelled by Lord Goddard C.J. who said that the Court cannot take notice of that because the interest she\n\n(') [1943] 1 K.B. 15."}}, {"text": "MudholTcar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39037, "end_char": 39047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "&, v.la, da Gajapalhy\n\nRao\n\nBiol< of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nMudholTcar, J.\n\nthe judgment was a sentence of imprisonment and the prisoner has died.", "canonical_name": "MuDHOLKAR,"}}, {"text": "Bondada Gajapathv", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41670, "end_char": 41687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ff edb h 't' th 1164 .and where the estate 1s not a ect y t e conv1c ion ere  would be no ground for allowing the intervention of the heir Bondada Gajapathv -0r executor."}}, {"text": "Mudlioll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41973, "end_char": 41981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mudlioll:a, J. of it."}}, {"text": "Rowe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43636, "end_char": 43640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If we may mention, the argument advanced in Rowe's case(') before Lord Goddard C.J., that by clearing her deceased husband's name the widow's chances of secur!ng employment would improve was not accep.ted as creahg."}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43942, "end_char": 43948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jlwlholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44707, "end_char": 44717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jlwlholkar, J.\n\nLeave to prosecute appeal refused.", "canonical_name": "Jlwlholkar"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_267_360_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI\n\nSUSHILA MAHENDRA NANAVATI\n\n{RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R.\n\nMUDHOLKAR, JJ.]\n\nHindu Law-Annulment of marriage on ground that respondent was at the time of marriage pregnant by some person other than petitioner-Satisfaction of court under s. 23-Nature of onus on husband in matrimonial cases-Whether court can act upon admissions of parties in proceedings under Hindu\n\nMarriage Act-Quantum of burden and its incidence-Difference -Value of medical opinion-Duration of pregra; ocy-Period of gestation-Substantial question of law-Co..'tcurrent finding of fact--.Power of Court to remand a case-Inherent powers of court-Exercise of-Evidence Act, ss. 112, 114-Code of Civil Procedure, s. 107. Order 41, !'1'. 20, 23, 2:;....constitution of India, Art. 133(1)-Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, ss. 12 and 23.\n\nThe appellant is a resident of Bombay while the father of respondent was a resident of Prantij in the former State of Baroda. They were betrothed in 1945 and their marriage was solemnised at Bombay according to Hindu rites on March 10, 1947. On August 27, 1947, respondent gave birth to a daughter after 5 months and 17 days of their marriage.\n\nIn April 1956. the appellant filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with respondent on the ground that the child had been conceived long prior to his marriage through someone else, the respondent was, at the time of marriage, pregnant by some one other than himself, that that fact was concealed from him and that ever since he had learnt about the birth of the <!hild he had not cohabited with the respondent nor had he any relation with her whatsoever. The defence of respondent was that she conceived the baby as a result of sex relations with the appellant after their betrothel on being assured by him that that was permissible in their community, and that the parents of the appellant knew about the relations between the parties and also about her having conceived prior to her marriage. The trial court accepted the allegations of the appellant and held that the respondent was not pregnant by the appellant but by a person other t!'an the appellant even before marriage. Respondent went m appeal to. the High Court against the order of ann1:11ment passed by the trial court. The High Court was not satisfied w•th. the findings of the trial court and remanded !he case to the tnal court after framing the following two new issues:-\n\n1. I~ it proved hat the .respondent was pregnant at th.\" time of marnage?\n\n2. Is it prove~ .that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner h3;8. not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the grounds for a. decree? Respondent further alleged th t th h'ld conception after the marri e a e !! 1 was the result of tionaI evidence and came t':f the cltn~ cothurt recorded addiusion at the respondent\n\n19~4\n\nMarch 18\n\n1964 was not pregnant at the time of marriage and that no sexual - . intercourse with the consent of appellant took place after the Mndra Ml Ma,..lal discovery by appellant of the grounds for a decree. These \"': ' findings were submitted to the High Court which held that it s .. Aila Makendra was not proved that respondent was pregnant at the time of\n\nNanamti marriage and that it was proved that petitioner had marital intercourse with the respondent subsequent to his discovery of the existence of the grounds for the decree. The High Court allowed the appeal of respondent and dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage. Appellant came to this Court after obtaining a certificate of fitness from the High Court. Accepting the appeal,\n\nHeld (Mudholkar, J. dissenting). (i) The child born to respondent on August '2:/, 1947 was practically a mature child and weighed 4 lbs. in weight and therefore it could not have been the resu:lt of conception taking place on or after March 10, 1947.\n\nThe child was conceived prior to March 10, 1947 and therefore respondent was pregnant at the time of marriage ty some one other than appellant. Hence, appellant was entitled to annulment of his marriage.\n\n(ii) Th€ appellant did not have marital intercourse with respondent after he discovered that she had been pregnant by some one else at the time of marriage.\n\nIn divorce cases, the court usually does not decide merely l' on the basis of the admissions of the parties. This is a rule of prudence and not a requirement of law. However, where ' there is no room for supposing that parties are colluding decision can be based on the admission of the parties.\n\nIt is undesirable that the burden should be imposed on litigants in this class of cases, in which the substantial issue between the parties was whether the husband had at what was considered the relevant times any opportunity of intercourse with his wife and no question of an abnormal period of gestation had been raised until the trial and then only by the commissioner himself, of adducing medical ev:idence re: the period of gestation. However, tliat may be unavoidable where medical evidence in regard to the period is called by respondent and then the case tecomes the battle-ground of experts.\n\n(iii) The case of Clark v. Clark is not a good guide both on facts and law for the determination of the question about the legitimacy of the child of the respondent. In that case, delivery after 174 days of the conception was proved to be on account of the fact that the mother of the child \"fell a day before delivery.\n\nIt is not correct to add a lunar month to the ascertained period of gestation in cases of a known date of conception merely on the ground that when books speak of foetus of a certain number of months, that foetus might be due to a con\"7ption\n\ntaking place on any day of the lunar !'10nth correspo!'dmg. to the menstruation prior to the conception and the m18'!penod after conception.\n\nPer Mudholkar, J. If the birth_ of an apparenly nonnal child 171 or 186 days after conception Is an JD1po8Slble phenomenon and if its impossibility is notorious, then alone a court\n\ncan take notice of it and the question of drawing a presumption 1964 arises. All that can be said is that such an occurrence is at best Mahend;;;-Manilal unusual but it is a far cry to say that it is impossible. It is true Nana\"\"'i that courts have taken notice of the fact that the normal period v. of gestation is 282 days but courts have also taken note of the Sushila Makendrrs fact that there are abnormal periods of gestation depending Nana•ali on various factors. It is not sate to base a conclusion as to the illegitimacy of a child and unchastity of its mother solely on the assumption that tecause its birth and condition at birth appeared to be normal, its period of gestation must have been normal, thus placing its date of conception at a point of time prior to the marriage of its parents.\n\nWhen a court is called upon to decide a matter mainly, if not wholly, on the opinion of medical men, it must proceed warily. Medical opinion. even of men of great experience and deep knowledge, is after all generalisation founded upon the observation of particular instances, however numerous they may be. When the Court finds that in individual cases departure from the norm has in fact been observed by some experts and when again the experts themselves do not speak with the same voice, the need for circumspection by the court becomes all the more necessary. rt may land itself into an error involving cruel consequences to innocent beings if it were to treat the medical opinion as decisive in each and every case. The responsibility for the . decision of a point arising in a case is solely upon the court and while it is entitled to consider all the relevant marerials before it, it would be failing in its duty if it acts blindly on such opinion and in disregard of other relevant materials placed before it.\n\nUnder the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Divorce Act, 1869, the condition for the grant af relief is the satisfaction of the court as to the existence of the grounds for granting the particular relief. The satisfaction as to the existence of the ground must be, as in a criminal proceeding beyond reasonat le doubt and must necessarily be founded upon material which is relevant for consideration of the court which would of course include evidence adduced in the case. Although in the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 the words used are \"satisfied on the ev>idence\" while in the Hindu Marriage Act, the legislature has used the words \"if the court is satisfied\" their meaning is the same.\n\nWhen the law places the burden of proof upon a party, it requires that party to adduce evidence in support of his allegations. unless he is relieved of the necessity to do so by reason of admissions made or the evidence adduced on behalf of his opponent. The law does not speak of the quantum of burden but only of its incidence and it would be mixing up the concepts of the incidence of the burden of prQl)f v.-.ith that of the discharge of the burden to say that in one case it is light and in another heavy.\n\nUnless it is shown that important or relevant evidence has been overlooked or misconstrued, it is not in consonance with the practice of Supreme Court to xamine a concurrent finding of fact, particularly when the findings are based on appreciation of evidence.\n\nCase law referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 166/ Mahendra Manilal 1963.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated April 28, Nanavati 1961 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 135 of\n\nv. 1958.\n\nS .. hila Ma/l<ndra Nanavati S. T. Desai, S. Singhvi, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nPurushottam Trikamdas, M. H. Chhatrapati and /. N.\n\nShroff, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 18, 1964. The judgment of RAGHUBAR DAYAL and AYYANGAR, JJ. was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.\n\nMuDHOLKAR J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.\n\nBaghubar Dc.yal, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, on a certificate granted by the Bombay High Court, arises out of a petition praying for the annulment of the petitioner-appellant's marriage with the respondent, under s. 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act XXV of 1955), hereinafter called the Act, on the ground that the respondent was, at the time of marriage, pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.\n\nThe facts leading to the proceedings are that the appellant and the respondent were betrothed sometime in June- July 1945 and were married on March 10, 1947. The appellant went abroad about the end of April 1947. A daughter was born to the respondent on August 27, 1947. The appellant returned to India some time in November 1947, but the parties did not live together thereafter.\n\nThe appellant instituted a suit, No. 34 of 1947-48, in the Court of the State of Baroda, at Baroda, for the declaration of nullity of the marriage. The suit was, however, dismissed on September 30, 1949 as the appellant failed to establish that he had his domicile in that State.\n\nThe Act came into force on May 18, 1955. The appellant took advantage of its provisions and on April 18, 1956 filed the petition for annulment of bis marriage with the respondent.\n\nThe appellant alleged in his petition that on learning of the birth of the child on August 27, 1947,. five months and seventeen days after the marriage, he felt surprised and suspected that the child had been conceived long prior to the marriage through someone else, that the respondent was, at the time of their marriage pregnant by someone other than himself, that this fact was concealed from him and that ever since he had learnt of the birth of the child he had not lived or cohabited with the respondent nor had any relations with her whatsoever.\n\nThe respondent, in her written statement, raised various defences. She admitted therein to have conceived the baby prior to the marriage, but alleged that she bad conceived as a result of sex relations with the petition!lf after their betrothal,\n\n. '\n\non being assured by him that that was permissible in their 1964 community. She further stated that her relations-in-law, viz., Makendra Manila! her father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law knew about Na11avati such relations between the parties and. about her having 8 h\"Ta v.M k d conceived prior to the marriage. She further alleged that she \"' 'Nanav:ti en \"' flatly refused to carry out abortion and that therefore, at the instance of the appellant, the marriage was performed in R09kubar Dayal, J.\n\nBombay and not at her parents' place. She denied that the child born to her was by any person other than the appellant.\n\nDue to her allegation about pre-marital sexual relations with the appellant and to her having conceived from such relations, she was required to furnish [Particulars about the time when, and the place or places where, the parties had sexual relations which she alleged to have Jed to her pregnancy. According to the particulars furnished by her, such sexual relations took place about or after Christmas, 1946, and again after about the middle of January 1947.\n\nOn the pleadings of the parties, six issues were framed. but those relevant for our purpose were:\n\nI. Whether the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by someone other than the petitioner as alleged in para 9 of the petition?\n\n2. Whether at the time of the marriage the petitioner was ignorant of the aforesaid fact?\n\n3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to have the marriage declared null and void?\n\nThe petitioner examined himself and his father. The respondent\" examined herself and one other witness. The documentary evidence adduced by the parties consisted mostly of letters written by the petitioner to the respondent and the respondent to the petitioner, since their betrothal, and letters written by other relations of the family to one another.\n\nThe trial Court did not accept the allegation of the respondent about the pre-marital sex relations with her husband and held that it was not established that she was pregnant by the petitioner. It also held that she was pregnant at the time of the marriage by some other person, that the petitioner did not know about her pregnancy at the time of the marriage\n\nan~ that he did not cohabit with her after knowing of her bemg pregnant by someone else at the time of marriage On these findings, the petition for annuhnent of the marrlage was allowed.\n\nTe respondent prefrred an _appeal to the High Court.\n\nThe High Court agr~ with the trial Court in its finding that the respoll:d.ent had fail~ to establish that she was pregnant by the petitioner at the time of the marriage, as also regardin;;\n\n~ the petitioner knowing of her pregnancy at that time.\n\nThe M.,..ndra Manila! learned Judges however held that the petitioner had not\n\nNanavati proved to their satisfaction that the respondent was pregnant\n\n8., hihl ; c.,,, ndra by someone other than the petitioner at the time of the marri-\n\nNanavati age and that the ptitioner was not the father of the child h ba D al J which was born and, considering that the trial Court had not Rag • '\n\n•Y ' • framed an issue about there being no marital intercourse between the parties after the petitioner's knowing that the respondent had been pregnant at the time of the marriage framed two issues and remitted them to the trial Court for ; ecording findings.\n\nThe two issues framed by the High Court were:\n\nI. Is it proved that the respondent was pregnant at the time of ihe marriage?\n\n2. Is it proved that-marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the grounds for a decree?\n\nThereafter, the trial Court recorded further evidence. The petitioner, besides examining himself, examined Dr. Champak- Ial, husband of his sister, Madhuben, who was a midwife at the Prantij Municipal Dispensary, Maternity Ward, in 1947 and who attended at the respondent's confinei; nent and two doctors, Dr. Ajinkya and Dr. Udani as experts. The respondent, for her part, examined Dr. Mehta as an expert witness, Kachrabhai, who was a compounder at the Pantij Municipal Dispensary in 1947, Khodidas a Doctor, and herself. Khodidas did not state anything material to the case. The trial Court, after considering the fresh evidence recorded by it, found that it was not proved that the respondent was pregnant at the time <0f marriage. This was on the first issue framed by the High Court. On the other issue it recorded a finding that it was proved that no sexual intercourse with the consent of the petitioner took place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the grounds for a decree. These findings were then submitted to the High Court.\n\nIn the High Court, objections were filed by the parties to these findings.\n\nPatel and Gokhale JJ., heard the appeal and delivered separate judgments. They agreed with the trial Court that it was not proved that the respondent was pregnant at the time of marriage.\n\nPatel J., further held that it was proved that the petitioner had marital intercourse with the respondent subsequent to his discovery of the existence of the grounds for the decree. Gokhale J., expressed the view that the finding of the trial Court, on this point, appeared to be correct. In the result, the High Court allowed the respondent's appeal and dismissed the petition. It is against this judgment and decree of the High Court that the petitioner has\n\npreferred this appeal on a certificate granted by the High 1964 Court, under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution, as already Mahendra Manila! mentioned.\n\nNanavati v.\n\nBefore dealing in detail with the contentions of the par- Suahila Mtdiendra . h 1 • . f th A Nanavah ties, we may set down t e re evant prov1S1ons o e ct, _ quoting the various sections: R09kubar Dayal, J. \"12. (!) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely: -\n\n• • • • •\n\n(b) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section\n\n(!), no petition for annulling a marriage-\n\n• • • • •\n\n(b) on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-section (!) shall be entertained unless the court is satisfied-\n\n(i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged;\n\n(ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnized after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage; and\n\n(iii) 1hat marital intercouse with the conaent of the petitioner has not taken place since the dis-> covery by the petitioner of the existence of the grounds for a decree.\"\n\n\"20. (!) Every petition presented under this Act shall state as distinctly as the nature of the case permits the facts on which the claim to relief is founded and shall also state that there is no coTftlsion betweell: the petitioner and the other party to the marnage.\n\n(2) The statements contained in every petition under this Act sha II be verified by the petitioner or some other competent person in the manner required by law f9.r the verification of plaints, and may, at the hearing, be referred to as evidence.\"\n\n.Jl.fahendra Manilal\n\nNanat•ati\n\nBusldla Mahendra\n\n]..anavat-i\n\nRaahubar Dayal, J.\n\n\"21. Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908).\"\n\n\"23(1) In any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, if the Court is satisfied that-\n\n(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or dis ability for the purpose of such relief, and\n\n• • • •\n\n(c) the petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent, and\n\n(d) there has not been any unnecessary or impro\n\nper delay in instituting the proceeding, and (el there is no other legal ground why relief should not be granted, then, and in such a case, but not otherwise, the\n\nCourt shall decree such relief accordingly.\" \"28. All decrees and orders made by the Court in any procee.ding under this Act shall be enforced in like manner as the decrees and orders of the Court made in the exercise of its original civil ju.risdic tion are enforced, and may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force; Provided that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only.\" It is to be seen that, according to the provisions set out above, statements contained in any petition could be referred to as evidence, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the proceedings under the Act and a Court has to pass a decree in the proceedings only when it is satisfied about certain matters specified in s. 23.\n\nTwo questions cf law raised at the hearing of this appeal may now be disposed of as their determination will govern the consideration of the other matter on record with respect to the revelant points to be decided in the case. These are: (i) whether the High Court was right in remitting the two issues for a finding to the trial Court and (ii) what is the standard of proof required for the satisfaction of the Court before it can pass a decree in these proceedings.\n\nThe High Court had to remit the second issue for a find ing as it was neceary for the determination of the case and\n\nthe trial Court had not framed a specific issue in regard to it. 1964 In the absence of such an issue, the parties could not be ex- Mahend;;;-Manila! peeled to have produced evidence directed to that point and Nanavali !herefore the High Court rightly remitted that issue for a finds .. hila v.Mah<ndl'a mg.\n\nNanavati .\n\nThe High Court remitted the first issue as it was of Raghubar Dayal, J. opinion that it was for the petitioner to prove to their satisfaction, beyond reasonable doubt, which he had failed to do, that the respondent was pregnant at the time of marriage. He had also to establish that the child could not possibly be born as a result of the petitioner's marital intercourse with the respondent after the marriage, the learned Judges holding that in these proceedings the Court could not base its decision on the mere admission of parties.\n\nThe High Court is certainiy right in stating that the petitioner had, in order to succeed, to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was pregnant by someone else at the time of marriage. It is, however, not correct in law in holding that the Court, in these proceedings, could in no circumstances base its decision on an admission of the parties.\n\nOn the facts of the present case, however, the decision did not rest on the admissions of the parties alone.\n\nIn White v. White(') this Court construed the expression 'satisfied on the evidence' in s. 14 of the Divorce Act and said at p. 1420:\n\n\"The important words requiring consideration are 'satisfied on the evidence'. These words imply that the duty of the Court is to pronounce a decree if satisfied that the case for the petitioner has been proved but dismiss the petition if not so satisfied . . . . and it has been there held that the evidence must be clear and satisfactory beyond the mere balance of probabilities and conclusive in the sense that it will satisfy ... the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man.\"\n\nIt approved of the observations in Preston Jones v. Preston\n\nJones(') to the effect that it would be quite out of keeping with the anxious nature of the proviSions to hold that the Court might be 'satisfied' in respect of a ground for dissolution, with something less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nThe Court further observed at p. 1421 :\n\n\"In a suit based on a matrimonial offence it is not\n\nnecessary and it is indeed rarely po8sible to prove the iSsue by any direct evidence for iri very few cilses can such proof be obtainable.\"\n\n(')[1958.] Sr•:. ~410.\n\n(') [1951] AC. 391, 417.\n\n1964 I f' II . __ . . t o ows that wha~ e Court has to see m these proceed- Malaendr• Manilal mgs IS whether the petitioner has proved beyond reasonable\n\nNanavati doubt that the respondent was pregnant by some one else at Smhila \"'Malaendra the time of marriage. The petitioner has to establish such\n\nNanavali facts and circumstances which would lead the Court either to\n\nR h b -D 1 J believe that the respondent was pregnant at the time of marriag u ar aya,' b 1 hid h d ' age y someone e se or to o t at a pru ent man would, on those facts and circumstances, be completely satisfied that it was so.\n\nIt is true that in divorce cases under the Divorce Act of I869, the Court usually does not decide merely on the basis of the admissions of the parties. This is a rule of prudence and not a requirement of law. That is because parties might make collusive statements admitting allegations against each other in order to gain the common object that both desire, for personal reasons. A decision on such admissions would be against public policy and is bound to affect not only the parties to the proceedings but also their issues, if any, and the general interest of the society. Where, however, there is no room for supposing that parties are colluding, there is no reason why admissions of parties should not be treated as evidence just as they are treated in other civil proceedings. The provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Civil Procedure provide for Courts accepting the admissions made by parties and requiring no further proof in support of the facts admitted.\n\nSection 58 of the Evidence Act inter alia provides that no fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleading. Rule 5 of O. VIII, C.P.C., provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be not admitted in the pleadings of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability.\n\nBoth these prov1s1ons, however, vest discretion in the Court to require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.\n\nRule 6 of 0. XII of the Code allows a party to apply to the Court at any stage of a suit for such judgment or order as upon the admissions of fact made either on the pleadings or otherwise he may be entitled to, and empowers the Court to make such order or give such judgment on the application as it may think just. There is therefore no good reason for the view that the Court cannot act upon the admissions of. the parties in proceedings under the Act.\n\nSection 23 of the Act requires the Court to be satisfied 1964 on certain matters before it, is to pass a decree. The satisfac- Mahemlra Manilal tion of the Court is to be on the matter on record as it is on Nanavati that matter that it has to conclde \"Yhether a certain fact has Snshila vMahendr\" been proved or not. The sattsfact10n can be based on the Nanavati admissions of the parties. It can be based on the evidence, 1 / oral or documentary, led in the case. The evidence may be Raghnbar Daya• • direct or circumstantial.\n\nIn Arnold v. Arnold(') Woodroffe J., said:\n\n\"In the present case admissions have been proved.\n\nDoubtless, caution is required in cases of divorce to see that there is no collusion and an admission must be examined from this point of view. But if, as here, there is no reason to suspect collusion an admission may be as cogent evidence in these as in any other cases. In Robinson v. Robinson (1859 1 Sw. & Tr. 362), Sir Alexander Cockburn says: -'The Divorce Court is at liberty to act and is bound to act on any evidence legally admissible by which the fact of adultery is established. If, therefore, there is evidence not open to exception of admissions of adultery by the principal respondent, it would be the duty of the Court to act on these admissions although there might be a total absence of all other evidence to support them.\n\nThe admission of a party charged with a criminal or wrongful act, has at all times and in all systems of jurisprudence been considered as most cogent and conclusive proof; and if all doubt of its genuineness and sincerity be removed, we see no reason why such a confession should not., as against the party making it, have full effect given to it.\" Reference may also be made to Over v. Over('). It was a suit for dissolution of marriage. The respondent did I'': appear throughout the proceedings. The evidence origina: consisted of affidavits by the petitioner and his son to proh the letters the respondent had written to the petitioner. Later, their statements were also recorded. The letters were held to be sufficient evidence of her having committed adultery. Sir Lallubhai Shah, Ag. C. J., observed at p. 255:\n\n\"I have dealt with this case at some length in view of the difficulty which we have felt on account of there being no other corroborative evidence of the admissions of the wife.\n\nBut, having regard to the\n\n(') I.L.R. 38 Cal. 907, 912.\n\n(') 27 B.L.R. 251.\n\n1964 circumstances, as disclosed in the evidence, I see .Mahentira Manila! no reason to doubt the genuineness of the admis- Nanavati sion made by the wife, and in the words of Cock- .s .. hila r£a1iendra burn C. J., it is our duty to act upon such admis- Nanavati sions, although there might be a total absence of R huba D J all other evidence to supporLthem.\" ag r , iyal, M t J d 261 / ar en ., sa1 at p. : \"As already stated, I think that such a confession is admissible in evidence, and I agree that there is no rule of law which absolutely precludes the Court from acting upon it. But as a rule of prudence the practice of the Divorce Courts has been in general not to act upon such confessions, unless corroborated.\" The aforesaid rule of prudence loses its importance wqen certain provisions of the Act enjoin upon the Court to be satisfied with respect to certain matters which would enable the Court to avoid passing a decree on collusive admissions.\n\nSection l 2(2)(b) provides that no petition for the annulment of the marriage shall be entertained unless the Court be satisfied that the petitioner was at the time of marriage ignorant of the facts alleged and that no marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner had taken place since his discovering the existence of the grounds for the decree. Such a finding necessarily implies that before reaching it the Court has satisfied itself that there had been no connivance of the petitioner in the coming into existence of the ground on which he seeks annulment of the marriage. Besides, section 23 also provides that the Court can pass a decree only if it is satisfied that any of the grounds for granting relief exists, that the petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent and that there was no legal ground on which the relief claimed could not be granted. In these circumstances, it would be placing undue restriction on the Court's power to determine the facts in issue on any particular type of evidence alone, specially when there be no such provision in the Act which would directly prohibit the Court from taking into account the admissions made by the parties in the proceedings.\n\nWe are of opinion that in proceedings under the Act the Court can arrive at the satisfaction contemplated by s. 23 on the basis of legal evidence in accordance with the provisions c of the Evidence Ai; t and that it is quite competent for the Court to arrive at the necessary satisfaction even on the basis of the admissions of the parties alone.\n\nAdmissions are to be ignored on grounds of prudence only when the Court, in the circumstances of a case, is of opinion that the admissions of the parties may be collusive. If there be no ground for such a view, it would be proper for the Court to act on those admissions without forcing the parties to lead other evidence to\n\n1964 establish the facts admitted, unless of course the admissions are contradicted by the facts proved or a doubt is created by Maheiu!;:;;-Manila! the proved facts as regards the correctness of the facts admit.\n\nN anavati ed v. t Sushila Mahendra The trial Court had recorded a finding on the basis of Nanavati the statements of the respondent in the written statement, Raghubra Dayal J. statements which were supported by her on oath when examin- ' ed as a witness.\n\nSupport for these statements was found from certain circumstances which the Court held established on the basis of the correspondence between the parties and certain oral evidence. The respondent's case that the child born to her on August 27, 1947 was begotten by the petitioner as they had intercourse at the relevant time sometime in December 1946 or January 1947, left no room for the Court to considr the new case that that child was conceived sometime after the marriage of the parties on March 10, 1947. In these circumstances, it was not really right for the High Court to remit an issue to the trial Court for recording a finding on the basis of such further evidence including expert evidence as be led by the parties on the question. In this connection, the remarks of Lord Simonds in Preston Jones' case(') at p.\n\n402, are very pertinent :\n\n\"Your Lordships would, I think, regard it as undesirable that the burden should be imposed upon litigants in this class of case of adducing evidence of the character which in Gaskill v. Gaskill (1921 P. 425) Lord Birkenhead thought it expedient for the Attorney-General to ask for the assistance of the court. That may be unavoidable where medi' cal evidence in regard to the period is called by the respondent; there is nothing to prevent a case becoming the battle-ground of experts. But I am dealing with such a case as that out of which this appeal arises, in which the substantial issue between the parties was whether the husband had at what was considered the relevant times any oppor tunity of intercourse with his wife and no question of an abnormal period of gestation had been raised until the trial and then only by the commissioner himself.\" However, as evidence has been led by both the parties and the. Courts below have considered it, we do not propose to decide the case on the basis of the evidence originally record ed and wuld content. ourselves by simply stating our view that the _High Court might well have decided the ease on that has is without remitting. the first issue to the trial Court.\n\nWe. ay now deal with some general aspects of the case.\n\nThe petit10ner has been consistent throughout. He took tlMt\n\n(') (1951) A.C. 391.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] • !!!!! positi!l'Il that he. was not the father of the child born to the M•htndra Manila/ respondent in August 1947 as the period of gestation between\n\nNaaavati the date of marriage and the date of birth was too short for a Su•hila ; htndrn mature child to be born. This does not mean that his case\n\nNanmaa was as has been considered by the Court below that the child Raghuba-; Da~•I, J. bmn was a fully mture child in. the sense that it was born after tlte normal period of gestal!on of about 280 days. He could not have stated so positively as that could not be known t-0 him.\n\nEven the doctors are probably not in a position to state that the child was born after a full period of gestation i.e., after 280 days.\n\nThe petitioner's case was that the child born was not a child whose period of gestation was 171 days from the date of conception or who could be said to be a prema lure child, but was a child born after almost the full period of gestation. He steadily stuck to this position. His conduct and the conduct of his relations from the time they learnt of the respondent's giving birth to the child had been consistent with this view.\n\nThe petitioner had no correspondence or connection with the respondent since he was informed of the birth of the child. His parents too did not enter into any correspondence with the respondent's parents. The petitioner's sister Sharda, however, appears to have written just one letter in acknowledgment of the respondent's sister's letter conveying the news of the birth of the child.\n\nShe has not been examined as a witness.\n\nShe appears to have written that letter when she was emotionally happy on the receipt of the news and had not given any thought to the matter.\n\nIn J 948, the petitioner instituted a suit for the annulment of the marriage in the Court at Baroda and there too pleaded what he pleaded in the petition giving rise to this appeal. The respondent, however, put up a different case there. Any way, that suit was dismissed on the preliminary ground that the petitioner did not have the necessary domicile to institute a suit in that Court.\n\nThe respondent, on the other hand, has not been consistent.\n\nIn her written statement filed in the Baroda Court she stated that she had become pregnant as a result of the sexual intercourse she had with the petitioner after marriage. The same line was not adopted in her written statement in this case, in which she admitted that she was pregnant at the time of the marriage, but stated that this was due to sexual intercourse with the petitioner prior to her marriage.\n\nShe supported this statement vigorously on oath. Later, after the close of the petitioner's evidence, and practically of her statement in examination-in-chief, she wanted to change her case by an amendment of the written statement to what had been said in the Baroda Court. This was not allowed by the trial Court. The High Court too did not allow this formally, but in effect had that point trieli by remitting an issue.\n\nNo good motive was suggested for the petitioner and his parents taking the view so firmly held by them about the childMahemlra ManilaT being not of the petitioner from the very moment they learnt Nanavati of the birth of the child on August 27, 1947. Their attitude SU8hila \"M.nendra was not an attitude of mere suspicion in connection with Nanavati which enquiries and observations could be made. The attitude R h ba~E 7 J was firm from the very beginning. They did not respond to ag • ' aya ' • letters from either the respondent or her father. What could be the motive for them to take such an attitude?\n\nThe respondent stated in her written statement:\n\n\"The petitioner's father has stayed in Europe for a very long time and holds very advanced views so also the petitioner but this entirely false litigation has been put forward at the instance of the petitioner's mother who wants to sacrifice the respondent knowing full well the part played by her son the petitioner and the other members of the family.\" Nothing like this was said in her written statement filed in the Court at Baroda: In her deposition before the findings were called for on the issues, she stated that the relations between herself and her mother-in-law were not very cordial. She said in her deposition, after the remission of the issues, that\n\n\"The parents of the petitioner were not on good terms with my parents as at the time of pheramani the petitioner's parents were not satisfied with the presents given by my parents.\" This cause for bad relations has not been indicated in any of the letters by the respondent or by the petitioner. It was not stated in the written statement.\n\nWe cannot take this to be a correct statement.\n\nIn her letter dated June 11, 1947 she merely stated:\n\n\" ... the nature of my mother-in-law had become peevish on account of ill-health and that I should not take anything to my heart. Respected papa used to advise me well and had also feelings for me ... She (mother-in-law) would sometimes become peevish only and then she herself would feel sorry.\n\nMamma would speak very highly of me before our neighbours.\" The ordinary usual expressions of disapproval between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law would not lead the relations-in-Jaw to make such accusations against their daughterin-law lightly, both on account of notions of family honour and on account of the natural love grand-parents would feel towards their grand-child.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1964]\n\n~ The respondent's letters prior to the marriage and subse- Mahendra Manila! quent thereto indicate her affection for the petitioner and her Nanavati feeling of being bound by her husband's desires. But, in one Sus/iila •3Iahendar respect at least, and for no good reasons, she ignored those Nanavati desires. We refer to the direction by the petitioner in his\n\nBaghubar Dnyal, J. letter dated June 22, 1947 asking her to destroy that particular letter and the letters received earlier. She did not do so.\n\nWhy? She has not given any explanation for keeping those letters with her in spite of the directions of the husband to the contrary. It can be said, in the circumstances of the case, that she was retaining the letters for using them if possible in her defence when any accusationof her having gone wrong prior to the marriage be made against her.\n\nIt has been considered by the Court below that the respondent's letters to Sharda and her father's letters to Dr.\n\nChampaklal in July 1947 had been suppressed. It did not believe the statements of Dr. Champaklal that these letters could not be traced. These persons had no reason to retain those letters. Two letters of Sushila to Sharda have been produced and their production has been relied upon in support of the view that other letters had been deliberately suppressed. We do not agree with this view. There was reason to retain these two letters which were sent after the birth of the child and which must have been taken to be letters of some importance as written at a time when it had been realised that the respondent's relations-in-law felt that the child born was not of the petitioner.\n\nThe main question for determination in this case is whether the child born to the respondent on August 27, 1947 could be the child of the petitioner, who, on the finding of the Courts below which was accepted by learned counsel for the respondent before us, did not cohabit with the respondent earlier than March 10, 1947.\n\nCounting both the days, i.e., March 10 and August 27, the total period between those dates comes to 171 days. The child born to the respondent is said to have weighed 4 pounds, the delivery being said to be normal. The child survived and is said to be even now alive.\n\nIt is not disputed that the usual period of gestation from the date of the first coitus is between 265 and 270 days and that delivery is expected in about 280 days from the first day of the mensturation period prior to a woman conceiving a child.\n\nWe shall later be examining the point urged before us by learned counsel for the respondent, as regards the possibility of a living child being delivered after a gestation of this duration, but it is sufficient at this stage to point out that, if the delivery was normal, the child born also normal and alive, it was not suggested that it was possible in the course of nature for such a child being born unless the conception took place long before March 10, 1947.\n\nIn this connection, reference may again be made to what 1964 was said by Lord Simonds in Preston-Jones' case(') at p. 402, Jiabcnrlm Jlanil\"I when considering the question whether a normal child born Jfmwrnli 360 days after the last intercourse of a man and a woman\"\"'\"''\" 'Jfal.cnd'• y, as the child of that man or not.\n\nHe said: Xnnal'!lli \"It would, I think, appear a fantastic suggestion to any Raglwlnr D•yal, J ..\n\nordinary man or woman that a normal child born 360 days after the last intercourse of a man and a woman was the child of that man and it is to me repugnant that a court of justice should be so little in accord with the common notions of man kind that it should require evidence to displace fantastic suggestions.\" Of similar effect is the observation of Lord Normand at o. 407,\n\nit being: • - ''I have felt great doubt whether the House ought not to say that, though it is not possible to draw the line at an actual number of days, 360 days is too long a period, unless evidence of medical knowledge is adduced by the respondent to show the contrary.\" Lord Morton of Henryton also said, at p. 413:\n\n\"If a husband proves that a child has been born 360\n\ndays after he last had an opportunity of intercourse with his wife, and that the birth was a normal one, and if no expe, rt evidence is called by either side, I am of opinion that the husband has proved his case beyond reasonable doubt.\"\n\nIn W. v. W. (No. 4) (') a similar observation was made by Cairns, J. in proceedings on an application for ordering the wife and child to undergo blood-tests in order to furnish evidence that the child was not the petitioner's. The child was born 195 days after the marriage. He said :\n\n\"The marriage was on October 7. 1961. The child was born on April 19, 1962. It is, therefore, obvious that the wife was pregnant at the time of the marriage.\"\n\nWe have then to see whether the evidence on the record is such which would justify the Court's holding against what it should normally hold on proof of the fact that the child was born after l 7 l days of the first coitus between the parties.\n\nWe shall consider the statements of the doctors relating to different matters when dealing with them.\n\nAs doctors Ajinkia and Mehta do not agree on several points we have\n\n(') (1951) A.C. 391. (') (1963) 2 All E.R. 3$6.\n\n1964 to decide whose statement should be ordinarily preferred. We .Maiiend;:;;-Manilal however consider that the Court should not leave the ques-\n\nNanavati lions undecided merely because the two doctors differ, as has IJushila Mahendra been done, practically, by the learned Judges of the High\n\nNarw, vati C-ourt.\n\nlloghubar D, yal, J.\n\nDr. Ajinkia is undoubtedly an expert in the subject of obstetncs and gynaecology. He took a Master's degree in midwifery in London in 1937 and passed the F.R.C.S. examination in Edinburgh in 1939 in midwifery and gynaecology.\n\nHe holds a diploma in child health of London University. He is a member of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. He returned to India in 1939. He was attached to the Nair Hospital as a specialist. He was Professer of the Medical College at Agra and was in charge of the Department of Midwifery and Gynaecology from.1942 to 1944. Since\n\n1949 he was attached to the J. J. Hospital as an Honorary Doctor for Midwifery and Gynaecology and later at the Wadia Maternity Hospital. He has three maternity homes with 60 beds in all.\n\nHe can therefore be rightly called a specialist in midwifery and gynaecology, with an experience of over 20 years.\n\nDr. Mehta states that he has been practising as a Gynaecologist and Obstetrician since 1926. His qualifications, however, are much less than those of Dr. Ajinkia and his experience too, as an obstetrician and gynaecologist, is much less.\n\nHe has passed the F.R.C.S. Examination in 1906 at Edinburgh. He was a Police Surgeon for about 10 years during which period he had no special means to acquire knowledge in midwifery, gynaecology or obstetrics. He was a doctor in the Army for 13 years from 1907 to 1920 and could not possibly have such experience during that period. He was an Associate Professor in Midwifery at Grant -Medical College during 1928 to 1937. He states that as a professor he was concerned both with giving -lectures to students and doing practical work of attending to cases and labour operations.\n\nDuring this period he was in charge of 6 beds at Motlibai Hospital. At the time of his deposition he was attached to the Parsee General Hospital and Parsee Lying-in Hospital for Women. He carried on private practice and had three consulting rooms. He states that most of his cases were gynaecology and midwifery.\n\nWhere Dr. Ajinkia and Dr. Mehta differ, we would prefer to rely on Dr. Ajinkia due to his superior qualifications and experience.\n\nWe do not consider it material that there exists some 1>light difference of opinion in matters, not of great signifi- 'Cance, between what the doctors state and what is stated in 'Certain well-recognized books on the subject, as the statements are on the basis of the theoretical knowledge as modified by\n\niheir actual experience and what is stated in books is based 196~ on conclusions derived from various reports by various doctors Mahendra Manila! working in !he field.\n\nNanavati v. . • • Sushi/, a Mahendr• Certam facts were urged before the High Court m sup- Nanavati port of the petitioner's case. Mr. Desai, learned counsel for - the petitioner, has again submitted them for our consideration. Raghllhar Dayal, J.\n\nThey are: ·\n\n1. The child was born 171 days after marriage and has lived.\n\n2. It was confirmed by about April 2, 1947, that the respondent was pregnant.\n\n3. The appearance of the respondent's belly.\n\n4. The symptoms of toxemia from which the respondent suffered.\n\n5. Normal delivery.\n\n6. Condition and weight of the child.\n\nWe shall first deal with points Nos. 2 to 4 which relate tc; the respondent's pregnancy and symptoms of its development at various periods. The relevant facts are to be determined mainly from the contents of the letters between the parties and between them and some other persons.\n\nSome letters make mention of the health of the respondent and the relevant letters in this respect are of the period April to August 1947. The parties were, as already stated, married on March 10, 1947. The respondent remained at the house of her relations-in-law , till about March 27, when she returned to her father's place at village Prantij. The first letter from the petitioner to the respondent is dated March 31, 1947 and expresses the hope that she had reached her place hale and hearty.\n\nThe next letter from him is dated April 5.\n\nIt refers to a letter received from the respondent and indicates that her letter had conveyed the news of her getting some fever and that she had gone to consult a doctor. Her letter might have also given some indication of her possibly being pregnant as the petitioner asked her to inform him about the opinion of the .doctor. There is nothing in this letter to show that the respondent had informed the petitioner about her suffering from nausea. The petitioner's letter dated April 8, 1947 refers to the receipt of a letter from the respondent which probably intimated that she was definitely pregnant, according to the opinion of the doctor, as the letter contains an expression 'knowing that you are pregnant' and indicates the petitioner's desire that the child be removed.\n\n1964 The respondent's letter dated April 13, 1947 states: Makendra Maniliil Nanavati \"I am not keeping good health at present, I am still getting fever. I get vomits also ... But fever does. not leave me and I am not allowed to take food also ... .I am bed-ridden at present... Well and good if the child survives and it will be still better if it does not.\"\n\nSushila .l'rfakendra\n\nNanarati\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nThe petitioner's letter dated April 15 has nothing particular in this connection. On April 17, the parties wrote to each other. The petitioner's letter said:\n\n\"I have been feeling very much anxious as your health is not remaining well .... Write about your health.\n\nIf you are not keeping good health and if you are not feeling disposed to come then you remain at your place. I won't take it ill at all.\"\n\nThe resp1 mdent's letter acknowledged the receipt of two letters of the petitioner, probably of April 8 and April 15, and said:\n\n\"I am keeping well now.\n\nI have no fever for the last two days. I am allowed to take light food. I get two or three vomits in a day. But I am better than before. So, please do not worry. I will start on the 22nd and reach (there) on the 23rd.\" Her letter of April 20, just intimates about her leaving for Bombay on April 22. She reached Bombay on April 23 and stayed there till the petitioner left for America on April\n\n27.\n\nAccording to the contents of these letters, the respondent suffered from morning sickness of a severe type. She had fever and several vomits in the day.\n\nIn her depm:ition she stated:\n\n\"Before I left for Prantij for the first time after my marriage, I had nausea and vomiting. . .. When I left for Prantij my health was ordinarily good. At Prantij I started vomiting. I consulted a lady doctor at Himatnagar .... After I consulted the doctor at Himatnagar, I came to know that I was pregnant.\"\n\nIn cross-examination she stated:\n\n\"I had a vomit on the day on which I left for Prantij'\n\nfrom Bombay about 17 or 18 days after marriage.\n\nAt the time when I had a vomit, I did not suspect or imagine that I was carrying ...... I consulted thelady doctor at Himatnagar within two or threedays after I reached Prantij. : .. I told the lady\n\ndoctor at Himatnagar that I was feeling uneasi- 1964 ness. I was vomiting and I had no appetite. The llahend;:;;-Jfanilal lady doctor examined my body including my' Sana•ati abdomen .... As a result of the opinion given by . v. h 1 d d H.\n\nI . .\n\nSu•h</a Jfa/icndra t e a y octor at 1matnagar ml!mated to the Nana.-ati petitioner that I was pregnant.\"\n\nIt is contended for the petitioner that such a condition -of the respondent could not be on account of pregnancy taking place on or after March 10, 1947. Morning sickness .of such type does not ordinarily take place soon after concep- .tion and a doctor cannot, without a biological examination, definitely state that she was pregnant.\n\nRe: morning sickness, Dr. Ajinkia stated that it occurred in the first and second month and expressed agreement with Modi's statement in his text book on Medical Jurisprudence that nausea or vomiting commences about the beginning of the second month and lasts generally till the end of the fourth month. It follows that the commencement of the morning .sickness at the end of March or the beginning of April 1947 may be possible from the respondent's conceiving after marri- .age, but that the severe type of morning sickness, viz., fever and vomiting several times a day should have also developed :so early after the conception is rather unlikely in view of\n\nwhat authorities state.\n\nWilliams in his 'Obstetrics' states at p. 275, 12th Edition:\n\n\"The so-called morning sickness of pregnancy, as the name implies, usually comes on in the earlier part of the day and passes off in a few hours, although it occasionally persists longer or may. occur at other times. It usually appears about the end of the first month and disappears spontaneously six or eight weeks later, although some patients suffer from it for a longer period.\"\n\nAt p. 706 he states:\n\n\"Nausea and vomiting of mild degree constitute the most common disorder of the first trimester of pregnancy. About one half of pregnant women complain of some degree of nausea at this time, and, of these, perhaps one third experience some degree of vomiting. In the present era, however, it is uncommon for nausea and vomiting to progress to a serious extent, that is, to a stage in which systemic effects such as acetonuria and substantial weight loss are produced .... and the condition is called hyperemesis gravidarum.\"\n\nRaghuba1 ayal, J.\n\n1964 He states at pp. 708 and 709:\n\nMahtndra Jfanilal Nanatiafi \"The disease varies in degree of severity from naus€a\n\nand morning sickness to the severe or pernicious type of vomiting which may have a fatal outcome.\n\nUsually the condition begins about the sixth week of gestation and abates around the twelfth week.\"\n\nv. 8ushila Mahendr<& Nanavati\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\n\"A small number of these patients develop persistent vomiting, lasting four to eight weeks or longer and resulting in a loss of body weight of 10 to 20 pounds or more. These patients vomit two, three, or more times a day and may. be unable to retain any nourishment by mouth.\" \"In the later stages of the disease-rarely seen today-- a low-grade fever frequently develops. This sel dom exceeds 101°F but may persist despite ade\n\nquate hydration.\" Dugald Baird states at p. 323 of the 7th Edition of the Combined Text Book on Obstetrics and Gynaecology:\n\n\"Morning sickness occurs in about 50 per cent of women during the early weeks of pregnancy. In many cases there is only a feeling of nausea, with per haps the ejection of a mouthful of fluid.\n\nIn others, some partly digested food may be expelled.\n\nIn graver cases vomiting may persist throughout the day, and apparently all the ingested food is returned. This latter type is a very serious condition and is described as hyperemesis gravidarum.\n\nIt is extremely difficult to draw any hard and fast line between the more severe form of morning sickness and a condition which should be labelled as hyperemesis. As soon as a patient suffering from morning sickness feels nauseated and is sick later in the day, she must be regarded as a mild case of hyperemesis and treated accordingly.\" The respondent does not state about fever and about several vomits in a day in her deposition, but such a condition was expressed in her letters. The respondent stated in crossexamination that when she went to Gamdevi, she continued to have vomiting, no appetite and uneasiness.\n\n None of the letters written subsequent to April 17 by either party make any mention of this condition continuing.\n\nChampaklal was not questioned about such a condition of hrs at Gamdevi. The petitioner was not questioned and the respondent does not state that she had nausea and vomiting when at Bombay between April 23 and 27.\n\nShe did not have vomit or nausea so long as she was at Bombay in March, though she happened to state in examination in chief that\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREIIIE COURT REPORTS - 289\n\nshe had a vomit on the day she left. The petitioner was not 1964 questioned about it. It appears to be too good to be true Mahendra ~Ia•ilal that she suffered from morning sickness of such a type only for Nanavati a short period of a littleover two weeks. These can be two SWJhila '.Mahendra possibilities. Either sh-:: did not suffer from any such sickness Nanavati during that period and just: mentioned about it to build up R h b D al J. her case regarding the development of pregnancy or that her \"9 u ar ay ' • pregnancy was of a longer period-at first she may have had ordinary morning sickness which usually' consists of a feeling of nausea without any-actual vomiting and could therefore be not known to others-and that the serious type of actual vomiting and fever' developed -later in the third or fourth month of pregnancy which would indicate that in April the pregnancy was about four months old and not one month .\n\n. We may refer to her first statement in Court. She then stated: · \"The. petitioner's father and his sister might be suspicious prior to the marriage that I was pregnant be ca use I was not keeping good health.'.'\n\nThis may refer to her suffering from. morning sickness prior to marriage. • ·\n\nRe: confirmation of pregnancy, Dr .. Ajinkia deposed that it was not possible to confirm pregnancy by April 3, 1947 if a woman married on March JO, 1947 had conception subsequent to the. wedding, except . _by_ performing some special biological test. Similar is the opinion of Dr. Mehta examined for the respondent. · The Cciu'it biow attached no importance to the doctor's telling the respondent _that she was pregnant about 3 _weeks after she was married, by saying that what was conveyed to the respondent was not a definite diagnosis of pregnancy: but only a suspicion about pregnancy as anybody would suspect after a woman's missing of the monthly course and suffering from morning sickness. It is .not justified in so construing what . the respondent stated in Court and what she appeared to have conveyed to the getitioner. The doctor's informing her definitely after examination of the body that she was pregnant again points to the fact that her pregnancy noticed in the first few days of April was of a longer duration thanthat of about 4 weeks. -\n\nFrom Bombay, the respondent went to Gamdevi where the petitioner's sister Sharda lived -and spent a few weeks there.\n\nLetters written in May are not of any importance. Her letter dated May' 12, 1947 to the. petitioner is on record. She\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-10 -\n\n.J!ahendra M1.1nilal\n\n1'.,.anavati\n\nSushila Jlahendra .. vanavati\n\nexpressed her intention to go to Bombay within a few days and to stay there for two months and stated: 'Then, when my jifth month (of pregnancy) will be about to be over I will go to Prantij ... \"\n\n- There is nothing particular in this Jetter. She, however, did Raghubar Dayal, J. not stay at Bombay for two months but left for Prantij before June 4, 1947 for some reason which was possibly not true.\n\nThe petitioner wrote letters to her on May 2, 6 and 14.\n\nIn his letter of May 2, he says that she must have told about her pregnancy to Sharda and that he, himself had not told anyone about it.\n\nIn his letter of May 6 he said: \"You tell Sharda that you are pregnant so that Mama can know it. Consult Sharda about food and • reading who will also guide you. So you should l)Ot become anxious at all. Convey to Champaklal through Sharda so that he may prescribe medicine for you, hence you may not have any trouble ahead.\" Iq his letter of May 14, he said:\n\n\"You must be taking good food and I think you must have consulted Champaklal.\"\n\nIn his letter dated May 31, he. for the first time, acknowledges receiving a letter from her. It mustbe the Jetter of May 12, as therein he refers to her intention to go to Bombay from Gamdevi. There is nothing particular in this letter either.\n\nThe petitioner's first letter to the respondent in June is dated June 3, 1947. It refers to the receipt of her air-mail letter from Bombay after a long time. It appears that letters of May 12 and May 24 were not sent by air-mail. Her sending a letter by air-mail on or about May 30 from Bombay indicates that she felt the urgency of commnnicating sometQ.il'lg\n\nto the petitioner. The contents of his letter dated June 3 indicate that she had mentioned what she had been suffering from and wanted to leave Bombay for her paternal home.\n\nThe letter does not disclose what sort of sufferings there were.\n\nProbably they were due to domestic affairs, as it appears that the relations between the mother-in-law and the daughter-inlaw were not good. He writes:\n\n\"If you tell me that I may write a letter to revered mother and father or write a letter to your father to call you at Prantij.\"\n\nWhy this urgency? The conditions of living at Bombay could not have been intolerable. Parents-in-law would have taken good <;.are of her troubles due to pregnancy. The urgency of her returning to Prantij could have been due to her feeling\n\nthat it would be difficult to keep her unduly advanced state 1961 of pregnancy a secret for any more appreciable time at Bom-MahendraManilal bay.\n\nNanavati v.\n\nThe next letter of June 4 was written by the petitioner Sushila lliah.endra . .\n\nN anavat' on receipt of the respondent's letter dated May 24. This letter _ too must have been from Bombay, as she appeared to haveRaghubar Dayal, J. informed him about the adjoining neighbours talking about them. Again, it is not clear what was the talk. The talk might have had reference to their marital relations with particular refernce to her pregnant condition, as it is said in the letter:\n\n\"Let people talk about me and you, but as long as we each have complete confidence over one another which is there to fear for us.\" On June 11, the respondent wrote to the petitioner. It appears that she returned to Prantij from Bombay on or about June 4, as she said:\n\n\"A week has passed since I came to Prantij\".\n\nShe states that she told her mother-in-law that she wanted to go back to her paternal house, as she was not keeping good health. There is no reference in this letter to what type of bad health she was keeping. She makes a significant statement in this letter. It is:\n\n\"She (namely the mother) asks me to take away the ornaments, take care of my health and to return in the 7th Month ... !' said I did not want to take ornaments because I would have lb take care of them on my way.\"\n\nAnother statement of hers which is of some significance is:\n\n\"My health has improved very much. Blood in my body has very much increased.\" It appears that her excuse to her mother-in-law for going to her parents' house was not a true one. Her reference to improved health and increase of blood in the body seems to indicate that she was feeling the enlargement of her abdomen.\n\nThe contents of this letter were interpreted in some such way by the petitioner who, in his letter dated June 22, wrote in the very second paragraph:\n\n\"I am asking you what is the mtmtti of your pregnancy\".\n\nSuch a question indicates that he probably felt surprised at this condition of her abdomen and having studied sex literature. as appears from his letters to her, he had his doubts how within such a short period of the marriage the respondent could have such an enlarged abdomen. This letter contains some very intimate details. The petitioner asked her to destroy it after she had read it and also to destroy his previous letters.\n\nLIP(D)ISCl-!O(a)\n\n292 SUPREllfE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 Such a suspicion expressed in his letter makes the respondent .llahendra Jlanilalwrite a very curt letter on July 2, 1947. In that letter she\n\nJr.\"'anat'ali said: v.\n\nSushila Jlahendra\n\n:Aanavat-i \"How are you to know how many months I have advanced in pregnancy. I am really so very angry with you today that I cannot understand what I should do with such a man. Do you not yourself knaw that you ask me how many months I have advanced in pregnancy. Calculate (months) in your own mind only.\"\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nIn between, the petitioner had written another letter to her on June 27, on receipt of her Jetter dated June 17. This letter also contains some significant statements:\n\n\"Now blly appears big and I feel what kind of baby would be born ... At present I appear very fat. I do not understand from where so much blood has come ...... \".\n\nThis letter was acknowledged by the petitioner by his letter dated June 27. In this letter again the petitioner wrote:\n\n\"Please write how many months of pregnancy you have\n\npassed\".\n\nThe letter was comparatively a very formal letter.\n\nOn June 28, 1947 the respondent writes to the petitioner in her letter :\n\n\"I am keeping good health etc .... Now I have to pass only five months ... The belly gives the appearance . of a big water pot and one becomes nervous to see it.. .A nurse comes to examine me every Sunday. I had once told her that something was moving in my belly and had asked her as to after how many months . these movements must be starting.\n\nShe said that my baby to be born would be very healthy because a child would make movemenfs after the fourth month only if it was healthy. I am very much worried. If the child would be strong I myself would die. How then would it be born? ... I go for a walk daily. I walk two milesone mile while going and one while coming back\".\n\nIt is clear from this correspondence which passed between the parties in the month of June that the respondent notioed her belly to have enlarged sufficiently befween June 11 and June 17, i.e., between the 107th and 114th day, counting from March 10 and adding 14 days to the tofal, that she had felt the quickening of the foetus sometime before June 28 and that the petitioner had some doubts about her condition being ._ <:ompatible with conception having taken place on or after\n\nMarch 10, 1947. Patel J., made an error in ignoring the letter of June 17, 1947 and in calculating the days 'upto June 28Mahendra Manilal to be 155 instead t>f 124. The respondent thus noticed the Nanavati .enlarged abdomen at the end of the 4th lunar month of preg-8., a;1a v.Mahendra\n\nnancy. She appears to have felt it before June 16 as she had Nanavati spoken about it to the nurse on a Sunday. The Sundays pre- Ragh b D. 1 J vious, fell on June 23 and June 16. It appears that she did • ar ya' • not speak on the 23rd as she did not say so in her letter of June 28 and said there: 'I had once tt>ld her'. She must have told the nurse latest on Sunday, June 16.\n\nTwo other statements in her letters also tend Jo indicate that her condition in the beginning of June had been such as probably gave rise to suspicions in the minds of persons about her pregnancy. These are her statement in the letter dated June II that her mbther-in-Iaw asked her to take away all -Ornaments. Ordinarily a mother-in-law would not have liked her daughter-in-law to take away all her ornaments when she be going to her maternal place for a few months. Such a r~\n\nqu~A might have been on account of her suspecting that she was in a much more advanced stage of pregnancy, than would have been expected in a case of pregnancy subsequent to marriage. The other statement is in the petitit>ner's letter of June 4 referring to her letter of May 24 stating that adjoining neighbours talked about it. Why should neighbours talk about the petitioner and the respondent prior to May 24, 1947? The talk must have been in connection with her pregnancy and its stage. The relations between the husband and wife are of no concern to the other people, except when they provide matter for scandal. This means that her abdomen had enlarged noticeably by May 24 and therefore could indicate to people\n\nthat her pregnancy was of a duration much larger than of about 74 days, which, on addition of 14 days, would be deem- ed to be pregnancy of 88 days, i.e., about 3 lunar mt>nths.\n\nNone of the doctors examined in the case deposes that the enlargement of the abdomen would be of such an extent in 3 calendar months of pregnancy, the period being counted from the first day of the last menstruation previt>us to the conception.\n\nDr. Ajinkia states that there cannot be perceptible abdo-\n\n~ minal enlargement within 3 months and 7 days of pregnancy fo ordinary cases and that such perceptible abdominal enlargement would be after the 4th month. He further states that when a woman is pregnant for the first time, the enlargement might not be visible as late as 5 months, and that a huge abdominal enlargement might occur within 3 mt>nths and 18 days of pregnancy in certain complications which, we may mention, do not appear to have occurred in the case of the respondent. On the other hand, Dr. Mehta states that the en largement of the abdomen is manifest from the 4th month\n\nSUPREME COUHT HEPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 and in any event will be manifest in the 5th month, even if ..llaAndra Manilal the pregnancy is for the first time. He did not agree with\n\nNall<IWli what Alan Brews states in his 'Manual of Obstetrics', 1957 s .. Aila .. .ica1ient1ra Edition, p. 84: .\n\nNanauati \" ...... enlargement of the abdomen usually does not Bagh.W Dayal, J. become manifest to the patient until the uterus rises well above the pubes, and therefore seldom attracts attention until the close of the first hillf of pregnancy. A multigravida owing to the laxity of the abdominal wall, usually notices abdominal enlargement earlier than a primigravida.\"\n\nWe prefer to rely on Dr. Ajinkia's statement in this respect.\n\nThe respondent felt the quickening of the foetus before June 16, i.e., before the I 12th day, or before the end of the fourth lunar month from the first day of the menstrual period prior to conception. That is too short a period.\n\nDr. Ajinkia stated that the perceptible foetal movement in a woman pregnant for the first time does not take place before the 20th week from the date of her conception and that the expectant mother begins to feel the movement of the child after the 20th week or end of the 7th month of pregnancy. He further stated that he would not consider it possible for a woman pregnant for ihc first time to have a marked perception of foetal movement by the 15th week of conception.\n\nWhen referred to a statement in Modi's Medical Jurisprudence to the effect that the first perception of the foetal movement occurred at any time between the 14th and 18th week, Dr. Ajinkia expressed his disagreement and referred to statements in the text book of 'Obstetrics & Gynaecology' by Dugald Baird, and in Eden & Holland's 'Manual of Obstetrics'. In the former it is stated:\n\n\"These are generally first felt about mid-term.:-.Thc\n\nmovements are often not felt by primigravidac till the end of the twentieth week while multiparae may recognize. them as early as the end. of the 16th week.\" In the latter it is stated:\n\n\"Definite history can be obtained. Quickening is usually found to occur between the 18th and 20th weeks. Mu1tiparae from former experience, notice the movements earlier than women pregnant for the first time.\" We are therefore of opinion that the statements by the respondent in her letters to the petitioner about the enlarge-. ment of her abdomen and the quickening of the foem fits\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\n8UPREJ\\IE COURT REPORTS 295\n\nin with her pregnancy being of a long!r duration than one 1964 starting on or after March 10, 1947, or notionally starting 14 Mahendr~ Manila!\n\ndays earlier.\n\nNamwmi v.\n\nThe only thing said against the pregnancy really havingSuaM1N Mahendra been of a greater duration is that the respondent had her anavat• body examined by Dr. Champaklal, husband of Sharda, Ra9kubar Dayaf, J. sister of the petitioner, sometime in May 1947, when she was at Gamdevi. She states that she had some bleeding and therefore consulted Dr. Champaklal who examined her body including the abdomen. Dr. Champaklal denies having done so. The High Court has preferred the t:tatement of the respondent to that Dr. Champaklal, as t!te petitioner himself had advised the respondent in his letters to consult Champaklal. There is nothing in the letters of the petitioner which he wrote to the respondent from USA in May 1947 which would indicate that she was to show her body to Champaklal. He simply advised her to consult him so that she may not have any trouble later on. This was a general advice and in view of her having suffered from morning sickness in the month of April. In none of the letters by her or by the petitioner in reply is any reference to her bleeding at Gamdevi and to her showing the body to Dr. Champaklal. Unless absolutely necessary, Dr.. Champaklal would not have examined her abdomen and there is nothing on the record to establish anything so unusual in the condition of the respondent as to persuade Champaklal to examine the body of a close relation of his. We are not prepared to prefer her statement to that of Champaklal in this respect. It is true that Dr. Champaklal does not depose to have noticed anything unusual about her condition. But that does not mean that her pregnancy was not more advanced than what it would have been if the conception had taken place on March 10, or later. A male relation is not expected to notice such a condition. We do not therefore consider any non-observation by Champaklal of any such enlargement of the respondent's abdomen as would indicate her pregnancy to be from a date anterior to March 10, to affect adversely the inferences to be drawn from her own statements in her letters referred to above.\n\nIn her letter of January 8, 1948, to Sharda, written long after her delivery, for the first time the respondent mentioned that her body was examined by Dr. Champaklal and that if there had been any deceit in her heart she could not have shown her body to him. There is no mention of bleeding in this letter which was written over four months after the delivery of the child.\n\nThe respondent stated about her bleeding and being examined by DI'.. Champaklal for the first time in her letter to the petitioner dated February 16, 1948, months after she\n\n1964 was delivered of the child and the petitioner had in a way Mah<ndra Manila! severed his connection with her. This belated statement is ' Nanavati not sufficient to discredit Champaklal. v.\n\nBuahila Mahendra The respondent suffered from symptoms of toxemia.\n\nN anavati Sb d lb _ e had blood pressure, passe a umen in urine and had Raghubar Dayal, J. swellings on the body. According to Dr. Ajinkia, there are two types of toxemia, one appearing in the early months, i.e.,. between the 2nd and 3rd month of pregnancy, and the other from the 7th month onwards, and that in the first case there is severe vomiting, dehydration and jaundice which may result in death due to liver necrosis, while in the latter case there is swelling of the tissues due to water retention (oedema), rise of blood-pressure, passage of albumen in the urine, headache, disturbance of vision, sometimes culminating in fits. He further stated that oedema, high bloodpressure and passing of albumen in urine may take place in the 4th month of pregnancy in a case of chronic kidney disease suffered by a women previously, but not in other cases. There is no evidence in the present case that the respondent had suffered from any chronic kidney disease. Dr. Ajinkia stated that he would call it a severe type of toxemia, if a pregnant woman suffering from oedema all over the body, passing albumen in the urine 'and having. high blood-pressure does not respond to treatment. In cross-examination he states that the first type of toxemia does not occur again and again during the period of pregnancy and that it does not appear after the third month, and that if the second type of toxemia appears in the early stage of pregnancy it can be concluded that the woman is suffering from chronic nephritis.\n\nDr. Mehta states in examination-in-chief that passage of albumen in urine and oedema usually occur at the second period of pregnancy which he described to be after the 3rd month and before the 7th month of pregnancy, but in crossexamination states that these can occur at any time and that it is not the case that these occur only in the last two or three months of pregnancy. When referred to a passage in Williams on 'Obstetrics', which contained the statement.\n\n\"It is a disease of the last two or three m'Onths of gestation for the most part and rarely occurs prior to the twenty-fourth week. It is most often seen in young primigravidae.\n\nPre-eclampsia is the fore-runner of prodromal stage of eclampsia.\n\nIn i;>ther words, unless the pre-eclamptic process is\n\nchecked by treatment or by delivery, it is more or less likely that eclampsia (convulsions and coma) will ensue.\" he said that he agreed with what was stated there. He argeed with the statement in \"Progress in Clinical Obstetrics and\n\nGynaecology\" by Lews to the effect that the condition 1964 appears in between 3 and IO per cent of pregnancies, gen- Jlahwdra M•nilal erally later than the thirty second week. He also agreed with Nanavati the statement in British Obstetric and Gynaecological Prac Sashila Mahtndro tice by Holland, II Edition, P. 256: NanatJati \"In the majority of cases of pre-eclampsia signs of the Ra9hubar Dayal, J. disease do not appear until after mid-term and in the majority not until after the thirtieth week of pregnancy.\" He agreed with what was stated in Dugald Baird's Combined Text Book of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, 6th Edition, to the effect:\n\n\"Sometime abbut the thirtieth week of pregnancy the patient, most commonly a prifuigravida, will be found to have some elevation of blood pressure and she may have noticed some puffiness of her ankles and hands. After the lapse of days or a week or two, the blobd pressure may rise further and albumen, often not more than a trace, can be . demonstrated in the urine. There may be a progres\n\nsive rise iIJ the blood-pressure and oedema becomes more marked. In severe cases the face, abdominal wall and Iibia are effected.\" It is thus clear that this type of severe toxemia which results in increased blood-pressure, passing of ablumen in urine and swelling of the body appears in the later stages of pregnancy and not usually before the end bf the 6th month, i.e., not during the period of .168 days of pregnancy. that is to say, not to take place before August IO, 1947 in the case of the respondent who was married on March I 0, even if for the purpose of duratibn 14 days are added to the period following March IO.\n\nThe respondent stated in the examination-in-chief that when she went to Prantij from Bombay, which was about the 4th of June 1947, she had swelling on her feet, hands and face. In cross-examination she further stated that she had swelling over these parts and also high blood-pressure in June and that the passing of albumen and swelling of hands and feet continued till delivery but there was no high bloodpressure at the time of delivery. The Court below did not act on the statement of the respondent about her having the symptoms of toxemia in the month of June as nbne of the letters on record written in June makes reference to such a condition of hers. This is true, but that does not necessarily mean that she did not have such symptoms in the month of .June. They might not have been ; very severe that month and the severity appeared in the mbnth of July. Letters on record amply make out that she was suffering from a severe type\n\n1964 of toxemia in July. It has been urged for the respondent in Mahendra Manilazconnection with her alleged toxemic condition in the month\n\nNanavati of June that her statement in her letter dated June 28 about\n\n8.., hila vMakendraher walking 2 miles a day is not compatible with her state-\n\nNanavati ment in Court and the suggestion for the petitioner that she huiiaD al J was suffering from toxemia in the month of June.\n\nThe Rag ' •Y ' statements of the respondent in her letters can be used against her as her admissions, but cannot be used in her favour accepting them to be correct statements. If she was pregnant at the time of marriage she must take such steps up to the time of delivery as to allay the suspicion that she had been really pregnant at the time of marriage. She may therefore be inclined to make 'wrong statements in her letters to prepare for any plausible explanation when the delivery took place before the expected time on the basis of her conception after marriage. There is therefore nll reason not to believe her statement that she did have such trouble of a milder kind in the month of June. Severe trouble does not usually come at once. It develops from a mild stage.\n\nBy June 4, 1947, the duration of pregnancy, if due to coitus on or after March 10, can be at most 100 days, a little over 3l lunar months, and 'according to the medical opinion, toxemia in the form of blood-pressure, odema and passing of albumen in urine does not occur after such a short period of pregnancy. It is to be concluded that by the end of May the duration of her pregnancy was of about 6 months. This fits in with the petitioner's contention that she was pregnant on March 10, when the marriage took place.\n\nA brief reference to the correspondence which shows that she was suffering from toxemia from the month of June 1947 may be made now. The first letter in this connection is dated July 12, 1947. It is Champaklal's letter to Kodarlal, father of the respondent, and was written on receipt of the respondent's letter addressed to Sharda. The respondent must have written that letter on or about July 10.\n\nChampaklal expresses worry on having the news about her health. He states:\n\n\"It is not a good sign if she has oedema on the legs and abdomen in passing the urine, and hence you keep Sushilabehn immediately under the treatment of a doctor either in Ahmedabad or at Bombay. Dr. Pandya at Ahmedabad is also a good doctor... continue the medicine as long as she advises. You can consult her and then inform us immediately.\" Sharda had herself written to the respondent on July 13, 1947 suggesting that she should go to Bmbay for consultation about her health. Champaklal agam wrote to\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRii!ME COURT REPORTS 299\n\nXoderlal on July 20, after receipt of letter from him and 1964 .'Stated: Mahendra Manilal Nanavati \"The medicine prescribed by Dr. Pandya is proper v. and I am sure that there will be complete cure. Su.shila Moh<:n<l\"' Follow her advice as regards medicine and food\n\nN~• directions. If she has given advice for her notRaghubar Dayal, 1. taking salt do follow it and if advised to live entirely on fruits and milk do follow the same because if proper care is not taken for this disease there will be epileptic fits at the time of child birth and the case will be serious. Your doctor has warned you from now by examining the urine and it is good that you have taken a warning and you have taken good precautions from now and hence I am sure that she will definitely improve.\"\n\nChampaklal's letter dated July 28, again on receipt of a letter from the respondent's father, asks the latter to inform him as to how the respondent's oedema stands.\n\nOn July 24, the respondent's father wrote to the petitioner's father stating therein:\n\n\"My daughter Sushilaben was got examined by Miss Pandya and her opinion is that she is passing albumen in her urine and that she is suffering from blood pressure. Her health is good. This is all.\" Manila!, the petitioner's father replies to this letter on July 27 and writes:\n\n\"Very pleased to learn, that Sushilabai has been 'shown' to the doctor and the medicine has been continued and that she is keeping good health. Very pleased to learn that you and the members of your family are keeping well. Here we all of us are keeping well, so much\".\n\nWith affecton of Manilal's Jai Gopal.\" The letter in a way, is a cold one. He has not stated what would have been both an expression of his feeling at the time and would also have been very polite in the circumstances. He expressed no concern and did not write that he be informed about the respondent's condition from time to time just as Champaklal happened to write in each of his letters. It is to be noted, however, that both Kodarlal and Manila! use language which could not have been correct factually. Kodarlal says 'her health is good' and Manila! expresses his pleasure on receipt of the letter.\n\n1964 The respondent's letter dated July 2, 1947 was the only Mahendra Manilailetter written to the petitioner in the month of July.\n\nNo Nanavati other letter is on the record and the petitioner states in his\n\nS1U1hila .M,; hendra letter dated July 27 that he had not received any letter from Nanavati her for a long time and was therefore very much worried.\n\nRaghubar D,, yal, J.\n\nThe petitioner wrote to the respondent on August 6. 1947 stating that he was awaiting her letter and that Champak- , lal and Sharda had informed him that her health was very bad and she was not in a position to write a letter. He asks for further news of her health by wire.\n\nIt is his letter dated August 12, 1947 which makes a reference to the respondent's letter dated August 4 which he thought was received after about a month of her previous letter. Thus it is clear that for about a month between July 2 and August 4, 1947, the respondent's condition was such that she was not even able to write a letter. It was when her condition had become very bad that news of her ill-health wa~ conveyed to Sharda by letter on or about July 10.\n\nThe last letter which the respondent writes to the petitioner is dated August 13. fo this letter she writes:\n\n\"As my health was very bad, a letter was sent to Shardaben and my father also wrote a letter to Champaklal. At that time he had written that Dr. (Miss) Pandya would be called in and treatment by her would be started; so we are taking her the treatment by her accordingly. We did not write to you for the simple reason that that would have caused you anxiety. The treatment is still continued. But there is no change. There are swellin_gs all over my body and I am feeling extremely weak. Consequently, I Jiave not even the strength to, write a letter. We had consulted Miss Pandya and Dr. De Monte and Doctor Anklesaria at Ahmedabad. So according to them poison is passing in the urine and along with it\n\nthere,.i;; also the blood-pressure and so it is likely that the case may be serious case of delivery and I might get convulsions at that time. That is why, right from now they have altogether stopped me from taking salt and they have also stopped me taking food, so as to avoid the rise of blood pressure. I am on the diet of mere milk and fruit. Also my medicines are continued. My dear, the exertions of writing even this much are causing a severe giddiness in, my head and so I now stop.\"\n\n1961 As a post-script to this letter she had further written:\n\nJfaltendra Jianilal \"They are attending all right on me here. Possibly, Nanavati they are going to take me to Ahmedabad ors , 1a 1\\ 1 , _,\n\nh d . b . viii \"'\"' n anera Bombay, for t e ehvery, ecause m a age Nanavati like this, there is not sufficient equipment avail- - ~~ ~~~~\n\nThe petitioner's letter dated , August 25, 1947 mykes reference to the letter from the respondent's sister dated August 17. ·\n\nThe respondent's letter dated August 13 is a very good synopsis of her condition and bf the reasons for not informing the petitioner of her ill-health. It is clear from this letter that Shardaben was informed in about the first week of July only when her health had deteriorated to a large extent as she said in the letter that a letter was sent to Shardaben as her health was very bad. Kodarlal informed Manila! even later, on July 24. There is therefore no reason nbt to accc; pt the respondent's statement on oath that she had suffered from blood-pressure, swellings and passing of albumen in the urin'e in the month of June and that she had oedema on her legs, ankle and feet when she left Bombay for Prantij on orabout June 4, 1947.\n\nThe doctors who examin\"ed her and whose names are given in her letter dated August 13, have not been examined.\n\nNo explanation has been given for not examining Dr. De Monte and Dr. Anklesaria. It is said that Miss Pandya refused to appear as a witness as she had not kept notes about the respondent's condition, remembered nothing about it and would not be able to depose anything in Court. We do not consider this to be a gbod explanation for not calling a relevant witness. Under the stress of oath and cross-examination Dr. Pandya might have recollected things which could have a bearing on the case. Madhuben, the nurse examined for the petitioner, deposed about the respondent's condition and that is nbt much different from what the respondent herself stated in Court and in her letters. Madhuben states in this connection: .... \"About two months before the date of the delivery . of the respondent I was called at the house of Sushilabai. At that time I had examined Sushilabai. At that time I noticed that there was swelling over the hands and feet of Sushilabai. I also noticed that Sushilabai was weak in her health and she had trouble about the passing of the urine. Her urine was examined. It was noticed that she was passing albumen in urine. At the\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS\n\n[I!J64]\n\n[1964 time when I examined Sushilabai at her house, Mahendra Manilal she had the 7th month. She was not taking pro- N•M••li per food.\" v.\n\nBwh>\";,..,, ndra As the delivery took place on August 27, Madhuben was - describing the resp_ondent's condition in about the last week ./laghubar Dayal, J. of June.' She has been disbelieved for remembering this condition of the respondent as she was not expected to remember this after such a lapse of time. We see no reason to disbelieve her when the respondent herself admits her suffering from these symptoms of toxemia. If Madhuben concluded from these symptoms that the respondent was in the 7th month of her pregnancy, there is nothing to be surprised at that, as, according to the medical opinion already discussed, such symptoms do not appear before the 7th month. Madhuben deposes that she used to visit the respondent at intervals of 8 or 10 days during those two months. The respondent denies that Madhuben ever attended on her except at the time of her delivery. According to her, a lady doctor of Himatnagar used to look her up every Sunday. This lady doctor has not been examined. It is alleged that she had left the place and her address could not be known. The respondent said in her letter to the petitioner, dated June 28, 1947:\n\n\"A nurse comes to examine (me) every Sunday\".\n\nThere is some dispute about the word 'nurse'. The original word in Gujarati was 'bai'. The correctness of the official translation of that word does not appear to be questioned before the trial Court or in the grounds of appeal to the High Court. We see no reason to disbelieve Madhuben's statement which, so far as the condition of the respondent goes, finds support from what the respondent herself states and also from the medical opinion about the stage of pregnancy when the symptoms observed by her occur.\n\nThe respondent's letter dated August 13, 1947 indicates the extreme severity of the toxemic condition she was in at that time. Doctors were contemplating the possibility of the respondent's suffering from convulsions at the time of delivery and therefore of moving her to Ahmedabad or Bombay where there was sufficient equipment to deal with a complicated case of delivery.\n\nNow, we may consider the expected condition of the child, born after 171 days of conception, as a result of the respondent's suffering from mild toxemia for about a month and thereafter from severe toxemia for about 8 weeks prior to delivery.\n\nWith respect to the effects of toxemia from which a mother suffers, on the expected baby, Dr. Ajinkia states that if toxemia starts at the end of the 4th month of pregnancy\n\nand in spite of the treatment there is no change in toxemia 1964 for a period of 7 weeks thereafter, the condition of the child Mahendra Manilal delivered 169 days after the marriage would most probably Nanavati be a still birth. s,,.hila Mahendra\n\nDr. Mehta states that the effect of toxemia in the mother,\n\nNanavali\n\nspeaking generally, is that the baby will be under-sized and Raghubar Dayal, J. feeble, though if toxemia be of a short duration, the baby may not be affected. He, however, states that toxemia starting at the end of the 4th month of pregnancy and showing no change in spite of treatment for a period of 7 weeks thereafter, would result either in the child's dying in the womb or in being delivered of on a premature date.\n\nThe respondent's suffering from toxemia for about 2! months at least prior to the delivery and from a very severe type of toxemia for about 7 weeks before the delivery, according to the medical opinion, would be an important factor in reducing the weight of the child born. There was nothing in the progress of the pregnancy of the respondent which could be conducive to the increase in weight of the foetus which would result from conception on or after March 10. A child born of a mother, who had so suffered from toxemia, after the full period of gestation can be 4 lbs. but a child born of such a mother after a period of 171 or 185 days of gestation cannot be 4 lbs. and will be less than 2 lbs. In fact, according to the medical opinion, tlie child born in such circumstances, should have been either dead already, or one which would die. soon after delivery.\n\nThe High Court relied on the statement of Dr. Mehta that though such is the normal expectation, certain children may survive on account of their \\jl).'herent vitality. We do not think that an extremely premahlre baby born of a mother who had suffered from severe toxemia has any chance of having such inherent vitality.\n\nThe delivery took place at the Prantij Municipal Dispensary, Maternity Ward. Madhuben, witness No. 2 for the petitioner. was working as a mid-wife at the hospital and had attended to the delivery of the respondent. She states that she had weighed the child and it weighed 4 or 4! pounds, that it was a mature child which was born after the expiry of the full period of gestation and that the child was a normal one. Her statement finds support from Exhibit K, one of the in-door case papers relating to the respoJ\\dent at the hospital. Madhuben states that Kachrabhai, the compounder, made entries in this paper under her instructions.\n\nExhibit K, as printed, shows that the portion of the column under 'disease' was torn. We have seen the original and could clearly read the word 'normal' and the other word may be\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] - 1984 either 'labour', as stated by Madhuben, or 'delivery'. It re- Mahendra Manila! cords 'Female child. weight 4 pounds'. The details noted Nanavati about the )nterval between the starting of the labour pains\n\n8., hila il:,.;..ndra and the delivery do not indicate that there was anything ab- Nanavati normal. .\n\nRaghubar Dayal, .T.\n\nKacherabai, the COIJJpounder, was examined by the respondent as witness No. 2. According to him, a white paper known as 'the maternity card' is also prepared along with the brown paper, which Exhibit K is, and that the white paper whic,1 must have accompanied Exhibit K was missing from the record. A photo copy of the pro-forma white paper was Ji taken on record. It requires entries about previous obstetric history and various other matters observed at the time of admission of a maternity case. There is no reason to suppose that the relevant white paper was removed from the records by the petitioner or by someone at his instance and that it contained matters which would show the entries in Exhibit K to be wrong or the statement of Madhuben to be inaccurate. Kachrabai states that all the records at the hospital remain in the custody of the Doctor, that they are kept under lock and key, that the key remains with the doctor or with him and that they were the only two responsible persons in the dispensary.\n\nHe has also stated that in the file there were some other brown papers also for which there were no corresponding white papers and that he did not charge the petitioner with the removal of any white paper from this file and that it was no fault of the petitioner if any white paper was not on the file. He has also proved the entry with respect to the respondent's delivery in the Maternity Admission Register. The entry is Exhibit 15. It also mentions the weight of the child to be 4 lbs. It has a 'dash' in the column for 'conditions of the child'. Kacherabai states that this 'dash' meant that. the condition was good. A 'dash' which is found in the column 'still born, miscarriage, abortion' cannot mean 'good'. 'Dash' in the column of 'condition of child' may mean 'good' as deposed to by Kacherabai. Any way, it must mean that there was nothing particular to note \\\\bout the condition of the baby.\n\nGokhale J., accepted Mahuben's statement about the weight of the baby and its condition but did not accept the statement that the baby was born after a full period of gestation. He considered the delivery to be premature.\n\nPatel J., considered Madhuben to be unreliable, assumed the weight of the baby to be 4 lbs. and accepted the rrespondent's statement about the condition of the baby and its being born premature.\n\nPatel J. remarked, in meeting the submission for the petitioner that Madhuben was living at Vrindaban and was leading a pious life and had no reason to make untrue statements\n\n7 S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS 305\n\nthat sometimes such persons might be bigoted and narrow- 1964 minded. He did not believe her statement that the child was JJatiend-;;;-M, milal\n\nkept on glucose for two days in accorda.ncc with the practice Sanamli followed in the Pranti1' Hospital, as normally mother's milk.. , .1 v1r, 1 d • , ''1ts111 n rt ien ra is available only after two days after the btrth of the child. .\\'amuat; The statement is said to be contrary to those of most of the - standard books referred to by the experts on behalf of the l!aylwbar D\"yal, J •\n\nparties. Madhuhen was not questioned about it and we have , not been referred to any statement to the contrary in any book on the subject.\n\nHe did not rely on the entry about the condition of the child .as the various entries in Exhibit 17 showed that the condition of children weighing 3 lbs. or 4 lbs. or 6 lbs. was similarly noted. The description of the condition of a child as good, need not have a necessary relation with the weight of the child born. It is to be noted that, according to the entries in the Maternity Admission Register, Exhibit 17, most of the children born in the Prantij Hospital weighed 4 lbs. or less.\n\nThe condition of all the children could not have been such as to require special mention. It may, however, be pointed out that no entry in Exhibit 17 shows the weight of the child to be 6 lbs.\n\nPatel J., suspected the genuineness of the entries in the hospital records as he misread Kacherabai's statement and so erroneously thought that the hurry with which the papers were produced by the Doctor raised some suspicion. Kacherabai, the compounder, examined for the respondent on May 7, 1950, stated:\n\n\"Doctor has returned to Prantij yesterday. He had gone to attend some marriage about 3 or 4 days ago.\"\n\nPatel J., however. happened to misread this statement and observed, in dealing with the question of normal deli -very,\n\n\"Keshavbhai (Kacherabai?), the witness of the respon\n\ndent, the compounder, said that the doctor left only a day before his giving evidence, i.e. he left on the 6th. The hurry with which the papers were produced by the doctor may raise some suspicion.\"\n\nThe fa.ct is that Dr. Modi who was attached to the Pran tij Municipal Dispensary in May 1959 was present in court on .May 2, 1959 to produce the documents summoned from him. He was not in a position to be present in Court between 3rd and 6th May on account of a marriage which was to takP. place on May 4. He, therefore, filed an affidavit that day stating the facts and requesting the Court to excuse his absence from Monday, May 4, 1959, till the morning of Thur~-\n\n1964 day, May 7, and expressing his readiness to leave the records Mahen&i---;;-.Manila! in the custody of the Court or such other person as the Court\n\nNanavaa directed. ., s,., h;/a Mahendra The order sheet of the trial Court dated May 2, 1959 Nanavati shows that the petitioner's counsel rt:quested the Cour't to tnkc the papers in its custody as the Doctor had come with Ragh•bar Dayal, J. the relevant papers. Counsel for the respondent had no objection. The records came in the custody of the Court in this way. Patel J., says:\n\n\"The white paper in respect of the respondent is missing. The petitioner and his advisers had the first glimpse of the hospital record in connection with this case if any one had it and it is a mystery that the white paper should disappear.\" The order sheet of May 2, 1959 shows that counsel for the petitioner had tendered in Court Entry No. 63 for the year 1947, i.e., Exhibit J. and indoor-case papers of the respondent, Exhibit K. It adds:\n\n\"Shri Mehta says that Dr. Modi (the doctor at the Prantij Municipal Dispensary who produced Exs.\n\nJ & Kl does not know of his personal (knowledge) • and he is producing the records (maintained) in the ordinary course of business. Mr. Shah (counsel for the respondent) has no objection.\" It appears that Dr. Modi did not file in Court any whit<~ paper. There is no evidence that the petitioner had the first glimpse of the hospital record and this is clear from the learned Judge's using the expression 'if anyone had it'. The petitioner is not to blame for the missing of the white paper.\n\nWhen the learned Judge suspected the bonafides of Dr. Modi and the petitioner in connection with the missing of the white paper relating to the respondent's delivery and was to base a finding on such a suspicion, he should have summoned Dr.\n\nModi and examined him in that connection and should not have left the matter by a mere observation: 'The doctor who produced it could not be cross-examined, as he produced the papers in a hurry'. We should, however, point out that what transpired when Exhibits J & K were produced gave no room for the comment made by the learned Jucjge.\n\nPatel J., was further of opinion that it was not expected of Madhuben to remember the condition of the child after so many years of the event and because the respondent herself described the condition of the child very much differently am! the latter could be expected to have better reasons for remembering its condition than the mid-wife. We may quote the statements of the respondent and Madhuben about the condition of the child. The respondent said:\n\n\"The child born to me was a-¥ery weak one. It \\vas a very small one. She was not in a position to cry at\n\nthe time of her birth. She did not cry for two days 1964\n\nafter her birth. Her eyes were closed. There, were Mahendra Manila! no hair on her head. She had no nails on her Nanavati fingers and toes.\n\nShe was notable to suck my s .. kil; Mahtndra milk. She was reddish in colour. As the ba)>y was Nanavati unable to suck my milk, milk was pumped out. That R k b -D yal J bb .\n\nI aguar a,. milk was thrown away. The a y was given g ucose and brandy. 12 or 13 days after delivery the baby was able to feed from the breast.\"\n\nMadhuben said:\n\n\"After the delivery Sushilabai appeared to be weak but th~ child was normal. It was .crying. The movement of the limbs was normal. The eyes of the child were open and the child-was taking glucose. The cries of the child indicated that the child was a healthy one.\" \"At the time of the delivery of Sushilabai, Dr. Chimanlal was not present. No other doctor or nurse was called at the time of Sushilabai's delivery. I alone attended to the delivery of Sushilabai.\"\n\nMadhuben was not cross-examined regarding her statement about the con, dition of the child and the respondent's version about the condition of the child was not put to her.\n\nThe only explanation suggested for this omission has been tha'. the respondent herself was not present in Court that day and therefore could not have instructed the counsel in tha.t regard. The expanation is feeble. The respondent was in Bombay on the day Madhuben was examined. She must have known that Madhuben had been summoned for evidence on that particular day and if she did not attend the Court tha.t day it must have been with a purpose. A party has to give instructions to his counsel in good time and has not to put that off till the actual date of hearing.\n\nMadhuben was questioned as to how she remembered these facts and .stated that during. the proceedings of the case at Baroda, somebody had made enquiries from her and therefore she was reminded of the respondent's delivery. This too must have happened in 1948. It appears to us that the reason for her remembering the details of the respondent's delivery could be the very fact which is the matter in issue in this case. The respondent belonged to a respectable family of the place which is not a large one. The date or at least the month of the marriage would be known in the locality.\n\nThe deliery took place within an unusually short period of the mrnage. It ppears that people of the locality talked about it. In these crrcumstances, MadhuJ>en could have recollected of this particular delivery when questioned about it.\n\n1964 It is very difficult for a witness to state on oath why he remem- Mahe,, J, ra Ma .. ilaZ bers a certain fact which took pla.ce long ago and the witness\n\nNanavali therefore makes his best to answer it at the spjUr , of the SuaAila vMah•nara moment. We do not consider the Jong period lapsing between\n\nNanavati the delivery and Madhuben's statement in Court sufficient R h b D 1 J to justify ignoring her statement or consider her to be an unag u ar aya ' • reliable witness when there is no reason for her to depose falsely, nor the fact that she stayed at the place of Manila!, father of the petitioner, in Bombay when she came to give evidence sufficient tel discredit her. She went to Bombay from Vrindaban where she had been residing after she gave up service and had been living the life of a devotee.\n\nIt is true that a mother is not likely to forget the condition of the child born to her, but the value of the respondent's . sta.temem depends on her veracity. Both the trial Court .and the High Court in their judgements held her to be an unreliable witness. Patel J., relies on her statement only so far as it is about the condition of the child .. We do not consider her statement about the condition of the child born to her to be worth reliance. She describes this condition to be practically exactly what ought to be the condition of a child after a periotl of gestation amounting to 171 days. The description given by her exactly fits in with the details of the descriptions found in text books on obstetrics. She was examined after the .. doctors examined for the petitioner and for her had made\n\n:•their statements. Apart from this, she could know'from other\n\n ' soui;;; es what condition a baby born after that period of gesta- ': tion should have and could therefore mould her statement accordingly.\n\nBefore the remand of the issues by the High Court, it was not her case that the child was born prematurely or that its condition was such as would have been the condition of a child born after that period of gestation. If the condition described now was the real condition of the child born, there could have been no reason for her to think that her true story of having conceived by her husband after the marriage might not be accepted by the Court. She could have doubts about it onlv when the condition of the child did not fit in with .the exp'°ected condition of a child born after that period of gestation. If the condition of the child was such as described by her, there was no reason why Madhuben would not have given in&tructions about the condition to the compounder, for noting in the Hospital records. That was not the normal condition of the child born, be it after the full expiry of the. usual period of gestation or after almost the full period of gestatin.\n\nThere is no difference in the statements of the doctors exammed in the case with respect to the care and attention necessary to be given to a baby born after such a period of gestation. The respondent was in the hospital till September 8,\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT ~EPORTS 309\n\n1947. She states that great care was taken of the child, but if that extreme care was taken, there would have been someMahendraManilal note aboui it in the hospital records and that itself would have Nanavati been a very good reason for Madhuben to remember about the sushi/a Mahendra child's condition.\n\nNanavati\n\nWe see no reason why Madhuben be not believed whenRaghubar Dayal, J. the available hospital records support her: She has no reason to depos~ falsely. In these circumstances, we are of opinion that Patel J., was in error in preferring the statement of the respondent to that of Madhuben.\n\nThe weight of a child born. is again a factor which tends to support the statement of Madhuben about the condition of the child and goes against the statement of the respondent.\n\nThe child weighed 4 lbs. Again, there is no difference in the opinion of the doctors examined for the parties that the weight of a child born at about the 6th month of pregnancy would be about 2 pounds. Such a statement is borne out from what is noted in the various books on that subject. We see no reason t<> doubt the statement. of Madhuben about the weight of that child. The entries in Exhibits K and 15 support it.\n\nWe do not see any reason to disbelieve the statement of Madhuben that the child was a mature child. The normal wr.ight of a child born after the full period of gestation is said to be 6 to 7 pounds, a.ccording to Dr. Ajinkia and 5 to 7 pounds, according to Dr. Mehta. but the weight of a normal\n\nchild depends upon various circumstances. In this connection, it is worth noticing that Exhibit 17 contains entries about 35 cases of births at the Prantij Hospital between December, 1942 and August 1952, about which Kacherabai was questioned by the respondent's counsel in the examination-inchief. Out of these the majority of children weighed less than 4 lbs. Only one weighed 5 lbs., one 4 lbs. and 8 ounces, and twelve weighed 4 lbs. Only one out of them appears to have died. It can be taken that the normal weight of the children born at this hospital is about 4 lbs. It is too much to expect that all these were cases of premature deliveries. It should not therefore be a matter for surprise and for disbelieving Madhuben when she states that the child born to the respondent was a mature child born after the expiry of the full period of gestation .. Of course, her statement cannot be taken to be literally correct. What it amounts to is that the child was born after practically the full period of gestation and was definitely not a child born in the 6th or 7th month of pregnancy.\n\nThere had been some difference of opinion between Dr.\n\nAiinkia and Dr. Mehta ex1;1mined for the petitioner and the respondent respectively, about the definition of 'normal labour' or 'normal delivery'. Both are agreed with what the\n\n1964 expression 'labour' means. Dr. Ajinkia states that normal .Mahendra ,11ani1ailabour would mean a series of processes by which the mature\n\nNanavat• or almost mature products of conception are expelled from Suskil• v:lla1'endra the mother's body and referred to, in this connection, the defi-\n\nNanavati nition of 'labour' in Williams' 'Obstetrics', 10th Edition, p.\n\nR k , D 1 J 324. Dr. Mehta agrees with the definition but would not asag \"'\"' ·•Y•' sociatc maturity or almost maturity of the child wilh the expression 'normal labour' and would restrict that expression to mean labour during which no artificial means are used. He had to admit later that labour has connection with ma.turity.\n\nWhen questioned whether normal labour could be compatible\n\n.vith premature birth, Dr. Mehta stated in examination-inchief:\n\n\"It may be termed as a normal labour, but one specifies the term that it was a, premature one.\"\n\nWe are i.nclined to prefer Dr. Ajinkia's view on this point. However, nothing much turns on it in view of our opinion about the weight of the child born and the weight being consistent with the weight of a child born after almost a full period of gestation, as would be discussed later.\n\nWe. therefore, accept as true the statement of Madhuben and hold that the child born to the respondent on August 27, 1947 was after normal labour and weighed 4 lbs. We also believe her statement that it was a mature child and had been born afte.r almost a full period of gestation for re.asons we now !>late.\n\nWe now deal with the question whether the child born after 171 days of marriage could survive and live for years, and if so, whether the respondent's child was born premature or after almost the full period of gestation and refer to what Dr. Ajinkia and Dr. Mehta had said in this connection\n\nDr. Ajinkia states that if special cane is taken at the time of delivery and also in the treatment of a child prema.ture- Iy born at the 28th week of conception, then it may survive.\n\nThe special care he refers to is not just giving more attention to the baby by the relations, but of a particular type. He has described the special care to be taken in the process of deliery and the care required after the delivery. During the deliv very the special care required is in regard to the following matters:\n\ni. The labour should not be allowed to be prolonged.\n\n2. As soon as the baby is delivered, its temperature should be maintained.\n\n3. Oxygen should be given to the child,, by special incubators.\n\n4. Some respiratory and circulatory stimulants will also 1964\n\nbe required. • Makendra Manilal' \"\" Nanavati\n\n5. Baby will be required to be handled very gently. v. . fi h . f . . l ll h Sushila Mahendra\n\n6. Since its resistance to g t m ectton 1s ow,' a t e Nanavati care is taken to prevent infection.\n\nThe care required a.fter delivery is in these respects:\n\nl. Maintenance of warmth.\n\n2. Maintenance of proper nourishment.\n\n3. Prevention of Cyanotic attacks by giving oxygen.\n\n4. Prevention of infection as stated before.\n\nThe respondent remained in the hospital for about 12 days till September 8. Madhuben does not state of any such care being taken either during the delivery or afterwards. In fact. the hospital did not have the requisite equipment. Madhuben has stated that abnormal cases of delivery were not attended to at the hospital.\n\nDr. Ajinkia further deposed that in his opinion even with the skilled care, a child born within the 7th calendar month cannot survive, and in this he is not fully supported by what Taylor states at p. 32 in his 'Principles & Practice of Medical Jurisprudence', 11th Edn .. Vol. II :\n\n\"Jn the absence of any skilled care Hunter's dictum on the unlikelihood of survival when born before the 7th calendar month remains as true as it was.\" There cannot be any positive definite statement in these matters by any one including a doctor and especially when there have been exceptional cases of whatever veracity mentioned in medical books. Possibly there had been no such case in the personal experience of Dr. Ajinkia where a child born before the 7th calendar month survived in spite of the care given to the child presumably at the hospital.\n\nDr. Mehta states that he had not applied his mind to the question whether a child born after 169 or 171 days after conception would be born alive. but had applied his mind on the footing of 184 days counted from the first day of the last menstruation. He was not, therefore, in a position to challenge the statement of Dr. Ajinkia that a child born after 169 days fro'!1 the date of conception would be born dead.\n\nWilliams, in his book on Obstetrics, states at p. 186 that at the end of the 6th month, the foetus weighs about 600 grams and a foetns born at this period would attempt to breath, but almost always perishes within a short time. He further states that in the 7th month the foetns a.ttains a weight ?f about I :000 grams and that a foetus born at this time moves its feet quite energetically and cries with a weak voice and as\n\nRaghubar Dayal,, J.\n\n~ a rule it cannot be reared, but occasionally expert care is re- Makenrira Manila! warded by a, successful outcome. Williams, however, states\n\nNanavati that generally speaking the length affords a more accurate cri- S..,, i/a v Mah<ndra terion of the age of the rocus than its weight. The weight of\n\nNanavati the child, however, is a good index of the period of gestation,\n\n11 h 00 D 1 J though it is not as good and accurate as tl, ie length of the ag u r ''Y\"' child born. The baby's weight of 4 lbs. at birth is not consistent with its being born after a gestation period of 185 days.\n\nIt is. therefore, reasonable to conclude that the child born to the respondent and weighing 4 lbs. was not a child born on the 6th or 7th month of pregnancy. This supports Dr. Ajinkia's statement.\n\nMadhuben does not state that the child was weak. The respondent states so. We do not believe her. Reference to certain letters may be made in this connection.\n\nThe respondent's sister sent a letter to Sharda on August 27 or 28 to which Sharda replied on August 31. It appeats from Sharda's letter that the respondent's sister's letter had said that the health of the respondent as well as of the baby was good. The sister's letter does not, in any way, convey the information that the baby was very weak and of such a condition as is now described by the respondent. On August 30, the respondent's father sent a telegram to the petitioner and said that both the respondent and the baby were well. On September 3, seven days after the birth of the child, Koderlal sends a letter to the petitioner. It is in this letter, that he states:\n\n\"After I had been to Marwar, our daughter Sushila has given birth to a daughter prematurely on 27th August 1947, at about 10 A.M. in the morning ......... and the health of both is very well ........ .\n\nIntimation has been given to your father by wire and through letter but there is no reply from him.\" This letter was written after the petitioner's parents had not responded in any way except by showing extreme indifference to the news of the birth of a grandchild. That, along with local gossip, must have put Koderlal on guard and even then he does not write anything with respect to the extremely weak condition of the child and simply states that the delivery was premature. Sushila also writes to Sharda on the same day, i.e., September 3. She was still in the hospital and ordinarily the mother of a baby 6 or 7 days old would not have written a letter to anyone. She writes in this letter:·-\n\n\"The health of myself. and my baby is all right. The baby is very weak............... Two letters and a telegram about the birth of the baby were sent to the respected Mamma, but there is no reply at all from the respected Pappa. Hence, all here are\n\n. d h . h . 1 1964 very much worne as to w y t ere 1s no rep y __ from the 'Vevai' (in-laws) even to the telegram.Jliahenrlra J!anilal And as I did not keep good health, the baby was Xanarati born prematurely before the full period which of Sas/dla iiahendra course is a matter over which the Almighty has Ifo•aiati dispensation. I do not know what idea he (Pappa-R 1 , -D al J . b . . b T h ag 111uar <ty , .\n\nVeva1) must e entertamrng a out me. o w om, but to you, can I write? ......... A telegram was sent to London to your brother, informing him about the birth of the baby but God knows why there is no reply from him.\"\n\nThe contents of this letter tend to confirm what we have said in connection with the letter of the respondent's father to the petitioner. The respondent and her people had a definite feeling that the petitioner and his people were not responding to the communications probably on account of the idea that the child born was not the petitioner's child. The respondent indirectly gave expression to such a feeling by saying that she did not know what idea her father-in-law was entertaining about her. Anv way, her letter does not state in what respect the baby was very weak. The expression ihat the baby was weak in no way conveys the idea that the baby's condition was such as has been now described by the respondent.\n\nFor a baby of mature period, the respondent's child was certainly weak. but for a baby born after a period of about 6 months' gestation, the baby born was not weak at all.\n\nThe respondent sends a letter to the petitioner on December 22. 1947. She expresses her grievance at not being informed first of the petitioner's return to the country, and states:-\n\n\"No one can be a match for nature; God alone stands for truth. Please forgive my mistakes if any.\"\n\nThese expressions also make out that she was fully conscious bv this time that the indifference of her husband towards her was on account of the feeling that the child born was not his. Still in this letter she does not give a full picture of the condition of the child born to her in order to impress the correctness of her implied statement that the child was really of the petitioner. That was the time when she and her people, could have placed facts and evidence in the form of either statements from the doctors or references to the doctors to whom the petitioner could refer for such information which could have supported the respondent's assertion.\n\nWhen ao reply was received to this letter. it was then that the respondent wrote a letter to Sharda on January 8,, 1948 and over a month later to the petitioner on Febtuary'l6, 1948.\n\nSUPRE:.VIE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nReference has been 1mde to these letters earlier in connection JJaliend;:;-.llanilal with the allegation that Champaklal had examined the res-\n\nXanavati pondcnt's body in May 1947 . ...\n\nSiisltita Jiahendra In her letter to Sharda, she is more explicit than what Xanavati she was in.her letter to the petitioner on December 27. She\n\n1la!Jhub;;; D,, yal, J. said:\n\n\"Hence I open out my heart to you this very day (and say) that I am absolutely innocent. I was in M.C. about ten days before the marriage ....... 1t did not occur to me, even in my dream, that an accusation of such a roguery would be brought against me....... To throw such an infamy on a person coming of a respect;1ble family would indeed be the limit; Behen:. You are kind and please think full well over this matter and bring it to end ....\n\nAs to whether it is your child or not, well, you may sec it and satisfy yourself as to whether or not its appearance and features tally (with yours).\"\n\nIt is clear Ii'ow, from this letter that she was fully conscious of the accusation against her, conveyed through silence if not through letters. Yet, in this letter, except for asserting her innocence, she does not come out with the facts about the condition of the baby and the extreme care taken by her.\n\nShe wrote in similar strain to her husband on February 16, and stated in that letter:\n\n\"I was keeping weak health and was suffering from blood-pressure and only on account of that the delivery has taken place earlier ....... It is, therefore onl, y the feeling of revenge entertained by the persons who have poisoned your ears towards me and the member> of my family. Further, if I were at fault and if I wanted to hide something from you then I would not have taken proper care of the child who was and is still weak due to its premature birth and consequently it would have died and I would have told (you) that there was something like mis-carriage. But as my conscience was clear and as I had trust in you I took proper care of it and brought about improvement in its health . .. .. .. It may well be that as you have not known me fully that you have got suspicious. But if you live with me you will be convinced that out of , iealousy and revenge an absolutely false charge has been put on an innocent woman.\"\n\nIt is for the. first time in this letter that something is said of taking proper care of the child who was weak. Even in this lettet she had not given a description of the condition of the\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE1IE COURT REPORTS 315\n\nchild at the time of its birth. a condition which would have 1964\n\nsulftccd to convey the idea that the child born was really a Mahendra Manilail\n\nchild of about 6 months' pregnancy. ll'anavati\n\n' The letters of the respondent and her relations subse-S,, shUa_ Jiahed•a qucnt to the birth of the child do not )lear out the respondent's °\"\".'.'.\".'.:.at• statement about the condition o[ the child at the time of its Rag/111bar Daya!, J .\n\nbirth and. therefore, do not in any way discredit the statement of Madhuben about the condition of the child born and its weight.\n\nTrue that there had been instances of children born after a co111parativeiy short period of gestation and that they had' survived-a frw for some years too, But such cases are few and it.may be open to doubt whether the period of gestation reported was absolutely correct. In this c, annection we may refer to Table No. 2 at p. 560 of 'British Obstetric & Gynaecological Practice' by Holland & Bourne, II Edn., which relates to Total Consecutive Births, Male, Classified by Birth Weight & Gestation Time. It also mentions still births and neo-natal deaths among them. It appears from this table that out of\n\n7.037 cases of births. there were 3 births i.e., .043 per cent with a gestation period between about 155 and 175 days, that all those three were cases of still births or neo-natal deaths and that the weight of each child was I lb. or so. There were 4 births i.e .. 057 pr cent with a gestation period between 170 and 185 days. All the four of them. were cases of still births and neo-natal deaths. Only one of them weihed 6 lbs. Two weighed 2 lbs. each and one weighed I lb. 13 i.e., .19 per cent were births with a period of gestation between 185 and 200\n\ndays. 12 of them were cases of still births and neo-natal deaths. Only two weighed 5 lbs. each. one of them surviving; one weighed 4 lbs. Three weighed 3 lbs. each. Six weighed 2 lbs. each and one weighed I lb.\n\nDr. Mehta states that a baby born 169 days after conception would weigh between l} and 2 lbs. A child whose, weight at birth is 4 lbs. might in rare cases be a full term baby. but ordinarily it was Oken to be a premature baby. according to him. and a 4 lbs. full-term baby was a rare occurrence.\n\nThe learned Judges considered the delivery premature on account of the respondent suffering from toxemia. We do not agree.\n\nDr. Ajinkia states that a premature delivery is one which takes place between the 28th week and the 40th week from the date of conception and that miscarriage means the expulsion of the product of conception before the 28th week of conception. He has also stated that the shorter the pet'i'od of gestation. th(.> more feeble would be the child and fewer would be the hours of its survival, while a child born out of miscarriage co, uld not survive even with special care because it\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\n1964 wa> not a viable child. By viable he meant that the child has Mahewlra . Jlanila~ been sufficiently developed to continue separate existence from\n\nIfona,,,.ti the mother. He is emphatic that a child could not be viable Suahila \"Maliendm even before the 28th week, say 25th or 26th week.\n\nKanavati Dr. Mehta. on the other hand, states that a child is supll.aghuba-; D,.yal J. posed to be normally viable about the 28th week, that there ' can be exceptions and a child might be viable before the 28th week and could be born alive and could survive. He said that he made this statement on the basis of knowledge which he had acquired from the standard books and referred to three cases mentioned in De Lee's Book.\n\nDr. Mehta has further stated with respect to premature deliveries that premature delivery could be before the 28th week. At first he stated that he could not say how long before such a delivery could be, but when pressed in cross-examination he stated that a 20 weeks' foetus. if ejected alive or dead from the body of a woman it would be a premature birth.\n\nHe admitted that abortion was different from premature delivery and also stated that if the delivery took place before the 28th week it was termed either miscarriage or abortion, but added that if the child born was a viable child, then such a delivery would be called a premature delivery.\n\nHe could not contradict Dr. Ajinkia's statement that a child born after 169 days from the date of conception would be born dead.\n\nWe may refer to what is stated about premature termination of pregnancy in British Obstetric Practice by Holland, at pp. 559-561, 2nd Edition:\n\n\"Premature termination of pregnancy may be defined as termination of the pregnancy after the twentyeighth week (accepted date of viability of the foetus) and before the fortieth week, counting from the first day of the last menstrual period.\n\nOn the other hand, most writers on the subject of prematurity tend to define the condition in terms of the weight of the baby rather than in terms of the maturity of the pregnancy. It was first laid down by the American Academy of Pediatrics in 1935 that a premature infant is one that weighs 5} lb. (2,500 gm) or less, regardless of the period of gestation. This definition was accepted by the International Medical Committee of the League of Nations and has gained universal acceptance, in spite of its scientific inaccuracy. Most obstetricians have seen babies of Jess than 5! lb. born after a gestation period of more than 280 days. Indeed, birth weight and duration of pregnancy are far from perfectly correlated.\n\nInfants weighing less than 5! lb. at birth may even be post mature. This\n\n7S.C.R.\n\n&UPREME COURT REPORTS 317\n\nis well shown in Tablv 2 cofi_structedby Kane and 1964 Penrose from 7,037 live )lirths from University Ma1i<ndr~ Manila!\n\nCollege Hospital records. It is seen that 470 babies NanaV\"ti weighed less than 5! lb., out that 111 (23.6 per u. ;:· mira cent.) of these under-weight babies were born at 8\"'k' Nan::: .. term or later; according to the O!dinary niethod of .- calculation. The term immaturity has been suggest-Raghubar Dayal,_J. ed as an alternative in view of these discrepancies, but it has not received universal acceptance. There is, however, more than academic significance in the difference_ because maturity as such, i):respective of weight, is of the._greatest importance in relation to foetal survival. A baby-wh_ose birth weight is 4 lb., if born at thirty-eight weeks stands a far better chance of survival, and is more likely to develop into a healthy child, both mentally and physically, than one of the same weight born a month earlfor.\" What has been said above about the viability of a child or its premature birth is with respect to a child born of a mother whose pregnancy progressed normally. The chances of survival of a baby born, of a mother who had su!j\"ered from severe toxemia for about two months prior to the delivery, are bound to be much less and would be further less if no special care is taken during delivery and thereafter. the weight of the respondent's baby, its condition at birth and its having lived as a matw; e child born after full period of gestation does, together with the other circumstances connected with the progress of the pregnancy. amply support the petitioner's . case that the child born to the respondentcould not be of the petitioner.\n\nWe have been referred to several cases in which the question about a child being conceived from the husband or not arose. Suffice it to say that cases fall into two categories. One where delivery takes. place much more than 280 days after the husband had last opporl]lnity to cohabit with his wife and the other where it takes place much earlier than 280 days from the first day of menstruation prior to conception. The first type of cases. to which reference need not be mad<), involve the determination of the question as to the period it took for a sperm to fertilize the ovum. Nothing precise about the period was known when cases prior to the decision of Preston Jones' case(') came up for consideration. It was Considered to vary much and so children. born .so lori'g as 349 \"days after the known ppriod of cohabitation were held to be legitimate, as not proved to be the results of adultery. No such question however arises in the other type of cases as the decision is to be given on the assumption that there had been fertilisation on the first day possible for the coitus between the husband and wife. The question to determine in such cases is\n\n(') (19.51) A.C. ~91.\n\n1964 whether the short period of gestation would justify the con- Jlalit:ndra Manaa1clusion that the child was born of conception from that\n\nNanavati coitus or was born as a result of some other sexual relat; ons.\n\nS\"'1tila Mal1tndra between the woman and someone prior to that coitus bet-\n\nNana .. ati ween the husband and wife. One such case was Clark v.\n\nRaghubar Da.yal, J. Clark(') on which much reliance has been placed by the Court below.\n\nIn this divorce case, on the petition of the husband there was no evidence of misconduct on the part of the wife and the only evidence of adultery was the fact of the birth of a child the period of gestation of which, assuming the husband to be tte father, could not have exceeded 174 days. The child lived, and, at the date of the hearing was about 3 years old. The medical evidence was to the effect that a child of so short a period of foetal lifo would not survive for more than day or two. In view of the fact that the date of conception could be fixed very rarely, it was considered that the periods of gestation generally spoken of were notional periods and that therefore where the date of conception could be fixed and thus the actual period of gestation be ascertained, such period was comparable to the longer notional period and consequently a six months' child might be comparable to what was called a 7 months' child.\n\nThe facts of that case were very much different from the present case and must have naturally influenced the view that a six months' child be comparable to a 7 months' child. The\n\nCout considered the allegation of the 4usband who lived quite close to where the wife lived for about a year after the delivery, that the child when born was a fully developed 9 months' child, grotesque. The Court believed the evidence of the µurse with\n\n30 years' experience that the child born was one of the two most extreme cases of premature births she had seen. The wife's mother deposed about the condition of the child which corresponded to a child born after 174 days of the conception.\n\nThe Court believed the statement of the mother of the child.\n\nThe lower limbs of the child were in irons even about 3 years after its birth. The delivery was hastened on account of an accident. The mother of the child had fallen a day earlier. The weight of the c)1ild, though noted as 3! lbs. was not more than 2! lbs., as the former weight included the weight of the towel.\n\nThe notional period of pregnancy is calculated from the first day of the menstruation preceding the conception and it is on this account that 14 days are added to the period of preg- nancy from the actual date of conception. On the basis of ' notional calculation, the fully mature child is born after 280 days. On the basis of the date of conception, the child is bom\n\n(') (1939] 2 All E.R. 59.\n\nbetween 265 and 270 days. The development of the foetus un- 1961\n\ndoubtedly depends on its age as counted from the date of con- Jiahemira Manilal ception and it is for this reason that the books on Obstetrics Nanavati mostly deal with the development of the foetus on the basis of Sush;/a rrahendra\n\ndays or weeks after conception, for a period of about 2 months Nanavati and thereafter they begin to note its development with respectRaghubar D yal J to the end of the 3rd and consecutive months. This must be a ' • due to the fact that by that time a difference of about a fort- . night in the period of gestation does not bring about a substan\n\ntial difference in the description of the development of the foetus. After all. the entire knowledge with respect to the development of the foetus with respect to the period of gestation is based on a consideration of a large number of cases and then arriving at some generalized conclusion about the develop- .ment of the foetus corresponding to its age from the date of conceptioh. It would not therefore be very correct to add 1 1unar month to the ascertained period of gestation in cases of a known date of conception merely on the ground that when books speak of a foetus of a certain number of months that foetus might be due to a conception taking place on any day -0f the lunar month corresponding to the menstruation prior 1o the conception and the miss-period after conception.\n\nIn the present case, however, it is known that the earliest dale for conception can be March 10, 1947. It is the statement of the respondent herself that about 10 days prior to the marriage she had her monthly course. It is clear therefore that the notional period of pregnancy in the present case cannot exce -ed the period from March 10 by more than 10 days. This means that the notional period of gestation of the respondent's child cannot be more than 181 days. We have, however, considered the case on the footing of 185 days which is equal to the period between March 10 and August 27 (both days inclusive) plus 14 days. There can therefore be no justification in the present case to consider that the respondent's child, though of 171 days' gestation after conception, if it be taken to be conceived on March 10, could be notionally equivalent to an age of 171 days plus 28 days, i.e., 199 days.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that Clark's case(') cannot be a good guide, both on facts and law, for the determination of the question before us about tht legitimacy of the respon- <lent's child.\n\nIt may be mentioned that Clark's oase(') was distinguished in Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886 & 1925. In re. and In re. S. B. an Infant.(') B. v. B. where it was held that a period of 188 days is too short to be accepted in law as a period of gestation on the ground that in Clark's case(') the child was\n\n(') [1939) 2 All E.R. 59. (') 1949(1) Ch. 108.\n\n320 SUPR:b]ME COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\n1964 not held to be a fully developed nine months' child but was Jlallendra M?nilai held, in view of the evidence of the experienced mid-wife\n\nNan;~\"'' to be an extreme case of premature birth. It was said at Suahila Mahendra p. 110 :- Nanavati\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\n\"There is, as I have said, no such evidence of prematurity here, and it would be straining the facts to assume that the birth was the result of intercourse that took place only 188 days previously.\" It is true that no allegation of any kind has been made about the respondent's general immorality or about her misconducting with someone at the time when the child born to her could be conceived. The mere fact that her character in general is not challenged does not suffice to rebut the conclusion arrived at from the various circumstances already discussed. The only question before us is whether on the evidence Jed it is possible for the petitioner to be the father of the child.\n\nThe facts and matters we have set out earlier clearly establish that the conception-to produce a child of the type delivered -must have taken place before Marcl:t 10, 1947, and if, as is now the case, the petitioner's first sexual contact with the respondent was on March JO, 1947, it follows that the respondent was pregnant by someone other than the petitioner at the time of her marriage.\n\nThe respondent, in her Jetter dated February 16, 1948 tCJ her husbanq said: --\n\n\"Further, you know that one has to insult wicked per- -\n\nsons in order to remain chaste. Therefore those wicked persons who have been insulted are ready to take revenge. Hence it is only out of jealousy that they poison your ears.\" If this statement is correct, it shows that persons in her village had evil eyes on her and that she had to reject their advances.\n\nWe may also now mention certain other circumstances on which the respondent relied to show that however unusual it might be, the 'child born to her was by the petitioner's marital intercourse with her after their wedding. They are : -\n\nl. Reluctance of the respondent to meet even the petitioner before the marriage though the engagement continued for a period of two years and she loved him.\n\n2. Suggestion to break off the engagement as late as January and February.\n\n3. Reluctance to abort the child.\n\n4. Symptoms of vomiting and nausea immediately after the miss of period.\n\n5. The fact that Champaklal, the brother-in-law of the 1964 petitioner did not notice the pregnancy of the res-Mahendra Manilal pondent which would be sure to have far advanced Nanavat. if the allegation were true, though she lived with himsushila v.Mahendro and was examined by him.\n\nNanavati\n\n6. She stayed up to the end of May at Vile-Parle in theRaghubarDayal, J. house of the petitioner's father and yet the pregnancy was not noticed.\n\n7. The progress of pregnancy from the beginning which was consistent only with pregnancy by marriage.\n\n8. The child being very weak and under-weight.\n\n9. Sudden delivery.\n\nThe first circumstance can only indicate that she was moral and did not want to have any irregular connection with the petitioner prior to the marriage. The petitioner has not challenged her character. A good general character does not necessarily mean that nobody could have had sexual intercourse with her even by force, a possibility indicated by her letter just quoted.\n\nThe second circumstance urged is that if she had become pregnant, she could have accepted the suggestion of breaking\n\noff the engagement when the petitioner had been expressing his dissatisfaction at his engagement with her. She could not have been very independent about it. The engagement was brought about by the parents of the parties though, possibly, with the implied or express consent of theirs. Breaking off the engagement might have led to scandals. She wrote to the petitioner in her letter dated May. 15, 1946 that people asked her as to why marriage was not taking place. A betrothal period of about 2 years is ordinarily a long period, when the parties were of marriageable age. So this circumstance, again, is of no force.\n\nThe third circumstance about her reluctance to abort the child, again, is not of any value. Abortion, as suggested by the petitioner in his letters of April 5 and 8, too would have led to complications and scandal and it could not have been certain that the abortion would not disclose the longer age of the foetus than what it ought to have been if it was of a connection after the marriage.\n\nWe have already dealt with the symptoms of nausea and vomiting appearing immediately after the first miss of the period and ceasing suddenly about the middle of April and held that they appeared to be more consistent with the petitioner's case than with the respondent's.\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-11\n\n1964 We have also dealt with the possibility of Champaklal's.\n\nMahendra . Manilal observing the stage of her pregnancy when she was at Gam- Nanavati devi in the month of May and have held that he could not pos-\n\nSushilavJfaheruJra sibly have noticed it\n\nNanai>Dti\n\nI . h h . . _ t 1s true t at t ere 1s no evidence that her parents-in-law Rayhubar Doyal, J. noticed during her stay at Bombay, from about the middle of May to June 4, that she waS\\ in an unduly advanced stage of pregnancy. Reference has already been made to the implication of the statement in her letter that her mother-in-law asked her to take all' the ornaments with her when she was leaving for her paternal place on or about June 4.\n\nWe have also referred to a letter of her father-in-law expressing no surprise and showing coldness on his part on learning of her condition in the last week of July 1947 and to persons talking about he.r and the petitioner by May 24, 1947. It is therefore not possible to say that the advanced stage of pregnancy was not noticed when she was at Bombay in the month of May.\n\nWe have already dealt with the progress of the pregnancy. and need not say anything more in that connection. It is not established that the child was very weak and was under-weight.\n\nThe last circumstance urged on behalf of the respondent is the fact of sudden delivery. The only circumstance alleged in this regard is that her father was not at Prantij on August\n\n27. Koderlal stated in his letter to the petitioner on September 3 that after he had been to Marwar their daughter Sushila had given birth to a daughter. If this statement, as translated, is correct, it shows that Koderlal had returned from his visit to Marwar and not that the delivery took place when he was away from Prantij. The respondent's bare statement that her father was not in the village that day, therefore, does not suffice to lead to the conclusion that the delivery was sudden and that no arrangements had been made for the delivery and that the delivery did take place after six months of pregnancy.\n\nFurther, a sudden delivery need not be a delivery of the six months' child. It may be a delivery sometime before the expected date. Even in such a case, no particular arrangements for the confinement might be made by the relations. We have already referred to the respondent's statement in her letter dated August 13. 1947 that the doctors were contemplating arrangements for the respondent's confinement in view of expected delivery, be it on account of the normally expected time of delivery approaching or of expecting an early delivery on account of the toxemic condition of the respondent. She said in that letter that they were going to take her to Ahmedabad or Bombay for the delivery since in a village like hers there was not sufficient equipment available. It cannot therefore be sai, d that the delivery was so sudden as to bear out the:\n\nrespondent's case that the delivery tqok place when she had 1964 just completed.6 months of pregnancy.\n\nMal .. ndra Mani!GI On the basis of the evidence discussed above and the pro- Nanamti babilities of the case, we are of opinion that th.e child born to s .. nila \"Mai.end;. the respondent on August 27, 1947 was practically a mature Nana•ati child and weighed 4 lbs in weight and that therefore it could - not have been the result of a conception taking ylace ori .or Raahubar Dayal, J. after March 10, 194 7. Jt follows that it was conceived prior to March 10 and that therefore the espondent was pregnant at the time o~ marrjage. .\n\nLastly, we may refer to ss. 112 and 114 of the Evidence Act. Section 114 provides that the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in .their relation to facts of the pltrticular case. The conclusion we have / arrived at about the child born to the respondent , being not the child .of the appellant, fits in with the presumption to be drawn in accordance with the provisions of this section.\n\nPeople in general consider that the child born, being of a gestation period of 185 days, cannot be a fairly mature baby and cannot survive like a normal child.\n\nMedical opinion, as it exists today and as. is. dislosed by text books on Obstetrics and Gynaecology, however, refer to some rare exceptions of livebirths even with a gestation period of a few days less than 180 days. But we have not found it possible to accept the respondent's case of the conception having taken place from and after March 10, 1947 for several reasons which we have explained in detail at the relevant place. We should observe that in the case before us the earliest date OQ which conception through the husband could have taken place is fixed with cer- , tainty, a matter which could not'be said of the freak cases re-.\n\nferred to in medical literature, for in them the earliest date of conception was a matter bf guess or inference. Besides, we have the feature in the present case, of evidence regarding the various phenomena and bodily changes attending on pregnancy at different stages of its course, and the combined effect of these does preclude any argument of a conception on or' after March IO, 1947. Lastly, we have <)efinite videnq,, otal and documentary, of the condition of the child at birth which is wholly inconsistent with a gestation of less than six months' duration, assuming that a live birth and the child healthy enough to survive is possible with such short duration of pregnancy. In passing, we might add that we consider it probable that it was because the physical condition of the child at birth approximated to a normal mature child, that the respondent originally put forward a case of pre-marital intercourse \\vith the husband-a story she could not sustain and which she ultimately abandoned.\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-) I\n\n- -.\n\nU!BI Section 112 of the Evidence Act provides that the fact Malundra Manilal that any person was born during the continuance of a valid\n\nNanavati marriage between his mother and any man shall be conclusive s ... hila :J; hendra proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it cn Nanavati be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to Bagh ba -D 1 J each other at any time when he could have been begotten. u ' •Y• ' The question of the legitimacy of the child born to the respondent does not directly arise in this case, though the conclusion we have reached is certain to affect the legitimacy of the respondent's daughter. However, the fact that she was born during the continuance of the valid marriage between the parties cannot be taken to be conclusive proof of her being a legitimate daughter of the appellant, as the various circumstances dealt with by us above, establish that she must have begotten sometime earlier than March 10, 1947, and as it has been found by the Courts below, and the finding has not been questioned here before us, that the appellant had no access to the respondent at the relevant time.\n\nIt has been found by the Courts below that the petitioner had no sexual intercourse with the respondent prior to marriage on March 10. This finding has not been challenged before us and appears to us to be well-founded. The only conclusion is that the respondent was pregnant at the time of marriage by someone other than the petitioner.\n\nThe next question to detennine is whether the petitioner had marital intercourse with the respondent after he had discovered that she was pregnant at the time of marriage by someone other than himself. The trial Court found that the petitioner did not have such intercourse after he had discovered about the respondent being pregnant at the tim~ of marriage. Patel J., did not agree with that finding. Gokhale J.. considered the view of the trial Court to be correct.\n\nThe petitioner states that he discovered the respondent being pregnant at the time of marriage by another person when he learnt of her delivering the child on August 27, 1947 and when he felt that could not be his child. He has further stated that since his return from abroad he had no intercourse with her and that is not disputed. The respondent admits it There is no evidence to the contrary either.\n\nThe last marital intercourse the petitioner had with his wife was at Bombay, before he left for abroad. That was between April 23 and 27. The question then is whether he could have known during those days about the respondent's :>eing pregnant at the time of marriage. The respondent does not state at that time she had such ostensible symptoms which could have led the petitioner discover that she had been pregnant at the time of marriage. The opinion of the experts on\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT\n\nEPORTS 325\n\nthis point is not very decisive. Dr. Aj nkia has stated in cross- ·~ examination that ordinarily the petitioner should have beenMahendra Manila! aware about the respondent's condition who was in advanc- Na.avat• ed pregnancy when he had coitus with her on April 26 when 8,., hila v.Mahendra the foetus would have been 157 days old on the assumption Nanavati that it had started its life i.e., the ovum had fertilised on Nov-R h b D\n\n1 J ember 20, 1946. He however added that it would not be posag • ar aya' • sible for the petitioner to detect that the respondent was pregnant if the coitus took place in darkness. He further stated that the woman who is pregnant for the first time has her abdominal tissues so tense that a non-medical person coming into contact by act of coitus might not be able to detect the enlargement of the abdomen. A husband, without having medical knowledge, can feel abdominal enlargement without any difficulty during coitus only when the pregnancy is advanced above 6 months.\n\nDr. Mehta, stated in examination-in-chief that a man having coittis with his wife 157 days after pregnancy begins, would immediately know about her being in a fairly advanced stage of pregnancy and added in answer to the Court's question that he would not know that she had been pregnant for 157 days but only know that she was merely pregnant. When asked by the respondent's counsel whether the husband would or would not have noticed the difference between 1 ! months' pregnancy and pregnancy of 5 months and 17 days he replied that the husband would not notice a pregnancy of 1 t months' but would certainly notice 5! months' pregnancy.\n\nWe consider these statements to be of no help in coming to a finding on the point whether the petitioner could discover on April 26 that his wife was not only pregnant but was pregnant from some day much earlier than the tenth day of March 1947 when they were married. Neither of the two doctors was questioned as to whether the petitioner could have known that his wife's pregnancy was of more than 1 t months' duration, and, unless the petitioner knew that, he could not be said to have discovered on April 26 that the respondent\n\niad bee~ pregnant by someone else at the time of marriage,\n\nirrespecllve of the fact whether the coitus that night took place in darkness or in light.\n\nIn this connection, we may again refer to what Williams says in his 'Obstetrics', 12th Edition, at p. 270:-\n\n\"lt should also be borne in mind that the abdomen changes .its. shape materially according as the\n\nwman 1s m the upright or horizontal position, bemg much less prominentwhen she is lying down.\"\n\nWe may also say that the mere fact that the petitioner alleges that the respondent gave birth to the child after a full\n\n1.!_r:!. period of gestation, does not actually mean that the child was Makendra Manilal born after such a period. The petitioner could not have known Nanavati when the child was conceived. By that statement he simply Sushila v. Mahmdra expresses his view, based on the fact that a fairly mature child\n\nNanavati was born on August 27, 1947 though the marriage had taken\n\n0 h b -D 1 J place on March 10. au u ar aya , .\n\nThe fact that the child born to the respondent was a mature baby does not mean that it was conceived on November 20, J 946. We have already indicated that the weight of the child and the surrounding circumstances could only indicate that the child was born after almost the usual period of gestation, though it could not be said that it must have been conceived 280 days earlier.\n\nWe therefore hold that the petitioner did not have marital intercourse with the respondent after he had discovered that she had been pregnant by someone else at the time of marriage.\n\nWe have already said that there is no collusion between the parties. The petitioner filed the petition within time. There is no legal ground which would justify refusing the petitioner a decree for deClaring the marriage between the parties to be null and void.\n\nWe therefore allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and annul the marriage between the parties by a decree of nullity. We direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.\n\n.Mudlwlkar, J.\n\nMuDHOLKAR, J-1 regret my inability to agree with the judgment proposed by my brother, Raghubar Dayal, J.\n\nThe appeal arises out of a petition for divorce instituted by the appellant on April 18, 1956 in the City Civil Court of Bombay against his wife, the respondent under s.12(1) (d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The petition was decreed by the City Civil Court, but on appeal. the High Court dismissed it.\n\nCertain broad facts which are not in dispute are briefly these: The appellant is a resident of Bombay, while the respondent's father was a resident of Prantij in the former State of Baroda. They were betrothed to each other in June or July, 1945, and their marriage was celebrated at Bombay according to Hindu rites on March 10, 1947. Thereafter, the couple lived together as husband and wife for a short while, and fue respondent then went to her parents' house at Prantij where she stayed till the third week of April, 1947. During her stay there she wrote to her husband informing him that she was in the family way. The appellant was to leave for the United States in connection with the family business, and, therefore. the respondent returned to Bombay towards the end of April of\n\nthat year. The husband and wife admittedly had martial rela- 1964 tions during this visit of the respondent to Bombay. After theMahendra Manilal appellant's departur~ for the United States, the respondent Nanavati stayed with the appellant's father for a few days, and theres,,, Mla v.Mahetulra after at Gamdevi in the hous of the appellant's sister, Sharda Nanavati and her husband. She stayed there for about four weeks, and then again returned to her father-in-law's house at Vile Parle.\n\nMudholkar, J, From the correspondence between the parties, it appears that the respondent and her mother-in-law were not getting on well, and the appellant, therefore, advised her to arrange for her return to her father's house as early as she could manage it.\n\nIn pursuance of this, the respondent returned to her father's house along with some one who had oeen sent by her father to fetch her. There was considerable correspondence between\n\nthe parties subsequent to this until August 21, 1947, on which date the respondent gave birth to a female child at Prantij. Information about this was communioated telegraphically as well as by a letter to the appellant's father and also to the appellant himself. According to the appellant, he was shocked when he learnt that the child was born to the responde!lt only 5 months and 17 days after their marriage, and he suspected that this child had been conceived before the marriage through some one else.\n\nAfter his return to India in November, 1947 he instituted a suit in a Baroda Court for the annulment of the marriage under the Baroda State Divorce Act, but that suit, which was defended on merits by the respondent, was dismissed by the Baroda Court on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The Hindu Marriage A9t, 1955 came into force on May 18, 1955.\n\nUnder this Act, it was competent to a person, though married prior to the commencement of the Act, to apply for divorce upon certain grounds including those set out in s. l 2((l)(d) within one year of the commencement of the Act. Availing himself of this provision, the appellant preferred a petition. out of which this appeal arises.\n\nIn the petition the appellant made allegations against the respondent to the effect that the child born to her was conceived by her through a person other than himself, and that she was actually in the family way before the marriage, of which fact he was not aware at that time. In her written statement the respondent denied these allegations. She stated that after their betrothal she succumbed to the entreaties and representations made by the appellant and permitted him to have sex relations with her, and that as a result of this, she had conceived from him. She further averred that the appellant, his sister and her husband were all aware of this before the marriage and thus no fraud had been practised upon the appellant and the members of his family by he~. It may be mentioned that such a plea was not taken by the respondent in the written\n\n1964 statement which she had filed in the proceedings, which had Mahendra Manilal been instituted in the Baroda Court. In her evidence, however,\n\nNanavati she has confined her averment only to having had sex rela- B .. hila \"Manendra lions with the appellant before the marriage, and stated that Nanavati she was not aware at the time of the marriage that she was pregnant. She added that she came to know of her pregnancy Mudholkar, J. only when she started vomiting, which was after her return to Prantij subsequent to the marriage. She has not repeated in her evidence the allegations that the appellant or any members of the family were aware of the fact of her pregnancy before the marriage.\n\nUpon the pleadings of the parties, the City Civil Court raised the following six issues: -\n\n\"()) Whether the Respondent at the time of the OJarriage was pregnant by some one other than the Petitioner as alleged in para 9 of the Petition?\n\n(2) Whether at the time of the marriage the petitioner was ignorant of the aforesaid fact?\n\n(3) Whether the petition is not maintainable for the reasons alleged in para 2 of written statement?\n\n(4) Whether the Petitioner's claim in the petition is barred by the Law of Limitation for the reasons alleged in paras 3 and 4 of the written statement?\n\n(5) Whether the Petitioner is entitled to have the marriage declared null and void?\n\n(6) To what relief the petitioner is entitled?'' The Court answered issues (!), (2) and (5) in the affirmative, and issues 3 and 4 in negative, and granted a decree to the appellant in terms of the prayer in the plaint.\n\nWhen the matter went up in appeal before the High Court, the two learned Judges. Gokhale and Patel, JJ. who heard it did not feel satisfied that the appellant had proved that the respondent was pregnant by some one other than the rppellant, and that the appellant was not the father of the child which was born to the respondent. In his judgment, Patel, J. observed : --\n\n\"The question then is whether we should dismiss ti)e\n\npetition on this ground. As mentioned before the evidence is not decisive of the pregnancy of the respondent before her marriage. The effect of a decree of nullity might be very serious to the child who is Jiving and who is now 10 years old as also to the respondents.\" Gokhale, J. expressed his agreement generally with the view taken by Patel, J, and after pointing out the necessity of obtaining on record expert evidence, said that the case should be sent down to the trial Court to record a finding as to whether\n\nit was proved that the respondent was pregnant at the time c, f 1964 marriage. Accordingly, the following two issues were framedMahendraManilal by the High Court and the case was remitted to the City Civil Nana•ali Court for recording a fincjing : - Su•hila v. M ahe1Ulra\n\nNanavati \"I. Is it proved that the respondent was pregnant atthe time of the marriage?\n\nMudholkar, J.\n\n2. Is it proved that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the grounds for a decree?\".\n\nIt may be mentioned that Mr. Amin, who appeared for the present appellant, contended that a great injustice would be done to him if these issues were required to be determined now. His objection was, however, overruled by the Court, Patel, J. pointing out that it would be the respondent who would be in greater difficulty, as her father was dead, and the Munim who was attending to the affairs of the family was dead, and the doctor, who attended on her during her pregnancy, was also dead. After the matter went back to the trial Court, five additional witnesses were examined by the appellant, including his brother-in-law, who is a doctor and a Gynaecologist, Dr. Ajinkya and a pediatrician Dr. Udani. The respondent examined herself as well as Dr. Mehta, a Gynaecologist and two other witnesses. Upon a consideration of the additional evidence, the High Court allowed the appeal.\n\nBefore us, the first point urged by Mr. S. T. Desai appearing for the appellant is that the High Court was in error in ordering the recording of fresh evidence. It is indeed surprising that the High Court which has correctly stated the legal position obtaining in divorce petitions, should have, upon its considered view that the evidence already adduced by the appellant was not sufficient to justify a passing of decree for annulment of marriage, sent down, despite the opposition of Mr ..\n\nAmin on behalf of the appellant, two issues for recording fresh findings by the City Court after permitting the parties to adduce additional evidence. It may be mentioned that the High Court thought that it was doing so to afford to the respondent, whose whole life was at stake, as observed by Patel, J., an opportunity to defend her honour and chastity. This question, however, did not really arise, if, in fact, the High Court felt that the appellant had not discharged the burden which the law had placed upon him to satisfy the Court beyond doubt that the respondent was pregnant by a person other than himself before the marriage, and that he was not aware of it. The two issues sent down for retrial by the High Court 'Yould seem to. suggest that these essential points had been missed by the trial Court. I have quoted in extenso the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) ' 1964 issues framed by the trial Court, and issues (!), . (2) and (5) Mahendra Manilal seem to cover both the additional issues settled by the High Nanava•i Court. No doubt, the first issue reads thus: v.\n\nSushila M a.hendra Nanavati\n\nMwlholkar, J.\n\n\"Whether the respondent at the time of the marriage was pregnant by some one oiher than the petitioner as alleged in para 9 of the Petition?\".\n\nThis-itself consists of two parts, the first being whether the respondent was pregnant at the time of the marriage, and the second being whether she was pregnant through a person other than the appellant. The fifth issue is undoubtedly couched m general terms, but it certainly includes the content of the second additional issue. The High Court was itself cognisant of this because after reproducing (see judgment of Patel, J.) the terms of s.23(1) it has set out what, according to it, would be the issues which would arise. Section 23(1) so far as relevant reads as follows: -\n\n\"In any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, if the court is satisfied that\n\n(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief,\n\n(b) the petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent,\n\n(c) there has not been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceedings, and\n\n(d) there is no other legal ground why relief should not be granted, then and in such a case, but not otherwise, the Court shall decree such relief accordingly.\" The issues which would arise, therefore, would be, as pointed out by Patel, J. the following:-\n\n\"(!) Whether the respondent was pregnant at the date of marriage.\n\n(2) If she was whether she was pregnant by some one other than the petitioner.\n\n(3) Whether the petitioner was at the time of marriage ignarant of the facts alleged.\n\n(4) Whether marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the grounds for a decree.\" That the trial Court was itself aware of this, would be clear from paragraph 43 of its judgment. It has dealt with the argument of Mr. Shah on behalf of the respondent that the\n\n:..\n\ncondition precedent laid down in s.12(2)(b)(iii) was not complim;!. ed with by the appellant. I. therefore, agree with Mr. DcsaiMahendrn Mnilal that the remission of the issues was wholly unjustified and Nanavat• should not have been allowed. The effect of this, however.sushi/a •Mahendra would be that the entire evidence adduced thereafter including Nanavati the evidence upon which Mr. Desai has placed such strong Mudholkar, J. reliance before us will have to be completely left out of consideration.\n\nNo doubt, an appellate Court has the power under s 107 of the Civil Procedure Code to remand a case or to frame issues and refer them for trial, or to take additional evidence or :require such evidence to be taken. But the exercise of these powers is regulated by the provisions of. 0.41, rr. 23 to 25 and\n\n27. Under r.23, an appellate Court has the power to rmand a case where the suit has been disposed of by the trial Court upon a preliminary point and its decision is reversed by the appellate Court. Rule 24 provides that where the evidence upon the record is sufficient to enable the appellate Court to pronounce judgment, it may do so and may proceed wholly upon the ground other than that on which the appellate Court proceeds. For this purpose it can also re-settle the issues if it finds it necessary so to do. A power to frame additional bsues is conferred by r.25, which reads as follows: -\n\n\"Where the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits, the Appellate Court may, if necessary, frame issues, and refer the same for trial to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, and in such case shall direct such Court to take the additional evidence required; and such Court shall proceed to try such issue and shall return the evidence to the Appe!Jate Court together with its findings thereon and the reasons therefor.\" Rule 27 deals with production of additional evidence in the appellate Court and prescribes the conditions upon which additional evidence can be allowed to be adduced in the appellate Court.\n\nRule 25 circumscribes the powers of the appellate Court to frame an issue and refer the same for trial to the Court below, if need be by taking additional evidence, and permits it to adopt this course only if (a) the trial Court had omitted to frame an issue, (b) try an issue or (c) to determine any question of fact which appears to the appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits. In this case, the High Court has purported to exercise its powers\n\nMaAendra Manilal\n\nNanav11ti\n\nSm Aila M ahendra\n\nNanavati\n\nMudhol/w, J.\n\nupon the ground that proper issues were not framed by the trial Court. I have already indicated above that the content of the two additional issues framed by the High Court is to be found in three of the issues raised by the City Civil Court.\n\nTherefore, there was no scope for the exercise of the High Court of its power under r. 25. No doubt, the High Court has made no reference tor. 25 when it framed the additional issues and sent them down for a finding; but its action must be rderable to r. 25, because that is the provision of law which deals with the question of remitting issues for trial to the trial Court.\n\nI may add that in view of the express provisions of this rule the High Court could not have . had recourse to inherent powers, because it is well settled that inherent powers can be availed of ex debito justitiae only in the absence of express provisions in the Code.\n\nUpon this view it would, therefore, follow that this appeal must be decided only on the basis of the evidence which was before the City Civil Court prior to the interlocutory judgement of the Hight Court remitting to it two issues for findings, leaving altogether out of consideration the evidence subsequently brought on record by the parties.\n\nBefore I deal with that evidence, it would be desirable to set out in brief the requirements of the law in a petition of this kind. The appellant had sought annulment of his marriage with the respondent upon the ground that she was pregnant by a person other than himself before the marriage, and that he was not aware of this fact. The law of divorce in India, is broadly speaking, modelled on the law of England. It will, therefore, be useful to refer to the decisions of the Courts in England. In Ginesi v. Ginesi('), it was said that in matrimonial cases the same strict proof of adultery is require.d as in criminal cases, and that the matrimonial . offence must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the tribunal of fact. This decision was criticised in Gower v.\n\nGower('). Ginesi v. Ginesi(') was actually followed in Fairman v. Fairman ('), where it was observed that when a witness gives evidence in matrimonial proceedings that he or she has committed adultery with a party to those proceedings that evidence must be treated with the same circumspection as the evidence of an accomplice in a criminal case.\n\nThe view taken in Ginesi's case(') has also been accepted in Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones(') and Galler v. Galler(').\n\nIn the first of these two cases, which is a decision of the House of Lords, it was established by evidence that during the period between 186 and 360 days before the birth of the child\n\n(') (1948) 1 All E.R. 373. (') (1939) 1 All E.R. 804.\n\n(') L.R. 1949 P. 341.\n\n(') 1951 A.C. 393. (') (1954) 1 All E.R. 536.\n\nxo the wife the husband had been continuously absent abroad 1964 ; and that there had been no opportunity for intercourse bet- Mahend;;;-Manilal\n\nween them. The child was normally delivered, and appeared Nanavati a normal, healthy and full-time child. It was contended on 0 h'l v.M h ., h h h'ld\"'\" 1 a a ,.., ra .behalf of the husband that m t ese CJrcumstances t e c 1 Nanavati must be deemed to have been born of adulterous intercourse by the wife with some one else. With the exception of Lord M\"dholkar, J. Oaksey, the view of the House of Lords was that the onus of proof on the husband in a case of this kind did not extend to establishing the scientific impossibility of his being the father .of the child. Lord Simonds. Lord Oaksey and Lord Mac Dermott were of the view that in the case of an interval of 360 days between intercourse with her husband and the birth of a child the court cannot. in the absence of further eJidence,\n\nTegard adultery by the wife as established. Lord Normand was dubitante, and Lord Morton of Henryton dissented from this view. In the course of his speech, Lord Simonds observed: -\n\n\"The result of a finding of adultery in such a case as this .is in effect to bastardize the child. That is a matter in which from time out of mind strict proof has been required.\n\nBut that does not mean that a degree of proof is dmanded such as in a scientific enquiry would justify the conclusion that such and such an event is impossible. In this context at least no higher proof of a fact is demanded tlilln that it is established beyond all reasonable doubt; see Head v. Head(').\n\nThe utmost that a court of law can demand is that il should be established bevond all reasonable doubt that a child conceived so many days after a particular coitus cannot be the result of that coitus.\" He then added that since writing his opinion he had had the advantage of reading that of Lord MacDermott and he concurred in what Lord MacDermott had to say.\n\nIt would be convenient now to refer to the observations of Lord MacDermott At page 417 of the Report are his relevant observations: -\n\n\"The evidence must, no doubt, be clear and satisfactory, beyond a mere balance of probabilities, and conclusive in the sense that it will satisfy what Lord Stowell, when Sir William Scott described in Loveden v. Loveden(') as 'the g\n\n0 uarded discreion of a reasonable and just man'; but these desiderata appear to me entirely consistent with the acceptance of proof beyond reasonable doubt as the standard required ............ I am unable to subscribe to the view which, though not propounded here, has its adherents, namely, that on\n\n(')Sim and S. 150. (') (1810) 2 Hag. Con., 13.\n\nMahendra Manilal\n\n1rtanavati\n\nits true construction the word 'satisfied' is capable of connoting something less than proof bey-\n\nSushila Ma.hendra. ond 'reasonable doubt'. The jurisdiction in divorce involves the status of the parties and the public interest requires that the marriage bond shall not Nanavati\n\nMudholkar, J. be set aside lightly or without strict inquiry.\n\nThe terms of the statute recognize this plainly, and I think it would be quite out of keeping with the anxious nature of its provisions to hold that the court might be 'satisfied', in respect of a ground for dissolution, with something less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.\" After saying that he did not base his conclusion as to the appropriate standard of proof. on any analogy drawn from criminal law since the two jurisdictions are distinct, he observed:-\n\n\"The true reason, as it seems to me, why both accept the same general standard-proof beyond reasonable doubt-lies not in any analogy, but in the gravity and public importance of the issues with which each is concerned.\" Lord Oaksey, after pointing out that the only thing suggested against the wife was that her child was born 360 days after her hnsband had access to her, observed: -\n\n\"In such circumstances the law, as I understand it, has always been that the onus upon the husband in .a divorce petition for adultery is as heavy as the onus which rests upon the prosecution in criminal cases. That onus is generally described as being a duty to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt but what is reasonable doubt is always difficult to decide and varies in practice according to the nature of the case and the punishment which may be awarded. The principle upon which this rule of proof depends is that it is better that many criminals should be acquitted than that one innocent person should be convicted. But the onus in such a case as the present, is not founded solely upon such considerations but upon the interest of the child and the interest of the State in matters of legitimacy, since the decision involves not only the wife's chastity and status but in effect the legitimacy of her child.\"\n\nOne of the decisions relied upon before the House of Lords was Gaskill v. Gaskill('), in which the birth of the child had taken place after an interval of 331 days between it and\n\n(') (1921) p, 425.\n\nthe coitus with the husband. Lord Birkenhead, L.C., who tried 1964 the case sitting as a judge of first instance, said, in regard to Mahend;;;-Ma i-•\n\nh 'f ni .. 1 ew1e:- .\n\nNanavati \"I can only find her guilty if I come to the conclusion Sushil:Mahe d that it is impossible, having regard to the present Nanavati • ra state of medical knowledge and belief, that the petitioner can be the father of the child. The ex- MwlhGlkar, J. pert evidence renders it manifest that there is no such impossibility. In thcs~ circumstances I accept the evidence of the respondent, and find that she has not committed adultery, and accordingly I dismiss the petition.\" Referring to this decision, Lord Morton of Henryton ob- .served in Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones('):-\n\n\"My Lords, in the case of Gaskill v. Gaskill(') the birth was far from being a normal one, but I think that Lord Birkenhead placed too heavy a burden of proof upon the husband. It is not the law to-day, in my view, and with all respect to Lord Birkenhead I do not think it was the law in 1921, that a husband is bound to prove that he cannot possibly be the father of the child; and I do not think that the case of Morris v. Davis('), cited by Lord Birkenhead, established the strict rule which he laid down.\" He then referred to Wood v. Wood('), in which the illi terval was 346 days and Hadlum v. Hadlum('), where the interval was 349 days, and observed:-\n\n\"But I think that the cases of Gaskill('), Wood(')\n\nand Hadlum(') put an unwarranted and increasing burden upon a husband who seeks to prove his wife's adultery.\" On the other hand, he expressed his agn:ment with the view of Ormerod, J., in M-T v. M-T('), where the interval was 340 days, and acting upon the medical evidence to the effect that the husband could not have been the father of the child, the learned Judge without saying anything about the burden of proof granted a decree to the husband.\n\nIn Galler v. Galler('), Hodson L.J. has observed at 1' 540:-\n\n\"I have used the language which I have, because, since Fairman v. Fairman(') was decided, the much debated question whether the standard of proof in a divorce suit, which is a kind of civil action, is the same as that in a criminal case, and whether the\n\n(') (1951) A.C. 391.\n\n(') (1921) P. 425. (') 5 Cl. & F. 163.\n\n(') (1947) P. 103.\n\n(') (1949) P. 197.\n\n(') (1949) P. 331. (') (19541 1 All E.R. 5:i6.\n\n(') L.R. (1949) P. 341.\n\n1964 case rules apply, has been considered by the House- Jlakerulra Manila}, of Lords in Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones(').\" Nanavati and has quoted with approval the opinions expressed by Lord Suahila Mahendra Simonds and Lord MacDermott. He then observed:- Nanavati \"It might appear from the passages which I have read M•dholkar, J. from the judgment in Fairman v. Fairman(') that the anology of criminal law was the ratio of that decision, but I think the result is the same by whichever road one travels. In divorce, as in crime. the court has to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.\" A similar view has been expressed by Sir Lallubhai Shah, J., in John Over v. Murial A.I. Over('). The learned Judgehas said:--\n\n\"1 desire to make it clear that in divorce cases, great care and caution are necessary in dealing with theadmissions of parties and it is only the exceptional circumstances of a given case that could justify the Court in acting upon the admissions of party as to adultery without any corroboration. Generally speaking, as a matter of prudence it is desirableto insist upon evidence corroborative of the admissions.\" Martin, J.. has observed in the same case at p. 259: -\n\n\"No doubt section 15 provides that subject toJhe provisions herein contained, all proceedings under this Act between party and party shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. But that provision, in my opinion, does not override the express directions in ss. 7, 12, 13 and 14 to which I have already alluded.\" (The provisions referred to are those of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869).\n\nIndeed, in White v. White('), which was a case under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, this Court has held that the words \"satisfied on the evidence\" in s.14 of the Act implied that it is the duty of the Court to pronounce a decree only when it is satisfied that the case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt as to the commission of a matrimonial offence.\n\nAfter pointing out that the evidence must be clear and satisfactory beyond the mere balance of probabilities, this Court had said that the rule laid down in Preston-Jones v. Preston- /ones(') should be followed by the Courts while dealing with cases under s. 7 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, Section 23(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which deals with the powers of the Court in a proceeding under the Act also provides that the Court shall decree the relief claimed by the petitioner, whether the petition is defended or not, if the Court fa\n\n(') (1951) A.C. 391.\n\n(') L.R. (1949) P. 341. (') 27 Born. L.R. 251.\n\n. (') 1958 [S.C.RJ 141<1.\n\nsatisfied that any of the grounds for granting relief exists and 1964\n\ncertain other conditions are satisfied. Thus, under the Indian Mahendra Mani/al' Divorce Act, 1869 as well as under Hindu Marriage Act, the Kanarnti condition for the grant of a relief is the satisfaction of the Court Sushila v.il!ahenrfr<> as to the existence of the grounds for granting the particular KanaMti relief. The satisfaction must necessarily be founded upon M11dl1olkar, J. material which is relevant for the consideration of the Court, and this would include the evidence adduced in the case. Therefore. though in the former Act the words used are \"satisfied on the evidence\" and the legislature has said in the latter Act \"if the court is satisfied\", the meaning is the same. In my judgment, what the Court has said in White's case(') about the applicability of the rule in Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones(') must also apply to a case under the Hindu Marriage Act.\n\nNow, let us consider the evidence which was originally tendered at the trial of the proceedings before the City Civil Court. In support of his case, the appellant examined himself and his father. The gist of his evidence, when he was examined in chief, is that he did not see the respondent between the date. of the betrothal and his marriage either at Bombay or at any other place, i.e., between November 1, 1946 and March JO, 1947, that he did not know at the date of the marriage that the respondent was pregnant, that he and the respondent lived together for JO or 12 days at Vile Parle after the marriage, that during this period she did not disclose to him that she had been pregnant prior to the marriage, that he left for U.S.A. in the last week of April, 1947, that the respondent who had gone to Prantij in the meanwhile returned to Bombay only a day prior to his departure, that he was aware before he left for U.S.A. that the respondent had become pregnant, and that he did not disclose this fact to any one, because he was not sure whether she was pregnant or not. He further stated that he returned to India towards the end of the year 1947 and that he only learnt I 0 to 15 days prior to his departure to India and while he was in London, of the birth of a child to the respondent, and that he was shocked at the news and began to suspect her. \"He denied having made any demand upon the respondent for having pre-marital sex relations or had said to her that betrothal was as good as marriage and that the marriage ceremony was merely a legal formality for \"legalising children\". In his cross-examination,. he admitted that he had seen the respondent before the marriage on three occasions, two of which were subsequent to the betrothal. He denied a suggestion made to him in cross-examination that he visited Ahmedabad where his father owns a house, on many occaions between November, 1946 and March, 1947. He also denied having\n\n(') [1958] S.C.R. 1410.\n\n(') [1951] A.C. 391.\n\n338 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS (1964)\n\n1!_6!_ expressed his desire to see the respondent. He, however, ad- Mah<ndra \"llaai/al milted that he had written to her suggesting that she should\n\nNaaavati come to Bombay where his sister was residing, and that he liu•ilila v . • IIahendra made this suggestion immediately after the betrothal had Nan, avati taken place.\n\nMudlw'kar, .J.\n\nA number of letters written by the appellant to the respondent in which he had suggested that they sliould meet and come in closer contact with each other were put to him, and he admitted them. He admitted having stated in his letter dated July 11. 1945 that the object of betrothal two years prior to marriage was that both should come in contact with each other so that they might be \"accommodative to each other and not for the sake of betrothal.\" He was asked to explain what he meant by this and his explanation was \"I meant that l and the respondent should try to know each other by writing letters and by knowing the views of each other. By the word 'Sugan' used in that sentence (which is in Gujarathi), he said that I meant that the marriage life may be smoothened after (sic) each other.\" He admitted that in one of her letters the respondent had stated that her father was objecting to her coming into contact with the appellant before marriage. He has admitted in his cross-examination that after he came to know that the respondent had conceived he had written to her that she should arrange for an abortion. In cross-examination, the following questions were put to him : - \"Q. In the letter dated 17th April 1947,. you have stated 'I had already told you from the beginning but you did not pay any attention to my say.' What do you mean by that sentence?\n\nA. (The witness refers to the letter dated 17th April\n\n1947 written by him to the respondent part of Ex No. 3 and gives the answer after reading the same).\n\nBy that sentence I meant to convey that I had told the respondent after the marriage when I had sexual intercourse with her that we should not have a child and for that purpose we should take precautions but in spite thereof no precautions were taken and therefore l had stated what is written in my letter dated 17th April 1947 part of Ex.\n\nNo. 3.\" He has also made admissions to the effect that he had suggested abortion to the respondent several times. According to him, she also expressed a similar desire. I have already pointed out that the appellant had said that he wanted to keep the fact of respondent's pregnancy a secret, though he knew about it before his departure to U.S.A. He had to admit that'he had suggested to the respondent that she should intimate the fact to his sister, Sharada. In that letter he had also said \"Explain\n\nall things to my sister Sharada\". According to him, however. l964 what he meant was that she should explain to Sharada\" in con MaA .. dro Ma.;1ai nection with the posting of the letters to be written by Sharada\n\nN ... .,,,, to me.\" That is all his evidence. There is nothing in the evi-8..,1;1a ~;,,.4,,,,\n\ndence of his father, which has any bearing upon the Question Na .. ooti of the respondent's pregnancy before the marriage.\n\nIn her evidence, the respondent has reiterated her denial of having conceived from a person other than the appellant She has, however, deposed to the fact that she had visited Bombay before the marriage about the Christmas days in the year 1946 and stayed in the house of Ramanlal, Witness No. 2 for the respondent, who is a friend of her father. According to her, the appellant used to visit his house and take her from there either to her father-in-law's house or to pictures or to some hotel. Then she has deposed, \"On those occasions I had sexual intercourse with the petitioner. I agreed to submit to the sexual intercourse by the petitioner because he threatened to break off the betrothal if I refused to permit him to have sexual intercourse. Prior to the date of my marriage with the petitioner, I had no sexual intercourse with any man other than the petitioner.\" She has further said categorically in her evidence that she did not know at the time of her marriage that she was pregnant and that she became aware of this after the marriage only when she started vomiting. This was.after she had returned to Prantij from Vile Parle. She has also staled in her evidence, \"After I went to Prantij after my visit to Bombay in Christmas 1946, I had monthly course. After I left for Prantij after my visit to Bombay in January 1947 and before the marriage I had monthly course. But on those occasions the bleeding was less.\" She was cross-examined at length with regard to her story that she had sex relations with the appellant before the marriage, and after asserting once again that she had met the appellant in Bombay in December 1946 or January 1947 she said in answer to the next question: -\n\n\"It is not true that prior to the marriage I knew that I was pregnant. It is not true that I deliberately suppressed the fact of my pregnancy from the petitioner and performed marriage with him. It is not true that I was not pregnant as a result of the sexual intercourse with the petitioner prior to the marriage.\"\n\nAnd then in answer to the question \"Before 10th March 1947 Mahendra, the petitioner, his sister Sharada and his father did not. kn?w that you were pregnant?\", her answer, after certain hes1tal!on was: -\n\n\"It is not true thac the petitioner, his sister Sharadaben and his father did not know that I was pregnant\n\nMuMoll:ar, J.\n\nSDPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1964J\n\n1964 prior to the marriage. According to me the peti- Jl'•l•ura .Ma.wu tioner, his father and his sister knew prior to our\n\nN•\"\"\"\"'' marriage that I was pregnant.\" v •. s...r.;1a Jlal<1ulr& In the letter dated January 8, 1948 written by her to the Nana.., i appellant's sister she had stated \"I am innocent\", and in crossexamination, she was asked as to what was the necessity for .Mwillwlbu, J. • bo her to write that in her letter if the child which was rn to her was conceived from the appellant, her answer was:-\n\n\"We came to know that a scandal was raised by my father-in-law and mother-in-law at Vile Parle and that is why I had written to my sister-in-law that I was innocent. The scandal which 1 have referred to in my earlier answer was that the baby born to me was premature and was not the child of the petitioner.\" She was then asked why she did not inform the appellant's l>ister, Sharadaben, that she had pre-marital sexual intercourse with the appellant, her answer was that she did not do so in obedience to an injunction from her husband. It may be mentioned that in the letter of January 8, 1948 the respondent had stated that she had her menstrual period 10 days prior to the marriage. The question put to her in cross-examination was whether she stated this in her letter with the object of showing that she had no sexual intercourse with any one before the marriage and her answer was:-\n\n\"Even if the woman is pre.gnant she woula be in monthly course. It is not true that the object of my writing the aforesaid statement in my letter was as you suggest.\" When again pressed to state what was the object in saying\n\n\"I am innocent\" in that letter, she answered:\n\n\"By saying that I was innocent, I meant to suggest that the scandal which was spread about the child being not of the petitioner was a false scandal.\" When asked why she did not write in that letter that this <:hild was conceived as a result of the sex relations she had with the appellant in December 1946 and January 1947, her answer was that the appellant knew the ft and knew that he was the father of the child. When aeW\\Vhy she had then described the child as premature in tMt letter, her answer was that that was because the child was weak. Eventually, however, she admitted that the child born to her was premature. The only other witness examined was Ramanlal, with whom the respondent claims to have stayed during her visit to Bombay in December 1946-January, 1947. He supports her statement in that Tegar<l as well as the other statement that during her stay the1e the appellant used to visit her and take her out.\n\nThat is all the evidence in the case, and the question is 1964 whether upon this evid;:;;;; e it was open to a Court to make aMalewdm Naoilal\n\ndecree under s. 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act annulling the Na\"\"\"\"' marriage upon the ground that the respondent had onceivd s ... Aila v.Naleiidra\n\nfrom a person other than the appellant before her marriage Naaa.oJi and that the appellant was not aware of this fact at the time of the marriage. It is contended on behalf of the appellant Madho//.,,, J. that the respondent has admitted both in her pleading and in her evidence in the Court that she had had pre-marital sex relations apd that this admission by her should be construed against her. An admission in a pleading must be taken as a whole, nd, therefore. if we are to act upon that admission, then that part of it which is to the effect that she had such sex relations with the appellant and not anyone else must also be regarded. No doubt, what applies to an admission in the pleading would not apply to statements made by a witness in evidence. It seems to me, however, that the defence taken by the respondent of having had pre-marital sex relations with the appellant as well as the evidence given by her in the Court was false. Had there been any truth in this, she would certainly have taken that defence in the earlier suit. which was filed in the Baroda Court. Apparently, faced with the fact that the child was born to her only five and half months after her marriage she and her advisers found themselves in a difficult situation.\n\nFor, having regard to the generally accepted notions of people regarding the normal period of gestation it would be difficult to convince any one of the fact that the child was legitimate, particularly in view of the fact that it has in fact survived and so would be presumed to have been normal. It may be because of this that she and her advisers thought of an obviously false defence. Would this, however, make any difference either in the incidence or the discharge of the burden which the law casts upon the petitioner in a proceeding like this, of establishing affirmatively the existence of the ground relied upon by him? I would say with Lord Normand that apart from the objection of principle, it would in the circumstances of this case be unjust to the respondent to infer or a.sume that the false defence is tantamount to an admission of guilt. If it is possible that an apparently normal child may be born 171 days after coitus (or even 186 days as contend, ed by Mr. Purshottam Trikamdas) and would survive, and if that was what had happened in this case, then in the words of Lord Normand \"the departure from the normal course of things is so extraordinary that the mother, conscious of innocence but believing herself the victim of a sport of nature, might, despairing of establishing the true defence, allow herself to palter with the truth, and might induce others closely connected with her to lend themselves to prevarication\n\n1961 or worse.\" I would, therefore, wholly leave out of account Malt..,,;;-Jla•ilal the false defence set up by the respondent. Even if the\n\nNa-ti appellant's evidence i~ believed completely, the facts which\n\n8,..,..7 v. Jl d can be said to have been established by him are only these: / ..... /;'\"~\"'(al that the child was born 171or186 days after the marriage;\n\n(b) that he never had pre-marital intercourse with the respon- MwlvJ/.w, J. dent; and (c) that he was not aware of her pregnancy before the marriage. Can it be said that this evidence justifies the conclusion that the child must have been conceived before the marriage, and since, if the appellant's statement is believed, it could not be conceived from him, but from some obe else? It was urged by Mr. Desai, apparently on the strength of an observation made in one of the speeches in Preston-Janes' case(') that where the period of gestation deducible in respect of a child deviates markedly from the normal, the burden on the husband who denies being its father of establishing the matrimonial offence alleged by him against his wife is a very light one.\n\nWith respect I would say that the argument is untenable. When the law places the burden of proof upon a party it .requires that party to addud~ evidence in support of his allegation, unless he is relieved of the necessity to do so by reason of admissions made by or in the evidence adduced on behalf of his opponent. The law does not speak of the quantum of burden but only of its incidence and to my mind it is mixing up the concepts of the incidence of burden of proof with that of the discharge of the burden to say that in one case it is light and in another heavy. Looked at that way, the argument would amount, in effect, to be that the appellant has fully discharged the burden of proving h!s wife's pre-marital conception because, admittedly, the child was born only 171 or at most 186 days after the marriage. While it would be relevant to bear in mind the fact that the child was born within 171 or 186 days of the marriage for deciding the question whether the conception was pre-marital, other relevant factors and circumstances cannot be excluded. For, it cannot be assumed that the delivery was normal, the child was born at the end of the full period, that it was a normal and mature child, that the mother maintained normal health throughout the period and so on. Again, there is no evidence whatsoever that the respondent was a woman of loose character.\n\nOn the other hand, such little evidence as there is bearing on the point would show that the respondent was a member of a family which had strong ideas regarding association between betrothed couples and was herself reluctant even to meet the appellant during the long period of their betrothal.\n\nThere is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the respondent cold, have had an opportunity of coming in contact with male persons at Prantij, where she lived before her marriage.\n\n(') [1951] A.C. 391.\n\nThe second thing is that if as contended on behalf of he\n\n19GI .appellant, the respondent's delivery was after the full penod .lfahendra , Jf,, 11;/al of gestation, her pregnancy must have been of about four Xanavati months' duration at the time of the marriage. If that were,. h'l \";~ , d • • 1Jlfo i a ..ua-11en ra so it is difficult to beheve that this fact would not come to Nanavati\n\nth~ notice of the female relatives of the appellant or the appellant himself, or of Dr. Champaklal the appellant's brother-in- Jfwllwlkar, J. law who has been found by the High Court to have examined her.\n\nMoreover, had that been so, she would not have shown readiness to break off her engagement till as late as in February, 1947 and thus taken the risk of becoming an unmarried mother. The third thing is that if the respondent's nausea started three weeks after returning to Prantij, how could it be related to a pregnancy of five months' duration? Fourthly, if the respondent had her menstrual period 10 days .before the marriage, then despite what she herself says, how could she be said to be pregnant at that time? Indeed, the progress of the pregnancy as appearing from the evidence which was not challenged before us is consistent only with post-marital conception. There is also the circumstance that despite exhortation by the appellant she refrained from having an abortion, which is more consistent with the pregnancy being post-marital than pre-marital.\n\nAs against this, all that is relied upon on behalf of the appellant is the circumstance that it would be against the generally accepted notions of mankind to hold that a normal child would be delivered after 171 or 186 days after conception. Can it reasonably be said that this circumstance is sufficient in itself to outweigh the other circumstances taken cumulatively?\n\nAt the stage with which I am dealing, there was no medical evidence in the case.\n\nBut it was said that the live birth of a child 171 or 186 days after conception is impossible and it must be presumed that the child was conceived before marriage and further that such a presumption can be competently drawn even in a proceeding of this nature.\n\nIf the birth of an apparently normal child 171 or 186 days after C?nceI?tion is .an impossible phenomenon and if its impossib1hty 1s notorious, then alone •a Court can take notice of it and the question of drawing a presumption would arise. All that can be said. is that such an occurrence can at best be said to be unusual; but it is a far cry to say that it would be impossible. No doubt, courts have taken notice of the fact that the normal period of gestation is 280 days, but the courts have also taken notice of the fact that there are abnormal periodr of gestation depending upon various factors. It would appear from the medical evidence in this case that one of such factors is a short cycle of menstruation. Another is that where the\n\nmoter is suffering from oedema and high blood pressure and\n\npasrng . albumen in her urine the period of gestation of the child will be shortened (see evidence of Dr. B. S. Mehta).\n\n. 1964 There may also be other factors which have not been brought Mah<ftd;;-Mani/al out in the evidence or which may not have yet come to the Nanavati notice of obstetricians.\n\nTherefore, while the courts ought Sush r v.M hendra in cai; es which largely turn upon medical evidence, to have\n\n1-~ •• ,,., f regard to the existing state of medical knowledge they should not overlook the fact that there is still a good deal which is Mu1holkar, J, not known.\n\nSo when a court is called upon to decide a matter like the one before us mainly, if not wholly, on the opinion of medical men it must proceed warily.\n\nMedical opinion even of men of great experience and deep knowledge is after all a generalisation founded upon the observation of particular instances, however numerous they may be. When further the Court finds that in individual cases departure from the norm has in fact been observed by some experts and when again the experts themselves do not speak with the same voice the need for circumspection by the court becomes all the more necessary. It may land itself into an error involving cruel consequences to innocent beings if it were to treat the medical opinion as decisive in each and every case. The responsibility for the decision of a point arising in a case is solely upon the court and wjlile it is entitled, nay bound, to consider all the relevant material before it, it would be failing in its duty if instead, it acts blindly on such opinion and in disregard of other relevant materials placed before it.\n\nInitially no attempt was ever made before the City Civil Cnurt to adduce any scientific evidence i.e., evidence of experts, and in the absence of such evidence, can it be said that there was anything else of which the City Civil Court ought to have taken judicial notice? Should it have drawn any presumption? The only relevant provisions regarding presumption are ss. l 12 and l 14 of the Evidence Act. Section 112 reads thus:\n\n\"The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.\" It refers to the upper limit of the duration of pregnancy for the purpose of determining the legitimacy of a child but not to the lower limit. Section 114 enables the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, etc., in their relation to facts of the particular case. The question would then be whether frarn the circumstance that the child was born five and half months or so after the marriage it could be presumed to have been conceived before the\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nITTJPHEl\\iE COURT REPORTS 345\n\nmarriage, regard being had to the common course of natural 196' events. If the only fact known was that the child was born Mahendra , Hanilal , on August 27, 1947 and nothing else was. known, it would be Nanavati open to the Court to presume that it was conceived so many Susliila v:l!akeodra days prior to its birth. If, however, in addition to this there Na,,;.vati was evidence to show that the mother was suffering from Mt11.lMlkar, J. eclempsis or that the child was weak and premature such a presumption would not arise, In this case, there is evidence of both these facts.\n\nThis consists of the testimony of the respondent herself and of her letter to the appellant, Ex. 6 dated August 13. 1947 and of that to Sharadaben, Ex. F dated September 3, 1947 produced by the appellant. This is further supported by the letters Ex. 11 written by Dr. Champaklal to the respondent's father on July 12; 1947 and September 20, 1947. It would, therefore, not be legitimate to raise the presumption that the child was born after the normal period of gestation and must, therefore, have been conceived before the marriage.\n\nSuch was the material before the City Civil Court at the conclusion of the trial and before High Court when it first heard the appeal. This material is insufficient for discharging the burden placed on the petitioner bys. 23 of the Act. On the basis of this material, no Court could reasonably come to a finding that the respondent was pregnant at the time of her marriage and that, therefore, the appellant was entitled to the annulment of the marriage.\n\nAs already pointed out by me, this is what the High Court itself felt, and having formed this view, it is a matter of surprise to me that the High Court should have proceeded to frame additional issues and send them down for findings to the City Civil Court. The only thing the High Court could properly do .was to allow the appeal and dismiss the appellant's petition for annulment of the marriage. Now, the High Court has, after receipt of the additional evidence and the fresh findings of the City Civil Court accepted one of those findings and dismissed the appellant's petition. If, therefore, I am right in my view that the letting in of the additional evidence for which the appellant had not even asked, was not permissible by law, then upon !llY v.1e~ that the evidence originally adduced in the proceedmgs is madequate for the purpose of granting the relief under s. 23 o.f the Act, the appeal must be dismissed.\n\nI would accordmgly dismiss it with costs in this Court, and direct that the appellant shall pay the respondent's costs in the High Court as well as in the City Civil Court.\n\nThis really ends the matter, but as my learned brother Raghubar Dayal J., has considered the medical and other evidence in great detail, I should at least make a brief reference. to it, even though, in my view, it has been illegally :ad1mtted. I will only refer to the evidence of those witnesses\n\n346 SUPREl\\11~ COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 upon whose statements reliance was placed before us by one\n\nM h d-. -M .1 1 party or the other.\n\nOne is Madhuben, who claims to have a ';\";::,,..,; \"\"'\" been working in the Prantij Municipal Dispensary from 1939\n\nSuski/a v. Mahendra to ld955. Shedsahid thhat shhedattendd tdo hthe delivery ohf thbe fresl\\'rmavati pon ent, an t at s e a examme er two mont s e ore the date of delivery, when she noticed swelling all over her Mudholkrtr, J. hands and feet.\n\nShe also says that the respondent had adva need seven months in the pregnancy when she first examined her and that the weight of the child which was born was 4 to 4} lbs. According to her, it' was a mature-child born after the full period of gestation.\n\nHer evidence was discarded not only by the High Court but also by the City Civil Court on the ground that she was deposing to these facts 12 years after the delivery is supposed to have occurred, and deposed without reference to any records made by her. No doubt. the Hospital Indoor case paper, Ex. K. was produced by a witness, Kacharabai, also examined at that stage; but in the absence of a white paper, which is normally a part of this particular record, it loses its value .. It is true that there was no crossexamination on behalf of the respondent regarding Madhubrn's statement that she had examined the respondent two months before the delivery, but it seems to me that from the fact that she deposed 12 years after the event and the further fact that she had to attend to at least 150 labour cases every year-a total of 2,400 cases during the time she worked in the hospital-her evidence cannot be regarded otherwise than as artificial. Indeed, she had long ceased to be in the service of the hospital. , and had even left Prantij, before she was summoned as a witness in the case.\n\nAccording to her, she was contacted by some bania and it is obvious that she has been induced to speak to facts which would assist the appellant in this case. Her evidence was rightly rejected by the courts below.\n\nThe next witness is the appellant himself. He has stated in his evidence that his case was that the child born to the respondent was born after the expiration of the full period of gestation, and that the respondent must have conceived somewhere in November or December, 1946. He has, however, admitted that when he had sex relations with the respondent, her clothes used to be removed, though he said that lights used to be switched off in the room in which they slept.\n\nWe cannot lose sight of the fact that in Bombay after sunset the streets are well illuminated and since the windows are usually kept open the light coming from outside is sufficient to illuminate the rooms adjacent to the streets. They therefore are not totally dark even at night.\n\nApart from that, the appellant has admitted that he did not feel anything abnormal when he came in contact with her. If her pregnancy had actually advanced to four months, in the normal course it would have been possible for him to notice her condition.\n\nThen there is the evidence of Dr. Ajinkya. He has de- 1964\n\nposed to a large number of things, and the only points which Mahendra M••ilal it is necessary to mention are: (a) the normal period of gesta- Nanavah tion is 280 days, which period is calculated from the first day sushila vMahendra of the last menstrual period; (b) where the hospital record Na114vati shows that the woman delivered of a child has normal labour Yudholhr, J. and the child weighed 4 lbs and is living, it must have been conceived 270 days before the date of birth; (c) if a child is born within 169 days from the date of marriage it would not be of sufficient maturity to survive; (d) confirmation of a pregnancy within three weeks of conception is possible only by a biological test; (e) abdominal enlargement would be perceptible after the fourth month of pregnancy; (f) viability is described as the critical period of maturity and that this period is the 28th week of conception and explained that the viable period is called critical period because it denotes the development of the child's tissues to the extent that it can have independent existence from its mother only after that and not before; and (g) a child born after the 28th week from concep: tion would survive when special care and treatment is given to it.\n\nHe has then described the special care which has to be taken in regard to such child. The following passage from Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Vol 2, I Ith Edn. p. 32 was put to him:\n\n\"'It was the opinion of William Hunter that few children born before 7th calendar month (or 210 days) are capable of living to manhood, but with advances in methods of Neonatal Resuscitation and maintenance, this dictum has gradually receded into history. It remains, nevertheless, that the less mature the infant the less likely is it to survive and the critical period of maturation appears to be somewhere between the 5th and 6th month. In the absence of any skilled care, Hunter's dictum on the likelihood of survival when born before the 7th calendar month remains as true as it was.\" According to him, this dictum was not wholly true, and what was attributed to Hunter was really the opinion of the author.\n\nI may mention here that Dr. Mehta has agreed with the above quotation from Taylor's book. Now, since the month of pregnancy is a lunar month the respondent's child which was born 26 weeks and four days after the marriage could be said to be one born. in the 7th month. The fact that such a child has survived its birth is no significant evidence of maturity. Taylor points out .that though infants born before the seventh month of pregnancy are less likely to survive they commonly do so. The following cases of survival of less mature infants are referred to in this connection: '\n\n1964 Bernardi described the survival of a I lb. 9 oz. infant in MaMndra Mm.ilal 1951, and Nanayakkara, in the same year, recorded a birth\n\nNana..ii at I lb. 4 oz. which survived. ' s ... h'';,.!,-:::; rra MacDonald reported the survival of a 14 in. long 2 lb, 7 oz. infant-thought to be a gestation of 6 to 61 months-- Mudlwlkar, J. that, six months later, weighed 5 lb. 6! oz.\n\n• The considerable experience of Victoria Crosse in problems of prematurity resulted in the publication of the follow\" ing table, emphasising the high mortality of prematurity:\n\nWeight of Infant (lb) Percentage leaving Hospital.\n\n0.2 3 2-3 27 3-4 60 4-5 78 5-5! 94\n\nThe author then refers to a case attended by Barker in which a female child born 22 weeks after intercourse was observed by him to have attained the age of I 1. Similarly the author refers to a case from America when a child born 192 days after intercourse was found alive at the time of report which was 16 months after its birth. In the well known Kinghorm case the doubt cast on the legitimacy of a child born 174 days after the marriage between the parents was found not to have been substantiated.\n\nIt would be convenient to quote here two passages from the article by J. H. Peel at p. 557 onwards of British Obstetric Practice (22nd edn.) on \"Duration of Pregnancy and its variations\". He begins by saying that the problem of the exact duration of pregnancy has not yet been solved that this is lfue to a large number of variable factors; He points out that the common method of calculating the date of delivery ignores all the variables. Dealing with premature termination of pregnancy he says: ·\n\n\"Premature termination of pregnancy may be defined as termination of the pregnancy after the twentyeighth week (accepted date of viability of the foetusl and before the fortieth week. counting from the first day of the last menstrual period. Orr the other hand, most writers on the subject of prematurity tend to define the condition in terms of the weight of the baby rather than in terms of the maturity of the pregnancy. It was first Iajd down by the American Academy of Pediatrics in 1935 that a premature infant is one that weighs 5! lbs.\n\nodess. regardless of the period of gestation. This 196' definition was accepted by the International Medi-ya1ie,., i;:;,-Manilar.\n\ncal Committee of the League of Nations and has Nanavaii gainc:<l universal acceptance, in .site of its scienti-S\"8Aila \"Mahentira fie inaccuracy. Most obstetnc1ans have seen Nanavati babies of less than 5! lbs. born after a gestation period of more than 280 days. Indeed, birth Mudholkar, J .. weight and duration of pregnancy are far from perfectly correlated. Infants weighing less than 5!\n\nlb. at birth may even be postmature. This is well shown in Table 2 constructed by Kane and Penrose from 7,037 live births from University ColJege Hospital records. It is seen that 470 babies weighed less than 5! lb., but that 111 (23.6 per cent) of these underweight babies were born at term or later, according to the ordinary method of calculation. The term immaturity has been suggested as an alternative in view of these discrepancies, but it has not received universal acceptance. There is, hbwever, more than academic significance in the difference, because maturity as such, irrespective of weight, is of the greatest importance in relation to foetal survival.\n\nA baby whose birth weight is 4 lb.; if born at thirty-eight weeks stands a far better chance of survival, and is more likely to develop into a healthy child, both mentally and physically than one of the same weight born a month earlier.\"\n\nI am not reproducing the table constructed by Kane and Penrose but I may only mention that the table shows a few cases of deliveries in which the duration of pregnancy was 177 days, though they ended either in still births or neonatal deaths. The conditions associated with premature labour are many and varied and Peel has classified them thus:\n\n\"(1) Maternal causes. (a) Pre-existing (b) Complications of Pregnancy.\n\n(2) Foetal and Placental causes.\n\n(3) Idiopathic causes.\"\n\nHe hasthen dealt with these causations of premature labour but I would content myself by quoting a portion of what he has said regarding 'Idiopathic causes'. This is what he says:\n\n\"In about 50 per cent of premature labours no definite cause can be found. Thus Sandifer (1944); analys-· ing premature births at Queen Charlottee's Hospital, found no definite cause in 372 out of a totaf of 681 spontaneous premature labours.\n\n1964 . : ....... The incidence of prematurity is without Mahendra Manilal Nanavati\n\ndoubt correlated with nutrition dependent upon social status.\" v.\n\nSUBhila Ma'hendra.\n\nNanavati What does all this show? It brings out the fact that while\n\nMudholkar, J. the natural phenomenon of human birth follows a general pattern it does not do so invariably. There are variations in it. A few have been recorded but in the nature of things the observations cannot be exhaustive, bearing in mind the fact that every minute a new human is being born in this world-or may be even more than one. Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act makes the opinion of scientists relevant when the court has to decide a point of science. But it does not make the opinions conclusive. Therefore, while the courts ought to pay due regard to the existing knowledge of scientists it does not necessarily follow that the opinions expressed by scientists must be always accepted without scrutiny.\n\nEvery phenomenon is the result of numerous factors and where all such factors are known to science an opinion of an expert concerning the particular phenomenon ought ordinarily to be accepted. . But when all the factors which come into play in a phenomenon are not known, an uncritical accep tance of an expert's opinion would be a dangerous thing.\n\nMedical scientists do not Jay claim to a knowledge of every factor involved in human birth. One of the factors they have to contend with is the operation of the life principle. The mystery of its behaviour has yet to be unravelled and, therefore, if an expert makes a dogmatic assertion about any matter concerning child-birth dismissing contrary opinions based upon the observations of departures from the so-called norm with supersilious disdain as Dr. Ajinkya has done or is unable to give a satisfactory explanation for the departure from the normal observed by other scientists, I would put aside his opinion on the ground that his whole approach is unscientific.\n\nIn this evidence Dr. Ajinkya has further deposed about toxaemia in pregnancy, enlargement of abdomen, weight of the child born after the full period of gestation. When he was asked the question: \"If toxaemia starts at the end of 4th month of pregnancy and in spite of the treatment, there is no change in toxaemia for a period of seven weeks thereafter what would be the condition of the child born 169 days after marriage?\" His answer was, \"most probably it would be a still birth.\" From this last statement of the witness it would appear that if, when the respondent's toxaemia as evidenced by vomiting and nausea started,. she was in the fourth month of pregnancy and not in the second month of pregnancy the child delivered by her on August 27, 1947 would be still born 'but in fact it was alive and. is now 16 years of age.\n\n7 SC.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT.3 351\n\nThe following passage from Mody's Medical Jurispru- 1964\n\ndence and Toxicology, 12th edn. p. 305 was put to him: Mahendra Manifal \" Nanava.ti. \"It has eei: observed in women whose. intermenstrual Bmhila vMaliendra\n\nperiod 1s shorter than the usual tlille, pregnancy Nanavati has terminated in the 8th or 9th month or even earlier the child having attained full develop- Mudhalkar, J. ment.\" (Italics are mine).\n\nDr. Ajinkya, however, expressed disagreement with it.\n\nAccording to him, the weight of the child born in the 5th or 6th month after the marriage would be 2! lbs. and the child would not survive, whereas here the evidence, if accepted, is that the weight of the child was 4 to 4! lbs. In the table constructed by Kane and Penrose three cases have been recorded in which the infant born in the 7th month of pregnancy weighed between 5 and 6 lbs. Dr. Ajinkya's opinion cannot, therefore, be accepted. He also said that if a pregnant woman is suffering from oedema all over the body, is passing albumen in the urine, has high blood pressure and does not respond to treatment, it would be a severe type of toxaemia and the child born to her would be still-born. If this opinion is accepted, then considering it along with the fact that the child born to the respondent is still alive, the evidence of Madhuben that the respondent was suffering from eclempsia and therefore she had to attend on her for two months before the delivery stands falsified.\n\nThe witness has also said that the period of gestation is usually counted in lunar months, meaning a month of 28 days and that as doctors do not know the date of the fruitful coitus, they calculate the period of gestation from the first day of the last menstruation of the woman. As regards nausea during pregnancy, he said that morning sickness occurs in the\n\n1st or 2nd month and has expressed agreement with the following passage from Mody's Text Book:\n\n\"Nausea or vomiting usually as a sign of pregnancy, most frequently occurs soon after the woman rises from bed in the morning. It commences about the beginning of the second month and lasts generally till the end of the fourth month. It may, however, commence soon after conception.\"\n\nAnother passage from Mody was also put to him.\n\nA passage from Taylor, Vol. 2, 6th ed. at p. 152 was read out to him. It runs as follows: -\n\n\"It would be in the highest degree unjust to impute illegitimacy to offspring, or a want of chastity to parents merely from the fact of a six months child being born living and surviving its birth. There are, indeed, no justifiable medical grounds for\n\nMahendra Manila!\n\nNanavati\n\nIS!Uhi/, a Ma1\".dra\n\nNanavatt\n\n. Jludholkar, J.\n\nadopting such an opinion-a fact clearly brought out by the answer to a question put to the principal medical witness in favour of the alleged antenuptial conception. He admitted that he had himself seen the case of a six months child who had survived for several days. He could not assign any reason why, if after such a period of gestation it is possible to prolong life for days, it should not be possible to extend it to months.\"\n\nHis only answer was that he was aware of this case, and observed: \"If such speculation can take you away frO)Il truth in one direction, it may also take you away from truth in the other direction.\" In re-examination, the following passage from Taylor's Book, 2nd Vol. 10th ed. at p. 37 was shown to him:\n\n\"On the other hand, when a child is born with the full signs of maturity, at or under seven months, from possible access of the husband, then there is a strong presumption that it is illegitimate.\"\n\nHe expressed agreement with this passage.\n\nThe evidence of this witness no doubt contains certain statements, which support the appellant but I agree with the view of Mr. Justice Patel that the witness though undoubtedly a leading obstetrician and gynaecologist, appears to have fenced while answering questions which tended to throw doubt on some of the opinions expressed by him. His evidence, however, also shows that if the respondent was in the fourth month of pregnancy at the time of the marriage her nausea would not have started soon after her return to Prantij. In fact, her nausea could have started much earlier, and even at the time of the marriage she should have been suffering from it. There is no evidence whatsoever to the effect that she had any such nausea at the time of the marriage. It is not disputed by the appellant that she was suffering from nausea from the time deposed to by her and for a considerable period thereafter. She could, therefore, not have. been in the fourth month of pregnancy towards the end of April, 1947. For, according to Dr. Ajinkya nausea starts in the first or second month of pregnancy or again in the seventh month of pregnancy. Therefore, upon this part of Dr.\n\nAjinkya's opinion, the appellant's definite case that the pregnancy commenced in November or December, 1946 falls to the ground. No doubt, the opinions of this witness regarding viability of a child born after five and half months and the weight of such child at birth and the impossibility of its survival support the appellant's. contention. But these are mat- 1ers upon which there is divergence amongst experts. I have\n\nalready referred to a passage from Taylor which was brought to the notice of this witness with which he disagreed. This M.i-ir• Maailal passage as well as that in Peel's article show that abnormal Naoooali cases do occur. Dr. Mehta's opinions run counter to Dr. swhila v. Malltnd,,.\n\nAjinkya's on certain crucial points. He has spoken not Nanaioati merely from his own observations as an obstetrician but on Mudholkar, J. the strength of the findings of other scientists. In this state\n\nof affairs can the court say that the appellant has discharged the burden which the law has cast upon him to prove that the respondent was pregnant at the time of the marriage? It is not enough for him to throw a doubt. He has to establish :the fact affirmatively.\n\nNo doubt the appellant has examined Dr. Udani, a Pediatrician, but even his evidence does not take the matter :any further. Therefore, I am referring to those passages in his evidence on which reliance was placed at the hearing and would only say this that what I have said about Dr. Ajinkya's evidence on similar matters applies equally to Dr. Udani's evidence. According to him, a child born 5 months and 17 days after conception would die immediately after birth, though very often it would be a case of miscarriage. The weight of such a child, according to him, would be It to 2 lbs.\n\nHe has agreed with Dr. Ajinkya regarding the normal period of gestation as well as the period after which a baby becomes viable. He has admitted.in his cross-examination that where the weight of a child at birth is 4 lbs. it would definitely be an indication of premature birth. The following question was put to him in cross-examination:\n\n\"You were asked by the counsel for the petitioner a little while ago that you could call certain signs as sign& of maturity. Now, as a responsible doctor, I take it that you can do so on the assumption that such symptoms are reliably established or found?\" His answer was :\n\n \"All the signs and symtoms must be established before I can opine on them.\n\nIf a baby can take the breast feed well by 3rd day of its life and that baby cries well, even though such a child may according to international definition be a premature one, none-the-less it is a fairly well-developed child as far as functions are con'\n\ncerned. So far as its functions are concerned it is a matured child. This is particularly true if the mother of the child has the disease like Toxaemia then that baby even if born between 36 and 40th week of pregnancy, that baby will be under-weight but it will be a matured child in function.\" I./P(D)lSCl-12\n\n1964 Mr. Vimadalal objected to the last part of the answer given Mohendra Manilalby the witness on the ground that it was volunteered by him. --Naoavati Even, however, if this is taken into account, it makes no di!fe- Swila TMohendra rence, because there is no positive evidence to show that the\n\nNanaooti respondent was suffering from toxaemia right t\\11 the termination of the pregnancy. When asked whether in his experience Mwlliolkar, J. . h h h\"ld or knowledge he has come across any case m w ic a c 1 born 26 weeks and four days had survived, his answer was:\n\n\"I have seen two babies surviving between 27th and 28th weeks.\n\nOne in London and one in Boston.\n\nBut in these cases exceptional care was required both for delivery as wen as for bringing it up.\"\n\nThis answer to some extent, goes against the opinion of Dr.\n\nAjinkya, though he has qualified it by adding that in most cases such child would be sti11-born and that in exceptiopal cases it would survive if special care and attention is paid to it.\n\nThere remains the evidence of Dr. Mehta who was examined as a witness on behalf of the respondent. He has also deposed that the period of gestation is counted from the first day of the last menstruation, and in this connection, he relied upon the following passage from British Obstetric and Gynaecological Practice by Sir Eardley HoJland and Aleck Bourne, 1955 ed.:\n\n\"According to Naegele's rule, which is almost universally employed, seven days are added to the first day of the last menstrual period and nine months added, in order to arrive at the expected date <if delivery. This is rea11y a simple way of adding 280 days of the first day to the last menstrual period, because experience has shown that this is the average duration of pregnancy.\"\n\nHe also agreed with the following passage from Dougald Baird's Combined Text Book of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 6th ed:\n\n\"It has long been known that the length of gestation\n\nin the human is almost ten lunar months (280 days) if calculated from the first day of tht last menstrual period.\"\n\nAccording to him, a four pound full term baby that is one born 280 days after the first day of the last menstrual period, is a rare occurrence. He was asked the question :\n\n\"Doctor, if a woman suffers from swelling, i.e. oedema, high blood pressure and passing of albumen in urine, woul, d that have any effect on the period of delivery?\", and ms\n\nanswer was that the child would be premature. He further de- 1964 posed that oedema, high blood pressure and passage of albu- Mah<ndra M\"\"ilal\n\nmen in urine occur in the second period of pregnancy, but Nanawli that it might occur earlier if the woman had some trouble SusMJa ahelllira with the kidneys or high blood pressure. By the seoond period Nanavati of pregnancy, he meant after the third month of pregnancy Madhalkar, J and before the seventh month of pregnancy. He further stated that nausea in pregnancy usually occurs at the time of the second missed period, but it might occur before or about the time of the first missed period. While he agreed with the other medical witnesses examined in this case that the child is supposed to be normal and viable after 28 weeks, he said that there are some exceptions to this and that a child born earlier than the 28th week may be born alive and can survive.\n\nHe stated that his statement is based upon the following two passages in De Lee's book:\n\n\"De Lee delivered a viable child one hundred and eighty-two days after the day of conception and Green Hill delivered a baby one hundred and ninety-one days after the beginning of the last menses and one hundred and seventy-six days after the last coitus. The baby weighed 735 gms (1 pound 10 ounces) and survived. The child is now normal in every way ... \"\n\nThe French law recognizes the legitimacy of a child born ()ne hundred and eighty days after marriage and \"three\n\nhundred days after the death of the husband, the German law one hundred and eighty one and three hundred and two days, respectively.\"\n\nHe then said the he was familiar with the case of Cark v.\n\nClark,(') which is also referred to in Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence, 2nd vol. 10th ed. at p. 36. Referring to it, he said:\n\n\"I agree with the proposition at page 35 of Taylor. It is as follows:-\n\n'Hence it is established that the children born at the 7th or even at the 6th month may be reared.'\n\nI believe the expression month used by the author is Lunar Month. It also agree with the proposition of Taylor at the same pagewhich runs as under-\n\n, It would be in the highest degree unjust to impute illegitimacy to offspring or a want of chastity\n\n(') [1939] 2 All E.R 59.\n\nL 1'(D)!SCl-12(o)\n\nSUFREME COURT REPORTS [19641\n\n1964 . to the parents merely from the fact of a MalientJYa Manila! six months child being born living and surviv- NOMlHJti ing its birth'.\"\n\nv. Ma.lend He .has also deposed about various matters such as normal 8~-ti ra labour, calculation of period and so on but it is not necessary to refer to that part of the evidence.\n\nJlwJAoliar, J.\n\nMr. Desai referring to the opinion of the witness regarding the mode of confirmation of pregnancy within three weeks. or so of conception said that the respondent's admission in a letter of 3rd April, 1947 that her pregnancy was confirmed that day by a doctor who had apparently not performed a biological test would show that conception must have taken place long before the date of marriage. The letter was not produced by the appellant and so we do not know what exactly she had said in it. Apart from that it is quite possible that the doctor whom the respondent consulted, as she was having nausea may have tentatively opined that it was probably due to the fact that she had conceived. The opinion of that doctor cannot be placed higher than that.\n\nRelying upon the admissions made by the respondent in the evidence that there was swelling-on her h1inds and feet in the month of June it• was argued that she must have then been in the 7th month of pregnancy because according to Dr.\n\nAjinkya this kind of toxaemia appears after the 7th month of pregnancy. It is to be remembered that she was deposing about this 12 years after the occurrence and as there was no reference to such an important matter in her letters of the 14th June and 2nd July, but only in a subsequent letter, she appears to have made a mistake about the month while deposing in court. In fact she first complained about the swellings and high blood pressure only in her letter of the 13th August.\n\nAgain even according to Dr. Ajinkya a pregnant woman may develop such troubles in the 4th month if she were suffering from chronic . kidney trouble. There is no evidence about her suffering from such trouble but the possibility of her having such trouble has not been ruled out. Dr. Mehta has also said that while swellings and high blood pressure usually occur in the second period of pregnancy, he stated that this period would be after the 3J_d and before the 7th month of pregnancy and suppqrted his view by reference to a passage at p. 225 from the 'British Obstetric and Gynaecological Practice'. In this state of evidence. it would not be reasonably safe to conclude that the respondent was in the 7th month of pregnancy in the month of June.\n\nNo doubt Dr. Ajinkya has said that there would be a perceptible abdominal enlargement in ordinary cases after the 4th month and the respondent has remarked in her letter\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME OURT REPORTS 357\n\nof the 28th June that her abdomen had the appearance of 1964 a big water pot.\n\nBut that was nothing more than innocent Jfahendra Manilal exaggeration and ought not to be taken literally.\n\nNanavati v. .\n\nSuihila Mahendra A good deal of argument was advanced on the footing Nanavati that the delivery of the respondent being normal, the birth of a Mudholkar, J. premature baby cannot be regarded as a 'normal delivery' in the medical parlance. Apart from the fact that Dr.\n\nAjinkya and Dr. Mehta have given different meanings to the expression 'normal delivery', there is no reliable evidence to the effect that the birth of a child to the respondent was regarded as normal delivery. As already observed, Madhuben's evidence is false and artificial and the hospital records consisting of indoor case papers are incomplete. It would also appear that the column of 'disease' is torn and attempts to reconstruct it seem to have been made. Moreover it would seem that entries used to be made in the hospital papers mechanically without reference to actualities. On these ground5 the entry.regarding the weight of the child at birthstated as 4 lbs--eannot be accepted at its face value.\n\nEven accepting it, there is unanimity of opinion amongst all the three experts examined in this case that this would be the weight of a premature baby and not that of a mature one.\n\nConsidered along with the circumstances that the delivery was sudden and the respondent was then in a poor state of health the appellant's case that the baby was a full term one and, therefore, illegitimate stands disproved.\n\nAll that I would say is that the medical evidence adduced in this case for establishing that the respondent had conceived before the marriage can in no sense be regarded as of a definite or conclusive nature. Indeed, in the case of Clark v.\n\nClark('). if the husband was assumed to be the father, the pregnancy could not have exceeded 174 days, and the child which was born, was alive at the hearing and was three years old. The medical evidence was to the effect that a child of so short a period of foetal life would not survive for more than a day or two. At the same time, the medical witnesses agreed that only rarely could the date of conception be fixed, and that the periods of gestation generally spoken of were notional periods.\n\nThere was no evidence of misconduct on the part of the wife, and the only evidence of adultery was the fact of the birth of a child, the period of gestation of which could not have exceeded 174 days. The Court held that the husband had not discharged the burden of proof in respect of the adultery and that it was sufficiently proved that the child was conceived in wedlock. It was further held that \"where the date of con- <; eption can be fixed, and the actual period of gestation is\n\n(') (1939) 2 All E.R 59.\n\n!!!!_ ascertained, this ascertained period is comparable to the MMndra M<>nilal longer notional period, and for this reason what is in fact a\n\nNanavati six month child may be comparable to what is called a seven B., hila v.Mah..Ora months child.\"\n\nNanavati\n\nNvdholkar, J.\n\nTo sum up, the substance of the medical evidence led on behalf of the appellant is that the normal period of gestation of a child is 280 days, that a child born 180 days after the last menstruation is not likely to be born alive or if born alive it will survive only if special care is taken, that such a case would not be that of normal delivery and its weight would be 1 ! to 2 lbs. With the aid of the evidence of Madhuben the appellant has sought to establish that the delivery was a normal one, that the respondent appeared to have delivered at full term and the child born was a normal one. He has further sought to prove 'with the aid of the hospital papers that the child weighed four lbs. or so and was found to be normal one. Madhuben's evidence has been rejected by both courts of fact and for very good reasons. The hospital papers cannot be relied upon in the absence of the white paper. Besides, a look at the hospital records would suggest that entries therein were made in a casual manner regardless of actualities. Thus all that we are left with is the evidence of the experts and the case records in text books. There is no unanimity amongst the three experts and even the text books refer to abnormal cases. Bearing in mind that the normal period of gestation evolved by the obstetricians is a generalisation deduced from particulars it cannot be regarded as an inflexible law of nature from which there can be no deviation. Indeed, reputed obstetricians have recorded cases where the period of gestation was found to be shorter in cases of mothers whose menstrual cycles were of three weeks.\n\nAgain where toxaemia of pregnancy is found to be considerable the development of a child in the womb has been found to take place more rapidly than in normal pregnancies. There may be conceivably other factors contributing to the shortening of the period of gestation and a more rapid development of a child in the womb than that which medical science has so far been able to notice. In these circumstances it would not be reasonably safe to base a conclusion as to the illegitimacy of a child and unchastity of its mother solely 011 the ·\n\nassumption that because its birth and condition at birth appeared to be normal its period of gestation must have been normal, thus placing its date of conception at a point of time prior to the marriage of its parents.\n\nThus, even if the additional evidence is taken into consideration, the appellant stands on, no stronger grounds.\n\nIt has also to be remembered that on the question as to whether the respondent was pregnant before her marriage Mahtiulra Ma•il• not only the High Court but also the City Civil Court has Na .. vati come to the c9nclusion that she was not.\n\nWe have thus con sushi/a Mahtiulra current findings of fact on this crucial question. It is settled Nanavati law that this Court does not interfere with such a finding\n\nI Mudholkar, J. mere y on the ground that another view of the evidence adduced in the case commends itself to this Court. The appeal has come before us by a certificate. granted by the High Court under Art. 133(1)(b) of the Constitution. One of the requirements of cl. (1) of Art. 133 is that in a case other than the one referred to in sub-cl. (c) the appeal must involve a substantial question of law where the judgment appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below. No doubt, strictly speaking, the judgment of the High Court cannot be regarded as judgment , of affirmance of the City Civil Court because initially the City Civil Court had granted a decree for annulment of marriage to the appellant. Substantially, however, the decree of the High Court must be regarded as one of affirmance if we take into consideration the fact that the High Court had affirmed the finding rendered by the City Civil Court on the additional issue framed by the High Court in regard to the question whether the respondent was pregnant at the time of the marriage. No doubt, technically, the High Courts' decision is not one of affirmance because it has reversed the decree of the City Civil Court. But we must have regard to the substance of the matter. It is true that the City Civil Court had originally granted a decree but the basis of that decree disappeared after it gave a contrary finding to the one rendered by it earlier on the crucial fact concerning the respondent's pregnancy befote her marriage. The High Court having accepted that finding there can be no escape from the position that we have here a case where upon the crucial question of fact, there are concurrent findings.\n\nUnless it is shown that a concurrent finding is vitiated by an error of law or procedure or unless it is shown that important or relevant evidence has been overlooked or misconstrued it would not be in consonance with the practice of this Court to re-examine that finding, particularly when, as here, the findings are based upon an appreciation of evidence. The Privy Council firmly adhered to this rule and this Court has accepted the Privy Council's practice in this' regard. There are numerous decisions on the point but I may refer only to the following as instances of cases in which this Court has refused to disturb concurrent findings of fact: Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Ba/afiwa/e v. Gopa/ Vinayak Gosavi & ors.('); Gherulaf Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya & ors.('); Bhlnka & others v.\n\n(') [1960] 1 S.C.R. 733 (') [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 406.\n\nJVahe.1tdru iUuilaJ,\n\n1va,, i.vati\n\nSuihila .i.IJahendra\n\nNanaiati\n\nMud1ol1'ar, J.\n\n360 SUPllEME COUHT REPORTS [1964]\n\nCharan Singh('); and Shamrao Bhagwanrao Deshmukh v.\n\nDominion of India('). No case has been brought to our notice in which this Court or the Privy Council has re-appreciated evidence in an appeal by special leave or disturbed a pure finding of fact concurrently made by the courts below. To do so now would be to ignore all precedents.\n\nAs already held by me the appeal must be dismissed with costs.\n\n(') (1959] Supp. 2 $.C.R. 798.\n\n(') AI.R. 1955 S.C. 249.", "total_entities": 400, "entities": [{"text": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUSHILA MAHENDRA NANAVATI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. 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Aila Makendra was not proved that respondent was pregnant at the time of\n\nNanamti marriage and that it was proved that petitioner had marital intercourse with the respondent subsequent to his discovery of the existence of the grounds for the decree."}}, {"text": "Held", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accepting the appeal,\n\nHeld (Mudholkar, J. dissenting). ("}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3679, "end_char": 3688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accepting the appeal,\n\nHeld (Mudholkar, J. dissenting). 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T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9614, "end_char": 9625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S .. hila Ma/l<ndra Nanavati S. T. Desai, S. Singhvi, J. B. Dadachanji, 0.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "S. Singhvi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9627, "end_char": 9637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S .. hila Ma/l<ndra Nanavati S. T. Desai, S. Singhvi, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9642, "end_char": 9655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S .. hila Ma/l<ndra Nanavati S. T. Desai, S. Singhvi, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "0. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9657, "end_char": 9669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S .. hila Ma/l<ndra Nanavati S. T. Desai, S. Singhvi, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9674, "end_char": 9689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Purushottam Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9711, "end_char": 9732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purushottam Trikamdas, M. H. Chhatrapati and /. N.\n\nShroff, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Purushottam Trikamdas"}}, {"text": "M. H. Chhatrapati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9734, "end_char": 9751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purushottam Trikamdas, M. H. Chhatrapati and /. N.\n\nShroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "N.\n\nShroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9759, "end_char": 9769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purushottam Trikamdas, M. H. Chhatrapati and /. N.\n\nShroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9843, "end_char": 9851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of RAGHUBAR DAYAL and AYYANGAR, JJ."}}, {"text": "MuDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9893, "end_char": 9902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.\n\nMuDHOLKAR J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.", "canonical_name": "MUDHOLKAR, JJ."}}, {"text": "Baghubar Dc.yal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9939, "end_char": 9954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baghubar Dc.yal, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, on a certificate granted by the Bombay High Court, arises out of a petition praying for the annulment of the petitioner-appellant's marriage with the respondent, under s. 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act XXV of 1955), hereinafter called the Act, on the ground that the respondent was, at the time of marriage, pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Baghubar Dc.yal"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10160, "end_char": 10165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10173, "end_char": 10197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10658, "end_char": 10663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant returned to India some time in November 1947, but the parties did not live together thereafter."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10927, "end_char": 10945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was, however, dismissed on September 30, 1949 as the appellant failed to establish that he had his domicile in that State."}}, {"text": "May 18, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11051, "end_char": 11063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act came into force on May 18, 1955."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11119, "end_char": 11133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant took advantage of its provisions and on April 18, 1956 filed the petition for annulment of bis marriage with the respondent."}}, {"text": "R09kubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12502, "end_char": 12516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She further alleged that she \"' 'Nanav:ti en \"' flatly refused to carry out abortion and that therefore, at the instance of the appellant, the marriage was performed in R09kubar Dayal, J.\n\nBombay and not at her parents' place."}}, {"text": "Champak- Ial", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15796, "end_char": 15808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, besides examining himself, examined Dr. Champak- Ial, husband of his sister, Madhuben, who was a midwife at the Prantij Municipal Dispensary, Maternity Ward, in 1947 and who attended at the respondent's confinei; nent and two doctors, Dr. Ajinkya and Dr. Udani as experts."}}, {"text": "Madhuben", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15833, "end_char": 15841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, besides examining himself, examined Dr. Champak- Ial, husband of his sister, Madhuben, who was a midwife at the Prantij Municipal Dispensary, Maternity Ward, in 1947 and who attended at the respondent's confinei; nent and two doctors, Dr. Ajinkya and Dr. Udani as experts.", "canonical_name": "Madhuben"}}, {"text": "Ajinkya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15995, "end_char": 16002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, besides examining himself, examined Dr. Champak- Ial, husband of his sister, Madhuben, who was a midwife at the Prantij Municipal Dispensary, Maternity Ward, in 1947 and who attended at the respondent's confinei; nent and two doctors, Dr. Ajinkya and Dr. Udani as experts."}}, {"text": "Udani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16011, "end_char": 16016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, besides examining himself, examined Dr. Champak- Ial, husband of his sister, Madhuben, who was a midwife at the Prantij Municipal Dispensary, Maternity Ward, in 1947 and who attended at the respondent's confinei; nent and two doctors, Dr. Ajinkya and Dr. Udani as experts."}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16072, "end_char": 16077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, for her part, examined Dr. Mehta as an expert witness, Kachrabhai, who was a compounder at the Pantij Municipal Dispensary in 1947, Khodidas a Doctor, and herself."}}, {"text": "Kachrabhai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16100, "end_char": 16110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, for her part, examined Dr. Mehta as an expert witness, Kachrabhai, who was a compounder at the Pantij Municipal Dispensary in 1947, Khodidas a Doctor, and herself."}}, {"text": "Pantij Municipal Dispensary", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16140, "end_char": 16167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, for her part, examined Dr. Mehta as an expert witness, Kachrabhai, who was a compounder at the Pantij Municipal Dispensary in 1947, Khodidas a Doctor, and herself."}}, {"text": "Khodidas", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16177, "end_char": 16185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, for her part, examined Dr. Mehta as an expert witness, Kachrabhai, who was a compounder at the Pantij Municipal Dispensary in 1947, Khodidas a Doctor, and herself."}}, {"text": "Khodidas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16209, "end_char": 16217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khodidas did not state anything material to the case."}}, {"text": "Patel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16823, "end_char": 16828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patel and Gokhale JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Gokhale", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16833, "end_char": 16840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patel and Gokhale JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17550, "end_char": 17564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahendra Manila", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17597, "end_char": 17612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133(l)(c) of the Constitution, as already Mahendra Manila!", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Busldla Mahendra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19464, "end_char": 19480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Jl.fahendra Manilal\n\nNanat•ati\n\nBusldla Mahendra\n\n]..anavat-i\n\nRaahubar Dayal, J.\n\n\"21."}}, {"text": "Raahubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19495, "end_char": 19509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Jl.fahendra Manilal\n\nNanat•ati\n\nBusldla Mahendra\n\n]..anavat-i\n\nRaahubar Dayal, J.\n\n\"21."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19711, "end_char": 19740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20906, "end_char": 20933, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21086, "end_char": 21091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nanavali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21890, "end_char": 21898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "peeled to have produced evidence directed to that point and Nanavali !", "canonical_name": "N anavati"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22054, "end_char": 22068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court remitted the first issue as it was of Raghubar Dayal, J. opinion that it was for the petitioner to prove to their satisfaction, beyond reasonable doubt, which he had failed to do, that the respondent was pregnant at the time of marriage.", "canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23096, "end_char": 23101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23109, "end_char": 23120, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24866, "end_char": 24877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25646, "end_char": 25673, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25800, "end_char": 25810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26094, "end_char": 26099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26949, "end_char": 26959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Alexander Cockburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27897, "end_char": 27915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "362), Sir Alexander Cockburn says: -'The Divorce Court is at liberty to act and is bound to act on any evidence legally admissible by which the fact of adultery is established."}}, {"text": "Lallubhai Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29085, "end_char": 29099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Lallubhai Shah, Ag."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30946, "end_char": 30956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31687, "end_char": 31692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghubra Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32624, "end_char": 32638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N anavati ed v. t Sushila Mahendra The trial Court had recorded a finding on the basis of Nanavati the statements of the respondent in the written statement, Raghubra Dayal J. statements which were supported by her on oath when examin- ' ed as a witness.", "canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33507, "end_char": 33514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, the remarks of Lord Simonds in Preston Jones' case(') at p.\n\n402, are very pertinent :\n\n\"Your Lordships would, I think, regard it as undesirable that the burden should be imposed upon litigants in this class of case of adducing evidence of the character which in Gaskill v. Gaskill (1921 P. 425) Lord Birkenhead thought it expedient for the Attorney-General to ask for the assistance of the court."}}, {"text": "Preston Jones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33518, "end_char": 33531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, the remarks of Lord Simonds in Preston Jones' case(') at p.\n\n402, are very pertinent :\n\n\"Your Lordships would, I think, regard it as undesirable that the burden should be imposed upon litigants in this class of case of adducing evidence of the character which in Gaskill v. Gaskill (1921 P. 425) Lord Birkenhead thought it expedient for the Attorney-General to ask for the assistance of the court.", "canonical_name": "Preston Jones"}}, {"text": "Birkenhead", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33788, "end_char": 33798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, the remarks of Lord Simonds in Preston Jones' case(') at p.\n\n402, are very pertinent :\n\n\"Your Lordships would, I think, regard it as undesirable that the burden should be imposed upon litigants in this class of case of adducing evidence of the character which in Gaskill v. Gaskill (1921 P. 425) Lord Birkenhead thought it expedient for the Attorney-General to ask for the assistance of the court.", "canonical_name": "Birkenhead"}}, {"text": "Nanmaa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35261, "end_char": 35267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This does not mean that his case\n\nNanmaa was as has been considered by the Court below that the child Raghuba-; Da~•I, J. bmn was a fully mture child in."}}, {"text": "Sharda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36337, "end_char": 36343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's sister Sharda, however, appears to have written just one letter in acknowledgment of the respondent's sister's letter conveying the news of the birth of the child.", "canonical_name": "Sharadaben"}}, {"text": "Baroda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36773, "end_char": 36779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In J 948, the petitioner instituted a suit for the annulment of the marriage in the Court at Baroda and there too pleaded what he pleaded in the petition giving rise to this appeal."}}, {"text": "Baroda Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37168, "end_char": 37180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In her written statement filed in the Baroda Court she stated that she had become pregnant as a result of the sexual intercourse she had with the petitioner after marriage."}}, {"text": "childMahemlra ManilaT", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38076, "end_char": 38097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No good motive was suggested for the petitioner and his parents taking the view so firmly held by them about the childMahemlra ManilaT being not of the petitioner from the very moment they learnt Nanavati of the birth of the child on August 27, 1947."}}, {"text": "Europe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38659, "end_char": 38665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent stated in her written statement:\n\n\"The petitioner's father has stayed in Europe for a very long time and holds very advanced views so also the petitioner but this entirely false litigation has been put forward at the instance of the petitioner's mother who wants to sacrifice the respondent knowing full well the part played by her son the petitioner and the other members of the family.\""}}, {"text": "Court at Baroda", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39040, "end_char": 39055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nothing like this was said in her written statement filed in the Court at Baroda: In her deposition before the findings were called for on the issues, she stated that the relations between herself and her mother-in-law were not very cordial."}}, {"text": "June 11, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39695, "end_char": 39708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In her letter dated June 11, 1947 she merely stated:\n\n\" ... the nature of my mother-in-law had become peevish on account of ill-health and that I should not take anything to my heart."}}, {"text": "Mamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40026, "end_char": 40031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mamma would speak very highly of me before our neighbours.\""}}, {"text": "Baghubar Dnyal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40799, "end_char": 40813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We refer to the direction by the petitioner in his\n\nBaghubar Dnyal, J. letter dated June 22, 1947 asking her to destroy that particular letter and the letters received earlier.", "canonical_name": "Baghubar Dc.yal"}}, {"text": "June 22, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40831, "end_char": 40844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We refer to the direction by the petitioner in his\n\nBaghubar Dnyal, J. letter dated June 22, 1947 asking her to destroy that particular letter and the letters received earlier."}}, {"text": "Champaklal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41407, "end_char": 41417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been considered by the Court below that the respondent's letters to Sharda and her father's letters to Dr.\n\nChampaklal in July 1947 had been suppressed.", "canonical_name": "Champaklal"}}, {"text": "Sushila", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41612, "end_char": 41619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two letters of Sushila to Sharda have been produced and their production has been relied upon in support of the view that other letters had been deliberately suppressed.", "canonical_name": "Sushilabehn"}}, {"text": "March 10 and August 27", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42446, "end_char": 42468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counting both the days, i.e., March 10 and August 27, the total period between those dates comes to 171 days."}}, {"text": "Preston-Jones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43488, "end_char": 43501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, reference may again be made to what 1964 was said by Lord Simonds in Preston-Jones' case(') at p. 402, Jiabcnrlm Jlanil\"I when considering the question whether a normal child born Jfmwrnli 360 days after the last intercourse of a man and a woman\"\"'\"''\" 'Jfal.cnd'• y, as the child of that man or not.", "canonical_name": "Preston Jones"}}, {"text": "Normand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44179, "end_char": 44186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of similar effect is the observation of Lord Normand at o. 407,\n\nit being: • - ''I have felt great doubt whether the House ought not to say that, though it is not possible to draw the line at an actual number of days, 360 days is too long a period, unless evidence of medical knowledge is adduced by the respondent to show the contrary.\""}}, {"text": "Morton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44477, "end_char": 44483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Morton of Henryton also said, at p. 413:\n\n\"If a husband proves that a child has been born 360\n\ndays after he last had an opportunity of intercourse with his wife, and that the birth was a normal one, and if no expe, rt evidence is called by either side, I am of opinion that the husband has proved his case beyond reasonable doubt.\""}}, {"text": "Henryton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44487, "end_char": 44495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Morton of Henryton also said, at p. 413:\n\n\"If a husband proves that a child has been born 360\n\ndays after he last had an opportunity of intercourse with his wife, and that the birth was a normal one, and if no expe, rt evidence is called by either side, I am of opinion that the husband has proved his case beyond reasonable doubt.\""}}, {"text": "Cairns", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44869, "end_char": 44875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) (') a similar observation was made by Cairns, J. in proceedings on an application for ordering the wife and child to undergo blood-tests in order to furnish evidence that the child was not the petitioner's."}}, {"text": "October 7. 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45118, "end_char": 45133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He said :\n\n\"The marriage was on October 7."}}, {"text": "April 19, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45157, "end_char": 45171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The child was born on April 19, 1962."}}, {"text": "Ajinkia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45615, "end_char": 45622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As doctors Ajinkia and Mehta do not agree on several points we have\n\n(') (1951) A.C. 391. (') (", "canonical_name": "Ajinkia"}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45627, "end_char": 45632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As doctors Ajinkia and Mehta do not agree on several points we have\n\n(') (1951) A.C. 391. (') (", "canonical_name": "Mehta"}}, {"text": "IJushila Mahendra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45940, "end_char": 45957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We .Maiiend;:;;-Manilal however consider that the Court should not leave the ques-\n\nNanavati lions undecided merely because the two doctors differ, as has IJushila Mahendra been done, practically, by the learned Judges of the High\n\nNarw, vati C-ourt.", "canonical_name": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati"}}, {"text": "lloghubar D, yal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46037, "end_char": 46053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lloghubar D, yal, J.\n\nDr. Ajinkia is undoubtedly an expert in the subject of obstetncs and gynaecology."}}, {"text": "Ajinkia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46063, "end_char": 46070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lloghubar D, yal, J.\n\nDr. Ajinkia is undoubtedly an expert in the subject of obstetncs and gynaecology.", "canonical_name": "Ajinkia"}}, {"text": "London University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46324, "end_char": 46341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He holds a diploma in child health of London University."}}, {"text": "Nair Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46469, "end_char": 46482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was attached to the Nair Hospital as a specialist."}}, {"text": "J. J. Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46667, "end_char": 46681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since\n\n1949 he was attached to the J. J. Hospital as an Honorary Doctor for Midwifery and Gynaecology and later at the Wadia Maternity Hospital."}}, {"text": "Wadia Maternity Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46751, "end_char": 46775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since\n\n1949 he was attached to the J. J. Hospital as an Honorary Doctor for Midwifery and Gynaecology and later at the Wadia Maternity Hospital."}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46948, "end_char": 46953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Mehta states that he has been practising as a Gynaecologist and Obstetrician since 1926.", "canonical_name": "Mehta"}}, {"text": "Ajinkia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47098, "end_char": 47105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His qualifications, however, are much less than those of Dr. Ajinkia and his experience too, as an obstetrician and gynaecologist, is much less.", "canonical_name": "Ajinkia"}}, {"text": "Edinburgh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47233, "end_char": 47242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has passed the F.R.C.S. Examination in 1906 at Edinburgh."}}, {"text": "Motlibai Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47812, "end_char": 47829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During this period he was in charge of 6 beds at Motlibai Hospital."}}, {"text": "Parsee General Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47884, "end_char": 47907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of his deposition he was attached to the Parsee General Hospital and Parsee Lying-in Hospital for Women."}}, {"text": "Parsee Lying-in Hospital for Women", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47912, "end_char": 47946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of his deposition he was attached to the Parsee General Hospital and Parsee Lying-in Hospital for Women."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48817, "end_char": 48822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Desai, learned counsel for - the petitioner, has again submitted them for our consideration.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "Raghllhar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48910, "end_char": 48925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghllhar Dayal, J.\n\nThey are: ·\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Prantij", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 49875, "end_char": 49882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent remained at the house of her relations-in-law , till about March 27, when she returned to her father's place at village Prantij."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49948, "end_char": 49962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first letter from the petitioner to the respondent is dated March 31, 1947 and expresses the hope that she had reached her place hale and hearty."}}, {"text": "April 8, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50558, "end_char": 50571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's letter dated April 8, 1947 refers to the receipt of a letter from the respondent which probably intimated that she was definitely pregnant, according to the opinion of the doctor, as the letter contains an expression 'knowing that you are pregnant' and indicates the petitioner's desire that the child be removed."}}, {"text": "April 13, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50895, "end_char": 50909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 The respondent's letter dated April 13, 1947 states: Makendra Maniliil Nanavati \"I am not keeping good health at present, I am still getting fever."}}, {"text": "Makendra Maniliil Nanavati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50918, "end_char": 50944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 The respondent's letter dated April 13, 1947 states: Makendra Maniliil Nanavati \"I am not keeping good health at present, I am still getting fever.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Sushila .l'rfakendra\n\nNanarati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51220, "end_char": 51250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sushila .l'rfakendra\n\nNanarati\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nThe petitioner's letter dated April 15 has nothing particular in this connection."}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52209, "end_char": 52216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She reached Bombay on April 23 and stayed there till the petitioner left for America on April\n\n27."}}, {"text": "Himatnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52629, "end_char": 52639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I consulted a lady doctor at Himatnagar .... After I consulted the doctor at Himatnagar, I came to know that I was pregnant.\""}}, {"text": "Modi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53873, "end_char": 53877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Re: morning sickness, Dr. Ajinkia stated that it occurred in the first and second month and expressed agreement with Modi's statement in his text book on Medical Jurisprudence that nausea or vomiting commences about the beginning of the second month and lasts generally till the end of the fourth month."}}, {"text": "Williams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54442, "end_char": 54450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Williams in his 'Obstetrics' states at p. 275, 12th Edition:\n\n\"The so-called morning sickness of pregnancy, as the name implies, usually comes on in the earlier part of the day and passes off in a few hours, although it occasionally persists longer or may.", "canonical_name": "William Scott"}}, {"text": "Raghuba1 ayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55436, "end_char": 55449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghuba1 ayal, J.\n\n1964 He states at pp.", "canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Mahtndra Jfanilal Nanatiafi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55491, "end_char": 55518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "708 and 709:\n\nMahtndra Jfanilal Nanatiafi \"The disease varies in degree of severity from naus€a\n\nand morning sickness to the severe or pernicious type of vomiting which may have a fatal outcome.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "8ushila Mahendr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55777, "end_char": 55792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. 8ushila Mahendr<& Nanavati\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\n\"A small number of these patients develop persistent vomiting, lasting four to eight weeks or longer and resulting in a loss of body weight of 10 to 20 pounds or more.", "canonical_name": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati"}}, {"text": "Dugald Baird", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56271, "end_char": 56283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dugald Baird states at p. 323 of the 7th Edition of the Combined Text Book on Obstetrics and Gynaecology:\n\n\"Morning sickness occurs in about 50 per cent of women during the early weeks of pregnancy.", "canonical_name": "Dougald Baird"}}, {"text": "Gamdevi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 57372, "end_char": 57379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent stated in crossexamination that when she went to Gamdevi, she continued to have vomiting, no appetite and uneasiness."}}, {"text": "Mahendra ~Ia•ilal that", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58067, "end_char": 58089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears to be too good to be true Mahendra ~Ia•ilal that she suffered from morning sickness of such a type only for Nanavati a short period of a littleover two weeks."}}, {"text": "Nanavati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58149, "end_char": 58157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears to be too good to be true Mahendra ~Ia•ilal that she suffered from morning sickness of such a type only for Nanavati a short period of a littleover two weeks.", "canonical_name": "N anavati"}}, {"text": "Ajinkia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 59205, "end_char": 59212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Re: confirmation of pregnancy, Dr .. Ajinkia deposed that it was not possible to confirm pregnancy by April 3, 1947 if a woman married on March JO, 1947 had conception subsequent to the."}}, {"text": "April 3, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59270, "end_char": 59283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Re: confirmation of pregnancy, Dr .. Ajinkia deposed that it was not possible to confirm pregnancy by April 3, 1947 if a woman married on March JO, 1947 had conception subsequent to the."}}, {"text": "March JO, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59306, "end_char": 59320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Re: confirmation of pregnancy, Dr .. Ajinkia deposed that it was not possible to confirm pregnancy by April 3, 1947 if a woman married on March JO, 1947 had conception subsequent to the."}}, {"text": ".J!ahendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60481, "end_char": 60491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-10 -\n\n.J!ahendra M1.1nilal\n\n1'."}}, {"text": "Sushila Jlahendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60517, "end_char": 60534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",.anavati\n\nSushila Jlahendra .. vanavati\n\nexpressed her intention to go to Bombay within a few days and to stay there for two months and stated: 'Then, when my jifth month (of pregnancy) will be about to be over I will go to Prantij ... \"\nThere is nothing particular in this Jetter.", "canonical_name": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati"}}, {"text": "June 4, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60891, "end_char": 60903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She, however, did Raghubar Dayal, J. not stay at Bombay for two months but left for Prantij before June 4, 1947 for some reason which was possibly not true."}}, {"text": "May 2, 6 and 14", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60989, "end_char": 61004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner wrote letters to her on May 2, 6 and 14."}}, {"text": "June 3, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61897, "end_char": 61909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's first letter to the respondent in June is dated June 3, 1947."}}, {"text": "Sushila lliah.endra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 63173, "end_char": 63192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanavati v.\n\nThe next letter of June 4 was written by the petitioner Sushila lliah.endra . .", "canonical_name": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati"}}, {"text": "haveRaghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63325, "end_char": 63343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter _ too must have been from Bombay, as she appeared to haveRaghubar Dayal, J. informed him about the adjoining neighbours talking about them."}}, {"text": ".llahendra Jlanilalwrite", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65535, "end_char": 65559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LIP(D)ISCl-!O(a)\n\n292 SUPREllfE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 Such a suspicion expressed in his letter makes the respondent .llahendra Jlanilalwrite a very curt letter on July 2, 1947."}}, {"text": "Sushila Jlahendra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65640, "end_char": 65657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that letter she\n\nJr.\"'anat'ali said: v.\n\nSushila Jlahendra\n\n:Aanavat-i \"How are you to know how many months I have advanced in pregnancy.", "canonical_name": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati"}}, {"text": "June 28, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66559, "end_char": 66572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 28, 1947 the respondent writes to the petitioner in her letter :\n\n\"I am keeping good health etc .... Now I have to pass only five months ... The belly gives the appearance ."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69344, "end_char": 69356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Why should neighbours talk about the petitioner and the respondent prior to May 24, 1947?"}}, {"text": "llaAndra Manilal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70829, "end_char": 70845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Dr. Mehta states that the en largement of the abdomen is manifest from the 4th month\n\nSUPREME COUHT HEPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 and in any event will be manifest in the 5th month, even if ..llaAndra Manilal the pregnancy is for the first time.", "canonical_name": "llaAndra Manilal"}}, {"text": "Alan Brews", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70921, "end_char": 70931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He did not agree with\n\nNall<IWli what Alan Brews states in his 'Manual of Obstetrics', 1957 s .. Aila .. .ica1ient1ra Edition, p. 84: ."}}, {"text": "Nanauati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71020, "end_char": 71028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanauati \" ...... enlargement of the abdomen usually does not Bagh.", "canonical_name": "N anavati"}}, {"text": "W Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71087, "end_char": 71094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W Dayal, J. become manifest to the patient until the uterus rises well above the pubes, and therefore seldom attracts attention until the close of the first hillf of pregnancy."}}, {"text": "Eden & Holland", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72473, "end_char": 72487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When referred to a statement in Modi's Medical Jurisprudence to the effect that the first perception of the foetal movement occurred at any time between the 14th and 18th week, Dr. Ajinkia expressed his disagreement and referred to statements in the text book of 'Obstetrics & Gynaecology' by Dugald Baird, and in Eden & Holland's 'Manual of Obstetrics'."}}, {"text": "Ra9kubar Dayaf", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73569, "end_char": 73583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Namwmi v.\n\nThe only thing said against the pregnancy really havingSuaM1N Mahendra been of a greater duration is that the respondent had her anavat• body examined by Dr. Champaklal, husband of Sharda, Ra9kubar Dayaf, J. sister of the petitioner, sometime in May 1947, when she was at Gamdevi."}}, {"text": "USA", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 74087, "end_char": 74090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing in the letters of the petitioner which he wrote to the respondent from USA in May 1947 which would indicate that she was to show her body to Champaklal."}}, {"text": "January 8, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75472, "end_char": 75487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In her letter of January 8, 1948, to Sharda, written long after her delivery, for the first time the respondent mentioned that her body was examined by Dr. Champaklal and that if there had been any deceit in her heart she could not have shown her body to him."}}, {"text": "Champaklal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 75900, "end_char": 75910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent stated about her bleeding and being examined by DI'.. Champaklal for the first time in her letter to the petitioner dated February 16, 1948, months after she\n\n1964 was delivered of the child and the petitioner had in a way Mah<ndra Manila!"}}, {"text": "February 16, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75968, "end_char": 75985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent stated about her bleeding and being examined by DI'.. Champaklal for the first time in her letter to the petitioner dated February 16, 1948, months after she\n\n1964 was delivered of the child and the petitioner had in a way Mah<ndra Manila!"}}, {"text": "N anavati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 76268, "end_char": 76277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N anavati Sb d lb _ e had blood pressure, passe a umen in urine and had Raghubar Dayal, J. swellings on the body.", "canonical_name": "N anavati"}}, {"text": "4th of June 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80557, "end_char": 80573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent stated in the examination-in-chief that when she went to Prantij from Bombay, which was about the 4th of June 1947, she had swelling on her feet, hands and face."}}, {"text": "Mahendra Manilazconnection", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 81451, "end_char": 81477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been urged for the respondent in Mahendra Manilazconnection with her alleged toxemic condition in the month\n\nNanavati of June that her statement in her letter dated June 28 about\n\n8.., hila vMakendraher walking 2 miles a day is not compatible with her state-\n\nNanavati ment in Court and the suggestion for the petitioner that she huiiaD al J was suffering from toxemia in the month of June.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "July 12, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83285, "end_char": 83298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first letter in this connection is dated July 12, 1947."}}, {"text": "Kodarlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83329, "end_char": 83337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is Champaklal's letter to Kodarlal, father of the respondent, and was written on receipt of the respondent's letter addressed to Sharda."}}, {"text": "Sushilabehn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83689, "end_char": 83700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He states:\n\n\"It is not a good sign if she has oedema on the legs and abdomen in passing the urine, and hence you keep Sushilabehn immediately under the treatment of a doctor either in Ahmedabad or at Bombay.", "canonical_name": "Sushilabehn"}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 83755, "end_char": 83764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He states:\n\n\"It is not a good sign if she has oedema on the legs and abdomen in passing the urine, and hence you keep Sushilabehn immediately under the treatment of a doctor either in Ahmedabad or at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Pandya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83783, "end_char": 83789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Pandya at Ahmedabad is also a good doctor... continue the medicine as long as she advises."}}, {"text": "July 13, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83975, "end_char": 83988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sharda had herself written to the respondent on July 13, 1947 suggesting that she should go to Bmbay for consultation about her health."}}, {"text": "Bmbay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 84022, "end_char": 84027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sharda had herself written to the respondent on July 13, 1947 suggesting that she should go to Bmbay for consultation about her health."}}, {"text": "Xoderlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84128, "end_char": 84136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Champaklal agam wrote to\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRii!ME COURT REPORTS 299\n\nXoderlal on July 20, after receipt of letter from him and 1964 .'Stated: Mahendra Manilal Nanavati \"The medicine prescribed by Dr. Pandya is proper v. and I am sure that there will be complete cure.", "canonical_name": "Xoderlal"}}, {"text": "Mahendra Manilal Nanavati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 84201, "end_char": 84226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Champaklal agam wrote to\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRii!ME COURT REPORTS 299\n\nXoderlal on July 20, after receipt of letter from him and 1964 .'Stated: Mahendra Manilal Nanavati \"The medicine prescribed by Dr. Pandya is proper v. and I am sure that there will be complete cure.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Su.shila Moh<:n", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84327, "end_char": 84342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Su.shila Moh<:n<l\"' Follow her advice as regards medicine and food\n\nN~• directions."}}, {"text": "notRaghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84443, "end_char": 84460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If she has given advice for her notRaghubar Dayal, 1.", "canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Sushilaben", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85171, "end_char": 85181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 24, the respondent's father wrote to the petitioner's father stating therein:\n\n\"My daughter Sushilaben was got examined by Miss Pandya and her opinion is that she is passing albumen in her urine and that she is suffering from blood pressure.", "canonical_name": "Sushilabehn"}}, {"text": "Manila", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 85355, "end_char": 85361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manila!,"}}, {"text": "Sushilabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85464, "end_char": 85474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the petitioner's father replies to this letter on July 27 and writes:\n\n\"Very pleased to learn, that Sushilabai has been 'shown' to the doctor and the medicine has been continued and that she is keeping good health.", "canonical_name": "Sushilabehn"}}, {"text": "Manilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 85723, "end_char": 85730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With affecton of Manilal's Jai Gopal.\""}}, {"text": "Mahendra Manilailetter", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 86374, "end_char": 86396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 The respondent's letter dated July 2, 1947 was the only Mahendra Manilailetter written to the petitioner in the month of July.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "S1U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86522, "end_char": 86525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghubar D,, yal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86672, "end_char": 86688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghubar D,, yal, J.\n\nThe petitioner wrote to the respondent on August 6.", "canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "August 6. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86736, "end_char": 86750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghubar D,, yal, J.\n\nThe petitioner wrote to the respondent on August 6."}}, {"text": "Champak-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86800, "end_char": 86808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1947 stating that he was awaiting her letter and that Champak- , lal and Sharda had informed him that her health was very bad and she was not in a position to write a letter.", "canonical_name": "Champaklal"}}, {"text": "lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86811, "end_char": 86814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1947 stating that he was awaiting her letter and that Champak- , lal and Sharda had informed him that her health was very bad and she was not in a position to write a letter."}}, {"text": "August 12, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86993, "end_char": 87008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is his letter dated August 12, 1947 which makes a reference to the respondent's letter dated August 4 which he thought was received after about a month of her previous letter."}}, {"text": "July 2 and August 4, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87197, "end_char": 87222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus it is clear that for about a month between July 2 and August 4, 1947, the respondent's condition was such that she was not even able to write a letter."}}, {"text": "Shardaben", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87594, "end_char": 87603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fo this letter she writes:\n\n\"As my health was very bad, a letter was sent to Shardaben and my father also wrote a letter to Champaklal.", "canonical_name": "Sharadaben"}}, {"text": "De Monte", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 88134, "end_char": 88142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We had consulted Miss Pandya and Dr. De Monte and Doctor Anklesaria at Ahmedabad."}}, {"text": "Anklesaria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 88154, "end_char": 88164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We had consulted Miss Pandya and Dr. De Monte and Doctor Anklesaria at Ahmedabad."}}, {"text": "Jfaltendra Jianilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 88806, "end_char": 88825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1961 As a post-script to this letter she had further written:\n\nJfaltendra Jianilal \"They are attending all right on me here.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Pandya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 90478, "end_char": 90484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the stress of oath and cross-examination Dr. Pandya might have recollected things which could have a bearing on the case."}}, {"text": "Madhuben", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 90555, "end_char": 90563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhuben, the nurse examined for the petitioner, deposed about the respondent's condition and that is nbt much different from what the respondent herself stated in Court and in her letters."}}, {"text": "Mahendra Manilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 91299, "end_char": 91315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS\n\n[I!J64]\n\n[1964 time when I examined Sushilabai at her house, Mahendra Manilal she had the 7th month.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "./laghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91521, "end_char": 91537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nBwh>\";,..,, ndra As the delivery took place on August 27, Madhuben was - describing the resp_ondent's condition in about the last week ./laghubar Dayal, J. of June.'", "canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "August 13, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 93125, "end_char": 93140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent's letter dated August 13, 1947 indicates the extreme severity of the toxemic condition she was in at that time."}}, {"text": "Prantij Municipal Dispensary, Maternity Ward", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 95849, "end_char": 95893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The delivery took place at the Prantij Municipal Dispensary, Maternity Ward."}}, {"text": "Kachrabhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96375, "end_char": 96385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhuben states that Kachrabhai, the compounder, made entries in this paper under her instructions.", "canonical_name": "Kachrabhai"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 96980, "end_char": 96994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghubar Dayal, .T.\n\nKacherabai, the COIJJpounder, was examined by the respondent as witness No."}}, {"text": "Kacherabai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 97001, "end_char": 97011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghubar Dayal, .T.\n\nKacherabai, the COIJJpounder, was examined by the respondent as witness No."}}, {"text": "Kachrabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97768, "end_char": 97777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kachrabai states that all the records at the hospital remain in the custody of the Doctor, that they are kept under lock and key, that the key remains with the doctor or with him and that they were the only two responsible persons in the dispensary.", "canonical_name": "Kachrabhai"}}, {"text": "Kacherabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98570, "end_char": 98580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kacherabai states that this 'dash' meant that.", "canonical_name": "Kachrabhai"}}, {"text": "Mahuben", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98945, "end_char": 98952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gokhale J., accepted Mahuben's statement about the weight of the baby and its condition but did not accept the statement that the baby was born after a full period of gestation.", "canonical_name": "Madhuben"}}, {"text": "Vrindaban", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 99435, "end_char": 99444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patel J. remarked, in meeting the submission for the petitioner that Madhuben was living at Vrindaban and was leading a pious life and had no reason to make untrue statements\n\n7 S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS 305\n\nthat sometimes such persons might be bigoted and narrow- 1964 minded."}}, {"text": "Sanamli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99762, "end_char": 99769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "kept on glucose for two days in accorda.ncc with the practice Sanamli followed in the Pranti1' Hospital, as normally mother's milk.. , .1 v1r, 1 d • , ''1ts111 n rt ien ra is available only after two days after the btrth of the child."}}, {"text": "Madhuhen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100098, "end_char": 100106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhuhen was not questioned about it and we have , not been referred to any statement to the contrary in any book on the subject.", "canonical_name": "Madhuben"}}, {"text": "Prantij Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 100678, "end_char": 100694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to be noted that, according to the entries in the Maternity Admission Register, Exhibit 17, most of the children born in the Prantij Hospital weighed 4 lbs."}}, {"text": "May 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101200, "end_char": 101211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kacherabai, the compounder, examined for the respondent on May 7, 1950, stated:\n\n\"Doctor has returned to Prantij yesterday."}}, {"text": "Keshavbhai (Kacherabai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 101447, "end_char": 101469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "happened to misread this statement and observed, in dealing with the question of normal deli -very,\n\n\"Keshavbhai (Kacherabai?),"}}, {"text": "dent", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 101500, "end_char": 101504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the witness of the respon\n\ndent, the compounder, said that the doctor left only a day before his giving evidence, i.e. he left on the 6th."}}, {"text": "Pran tij Municipal Dispensary", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 101751, "end_char": 101780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fa.ct is that Dr. Modi who was attached to the Pran tij Municipal Dispensary in May 1959 was present in court on .May 2, 1959 to produce the documents summoned from him."}}, {"text": ".May 2, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101817, "end_char": 101829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fa.ct is that Dr. Modi who was attached to the Pran tij Municipal Dispensary in May 1959 was present in court on .May 2, 1959 to produce the documents summoned from him."}}, {"text": "3rd and 6th May", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101930, "end_char": 101945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was not in a position to be present in Court between 3rd and 6th May on account of a marriage which was to takP. place on May 4."}}, {"text": "Nanavaa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 102320, "end_char": 102327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the custody of the Court or such other person as the Court\n\nNanavaa directed. .,"}}, {"text": "May 2, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 102401, "end_char": 102412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h;/a Mahendra The order sheet of the trial Court dated May 2, 1959 Nanavati shows that the petitioner's counsel rt:quested the Cour't to tnkc the papers in its custody as the Doctor had come with Ragh•bar Dayal, J. the relevant papers."}}, {"text": "Ragh•bar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102542, "end_char": 102556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h;/a Mahendra The order sheet of the trial Court dated May 2, 1959 Nanavati shows that the petitioner's counsel rt:quested the Cour't to tnkc the papers in its custody as the Doctor had come with Ragh•bar Dayal, J. the relevant papers.", "canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103381, "end_char": 103385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shah (counsel for the respondent) has no objection.\""}}, {"text": "Chimanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 105730, "end_char": 105739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time of the delivery of Sushilabai, Dr. Chimanlal was not present."}}, {"text": "MadhuJ", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 107362, "end_char": 107368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these crrcumstances, MadhuJ>en could have recollected of this particular delivery when questioned about it."}}, {"text": "en", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 107369, "end_char": 107371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these crrcumstances, MadhuJ>en could have recollected of this particular delivery when questioned about it."}}, {"text": "Nanavali", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 107609, "end_char": 107617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 It is very difficult for a witness to state on oath why he remem- Mahe,, J, ra Ma .. ilaZ bers a certain fact which took pla.ce long ago and the witness\n\nNanavali therefore makes his best to answer it at the spjUr , of the SuaAila vMah•nara moment."}}, {"text": "Nanavati", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 107756, "end_char": 107764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not consider the Jong period lapsing between\n\nNanavati the delivery and Madhuben's statement in Court sufficient R h b D 1 J to justify ignoring her statement or consider her to be an unag u ar aya ' • reliable witness when there is no reason for her to depose falsely, nor the fact that she stayed at the place of Manila!,"}}, {"text": "Madhuben", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107782, "end_char": 107790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not consider the Jong period lapsing between\n\nNanavati the delivery and Madhuben's statement in Court sufficient R h b D 1 J to justify ignoring her statement or consider her to be an unag u ar aya ' • reliable witness when there is no reason for her to depose falsely, nor the fact that she stayed at the place of Manila!,", "canonical_name": "Madhuben"}}, {"text": "whenRaghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110888, "end_char": 110906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanavati\n\nWe see no reason why Madhuben be not believed whenRaghubar Dayal, J. the available hospital records support her: She has no reason to depos~ falsely."}}, {"text": "Aiinkia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 113175, "end_char": 113182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There had been some difference of opinion between Dr.\n\nAiinkia and Dr. Mehta ex1;1mined for the petitioner and the respondent respectively, about the definition of 'normal labour' or 'normal delivery'.", "canonical_name": "Ajinkia"}}, {"text": "Makendra Manilal' \"\" Nanavati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 115942, "end_char": 115971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Makendra Manilal' \"\" Nanavati\n\n5.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Sushila Mahendra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 116050, "end_char": 116066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l ll h Sushila Mahendra\n\n6.", "canonical_name": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati"}}, {"text": "Taylor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 116893, "end_char": 116899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ajinkia further deposed that in his opinion even with the skilled care, a child born within the 7th calendar month cannot survive, and in this he is not fully supported by what Taylor states at p. 32 in his 'Principles & Practice of Medical Jurisprudence', 11th Edn .. Vol."}}, {"text": "Koderlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 119956, "end_char": 119964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 3, seven days after the birth of the child, Koderlal sends a letter to the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Xoderlal"}}, {"text": "Marwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 120059, "end_char": 120065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in this letter, that he states:\n\n\"After I had been to Marwar, our daughter Sushila has given birth to a daughter prematurely on 27th August 1947, at about 10 A.M. in the morning ......... and the health of both is very well ........ ."}}, {"text": "27th August 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 120133, "end_char": 120149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in this letter, that he states:\n\n\"After I had been to Marwar, our daughter Sushila has given birth to a daughter prematurely on 27th August 1947, at about 10 A.M. in the morning ......... and the health of both is very well ........ ."}}, {"text": "Pappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 121164, "end_char": 121169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The baby is very weak............... Two letters and a telegram about the birth of the baby were sent to the respected Mamma, but there is no reply at all from the respected Pappa."}}, {"text": "Jliahenrlra J!anilal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121306, "end_char": 121326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jliahenrlra J!anilal And as I did not keep good health, the baby was Xanarati born prematurely before the full period which of Sas/dla iiahendra course is a matter over which the Almighty has Ifo•aiati dispensation."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 121705, "end_char": 121711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A telegram was sent to London to your brother, informing him about the birth of the baby but God knows why there is no reply from him.\""}}, {"text": "December 22. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 122764, "end_char": 122781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent sends a letter to the petitioner on December 22."}}, {"text": "Siisltita Jiahendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124059, "end_char": 124078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Siisltita Jiahendra In her letter to Sharda, she is more explicit than what Xanavati she was in.her letter to the petitioner on December 27."}}, {"text": "Mahendra Manilail", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 126513, "end_char": 126530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a condition which would have 1964\n\nsulftccd to convey the idea that the child born was really a Mahendra Manilail\n\nchild of about 6 months' pregnancy.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Holland", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 127338, "end_char": 127345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 at p. 560 of 'British Obstetric & Gynaecological Practice' by Holland & Bourne, II Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Kanavati Dr. Mehta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 129560, "end_char": 129578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kanavati Dr. Mehta."}}, {"text": "D,.yal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129637, "end_char": 129643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the other hand, states that a child is supll.aghuba-; D,.yal J. posed to be normally viable about the 28th week, that there ' can be exceptions and a child might be viable before the 28th week and could be born alive and could survive."}}, {"text": "De Lee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 129968, "end_char": 129974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He said that he made this statement on the basis of knowledge which he had acquired from the standard books and referred to three cases mentioned in De Lee's Book."}}, {"text": "Holland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 130870, "end_char": 130877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may refer to what is stated about premature termination of pregnancy in British Obstetric Practice by Holland, at pp."}}, {"text": "American Academy of Pediatrics", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 131363, "end_char": 131393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was first laid down by the American Academy of Pediatrics in 1935 that a premature infant is one that weighs 5} lb. ("}}, {"text": "International Medical Committee of the League of Nations", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 131547, "end_char": 131603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This definition was accepted by the International Medical Committee of the League of Nations and has gained universal acceptance, in spite of its scientific inaccuracy."}}, {"text": "respectRaghubar D yal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138116, "end_char": 138137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The development of the foetus un- 1961\n\ndoubtedly depends on its age as counted from the date of con- Jiahemira Manilal ception and it is for this reason that the books on Obstetrics Nanavati mostly deal with the development of the foetus on the basis of Sush;/a rrahendra\n\ndays or weeks after conception, for a period of about 2 months Nanavati and thereafter they begin to note its development with respectRaghubar D yal J to the end of the 3rd and consecutive months."}}, {"text": "Clark", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 140062, "end_char": 140067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are therefore of opinion that Clark's case(') cannot be a good guide, both on facts and law, for the determination of the question before us about tht legitimacy of the respon- <lent's child."}}, {"text": "Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140287, "end_char": 140320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jlallendra M?nilai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140682, "end_char": 140700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "320 SUPR:b]ME COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\n1964 not held to be a fully developed nine months' child but was Jlallendra M?nilai held, in view of the evidence of the experienced mid-wife\n\nNan;~\"'' to be an extreme case of premature birth."}}, {"text": "Nanavati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140853, "end_char": 140861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said at Suahila Mahendra p. 110 :- Nanavati\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\n\"There is, as I have said, no such evidence of prematurity here, and it would be straining the facts to assume that the birth was the result of intercourse that took place only 188 days previously.\"", "canonical_name": "N anavati"}}, {"text": "Marcl:t 10, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 141723, "end_char": 141739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts and matters we have set out earlier clearly establish that the conception-to produce a child of the type delivered -must have taken place before Marcl:t 10, 1947, and if, as is now the case, the petitioner's first sexual contact with the respondent was on March JO, 1947, it follows that the respondent was pregnant by someone other than the petitioner at the time of her marriage."}}, {"text": "May. 15, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 144480, "end_char": 144493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She wrote to the petitioner in her letter dated May. 15, 1946 that people asked her as to why marriage was not taking place."}}, {"text": "Mahendra . Manilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 145456, "end_char": 145474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahendra .", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "SushilavJfaheruJra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 145605, "end_char": 145623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manilal observing the stage of her pregnancy when she was at Gam- Nanavati devi in the month of May and have held that he could not pos-\n\nSushilavJfaheruJra sibly have noticed it\n\nNanai>Dti\n\nI ."}}, {"text": "Rayhubar Doyal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145732, "end_char": 145746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t 1s true t at t ere 1s no evidence that her parents-in-law Rayhubar Doyal, J. noticed during her stay at Bombay, from about the middle of May to June 4, that she waS\\ in an unduly advanced stage of pregnancy.", "canonical_name": "notRaghubar Dayal"}}, {"text": "August 13. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 147762, "end_char": 147777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already referred to the respondent's statement in her letter dated August 13."}}, {"text": "March 10, 194", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 148801, "end_char": 148814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the respondent on August 27, 1947 was practically a mature Nana•ati child and weighed 4 lbs in weight and that therefore it could - not have been the result of a conception taking ylace ori .or Raahubar Dayal, J. after March 10, 194 7."}}, {"text": "ss. 112 and 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148967, "end_char": 148982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149004, "end_char": 149015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March IO, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 150659, "end_char": 150673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, we have the feature in the present case, of evidence regarding the various phenomena and bodily changes attending on pregnancy at different stages of its course, and the combined effect of these does preclude any argument of a conception on or' after March IO, 1947."}}, {"text": "Section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151317, "end_char": 151328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Malundra Manilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 151372, "end_char": 151388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U!BI Section 112 of the Evidence Act provides that the fact Malundra Manilal that any person was born during the continuance of a valid\n\nNanavati marriage between his mother and any man shall be conclusive s ... hila :J; hendra proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it cn Nanavati be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to Bagh ba -D 1 J each other at any time when he could have been begotten.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Aj nkia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 154219, "end_char": 154226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Aj nkia has stated in cross- ·~ examination that ordinarily the petitioner should have beenMahendra Manila!", "canonical_name": "Ajinkia"}}, {"text": "tenth day of March 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 156051, "end_char": 156074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We consider these statements to be of no help in coming to a finding on the point whether the petitioner could discover on April 26 that his wife was not only pregnant but was pregnant from some day much earlier than the tenth day of March 1947 when they were married."}}, {"text": "Makendra Manilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 157012, "end_char": 157028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "period of gestation, does not actually mean that the child was Makendra Manilal born after such a period.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Nanavati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 157243, "end_char": 157251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By that statement he simply Sushila v. Mahmdra expresses his view, based on the fact that a fairly mature child\n\nNanavati was born on August 27, 1947 though the marriage had taken\n\n0 h b -D 1 J place on March 10.", "canonical_name": "N anavati"}}, {"text": "November 20, J 946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 157464, "end_char": 157482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the child born to the respondent was a mature baby does not mean that it was conceived on November 20, J 946."}}, {"text": ".Mudlwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158385, "end_char": 158395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Mudlwlkar, J.\n\nMuDHOLKAR, J-1 regret my inability to agree with the judgment proposed by my brother, Raghubar Dayal, J.\n\nThe appeal arises out of a petition for divorce instituted by the appellant on April 18, 1956 in the City Civil Court of Bombay against his wife, the respondent under s.12(1) (d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.", "canonical_name": ".Mudlwlkar"}}, {"text": "City Civil Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 158608, "end_char": 158634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Mudlwlkar, J.\n\nMuDHOLKAR, J-1 regret my inability to agree with the judgment proposed by my brother, Raghubar Dayal, J.\n\nThe appeal arises out of a petition for divorce instituted by the appellant on April 18, 1956 in the City Civil Court of Bombay against his wife, the respondent under s.12(1) (d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955."}}, {"text": "s.12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158674, "end_char": 158681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 158693, "end_char": 158717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 159469, "end_char": 159482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was to leave for the United States in connection with the family business, and, therefore."}}, {"text": "theMahendra Manilal appellant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 159727, "end_char": 159756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After theMahendra Manilal appellant's departur~ for the United States, the respondent Nanavati stayed with the appellant's father for a few days, and theres,,, Mla v.Mahetulra after at Gamdevi in the hous of the appellant's sister, Sharda Nanavati and her husband."}}, {"text": "Nanavati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 159807, "end_char": 159815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After theMahendra Manilal appellant's departur~ for the United States, the respondent Nanavati stayed with the appellant's father for a few days, and theres,,, Mla v.Mahetulra after at Gamdevi in the hous of the appellant's sister, Sharda Nanavati and her husband.", "canonical_name": "N anavati"}}, {"text": "Sharda Nanavati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 159953, "end_char": 159968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After theMahendra Manilal appellant's departur~ for the United States, the respondent Nanavati stayed with the appellant's father for a few days, and theres,,, Mla v.Mahetulra after at Gamdevi in the hous of the appellant's sister, Sharda Nanavati and her husband."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 160574, "end_char": 160589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was considerable correspondence between\n\nthe parties subsequent to this until August 21, 1947, on which date the respondent gave birth to a female child at Prantij."}}, {"text": "Baroda Court for the annulment of the marriage under the Baroda State Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161116, "end_char": 161197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "framedMahendraManilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 165246, "end_char": 165267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the following two issues were framedMahendraManilal by the High Court and the case was remitted to the City Civil Nana•ali Court for recording a fincjing : - Su•hila v. M ahe1Ulra\n\nNanavati \"I. Is it proved that the respondent was pregnant atthe time of the marriage?"}}, {"text": "Amin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 165712, "end_char": 165716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that Mr. Amin, who appeared for the present appellant, contended that a great injustice would be done to him if these issues were required to be determined now."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 166609, "end_char": 166620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before us, the first point urged by Mr. S. T. Desai appearing for the appellant is that the High Court was in error in ordering the recording of fresh evidence.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "High Nanava•i Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 168078, "end_char": 168097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) and (5) Mahendra Manilal seem to cover both the additional issues settled by the High Nanava•i Court."}}, {"text": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 168141, "end_char": 168168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, the first issue reads thus: v.\n\nSushila M a.hendra Nanavati\n\nMwlholkar, J.\n\n\"Whether the respondent at the time of the marriage was pregnant by some one oiher than the petitioner as alleged in para 9 of the Petition?\".", "canonical_name": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati"}}, {"text": "Mwlholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168170, "end_char": 168179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, the first issue reads thus: v.\n\nSushila M a.hendra Nanavati\n\nMwlholkar, J.\n\n\"Whether the respondent at the time of the marriage was pregnant by some one oiher than the petitioner as alleged in para 9 of the Petition?\".", "canonical_name": "Mwlholkar"}}, {"text": "s.23(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168771, "end_char": 168778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168856, "end_char": 168869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.12(2)(b)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170234, "end_char": 170249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DcsaiMahendrn Mnilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 170324, "end_char": 170344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. therefore, agree with Mr. DcsaiMahendrn Mnilal that the remission of the issues was wholly unjustified and Nanavat• should not have been allowed."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 170590, "end_char": 170595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect of this, however.sushi/a •Mahendra would be that the entire evidence adduced thereafter including Nanavati the evidence upon which Mr. Desai has placed such strong Mudholkar, J. reliance before us will have to be completely left out of consideration.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "s 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170756, "end_char": 170761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MaAendra Manilal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 172902, "end_char": 172918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the High Court has purported to exercise its powers\n\nMaAendra Manilal\n\nNanav11ti\n\nSm Aila M ahendra\n\nNanavati\n\nMudhol/w, J.\n\nupon the ground that proper issues were not framed by the trial Court.", "canonical_name": "llaAndra Manilal"}}, {"text": "Aila M ahendra\n\nNanavati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 172934, "end_char": 172958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the High Court has purported to exercise its powers\n\nMaAendra Manilal\n\nNanav11ti\n\nSm Aila M ahendra\n\nNanavati\n\nMudhol/w, J.\n\nupon the ground that proper issues were not framed by the trial Court."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 174616, "end_char": 174623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The law of divorce in India, is broadly speaking, modelled on the law of England."}}, {"text": "Ginesi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 175369, "end_char": 175375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken in Ginesi's case(') has also been accepted in Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones(') and Galler v. Galler(')."}}, {"text": "M\"dholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 176281, "end_char": 176290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With the exception of Lord M\"dholkar, J. Oaksey, the view of the House of Lords was that the onus of proof on the husband in a case of this kind did not extend to establishing the scientific impossibility of his being the father .of the child.", "canonical_name": "MUDHOLKAR, JJ."}}, {"text": "Oaksey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 176517, "end_char": 176523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Oaksey and Lord Mac Dermott were of the view that in the case of an interval of 360 days between intercourse with her husband and the birth of a child the court cannot."}}, {"text": "Mac Dermott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 176533, "end_char": 176544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Oaksey and Lord Mac Dermott were of the view that in the case of an interval of 360 days between intercourse with her husband and the birth of a child the court cannot.", "canonical_name": "Mac Dermott"}}, {"text": "MacDermott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 177686, "end_char": 177696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then added that since writing his opinion he had had the advantage of reading that of Lord MacDermott and he concurred in what Lord MacDermott had to say.", "canonical_name": "Mac Dermott"}}, {"text": "Stowell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 178042, "end_char": 178049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be convenient now to refer to the observations of Lord MacDermott At page 417 of the Report are his relevant observations: -\n\n\"The evidence must, no doubt, be clear and satisfactory, beyond a mere balance of probabilities, and conclusive in the sense that it will satisfy what Lord Stowell, when Sir William Scott described in Loveden v. Loveden(') as 'the g\n\n0 uarded discreion of a reasonable and just man'; but these desiderata appear to me entirely consistent with the acceptance of proof beyond reasonable doubt as the standard required ............ I am unable to subscribe to the view which, though not propounded here, has its adherents, namely, that on\n\n(')Sim and S. 150. (') ("}}, {"text": "William Scott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 178060, "end_char": 178073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be convenient now to refer to the observations of Lord MacDermott At page 417 of the Report are his relevant observations: -\n\n\"The evidence must, no doubt, be clear and satisfactory, beyond a mere balance of probabilities, and conclusive in the sense that it will satisfy what Lord Stowell, when Sir William Scott described in Loveden v. Loveden(') as 'the g\n\n0 uarded discreion of a reasonable and just man'; but these desiderata appear to me entirely consistent with the acceptance of proof beyond reasonable doubt as the standard required ............ I am unable to subscribe to the view which, though not propounded here, has its adherents, namely, that on\n\n(')Sim and S. 150. (') (", "canonical_name": "William Scott"}}, {"text": "S. 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178434, "end_char": 178440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahendra Manilal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 178471, "end_char": 178487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahendra Manilal\n\n1rtanavati\n\nits true construction the word 'satisfied' is capable of connoting something less than proof bey-\n\nSushila Ma.hendra.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Sushila Ma.hendra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 178600, "end_char": 178617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahendra Manilal\n\n1rtanavati\n\nits true construction the word 'satisfied' is capable of connoting something less than proof bey-\n\nSushila Ma.hendra.", "canonical_name": "Sushila M a.hendra Nanavati"}}, {"text": "Birkenhead", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 180846, "end_char": 180856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Birkenhead, L.C., who tried 1964 the case sitting as a judge of first instance, said, in regard to Mahend;;;-Ma i-•\n\nh 'f ni .. 1 ew1e:- .", "canonical_name": "Birkenhead"}}, {"text": "MwlhGlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 181230, "end_char": 181239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ex- MwlhGlkar, J. pert evidence renders it manifest that there is no such impossibility.", "canonical_name": "Mwlholkar"}}, {"text": "Gaskill", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 182260, "end_char": 182267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then referred to Wood v. Wood('), in which the illi terval was 346 days and Hadlum v. Hadlum('), where the interval was 349 days, and observed:-\n\n\"But I think that the cases of Gaskill('), Wood(')\n\nand Hadlum(') put an unwarranted and increasing burden upon a husband who seeks to prove his wife's adultery.\""}}, {"text": "Ormerod", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 182454, "end_char": 182461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, he expressed his agn:ment with the view of Ormerod, J., in M-T v. M-T('), where the interval was 340 days, and acting upon the medical evidence to the effect that the husband could not have been the father of the child, the learned Judge without saying anything about the burden of proof granted a decree to the husband."}}, {"text": "Hodson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 182757, "end_char": 182763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Galler v. Galler('), Hodson L.J. has observed at 1' 540:-\n\n\"I have used the language which I have, because, since Fairman v. Fairman(') was decided, the much debated question whether the standard of proof in a divorce suit, which is a kind of civil action, is the same as that in a criminal case, and whether the\n\n(') (1951) A.C. 391."}}, {"text": "Suahila Mahendra Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 183419, "end_char": 183443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanavati and has quoted with approval the opinions expressed by Lord Suahila Mahendra Simonds and Lord MacDermott."}}, {"text": "M•dholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 183546, "end_char": 183555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then observed:- Nanavati \"It might appear from the passages which I have read M•dholkar, J. from the judgment in Fairman v. Fairman(') that the anology of criminal law was the ratio of that decision, but I think the result is the same by whichever road one travels.", "canonical_name": "MUDHOLKAR, JJ."}}, {"text": "Martin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 184359, "end_char": 184365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Martin, J.. has observed in the same case at p. 259: -\n\n\"No doubt section 15 provides that subject toJhe provisions herein contained, all proceedings under this Act between party and party shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184425, "end_char": 184435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184570, "end_char": 184597, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 12, 13 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184678, "end_char": 184698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "provisions referred to are those of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184738, "end_char": 184802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Divorce Act, 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184863, "end_char": 184887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184955, "end_char": 184959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Divorce Act, 1869", "statute": "the Indian Divorce Act, 1869"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185418, "end_char": 185422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Divorce Act, 1869", "statute": "the Indian Divorce Act, 1869"}}, {"text": "Indian Divorce Act, 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 185430, "end_char": 185454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 23(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185456, "end_char": 185469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Divorce Act, 1869", "statute": "the Indian Divorce Act, 1869"}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 185477, "end_char": 185501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Divorce Act, 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 185960, "end_char": 185977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 185995, "end_char": 186013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "M11dl1olkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 186249, "end_char": 186260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The satisfaction must necessarily be founded upon M11dl1olkar, J. material which is relevant for the consideration of the Court, and this would include the evidence adduced in the case."}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 186737, "end_char": 186755, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November 1, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 187155, "end_char": 187171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the betrothal and his marriage either at Bombay or at any other place, i.e., between November 1, 1946 and March JO, 1947, that he did not know at the date of the marriage that the respondent was pregnant, that he and the respondent lived together for JO or 12 days at Vile Parle after the marriage, that during this period she did not disclose to him that she had been pregnant prior to the marriage, that he left for U.S.A. in the last week of April, 1947, that the respondent who had gone to Prantij in the meanwhile returned to Bombay only a day prior to his departure, that he was aware before he left for U.S.A. that the respondent had become pregnant, and that he did not disclose this fact to any one, because he was not sure whether she was pregnant or not."}}, {"text": "U.S.A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 187488, "end_char": 187494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the betrothal and his marriage either at Bombay or at any other place, i.e., between November 1, 1946 and March JO, 1947, that he did not know at the date of the marriage that the respondent was pregnant, that he and the respondent lived together for JO or 12 days at Vile Parle after the marriage, that during this period she did not disclose to him that she had been pregnant prior to the marriage, that he left for U.S.A. in the last week of April, 1947, that the respondent who had gone to Prantij in the meanwhile returned to Bombay only a day prior to his departure, that he was aware before he left for U.S.A. that the respondent had become pregnant, and that he did not disclose this fact to any one, because he was not sure whether she was pregnant or not."}}, {"text": "Mudlw'kar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 189111, "end_char": 189120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mudlw'kar, .J.\n\nA number of letters written by the appellant to the respondent in which he had suggested that they sliould meet and come in closer contact with each other were put to him, and he admitted them.", "canonical_name": ".Mudlwlkar"}}, {"text": "July 11. 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 189367, "end_char": 189380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He admitted having stated in his letter dated July 11."}}, {"text": "17th April 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 190339, "end_char": 190354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In cross-examination, the following questions were put to him : - \"Q. In the letter dated 17th April 1947,."}}, {"text": "17th April\n\n1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 190541, "end_char": 190557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. (The witness refers to the letter dated 17th April\n\n1947 written by him to the respondent part of Ex No."}}, {"text": "Sharada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 191449, "end_char": 191456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have already pointed out that the appellant had said that he wanted to keep the fact of respondent's pregnancy a secret, though he knew about it before his departure to U.S.A. He had to admit that'he had suggested to the respondent that she should intimate the fact to his sister, Sharada.", "canonical_name": "Sharadaben"}}, {"text": "Ramanlal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 192203, "end_char": 192211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In her evidence, the respondent has reiterated her denial of having conceived from a person other than the appellant She has, however, deposed to the fact that she had visited Bombay before the marriage about the Christmas days in the year 1946 and stayed in the house of Ramanlal, Witness No."}}, {"text": "10th March 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 193994, "end_char": 194009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And then in answer to the question \"Before 10th March 1947 Mahendra, the petitioner, his sister Sharada and his father did not."}}, {"text": "Mahendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 194010, "end_char": 194018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And then in answer to the question \"Before 10th March 1947 Mahendra, the petitioner, his sister Sharada and his father did not.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Sharadaben", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 194203, "end_char": 194213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "her answer, after certain hes1tal!on was: -\n\n\"It is not true thac the petitioner, his sister Sharadaben and his father did not know that I was pregnant\n\nMuMoll:ar, J.\n\nSDPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1964J\n\n1964 prior to the marriage.", "canonical_name": "Sharadaben"}}, {"text": "MuMoll:ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 194263, "end_char": 194272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "her answer, after certain hes1tal!on was: -\n\n\"It is not true thac the petitioner, his sister Sharadaben and his father did not know that I was pregnant\n\nMuMoll:ar, J.\n\nSDPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1964J\n\n1964 prior to the marriage."}}, {"text": ".Mwillwlbu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 194690, "end_char": 194700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v •. s...r.;1a Jlal<1ulr& In the letter dated January 8, 1948 written by her to the Nana.., i appellant's sister she had stated \"I am innocent\", and in crossexamination, she was asked as to what was the necessity for .Mwillwlbu, J. • bo her to write that in her letter if the child which was rn to her was conceived from the appellant, her answer was:-\n\n\"We came to know that a scandal was raised by my father-in-law and mother-in-law at Vile Parle and that is why I had written to my sister-in-law that I was innocent."}}, {"text": "aMalewdm Naoilal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197043, "end_char": 197059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is all the evidence in the case, and the question is 1964 whether upon this evid;:;;;; e it was open to a Court to make aMalewdm Naoilal\n\ndecree under s. 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act annulling the Na\"\"\"\"' marriage upon the ground that the respondent had onceivd s ... Aila v.Naleiidra\n\nfrom a person other than the appellant before her marriage Naaa.oJi and that the appellant was not aware of this fact at the time of the marriage."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197074, "end_char": 197079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Marriage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 197087, "end_char": 197105, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madho//.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 197399, "end_char": 197407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended on behalf of the appellant Madho//.,,, J. that the respondent has admitted both in her pleading and in her evidence in the Court that she had had pre-marital sex relations apd that this admission by her should be construed against her."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 199443, "end_char": 199463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it is possible that an apparently normal child may be born 171 days after coitus (or even 186 days as contend, ed by Mr. Purshottam Trikamdas) and would survive, and if that was what had happened in this case, then in the words of Lord Normand \"the departure from the normal course of things is so extraordinary that the mother, conscious of innocence but believing herself the victim of a sport of nature, might, despairing of establishing the true defence, allow herself to palter with the truth, and might induce others closely connected with her to lend themselves to prevarication\n\n1961 or worse.\"", "canonical_name": "Purushottam Trikamdas"}}, {"text": "Preston-Janes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 200759, "end_char": 200772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged by Mr. Desai, apparently on the strength of an observation made in one of the speeches in Preston-Janes' case(') that where the period of gestation deducible in respect of a child deviates markedly from the normal, the burden on the husband who denies being its father of establishing the matrimonial offence alleged by him against his wife is a very light one.", "canonical_name": "Preston Jones"}}, {"text": "Nanavati", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 203286, "end_char": 203294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h'l \";~ , d • • 1Jlfo i a ..ua-11en ra so it is difficult to beheve that this fact would not come to Nanavati\n\nth~ notice of the female relatives of the appellant or the appellant himself, or of Dr. Champaklal the appellant's brother-in- Jfwllwlkar, J. law who has been found by the High Court to have examined her."}}, {"text": "Jfwllwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 203423, "end_char": 203433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h'l \";~ , d • • 1Jlfo i a ..ua-11en ra so it is difficult to beheve that this fact would not come to Nanavati\n\nth~ notice of the female relatives of the appellant or the appellant himself, or of Dr. Champaklal the appellant's brother-in- Jfwllwlkar, J. law who has been found by the High Court to have examined her."}}, {"text": "B. S. Mehta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 205992, "end_char": 206003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "albumen in her urine the period of gestation of the child will be shortened (see evidence of Dr. B. S. Mehta)."}}, {"text": "Mu1holkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 206438, "end_char": 206447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f regard to the existing state of medical knowledge they should not overlook the fact that there is still a good deal which is Mu1holkar, J, not known.", "canonical_name": "MUDHOLKAR, JJ."}}, {"text": "City Civil Cnurt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 207580, "end_char": 207596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Initially no attempt was ever made before the City Civil Cnurt to adduce any scientific evidence i.e., evidence of experts, and in the absence of such evidence, can it be said that there was anything else of which the City Civil Court ought to have taken judicial notice?"}}, {"text": "Section 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207938, "end_char": 207949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208509, "end_char": 208520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahendra , Hanilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 209079, "end_char": 209097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the only fact known was that the child was born Mahendra , Hanilal , on August 27, 1947 and nothing else was.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Mt11.lMlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 209380, "end_char": 209391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, however, in addition to this there Na,,;.vati was evidence to show that the mother was suffering from Mt11.lMlkar, J. eclempsis or that the child was weak and premature such a presumption would not arise, In this case, there is evidence of both these facts."}}, {"text": "3, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 209707, "end_char": 209714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F dated September 3, 1947 produced by the appellant."}}, {"text": "July 12; 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 209846, "end_char": 209859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11 written by Dr. Champaklal to the respondent's father on July 12; 1947 and September 20, 1947."}}, {"text": "September 20, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 209864, "end_char": 209882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11 written by Dr. Champaklal to the respondent's father on July 12; 1947 and September 20, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211402, "end_char": 211407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahendra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 212190, "end_char": 212198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One is Madhuben, who claims to have a ';\";::,,..,; \"\"'\" been working in the Prantij Municipal Dispensary from 1939\n\nSuski/a v. Mahendra to ld955.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Kacharabai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 213007, "end_char": 213017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. was produced by a witness, Kacharabai, also examined at that stage; but in the absence of a white paper, which is normally a part of this particular record, it loses its value .. It is true that there was no crossexamination on behalf of the respondent regarding Madhubrn's statement that she had examined the respondent two months before the delivery, but it seems to me that from the fact that she deposed 12 years after the event and the further fact that she had to attend to at least 150 labour cases every year-a total of 2,400 cases during the time she worked in the hospital-her evidence cannot be regarded otherwise than as artificial."}}, {"text": "Madhubrn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 213243, "end_char": 213251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. was produced by a witness, Kacharabai, also examined at that stage; but in the absence of a white paper, which is normally a part of this particular record, it loses its value .. It is true that there was no crossexamination on behalf of the respondent regarding Madhubrn's statement that she had examined the respondent two months before the delivery, but it seems to me that from the fact that she deposed 12 years after the event and the further fact that she had to attend to at least 150 labour cases every year-a total of 2,400 cases during the time she worked in the hospital-her evidence cannot be regarded otherwise than as artificial.", "canonical_name": "Madhuben"}}, {"text": "Mahendra M••ilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 215117, "end_char": 215133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has de- 1964\n\nposed to a large number of things, and the only points which Mahendra M••ilal it is necessary to mention are: (a) the normal period of gesta- Nanavah tion is 280 days, which period is calculated from the first day sushila vMahendra of the last menstrual period; (b) where the hospital record Na114vati shows that the woman delivered of a child has normal labour Yudholhr, J. and the child weighed 4 lbs and is living, it must have been conceived 270 days before the date of birth; (c) if a child is born within 169 days from the date of marriage it would not be of sufficient maturity to survive; (d) confirmation of a pregnancy within three weeks of conception is possible only by a biological test; (e) abdominal enlargement would be perceptible after the fourth month of pregnancy; (f) viability is described as the critical period of maturity and that this period is the 28th week of conception and explained that the viable period is called critical period because it denotes the development of the child's tissues to the extent that it can have independent existence from its mother only after that and not before; and (g) a child born after the 28th week from concep: tion would survive when special care and treatment is given to it.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Yudholhr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 215418, "end_char": 215426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has de- 1964\n\nposed to a large number of things, and the only points which Mahendra M••ilal it is necessary to mention are: (a) the normal period of gesta- Nanavah tion is 280 days, which period is calculated from the first day sushila vMahendra of the last menstrual period; (b) where the hospital record Na114vati shows that the woman delivered of a child has normal labour Yudholhr, J. and the child weighed 4 lbs and is living, it must have been conceived 270 days before the date of birth; (c) if a child is born within 169 days from the date of marriage it would not be of sufficient maturity to survive; (d) confirmation of a pregnancy within three weeks of conception is possible only by a biological test; (e) abdominal enlargement would be perceptible after the fourth month of pregnancy; (f) viability is described as the critical period of maturity and that this period is the 28th week of conception and explained that the viable period is called critical period because it denotes the development of the child's tissues to the extent that it can have independent existence from its mother only after that and not before; and (g) a child born after the 28th week from concep: tion would survive when special care and treatment is given to it."}}, {"text": "William Hunter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 216536, "end_char": 216550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 32 was put to him:\n\n\"'It was the opinion of William Hunter that few children born before 7th calendar month (or 210 days) are capable of living to manhood, but with advances in methods of Neonatal Resuscitation and maintenance, this dictum has gradually receded into history."}}, {"text": "Hunter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 216988, "end_char": 216994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the absence of any skilled care, Hunter's dictum on the likelihood of survival when born before the 7th calendar month remains as true as it was.\""}}, {"text": "Bernardi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 217814, "end_char": 217822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following cases of survival of less mature infants are referred to in this connection: '\n\n1964 Bernardi described the survival of a I lb."}}, {"text": "Nanayakkara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 217899, "end_char": 217910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "infant in MaMndra Mm.ilal 1951, and Nanayakkara, in the same year, recorded a birth\n\nNana..ii at I lb."}}, {"text": "MacDonald", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 218014, "end_char": 218023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s ... h'';,.!,-:::; rra MacDonald reported the survival of a 14 in."}}, {"text": "Mudlwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 218128, "end_char": 218137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "infant-thought to be a gestation of 6 to 61 months-- Mudlwlkar, J. that, six months later, weighed 5 lb.", "canonical_name": ".Mudlwlkar"}}, {"text": "Victoria Crosse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 218221, "end_char": 218236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• The considerable experience of Victoria Crosse in problems of prematurity resulted in the publication of the follow\" ing table, emphasising the high mortality of prematurity:\n\nWeight of Infant (lb) Percentage leaving Hospital."}}, {"text": "Barker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 218499, "end_char": 218505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "94\n\nThe author then refers to a case attended by Barker in which a female child born 22 weeks after intercourse was observed by him to have attained the age of I 1."}}, {"text": "J. H. Peel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 219028, "end_char": 219038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be convenient to quote here two passages from the article by J. H. Peel at p. 557 onwards of British Obstetric Practice (22nd edn.)"}}, {"text": "Kane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 220610, "end_char": 220614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is well shown in Table 2 constructed by Kane and Penrose from 7,037 live births from University ColJege Hospital records."}}, {"text": "Penrose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 220619, "end_char": 220626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is well shown in Table 2 constructed by Kane and Penrose from 7,037 live births from University ColJege Hospital records."}}, {"text": "Peel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 221751, "end_char": 221755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conditions associated with premature labour are many and varied and Peel has classified them thus:\n\n\"(1) Maternal causes. ("}}, {"text": "Sandifer", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 222175, "end_char": 222183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus Sandifer (1944); analys-· ing premature births at Queen Charlottee's Hospital, found no definite cause in 372 out of a totaf of 681 spontaneous premature labours."}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222920, "end_char": 222930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 222938, "end_char": 222957, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ajinkya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 224107, "end_char": 224114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mystery of its behaviour has yet to be unravelled and, therefore, if an expert makes a dogmatic assertion about any matter concerning child-birth dismissing contrary opinions based upon the observations of departures from the so-called norm with supersilious disdain as Dr. Ajinkya has done or is unable to give a satisfactory explanation for the departure from the normal observed by other scientists, I would put aside his opinion on the ground that his whole approach is unscientific.", "canonical_name": "Ajinkia"}}, {"text": "Mody", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 225216, "end_char": 225220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 SC.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT.3 351\n\nThe following passage from Mody's Medical Jurispru- 1964\n\ndence and Toxicology, 12th edn."}}, {"text": "Mahendra Manifal \" Nanava.ti.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 225302, "end_char": 225331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 305 was put to him: Mahendra Manifal \" Nanava.ti. \"", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Nanavatt\n\n. Jludholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 227833, "end_char": 227855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanavati\n\nIS!Uhi/, a Ma1\".dra\n\nNanavatt\n\n."}}, {"text": "Nanaioati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 230779, "end_char": 230788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has spoken not Nanaioati merely from his own observations as an obstetrician but on Mudholkar, J. the strength of the findings of other scientists."}}, {"text": "Udani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 231233, "end_char": 231238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt the appellant has examined Dr. Udani, a Pediatrician, but even his evidence does not take the matter :any further."}}, {"text": "Vimadalal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 233050, "end_char": 233059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I./P(D)lSCl-12\n\n1964 Mr. Vimadalal objected to the last part of the answer given Mohendra Manilalby the witness on the ground that it was volunteered by him."}}, {"text": "Mohendra Manilalby", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 233106, "end_char": 233124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I./P(D)lSCl-12\n\n1964 Mr. Vimadalal objected to the last part of the answer given Mohendra Manilalby the witness on the ground that it was volunteered by him."}}, {"text": "--Naoavati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 233183, "end_char": 233193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "--Naoavati Even, however, if this is taken into account, it makes no di!fe- Swila TMohendra rence, because there is no positive evidence to show that the\n\nNanaooti respondent was suffering from toxaemia right t\\11 the termination of the pregnancy."}}, {"text": "Nanaooti", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 233338, "end_char": 233346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "--Naoavati Even, however, if this is taken into account, it makes no di!fe- Swila TMohendra rence, because there is no positive evidence to show that the\n\nNanaooti respondent was suffering from toxaemia right t\\11 the termination of the pregnancy.", "canonical_name": "N anavati"}}, {"text": "Mwlliolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 233468, "end_char": 233478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When asked whether in his experience Mwlliolkar, J. ."}}, {"text": "Boston", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 233696, "end_char": 233702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One in London and one in Boston."}}, {"text": "Eardley HoJland", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 234377, "end_char": 234392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has also deposed that the period of gestation is counted from the first day of the last menstruation, and in this connection, he relied upon the following passage from British Obstetric and Gynaecological Practice by Sir Eardley HoJland and Aleck Bourne, 1955 ed.:"}}, {"text": "Aleck Bourne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 234397, "end_char": 234409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has also deposed that the period of gestation is counted from the first day of the last menstruation, and in this connection, he relied upon the following passage from British Obstetric and Gynaecological Practice by Sir Eardley HoJland and Aleck Bourne, 1955 ed.:"}}, {"text": "Naegele", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 234436, "end_char": 234443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"According to Naegele's rule, which is almost universally employed, seven days are added to the first day of the last menstrual period and nine months added, in order to arrive at the expected date <if delivery."}}, {"text": "Dougald Baird", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 234854, "end_char": 234867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also agreed with the following passage from Dougald Baird's Combined Text Book of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 6th ed:\n\n\"It has long been known that the length of gestation\n\nin the human is almost ten lunar months (280 days) if calculated from the first day of tht last menstrual period.\"", "canonical_name": "Dougald Baird"}}, {"text": "Madhalkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 235861, "end_char": 235870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the seoond period Nanavati of pregnancy, he meant after the third month of pregnancy Madhalkar, J and before the seventh month of pregnancy."}}, {"text": "Green Hill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 236544, "end_char": 236554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that his statement is based upon the following two passages in De Lee's book:\n\n\"De Lee delivered a viable child one hundred and eighty-two days after the day of conception and Green Hill delivered a baby one hundred and ninety-one days after the beginning of the last menses and one hundred and seventy-six days after the last coitus."}}, {"text": "JlwJAoliar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 238061, "end_char": 238071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JlwJAoliar, J.\n\nMr. Desai referring to the opinion of the witness regarding the mode of confirmation of pregnancy within three weeks."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 238081, "end_char": 238086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JlwJAoliar, J.\n\nMr. Desai referring to the opinion of the witness regarding the mode of confirmation of pregnancy within three weeks.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "Jfahendra Manilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 240628, "end_char": 240645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But that was nothing more than innocent Jfahendra Manilal exaggeration and ought not to be taken literally.", "canonical_name": "267\n\nMAHENDRA MANILAL NANAVATI"}}, {"text": "Nanavati\n\nNvdholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 243599, "end_char": 243618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanavati\n\nNvdholkar, J.\n\nTo sum up, the substance of the medical evidence led on behalf of the appellant is that the normal period of gestation of a child is 280 days, that a child born 180 days after the last menstruation is not likely to be born alive or if born alive it will survive only if special care is taken, that such a case would not be that of normal delivery and its weight would be 1 !"}}, {"text": "Mahtiulra Ma•il•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 246224, "end_char": 246240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be remembered that on the question as to whether the respondent was pregnant before her marriage Mahtiulra Ma•il• not only the High Court but also the City Civil Court has Na .. vati come to the c9nclusion that she was not."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 246723, "end_char": 246737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 246797, "end_char": 246805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Ba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 248874, "end_char": 248903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are numerous decisions on the point but I may refer only to the following as instances of cases in which this Court has refused to disturb concurrent findings of fact: Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Ba/afiwa/e v. Gopa/ Vinayak Gosavi & ors.(');"}}, {"text": "[1960] 1 S.C.R. 733", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 249018, "end_char": 249037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Charan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 249189, "end_char": 249201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IJahendra\n\nNanaiati\n\nMud1ol1'ar, J.\n\n360 SUPllEME COUHT REPORTS [1964]\n\nCharan Singh('); and Shamrao Bhagwanrao Deshmukh v.\n\nDominion of India(')."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_32_48_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "196~\n\n.Jl•rch 6\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAJA BIRAKISHORE\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA\n\n' [1964\n\nIP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH, 4\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI JJ.] 1 Fundamental rights-Interference with religious affairs of Temple-Constitution of India, Art. 31(2)-Applicability-Shri Jagannath Tempie Ah, 1954 (No. II of 1955), ss. 8, 11, 18, 21, 21A and 3()-Validity-Constitution of India, Arts. 13, 19, 26(d), 27 and 28.\n\nA writ petition was filed in the Orissa High Court by the father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954.\n\nThe petition was dismissed by High Court which held that the Act was valid and constitutional except s. 28(2)(f). The High Court struck down that provision and upheld the constitutionality of the rest of the Act. The appellant came to this Court after obtaining a certificate of fitness to appeal to Supreme Court.\n\nThe contentions raised b'efore this Court were that the Act was discriminatory. as the Jagannath Temple alone had been singled out for special treatment as compared to other temples in the State of Orissa. The Act took away the sole management of the Temple which had so far .been vested in the appellant or his ancestors. S. 15(1) of the Act interfered with the religious affairs of the temple. The valiclity of ss. 11, 19, 21, 21A and 30 of the Act was also attacked. Dismissing the appeal, Held: There is no violation of Art. 14 af the Constitution.\n\nThe J agannath Temple occupies a unique position in the State of Orissa, and is a temple of national importance and no other temple in that State can compare with it. It stands in a class by itself and considering the fact that it attracts pilgrims from all over India in large numbers, it could be the subject of special consideration by the State Government. A law may be constitutional even though it related to a single individual if on account of special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself. .\n\n(ii) There was no violation of Art. 19(1) (f) or Art.. 31(2) of the Constitution. All that the Act has done is that it has taken away the sole right of the appellant to manage the property of the Temple and another body has been set up in its olace with the appellant as its Chairman. Such a process cannot be said to constitute the acquisition of the extinguished office or of the vesting of the rights in the person holding that office. The appellant occupied a dual position as Superintendent and. Adya Sevak. His position as Superintendent has gone and in that place he has become the Chairman of the Committee set up under s. 6.\n\nThe position of the applicant as Adya Sevak is safeguarded by s. 8 of the Act inasmuch as the rights and privileges in respect of Gajapati Maharaja Seva a.re protected even though he may cease to be Chairman on account of his minority or on account of some other reason. ·\n\n(iii) S. l5(1) of the Act does not interfere with the religious affairs of the Temple. Sevapuja of the Temple has two aspects.\n\nOne aspect is the provision of materials and that is a secular\n\n-, ,\n\nfunction. The second aspect is the performance of the Sevapuja 1964 and other rights as required by religion. S. 15(1) has nothing -- to do with the second aspect which is the religious aspect of Seva-Raja Birakishore puja. Whiles. 15(1) imposes a duty on the committee to look after , v. . the secular aspect of the Sevapuja, it leave the religious part The State of Or1Bsa entirely untc, uched. -\n\n(iv) Ss. 11, 19 and 21 were valid provisions and could not be attacked as ss. 5 and 6 constitut'ng the committee in place of the Raja, were valid. Ss. 21A and 30 were also valid.\n\nArts. 27 and 28 had nothing to do with the matter dealt with under Act. It was not open to the appellant to argue that the Act was bad as it was hit by Art. 26(d). No such contention wa• properly raised in the High Court.\n\nTilkayat, Shri Govindlal ii v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 1638, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 135 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated April 30, 1958, of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 321 of 1955.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad and A. D. Mathur, for the appellant. '\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, M. S. K. Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 5, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered byw ANCHOO, J .--1 his appeal on a certificate gra\\lted by Wanc/ioo J. the Orissa High Court raises the question of the constitutionality of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954, No. II of 1955, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The challenge to the Act was made by the father of the present appellant by a writ petition filed in the High Court of Orissa. The appellant was substituted for his father on the death of the latter while the writ petition was pending in the High Court. The case put forward in the petition firstly was that the Shri Jagannath Temple (hereinafter referred to as the Temple) was the private property of the petitioner, Raja of Puri, and the Act, which deprived the appellant of his property was unconstitutional in view of Art. 19 of the Constitution. In the alternative it was submitted that the appellant had the sole right -of superintendence and management of the Temple and that that right could not be taken away without payment of compensation, and the Act inasmuch as it took away that right without any compensation was hit by Art. 31 of the Constitution. It was further pleaded that the right of superintendence was property within the meaning of Art. 19 (I) (f) and inasmuch as the appellant had been deprived of that property by the Act, it was an unreasonable provision which was not\n\nL'P(ll)l~CJ-2 ...\n\nRaja Biralcisliore\n\nThe Slafe of Orissa\n\nWanehoo, J.\n\nsaved under Art. 19(5). The Act was further attacked on the ground that i~ was discriminatory and was therefore hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, as the Temple had been singled out for special legislation, though there was a general law in force with respect to Hindu religious endowments, namely, the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act No. II of 1952.\n\nReliance was placed on Arts. 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution to invalidate the Act. though the appellant did not indicate in the petition how those Articles hit the Act. Lastly, it was urged that the utilisation of the Temple funds for purposes alien to the interest of the deity as proposed under the Act was illega.1 and ultra vires.\n\nThe petition was opposed on behalf of the State and it was urged that the Temple was not the private property of the appellant. The case of the State was that it was a public temple and the State always had the right to see that it was properly administered. Before the British conquered Orissa in 1803, the Temple had for a long time been managed by\n\nMuslim Rulers directly, though through Hindu employees.\n\nAfter 1803, the Temple began to be managed directly by the British Government, though by Regulation IV of 1809 the management was made over to the Raja of Khurda (who is now known as the Raja of Puri). who was appointed as hereditary superintendent in view of his family's connection in the past with the Temple. Even so, whenever there was mismanagement in the Temple during the course of the last century and a half, the Government always intervened and many a time administered the secular affairs of the Temple directly through one of its officers in whose favour the then Raja was made to execute \\l power of attorney divesting himself completely of all powers of management. The case of the State further was that in view of the reported mismanagement of the Temple, the State legislature passed the Puri Shri Jagannath Temple (Administration) Act, (No. XIV of\n\n1952) for the appointment of a Special Officer fer the preparation of a record pertaining to the rights and dutiesof different sevaks\" and pujaris and such other persons connected with the seva, puja or management of the Temple and its endowments in order to put the administration of the Temple on a suitable basis. A Special Officer was accordingly appointed who submitted his report on March 15, 1954, which disclosed serious mismanagement of the affairs of the Temple and in consequence the Act was passed in 1955. The Stlte contended that the Act was perfectly valid and constitutional and did not offend any constitutional provision.\n\nWhen the matter came to be argued before the High Court, the appellant gave up the plea that the Temple was his private property and 1t was conceded that it was a public u:m pie, the properties of which were the properties of the ddty\n\n'1 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREM.F. COURT REPORTS 35\n\n. . fhR' fPur'I' 1964 and not the private properties o t e a1a o\n\n1. n view -- -0f this concession, the attack on the constitutionality of the Raj<! Birakiahore\n\nAct was bas~~ mainl_y on the ground that it took awar theTheSta1e'::1on ...\n\nRa ja's perqms1tes which had been found to belong to bun m -- the record of rights prepared under the Act of 1952. It may Wanclwo, J. be mentioned that the Raja of Puri had two-fold connection with the Temple. In the first place, the Raja is the adya sevak, i.e., the chief servant of the Temple and in that capacity he has certain rights and privileges. In addition to that, . he was the sole superintendent of the Temple and was incharge of the management of the secular affairs of the Temple.\n\nThe main contention of the appellant before the High Court was that the Act not only took away the management of the secular affairs of the Temple from the appellant but also\n\ninterfered with his rights as adya sevak and was therefore unconstitutional. The High Court repelled ail the submissions on behalf ot the appellant and held that the Act was valid and constitutional except for one provision contained in s. 28(2)(f) thereof. The High Court therefore struck down that provision and upheld the constitutionality of the rest of the Act. Thereupon the appellant applied for a certificate which was granted; and that is how the appeal has come up before us.\n\nBefore we consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act we should like to indicate briefly what the scheme of the Act is and what it provides with respect to the management of the Temple. Section 1 provides for its commencement. Section 2 provides for certain repeals. Section 3 provides that the Orissa Act XIV of 1952 shall be deemed to be a part of the Act and delegates to the committee constituted under s. 6 of the Act all powers of the State Government under the 1952-Act from such date as the. State Government may notify. Section 4 is the definition section. Section 5 vests the administration and the governance of the Temple and its endowments in a committee called the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee. The Committee shall be a body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common seal and may by the said name sue and be sued. Section 6 provides for the constitution elf the committee with the Raja of Puri as its chairman. No person who does not profess the Hindu religion shall be eligible for membership. Besides providing for some ex officio members. the other members of the committee are all nominated by the State Government, one from among the persons entitled to sit on the mukti-mandap, three from among the sevaks of the Temple recorded as such in the record of rights, and seven from among those who do not belong to the above two classes.\n\nRaja Birakishorl\n\nTlie Swte of Orisso\n\nWanckoo. , J,\n\nThe Collector of the district of Puri is an ex officio member and is designated as the vice-chairman of the committee.\n\nSection 7 provides for the appointment of a chairman during the minority of the Raja of Puri or during the time when the Raja is suffering from any of the disabilities mentioned in s. 10(1) clauses (a) to (e) and (g) thereof. Section 8 lays down that nothing in s. 7 shall be deemed to affect the rights and privileges of the Raja of Puri in respect of the Gajapati Maharaj Seva merely on the ground that the Raja has ceased to perform the duties of the chairman for the time being.\n\nSection 9 provides for the terms of office of members and s. l 0 gives power to the State Government to remove any mem her of the committee other than the ex officio members on the grounds specified in els. (a) to (g) thereof. No member can be removed from his membership . unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his: removal. Section 11 provides for dissol'ution -and supersession of the committee in certain contingencies, such as incompetence to perform the duties imposed upon it by' the Act pr making of default in. performing such duties. The committee is given an opportunity to show cause against any such action before it is taken, and provision iS made for continuing the management during .the time the committee is superseded or has been dissolved. Section 12 provides for casual vacancies, s. 13 for the meetings of the committee and s. 14 for allowances to the members of the committee payable from the Temple fund, but no member of the committee other than the administrator is to be paid any salary or other remuneration from the Temple fund except such travelling and daily a.llowances as may be prescribed. Section 15 provides for the duties of the committee and it may be quoted in full as it is the main target of attack: -\n\n\"15. Subject to the provisions of this Act and the ruleS' made thereunder, it shall be the duty of the Committee--\n\n(1) to arrange for the proper performance of sevapujah and of the daily and periodical Nitis of the Temple in accordance with the Record-of-Rights~\n\n(2) to provide. facilities for the proper performance of worship by the pilgrims;\n\n(3) to ensure the safe custody of the funds, valuable securities and jewelleries and for 1he p(reserva. tion and management of the properties vested in the Temple; ·\n\n(4) to ensure maintenance of order and discipline and proper hygienic conditions in the Temple and' of proper standard of cleanliness and purity in the offerings made therein;\n\nI 'il\n\n(5) to ensure that funds of the specific and religious\n\nH64 endowments are spent according to the wishes, Raja Bimkithort so far as may be known, of the donors; v.\n\nThe State of 0.-iaaa\n\n(6) to make provision for the payment of suitable - emoluments to its salaried staff; and Wanchoo, J.\n\n(7) to do all such things as may be incidental and conducive to the efficient management of the affairs of the Temple and its endowments and the convenience of the pilgrims.\" Section 16 provides a ban on the alienation of Temple properties subject to certain conditions. ection 17 lays down that the committee shall have no power to borrow money from any person except with the previous sanction of the State Government. Section 18 provides for an annual administration report to be submitted to the Government. Section 18-A gives power to the committee with the prior approval of the State Government to delegate its functions to the Collector of the district or, as the case may be, to the officer who happens to be a member of the committee in place of such Collector.\n\nSection 19 gives power to the State Government to appoint an administrator for the Temple. Section 20 provides for the qualifications and conditions of service of the administrator and s. 21 for the powers and duties of the administrator. As this section is specially attacked we quote it here in full. \"S.21. (I) The Administrator shall be Secretary of the Committee and its chief executive officer and shall subject to the control of the committee have powers to carry out its decision in accordance with the provisions of this act.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section .(1) or in section 5, the Administrator shall be responsible for the custody of all records and properties of the Temple, and shall arrange for proper collections of offerings made in the Temple and shall have power-\n\n(a) to appoint all officers and employees of the Temple;\n\n(b) to lease out for a period not exceeding one year at a time the lands and buildings of the Temple which are ordinarily leased out;\n\n(c) to call for tehders for works or supplies and accept such tenders when the amount or value ,\"' thereof does not exceed two thousand rupees; id> to order for emergency repairs;\n\n{e) to specify, by general or special orders, such conditions and safeguards as he deems fit, sul\\ ject to which any sevak, office-holder or servant\n\nRaja Birakiahore\n\nTll< Slat< of Orisaa\n\nWanclaoo, J.\n\n38 SuPREME COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\nshall have the right to be in possession of jewels or other valuable belongings of the temple;\n\n(f) to decide disputes relating to the collection, distribution or apportionment of offerings, fees and other recepits in cash or in kind received from the members of the public;\n\n(g) to decide disputes relating to the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of sevaks, officeholders and servants in respect of sevapuja antl nitis, whether ordinary or special in nature;\n\n(h) to require rvarious sevaks and other persons to do their legitimate duties in time in accordance with the Recor, d-of-Rights; and\n\n(i) in the absence of any sevak or his substitutes or on the failure on the part of any such person to perform his duties, to get the niti or seva performed in accordance with the record-ofrights by any other person.\n\n(3) The administrator may subject to such conditions, if any, as the committee may, by general or special order impose, afford facilities on payment of fees for special darshan or for any special service, ritual or ceremony, such darshan, service, ritual or ceremony not being inconsistent with the custom and usage of the Temple and he shall have power to determine the portion, if any, of such fees which shall be paid to the sevaks, office-holders or servants of the Temple.\" Section 21:A provides that all sevaks, office-holders and servants attached to the Temple or in receipt of any emoluments or perquisites therefrom shall, whether such service is hereditary or not, be subject to the control of the administrator who may, subject to the provisions of the Act and the regulations made by the committee in that behalf, after giving the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard withhold the receipt of emoluments or perquisites, impose a fine, suspend or dismiss any of them for breach of trust, incapacity, disobedience of lawful orders, neglect of or wilful absence from duty, disorderly behaviour or conduct derogatory to the discipline or dignity of the temple or for any other sufficient cause: Section 22 provides for extraordinary powers of the administrator who is directed to take action in emergency and report forthwith to the committee the action taken and the reasons therefor. Section 23 provides for the establishment schedule and s. 24 provides for an appeal to the committee against an order of the administrator under s. 21 (2)(f) or (g) ors. 21-A. Sections 25 to 27 provide for the preparation of annual budget and auc\\it. Section 28 provides for a Temple fund and how it is to be utilised. Section 29 bars suits against\n\nthe State Government or against the committee or the adminis- 1964 trator for anything done or purported to be done by any of Roja Birakisl•>r< them under the provisions of the Act. Section 30 gives power The 1. •· 10 . f 1 . d f h T 1 d 't d ctate\n\n0 '\"'\" o genera supermten ence o t e emp e an 1 s en ow- _ ments to the State Government which may pass any orders lfonchoo, J. for the proper maintenance or administration of the Temple or its endowments or in the interest of the general public worshipping in the Temple. It also gives power to the State Government to examine the records o( the administrator or of the committee in respect of any proceedings with a view to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order made therein; and if in any case it appears to the State Government that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted, for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. The State Government is also given the power to stay the execution of any such decision or order in the meantime. Section 30-A creates an offence which is punishable on conviction with fine which may extend to Rs. 500 whenever any person having duties to perrorm in respect of the nitis of the Temple or sevapuja of the deity raises any claim or dispute and fails or refuses to perform such duties, knowing or having reasons to believe that the non-perforinance of the said duties would cause delay in the performance of the niti or sevapuja or inconvenience or harassment to the public or any section thereof entitled to worship in the Temple and wilfully disobeys or fails to comply with the orders of the administrator directing him to perform his duties without prejudice to the results of a proper adjudication of such claim or dispute. Section 31 gives power to the committee to frame regulations as to the conditions of service of office bearers and employees of the Temple, procedure for transfer of sevapuja. chuli or panti in the Temple, observance of nitis and other usages in the Temple in the absence of specific mention in the record of rights; and any other matters for which regulations are required to be made for the purposes of the Act. Section\n\n32 gives power to the State Government to frame rules. Section 33 lays down that \"the committee shall be entitled to take and be in possession of all movable and immovable properties, including the Ratna Bhandar and funds and jewelleries, records, documents and other assets belonging to the Temple\" and also lays down the procedure to be followed in case of resistance in obtaining such possession. Section 34 lays down that \"all public officers having custody of any record, register, report or other documents relating to the Temple or anv movable or immovable property threof shall furnish such copies of or extracts from the same as may be required by the administrator\". Section 35 lays down that \"no act or proceeding of the CO!Jlmittee or of any person acting as a member of the comn.ittee shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only\n\n1964 of a defect in the establishment or constitution of the commit- Ra.i• BirMillore tee or on the ground that any member of the committee was\n\n'\" not entitled to hold or continue in such office by reason of any The State•!°\"\"\" disqualification or by reason of any irregularity or illegality in w...;;;, J. his appointment or by reason of such act having been done or proceeding taken during the period of any vacancy in the office of member of the committee.\" Similar protection is given to an act or proceeding of the administrator. Section 36 provides for the removal of difficulties by the Sta.te Government so long as the order passed in that behalf is not inconsistent with the Act or the rules made thereunder.\n\nThis review of the provisions of the Act shows that broadly speaking the Act provides for the management of the secular affairs of the Temple and does not interfere, with the religious affairs thereof, which have to be performed according to the record of rights prepared under the Act of 1952 and where there is no such record of rights in accordance with custom and usage obtaining in the Temple. It is in this background that we have to consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act. We may first dispose of the attack based on Art. 14. It is urged that inasmuch as this special Act has been passed for this Temple and the general Act, namely, the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act No. II of 1952 no longer applies to this Temple, there has been discrimination inasmuch as the Temple has been singled out for special treatment as compared to other temples in the State of Orissa. There is no doubt that the Act is in many respects different from Act II of 1952 and substitutes the committee for the Raja of Puri for the purpose of management of the Temple, and there would prima facie be discrimination unless it can be shown that the Temple stands in a class by itself .and required special treatment. As to that the affidavit on behalf of the State Government is that the Temple is a unique institution in the State of Orissa and is in a class by itself and that there is no comparison between the Temple and other temples in the State. The averment on behalf of, the State is that the Temple has been treated as a special object throughout the centuries because of i!s unique importance and that there is no other temple which occupies the unique place whih this Temple occupies in the whole of India. Also there is no other temple in Orissa with such vast assets or which attracts such a large number of pilgrims which pour into it from the whole of India. It is also averred that it is absolutely incorrect that there are other temples in Orissa which are equal to it from the standpoint of assets or from the standpoint of their all-India character or from the standpoint of the complicated nature of nitis and sevapuja affecting the lives, religious susceptibilities and sentiments of millions of people spread all over India. There can be no doubt after this averment on behalf of the State that the Temple occupies a unique position in the State of Orissa and\n\n• i\n\nis a temple of national importance and no other temple in that State can compare with it. It stands in a class by itself and considering the fact that it attracts pilgrims from all over India in large numbers it must be a subject of special consideration by the State Government. In reply to these averments on behalf of the State, all that the appellant stated in his rejoinder was that these averments were not admitted. There was no denial of the special importance of the Temple as averred on behalf of the State and we have no doubt therefore that this Temple stands in a class by itself in the State of Orissa and therefore requires special treatment. We may in this connection refer to the decision of the Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalj/ v. State of Rajasthan(') where in relation to the temple at Nathdwara with respect to which a special Act had been passed by the State of Rajasthan, this Court observed that \"a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself\". The attack under Art. 14 on the constitutionality of the law with respect to the temple at Nathdwara was repelled on the ground that the temple had a. unique position amongst the Hindu Shrines in the State of Rajasthan and no temple could be regarded as comparable with it. The same reasons in our opinion apply to the Temple in the present case and the Act cannot be struck down under Art. 14 because the Temple in the present case holds a unique position amongst the Hindu temples in the State of Orissa and no other temple can be regarded as comparable with it.\n\nNext we come to the attack on the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it has taken away the sole management of the temple which had so far been vested in the appellant or his ancestors. The reasons why the Act was passed are to be found in the preamble thereof. The preamble say& that the ancient Temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri has eversince its inception been an institution of unique and national importance, in which millions of Hindu devotees from regions far and wide have reposed their faith and belief and ha.ve re- 5arded it as the epitome of their tradition and culture. It further says that long prior tO' and after the British conquest the superintendence, control and management of the affairs of the Temple have been the direct concern of successive rulers, governments and their officers and of the public exchequer. It then says that by Regulation IV of 1809 and thereafter by other laws and regulations in pursuance of arrangements entered into with the Raja, of Khurda, later designated as the Raja of Puri, the said Raja came to be entrusted hereditarily with the management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties as superintendent subject to the control and supervision of the ruling power. It then goes on to say that in view of grave\n\n('J [1964] 1 S.C.R, 561.\n\nRaja Birakialwre ...\n\nThe State of Oriaea\n\nfJ'anchoo, J.\n\n1964 and serious irregularities thereafter the Government had to Raja Birakiahore intervene on various occasions in the past. Finally the pre- . v. . amble says that the administration under the superintendent The Stare•! Om•• has further deteriorated and a situation has arisen rendering it\n\nWanchoo, expedient to reorganise the scheme of management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties and provide better administration and governance therefor in supersession of all. previous laws, regulations and arrangements, having regard to the ancient customs and usages and the unique and traditional nitis and rituals contained in the record of rights prepared under the 1952 Act. So for all these reasons the appellant was removed from the sole superintendence of the Temple and a committee was appointed by s. 6 of the Act for its management. These statements in the preamble are not seriously in dispute as will be clear from the reports by G.\n\nGrome dated June 10, 1905 and by the Special Officer appointed under the 1952 Act dated March 15, 1954 and the correspondence which passed from time to time between the officers of the Government and the predecessors of the appellant. In these circumstances--if the secular management of the Temple was taken away from the sole coQtrol of the appellant and vested in a committee of which he still remains the chairman, it cannot be said that the provisions contained in the Act for that purpose are hit either by Art. 31 (2) or by Art. l 9(f). There is in our opinion a complete parallel between the provisions of the Act and the Act relating to the temple at Nathdwara in Rajasthan, which came up for consideration before this Court in Tilkayat. Govindlalji's case('). If anything, the case of the appellant is weaker than that of Shri Govindlalji, for the appellant in the present case was conferred with the power of superintendence by Regulation IV of 1809 after the British conquered .Orissa. Whatever may have been his connection prior to 1809 with the Temple, the history of the Temple shows that the Muslim Rulers had removed him and were carrying on the management of the Temple directly through Hindu officers appointed by them. The right of management was conferred on the appellant's ancestor after the British conquest by virtue of the Regulation of 1809 and other laws passed , thereafter. All that the Act has done is to replace his sole right of management by appointing a. committee of which he is tl1e chairman .. Further there can be in the circumstances no question of the application of Art. 31 (2) in the present case. In the first place the right of superintendence is not property in this case for it carried no beneficial enjoyment of any property with it, and in tlie second case, that right has not been acquired by tile State which Art. 31(2) requires. As was pointed out in Tilkayat GovindltiBji's case('), all tllat has happened in the present case is that the sole right of the appellant to\n\n(') [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561.\n\n1964 manage the property ha~ been extinguished and in its place another body for the purpose of the administration of the d I h d h Raja Birnlish.or~ property of the Temple has been create . n ot er war s t e v. office of one functionary is brought to an end and another TA• Sta<e of Ori,.• functionary has come into existence in its place. Such a process cannot be said to constitute the acquisition of the extinguished office or the vesting of the rights in the person holding that office: (see Tilkayat Govindlalji's case(').\n\nAs we have already pointed out, the appellant and his predecessors always had two distinct rights with respect to this Temple. In the first place, they were the adya sevaks and as such had. certain rights and privileges and perquisites. fhe rights as adya sevak as we shall show later have not been touched by the Act. The Act has only deprived him of the second right i.e .. the sole management of the Temple which carried no beneficial enjoyment of any property with it and has conferred that management on a committee of which he still remains the chairman. In view of this clear dichotomy in the rights of the appellant al)d his predecessors there is no question of Art. 31(2) applying in the present case at all, insofar as this right of superintendence of the appellant is concerned. The attack on the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that the sole right of superintendence has been taken away from the appellant and th11t is hit by Art. 19(1)(0 or Art. 31 (2) must therefore fail.\n\nThis brings us to the other aspect of the rights of the appellant as adya sevak, and it is urged that those rights have been taken away by the Act, and insofar as the Act has done that it is unconstitutional in that the provisions with respect to those rights are unreasonable and cannot be protected under Art. 19(5). Now we have already referred to the provisions of the Act, and if one looks a.t those provisions one finds nothing in them which takes away the rights of the appellant as adya sevak. If anything, there are indications in the Act to show that his rights, other than those of superintendence remain intact. Whn we sa)'. this we are not to b~ understood as saying that any nghts which the appellant might have had in the capacity of adya sevak but which were of the nature of secular management of the Temple would still remain in him.\n\nBecause the appellant and his predecessors were holding a dual position of superintendent and adya sevak, there was in the past a mix-up of his rights flowing from being an adya. sevak with his rights as a superintendent. But apart from the rights which vested in him as the sole manager of the Temple with respect to its management and which have only been taken away from him by the Act. we find nothing in the Act which takes away his rights as an adya sevak (i.e. the chief servant) of Lord Jagannath in the matter of sevapuja, nitis etc. These rights flow from his position as adya sevak, they\n\n\nH'anclwo, J.\n\nRaja Biraki&hore\n\nTe Slate of Orissa\n\nWanchOo, J.\n\nare religious in character and are refernble to his status and obligations as sevak. We may in this connection refer to s. s of the Act which lays down that nothing ins. 7 shall be deemed to affect the rights and privileges of the Raja in respect of Gajapati Mahaaja Seva merely on the ground that the Raja has ceased to perform the duties of the chairman for the time being. This provision clearly shows that even though the appellant may not be able to act as chairman of the committee because of his minority or because of certain disqualifications mentioned in s. 7 read with s. 10()), his rights and privileges in respect of the Gajapati Maharaja Seva (i.e., the daily sevapuja of Lord Jaganna.th) remain unaffected, and these were the Iights which he had as adya sevak. Therefore s. 8 preserves by the clearest implication the rights of the appellant as adya sevak in connection with the sevapuja of Lord Jagannath. In this connection our attention was drawn to s. 14 of the Act, which provides tha.t it shall be within the power of the State vernment by order to direct from time to time the payment from out of the Temple fund to the chairman of such allowances at times and in such manner as the State Government may consider reasonable and proper.\n\nIt is said that in view of s. 14, the appellants rights and privileges as adya sevak have gone. We are of opinion that this is not so. As we have already said, the position of the superintendent and of adya sevak were two different positions, which the appellant and his predecessors held in this Temple. His position as a Superintendent has gone and in place of it he has become the chairman of the committee constituted under s. 6.\n\nWhen s. 14 speaks of allowances to him, it refers to his position as a chairman, which replaces his position as superintendent before the Act. It has nothing to do with his position as an adya sevak, which is safeguarded by s. 8 of the Act inasmuch as rights and privileges in respect of the Gajapati Maha-· raja Seva are protected, even though he may cease to be the chairman on account of his minority or on account of some other reason. Therefore. the provisions of s. 14 refer to allowances on! y as a chairman and have nothing to do with the rights, privileges and perquisites as an adya sevak. for he remains as adya sevak even though he may not for certain reasons remain a chairman. His rights, privileges and perquisites as adya sevak will remain protected under s. 8 even though he may not be entitled to anything under s. 14 if he ceases to be the chairman in view of s. 7. No provision in the Act has been pointed out to us, which expressly takes away his rights, privileges and perquisites as adya sevak; on the other hand there are other provisions which seem to indicate that even the rights and privileges of sevaks have not been affected by the Act. If so it is hardly likely in the absence of any specific provision, that the Act would affect the privileges of the appellant as adya sevak. For example, s. 21 (2) .(g) gives power to the\n\nadministrator to decide disputes relating to . the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of sevaks, office-holders and servants in respect of sevapuja and nitis, whether ordinary or special in nature. This clearly postulates that the rights and privileges of sevaks remain intact, and if there is any dispute about them, the administrator has to decide it. Again s. 21(2)(f) provides that the administrator shall have power to decide disputes relating ta the collection, distribution or apportionment of offerings, fees and other receipts in cash or in kind received from the members of the public. This again postulates a right in some persons who could only be sevaks etc. to a share of the offerings, fees and other receipts, and if there is any dispute about its distribution or apportionment, the administrator has been given the power to decide it. Reading these two clauses together, there can be no manner of doubt that the Act does not affect even the rights, privileges and perquisites of sevakas.\n\nIf so, in the absence of express provision, it cannot possibly be argue:! that the Act affects rights, privileges and perquisites of adya sevak. As we have already indicated, those rights, privileges and perquisities of adya sevak have also been safe guarded under s. 8 of the Act. Then we may refer to s. 21 (3) which provides that \"the administrator may subject to such conditions, if any, as the committee may, by general or special order impose, afford facilities on payment of fees for special darshan or for any special service, ritual or ceremony such darshan, service, ritual or ceremony not being inconsistent with the custom and usage of the Temple and he shall have power to determine the portion, if any, of such fees which shall paid to the sevakas, office-holders or servants of the Temple\" This again postulates that the rights, privileges and perquisites of the sevaks a:e not to be affected by the Act but have to be governed by the record of rights or, as the case may be. by the order of the committee. The argument that the Act is ultra vires because it takes awa, y the rights, privileges and perquisites of the appellant as adya sevak, some of which may be property must therefore fail in view of the specific provision in s. 8 and indications in other provisions of the Act to which we have referred.\n\nClause (I) of s. 15 of the Act is however specially attacked as interfering with the religious affairs of the Temple. The rest of the provisions of that section deal so obviously with secular\n\natters tht they have not been challenged. This clanse provides that 1t shall be the duty of the committee to arrange for the proper performance of sevapuja and of the daily and periodical nitis of the Temple in accordance with the record of rights. As we read this clause we see no invasion of the religious affairs of the Temple therein. All that it provides is that it shall be the duty of e committee to arrai; ige for the proper performance of sevapuia etc. of the Temple m accordance with\n\nRaja Birakiskore\n\nv. 'J'!te State of Oris8Cl\n\nlVanclwo, J.\n\n1'64\n\n Raja Birakialwre ...\n\nThe State of Orisaa\n\nff'anchoo, J.\n\nthe record of rights. Sevapuja etc. have always two aspects.\n\nOne aspect is the provision of materials and so on for the purpose of the sevapuja. This is a secular function. The other aspect is that after materials etc. have been provided, the sevaks\n\no~ other persons who may be entitled to do so, perform the sevapuja and other rites as required by the dictates of religion.\n\nClause (I) of s. 15 has nothing to do with the second aspect. which is the religious aspect of sevapuja; it deals with the secular aspect of the sevapuja and enjoins upon the committee the duty to provide for the proper performance of sevapujd and that is also in accordance with the record of rights. Sr> that the committee cannot deny materials for sevapuja if the record of rights says that certain materials are necessary. We are clearly of the opinion that cl. (I) imposes a duty on the committee to look after the secular part of the sevapuja and leaves the religious part thereof entirely untouched. Further under this clause it will be the duty of the committee to see that those who are to carry out the religious part of the duty do their duties properly. But this again is a secular function to see that sevaks and other servants carry out their duties properly; it does not interfere with the performance of religious duties themselves. The attack on this provision that it interferes with the religious affairs of the Temple must therefore fail.\n\nWe may now briefly refer to some other sections of the AcL which were attacked. Apart from the main sections 5 and 6 by which the appellant was divested of the sole management, the first section so attacked is s. 11 which deals with the dissolution and supersession of the committee. We have not been abk to understand how this section can be attacked once it is held that ss. 5 and 6, constituting the committee in place of the Raja, are valid, as we have held tha.t they are for they are the main provisions by which the management has been transferred from the sole control of the Raja to the control of the committee. The next section in this group is s. 19. That section provides for the appointment of an administrator to carry on the day to day administration of the secular part of the affairs of the Temple .. We cannot see how this provision is liable to attack once ss. 5 and 6 are held good, for the committee must have some officer under it to carry on the day to day administration. The next provision that is attacked in this group is s. 21, which deals with powers and duties of the administrator.\n\nAgain we cannot see how this provision can be attacked once it is held that the appointment of the administrator under s. 19 is good, for s. 21 only delimits the powers and duties of the administrator, and all powers and duties therein specified are with respect to the secular affairs of the Temple, and have no direct impact on the religious affairs thereof. The next section in this group is s. 21-A. That section is clearly concerned with the secular management of the Templl'. for the disciplinary\n\n'1 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COURT REJ.'ORTS 47\n\npowers conferred thereby on the administrator are necessary in order to carry on the administration of the secular affairs of the Temple. lhe next section which is attacked is s. 30, which gives over all supervisory power to the State Government. We cannot see how the control which the State Government is authorised to exercise by s. 30 over the committee can be attacked once the appcintment of the committee is held to be good. The last section under this group is s. 30A, which creates a criminal offence and makes sevaks etc. liable to a fine on conviction. We think it unnecessary for present purposes t0 consider the validity of this section. The matter can be decided if and when :i case of prosecution under that section ever arises.\n\nThis brings us to the contention relating to Arts. 26, 27 and 28 of 1;1e Conslil QJion, which were referred to in the petition.\n\nArticles 27 and 28 in our opinion have nothing to do with the matters dealt with under the Act. The main reliance has however been placed on Art. 26(d) which Jays down that subject to public order, monjlity and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to administer its property in accordance with law. In the first place besides saying in the petition that the Act was hit by Art. 26 there was no indication anywhere therein as to which was the denomination which was concerned with the Temple and whose rights to administer the Temple have been taken away. As a matter of fact the petition was filed on the basis that the appellant was the owner of the Temple which was his private property. There was no claim put forward on behalf of any denomination in the petition. Under these circumstances we are of opinion that it is not open to the appellant to argue that the Act is bad as it is hit by Art. 26(d). The argument addressed before the High Court in this connection was that the worshippers of Lord Jagannath constitute a distinct religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 and that they had a right to administer the Temple and its endowments in accordance with la.w and that such administration should be only through the Raja of Puri as superintendent of the Temple assisted by the innumerable sevaks attached thereto. But inasmuch as. te Act has ake_n away this right of management from the rehgmus denommatmn, i.e., the worshippers of Lord Jagannath, and entrusted it to the nominees of the State Government, there had been a contravention of the fundamental rights guaranteed under cl. (d) of Art 26. This argument was met on behalf of the State with the contention that the Temple did not pertain to any particular sect, cult. or creed of Hindus but was a public temple above all sects, cults and, creeds, therefore, as the temple was not the temple of any particular domination no question arose of the breach of cl.(d) of Art. 26. The foundation for all this argument which was\n\nRaja BirakishOrf.\n\nTin. State of OrisJa\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\n48 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\n1981 urged before the High Court was not laid in the writ petition.\n\nRaja Birafi, hore In these circumstances we think it was unnecessary for the T v. .\n\nHigh Court to enter into this question on a writ petition of he State of Or\"'\"' this kind. The High Court however went into the matter and\n\nWanckoo, J. repelled the argument on the ground that the Temple in the present case was meant for .all Hindus, even if all Hindus were treated as a denomination for purposes of Art. 26, the management still remains with Hindus, for the committee of management consists entirely of Hindus, even though a nominated committee. In view of the defective state of pleadings however we are not prepared to allow the argument under Art. 26(d) to be raised before us and must reject it on the sole ground that no such contention was properly raised in the.High Couot.\n\nFor these reasons we find there is no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs.\n\nA ppea/ dismissed.", "total_entities": 187, "entities": [{"text": "RAJA BIRAKISHORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Raja Biralcisliore", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF ORISSA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ORISSA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 189, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. 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448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 28(2)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 696, "end_char": 707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa High Court by the father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954", "statute": "the Orissa High Court by the father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 895, "end_char": 908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant came to this Court after obtaining a certificate of fitness to appeal to Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1109, "end_char": 1115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as the Jagannath Temple alone had been singled out for special treatment as compared to other temples in the State of Orissa."}}, {"text": "S. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1234, "end_char": 1242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa High Court by the father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954", "statute": "the Orissa High Court by the father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "ss. 11, 19, 21, 21A and 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1324, "end_char": 1350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa High Court by the father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954", "statute": "the Orissa High Court by the father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1435, "end_char": 1442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa High Court by the father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath 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"label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2730, "end_char": 2740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position of the applicant as Adya Sevak is safeguarded by s. 8 of the Act inasmuch as the rights and privileges in respect of Gajapati Maharaja Seva a.re protected even though he may cease to be Chairman on account of his minority or on account of some other reason. ·", "canonical_name": "Adya Sevak"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2759, "end_char": 2763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajapati Maharaja Seva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2827, "end_char": 2849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position of the applicant as Adya Sevak is safeguarded by s. 8 of the Act inasmuch as the rights and privileges in respect of Gajapati Maharaja Seva a.re protected even though he may cease to be Chairman on account of his minority or on account of some other reason. ·", "canonical_name": "Gajapati Maharaja Seva"}}, {"text": "S. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3279, "end_char": 3287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seva-Raja Birakishore puja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3365, "end_char": 3391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. 15(1) has nothing -- to do with the second aspect which is the religious aspect of Seva-Raja Birakishore puja."}}, {"text": "State of Or1Bsa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3528, "end_char": 3543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the secular aspect of the Sevapuja, it leave the religious part The State of Or1Bsa entirely untc, uched. -"}}, {"text": "Ss. 11, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3574, "end_char": 3591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 21A and 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3716, "end_char": 3730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 27 and 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3749, "end_char": 3764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 26(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3901, "end_char": 3911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tilkayat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3972, "end_char": 3980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tilkayat, Shri Govindlal ii v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 1638, referred to."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4062, "end_char": 4090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad and A. D. Mathur, for the appellant. '"}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4249, "end_char": 4262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad and A. D. Mathur, for the appellant. '"}}, {"text": "A. D. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad and A. D. Mathur, for the appellant. '"}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4303, "end_char": 4314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, M. S. K. Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4346, "end_char": 4361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, M. S. K. Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4366, "end_char": 4380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, M. S. K. Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4795, "end_char": 4815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The challenge to the Act was made by the father of the present appellant by a writ petition filed in the High Court of Orissa."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5212, "end_char": 5219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa High Court raises the question of the constitutionality of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954", "statute": "the Orissa High Court raises the question of the constitutionality of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5525, "end_char": 5532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa High Court raises the question of the constitutionality of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954", "statute": "the Orissa High Court raises the question of the constitutionality of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5646, "end_char": 5653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raja Biralcisliore", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5806, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 (I) (f) and inasmuch as the appellant had been deprived of that property by the Act, it was an unreasonable provision which was not\n\nL'P(ll)l~CJ-2 ...\n\nRaja Biralcisliore\n\nThe Slafe of Orissa\n\nWanehoo, J.\n\nsaved under Art.", "canonical_name": "Raja Biralcisliore"}}, {"text": "Wanehoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5847, "end_char": 5854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 (I) (f) and inasmuch as the appellant had been deprived of that property by the Act, it was an unreasonable provision which was not\n\nL'P(ll)l~CJ-2 ...\n\nRaja Biralcisliore\n\nThe Slafe of Orissa\n\nWanehoo, J.\n\nsaved under Art.", "canonical_name": "Wanclaoo"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5872, "end_char": 5882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5979, "end_char": 5986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6177, "end_char": 6201, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arts. 26, 27 and 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6242, "end_char": 6261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7026, "end_char": 7044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After 1803, the Temple began to be managed directly by the British Government, though by Regulation IV of 1809 the management was made over to the Raja of Khurda (who is now known as the Raja of Puri)."}}, {"text": "Khurda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7122, "end_char": 7128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After 1803, the Temple began to be managed directly by the British Government, though by Regulation IV of 1809 the management was made over to the Raja of Khurda (who is now known as the Raja of Puri)."}}, {"text": "Puri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7162, "end_char": 7166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After 1803, the Temple began to be managed directly by the British Government, though by Regulation IV of 1809 the management was made over to the Raja of Khurda (who is now known as the Raja of Puri)."}}, {"text": "March 15, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8224, "end_char": 8238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Special Officer was accordingly appointed who submitted his report on March 15, 1954, which disclosed serious mismanagement of the affairs of the Temple and in consequence the Act was passed in 1955."}}, {"text": "Wanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9112, "end_char": 9119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may Wanclwo, J. be mentioned that the Raja of Puri had two-fold connection with the Temple.", "canonical_name": "Wanclaoo"}}, {"text": "s. 28(2)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9900, "end_char": 9911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10348, "end_char": 10357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before we consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act we should like to indicate briefly what the scheme of the Act", "statute": "Before we consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act we should like to indicate briefly what the scheme of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10389, "end_char": 10398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before we consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act we should like to indicate briefly what the scheme of the Act", "statute": "Before we consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act we should like to indicate briefly what the scheme of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10429, "end_char": 10438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before we consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act we should like to indicate briefly what the scheme of the Act", "statute": "Before we consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act we should like to indicate briefly what the scheme of the Act"}}, {"text": "Orissa Act XIV of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10457, "end_char": 10479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10569, "end_char": 10573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XIV of 1952", "statute": "Orissa Act XIV of 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10691, "end_char": 10700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XIV of 1952", "statute": "Orissa Act XIV of 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10728, "end_char": 10737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XIV of 1952", "statute": "Orissa Act XIV of 1952"}}, {"text": "Jagannath Temple Managing Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10846, "end_char": 10881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 5 vests the administration and the governance of the Temple and its endowments in a committee called the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11012, "end_char": 11021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XIV of 1952", "statute": "Orissa Act XIV of 1952"}}, {"text": "Raja Birakishorl", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11538, "end_char": 11554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Birakishorl\n\nTlie Swte of Orisso\n\nWanckoo. ,", "canonical_name": "Raja Biralcisliore"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11712, "end_char": 11721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11893, "end_char": 11901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11938, "end_char": 11947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11974, "end_char": 11978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12196, "end_char": 12205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12559, "end_char": 12569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12993, "end_char": 13003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13035, "end_char": 13040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13079, "end_char": 13084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13357, "end_char": 13367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Bimkithort", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14282, "end_char": 14297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion and management of the properties vested in the Temple; ·\n\n(4) to ensure maintenance of order and discipline and proper hygienic conditions in the Temple and' of proper standard of cleanliness and purity in the offerings made therein;\n\nI 'il\n\n(5) to ensure that funds of the specific and religious\n\nH64 endowments are spent according to the wishes, Raja Bimkithort so far as may be known, of the donors; v.\n\nThe State of 0.-iaaa\n\n(6) to make provision for the payment of suitable - emoluments to its salaried staff; and Wanchoo, J.\n\n(7) to do all such things as may be incidental and conducive to the efficient management of the affairs of the Temple and its endowments and the convenience of the pilgrims.\""}}, {"text": "State of 0.-iaaa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14345, "end_char": 14361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion and management of the properties vested in the Temple; ·\n\n(4) to ensure maintenance of order and discipline and proper hygienic conditions in the Temple and' of proper standard of cleanliness and purity in the offerings made therein;\n\nI 'il\n\n(5) to ensure that funds of the specific and religious\n\nH64 endowments are spent according to the wishes, Raja Bimkithort so far as may be known, of the donors; v.\n\nThe State of 0.-iaaa\n\n(6) to make provision for the payment of suitable - emoluments to its salaried staff; and Wanchoo, J.\n\n(7) to do all such things as may be incidental and conducive to the efficient management of the affairs of the Temple and its endowments and the convenience of the pilgrims.\"", "canonical_name": "State of 0.-iaaa"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14453, "end_char": 14460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion and management of the properties vested in the Temple; ·\n\n(4) to ensure maintenance of order and discipline and proper hygienic conditions in the Temple and' of proper standard of cleanliness and purity in the offerings made therein;\n\nI 'il\n\n(5) to ensure that funds of the specific and religious\n\nH64 endowments are spent according to the wishes, Raja Bimkithort so far as may be known, of the donors; v.\n\nThe State of 0.-iaaa\n\n(6) to make provision for the payment of suitable - emoluments to its salaried staff; and Wanchoo, J.\n\n(7) to do all such things as may be incidental and conducive to the efficient management of the affairs of the Temple and its endowments and the convenience of the pilgrims.\"", "canonical_name": "Wanclaoo"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14641, "end_char": 14651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14887, "end_char": 14897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14978, "end_char": 14988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15239, "end_char": 15249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15330, "end_char": 15340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15424, "end_char": 15429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15543, "end_char": 15547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15830, "end_char": 15839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Birakiahore", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16561, "end_char": 16577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section .(1) or in section 5, the Administrator shall be responsible for the custody of all records and properties of the Temple, and shall arrange for proper collections of offerings made in the Temple and shall have power-\n\n(a) to appoint all officers and employees of the Temple;\n\n(b) to lease out for a period not exceeding one year at a time the lands and buildings of the Temple which are ordinarily leased out;\n\n(c) to call for tehders for works or supplies and accept such tenders when the amount or value ,\"' thereof does not exceed two thousand rupees; id> to order for emergency repairs;\n\n{e) to specify, by general or special orders, such conditions and safeguards as he deems fit, sul\\ ject to which any sevak, office-holder or servant\n\nRaja Birakiahore\n\nTll< Slat< of Orisaa\n\nWanclaoo, J.\n\n38 SuPREME COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\nshall have the right to be in possession of jewels or other valuable belongings of the temple;\n\n(f) to decide disputes relating to the collection, distribution or apportionment of offerings, fees and other recepits in cash or in kind received from the members of the public;\n\n(g) to decide disputes relating to the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of sevaks, officeholders and servants in respect of sevapuja antl nitis, whether ordinary or special in nature;\n\n(h) to require rvarious sevaks and other persons to do their legitimate duties in time in accordance with the Recor, d-of-Rights; and\n\n(i) in the absence of any sevak or his substitutes or on the failure on the part of any such person to perform his duties, to get the niti or seva performed in accordance with the record-ofrights by any other person.", "canonical_name": "Raja Biralcisliore"}}, {"text": "Wanclaoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16601, "end_char": 16609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section .(1) or in section 5, the Administrator shall be responsible for the custody of all records and properties of the Temple, and shall arrange for proper collections of offerings made in the Temple and shall have power-\n\n(a) to appoint all officers and employees of the Temple;\n\n(b) to lease out for a period not exceeding one year at a time the lands and buildings of the Temple which are ordinarily leased out;\n\n(c) to call for tehders for works or supplies and accept such tenders when the amount or value ,\"' thereof does not exceed two thousand rupees; id> to order for emergency repairs;\n\n{e) to specify, by general or special orders, such conditions and safeguards as he deems fit, sul\\ ject to which any sevak, office-holder or servant\n\nRaja Birakiahore\n\nTll< Slat< of Orisaa\n\nWanclaoo, J.\n\n38 SuPREME COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\nshall have the right to be in possession of jewels or other valuable belongings of the temple;\n\n(f) to decide disputes relating to the collection, distribution or apportionment of offerings, fees and other recepits in cash or in kind received from the members of the public;\n\n(g) to decide disputes relating to the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of sevaks, officeholders and servants in respect of sevapuja antl nitis, whether ordinary or special in nature;\n\n(h) to require rvarious sevaks and other persons to do their legitimate duties in time in accordance with the Recor, d-of-Rights; and\n\n(i) in the absence of any sevak or his substitutes or on the failure on the part of any such person to perform his duties, to get the niti or seva performed in accordance with the record-ofrights by any other person.", "canonical_name": "Wanclaoo"}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17951, "end_char": 17961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18695, "end_char": 18705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18886, "end_char": 18896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18941, "end_char": 18946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19031, "end_char": 19036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 25 to 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19062, "end_char": 19079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19137, "end_char": 19147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19205, "end_char": 19215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Roja Birakisl•>r", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19362, "end_char": 19378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 29 bars suits against\n\nthe State Government or against the committee or the adminis- 1964 trator for anything done or purported to be done by any of Roja Birakisl•>r< them under the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19418, "end_char": 19428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lfonchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19601, "end_char": 19609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d f h T 1 d 't d ctate\n\n0 '\"'\" o genera supermten ence o t e emp e an 1 s en ow- _ ments to the State Government which may pass any orders lfonchoo, J. for the proper maintenance or administration of the Temple or its endowments or in the interest of the general public worshipping in the Temple."}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20353, "end_char": 20363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21081, "end_char": 21091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21495, "end_char": 21506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21559, "end_char": 21569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21904, "end_char": 21914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22181, "end_char": 22191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22884, "end_char": 22894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23609, "end_char": 23616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23742, "end_char": 23766, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "is no doubt that the Act is in many respects different from Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23971, "end_char": 24034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26220, "end_char": 26229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may in this connection refer to the decision of the Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalj/ v. State of Rajasthan(') where in relation to the temple at Nathdwara with respect to which a special Act had been passed by the State of Rajasthan, this Court observed that \"a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself\"."}}, {"text": "Nathdwara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26268, "end_char": 26277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may in this connection refer to the decision of the Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalj/ v. State of Rajasthan(') where in relation to the temple at Nathdwara with respect to which a special Act had been passed by the State of Rajasthan, this Court observed that \"a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26640, "end_char": 26647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27009, "end_char": 27016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jagannath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27513, "end_char": 27522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The preamble say& that the ancient Temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri has eversince its inception been an institution of unique and national importance, in which millions of Hindu devotees from regions far and wide have reposed their faith and belief and ha.ve re- 5arded it as the epitome of their tradition and culture."}}, {"text": "Raja Birakialwre", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28494, "end_char": 28510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Birakialwre ...\n\nThe State of Oriaea\n\nfJ'anchoo, J.\n\n1964 and serious irregularities thereafter the Government had to Raja Birakiahore intervene on various occasions in the past.", "canonical_name": "Raja Biralcisliore"}}, {"text": "State of Oriaea", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28520, "end_char": 28535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Birakialwre ...\n\nThe State of Oriaea\n\nfJ'anchoo, J.\n\n1964 and serious irregularities thereafter the Government had to Raja Birakiahore intervene on various occasions in the past.", "canonical_name": "State of 0.-iaaa"}}, {"text": "fJ'anchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28537, "end_char": 28546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Birakialwre ...\n\nThe State of Oriaea\n\nfJ'anchoo, J.\n\n1964 and serious irregularities thereafter the Government had to Raja Birakiahore intervene on various occasions in the past."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29366, "end_char": 29370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G.\n\nGrome", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29501, "end_char": 29510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These statements in the preamble are not seriously in dispute as will be clear from the reports by G.\n\nGrome dated June 10, 1905 and by the Special Officer appointed under the 1952 Act dated March 15, 1954 and the correspondence which passed from time to time between the officers of the Government and the predecessors of the appellant."}}, {"text": "June 10, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29517, "end_char": 29530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These statements in the preamble are not seriously in dispute as will be clear from the reports by G.\n\nGrome dated June 10, 1905 and by the Special Officer appointed under the 1952 Act dated March 15, 1954 and the correspondence which passed from time to time between the officers of the Government and the predecessors of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30018, "end_char": 30025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "is in our opinion a complete parallel between the provisions of the Act and the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30055, "end_char": 30138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tilkayat. Govindlalji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30242, "end_char": 30263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is in our opinion a complete parallel between the provisions of the Act and the Act relating to the temple at Nathdwara in Rajasthan, which came up for consideration before this Court in Tilkayat.", "canonical_name": "Tilkayat GovindltiBji's"}}, {"text": "Govindlalji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30342, "end_char": 30353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If anything, the case of the appellant is weaker than that of Shri Govindlalji, for the appellant in the present case was conferred with the power of superintendence by Regulation IV of 1809 after the British conquered .Orissa."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31113, "end_char": 31120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is in our opinion a complete parallel between the provisions of the Act and the Act", "statute": "There is in our opinion a complete parallel between the provisions of the Act and the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31365, "end_char": 31375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tilkayat GovindltiBji's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31408, "end_char": 31431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was pointed out in Tilkayat GovindltiBji's case('), all tllat has happened in the present case is that the sole right of the appellant to\n\n(') [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561.", "canonical_name": "Tilkayat GovindltiBji's"}}, {"text": "[1964] 1 S.C.R. 561", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31532, "end_char": 31551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tilkayat Govindlalji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32051, "end_char": 32071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a process cannot be said to constitute the acquisition of the extinguished office or the vesting of the rights in the person holding that office: (see Tilkayat Govindlalji's case(').", "canonical_name": "Tilkayat GovindltiBji's"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32754, "end_char": 32764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(0 or Art. 31 (2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33033, "end_char": 33060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33390, "end_char": 33400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "H'anclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34537, "end_char": 34545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These rights flow from his position as adya sevak, they\n\nH'anclwo, J.\n\nRaja Biraki&hore\n\nTe Slate of Orissa\n\nWanchOo, J.\n\nare religious in character and are refernble to his status and obligations as sevak."}}, {"text": "Raja Biraki&hore", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34551, "end_char": 34567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These rights flow from his position as adya sevak, they\n\nH'anclwo, J.\n\nRaja Biraki&hore\n\nTe Slate of Orissa\n\nWanchOo, J.\n\nare religious in character and are refernble to his status and obligations as sevak.", "canonical_name": "Raja Biralcisliore"}}, {"text": "WanchOo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34589, "end_char": 34596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These rights flow from his position as adya sevak, they\n\nH'anclwo, J.\n\nRaja Biraki&hore\n\nTe Slate of Orissa\n\nWanchOo, J.\n\nare religious in character and are refernble to his status and obligations as sevak.", "canonical_name": "Wanclaoo"}}, {"text": "Gajapati Mahaaja Seva", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34852, "end_char": 34873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 shall be deemed to affect the rights and privileges of the Raja in respect of Gajapati Mahaaja Seva merely on the ground that the Raja has ceased to perform the duties of the chairman for the time being.", "canonical_name": "Gajapati Maharaja Seva"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35167, "end_char": 35171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10()", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35182, "end_char": 35189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35388, "end_char": 35392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35570, "end_char": 35575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35888, "end_char": 35893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36289, "end_char": 36293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36301, "end_char": 36306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36520, "end_char": 36524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36765, "end_char": 36770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37068, "end_char": 37072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37126, "end_char": 37131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37175, "end_char": 37179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37617, "end_char": 37622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21(2)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38020, "end_char": 38031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38931, "end_char": 38935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38969, "end_char": 38974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39911, "end_char": 39915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40005, "end_char": 40010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Birakiskore", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40679, "end_char": 40695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Temple m accordance with\n\nRaja Birakiskore\n\nv. 'J'!te State of Oris8Cl\n\nlVanclwo, J.\n\n1'64\n\n Raja Birakialwre ...\n\nThe State of Orisaa\n\nff'anchoo, J.\n\nthe record of rights.", "canonical_name": "Raja Biralcisliore"}}, {"text": "State of Oris8Cl", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40707, "end_char": 40723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Temple m accordance with\n\nRaja Birakiskore\n\nv. 'J'!te State of Oris8Cl\n\nlVanclwo, J.\n\n1'64\n\n Raja Birakialwre ...\n\nThe State of Orisaa\n\nff'anchoo, J.\n\nthe record of rights.", "canonical_name": "State of 0.-iaaa"}}, {"text": "lVanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40725, "end_char": 40733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Temple m accordance with\n\nRaja Birakiskore\n\nv. 'J'!te State of Oris8Cl\n\nlVanclwo, J.\n\n1'64\n\n Raja Birakialwre ...\n\nThe State of Orisaa\n\nff'anchoo, J.\n\nthe record of rights."}}, {"text": "State of Orisaa\n\nff'anchoo,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40772, "end_char": 40799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Temple m accordance with\n\nRaja Birakiskore\n\nv. 'J'!te State of Oris8Cl\n\nlVanclwo, J.\n\n1'64\n\n Raja Birakialwre ...\n\nThe State of Orisaa\n\nff'anchoo, J.\n\nthe record of rights."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41196, "end_char": 41201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42342, "end_char": 42358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42452, "end_char": 42457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42615, "end_char": 42626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42898, "end_char": 42903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43119, "end_char": 43130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43292, "end_char": 43297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43476, "end_char": 43481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43495, "end_char": 43500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43752, "end_char": 43757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44078, "end_char": 44083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44235, "end_char": 44240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44371, "end_char": 44377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 26, 27 and 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44692, "end_char": 44711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 27 and 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44776, "end_char": 44794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 26(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44917, "end_char": 44927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45193, "end_char": 45200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 26(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45714, "end_char": 45724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45900, "end_char": 45907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46433, "end_char": 46439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46765, "end_char": 46772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raja BirakishOrf", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46822, "end_char": 46838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The foundation for all this argument which was\n\nRaja BirakishOrf.", "canonical_name": "Raja Biralcisliore"}}, {"text": "State of OrisJa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46846, "end_char": 46861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of OrisJa\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\n48 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\n1981 urged before the High Court was not laid in the writ petition.", "canonical_name": "State of 0.-iaaa"}}, {"text": "Raja Birafi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46980, "end_char": 46991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Birafi, hore In these circumstances we think it was unnecessary for the T v. .", "canonical_name": "Raja Biralcisliore"}}, {"text": "Wanckoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47205, "end_char": 47212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court however went into the matter and\n\nWanckoo, J. repelled the argument on the ground that the Temple in the present case was meant for .all Hindus, even if all Hindus were treated as a denomination for purposes of Art.", "canonical_name": "Wanclaoo"}}, {"text": "Art. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47382, "end_char": 47389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 26(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47629, "end_char": 47639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_361_375_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 361\n\nDAHY ABHAI CHHAGANBHAI THAKKER v.\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.J\n\nCriminal Law-Burden of proof of guilt-Genera! and special burdens, if in conflict-Plea of insanity-Mode of proof enumerated-Questions under s. 154 of Evidence Act-When court can permit-Indian Pena! Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 80, 84, 299-Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), ss. 105, 137, 154.\n\nThe appellant was charged with murdering his wife. Before the Sessions Judge a defence was set up that the appellant was insane when the incident took place and was not capable of understanding the nature of his act. The Sessions Judge rejected the plea of insanity and convicted him under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal the High Court confirmed the conviction.\n\nHe!d-(i) There is no conflict between the general burden to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity.\n\n(ii) The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions: (1). The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite 1THns rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by s. 84 of the Indian Penal Code: the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidenc€'-{Jral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that which rests upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regard.~ one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden <if proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.\n\nK. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, [1962) Supp, 1 S.C.R. 567, followed.\n\nRamhitram v. State. A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 187, disapproved .\n\n. Kamla Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1955 Pat. 209, approved.\n\nH. M. Advocate v. Fraser, (1878)4 Couper 70. referred to.\n\n(iii) The court can permit a person, who calls a witness, to put questions to him which might be put in cr<>&s-€xamination, at any stage of the examination of the witness, provided it takes care to give an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine him on the answers elicited which do not find place in the examina- ,, tion-in-chief.\n\nMarchl~\n\n' '\n\n~ Section 137 of the Evidence Act, gives only the three stages DaAyobliai 0111taga,.. in the examination of a witness, and it has no relevance to the\n\nbliai TWa< ques~10n whe~ a party calling a witness can be permitted to put T. to him quest10ns under s. 154 of the Evidence Act: that is Stale of Gujaral governed by the provisions of s. 154 of the said Act, which confers a discretionary power on the court to permit a person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party.\n\nTahsildar Singh v. The State of U.P., 11959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 875, followed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 27, 1961 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 656I1960.\n\nB. K. Banerjee, for the appellant.\n\nD. R. Prem, 'R. H. Dhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 19, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBA RAO, J.-This appeal raises the question of the defence of insanity for an offence under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe appellant was the husband of the deceased Kalavati.\n\nShe was married to the appellant in the year 1958. On the night of April 9, 1959, as usual, the appellant and his wife slept in their bed-room and the doors leading to that room were bolted from inside. At about 3 or 3.30 a.m. on the next day Kalavati cried that she was being killed. The neighbours collected in front of the said room and called upon the accused to open the door. When the door was opened they found Kalavati dead with a number of wounds on her body.\n\nThe accused was sent up for trial to the sessions on the charge Of murder. Before the Additional Sessions Judge, Kaira, a defence was set up that tf.e accused was insane when the incident was alleged to have taken place and was not capable of understanding the nature of his act.\n\nThe learned Additional Sessions Judge considered the entire evidence placed before him, and came to the conclusion that the accused had failed to satisfy him that when he committed the murder of his wife he was not capable to knowing the nature of the act and that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. Having rejected his plea of insanity, the learned Additicmal Sessions Judge convicted him under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. On appeal\n\nthe High Court agreed with that finding, though for different reasons, and confirmed the conviction and sentence of the Dahyablw.i OMaga.- accused. Hence the present appeal. bhai Tlw.kkt• v.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contended that the State ofGujara1 High Court, having believed the evidence of the prosecution subba Rao, J. witnesses, should have held that the accused had discharged the burden placed on him of proving that at the time he killed his wife he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. He further contended that even if he had failed to establish that fact conclusively, the evidence adduced was such as to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Judge as regards one of the ingredients of the offence, namely, criminal intention, and, therefore, the court should have acquitted him for the reason that the prosecution had not prov ed the case beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nBefore we address ourselves to the facts of the case and the findings arrived at by the High Court, it would be convenient to notice the relevant aspects of the law of the plea of insanity. At the outset let us consider the material provisions without reference to decided cases. The said provisions are :\n\nINDIAN PENAL CODE\n\nSection 199-Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.\n\nSection 84-Nothing is an offence which is done by\n\na person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.\n\nINDIAN EVIDENCE ACT\n\nSection 105-When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code (XL V of\n\n1860) or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in anv law defining the offence, is upon him,. and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.\n\n196'\n\nyab/UJi OMagan.\n\nbiai TW/ar\n\nSlaJe of Gujarat\n\nSuba Rao, J.\n\nSection 4-\"Shall presume\": Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such facts as proved unless and until it is disproved. • \"Pnved\"-A fact is said to be \"proved\" when after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. \"Disproved\"-A fact is said to be disproved' when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case. to act upon the supposition that it does not exist.\n\nSection IOI-Whoever desires any Court to give judg\n\nment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of fact which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.\n\nWhen a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. \"\n\nIt is a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent 'and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in s., 299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, as s. 84 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what be was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception, under s. 105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the accused; and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.\n\nUnder s. 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of \"shall presume\" in s. 4 thereof, the court shall regard the ; absence of such 1.:lrcumstances as prj)Ved unless,, , after considering the ma.tters before it, it believes that said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist To put\n\n'7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 365\n\nit in other words, the accused will have to rebut 1964 the presumption that such circumstanc:es did not exist, by Dahyah;;;;; oMaq ... placing material before the court sufficient to make it conbooi T/uJU.. sider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that v.\n\nState of G1<jaml a prudent man would act upon them. The accused has to satisfy the standard of a \"prudent man\". If the material placed Subba Rao, J. before the court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of \"prudent man\", the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under s. 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in s. 299 of the Indian Penal Code. If the judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the gene\n\nral burden, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity.\n\nThe textbooks placed before us and the decisions cited at the Bar lead to the same conclusion. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edn., Vol. 10, at p. 288, it is stated thus:\n\n\"The onus of establishing insanity is on the accused.\n\nThe burden of proof upon him is no higher than which rests upon a party to civil proceedings.\"\n\nGlanville Williams in his book 'Criminal Law\", The General Part, 2nd Edn., places the relevant dspect in the correct pers pective thus, at p. 516:\n\n\"As stated before, to find that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his act is, in part, only another way of finding that he was ignorant as to some fact constituting an ingredient of the crime; and if the crime is one requiring intention or recklessness he must, on the view advanced in this book, be innocent of mens rea. Since the persuasive burden of proof of mens rea is on the prose\n\ncution, on question of defence, or of disease of the mind, arises, except in so far as tpe prisoner is called upon for his own safety to neutralise the evidence of the prosecution. No persuasive burden of proof rests on him, and if the jury are uncertain whether the allegation of mens rea is made out ................................. the benefit of the doubt . must be given to the prisoner, for, in 'the words\n\nDahyabhai Chltaganbhai TkaJ..:l<tr\n\nState of Oiijar.1l\n\nS11b~ Rao, J.\n\nof Lord Reading in another context, \"the Crown would then have failed to discharge the burden imposed on it by our law of satisfying the jury beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the prisoner.\" This Court in K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra(') had to consider the question of burden of proof in the context of a defence based on the exception embodied in s. 80 of the Indian Penal Code. In that context the law is summarized thus:\n\n\"The alleged conflict between the general burden which lies on the prosecution and the special burden imposed on the accused under s. 105 of the Evidence Act is more imaginary than real. Indeed. there is no conflict at all. There may arise three different situations: (!) A statute may throw the burden of proof of all or some of the ingredients of an offence on the accused: (see ss. 4 and 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act). (2) The special burden may not touch the ingredients of the offence, but only the protection given on the assumption of the proof of the said ingredients: (see ss. 77, 78, 79, 81 and 88 of the Indian Penal Code). (3) It may relate to an exception, some of the many circumstances required to attract the exception, if proved, affecting the proof of all or some of the ingredients of the offence: (see s. 80 of the Indian Penal Code) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : ....... '.......... In the third case. though the burden lies on the accused to bring his case within the exception the facts proved may .not discharge the said burden, but may affect the proof of the ingredients of the offence.\" !After giving an illustration, this Court proceeded to state:\n\n\"That evidence may not be sufficient to prove all the ingredients of s. 80 of the Indian Penal Code, but may prove that the shooting was by accident or inadvertence, i.e., it was done without any inten- . ti on or requisite state of mind, which is, the essence of the offence, within the meaning of s. 300, Indian Penal Code, or at any rate may throw a reasonable doubt on the essential ingredients of the offence of murder .................. In this view it might be said that the general burden to prove the ingredients of the offence, unless there is a specific statute to the contrary, is always on the prosecution, but the burden to prove the circumstances coming under the exceptions lies upon the accused.\" (') [1962] Supp. 1 S:C'R. 567, 597, 598.\n\nWhat is said of s. 80 of the Indian Penal Code will equally ~\".!_ apply to s. 84 thereof. A Division Bench of the Patna High D<ihybhai Oh1-\n\nCourt in Kam/a Singh v. The State (') invoked the same princibha• Thakker pie when the plea of insanity was raised. A Division Bench of state :j GvJaral tlie Nagpur High Court in Ramhitram v. State(') has struck a different note inasmuch as it held that the benefit of doubt Subba Rao, 1 • which the law gives on the presumption of innocence is available only where the prosecution had not been able to connect the accused with the occurrence and that it had nothing to do with the mental state of the accused. With great respect, we cannot agree with this view. If this view weie correct, the court would be helpless and would be.legally bound to convict an accused even though there was 'genuine and reasonable doubt in its mind that the accused had not the requisite intention when he did the act for which he was charged. This view is also inconsistent with that expressed in Nanavati's case('). A Scottish case, H.M. Advocate v. Fraser('), noticed in Glanville Williams' \"Criminal Law\", The General Part, 2nd Edn., at p. 517, pinpoints the distinction between these two categories of burden of proof. There, a man killed his baby while he was asleep; he was dreaming that he was struggling with a wild beast. The learned author elaborates the problem thus:\n\n\"When the Crown proved that the accused had killed his baby what may be called an evidential presumption or presumption of fact arose that the killing was murder. Had no evidence been adduced for the defence the jury could have convicted of murder, and their verdict would have been upheld on appeal. The burden of adducing evidence of the delusion therefore lay on the accused. Suppose that, when all the evidence was in, the jury did not know what to make of the matter. They might suspect the accused to be inventing a tale to cover his guilt, and yet not be reasonably certain about it. In that event the accused would be entitled to an acquittal. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the actus reus but the mens rea.\" '.The octrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of msamty ay be stated in the following propositions: (I) The prosecut10n must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed te offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burde~ o~ provmg that always rests on the prosecution from the begmmng. to the end of the trial. (2) There is a rebuttabl7 presumpton tat the accused was not insane, when he committed the crune, m the sense laid down by s. 84 of the\n\nI') A.I.R. 1955 Pat. 209.\n\nI') A.I.R. 1956 Nag 187 (') [1962] Supp. 1 S.C!R. 5,67. (') (1878) 4 Coupr 70:\n\n196' Indian Penal Code: the accused may reblit it by placing be- Dah bit ; Oh.!aga _fore the court all the relevant evidence-oral, documentary or\n\nIf,..;\" Tkaker n circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher v. than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the 81•1• of Gojara< accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was\n\nBub/Ja Rao, J. insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.\n\nNow we come to ihe merits of the case. Ordinarily this Court in exercise of its jurisd_iction under Art. 136 of the Constitution accepts the findings of fact arrived at by the High Court. But, after having gone through the judgments of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and tht\" High Court, we are satisfied that this is an exceptional case to depart from the said practice. The learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on the ground that their version was a subsequent development designed to help the accused. The learned Judges of the High Court accepted their evidence for two different reasons. Raju, .l., held that a court can permit a party calling a witness to put questions under s. 154 of the Evidence Act only in the examination-inchief of the witness; for this conclusion, he has given the following two reasons: (!) the wording of ss. 137 and 154 of the Evidence Act indicates it,-and (2) if he is permitted to put questions in the nature of cross-examination at the stage of re-examination by the adverse party, the adverse party will have no chance of cross-examining the witness with reference io the answers given to the said questions. Neither of the two reasons, in our view, is tenable. Section 137 of the Evidence Act gives only the three stages in the examination of a witness, namely, examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination. This is a routine sequence in the examination of a witness. This has no relevance to the question when a party calling , a witness can be permitted to put to him questions under s. 154 of ihe Evidence Act: that is governed by the provisions of s. 154 of the said Act, which confers a discretionary power on the court to permit a person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 154 does not in terms, or by necessary implication confine the exercise of the power by the court before the examination-in-chief is concluded or to any particular stage of the examination of the witness. It is wide in scope and the discretion is entirely left to the court to exercise the power when the circumstancs demand. To confine this power to the stage of examination-in-chief is to make\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE!IIE COURT HEPORTS 369\n\nit ineffeCtive in practice. A clever witness in his examination 1901 in-chief faithfully conforms to what he stated earlier to the Dahyah/.a; Ghfia!l\"\"- police or in the committing court, but in the cross-examina- Mai 1'1.akk\" tion introduces statements in a subtle way contradicting in sia•e 0/(;,,, i,, ra•. effect what he stated in the examinationin-chief. If his design is obvious, we do not see why the court cannot, during the S1tbba Rao, J. course of his cross-examination, permit the person calling him as a witness to put questions to him which might be put in cross.examination by the adverse party. To confine the operation of s. 154 of the Evidence Act to a particular stage in the examination of a witness is to read words in the section which are not there. We cannot also agree with the High Court th2t if a party calling a witness is permitted to put such questions to the witness after he has been cross-examined by the adverse party, the adverse party will not have any opportunity to further cross-examine the witness on the answers elicited by putting such questions. In such an event the court certainly, in exercise of its discretion, will permit the adverse party to crossexamine the witness on the answers elicited by such questions.\n\nThe court, therefore, can permit a person, who calls a witness, to put questions to him which might be put in the crossexamination at any stage of the examinaiion of the witness, provided it takes care to give an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine him on the answers elicited which do not find place in the examination-in-chief. In the present case what happened was .that some of the witnesses faithfully repeated what they had stated before the police in the examination-inchief, but in the cross-examination they came out with the story of insanity of the accused. The court, at the request of the Advocate for the prosecution: permitted him to crossexamine the said witnesses. It is not suggested that the Advc- • cate appearing for the accused asked for a further opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and was denied of it by the court. The procedure followed by the learned Judge does not conflict with the express provisions of s. 154 of the Evidence Act. Mehta, J., accepted the evidence of the witnesses on the ground that the earlier statements .made by them before the police did not contradict their evidence in the court as the non-mention of the mental state of the accused in th~ earlier statements was only an omission. This reason given by the learned Judge is also not sound. This CQUrt in Tahsildar Singh\n\nv., he Stare of U.P.(') laid down the following test for ascertammg under what circumstances an alleged omission can be relied upon to contradict the positive evidence in court:\n\n\" ............... (3) though a particular statement is not expressly recorded, a statement that can be deemed to be part of that expressly recorded can be used\n\n(')(1959] Supp. 2 $.C.R. 875, 903.\n\nDahJll/Jllai Ohliagan.\n\nbhai TAak.l:er\n\nfor contradiction, not because it is an omission strictly so-called but because it is deemed to form part of the recorded statement; (4) such a fiction is v.\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nSobba Rao, J,\n\npermissible by construction only in the following three cases: (i) when a recital is necessarily implied from the recital or recitals found in the statement .................. , ... ; (ii) a negative aspect of a positive recital in a statement ........................ ; and (iii) when the statement before the police and that before the Court cannot stand together ............... \".\n\nBroadly stated, the position in the present case is that the witnesses in their statements before the police attributed a clear intention to the accused to commit murder, but before the court they stated that the accused was insane and, therefore, he committed the murder. In the circumstances it was necessarily implied in the previous statements of the witnesses before the police that the accused was not insane at the time he committed the murder. In this view the previous statements of the witnesses before the police can be used to contradict their version in the court. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, in relying upon some of the important prosecution witnesses was vitiated by the said errors of law. We would, there- . fore, proceed to consider the entire evidence for ourselves.\n\nWhen a plea of legal insanity is set up, the court has to considet whether at the time of commission of the offence the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of kn9wing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. The crucial point of time for ascertaining the state of mind of the accused is the time when the offence was committed. Whether the accused was in such a state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of s. 84 of the Indian Penal Code can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime.\n\nThe first question is, what is the motive for the appellant to kill his wife in the ghastly manner he did by inflicting 44 knife injuries on her body? Natverlal Atmaram, the father of the deceased Kalavati, was examined as P.W. 13. He said that about 20 days before his daughter was murdered he received a letter from the accused asking him to take away his daughter on the ground that he did not11ike her, that he went to Bherai with that letter, showed it to Chhaganbhai, the father of the accused, and had a talk with him about it; that Chhaganbhai took that letter from him and promised to persuade the accused not to discard his wife; that, after a week he again went to Bherai and asked the accused why he did not like the deceased and the accused replied that he did not like her as she was not working properly; and that thereafter he went back to his village and sent a message through someone that.he would go\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREllIE COURT REPORTS 371\n\nto Bherai to take his daughter on Chitra Sudi 1. The murder 1964 took pla~ on the n}ght before C!mitra Sudi L In. the cross- Dohya1>h:i0hhai7a•· exammation he admitted that he did not tell the pohce that he bhai Thakter \" had given the letter to the father of the accused, but he told si.u\n\n0jG.u al the Sub-Inspector that he had shown the letter to him. ~·· Chhaganlal, the father of the accused, as P.W. 7, no doubt Bubba Rao, J. denied that Natverlal gave him the letter written by the accused, but he admitted that Natverlal came to his village 10 or 15 days before the inddent to take his daughter away. The evidence of Natverlal that he went to the village of the accused is corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 7. It is, therefore, likely that the accused wrote a letter to .Natverlal to take away Kalavati and it is also likely that Natverlal gave that letter to . P.W. 7 to persuade his son not to discard his wife. P.W.s 2 to 7 said in the cross-examination that the accused and his wife were on cordial terms, but, as we will indicate later in our judgment, all these witnesses turned hostile in the -sessions court and made a sustained attempt to support the case of insanity. That apart, their evidence does not disclose what opportunities they had to notice the cordial relation that exist- _ ed between the ac:Cused and the deceased. Thelearned Additional Sessions Judge rightly disbelieved. their evidence; The learned Additional Sessions Judge, who had seen Natverlal in the witness-box, has accepted his evidence; We, having gone through his evidence, see no reason to differ from the opinion of the learned Additional Sessions J udge .. lt is also not denied that though the accused _was in Ahmedabad for ten. months, he did not take his wife with him: We accept the evidence of Natverlal and hold that the accused did not like his wife and. therefore, wanted his father-in-law to' take her. away to his home and that his father-in-law promised to do so before Chaitra Sudi 1. · -\n\nThe next question is, what was the previous history of the mental condition of the accused? Here again, the prosecution witnesses, P.W.s. 2 to 7, deposed for the first time in the sessions court that 4 or 5 years before the incident the accused was getting fits of. insanity. But all these witnesses stated before the police that the accused had committed the murder of his wife, indicating thereby that he was sane at that time. Further, their evidence is inconsistent with the facts established in the case. During this period, it was admitted by P.W. 7, the accused was not treated by any doctor. Prior to the incident he was serving in Ahmedabad in Monogram Mills for about a year and a half. Though the father of the deceased was staying in a village only a few miles away from the village of the accused and though . the betrothal was fixed -5 years· before the marriage, he did not know that the accused was insane, for if he had known that such was the mental condition of the accused he would no! have given his daughter in marriage to\n\nSUPHEME COURT HEPOHTS •\n\n(1964]\n\n1964 him. It is impossible to conceive that he would not have known JJahy®l•a' Chhan••· that th_e ccused was insane if he was really so, and particularly\n\nMai Thakker when 1t 1s the case of the accused that 1t was not kept scret v. but was well known to many people and lo some of the wit- 'ta1, e of Gujarat nesses, who. came to depose for him. A month and a half prior Suhba Rao, J. to the incident Chhaganlal had gone to Ahmedabad for medical treatment and during that period the accused came from Ahmedabad to manage his fathers shop in his absence. The fact that he was recalled from Ahmedabad was not disputed: but, while Natverlal said that the accused was recalled ih order to manage Chhaganlal's shop in his absence. Chhaganlal sa'd that he was recalled because he was getting insane. The best evidence would have been that of the relative in whose house the accused was residing in Ahmedabad. But the relative was not examined. Jt appears to us that the accused was serving in Ahmedabad in Monogram Mills and he was asked to come to the village of his father to attend to the latter's business a month and a half before the incident, as the father was leaving for Ahmedabad for medical treatment. Before the commencement of the trial in the sessions court on June 27, 1959, an application was filed on behalf of the accused, supported by an affidavit field by the father of the accused. praying tha.t, as the accused had become i.nsane, he should be sent for proper medical treatment and observation. In that affidavit it was not stated that the accused was getting fits of insanity for the last 4 or 5 years and that he had one such fit at that time. If that was a fact, one would expect the father to allege prominently the said fact in his affidavit. These facts lead to a reasonable inference that the case of the accused that he had periodical fits of insanity was an afterthought. The general statements of witnesses, P.W.s I to 6 that he had such fits must, therefore, necessarily be false.\n\nWe. therefore. hold that the accused had no antecedent history of insanity.\n\nNow coming to the date when the incident took place, P.W. 7, the father of the accused, said that the accused was insane for 2 or 3 days prior to the incident. His evidence further discloses that he and his wife had gone to Ahmedabad on the date of the incident and returned in the same evening. If really the accused had a fit of insanity a day or two before the incident, is it likely that both the parents would have left him and gone to Ahmedabad? To get over this incongruity P.W. 7 said that he went to Ahmedabad to see a bridegroom for his daughter and also to get medicine for the accused. But he did not '3Y which doctor he consulted and wherefrom he purchased the medicines or whether in fact he bought any medicines at all. lf the accused had a fit of insanity. is it likely that the wife would have slept with him in the same room? We must, therefore, hold that it had not been established that 2 or 3 days before the incident the accused had a fit of insanity.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS 373\n\nNow we come to the evidence of what happened on the 1964 night of the incident. Nobody except the accused knows what Dahyabhai Ohhagan happened in the bed-room. P.W.s 2 to 7 deposed that on the Ma; Wmkkcr 10th April, 1959, corresponding to Chaitra Sudi I, between 3 Slak ;/Gujarat and 4 a.m. they heard shouts of the deceased Kalavati to the effect that she was being killed; that they all went to the room Subba Raa, J. but found it locked from inside; that when the accused was asked to open the door, he said that he would open it only 'after the Mukhi (P.W. ]) was called; that after the Mukhi came there, the accused opened the door and came out of the room with a blood-stained knife in his hand; that the accused began\n\ntalking irrelevantly and was speaking \"why, you killed my mother?\" \"why, you burnt my father's house?\"; that afterwards the accused sat down and threw dust and mud at the person.s gathered there; and that he was also laughing without any cause. In short, all the witnesses in one voice suggested that the accused was under a hallucination that the deceased had murdered his mother and burnt his father's house and, therefore, he killed her in that state of mind without knowing. what he was doing. But none of these witnesses had described the condition of the accused immediately when he came out of the room, which they did so graphically in the sessions court, at the time when they made statements , before the police. In effect they stated before the police that the accused came out of the room with a blood-stained knife in his hand and admitted that he had murdered his wife; but in the witness-box they said that when the accused came out of the room he was behaving like a mad man and giving imaginary reasons for killing his wife. The statements made in the depositions are really inconsistent with the earlier statements made before the police and they are, therefore, contradictions within the meaning of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We cannot place any reliance on the evidence of these witnesses: it is an obvious development to help the accused.\n\nThe subsequent events leading up to the trial make it abundantly clear that the plea of insanity was a belated afterthought and a false case. After the accused came out of the room, he was taken to the chora and was confined in a room in the chora. P.W. 16, the police sub-inspector, reached Bherai at about 9.30 ; i.m. He interrogated the accused, recorded his s1!1tement and arrested him at about 10.30 a.m. According to\n\nhim, as the accused was willing to make a confession, he was\n\nsn.t to the judicial magistrate. This witness described the cond1tmn of the accused when he met him thus:\n\n\"When I went in the Chara he had saluted me and he\n\n; vas cmpleely sane. There was absolutely no\n\n~1gn of msamty and he was not behaving as an msane man. He was not abusing. He had replied to\n\nDahyabhai Ohhaganbhai Thakker\n\nmy questions understanding them and was giving relevant replies. And therefore 1 had sent him to the Magistrate for confession as he wanted to confess.\" T.\n\nStal• of Gujarat\n\nSuboa Rao, J.\n\nThere is no reason to disbelieve this evidence, particularly when this is consistent with the subsequent conduct of the accused. But P.W. 9, who attested the panchnama, Ex. 19, recording the condition of the accused\"s body and his clothes, deposed that the accused was murmuring and laughing. But no mention of his condition was described in the panchnama.\n\nThereafter, the accused was sent to the Medical Officer, Mater, for examination and treatment of his injuries. The doctor examined the accused at 9.30 p.m. and gave his evidence as P. W. 1 I. He proved the certificate issued by him, Ex. 23.\n\nNothing about the mental condition of the accused was noted in that certificate. Not a single question was put to this witness in the cross-examination about the mental condition of the ac- . cused. On the same day. the accused was sent to the judicial Magistrate, First Class, for making a confession. On the next day he was produced before the said Magistrate, who sked him the necessary questions and gave him the warning that his confession would be used against him at the trial. The accused was given time for reflection and was produced before the Magistrate on April 13, 1959. On that date he refused to make the confession. His .conduct before the Magistrate, as recorded in Ex. 31, indicates that he was in a fit condition to appreciate the questions put to him and finaUy to make np his mind not to make the confesion which he had earlier offered to do. During the enquiry proceedings under Ch. XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no suggestion was made on behalf of the accused that he was insane. For the first time on June 27, 1959, at the commencement of the trial in the-'l'lessions court an application.was filed on behalf of the accused aUeging that he was suffering from an attack of insanity. On June 29, 1959, the Sessions Judge sent the accused to the Civil Surgeon, Khaira, for observation. On receiving his report, the learned Sessions Judge, by his order dated July 13, 1959, found the accused insane and incapable of making his defence. On August 28, 1959, the court directed the accused to be sent to the Superintendent of Mental Hospital, Barpda, for keeping him under.observation with a direction to send his report on or before September 18, 1959. The said Superintendent sent his report on August 27, 1960, to the effect that the accused was capable of understanding the proceedings of the court and of making his defence in the court. On enquiry the court heid that the accused could understand the proceedings of the case and was capable of making his defence. At the commencement of the trial, the pleader for the accused stated that the accused could understand the proceedings. The proceedings before the\n\nSessions Judge only show that for a short time after the case 1964 had commenced befor.e him the accused was insane_. Rnt !hat Dal, yahliai O/lhagq.\n\nfact would not estabhsh that the accused was havms Ills of Mai 1'1'akker insanity for 4 or 5 years before the incident and that at the v. time he killed his wife he had such a fit of insanity as to give State of Oojarai him the benefit of s. 84 of the Indian Penal Code. The said Subba Rao, J. entire conduct of the accused from the time he killed his wife upto the time the sessions proceedings commenced is inconsist\n\nent with the fact that he had a fit of insanity when he killed his wife.\n\nIt is said that the situation in the room supports the version that the accused did not know what he was doing. It is asked, why the accused should have given so many stabs to kill an unarmed and undefended woman? It is said that it discloses that the accused was doing the act under some hallucination. On the other hand the existence of the weapons in the room, the closing of the door from inside, his reluctance to come out of the room till the Mukhi came, even if that fact is true, would indicate that it was a premeditated murder and that he knew that if he came out of the room before the Mukhi came he might be manhandled. Many sane men give more than the necessary stabs to their victims. The number of blows given might perhaps reflect his vengeful mood or his determination to see that the victim had no escape. One does not count his strokes when he commits murder. We, therefore, do not see any indication of insanity from the materials found in the room; on the other hand they support the case of premeditated murder.\n\nTo summarize: the accused did not like his wife; even though he was employed in Ahmedabad and stayed there for about IO months, he did not take his wife with him; he wrote a letter to his father-in-law to the effect that the accused did not like her and that he should take her away to his house; the father-in-law promised to come on Chaitra Sudhi 1; the accused obviously expected him to come on April 9. 1959 and tolerated the presence of his wife in his house till then; as his father-in-law did not come on' or before April 9, 1959, the accused in anger or frustration killed his wife. It has not been established that he was insane; nor the evidence is sufficient even to throw a reasonable doubt in our mind that the act might have been committed when the accused was in a fit of insanity. We, therefore, though for different reasons, agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court and dismiss the appeal.\n\n'Appeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 135, "entities": [{"text": "361\n\nDAHY ABHAI CHHAGANBHAI THAKKER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAHYABHAI CHHAGANBHAI THAKKER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 287, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 80, 84, 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374, "end_char": 389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 390, "end_char": 415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 105, 137, 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 429, "end_char": 446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 739, "end_char": 745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 753, "end_char": 770, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1554, "end_char": 1559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1567, "end_char": 1584, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2915, "end_char": 2926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3165, "end_char": 3171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3248, "end_char": 3254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3671, "end_char": 3689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 27, 1961 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B. K. Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3724, "end_char": 3738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Banerjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. R. Prem", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3760, "end_char": 3770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem, 'R. H. Dhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3773, "end_char": 3785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem, 'R. H. Dhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem, 'R. H. Dhebar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBA RAO, J.-This appeal raises the question of the defence of insanity for an offence under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3984, "end_char": 3990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3998, "end_char": 4015, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kalavati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4318, "end_char": 4326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At about 3 or 3.30 a.m. on the next day Kalavati cried that she was being killed."}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Kaira", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4631, "end_char": 4663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the Additional Sessions Judge, Kaira, a defence was set up that tf.e accused was insane when the incident was alleged to have taken place and was not capable of understanding the nature of his act."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5242, "end_char": 5248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5273, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dahyablw.i OMaga.-", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5466, "end_char": 5484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal\n\nthe High Court agreed with that finding, though for different reasons, and confirmed the conviction and sentence of the Dahyablw.i OMaga.- accused."}}, {"text": "State ofGujara1 High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5591, "end_char": 5617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bhai Tlw.kkt• v.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contended that the State ofGujara1 High Court, having believed the evidence of the prosecution subba Rao, J. witnesses, should have held that the accused had discharged the burden placed on him of proving that at the time he killed his wife he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law."}}, {"text": "subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bhai Tlw.kkt• v.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contended that the State ofGujara1 High Court, having believed the evidence of the prosecution subba Rao, J. witnesses, should have held that the accused had discharged the burden placed on him of proving that at the time he killed his wife he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "INDIAN PENAL CODE", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6633, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 199", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6635, "end_char": 6646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6913, "end_char": 6923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7146, "end_char": 7165, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7335, "end_char": 7352, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "biai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7595, "end_char": 7599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "biai TW/ar\n\nSlaJe of Gujarat\n\nSuba Rao, J.\n\nSection 4-\"Shall presume\": Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such facts as proved unless and until it is disproved. • \""}}, {"text": "Suba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7625, "end_char": 7633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "biai TW/ar\n\nSlaJe of Gujarat\n\nSuba Rao, J.\n\nSection 4-\"Shall presume\": Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such facts as proved unless and until it is disproved. • \"", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7639, "end_char": 7648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9086, "end_char": 9103, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9186, "end_char": 9191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9199, "end_char": 9216, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9468, "end_char": 9474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9683, "end_char": 9689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9758, "end_char": 9762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of G1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10420, "end_char": 10431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of \"shall presume\" in s. 4 thereof, the court shall regard the ; absence of such 1.:lrcumstances as prj)Ved unless,, , after considering the ma.tters before it, it believes that said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist To put\n\n'7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 365\n\nit in other words, the accused will have to rebut 1964 the presumption that such circumstanc:es did not exist, by Dahyah;;;;; oMaq ... placing material before the court sufficient to make it conbooi T/uJU.. sider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that v.\n\nState of G1<jaml a prudent man would act upon them.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10555, "end_char": 10564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the material placed Subba Rao, J. before the court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of \"prudent man\", the accused will have discharged his burden.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "s. 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10843, "end_char": 10849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11139, "end_char": 11145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11153, "end_char": 11170, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11636, "end_char": 11644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edn.,"}}, {"text": "Glanville Williams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11865, "end_char": 11883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Glanville Williams in his book 'Criminal Law\", The General Part, 2nd Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Dahyabhai Chltaganbhai TkaJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12832, "end_char": 12859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "must be given to the prisoner, for, in 'the words\n\nDahyabhai Chltaganbhai TkaJ..:l<tr\n\nState of Oiijar.1l\n\nS11b~ Rao, J.\n\nof Lord Reading in another context, \"the Crown would then have failed to discharge the burden imposed on it by our law of satisfying the jury beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the prisoner.\""}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12888, "end_char": 12891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13267, "end_char": 13272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13280, "end_char": 13297, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13475, "end_char": 13481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13725, "end_char": 13736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13744, "end_char": 13772, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 77, 78, 79, 81 and 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13935, "end_char": 13960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13968, "end_char": 13985, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14175, "end_char": 14180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14188, "end_char": 14205, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14619, "end_char": 14624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14632, "end_char": 14649, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14849, "end_char": 14855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14857, "end_char": 14874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15322, "end_char": 15327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15335, "end_char": 15352, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15381, "end_char": 15386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Patna High D<ihybhai Oh1-", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15420, "end_char": 15445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Patna High D<ihybhai Oh1-\n\nCourt in Kam/a Singh v. The State (') invoked the same princibha• Thakker pie when the plea of insanity was raised."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15722, "end_char": 15731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of state :j GvJaral tlie Nagpur High Court in Ramhitram v. State(') has struck a different note inasmuch as it held that the benefit of doubt Subba Rao, 1 • which the law gives on the presumption of innocence is available only where the prosecution had not been able to connect the accused with the occurrence and that it had nothing to do with the mental state of the accused.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Nanavati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16327, "end_char": 16335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view is also inconsistent with that expressed in Nanavati's case(')."}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17924, "end_char": 17929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18050, "end_char": 18067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gojara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18350, "end_char": 18356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3) Even if the 81•1• of Gojara< accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was\n\nBub/Ja Rao, J. insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged."}}, {"text": "Bub/Ja Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18418, "end_char": 18428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3) Even if the 81•1• of Gojara< accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was\n\nBub/Ja Rao, J. insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18960, "end_char": 18968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Raju", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19508, "end_char": 19512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raju, .l.,"}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19597, "end_char": 19603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 137 and 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19752, "end_char": 19767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20115, "end_char": 20126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20454, "end_char": 20460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20520, "end_char": 20526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20722, "end_char": 20733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21599, "end_char": 21601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21804, "end_char": 21810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23374, "end_char": 23380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23402, "end_char": 23407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mehta, J., accepted the evidence of the witnesses on the ground that the earlier statements .made by them before the police did not contradict their evidence in the court as the non-mention of the mental state of the accused in th~ earlier statements was only an omission."}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24339, "end_char": 24355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bhai TAak.l:er\n\nfor contradiction, not because it is an omission strictly so-called but because it is deemed to form part of the recorded statement; (4) such a fiction is v.\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nSobba Rao, J,\n\npermissible by construction only in the following three cases: (i) when a recital is necessarily implied from the recital or recitals found in the statement .................. , ... ; (ii) a negative aspect of a positive recital in a statement ........................ ; and (iii) when the statement before the police and that before the Court cannot stand together ............... \".", "canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT"}}, {"text": "Sobba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24357, "end_char": 24366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bhai TAak.l:er\n\nfor contradiction, not because it is an omission strictly so-called but because it is deemed to form part of the recorded statement; (4) such a fiction is v.\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nSobba Rao, J,\n\npermissible by construction only in the following three cases: (i) when a recital is necessarily implied from the recital or recitals found in the statement .................. , ... ; (ii) a negative aspect of a positive recital in a statement ........................ ; and (iii) when the statement before the police and that before the Court cannot stand together ............... \".", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26037, "end_char": 26042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26050, "end_char": 26067, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Natverlal Atmaram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26316, "end_char": 26333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Natverlal Atmaram, the father of the deceased Kalavati, was examined as P.W. 13."}}, {"text": "Bherai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26588, "end_char": 26594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He said that about 20 days before his daughter was murdered he received a letter from the accused asking him to take away his daughter on the ground that he did not11ike her, that he went to Bherai with that letter, showed it to Chhaganbhai, the father of the accused, and had a talk with him about it; that Chhaganbhai took that letter from him and promised to persuade the accused not to discard his wife; that, after a week he again went to Bherai and asked the accused why he did not like the deceased and the accused replied that he did not like her as she was not working properly; and that thereafter he went back to his village and sent a message through someone that.he would go\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREllIE COURT REPORTS 371\n\nto Bherai to take his daughter on Chitra Sudi 1."}}, {"text": "Chhaganbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26626, "end_char": 26637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He said that about 20 days before his daughter was murdered he received a letter from the accused asking him to take away his daughter on the ground that he did not11ike her, that he went to Bherai with that letter, showed it to Chhaganbhai, the father of the accused, and had a talk with him about it; that Chhaganbhai took that letter from him and promised to persuade the accused not to discard his wife; that, after a week he again went to Bherai and asked the accused why he did not like the deceased and the accused replied that he did not like her as she was not working properly; and that thereafter he went back to his village and sent a message through someone that.he would go\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREllIE COURT REPORTS 371\n\nto Bherai to take his daughter on Chitra Sudi 1.", "canonical_name": "Chhaganbhai"}}, {"text": "Bubba Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27543, "end_char": 27552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~·· Chhaganlal, the father of the accused, as P.W. 7, no doubt Bubba Rao, J. denied that Natverlal gave him the letter written by the accused, but he admitted that Natverlal came to his village 10 or 15 days before the inddent to take his daughter away."}}, {"text": "Natverlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27569, "end_char": 27578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~·· Chhaganlal, the father of the accused, as P.W. 7, no doubt Bubba Rao, J. denied that Natverlal gave him the letter written by the accused, but he admitted that Natverlal came to his village 10 or 15 days before the inddent to take his daughter away.", "canonical_name": ".Natverlal"}}, {"text": "Natverlal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27750, "end_char": 27759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Natverlal that he went to the village of the accused is corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 7."}}, {"text": ".Natverlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27906, "end_char": 27916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, likely that the accused wrote a letter to .Natverlal to take away Kalavati and it is also likely that Natverlal gave that letter to .", "canonical_name": ".Natverlal"}}, {"text": "s 2 to 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28054, "end_char": 28062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28835, "end_char": 28844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "their evidence; The learned Additional Sessions Judge, who had seen Natverlal in the witness-box, has accepted his evidence; We, having gone through his evidence, see no reason to differ from the opinion of the learned Additional Sessions J udge .. lt is also not denied that though the accused was in Ahmedabad for ten."}}, {"text": "Chaitra Sudi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29105, "end_char": 29117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "away to his home and that his father-in-law promised to do so before Chaitra Sudi 1. · -", "canonical_name": "Chaitra Sudi I"}}, {"text": "s. 2 to 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29261, "end_char": 29270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JJahy®l•a' Chhan••", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30273, "end_char": 30291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is impossible to conceive that he would not have known JJahy®l•a' Chhan••· that th_e ccused was insane if he was really so, and particularly\n\nMai Thakker when 1t 1s the case of the accused that 1t was not kept scret v. but was well known to many people and lo some of the wit- 'ta1, e of Gujarat nesses, who."}}, {"text": "Mai Thakker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30360, "end_char": 30371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is impossible to conceive that he would not have known JJahy®l•a' Chhan••· that th_e ccused was insane if he was really so, and particularly\n\nMai Thakker when 1t 1s the case of the accused that 1t was not kept scret v. but was well known to many people and lo some of the wit- 'ta1, e of Gujarat nesses, who."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30506, "end_char": 30513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is impossible to conceive that he would not have known JJahy®l•a' Chhan••· that th_e ccused was insane if he was really so, and particularly\n\nMai Thakker when 1t 1s the case of the accused that 1t was not kept scret v. but was well known to many people and lo some of the wit- 'ta1, e of Gujarat nesses, who."}}, {"text": "Suhba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30576, "end_char": 30585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A month and a half prior Suhba Rao, J. to the incident Chhaganlal had gone to Ahmedabad for medical treatment and during that period the accused came from Ahmedabad to manage his fathers shop in his absence.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Chhaganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30606, "end_char": 30616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A month and a half prior Suhba Rao, J. to the incident Chhaganlal had gone to Ahmedabad for medical treatment and during that period the accused came from Ahmedabad to manage his fathers shop in his absence.", "canonical_name": "Chhaganbhai"}}, {"text": "June 27, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31474, "end_char": 31487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the commencement of the trial in the sessions court on June 27, 1959, an application was filed on behalf of the accused, supported by an affidavit field by the father of the accused."}}, {"text": "Dahyabhai Ohhagan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33421, "end_char": 33438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nobody except the accused knows what Dahyabhai Ohhagan happened in the bed-room."}}, {"text": "s 2 to 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33469, "end_char": 33477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chaitra Sudi I", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33544, "end_char": 33558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W.s 2 to 7 deposed that on the Ma; Wmkkcr 10th April, 1959, corresponding to Chaitra Sudi I, between 3 Slak ;/Gujarat and 4 a.m. they heard shouts of the deceased Kalavati to the effect that she was being killed; that they all went to the room Subba Raa, J. but found it locked from inside; that when the accused was asked to open the door, he said that he would open it only 'after the Mukhi (P.W. ]) was called; that after the Mukhi came there, the accused opened the door and came out of the room with a blood-stained knife in his hand; that the accused began\n\ntalking irrelevantly and was speaking \"why, you killed my mother?\" \"", "canonical_name": "Chaitra Sudi I"}}, {"text": "Subba Raa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33711, "end_char": 33720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W.s 2 to 7 deposed that on the Ma; Wmkkcr 10th April, 1959, corresponding to Chaitra Sudi I, between 3 Slak ;/Gujarat and 4 a.m. they heard shouts of the deceased Kalavati to the effect that she was being killed; that they all went to the room Subba Raa, J. but found it locked from inside; that when the accused was asked to open the door, he said that he would open it only 'after the Mukhi (P.W. ]) was called; that after the Mukhi came there, the accused opened the door and came out of the room with a blood-stained knife in his hand; that the accused began\n\ntalking irrelevantly and was speaking \"why, you killed my mother?\" \"", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Mukhi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33854, "end_char": 33859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W.s 2 to 7 deposed that on the Ma; Wmkkcr 10th April, 1959, corresponding to Chaitra Sudi I, between 3 Slak ;/Gujarat and 4 a.m. they heard shouts of the deceased Kalavati to the effect that she was being killed; that they all went to the room Subba Raa, J. but found it locked from inside; that when the accused was asked to open the door, he said that he would open it only 'after the Mukhi (P.W. ]) was called; that after the Mukhi came there, the accused opened the door and came out of the room with a blood-stained knife in his hand; that the accused began\n\ntalking irrelevantly and was speaking \"why, you killed my mother?\" \""}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35249, "end_char": 35255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35263, "end_char": 35289, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35769, "end_char": 35771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dahyabhai Ohhaganbhai Thakker", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36193, "end_char": 36222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had replied to\n\nDahyabhai Ohhaganbhai Thakker\n\nmy questions understanding them and was giving relevant replies."}}, {"text": "Suboa Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36399, "end_char": 36408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.\n\nStal• of Gujarat\n\nSuboa Rao, J.\n\nThere is no reason to disbelieve this evidence, particularly when this is consistent with the subsequent conduct of the accused.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "April 13, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37583, "end_char": 37597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused was given time for reflection and was produced before the Magistrate on April 13, 1959."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37933, "end_char": 37959, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June 29, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38235, "end_char": 38248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 29, 1959, the Sessions Judge sent the accused to the Civil Surgeon, Khaira, for observation."}}, {"text": "Khaira", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38308, "end_char": 38314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 29, 1959, the Sessions Judge sent the accused to the Civil Surgeon, Khaira, for observation."}}, {"text": "July 13, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38405, "end_char": 38418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receiving his report, the learned Sessions Judge, by his order dated July 13, 1959, found the accused insane and incapable of making his defence."}}, {"text": "August 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38485, "end_char": 38500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 28, 1959, the court directed the accused to be sent to the Superintendent of Mental Hospital, Barpda, for keeping him under.observation with a direction to send his report on or before September 18, 1959."}}, {"text": "Barpda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38586, "end_char": 38592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 28, 1959, the court directed the accused to be sent to the Superintendent of Mental Hospital, Barpda, for keeping him under.observation with a direction to send his report on or before September 18, 1959."}}, {"text": "September 18, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38677, "end_char": 38695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 28, 1959, the court directed the accused to be sent to the Superintendent of Mental Hospital, Barpda, for keeping him under.observation with a direction to send his report on or before September 18, 1959."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38740, "end_char": 38755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Superintendent sent his report on August 27, 1960, to the effect that the accused was capable of understanding the proceedings of the court and of making his defence in the court."}}, {"text": "State of Oojarai", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39514, "end_char": 39530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fact would not estabhsh that the accused was havms Ills of Mai 1'1'akker insanity for 4 or 5 years before the incident and that at the v. time he killed his wife he had such a fit of insanity as to give State of Oojarai him the benefit of s. 84 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39550, "end_char": 39555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39563, "end_char": 39580, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "April 9. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41238, "end_char": 41251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To summarize: the accused did not like his wife; even though he was employed in Ahmedabad and stayed there for about IO months, he did not take his wife with him; he wrote a letter to his father-in-law to the effect that the accused did not like her and that he should take her away to his house; the father-in-law promised to come on Chaitra Sudhi 1; the accused obviously expected him to come on April 9."}}, {"text": "April 9, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41363, "end_char": 41376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1959 and tolerated the presence of his wife in his house till then; as his father-in-law did not come on' or before April 9, 1959, the accused in anger or frustration killed his wife."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_376_382_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "MarcA20\n\n376 SUPii:EME COURT REPORTS [1964)\n\nHYDERABAD CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL\n\nWORKS LTD. ETC.\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS. [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA•AYYANGAR AND s. M. SIKRI, JJ.]\n\nMedicinal and Toilet Preparation (Excise Duties) Act No. 16 of 1955, s. 21-Whether repeals rule 36 frcrmed-under Hyde'rabad\n\nAbkari Act-If Act No. 16 is a law \"otherwise made by Parliament' within the meaning of Art. 277- Hyderabad Act and Rul.1> 36 repealed-Constitution of India, Art. 277, Entry 84, List I of Vll Schedule-Hyderabad Medical Preparations and Spirituous Rules 1345 F, r. 36 ..\n\nThe appellants are manufacturers of medicine in which they have to use alcohol. According to r. 36 of the Medical Preparation and Spirituous Rules, 1345 F framed under the Hyderabad Abkari Act, 1316 F the appellant used to pay certain fees to the State Government for the supervision of the use of alcohol by the appellants. After the coming into force of the Medical and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955 and the Rules framed thereunder the appellants contended that since R. 36 was repealed by this Act they had not to pay that fee. On the refusal of the State Government to accept their contention the appellants filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the power of the Government to levy the fee. But the High Court held that R. 36 was not repealed and dismissed the writ petitions.\n\nThereupon the appellant filed the present appeals on certificates granted by the High Cf>urt.\n\nBefore this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that s. 21 of the 1955 Act in terms repealed any corresponding State law and therefore R. 36 stood repealed. The respondent contended that the proviso to that section saved all previous rules which were not inconsistent with the Act and hence R. 36 should be deemed to be in force. It was further contended by the respondent-State that R. 36 remained in force because it was meant to carry out the general purpose of the Hyderabad Abkari Act which was a general Act relating to alcohol and intoxicating drugs.\n\nHeld: (i) By virtue of Entry 84 List I of the VII Schedule to the Constitution no charge could be levied on the manufacture of medicinal .preparations except by the Union of India and since the 1955 Act is a law made otherwise by Parliament within the meaning of Art. 277 the duties and other charges which used to be levied by the State in connection with medicinal preparations could no longer be levied by it. Further the effect of s. 21 of the Act is that so far as the Hyderabad Act applied to the use of alcohol in the manufacture of medicinal and toilet preparations, the Hyderabad Act must be deemed to have been repealed.\n\n(ii) By reasons R. 143 of the 1956 Rules r. 36 must be held to have been repealed after the coming into force of the 1955 Act and the rules framed thereunder. The purpose of R. 36 is clearly\n\novered by the 1955 Ac.t and the rules framed thereunder and It cannot survive the said Act and Rules in view of s. 21 of the Act and r. 143 and the proviso to s. 21 cannot be availed of by the State.\n\n(iii) The field covered by R. 36 is completely covered by the 1964 Rules framed under the Act and therefore R. 36 can no longer be Hyderabad Ohemiwl justified as good under the general law relating to alcohol and inand Pharmaceulical toxicating drugs as contended by the State.\n\nWorks Ltd. etc.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 399- 403 /1962. Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 17, 1961 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 400, 431 to 433 and 495 of 1958.\n\nK. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nK. R. Chaudhuri and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respon- dents (in all the appeals).\n\nMarch 20, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nStat< of Andhra Prod\"h and Ors.\n\nWANCHOO, J.-These are five connected appeals on certi- Wanchoo, J. ficates granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. They involve a common question of law and will be dealt with together. The brief facts necessary to understand the question of Jaw raised in these appeals are these. The appellants manufacture medicines in which they have to use alcohol. Before Parliament passed the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Ex- cise Duties) Act. No. 16 of 1955, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the appellants were working under licences granted under the Hyderabad Abkari Act, No. l of 1316-F. Under that Act certain rules called the Medical Preparations and Spirituous. Rules, 1345-F were framed and r .. 36 thereof provided that \"the expenses of the establishment for the supervision of the work shall be borne by the pharmaceutical laboratory\n\n(licensee) as per the decision of the Commissioner Excise\". It appears that for the manufacture of medicines, the appellants used to be supplied with alcohol. Further the State qovemment posted on the bonded manufacturies of the appellants certain supervisory excise staff, and r. 36 was obviously framed to re-imburse the Government for expenses incurred in that behalf. After the Act came into force from April l, 1957, the appellants who were manufacturing medicinal preparations were governed by it and the Rules framed thereunder and took licences under the Act. The appellants then contended that as the Act had repealed all previous provisions with respect to medicinal preparations, they were no longer bound to pay the charges prescribed under r. 36 of 1345-F Rules. Their contention was that this rule along with such provisions of the Hyderabad Abkari Act, which concerned medicinal preparations were repealed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The State Government could therefore no longer ask\n\nhem to pay the costs of the establishment posted at their\n\n1964 bonded manufacturies for supervision . The appellants there- Hyi, uabad cn.mical upon filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging the\n\nand Pharma<eutical levy of these charges.\n\nWork< Lid. do.\n\n•· The petitions were opposed on behalf of the State and its j,\":;;,:{ :::f'Or~. contention was that.even though the Act and the Rules framed thereunder had come into force from April I, 1957, r. 36 Wanchoo, J. of the 1345-F Rules continued and was not repealed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, and the State was entitled to the expenses of the supervisory staff and could realise it from the appellants.\n\nThe High Court held that r. 36 could not be said to have been repealed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and was still good law. In this connection the High Court pcinted out that the Hyderabad Abkari Act was not concerned only with medicinal preparations but was a general Act dealing with excise including alcohol, and that alcohol in the ultimate analysis was liquor; therefore the State Government which supplied alcohol to the appellants for the purpose of making medicinal and toilet preparations for which no duty was paid was entitled to see that the alcohol was not used for purposes other than that for which it was supplied to the appellants.\n\nAccordingly the High Court held that r. 36 of the 1345-F Rules was designed to achieve this object, under the general law of excise contained in the Hyderabad Abkari Act, and was therefore good. In consequence, the writ petitions were dismissed.\n\nThe appellants then applied for certificates to appeal to this Court, which were granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us The only question that falls for consideration therefore is whether after the coming into force of the Act and the Rules, ' r. 36 of the 1345-F Rules can still be said to survive. There is no doubt that the Hyderabad Abkari Act was a general Act - and before the Constitution came into force, r. 36 of the 1345-F Rules would be good law. Under the Constitution, however, medicinal and toile't preparations came under entry 84, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which provides for duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India, except-\n\n(a) alcohclic liquors for human consumption;\n\n(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics, but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing a.lcohol or any substance containing opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics. No charge could thereafter be levied 6n the manufacture of medicinal preparations except by the Union in the shape of duties under item 84 of List I.\n\n• The State Government however insisted on the payment ol the charges.\n\nBut under Art. 277 of the Constitution \"any taxes, duties, 1964\n\ncesses or fees, which, immediately before the commencement Hyderabad Chem.ical of this Constitution were being lawfully levied by the Govern-•\"tP~\"\" 1 ment of any State ...... may, notwithstanding .that hose taxes, or :_ 1\n\n• e1c. duties cesses or fees are mentioned m the Umon List, contrnue State of Andhra to be ievied and to be applied to the same purposes until pl'Ovi- Prad\"'h and°''\n\nsion to the contrary is made by Parliament by law\". In view Wanckoo, J. of this provision, all duties and charges levied by the State before the coming into force of the Constitution on the maufacture of. medicinal preparations could continue to be levied until law was made by Parliament otherwise. It is not in dispute that the Act came into force from April l, 1957 and is a law made otherwise by Parliament within the meaning of Art. 277, and therefore duties and other charges levied by the State\n\nin connection with medicinal preparations could no longer be levied by it. Further the Act specifically provides in s. 21 that \"if, immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is in force in any State any law corresponding to this Act, that law is hereby repealed\". It is true that the Hyderabad Abkari Act was a general law which was concerned with liquor and intoxicating drugs generally; it thus applied to alcohol also (treating it as liquor) used for manufacturing medicinal preparations. The effect of s. 21 therefore is that so far as the Hyderabad Abkari Act applied to the use of alcohol, treating it to be liquor, in the manufacture of medicinal and toilet preparations, the Hyderabad Abkari Act must be deemed to have been repealed to that extent only by s. 21.\n\nReliance is placed on behalf of the State on the proviso to s. 21, which lays down that \"all rules made, ...... under any law hereby repealed shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act. have the same force and effect as if they had been respectively made ...... under tbis Act and by the authority empowered hereby is in that behalf.\" It is therefore contended that by virtue of the proviso to s. 21, r. 36 of the 1345-F Rules must be deemed to continue. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. Rules were framed under the Act in 1956 and came into force along with the Act. Rule 143 of these Rules provides that all rules made under any law •corresponding 'to the Act in force in any State are hereby repealed except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such repeal. Consequently all rules framed for the purpose of the manufa.cture of medicinal preparations came to an end in view of r. 143 of 1956 Rules. Therefore r. 36 of 1345-F Rules, which appears in the Medicinal Preparations and Spiritui?US ules mus~ e held to be no longer good law so far as it\n\napples to med1cmal preparations. That is one reason why we consider. tha.t r. 36 must be held to have been repealed after the com mg mto. force of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The proviso to s. 21 on which reliance has been placed\n\n1964 cannot change the position in view of the new Rules framed Hyderabad Ohemka! in 1956 with respect to medicinal preparations. As soon as th.e aftll PhaN11aewtical new Rules came mto force the old rules must fall and there- 1s\n\nWorka Ltd. etc. a specific provision in the new Rules (namely r. 143) which Stare 0jAndhra says that all rules made under any la.w corresponding to the Prnduh and Ors. Act are hereby repealed.\n\n= ' J We may refer in this connection to the construction of ffa1&C\"OO, • r. 36 of the Rules of 1345F. It provides that the expenses of the establishment for the supervision of the work shall be borne by the pharmaceutical laboratory. The establishment which has to be paid for under r. 36 therefore is for the supervision of the work done by the pharmaceutical laboratories.\n\nNow the work done by a pharmaceutical laboratory is to manufacture medicinal preparations. Rule 36 therefore provides that expenses of the establishment for the supervision of the work of medicinal preparations manufactured by pharmaceutical laboratories have to be paid by the laboratory concerned. The supervisory staff which has to be paid for under r. 36 therefore is meant for the supervision of the manufacture of medicinal preparations and it is for that purpose only that expenses have to be borne by the laboratory concerned. The purpose of the rule therefore is clearly covered by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and it cannot survive the Act and the Rules in view of s. 21 of the Act and r. 143 of the 1956-Rules, and the proviso to s. 21 cannot be availed of by the State.\n\nThis brings us to the alternative argument on behalf of the State, namely, that in any case the rule still remains good because it is meant to carry out the general purpose of the Hyderabad Abkari Act, namely to see that unauthorised sale of alcohol is not made for human consumption by the laboratory to which it is supplied for purposes of manufacture of medicinal preparations. Therefore it is said that'the rule is good inasmuch as it is concerned with the enforcement of the general law relating to alcohol and intoxicating drugs contained in the Hyderabad Abkari Act. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention either. In the first place, as we have already indicated. the main object of the supervisory stall\" mentioned in r. 36 is lo supervise the manufacture of medicinal preparations. In that connection the supervisoTy staff will certainly see that the alcohol supplied is used for the purpose for\" which it is supplied and is not used in any other manner.\n\nRule 3(5 is only concerned with seeing that the manufacture of med icin:d preparations is made properly and is done under the supervision of the establishment attached to each laboratory; and it is only incidentally that in that connection the establishment is also to see that the alcohol supplied is not used other- , wise than for the purpose of manufacture. That however wilt\n\nnot make the rule good under the Hyderabad Abkari Act, which deals with alcohol and intoxicating drugs generally.\n\nWhat we have said above is borne out if we look at the l'JG4 1956-Rulcs. Rule 20 provides that in case of manufacture in Ilydum,-;; d(,,,, ,,,;,.,. bond (and we are concerned in the present appeals with such and, Phmmacu,1;,-01 manufacture) alcohol on which duty has not been paid sh~.ll fl 0\"h Ltd.'\"· be used under excise supervision. Rule 42 provides that \"it siat• 0{_:1,,, u, ia\n\nshall be open to the Excise Commissicner to determine the size l'm-1<-.,7, \"\"\" o.·,. of the supervisory staff in consultation with the licencee.\" 1t is rraw!oo J. clear therefore that under the 1956 Rules s'Upervisory staff is ' attached to bonded manufacturies which manufacture medicinal preparations. This is al<o the purpose of r. 36. Further r. 141 provides that \"the licencee of a bonded manufactory or warehouse shall, where so required by the Excise Commissioner, provide the officer and the staff posted to the mannfactory or bonded warehouse with suitable lodging conveniently situated to the factory or bonded warehouse premises at a rent not exceeding 10 per cent of the pay of each officer so accommodated. If for any reason the licencee is not able to provide such accommodation he shall provide suitable accommodation to the satisfaction of the Excise Commissioner near the manufactory or bonded warehouse recovering only 10 per cent of the pay of the occupant.\" Then r. 45 provides that \"the officer-in-charge shall exercise such supervision as is required to ensure that alcohol issued fCJr a. certain preparation is added to the materials which go to make that preparation and that no portion of such alcohol is diverted to other purpose.\" It is clear therefore from these rules that the supervisory staff is attached to a bonded manufactory for the purpose of supervision to see that the manufacture is carried on properly and also to see that alcohol issued for the purpose of manufacture is not diverted to any other use. We cannot therefore accept the argument that simply because the supervisory staff has got to see that alcohol supplied, assumig it to be liquor. is not misused, r. 36 is still good law because, its purpose is to see that the general la.w relating to alcohol and intoxicating drug~ contained in the Hyderabad Abkari Act is carried out As the I 956-Rules show it is the duty of the supervisory staff attachd to a bonded manufactory to see that the manufacture is properly made and that alcohc!l supplied is not diverted to any use except tha.t of the manufacture of the preparation. This being the purpose of the 1956-Rules, the levy under r. 36 of 1345-F cannot be justified on the ground that under that rule che supervisory staff has to see that the general law relating to alcohol and intoxicating drugs is not violated. There is no doubt that the field covered by r. 36 of the 1345-F Rules is _.-- completely covered by the Rules framed under the Act and therefore r. 36 can no longer be justified as good under the general law rela.ting to alcohol and intoxicating drugs. We may add that the Act or the 1956 Rules make no provision for any such charge as is provided in r. 36 of 1345-F Rules, the intention being that the duty under the Act will cover all expenses\n\n1964 for enforcing it. The fact that members of the supervisory stall ryd<ra;;;;; ichtmiool are the servants of the respondent makes no difference because 1n<i Pharduti<.al they function under the Act and the rules framed thereunder\n\nWork~ Lt etc. and not under the Hydera.bad Act. We are therefore of opinion Swte oJAwlhra that reading s. 21 of the Act and r. 143 of the Rules framed Pradesh and Ora. thereunder, r. 36 of 1345-F Rules must be held to have been\n\nW h J repealed and thaJ. it is not saved by the proviSo to s. 21. We anc oo, . therefore allow t e appeals, set aside the orders of the High Court, anc\\ direct the issue of writs as prayed for. The appellants will get their costs from the respondenne set of hearing costs.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "HYDERABAD CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL\n\nWORKS LTD. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HYDERABAD CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL WORKS LTD. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 161, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 188, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA•AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 213, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 218, "end_char": 234, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 306, "end_char": 311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Abkari Act-If Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 362, "end_char": 379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449, "end_char": 457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abkari Act-If Act", "statute": "Abkari Act-If Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 496, "end_char": 517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 519, "end_char": 527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "List I of Vll Schedule-Hyderabad Medical Preparations and Spirituous Rules 1345", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 539, "end_char": 618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Medical Preparation and Spirituous Rules, 1345", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 738, "end_char": 784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Abkari Act, 1316", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 804, "end_char": 830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1609, "end_char": 1614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hyderabad Abkari Act, 1316", "statute": "the Hyderabad Abkari Act, 1316"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2280, "end_char": 2294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (i) By virtue of Entry 84 List I of the VII Schedule to the Constitution no charge could be levied on the manufacture of medicinal .preparations except by the Union of India and since the 1955 Act is a law made otherwise by Parliament within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2345, "end_char": 2355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (i) By virtue of Entry 84 List I of the VII Schedule to the Constitution no charge could be levied on the manufacture of medicinal .preparations except by the Union of India and since the 1955 Act is a law made otherwise by Parliament within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2550, "end_char": 2555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3051, "end_char": 3056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3098, "end_char": 3103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3271, "end_char": 3280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) The field covered by R. 36 is completely covered by the 1964 Rules framed under the Act and therefore R. 36 can no longer be Hyderabad Ohemiwl justified as good under the general law relating to alcohol and inand Pharmaceulical toxicating drugs as contended by the State."}}, {"text": "K. Srinivasamurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3650, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3727, "end_char": 3742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhuri and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respon- dents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3747, "end_char": 3764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhuri and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respon- dents (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3904, "end_char": 3911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WANCHOO, J.-These are five connected appeals on certi- Wanchoo, J. ficates granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3959, "end_char": 3966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WANCHOO, J.-These are five connected appeals on certi- Wanchoo, J. ficates granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3994, "end_char": 4022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WANCHOO, J.-These are five connected appeals on certi- Wanchoo, J. ficates granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "April l, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Act came into force from April l, 1957, the appellants who were manufacturing medicinal preparations were governed by it and the Rules framed thereunder and took licences under the Act."}}, {"text": "Their contention was that this rule along with such provisions of the Hyderabad Abkari Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5531, "end_char": 5621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "is no doubt that the Hyderabad Abkari Act was a general Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7945, "end_char": 7961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no doubt that the Hyderabad Abkari Act was a general Act", "statute": "There is no doubt that the Hyderabad Abkari Act was a general Act"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8074, "end_char": 8079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the Constitution, however, medicinal and toile't preparations came under entry 84, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which provides for duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India, except-\n\n(a) alcohclic liquors for human consumption;\n\n(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics, but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing a.lcohol or any substance containing opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics."}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8587, "end_char": 8595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no doubt that the Hyderabad Abkari Act was a general Act", "statute": "There is no doubt that the Hyderabad Abkari Act was a general Act"}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8944, "end_char": 8950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "duties cesses or fees are mentioned m the Umon List, contrnue State of Andhra to be ievied and to be applied to the same purposes until pl'Ovi- Prad\"'h and°''\n\nsion to the contrary is made by Parliament by law\"."}}, {"text": "Wanckoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9093, "end_char": 9100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view Wanckoo, J. of this provision, all duties and charges levied by the State before the coming into force of the Constitution on the maufacture of.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9466, "end_char": 9474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9652, "end_char": 9657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10055, "end_char": 10060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10313, "end_char": 10318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10381, "end_char": 10386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10729, "end_char": 10734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11632, "end_char": 11637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Worka Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11904, "end_char": 11914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon as th.e aftll PhaN11aewtical new Rules came mto force the old rules must fall and there- 1s\n\nWorka Ltd. etc."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13161, "end_char": 13166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13227, "end_char": 13232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18286, "end_char": 18291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18471, "end_char": 18476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_383_390_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "78.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS 383\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, U.P.\n\nBIJLI COTTON MILLS, HATHRAS\n\nIP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WAINCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]\n\nSales Tax-Reference under Act pending before High Court -Impugned !egis!ation in relation to the matter in reference amended-High Court whether can take cognisance of am•nded legis!ation-U.P. Sa!es Tax Act, 1948 (U.P. Act 15 of 1948), ss. 3A, 31.\n\nThe respondent is a manufacturer of cotton yarn and is registered as a dealer under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. This act came into force on April 1, 1948. Under this Act, sales tax was payable on sales of cotton yarn at a uniform rate of 3 pies in a rupee. Under s. 3(A) of the Act the Government of U.P. issued a not'fication declaring that with effect from June 9, 1948, the Sales Tax would be charged at the rate of six pies per rupee in respect of sales of the cotton yarn. In the present case, the assessee had opted under s, 7 of the Act to be assessed on the turnover of previous year. The Sales Tax Officer held on the basis of the notification dated June 9, 1948, that the rate of three pies per rupee in rspect of sales of cotton yarn was to apply in the year of assessment for the first 69 days and for the remaining part of the year the rate of six pies per rupee was to .apply.\n\nThe decision of the Sales Tax Officer was affirmed by the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax. The Judge referred the case to the High Court. On reference the High Court held on the basis of its judgment in Modi Food Products Ltd. that the rate of three pies per rupee would apply for the assessment of 1948-49 because the assessee had opted under s. 7 to be assessed on the basis of the turnover of the previous year. In the meantime the legislature of Uttar Prade5h by Act III of 1963 enacted s. 31 which makes Sales-tax exigible from an assessee who has opted to pay tax .on the turnover of the previous year, as if the altered rates were in force during the previous year. The amendment is given retroactive operation and applies to assessments oending or closed.\n\nThe question for consideration before this Court was whether this Amending Act would apply to the present assessment.\n\nHe!d: (i) 'l'he law found incorporated in s. 31 by Amending Act III of 1963 would apply to the present case. This Court in giving its opinion on the question in the light of the amending Act is seeking to apply a legislative provision which was, by express enactment, in force at the time when the liability arose, for s. 31 enacted by Act III of 1963 is to be deemed to have been in operation at all material times in supersession of the previous law declared by this Court in Modi Sugar Mills Ltd.'s case. This Court is, therefore, not seeking to apply any Jaw to the question posed before the High Court which was not in force on the date of the transaction which is the subject-matter of the reference\n\nModi Food Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of S_ales-tax, U.P.\n\nA.I.R. 1956 All. 35 and Commissioner of Sales-tax, U.P. v. Modi\n\nSugar Mills Ltd., [1961) 2. S.C.R. 189 explained.\n\nMarch 2()\n\n(ii) When the question has been referred to the High Court -OvmmissWnrr of and in the meantime the law has been amended with retroactive\n\nSal•·• Tnx, U.P. operation, it would be the duty of the High Court to apply the ,.. law so amended as if it applies. By taking notice of the law llijli Collon ~N/,, which has been substituted for the original provision, the High\n\nllriJhra.9 Court is giving effect to tr.e legislative intent and docs no more than what must be deemed to be necessarily implicit in the question referred by the Tribunal, provided the question is couched in terms of sufficient amplitude to cover an enquiry into the question in the light of the amended law, and the enquiry does not necessitate investigation of fresh facts.\n\nMI s. Chatturam Horilram Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax, Bihar and Orissa, {1955] 2 S.C.R. 290 and M / s. Rampur\n\nDistillery Chemical Works Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P., I.T. Reference No. 362/58 dt. 17-1-64, distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISPlCTION: Civil Appeal No. 546 nf\n\n1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 17, 1958 of the Allahabad. High Court in Misc. Case No. 152 of 1952.\n\nC. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellant\n\nS. K. Kapur, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 20, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSHAH, J -Bijli Cotton Mills-respondent in tbis appealis a manufacturer of cotton yarn and is registered as a dealer under the U.P. Sales Tax Act (15 of 1948). Under the U.P.\n\nSales Tax Act 05 of 1948) which came into force on April 1, 1948, sales-tax became payable on sales of diverse commodities including cotton yarn at a uniform rate of three pies in a rupee. By Act 25 of 1948, s: 3-A was incorporated in Act 15 of I 948 conferring upon the Provincial Goverhlnnt power to declare by notification that the proceeds of safe.. of any goods or class of goods shall not be included in the turnover of any dealer except at such single point in the serie's of sales by successive dealers as the State Government may specify. Bys. 7 as amended by Act 25 of 1948. a dealer had the option to submit his return on the basis of the turnover of the mies in the previous year or on the basis of turnover of the sales in the current year. The respondent company opted to be assessed on the basis of the turnover of the previous year ending March 31, 1948.\n\nIn exercise of the power under s. 3-A of the Act the Government of U.P. issued a notification declaring that with effect from June 9, I 948, the proceeds of goods entered in column 2 of the schedule to the said notification (which included cotton yarn) shall not be included in the turnover of any dealer except at the point in the series of sales by successive\n\ndealers, and that with effect from June 9, 1949, the rate of tax 1964 in respect of the turnover of the aforesaid goods shall be as Oommi..W..r of set out in the schedule. As a result of the notification the sale saie. Tan:, U.P. of cotton yam became taxable at a single point i.e. at a point BT 0;;,, M\"ll <Jf sale by the importer if the goods were imported from outside IJ ' Balhaa\n\n'• Uttar Pradesh and at a point of sale by the manufacturer, if manufactured in Uttar Pradesh, and the rate of tax in respect 'of cotton yarn was fixed, since the date of notification, at six pies per rupee.\n\nThe Sales-tax Officer, Hathras in assessing the respondent company to sales-tax for the assessment year 1948-49 held that because of the notification issued by the Government, the rate of three pies per rupee in respect of sales of cotton yarn was to .apply in the year of assessment for the first 69 days and for the remaining part of the year the rate of six pies per rupee was to .apply, and on that account notwithstanding that the assessee had opted under s. 7 to be assessed on the basis of the turnover of the previous year, the rate of three pies was applicable to the assessable turnover for the first 69 days and for the rest of the year the rate applicable was six pies per rupee. This order was modified in appeal by the Judge (Appeals) Sales Tax, Meerut, who directed assessment of tax on the turnover at a uniform rate of thret' pies per rupee. But the order of the appellate court was reversed by the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, U.P. who restored the order of the Sales-tax Officer. The Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax at the instance of the respondent company then referred to the High Coutt of Judicature at Allahabad the following question:\n\n\"Wht'ther the assessees who had elected the previous year are liable to pay tax in the assessment year I 948-49 according to the rates prevailing during the year\", and the High Court following its judgment in Modi Food Products Ltd. v. Com1\"issioner of Sales Tax, U.P.(') answered the question as follows:\n\n\"all sales of the assessee during the previous year which corresponded with the calendar year 1947 have to be taxed at the fla.t rate of 3 pies per rupee when making the assessment for the assessment year\n\n1948-49\". .\n\nWith special leave, the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. has .appealed to this Court against the order of the High Court. . It may _be observed that the judgment of the Allahabad Htgh Court m Modi Food Products Ltd.'s case(') was confirmed by this Court: Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. The\n\n(') AI.R. 1956 All. 35.\n\nL, P(D)ISCI-13\n\nSluJh, J.\n\n1.9C4\n\nCor.; missioner of Bales 'l'nx. c:.P.\n\nBijli Cotton 11!ills,\n\nJlaflira..~\n\nS!iah, J.\n\nModi Sugar Mills Ltd.(') But the Legislature of the State of Uttar Pradesh has. since that judgment was pronounced. enacted validating legislation by Act lII of 1963 which has provided by s. 7 of the Amending Act that:\n\n\"After section 30 of the Principal Act. the following shall be added and be deemed. to have been added with effect from the first day of April, 1948. as new section 31 : '31. (l) Where any dealer has. in accordance with the provisions of section 7, as it stood prier to its amendment by section 7 of U.P. Act XIX of 1956. opted to be assessed to tax on the basis of his turnover of the previous year, he shall be assessed to tax at such rates as arc prevalent during the year for which the assessment is being made, and if the rates of tax on any goods or class of goods are altered during such assessment year, the dealer, in respect of the turnover of such goods, shall be liable to pay tax at the altered rates, as if the altered rates were in force during the previous'year also proportionately for the same number of days as they are in force during the assessment year.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, all assessments or orders made. actions or prcceedings taken, directions issued. jurisdictions exercised or tax levied or collected by any officer or authority purporting to act under the provisions of sub-section (I) of section 7. as it stood prior to its amendment by section 7 of U .P. Act XIX of 1956, shall be deemed to be good and valid in law as if such assessments, orders, actions, proceedings, directions, jurisdictions and tax have\n\nbeen duly made, taken, issued, exercised, levied or collected. as the case may be, under or in accordance with the said provisions of this Act as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Bikri Kar (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1962 and as if the amendment so made had been in force on all material dates.\n\nExplanation-For the purpose of this section the expression \"previous year\" shall have the meaning assigned to it in sub-clause (ii) of clause (j) of section 2 of this Act, as it stood prior to its amendment by section 2 of the U.P. Act XIX of 1956.'\" Section 31 makes sales-tax exigible from an assessee who has opted to pa.y tax on the turnover of the previous year, as if the altered rates were in force during the previolls year. The turnover of the previous year must therefore be broken up. the new rate of tax being applicable proportionately for the\n\n(') [1961] 2 S.C.R. 189.\n\n• ...\n\name number of days in the previous year as were in force in the assessment year. The ameodment is retroactive, and applies to assessments pending or closed, as if the validating Act had be<:n in force at the material date.\n\nThis Court had in the Modi Sugar Mills Ltd.'s case(') held that where the assessee had elected to submit his return on the turnover of the previous year under s. 7 of Act 15 of 1948 as amended by Act 25 of 1948 he was liable to be assessed to sales-tax at the rate in force on the first day of the year of assessment, because the liability arises on that date, and any subs..'quent enhancement of the rate by virtue of a notification under s. 3-A does not alter that liability. The view expressed by the Court has been modified by express legislation operative retrospectively. The liability to tax of the turnover of the previous year which is regarded as the fictional turnover of the year of assessment has to be determined on the basis that the rates applicable in the year of assessment were fictionally projected on the taxable turnover.\n\nMr. Kapur appearing on behalf of the respondent company submitted that in answering the question referred by the Judge <Revisions) this Court was bound to give its opinion in the light of the Jaw applicable to the transaction as it prevailed at the date on which the reference was made and not of any subsequent amendment of the Act. Counsel submits that as the High Court exercises an advisory jurisdiction, so does this Court in appeal against the order of the High Court, and its advice can only be tendered on the question referred and in the light of the law as was applicable at the date when the reference was made. Counsel says that if the Jaw as amended is to be taken into consideration, in substance this Court would be answering a question other than the one which was referred by the Judge cRevisions) Sales Tax. In our view there is no\n\nbstance in this contention. The qnestion referred to the High Court posed a problem as to the liability of the respondent rompany to l><! assessed for the assessment year I 948-49. Two rival views \\\\-ere propounded before the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax. One was that the rates applicable to the fictional turnover for the year of assessment were those prevalent in the year 1948-49 and for the purpose of assessment they had to be applied to the turnover in the same proportion in which they. would have applied if the option had not been exercised.\n\nThat was the contention of the Sales Tax Department. The contention of the assessee was that having opted for the turnover of the previous year, the rates applicable to the turnover would be crystalised on the first day of the year of assessment and any modification since the commencement of the year in the rates would be inapplicable. This Court in the Modi Sugar\n\n(') [1961] :!, S.c.R. 189.\n\nComniissioner of Salu Tax, U.P.\n\nBiili Collon llilla,\n\nHathras\n\nShah, J.\n\nCommiuioner of\n\nBal\" Tax, u.J!.\n\nBijli Cott.on Mills,\n\nBatlaras\n\nBliak, J.\n\nMiils Ltd.'s case(') accepted the contention raised by the assessee. But for the amendment, the question which was posed by the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax would have to be answered as it was answered by the High Court. The Legislature has. however, am.ended the Act and has declared that notwithstanding the option exercised by the assessee the tax would have to be computed in the light of the rates prevailing in 1948-49 as if they were projected upon the turnover of the previous year.\n\nThe Legislature has expressly stated that this rule will prevail as if it was in force during the assessment year and all assessments will be made in the light of this amended rule. In answering the question which was submitted by the Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, therefore, the law enacted by the Legislature is the law found incorporated in s. 31 by Amending Act Ill of\n\n1963. This Court in giving its opinion on the question in the light of the amending Act is seeking to apply a legislative provision which was, by express enactment, in force at the time when the liability arose, fer s. 31 enacted by Act III of 1963 is to be deemed to ha.ve been in operation at all material times in supersession of the previous rule declared by this Court.\n\nThis Court is, therefore, not seeking to apply any law to the question posed before the High Court which was not in force on the date of the transaction which is the subject-matter of the reference.\n\nThe following observation made by Jagannadhadas J., in Messrs Chatturam Horilram Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncometax, Bihar and Orissa(') on which reliance was placed by counsel for the respondent company:\n\n\"The High Court's jurisdiction was only to answer the particular question that was referred to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and it is extremely doubtful whether they could ha.ve taken notice of a subsequent legislation and answered a different question.\",\n\ndos not suggest a different rule. In Messrs Chatturam Hori/- ram Ltd.'s case(') a previous assessment to income-tax of the assessee fell through because the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was not in force iii Chota Nagpur area where the assessee was carrying on business during the relevant assessment .year.\n\nThereafter Bihar Regulation IV of 1942 was promulgated by • the Governor of Bihar with the assent of the Governor-General and thereby the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was brought into force in Chota Nagpur retrospectively as from March 30, 1939.\n\nOn February 8. 1944, the Income-tax Officer issued a fresh notice under s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. which resulted in the assessment of the appellant to income-tax. and the question which fell to be determined was whether the\n\n(') [1961) 2 S.C.R. 189.\n\n\nnotice was properly issued under s. 34 of the Act. It was argued 1961 that when the High Court answered the earlier reference which Commi&ioner o/ negatived the claim of the Revenue to assess the assessee, Bihar Sal .. Ttn. U.P.\n\nRegulation IV of 1942 had in fact been enacted, and if the Bijli cart... Mill<, High Court had applied that Regulation the result would have Hatkra• been different, and in meeting that argument the Court observ- - ed that it was doubtful if the High Court had jurisdiction to Shah, J. take into consideration the 'ubsequent legislation for answering a question other than the one which was actually raised.\n\nThe doubt expressed was therefore in respect of the power of the Court to decide a question other than the question which was actually referred and not in respect of the power and indeed the duty of the High Court to apply to the question referred the law enacted with retroactive operation.\n\nIn support of his contention Mr. Kapur relied upon the observation of Desai, C.J ., in MI s Rampur Distillery Chemical Works Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.(') to the following effect:\n\n\"The argument was that though the High Court has to answer the question referred to it with reference to the law in force in 1957 (when the Tribunal disposed of the appeal), what that la, w was has to be discovered today with reference to the law existing today. What was the law in 1957 on the basis of which the Tribunal disposed of the appeal has certainly to be decided by this court today but what has to be decided is the la.w existing in 1957 and not deemed to exist in 1957 by virtue of an amendment in the law made in 1962.\"\n\nBut in that case, in the view of the High Court the amendment made by the amending statute of 1962 which came into force after the reference was made by the Income-tax Tribunal had no retrospective operation, and the question referred by the Tribunal had to be answered by the High Court in the light of the relevant law applicable at the date of the transaction.\n\nThe observation relied upon has to be read in the context of the finding of the High Court as to the character of the amending legislation. The observation therefore does not assist the contention that even in cases where the relevant statute has been amended with retroactive operation. so as to apply to the transa.ction which forms the subject-matter of the reference. and the High Court or this Court is bound in recording its opinion on the question referred to ignore the amended la;;,,. If what counsel contends is true. the answer given by the High Court or by this Court would have no value whatever in cases where by retroactive amendment of the law, the old law has\n\n(') LT. Reference No. 362 of 1958 decided on Jan. 17, 1964.\n\nComminim1er of Balu Tax, U.P.\n\n\"· Bijli 08\"'\"' Jlilla,\n\nHatMM\n\nShah, J.\n\nbeen superseded and is substituted by a new statutory provision. Undoubtedly the Tribunal called upon to decide a taxing dispute must apply the relevant Jaw applicable to a particular transaction to which the problem relates. and that Jaw normally is the law applicable as on the date on which the transaction in dispute has taken place. If the Jaw which the T n'bunal seeks to apply to the dispute is amended, so as to make the law applicable to the transaction in dispute, it would be bound to decide the question in the light of the Jaw so amended. Similarly when the question bas been referred to the High Court and in the meanwhile the Jaw has been amended with retroactive operation. it would be the duty of the High Court to apply the Jaw so amended if it applies. By taking notice of the Jaw which has been substituted for the original provision, the High Court is giving effect to legislative intent and does no more than what must be deemed to be necessarily implicit in the question referred by the Tnl>unal, provided the question is conched in terms of sufficient amplitude to cover an enquiry into the question in the light of the amended Jaw, and the enquiry does not necessitate investigation of fresh facts. If the question is not so couched as to invite the High Court to decide the question in the light of the Jaw as amended O£ if it necessitates in~-esti gation of facts which have not been investigated, the High Court may refuse to answer the question. Application of the relevant Jaw to a problem raised by the reference before the High Court is not normally excluded merely because at the date when the Tnl>unal decided the question the relevant Jaw was not O£ could not be brought to its notice. There is nothing so peculiar in the nature of a reference under the Indian Income-tax Act or the Sales Tax Acts that in deciding it the High Court is restricted to the application of the Jaw which has been superseded by legislation since the date when the reference was made by the Tax Tribunal and is obliged to refuse to apply the law which by legislative direction has to be applied to a particular transaction which is the subject-matter of the reference.\n\nOn the view taken by us this appeal must be allowed and the question raised by the Judge <Revisions) Sales Tax must be answered in the affirmative. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs both in this Court and the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "383\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, U", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "383\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, U", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BIJLI COTTON MILLS, HATHRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIJLI COTTON MILLS, HATHRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 179, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 200, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sales Tax-Reference under Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 203, "end_char": 232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 401, "end_char": 414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3A, 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 438, "end_char": 448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 544, "end_char": 563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 593, "end_char": 606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This act came into force on April 1, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 3(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 716, "end_char": 723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Government of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 739, "end_char": 757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 3(A) of the Act the Government of U.P. issued a not'fication declaring that with effect from June 9, 1948, the Sales Tax would be charged at the rate of six pies per rupee in respect of sales of the cotton yarn."}}, {"text": "June 9, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 812, "end_char": 824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 3(A) of the Act the Government of U.P. issued a not'fication declaring that with effect from June 9, 1948, the Sales Tax would be charged at the rate of six pies per rupee in respect of sales of the cotton yarn."}}, {"text": "Modi Food Products Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1544, "end_char": 1567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On reference the High Court held on the basis of its judgment in Modi Food Products Ltd. that the rate of three pies per rupee would apply for the assessment of 1948-49 because the assessee had opted under s. 7 to be assessed on the basis of the turnover of the previous year."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1685, "end_char": 1689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "legislature of Uttar Prade5h", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1776, "end_char": 1804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime the legislature of Uttar Prade5h by Act III of 1963 enacted s. 31 which makes Sales-tax exigible from an assessee who has opted to pay tax .on the turnover of the previous year, as if the altered rates were in force during the previous year."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1832, "end_char": 1837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2267, "end_char": 2272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amending Act III of 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2276, "end_char": 2300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2544, "end_char": 2549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act III of 1963", "statute": "Amending Act III of 1963"}}, {"text": "Modi Sugar Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2703, "end_char": 2724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in giving its opinion on the question in the light of the amending Act is seeking to apply a legislative provision which was, by express enactment, in force at the time when the liability arose, for s. 31 enacted by Act III of 1963 is to be deemed to have been in operation at all material times in supersession of the previous law declared by this Court in Modi Sugar Mills Ltd.'s case."}}, {"text": "1955] 2 S.C.R. 290", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4305, "end_char": 4319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellant\n\nS. K. Kapur, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4324, "end_char": 4333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellant\n\nS. K. Kapur, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4354, "end_char": 4365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellant\n\nS. K. Kapur, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4367, "end_char": 4378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellant\n\nS. K. Kapur, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4383, "end_char": 4394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellant\n\nS. K. Kapur, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSHAH, J -Bijli Cotton Mills-respondent in tbis appealis a manufacturer of cotton yarn and is registered as a dealer under the U.P. Sales Tax Act (15 of 1948).", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "-Bijli Cotton Mills", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4487, "end_char": 4506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSHAH, J -Bijli Cotton Mills-respondent in tbis appealis a manufacturer of cotton yarn and is registered as a dealer under the U.P. Sales Tax Act (15 of 1948)."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4610, "end_char": 4623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 31, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5509, "end_char": 5523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company opted to be assessed on the basis of the turnover of the previous year ending March 31, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5557, "end_char": 5561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "June 9, I 948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5652, "end_char": 5665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the power under s. 3-A of the Act the Government of U.P. issued a notification declaring that with effect from June 9, I 948, the proceeds of goods entered in column 2 of the schedule to the said notification (which included cotton yarn) shall not be included in the turnover of any dealer except at the point in the series of sales by successive\n\ndealers, and that with effect from June 9, 1949, the rate of tax 1964 in respect of the turnover of the aforesaid goods shall be as Oommi..W..r of set out in the schedule."}}, {"text": "June 9, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5924, "end_char": 5936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the power under s. 3-A of the Act the Government of U.P. issued a notification declaring that with effect from June 9, I 948, the proceeds of goods entered in column 2 of the schedule to the said notification (which included cotton yarn) shall not be included in the turnover of any dealer except at the point in the series of sales by successive\n\ndealers, and that with effect from June 9, 1949, the rate of tax 1964 in respect of the turnover of the aforesaid goods shall be as Oommi..W..r of set out in the schedule."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6277, "end_char": 6290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tan:, U.P. of cotton yam became taxable at a single point i.e. at a point BT 0;;,, M\"ll <Jf sale by the importer if the goods were imported from outside IJ ' Balhaa\n\n'• Uttar Pradesh and at a point of sale by the manufacturer, if manufactured in Uttar Pradesh, and the rate of tax in respect 'of cotton yarn was fixed, since the date of notification, at six pies per rupee."}}, {"text": "Hathras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6506, "end_char": 6513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sales-tax Officer, Hathras in assessing the respondent company to sales-tax for the assessment year 1948-49 held that because of the notification issued by the Government, the rate of three pies per rupee in respect of sales of cotton yarn was to .apply in the year of assessment for the first 69 days and for the remaining part of the year the rate of six pies per rupee was to .apply, and on that account notwithstanding that the assessee had opted under s. 7 to be assessed on the basis of the turnover of the previous year, the rate of three pies was applicable to the assessable turnover for the first 69 days and for the rest of the year the rate applicable was six pies per rupee."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6944, "end_char": 6948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Coutt of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7577, "end_char": 7614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax at the instance of the respondent company then referred to the High Coutt of Judicature at Allahabad the following question:\n\n\"Wht'ther the assessees who had elected the previous year are liable to pay tax in the assessment year I 948-49 according to the rates prevailing during the year\", and the High Court following its judgment in Modi Food Products Ltd. v. Com1\"issioner of Sales Tax, U.P.(') answered the question as follows:\n\n\"all sales of the assessee during the previous year which corresponded with the calendar year 1947 have to be taxed at the fla.t rate of 3 pies per rupee when making the assessment for the assessment year\n\n1948-49\". ."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8190, "end_char": 8221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With special leave, the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. has .appealed to this Court against the order of the High Court. .", "canonical_name": "383\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, U"}}, {"text": "SluJh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8501, "end_char": 8506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L, P(D)ISCI-13\n\nSluJh, J.\n\n1.9C4\n\nCor.;"}}, {"text": "S!iah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8594, "end_char": 8599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c:.P.\n\nBijli Cotton 11!ills,\n\nJlaflira..~\n\nS!iah, J.\n\nModi Sugar Mills Ltd.(') But the Legislature of the State of Uttar Pradesh has."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8793, "end_char": 8797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8832, "end_char": 8842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8982, "end_char": 8992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9063, "end_char": 9072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9112, "end_char": 9121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9987, "end_char": 9996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10036, "end_char": 10045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10647, "end_char": 10656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10708, "end_char": 10717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10749, "end_char": 10759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 189", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11060, "end_char": 11079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11472, "end_char": 11476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11753, "end_char": 11757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12162, "end_char": 12167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kapur appearing on behalf of the respondent company submitted that in answering the question referred by the Judge <Revisions) this Court was bound to give its opinion in the light of the Jaw applicable to the transaction as it prevailed at the date on which the reference was made and not of any subsequent amendment of the Act."}}, {"text": "Comniissioner of Salu Tax, U.P.\n\nBiili Collon llilla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13957, "end_char": 14009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Comniissioner of Salu Tax, U.P.\n\nBiili Collon llilla,\n\nHathras\n\nShah, J.\n\nCommiuioner of\n\nBal\" Tax, u.J!."}}, {"text": "Bliak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14096, "end_char": 14101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bijli Cott.on Mills,\n\nBatlaras\n\nBliak, J.\n\nMiils Ltd.'s case(') accepted the contention raised by the assessee."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14941, "end_char": 14946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15187, "end_char": 15192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15581, "end_char": 15594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following observation made by Jagannadhadas J., in Messrs Chatturam Horilram Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncometax, Bihar and Orissa(') on which reliance was placed by counsel for the respondent company:\n\n\"The High Court's jurisdiction was only to answer the particular question that was referred to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and it is extremely doubtful whether they could ha.ve taken notice of a subsequent legislation and answered a different question.\","}}, {"text": "Messrs Chatturam Hori/- ram Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16057, "end_char": 16089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Messrs Chatturam Hori/- ram Ltd.'s case(') a previous assessment to income-tax of the assessee fell through because the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was not in force iii Chota Nagpur area where the assessee was carrying on business during the relevant assessment .year."}}, {"text": "Chota Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16225, "end_char": 16237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Messrs Chatturam Hori/- ram Ltd.'s case(') a previous assessment to income-tax of the assessee fell through because the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was not in force iii Chota Nagpur area where the assessee was carrying on business during the relevant assessment .year."}}, {"text": "Thereafter Bihar Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16326, "end_char": 16353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 30, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16554, "end_char": 16568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Bihar Regulation IV of 1942 was promulgated by • the Governor of Bihar with the assent of the Governor-General and thereby the Indian Finance Act of 1939 was brought into force in Chota Nagpur retrospectively as from March 30, 1939."}}, {"text": "February 8. 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16574, "end_char": 16590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 8."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16643, "end_char": 16648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Thereafter Bihar Regulation", "statute": "Thereafter Bihar Regulation"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16656, "end_char": 16683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1961) 2 S.C.R. 189", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16816, "end_char": 16835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16872, "end_char": 16877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "High Court had applied that Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17149, "end_char": 17187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17345, "end_char": 17349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P.\n\nRegulation IV of 1942 had in fact been enacted, and if the Bijli cart... Mill<, High Court had applied that Regulation the result would have Hatkra• been different, and in meeting that argument the Court observ- - ed that it was doubtful if the High Court had jurisdiction to Shah, J. take into consideration the 'ubsequent legislation for answering a question other than the one which was actually raised.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17840, "end_char": 17845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention Mr. Kapur relied upon the observation of Desai, C.J .,"}}, {"text": "Jan. 17, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19592, "end_char": 19605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "362 of 1958 decided on Jan. 17, 1964."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21477, "end_char": 21491, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_391_402_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 391\n\nMALAYALAM PLANTATIONS LTD. v.\n\nTHE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL\n\nINCOME-TAX AND SALES TAX [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .. K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S.M. SiKRI, JJ.]\n\nSales Tax-Tea sold bu auction at Fort Cochin which was outside State of Travancore-Cochin-Whether to he included in turn-over for purposes of Sales-tax-\"Outside Sale\"-Meanina of-Doctrine of territorial nexus in Sales Ta.r legis!ation- Point not urged in High Court or taken up in Statement of case-It can be taken up in Supreme Court-Constitution of India, Art. 286(i)(a} before and after the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956-Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act. 1950, s. (J).\n\nThe appellant company owns several estates wherein tea is grown and it was assessed to sales-tax by the Sales Tax Officer in respect of the tea sold by 1t during the years 1954-55 and 1955-56. An appeal filed by the appellant was rejected bv the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the ground that the tea when sold was admittedly in godowns in the State of Travancore-Cochin and that consequently the sales must be deemed tc have taken place within tl:e State of Travancore-Cochin and hence liable to be included in the taxable turn-over. When a further appeal was taken to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. it was held that the property in the goods sold passed at Fort Cochin in Madras State on the fall of the hammer at the auction and hence the same was not taxable. The State filed a revision petition to the High Court. While the High Court accepted the finding of the Tribunal that the property in the goods sold passed at Fort. Cochin on the fall of the hammer at the auction. it differed from the Tribunal as regards the effect of the circm!'- stance that the tea sold was. at the point of sale, physically in godowns situated in the State of Travancore-Cochin and held the sales to be taxable. The appellant cam<> to this Court after obtaining a certificate of fitness from the High Court.\n\nThe onlv question argued before this court was whetter a sale of tea effected by the appellant by auction at Fort Cochin in Madras State wa• a sale outside the State of Travancore- Cochin or inside it and whether the same was taxable or not. • Accepting the appeal.\n\nHELD: No sales tax was to be levied in this case as the sales took place outside the State of Travancore-Cochin. The test for determining whP.ther a sale is inside or outside a State is \\\\here the property in the goods passed and in the present case the property in the goods passed in Fort Cochin in Madras State on the fall of the hammer at the auction.\n\nThe point about the property not having passed in the Madras State was not argued before the High Court and was also not urged in the statement of case filed by respondent and hence the same was not allowed to be argued in the Supreme Court.\n\nPer Shah. J. The property in the goods passed at Fort Cochin in Madras State and as the goods were delivered not for the purpose of consumption in any particular State, the sales were not inside Travancore-Cochin but were outside the\n\nMarch 20\n\nMalayalam Planfa.\n\ntions Ltd.\n\nTheDepuly Commisaioner of\n\nAgricultural Incomttax and\n\nSalea Taz\n\nState and were as held by this Court in A. V. Thomas & Co. v.\n\nDeputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax Trivandrum, 14 S.T.C. 363, not liable to be taxed under the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1950.\n\nThe doctrine of territorial nexus had full play in sales tax legislation under the Government of India, Act, 1935 and was not abrogated by the enactment of Art, 286 of the Constitution.\n\nIt continued to be in operation in the interregnum between the promulgation of the Constitution and the amendment of Art. 286 by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act. 1956. It also applies now subject to certain modifications.\n\nPar Jiament has been given the power to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purcl:ase of goods takes place outside the State or in the course of the import of the goods into or export of the goods out of the territory of India. Exercising the power und.er\n\ncl. (2) Parliament has enacted the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and by s. 4(2) the doctrine of territorial nexus has been given legislative recognition th<mgh in somewhat limited form.\n\nDeputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Salestax. Trivandrum v. A.V. Thomas & Co., I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1395; India Cower Corporation Limited v. State of Bihar, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 276; A. V. Thomas & Co. Ltd. v. Deputu Commissioner of\n\n.4.griultural Income-tax and Sales-tax, Trivandrum 1953 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 608 363; Poppat Lal Shah v. The State of Madras, r1953] S.C.R. 677; and the Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. v. The\n\nState of Bihar [1958] S.C.R. 1356. referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 678 and 679 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated April 4, 1961 of the Kerala High Court in Tax Revision Nos. 52 & 53/1959.\n\nG. B. Pai, T. N. Ramachandra, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nGovinda Menon a.nd V. A. Seyid Muhammad, for the respondent (in both the appeals).\n\nC. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the interveners (in both the appeals).\n\nMarch 20, 1964.\n\nThe judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., WANCHOO, RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND SIKRI, JJ. was delivered by AYYANGAR J. SHAH, J. ddivered a separate Opinion.\n\nAyyanga,, J.\n\nAVYANGAR, J.-The appellant owns several estates wherein inter alia le~ is grown and was assessed to sales-tax in respect of the tea sold by it during the years 1954-55 and 1955-56, by the Sales Tax Officer, First Circle, Quilon in the State of Travancore-Cochin by his order dated December 23. 1956.' In the taxable turnover on which sales tax was computed by the assessing authority were included two items which are the subject of complaint in these two appeals which relate to these two years of assessment. Before the aSsessing officer the appellant claimed that certain sales of its tea which were\n\nconducted by auction at Fort Cochin-a place which at the relevant date was in the Madras State. were sales \"outside\"\n\nthe Travancore-Cochin State and that consequently these sales were exempted from taxation by the State of Travancore-Cochin under Art. '286(1)-(a) of 1the Constitution. The Sales Tax Officer rejected this contention and included the sum involved in these sales in the taxable turnover. An appeal filed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner also failed, this authority holding that as the tea sold was, at the date of the auction, admittedly in godowns in Willingdon Island in the State of Travancore-Cochin, the sales must be deemed to ha.ve taken place within taxing State by virtue of a provision in the State Sales Tax Act to which we shall refer later and hence liable to be included in the taxable turnover. There was a further appeal taken by the Appellant to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal which upheld the appellant's contention and set aside the assessment in so far as it included the turnover relating to the auction sales of tea held at Fort Cochin, this turnover amounting to Rs. 56,43,184111 /- in regard to the assessment year 1954-55 and Rs. 62,13,60413/- in regard to the assessment year 1955-56 and remanded the case for fresh disposal by excluding these sums from the computation of the taxable turnover. A revision petition was thereafter filed before the High Court by the State under s.\n\nI 5(b) of the General Sales Tax Act of Travancore-Cochin and the learned Judges allowed the Revision and upheld the order of the assessing officer and the Appellate Commissioner holding the turnover represented by these auction sales to be validly taxable under the State law relating to sales tax. The appellant thereafter applied to the High Court for a certificate of fitness and this having been granted the appeals are now before us.\n\nBefore proceeding further it is necessary to set out the statutory provision contained in the taxing enactment of the\n\nState. The General Sales Tax Act (Act XI of 1125 (ME) 1950) which imposed a sales tax on sales by dealers defines a \"sale\" by s. 21j) in these terms:-\n\n\" 'Sale' with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means e.very transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration and includes also a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge;\n\nx x x x Explanation (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Sale of Goods Act for the time bein& in\n\nMaklyalam Plantations Ltd. v.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and\n\nSale8 Ta:z\n\nAyyangar, J,\n\nMalayalam Plantations Ltd.\n\nThe De:puty !)ommisswner of\n\nAyrkultural Income-tax and\n\nSrles Tax\n\nforce, the sale or purchase of any goods shall be deemed for the purpose of this Act, to have taken place in the State wherever the contract of sale or purchase might have been made (a) if the goods were actually in the State at the time when the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made; or (b) in case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods by description, then, if the goods are actually produced in the State at any time after the contract of sale or purchase in respect thereof was made.\" When the Constitution came into force a new section numbered s. 26 was inserted by the Adaptation Order bringing the Act into line with Art. 286(1) of the Constitution and this read:-\n\n\"No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place-\n\n(a) outside the State or (b) ................................ .\n\nExplanation-For the purposes of sub-clause (a) a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the consumption in that State, notwithst, anding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale \"or purchase passed in another State.\" The position, therefore, was that though cl. (a) to Explanation 2 to s. 2(j) enacted that \"notwithstanding anything contrary in the Sale of Goods Act, the sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the State if the goods were actually in the State at the time the contract for sale or purchase of goods thereof was made\", still by the non-obstante provision contained in s. 26 a tax on the sale or purchase of goods could not be imposed where such sale or purchase took place \"outside\" the State of Travancore-Cochin. It is only necessary to add that even if s. 26 were ignored still by the terms of Art. 2860)(a) the position would be the rnme and the State could not validly levy a tax on a sale which is \"outside\" that State.\n\nNow the question is can a sale of the tea effected by the Appellant by auction at Fort Cochin and which were included in its taxable turnover be. said to be \"outside\" the State? The facts in relation to the transaction relating to the sale of the.tea and which the learned Judges of the High Court held not to be an \"outside\" sale may be stated in their own words: -\n\n\"The sales of teas were concluded at Fort Cochin and the goods were stocked in godowns situated in the\n\nTravancore Cochin State. The deliveries of the goods were also made to the buyers from the godowns in Willingdon island in the Travancore Cochin State. The Appellate Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the ownership of the commo dity having passed in Fort Cochin, the property had not passed within the taxing State, accordingly they would be 'outside' sales for purpose of Art. 286(1) and exempt from taxation.\" The Appellate Tribunal had recorded a finding that the property in the goods sold passed at Fort Cochin on the fall of the hammer at the auction and the learned Judges of the High Court proceeded on the same basis. The point on which the. learned Judges differed from the Tribunal was only as regards the effect of the circumstance that the tea sold, was at the point of sale, physically in godowns situated in the State of Travanc:ore-Cocbin. The Appellate Tribunal bad, in reaching the con clusion in favour of the appellant, as to the taxable character of the turnover represented by these auction sales, referred to a large number of decisions of this Court and to the observations contained in them as well as to several decisions of the various High Courts. When the matter came up before the High Court the position was, that that Court bad after a review of most of the earlier caSes which had been referred to by the Tnlmnal, held in Deputy Commissioner of A gricu/tura/ Income-tax and Sales-tax, Trivandrum v. A.V. Thomas & Co.(') that the word 'outside sale' in Art. 286(1)(a) bad no reference exclusively to the transfer of the property in the goods according to the provisions of the Sales of Goods Act, and therefore. that Explanation 2 to s. 2(j) was not violative of Art. 286(l)(a) and that if at the moment when the property passed, it r.ot being very relevant where the property passed, the goods were in the State of Travancore-Cochin, then it was not an \"outside\" sale quoad Travancore Cochin and could be subjected to salestax by that State. Before the learned Judges a decision of thi~ Court in India Copper Corporation limited v. State of Bihar.(') was however relied on as leading to a different result but the learned Judges held that the decision of this Court could be distinguished on the facts and they held that their previous deci: sion reported in A.V. Thomas's case(') was still good law and entirely covered the point raised.\n\nThe question for consideration in the appeal is the correctness of the view expressed by the High Court. The decision in Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sa/estax, Trivandrum v. A. V. Thomas & Co.(') was brought before this Court on appeal and has been reversed <See A. V. Thomas & Co. Lid. v. Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales-tax, Trivandruni('). In so doing this Court pointed\n\n\nMalayfl/am PlanlatioMLttl.\n\nTll<Deputy Oommi4Biomt o/\n\n.Agricu/lural 1-.ta.:alld\n\nBakaT...,\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\nMalayalam Planlali<>n• Lkl.\n\nTkeDepuly Oommia&iomr of Agricultuml Jncome.la3; and\n\ni:Jak4 p..,,\n\nAgyangar, J.\n\nout that the decision of this Court in the Indian Copper Corpormion case(') had settled the Jaw by laying down that the State (other than a \"delivery-cum-consumption\" State) which could tax a 'non-explanation sale' (to adopt the phraseology used in these cases to identify a sale falling outside the explanation to Art. 286(l)(a)) could only be that State in which the property in the goods passes. Now, as regards the facts, there is no distinction between the facts in the A. V. Thomas's case(') and the case now under appeal and, indeed, the learned Judges of the High Court have proceeded on that basis. Dealing with the question as to what is an \"outside\" sale Kapur, J. speaking for the Court said in the case of A. V. Thomas & Co.(') Ltd.: -\n\n\"It has been found and it has not been disputed that the title to the goods in the present case passed at Fort Cochin ............ the question is whether the sale was 'outside sale' or 'inside sale' as the expressions have been compendiously used in various judgments to indicate sales taking place within a State or without it. The Explanation to Art. 2860)-\n\n(a) . .. .. . .. .. .. . . . explains what a sale outside the State is . .. .. . . . . . . . where the Explanation applies the difficulty about the situs is resolved but in a case like the present one the difficulty still remains because the Explanation does not operate in the sense that the rival States claiming to tax the same taxable event are not the States of delivery for consumption in that State and those where the title in the goods passes.\" After referring to the decision in the India Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar (') the Court held that the sale in the case before them was an \"outside\" sale quoad Travancore- Cochin, because the title passed at Fort Cochin in the State of Madras. On this reasoning this Court reversed the decision in the case of the High Court and held that the sale there in question being an \"outside\" sale was not taxable by reason of the prohibition contained in Art 286(l)(a).\n\nDealing with the connotation of the expression 'outside' in Art. 286(1)(a) this Court had observed, in India Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar.(') :-\n\n\"If a single State was designed to have the power to tax any particular transaction of sale, the question that next falls to be considered is the determination of that State in regard to which it could be predicated that the sale in question was not 'outside' that State or in other words, the determinati!Jn of the\n\nparticular State in regard to which it could be said that the sale was 'inside' that State. The key to the problem is afforded by two indications in the Article itself: (l) the opening words of Article 286(1) which speak of a sale or purchase taking place and (2) the non-obstante clause in the Explanation which refers to the general law relating to 'sale of goods under which property in the goods has, by reason of such sale or purchase, passed in another State'. These two together indicate that it is the passing of property within the State that is intended to be fastened on, for the purpose of determining, whether the sale in question is 'inside' or 'outside' the State, and therefore subject to the operation of the 'Explanation' that State in which property passes would be the only State which would have the power to levy a tax on the sale. As was explained in the recent decision of this Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer.\" It was the principle of law laid down in this passage that was given effect to by this Court in A. V. Thomas's case(') and it was on this basis that the appeal was allowed. It would therefore ifollow that the present appeals which are wholly dependent on the correctness of the meaning of the expression 'outside sales' in Art. 286(1)(a) which High Court adopted in A. V. Thomas's case have necessarily to be allowed.\n\nLearned Counsel for the respondent-State, however, urged that in the present case a point had been raised before the High Court as to whether on the facts the property in the goods sold by auction conducted at Fort Cochin really passed at Fort Cochin in the Madras State or whether it passed in Willingdon island in Travancore-Cochin when the goods were actually delivered to the buyer. As regards this question of fact or of mixed fact and law the position is this. The Sales Tax Appellate Tnlmnal recorded a finding on this matter in these terms:\n\n\"The question whether the sales took place outside the\n\nState or not will have to be decided on the basis of the general Jaw relating to sale of goods. We hold that in the case of auction sales of full lots the sales were of ascertained goods and henc~ became complete on the fall of the hammer and that the sales took place within the Madras State.\"\n\nIn the revision application which the department filed to the High Court this question whether the property in the goods\n\nMalayalam Planllllionl Ltl.\n\n•• Pit< Dtpvtg Commisrimw of\n\nAgricoltuml Income-tax and\n\nSalu Ta:t\n\n196l\n\n.Malayalam .Planratiom Lid.\n\nThe Deptdy Oommissiontr of Agricultural\n\nIncome-tax and Sales Tax\n\n., Agya11gar, J.\n\nf,/w.Ji, J.\n\ndid pass at Fort Cochin was raised but nevertheless the argument before the High Court proceeded wholly on the basis. of the correctness of the finding by the Appellate Tribunal that the property in the teas did pass on the fall of the hammer at Fort Cochin. The point about the property not having passed in the Madras State does not appear to have been even argued before the High Court. Even in the statement of the case filed by the respondent it is not stated that this point about the property not having passed at Fort Cochin in Madras was urged before the High Court during the course of the argument. Before concluding it might be mentioned that in A. V. Thomas's case\n\nisupra) where, as we have stated earlier, the nature of the transaction was identical with the one in the appeals before us this Court observed: -\n\n\"It has been found and it has not been disputed that the title to the goods in the present case passed at Fort Cochin.\"\n\nIn these circumstances, we declined to pennit learned Counsel for the respondent to urge any ground relating to the property in the goods in the teas sold not having passed in Fort Cochin in the Madras State to be raised, as the point which is not one of pure law was not urged before the learned Judges of the High Court.\n\nThe appeals are, therefore, allowed and the order of the High Court reversed and that of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal restored. The appellant will have his costs here and in the High Court-one hearing fee.\n\nSHAH. J.-If the question raised in these appeals were res integra, I would hold that the price obtained at auction sales of tea held at Fort Cochin when the goods were lying in war~ houses in the Travancore-Cochin State was liable to be taxed under the General Sales Tax Act 01 of 1125 M.E.), for in my view Art. 286(!)(a) Explanation, before it was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, did not altogether exclude the doctrine of territorial nexus in its application to salestax legislation. It is settled law in this Court that tonder the Government of India Act, 1935, the Provincial Legislatures could, relying upon the territorial nexus, levy sales-tax upon transactions of sale, not wholly completed within their territory. fixing upon one or more ingredients of a sale furnishing a territorial connection with the taxing Province: Poppat Lal Shah v. The State of Madras(') and The Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar ('). By the Constitution certain restrictions were placed upon the power of the States\n\n(') [1953] S.C.R. 677.\n\n(') [1958] S.C.R. 1356.\n\n7 S.C.R\n\nSUPRE.11E COURT REPORTS 399\n\nlo legislate in respect of taxes on sales and purchases. By Art. 286(l)(a) read with the Explanation, an Explanation sale i.e. a sale in which goods sold were actually delivered in a State for the purpose of consumption in that State was made taxable only by the State in which the goods were delivered for consumption. But Art. 286 was, in my view, not intended to exclude the operation of the doctrine of territorial nexus in the field not covered by the legislative prohibitions. In dealing with the effect of s. 33 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act which in- -corporated the prohibitions imposed by Art. 286( I) & m.\n\nwith the concurrence of S. K. Das J., it was observed by me in Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and .others(') at p. 293: -\n\n• \" x x x by enacting that a tax shall not be imposed under the Act when the sale takes place outside the State of Bihar x x,\n\n\"Only the power to tax \"Explanation sales\"' which do not take place within the State of Bihar is taken away, but not the power to tax \"non-Explanation sales\" in which though under the general law of sale of goods the property passes outside the State, there exists between the taxing power of the State and the sale a nexus as contemplated by the definition of sale in s. 2(g). If the sale is one in which the goods have been delivered outside the State of, Bihar, but not as a direct result of the sale or not for the purpose of consumption in the State Of\n\nfirst delivery, the sale will not be covered by the Explanation, and the right to tax the sale, if arising otherwise under the Act relying upon the territorial nexus, will not be impaired by the prohibition imposed by cl. (l)(a)(i) of s. 33.\"\n\nIt may be mentioned thats. 33 of the Bihar Sales Tax At was enacted to give effect expressly to the legislative restrictions imposed by Art. 286 of the Constitution. In Indian Copper Corporation Ltd.'s case(') certain transactions of sale were effected by the assessee after the promulgation of the Constitution, under which the property in the goods passed in the\n\nState of Bihar but delivery was effected outside the State of Bihar for consumption also outside Bihar. In some cf these transactions goods were delivered in the State of first destination for consumption therein whilst in others the goods were delivered not for consumption in the State of first delivery.\n\nThe assessee contended that both these categories of transactions were exempt from tax under Art. 286(1)(a) as they were\n\n\n196J\n\nMalayalam Plan.tatiOfl' Lid,\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural\n\nIncome-tax and Bale~ Taz\n\nShah, J.\n\nMalayalam Planlalions Lid.\n\nThe Deputy Commissi-0ner\n\nof AgricuJ, fural\n\nJn, come-ta.r and Sales Tax\n\nSlush, J.\n\n400 SUPREl\\fE COURT HEPORTS [1964]\n\noutside sales. This Court unanimously negatived the contention of the assessee in respect of sales in which delivery in the State of first destination was not for consumption therein, and the transactions were on that account not \"Explanation sales\".\n\nIt was held that the State of Bihar was competent to tax those \"Non-explanation sales\" in which the property in the goods had passed in the State of Bihar. But two \"different grounds were given in support of the conclusion in that case. My brethren Hidayatullah, Das Gupta and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ., were of the view that passing of property within the State alone was intended after the Constitution to be fastened upon for the purpose of determining whether the sale is inside or outside the State, and therefore subject to the operation of the Explanation that ;')tale in which the property passes would be the only State, which had the power to tax the sale. S. K.\n\nDas, J., and .I were of the view that sale transactions not falling within the constitutional prohibitions remained taxable because in adjudging whether a \"non-Explanation\" sale-transaction was \"outside the State\", the doctrine of territorial nexus could not be wholly excluded from consideration.\n\nIn a recent judgment of this Court in A.V. Thomas & Co.\n\nLtd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax ana\n\nSales-tax, T rivandrum(') this Court held in construing Art. 286(l)(a) in the light of the Explanation before that Article was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act. that:- I\n\n\"Where the Explanation to Article 286(l)(a) of the Constitution of India is inapplicable, it is the 'pas\" sing of property within the State' that is intended to be fastened on for the purpose of determining whether a sale is 'inside' or 'outside' the State.\n\nTherefore subject to the operation of the 'Explanation', that State in which the property in the goods passes would be. the only State which would have the power to levy a tax on the sale.\"\n\nIn A. V. Thomas & Co. Ltd.'s case(') chests of tea 'were stored in warehouses at Willingdon Island in the Travancore- Cochin State, but auctions of the tea chests were held at Fort Cochin which was at the material time within the State of Madras, and after the price was paid at Fort Cochin delivery orders were given to the purchasers addressed to the warehouse-keepers at Willingdon Island and actual delivery was given at the warehouses. The chests of tea were then sent from Willingdon Island for consumption in other parts .of India or were exported out of India. It was held, by the Court in that\n\nI. \\\n\n. . • .· .. _ .....\n\n. \"·.\n\n' . . . ~-\n\n'_ .,:;) -, , ' \\\n\n-.-,:i S.C.R;' 'suPREME COURT REPORTS __ 401 --·.\n\ncase tht the property in the goods pased .at Fort Cochin and as the goods were delivered not for the purpose of. C<?nsumption in any particular State, the sales were not ms1de the\n\nState of Travancore-Cochin but were outside that State and were not liable to be taxed under the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act (11 of 1125 ME). The Court observed that in sales which were not \"Explanation sales\" passing of property within the State was decisive of the liability to pay sales-tax. No opinion was expressed on the question whether the doctrine of territorial nexus as investing the State with the right to tax a. sale transaction outside the legislative restridions imposed by Art. 286, was, since the promulgaticin _of the Constitution,· rendered ineffective. As the fact which' give rise to this case are substantially the same as the facts on which\n\nA. V. Thomas & Co. Ltd.'s easel') was decided, the decision of the appeals must be in favour of the assessee:\n\nIt is'necessary to record this judgment, Jest it be assumed that I agree with the view that the doctrine of territorial nexus in its application to sales-tax legislation has. since the enactment of the Constitution, been completely abrogated. It may be pertinent to note that since the amendment of the Constitution by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, Art. 2860)-\n\n(a) (which remains unamended) is now free from the shackles of the Explanation which is deleted and by cl. (2) the Parliament is invested with power to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in cl. (I), namely, outside the State or in the course of the import of the goods into, \"or export of the goods out of, the territory of India. Exercising the power under cl. (2) the Parliament has enacted the Central Sales Tax Act (74 of 1956), and bys. 4(2) the doctrine of territoriaI nexus has been given legislative recognition, though in somewhat limited form. That sub-section provides: -\n\n\"A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place inside a State if the goods are within the- State-\n\n(a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time the contract of sale is made; and\n\n196l\n\nMalayalam PlawJations Lttl~\n\nThe Deyuty Commissioner of .Agricultural\n\nlncome-taJ: and SakaT<n\n\nShah, J.\n\n(b) in the case of unascertained or future goods, at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of the other party is prior or subsequent to such appropriation.\n\nExplanation.-Where there is a single contract of sak\n\nor purchase of goods situated at more places than (') [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 608.\n\nMa!ayalani Planlatiom Ltd.\n\nThe De,,, Wy Commissumer of .Agricultural\n\nincome-tax and Sales Tax\n\nShah, J.\n\none, the provisions of this sub-section shall apply as if there were separate contracts in respect of the goods at each uf such places.\"\n\nThe doctrine of territorial nexus had full play in sales-tax legislation under the Government of India Act, 1935: it also applies subject to certain modifications since the amendment of the Constitution by \\he Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act. And I am unable to persuade myself that by the enactment of Art. 286 of the Constitution, it stood abrogated in the interregnum between the promulgation of the Constitution and the amendment of Art. 286 by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 108, "entities": [{"text": "391\n\nMALAYALAM PLANTATIONS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MALAYALAM PLANTATIONS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL\n\nINCOME-TAX AND SALES TAX", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME-TAX AND SALES TAX", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 181, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 182, "end_char": 189, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 214, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S.M. SiKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 219, "end_char": 234, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 571, "end_char": 592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 671, "end_char": 710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1085, "end_char": 1102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal filed by the appellant was rejected bv the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the ground that the tea when sold was admittedly in godowns in the State of Travancore-Cochin and that consequently the sales must be deemed tc have taken place within tl:e State of Travancore-Cochin and hence liable to be included in the taxable turn-over."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1306, "end_char": 1334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When a further appeal was taken to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Fort Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1394, "end_char": 1405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was held that the property in the goods sold passed at Fort Cochin in Madras State on the fall of the hammer at the auction and hence the same was not taxable."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1409, "end_char": 1415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was held that the property in the goods sold passed at Fort Cochin in Madras State on the fall of the hammer at the auction and hence the same was not taxable."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cochin on the fall of the hammer at the auction."}}, {"text": "Travancore- Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2198, "end_char": 2216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The onlv question argued before this court was whetter a sale of tea effected by the appellant by auction at Fort Cochin in Madras State wa• a sale outside the State of Travancore- Cochin or inside it and whether the same was taxable or not. •"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2880, "end_char": 2893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point about the property not having passed in the Madras State was not argued before the High Court and was also not urged in the statement of case filed by respondent and hence the same was not allowed to be argued in the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2900, "end_char": 2904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Shah.", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "Madras State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2960, "end_char": 2972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. The property in the goods passed at Fort Cochin in Madras State and as the goods were delivered not for the purpose of consumption in any particular State, the sales were not inside Travancore-Cochin but were outside the\n\nMarch 20\n\nMalayalam Planfa."}}, {"text": "Malayalam Planfa.\n\ntions Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3141, "end_char": 3170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. The property in the goods passed at Fort Cochin in Madras State and as the goods were delivered not for the purpose of consumption in any particular State, the sales were not inside Travancore-Cochin but were outside the\n\nMarch 20\n\nMalayalam Planfa."}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3422, "end_char": 3467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3774, "end_char": 3782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4124, "end_char": 4129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Par Jiament has been given the power to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purcl:ase of goods takes place outside the State or in the course of the import of the goods into or export of the goods out of the territory of India."}}, {"text": "Parliament has enacted the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4168, "end_char": 4222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4230, "end_char": 4237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament has enacted the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Parliament has enacted the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 276", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4515, "end_char": 4534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5010, "end_char": 5019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, T. N. Ramachandra, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "T. N. Ramachandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5021, "end_char": 5038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, T. N. Ramachandra, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5040, "end_char": 5056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, T. N. Ramachandra, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "C.\n\nMathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5061, "end_char": 5071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5076, "end_char": 5091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Govinda Menon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5135, "end_char": 5148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Govinda Menon a.nd V. A. Seyid Muhammad, for the respondent (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5154, "end_char": 5174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Govinda Menon a.nd V. A. Seyid Muhammad, for the respondent (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "C. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5219, "end_char": 5231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the interveners (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5233, "end_char": 5245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the interveners (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5247, "end_char": 5261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the interveners (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. L.\n\nVohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5266, "end_char": 5278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. S. Pathak, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the interveners (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5357, "end_char": 5371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., WANCHOO, RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND SIKRI, JJ."}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5379, "end_char": 5386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., WANCHOO, RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND SIKRI, JJ."}}, {"text": "RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5388, "end_char": 5407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., WANCHOO, RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND SIKRI, JJ.", "canonical_name": "RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5412, "end_char": 5417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., WANCHOO, RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND SIKRI, JJ."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR J. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5440, "end_char": 5456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by AYYANGAR J. SHAH, J. ddivered a separate Opinion."}}, {"text": "Ayyanga", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5491, "end_char": 5498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyanga,, J.\n\nAVYANGAR, J.-The appellant owns several estates wherein inter alia le~ is grown and was assessed to sales-tax in respect of the tea sold by it during the years 1954-55 and 1955-56, by the Sales Tax Officer, First Circle, Quilon in the State of Travancore-Cochin by his order dated December 23.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "AVYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5505, "end_char": 5513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyanga,, J.\n\nAVYANGAR, J.-The appellant owns several estates wherein inter alia le~ is grown and was assessed to sales-tax in respect of the tea sold by it during the years 1954-55 and 1955-56, by the Sales Tax Officer, First Circle, Quilon in the State of Travancore-Cochin by his order dated December 23.", "canonical_name": "Agya11gar"}}, {"text": "December 23. 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5786, "end_char": 5803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyanga,, J.\n\nAVYANGAR, J.-The appellant owns several estates wherein inter alia le~ is grown and was assessed to sales-tax in respect of the tea sold by it during the years 1954-55 and 1955-56, by the Sales Tax Officer, First Circle, Quilon in the State of Travancore-Cochin by his order dated December 23."}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6231, "end_char": 6241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were sales \"outside\"\n\nthe Travancore-Cochin State and that consequently these sales were exempted from taxation by the State of Travancore-Cochin under Art. '"}}, {"text": "Willingdon Island", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6684, "end_char": 6701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal filed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner also failed, this authority holding that as the tea sold was, at the date of the auction, admittedly in godowns in Willingdon Island in the State of Travancore-Cochin, the sales must be deemed to ha.ve taken place within taxing State by virtue of a provision in the State Sales Tax Act to which we shall refer later and hence liable to be included in the taxable turnover."}}, {"text": "-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6728, "end_char": 6735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal filed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner also failed, this authority holding that as the tea sold was, at the date of the auction, admittedly in godowns in Willingdon Island in the State of Travancore-Cochin, the sales must be deemed to ha.ve taken place within taxing State by virtue of a provision in the State Sales Tax Act to which we shall refer later and hence liable to be included in the taxable turnover."}}, {"text": "State by virtue of a provision in the State Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6797, "end_char": 6854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8226, "end_char": 8231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8681, "end_char": 8746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9569, "end_char": 9574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Sale of Goods Act", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Sale of Goods Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9644, "end_char": 9655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Sale of Goods Act", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Sale of Goods Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10386, "end_char": 10393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10449, "end_char": 10466, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10704, "end_char": 10709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10892, "end_char": 10897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 2860", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10933, "end_char": 10942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Travancore Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11535, "end_char": 11552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts in relation to the transaction relating to the sale of the.tea and which the learned Judges of the High Court held not to be an \"outside\" sale may be stated in their own words: -\n\n\"The sales of teas were concluded at Fort Cochin and the goods were stocked in godowns situated in the\n\nTravancore Cochin State."}}, {"text": "Willingdon island", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11637, "end_char": 11654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deliveries of the goods were also made to the buyers from the godowns in Willingdon island in the Travancore Cochin State."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11914, "end_char": 11925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Travanc:ore-Cocbin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12377, "end_char": 12395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "learned Judges differed from the Tribunal was only as regards the effect of the circumstance that the tea sold, was at the point of sale, physically in godowns situated in the State of Travanc:ore-Cocbin."}}, {"text": "Tnlmnal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12879, "end_char": 12886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter came up before the High Court the position was, that that Court bad after a review of most of the earlier caSes which had been referred to by the Tnlmnal, held in Deputy Commissioner of A gricu/tura/ Income-tax and Sales-tax, Trivandrum v. A.V. Thomas & Co.(') that the word 'outside sale' in Art.", "canonical_name": "Tnlmnal"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13026, "end_char": 13040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13207, "end_char": 13214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13236, "end_char": 13250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A.V. Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13833, "end_char": 13844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was however relied on as leading to a different result but the learned Judges held that the decision of this Court could be distinguished on the facts and they held that their previous deci: sion reported in A.V. Thomas's case(') was still good law and entirely covered the point raised.", "canonical_name": "A. V. Thomas"}}, {"text": ".Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14430, "end_char": 14439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tll<Deputy Oommi4Biomt o/\n\n.Agricu/lural 1-.ta.:alld\n\nBakaT...,\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\nMalayalam Planlali<>n• Lkl.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "Agyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14542, "end_char": 14550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TkeDepuly Oommia&iomr of Agricultuml Jncome.la3; and\n\ni:Jak4 p..,,\n\nAgyangar, J.\n\nout that the decision of this Court in the Indian Copper Corpormion case(') had settled the Jaw by laying down that the State (other than a \"delivery-cum-consumption\" State) which could tax a 'non-explanation sale' (to adopt the phraseology used in these cases to identify a sale falling outside the explanation to Art.", "canonical_name": "Agya11gar"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14871, "end_char": 14885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. V. Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15031, "end_char": 15043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, as regards the facts, there is no distinction between the facts in the A. V. Thomas's case(') and the case now under appeal and, indeed, the learned Judges of the High Court have proceeded on that basis.", "canonical_name": "A. V. Thomas"}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the question as to what is an \"outside\" sale Kapur, J. speaking for the Court said in the case of A. V. Thomas & Co.(') Ltd.: -\n\n\"It has been found and it has not been disputed that the title to the goods in the present case passed at Fort Cochin ............ the question is whether the sale was 'outside sale' or 'inside sale' as the expressions have been compendiously used in various judgments to indicate sales taking place within a State or without it."}}, {"text": "Art. 2860", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15655, "end_char": 15664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16582, "end_char": 16595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16658, "end_char": 16672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17268, "end_char": 17282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18400, "end_char": 18414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tnlmnal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18987, "end_char": 18994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sales Tax Appellate Tnlmnal recorded a finding on this matter in these terms:\n\n\"The question whether the sales took place outside the\n\nState or not will have to be decided on the basis of the general Jaw relating to sale of goods.", "canonical_name": "Tnlmnal"}}, {"text": "Deptdy Oommissiontr of Agricultural\n\nIncome-tax and Sales Tax\n\n.,", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19657, "end_char": 19722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deptdy Oommissiontr of Agricultural\n\nIncome-tax and Sales Tax\n\n.,"}}, {"text": "Agya11gar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19723, "end_char": 19732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agya11gar, J.\n\nf,/w.", "canonical_name": "Agya11gar"}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21234, "end_char": 21238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH.", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(!)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21542, "end_char": 21556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "is settled law in this Court that tonder the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21743, "end_char": 21817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22423, "end_char": 22437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is settled law in this Court that tonder the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "It is settled law in this Court that tonder the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22687, "end_char": 22695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is settled law in this Court that tonder the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "It is settled law in this Court that tonder the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22876, "end_char": 22881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22959, "end_char": 22971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23002, "end_char": 23011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286( I) & m.\n\nwith the concurrence of S. K. Das J., it was observed by me in Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and .others(') at p. 293: -\n\n• \" x x x by enacting that a tax shall not be imposed under the Act when the sale takes place outside the State of Bihar x x,\n\n\"Only the power to tax \"Explanation sales\"' which do not take place within the State of Bihar is taken away, but not the power to tax \"non-Explanation sales\" in which though under the general law of sale of goods the property passes outside the State, there exists between the taxing power of the State and the sale a nexus as contemplated by the definition of sale in s. 2(g).", "canonical_name": "S. K.\n\nDas"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23088, "end_char": 23093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286( I) & m.\n\nwith the concurrence of S. K. Das J., it was observed by me in Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and .others(') at p. 293: -\n\n• \" x x x by enacting that a tax shall not be imposed under the Act when the sale takes place outside the State of Bihar x x,\n\n\"Only the power to tax \"Explanation sales\"' which do not take place within the State of Bihar is taken away, but not the power to tax \"non-Explanation sales\" in which though under the general law of sale of goods the property passes outside the State, there exists between the taxing power of the State and the sale a nexus as contemplated by the definition of sale in s. 2(g)."}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23619, "end_char": 23626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24044, "end_char": 24049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24189, "end_char": 24197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Copper Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24222, "end_char": 24252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Indian Copper Corporation Ltd.'s case(') certain transactions of sale were effected by the assessee after the promulgation of the Constitution, under which the property in the goods passed in the\n\nState of Bihar but delivery was effected outside the State of Bihar for consumption also outside Bihar."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24820, "end_char": 24834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25385, "end_char": 25399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held that the State of Bihar was competent to tax those \"Non-explanation sales\" in which the property in the goods had passed in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25613, "end_char": 25625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My brethren Hidayatullah, Das Gupta and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25627, "end_char": 25636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My brethren Hidayatullah, Das Gupta and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25641, "end_char": 25660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My brethren Hidayatullah, Das Gupta and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.,", "canonical_name": "RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "S. K.\n\nDas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26030, "end_char": 26040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K.\n\nDas, J., and .I were of the view that sale transactions not falling within the constitutional prohibitions remained taxable because in adjudging whether a \"non-Explanation\" sale-transaction was \"outside the State\", the doctrine of territorial nexus could not be wholly excluded from consideration.", "canonical_name": "S. K.\n\nDas"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26509, "end_char": 26523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26667, "end_char": 26684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26692, "end_char": 26713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. V. Thomas & Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27094, "end_char": 27117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A. V. Thomas & Co. Ltd.'s case(') chests of tea 'were stored in warehouses at Willingdon Island in the Travancore- Cochin State, but auctions of the tea chests were held at Fort Cochin which was at the material time within the State of Madras, and after the price was paid at Fort Cochin delivery orders were given to the purchasers addressed to the warehouse-keepers at Willingdon Island and actual delivery was given at the warehouses."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28494, "end_char": 28502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 2860", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29140, "end_char": 29149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29626, "end_char": 29647, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SakaT<n\n\nShah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30114, "end_char": 30127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That sub-section provides: -\n\n\"A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place inside a State if the goods are within the- State-\n\n(a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time the contract of sale is made; and\n\n196l\n\nMalayalam PlawJations Lttl~\n\nThe Deyuty Commissioner of .Agricultural\n\nlncome-taJ: and SakaT<n\n\nShah, J.\n\n(b) in the case of unascertained or future goods, at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of the other party is prior or subsequent to such appropriation."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31041, "end_char": 31049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The doctrine of territorial nexus had full play in sales-tax legislation under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The doctrine of territorial nexus had full play in sales-tax legislation under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31175, "end_char": 31183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The doctrine of territorial nexus had full play in sales-tax legislation under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The doctrine of territorial nexus had full play in sales-tax legislation under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_403_409_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "' .\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE'.IIE COURT REPOHTS 403\n\nRADHEY SHY AM SHARMA\n\nTHE POST MASTER GENERAL CENTRAL CIRCLE\n\nNAGPUR\n\n[P. B. GA, JENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.]\n\nFundamental Right-Postal employee taking part in a demonstration in furtherance of the strike-Ordinance prohibiting strikes in any postal, telegraph or telephone service-Constitutionality of-Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, No. 1 of 1960, ss. 3, 4 and 5--Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1)(a). J9(1)(b}.\n\nThe petitioner was serving as an officiating Teleprinter Supervisor at Jaipur when the employees of the Posts and Tele graphs Department went on strike from the midnight of July 11, 1960, throughout India and there was a similar strike at Jaipur. The petitioner's case was that he was on duty that day from 12 noon to B p.m. and aft€r his duty was over. he did not go home but went to the dormitory where he fell asleep as he was tired. On hearing some noise he woke up at 11-30 p.m. and wanted to go home but was arrested by the police under the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, No. 1 of 1960. The criminal charge was however withdrawn. On July 21, 1960, a charge. sheet was served on the petitioner in the following terms:\n\n\"That Shri Radhey Shyam Sharma I C/S Telegraphist,\n\nCTO Jaipur committed gross misconduct in that on the mitlnight of the 11th July, 1960. he took part in a demonstration in furtherance of the strike of the P. & T. Employees in violation of the orders dated 8-7-1960\n\nissued by the Government of India under the 'Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 (1 of 1960)' prohibiting strikes in any Postal, telegraph or telephone service''.\n\nThe enquiry officer found him guilty of the charge and ordered that his pay should be reduced in the time scale by three stages for a period of two years and on restoration the period of reduc~\n\ntion was not to operate to postpone his future increments. 0'1 appeal, the Director General considered the whole matter on merits and rejected the appeal. In this Court it was urged that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was violative of his fundamental rights under Arts. 19(l)(a) and (b), reliance being placed on t\\vo cases of this court in Ka1neshwar Prasad v. State\n\nof Bihar and 0. K. Ghosh v. E. X. Joseph; that .ss. 3, 4 and 5 of the Ordinance were ultra-vires, as they contravened Art. I9(])(a) and\n\n(b) and that in any case there was no evidence on which it could .- be found that the charge ai:ainst him had been proved . ..\n\nHeld: .The provisions of the Ordinance in ss. 3, 4 and 5 did not violate the fundamental rights enshrined in Art. 19(l)(a) and (b). A perusal of Art. 19(1) shows that there is no fundamental right to strike, and all that the ordinance provided was with respect to any illegal strike as provided in the Ordinance. There\n\nwas no provision in the Ordinance which in any way restricted those fundamental rights. It was not <in dispute that P:irliament had the competence to make a law in the terms of the Ordinance and therefore the President had also the power to promulgate such an Ordinance. ·\n\n19G4\n\n!-larch 23\n\n1164.\n\nRadhey BAyam\n\nSloarma\n\nThe P08tmaater General Central Circle. N01Jpur\n\nTe competence of the legislature therefore being not in dispute 1t cannot be held that the Ordinance violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(a) and (b).\n\n. A!! India Bank EmployeetAssociation v. National Industrial Tribunal, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 269, referred to.\n\nThe two cases relied on by the petitioner have no relevance in connection with the charge in the present case. The punishment given to the petitioner cannot therefore be set aside on the ground that the charge was in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(a) and (b).\n\nKameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369 and 0. K. Ghosh v. E. X. Joseph, [1963] Supp. l S.C.R. 789, held inapplicable. If on the undisputed facts the authorities came to the ronclusion that the petitioner acted in furtherance of the strike which was to commence half an hour later and was thus guilty of gross misconduct, it could not be said that there was no evidence on which the authorities concerned could find the charge framed against the petititoner proved.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 208 of 1963- Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nB. D. Sharma, for the petitioner.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, S. P. Varma and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 23, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is a petition under Art. 32 of thte Constitution. The petitioner was appointed as a Telegraphist by the Post Master General Nagpur in 1949. In July 1960, he was serving as an officiating Teleprinter Supervisor at Jaipur. The employees of the Posts aµd Telegraphs Department (hereinafter referred to as the Department) went on strike from the midnight of July I I, 1960 throughout India and there was a similar strike at Jaipur. The petitioner was on duty on that day from\n\nI 2 noon to 8 p.m. He says that after his duty was over, he did not go home but went to the dormitory where he fell asleep as he was tired. At about 11-30 p.m. he woke up on hearing some noise and discovered tha.t it was very late and then he wanted to go home. But as he came out, he was arrested by the police on the ground that he was also one of the demonstrators, who were, demonstrating outside in connection with the strike. The arrest was made under the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, No. 1 of 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance).\n\nOn July 13, the petitioner was suspended on the ground that a criminal charge was pending against him in a criminal court.\n\nHowever the criminal charge was withdrawn on July 18, 1960.\n\nOn July '21, 1960, a charge-sheet was served on the petitioner in the full owing terms: -\n\nRadhey Skyam\n\nSllMma\n\nv. ' \"That Shri Radhey Sh yam Sharma I CI S Telegraphist, CTO Jaipur committed gross misconduct in that on the midnight of ihe I Ith July 1960, he took part in a demonstration in flJ!thranc_e of the strike of the P. & T. Employees m v10lauon of the orders dated 8-7-1960 issued by the Government of India under the \"Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 (I of 1960)\" prohibiting strike in any postal, telegraph or telephone Service.\"\n\nThe Postmaster General Central Cirde, Nagpur\n\nAn inquiry was made in the matter by the Post Master General, Central Services Nagpur to whom it was transferred _as the petitioner had been appointed by that officer. The enqmry officer found the petitioner guilty of the charge framed against him and thereupon a notice was issued to him to show cause why the penalty of reduction in the time scale by three stages for a period of two years affecting the future increments be not imposed upon him. Thereafter the Post Master General after taking into account the explanation submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice ordered that the pay of the petitioner should be reduced in the lime scale by three stages for a period of two years and on restoration the period of reduction was not to operate to postpone his future increments. Thereupon the petitioner filed an appeal to the Director General, Posts and Telegraphs. The Director General directed further evidence to be taken on certain lines before deciding the appeal.\n\nHowever, no further evidence was given on behalf of the Department and the matter was re-submitted to the Director General as it was Finally, the Director General considered thewhole matter on the merits and rejected the appeal.\n\nThe present petition is a sequetto the order of the Director General, and the petitioner contends that the punishment imposed upon him is violative of his fundamental rights under Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19 (I) (b) and should be quashed. Reliance is placed on his behalf on two cases of this Court in Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar,(') and 0. K. Ghosh v. E. X. Joseph(').\n\nFurther it is contended that ss. 3, 4 and 5 of the Ordinance are ultra vires, as they contravene sub-clauses .(a) and (b) of Art. 19 (!). Lastly, it is urged that in any case there was no evidence on which it could be found that the charge against the petitioner had been proved.\n\nWamkoo, J.\n\nRadhey Shyam\n\n/3karma ... ' The Po!ttaaster Ge1ural Central Circle, N <, lgpUr\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nThe petition has been opposed on behalf of the Union of India and it is urged that the Ordinance is perfectly constitutional and does not violate any fundamental rights. It is further urged that the two cases relied upon by the petitioner are of no assistance fo him, as they were concerned with R.4-A and Rule 4-B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, l 955.\n\nLastly it is urged that there was evidence on which the autho . rities concerned could find the charge proved against the petitioner.\n\nThe first question that arises is whether ss. 3, 4 and 5 of the Ordinance are violative of any fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The Ordinance as its name shows was passed in order that essential services may be maintained.\n\nIts netessity had arisen because of a threat of strike inter alia by the employees of the Departmentt. Among 'Essential Service\" as defined in s. 2 (I) is included the postal, telegraph or telephone service. Section 3 of the Ordinance provides that \"if the Central Government is satisfied that in the public interest it is necessary or expedient so to do, it may, by general or special order, prohibit strikes in any essential service specified in the Order\". Further upon the issue of such an order no person employed in any essential service to which the order relates shall go or remain on strike; and any strike declared or commenced, whether before or after the issue of the order. by persons employed in any such service, shall be illegal. Section 4 provides that any person who commences a strike which is illegal under the Ordinance or goes or remains on or otherwise takes part in, any such strike shall be punished with imprisonment. Section 5 provides that any person who instigates, or incites other persons to take part in, or otherwise acts in furtherance of, a strike which is illegal unlier the Ordinance shall be punishable with imprisonment.\n\nThe constitutionality of these sections is attacked on the ground that they violate.the fundamental rights guaranteed by els. (a) and (b) of Art. 19 (!). Under cl. (I) (a) all citizens have the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression and under cl. (!) (bl to assemble peaceably and without arms. Reasonable restrictions on these fundamental rights can be placed under the conditions provided in els. (2) and (3) of Art. 19. We are of opinion that there is no force in the contentiton tli!at these provisions of the Ordinance violate the fundamental rights enshrined in sub-els. (a) and (b) of Art. 19(1). A perusal of Art. 19(1) shows that there is no fundamental right to strike. and all that the Ordinance provides is with respect to any illegal strike as provided in the Ordinance. This aspect has been elaborately discussed in the Bank Employees' case(') and it has been held that there is no fundamental right to strike\n\n\n\\ 407\n\n1964 (see All India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal(')). There is no provision in the Ordinanc which in any way restricts freedom of speech and expression, nor is there any provision therein which restricts any one from assembling peaceably and without arms. The Ordinance .thus has nothing to do with restricting the fundamental nghts enshrined in sub-els. (a) and (b) of Art. 19(1), and there 1s therefore no necessity of even considering whether the provisions of the Ordinance can be justified under els. (2) and\n\nR.aMyShyam\n\n•· The Po•lm.uler ··- General Central Circle, Nagpur\n\n1 (3) of Art. 19. It is not disputed that Parliament had the com·\n\npetence to make a law in the terms of the Ordinance and therefore the President had also the power to promulgate such an Ordinance. The competence of the legislature therefore being not in dispute we fail to see how the Ordinance can violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-els . (a) and (b) of Art. 19(1) for there is no provision in it which in any way restricts those fundamental rights.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner in this connection relies on two cases of thi.s Court to which reference has already been made. Kameshwar Prasad's case.(') related to R. 4'A of the Bihar Government Servants' Conduct Rules. 1956, which provided that no government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of strike in connection with any ma.tter pertaining to his conditions of service. This Court held in that case that R.4-A insofar as it prohibited any form of demonstration, be it however innocent or however incapable of causing a breach of public tranquility was violative of Arts. 19(1) (a) and 19(1) (b) of the Constitution. This Court also held that insofar as that rule prohibited a strike it was good. since there was no fundamental right to resort to strike. In 0. K. Ghosh' s case(') this Court was concerned with r. 4-A and r. 4-B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, and following the decision in Kameshwar Prasad's case('). 4-A was struck down in part so far as it related to demonstrations and r. 4-B was also held to be invalid. That case did not deal with the Ordinance at all and the charge in that case did not seem to have been in the same terms as the charge in the present case. No argument appears to have been urged either in the High Court or before this Court about the validity of the Ordinance or about the validity of the impugned order in rela(\\on to the. Ordinance or the illegal character of the strike. In the circumstances that case is also of no assistance to the petitioner and there was n?thing decided .ere which would in any way' affect the validity of the prov1S1ons of the Ordinance. We are therefore of opmion that the Ordinance is valid.\n\nWan.c/Joo, J.\n\nRadh•y Shyam\n\nSharme.\n\nThe Pwtmaster General Gentra~ Circle, Nagpur\n\nWanclwo, J.\n\nWe have already set out the charge framed against the petitioner. It will be seen that the charge is based entirely on the Ordinance and has no connection with rr. 4-A and 4-B which were considered in the Q.K. Glwsh's case('). The petitioner is charged with gross misconduct on the ground that on the midnight of July 11, 1960, he took part in a demonstration in furtherance of the strike of the employees of the Department in violation of the order of July 8, 1960. It is not disputed that on July 8, 1960, the Central Government had issued an order under s. 3 of the Ordinance prohibiting any strike in the Department. The strike therefore that started on the midnight of July 11, 1960 was an illegal strike in view of s. 3 (4)(b) of the Ordinance. Section 5 of the Ordinance provides inter a/ia that any person who acts in furtherance of a strike which is illegal is punishable thereunder.\n\nThe charge against the petitioner was that he had acted in furtherance of the strike which was to commence on the. midnight of July II, 1960 and was therefore guilty of gross misconduct. It is this charge of gross misconduct which has been found to be proved against the petitioner and which has led to the punishment inflicted on him. This charge as already indicated has nothing to do with r. 4-A and r. 4-B and therefore the two cases on which the petitioner relies have no relevance in connection with this charge. The punishment given to t.he petitioner cannot therefore be set aside on the ground that the. charge was in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-els. (a) and (b) of Art. 19(1), which deal wit!). freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. The charge does not deal with these two matters at all. On the other hand it deals with acting in furtherance of the illegal strike which started on the midnight of July 11, 1960, and the petitioner was charged with gross misconduct inasmuch as he acted in furtherance of the illegal strike on July 11, 1960 after the strike had been prohibited by the Central Government by order dated July 8, 1962. Whether the \"acting\" in furtherance of the strike took the form of speeches or demonstrations would make no difference. In either case it can be said that there is a violation of Art. 19 (!) (a).\n\nThe only question that remains for consideration therefore is whether the petitioner's contention that there was no evidence at all on which the authorities concerned could find the petitioner guilty of the charge is correct. So far as that is concerned, the authorities had the following undisputed facts before them: -\n\n(!) The petitioner \"was the Secretary of the local union of the employees of the Department; .\n\n(') [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 789.\n\n(2) On that day the petitioner's duty finished at ,8 p.m. and he should have normally gone home; but he stayed on in the dormitory till 11-30 p.m. which was just half an hour 'before the strike was to commence;\n\n(3) The d.emonstration was held in connection with the strike by the employees of the Department at 11-30 p.m. just half an hour before the strike was to commence;\n\n(4) The petitioner took part in that demonstration and was actually arrested amongst the demonstrators. If on these undisputed facts the authorities came to the conclusion that the petitioner acted in furtherance of the strike which was to commence half an hour later and was thus guilty of gross misconduct it cannot in our opinion be said that there was no evidence on which the authorities concerned could find the charge framed against the petitioner proved.\n\nThe contention therefore that there was no evidence on which the authorities concerned could find the charge proved must fail.\n\nWe therefore dismiss the petition. In the circumstances of this case we pass no order as to costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nRadlV'y ST.ya,.\n\nThe Postma8ter Gcnlral Central\n\nCircle, N(;.gpur\n\nWanchoo, J.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "THE POST MASTER GENERAL CENTRAL CIRCLE\n\nNAGPUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE POST MASTER GENERAL CENTRAL CIRCLE NAGPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 216, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. 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Employees in violation of the orders dated 8-7-1960\n\nissued by the Government of India under the 'Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 (1 of 1960)' prohibiting strikes in any Postal, telegraph or telephone service''."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1550, "end_char": 1569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he took part in a demonstration in furtherance of the strike of the P. & T. 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D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4455, "end_char": 4467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, S. P. Varma and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4533, "end_char": 4544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, S. P. Varma and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4549, "end_char": 4561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, S. P. Varma and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4644, "end_char": 4651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is a petition under Art.", "canonical_name": "Wanchoo"}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is a petition under Art.", "canonical_name": "Wanchoo"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4694, "end_char": 4701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July 13,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5714, "end_char": 5722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 13, the petitioner was suspended on the ground that a criminal charge was pending against him in a criminal court."}}, {"text": "July 18, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5880, "end_char": 5893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However the criminal charge was withdrawn on July 18, 1960."}}, {"text": "July '21, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5899, "end_char": 5913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July '21, 1960, a charge-sheet was served on the petitioner in the full owing terms: -\n\nRadhey Skyam\n\nSllMma\n\nv. ' \"That Shri Radhey Sh yam Sharma I CI S Telegraphist, CTO Jaipur committed gross misconduct in that on the midnight of ihe I Ith July 1960, he took part in a demonstration in flJ!thranc_e of the strike of the P. & T. Employees m v10lauon of the orders dated 8-7-1960 issued by the Government of India under the \"Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 (I of 1960)\" prohibiting strike in any postal, telegraph or telephone Service.\""}}, {"text": "Radhey Skyam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5987, "end_char": 5999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July '21, 1960, a charge-sheet was served on the petitioner in the full owing terms: -\n\nRadhey Skyam\n\nSllMma\n\nv. ' \"That Shri Radhey Sh yam Sharma I CI S Telegraphist, CTO Jaipur committed gross misconduct in that on the midnight of ihe I Ith July 1960, he took part in a demonstration in flJ!thranc_e of the strike of the P. & T. Employees m v10lauon of the orders dated 8-7-1960 issued by the Government of India under the \"Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 (I of 1960)\" prohibiting strike in any postal, telegraph or telephone Service.\"", "canonical_name": "Radhey Sh yam Sharma"}}, {"text": "Radhey Sh yam Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6025, "end_char": 6045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July '21, 1960, a charge-sheet was served on the petitioner in the full owing terms: -\n\nRadhey Skyam\n\nSllMma\n\nv. ' \"That Shri Radhey Sh yam Sharma I CI S Telegraphist, CTO Jaipur committed gross misconduct in that on the midnight of ihe I Ith July 1960, he took part in a demonstration in flJ!thranc_e of the strike of the P. & T. Employees m v10lauon of the orders dated 8-7-1960 issued by the Government of India under the \"Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 (I of 1960)\" prohibiting strike in any postal, telegraph or telephone Service.\"", "canonical_name": "Radhey Sh yam Sharma"}}, {"text": "Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6325, "end_char": 6371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Services Nagpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Postmaster General Central Cirde, Nagpur\n\nAn inquiry was made in the matter by the Post Master General, Central Services Nagpur to whom it was transferred _as the petitioner had been appointed by that officer."}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7895, "end_char": 7916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8116, "end_char": 8130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8212, "end_char": 8219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Wamkoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8368, "end_char": 8374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wamkoo, J.\n\nRadhey Shyam\n\n/3karma ... ' The Po!ttaaster Ge1ural Central Circle, N <, lgpUr\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nThe petition has been opposed on behalf of the Union of India and it is urged that the Ordinance is perfectly constitutional and does not violate any fundamental rights."}}, {"text": "Radhey Shyam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8380, "end_char": 8392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wamkoo, J.\n\nRadhey Shyam\n\n/3karma ... ' The Po!ttaaster Ge1ural Central Circle, N <, lgpUr\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nThe petition has been opposed on behalf of the Union of India and it is urged that the Ordinance is perfectly constitutional and does not violate any fundamental rights.", "canonical_name": "Radhey Sh yam Sharma"}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9020, "end_char": 9034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9362, "end_char": 9366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9476, "end_char": 9494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3 of the Ordinance provides that \"if the Central Government is satisfied that in the public interest it is necessary or expedient so to do, it may, by general or special order, prohibit strikes in any essential service specified in the Order\"."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9965, "end_char": 9974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10163, "end_char": 10172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10521, "end_char": 10528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10809, "end_char": 10816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10987, "end_char": 10997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11012, "end_char": 11022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11729, "end_char": 11739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11949, "end_char": 11956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11982, "end_char": 11992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that Parliament had the com·\n\npetence to make a law in the terms of the Ordinance and therefore the President had also the power to promulgate such an Ordinance."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12314, "end_char": 12324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kameshwar Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12542, "end_char": 12558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kameshwar Prasad's case.(')"}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13023, "end_char": 13034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ". K. Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13216, "end_char": 13226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 0."}}, {"text": "Pwtmaster General Gentra~ Circle, Nagpur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14183, "end_char": 14223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Pwtmaster General Gentra~ Circle, Nagpur\n\nWanclwo, J.\n\nWe have already set out the charge framed against the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Wanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14225, "end_char": 14232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Pwtmaster General Gentra~ Circle, Nagpur\n\nWanclwo, J.\n\nWe have already set out the charge framed against the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Q.K. Glwsh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14443, "end_char": 14453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4-A and 4-B which were considered in the Q.K. Glwsh's case(')."}}, {"text": "July 8, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14691, "end_char": 14703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner is charged with gross misconduct on the ground that on the midnight of July 11, 1960, he took part in a demonstration in furtherance of the strike of the employees of the Department in violation of the order of July 8, 1960."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14795, "end_char": 14799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14959, "end_char": 14963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14989, "end_char": 14998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July II, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15259, "end_char": 15272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "midnight of July II, 1960 and was therefore guilty of gross misconduct."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15836, "end_char": 15846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July 8, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16339, "end_char": 16351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand it deals with acting in furtherance of the illegal strike which started on the midnight of July 11, 1960, and the petitioner was charged with gross misconduct inasmuch as he acted in furtherance of the illegal strike on July 11, 1960 after the strike had been prohibited by the Central Government by order dated July 8, 1962."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16532, "end_char": 16539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "RadlV'y", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18090, "end_char": 18097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RadlV'y ST.ya,."}}, {"text": "Postma8ter Gcnlral Central\n\nCircle, N(;.gpur\n\nWanchoo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18111, "end_char": 18164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Postma8ter Gcnlral Central\n\nCircle, N(;.gpur\n\nWanchoo, J."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_410_418_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "410 SUPREl\\'IE COURT REPORTS\n\nKANUMUKKALA KRISHNA MURTHY\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n[1964}\n\n[K. SOBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.J ~\n\nIndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 415, 419-Cheating -Public Service Commission, false representations to-If deception of Government.\n\nThe appellant applied for a post advertised by the Madras Public Service Commission, making certain representations in his application which were found to be false. He was convicted under s. 419 Indian Penal Code for having cheated the commission. This conviction was confirmed by the Sessions Judge and the revision was dismissed by the High Court. ' Held: (i) Cheating can be committed in either of the two ways described in s. 415 Indian Penal Code. 'Deceiving a person' is. common in both the ways of cheating.\n\n(ii) The appellant's misrepresentation to the Service Commission continued and persisted till the final stage of the Government itself was deceived by the misrepresentation made in the application presented to the Service commission.\n\n The Service Commission is a statutory adviser to the Government in the matter of appointment to the Service. DecePtion of such an adviser is deception of the Government which is expected to pay heed to its advice and act accordingly.\n\nState of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivasta'IJa [1958J S.C.R. 533, The Crown v. Gunput, 1868 Pun, i. Rec. Cr!. Case No. 6, P. E.\n\nBillinghurst v. H. P. Blackburn, 27 C.W.N. 821; Legal Remembrancer v. Manmatha Bhusan Chatterjee, & Legal Remembrancer v. Hridoy Narian I.L.R. 51 Cal. 250, Emperor v. Faza!\n\nDin (1906) 4 Cr. L.J. 355, Queen Empress v. Appasami, I.L.R. lZ\n\n~/lad. 151. As/:iwani Kumar Gupta v. Emperor. I.L.R. 1937 (1) Cal. ?l and In re: Hampshire Land Company, [1896] (2) Ch. 743. referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1,34 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 17, 1962 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 298 of 1961.\n\nA. S. R. Chari, G.D. Gupta, S. Balakrishnan, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant.\n\nS. G. Patwardhan and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 23, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The facts leading to this appeal. by special leave, are these: The Madras Public Service Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Service Commission, by its notification published\n\nin the Fort St. George Gazette dated August 3, 1948, invited applications for appointment of Assistant Surgeons in the Madras Medical Service (Men's Section), from persons who had rendered temporary service as Assistant Surgeons in that Ser- vice at any time between September 3, 1939 and December 31, 1947 and from persons who had rendered War Service and possessed the qualifications mentioned in paragraph 3 of the notification. Paragraph 3 of the notification, inter alia, reads:\n\n\"Applicants must satisfy the Commission-\n\n(a) that they are registered practitioners within the meaning of the Madras Medical Registration Act, 1914;\n\n(b) that they possess the L.M.S. degree or the M.B., . B.S., degree of a University in the Province or an equivalent qualification.\"\n\nThe appellant, who was at the time serving as a Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Madras Medical Service on a temporary basis, applied for the permanent appointment to the posts notified by the Public Service Commission. In this application he made the following representations, which have been found to be false, by the Courts below :\n\n(i) that his name was Kaza Krishnamurthy;\n\n(ii) that his place of birth was Bezwada, Krishna district;\n\n(iii) that his father was K. R. Rao of Bezwada; and\n\n(iv) that he held the degree of M.B., B.S., TI Class, from the Andhra Medical College, Vizagapatam, Andhra University.\n\nOn these facts, the appellant was convicted of the offence under s. 419 I.P.C. for having cheated the Madras Public Service Commission by personating as Kaza Krishnamurthy and misrepresenting that he had the necessary qualifications for the post advertised inasmuch as he held the degree of M.B., B.S.,\n\nand that this deception of the Service Commission was likely to have caused damage to its reputation.\n\nIt may now be mentioned that the appellant was also tr, ied for offences under s. 420 and s. 465 I.P.C. in connection with certain acts committed by him in June and October, 1944. The trial Court acquitted him of the offence under s. 465, but convicted him of the other offence. He was, however; acquitted on appeal, by the Sessions Judge, of the offence under s. 420 I.P.C.\n\nThe appellant's conviction under s. 419 I.P.C. was confirmed by the Sessions Judge and the revision against that\n\nKanu.m11kkala Krishna Murthy\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradtsh\n\nRayhubar Dayal, J,\n\nKanumUJ:ala Kriahna Murlhy\n\nSUPRE1\\1E COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\norder was dismissed by the High Court. It is against this order of the High Court that the appellant has preferred this appeal, after obtaining special leave. v.\n\nSiok of A71dlwa It has been contended for the appellant that on the facts Praduh estabtished in the case, no offence under s. 419 l.P.C. is made llagkobar Dayal, J. out against him, as the appellant's efficiency as a surgeon is not in dispute, he having secured good reports from his superiors during the period of his service and as therefore there could be no question of the Service Commission suffering damage in its reputation.\n\nOn the contrary, it is urged for the State that the offence of cheating is made out against the appellant as he deceived the Service Commission and that such deception was likely to damage its reputation as he deceived the Service Commission and obtained from it 'property' viz., the admission card entitling him to sit at the Competitive Examination for the appointment of candidates for these posts, and as the appellant also deceived the Government of the State by his false representations. and dishonestly induced it to appoint him in service and pay him salary during the period of his service.\n\nSection 415 I.P.C., defines 'cheating' and reads:\n\n\"Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'.\n\nExplanation-A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section\".\n\nCheating can be committed in either of the two ways described in s. 415 l.P.C. 'Deceiving a person' is common in both the ways of cheating. A person deceived may be fraudulently or dishonestly induced to deliver any property or to consent to the retention of any property by any person. The person deceived may also be intentionally induced to do or to omit to do. anything which he would not have done if not deceived and which act of his caused or was likely to cause damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property.\n\nThe Courts below, as already stated, found that the appellant cheated the Service Commission by deceiving that he held the degree of M.B., B.S. and by intentionally inducing the\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREIIIE COURT REPORTS 413\n\nCommission to recommend his appointment to the post of Civil 1964 Assistant Surgeon, 11 Class, and that this act of the Service Kanumukkala Commission was likely to damage its reputation as the appel- Kri•h•• Mu..U.y !ant did not really possess the degree of M.B., B.S. Assuming, s ,; A_ dMG without deciding, that such a deception of the Service Comtat~%.U:h mission and its recommendation could, in certain circum- - stances, cause damage to its reputation, we are of opinion that Raghubar Dayal, 1• in the circumstances of this case there was no likelihood of the causing of such damage to its reputation. There is nothing on the record to show that the Service Commission could have ordinarily detected the deception or that the appointment of the applicant to the post in the Medical Service was the appointment of a person who proved to be inefficient. On the contrary, the evidence on the record shows that for about\n\n10 years between his appointment and the institution of this case, he served efficiently and obtained good reports from the Departmental Superiors. His incompetency for the post was due (O his having not obtained the minimum academic qualifications prescribed for the candidates for these posts. We are therefore of opinion that the appellant has not committed the offence of 'cheating' as defined in the latter part of s. 415 I.P.C., even though he had deceived the Service Commission by re- • presenting himself to be a duly qualified candidate, and thus induced it to select him for the post.\n\nIt was argued for the State that the Public Service Commission held a competitive examination and must have therefore issued an admission card to the appellant entitling him to sit at that ccmpetitive examination and that therefore the appellant having induced by deception the Service Commission to deliver to him the admission card which is 'property', committed the offence of 'cheating' as defined in the first part of s. 415 I.P.C. There is no force in this contention for the simple reason that there is nothing on the record to indicate that an admission card was issued entitling the appellant to sit at the competitive examination. In fact, no examination as such took place, and the contention for the respondent appears to have been made under a mis1pprehension arising out of the letter of the Secretary of the Service Commission to the Surgeon- General with the Government of Madras stating thQt he was enclosing the list containing the names and other particulars of 45 candidates who were successful at the competitive examinatien held by the Commission for the direct recruitment of Civil Assistant Surgeons. Class JI (Men) in the Madras Medical Service. It is however clear from the record that the candidates were simply interviewed by the Commission. There is nothing on the record to show that any written examination to wh'ch admission was by admission cards. took place. The judgment of the Magistrate states:\n\n19\"\n\nKan11muHalG KrnAna .Murthy\n\nSum of Andhra\n\nPraduh\n\nBoghbar Dago I, J.\n\n\"The accused was interviewed by the Service Commission as seen from Exhibit P-70, extract of Service Commission particulars\".\n\nThe same statement is made in the judgment of the Sessions Judge who said:\n\n\"The accused sent an application Ex. P-72 ...... showing that he passed M.B., B.S. degree examination, and on receiving it and interviewing him, the Public Service Commission selected him as Civil Assistant Surgeon, Class I\".\n\nThe High Court states the same\" in its judgment. It said:\n\n\"In 1948 he sent an application to the Madras Public Service Commission for selection as class JI Civil Assistant Surgeon and was selected ac such 'following an interview by the said body''.\n\nIn these circumstances, we cannot hold merely on the basis of suggestions, that any competitive written examination was held and that any admission card was issued to the appel lant entitling him to sit at the examination and, consequently. cannot hold that the 9ffence of cheating by dishonestly inducing the Service Commission to deliver him property was committed by the appellant. •\n\nThe only other question to determine now is whether the appellant deceived the Government of Madl'\"ds and dishone;; tly induced it to deliver something in the form of salary to the appellapt. It is urged that the appointment to the post Jay with the Government and not with the Service Commission and that the Government would not have appointed him to the post in the Medical Service if it had not believed that the appellant possessed the necessary qualifications which. in his case, would be a degree of M.B., B.S., and that such a belief was entertained by the Government on account of the deception practised by the appellant in misrepresenting in his applicatinon that he held such a degree. On the other hand, it is contended for the appellant that the delivery of 'property' is to be by the person deceived, in view of the language. of s. 415 l.P.C., and that the person deceived, if any, was the Service Commission and not the Government, the application containing the misreprcsentatio:1 having been made to the Service Commission and not to the\n\nGovernment.\n\nWe accept the contention for the respondent. The appointments to the Medical Services are made by Government.\n\nThe Service Commission simply selected the candidates and recommends their names to Government for appointment.\n\nThis is clear from letter Exhibit P. 47 from the Secretary to the Service Commission to the Surgeon-General with the Govern111ent of Madras. The letter refers to the enclosing\n\nKan1unukkafa J(ri8hna Murthy\n\nSia/I' of And'hrtJ\n\nPradesh\n\nof a list containing the names arid other particulars of the candidates who were successful at the examination, their names being arranged in order of merit. It refers to the relaxing of a certain rule in view of the paucity of candidates and states that they may be appointed, if necessary, pending receipt of the certificate of physical fitness and a further communication from the commission.\n\nRagliubar Da.'Juf, J.\n\nThis is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 241 provided that appointments in connection with the affairs of a Province will be made by the Governor of the Province. Sub-s. ii) of s. 266 makes it a duty of the Provincial Public Service Commission to conduct examinations for appointments to the services of a Province.\n\nClause (a) of sub-s. (3) provides that the Provincial Public ~r vice Commission shall be consulted on all matters relating to methods of recruitment to civil services and for civil posts and\n\ncl. (bl provides that it shall be consulted on the principles to be followed in making appointments to civil services and posts and on the suitability of candidates for such appointments. The Public Service Commission is constituted in pursuance of the provisions of s. 264. It is thus a statutory body and indpen dent of the Government. This aspect of a Public Service Commission was emphasized in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srimstava(') when considering the corresponding provisions of\n\nart. 320 of the Constitution. This Court said:\n\n\"Once. relevant regulations have been made, they are meant to be followed in letter and in spirit and it goes without saying that consultation with the Commission on all disciplinary matters affecting a public servant has been specifically provided tor. in order, first, to give an assurance to the Services that a wholly independent body, not directly concerned with the making of orders adversely affecting public servants, has considered the action proposed to be taken against a particular public servant, with an open mind; and. secondly, to afford the Government unbiassed advice and opinion on matters vitally affecting the morale o[ public services\".\n\nIt is in view of these provisions that the Public Service Commission invites applications for appointment to the various posts under the Government and subsequently makes a selection out of the candidates for appointment to those posts. The selection may be after holding a written examination or after interviewing candidates or after doing both. Names of the cnndidates selected are arranged in order of merit and forwarded to the Government. The Government is expected, as a rule.\n\nI') [1958] S.C.R. 533, 543.\n\nKanumttkkala Kriskoo Murthy\n\nBlale of Andkm\n\nP, aiJ.,..h\n\nto make appointments to the posts from out of the list, in the same order. It has, however, diocretion not to appoint any part of the persons so selected and securing a place in the order of merit which would have ordinarily led to his appointment.\n\nAny representation made in an application for appointllagh,, bar Dayal, J. ment is really a representation made to the Government. !he appointing authority, and not only to the Public Service Commission to which the application is presented and which has to deal with that application in the first instance, up to the >tage of selection. The object of the applicant was to secure an appointment and not merely to deceive the Public Service Commission and sit at the examination or to appear at the inter•:iew.\n\nThe deception was practised for that purpose and therefore there seems to be no good reason for holding that the deception came to an end once the Service Commission was deceived and had taken action on it as a result of the deception. A false representation in an application to the Service Commission continues and persists to be so till the application is considered by the final authority responsible for making the appointments and must therefore be deemed to be made to that final , rnthority as well. In the instant case, when the recommendation of the Service Commission was sent to the Government, the qualifications of the recommended candidates, including the fact that the appellant had passed the M.B., B.S. examination were mentioned. The Government therefore believed that the appellant possessed the degree of M.B., B.S., that as the Service Commission had scrutinized the application in that regard and had satisfied itself that the appellant possessed that degree. The consequence of that is that the Government were led to believe that fact, which thus became a false representation.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the appellant's misrepresentation to the Service Commission continued and persisted till the final stage of the Government passing an order of ap pointment and that therefore the Government itself was deceived by the misrepresentation he had made in his applicacation presented to the Service Commission.\n\nThe fact that the Service Commission is an independent statutory authority has no relevant bearing on this question. lt is a statutory body as it is constituted under he provisions of a statutes. It is independent of the Government in the sense that in its selection of candidates or in its tendering advice to the Government it does not take any hint or instructions or duu from the Government. lt brings to bear its own independent mind to judge the comparative merit~ of the candidates and their suitability to the posts they apply for. Its function is to advise the Government on the suitability of the candidates. It is therefore a statutory adviser to Government in the matter of appointment to the Services. Deception of such an adviser is\n\ndeception of the Government which is expected to pay heed to its advice and act accordingly.\n\nThere have been cases in which servants or agents of an authority have been deceived while the loss has been surtered by the authority concerned. In such cases, the person deceil(ing the servants or agents has been held to have deceived th~ authority concerned, though no direct question was raised about the deception being made not to the authority but to i; s servant. The principle of the cases, to our mind, fully applies to the case of candidates deceiving the Public Service Commission and thereby deceiving the Government in believing llmt they satisfied the various conditions prescribed for candidates for those appointments. We may refer to some such cases.\n\nIn the Crow\" v. Gunput(') the accused who had produced a railway pass with an altered number before lhc ticket co\\kctor when travelling by a train, was held to have thereby t11shoncstly induced the railway company to do or omit to do what they otherwise would not have done or omitted by the production of the altered pass. The deception of the t1claet coilector was considered to be deception of the railway wrapany.\n\nIn P. E. Billinghurst v. fl. P. Blackburn(') certain bills were presented by a company for payment. They were cheked by Government officials who were deceived by certain representations made by subordinate officials through whom the\n\n1 bills had passed, and consequently payments were _made in\n\nsatisfaction of the demands under the bills. The persons concerned in causing the deception were convicted of cheating ihe Government.\n\nIn Legal Remembrancer v. Manmatha Bhusan Clw!ter; te and Legal Remembrancer v. Hridoy Narain(-') it was held that if the evidence showed that responsible officers of the East Indian Railway Company and its Asansol Office were dcce; ved and induced either to allot wagons to a certain colliery which would not otherwise have been allotted or to make out wagon chalans for the colliery which would not otherwise have been made, it was sufficient lo support the allegations in the charges that the railway company was, by reason of deceipt, induced to act in a certain way. The deception of the responsible officers was thus taken to be the deception of the railway company, the possible damage to whose reputation was remote.\n\nIn Emperor v. Fazal Din(') it was held that the deception practised was likely to cause damage or harm to the person on\n\n!') 1868 Punj. Rec. Col. Case No. 6.\n\n(') 27 C.W.N. 82:. (') I.L.R. 51 Cal. 250 (') 1906 4 Cr!. L.J. 355.\n\n0P(D)ISCI-l4\n\nKanumukkala Krisluia Murthy\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradeek\n\nRaghubar Dayal,, J.\n\n1964 whom it was practised or to the railway authorities whose Kanumukka'a agent he was in the matter of appointments.\n\nKriahna Murthy\n\ny, In Queen-Empress v. Appasami(') the act of the accused Stale of Andkra . b . . b Pradesh m o tammg, y personation, a hall ticket from the Supcrinten-\n\n- 1 J dent at a University Examination and in signing the name.of Raghubar Daya, • th h · h Id d' ano er person on t e exammat10n papers was e to m 1cate an intention on his part to lead the University authorities to believe that the examination papers were answered by the other person. This again is on the principle that the deception of the Superintendent who was working for the University was a deception of the University itself.\n\nSimilarly, in Ashwini Kumar Gupta v. Emperor(') the accused personated another person at a University examination cheating the Registrar. It was held that this not only damaged the reputation of the Registrar, but also that of the University. Reference may also be made to the case reported as In re: Hampshire Land Company(') in which a Society had lent money to a company on the borrowing of the directors of thift company who were not competent to borrow, the resolution conferring on them the power of borrowing being invalid for certain reasons. It was held that the Society had a right to assume, in a case like that, that all the essentials of imernal management had been carried out by the borrowing compariy.\n\nOn the same principle it can be said that the Government of the State' had a right to assume that the Service Commission had verified that the candidates selected by it for appoi!1tment by the Government possessed the necessary qualifications and in that view the scrutiny by the Service Commission can be said to be on behalf of the Government.\n\nThe Government appointed the appellant to a post in its Medical Service on being induced by deception that he was fully qualified for the appointment. Jn consequence of the appoihtment, Government had to pay him the salaries which fell due.\n\nIt is clear therefore that the appellant, by deceiving the Government, dishonestly induced it to deliver property to him and thus committed the offence of cheating under s. 415 I.P.C. as he pretended to be Kaza Krishnamurthy which he was not. The offence really committed by him was 'cheating' by personation, punishable under s. 419 l.P.C. The conviction of the appellant for this offence is therefore correct. We accordingly dismiss his appeal and order that he will surrender to his bail and serve out the sentence.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(') I.L.R. 12 Mad. 151. '') I.L.R. 1937 (]) Cal. 71. (') 1896 (2) Ch. 74~ ..\n\n• 11", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "KANUMUKKALA KRISHNA MURTHY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Kanumttkkala Kriskoo Murthy", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SOBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 415, 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Madras Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant applied for a post advertised by the Madras Public Service Commission, making certain representations in his application which were found to be false."}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 484, "end_char": 490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 491, "end_char": 508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 415", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 730, "end_char": 747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A. S. R. Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2004, "end_char": 2018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, G.D. Gupta, S. Balakrishnan, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G.D. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2020, "end_char": 2030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, G.D. Gupta, S. Balakrishnan, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2032, "end_char": 2047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, G.D. Gupta, S. Balakrishnan, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2049, "end_char": 2059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, G.D. Gupta, S. Balakrishnan, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2061, "end_char": 2073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, G.D. Gupta, S. Balakrishnan, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2077, "end_char": 2088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, G.D. Gupta, S. Balakrishnan, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2093, "end_char": 2109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R. Chari, G.D. Gupta, S. Balakrishnan, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwa/a, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. G. Patwardhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2131, "end_char": 2147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. G. Patwardhan and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2152, "end_char": 2169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. G. Patwardhan and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2252, "end_char": 2266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The facts leading to this appeal.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ"}}, {"text": "December 31, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2763, "end_char": 2780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by special leave, are these: The Madras Public Service Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Service Commission, by its notification published\n\nin the Fort St. George Gazette dated August 3, 1948, invited applications for appointment of Assistant Surgeons in the Madras Medical Service (Men's Section), from persons who had rendered temporary service as Assistant Surgeons in that Ser- vice at any time between September 3, 1939 and December 31, 1947 and from persons who had rendered War Service and possessed the qualifications mentioned in paragraph 3 of the notification."}}, {"text": "Madras Medical Registration Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3070, "end_char": 3107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3435, "end_char": 3460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, who was at the time serving as a Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Madras Medical Service on a temporary basis, applied for the permanent appointment to the posts notified by the Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Kaza Krishnamurthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3601, "end_char": 3619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this application he made the following representations, which have been found to be false, by the Courts below :\n\n(i) that his name was Kaza Krishnamurthy;\n\n(ii) that his place of birth was Bezwada, Krishna district;\n\n(iii) that his father was K. R. Rao of Bezwada; and\n\n(iv) that he held the degree of M.B., B.S., TI Class, from the Andhra Medical College, Vizagapatam, Andhra University."}}, {"text": "Krishna district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3664, "end_char": 3680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this application he made the following representations, which have been found to be false, by the Courts below :\n\n(i) that his name was Kaza Krishnamurthy;\n\n(ii) that his place of birth was Bezwada, Krishna district;\n\n(iii) that his father was K. R. Rao of Bezwada; and\n\n(iv) that he held the degree of M.B., B.S., TI Class, from the Andhra Medical College, Vizagapatam, Andhra University."}}, {"text": "K. R. Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3709, "end_char": 3718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this application he made the following representations, which have been found to be false, by the Courts below :\n\n(i) that his name was Kaza Krishnamurthy;\n\n(ii) that his place of birth was Bezwada, Krishna district;\n\n(iii) that his father was K. R. Rao of Bezwada; and\n\n(iv) that he held the degree of M.B., B.S., TI Class, from the Andhra Medical College, Vizagapatam, Andhra University."}}, {"text": "Bezwada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this application he made the following representations, which have been found to be false, by the Courts below :\n\n(i) that his name was Kaza Krishnamurthy;\n\n(ii) that his place of birth was Bezwada, Krishna district;\n\n(iii) that his father was K. R. Rao of Bezwada; and\n\n(iv) that he held the degree of M.B., B.S., TI Class, from the Andhra Medical College, Vizagapatam, Andhra University."}}, {"text": "Andhra Medical College, Vizagapatam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3799, "end_char": 3834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this application he made the following representations, which have been found to be false, by the Courts below :\n\n(i) that his name was Kaza Krishnamurthy;\n\n(ii) that his place of birth was Bezwada, Krishna district;\n\n(iii) that his father was K. R. Rao of Bezwada; and\n\n(iv) that he held the degree of M.B., B.S., TI Class, from the Andhra Medical College, Vizagapatam, Andhra University."}}, {"text": "Andhra University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3836, "end_char": 3853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this application he made the following representations, which have been found to be false, by the Courts below :\n\n(i) that his name was Kaza Krishnamurthy;\n\n(ii) that his place of birth was Bezwada, Krishna district;\n\n(iii) that his father was K. R. Rao of Bezwada; and\n\n(iv) that he held the degree of M.B., B.S., TI Class, from the Andhra Medical College, Vizagapatam, Andhra University."}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3921, "end_char": 3927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Medical Registration Act, 1914", "statute": "the Madras Medical Registration Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3928, "end_char": 3933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4342, "end_char": 4348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4353, "end_char": 4359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4360, "end_char": 4365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 465", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4494, "end_char": 4500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4624, "end_char": 4630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4631, "end_char": 4636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4672, "end_char": 4678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4679, "end_char": 4684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Andhra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4783, "end_char": 4798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was, however; acquitted on appeal, by the Sessions Judge, of the offence under s. 420 I.P.C.\n\nThe appellant's conviction under s. 419 I.P.C. was confirmed by the Sessions Judge and the revision against that\n\nKanu.m11kkala Krishna Murthy\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradtsh\n\nRayhubar Dayal, J,\n\nKanumUJ:ala Kriahna Murlhy\n\nSUPRE1\\1E COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\norder was dismissed by the High Court.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH"}}, {"text": "Rayhubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4809, "end_char": 4823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was, however; acquitted on appeal, by the Sessions Judge, of the offence under s. 420 I.P.C.\n\nThe appellant's conviction under s. 419 I.P.C. was confirmed by the Sessions Judge and the revision against that\n\nKanu.m11kkala Krishna Murthy\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradtsh\n\nRayhubar Dayal, J,\n\nKanumUJ:ala Kriahna Murlhy\n\nSUPRE1\\1E COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\norder was dismissed by the High Court.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ"}}, {"text": "ala Kriahna Murlhy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4837, "end_char": 4855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was, however; acquitted on appeal, by the Sessions Judge, of the offence under s. 420 I.P.C.\n\nThe appellant's conviction under s. 419 I.P.C. was confirmed by the Sessions Judge and the revision against that\n\nKanu.m11kkala Krishna Murthy\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradtsh\n\nRayhubar Dayal, J,\n\nKanumUJ:ala Kriahna Murlhy\n\nSUPRE1\\1E COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\norder was dismissed by the High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5175, "end_char": 5181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "llagkobar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5197, "end_char": 5212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nSiok of A71dlwa It has been contended for the appellant that on the facts Praduh estabtished in the case, no offence under s. 419 l.P.C. is made llagkobar Dayal, J. out against him, as the appellant's efficiency as a surgeon is not in dispute, he having secured good reports from his superiors during the period of his service and as therefore there could be no question of the Service Commission suffering damage in its reputation."}}, {"text": "Section 415", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6088, "end_char": 6099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 415", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6772, "end_char": 6778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7933, "end_char": 7947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ant did not really possess the degree of M.B., B.S. Assuming, s ,; A_ dMG without deciding, that such a deception of the Service Comtat~%.U:h mission and its recommendation could, in certain circum- - stances, cause damage to its reputation, we are of opinion that Raghubar Dayal, 1• in the circumstances of this case there was no likelihood of the causing of such damage to its reputation.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ"}}, {"text": "s. 415", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8795, "end_char": 8801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8802, "end_char": 8807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 415", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9395, "end_char": 9401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9402, "end_char": 9407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9847, "end_char": 9867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, no examination as such took place, and the contention for the respondent appears to have been made under a mis1pprehension arising out of the letter of the Secretary of the Service Commission to the Surgeon- General with the Government of Madras stating thQt he was enclosing the list containing the names and other particulars of 45 candidates who were successful at the competitive examinatien held by the Commission for the direct recruitment of Civil Assistant Surgeons."}}, {"text": "Madras Medical Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10119, "end_char": 10141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Class JI (Men) in the Madras Medical Service."}}, {"text": "Kan11muHalG KrnAna .Murthy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10410, "end_char": 10436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Magistrate states:\n\n19\"\n\nKan11muHalG KrnAna .Murthy\n\nSum of Andhra\n\nPraduh\n\nBoghbar Dago I, J.\n\n\"The accused was interviewed by the Service Commission as seen from Exhibit P-70, extract of Service Commission particulars\"."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10445, "end_char": 10451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Magistrate states:\n\n19\"\n\nKan11muHalG KrnAna .Murthy\n\nSum of Andhra\n\nPraduh\n\nBoghbar Dago I, J.\n\n\"The accused was interviewed by the Service Commission as seen from Exhibit P-70, extract of Service Commission particulars\"."}}, {"text": "Boghbar Dago I", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Magistrate states:\n\n19\"\n\nKan11muHalG KrnAna .Murthy\n\nSum of Andhra\n\nPraduh\n\nBoghbar Dago I, J.\n\n\"The accused was interviewed by the Service Commission as seen from Exhibit P-70, extract of Service Commission particulars\"."}}, {"text": "s. 415", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12394, "end_char": 12400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12977, "end_char": 12983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is clear from letter Exhibit P. 47 from the Secretary to the Service Commission to the Surgeon-General with the Govern111ent of Madras."}}, {"text": "Ragliubar Da.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13477, "end_char": 13490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ragliubar Da."}}, {"text": "This is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13500, "end_char": 13575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13577, "end_char": 13588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "This is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 266", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13721, "end_char": 13727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "This is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Provincial Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13751, "end_char": 13787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-s. ii) of s. 266 makes it a duty of the Provincial Public Service Commission to conduct examinations for appointments to the services of a Province."}}, {"text": "s. 264", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14320, "end_char": 14326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "This is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "art. 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14546, "end_char": 14554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "This is also clear from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Kanumttkkala Kriskoo Murthy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15768, "end_char": 15795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kanumttkkala Kriskoo Murthy\n\nBlale of Andkm\n\nP, aiJ.,..h\n\nto make appointments to the posts from out of the list, in the same order.", "canonical_name": "Kanumttkkala Kriskoo Murthy"}}, {"text": "Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16141, "end_char": 16146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any representation made in an application for appointllagh,, bar Dayal, J. ment is really a representation made to the Government. !"}}, {"text": "East Indian Railway Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20562, "end_char": 20589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Legal Remembrancer v. Manmatha Bhusan Clw!ter; te and Legal Remembrancer v. Hridoy Narain(-') it was held that if the evidence showed that responsible officers of the East Indian Railway Company and its Asansol Office were dcce; ved and induced either to allot wagons to a certain colliery which would not otherwise have been allotted or to make out wagon chalans for the colliery which would not otherwise have been made, it was sufficient lo support the allegations in the charges that the railway company was, by reason of deceipt, induced to act in a certain way."}}, {"text": "Kanumukkala Krisluia Murthy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21359, "end_char": 21386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0P(D)ISCI-l4\n\nKanumukkala Krisluia Murthy\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradeek\n\nRaghubar Dayal,, J.\n\n1964 whom it was practised or to the railway authorities whose Kanumukka'a agent he was in the matter of appointments.", "canonical_name": "Kanumttkkala Kriskoo Murthy"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21388, "end_char": 21403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0P(D)ISCI-l4\n\nKanumukkala Krisluia Murthy\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradeek\n\nRaghubar Dayal,, J.\n\n1964 whom it was practised or to the railway authorities whose Kanumukka'a agent he was in the matter of appointments.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH"}}, {"text": "Kriahna Murthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21555, "end_char": 21569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kriahna Murthy\n\ny, In Queen-Empress v. Appasami(') the act of the accused Stale of Andkra ."}}, {"text": "Raghubar Daya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21791, "end_char": 21804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b Pradesh m o tammg, y personation, a hall ticket from the Supcrinten-\n1 J dent at a University Examination and in signing the name.of Raghubar Daya, • th h · h Id d' ano er person on t e exammat10n papers was e to m 1cate an intention on his part to lead the University authorities to believe that the examination papers were answered by the other person.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ"}}, {"text": "Hampshire Land Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22464, "end_char": 22486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference may also be made to the case reported as In re: Hampshire Land Company(') in which a Society had lent money to a company on the borrowing of the directors of thift company who were not competent to borrow, the resolution conferring on them the power of borrowing being invalid for certain reasons."}}, {"text": "s. 415", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23641, "end_char": 23647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23648, "end_char": 23653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23798, "end_char": 23804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_419_423_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 419\n\nMD. QASIM LARRY, FACTORY MANAGER, SASA-\n\nMUSA SUGAR WORKS\n\nMUHAMMAD SAMSUDDIN AND ANOTHER\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K.N. WANCHOO AND K.C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, JJ].\n\nWages-Industrial Dispute-Wages fixed by the Award-If wages as defined by the Act-Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (IV\n\nOf 1936), SS. 2(vi), 15.\n\nIn pursuance of an award made by an Industrial Tribunal fixing the pay of the employees at Rs. 2/2/- per day, the management of the appellant had entered into an agreement with its workmen, that the effect would be given to the wage structure prescribed by the said award. In spite of the award and the agreement, the appellant paid its employees only As. -/10/- per day and that led to the present claim made by the respondents under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. They asked for an order from the payment of wages authority directing the appellant to pay the said prescribed wages. Against the respondent's claim it was urged by the appellant that s. 15 of the Act was inapplicable, because the rates of wages fixed by the award did not fall within the definition of wages prescribed by s. 2(vi) of the Act. The authority rejected the appellant's contention. The appellant then challenged the correctness of the conclusion of the authority before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the finding of the authority. It held that s. 15 was applicable to the case, because the wages prescribed by the award did amount to wages as defined by s. 2(vi) of the Act. On appeal by Special Leave the appellant contended that before it is held that the wages prescribed by the award fall under s. 2(vi), it must be shown that they constitute part of the terms of the contract of employment, either express of implied.\n\nHeld: The argument is not well-founded. When an award is made and it prescribes a new wage structure, in law the old contractual wage structure becomes inoperative and its place is taken by the wage structure prescribed by the award.\n\nIn a sense, the latter wage structure must be deemed to be the contract between the parties, because that, in substance, is the effect of industrial adjudication. The true legal position is that when industrial disputes are decided by industrial adjudication and awards are made. the said awards supplant contractual terms in respect of matters covered by them and are substituted by them. That being so, it is difficuit to hold that the wages prescribed by the award cannot be treated as wages under s. 2(vi) of the Act before it was amended. The amendment has merely clarified what was included in the unamended definition itself.\n\nSouth Indian Bank Ltd. v. A. R. Chacko, A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1522, referred to.\n\nJogindra Nath Chatter.iee and Sons, v. Chandreswar Singh, A.LR., 1951 Cal. 29, inapplicable.\n\nModern Mlls Ltd. v. V. R. M:anga!vedhikar, A.LR., 1950 Born. 342 and V. B. Godse, Manager, Prabha Mills Ltd. v. R. M.\n\nN airk [1953] 1 L.L.J. 577, approved.\n\nL/P{D)JSCI-14(a)\n\nMarch 24\n\nMd. Qa.oim La\"y,\n\nFadmy Manager,\n\nSaaamuaa Sugar Work<\n\nMuhammad Samauddin and\n\nAn<>IMr\n\n.w~;:\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 251 of\n\n1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 20, 1957, of the Patna High Court in Civil Revision No. 40 of 1956.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, and R. C. Prasad, for the appellants.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\nMarch 24, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-The short question which arises Gaj<nlragadm, c.J.ifi this appeal is whether the term \"wages\" as defined by section 2(vi) of the Paymf'nt of Wages Act, 1936 (No. 4 of 1936) (hereinafter called 'the Act') includes wages fixed by an award in an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees. This question has to be answered in the light of the definition prescribed bys. 2(vi) before it was amended in 1958.\n\nThe subsequent amendment expressly provides by s. 2(vi) (a) that any remuneration payable under any award or settlement between the parties or order of a Court, would be included in the main definition under s. 2(vi). The point which we have to decide in the present appeal is whether the remuneration payable under an award was not already included in the definition of wages before the said definition was amended.\n\nIt is common ground that between the appellant, Sasamusa Sugar Works Ltd., and its workmen, the respondents, an award had been made by an Industrial Tribunal\n\nfixing the pay of the employees at Rs. 2/2/- per day, and in pursuance of the said award, the management of the appellant had entered into an agreement with the respondents that effect would be given to the wage structure, prescribed by the said award. This agreement was subsequently published in the Bihar Gazette as a part of the award. In spite of the award and the agreement. the appellant paid its employees cmly As. -/ I 0 /- per day and that led to the present claim made by the respndents under s. 15 of the Act. The respondents contended before the payment of wages authority that the refusal of the appellant to pay to them wages at the rate awarded. in substance, amounted to an illegal deduction from their wages and on that basis, they asked for an order from the authority directing the appellant to pay to the respondents the said prescribed wages.\n\nThe appellant raised two pleas against the respondents' claim. It urged thats. 15 of the Act was inapplicable, because the rates of wages fixed by the award did not fall within the definition of wages prescribed by s. 2(vi) and it also argued that the claim of the respondents was barred by limitation.\n\nThe authority has found that s. 2(vi) includes wages prescribed 1964 by the Industrial Tribunal, and so, it has rejected the appel- Md. Qcuim LMry !ants' contention that the applications made by the respon- Fad-Ory MMlafl.;, dents were incompetent under s. 15 of the Act. In regard to /aaam;-a lea the question of limitation, the authority did not decide the ugar v.\n\n0 ' said question as a preliminary question, because it held, and, Muhammad · · ht! th · d t\" f f t Sa11111uddin and m our op1mon, ng y, at 11 was a m1xe ques ion o ac Another and law, and so, it had to be tried after recording evidence.\n\nGajemlraga<lkar, The appellant challenged the correctness of the conclu-\n\nO.J. sion of the authority that the applications made by the respondents were competent under s. 15 of the Act before the Patna High Court by filing a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court has affirmed the finding of the authority and held that s. 15 was applicable to the case, because the wages prescribed by the award did amount to wages as defined by s. 2(vi) of the Act. On that view, the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. It is this order which the appellant seeks to challenge before us by its present appeal by special leave.\n\nSection 2(vi) as it stood at the relevant time, provides. inter alia, that wages means all remuneration. capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled. be payable. Mr. Setalvad for the appellant contends that before it is held that the wages prescribed by the award fall under s. 2(vi), it must be .shown that they constitute part of the terms of the contract of employment, either express or implied. The terms in question need not be express and can be implied; but they must be terms which arise out of the contract of employment, and since an award made by an Industrial Tribum:I cannot be said to amount to a contract of employment. the wage structure prescribed by the award cannot fall within the definition prescribed by s. 2<vi). That, in brief. is the ; ubstance of the argument raised by the appellant.\n\nWe are not inclined to hold that even under the unamended definition of wages, rates of remuneration prescribed\n\ny an award cold not be included. Jn dealing with the ques t1on of construmg the unamended definition of the term \"wages\", it is essential to bear in mind the scope and character of he powers. conferred on Tndu; trial Tribunals when they deal with mdustnal disputes under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is now well-settled that unlike ordinary civil courts which are bound by the terms of contract between\n\nhe parties when the)'. deal with disputes arising between them m respect of the said terms, Industrial adjudication is not bound to uphold the ~1'1!1s of contract between the employer\n\nad the_ em.ployees. If 1t 1s shown to the satisfaction of Industrial ad1ud1cation that the terms of contract of employment,\n\n1964 for instance, need to be revised in the interests of social justice, MtJ Qaaim J; any it is at liberty to consider the matter, take into account all\n\nF~ Manage;., relevant factors and if a change or revision of the terms aps....,..... pears to be justified, it can, and often enough it does, radically Sugar orl:a change the terms of the contract of employment. The develop- Mu/atJmniad ment of industrial law during the last decade bears testimony Snd to the fact that on references made under s. lO(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, terms of employment have constantly GajendragadhM, been examined by industrial adjudication and wherever it\n\nO.J. appeared appropriate to make changes in them, they have been made in accordance with the well-recognised principles of fair play and justice to both the parties. Therefore the basic assumption made by Mr. Setalvad in contending that s. 2(vi) cannot take in the wages prescribed by the award, is not wellfounded. When an award is made and it prescribes a new wage structure, in law the old contractual wage structure becomes inoperative and its place is taken by the wage structure prescribed by the award. In a sense, the latter wage structure must be deemed to be a contract between the parties. because that, in substance, is the effect of industrial adjudication. The true legal position is that when industrial disputes are decided by industrial adjudication and awards are made, the said awards supplant contractual terms in respect of matters covered by them and are substituted for them. That being so, it is difficult to accede to the argument that the •vages prescribed by the award cannot be treated as wages under s. 2(vi) of the Act before it was amended. The amendment has merely clarified what, in our opinion, was included in the unamended definition itself.\n\nIn this connection, we may incidentally refer to the decision of this Court in the South Indian Bank Ltd. v. A. R.\n\nChacko('), where it has been observed by this Court that the very purpose for which industrial adjudication has been given the peculiar authority and right of making new contracts between employers and workmen makes it reasonable to think that even though the period of operation of the award and the period for which it remains binding on the parties may elapse -in respect of both of which special provisions have been made under sections 23 and 29 respectively-the 1:ew contract would continue to govern the relations between the parties till it is replaced by another contract This observation clearly and emphatically bring out that the terms prescribed by an award, in law, and in substance, constitute a fresh contract between the parties.\n\nThis question appears to have been considered by the Bombay and the Calcutta High Courts. In Jogerulra Nath\n\n(') A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1522.\n\n{:hatierjee and Sons v. Chandreswar Singh('), the Calcutta 1964 High Court appears to have taken the view which supports Md. Qaaim Lartr.\n\nMr. Setalvad's argument, whereas in the Modern Mills Ltd. v. 1'\"\"\"\"1/ M•ll<IO'•.\n\nV. R. Manga/vedhkar('), and in V. B. Godse, Manager, Prabha 8~;:,\"if.':, t, Mills Ltd., v. R. M. Naick, Inspector, under the Payment of •· Wages Act('), the Bombay High Court has interpreted s. 2(vi) s!':!::l:ii:.\"!.i to include wages directed to be paid by industrial adjudication.\n\nAnother In our opiriion, the Bombay view correctly represents the true legal position iri the matter.\n\nGajendragadhr,\n\n0.J.\n\nThe result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The matter will now go back to the authority under the Act for disposal in accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 29.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\n(') Al.R. 1930 Born. 342.\n\n(') (1953] I L.L.J. 577.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "419\n\nMD. QASIM LARRY, FACTORY MANAGER, SASA-\n\nMUSA SUGAR WORKS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MD. QASIM LARRY, FACTORY MANAGER, SASA MUSA SUGAR WORKS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUHAMMAD SAMSUDDIN AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUHAMMAD SAMSUDDIN AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K.N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 168, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 192, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. 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J.-The short question which arises Gaj<nlragadm, c.J.ifi this appeal is whether the term \"wages\" as defined by section 2(vi) of the Paymf'nt of Wages Act, 1936 (No."}}, {"text": "section 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3610, "end_char": 3623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wages Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3969, "end_char": 3977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4130, "end_char": 4138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wages Act, 1936", "statute": "Wages Act, 1936"}}, {"text": "Sasamusa Sugar Works Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4388, "end_char": 4413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that between the appellant, Sasamusa Sugar Works Ltd., and its workmen, the respondents, an award had been made by an Industrial Tribunal\n\nfixing the pay of the employees at Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5003, "end_char": 5008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5580, "end_char": 5588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajemlraga", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6276, "end_char": 6286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajemlraga<lkar, The appellant challenged the correctness of the conclu-\n\nO.J. sion of the authority that the applications made by the respondents were competent under s. 15 of the Act before the Patna High Court by filing a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6472, "end_char": 6488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajemlraga<lkar, The appellant challenged the correctness of the conclu-\n\nO.J. sion of the authority that the applications made by the respondents were competent under s. 15 of the Act before the Patna High Court by filing a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6516, "end_char": 6524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6617, "end_char": 6622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6727, "end_char": 6735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6925, "end_char": 6938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7185, "end_char": 7193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setalvad for the appellant contends that before it is held that the wages prescribed by the award fall under s. 2(vi), it must be .shown that they constitute part of the terms of the contract of employment, either express or implied."}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7294, "end_char": 7302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7746, "end_char": 7750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tribunals when they deal with mdustnal disputes under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8162, "end_char": 8261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9196, "end_char": 9219, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9568, "end_char": 9576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10360, "end_char": 10368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 23 and 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11058, "end_char": 11076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay and the Calcutta High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11427, "end_char": 11462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question appears to have been considered by the Bombay and the Calcutta High Courts."}}, {"text": "Md. Qaaim Lartr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11631, "end_char": 11646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "{:hatierjee and Sons v. Chandreswar Singh('), the Calcutta 1964 High Court appears to have taken the view which supports Md. Qaaim Lartr."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11888, "end_char": 11905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t, Mills Ltd., v. R. M. Naick, Inspector, under the Payment of •· Wages Act('), the Bombay High Court has interpreted s. 2(vi) s!':!::l:ii:.\"!.i to include wages directed to be paid by industrial adjudication."}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11922, "end_char": 11930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadhr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12118, "end_char": 12131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadhr,\n\n0.J.\n\nThe result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_424_429_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "March.24\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nG. M. TALANG AND OTHERS\n\nSHAW WALLACE AND CO. AND ANR\n\n[1964]\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO AND K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Age of Retirement_.:.Trend in Bombay Region-Conclusion in earlier decision recorded by Supreme\n\nCourt-Enquiry as to accuracy thereaf-lndustri.al Tribunal- Propriety.\n\nShortly after the extension of the age of retirement from 55 to 58 subject to the employee passing a medical examination at 55 in the respondent-company's Head Office at Calcutta, their workmen at Bombay branch raised an industrial dispute claiming the extension of their age of retirement from 55 to 60. The dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. The company resisted the claim but was agreeable to introduce similar provisions as introduced at Calcutta. The difficulty in accepting the company's case was the conclusion recorded by the Supreme\n\nCourt in its earlier decisions that the trend in Bombay region was to fix the age at 60. So the Tribunal considered it to be its duty to enquire whether the conclusion recorded by the Supreme Court was accurate and ultimately persuaded itself to hold that no such trend was established in fact, and directed that the age of retirement should be 58.\n\nHeld: (i) After careful consideration of all the materials placed on this record. there was nothing to justify any doubt about the correctness of what was said on the earlier occasion by this Court. The approach adopted by the Tribunal in dealing with this aspect of the problem is not very commendable and its present conclusion that what was said by itself on an earlier occasion and was confirmed by this Court in appeal, was in fact inaccurate, is on the whole unsound.\n\nWhat. the Tribunal has failed to notice is that instances which , may justify a revision of the judicial opinion expressed on an earlier occasion about a particular trend must be strong and unambiguous and they must speak for the period both before and more particularly after the previous finding had been recorded in the mat1:€r.\n\n(ii) The information furnished by the several documents on this record clearly show a consistent trend in the Bombay region to fix the retirement age of clerical and subordinate staff at 60.\n\nImperial Chemical Industries (India) Private Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 349 and Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd. v.\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 513 of 1963. Appeal by special leave frornthe Award dated December 1961 of the Maharashtra Industrial Tribunal in Reference (l.T.) No. 48 of 1961.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-Genera/, c: L. Dudhia, K. T. Sule, Atiqur Rahman and K. L. Hathi, for the appel~ I ants.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, N. V. Phadke, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. 1964 Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent No. 1.\n\nG.M. Talang and\n\nOra.\n\nMarch 24, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was deli-shaw wal'k...and vered by Co. and .dnr.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal arises out of an industrial -dispute as regards the age of retirement. The first respondent, Shaw Wallace & Co., was incorporated in January, 1946 as a Private Limited Company to take over the business of the partnership firm of the Shaw Wallace & Co., which had been doing business in India for about 60 years. In July, 1947 the Private Limited Company was converted into a Public Limited\n\nCompany. The Head Office of the Company is at Calcutta.\n\nIt has Branches in Bombay, Delhi and _\\1adras. The general practice of the Company both at the Head Office and the Branch Offices appears to have been to retire its employees at the age of 55 though in certain cases the Company in its discretion permitted an employee to continue beyond that age.\n\nIn September, 1959 an agreement was entered into between the Company and its employees at Calcutta under which the age of retirement was extended to 58 years subject to the employees passing a medical examination on reaching the age of 55. Shortly after this the Company's employees at Bombay raised a dispute regarding their retirement age. They claimed , that no workman should be retired from se1vicc before he bad completed 60 years of age. This dispute was ultimately referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra. Before the Tribunal the Company resisted the workmen's claim but submitted that it was agreeable to introduce for its Bombay employees provisions similar to those which had been introduced by agreement for the Calcutta employees-retirement at the age of 58 sub ject to the employee passing a medical aamination on reac\\1ing the age of 55.\n\nThe Tribunal has directed that the age of retirement should be 58 but the Company may in its discretion and with the express or implied consent of the employee concerned continue an employee after he attains !hat age. It is aaainst this decision that the present appeal has been filed by the workmen.\n\nAs has already been noticed there is no dispute that the age of compulsory retirement should not remain at 55. The dispute is whether it should be fixed at 58 or at 60. It is interesting to refer in this connection to the information that has been collected by the Pay Commission 0957-59) as regards the pensionable ages prescribed under the Pension Insurance Schemes for employees generally or for industrial\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nO.M. Talang and\n\nOrs.\n\nv. 8\"\"\"' W aUau and\n\nOo.and.Anr.\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nemployees and under social assistance or universal schemes in forty-eight countries in 1954. According to this the pensionable age is 70 in two countries; 67 in another two; 65 in twenty-four, 60 in seventeen, 55 in two and 50 in one. Thus. out of 48 countries for which information was available it was found that in 45 countries the pensionable age was fixed at 60 or more. As the Pay Commission Report pointed out:--\n\n\"This is particularly remarkable, considering that the countries differ widely in demographic constitution, levels of economic development, and climatic and social condition; and it indicates a virtual unanimity of competent opinion that balancing the various factors-physiological, economic and social -that are relevant, the normal working life should continue up to the age of 60. and may well go on up to 65 years.\n\nIt is undoubtedly more useful, however, and indeed essential for our present purpose to examine the trends in this matter in our own country and specially in the region in which the present dispute has arisen. In the delicate task of adjusting needs of the employees to the interests of the employers and what is even more important to the general interests of the country at large, industrial adjudication has to pay special attention to the prevailing practice in the indu:; trial region concerned. If in any particular region employee:> have been successful in their claim for fixing the age of retirement at 60 this very success is bound to raise in others in the region similar expectations. Refusal of similar relief to them is likely to create discontent. It is. the endeavour of industrial adjudication to prevent this. That is why on questions of age of retirement and hours of work and other similar matters industrial tribunals attach much weight to what has been done in other industrial concerns in the neighbourhood in recent timeswhether by agreement or by adjudication.\n\nIn support of their demand for fixing the age of retirement at 60 the workmen tried to show that in recent yea\" at least the tendency in comparable concerns in Bombay region has been to fix the retirement age at 60. The Chart which is marked Ex. U-5 mentions 50 concerns in which the age of retirement is 60. In several of these this age had been fixed as far back as 1950 while in the rest the age was fixed in later years, that is, between 1952 and 1961. The workmen claim that these showed clearly a tendency in the Bombay region to fix the age of retirement in comparable concerns at\n\n60. Special emphasis was naturally placed on some decisions of this Court which contained pronouncements as regards the existence of such a trend. In Imperial Chemical Industries\n\n(India) Private Ltd., v. The Workmen(') where the Tribunal had raised the age of retirement from 55 to 58 and both parties G. M. TaUi\"'l \"\"4\n\nappealed, this Court pointed out that one of the documents Or•. on the record \"would conclusively show that in Bombay the Shaw w.u;... tllfll age of retirement is almost invariably fixed at 60 and not at Oo. awl Aw. 55\". In an earlier decision of this Court in Du11/op Rubber Co.\n\nLtd., v. Workmen(') it had been urged that the employer was na. GwflG, J. an All India concern and that changing the terms and conditions of service in regard to the age of retirement in one place might unsettle the uniformity and might have serious repercussions in other branches. The Court pointed out that though this was a relevant consideration its effect had to be judged in the light of other material and relevant circumstances, and that one of the important material considerations in this connection would be that the age of retirement can be and often is determined on industry-cum-region basis. The Court then took into account the fact that the Tribunal had found that in all the awards in recent times in various concerns in Bombay region the trend had been to fix the age of retirement at 60 years. It was mainly in view of this finding of the Tribunal that this Court refused to disturb the award fixing the age of ff tirement at 60 years. It is important to notice that the correctness of the Tribunal's finding that in all the awards in recent times in the Bombay region the trend had been to fix the retirement age at 60 years, was not challenged before this Court .\n\nIn the present case an attempt appears to have been made on behalf of the respondent Company to show that it was not correct to say that the trend in Bombay region had been to fix the age of retirement at 60. Reliance was placed for this purpose on the Chart Ex. Cl. It appears that the respondent company wrote to the Bombay Chamber of Commerce to ascertain from its memberncerns as regards the age of retirement observed by them and the information received from some of them was incorporated in this Chart. The workmen objected to this being received in evidence on the ground that the original letters had riot been brought on the record.\n\nIt is not however seriously disputed that the Chart correctly reproduces the information as regards the age of retirement given by the various concerns named there. We think therefore that the objection was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. This Chart shows the age of retirement for 75 concerns.· In most of the' cases the age of retirement is shown as 55 and in:. a few at 58. At fiPSt sight therefore:. it appears to afford impressive\n\n(') [1961) 2 S.C.R. 349.\n\n(') [1960) 2 S.C.R. 51.\n\n1964 testimony against the workmen's case that the recent trend _, in Bombay has been to fix the age of retirement at 60. But on G. M. Tala1'(J\"\"\"\n\nOra. a closer examination it is clear that this document is of little Slia wiJi and assistance for finding out the recent trend. There is no indica-\n\nOo~ and A°:.;. ti on at all as to how long ago the age of retirement in these concerns was fixed at 55 or at 58. The Statement filed by the Da. G•pl•, J. workmen to explain this Chart shows tliat in two of these cases, viz., Ingerzoll Band and Northern Assurance Co., the demand for fixing the age of retirement at 60 years is under negotiation. Exhibit U-6 also shows that in 25 of these concerns the clerical and subordinate staff were nl't organised into trade unions. There is thus good ground for thinking that the reason why these concerns have kept the age of retirement at 55 or 58 are special to them and do not show any recent trend in the matter. In spite of these infirmities this document, Ex.\n\nCl, appears to have impressed the Tribunal. The main difficulty in accepting the Company's case on Lhis point, viz., the pronouncements of this Court, however, remained. So, the Tribunal considered it to be its duty to enquire whether the conclusion recorded by this Court in some of its earlier decisions as to the relevant trend in the Bombay region was accurate. Having embatked on this enquiry, the Tribunal appears to have taken considerable pains to perform this duty and it has ultimately persuaded itself to hold that no such trend is established in fact. We ought to add in this connection, that the approach adopted by the Tribunal in dealing with this aspect of the problem is not very commendable, and that its present conclusion that what was said by itself on an earlier occasion and was confirmed by this Court in appeal, was in fact inaccurate, is on the whole unsound.\n\nIf this Court had erred in making those pronouncements we would be the first to admit such mistakes and to correct the error. After careful consideration of all the materials placed on this record, we have, however, found nothing to justify any doubt about the correctness Jf what was said on the earlier occasion. On the contrary, the awards and agreements on the question of age of retirement about which information is furnished by the several documents on this record clearly show a consistent trend in the Bombay region to fix the retirement age of clerical and subordinate staff at 60. The very few departures from this practice which the Tribunal has mentioned are, in our opinion, wholly insufficient to indicate any slowing down of this trend. What the Tribunal has failed to notice is that instances which may justify a revision of the judicial opinion expressed on an earlier occasion about a particular trend must be strong and unambiguous and they must speak for the period both before and more particularly after the previous finding had been recorded in the matter.\n\nNotice has also to be taken in this connection of the 1964 Report of the Norms Committee in which the following a. M. Tata.g owl opinion was expressed : - Ors. \"After taking into consideration the views of the earlier /Jllaw w.Ti;... awl\n\nCommittees and Commissions including those of Oo. and Anr. the Second Pay Commission the report of which D G pl q has been released recently, we feel that the retire- \"' u •, meat age for workmen in all industries should be fixed at 60. Accordingly, the norm for retirement age is fixed at 60\".\n\nThis considered opinion of a Committee on which bo!h employers and employees were represented emphasised the fact that in the Bombay region at least there is a general agreement that the age of retirement should be fixed at 60. The Tribunal has referred to these observations, but has brushed them aside in a way for which we find no justification.\n\nOn a consideration of all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the oral and documentary evidence on this record. we have come to the conclusion that the age of retirement of the appellant-workmen should be fixed at 60.\n\nAccordingly, we allow the appeal with costs, and in modification of the award made by the Tribunal direct that the age of retirement for the workmen of the respondent be fixed at 60.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "M. 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Talang and\n\nOrs.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "O.M. Talang", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is interesting to refer in this connection to the information that has been collected by the Pay Commission 0957-59) as regards the pensionable ages prescribed under the Pension Insurance Schemes for employees generally or for industrial\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nO.M. Talang and\n\nOrs.", "canonical_name": "G.M. Talang"}}, {"text": "[1961) 2 S.C.R. 349", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10759, "end_char": 10778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1960) 2 S.C.R. 51", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10785, "end_char": 10803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. Tala1'(J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10938, "end_char": 10949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But on G. M. Tala1'(J\"\"\"\n\nOra."}}, {"text": "Northern Assurance Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11348, "end_char": 11370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ingerzoll Band and Northern Assurance Co., the demand for fixing the age of retirement at 60 years is under negotiation."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_430_434_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Jlll\"AU\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964)\n\nMARA AND OTHERS\n\nNIKKO AND OTHERS\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.]\n\nInheritance-Jhalli Jats of Tahsil Ludhiana-Properties Ancestral or non-Ancestral-Whether Sister excludes collaterals.\n\nClaiming inheritance to the properties of one P-a Jhalli J at of Ludhiana TehsiL the respondents, who were P's sister and sister's son filed a suit against the appellants-P's collaterals.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge decreed the suit and an appeal to the I1istrict Judge was dismissed. They held that the lands in suit were not ancestral and that there was no evidence to show that among the Jhalli Jats of Ludhiana collaterals excluded sisters and sister's son in respect of non-ancestral property. An appeal to the High Court was also dismissed.\n\nHeld: (i) Where lands are so mixed up that the ar.cestral and non-ancestral portions cannot be separated they must be regarded as non-ancestral unless it is shown which are ancestral and which are not.\n\nAvtar Singh v. Thakar Singh, 35 I.A 206, applied.\n\nLand ceases to be ancestral if it comes into the hands of any owner otherwise than by descent.\n\nInder Singh v. Gulzara Singh, AI.R. 1951 Punj. 345, Saif-ul- Rahman v. Mohammad Ali Khan, I.L.R. 9 Lah. 95 and Jagtar Singh v. Raghbir Singh, I.L.R. 13 Lah. 165, referred to.\n\n(ii) The application of the personal law to \"the family by the courts below was correct and paragraph 24 of Rattingan's Digest which excludes sisters from inheritar.ce from non-ancestral property is too widely stated.\n\nUjagar Singh v. Mst. Jeo, [1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 781 and Waryam Singh v. Smt. Sukhi, CA No. 452/61 decided on 23-4-1963\n\n(non-reportable) referred to.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 490 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 20, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 1591 of 1959.\n\nKartar Singh Chawla and Harbans Singh, for the appellants.\n\nI. M. Lal and M. R. K. Pillai, for the respondents.\n\nMarch 24, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRitlayatvllah, J.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is a defendants' appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court of Punjab dated October 20, 1959 dismissing summarily second appeal filed by the appellants. The suit was filed by the respondents for possession of a plot, a house and a Taur and half share in certain lands as preferential heirs of one Pohla after the death\n\n1964 of Pohla's widow Punjab Kaur on February 7, 1952. The plaintiffs are Mst. Nikko, sister of Pohla and Jarnail Singh, son of Mst. Har Kaur who was another sister of Pohla. The first appellant Mara is a collateral of 4th degree of Pohla and the other two appellants are Mara's sons. The following genealogy gives the relationship of the parties: -\n\nMara and Other•\n\nNiikl:o OlMi Or1.\n\nI Sohela\n\nI PirBux\n\nI Mara defendant No. 1\n\n:MohindL Singh\n\ndefendant No2\n\nI Major Singh\n\ndefendant No. 3\n\nSultani\n\nPohla\n\n(son)\n\nI Shrimati Punjab Kaur\n\nwidow\n\nI Baghaila\n\nI Jaimal\n\nI Mat. Har Kaur (daughter)\n\nI Jarna.il son of Arjan Singh\n\nPlaintiff No.2\n\nI Sunder died sonle88 and\n\nwifeless\n\nI Mat.Nikko alia.s Punjab Kaur\n\n(daughter) wife of S&nta Singh J &t, resident of Ayali Kalan, Plaintiff No. I.\n\nThe parties are Jhalli lats of village Chomon, Tehsil and District Ludhiana. The plaintiffs claimed that the property was non-ancestral and according to the Riwaj applicable to the family, sisters excluded collaterals in respect of both ancestral and non-ancestral properties. It appears that after the death of Panjab Kaur, Mara got one of the fields mutated in his own name and thereafter took possession of the whole pro. perty. He made gifts to his sons of some of the properties a.nd that is why they were joined in the suit. Mara and his elder son Mohinder Singh filed a joint written statement in which. they raised many pleas the details whereof need not be given here. They claimed that according to the custom applicable to the family, sister and sister's sons were excluded from inheritance in respect of properties whether ancestral or nonancestral. They , however claimed that the property was ancestral and denied the genealogy. -• The Subordinate Judge, Second Class, Ludhiana framed six issues of which issues No. 2, 3 and 4 alone are important in this appeal. Those issues are: -\n\n\"2. Whether the property is ancestral qua Pohla and\n\nMara?\" \"3. Whether the question of the nature of the pro.\n\nperty is material for the decision of this case?\"\n\nHidayalollali. J,\n\n.Mara and Olher1 ...\n\nNil:lro ond Ora.\n\nHUlaya!u!lah, J.\n\n\"4. Whether the plaintiffs are preferential heirs to the estate of Mst Panjabo widow of Pohla?\"\n\nThe parties led voluminous oral evidence in the case but the Subordinate Judge did not rely upon it We have not been referred to any portion of this evidence in tJiis appeal. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the suit lands were not ancestral and further that no evidence was produced to prove that the other properties were ancestral. On the third issue he referred to question No. 52 from the Riwaj-i-am relating to the settlements of 1882 and 1909-1910 (Exts. D-1 and D-2) in which it is stated that among the lhalli lats of Tehsil Ludhiana sisters or sisters' sons never succeed. He, however, held on the authority of Ahmad v. Mohammad and others(') that since question refers only to ancestral property and that the nature of the property was thus material. On the fourth issue he held on the strength of the answer to question No. 52 that sisters and their sons were excluded from ancestral property but as the answer was not applicable to 1:on-ancestral property the personal law would apply unless special custom was proved. He therefore placed the burden on the defendants relying .upon Harnam Singh v. Mst. Gurdev Kaur, (') Mst.\n\nSukhwant Kaur v. S. Balwant Singh and others(') and Mst. Jeo\n\nv. Ujagar Singh.(') As he had alre:ldy rejected the oral evidence and there was no other proof that the property was ancestral, he decreed the suit.\n\nOn appeal the District Judge, Ludhiana remitted three issues to the trial Judge and they were as follows : -\n\n\"Issue No. 4: -\n\nWhether there is any custom by which the parties are governed according to which the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed to the ancestral as well as non-ancestral left by the Pohla in preference to Mara defendant? \"\n\n\"Issue No. 4A: -\n\nWhether under the custom by which parties are governed the defendant Mara is a preferential heir to the plaintiffs in respect of the ancestral as well as non-ancestral property of Pohla deceased?\"\n\n(') A.I.R. 1936 Lah. 809.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1951 Simla 242.\n\n(') 1957 P:L.R. 609.\n\n(') 1953 P.L.R. 1\n\n\"Issue No. 4B: - 1964\n\nIf the custom set out by the parties is not proved, whether the plaintiffs are preferential heirs to Mara .i.lefendant under personal law applicable to the parties?\"\n\nMara and Others\n\nOn these issues the report of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Ludhiana was against the contention of the defendants.\n\nThe learned District Judge held, in Jgreement with the Subordinate Judge, that the lands in suit were not ancestral and he held also that there was no evidence to show that among the Jhalli Jats of Ludhiana collatrals excluded sisters and sisters' sons in respect of non-ancestral property. He referred to Exts. 9, IO, 12 and 13 which were judgments in other cases a> evidencing the contrary. He accordingly dismissed the appeal. The Second appeal filed thereafter was dismissed summarily by the High Court. .\n\nThe first question to decide is whether these 13nds are ancestral or non-ancestral. The concurrent finding of the two courts below is that none of the properties in dispute is ancestral. The High Court prima facie saw no reason to differ from any of the conclusions of the courts below. It is contended on the strength of a Kafiat of Thu/la Malla prepared at the settlement of 1882 that this land came into possession of one Sekhu who was admittedly a common ancesto1 in the famil'y and the property, which is now in dispute, mut be regarded as ancestral. It is contended that the finding is vitiated because the two courts below did not read this Kafiat along with the extracts from the Records of rights of the years 1882 and 1909- . 1910 in which the names of Jaiinal and Sunder, sons of Baghela, and of Pir Bux son of Sohila are shown ~.s persons in enjoyment of half shares in these lands. It is argued that the lands in suit are thus proved to be ancestral as they belonged to Sekhu the common ancestor and the Riwaj-i-am as disclosed in question No. 52 applies to the case. It appears, however, from the Kafiat as well as the Record of Rights that these lands were once abandoned and when people came back Sekhu got possession of some lands but in addition to these Sekhu's descendants had acquired the share of one Dalpat in the Thu/la and subsequently the entire estate of another holder, namely, Maidas was purchased by Jaiinal, Sunder and Sohila. This shows that the lands in dispute are not entirely ancestral but are made up of lands which may be described as ancestral and non-ancestral.\n\nNow, it has been ruled in the Punjab consistently that where lands are so mixed up that the ancestral and nonancestral, portions cannot he separated they must be regarded\n\nil ikko and Ors.\n\nIJidayatulla.k, J.\n\nJ[ara and OtMrs\n\nNikko and Ors.\n\nHidayatullah, J.\n\nas non-ancestral, unless it is shown which are ancestral and which are not. This was laid down by the Privy Council in Avtar Singh v, Thakar Singh('). It was held by Mr. Justice Kapur (as he then was) in Indar Singh v. Gulzara Singh and others(') basing himself upon Saif-ul-Rahman v. Mohammand Ali Khan(') and Jagtar Singh v. Raghbir Singh(') that land ceases to be ancestral if it comes into the hands of an owner otherwise than by descent. Once these conclusions are reached, it is quite obvious that the decision of the District Judge not to apply the answer to question No. 52 to non-ancestral land was right. It may be mentioned that the answers to questions refer to ancestral property only and this is now firmly established. In fact, it was not denied at the hearing.\n\nIt is, however, contended that there are decisions to show that the right of the collaterals was recognised in respect of even non-ancestral land to the exclusion of sisters and their sons. No ruling from the Law Reports has been brought to our notice. Some cases from the Ambala and Amritsar Districts are cited but those obviously cannot be any authority, because, as is well-known, custom in the Punjab changes from district to district, tehsil to tehsil and pargana to pargana. It has been ruled in this Court that paragraph 24 of Rattingan's Digest which excludes sisters from inheritance from non-ancestral property is too widely stated. (See Ujagar Singh v. Mst.\n\nJeo(') and (Waryam Singh and Others v. Smt. Sykhi and another) (Civil Appeal No. 452 of 1961 decided on April 23, 1963).\n\nThe learned District Judge cited some instances in which the sisters and sisters' sons were allowed to succeed in preference to collaterals. One of the documents filed by the defendants in the suit (Ext. D-6) also supports the contention of the respondents. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the Jw application of the personal law to the family by the courts below was erroneous. It is contended lastly that the rulings only show that collaterals of 5th degree are excluded and there is no case showing that a collateral of 4th degree was excluded. If personal Jaw applies, as it does, a collateral of the 4th degree is also excluded.\n\nIn our judgment this appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(') 35 I.A. 206. (') AI.R. 1951 Pb. 345. (') I.L.R 9 Lah. 95. (') I.L.R. 13 Lah. 165. (') (1959 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 781.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "MARA AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MARA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NIKKO AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NIKKO AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rattingan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1421, "end_char": 1430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) The application of the personal law to \"the family by the courts below was correct and paragraph 24 of Rattingan's Digest which excludes sisters from inheritar.ce from non-ancestral property is too widely stated."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1823, "end_char": 1840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 20, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh Chawla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1885, "end_char": 1904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kartar Singh Chawla and Harbans Singh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1909, "end_char": 1922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kartar Singh Chawla and Harbans Singh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "I. M. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1945, "end_char": 1954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. M. Lal and M. R. K. Pillai, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "M. R. K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1959, "end_char": 1974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. M. Lal and M. R. K. Pillai, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Ritlayatvllah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRitlayatvllah, J.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is a defendants' appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court of Punjab dated October 20, 1959 dismissing summarily second appeal filed by the appellants."}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2077, "end_char": 2089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRitlayatvllah, J.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is a defendants' appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court of Punjab dated October 20, 1959 dismissing summarily second appeal filed by the appellants.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Pohla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2413, "end_char": 2418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was filed by the respondents for possession of a plot, a house and a Taur and half share in certain lands as preferential heirs of one Pohla after the death\n\n1964 of Pohla's widow Punjab Kaur on February 7, 1952."}}, {"text": "Punjab Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2458, "end_char": 2469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was filed by the respondents for possession of a plot, a house and a Taur and half share in certain lands as preferential heirs of one Pohla after the death\n\n1964 of Pohla's widow Punjab Kaur on February 7, 1952."}}, {"text": "Nikko", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2515, "end_char": 2520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nikko, sister of Pohla and Jarnail Singh, son of Mst.", "canonical_name": "Nikko"}}, {"text": "Jarnail Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2542, "end_char": 2555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nikko, sister of Pohla and Jarnail Singh, son of Mst."}}, {"text": "Har Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2569, "end_char": 2577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Har Kaur who was another sister of Pohla."}}, {"text": "Mara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2631, "end_char": 2635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first appellant Mara is a collateral of 4th degree of Pohla and the other two appellants are Mara's sons.", "canonical_name": ".Mara"}}, {"text": "MohindL Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2868, "end_char": 2881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\n:MohindL Singh\n\ndefendant No2\n\nI Major Singh\n\ndefendant No.", "canonical_name": "Mohinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Major Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2900, "end_char": 2911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\n:MohindL Singh\n\ndefendant No2\n\nI Major Singh\n\ndefendant No."}}, {"text": "Sultani\n\nPohla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2930, "end_char": 2944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3\n\nSultani\n\nPohla\n\n(son)\n\nI Shrimati Punjab Kaur\n\nwidow\n\nI Baghaila\n\nI Jaimal\n\nI Mat."}}, {"text": "Sunder", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3083, "end_char": 3089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Har Kaur (daughter)\n\nI Jarna.il son of Arjan Singh\n\nPlaintiff No.2\n\nI Sunder died sonle88 and\n\nwifeless\n\nI Mat.", "canonical_name": "Sunder"}}, {"text": "Chomon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3269, "end_char": 3275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe parties are Jhalli lats of village Chomon, Tehsil and District Ludhiana."}}, {"text": "Ludhiana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3297, "end_char": 3305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nThe parties are Jhalli lats of village Chomon, Tehsil and District Ludhiana."}}, {"text": "Panjab Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that after the death of Panjab Kaur, Mara got one of the fields mutated in his own name and thereafter took possession of the whole pro."}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3784, "end_char": 3798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mara and his elder son Mohinder Singh filed a joint written statement in which.", "canonical_name": "Mohinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Second Class, Ludhiana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4180, "end_char": 4221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Subordinate Judge, Second Class, Ludhiana framed six issues of which issues No."}}, {"text": "Hidayalollali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4491, "end_char": 4504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayalollali."}}, {"text": ".Mara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4510, "end_char": 4515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J,\n\n.Mara and Olher1 ...\n\nNil:lro ond Ora.", "canonical_name": ".Mara"}}, {"text": "HUlaya!u!lah,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4550, "end_char": 4563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HUlaya!u!lah, J.\n\n\"4."}}, {"text": "Panjabo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether the plaintiffs are preferential heirs to the estate of Mst Panjabo widow of Pohla?\""}}, {"text": "District Judge, Ludhiana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6037, "end_char": 6061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the District Judge, Ludhiana remitted three issues to the trial Judge and they were as follows : -\n\n\"Issue No."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, First Class, Ludhiana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6919, "end_char": 6959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mara and Others\n\nOn these issues the report of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Ludhiana was against the contention of the defendants."}}, {"text": "Sekhu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7943, "end_char": 7948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is contended on the strength of a Kafiat of Thu/la Malla prepared at the settlement of 1882 that this land came into possession of one Sekhu who was admittedly a common ancesto1 in the famil'y and the property, which is now in dispute, mut be regarded as ancestral."}}, {"text": "Jaiinal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8281, "end_char": 8288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1910 in which the names of Jaiinal and Sunder, sons of Baghela, and of Pir Bux son of Sohila are shown ~.s persons in enjoyment of half shares in these lands."}}, {"text": "Sunder", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8293, "end_char": 8299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1910 in which the names of Jaiinal and Sunder, sons of Baghela, and of Pir Bux son of Sohila are shown ~.s persons in enjoyment of half shares in these lands.", "canonical_name": "Sunder"}}, {"text": "Baghela", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8309, "end_char": 8316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1910 in which the names of Jaiinal and Sunder, sons of Baghela, and of Pir Bux son of Sohila are shown ~.s persons in enjoyment of half shares in these lands."}}, {"text": "Pir Bux", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8325, "end_char": 8332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1910 in which the names of Jaiinal and Sunder, sons of Baghela, and of Pir Bux son of Sohila are shown ~.s persons in enjoyment of half shares in these lands."}}, {"text": "Sohila", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8340, "end_char": 8346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1910 in which the names of Jaiinal and Sunder, sons of Baghela, and of Pir Bux son of Sohila are shown ~.s persons in enjoyment of half shares in these lands."}}, {"text": "Dalpat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8841, "end_char": 8847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears, however, from the Kafiat as well as the Record of Rights that these lands were once abandoned and when people came back Sekhu got possession of some lands but in addition to these Sekhu's descendants had acquired the share of one Dalpat in the Thu/la and subsequently the entire estate of another holder, namely, Maidas was purchased by Jaiinal, Sunder and Sohila."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9151, "end_char": 9157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it has been ruled in the Punjab consistently that where lands are so mixed up that the ancestral and nonancestral, portions cannot he separated they must be regarded\n\nil ikko and Ors."}}, {"text": "il", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9293, "end_char": 9295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it has been ruled in the Punjab consistently that where lands are so mixed up that the ancestral and nonancestral, portions cannot he separated they must be regarded\n\nil ikko and Ors."}}, {"text": "ikko", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9296, "end_char": 9300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it has been ruled in the Punjab consistently that where lands are so mixed up that the ancestral and nonancestral, portions cannot he separated they must be regarded\n\nil ikko and Ors.", "canonical_name": "Nikko"}}, {"text": "IJidayatulla.k,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9311, "end_char": 9326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IJidayatulla.k, J.\n\nJ[ara and OtMrs\n\nNikko and Ors."}}, {"text": "J[ara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9331, "end_char": 9336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IJidayatulla.k, J.\n\nJ[ara and OtMrs\n\nNikko and Ors."}}, {"text": "Nikko", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9348, "end_char": 9353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IJidayatulla.k, J.\n\nJ[ara and OtMrs\n\nNikko and Ors.", "canonical_name": "Nikko"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9364, "end_char": 9376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah, J.\n\nas non-ancestral, unless it is shown which are ancestral and which are not.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9560, "end_char": 9565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by Mr. Justice Kapur (as he then was) in Indar Singh v. Gulzara Singh and others(') basing himself upon Saif-ul-Rahman v. Mohammand Ali Khan(') and Jagtar Singh v. Raghbir Singh(') that land ceases to be ancestral if it comes into the hands of an owner otherwise than by descent."}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10433, "end_char": 10439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some cases from the Ambala and Amritsar Districts are cited but those obviously cannot be any authority, because, as is well-known, custom in the Punjab changes from district to district, tehsil to tehsil and pargana to pargana."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10444, "end_char": 10452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some cases from the Ambala and Amritsar Districts are cited but those obviously cannot be any authority, because, as is well-known, custom in the Punjab changes from district to district, tehsil to tehsil and pargana to pargana."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10935, "end_char": 10949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "452 of 1961 decided on April 23, 1963)."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_435_440_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 435\n\nSTATE OF UTIAR PRADESH v.\n\nSABIR ALI AND ANR.\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.]\n\nCriminal Trial- Offence under Uttar Pradesh Private Forests Act (VI of 1949}-Provision for trial of offences only by\n\nMagistrate of the Second or Third C!ass-Tria! by First Class Magistrate-Validity of-Genera! and Special provision-Code\n\nof Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 28 and 29(1).\n\nOn a complaint by the District Magistrate the respondents were put on trial for an offence under s. 15(1) of the Uttar\n\nPr•.desh Private Forests Act, 1949. Tile charge against the first respondent was that he sold one tamarind tree to respondent No. 2 for the purpose of felling and removing it without obtaining permission from the competent authority_ and that against respondent No_ 2 was that he felled the tree and removed it.\n\nThe complaint was transferred from one Magistrate to another till it came on the file of Mr. Upadhya, a Magistrate of Second Class. After he had recorded all the evidence and examined the two , respondents, the powers of Magistrate, First Class were conferred on him. Thereafter, by his judgment the respondents were found guiJty and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs- 50/- each or to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. On appeal, which was later converted into a revision the Additional Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court recommending that the trial before the Magistrate, First Class be quashed as he had no jurisdiction to try the offence. The reference was . heard by Mulla, J., who was of the opinion that the trial was proper but as the rulings of the same Court stood in his way, he referred the case to a larger Bench. The case was heard by a Division Bench and the learned -Judges ditfered amongst themselves. Mr. Justice Nigam was of the view that the trial was valid but Mr. Justice Singh did not agree with him. The case was then placed before Mr. Justice Verma who agreed with Mr.\n\nJustice Singh and the conviction and sentenc~ passed on the respondents were set aside. - Acoording to the opinion of Mr. Justice Nigam which found support from the order of reference made by Mulla, J., there was nothing to prevent the -Firs1j Class Magistrate from trying an offence under s. 15(1) of the Act, because under Schedule m of the Code of Criminal Procedure the ordinary powers_ of a Magistrate, First Class include the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the Second Class. According to the olher view, the Forests Act confers jurisdiction on Magistrates of the Seoond\n\nand Third Class and this excludes jurisdiction of any superior Magistrate. On appeal by certificate: Held: (i) The words_ of the second sub.section of s. 15of the Act or not rendered ineffective by the prescription of the ordinary powers of the Magistrates. To call in aid Schedule m would render the provisions of s. 29 of the Code of Criminal\n\nProcedure redundant and useless at least in thosecases where the second part of the second schedule applies. What s. 15(2) does is to prescribe a particular court and in view of. the words of s. 29(1) no other. court oan try offences under s. 15(1) even though the powers of those courts may be superior to those of\n\nMM<lo!4\n\nPradesh\n\nSabir Al~ c{; Anr.\n\nHidayatulla11, J.\n\nMagistrates of the Second and Third Class. In the Second Schedule itself, which prescribes the courts for the trial of offences under law other than the Penal Co<!e, is exciuded, the Third Schedule cannot bring about the same result indirectly. The provisions of the Third Schedule must therefore be taken to define general powers and not to create jurisdiction to try offences which the second schedule does.\n\n(ii) The scheme of the Code read with the provisions of s. 15 of the Act clearly shows that offences under s. 15 are not triable by any Magistrate as it would be if the Second Schedule were applicable. They are therefore triable by such Magistrates as have been named in the second sub-section. There is good reason for holding thtis, because a conviction by a Magistrate of the second or the third class, as the case may be is open to an appeal whereas a conviction by a Magistrate of tne First Class and a sentence of fine of Rs. 50/- or under a fine of Rs. 200/- after a summary trial is not appealable. It is a circumstance which must be taken into account. It is forcefully illustrated in this case. An appeal would have laid against the same decision if the Magistrate had not been given the ]:)owers of a First Class Magistrate during the trial. The respondents were robbed of a right of appeal. In any event. in vi\"w of the clear words of s. 29(1r, the trial of these cases onght to have been before a court designated in s. 15(2) and as the trial was before a Magistrate who was not empowered to try the offence the proceedings were rightly declared void under s. 53G(p) and of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nJ addu v. State, A.LR, 1952 All.872 and Ilarbans Singh v.\n\nState, A.LR 1953 All.179, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 193 of 1962. Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 12, 1962 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Reference No. 21 of 1961.\n\n0. P. Rana, Atiqur-Rehman and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\nMarch 24, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by. ·\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) against its order dated March 12, 1962 quashing the trial of the respondents for an offence under s. 15(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Private Forests Act (VI of 1949). This trial commenced on February II, 1959 on a complaint by the District Magistrate Bahraich. The charge against the first respondent was that he sold one tamarind tree to respondent No. 2 for the purpose of felling and removin_g it without obaining permission from the competent authority and that agamst -respondent No. 2 was that he felled the tree and removed it. The complaint was transferred from one Magistrate to another\n\ntill it came on the file of Mr. T. B. Upadhaya who was a Magistrate of the Second Class. After Mr. Upadhaya had re corded all the evidence and examined the two respondents the powers of Magistrate, First Class .were conferred o~ him.\n\nThereafter he pronounced judgment m the case and tindmg respondents guilty he sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 50 /. each or to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The respondents filed an appeal before the Addi tional Sessions Judge, Bahraich which was later converted into a revision. Th.e learned Additional Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court recommending that the trial before the Magistrate, First Class be quashed as he had no jurisdiction to try the offence. This reference was heard by Mulla, J. who did not agree with the opinion of Beg, J. in Jaddu and others v. State,(') on which the Additional Sessions Judge had relied. Beg, J. had taken the same view in a subsequent case also-Harbans Singh and others v. State.(') Mulla, J. was of the opinion that the trial was proper, but as these rulings stood in his way, he made a reference of the case to a larger Bench.\n\nThe case was heard by a Division Bench consisting of B. N.\n\nNigam and S. D. Singh, JJ. The learned Judges differed amongst themselves: Mr. Justice Nigam was of the view that the trial was valid but Mr. Justice Singh did not agree with him. The case was then placed before Mr. Justice Verma who agreed with Mr. Justice Singh. As a result, the conviction and sentence passed on the respondents were set aside. The case was, however, certified by the High Court as fit for appeal and the present appeal has been filed.\n\n. :-Vhic.h of the lwo views is the right one is the short question m this appeal. Section 15(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Private Forests Act confers jurisdiction to try offences under the first sub-section on Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class.\n\nThe trial i~ the present case was by a Magistrate of the First Class, and 1f there was no jurisdiction in him to try the offence then the proceedings er_e rightly declared void under s. 530(p) of. te Code of Cnmmal Procedure. According to the op1mon of Mr. Justice Nigam which finds support from the order of reference made y Mulla, J., there is nothing to prevent the First Class Magistrate from trying an offence under s. 15( _!) .of the Act, because under Schedule III of the Code of Cnmmal Procedure the ordinary powers of a Magistrate First Class include the. ordinary powers of a Magistrate of th~· Second lss .. ccordmg to the other view, the Forests Act\n\ncofers 1unsd1cllon .on Magistrates of the Second and the\n\nThir~ Class and this excludes jurisdiction of any superior Magistrate.\n\n(') A.LR. 1952 All.873. (') A.I.R. 1953 All.179.\n\nPradesh\n\nSabir Ali di Anr.\n\n1964 fl\":::JJ.\"\"'\n\nv. flabir .Ali do .AM\n\nBidayotullah, J\n\nSection 15 of the Forests Act reads as follows:-\n\n\"15 Offences under this Chapter and trial of such offences and penalties thereof: -\n\n(l) Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of this Chapter or deviates from the prescriptions of a sanctioned working plan without the previous sanction of the For est Officer shall be punishable with fine not exceeding one hundred rupees for the first offence and with fine not exceeding one thousand rupees or simple imprisonment not exceeding .. three months or both for the second or any subsequent offence.\n\n(2) Offences under this section shall be triable by a Magistrate of the Second or Third Class, and proceedings under this section may be instituted on a complaint made by the landlord of the notified area or forest in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed or by any right-holder of such a notified area or forest or by the Forest Officer or by any officer specially empowered by the Provincial Government in this behalf .\n\n(3)\n\n(4)\n\n• • • • • • • *\"\n\nThe question is one of interpretation of the first part of sub-s. (2) which says that offences under s. 15 shall be triable by a Magistrate of the Second or Third Class. It does not use the phrase \"any Magistrate\" nor does it specify \"a Magistrate of the First Class\". The question is whether the words of the subsection exclude a First Class Magistrate. The answer to this, in our opinion, is furnished by ss. 28 and 29 of the Code -0f Criminal Procedure. They provide as follows:~\n\n\"28. Offences under Penal Code-Subject to the other provisions of this Code any offence under the Indian Penal Code may be tried-\n\n(a) by the High Court, or\n\n(b) by the Court of Session, or\n\n(c) by any other Court by which such offence is shown in the eighth column of the second schedule to be triable''.\n\n\"29. Offences under other laws-(l) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in this behalf in such law, be tried by such court.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'IS 439\n\n(2) When no Court is mentioned, it may be tried by the High Court or subject as aforesaid by any Court constituted under this Code by which such offence is shown in the eighth column of Second Schedule to be triable\".\n\nThe scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is that it provides separately for trial of offences under the Penal Code and for offences under any other law. The court which is to try them is indicated in the Code in the eighth column of the Second Schedule. The first part deals with offences under the Penal Code and the second part with offences under any other law.\n\nThe last entry in the Second Schedule provides for the trial for offences under any other law which are punishable with imprisonment for less than one year or with fine only and they are made triable by \"any Magistrate\". If the matter were governed by the Second Schedule, the last entry would undoubtedly have comprehended a Magistrate, First Class. But s. 29 says that offences under any other law shall be tried by that court which that law mentions and it is only when no court is mentioned that the eighth column of the Second Schedule is applicable. Here sub-s. (2) of s. 15 mentions the courts by which offences under s. 15(1) are triable and s. 29(1) excludes the application of the seco'nd part of the Second Schedule. The words of sub-s. (I) of s. 29 are peremptory. There is no escape from them. They say that 'subject to the other provisions of the Code' any offence under any other law shall be tried by the court when such court is mentioned in that law. A case under s. 15(1) therefore, is triable only by the two courts named therein, namely, Magistrates of the Second and the Third classes and not by any other Magistrate.\n\nThe appellant relies upon the words 'subject to the other provisions of the Code' and refers to the Third Schedule. But that Schedule deals with the ordinary powers of the, Magistrates under the Criminal Procedure Code. The words of the second sub-section of s. 15 are not rendered ineffective by the prescription of the ordinary powers of the Magistrates. To call in aid Schedule III would render the provisions of s. 29 redundant and useless at least in those cases where the second part of the Second Schedule applies. What s. 15(2) does is to prescribe a particular court and in view of the words of s. 29 (I) no other court can try offences under s. 15 (!) even though the powers of those courts may be superior to those of Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class. If the Second Schedule itself, which prescribes the courts for the trial of offences under laws other than the Penal Code, is excluded, the Third Schedule cannot bring about the same result indirectly. The provisions of the Third Schedule must\n\nStale of Utla•\n\nPradesh\n\nSabir .Ali Anr ..\n\nHidayatullah, .J •.\n\nSla'.e of U ttar\n\nPradesh\n\nv. .\n\nSabir~Ali & .Anr.\n\nHidayatullah, J.\n\ntherefore be taken to define general powers and not to create jurisdictions to try offences which the Second Schedule does.\n\nIt was argued before us that there is no point in prescribing that the Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class can try subsequent offences because their powers under s. 32 do not extend as far as the punishment prescribed bys. 15(1).\n\nThis question does not arise directly but it may be said that two views are possible: one is that by implication the powers of these Magistrates are extended beyond what is prescribed under s. 32. The other is that in a case where the Magistrate feels that a heavier punishment should be imposed he can take recourse to the provisions of s. 349 of the Code and make a recommendation to a Magistrate who can impose adequate punishment in the case. The words \"subject to the other provisions of the Code\" would enable this to be done.\n\nfo our opinion. therefore, the scheme of of the Code read with the provisions of s. 15 of the Forests Act clearly show that offences under s. 15 are not triable by any Magistrate as it would be if the Second Schedule were applicabl~.\n\nThey are therefore triable by such Magistrates as have been named in the second sub-section. There is good reason for holding this, because a conviction by a Magistrate of the Second or the Third Class, as the case may be, is open to an appeal whereas a conviction by a Magistrate of the First Class and a sentence of fine of Rs. 50/- or under or a fine uf Rs. 200/- after a summary trial is not appealable. It is possible that it was intended that a right of appeal should be conferred and therefore the trial of these offences was restricted to Magistrates of the Second and the Third Class.\n\nThis was pointed out by Mr. Justice Beg in Harbans Singh and others\n\nv. State(') and was also referred to by Mr. Justice Verma in the opinion in the present case. In our opinion, it is a circumstance which may be taken into account. It is forcefully illustrated in this case. An appeal would have lain against the same decision if the Magistrate had not been given the powers of a First Class Magistrate during the trial. The respondents were robbed of a right of appeal. Jn any event, in view of the clear words of s. 29(1), the trial of these cases ought to have been before a court designated in s. 15(2) and as the trial was before a Magistrate who was not empowered - to try the offence the proceedings were rightly declared void under s. 530(p) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We accordingly hold that the decision under appeal was correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n('l A.LR. 1953 All. 179.", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "435\n\nSTATE OF UTIAR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SABIR ALI AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SABIR ALI AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. 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{"document_id": "1964_7_441_446_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\nIBRAHIM 'v\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)\n\nForeigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946), ss. 2(a) 3.9 and 14- Whether a person is a foreigner has to be riccid?d in relation to the time of the offence-The fact. that he was not a foreigner before the time of offence; not material-Onus of proof on the accused-Citizenship Act, 1955 (LVII of 1955). s. 9(2).\n\nThe appellant, a Pakistani National originally came over to India on a Pakistani Passport ancl on the strength of visa.\n\nHe was found to be overstaying in India and he was deported on April 21, 1957. Subsequently on finding him again in India he was charged with an ofience of having entered India without a passport in contravention of s. (2) (a) of the Foreigners Act,\n\n1946. His defence was t.hat he had been in India from his birth and that the person who was said to have been deported in 1957 was some other and not himself. The trial court accepted this defence and acquitted him. The State appealed to the High Court and the High Court rever; ed the finding of the lower court and held l\\im guilty of the offence charged. The present appeal was filed on a special leave granted by this Court.\n\nThe first contention of the appellant was that the High Court was wrong in rever81ng the fh1ding of the -trial court on the issue of the identity of the appellant. Secondly it was submitted that under s. 2(2) of the Foreigners Act as it stood before\n\nthe Amendment which crune onto force on January 19, 1957 the appellant though a Pakistani citizen was not a \"foreigner\"\n\nand hence his entry into India before that date \\Vould not constitute an offence. It was contended further that the co1.<rts had no jurisdiction to determine whether the appellant was or was not a foreigner by reason of the provision of s. 9(2) of the Indian Citizen-ship act 1955.\n\nHeld: The appellant was the person who was deported on April 21, 1957 and the f; nding of the High Court on the question of his identity was corre:::t.\n\n(ii) If on the date when the offence is committed a person is \"a foreigner'' as defined by the Act, it would be no excuse for him to say that on an Ci.irlier date he was not foreigner. Since the appellant was deported in April 1957 and he came back to India subsequently without a passport he v..•as a foreigner under the amendment provision which came into force on January 19, 1957 had committed an offence under s. 3 of the Foreigners Act.\n\n(iii) Under s. 9 of the Foreigners Act the onus is upon the person who is accused under the Act to prove that he is not a foreigner. It is only where there is proof that a person is, to start with a citizen of Tndia and it is alleged that he has lost his Indian Citizenship by reason of acquiring the nationality of tl:e foreign State that any question of invoking the provisions of s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act arises. In the present case the appellant a Pakistani national came to India originally with a Pakistani Passport and after his deportation in April 1957 came back to India without a passport and hence he cannot invoke s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act and he had committed an offence under s. 3 (2)(a) of the Foreigners Act.\n\nAfarch 24\n\nStat. of Rajaathan\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals No. 14 of 1963. Appeal by specl1eave from the judgment and order dated November 9, 1962 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 502 of 1961.\n\nS. Shaukat Hussain, for the appellant.\n\nH. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 24, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-This appeal, by special leave, against the judgment of the High Court of Jodhpur raises for consideration the legality of the conviction of the appellant for a contravention of s. 3 of the Foreigners Act (Act XXXI of 1946) which is an offence under s. 14 of that Act. The relevant portion of s. 3 enacts : -\n\n\"3. ([) The Central Government may by order make provision, either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigners, for prohibiting regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or other departure therefrom or their presence or continued presence therein.\n\n(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, orders made under this section may provide that the foreigner: -\n\n(a) shall not enter India or shall enter India only at such times and by such route and at such port or place and subject to the observance of such conditions on arrival as may be prescribed;\n\nSection 14 reads :\n\n\"14. If any person contravenes the provisions of this Act or of any order made thereunder, or any direction given in pursuance of this Act or suc)l order, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine; and if such person has entered into a bond in pursuance of clause (f) of subsection (2) of section -3. his bond shall be forfeited, and any person bound thereby shall pay the penalty thereof, or show cause to the satisfaction of the convicting Court why such penalty should not be paid.\"\n\nThe facts giving rise to the appeal are briefly these: The 1964 case of the prosecution was that the appellant-Ibrahim, s Io Ibrahim Miru--a resident of Rajgarh in Bikaner Division-was a v.\n\nPakistani national who had originally come over to India on Bw.te 01 RajClfllia• a Pakistani passport issued to him in 1954 and on the strength Ar J. of a visa granted in December, 1956. He was then found to be overstaying in India since February 18, 1957 and an order was thereupon passed in March, 1957 for his deportation. This order was given effect to and on April 21, 1957 he was taken across the Pakistan border at the Check Post Munabao by the Indian police officials and deported. Then followed the events which have given rise to the present proceedings. Subsequent to his deportation to Pakistan and on a date as regards which the prosecution had no information, the appellant had, unknown to the Indian authorities, managed to come over to India clandestinely and he was found again in Rajgarh. On seeing him there the Sub-Inspector of Churu made a report to the Station House Officer of Rajgarh by which he drew the latter's attention to the fact that the appellant who had been deported had 10anaged to cross the border. on the side of Ganganagar and had re-entered India and he brought this to his notice for the purpose of action being taken. The accused was thereupon apprehended and was charged with an offence of having entered India without a passport in contravention of s. 3(2)(a) of the Fordgners Act.\n\nThe defence of the appellant was simple. He said he had been in India all the time since birth, had never gone to Pakistan and so had never come here in 1957 with a Pakistani passport, was never deported therefrom and therefore there was no question of his having entered India without a passport. In other words, his defence was that h:e was not the 'person who had come over in 1957 and had been deported to Pakistan in April 1957.\n\nIn support of their case the prosecution proved the order of Government by which Ibrahim, son of Meeru of Rajgarh had been directed to be deported in which is found a reference to his having come over to India with a passport a.nd having overstayed the time permitted by the visa, the general diary of the , Emigration Check Post, Munabao dated April 21, 1957 which recited that on April 21, 1957 the deportee-.\n\nCbrahim-had come with a Head Constable and that the deportation order had been given effect to, and an entry in the deportation register of the Check Post which recited the date arid number of the Pakistani passport and the .. authority by which the order of deportation had been passed and the carrying out of the acwat deportation. In order tO establish the identity of the appellant with Ibrahim mentioned in these documents the _prosecution examined. two witnesses-- Shiv Rattan who was the Police Inspector in-charge of the\n\n'\".\n\nBtate of Rajasthan\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\n,_-.\n\nMunabao Check Post at the relevant date (P.W. 2) and Govind Singh who was a pe9n who was posted at the police lines at Churu and who accompanied Dube Singh, Head Constable when Ibrahim was taken from Rajgarh to the Check Post at Munabao for being deported. These two witnesses identified the appellant who was present in Court Ibrahim whom they had seen off at the border Check Post in execution of the order to deport. The learned Megistrate, however, was not satisfied with this proof of identity. because he was of the view that the two prosecution witnesses-P.Ws 2 and 3could not, after the lapse of 4 years, be believed when they said that they remembered that the appellant was Ibrahim whom they had seen deported at the Check Post. The learned Magistrate also held that there was some discrepancy in the father's name of Ibrahim in one of the documents produced by the prosecution which, according to him, did not tally with the name of the appellant's father. On tltese grounds the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused.\n\nThe respondent-State filed an appeal to the High Court against this order of acquittal and the learned Judges h.olding that there could be no doubt about the identification by P.W.s 2 and 3 of the appellant as the Ibrahim whom they had deport ed, reversed the order of acquittal and held the appellant guilty of the offence charged and. sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. It is from this judgment of the High Court that the present appeal has been filed pursuant to leave granted by this Court.\n\nThe first point urged by learned counsel for the appellant was as regards the identity of the appellant \\\\ith Ibrahim.\n\nOn this we are quite satisfied that the learned Judges were correct in their appreciation of the evidence in the case. Both the witnesses-P.W.s 2 and 3-are public servants and there is no reason why they should depose falsely against the appellant.\n\nThe documents produced as regards which there is no challenge give the name of the person deported as Ibrahim, his father as Miru and besides, they specify his age as 27 which, it is conceded, tallies with the description of the appellant. The only point that was suggested by learned Counsel was that in Ex. P-I-the deporting register at the Check Post-the neme of Ibrahim's father was stated to have been entered as Murra and not Miru. When, hc'wever, it was poin.ted out to learned Counsel during the course of the arguments that there was a possibility of these words written in Urdu being wrongly transliterated in the English learned Counsel did not persist in the point. If then Ibrahim s/o Miru, aged 27 was deported and there is evidence adduced which has been accepted by the High Court that it was the appellant tl13t was deported on the former occasion, we find no substance in the argument as regards this question of identity.\n\nThe second submission of learned counsel was based on 1964 the fact that under s. 2(a) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, as origi- Ibrahim nally enacted, a citizen of Pakistan which wa~ a member of the 8 ,, vR. . ,_ B .. h C 1 h \" f . \" . h. h A tate o, \"'\"'\"~• nt1s ommonwea t was not a ore1gner wit m t at ct _. and that citizens of Pakistan became \"foreigners\" only by Ayyanyar, J. virtue of the amendment effected by Central Act XI of 1957 which came into force on January 19, 1957. The argument based on this feature was as follows: A person wh<> can be held guilty of a contravention of s. 3 of the Foreigners Act is only a \"foreigner\". Even according to the case of the prosecution the appellant had come over to India on the strength of a Pakistanl passport issued in 1954 and under a visa of December, 1956. It must, therefore, be taken that he had crossed over to India before the 19th January, 1957. On that date he was not a foreigner, though a Pakistani, as he was a citizen of a Common-wealth country. He c0uld not, in Jaw, become a \"foreigner\" subsequently and no action could be taken against him on the footing that he had become a \"foreigner\". We see no merit in this submission. A prima facie reading of the Foreigners Act would show that if on the date when the offence is committed a person is a \"foreigner\"', as defined by the Act, it would be no excuse for him to say that on an earlier date he was not a foreigner. But it is, h0wever, unnecessary to consider this point further because, firstly, there is no proof on the record before us that the appellant entered India before January 19, 1957. But even if he had it would only mean that the earlier order of deportation which was passed in March/ April 1957 was a wrong order and that certainly is not a matter with which we are concerned, because it is common ground, if the identity of the appellant is held to be established, that the appellant was deported to Pakistan in April,\n\n1957. He could come over to India only subsequent to April, 1957 and if he did come over it is also common ground that he came over without a passport. As the date upon which he could have come over was certainly after April, 1957 by which date s. 2(a) of the Foreigners Act containing the definition of 'Foreigner\" had been amended, the appellant was a foreigner when he came into India without a valid passport and visa in contravention of the provisions of s. 3 of the Foreigners Act, and that is the offence with which he is now being charged. We find therefore that there is no substance in this point.\n\nLastly, it was submitted that the Courts could have no jurisdiction to determine whether the appellant was a \"foreigner\" and that their jurisdiction in that regard was barred by the provisions of s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955. This argument proceeds upon a misapprehension of the legal position. In the first place, under s. 9 of the Foreigners Act the onus is upon the person who is accused tinder that Act to\n\n1961 prove that he is not a foreigner. In the present case once the Ibrahim plea regarding the absence of identity of the appellant with v.. the deportee of April, 1957 was rejected it could not be sug- 8101' 01 R11:1081Jian gested that the appellant was ever an Indian citizen. It is only\n\nA111/<lnuar, J. where there is proof that a person is to start with, a citizen of India and it is alleged that he has lost his Indian citizenship by reason of acquiring the nationality of a foreign State that they question of invoking the provisions of s. 9('.!) of the Citizenship Act arises. That is not the case here. The case of the prosecution was that the appellant was a Pakistani national who had come over to India on a valid Pakistani passport. in 1957 and had been legally deported out of India in April, 1957. On those facts there is no question of s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act being invoked or coming into play. The offence charged was that having been deported once out of India, he again en, tered India without proper travel documents in violation of the provisions of s. 3(2)(a) of the Foreigners Act.\n\nThere was one further point that was mentioned by learned Counsel but which we did not permit him to argue. Learned Counsel said that the order now passed was one by the State Government and that there was no proof that the Central Government had delegated this power to the State Government. Apart from the point being without s11bstance in view of the tenns of s. 3(2)(a) we have extracted earlier, and which was the offence with wliich the appellant was charged, this point about delegation was never urged in the Courts below and consequently no evidence was led to establish delegation under s. 12 of the Act if that was necessary for sustaining the prosecution in the present case. As this point was not raised in the Courts below we declined to pennit learned Counsel to raise it before us.\n\nWe consider that the learned Judges were right in holding that the prosecution had established the offence charged against the accused.\n\nThere are no merits in the appeal which fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed •.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "IBRAHIM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IBRAHIM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "statute": "Foreigners Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Onus of proof on the accused-Citizenship Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 343, "end_char": 393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 410, "end_char": 417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Onus of proof on the accused-Citizenship Act, 1955", "statute": "Onus of proof on the accused-Citizenship Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 480, "end_char": 485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a Pakistani National originally came over to India on a Pakistani Passport ancl on the strength of visa."}}, {"text": "April 21, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 604, "end_char": 618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was found to be overstaying in India and he was deported on April 21, 1957."}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1423, "end_char": 1430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreigners Act,\n\n1946", "statute": "the Foreigners Act,\n\n1946"}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1438, "end_char": 1452, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1831, "end_char": 1838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 19, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2397, "end_char": 2413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the appellant was deported in April 1957 and he came back to India subsequently without a passport he v..•as a foreigner under the amendment provision which came into force on January 19, 1957 had committed an offence under s. 3 of the Foreigners Act."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2445, "end_char": 2449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2457, "end_char": 2471, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2486, "end_char": 2490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2498, "end_char": 2512, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tndia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2684, "end_char": 2689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is only where there is proof that a person is, to start with a citizen of Tndia and it is alleged that he has lost his Indian Citizenship by reason of acquiring the nationality of tl:e foreign State that any question of invoking the provisions of s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act arises."}}, {"text": "s. 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2857, "end_char": 2864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Citizenship Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2872, "end_char": 2887, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3107, "end_char": 3114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Citizenship Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3122, "end_char": 3137, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3176, "end_char": 3180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3195, "end_char": 3209, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": ".Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3243, "end_char": 3252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Rajaathan\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals No.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "S. Shaukat Hussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3466, "end_char": 3484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Shaukat Hussain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. R. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3506, "end_char": 3518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. P. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3523, "end_char": 3534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-This appeal, by special leave, against the judgment of the High Court of Jodhpur raises for consideration the legality of the conviction of the appellant for a contravention of s. 3 of the Foreigners Act (Act XXXI of 1946) which is an offence under s. 14 of that Act.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "High Court of Jodhpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-This appeal, by special leave, against the judgment of the High Court of Jodhpur raises for consideration the legality of the conviction of the appellant for a contravention of s. 3 of the Foreigners Act (Act XXXI of 1946) which is an offence under s. 14 of that Act."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3807, "end_char": 3811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3819, "end_char": 3833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3879, "end_char": 3884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3922, "end_char": 3926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3951, "end_char": 3969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government may by order make provision, either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigners, for prohibiting regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or other departure therefrom or their presence or continued presence therein."}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4645, "end_char": 4655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ibrahim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5335, "end_char": 5342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to the appeal are briefly these: The 1964 case of the prosecution was that the appellant-Ibrahim, s Io Ibrahim Miru--a resident of Rajgarh in Bikaner Division-was a v.\n\nPakistani national who had originally come over to India on Bw.te 01 RajClfllia• a Pakistani passport issued to him in 1954 and on the strength Ar J. of a visa granted in December, 1956.", "canonical_name": "IBRAHIM"}}, {"text": "Rajgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5377, "end_char": 5384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to the appeal are briefly these: The 1964 case of the prosecution was that the appellant-Ibrahim, s Io Ibrahim Miru--a resident of Rajgarh in Bikaner Division-was a v.\n\nPakistani national who had originally come over to India on Bw.te 01 RajClfllia• a Pakistani passport issued to him in 1954 and on the strength Ar J. of a visa granted in December, 1956."}}, {"text": "Bikaner", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5388, "end_char": 5395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to the appeal are briefly these: The 1964 case of the prosecution was that the appellant-Ibrahim, s Io Ibrahim Miru--a resident of Rajgarh in Bikaner Division-was a v.\n\nPakistani national who had originally come over to India on Bw.te 01 RajClfllia• a Pakistani passport issued to him in 1954 and on the strength Ar J. of a visa granted in December, 1956."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5818, "end_char": 5826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was given effect to and on April 21, 1957 he was taken across the Pakistan border at the Check Post Munabao by the Indian police officials and deported."}}, {"text": "Churu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6263, "end_char": 6268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On seeing him there the Sub-Inspector of Churu made a report to the Station House Officer of Rajgarh by which he drew the latter's attention to the fact that the appellant who had been deported had 10anaged to cross the border."}}, {"text": "Ganganagar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the side of Ganganagar and had re-entered India and he brought this to his notice for the purpose of action being taken."}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6707, "end_char": 6717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ibrahim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7257, "end_char": 7264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of their case the prosecution proved the order of Government by which Ibrahim, son of Meeru of Rajgarh had been directed to be deported in which is found a reference to his having come over to India with a passport a.nd having overstayed the time permitted by the visa, the general diary of the , Emigration Check Post, Munabao dated April 21, 1957 which recited that on April 21, 1957 the deportee-.", "canonical_name": "IBRAHIM"}}, {"text": "Meeru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7273, "end_char": 7278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of their case the prosecution proved the order of Government by which Ibrahim, son of Meeru of Rajgarh had been directed to be deported in which is found a reference to his having come over to India with a passport a.nd having overstayed the time permitted by the visa, the general diary of the , Emigration Check Post, Munabao dated April 21, 1957 which recited that on April 21, 1957 the deportee-."}}, {"text": "Munabao", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7507, "end_char": 7514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of their case the prosecution proved the order of Government by which Ibrahim, son of Meeru of Rajgarh had been directed to be deported in which is found a reference to his having come over to India with a passport a.nd having overstayed the time permitted by the visa, the general diary of the , Emigration Check Post, Munabao dated April 21, 1957 which recited that on April 21, 1957 the deportee-."}}, {"text": "Cbrahim", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7589, "end_char": 7596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cbrahim-had come with a Head Constable and that the deportation order had been given effect to, and an entry in the deportation register of the Check Post which recited the date arid number of the Pakistani passport and the .. authority by which the order of deportation had been passed and the carrying out of the acwat deportation.", "canonical_name": "IBRAHIM"}}, {"text": "Shiv Rattan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8060, "end_char": 8071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "two witnesses-- Shiv Rattan who was the Police Inspector in-charge of the\n\n'\"."}}, {"text": "Govind Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8218, "end_char": 8230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Munabao Check Post at the relevant date (P.W. 2) and Govind Singh who was a pe9n who was posted at the police lines at Churu and who accompanied Dube Singh, Head Constable when Ibrahim was taken from Rajgarh to the Check Post at Munabao for being deported."}}, {"text": "Dube Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8310, "end_char": 8320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Munabao Check Post at the relevant date (P.W. 2) and Govind Singh who was a pe9n who was posted at the police lines at Churu and who accompanied Dube Singh, Head Constable when Ibrahim was taken from Rajgarh to the Check Post at Munabao for being deported."}}, {"text": "s 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9378, "end_char": 9387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "\\\\ith Ibrahim", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9804, "end_char": 9817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first point urged by learned counsel for the appellant was as regards the identity of the appellant \\\\ith Ibrahim."}}, {"text": "s 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9962, "end_char": 9971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Miru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10195, "end_char": 10199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The documents produced as regards which there is no challenge give the name of the person deported as Ibrahim, his father as Miru and besides, they specify his age as 27 which, it is conceded, tallies with the description of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Murra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10488, "end_char": 10493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-I-the deporting register at the Check Post-the neme of Ibrahim's father was stated to have been entered as Murra and not Miru."}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11091, "end_char": 11098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11106, "end_char": 11126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ayyanyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11379, "end_char": 11387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that citizens of Pakistan became \"foreigners\" only by Ayyanyar, J. virtue of the amendment effected by Central Act XI of 1957 which came into force on January 19, 1957.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "Central Act XI of 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11428, "end_char": 11450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11600, "end_char": 11604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XI of 1957", "statute": "Central Act XI of 1957"}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11612, "end_char": 11626, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "19th January, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11898, "end_char": 11916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must, therefore, be taken that he had crossed over to India before the 19th January, 1957."}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12234, "end_char": 12248, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13212, "end_char": 13219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13227, "end_char": 13241, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13427, "end_char": 13431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13439, "end_char": 13453, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13772, "end_char": 13779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Citizenship Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13787, "end_char": 13808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13905, "end_char": 13909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Citizenship Act, 1955", "statute": "the Citizenship Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13917, "end_char": 13931, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9('.!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14539, "end_char": 14548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Citizenship Act, 1955", "statute": "the Citizenship Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Citizenship Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14556, "end_char": 14571, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14847, "end_char": 14854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Citizenship Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14862, "end_char": 14877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15073, "end_char": 15083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15091, "end_char": 15105, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15436, "end_char": 15439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15471, "end_char": 15481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15705, "end_char": 15710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_447_455_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 447\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB JAMMU\n\n& KASHMIR, HIMACHAL PRADESH AND PATIALA v.\n\nPUNJAB DISTILLING INDUSTRIES LTD.\n\n[A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J.C. SHAH, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax-Distiller taking deposit refundable on return\n\nof bottles-Balance of deposits after refund, if trading receipt-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s.10.\n\nThe assessee, a distiller of country liquor, carried on the business of selling liquor to licensed whole salers. The assessee '5tarted collecting from its customers from the year 1945 besides the price of the liquor and the bottles in which the liquor was sold a further charge called \"empty bottles return security deposit.\" The entire sum collected on this account in respect of any one transaction would be refunded in full on return of 90 per cent. of the bottles covered by it. The question for consideration before this Court was whether t~ charge \"security deposit\" amounted to a trading receipt assessable to Income Tax.\n\nHeld: The amounts paid to the assessee and described as 'security deposit' were trading receipts and therefore income of the assessee assessable to tax. These amounts were paid as an integral part of the commercial transaction of the sale of liquor in bottles and represented an extra price charged for the bottles. They were not security deposits as there was nothing to secure, there being no right to the return of bottles. These appeals are covered by the judgment of this Court in Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax.\n\nPunjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v. Commissi07leT of Income tax [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 693, relied on.\n\nDavies v. Shell Company of China Ltd. (1951)32\n\nT.C. 133 and K.M.S. Lakshmanier & Sons v. Commissioner of Incometax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras [1953] S.C.R. 1057, distingW.•hed.\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JuR1so1cnoN: Civil Appeals Nos. 107-111 of 1963 .. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 23, 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 14 of 1960.\n\nR. Ganapathi Iyer and R.N. Saclzthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals).\n\nS.T. Desai, R.K. Gauba, B.P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\nMarch 24. 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR, J.-We think.that these appeals are covered by the judgment of this Court in Punjab Distilling Industries .Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') and the High . Court\n\n(') [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 693.\n\nSarkar, I.\n\nOommiuioner of\n\nlntome-t®;, Punjab, Jammu\n\nd1 Kashmir,\n\nHimaclial Pradesh and\n\nPatiala\n\nPun}ab Diatilling\n\nlnduatries Ltd.\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nwas in error in its view that the ratio decidendi of that judgment was not applicable to them. The earlier case had arisen out of the assessment of the same assessee but it was concerned with the years 1947-48 and 1948-49 while the present appeals are concerned with the years 1946-47, 1949-50, 1950-51, and 1951-52. The accounting period of the assessee was from December 1, in one year to November 30 of the following year. In both the cases the assessments were for income-tax, excess profits tax and business profits tax, The point for consideration in respect of all these taxes was, however, the same.\n\nA full statement of the facts will be found in the Judgment in the earlier case and it is unnecessary to state them at length over again. The assessee who was a distiller and seller of bottled country liquor, started collecting from its customers from the year 1945 besides the price of the liquor and the bottles in which the liquor was sold, a further charge called \"empty bottles return security deposit\". This charge was made at a certain rate per bottle delivered depending on its size on the term that it woud be refunded as and when the bottles were returned to the assessee and that the entire sum collected on this account in respect of any one transaction would be refunded in full on return of 90 per cent of the bottles covered by it.\n\nThe question is whether this charge is a trading receipt assessable to tax. In the earlier case this Court held it to be assessable. This Court then said (p. 687), \"the trade consisted of sale of bottled liquor and the consideration for the sale was constituted by several amounts respectively called, the Price of the liquor, the price of the bottles and the security deposit. Unless all these sums were paid the appellant would not have sold the liquor. So the amount which was called security deposit was actually a part of the consideration for the sale and, therefore, part of the price of what was old.\"\n\nIn respect of the years now under consideration the Income-tax Officer taxed these charges and on appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the Income-tax Officer's view. On further appeal, however, the Income-tax Tribunal reversed the decisions of the authorities bdow and held that these charges were loans and not trading receipts.\n\nIt may be stated that all this had happened before the aforesaid earlier judgment was delivered. After the Tribunal's decision, the Commissioner of Income-tax obtained a reference of the following question to the Punjab High Court: ·\n\n\"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the collections by the assessee company. described in its accounts as 'empty bottle return security deposits' were income assessable under Section 10 of the Income-tax Act.\"\n\n1960 It is of interest to note that the earlier case also concerned .an identical question and had been answered both by the High Court and this Court in the affirmative.\n\nIf the judgment in the earlier q1se covered the present appeals, then the question referred would, of course, have to be answered in the affirmative. The High Court, however, took the view that as a result of the amendment of the rules made under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 which came into effect irom April I, 1948, the charges collected after that date were not covered by that judgment. It held that the amended rule made the ratio decidendi of our judgment inapplicable to the charges collected after that date. The rule referred to is r. 40(14)(0 and the relevant part of it on which the High Court based its view is as follows: -\n\nCommi8sioner o/\n\nIncQme-taz, Punjab, Jammu\n\n&r Kashmir, HimaclUJl and\n\nPatiala v Punjab Distilling\n\nIndustries Ltd. p\n\n<v) It is compulsory for the licensee to return at least\n\n90 per cent. of the bottles issued to him by the licensed distiller.\n\n(vil The licensed distiller may, at the time of issue, demand security at the rates of three rupees, two rupees or one rupee and eight annas per dozen quart, pint or nip bottles respec!ively upto 10 J.ler cent. of the bottles issued by him and confiscate the security to the extent falling short of the 90 per cent. limit.\n\nThe licensee referred to in the earlier of the ntles quoted is the wholesaler to whom the distiller sold his liquor. It is not very .::!ear what is meant by the words \"upto 10 per cent. of the bottles issued\" or the words \"falling short of the 90 per cent. limit\". It is not necessary, however, to pursue this matter for we shall not be concerned with the precise meaning of these words. It is not in dispute that some charge described as a deposit was realised on the term that it would be refunded in certain eventualities and that is enough for our purpose for lhe only question is whether this charge was a trading receipt.\n\nThe High Court thought that the earlier judgment of this Court had been based on three considerations, namely (!) that the charge concerned had been made without Government's sanction and entirely as a condition imposed by the assessee itself for the sale of its liquor; (2) that it could not be security deposit for the return of the bottles for there was no right to their return and (3) that it was refundable under the contract of sale itself. In the High Court's view if these circumstances were not there, our decision would have been different. The High Court held that since the amended rules came into force, none of these considerations was available and, therefore, the\n\nLP(D) !SCI-15&\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome.tax, Punjab, Jammu\n\nJIKasMnir,\n\nHimaau.l Pradeah and\n\nPatia'fa\n\nPunjab DiMUting lnd\"\"1'iea Ltd..\n\nSarkar, J.\n\ncharges could not be held to be trading receipts. The following quotation from the judgment of the High Court fairly summarises its reasoning: -\n\n\"The amended rules were given effect from 1st April.\n\n1948. To securities demanded in accordance with the above rules the three considerations which prevailed with their Lordships of the Supreme Court and which have been mentioned above will not apply to the instant case. It cannot. therefore, be said, as was the case in the appeal before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, that the 'additional amounts had been taken without Government's sanction and cntirely as a condition imposed by the appellant itself for the sale of its liquor'.\n\nAgain it cannot be said that the 'wholesalers were under no obligation to return the bottles.' Lastly, in view of the statutory rule amended in 1948 it cannot be said that the deposit was part of each trading transaction and was refundable under the terms of the contract relating to trading transaction under which it had been made.\" It is not in dispute that if the High Court was in error in this reasoning, the present case will be governed by the earlier decision.\n\nWith respect to the learned Judges of the High Court, we think that the earlier judgment of this Court has been misunderstood by them. That judgment had not been based on the three points mentioned by the High Court and this we now proceed to show. The first point of distinction between the two cases was based on the observation in the earlier case that the additional amounts had been taken without Governmenfs sanction and entirely as a condition imposed by the appellant itself for the sale of its liquor'. The High Court apparently th9ught that by this observation it was suggested that if the amounts had been taken under Government's sanction, then they would not have been taxable. We are wholly unable to agree that this is a correct reading of that judgment. That observation contained only a recital of fact and was made for the purpose of distinguishing these amounts from the other amounts charged by the assessee as price of bottles to which we have earlier referred. The other amount was charged under a scheme framed \" by the Government and called the \"buy back scheme\". We find nothing in the earlier judgment to show that the conclusion there arrived at was based on the fact that the charge had not been. made with the sanction of the GovernmeQt. That nothing turned on whether a charge was made under a Government scheme or purely as a matter of contract would indeed appear to have always been the common case. Thus even before the\n\n.amended rules had come into force, the assessee had been .collecting under the aforesaid \"buy scheme\" which had the sanction of the Government, from its customers as price of the bottles, a charge which was refundable on the return of the bottles. The charge now under consideration is a charge .additional to that collected under the 'buy back scheme' and this we have earlier said. lthas never been in dispute, either in the earlier case or now, that the charge under the 'buy back scheme' which was collected under Government's sanction constituted a taxable income. This Court had never said, nor was it ever contended by the assessee that a collection would not be taxable if it had been made with the sanction of the Government. The first point of distinction sought to be made by the High Court is, therefore, unfounded.\n\nThe second point made by the High Court was that the observation in the earlier judgment that the charge could not be a security for the return of the bottles as there was no right to such return, was no longer applicable as under the amended rules there was a right to the return of the bottles. We do not agree for reasons to be stated later, that under the amended rules there was such a right but we will assume for the present that there was. Now, the argument in connection with which that observation was made was that if the charges were deposits for securing the return of the bottles, they were not trading receipts. By the aforesaid observation this Court dealt with the first part of this argument and said that the assumption that the charges were for securing the return of the bottles was unfounded for there was no right to such return. If the charges were not by way of security deposit the argument must, of .course, fail. So that was one answer that was given to the argument. But this Court did not stop there and proceeded to •consider the argument as a whole, namely, whether if the charges were security deposits, they were not trading receipts.\n\nNow, the reason why it was said that if the charges were security deposits they were not trading receipts is to be found in two cases on which the argument was based. The first. was the case of Davies v. Shall Company of China Ltd.('). In that Case the Company had delivered its product to certain agents for sale and payment of the sale proceeds to it. The Company took money from each agent as deposit to secure itself against the risk of default by him to account for the sale proceeds. It was observed by Jenkins L.J.,\n\n\"Mr. Grant described the agents' deposits as part of the Company's trading structure, not trade receipts but anterior to the stage of trade receipts, and I think that is a fair description of them. It seems to\n\n!'l (1951) 32 T.C. 133.\n\nLP(D)iSCI-15\n\n1964 Comm-•/ Imome-taz, Punjab, Jamm•\n\ndi Kaahmir,.\n\nHimachal Pradukand\n\nPaliala\n\ny, Punjab Dialilling lndmtrieo Lid.\n\nSarkar, J,\n\nOommialitnlu of\n\n]ncome-ta:t, Pvnjab. Jammu\n\ndi Kaali.mir,\n\nHimadoal Pmduhaml\n\nPatiala\n\nPunjab Di/dilling\n\nlndmtriea Ltd.\n\n.Sarkar, J.\n\nme that it would be an abuse of language to describe one of these agents, after he had made a deposit, as a trade creditor of the Company in respect of the deposit, not on account of any goods supplied or services rendered by him in the course of its trade, but simply by virtue of the fact that he has been appointed an agent of the Company with a view to him trading on its behalf, and as a condition of his appointment has deposited with or, in other words, lent to the Company the amount of liis stipulated deposit.\"\n\nThat was the kind of security deposit which Mr. Sastri appearing for the assessee on the earlier occasion said the \"empty bottles .return security deposits\" were. The real point, therefore, in contending that the deposits were security deposits was to establish that they were not part of the trading transactions at all but related to a stage anterior to the trading transactions. This contention was rejected and it was held that the \"empty bottles return security deposits\" were not the kind of deposits considered in the Shall Company case.\n\nThe other case on which Mr. Sastri then relied was K.M.\n\nS. Lakshmanier & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax Madras('). That case dealt with three trade arrangements. Mr. Sastri contended that the \"empty bottles return security deposits\" were the kind of deposits dealt with in the third arrangement considered in that case but this argument also failed. Under the third arrangement, the trader took from its constituent at the commencement of an expected series of trading transactions with it a deposit and kept the same till the business connection came to an end whereupon the deposit was refundable to the constituent with interest at 3 per cent per annum after deduction thereout of any amount remaining due from the constituent on the trading transactions. The understanding was that the constituent would pay for each purchase made by him from the trader during the continuance of the business connection and it was only where he failed to make the payment that the amount due became liable to be deducted from the deposit. This deposit was held by this Court to be a loan for these reasons : \"The amount deposited by a customer was no longer to have any relation to the price fixed for the goods to be delivered under a forward contract-either in instalment or otherwise. Such price was to be paid by the. customer in full against delivery in respect of each contract ............... It was only at the end of the 'business connection' with the appellants that an adjustment was to be made towards any possible liability arising out\n\n(') [1953] S.C.R. 1057.\n\nof the customer's default ............ The transaction had thus all the essential elements of a contract of loan.\" (p. 1063).\n\nNone of these cases, therefore, was concerned with the question whether a security deposit was by its very nature such that it could not be a trading receipt. The first case dealt with\n\nOommiasionu of\n\nlncome-taz, Punjab, Jamm1'\n\n& Kaahmir, Himachal Praduhand an actual security deposit but it was held that that deposit Pa1; a1a was not a trading receipt not for the reason that it was ii P . 6 Ti, nr , security deposit but for the reason that it formed t:1~.tri~ ~;; t the structure under which trading transactions producing trading receipts were conducted and was not itself connected with any trading transaction. In the second case the receipt was held to be a loan; that it might be also a security deposit was not even mentioned. It was held not to be a trading receipt because it had no connection with the trading transactions but related to a stage anterior to the trading transactions.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the contention that the charges formed a security deposit had been advanced only for the purpose of showing that they were not a part of the trading transactions. The question was not really whether the charges were security deposits but whether they were part of the trading transactions or had been made at anterior stages. This Court decided that they were part of the trading transactions and were not relatable to an anterior stage. That is all that it was called upon to decide and did decide.\n\nThat on the earlier occasion this Court was not concerned with the question whether the charges made were security deposits or not would appear from the following observations occurring at p. 690. \"Mr. Sanyal was prepared to argue that even if the amounts were securities deposited for the return of the bottles, they would still be trading recepits, for they were part of the trading transactions and the return of the bottles was necessary to enable the appellant to carry on its trµde, namely, to sell liquor in them. As we have held that the amounts had not been paid as security for the return of the bottles, we do not consider it necessary to pronounce upon this contention.\" This Court, therefore, did not decide that if the deposits had been made to secure the return of the bottles, they could not be a trading receipt. The High Court was in error in distinguishing the present case from the earlier one on the basis that this Court had then so decided.\n\nWe now turn to the question whether under the amended rules there was any right in the distiller to the return of the bottles. We think there was not and in this respect the two cases .are identical; in none was the charge in fact. a security deposit. The reason for that view is this. The liquor passed through three sales before it reached tbe consumer first the distiller sold it to wholesaler then the wholesaier to a retailer and lastly, the retailer to the consumer, If the\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nCo, nmissiontf\" of\n\nInrome-tax, Punjab. Jammu Ka.skmif\", Himachal Pradesh and Patiala\n\nP unjoh DistiUin1\n\nln-fu.<1trie~ Ltd-\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nrules created an obligation on the wholesaler to return the bottles to the distiller, then the rules. would provide for a return of the bottles to the wholesaler by the retailer and to the retailer by the consumer; without such rules it would be idle to require the wholesaler to return the bottles to the distiller.\n\nWe have not been shown anything creating a right in the wholesaler or the retailer to a return of bottles. Clearly, the consumers were under no obligation to return the bottles in which they bought liquor. Sub-clause (v) of the rule on which the High Court based itself, referred to the return of the bottles in which liquor was sold. In the absence of a right in the wholesaler to a return of the bottles from the retailer, it would be insensible to read that provision as creating an obligation on the wholesaler to return the bottles. He had no means under the rules to perform that obligation. That rule, therefore, must be read as intending only to lay down that if the wholesaler could not return the bottles, his <ieposit was liable to be confiscated under sub-d. (vi). Again, the rules do not lay down any procedure by which the distiller might enforce the return of the bottles to him, which they would have undoubtedly done if it was intended to give him a right to the return of the bottles. Indeed there is nothing to show that he can obtain such a return. Whether the wholesaler would be liable to punishment under the Act for breach of his obligation to return the bottles or not is to no purpose, for we are now concerned with the right of the distiller to obtain a return of the bottles. It seems to us that the only reason why the rules required a wholesaler to return the bottles to the distiller was to authorise the imposition of a term of the sale upon the breach of which, tpe charges lnade for the bottles would cease to be refundable.\n\nWe now come to the last point of distinction made by the High Court. On the earlier occasion this Court had said that the amount deposited was refundable under the terms of the contract constituting the trading transaction and was, therefore, a trading receipt. The learned Judges of the High Court seem to have been of the opinion . that since the rule was amended, the deposits had to be made under it and, therefore, were not thereafter received under the contract or as part of the trading transaction constituted by it. With great respect to the learned Judges, there appears to be some confusion here. The rule by its own fdrce does not compel a deposit to be made. The terms of the rule make this perfectly clear. All that it does is to empower a distiller to take a deposit. But the deposit must be taken under a contract in regard to it: it is not taken under the rule itself. In other words, all that the rule does is to authorise the making of a contract concerning the deposit on the terms mentioned in it, the object apparently\n\nbeing to avoid any question as to its validity arising later. We\n\n19G4 may here point out that the trade.in liquor is largely control-co,,,,,,;,.;;-,,;;;, of led by Government regulations. It must, therefore, be held Inw'!'e-tax, that the deposit was actually taken under a contract; it was ~1:, t.;[; mmu none the less so though the contract was authorised by the H; ma, hal ' stationery rules. The third point of distinction on which the f:ad7h and High Court relied was, therefore, also without foundation. at•a :.\n\nWhether if the deposits had beenmade without a contract and Punjah DistUhng directly under the rules and in respect of a trading transaction Ina,,, tric.• J, id. made by a contract they would have been trading receipts or Sarkar, J. not, is not a question that arises in the present appeals and on that question we express no opinion now.\n\nFor these reasons we think that these appeals are compietely governed by the earlier judgment of this Court and we answer the question referred in the affirmative. We should state that even according to the High Court the amounts collected as \"empty bottles return security deposit\" prior to April I, 1948, were chargeable to tax.\n\nThe appeals are allowed and the respondent will pay the costs here and below.\n\nThere will be one set of costs allowed as hearing fee.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 27, "entities": [{"text": "447\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB JAMMU\n\n& KASHMIR, HIMACHAL PRADESH AND PATIALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB JAMMU & KASHMIR, HIMACHAL PRADESH AND PATIALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PUNJAB DISTILLING INDUSTRIES LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PUNJAB DISTILLING INDUSTRIES LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 169, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 186, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 193, "end_char": 205, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 330, "end_char": 357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 372, "end_char": 376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathi Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2055, "end_char": 2072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathi Iyer and R.N. Saclzthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R.N. Saclzthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2077, "end_char": 2091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathi Iyer and R.N. Saclzthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S.T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2134, "end_char": 2144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, R.K. Gauba, B.P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R.K. Gauba", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2146, "end_char": 2156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, R.K. Gauba, B.P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "B.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2158, "end_char": 2168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, R.K. Gauba, B.P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2173, "end_char": 2183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, R.K. Gauba, B.P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2287, "end_char": 2293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR, J.-We think.that these appeals are covered by the judgment of this Court in Punjab Distilling Industries .Ltd.", "canonical_name": ".Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2493, "end_char": 2499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar, I.\n\nOommiuioner of\n\nlntome-t®;, Punjab, Jammu\n\nd1 Kashmir,\n\nHimaclial Pradesh and\n\nPatiala\n\nPun}ab Diatilling\n\nlnduatries Ltd.\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nwas in error in its view that the ratio decidendi of that judgment was not applicable to them.", "canonical_name": ".Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5170, "end_char": 5187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Tribunal's decision, the Commissioner of Income-tax obtained a reference of the following question to the Punjab High Court: ·\n\n\"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the collections by the assessee company."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5383, "end_char": 5393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5401, "end_char": 5415, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab Excise Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5842, "end_char": 5865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April I, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5894, "end_char": 5907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, however, took the view that as a result of the amendment of the rules made under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 which came into effect irom April I, 1948, the charges collected after that date were not covered by that judgment."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8783, "end_char": 8796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "therefore, be said, as was the case in the appeal before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, that the 'additional amounts had been taken without Government's sanction and cntirely as a condition imposed by the appellant itself for the sale of its liquor'."}}, {"text": "Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13397, "end_char": 13404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was observed by Jenkins L.J.,\n\n\"Mr. Grant described the agents' deposits as part of the Company's trading structure, not trade receipts but anterior to the stage of trade receipts, and I think that is a fair description of them."}}, {"text": "Grant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13417, "end_char": 13422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was observed by Jenkins L.J.,\n\n\"Mr. Grant described the agents' deposits as part of the Company's trading structure, not trade receipts but anterior to the stage of trade receipts, and I think that is a fair description of them."}}, {"text": ".Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13916, "end_char": 13923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jammu\n\ndi Kaali.mir,\n\nHimadoal Pmduhaml\n\nPatiala\n\nPunjab Di/dilling\n\nlndmtriea Ltd.\n\n.Sarkar, J.\n\nme that it would be an abuse of language to describe one of these agents, after he had made a deposit, as a trade creditor of the Company in respect of the deposit, not on account of any goods supplied or services rendered by him in the course of its trade, but simply by virtue of the fact that he has been appointed an agent of the Company with a view to him trading on its behalf, and as a condition of his appointment has deposited with or, in other words, lent to the Company the amount of liis stipulated deposit.\"", "canonical_name": ".Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14499, "end_char": 14505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was the kind of security deposit which Mr. Sastri appearing for the assessee on the earlier occasion said the \"empty bottles .return security deposits\" were."}}, {"text": "Sanyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18347, "end_char": 18353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sanyal was prepared to argue that even if the amounts were securities deposited for the return of the bottles, they would still be trading recepits, for they were part of the trading transactions and the return of the bottles was necessary to enable the appellant to carry on its trµde, namely, to sell liquor in them."}}, {"text": "Punjah DistUhng", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23240, "end_char": 23255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether if the deposits had beenmade without a contract and Punjah DistUhng directly under the rules and in respect of a trading transaction Ina,,, tric.• J, id. made by a contract they would have been trading receipts or Sarkar, J. not, is not a question that arises in the present appeals and on that question we express no opinion now."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_456_470_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nSRI VENKATA SEETARAMANJANEYA RICE AND\n\nOIL MILLS AND ORS.\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC. [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND s. M. S!KRI, JJ.J\n\nMadras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary) Powers Act, 1949 (Mad. 29 of 1949), ss. 3(1) (2)- Applicability of the Act to electricity supplied by State-Intention of Legislature, consideration of-Notified orders <>nhancing agreed rate by State-Whether valid under s. 3-Regu- Zate, meaning of-Increase of tariff-If reasonable and in interest of general public-Whether contravenes Arts. 14 and 19(1)-Constitution of India, Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) and (f).\n\nElectricity was supplied to the appellants by the respondent-state for manY. years past, and several individual agreements were passed between them prescribing the terms and conditions for the supply. One of these terms stipulated the rate at which the supply had to be charged. These agreements did not contain any provision authorising the State to increase the rates during their operation. The respondent-state issued two notified orders enhancing the agreed rates. The orders indicated that the main reason which inspired the increase was that the existing electricity tariffs which were formulated several years before, had become completely uneconomic and meant continuously growing loss to the State. A large number of consumers challenged the validity of the two orders in the High Court under Art. 226. The writ petitions were allowed and the respondent was restrained from enforcing the revised rates. These decisions were challenged by the respondent by appeals in the High Court, which took a different view and dismissed the writ petitions. On appeals to this Court, it was contended, inter alia that the respondent had no authority to increase the rate, changing this important term of the contract by taking recourse to s. 3(1) of the Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary) Powers Act. that the power to regulate the supply of essefltial articles had to be applied in regard to transactions between citizens and citizens and could not be applied to an essential article which the State itself supplied; that the power to regulate conferred on the respondent by s. 3(1) could not include the power to increase the tariff rate, that the notified orders were invalid as they contravened the provisions of Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) and that of Art 14 of the Constitution.\n\nHeld: (i) The challenge to the validity of the notified orders on the ground that they were outside the purview of s. 3(1) of the Act could not be sustained.\n\nThe State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided in express terms or by necessary implication. In applying this rule, the court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by considering all the relevant provisions of the statute together and not concentrating its attention on a particular provision which may be in dispute.\n\nWhere the quest!ion is not so much as to whether the State is bound by the statute, but whether it can claim the benefit of the provision of a statute, the same rule of construction\n\nmay have to be applied. Where the statute may be for the pub- 19~4 lie good and by claiming the benefit. c\".nferre~ on it bv i!s . - provisions the State may allege that it is servmg the public /\" Venka~ good, it would sti.11 be necessary to ascertain whether te. in- Ric~~d'Q;~3n; lf: tention of the l\"'g1slature was to make the relevant proV1s1ons and Otkera applicable. v.\n\nDirector of Rationing and Distribution v. Corporation of Slale of Andhro Calcutta, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 158 ahd Province of Bombay v. Muni- Praluh etc. cipa! Corporation of the City of Bombay, [1945-46] L.R. 73 I.A. 271, applied.\n\n(ii) In construing s. 3 of the Act of the usual rule of construction must be adopted. s. 3 must not be read in isolation, but must be considered in its proper setting and due regard must be had for the other provisions of the Act and its general sch.., me and purpose.\n\n(iii) The purpose of the Act is to secure the supply of essential articles at fair prices, it would be irrelevant as to who makes the supply; what is relevant is to regulate the supply at a fair price.\n\n(iv) ft is well-settled that the function of a clause like\n\ncl. (2) of s. 3 is merely illustrative. In other _words the proper approach to adopt in construing els. (D andl (2) of s. 3 is ta assum\"' that whatever is included in cl. (2) is also included in cl. (1).\n\nKing Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, 72 I.A. 241 and Santosh Kumar Jain v. State, [1951] S.C.R.. 303, applied.\n\n(v) The word 'regulate' is wide enough to confer power on the State to regulate either by increasing the rate or decreasing the rate, the test being what is it that is necessary or expedient to be done to maintain, increase or secqre supply of the essential articles in question and to arrange for its equitable distribution and its availability at fair prices.\n\n(vi) Having regard to all the circumstances in this case, th\" change made in the tariff were reasonable and in the interests of the general public.\n\n(vii) There was ats0lute no material on the record of the appeals on which a plea under Art. 14 of the Constitution could even be raised.\n\nOVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 429 439, 591, 592, 597, 689, 694, 724, 725 and 727 of 1962 and 15, 139, 140, 159, 267 to 269, 331, 334, 337, 340, 342, 343, 347, 352, 389, 746 and 748 of 1963. Appeals from the judgments and order dated December 19, 1958, March 7, 1959, March 11, 1959, April 22, 1959, April 24, 1959 in Writ Appeals Nos. 135, 122 of 1957 etc.\n\nT. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 429 to 434 and 694 of 1962 and C.A. No. 269 / 63).\n\nM. C. Setalvad. P. Kodandaramayya, E. V. Bhagarathi Rao and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 438 and 439 I 62).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, and R. Ganapathi Iyer, for the appellants (in C. A. Nos. 436, 437, 724, 725 and 727 / 62).\n\n1964 K. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal. for the appellants Sri Venkata (in C. As. Nos. 591, 582, 597, and 689 /62 and 140, 267 Seetaramanjaneya and 268 / 63).\n\nRiu and OilMiU.\n\nand Others.\n\nK. Jayaram and R. Thiagarajan, for the appellants (in\n\nState of'.4ndhra C.A. Nos. 139, 159, 330, 334, 337, 340, 342, 343, 347 and\n\nPradeBh etc. 352/ 63).\n\nK. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos. 15 and 389 of 63).\n\nA. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam, for the appellant (in C. As. Nos. 746, and 748 of 63).\n\nD. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, M. V. Goswami and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in C. As. Nos. 435- 437, 724, 725 and 727 / 62).\n\nD. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, Yogcshwar Prasad and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in C. As. Nos. 429- 434, 438, 439 and 694/62 and 269 of 63).\n\nD. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, M. S. K. Sastri and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 591, 597 and 689/62 and 140, 267 and 268/63) and respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 592/62).\n\nJ. V. K. Sarma and T. Satyanarayana, for respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 592/62).\n\nD. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, R. Gopalakrishnan and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in C. As. Nos. 15, 139, 331, 334, 337, 340, 342, 343, 347, 352, 159, 389 and 746-748/63).\n\nMarch 25, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nQajendreyadkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-The principal question of law which arises in this group of 37 civil appeals relates to the construction of section 3 of the Madras Essential Articles ControI and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1949 (No. 29 of 1949) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The dispute which has given rise to these appeals centres round the validity of two notified orders issued by the respondent, State of Andhra Pradesh on the 28th January, 1955, and 30th January, 1955 respectively, and it is the contention of the appellants that the said notified orders are outside the purview of s. 3. The appellants in all these appeals are supplied electricity by the respondent for many years past, and several individual agreements have been passed between I them and the respondent during the period 1946 to 1952 prescribing the terms and conditions on which the said supply would be 'made to them. One of these terms stipulated the rate at which the supply of electricity had to be charged ,\n\n/7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 459\n\n1964 against the consumers. The impugned orders have purported to increase this rate, and the appellants contend that the Sri Venkara respondent had no authority to change this important term s,, taramanjaneya\n\nof the contract to their pre1 udice by taking recourse to Rfre and Oil Mills and Otliers s. 3(1) and issuing notified orders in that behalf. That, in v. substance, is the nature of the controversy between the parties Stare 01 AndAra before us.\n\nPradc41 etC.\n\nG'ajendragadCar , C.J ~\n\nIt appears that the Government of Madras, and subsequently, its successor, the respondent, had a single power grid system for the whole State comprising Tungabhadra and Machkund Hydro Electric System and the Thermal System of Nellore. The entire energy was integrated into one power system. The Government of Madras entered into agreements with several consumers in the State, including the appellants,. for the supply of energy in bulk at the specified rates which were called tariffs, for the years 1951 and 1952. These agreements were to be in operation for ten years. It is common ground that these agreements did not contain any provision authorising the Government to increase the rates during their operation. The charges fixed were calculated at graded regressive rates according to increasing slabs of consumption units, and the overall unit rates including the demand charge were not to exceed 66 annas without prejudice to the monthly minimum payment and the guaranteed consumption.\n\nThe Government of Andhra then issued the two impugned orders relating to Machkund and Nellore, and Tungabhadra and Chittoore District areas respectively, enhancing the agreed ra.tes. These enhanced rates were specified in Schedules A and B attached to the said orders. According to these orders, these increased tariffs were to take effect from the date on which meter readings were to be taken in the month of February, 1955 and were to operate for the future., The increase in the rates effected by these orders was thus to operate not retrospectively, but prospectively. The impugned orders indicate that the main reason which inspired the said orders was the knowledge that the existing electricity tariffs which were formulated nearly 15 years before. had become completely uneconomic; the charges of labour and the price level of all material had enormously increased; and that inevitably meant continuously growing loss to the Government.\n\nThe Accountant-General made queries in respect of th~ recurring loss and drew pointed attention of the State Government to the deficits in the working of the Power System. Accordingly, the question of revision of tariffs was considered in the State of Madras, but was not decided because reorganisation of the States was then in contemplation. After the respondent State was born, its Chief Engineer sumbitted proposals for\n\n1964 revii:ions of tariffs in all the areas covered by the relevant Sri Venkata schemes. That is how the impugned notified orders came to 8eetaramani_antya be ii:sued by the respondent.\n\nRsce and Oil Mills\n\nand Other The appellants were naturally aggrieyed by these orders,\n\n8 v. , because they added to their liability to pay the rates for the 1f.!df.f':f:'.'a, supply of electricity by the respondent to them. Accordingly,\n\n- a large number of consumers moved the Andhra Pradesh Gajendraqadkar,0.J.High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and challenged the validity of the two impugned orders. The learned sing:le Judge who heard these writ petitions upheld the appellants' plea and came to the conclusion that the impugned orders were not justified by the authority conferred on the . respondent by s. 3 of the Act, and were unauthorised, illegal and inoperative. In the result, the writ petition filed by rnme of the appellants before us were allowed and an appropriate order was issued against the respondent restraining it from enforcing the revised tariff rates.\n\nThese decisions were challenged by the respondent by preferring several Letters Patent Appeals. The Division Bench which heard these Letters Patent Appeals took a different view; it held that on its fair and reasonable construction, s. 3 did confer authority on the respondent to issue the impugned orders, and so, the challenge made to the validity of the said orders could not be sustained. That is why the Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the respondent were allowed and the writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed. It is against these orders that the appellants have come to this Court with a certificate issued by the said High Court.\n\nAfter the Division Bench had pronounced its decision on this point, several other writ petitions were filed by other consumers, and naturally the single Judge who heard them followed the decision of the Division Bench and dismissed the said writ petitions. The consumers who were aggrieved by the decision of the learned single Judge were then allowed to come to this Court directly by special leave, because the points which they wanted to raise were exactly the same as were raised by the other consumers who had come to this Court against the principal decision of the Division Bench.\n\nThe present group of appeaJs thus consists of matters which have been decided by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, as well as those which have been decided by a learned single Judge, and they all raise thesame common question about the construction of s. 3 of the Act, and the validity of the impugned notified orders.\n\nBefore addressing ourselves to the question of construin:~ s. 3, it is necessary to recapitulate the legislative history of the Act. It will be recalled that during the Second World\n\nWar, the Government of India passed the Defence of India 1961 Act (No. 35 of 1939) on the 29th of September, 1939. By s.; Venkata virtue of the powers conferred on the Central Government s.-a-\"4•\"\"!f<J\n\nby s. 2 of the said Act, several Rules came to be framed by R\"\"' ~:Z ~7,!;\" Central Government known as the Defence of India Rules. v.\n\nAmongst these Rules was Rule 81(2) which clothed the sia;,•:J..1M.Ara Central Government with power to issue orders which may '_ e1e. appear to the Central Government to be necessary or ex- Gajendraga<ik&r, O.J. pedient for securing \"the defence of British India, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community\". These Rules were in operation during the continuance of the war.\n\nAfter the war came to an end, it was realised that the economic situation in the country continued to be serious, and for the proper regulation of economic affairs, it was thought necessary to continue the orders issued under the Defence of India Rule 81(2), because shortage of supply of essential articles was very much in evidence then. The purpose of continuing the orders was to ensure the supply of essential articles to the community at large at reasonable prices and to secure their equitable distribution. In due course, the Defence of India Act came to an end in 1946, but the Central Legislature thought it necessary to pass another Act to take its place and that was the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (No. 24 of 1946). On the same lines, the Madras Legislature passed an Act in 1946 (No. 14 of 1946).\n\nLater, it was replaced by Act No. 29 of 1949 with which we are concerned in the present appeals. After the respondent State was created under the Scheme of Reorganisation of States, it passed Act No. 1 of 1955 and this Act received the assent of the President on the 21st of January, 1955. By this Act, the Legislature of the respondent State virtually adopted the Madras Act. As a result, the impugned orders are, in substance, referable to s. 3 of the Madras Act.\n\nBefore we part with this topic, it may be mentioned that when the Madras Act was passed, its Schedule gave a list of the essential articles as defined by s. 2(a) and these articles were 12 in number. When the Andhra Legislature passed Act No. 1 of 1955 and adopted the Schedule of essential articles for its purpose, the number of these articles was reduced to two; they are charcoal and electrical energy. The Andhra Act was originally intended to be in operation until the 25th January, 1956, but it was later continued from time to time. It is common ground that when the impugned_ orders were passed, section 3 of he_ Act was in operation and the present appeals have been argued on the basis that the said section is constitutionally. valid, so that the main point which calls for our decision is the construction of the said section.\n\n1964 Mr. Setalvad for the appellants contends that in con- Bri v enkata strui:1g s. 3, we ought not to concentrate on the words used seetaramanjaneya in s. 3 in isolation, but must look at the said section along , Bi<• and Oil Mills with the other provisions of the Act. The rule of harmonious\n\nand Olhers h th tru ll v. constructton, e urges, requires at we must so cons e a Stale of Andhra the provisions of the Act as to avoid any conflict or repug-\n\nProdesh etc. nancy between them. So construed, section 3, according to\n\nGajend\"'!ladkar, O.J. him, cannot be said to confer power on the respondent to enha nee the tariff rate ohargeable against the appellants in respect of the supply of energy made by the respondent to them. The whole scheme of the Act indicates clearly that the power to regulate the supply of an essential article which has been conferred on the State Government has to be applied in regard to transaction between citizens and citiz•!ns and cannot be applied to an essential article which the State itself supplies. It would be odd, he suggests, if the State Government is given the power to issue a notified order regulating the rates at which it should supply energy which it itself produces. Therefore, the dealings by the State Government in the matter of supply of energy to the wnsumers should be deemed to be outside the provisions of s. 3, and that would make the impugned orders invalid.\n\nThe question as to whether the State Government would be bound by the provisions of legislative enactments passed by the State Legislature has sometimes led to difference in - judicial opinion; but the decision of this Court in the Director of Rationing and Distribution v. The Corporation of Calcutt.2 and Ors.(') must be taken to have settled this question.\n\nThe effect of the majority decision rendered in that case is to :recognise the validity of the rule of interpretation of statutes enunciated by the Privy Council in Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay(') and that rule is that the State is not bound by a statute un-. less it is so provided in express terms or by necessary implication. In applying this rule, it is obviously necessary that the Court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by considernig all the relevant provisions of the statute together and not concentrating its attention on a particular provision which may be in dispute between the par1 ies. If, after reatling all the relevant provisions of the\n\nsta~Jte, the Court is' satisfied that by necessary implication the obligation imposed by the statute should be enforced aga:inst the State, that conclusion must be adopted. If there are express terms to that effect, there is, of course, no difficulty. In dealing with this vexed question, sometimes it is nec•!ssary also to enquire whether the conclusion that the State is not bound by the specific provision of a given statute,\n\n(') [1961] 1 S.C.R 158.\n\n(') 73 I.A. 271.\n\nwould hamper the working of the statute, or would lead to l964 the anomalous position that the statute may lose its effi- Sri Venkata cacy, and if the answer to either of these two questions Se.eJar•\".;\"\"<i•nta . d' h th bl' . . d b th h uld Rice\"\"\" O•l Milla m 1cates t at e o 1galion impose y e statute s o and au.era be enforced against the Stat~, the Court would be inclined •· to infer by necessary implication that the State, in fact, is Stj,~:J,1,.W:/:.• bound by the statute.\n\nWhere, however, the question is .not so much as to Gajendrayiulkar, O.J. whether the State is bound by the statute, but whether it can claim the benefit of the provision of a statute, the same rule of construction may have to be applied. Where the statute may be for the public good, and by claiming the benefit conferred on it by its provisions the State may allege that it is serving the public good, it would still be necessary to ascertain whether the intention of the legislature was to make the relevant provisions applicable to the State. This position is also established by the decision of the Privy\n\nCouncil in Province of Bombay(') and it still continues to be a law in this country.\n\nIncidentally, we may add that where the Crown seeks to take advantage of a statute and urges that though it is not bound by the statute, it is at liberty to take advantage of it, English Law does not easily entertain such a plea, though there are observations made in some judicial .pronounce- . ments to the contrary. As Halsbury points out, \"it has been\n\nsaid that, unless it is expressly or impliedly prohibited from doing so, the Crown may take advantage of a statute notwithstanding that it is not bound thereby.\" Having made this statement, Halsbury has added. a note of caution by saying that \"there is only slender authority for this rule, and since both the rule and such authority as does exisf have also been doubted, the rule cannot, perhaps, be regarded as settled law(')\".\n\nTo the same effect is the comment made by Maxwell when he quotes with approval the view expressed by Sir\n\nJohn Simon that the decisions which recognise the right of the Crown to take advantage of a statutory provision \"start with a passage in an unsuccessful argument of a law officer which was not even relevant to the case before the court, but which has been taken out by a text-writer and repeated for centuries until it was believed that it must have some\n\nfoundation(')\".\n\nTherefore, in construing s. 3 of the Act we cannot permit the respondent to rely upon the artificial rule that since\n\n(') 73 I.A. 271.\n\nI') Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 36, p. 432, para 654.\n\n~') Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed. p. 136\n\n1964 the respondent claims a benefit under s. 3, that construc- 8,.; Venkaw tion should be adopted which supports such a claim. Thus,.\n\nBe<taranjaya the position is that when we construe s. 3, we must adopt R••0•\"ffWJ..M•11• the usual rule of construction; we must not read s. 3 in iso-\n\n•• v. \"· lation, but must consider it in its proper setting and must Swee of Andhra have due regard for the other provisions pf the Act, and\n\nPraiuhete. its general scheme and purpose.\n\nGajendragadl:al', O.J.\n\nReverting then to Mr. Setalvad 's main argument, it may be conceded that when the Act was passed in 1949, mainly and primarily the power conferred by s. 3 on the State Government must have been intended to regulate the supply of essential articles made by one citizen to another. The Stale had not then entered commercial activities on a large scale and when s. 3(1) contemplated notified orders issued for the purpose of securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of essential articles, the legislature could not have in its mind supply of essential articles made by the State itself. That is one point in favour of Mr. Setalvad's construction. If we examine the scheme of the Act, it may also have to be conceded that some of the provisions may not be applicable to the State. Take, for instance, the provision of s. 4 which relate to the powers of requisitioning and acquisition of properties, and the subsequent two sections that deal with payment of compensation and release from requisition respectively; these provisions may not be applicable to the State. Take, again, the control of agriculture which is contemplated by s. 7; it would not be applicable to the State. Section 12 which deals with penalties may also be inapplicable to the State, and so, would s. 13 be inapplicable, because it deals with abetment and assistam; e of contravention 9f the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the general scheme of the Act and some of its provisions seem to suggest that the State may not have been within the contemplation of the Act.\n\nBut it is obvious that the rule of harmonious constrµcticn on which Mr. Setalvad has solely rested his case, can be invoked successful1y by him only if the words used in s. 3 are capable of the construction which he suggests. If the said words are capable of two constructions one of which supports the appellants' case and the other that of the respondent, it would be legitimate to adopt the first construction. because it has the merit of harmonising the provisions of s. 3 with the general scheme and purpose of the Act. On the other hand, if the words used in s. 3(1) are not reasonably capable of the construction for which the appellants contend, then it would be unreasonable and illegitimate for the Court to limit the scope of those words arbitrarily solely for the purpose of establishing harmony between the\n\nAct. Therefore, it 1964 assumed object and the scheme of the is necessary tq, examine the words used fully. Let us first read s. 3(1) :- in s. 3 very care- Sri Ve1'kala Seetaramanjaneya Rice and Oil Muz.t. \"The State Government so far as it appears to them and Others. to be necessary or expedient for maintaining, instate ofAtUlhra creasing or securing supplies of essential articles Pradeahetc. or for arranging fQr their equitable distribution Ga.j d --;; dk\n\nO.J and availability at fair prices may, by notified en rag \"'• • order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the supply, distribution and transport of essential aticles arid trade and commerce therein''.\n\nSub-section (2) provides that without prejudice to the generality of the. powers conferred by sub-section (i), an order made thereunder may provide for objects specified in clauses\n\n(a) to (k). The majority of these objects may not be applicable to the State, while, conceivably, some may be applicable to it.\n\nSection 3(1) is obviously intended to secure supplies cf essential articles and to arrange for their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. If electrical energy is one of the essential articles mentioned in the Schedule, there can be no difficulty in holding that a notified order can be issued under s. 3(1) for regulating the supply of the said energy and making it available at a fair price. Indeed: it is not disputed and cannot be disputed that if electrical energy is produced by a private licensee and is then supplied to the consumers, such a supply would fall within the mischief of s. 3(1), and the terms on which it can and should be made to the consumers can be regulated by a notified order.\n\nThere can also be no serious dispute that the terms of a contract entered into between a private supplier of electrical energy and the consumer could be modified by a notified order. Section 3(i) undoubtedly confers power on the State Government to vary ang modify contractual terms in respect of the supply or distribution of essential articles. If that be so, on a plain reading of s. 3(1) it seems very difficult to accept the argument that the supply of electrical energy which is included in s. 3'(1) if it is made by a private producer should go outside the said section as soon as it is produced by the. State Government. The emphasis .is not on who produces and supplies, but on the continuance of the equitable distribution and supply of essential articles at fair prices.\n\nIf the object which s. 3(1) has in mind is such equitable distribuiton and availability at fair prices of essential articles, then that object would still continue to attract the provisions of s. 3(1) even though the essential article may be produced by the State and may be supplied by it to the consumers.\n\n1964 The words used in s. 3(1) are so clear, unambiguous and Sri Venkata wie that it would be unreasonable to limit their scope arti-\n\nSeelarama~:iane.ya ficially on the ground that by giving effect to the wide -~~-1 . . .. andOthers. anguage of the sechon, we might reach a result which 1s v. not completely harmonious or consistent with the assumed\n\n:>tarad\"f.h j, dhra object and purpose of the Act. Indeed, as we have just indi- - cated, if the purpose of the Act is to secure the supply of\n\najendrOIJ•dkar, O.J. essential articles at fair prices, it would be irrelevant as to who makes the supply; what is relevant is to regulate the sup:ply at a fair price. Therefore, we are not prepared to accede to Mr. Setalvad's argument that s. 3(1) does not confer on the respondent the power to modify the terms of agreements between it and the appellants.\n\nMr. Setalvad, no doubt, contended that in construing s. 3(1), we may have regard to the fact that most of the clauses under s. 3(2) would be inapplicable to the respondent State, and so, he virtually suggests that even though the words in s. 3(1) may be wide, their width should be controlled by the limited scope of the clauses prescribed by subsection (2). We are not prepared to accept this argument.\n\nAfter the decision of the Privy Council in King Emperor v.\n\nSilinath Banerjee('), it is well-settled that the function of a clause like clause (2) of s. 3 merely illustrative (vide also.\n\nSantosh Kumar Jain v. The State(')). In other words, the proper approach to adopt in construing clauses (]) and (2) of s. 3 is to assume that whatever is included in clause (2) is also included in clause (!). That is not to say that if the words of clause (!) are wide enough to include cases not included in clause (2), they must, for that reason. receive a narrower construction. Therefore, we must ultimately go back to clause (!) to decide whether the supply of electrical energy made by the respondent to the appellants can be regulated by a notified order issued under it or not, and the answer to that question must, in our opinion, be in the affirmative.\n\nIn this connection, it may be pertinent to refer to s. 3(2}(b) which provides for controlling the prices at which any essential article may be bought or sold. It is not easy to see why this clause cannot take in articles which may be purchased or sold by the State. The clause is so worded that the transactions of sale and purchase of all essential articles would be included in it. It is true that where the State wants to sell its essential articles, it may be able to regulate the prices and control them by means of an executive order; but that is not relevant and !llaterial in construing the effect\n\n(') 72 I.A. 241 at p. 248.\n\n(') 1951 S.C.R. 303.\n\nof the words; if the words take within their sweep. essential\n\narticles sold by the State, there is no reason why 1t should Sri Venkata not be competent to the State to issue a notified order con- •1::;•::-di~Af; I\\. trolling the prices in that behalf. and Others In regard to the purchase of essential articles by the State of. Andhra State, the position is still clearer. If the State wants to pur- PradVJh eic. chase essential articles. power to regulate th~ pnces of such Gajewlragadkar, C.J. articles would seem to be clearly mcluded m s. 3(2)(b). Indeed, during the course of his arguments, Mr. Setalvad did not seriously dispute this position. Therefore, when 'he State wants to purchase essential articles, it can regulate the price in that behalf by means of a notified order issued under s. 3(1) and that shows that in the cases of both sale and purchase of essential articles by the State, s. 3(2)(b) read with s. 3(1) would clothe the State with the power to issue the relevant notified order.\n\nThen, it was faintly argued qy Mr. Setalvad that the power to regulate conferred on the respondent by s. 3(1) cannot include the power to increase the tariff rate; it would include the power to reduce the rates. This argument is entirely misconceived. The word \"regulate\" is wide enough to confer power on the respondent to regulate either by increasing the rate, or decreasing the rate, the test being what is it that is necessary or expedient to be done to maintain, increase, or secure supply of the essential articles in question and to arrange for its equitable distribution and its availability at fair prices. The concept of fair prices to which s. 3(1) expressly refers does not mean that the price once\n\nfixed must either remain stationary, or must be reduced in order to attract the power to regulate. The power to regulate can be exercised for ensuring the payment of a fair price, and the fixation of a fair price would inevitably depend upon a consideration of all relevant and economic factors which contribute to the determination of such a fair price. If the fair price indicated on a dispassionate consideration of all relevant fa.c.tors turns out to be higher than the price fixed and prea1hng, then the power o regulate the price must\n\nnecessnly . mclude t.he power to mcrease the price so as to make 1t farr. That 1s why we do not think Mr. Setalvad is right in contending that even though the respondent may have the power to regulate the prices at which electrical energy should be supplied by it to the appellants, it had no power to enhance the said price. We must, thert!fore, hold that the challenge to the validity of the impugned notified orders on the ground that they are outside the purview of s. 3(1) cannot be sustained. ·\n\nThat takes us to the next question as to whether the impugned notified orders are invalid, because they contravene\n\nSUPREME COUR'I REPORTS (1964]\n\nI . 1964 the provisions of Art 19(l)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.\n\nSri Venkata The. impugned orders have been notified by virtue of the\n\n~etaramantane¥• power conferred on the respondent by s. 3(1) and may there- \"'\"'' aw.I Oil Mills b ted l f ' aw.I Other•. tore, e trea . as aw or the purpose of Art. 19. We may v. alo assume m favour of the appellants that the right to re-\n\nSta~, i,1.dhra ce1ve the supply of electricity at the rates specified in the __ etc. agreements is a right which falls within Art. 19(1)(0 or (g).\n\nGajendraqwlkar, G.J. Even so, can it be said that the impugned notified orders are not reasonable and in the interests of the general public?\n\nThat is the question which calls for an answer in dealing with the present contention. It is true that by issuing the impugned notifii:d orders, the respondent has successful1y altered the rates agreed between the parties for their respective contracts and that, prima facie, does appear to be unreasonable. But, on the other hand, the evidence shows that the tariff which was fi i,; d several years ago had become completely out of date and he reports made by the Accountant-General from time to time clearly indicate that the responden.t was supplying electricity to the appellants at the agreed rates even though 1t was incurring loss from year to year. Therefore, it cannot l>e said that the impugned notified orders were not justified on the merits. The prices of all commodities and labour charges having very much increased meanwhile, a case had certainly been made out for increasing the tariff for the supply of electrical energy. But it could not be possible to hold that the restriction imposed on the appellants' right by the increase made in the rates is reasonable and in the interests of the general public solely because the impugned orders have saved the recurring loss incurred by the respondent under the contracts. If such a broad and general argument were accepted, it may lead to unreasonable and even anomalous consequences in some cases. This question, however, has to be considered from the point of view of the community at large; and thus considered, the point which appears to support the validity of the impugned orders is that these orders were passed solely for the pur.- pose of assuring the supply pf/electrical energy and that would clearly be for the goOd of the community at large.\n\nUnless prices were increased, there was risk that the supply of electrical energy may itself have come tp an end. If the respondent thought that the agreements made with the appellants were resulting in a heavy loss to the public treasury from year to year, it may have had to consider whether the supply should not be cut down or completely stopped. It may well be that the respondent recognised its obligation to the public at large and thought that supplying electrical energy to the consumers who were using it for profit-making purposes. at , a loss to the public exchequer would not ?e reasonable and legitimate, and it apprehended that the legislature may well question the propriety or wisdom of such I\n\n.a course; and so, instead of terminating the .contracts, de- 1964 cided to assure the supply of eledrical energy at a fair price Sri Venkata .and that is why the impugned notified orders were issued. Seetaramanjaneya\n\nWe ought to make it clear that there has been no suggestion Ric~::a'\"ii?,;,;. 1 ' 118 before us that the prices fixed by the impugned notified v. orders are, in any sense, unreasonable or excessive, and it State 01 Andhra\n\n' ' 'fi h h d 'ff h t • t Pradesh etc. 1s s1gn1 cant t at even t e revise tan as o come m o _ operation prospectively and not retrospectively. Therefore, Gajendragadkar, O.J. having regard to all the circumstances in this case, we are disposed to hold that the change made in the tariff by the notified orders must be held to be reasonable and in the interests of the general public.\n\nMr. Setalvad also attempted to challenge the validity of the impugned orders on the ground that they contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, he invited our attention to the allegation made in Writ Petition No. 923 of 1956. In that writ petition, one of the petitioners stated that the rate prescribed under the agree- . ments had not changed and had remained stationary as far as consumers under the State Government's licensees were concerned. The affidavit appears to concede that certain other licensees had increased their rates, but that increase, it is claimed, was negligible or nominal; and so, the argument \\vas that the rate, s which are widely divergent between consumer and consumer constitute a contravention of Art.\n\n14. Mr. Setalvad fairly conceded that these allegations are vague and indefinite and no other material has been produced either by the petitioner who has made this affidavit, or by any of the other petitioners who moved the High Court for challenging the validity of the impugned orders. 1!1 fact, we do not know what the rates charged by other licensees are and have been, and how they compare with the rates prescribed by the original contracts as well ras the rates enhanced by the impugned notified orders. We ought to add that the Division Bench of the High Court appears to be in error when it assumed that the respondent was the\n\nole supplier of electrical energy in the State of Andhra. It is true. that the bulk of the energy is supplied by the respondent; but there are some other private licensees which are licensed to supply electrical energy to the consumers and in that sense, at the relevant time the respondent was not a monopolist in the 1,0atter of supply of electricity. This Court\n\nhas repeatedly pomted out that when a citizen wants to challenge the validity of any statute on the ground that it\n\ncotravenes Art. 14. SJ?ecific. clear and unambiguous allegabons 1!1ust be made m that behalf and it must be shown that the. 1mpu.gne~ sta!ute is based on discrimination and that such discnmmatmn 1s not referable to any classification\n\n1964 whic:h is rational and which has nexus with the object in- Sri Venkata tended to be achieved by the said statute. Judged from that Seetaramanjaneya point of view, there is absolulety no material on the record RicrnndOil Mill8 of any of the appeals forming the present group on which and Otliera. . v. a plea under Art. 14 can even be raised. Therefore, we do State of Andhra not think it is necessary to pursue this point any further.\n\nPrade11hetc.\n\n-~- Gajendragadkar, O.J.\n\nThe result is the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fees.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 159, "entities": [{"text": "SRI VENKATA SEETARAMANJANEYA RICE AND\n\nOIL MILLS AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SRI VENKATA SEETARAMANJANEYA RICE AND OIL MILLS AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 172, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 197, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. 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C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5779, "end_char": 5793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad."}}, {"text": "P. Kodandaramayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5795, "end_char": 5812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Kodandaramayya, E. V. Bhagarathi Rao and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "E. V. Bhagarathi Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5814, "end_char": 5834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Kodandaramayya, E. V. Bhagarathi Rao and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "T. V. R. Tatachari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5839, "end_char": 5857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Kodandaramayya, E. V. Bhagarathi Rao and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "R. 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Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6210, "end_char": 6220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Jayaram and R. Thiagarajan, for the appellants (in\n\nState of'.4ndhra C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Thiagarajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6225, "end_char": 6239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Jayaram and R. Thiagarajan, for the appellants (in\n\nState of'.4ndhra C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6365, "end_char": 6380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "A. Vedavalli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6435, "end_char": 6447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam, for the appellant (in C. As."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6452, "end_char": 6464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam, for the appellant (in C. 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As.", "canonical_name": "B. R. G. K. Achar"}}, {"text": "T. Anantha Babu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6675, "end_char": 6690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, Yogcshwar Prasad and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in C. As.", "canonical_name": "T. Anantha Babu"}}, {"text": "Yogcshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6692, "end_char": 6708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, Yogcshwar Prasad and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in C. As."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6846, "end_char": 6861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, M. S. K. Sastri and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6866, "end_char": 6883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, M. S. K. Sastri and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in C.A. Nos.", "canonical_name": "B. R. G. K. Achar"}}, {"text": "J. V. K. Sarma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7008, "end_char": 7022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. V. K. Sarma and T. Satyanarayana, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "T. Satyanarayana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. V. K. Sarma and T. Satyanarayana, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7120, "end_char": 7137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, R. Gopalakrishnan and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents (in C. As."}}, {"text": "Qajendreyadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7333, "end_char": 7347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nQajendreyadkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-The principal question of law which arises in this group of 37 civil appeals relates to the construction of section 3 of the Madras Essential Articles ControI and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1949 (No."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7355, "end_char": 7369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nQajendreyadkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-The principal question of law which arises in this group of 37 civil appeals relates to the construction of section 3 of the Madras Essential Articles ControI and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1949 (No.", "canonical_name": "G'ajendragadCar"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7485, "end_char": 7494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7759, "end_char": 7782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute which has given rise to these appeals centres round the validity of two notified orders issued by the respondent, State of Andhra Pradesh on the 28th January, 1955, and 30th January, 1955 respectively, and it is the contention of the appellants that the said notified orders are outside the purview of s. 3.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC"}}, {"text": "30th January, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7814, "end_char": 7832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute which has given rise to these appeals centres round the validity of two notified orders issued by the respondent, State of Andhra Pradesh on the 28th January, 1955, and 30th January, 1955 respectively, and it is the contention of the appellants that the said notified orders are outside the purview of s. 3."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7947, "end_char": 7951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8516, "end_char": 8523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The impugned orders have purported to increase this rate, and the appellants contend that the Sri Venkara respondent had no authority to change this important term s,, taramanjaneya\n\nof the contract to their pre1 udice by taking recourse to Rfre and Oil Mills and Otliers s. 3(1) and issuing notified orders in that behalf.", "canonical_name": "Venkata"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8690, "end_char": 8697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pradc41", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8846, "end_char": 8853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradc41 etC.\n\nG'ajendragadCar , C.J ~\n\nIt appears that the Government of Madras, and subsequently, its successor, the respondent, had a single power grid system for the whole State comprising Tungabhadra and Machkund Hydro Electric System and the Thermal System of Nellore."}}, {"text": "G'ajendragadCar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8860, "end_char": 8875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradc41 etC.\n\nG'ajendragadCar , C.J ~\n\nIt appears that the Government of Madras, and subsequently, its successor, the respondent, had a single power grid system for the whole State comprising Tungabhadra and Machkund Hydro Electric System and the Thermal System of Nellore.", "canonical_name": "G'ajendragadCar"}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8905, "end_char": 8925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradc41 etC.\n\nG'ajendragadCar , C.J ~\n\nIt appears that the Government of Madras, and subsequently, its successor, the respondent, had a single power grid system for the whole State comprising Tungabhadra and Machkund Hydro Electric System and the Thermal System of Nellore."}}, {"text": "Government of Andhra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9884, "end_char": 9904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Andhra then issued the two impugned orders relating to Machkund and Nellore, and Tungabhadra and Chittoore District areas respectively, enhancing the agreed ra.tes."}}, {"text": "Machkund", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9953, "end_char": 9961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Andhra then issued the two impugned orders relating to Machkund and Nellore, and Tungabhadra and Chittoore District areas respectively, enhancing the agreed ra.tes."}}, {"text": "Nellore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9966, "end_char": 9973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Andhra then issued the two impugned orders relating to Machkund and Nellore, and Tungabhadra and Chittoore District areas respectively, enhancing the agreed ra.tes."}}, {"text": "Tungabhadra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9979, "end_char": 9990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Andhra then issued the two impugned orders relating to Machkund and Nellore, and Tungabhadra and Chittoore District areas respectively, enhancing the agreed ra.tes."}}, {"text": "Chittoore District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9995, "end_char": 10013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Andhra then issued the two impugned orders relating to Machkund and Nellore, and Tungabhadra and Chittoore District areas respectively, enhancing the agreed ra.tes."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11079, "end_char": 11085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, the question of revision of tariffs was considered in the State of Madras, but was not decided because reorganisation of the States was then in contemplation."}}, {"text": "Rsce", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11439, "end_char": 11443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rsce and Oil Mills\n\nand Other The appellants were naturally aggrieyed by these orders,\n\n8 v. , because they added to their liability to pay the rates for the 1f.!df.f':f:'."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Gajendraqadkar,0.J.High", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11718, "end_char": 11756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly,\na large number of consumers moved the Andhra Pradesh Gajendraqadkar,0.J.High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11769, "end_char": 11777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12061, "end_char": 12065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12563, "end_char": 12567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13682, "end_char": 13707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present group of appeaJs thus consists of matters which have been decided by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, as well as those which have been decided by a learned single Judge, and they all raise thesame common question about the construction of s. 3 of the Act, and the validity of the impugned notified orders."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13846, "end_char": 13850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13973, "end_char": 13977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14106, "end_char": 14125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be recalled that during the Second World\n\nWar, the Government of India passed the Defence of India 1961 Act (No."}}, {"text": "29th of September, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14187, "end_char": 14210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "35 of 1939) on the 29th of September, 1939."}}, {"text": "Venkata", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14219, "end_char": 14226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By s.; Venkata virtue of the powers conferred on the Central Government s.-a-\"4•\"\"!f<J\n\nby s. 2 of the said Act, several Rules came to be framed by R\"\"' ~:Z ~7,!;\"", "canonical_name": "Venkata"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14265, "end_char": 14283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By s.; Venkata virtue of the powers conferred on the Central Government s.-a-\"4•\"\"!f<J\n\nby s. 2 of the said Act, several Rules came to be framed by R\"\"' ~:Z ~7,!;\""}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14303, "end_char": 14307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government known as the Defence of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14376, "end_char": 14430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gajendraga", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14626, "end_char": 14636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appear to the Central Government to be necessary or ex- Gajendraga<ik&r, O.J. pedient for securing \"the defence of British India, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community\".", "canonical_name": "G'ajendragadCar"}}, {"text": "Defence of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15119, "end_char": 15135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the war came to an end, it was realised that the economic situation in the country continued to be serious, and for the proper regulation of economic affairs, it was thought necessary to continue the orders issued under the Defence of India Rule 81(2), because shortage of supply of essential articles was very much in evidence then."}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15661, "end_char": 15679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same lines, the Madras Legislature passed an Act in 1946 (No."}}, {"text": "21st of January, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15988, "end_char": 16009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1955 and this Act received the assent of the President on the 21st of January, 1955."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16163, "end_char": 16167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16342, "end_char": 16349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16397, "end_char": 16415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Andhra Legislature passed Act No."}}, {"text": "25th January, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16663, "end_char": 16681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Andhra Act was originally intended to be in operation until the 25th January, 1956, but it was later continued from time to time."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16793, "end_char": 16802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17038, "end_char": 17046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 Mr. Setalvad for the appellants contends that in con- Bri v enkata strui:1g s. 3, we ought not to concentrate on the words used seetaramanjaneya in s. 3 in isolation, but must look at the said section along , Bi<• and Oil Mills with the other provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17110, "end_char": 17114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17182, "end_char": 17186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oil Mills with the other provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17252, "end_char": 17298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Stale of Andhra the provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17405, "end_char": 17446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17530, "end_char": 17539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Stale of Andhra the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Stale of Andhra the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Gajend\"'!ladkar,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17555, "end_char": 17571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So construed, section 3, according to\n\nGajend\"'!ladkar, O.J. him, cannot be said to confer power on the respondent to enha nee the tariff rate ohargeable against the appellants in respect of the supply of energy made by the respondent to them."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18396, "end_char": 18400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Stale of Andhra the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Stale of Andhra the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 S.C.R 158", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19966, "end_char": 19984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gajendrayiulkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20541, "end_char": 20556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where, however, the question is .not so much as to Gajendrayiulkar, O.J. whether the State is bound by the statute, but whether it can claim the benefit of the provision of a statute, the same rule of construction may have to be applied.", "canonical_name": "G'ajendragadCar"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21123, "end_char": 21129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position is also established by the decision of the Privy\n\nCouncil in Province of Bombay(') and it still continues to be a law in this country."}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21508, "end_char": 21516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Halsbury points out, \"it has been\n\nsaid that, unless it is expressly or impliedly prohibited from doing so, the Crown may take advantage of a statute notwithstanding that it is not bound thereby.\""}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22016, "end_char": 22023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect is the comment made by Maxwell when he quotes with approval the view expressed by Sir\n\nJohn Simon that the decisions which recognise the right of the Crown to take advantage of a statutory provision \"start with a passage in an unsuccessful argument of a law officer which was not even relevant to the case before the court, but which has been taken out by a text-writer and repeated for centuries until it was believed that it must have some\n\nfoundation(')\"."}}, {"text": "John Simon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22080, "end_char": 22090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect is the comment made by Maxwell when he quotes with approval the view expressed by Sir\n\nJohn Simon that the decisions which recognise the right of the Crown to take advantage of a statutory provision \"start with a passage in an unsuccessful argument of a law officer which was not even relevant to the case before the court, but which has been taken out by a text-writer and repeated for centuries until it was believed that it must have some\n\nfoundation(')\"."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22478, "end_char": 22482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22752, "end_char": 22756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22896, "end_char": 22900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22983, "end_char": 22987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Swee of Andhra have due regard for the other provisions pf the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23066, "end_char": 23132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23357, "end_char": 23361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Swee of Andhra have due regard for the other provisions pf the Act", "statute": "Swee of Andhra have due regard for the other provisions pf the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23566, "end_char": 23573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Swee of Andhra have due regard for the other provisions pf the Act", "statute": "Swee of Andhra have due regard for the other provisions pf the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24044, "end_char": 24048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Swee of Andhra have due regard for the other provisions pf the Act", "statute": "Swee of Andhra have due regard for the other provisions pf the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24357, "end_char": 24361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24404, "end_char": 24414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24495, "end_char": 24500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24937, "end_char": 24941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25239, "end_char": 25243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25332, "end_char": 25339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25714, "end_char": 25721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25728, "end_char": 25732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ve1'kala Seetaramanjaneya Rice and Oil Muz.t", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25748, "end_char": 25792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Let us first read s. 3(1) :- in s. 3 very care- Sri Ve1'kala Seetaramanjaneya Rice and Oil Muz.t. \""}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26569, "end_char": 26581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26887, "end_char": 26894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27178, "end_char": 27185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27475, "end_char": 27487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27676, "end_char": 27683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27789, "end_char": 27793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28095, "end_char": 28102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28268, "end_char": 28275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28407, "end_char": 28414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29121, "end_char": 29128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29292, "end_char": 29299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29363, "end_char": 29370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29478, "end_char": 29485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29794, "end_char": 29798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29951, "end_char": 29955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2}(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30548, "end_char": 30558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajewlragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31629, "end_char": 31643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "power to regulate th~ pnces of such Gajewlragadkar, C.J. articles would seem to be clearly mcluded m s. 3(2)(b).", "canonical_name": "G'ajendragadCar"}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31694, "end_char": 31704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31951, "end_char": 31958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32054, "end_char": 32064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32075, "end_char": 32082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32262, "end_char": 32269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32813, "end_char": 32820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33885, "end_char": 33892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34091, "end_char": 34103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkata", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34138, "end_char": 34145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Venkata The.", "canonical_name": "Venkata"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34257, "end_char": 34264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34365, "end_char": 34372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(0 or (g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34571, "end_char": 34590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gajendraqwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34593, "end_char": 34607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendraqwlkar, G.J. Even so, can it be said that the impugned notified orders are not reasonable and in the interests of the general public?", "canonical_name": "G'ajendragadCar"}}, {"text": "Seetaramanjaneya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37368, "end_char": 37384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seetaramanjaneya\n\nWe ought to make it clear that there has been no suggestion Ric~::a'\"ii?,;,;."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37651, "end_char": 37653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37763, "end_char": 37777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, Gajendragadkar, O.J. having regard to all the circumstances in this case, we are disposed to hold that the change made in the tariff by the notified orders must be held to be reasonable and in the interests of the general public.", "canonical_name": "G'ajendragadCar"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38106, "end_char": 38113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38750, "end_char": 38758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39886, "end_char": 39893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40429, "end_char": 40436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40474, "end_char": 40489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, we do State of Andhra not think it is necessary to pursue this point any further."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_471_476_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 471\n\nSTATE OF MYSORE\n\nM. H. BELLARY\n\nIP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR. C.J .• K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.J\n\nBombay Civil Service Rules-Government Servant of one department sent on deputation to another department-On reversion entitled to the promotions based on merit-cum seniority basis in the parent department-Breach of Statutory Rule under Art. 309 gives rise to cause of action-Constituticn of India, Art. 309, 313-Bombay Civil Service Rules, R. 50(b).\n\nThe respondent was a Government servant in one of the departments of the Bombay Go\\'ernment. He was sent on , eoutation to another department and after serving there for a long period and getting a number of promotions he was reverted back to his parent department and ordered to be posted at. > considerably lower grade, while another Government servant who was below his rank was promoted as Assistant\n\nSecretary. Thereupon the respondent file\".! a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of his posting. A preliminary objection was raised by the appellant that the petition was not maintainable. But the High Court held that the respondent was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court when there is a violation of a statutory rule and on merits it held that the respondent was entitled to the relief claimed. The present appeal was filed on a certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution.\n\nBefore this Court in view of the decision State of UP. v.\n\nBabu Ram Upadhya. [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679 it was not disputed that if there was a breach of a statutory rule framed under Art. 309 or continued under Art. 313 in relation to the condition of service the aggrieved GoV'ernment servant could have recourse to the Court.\n\nThe main contention on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent was not entitled to be appointed to any higher post than as a Senior Assistant or to receive a salary higher than that which had been granted to him bv the impugned order. ·\n\nHeld: (i) Assuming that this was a case where the respondent had a lien and his lien had not been suspended it was not possible to interpret Rule 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules as providing different criteria to cases where a Government servant had a lien and where his lien has been suspended.\n\nThe Rule and the circular make it abundantly clear that an officer on deputation in another department shall be restored to the position he would have occupied in his parent department had he not been deputed.\n\n(ii\\. Where promotions are based on seniority-cum-merit basis an officer on deputation has a legal right to claim promotion to a higher post in his parent department provided his service in the department to which he is lent is satisfactory.\n\nThis may not be the case in regard to selection posts.\n\nMarch25\n\nState of My801't\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 677 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 31, 1961 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 283 of 1959. v.\n\nM.H. Bellary\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant S. V. Venkataranga Iyengar, M. Rama Jois and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 25, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.AyyafllJM, J.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-A very short question regarding the proper construction of Rule 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Ruks is involved in this appeal which comes before us by a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Mysore\n\nundr Art. 133 of the Constitution. '\n\nThe facts giving rise to this appeal which are necessary to be narrated to appreciate the only point urged before us weri: these: The resporn; lent was recruited as an Upper Division Clerk by the Government of Bombay , in .1931 and was later appointed substantively as a Junior Assistant in the Political Department. While so, on September 17, .1943 his services were transferred on deputation to the office of the Controller of Rationing,. Bombay to work as a Senior Assistant in the newly started Rationing department which was a temporary department. He obtained successive promotions in this department and by March, 1954 he was drawing a pay of Rs. 460/- p.m. in the grade Rs. 350-30-650 as Rationing Officer. That department was abolished in March, 1954 and thereafter he was reverted to his parent department. Though his parent department was the Political Department, the respondent wa:;, after he ceased to be a Rationing Officer, posted first to the Labour Department and then to the Public Works Department. When this reversion took place his pay was fixed at Rs. 120/- p.m. The petitioner protested against this reversion and this Joss of his emoluments on the ground that this fixation of pay was contrary to the Rules framed by Government in regard to the service Conditions of a Government servant who was appointed on deputation in another department. He also pointed out that the officer next below him in his parent department had been appointed as an Assistant Secretary by virtue of normal and\n\nreular promotion. Before. however. final orders were passed. on his representation by the Government of Bombay, the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 came into force and the respondent was allotted to the State of Mysore. On November 27, 1958 the Government of Mysore informed the respondent through an official memorandum that in view of\n\ncertain communications received by that Government from the Government of Bombay in answer to his representations he should be considered to have held the post of Senior Assistant on June 1, 1954 on a salary of Rs. 225/- in the grade Rs. 210-15-300. The petitioner's complaint, however, was that even this order was in violation of the conditions of his service and he claimed that when he was reverted to the parent department he was entitled to be posted as an Assistant Secretary-a post which according to him, he would have held on that date had he not been deputed to the department of Civil Supplies on September 17, 1943.\n\nThere was no dispute that subject to an argument to which we shall refer presently, the respondent would have held the post of Assistant Secretary because the person next below him-one Nadkarni-actually held that post on that day. The respondent claimed that on the basis of the Service Rules to which we shall immediately make reference he should, on his return to the parent department, have been posted as an Assistant Secretary and been allowed the scale of emoluments applicable to that post. As the Government of Mysore refused to accede to his demand the respondent filed a petition under Art. 226 for inter alia a writ of mandamus directing the appellant-State to include the petitioner in the grade-pay of an Assistant Secretary and fix him above Nadkarni.\n\nThe appellant raised a preliminary objection to the writ petition, the objection being that the complaint of the peti tioner was not justiciable. This was primarily based upon thefact that the respondent relied upon a circular of the Government of Bombay dated October- 31, 1950 in support of his plea that he was entitled to the benefit that he claimed on reversion to the parent department from his service on deputation.\n\nThe material part of that circular ran:\n\n\"It has come to the notice of Government that Government ervants when deputed to o.ther Departments or offices often draw pay in time scales which are identical with the timescales in their parent Departments. The question therefore, arises on their reversion to their parent Department whether the service rendered in an identical time scale in the Department to which their service had been lent, should be allowed to count for increments in the parent Depart~ ment under' Note 4 below Bombay Civil .Service Rule 4 I. Government is pleased to direct that all such cases should be regulated under Bombay Civil Service Rule 51 and that only that portion\n\nBtatt of Myaore\n\nM.H. Bellarg\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nSuite of ... lf ysore\n\nM.H.\n\nBellary\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nof service in the foreign Department or office should be allowed to count for increments in the parent Department during which 'the person concerned would have drawn pay in the time scale applicable to the post he holds on reversion, but for his deputation to another Department or office, i.e., the case should be so regulated as to restore the position the person concerned would have occupied in his parent Department had he not been deputed.\"\n\nThe question as to whether this circular which was treated as an administrative instruction could confer rights enforceable in a court on a Government servant was referred to a Full Bench for its opinion. Before the learned Judges of the Full Bench the learned Advocate-General, however, brought to the notice of the Court that this circular merely gave effect to a statutory rule framed by the Government. of Bombay. The relevant rule in this respect was rule 50(b)' of the Bombay Civil Services Rules which ran:\n\n\"50(b) Service in another post, other than a post carrying less pay referred to in clause (a) of rule 22 whether in a substantive or officiating capacity, service on deputation and leave other than extraordinary leave counts for increments in the time scale applicable to the post on which the Government servant holds a lien as well as in time scale applicable to the post or posts. if any, on which he would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended:\n\nProvided that Government may, in any case in which they are satisfied that the leave was taken on account of illness or for any other came beyond the Government servant's control, direct that extraordinary leave shall be counted for increment under this clause.\"\n\nThe position, therefore, that emerged after this was whether an infraction of a statutory rule could give rise to a cause of action to an aggrieved Government servant. The learned Judges answered this question in the affirmative and thereafter the Division Bench which heard the petition allowed the writ and granted the respondent the relief that he sought.\n\nIt might be mentioned that even by the date of the pendency of these proceedings in the High Court the respond.en! had retired on account of superannuation and the only question, therefore, was whether he would be entitled to the remuneration to which he would have been entitled under the rule in question. The appellant-State applied to the High Court\n\nfor a certificate to enable an appeal to be filed to this Court. and on this having been granted the appeal is now before us.\n\nIn view of the decisions of this Court of which it is sufficient to refer to State of U.P. v. Babu Ram U padhya(') it was not disputed that if there was a breach of a statutory rule framed under Art. 309 or which was continued under Art. 313 in relation to the clonditions of service the aggrieved Government servant could have recourse to the Court for redress.\n\nLearned Counsel for the Appellant, however, urged two contentions in support of the stand that the respondent was not entitled to be appointed to any higher post than as a Senior Assistant or to receive a salary higher than Rs. 225 /- . in the scale Rs. 210-15-300 which had been granted to him by the impugned order of November, 1958. The first was that on a proper construction of Rule 50(b), an officer who after serving on deputation in another department is revert' ed to his parent department is entitl.ed to nothing more than the increments allowable in the time scale applicable to the substantive appointment which he held at the time of the transfer. In this connection stress was laid on the words \"increments in the time scale applicable to the post on which the Government servant holds a lien\" occurring in the subrule. We are unable to accept this contention. In the first place, it is not clear whether the case of the respondent was one where he held a lien or one where the lien was suspended, and no material was placed before the Court in this regard, the point .in this form not being urged in the High Court. But even assuming that it was a case where the respondent had a lien and his lien had not been suspended it is difficult to see what logic there could be in interpreting the rule as providing different criteria in the two cases.\n\nWhere the lien is suspended the rule speaks of the \"post or posts, if any he would !).ave held if his lien had not been 1'Uspended\". By the use of the plural, it is clear that the rule <:ontemplated the suspended lien being transferred from one post to another-in other words, to a promotion from one post to another during the period of the service in another department. If there was any ambiguity in what the rule meant it is wholly dispelled by reference to the circular which ensures to the officer on deputation in another department that he shall be restored to the position he \"would have occupied in his parent department had he not been deputed\". It was not suggested that there was any ambiguity in the wording of this circular which, in our opinion, gives proper effect to the provisions of Rule 50(b) ..\n\n\nState of My-ore •.\n\nM. H. Bellary\n\nAyya'tll}ar, J,\n\n. 1964\n\nStale of JrJy.sore\n\nM. H. Bella1y\n\nAyyan3ar, J.\n\nThe other submission of learned Counsel was tnat a Government servant though he had a right to increments in a time scale applicable to the post that he held on the date of his transfer on deputation and on which he had a lien, had no legal right to be promoted to a higher post and that the construction adopted by the High Court virtually conceded or guaranteed to officers on deputation a right to an automatic promotion which they would not have had if they had not been posted on deputation. We see no force in this cont,!ntion either. Learned Counsel is right only in so far as the promotion involved relates to a selection post. But where it is based on seniority-cum-merit, those considerations are not relevant. The servir, e of an officer on deputation in another department is treated by the rule as equivalent to service in the parent department and it is this equation between the services in the two departments that forms the basis of Rule 50(b). So long therefore as the service of the employee in the new department is satisfactory and he is obtaining the increments and promotions in that department. it sl:ands to reason that that satisfactory service and the manner of '.ts discharge in the post he actually fills, should be deemed to be rendered in the parent. department also so as to entitle him to promotions, which are often on seniority-cummerit basis. What is indicated here is precisely what is termed in official language the \"next below rule\" under which an officer on deputation is given a paper-promotion and shown as holding a higher post in the parent department if the officer next below him there is being promoted. If there are adverse remarks against him in the new department or punishm!nts inflicted on him there, different considera.tions would. arise and these adverse remarks etc. would and could certainly be taken into account in the parent department also, but that is not the position here. In view. of the facts of the cast.> ii is not necessary to discuss this aspect in any detail or any further.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "471\n\nSTATE OF MYSORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MYSORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. H. BELLARY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. H. BELLARY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 169, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 409, "end_char": 417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 309, 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 471, "end_char": 484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Civil Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 485, "end_char": 511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 990, "end_char": 998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Civil Service Rules", "statute": "Bombay Civil Service Rules"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1448, "end_char": 1456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Civil Service Rules", "statute": "Bombay Civil Service Rules"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 679", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1556, "end_char": 1575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1656, "end_char": 1664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1684, "end_char": 1692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of My801't", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2872, "end_char": 2888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March25\n\nState of My801't\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 31, 1961 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3083, "end_char": 3099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nM.H. Bellary\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant S. V. Venkataranga Iyengar, M. Rama Jois and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3104, "end_char": 3121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nM.H. Bellary\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant S. V. Venkataranga Iyengar, M. Rama Jois and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. V. Venkataranga Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3141, "end_char": 3167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nM.H. Bellary\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant S. V. Venkataranga Iyengar, M. Rama Jois and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. Rama Jois", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3169, "end_char": 3181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nM.H. Bellary\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant S. V. Venkataranga Iyengar, M. Rama Jois and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nM.H. Bellary\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant S. V. Venkataranga Iyengar, M. Rama Jois and A. G.\n\nRatnaparkhi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": ".AyyafllJM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.AyyafllJM, J.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-A very short question regarding the proper construction of Rule 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Ruks is involved in this appeal which comes before us by a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Mysore\n\nundr Art."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3303, "end_char": 3311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.AyyafllJM, J.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-A very short question regarding the proper construction of Rule 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Ruks is involved in this appeal which comes before us by a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Mysore\n\nundr Art.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3512, "end_char": 3532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.AyyafllJM, J.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-A very short question regarding the proper construction of Rule 50(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Ruks is involved in this appeal which comes before us by a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Mysore\n\nundr Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3539, "end_char": 3547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3768, "end_char": 3788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to this appeal which are necessary to be narrated to appreciate the only point urged before us weri: these: The resporn; lent was recruited as an Upper Division Clerk by the Government of Bombay , in .1931 and was later appointed substantively as a Junior Assistant in the Political Department."}}, {"text": "September 17, .1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While so, on September 17, .1943 his services were transferred on deputation to the office of the Controller of Rationing,."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4013, "end_char": 4019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay to work as a Senior Assistant in the newly started Rationing department which was a temporary department."}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5203, "end_char": 5234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5290, "end_char": 5305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on his representation by the Government of Bombay, the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 came into force and the respondent was allotted to the State of Mysore."}}, {"text": "November 27, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5310, "end_char": 5327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 27, 1958 the Government of Mysore informed the respondent through an official memorandum that in view of\n\ncertain communications received by that Government from the Government of Bombay in answer to his representations he should be considered to have held the post of Senior Assistant on June 1, 1954 on a salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5332, "end_char": 5352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 27, 1958 the Government of Mysore informed the respondent through an official memorandum that in view of\n\ncertain communications received by that Government from the Government of Bombay in answer to his representations he should be considered to have held the post of Senior Assistant on June 1, 1954 on a salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "June 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5608, "end_char": 5620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 27, 1958 the Government of Mysore informed the respondent through an official memorandum that in view of\n\ncertain communications received by that Government from the Government of Bombay in answer to his representations he should be considered to have held the post of Senior Assistant on June 1, 1954 on a salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "September 17, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6034, "end_char": 6052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's complaint, however, was that even this order was in violation of the conditions of his service and he claimed that when he was reverted to the parent department he was entitled to be posted as an Assistant Secretary-a post which according to him, he would have held on that date had he not been deputed to the department of Civil Supplies on September 17, 1943."}}, {"text": "Nadkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6240, "end_char": 6248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no dispute that subject to an argument to which we shall refer presently, the respondent would have held the post of Assistant Secretary because the person next below him-one Nadkarni-actually held that post on that day."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6651, "end_char": 6659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nadkarni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6811, "end_char": 6819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 for inter alia a writ of mandamus directing the appellant-State to include the petitioner in the grade-pay of an Assistant Secretary and fix him above Nadkarni."}}, {"text": "October- 31, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7083, "end_char": 7100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was primarily based upon thefact that the respondent relied upon a circular of the Government of Bombay dated October- 31, 1950 in support of his plea that he was entitled to the benefit that he claimed on reversion to the parent department from his service on deputation."}}, {"text": "M.H. Bellarg\n\nAyyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7960, "end_char": 7982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question therefore, arises on their reversion to their parent Department whether the service rendered in an identical time scale in the Department to which their service had been lent, should be allowed to count for increments in the parent Depart~ ment under' Note 4 below Bombay Civil .Service Rule 4 I. Government is pleased to direct that all such cases should be regulated under Bombay Civil Service Rule 51 and that only that portion\n\nBtatt of Myaore\n\nM.H. Bellarg\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nSuite of ... lf ysore\n\nM.H.\n\nBellary\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nof service in the foreign Department or office should be allowed to count for increments in the parent Department during which 'the person concerned would have drawn pay in the time scale applicable to the post he holds on reversion, but for his deputation to another Department or office, i.e., the case should be so regulated as to restore the position the person concerned would have occupied in his parent Department had he not been deputed.\""}}, {"text": "M.H.\n\nBellary\n\nAyyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8011, "end_char": 8034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question therefore, arises on their reversion to their parent Department whether the service rendered in an identical time scale in the Department to which their service had been lent, should be allowed to count for increments in the parent Depart~ ment under' Note 4 below Bombay Civil .Service Rule 4 I. Government is pleased to direct that all such cases should be regulated under Bombay Civil Service Rule 51 and that only that portion\n\nBtatt of Myaore\n\nM.H. Bellarg\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nSuite of ... lf ysore\n\nM.H.\n\nBellary\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nof service in the foreign Department or office should be allowed to count for increments in the parent Department during which 'the person concerned would have drawn pay in the time scale applicable to the post he holds on reversion, but for his deputation to another Department or office, i.e., the case should be so regulated as to restore the position the person concerned would have occupied in his parent Department had he not been deputed.\""}}, {"text": "Government. of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8883, "end_char": 8904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the learned Judges of the Full Bench the learned Advocate-General, however, brought to the notice of the Court that this circular merely gave effect to a statutory rule framed by the Government."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10760, "end_char": 10768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10798, "end_char": 10806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. H. Bellary", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13129, "end_char": 13142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not suggested that there was any ambiguity in the wording of this circular which, in our opinion, gives proper effect to the provisions of Rule 50(b) ..\n\nState of My-ore •.\n\nM. H. Bellary\n\nAyya'tll}ar, J,\n\n.", "canonical_name": "M. H. BELLARY"}}, {"text": "M. H. Bella1y", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13189, "end_char": 13202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964\n\nStale of JrJy.sore\n\nM. H. Bella1y\n\nAyyan3ar, J.\n\nThe other submission of learned Counsel was tnat a Government servant though he had a right to increments in a time scale applicable to the post that he held on the date of his transfer on deputation and on which he had a lien, had no legal right to be promoted to a higher post and that the construction adopted by the High Court virtually conceded or guaranteed to officers on deputation a right to an automatic promotion which they would not have had if they had not been posted on deputation.", "canonical_name": "M. H. BELLARY"}}, {"text": "Ayyan3ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13204, "end_char": 13212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964\n\nStale of JrJy.sore\n\nM. H. Bella1y\n\nAyyan3ar, J.\n\nThe other submission of learned Counsel was tnat a Government servant though he had a right to increments in a time scale applicable to the post that he held on the date of his transfer on deputation and on which he had a lien, had no legal right to be promoted to a higher post and that the construction adopted by the High Court virtually conceded or guaranteed to officers on deputation a right to an automatic promotion which they would not have had if they had not been posted on deputation.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_477_483_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 477\n\nMANAGEMENT OF BOMBAY CO. LTD. v.\n\nWORKMEN\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO AND K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Christmas bonus-Implied agreement-Test.\n\nAn industrial dispute arose between the appellant and its workmen as to payment of bonus for the years 1957-58 and 1958-59. The dispute was referred for adjudication to the tribunal. The respondents claimed bonus on the basis that payment of some bonus at Christmas had become an implied con<lition of service between the appellant and its workmen. The workmen claimed H months' wages for each year on the basis of\n\nan implied term of service. On these facts the tribunal held on the basis of the decision of this Court in MI s. Ispahani Ltd. v. Ispahani Employees Union that payment of bouns at' the rate of 1l: months' salary as an implied condition of service had been established. It is this award of the tribunal which has been challenged before this Court.\n\nHeld: (i) Where the payment of bonus is connected with a festival it is possible to infor that there is an implied condition to pay something at the time of the festival. even though the payment has not been made at a uniform rate in previous years. In the present case, the payment has not been uniform over the years and before an implied term of service to pay bonus can be inferred it must be shown that the payment was connected with some festival. Therefore the tribunal was not right in holding that there could be an implied condition of service as to payment of bonus unconnected with any festival.\n\nIn the present case, though the amount paid in December was originally called an advance, at least one month's salary out of the so-called advance always remairned with the workmen and was treated as bonus connected with Chi:istmas festival. On the facts of this case it was held that there was an implied condition of service between the appellant and its workmen that something would be paid every year about Christmas time as festival bonus.\n\nMI s. Ispahani Ltd. v. Ispahani Employees' Union, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 24, relied on.\n\n(ii) In a case of payment which is made at different term and is not at a uniform rate the duty of the court is to~ connect the payment with a festival (in this case Christmas). On the evidence in this case it is clear that the minimum is only one ll)onth's salary payable about Christmas time and this was actually paid in 1951-52 and 1953-54. Therefore the payment of one month's salary as Christmas bonus is proved as an implied condition of service between the appellant and ita workmen on the admitted facts of this case.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 583 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the Award dated June 18, 196-2 of the Industrial Tribunal, Ernalrulam, in Industrial Dispute No. 38 of 1960.\n\n.Jfarch 2/Y\n\n1964 G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravin- Management of der Narain, for the appellant.\n\nBombay Co. Ltd.\n\nWorkmen\n\nJ anardan Sharma, for the respondents.\n\nMarch 25, 1964. The judgment of the livered by Court was de-\n\nWanchoo, J. W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam. A dispute arose between the appellant and its workmen as to payment of bonus for the years 1957-58 and 1958-59, and was referred for adjudication to the tribunal. The respondents claimed bonus on two grounds: (i) on the basis of profits earned by the appellant, and (ii) on the basis that payment of some bonus at Christmas had become an implied condition of service between the appellant and its workmen. It may be mentioned that the .claim was for four months' wages for each year on the basis of profit bonus. The alternative claim was for 1 t months' wages for each year on the basis 0La11 implied term of service. We may also mention that the appellant had paid two months' basic salary as bonus for the year 1957-58, and one month's basic pay as bonus for the ye21r 1958-59. The appellant contended that there was no surplus available on the basis of the Full Bench formula applied in such cases and therefore no profit bonus could be paid. It also contended that no bonus was .payable as an implied term of service.\n\nThe tribunal found on an application of the Full Bench formula that there was no available surplus in either of the two years and therefore no bonus was payable as profit bonus. It then went into the question whether any bonus was payable as an implied condition of service and relying on the decision of this Court in Messrs. Ispahani Lid. v. lspahani Employees' Union(') held that payment of bonus at the rate of 1 t months' salary as an implied condition of service had been established. It therefore ordered the appellant to pay that amount after taking into account one month's salary already paid by it. It is this award of the tribunal which has been brought before us by special leave.\n\nThe main contention on behalf of the appellant are two-fold:\n\n(I) It is urged that the tribunal erred in holding that payment of bonus as an implied condition of service need not be attached to any festival;\n\n(2) On the undisputed facts of this case, the tribunal was not right in holding that a case had been made out for\n\n\npayment of some bonus as an implied condition of service, and in any case, even if a case had been made out for payment of some bonus, it could not be at the rate of 1 ! months' salary.\n\nTurning to the first contention raised on behalf of the . appellant, we are of opinion that the tribunal was not right in holding that there could be an implied condition of service as to payment of bonus unconnected with any festival. In lspahani's case(') the question raised was whether there was an implied condition of service for payment of some bonus at the time of puja festival in Bengal. In that connection this Court laid down the tests for holding when it could be said that there was an implied condition of service for payment of some bonus in connection with some festival. This Court also pointed out that it was not necessary in order to establish an implied condition of service as to payment of some bonus at the time of a festival like puja in Bengal that the amount paid in connection with the festival should be uniform, and that in the absence of a uniform rate an implied agreement to pay something could be inferred. Now where the payment is connected with a festival it is possible to infer that there is an implied condition to pay something at the time of the festival, even though the evidence discloses that in previous years payment has not been made at a uniform rate. But it is difficult to see how the principle which applies to a case of payment at the time of a festival can be extended to infer an implied term of payment where the payment has been made entirely unconnected with any festival and at rates which have varied from year to year. We are therefore of opirtion that when this Court laid down that there was an implied condition of service to pay something about the time of puja festival in lspahani's case('), it was clear that such implied condition of service could be inferred where the rate of payment was not uniform only when such payment was obviously connected with some festival. In the present case also, the paymeµt has not been uniform over the years and therefore before an implied term of service to pay bonus can be inferred it must be shown that the payment was connected with some festival. It would in our opinion be impossible to lrlfet an implied condition of service where payment has nc1t been uniform in the past, unless sucb payment can be connected with some festival. We are therefore of opinion that the tribunal was wrong in holding that an inference could be drawn for payment of bonus as an implied condition of service in the circumstances of the present case wheli the payment was not uniform iii the past even though it was not connected with any festival . (') [11i6o] 1 S.C.R./ 24.\n\nManagement of Bombay Co. LjiJ.\n\nWorkmen\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nM a:nagement o.f .Bomboy Co. Ltd.\n\nWorkmen\n\nWanchoo~J,\n\nBut that in our opinion does not dispose of the matter.\n\nThe evidence shows that payment of some bom.; s began to be made from the year 1945·46 in which year bonus varying from one month to 3! months' salary was paid in this branch. It may be added that the appellant has a number of other branches in other parts of the country. What we are saying in this case is only concerned with the Cochin branch and may not necessarily be applicable to other branches of the appellant, the facts of which are not before us. From 1946-47 to 1949-50, it appears that some lumpsum was paid, though the amount is not exactly known. It is also not clear whether during the years 1945-46 to 1949-50 paymen_t was made about Christmas time, as there is no evidence •either way. In 1950-51 it appears that It months' salary was paid as bonus. No payment appears to have been made in that year about Christmas time, though it is said that 1 t months' salary was paid as bonus sometime afterwards. From 1951-52 right upto 1958-59, payment was made at the rate of one month's salary to two months' salary about Christmas time. It is clear therefore that at any rate since 1951-52 payment is connected with Christmas festival, though there is no clear evidence as to the earlier payments being connected with Christmas. At the same time there is no clear evidence that those payments were not connected with Christmas even though payment\\ for the year 1950-51 might have been made sometime, after Christmas.\n\nOn the whole therefore it seems to us that it is possible to infer that the payments which began from 1945-46 and have been made throughout upto 1958-59 were in all probability connected with Christmas festival. This inference in our opinion is strengthened by the fact that from 1951-52 undoubtedly payments were connected with Christmas and were always made about Christmas time, even though there was adjustment on some occasions later on by payment of more amount or by reduction of the amount already paid by deducting some part of it from la.1er salary. We are therefJre of opinion that we can infer from the evidence on the record that the payment in the present case is connected with Christmas festival. Therefore even though the tribunal was wrong in holding that the payment need not be connected with any festival in a case like the present where the\n\nrate has not been uniform, the respondents have made out a case of payment of some bonus as an implied condition of service C'6nnected with a festival subject to what we say on the second contention raised on behalf of the appellant.\n\nThe appellant however contends that it has not been proved that the paylnent of bonus was in connection with the Christmas festival on the undisputed evidence in this\n\nI '\n\n~\\.\n\ncase. Now the evidence is that something used to be invariably paid at least from 1951-52 about Christmas time. Later on something mote was paid in some years. In one year nothing more was paid and in three years the appellant took back part of the payment which had been made. The appellant's contention is that the payment before Christmas which has been established in this case was only an advance in connection with the festival which was later adjustable from the salary of the workmen. It is true that when the payment was made it was designated as an advance. For example, when payment was made in December 1953, it was designated as an advance and it was stated in the notice that it would be treated as advance against any bonus and in the event of no bonus as advance against salary. Even so, the evidence shows that the so-called advance was never recovered in full. Sometimes more was paid in addition to what had been paid in December.\n\nOnce nothing more was paid but the amount already paid in December was not recovered. Three times something was recovered from what was paid in December; even so a minimum of one month's .salary out of the so-called advance in December was always left with the workmen. So though the amount paid in December was originally called an advance, at least one month's salary out of the so-called advance :always remained with the workmen and was treated as bonus connected with Christmas festival. The fact that the payment was originally called advance would not detrad -from the conclusion that some amount was really paid as bonus in connection with Christmas festival.\n\nThere is no evidence to show that this amount was paid\n\nx-gratia. In this connection our attention is drawn to what happened in April 1954. Then a notice was given about payment of additional bonus which was called ex-gratia. The evidence however shows that in 1953-54 one month's salary was paid in December and in addition half a month's salary was paid later on and it was this additional half month's salary which was designated as ex-gratia payment. There is nothing to show that the payment made in December was ever designated as ex-gratia payment. It could hardly be so designated for it was usually called an advance which was claimed as recoverable though the whole of it was never recovered. In spite of the payment made in December being called an advance, we are of opinion that on the evidence in this case it is clear that part of the advance was made as\n\na bonus in connection with Christmas festival. It is therefore established on the evidence that there was an implied condition of service between the appellant and its workmea that something would be paid every year about Christmas time as festival bonus.\n\nL.'P(D)!SCI-16\n\nMa._.,.e of Boml>ay Oo. LIL v.\n\nWorkmen\n\nWanclwo, I.\n\n1964 The next question to which we turn is the mmmmm Jl•tlf1!1•;;;;;;; of amount which has to be paid as an implied condition of ser- BomJJay Oo. Ltd. vice. Here again the evidence shows that the minimum that w v;. has been paid, at any rate since 1951-52, is one month'& or men salary. Sometimes more has been paid, but one month's Wanchoo, J. i; alary seems to have been paid in connection with Christmas for an unbroken period of time, which is long enough to\n\npermit an inference that there is an implied condition of service for payment of one month's salary as festival bonu& connected with Christmas in this branch of the appellant.\n\nWe cannot agree with the tribunal that the evidence shows a minimum payment of It months' salary at the time of .Christmas. It is true that if we take into account what wai;\n\np:aid later also over the entire period from 1950-51, the minimum is l! months' salary; but in a case of payment which is not at a uniform rate we have to connect the payment with a festival (in this case Christmas). We can therefore only look at the payment made in December to decide what is the minimum which may be treated as a condition of service. Once it is proved that there was an implied condition of service, some amount has to oe paid under the said implied term; what the minimum would be in that behalf must be decided as a question of fact. On the evidence in this case it is clear that the minimum is only one month's. salary payable about Christmas time and this w.as actually paid in 1951-52 and 1953-54, though in other years more was paid which was later liable to adjustment. We therefore hold that there is an implied condition of service between the appellant and its workmen that one month's salary as the minimum would be paid as Christmas bonus to the work-· men about Christmas tiine. The decision of the tribunal therefore allowing 1 ! months' salary as the minimum must be modified and we hold that payment of one month's. salary as Christmas bonus is proved as an implied conditio11 of service between the appellant and its workmen on the admitted facts of the case. The minimum of one month's basic salary has to be paid even if there is loss in any give11 year. We may add that though this is the minimum, it would be open to the appeUant to pay more if its profit position justifies the payment of more. But we cannot agree with the tribunal that in the year 1958-59, the profit position of the appellant justifies payment of more than the minimum. It has been found t)lat in .that year there was actually a small loss of Rs. 8,000 /- suffered by the appellant. Therefore even though the tribunal may be justified in awarding a reasonable amount as festival bonus once it is proved that somethinghas to be paid as an implied condition of servioe towards such bonus, it cannot be said in this case that the tribunal was justified in giving anything beyond the minimum for\n\n\"1 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREllE COURT REPORTS 483\n\nthis was a year of loss. We are therefore of opinion that 196,\n\nthe amount awlllded as festival bonus for the year 1958-59 Managem'111 •! should be reduced to one month's salary and order accord- Bombay Oo. IM.\n\nmnlv v. ~,.\n\nWr.rlme11\n\nBefore we part with this appeal we should like to add Wanclwo, 1. that there was no stay order by this Court in this case. The i:xtra am\\)Ullt of 15 days' salary awarded by the tribunal has already been paid to the workmen. Mr. Pai has assured us that he would advise his client that the additional amount S> paid may not be recovered back in the circumstances.\n\nWe therefore partly allow the appeal in the manner indicated above. In the lircumstances we pass no order as to Clllllb..\n\nAppeal partly allowed.", "total_entities": 18, "entities": [{"text": "477\n\nMANAGEMENT OF BOMBAY CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANAGEMENT OF BOMBAY CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "its workmen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 264, "end_char": 275, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1960] 1 S.C.R. 24", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2079, "end_char": 2097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 18, 196-2", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2744, "end_char": 2758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Award dated June 18, 196-2 of the Industrial Tribunal, Ernalrulam, in Industrial Dispute No."}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Ernalrulam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2766, "end_char": 2797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Award dated June 18, 196-2 of the Industrial Tribunal, Ernalrulam, in Industrial Dispute No."}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2856, "end_char": 2865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Jfarch 2/Y\n\n1964 G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "J anardan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay Co. Ltd.\n\nWorkmen\n\nJ anardan Sharma, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3083, "end_char": 3090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the livered by Court was de-\n\nWanchoo, J. W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam."}}, {"text": "lspahani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In lspahani's case(') the question raised was whether there was an implied condition of service for payment of some bonus at the time of puja festival in Bengal."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5818, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In lspahani's case(') the question raised was whether there was an implied condition of service for payment of some bonus at the time of puja festival in Bengal."}}, {"text": "Management of Bombay Co. LjiJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7995, "end_char": 8025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Management of Bombay Co. LjiJ.\n\nWorkmen\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nM a:nagement o.f .Bomboy Co. Ltd.\n\nWorkmen\n\nWanchoo~J,\n\nBut that in our opinion does not dispose of the matter."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8494, "end_char": 8500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What we are saying in this case is only concerned with the Cochin branch and may not necessarily be applicable to other branches of the appellant, the facts of which are not before us."}}, {"text": "Wanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13674, "end_char": 13681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LIL v.\n\nWorkmen\n\nWanclwo, I.\n\n1964 The next question to which we turn is the mmmmm Jl•tlf1!1•;;;;;;; of amount which has to be paid as an implied condition of ser- BomJJay Oo."}}, {"text": "Wanclwo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16937, "end_char": 16944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wr.rlme11\n\nBefore we part with this appeal we should like to add Wanclwo, 1."}}, {"text": "Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17111, "end_char": 17114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pai has assured us that he would advise his client that the additional amount S> paid may not be recovered back in the circumstances."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_484_489_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "M...U.26\n\n/ '\n\n.'\": \\-,.J-,~:.-:' :>.:, \\\\, { /' '\\'\n\n.i', _ .. ;'~- ' \";.~'-~-:.... /,\\) --....,,.,··\n\n_-~:;-\\\"' ',\n\n.. \\ ·.\n\n:SUPREJUE COURT REPORTS [1964}.\n\nLABOUR COMMISSIONER, MADHYA PRADESH\n\n.· v.\n\nBURHANPUR TAPTI MILLS AND OTHERS\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. W ANCHOO AND K. C. DAS\n\nGUPTA, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Disputtrike-Legality-Whether employer can decide and take action-Jurisdiction of Labour Co1n1nissioner- \"Rendered i!!egal\" in s. 42(l)(g) if means \"held illegal\" Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947 (C. P. and Berar Act 33 of 1947), ss. 16, 41 and 42(1)(g).\n\nAn employee was summarily dismissed by the respondentemployer after holding an enquiry on the allegation that he had instigated workers to go on an illegal strike. The employee applied under s. 16 of Central Provinces and Berar Industrial . Disputes Settlement Act to the Labour Commissioner, who held that authority to decide the legality of a strike had been entrusted by s. 41 of the Act to the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court and that before a strike had been held by either of these authorities to be illegal the employer had no right to take any action against his workmen on his own view that a strike was illegal and ordered the reinstatement of the employee with full wages. The revision application by the respondentempl.oyer to the State Industrial Court proved unsuccessful tl:ough it disagreed with the Labour Court's view that the employer could not take action before a decision from the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court declaring the strike to be illegal had been obtained. Thereafter, the employer moved the High Court under Art. 226. The High Court was of the view that though the Labour Commissioner may not have the jurisdiction to decide the question of illegality of a strike, it may decide the question incidentally for the purposes mentioned in s. 16 if in an enquiry such a question is raised, :.ind quashed the orders of the Labour Commissioner and the State Industrial Court. On appeal preferred by the Labour Commissioner in this Court.\n\nHeld: (i) The employer is free to take action against the employee as soon as he thinks that the strike in which he has participated comes within the provisions of s. 40 of the Act. The phrase ''rendered illegal\" in s. 42(1)(g) has been deliberately used in contradistinction to the words ''held illegal\" used in ss. 43, 44 and 45.\n\nIt would be an impossible position for industri3l management if after notice has been given of a strike or a strike has started-- which the employer considers to be illegal within the meaning of s. 40 he should be compelled to stay his hands and wait till a State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has given a declaration on the question.\n\nThe use of the word \"shall\" in s. 41 in connection with the action to be taken on a reference by the State Government and \"may\" in connection with the action on an application by others in the same section compels the conclusion that on an application .. by anybody other than the State Government, the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court may also refuse to, take action.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE1\\1E COURT REPORTS 485\n\n(ii) For performing its functions under s. 16(3) of the Act tl::e Labour Commissioner has jurisdiction to c'ecide the question of legality or illegality of a strike when that question is raised before it. ' CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 529 of\n\n1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 24, 1958, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 82 of 1958.\n\nI. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, B. Narayanaswamy, !. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and 0. C. Mathur, for respondent No. 1.\n\nM .S.K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No. 2.\n\nMarch 25, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-Two main questions arise in this appeal.\n\nThe first is whether s. 42(1)(g) of the Central Provinces and Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947 prohibits an employer from taking action against a workman for participation in an illegal strike before it is so declared under s. 41 of the Act The second question is whether in an application made under s. 16(3) of the Act the Labour Commissioner has jurisdiction to decide the legality or illegality of the strike.\n\nOn September 21, 1956 the first respondent in this appeal, the Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd .. served a charge-sheet on one of the employees Sulemankhan Mullaji, who is the second respondent in the appeal alleging that he had instigated workers of the Weaving Department to go on an illegal strike earlier that day. After holding an enquiry into the matter the Manager came to the conclusion that the charge had been established being of opinion that this constituted misconduct under cl. 25(b) of the Standing Orders. Thereafter, the Manager ordered Sulemankhan to be summarily dismissed without notke and without compensation in lieu of notice. Sulemank:han made an application against this order to the Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh under s. I 6 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. The Labour Commissioner was of opinion that the authority to decide the legality of a strike had been entrusted by s. 41 of the Act by the legislature to the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court. He also held that before a strike had been held by either of these authorities to be illegal the employer had no right to take any action against his workmen on his own view that a strike was illegal. The Labour Commissioner further held that there was no legal evidence to prove the allegations against Sulemank:han and that in inflicting the pun; shment of dismissal the Manager had not paid due regard to suJ>.\n\ncl. 4 of cl. 26 of the Standing Orders. Accordingly, he ordered\n\nLaOO..r Oommil- \"'°\"\", M adliya\n\nPraduh\n\nBurhanpur Ta, it M ill8 and Other•\n\nDaa Gvpta, J.\n\n1964 the reinstatement of Sulemankh:m with full wages from the Labou; c..,,,.;.. date of dismissal to the date of reinstatemenL\n\naioner, MadAya Pradeah The revision application by the first respondent proved nn- Burha;;,,,, Tapli successful. The State Industrial Court. which is the revisional Mills and ou,,,.authority, disagreed with the Labour Court's view that the employer could not take action before a decision from the Ila\" Gup•a, J State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court declaring\n\nthe strike to he illegal had been obtained. Being however of opinion that the enquiry had nlOt been held in 3CCO(dance with the Standing Order in cl. 26(2) and also that in awarding the punishment the Manager had not taken into consideration the matters mentioned in the Standing Orders in cl. 26(4), the Industrial Court conclnded that the Labonr Commissioner was justified in examining the evidence or itself. It further held that the finding of fact given by the Labour Commissioner could not he challenged in revision. The final conclusion of the State Industrial Court. as already indicated, was that the order of reinstatement made by the Labour Commissioner was fully justified\n\nAgainst this order the employer ltbe l:iJllt respondent) moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under ArL 226 of the Constitution. The High Court indicated its view that though the Labour Commissioner may not haYC the jurisdication to decide the question of illegality of a strike. it may decide the question incidentally for the purposes mentioned in s. J 6 of the Act if in an enquiry under s. 16 a question is raised that the dismissal was wrongful as there was no incitement of an illegal strike under cl. 2S(b) of the Standing O(ders. After expressing this view the High Court. howew:r, added the wools: \"That aspect of the matter need not be considered hecanse the strike instigated here was not held to he a legal strike.\" The High Court was of opinion that the Indnstrial Court had fallen into an error in thinking that the charge sheet saved on the workmen was defective. It also held that neither the I abom: Commissioner nor the State Indnstrial Court had any jurisdiction to examine the findings of the domestic tribunal as an appellate authority and to come to a contrary conclusion on the same evidence. Accordingly. the High Court quashed the orders of the Labour Commissioner and the State Industrial CourL\n\nThe present appeal has been preferred by the Labour Commissioner. Madhya PradeSh. No appeal bas been prefened by the workman himself. It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider in this appeal the correctness or otherwise of the High Conrt's decision on the merits of the case. What WI: haYC to decide. as already indicated is whether sec. 42 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act. 1947\n\nstood in the way of the employer taking action against a work- 1964 man for participation in an illegal strike before it had beenLabourCommiaaioner declared to be so under s. 41; and secondly, whether when there Madhya Praduh has been no such decision the Labour Commissioner has juris- Burhanp=~ Tapti diction to decide the question of legality or illegality of the Mills and Other•\n\nstrike in an application made to him under s. 16 of the Act.\n\nThe relevant provisions of s. 42 which require consideration for a decision of the first question are that: \"No employer shall dismiss, discharge, suspend or reduce any employee or punish him in any other manner solely by reason of the circumstance that the employee has participated in a strike which is not \"rendered illegal\" under any provision of this Act.\" The provisions of the Act rendering a strike illegal are set out in s. 40. Prima facie it appears that it is only where the strike in which an employee has participated does not come within any of the provisions of s. 40 that the employer is prohibited from taking action against him. The prohibition operates only when a strike is not \"rendered illegal\" under any provisions of the Act. That, it is urged by the respondent-employer, is the same thing as saying that the prohibition operates only where the strike is not illegal within the meaning of the provisions of s. 40 of the Act\n\nThe argument on behalf of the appellant is that the words \"rendered illegal\" in s. 4Z (l)(g) should properly be construed as \"held illegal\". It has to be noticed in this connection that s. 41 of the Act provides a machinery under which not only the State Government but any employer or employee can approach the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court for a decision whether a strike or a lockout of which notice has been given or which has taken place is illegal. According to the appellant, it is only after on such an application the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has decided that a strike is illegal, that the employer can take action. We are unable to see any justification for such a construction. It is clear to us that the phrase \"rendered illegal\" in s. 42(1)(g) has been deliberately used in contradistinction to the words \"held illegal\" used in ss. 43, 44 and 45. Section 43 provides penalty on an employer who \" declares a lockout which is held by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court to be illegal\". Section 44 provides penalty against an employee \"who goes on a strike or who joins a strike which is held by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court to be illegal\".\n\nSection 45 provides penalty for instigation or incitement to or participation or acting in furtherance of a strike or lockout \"which is held to be illegal by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court\". When the legislature used the words \"held illegal\" by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court in ss. 43, 44 and 45 but used different phraseology,\n\nDaa Gupta, J.\n\n1964 viz .• \"rendered illegal\" ins. 42(l)(g) the conclusion is irresistible\n\nLaOOi<i:Oommi.!sione•, that this was done deliberately. The reason for this is not Madhya Pradesh far to seek. However, quickly the State Industrial Court or the\n\nB&rhan;, r Tapti District. Idustrial Court 1?ay act on a~ application un_der s. 41\n\nMilla and Diners the dec1s1on on the legahty or otherwise of a strike 1s bound to take a considerable time. It would be an impossible position Das Gupta, J. for industrial management if after notice has been given of a strike or a strike has started which the employer considers to be illegal within the meaning of s. 40 he should be compelled to stay his hand and wait till a State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has given a declaration on the question. It also appears clear that these authorities are not bound to give a decision on an application by the employer.\n\nThe Section runs thus: --\n\n\"The State Industrial Court pr a District Industrial Court shall, on a reference made by the State Government, and may, on an application by any employer or employee concerned or by a representative of the employees concerned or by the Labour Officer, decide whether any strike or lockout or any change of which notice has been given or which has taken place is illegal.\" It has to be noticed that while on a reference by the State Government the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court \"shall\" decide the question of legality of the strike or lockout, it \"may\" decide the question on an application by the employer or employee or any other person mentioned in the section. The use of the word \"shall\" in connection with the action to be taken on a reference by the State Government and \"may\" in connection with the action on an application by others in the same section compels the conclusion that on 3n application by anybody other than the State Government, the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court may also refuse to take action. The suggested construction of the words \"rendered illegal\" as \"held illegal\" might therefore have the curious result that even though the strike is in fact illegal within the meaning of s. 40 of the Act no action can at any time be taken against an employee for participation in it. We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the words \"rendered illegal\" does not mean \"held illegal\" and the employer is free to take action against the employee as soon as he thinks that the strike in which he has participated comes within the provisions of s. 40 of the Act.\n\nWhen the employer takes such action against the employee by dismissing, discharging, removing or suspending him, it will be open to the employee to apply to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment of compensation for loss of\n\nwages. This is provided in s. 16(2) o~ th.e Act. Section 16(3) 1964 provides that if on receipt c_:if such apphcat10n th~ Labour Com- Labour commumissioner after such enqmry as may be prescnbed finds that 8'aner, Madhya the dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension was in contra- P\"'!uh vention of any of the provisions of this Act or in contravention Burlulnpr Tap1i of a Standing Order made or sanctioned under this Act or was Mills Other• for a fault or misconduct committed by the employee more than Das Gupta, J. six months prior to the date of such dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, he may direct reinstatement of the employee or other relief. The question has been raised whether when the order of dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension purports to have been made for participation in or instigation to an illegal strike it is open to the Labour Commissioner to decide the question of illegality of a strike. On behalf of the appellant it has been suggested that exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question of legality or illegality of a strike has been given by the Act to the two authorities, viz .• the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court, as mentioned in s. 41. There is no doubt that s. 41 which has been set out above empowers the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court to decide the question of legality of a strike on a reference by the Government, or application by employer or employee or others mentioned in the section. Mr. Shroff argues that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to have two parallel bodies-the Labour Commissioner as well as the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court-having jurisdiction to decide such a matter. For, as he points out, it may well be that while on an application under s. 16(3) the Labour C:ommissioner holds that the strike was not illegal the contrary view may be taken by the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court on an application under s. 41 or vice versa.\n\nThis argument is plausible at first sight. There is however one\n\ngrat difficulty in accepting it. Tha.t consists in the fact, alrady P?mted out: that the State Industnal Court or a District Jndust~1al Court is not bound to give any decision at all on applica- !ion by any party other than .te State Government. There being thus cses where the authont1e~ mentioned in s. 41 may refuse to dec1d~ the quest10n of legality or illegality of a strike, it is not possible to .sy that el'.clusive jurisdiction is given by s. 41 t? these aut.hon!ie~ to decide the question of legality or illegality <'.f a. strike. t 1s reasonable to held therefore that for perfom.mg its funtI<?ns_ uder s. 16(3) of the Act the Labour Comi; n1ss10er has 3ur_1sd1chon to d.ecide the question of legality or tllegahty of a stnke when that question is raised before it.\n\n-:- The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "LABOUR COMMISSIONER, MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 195, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LABOUR COMMISSIONER, MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BURHANPUR TAPTI MILLS AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 236, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BURHANPUR TAPTI MILLS AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 239, "end_char": 259, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 298, "end_char": 308, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 42(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 484, "end_char": 556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 16, 41 and 42(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 591, "end_char": 614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 808, "end_char": 813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Disputes Settlement Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 858, "end_char": 881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 991, "end_char": 996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1706, "end_char": 1714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1933, "end_char": 1938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2346, "end_char": 2357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 43, 44 and 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2443, "end_char": 2460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2658, "end_char": 2663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2848, "end_char": 2853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3659, "end_char": 3671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3693, "end_char": 3707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, B. Narayanaswamy, !."}}, {"text": "B. Narayanaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3709, "end_char": 3725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, B. Narayanaswamy, !."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3730, "end_char": 3743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3745, "end_char": 3760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and 0."}}, {"text": "0. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3765, "end_char": 3777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and 0."}}, {"text": "M .S.K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3802, "end_char": 3816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M .S.K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. S. Narasimhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3821, "end_char": 3837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M .S.K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3922, "end_char": 3931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-Two main questions arise in this appeal.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "s. 42(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3999, "end_char": 4010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4018, "end_char": 4090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4220, "end_char": 4225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 16(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4297, "end_char": 4305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "September 21, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4414, "end_char": 4432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 21, 1956 the first respondent in this appeal, the Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd .. served a charge-sheet on one of the employees Sulemankhan Mullaji, who is the second respondent in the appeal alleging that he had instigated workers of the Weaving Department to go on an illegal strike earlier that day."}}, {"text": "Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 21, 1956 the first respondent in this appeal, the Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd .. served a charge-sheet on one of the employees Sulemankhan Mullaji, who is the second respondent in the appeal alleging that he had instigated workers of the Weaving Department to go on an illegal strike earlier that day.", "canonical_name": "BURHANPUR TAPTI MILLS AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Sulemankhan Mullaji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4549, "end_char": 4568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 21, 1956 the first respondent in this appeal, the Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd .. served a charge-sheet on one of the employees Sulemankhan Mullaji, who is the second respondent in the appeal alleging that he had instigated workers of the Weaving Department to go on an illegal strike earlier that day.", "canonical_name": "Sulemankhan Mullaji"}}, {"text": "cl. 25(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4893, "end_char": 4902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Indnstrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Sulemankhan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4959, "end_char": 4970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the Manager ordered Sulemankhan to be summarily dismissed without notke and without compensation in lieu of notice.", "canonical_name": "Sulemankhan Mullaji"}}, {"text": "Sulemank", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5055, "end_char": 5063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sulemank:han made an application against this order to the Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh under s. I 6 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947.", "canonical_name": "Sulemankhan Mullaji"}}, {"text": "han", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5064, "end_char": 5067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sulemank:han made an application against this order to the Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh under s. I 6 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5135, "end_char": 5149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sulemank:han made an application against this order to the Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh under s. I 6 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5170, "end_char": 5238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5355, "end_char": 5360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "District Industrial Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5428, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Commissioner was of opinion that the authority to decide the legality of a strike had been entrusted by s. 41 of the Act by the legislature to the State Industrial Court or the District Industrial Court."}}, {"text": "cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5870, "end_char": 5875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "cl. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5879, "end_char": 5885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Daa Gvpta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6012, "end_char": 6021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, he ordered\n\nLaOO..r Oommil- \"'°\"\", M adliya\n\nPraduh\n\nBurhanpur Ta, it M ill8 and Other•\n\nDaa Gvpta, J.\n\n1964 the reinstatement of Sulemankh:m with full wages from the Labou; c..,,,.;..", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "cl. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6681, "end_char": 6690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 26(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6825, "end_char": 6834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7288, "end_char": 7316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as already indicated, was that the order of reinstatement made by the Labour Commissioner was fully justified\n\nAgainst this order the employer ltbe l:iJllt respondent) moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under ArL 226 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7614, "end_char": 7619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 2S(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7727, "end_char": 7736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya PradeSh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8511, "end_char": 8525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya PradeSh.", "canonical_name": "Madhya PradeSh"}}, {"text": "sec. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8783, "end_char": 8790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9040, "end_char": 9045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Praduh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9080, "end_char": 9093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1947\n\nstood in the way of the employer taking action against a work- 1964 man for participation in an illegal strike before it had beenLabourCommiaaioner declared to be so under s. 41; and secondly, whether when there Madhya Praduh has been no such decision the Labour Commissioner has juris- Burhanp=~ Tapti diction to decide the question of legality or illegality of the Mills and Other•\n\nstrike in an application made to him under s. 16 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Madhya PradeSh"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9296, "end_char": 9301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9342, "end_char": 9347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9745, "end_char": 9750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9892, "end_char": 9897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10246, "end_char": 10251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4Z", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10344, "end_char": 10349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10450, "end_char": 10455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11062, "end_char": 11073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 43, 44 and 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11158, "end_char": 11175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11177, "end_char": 11187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11338, "end_char": 11348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11524, "end_char": 11534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 43, 44 and 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11861, "end_char": 11878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daa Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11912, "end_char": 11921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "43, 44 and 45 but used different phraseology,\n\nDaa Gupta, J.\n\n1964 viz .• \"rendered illegal\" ins.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12244, "end_char": 12249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12394, "end_char": 12403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be an impossible position Das Gupta, J. for industrial management if after notice has been given of a strike or a strike has started which the employer considers to be illegal within the meaning of s. 40 he should be compelled to stay his hand and wait till a State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court has given a declaration on the question.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12566, "end_char": 12571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14115, "end_char": 14120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14476, "end_char": 14481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14762, "end_char": 14770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14784, "end_char": 14797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Standing Order made or sanctioned under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15111, "end_char": 15159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15940, "end_char": 15945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Standing Order made or sanctioned under this Act", "statute": "Standing Order made or sanctioned under this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15970, "end_char": 15975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Standing Order made or sanctioned under this Act", "statute": "Standing Order made or sanctioned under this Act"}}, {"text": "Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16232, "end_char": 16238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shroff argues that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to have two parallel bodies-the Labour Commissioner as well as the State Industrial Court or a District Industrial Court-having jurisdiction to decide such a matter."}}, {"text": "s. 16(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16546, "end_char": 16554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16736, "end_char": 16741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17125, "end_char": 17130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17272, "end_char": 17277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17437, "end_char": 17445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_490_502_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Jlarch26\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964)\n\nK. V. NARAYANASWAMI IYER v.\n\nK. V. RAMAKRISHNA IYER AND ORS.\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.J\n\nHindu Law-Property acquired in the name of a member of ioin't family-Joint family having sufficient nucleus on that date-Presumption that property is acquired from joint family funds-If rebuttable-Past transactions-Manager when accountable.\n\nThere were three brothers who continued as members of a joint family with the eldest of them, the first respondent as the karta. Certain properties were acquired thereafter for the joint family. Certain properties were also acquired in the name of thPfirst respondenfs son his wife and grandson. The two other brothers of respondent no. 1 acquired properties for themselves out of their own earnings. Relations became strained between the brothers and the second brother the present appellant filed suit for partition claiming not only the original properties of the joint\n\nfamily and the properties acquired for the joint family by the Karta, the present respondent but also the properties acquired by the respondent no. 1 in the name of his \\Vife, son and grandson as joint family properties. He also called on the first respondent to account for the past years. The third brother was impleaded as second defendant. Respondent no. l's contention was teat the last mentioned properties were bought by him from his own savings and therefore were not part of the joint family property and consequently not liable to partition. The learned trial Judge held that those properties were joint family property and were liable to be partitioned. Respondent No. 1 thereupon appealed to the High Court and the High Court allowed the appeal regarding substantial part of the schedule properties. Thereupon the appellant filed the present appeal.\n\nHeld: (i) Where properties were acquired in the name of a joint family member, if at the date of' such acquisition the joint family had sufficient nucleus for acquiring it, the property should be presumed to have been acquired from out of family funds and so to form part of the joint family property, unless the contrary is shown. In the present case on a consideration of the evidence it is found th~ the joint family had at the date of the acquisition of the properties in question sufficient nucleus from which these properties could be acquired.\n\nAmritlal Sen & Ors. v. Surath Lal Sen, A.LR. 1942 Cal. 553 and Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurthy, I.L.R. [1948] Mad (P.C.) 440, referred to.\n\n(ii) In the absence of any evidence of fraud or misrepresentation the Karta of a joint family cannot be called upoJl to account for the past transactions, but this does n\"t mean that the parties were bound to accept the statement of the Karla as to what the property consisted of and an enquiry should be directed by the court in a manner usually adopted to disover that in fact the property consisted of at the date of the partit10n. In what anner this principle can be applied depends on the facts and c:rcumstances of each case. Where as m the present case the evidence on record shows prima facie that the Karta could not reasonably\n\nbe expected to have in his hands at the date of the suit any ac- 1964 cumulaties found on evidence to have been acquired by the fami- K. v. Narayana. ly, there can be no justification for calling the Karta to account \"\"\"mi Jy\" foc his past dealing with the joint family property and its income. v.\n\nK.V.Ramakrialona Pammchwar Dube v. Govind Dube, IL.R., 53 Cal. 459, Iyer and Ollur,_ explained.. ..\n\nQvn. APPEU.ATE JURISDICTIO~: Civil Appeal No. 589 of 1960. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 28. 1953, of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 69S of 1949.\n\nK.N. Rajagopal Sastri, K. Jayram and R. Ganapthy Iyer. foc the appellanL\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T.V.R. Tatachari, for re~ pondent nos. I, 3, 4 and 6 to 8.\n\nB. Kalyona Sumlaram, M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chaudhry. M. R. Krishna Pillai for K. R. Chaudhuri, for res pondent no. 2.\n\nMarch 26. 1964. The Judgment of the Court was deli vered by\n\nDAS CiuPTA, J.-Three brothers, Ramakrishna, Naraya- DaaGupta, J. naswamy and Mahadeva, who are eighty-three, seventy nine and sixty nine years of age respectively, are the main figures in this litig; ltion.. After their father's death in 1908 the three brothers cxmtinued as members of a joint family. The eldest brother, Ramakrishna became under the law the Karta of the family. When the father died the family was possessed of about 10 acres of land. But he had left some debts and one of the first acts which Ramakrishna had to do as the Manager was the repayment of those debts. Ramakrishna had become the Kamam in Narasingampettai in 1902 and even during hi~ father's life time started acquiring property. Property to the extent of aboot 2S acres was acquired for the joint family between the years 1911 to 1931. In 1927 Ramakrishna had\n\nbeen transferred to the bigger village of V epatthur and continued to be there till 1930. On his retirement in that year his son Venkalar.una succeeded him as the Kamam of Vepattbur. Betwa:n 1931 to 1946 properties in Vepa.tthur and other\n\nvillages were acquired in the name of Ramaki1ishna's son Vanbtarama, his wife Mangalathammal, his grandon (Venbfar:1ma's soo) Mahalingam. Some property was acquired aJso m the name of Mangalathammal's brother Raja Ayyar.\n\nMonies were also invested in loans in the names of Rama hislma's wife, Mangalathammal, his son Venkatarama and Jaa gnt•wlsoo, Mahalingam.\n\n1964 The second brother Narayanaswami became a Vakil's K. V. Nrayana. clerk in Kumbakonam in 1910. The third brother Mahadeva\n\n•wam~ Iyer who was a boy of thirteen at the time of his father's death was K. v. Ra;,..kri.ohna put into the medical school and qualified as a doctor. He was Iyer and Ot/,.rs in servie as a' Sub: Assistant Surgeon at the time when the pre- Daa Gupta, J. iient smt was mstttuted by Narayanaswamy. Both of them earned well and have admittedly acquired properties for themselves out of their own earnings.\n\nAs early as the thirties feelings became strained betv.een Ramakrishna, the eldest brother and Narayanaswami the second brother. Mahadeva who had to remain away at different places in connection with his service demanded partition of the joint family properties and in this Narayanaswami also seems to have joined him. The extreme action of going to courts was however not taken so long as mother was alive.\n\nShe died early in 1945 at the age of 90 years. In December, (]2th December) 1946 Narayanaswami sent a lawyer's notice to Ramakrishna in which he claimed that not only the 25 acres acquired between 1911 and 1931 but also the properties acquired in the name of Ramakrishna's wife. his son and brotherin-law had been acquired with the income of the family and formed part of the joint family properties. He claimed also in this notice that family funds of about Rs. 25.000 {- was in the hands of Ramakrishna in the shape of cash and Benami investments. He demanded a partition of all these properties and of the cattle and other movable properties owned by the family. He also called upon Ramakrishna to account for the income derived from the family properties \"for the last three years at least\". In all these he claimed a one-third share.\n\nTo this Ramakrishna.replied on December 31, 1946. He stated that the joint family properties consisted only of l 0 acres left by their father and about 25 acres acquired later on and denied that the other properties belonged to the family.\n\nSoon after this, on the !st February 1947. Narayanaswami brought this suit for partition and accounts in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam. The eldest brother Ramakrishna was impleaded as the first defendant; Mahadeva. the third brother, was the second defendant. Ramakrishna's son Venkatarama, his wife Mangalathammal and his brother-inlaw Raja Iyer were impleaded as the third, fourth and the fifth defendants respectively. Mahalingam was impleaded as the sixth defendant Two other minor sons of Venkatarama were also impleaded. They are the seventh and the eighth defendants in the case.\n\nThe plaintiff's case was short and simple. He claimed that Ramakrishna as the Karta of the joint family managed the family properties and acquired properties with the family funds from 1911 to 1946. He thus claimed that not only the 34\n\nacres and 58 cents of land in the village Kumarakshi (men- 1961 tioned in the A Schedule) which the first defendant Ramax. v. Narayanakrishna's wife or son or grandson or brother-in-law were joint swami Iyer ties mentioned in the Scheduk-s B, Bl and B2, and C, Cl and v\n\nv. kriBh C2 and D for which the sale deeds stood in the name of Rama- K[y;, a;: 0ta..':\n\nkrishna's wife or son or grandsc'!l or brother-in-law were joint family properties. He claimed also that between 1931 and 1946 Das Gupta, J.\n\nRamakrishna, the Karta. had invested family funds in the name of his wife. his son and his l!fandson and these were also joint family properties. The movable properties claimed to be joint family properties were mentioned in Schedule A2, while the house in Thiagarajapuram, also claimed to be joint family property was mentioned in Al Schedule. The plaintiff prayed for allotment to him of one third share of these properties by division in metes and bounds into three equal shares. He further prayed for a direction on the first defendant to account for the management of the family properties for three years and for payment to the plaintiff of his share in the amount that may be found due.\n\nThe second defendant Mahadeva generally supported the plaintiff though as regards the years, 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943 his case in the written statement was that it was the plaintiff Narayanaswamy and not the first defendant who collected the income frqm the joint family properties. For these four years, he pleaded that the plaintiff was liable to render an account while for the remaining period the first defendant was said to be liable. In a Schedule to his written statement he mentioned several other items of properties which he claimed belonged to the joint family though one of the sale deeds stood in the name of the sixth defendant Mahalingam and the other in the name of the fifth defendant Raja Ayjar. The other defendants contested the suit.\n\nThe first defendant's case was that though on his father's death he became in law the Karta of the joint Hindu family the actual management was carried on by the mother till 1940 and from 1940 till the mother's death in 1945 by the plaintiff Narayanaswami. It was only after the mother's death that he has taken up the , management of the properties. He pleaded that of the properties mentioned in the plaint only 34.58 acres mentioned in the A Schedule formed the joint family property. (In addition to some of the movable properties mentioned in A2 Schedule). He further pleaded that a house in Kumbakonam town which was acquired by the plaintiff in his own name as also some lands in Manalur village in Kumbakonam and Rs. 8,000 /- in casji which the plaintiff had obtained on sale of certain lands also formed part of the joint family property.\n\nHis wife Mangalathammal, the fourth defendant also pleade<; l that the properties and the investments standing in her\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[IDMJ\n\n1964 name were made by her on her own account with the monies K. v. Narayanawhic_h her husband Ramakrishna gave to her from his own\n\n..,,.,,., Iy\" earmngs. These therefore were not part of the joint family pro- K. V. llah ... perty and consequently not liable to partition.\n\nIyu and Otha-• The third defendant (Venkatarama's) case was that the\n\nDaaa<Ju:p14, J. purchases of land and investments of money srandjng in his name were all with his own earnings since he became Qamam and did not form part of the joint family property. As reganls what stood in the name of his son Mahalingam the thinl defendant pleaded that these were with his own eanings. The fifth defendant also pleaded that whatever stood in his name was acquired by him with Iris own money 2.nd did not form part of the joint family of the plaintiff and his brothers.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge held Gll a considetation of the evidence that the plaintiff's case that the Lldest b!Uthe£ Ramakrishna managed the family property zs the Karta from and after their father's death in 1908 till the date cf the suit had been established. He also came to the conclusion that in about 1931 Ramakrishna had with him an aa:umulaled income of about Rs. 14,000/- belonging to the family and but very little money of his own. From these findings it was an easy step to hold, as the learned Judge did,. that the immovable properties mentioned in Schedules A, Al, B, Bl, C. Cl, C2 and D as also Item 5 in Schedule B2 were all properties belonging to the joint family. Out of these he found that the properties in Schedule Al, that is, a house in Thiagarajapuram had been given away to the sister Rukmaniammal and was no kmgt:r a joint family property and therefore not liable to divisioi:L. The rest of the properties, he held, was liable to be divided amoog: the three brothers, the plaintiff and the defendants I and 2 The Court also held that the mortgages and notes on whlch money had been lent in the names of defeOOants 3 to 5 belonged to the joint family with the exception of a few standing in the name of the thlrd defendant (Venbtarama). which was held to be the third defendant's personal property.\n\nA preliminary decree was made by the Court in accordana:-\n\nwith these findings with a direction that an account be taken with reference to income of the properties in Schedules A, Al~ B, Bl, C, Cl and D and Item 5 in Sch. B2 and 1he house at Kumbakonam mentioned in the Schedule to the first dant's written statement, for three years priO£ to the date of the suit and from the date of the suit till the passing of the final decree. As regards the properties in Scbednle A it was directed that the accounting will cease from the date en whiclr the parties took possession of their share in aaxxdance with: the interim decree.\n\nAgainst this decision the first defendant to the Hi&h Court of Judicature at Madras. The plainlitf also fikd\n\nan appeal challenging the decision of the Subordinate Judge 1964 that the house in Kumbakonam was a joint family property. K.V. Nara1JCVA4- The High Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal holding that the awami Jy.,.\n\nKumbakonam house was a separate self acquisition of the K.v.~ plaintiff. Against this decision of the High Court no appeal has Iyer allll Ollltr• been preferred and we are no longer concerned with the question whether this house was plaintiff's property or not.\n\nDaa Gupla, J.\n\nIn the appeal preferred by the first defendant the High Court came to the conclusion, disagreeing with the Trial Court, that the first defendant Ramakrishna had saved enough from his separate earnings from which it was quite possible for him to make all the acquisitions and investments in the name of his son, wife and grandson subsequent to 1930. In the opinion of the High Court the view of the Subordinate Judge that by 1930 the first defendant had in his hands a sum of Rs. 14,000 I accumulated from the income of the joint family lands was \"surprising and untenable\". It did not disturb the Trial Court's findings that Schedule D land acquired in the name of the 3rd defendant was joint family property, ap . parently because no appeal had been filed as regards this property. Taking these 14 acres to be acquisitions for the family the High Court recorded its conclusion thus: -\n\n\"When we consider that the joint family nucleus has been more than quadrupled, it is difficult to see what grievance the younger coparceners really have, particularly the second defendant, who after keeping for himself his earnings as a Doctor in Government Service finds himself entitled to a share in a greatly increased ancestral patrimony.\" Fina:lly the High Court concluded \"that the plaintiff bas not shown that any of the acquisitions or investments in the names of defendants 3, 4 and 6 were made from joint family funds.\" Accordingly, it allowed also the appeal preferred by the first defendant, holding that the only items liable for parti tion as joint property assets were those in Schedules A and D.\n\nIt also ordered that the first defendant would account for the income from 12th December 1946, the date on which notice demanding partition was sent to him by the plaintiff. The present appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff against this deci sion of the High Court.\n\nTwo main arguments were advanced before us by Mr.\n\nRajagopala Sastri in support of the appeal. The first is as regards the properties purchase~ in the name of the first\" defendant's wife, his son, and hiS grandson. Learned Counsel subn:iitted tha.t the High Court did not record any clear conclut?n that .at the date of the cquisition of these properties the JOmt family had not a sufficient nucleus for acquiring these.\n\n1964 He argued that the acquisitions in the name of the first defen- K.V. Narayanadant's wife was admittedly with funds advanced by the first\n\nswami Iyer defendant himself; and if at the date of the acquisition in her K. v. Ra;;.lcrishna name the joint famHy had sufficient nucleus for acquiring\n\nIyer and Others them, the presumption would be that they were acquired with joint family funds notwithstanding the fact that the first defen- Daa Gupta, J. dant may have sufficient funds of his own for the same purpose. It was rightly argued that in such a case the property should be held to be joint family property unless the presump tion of the acquired property also being joint family property was re-butted by the first defendant. It was also argued that acquisitions in the name of the third defendant and the sixth defendant should also be held to have been made with funds advanced by the first defendant himself and so these also should be presumed to have been acquired with joint family funds if it is shown that the joint family had sufficient nucleus for acquiring these at the date of the acquisitions and the first defendant does not show positively that the funds with which they were acquired did not belong to the joint family.\n\nThe legal position is well settled that if in fact at the date of acquisition of a particular property the joint family had sufficient nucleus for acquiring it, the property in the name of any member of the joint family should be presumed to be acquired from out of family funds and so to form part of the joint family property, unless the contrary is shown. (Vide Amritlal Sen & ors., v. Surath Lal Sen & others(') Appalaswam; v. Suryanarayanamurthy & others(').\n\nIn the case before us, it is not disputed that the acquisitions in the name of the first defendant's wife were made with funds advanced by him. As regards the acquisitions in the name of the third defendant and his minor son the sixth defendant also we find it reasonable to hold from the evidence, as regards the earnings of the third defendant and other circumstances, that for these acquisitions also money was paid by the first defendant. The question whether the joint family had at the time of each of these acquisitions sufficient nucleus from which the acquisitions could have been made is therefore of great importance.\n\nOn a consideration ot the evidence, as discussed below, we have come to the conclusion that it does not appear that the joint family had at the date of tile acquisitions made in the names of the first-defendant's.wife, his son, and his grandson sufficient nucleus from which these properties could be acquired. In coming to this conclusion we have taken into consideration the fact that family funds were spent in pUJchasing 14 acres of land mentioned in the name of the 5th defendant.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1942 Cal. 553. (') LL.R. [1948] Mad. (P.C.) 440.\n\nThe period during which acquisitions admittedly for the 196# joint family were made came to an end in about l 931. At that x. v. Karayanatime the first defendant had, according to his own evidence, su-ami Iyer about Rs. 15,000/- in his hand. His case is that this entire K.V. Ra;,; akrishno amount was what he had accumulated out of his own earn- Iyer and Oters ings. The Subordinate Judge held that a little more than Da• Gupta, J.\n\nRs. 14,000 /- out of this amount was ihe savings from the family funds. We agree with the High Court that thi~ conclus!on is not justified by the evidence on the record. As rightly pomt- ' ed out by the High Court properties worth about Rs. 20,000 /- had been purchased out of the family income during this period. During part of this period at least monies had to be spent for other requirements of the family including the expenses on the education of the third brother Mahadeva. The several documents produced in the case show that at the time of more than one purchase the first liefendant had to borrow money on promissory notes to pay the consideration mentioned in the documents. It is worth mentioning that even the plaintiff: was not prepared to say that the family in.coll!e was sufficient to pay for these purchases. In cross-exammat10n a question was put to him in these words : -\n\n\"Q. From 1911 out of the family income Rs. 20,000 I -\n\nworth of lands had been purchased? Can there have been more income from the family lands?\" The answer is significant. It was in these words:·-\n\n\"A. From the family income. the joint income of myself and Defendant I certainly exceeded Rs. 20,000 I-. The income of myself and Defendant I which went in the purchase of lands may have come to Rs. 10.000/-\".\n\nIn other words. the plaintiff: himself seem to concede that only Rs. 10.0001of the family income was available during this period for purchase of lands. The claim made here that he also contributed to the purchase is clearly inconsistent with his own written statement and with other parts of his evidence and cannot be accepted.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge appears to have been convinced that Ramakrishna's personal earnings were very little.\n\nHe thought also that what little Ramakrishna earned was required for the expenses of his own branch of the family. The learned Judge concluded that he could not have saved out of these earn\\ngs. This view appears to have been mainly responsible for this conclusion that almost the whole of Rs. l 5,000 /. which the defendant No. I admitted to have with him in about l _931 came out of the family funds. In our opinion, the matenals on the record do not justify the Trial Court's view that Ramakrishna could not have accumulated a sum of\n\n1961 Rs. 15,000/- out of his own income. The mamools which he K. v. Xarayanareceived as Karnam of Narasingampettai and later on of the •wami Iyer bigger village Vepatthur amounted to a considerable quan- K v R \"· k . h tity of paddy and must have fetched him a goodly income. 1; er ~':/ <fthr:a There was apart from this, his income from the banana plantations which he had at Narasingampettai. One of the lease Das Gupta, J. deeds shows a receipt of Rs. 450 /- for one season. Taking good years with bad, it would not be unreasonable to think that this also brought him a few thousands of rupees. we are convincerl also on a consideration of his evidence, t<.ken with the entries in the account book of Appaswamy Iyer !Ex. B 101) that he received a sum of Rs. 2,500 /- as reward for successfully maintaining the litigation on Appalaswamy's behalf. ihere can be little doubt that he received a good sum also as fees for writing documents. One of his witnesses, Narayanaswami Reddiar, DW 7, has given evidence that he paid the defendant Rs. LOOO /- as fees for the documents written for him. Even if this be considered an exaggeration, 1t is quite clear from the evidence of this witness that Ram3krishna who, it may be noted, was' a man of some education, did a flourishing side business as a writer of documents, saved two or three thousand rupees, earned by him by this work during the entire period he served as a Karnam. It is more than probable that he had other sources of income which he did not think it prudent to mention in the witness box.\n\nOn a consideration of the circumstances we are convinced that this story that he had Rs. 15,000/- in his hands in about 1931 as accumulated out of his own earnings is substantially true.\n\nMr. Rajagopala Sastri has however rightly pointed out that a finding that in 1931 very little remained out of the family income would not be sufficient to show that there was no sufficient nucleus for the acquisition of the different properties in the name of the defendant's wife, his son nd his grandson after 1931. For a proper decision of this question it is necessary to consider roughly the income and expenditure out of the admittedly family properties during this period.\n\nWe shall first consider the period, 1931 to 1939, as it is clear from the evidence that during this period the defendant No. I carried on the actual management of the joint family properties. It is common case of both the parties that the paddy yield in 1931 was 856 kalams; during 1932 1,000 kalams and during 1933 1,118 kalams. For the next five years paddy yield was, according to the respondent's counsel, J,058, 1,058, 958, 958, and 958 kalams. The appellant's counsel puts his estimates and l,160 kalams respectively. These differences in the estimates for these years at the higher figures of 1,360, 1,360, 1,160, 1,160 seem to be mainly due to the fact that while,\n\n...\n\naccording to the respondent, the family was in possession of 1964 only six acres of mortgaged land in addition to the 35 acres, K.V . .NarayaM\n\nthe appellant's case was that an additional area of six acres swami Iyer of mortgaged land was also in the_ family's possessir.n during K.V.Ra;,;,, krishno\n\nthese years. Mr. Ra jagopala Sastn was not however able to Iyer and Other• Point out anything on the record in support of this claim.\n\nII Da8 Gupta, J.\n\nWe think it reasonable therefore to accept as substantia y correct the estimate of paddy yield as mentioned before us on behalf of the respondent for these years. For the year 1939 the yield may be taken as 1,153 kalams roughly as in that year the D Schedule lands now found to be the property of the joint family had also been acquired.\n\nOn an examination of the evidence on the record we accept the price for each kalam of paddy to be Rs. 2.50 nP for each of the years 1931 and 1932 an\\! 1.19, l.25, 1.37, 1.40, 1.50, 1.56 and 1.62 for the years 1933 to 1939 respectively, as contended before us on behalf of the respondent. '.fhe total income received from paddy in these nine years thus appears to be about Rs. 14,976/·. To this has to be added the receipts from the dry crops like black grams and green grams grown on some of the lands. We accept the evidence given by the defendant that dry crops were not grown in every year and also not en all the lands. The sale proceeds of black grams and green grams amounted to Rs. 72 I - for the year 1935 according to the account book Ex. A 98. Taking this to be the average receipt per year from the dry crops the receipts from these crops during the nine years under consideration ''amounted to about Rs. 648 I-. The total income from the crops grown on the joint family lands during the years 1931 to 1939 thus works out approximately to be about Rs. 15,624 I. Adding to this the sum of Rs. 1,100/- received on repayment of the mortgage loan on Ex. 187 the joint family earnings during these nine years appears to have amounted to about Rs. 16,724/-.\n\nIt is now necessary to have some idea of the expenditure incurred during these years. The claim of expenditure of Rs. 5,172/ during these years made before us on behalf of the respondent is not disputed by the appellant. We think also that the respondent's claim that Rs. 1,100/- advanced on the mortgage bond <Ex. 187) was paid from family funds should be accepted. We have next to add the sum of Rs. 6,500/- that was\n\npai~ for the purchase of the D. Scedule lands, Rs. 4,030 /. paid as k1sts and Rs. 2.000 I as cultivation expenses including Kariasthan's pay. The total expenditure during the nine years-1931 to 1939-amounted thus to more than Rs. 18,000/-.\n\nProceed_ing therefore on the basis on which there is no longer any_ dispute, t?at the D Schedule lands were acquired out of the family _funds, 1t appears clear that the jomt family did not possess sufficient nucleus for making any of the other purchases .\n\ni964 made during this period. viz~. the properties mentioned in Schex. v. N .... _ dules Band Bl purchased by the document Ex. 125. the pro- ...,,.; Iyer perties mentioned in Schedule Cl purchased by the document\n\nx. v. Raba Ex. B 124. the properties mentioned in Schedule C purchased\n\nIyeraai.IOU-• by Ex. 129. the.properties mentioned in the Schedule to the written statement of the second defendant purchased by docu- Daa Gvpta, J. ments Exhibits B 134 and B 135. The Hi!!h Court's conclusion as regards these properties that they did ot form part of the joint family properties and are not liable to partition in the present suit is therefore clearly correct_\n\nThe properties mentioned in Schedule C2 were purchased on the 24th April 1941 by Ex. 136 in the name of the 4th defendant while properties mentioned in Item l of B2 Schedule were purchased on the 19th August 1942 by Ex. 126 in the name of the sixth defendant. Though it was the first defendant's case that he had nothing to do with these purchases we are convinced on a consideration of the evidence that the monies for these purchases were also advanced by him. To decide whether these properties or the properties mentioned in Item 5 of Schedule 82, a house in Vepatthur. of which mortgage \\>as taken in the name of the first defendant himself bv Ex. B 1929 on the 10th May 1942, formed part of the joint family property, it is necessary to examine what funds, if any, belonging to the joint family were with the first defendant during these years. The first defendant's case, as already indicated, is that from 1940 till the mother's death in 1945 the plaintiff and not he managed the joint family properties so that he did not receive any portion of the joint family earnings during the period. The plaintiff has strenuously denied the truth of this statement. There are several circumstances however which make us think that the first defendant's version is true. The most important of these is the fact that the youngest brother Mahadeva, who is clearly siding with the plaintiff in this family quarrel, made a definite assertion in his written statement in these words: \"Similarly the plaintiff has been collecting the income from the joint family properties during the years 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943.\" He also stated there that the plaintiff had assured him that he would maintain proper accounts for the collection and expenditure of the income joint family for his period of management and made the definite claim that the plaintiff was liable to render an account for the period of his management. It is true that at the trial Mahadeva tried to explam away this assertion in the written statement by saying that this was based on information given to him by the defendant No. I. In the very next sentence, however, he again said that this view that the plaintiff was exclusively managing for <:.!rtain years was his conclusion. It is important to notice in this connection tat at the bottom of Ex. H 190 dated the 13th March 1941 which Mahadeva\n\n.. .\n\n7 S.C.R. SUPRElE.COURT.REPORTS 501\n\n. received. from Ramakrishna, Mahadeva'made in his own hand 1961 an entry in red ink to the followinj): effect:.-, ·, · \"1939-Kuruvai (paddy}-sold by Nam 1<;;39-Semba\n\nMudal (harvest}-by Nana, sold in 1940.\"\n\nK.V.1taraya1UJswami Iyer\n\nIt is true that there are some ktters '\\', bich indiate that even during 1941 and thereafter Ramakrishna was issuing some instructions to the Kariasthan. But, considering the facts mentioned above along with the letters E thibits B 177 and B 72 in which detailed instructions about the cultivation were being given by the plaintiff to the Kariasthan, we have come to the conclusion that from about 1940 till the mother's death early in 1945 the plaintiff displaced the first _defendant from the management of the family lands and took away all the family lands in K; umarakshi and took away all the income from them.\n\nThe only income from joint family properties that appears . to have come into the hands of the lirst defendant during this period was that from D Schedule lands. The yield from these lands may roughly be estimated at about 300 kalams for each year. The price per kalam in 1941 appears from Ex. 100 to have been Rs. 2/6/-. The net income, after payment of the kist and debiting the expenses of cultivation etc.; may be placed therefore at about Rs. 500 /-. It is undoubtedly a very rough estimate.\n\nBut in the absence of anything more specific on the record we think it proper to accept this as a reasonable basis for ascertaining the nucleus available in the first defendant's hands from the D. Schedule property. On this calculation the first defendant appears to have had in his hands about Rs .. 1.500/- during the years 1940 to 1942. There was already however a deficit of more than this amount on his management of the properties during the previous period 1931 to 1939. It is reasonable therefore to think that there was no nucleus from the joint family properties which the first defendant could have possibly t:sed in making the acquisitions during 1941 and 1942. The conclusion of the High Court that these properties did not belong to the joint family and are therefore not liable to partition cannot therefore be disturbed.\n\nK. V. Ramakrishna Iyer a11-d Others\n\nDaa Gupta, J.\n\nSome of the properties mentioned in Schedule B2 to the plaint were purchased in 1945 and 1946 by Ex.: B 127 and.B~.\n\n128 in the name of. the third defendant, Venkatarama. At the time of these acquisitions the third defendant had been karnam of Vepatthur for over 15 years. It is not unlikely he would have saved some portion of his own earnings during this period so as to be able to pay for these purchases out of his own earnings. It cannot therefore be said reasonably that these purchases were made from funds advanced by the first defendant. Apart from this, it appears that the plaintiff has not been able to show that at the time of these acquisitions the first defendant had\n\n. , / - ·,~.~~~;~~· ·:~\\ \\~~~,-~~ :. \\ ~\":'>\n\nJ \\:.:~, ', • ' , 't '\\ ',\n\n\\, . I\n\nSUPRE~IE. COURT REPORTS\n\n[19G4}\n\n1964 with him sufficient income out of the joint family properties for K. v. Narayanapurchasing all these lands. We have already found that the first awami Iyer . defendant resumed management of the joint family properties Ky R v. k . h on his mother's death in 1945. On the question about the in- 1;,; •• 'd'\"o; l:,.na come and expenses during this period there is hardly any evi- . dence worth the name on the record:\" On a consideration of all D .. Gupta, J. these circumstances, we are of opinion that the High Court's conclusion as regards these properties also that they did not form part of the joint family property is correct.\n\nThis brings us to Mr. Rajagopala Sastri's second argument.· While admitting the legal position that in the absence of any evidence of fraud or misappropriation the Karta cannot be called upon to account for the past transactions, learned Counsel stresses the responsibility of the Karta to establish what are the assets available for partition. In support of this, the learned Counsel drew our attention to the decision in Parmeshwar Dube v. Gobind Dube('). That case laid down the rule that in the absence of fraud or other improper conduct the only ac- . count the Karta of a joint family is liable for is to the existing state of the property divisible; but that this did not mean that the parties were bound to accept the statement of the Karta as to what the property consisted of and an enquiry should be directed by the court in a manner usually adopted to discover what in fact the property consisted of at the date of the partition. About the correctness of this proposition there is no dispute. In what manner this principle can be applied depends however on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, as in the present case, the evidence aiready adduced before the court shows prima facie that the Karta could not reasonably be expected to have in his hands at the date of the suit any accumulation worth the name in addition to the irr.movable properties found on evidence to have been acquired for the family. there can be no justification for calling the Karta to account for his past dealings with the joint family property and its income. In the circumstances of this case therefore the order of the High Court that there was no liability on the first defendant as managing member to render any account of any kind prior to the 12th December 1946, on which notice demanding partition was issued, does not call for any modification.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(') I.L.R. 53 CaL 459.", "total_entities": 87, "entities": [{"text": "K. V. NARAYANASWAMI IYER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. V. NARAYANASWAMI IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. V. RAMAKRISHNA IYER AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. V. RAMAKRISHNA IYER AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "APPEU.ATE JURISDICTIO~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPEU.ATE JURISDICTIO~: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K.N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3756, "end_char": 3777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.N. Rajagopal Sastri, K. Jayram and R. Ganapthy Iyer."}}, {"text": "K. Jayram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3779, "end_char": 3788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.N. Rajagopal Sastri, K. Jayram and R. Ganapthy Iyer."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapthy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3793, "end_char": 3809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.N. Rajagopal Sastri, K. Jayram and R. Ganapthy Iyer."}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3830, "end_char": 3853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "foc the appellanL\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T.V.R. Tatachari, for re~ pondent nos."}}, {"text": "T.V.R. Tatachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "foc the appellanL\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T.V.R. Tatachari, for re~ pondent nos."}}, {"text": "B. Kalyona Sumlaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3918, "end_char": 3937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Kalyona Sumlaram, M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chaudhry."}}, {"text": "M. Rajagopalan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3939, "end_char": 3953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Kalyona Sumlaram, M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chaudhry."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chaudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3955, "end_char": 3975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Kalyona Sumlaram, M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chaudhry."}}, {"text": "M. R. Krishna Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3977, "end_char": 3997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. Krishna Pillai for K. R. Chaudhuri, for res pondent no."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4002, "end_char": 4017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. R. Krishna Pillai for K. R. Chaudhuri, for res pondent no."}}, {"text": "DAS CiuPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4104, "end_char": 4114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deli vered by\n\nDAS CiuPTA, J.-Three brothers, Ramakrishna, Naraya- DaaGupta, J. naswamy and Mahadeva, who are eighty-three, seventy nine and sixty nine years of age respectively, are the main figures in this litig; ltion.. After their father's death in 1908 the three brothers cxmtinued as members of a joint family.", "canonical_name": "DAS CiuPTA"}}, {"text": "Ramakrishna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deli vered by\n\nDAS CiuPTA, J.-Three brothers, Ramakrishna, Naraya- DaaGupta, J. naswamy and Mahadeva, who are eighty-three, seventy nine and sixty nine years of age respectively, are the main figures in this litig; ltion.. After their father's death in 1908 the three brothers cxmtinued as members of a joint family.", "canonical_name": "Ramakrishna.replied"}}, {"text": "Mahadeva", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4181, "end_char": 4189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deli vered by\n\nDAS CiuPTA, J.-Three brothers, Ramakrishna, Naraya- DaaGupta, J. naswamy and Mahadeva, who are eighty-three, seventy nine and sixty nine years of age respectively, are the main figures in this litig; ltion.. After their father's death in 1908 the three brothers cxmtinued as members of a joint family.", "canonical_name": "Mahadeva'made"}}, {"text": "Ramakrishna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4426, "end_char": 4437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The eldest brother, Ramakrishna became under the law the Karta of the family.", "canonical_name": "Ramakrishna.replied"}}, {"text": "Narasingampettai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4723, "end_char": 4739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramakrishna had become the Kamam in Narasingampettai in 1902 and even during hi~ father's life time started acquiring property."}}, {"text": "V epatthur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4989, "end_char": 4999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1927 Ramakrishna had\n\nbeen transferred to the bigger village of V epatthur and continued to be there till 1930."}}, {"text": "Venkalar.una", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5076, "end_char": 5088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On his retirement in that year his son Venkalar.una succeeded him as the Kamam of Vepattbur."}}, {"text": "Vepattbur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5119, "end_char": 5128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On his retirement in that year his son Venkalar.una succeeded him as the Kamam of Vepattbur."}}, {"text": "Vepa.tthur and", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5165, "end_char": 5179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Betwa:n 1931 to 1946 properties in Vepa.tthur and other\n\nvillages were acquired in the name of Ramaki1ishna's son Vanbtarama, his wife Mangalathammal, his grandon (Venbfar:1ma's soo) Mahalingam."}}, {"text": "Ramaki1ishna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5225, "end_char": 5237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Betwa:n 1931 to 1946 properties in Vepa.tthur and other\n\nvillages were acquired in the name of Ramaki1ishna's son Vanbtarama, his wife Mangalathammal, his grandon (Venbfar:1ma's soo) Mahalingam.", "canonical_name": "Ramakrishna.replied"}}, {"text": "Mangalathammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5371, "end_char": 5385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some property was acquired aJso m the name of Mangalathammal's brother Raja Ayyar."}}, {"text": "Raja Ayyar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5396, "end_char": 5406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some property was acquired aJso m the name of Mangalathammal's brother Raja Ayyar.", "canonical_name": "Raja Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Rama hislma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5460, "end_char": 5471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Monies were also invested in loans in the names of Rama hislma's wife, Mangalathammal, his son Venkatarama and Jaa gnt•wlsoo, Mahalingam."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5504, "end_char": 5515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Monies were also invested in loans in the names of Rama hislma's wife, Mangalathammal, his son Venkatarama and Jaa gnt•wlsoo, Mahalingam.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama"}}, {"text": "Narayanaswami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5572, "end_char": 5585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 The second brother Narayanaswami became a Vakil's K. V. Nrayana.", "canonical_name": "Narayanaswami"}}, {"text": "Kumbakonam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5627, "end_char": 5637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "clerk in Kumbakonam in 1910."}}, {"text": "Mahadeva\n\n•wam~ Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third brother Mahadeva\n\n•wam~ Iyer who was a boy of thirteen at the time of his father's death was K. v. Ra;,..kri.ohna put into the medical school and qualified as a doctor."}}, {"text": "Daa Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5915, "end_char": 5924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was Iyer and Ot/,.rs in servie as a' Sub: Assistant Surgeon at the time when the pre- Daa Gupta, J. iient smt was mstttuted by Narayanaswamy.", "canonical_name": "DAS CiuPTA"}}, {"text": "Narayanaswamy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5956, "end_char": 5969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was Iyer and Ot/,.rs in servie as a' Sub: Assistant Surgeon at the time when the pre- Daa Gupta, J. iient smt was mstttuted by Narayanaswamy.", "canonical_name": "Narayanaswami"}}, {"text": "Mahadeva", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6208, "end_char": 6216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahadeva who had to remain away at different places in connection with his service demanded partition of the joint family properties and in this Narayanaswami also seems to have joined him.", "canonical_name": "Mahadeva'made"}}, {"text": "2th December) 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6550, "end_char": 6568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In December, (]2th December) 1946 Narayanaswami sent a lawyer's notice to Ramakrishna in which he claimed that not only the 25 acres acquired between 1911 and 1931 but also the properties acquired in the name of Ramakrishna's wife."}}, {"text": "Ramakrishna.replied", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7336, "end_char": 7355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this Ramakrishna.replied on December 31, 1946.", "canonical_name": "Ramakrishna.replied"}}, {"text": "December 31, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7359, "end_char": 7376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this Ramakrishna.replied on December 31, 1946."}}, {"text": "st February 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7594, "end_char": 7610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st February 1947."}}, {"text": "court of the Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7678, "end_char": 7720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayanaswami brought this suit for partition and accounts in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Kumbakonam."}}, {"text": "Raja Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7923, "end_char": 7932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramakrishna's son Venkatarama, his wife Mangalathammal and his brother-inlaw Raja Iyer were impleaded as the third, fourth and the fifth defendants respectively."}}, {"text": "Mahalingam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8008, "end_char": 8018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahalingam was impleaded as the sixth defendant Two other minor sons of Venkatarama were also impleaded.", "canonical_name": "Mahalingam"}}, {"text": "Kumarakshi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8453, "end_char": 8463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He thus claimed that not only the 34\n\nacres and 58 cents of land in the village Kumarakshi (men- 1961 tioned in the A Schedule) which the first defendant Ramax."}}, {"text": "krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8545, "end_char": 8552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Narayanakrishna's wife or son or grandson or brother-in-law were joint swami Iyer ties mentioned in the Scheduk-s B, Bl and B2, and C, Cl and v\n\nv. kriBh C2 and D for which the sale deeds stood in the name of Rama- K[y;, a;: 0ta..':\n\nkrishna's wife or son or grandsc'!l or brother-in-law were joint family properties."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He claimed also that between 1931 and 1946 Das Gupta, J.\n\nRamakrishna, the Karta.", "canonical_name": "DAS CiuPTA"}}, {"text": "Ramakrishna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8913, "end_char": 8924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He claimed also that between 1931 and 1946 Das Gupta, J.\n\nRamakrishna, the Karta."}}, {"text": "Thiagarajapuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9170, "end_char": 9185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The movable properties claimed to be joint family properties were mentioned in Schedule A2, while the house in Thiagarajapuram, also claimed to be joint family property was mentioned in Al Schedule."}}, {"text": "Mahadeva", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9629, "end_char": 9637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second defendant Mahadeva generally supported the plaintiff though as regards the years, 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943 his case in the written statement was that it was the plaintiff Narayanaswamy and not the first defendant who collected the income frqm the joint family properties.", "canonical_name": "Mahadeva'made"}}, {"text": "Narayanaswamy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9791, "end_char": 9804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second defendant Mahadeva generally supported the plaintiff though as regards the years, 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943 his case in the written statement was that it was the plaintiff Narayanaswamy and not the first defendant who collected the income frqm the joint family properties.", "canonical_name": "Narayanaswami"}}, {"text": "Mahalingam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10252, "end_char": 10262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a Schedule to his written statement he mentioned several other items of properties which he claimed belonged to the joint family though one of the sale deeds stood in the name of the sixth defendant Mahalingam and the other in the name of the fifth defendant Raja Ayjar.", "canonical_name": "Mahalingam"}}, {"text": "Raja Ayjar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10312, "end_char": 10322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a Schedule to his written statement he mentioned several other items of properties which he claimed belonged to the joint family though one of the sale deeds stood in the name of the sixth defendant Mahalingam and the other in the name of the fifth defendant Raja Ayjar.", "canonical_name": "Raja Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Narayanaswami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10608, "end_char": 10621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first defendant's case was that though on his father's death he became in law the Karta of the joint Hindu family the actual management was carried on by the mother till 1940 and from 1940 till the mother's death in 1945 by the plaintiff Narayanaswami.", "canonical_name": "Narayanaswami"}}, {"text": "Kumbakonam town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10963, "end_char": 10978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further pleaded that a house in Kumbakonam town which was acquired by the plaintiff in his own name as also some lands in Manalur village in Kumbakonam and Rs."}}, {"text": "Manalur village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11053, "end_char": 11068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further pleaded that a house in Kumbakonam town which was acquired by the plaintiff in his own name as also some lands in Manalur village in Kumbakonam and Rs."}}, {"text": "Iyu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11639, "end_char": 11642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iyu and Otha-• The third defendant (Venkatarama's) case was that the\n\nDaaa<Ju:p14, J. purchases of land and investments of money srandjng in his name were all with his own earnings since he became Qamam and did not form part of the joint family property."}}, {"text": "Rukmaniammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13015, "end_char": 13027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of these he found that the properties in Schedule Al, that is, a house in Thiagarajapuram had been given away to the sister Rukmaniammal and was no kmgt:r a joint family property and therefore not liable to divisioi:L. The rest of the properties, he held, was liable to be divided amoog: the three brothers, the plaintiff and the defendants I and 2 The Court also held that the mortgages and notes on whlch money had been lent in the names of defeOOants 3 to 5 belonged to the joint family with the exception of a few standing in the name of the thlrd defendant (Venbtarama)."}}, {"text": "Venbtarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13454, "end_char": 13464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of these he found that the properties in Schedule Al, that is, a house in Thiagarajapuram had been given away to the sister Rukmaniammal and was no kmgt:r a joint family property and therefore not liable to divisioi:L. The rest of the properties, he held, was liable to be divided amoog: the three brothers, the plaintiff and the defendants I and 2 The Court also held that the mortgages and notes on whlch money had been lent in the names of defeOOants 3 to 5 belonged to the joint family with the exception of a few standing in the name of the thlrd defendant (Venbtarama)."}}, {"text": "Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14210, "end_char": 14239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decision the first defendant to the Hi&h Court of Judicature at Madras."}}, {"text": "K.V. Nara1JCVA4-", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14389, "end_char": 14405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.V. Nara1JCVA4- The High Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal holding that the awami Jy.,."}}, {"text": "Daa Gupla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14745, "end_char": 14754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daa Gupla, J.\n\nIn the appeal preferred by the first defendant the High Court came to the conclusion, disagreeing with the Trial Court, that the first defendant Ramakrishna had saved enough from his separate earnings from which it was quite possible for him to make all the acquisitions and investments in the name of his son, wife and grandson subsequent to 1930.", "canonical_name": "DAS CiuPTA"}}, {"text": "Schedule D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15385, "end_char": 15395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th December 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16436, "end_char": 16454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, it allowed also the appeal preferred by the first defendant, holding that the only items liable for parti tion as joint property assets were those in Schedules A and D.\n\nIt also ordered that the first defendant would account for the income from 12th December 1946, the date on which notice demanding partition was sent to him by the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16684, "end_char": 16701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two main arguments were advanced before us by Mr.\n\nRajagopala Sastri in support of the appeal.", "canonical_name": "Rajagopala Sastri"}}, {"text": "K.V. Narayanadant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17124, "end_char": 17141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 He argued that the acquisitions in the name of the first defen- K.V. Narayanadant's wife was admittedly with funds advanced by the first\n\nswami Iyer defendant himself; and if at the date of the acquisition in her K. v. Ra;;.lcrishna name the joint famHy had sufficient nucleus for acquiring\n\nIyer and Others them, the presumption would be that they were acquired with joint family funds notwithstanding the fact that the first defen- Daa Gupta, J. dant may have sufficient funds of his own for the same purpose."}}, {"text": "swami Iyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17198, "end_char": 17208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 He argued that the acquisitions in the name of the first defen- K.V. Narayanadant's wife was admittedly with funds advanced by the first\n\nswami Iyer defendant himself; and if at the date of the acquisition in her K. v. Ra;;.lcrishna name the joint famHy had sufficient nucleus for acquiring\n\nIyer and Others them, the presumption would be that they were acquired with joint family funds notwithstanding the fact that the first defen- Daa Gupta, J. dant may have sufficient funds of his own for the same purpose."}}, {"text": "Da• Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20363, "end_char": 20372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Subordinate Judge held that a little more than Da• Gupta, J.\n\nRs.", "canonical_name": "DAS CiuPTA"}}, {"text": "Vepatthur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22829, "end_char": 22838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mamools which he K. v. Xarayanareceived as Karnam of Narasingampettai and later on of the •wami Iyer bigger village Vepatthur amounted to a considerable quan- K v R \"· k ."}}, {"text": "Appaswamy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23372, "end_char": 23386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "we are convincerl also on a consideration of his evidence, t<.ken with the entries in the account book of Appaswamy Iyer !"}}, {"text": "Appalaswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23495, "end_char": 23506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,500 /- as reward for successfully maintaining the litigation on Appalaswamy's behalf."}}, {"text": "Narayanaswami Reddiar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23629, "end_char": 23650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of his witnesses, Narayanaswami Reddiar, DW 7, has given evidence that he paid the defendant Rs."}}, {"text": "Ram3krishna", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23860, "end_char": 23871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if this be considered an exaggeration, 1t is quite clear from the evidence of this witness that Ram3krishna who, it may be noted, was' a man of some education, did a flourishing side business as a writer of documents, saved two or three thousand rupees, earned by him by this work during the entire period he served as a Karnam."}}, {"text": "Ra jagopala Sastn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25886, "end_char": 25903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ra jagopala Sastn was not however able to Iyer and Other• Point out anything on the record in support of this claim.", "canonical_name": "Rajagopala Sastri"}}, {"text": "Da8 Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26007, "end_char": 26016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II Da8 Gupta, J.\n\nWe think it reasonable therefore to accept as substantia y correct the estimate of paddy yield as mentioned before us on behalf of the respondent for these years.", "canonical_name": "DAS CiuPTA"}}, {"text": "Kariasthan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28169, "end_char": 28179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2.000 I as cultivation expenses including Kariasthan's pay."}}, {"text": "Schedule C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28718, "end_char": 28728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28807, "end_char": 28817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daa Gvpta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28964, "end_char": 28973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the.properties mentioned in the Schedule to the written statement of the second defendant purchased by docu- Daa Gvpta, J. ments Exhibits B 134 and B 135.", "canonical_name": "DAS CiuPTA"}}, {"text": "Schedule C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29236, "end_char": 29246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th August 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29404, "end_char": 29420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 in the name of the 4th defendant while properties mentioned in Item l of B2 Schedule were purchased on the 19th August 1942 by Ex."}}, {"text": "Schedule 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29747, "end_char": 29758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th May 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29875, "end_char": 29888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B 1929 on the 10th May 1942, formed part of the joint family property, it is necessary to examine what funds, if any, belonging to the joint family were with the first defendant during these years."}}, {"text": "Mahadeva'made", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31638, "end_char": 31651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from Ramakrishna, Mahadeva'made in his own hand 1961 an entry in red ink to the followinj): effect:.-, ·, · \"1939-Kuruvai (paddy}-sold by Nam 1<;;39-Semba\n\nMudal (harvest}-by Nana, sold in 1940.\"", "canonical_name": "Mahadeva'made"}}, {"text": "K.V.1taraya1UJswami Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31817, "end_char": 31841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.V.1taraya1UJswami Iyer\n\nIt is true that there are some ktters '\\', bich indiate that even during 1941 and thereafter Ramakrishna was issuing some instructions to the Kariasthan."}}, {"text": "K. V. Ramakrishna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33797, "end_char": 33814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V. Ramakrishna Iyer a11-d Others\n\nDaa Gupta, J.\n\nSome of the properties mentioned in Schedule B2 to the plaint were purchased in 1945 and 1946 by Ex.:", "canonical_name": "K. V. RAMAKRISHNA IYER AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34007, "end_char": 34018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the third defendant, Venkatarama.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama"}}, {"text": "D .. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35095, "end_char": 35105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dence worth the name on the record:\" On a consideration of all D .. Gupta, J. these circumstances, we are of opinion that the High Court's conclusion as regards these properties also that they did not form part of the joint family property is correct."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_49_54_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORT8 49\n\nPENU BALAKRISHNA IYER AND ORS\n\nSRI ARIY A M. RAMASW AMI IYER AND ORS.\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. S!KRI JJ.]\n\nDecree-Special Leave against decision of a Single Judge- Right to move under Letters Patent not availed of-Special Leave if and when can be revoked-Basic requirement in paising decree not satisfied-Proprietu and Leua!itv-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), s. 100-Constitution of India, Art. 136.\n\nThe respondents brought a suit for a mandatory injunction directing the removal of certain masonry structure on suit site and for a pPrmanent injunction restraining the appellants from encroaching upon the suit property and from causing obstruc tion to the right of way of the residents of the village. They claimed that the suit property formed part of a public street and the appellants had no right to encroach upon it. 'J'.he appellants cla.:med the suit property as absolute owners and as such, they \\Vere entitled to use it in any tnanner they pleased.\n\nThe trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal. the learned Subordinate Judge set aside the decree. On challenge of this decree by the respondents in second appeal before the High Court, the learned single Judge passei; I a decree in their favour. All that the learned Judge stated in h's judgment was that \"after a careful considerat'.on of all the issues that arise for decision in this second appeal, I am of the opinion that the best form in which a decrce coJlrl be given to the olaintiffs is in the follo\\ving terms\" and then he proceeded to set out the terms of his decree. On appeal by Special Leave the appellants contended that the method adopted by the learned Judge in disposing of the second appeal before him clearly shows that the judgment delivered by him cannot be sustained. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that since the appellants did not avail themselves of the remedy available to them under the Letters Patent of the High Court either the special Leave granted by this Court should be revoked, or the appeal should be dismissed.\n\nHeld: It would not be possible to lay down an unqualified rule that special leave should not be granted if the party has &. not moved for leave under the Letters Patent and it cannot be so granted, nor is it possible to lay down an inflexible rule that if in such a case special leave has been granted, it must always and necessarily be revoked. Having regard to the wide scope of the powers conferred on this Court under Art.\n\n136. it is not possible and, indeed, it would not be expedient, to lay down any general rule which would govern all cases.\n\nThe question as to whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 should be exercised or not, and if yes, on what terms and conditions, is a matter which this Court has to decide on the fact; of e.ach case.\n\nPcn.u Balakrislina IY\"' and Or1.\n\nSri Ariya M.\n\nRama-u-ami Iyer and Or8.\n\n50 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS lJ 964)\n\nRaruha Singh v. Achal, A.LR. 1961, S.C. 1097, referred to.\n\nIn the present case, the learned Judge passed an order which reads more like an award made by an arbitrator who, by terms of his reference, is not under an obligation to give reasons for his conclusions embodied in the award. When such a course is adopted by the High Court in dealing with second appeals, it must obviou'i.lY be corrected and the High Court must be asked to deal with the matter in a normal way in accordance with law. Therefore, the decree passed in second appeal, must be set aside on the ground that the judgment delivered by the learned Judge did not satisfy the basic and legitimate requirements of a judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 79 of 1962.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and decree dated February 20, 1958 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 91 of 1955.\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan. for the appellants.\n\nK. N. R.ajagopa/ Sastri and B. K. B. Naidu, for respondents Nos. 1 to 4.\n\nM1rch.6, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGojenaragwlkar, c.J. 0AJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.-This appeal by Special leave raises a short question about the correctness, propriety and legality of the decree passed by the Madras High Court in second appeal No. 91 of 1955. The respondents had sued the appellants in the Court of the District Munsif of Thiruvaiyaru for a mandatory injunction directing the removal of certain masonry structure standing on the suit site which was marked as A B C D in the plan attached to the plaint and for a permanent injunction restraining the appella.nts from buil ding upon or otherwise encroaching upon the suit property and from causing obstruction to the right of way of the residents of the village in which the suit property was situated. According to the respondents, the plot on which encroachment had been caused by the construction of the masonry structure by the appellants was a street and the reliefs they claimed were on the basis that the said property formed part of a public street and the appellants had no right to encroach upon it. This suit .. had been instituted by the respondents in a representative capacity on behalf of themselves and other residents in the locality.\n\nThe appellants disputed the main allegation of the respondents that the masonry structure to which the respondents had objected, stood on any part of the public street.\n\nAccording to them, the plot on which the masC>nry structure stbod along with the adjoining property belonged to them as\n\nabsolute owners and as such, they were entitled to use it in any manner they pleased. On these pleadings, appropriate issues were framed by the learned trial Judge and on comidering the evidence, findings were recorded by him in favour of the respondents. In the result, the respondents' suit was decreed and injunction was issued against the appellants.\n\n19f4\n\nPenu Balakn.kna\n\nIyer and Ora.\n\nBri Ariya M.\n\nRamasuami Iyer\n\nand Ors:\n\nThe appellants then took the dispute before the Subordi- Gajendragadkar, C.J. nate Judge at Kumbakonam. On the substantive issues 'which arose between the parties, the learned Subordinate Judge made findings against the respondents and in consequence, the decree passed by the Trial Court was set aside. The learned\n\nSubordinate Judge, however, made it clear that it might be open to the respondents to agitate \"against any case of custo mary rights in the nature of an easement in their favour, if they can legally do so, without any bar, and if they are so advised.\" That question was left by him as undecided as it did not arise before him in the present suit.\n\nThis decree was challenged by the respondents by preferring a second appeal before the Madras High Court. Basheer Ahmed Sayeed J. who heard this appeal, passed a decree which is chalbnged before us by the appellants in the present appeal. All that the learned Judge has done in his judgment is to state that \"after a careful consideration of all the issues that arise for decision in this Second Appeal. I am of the opinion that the best form in which a decree could be given to the plaintiffs is in the following terms,\" and then the learned Judge has proceeded to set out the terms of his decree in clauses (!),\n\n(2) & (3), the 3rd clause being sub-divided into clauses (a), (b) & (c). As to the costs, the learned Judge directed that parties should bear their own costs throughout. The appellants contend that the method adopted by the learned Judge in disposing of the second appeal before him clearly shows that the judgment delivered by him cannot be sustained.\n\nBefore dealing with this oontention, however, it is necessary to refer to a .preliminary objection raised by Mr. Rajagopal Sastri on behalf of the respondents. He contends that. it was open to the appellants to apply for\" leave to file a Letters: Paten! appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge &nd smoe the appellants have .. not adopted that course, it is not open to them to come to this Court by special leave. He has, therefore, argued that either the leave granted by this Col t~ the appellants should be revoked. or the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that this was not a matter in which this. Court will interfere having regard to the fact that a remedy available to the appellant under the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court has not been availed of by them ..\n\nIn resisting this preliminary objection, Mr. M. S. K. Sastri for the appellants has relied on the decision of this Court in\n\nPenu Btdakrishna\n\nIyer and Ors. ..\n\nSri Ariya M.\n\nRamasu:ami Jylr\n\nand Ors. -·\n\nRaruha Singh v. Aclial Singh and Others('). In that case, this Court allowed an appeal preferred against a second appellate dec'ision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on the ground that the said impugned decision had interfered with a tinding of fact contrary to the provisions of section 100 of the Civ ii Procedure Code. It appears that a preliminary objection had been raised in that case by the respondents siniilar to th~ one which is raised in the present appeal, and in rejecting that preliminary objection, this Court observed that \"since leave has been granted. we do not think we can or should virtually revoke the leave by accepting the preliminary objection.\" It is because of this observation that this appeal has been referred to a larger Bench. It is true that the statement on which\n\nMr. M. S. K. Sastri relies does seem to support his contention; but we are satisfied that the said statement should nm be in- \\erpreted as laying down a general proposition that if special leave is granted in a given case, it can never be revoked. On several occasions, this Court has revoked special leave when facts were brought to its notice to justify the adoption of that course, and so we do not think Mr. M. S. K. Sastri is justified in contending that leave granted to the appellants under Art. 136, as in the present case, can never be revoked. The true position is that in a given case, if the respondent brings to the notice of this Court facts which would justify the Court in revoking the leave already granted, this Court would, in the interests of justice, not hesitate to adopt that cours~. Therefore, the question which falls to be considered is whether the present appeal should be dismissed solely on the ground that the appellants did not apply for leave under the relevant clause\n\nof the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court.\n\nThere is no doubt that if a party wants to avail himself of the remedy provided by Art. 136 in cases where the decree of the High Court under appeal has been passed under s. 100 C. P. C., it is necessary that the party must apply for leave under the Letters Patent, if the relevant clause of the Letters Patent provides for an appeal to a Division Bench against the decision of a single Judge. Normally, an application for special leave against a second appellate decision would not be granted unless the remedy of a Letters Patent Appeal has been availed of. In fact, no appealagainst second appellate decisions appears to be contemplated by the Constitution as is evident from the fact that Art. 133(3) expressly provides that normally an appeal will not lie to this Court from the judgment, decree, or final order of one Judge of the High Court.\n\nIt is only where an applica.tion for special leave agaiust a second appellate judgment raises issues of law of general importance that the Court would grant the application and proceed to deal with the mljfits of the contentions raised by the appellant. But even in s\\Jch cases, it is necessary that the remedy\n\n(') A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1097.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE;\\IE COURT REPORTS 53\n\nby way of a Letters Patent Appeal must be resorted to before 1964 a party comes to this Court. Even so, we do not think it would Penu Balakri8/ina be possible to lay down an unqualified rule that leave should Iyer and Ors. not be granted if the party has not moved for leave under the sr Av.- 11 Letters Patent and it cannot be so granted, nor is it possible Ra,.:..,,:;: Iy;,\n\nto lay down an inflexible rule that if in such a case leave has and Ors. been granted it must always and necessarily be revoked. Having 0 . irag dk\n\n0 J regard to the wide scope of the powers conferred on this Court \"J'\" a ar, • under Art. 136. it is not possible and, indeed, it would not be expedient, to lay down any general rule which would govern all cases. The question as to whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 should be exercised or not, and if yes, on what terms and conditions, is a matter which this Court has to decide on the facts of each case.\n\nIn dealing with the respondents' contention that the special leave granted to the appellant against a second appellate decision should be revoked on the ground that the appellant had not applied for leave under the relevant clause of the Letters Patent it is necessary to bear in mind one relevant fact.\n\nIf at the stage when special leave is granted, the respondent caveator appears and resists the grant of special leave on the ground that the appellant has not moved for Letters Patent Appeal, and it appears that the said ground is argued and rejected on the merits and consequently special leave is granted, then it would not be open to the respondent to raise the same point over again at the time of the final hearing of the appeal.\n\nIf, however, the ca, veator does not appear, or having appeared, does not raise this point. or even if he raises the point the Court does not decide it before granting special leave, the same point can be raised at the time of final hearing. In sucjl a case, there would be no technical bar of res judicata, and the decision on the point will depend upon a proper consideration of all the relevant facts.\n\nReverting then to the main point raised by the appellants in this appeal, we do not think we would be justified in refusing to deal with the merits of the appeal solely on the ground that the appellants did not move the learned single Judge for leave to prefer an appeal before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. The infirmity in the judgment under appeal is so glaring that the ends of justice require that we should set aside the decree and send the matter back to the Madras High Court for disposal in a.ccordance with Jaw. The limitations placed by s. JOO, C.P.C., on the jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts in dealing with second appeals are well-known and the procedure which has to be followed by the High Courts in dealing with such appeals is also well-established.\n\nIn the present case, the learned Judge has passed an order which reads more like an award made by an arbitrator who,\n\nlSll by terms of his reference, is not under an obligatio11 to give p.,.. BalakriaAnalyer reasons for his conclusions embodied in the award. When such\n\nand Ors. a course is adopted by the High Court in dealing with second Sri ;;, ya M. appeals, it must obviously be corrected and the High Court R•m\"\"\"\"\"'i Iyer must be asked to deal with the matter in a normal way in acan<i Ors. cordance with law. That is why we think we cannot uphold Goj<ndragadkar, o.J. the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Rajagopal Sastri, even though we disapprave of the conduct of the appellants in coming to this Court without attempting to obtain the leave of the tearned single Judge to file a Letters Patent Appeal before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the decree passed in second appeal, we set it aside on the ground that the judgment delivered by the learned judge does not satisfy the basic and legitimate requirements of a judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe result is, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and second appeal No. 91 of 1955 is sent back to the Madras High Court with a direction that it should be dealt with in accordance with law. The costs of this appeal wo!•ld be costs in the second appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "ORS\n\nSRI ARIY A M. RAMASW AMI IYER AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SRI ARIYM. RAMASW AMI IYER AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. 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RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 430, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 477, "end_char": 483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 484, "end_char": 505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 507, "end_char": 515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2565, "end_char": 2574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2759, "end_char": 2767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ariya M.\n\nRama-u-ami Iyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2948, "end_char": 2973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Ariya M.\n\nRama-u-ami Iyer and Or8.", "canonical_name": "Ariya M.\n\nRama-u-ami Iyer"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3718, "end_char": 3745, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3944, "end_char": 3959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan.", "canonical_name": "M. S. K. Sastri"}}, {"text": "M. S. Narasimhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3964, "end_char": 3980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan."}}, {"text": "K. N. R.ajagopa/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4003, "end_char": 4019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. R.ajagopa/ Sastri and B. K. B. Naidu, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. K. B. Naidu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4031, "end_char": 4045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. R.ajagopa/ Sastri and B. K. B. Naidu, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Gojenaragwlkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4136, "end_char": 4150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGojenaragwlkar, c.J. 0AJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.-This appeal by Special leave raises a short question about the correctness, propriety and legality of the decree passed by the Madras High Court in second appeal No."}}, {"text": "0AJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4157, "end_char": 4171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGojenaragwlkar, c.J. 0AJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.-This appeal by Special leave raises a short question about the correctness, propriety and legality of the decree passed by the Madras High Court in second appeal No."}}, {"text": "Court of the District Munsif of Thiruvaiyaru", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4403, "end_char": 4447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents had sued the appellants in the Court of the District Munsif of Thiruvaiyaru for a mandatory injunction directing the removal of certain masonry structure standing on the suit site which was marked as A B C D in the plan attached to the plaint and for a permanent injunction restraining the appella.nts from buil ding upon or otherwise encroaching upon the suit property and from causing obstruction to the right of way of the residents of the village in which the suit property was situated."}}, {"text": "Penu Balakn.kna\n\nIyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5967, "end_char": 5988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19f4\n\nPenu Balakn.kna\n\nIyer and Ora."}}, {"text": "Ariya M.\n\nRamasuami Iyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6003, "end_char": 6027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bri Ariya M.\n\nRamasuami Iyer\n\nand Ors:\n\nThe appellants then took the dispute before the Subordi- Gajendragadkar, C.J. nate Judge at Kumbakonam.", "canonical_name": "Ariya M.\n\nRama-u-ami Iyer"}}, {"text": "Subordi- Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6087, "end_char": 6110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bri Ariya M.\n\nRamasuami Iyer\n\nand Ors:\n\nThe appellants then took the dispute before the Subordi- Gajendragadkar, C.J. nate Judge at Kumbakonam."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6791, "end_char": 6808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decree was challenged by the respondents by preferring a second appeal before the Madras High Court."}}, {"text": "Basheer Ahmed Sayeed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6810, "end_char": 6830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basheer Ahmed Sayeed J. who heard this appeal, passed a decree which is chalbnged before us by the appellants in the present appeal."}}, {"text": "Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7786, "end_char": 7802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before dealing with this oontention, however, it is necessary to refer to a .preliminary objection raised by Mr. Rajagopal Sastri on behalf of the respondents."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8517, "end_char": 8532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court will interfere having regard to the fact that a remedy available to the appellant under the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court has not been availed of by them ..\n\nIn resisting this preliminary objection, Mr. M. S. K. Sastri for the appellants has relied on the decision of this Court in\n\nPenu Btdakrishna\n\nIyer and Ors. ..", "canonical_name": "M. S. K. Sastri"}}, {"text": "Ariya M.\n\nRamasu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8637, "end_char": 8653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Ariya M.\n\nRamasu:ami Jylr\n\nand Ors. -·", "canonical_name": "Ariya M.\n\nRama-u-ami Iyer"}}, {"text": "ami Jylr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8654, "end_char": 8662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Ariya M.\n\nRamasu:ami Jylr\n\nand Ors. -·"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8818, "end_char": 8843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, this Court allowed an appeal preferred against a second appellate dec'ision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on the ground that the said impugned decision had interfered with a tinding of fact contrary to the provisions of section 100 of the Civ ii Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8958, "end_char": 8969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9975, "end_char": 9983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10611, "end_char": 10619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10699, "end_char": 10705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11221, "end_char": 11232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Penu Balakri8", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11885, "end_char": 11898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so, we do not think it would Penu Balakri8/ina be possible to lay down an unqualified rule that leave should Iyer and Ors."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12369, "end_char": 12377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12561, "end_char": 12569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14427, "end_char": 14432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15763, "end_char": 15790, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15933, "end_char": 15939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "91 of 1955 is sent back to the Madras High Court with a direction that it should be dealt with in accordance with law."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_503_538_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "is.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 503\n\nTHE AMALGAMATED ELECTRICITY CO. LTD. v.\n\nN.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER\n\n(A. K. SARKAR, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAJAGOPALA AYYAN\n\nGAR, JJ.J\n\nEiectricity Supply Act, 1948 (54 of 1948), ss. 57, 57A, 70 Sch.\n\nVI Indian Electricity Aot, 1910 (9 of 1910). s. 3 Schedule -Electricity Rates-Enhancement-Powers of !icensee- Limits of such power-Legality of rates-J11.nsdiction of civil court-Burden of proof- The appellant company was supplying electricity under licence issued in 1932 by the Government of Bombay under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. The licence fixed the limits rf the prices which the appellant rould charge but these limits were altered by an order made by the Government on December 30, 1942, acting under para XI of the Schedule to that Act, Due to the conditions brought about by the seeond world war, the licensee was permitted to add a surcharge not exceeding 33-1/3 % to the existing charges. On September 30, 1946, tho Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act, 1946, was passed which continued the surcharges for a period ofthree years. Though the Surcharge Act of 1946 expired on September 30, 1949, the appellant continued charging the consumers at rates which included the surcharge and thi' was sought to be justified by resort to the provisions' of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, which came into force on September 10,\n\n1948. On September 25, 1958, the appellant gave notice to its customers that with effect from November 1, 1958, it would charge them at certain rates which the customers considered to be illegal and unauthorised on the ground that they were in excess of those prescribed in the order of December 30, 1942. In the suits instituted on behalf of the consumers challenging the legality of the rates levied by the appellant in excess of the maximum prescribed by the Government of Bombay in its order dated December 30, 1942, the defence of the appellant was that the charges were well within the limits prescribed by the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, which according to its contention. effected such a radical change in the method of determining the reasonable rate as to completely supersede the rates and the maxima fixed under the Electricity Act of 1910. The question was also raised as to whether having regard to the provisions contained in ss. 57 and 57A of the Act of 1948 a civil court would have jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the legality of the rates levied by the appellant. ·\n\nHeld-(i) The maxima prescribed by the State Government which bound the licensee under the Indian Electricity Act. 1910. no longer limited the amount which he could charge after the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, came into force and that the licensee had a statutory right to adjust his rates as provided by Part I of Sch. VI of the latter Act.\n\n(ii) Where a party challenged the legality oi the rates on the ground that they contravened the provisions contained in Sch. VI of the Act of 1948 there was no duty on the licensee to prove that the rates were within the limits indicated in Sch. VI and it was for the party alleging his right to relief to prove his case.\n\nMarch JO\n\n196A Per Sarkar, J.-The respondents were not entitled to canvass TM. Amalgamakd in a civil court any question ao to the rates of a licensee being in Elutrici<yOo. Lid. excess of the limit prescribed in para I of Sch. VI to the Act of v.\n\n1948. A civil court could not declare that the rates charged by a N.S. Bha<lu:na licensee were illegal as they made its clear profit exceed the reaandAiwther sonable return. If there as such excess. the relief could be obtained. only if'the Government set up a rating committee, a refund became due thereupon under the last proviso to para I of Sch. VI or if relief was available under para Il(l) of that Schedule.\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nPer Das Gupta and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.-(i) There could be unilateral adjustment of the rates by a licensee but such an adjustment must not leave him with more than the reasonable return. Where the amount of reasonable return is exceeded, para II of Sch. VI comes into play and the excess over the reasonable return is to be distributed in the manner !&id down in that paragraph.\n\n(ii) In view of the machinery that is provided for complaints in the event of the licensee deriving more than a reasonable return as contemplated by Sch. VI, the failure consciously to adjust the rates by working out the details so as to reach at the same rate aswas charged previously did not constltute a failure to adjust the rates as required by para I.\n\n(iii) There being no express bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court, its jurisdiction could not be held to be excluded in respec't of such matters which were not assigned by s. 57A of the Act of 1948 to the rating committee, or in regard to which the rating committee could not afford the consumer relief aga, inst an infraction of a statutory provision by which he was aggrieved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 590- 591 of 1963-Appeals from the judgment and decree dated February 6, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Second Appeals Nos. 471and472 of 1960.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, M. M. Gharekhan and I.N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 590/1963).\n\nH. N. Sanyal. Solicitor-General, M.C. Setalvad, M.M.\n\nGharekhan and I.N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 591 / 63).\n\nNaraindas C Malkani, J.B. Dadachan/i, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents (in both the appeals).\n\nMarch 30, 1964. The judgment of DAS GUPTA and AY- YANGAR JJ. was delivered by AYYANGAR J. SARKAR J. delivered a separate opinion.\n\nSARKAR, J.-The appellant is a company carrying on business as supplier of electricity in a certain area in the State of Bombay. The respondents Bhathena and , Tendulkar were consumers of electrical energy supplied by the appellant. The\n\npresent appeals arise out of disputes between these consumers 1964 and the appellant concerning the legality of the charges made The Amalga111ated\n\nby the appellant for electricity supplied by it.\n\nElectricity Co. Lid. v.\n\nThe supply of electrical energy is controlled by two statutes and the questions involved in the present cases will turn on them. These statutes are the Electricity Act, 1910 and the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948. I will first consider the Act of 1910. Section 3 of this Act gives power to the Government to grant a licence to• a party to supply electrical energy in any specified area and to prescribe in the licence the limits of price to be charged by it for the supply. This section further provides that the provisions in the Schedule to the Act would, unless otherwise directed, be deemed to be incorporated in the licence. Paragraph XI of that Schedule states that a licensee would not be entitled to exceed the limits of price fixed in his licence. This paragraph, however, gives power to the Government to alter these limits on the recommendation of an Advisory Board appointed under s. 35 of the Act. It is not necessary to refer to the other provisions of this Act.\n\nThe appellant had been supplying electricity under a licence issued in 1932 by the .Government of Bombay under the Act of 1910. The licence fixed the limits of the prices which the appellant could charge but these limits were altered by an order made by the Government on December 30, 1942 under paragraph XI of the Schedule and stood thereafter as follows: A. For lights and fans annas -/5/- (= 31 nP.) per unit and, B.\n\nFor motive power, (i) upto 4 B.H.P. anna -/1 /. (=0.06 nP.) per unit in addition to standing charge of Rs. 2/- per month per B.H.P connected.\n\n(ii) over 4 B.H.P. i:/9 pies (=0.05 nP.) per unit in addition to the standing charge at the same rak of Rs. 2/- per B.H.P. per month.\n\nDue to the conditions brought about by the Second World War, certain orders were made from time to time permitting the licensees to add a surcharge n0t exceeding 33! per cent to the existing charges. Lastly, on September 30, 1946 an Act was passed by the Bombay legislature called the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act, 1946, hereinafter refer red to as the Surcharge Act, which continued the surcharge specified therein for a period of three years. This Act expired on September 30, 1949. It is said that even thereafter the appellant continued charging the. consumers at ra.tes which included the surcharge under the Surcharge Act, and, therefore. at rates in excess of those fixed by the Order of December 30,\n\n1942 and that was illegal. The appellant on its part claims\n\nN.S. Bhathena\n\nand AnnlMr\n\nSarkar, J.\n\n1964 that its charges after the expiry of the Surcharge Act were air TA< ..A._malganuzted justified under the Act of 1948 the relevant provisions of Electricity Go. Ltd. which came into force on September 10, 1948. This Act will v.\n\nN.S. Bhathena be referred to later.\n\nand Another\n\nSarkar, J, The respondent Bathena commenced taking electricity from the appellant sometime in\n\n1954. Soon thereafter he started disputes about the legality of the charges realised from him by the appellant in respect of energy supplied for purposes of motive power of over 4 B.H.P. and in 1955 filed a suit against the appellant for refund of amounts alleged to have been illegally collected from him in excess of the limits fixed by the order of December 30, 1942, namely, an excess standing charge of 0.69 nP. per B.H.P. per month over that fixed by the Order of December 30, 1942 and a similar excess unit charge of 0.01 nP. per unit. That suit is still pending and with the disputes involved in it I am not concerned in this judgment.\n\nOn September 25, 1958, the appellant gave notice to its customers that with effect from November 1. 1958 it would charge for motive power 0.09 nP. per unit plus a standing charge of Rs. 2.69 per B.H.P. per month. The unit charge mentioned in the notice was in excess of that prescribed in the order of December 30, 1942 by 0.04 nP. per unit. There is no dispute that this notice revised the unit charge existing at its date but it seems that it did not enhance the then existing standing charge. The notice gave rise to further disputes as a result of which two suits were filed against the appellant on March 31. 1959 in the court of the Civil Judge, Belgaum.\n\nThe first of these suits was filed by the respondent Bathena acting for himself and all other consumers of electricity supplied by the appellant for purposes of motive power over 4 B.H.P. for the following reliefs:\n\n\"(a) That a declaration be granted by this Hon'able Court thai the standing charges of 2.69 nP. per B.H.P. per month and the excess sum of 0.04 nP. per unit of energy consumed, for motive power whether oonnected or otherwise, are illegal and unauthorised, inoperative and ultra vires of the Defendant company and the Plaintiff is not bound to pay the same and that the Defendant-Company have no 'authority to control or interfere in the supply of electric energy or its use, and that the restrictions imposed in Notice dated 25-9-58 are illegal, bad in law, and,\n\n(b) an injunction restraining the Defendant-Company, its servants, its agents or its representatives from levying and recovering the excess and illegal charges, (such as standing charges and per unit\n\nof consumed energy at 0.04 nP.) from the plain- 1964 tiff, by means of any coercive measures and from The Amalgamai. interfering or controlling with the electric supply\".ElectrieityOo.Ltd.\n\nThe other suit was filed by the respondent Tandulkar also s •· N . . Bhathena in a representative capacity in respect of the charge of 0.37 andAnother nP. per unit for electricity supplied for lights and fans, and it .\n\n1. f Sarkar, J. sought the followmg re 1e s:\n\n\"(a) That a declaration be granted by this Hon 'able Court that the excess sum of 0.06 nP. per unit of energy consumed for lights and fans, are illegal and unauthorised, inoperative and ultra vires of the Defendant-Company and the plaintiff is not bound to pay the same.\n\n(b) An injunction restraining the Defendant-Company its servants, its agents or its representa.tives from Iexying and recovering the excess and illegal charges, i.e. 0.06 nP. per unit of consumed energy from the plaintiff by means of any coercive measures and from interfering or controlling with the electric supply\".\n\nVarious persons were on their own applications later added as plaintiffs in these suits.\n\nThe suits were decreed by the trial Court but that decision was reversed on appeal by a District Judge. On second appeal, however, the High Court oj Mysore set aside the decision of the learned District Judge and restored that of the trial Court.\n\nThe present appeals are against the judgment of the High Court.\n\nI will first take up the suit relating to the charges for motive power. To clear the ground it may be stated that this suit is not concerned with any charge made prior to the date that it was filed. As earlier stated, it asks for a declaration and an injunction. An injunction cannot of course be in respect of a past period and the declaration sought must also, therefore. be confined to the future. In anv case, since the declaration is sought in respect of the charges as revised by the said notice as from November I, 1958 it is clear that no question as to the legality of any charge made before November I, 1958 was sought to be raised. It would have been noticed that the suit was concerned with disputes about two charges, namely, the unit charge of 0.09 nP. per unit fixed by the notice of September 25, 1958 and the standing charge of Rs. 2.69 per B.H.P. per month.\n\nI will first consider the dispute about the unit charge.\n\nCould the appellant enhance the charge? It is not disputed that a licensee can on his own enhance his charges upto the maximum limit fixed in the licence or otherwise fixed by the Government. The dispute is as to the right to enhance them\n\nTiie Amalgamated Eltdri<ily Co. Ltd.\n\nN.S. BhatheM\n\nan:l.A.nofher\n\n8ar'/v.Jr, J.\n\nbeyond that limit and in this judgment I will be _discussing\n\nsuch enhancement cnly. It is not in controversy that under the Electricity Act of 1910 it could not do so but as already stated, the appellant bases its claim to enhance the charge on the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 as amended by Act 101 of\n\n1956 with effect from•December 30, 1956. It will be noticed that this amendment was in force when the revised rate came into force under the notice of September 25, 1958. The relevant provisions of this Act so amended are these : S. 57. \"The prO'Visions of the Sixth Schedule and the Seventh Schedule shall be deemed to be incorporated fo the licence of every licensee, not being a local authority-\n\n(a) in the case of a licence granted before the com\n\nmencement of this Act, from the date of the commencement of the licensee's next succeeding-- year of account; and.\n\n(b) in the case of a licence granted after the commencement of this Act, from the date of the commencement of suply, and as from the said date, the licensee shall comply 'IVith the provisions of the said Schedules accordingly, and any pr()- visions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), and the licence granted to him thereunder and of any other Jaw, agreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall, in relation to the licensee, be void and of no effect in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of section 57 A and the said Schedules\".\n\nS. 57A. \"(1) Where the provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the Seventh Schedule are under section 57 deemed to be incorporated in the licence of any licensee, the following provisions shall have effect in relation to the said licensee, namely:-\n\n(a) the Board or where no Board is constituted under this Act, the State Government-\n\n(i) may, if satisfied that the licensee bas failed to\n\ncomply with any of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule; and,\n\n(ii) shall, when so requested by the licensee in\n\nwriting, constitute a rating committee to examine the licensee's charge.~ for the supply of electricity and to make recommendations in that behalf to the State Government: * * * * •\n\n(c) a rating committee shall ............ report to the\n\nState Government .................. making recommendations regarding the charges for electricity which the licensee may make ............ .\n\n(d) within one month after the receipt of the report 1Yt14 under clause (c), the State Government . . . . . . .. . .. Tht A~\n\ninay ............... make an order in accordance Electricity Go. Ltd. therewith fixing the licensee's charges for the sup-\n\nN 8 ; hathena ply of electricity ......... and the licensee shall ~,;, iAnother forthwith give effect to such order\".\n\nSixth Schedule\n\nI. \"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), and the provisions in the licence of a licensee, the licensee shall so adjust his rates for the sale of electricity whether by enhancing or reducing them that his clear prcfit in any year of account shall not, as far as possible, exceed the amount of reasonable return; • • • • •\n\nhow the first paragraph of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 clearly gives a licensee the power to adjust and therefore also to enhance his rates on his own. It, however, fixes a limit for the enhancement and that. is, so as not, as far as possible, to make his \"clear profit\", for the year exceed the amount of \"reasonabie return\". The methods of determining \"clear profit\" and \"reasonable return\" are stated respectively in els. (2) and (9) cf paragraph XVII of the Schedule but it will not be necessary for me to go into their details. Now under paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule the rates can be enhanced \"Notwitllstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), and the provisions in the licence of a licensee\". Nothing to the contrary, therefore, contained in the Act of 1910 or the licence can make the enhancement of the rates by the licensee in terms; of this paragraph illegal. It would follow that the pqwer under paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule would justify enhancement of .the rate beyond that fixed by the licence or any order of the Government. This seems to me to be perfectly plain. It will be remembered that paragraph XI of the Schedule to the Act of 1910 prohibited a. licensee from charging a rate in excess of the maximum fixed by the licence:· That provision, howeyer, was repealed by Act IOI of 1956. This was obviously done because it was realised that paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 made the prohibition in paragraph XI of the Schedule to the Act of 1910 quite ineffective. Then we have s. 70(1) of the Act of 1948 which provides that \"No provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), or of any rules ma.de thereunder or of any instrument having effect by virtue of such law or rule shall, so far as it is inconsistrnt with any of the provisions of this Act. have any effect\".\n\nThis provision also supports the view that the power t(}\n\nSarkar, J.\n\n1964 enhance the rates given by the Act of 1948 is not in any way The A-;;;;; lgamateil affected by anything in the Act of 1910 or the licence granted Blectrieity. Go. Ltd under it. v. :N.8. Bhathena andAnotlter\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents, however, first contended that the power to enhance cannot be exercised by the iic'cnsee on its own. If, it wants an increase in its rates it has first to ask the Government under s. 57 A of the Act of l 948 to constitute a rating committee. This contention appears to me to be entirely unfounded. No doubt a licensee can ask the Government to constitute a rating committee under that section and if the Government does so and fixes rates on the\n\nbsis of the recommendations of that committee, the licensee would be bound by such fixation of rates. But I find nothing in s. 57 A or anywhere else in the Act of 1948 to lead to the view that the licensee cannot increase his rates except after a rating committee has recommended such increase and the Government has permitted it.\n\nSuch a view would largely render paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule nugatory. Nor do l think that there is any conflict betweens. 57A and paragraph J as was contended by the respondents. Quite clearly s. 57 A giYes a licensee the power to call for the constitution of rating committee. If he does so. be does not take the risk of Ii ing an enhanced rate on his own with the possible consequences of having to refund part of the amounts collected under provisions to which reference will be made later. That seems to be the only reason why the licensee has been given the right to ask for the constitution of a rating commit~ If he does not mind taking the risk of these consequences, J find nothing in the Act of 1948 requiring him to ask for the constitution of a rating committee before he can proceed to enhance the rates on bis own.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents then relied on subs. (2) of s. 70 of the Act of 1948 which states that \"Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910\". He contended that thjs showed that an attempt has to be made to harmonise the two Acts and, therefore, the power to enhance the rates given by the Act of 1948 must be confined to an enhancement upto the maxima limits specified in the Iicel}ie granted or any order made by the Government. I am wholly unable to agree that subs. (2) of s. 70 of the Act of 1948 requires the two Acts to be harmonised. In fact sub-s .. m of s. 70 of the Act of 1948 provides that when there is inconsistency between the two Acts, the earlier Act is not to have effect. There can be no question of harmonising unless there is inconsistency and sub-s. (\\) says what is to happen in case of inconsistency; it is that one is to give way to the other and not that\n\n'1 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREMJ<~ COURT REPORTS 511\n\nan allemprshould be made to harmonise the two. Furthermore 1964 sub-s. \\2.) of. s. 70 cl the Act of 1948 says that \"Save as other- TheAmalgammuf wise provided in this Act\" the later Act is not to be read as Electricity Co. Ltd; in derogation of the earlier Act. When, therefore, it is other- N 8 B/;;; th wise proided in the Act of 1948, this Act might be read as ·.;., lAno:£: in derogation of the Act of 1910. Now s. 57 of the Act of\n\n1948 and paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to it clearly pro- 8 • i•r, J vide that the provisions therein contained are to override the provisions of the earlier Act. It would thus be against the express terms of the Act of 1948 to .attempt to harmonise the power to enhance the rates given to the licensee by it with any of the provisions of the licence or the Act of 1910.\n\nLastly, learned counsel for the respondents relied on Babula! Chaganlal Gujerathi v. Chopda Electric Supply Co.\n\nLtd.('\\ to support his contention that under paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 a licensee had the power to enhance the rates only upto the maxima limits specified in the licence er Government's order but not beyond those limits. It was no doubt so decided in that case but then it turned on paragraph I ofthe Sixth Schedule as it stood before the amendment in 1956. Before the amendment, that paragraph did not contain the words \"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910! and the provisions in the licence of a licensee\". It sems to me plain that these words have made a material change in the provision and as it now stands, it cannot be said that the enhancement permitted must be restricted to the limit fixed in the licence or an order by the Government. The decision cited, therefore, is of no assistance in interpreting paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule as it stands after the amendment in 1956.\n\nWhether Chhaganlal's case(') was correctly decided in view of the terms of paragraph I as it stood before the amendment is not a question which arises for determination in this case and on that question I express no opinion. I think that it must be held on the terms of paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 as it stood at the time of the notice that a liomsee had power to enhance the rates and such power was not 1imited to an enhancement up to the limits fixed by the licence or otherwise by any order of the Government.\n\nOn the question whether under paragraph I of the Sixth Scheclul.e to the Act of 1948 a licensee could enhance his rates beyond the limits fixed by the Government or in the licence the High Court took the same view as I have done and held that the respondents could not claim any relief solely on the ground that the rates charged had exceeded those limits. The High Court, however. observed that the appellant had failed to establish that it had revised its rates -----------~------------ '') I.L.R. [1955] Born. 42.\n\nThe A.malgam.ated Electricity Co. Ltd. v.\n\nN.S. Blvtthena\n\nand Another\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nas provided by the Act of 1948 before its amendmen! in\n\n1956 and, therefore, held tha.t the appellant must be taKen to have illegaliy continued the surcharge which it was levying under the Surcharge Act, 1946 even after its expiry on October. 1, 1949. It is somewhat difficult to understand these observations. As I have earlier said, no question as to the legality of any charge made before the suit or at any rate, before November 1, 1958, arises in this case.\n\nTherefore, even if the appellant had not revised its charges prior to the amendment. no grievance on that account can be made on the plaint on which the present suit is based.\n\nFurthermore I do not see why the burden of proving that those charges were the charges duly revised under the Act of 1948 prior to its amendment should be upon the appellant. No issue on this question also appears to have been framed by the trial Court a.t all. Even the plaint does not say that what the appellant had done was to continue an illegal charge. I repeat that whether the charges made before Novem\n\nber 1, 1958 were illegal or not, is not a question that arises for decision in these cases. Admittedly the notice of September 25, 1958, revised the unit charge and, therefore, in fact there was no continuation of an earlier illegal charge, assuming the earlier charge to have been illegal.\n\nThe High Court, however, also held that the appellant was under a statutory duty under the Act of 1948 to adjust its rates so that its ciear profit did not exceed the amount of reasonable return and it had not established that it had done so after the Act was amended, nor had it proved that the enhancement mentioned in the notice of September 25. 1958 would not result in its clear profits exceeding the amount of reasonable return. Lastly, the High Court observed that \"even otherwi.se the enhancement is the continuation of the illegal charges and that by itself is invalid\". It was on these grounds that the High Court decided the cases in favour of the respondents. I am unable to agree with the High Court on any of these points.\n\nI will take the last point first. With respect to the learned Judges of the High Court, I do not understand what exactly is meant by the enhancement being the continuation of the illegal charge. That there was a revision of the rates by the notice of September 25, 1958 is the respondent's own case in the plaint. I will assume that the revision raised the rates to the figures that were chargeable under the expired Surcharge Act of 1946. But the identity of the figures cannot by itself make the enhancement illegal if it was legal under the Act of 1948 as amended. Indeed as there was admittedly a revision there was really no continuation of a previous charge.\n\nThis point must, therefore, be rejected.\n\n' ~./\n\nThe other points on which, as stated above. the High 1964 Co.urt based itself, appear me to. be eqaally untenable. These T1\" Amalgamated pomts are really one and that 1s whether the appellant hasElectricityOo.Ltd. established that the revised rate fixed by the notice of \"• September 25, 1958 would not make its clear profit exceed N.~d\n\n11~~~,: the amount of reasonable return. As already stated, it is admitted in the plaint that there was a revision of the unit Sarkar, J. charge by the notice. So it is not in dispute that after the amendment of paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule the appellant had revised its unit charge. I am unable to agree that the onus of establishing that the revision did not make the appel- 1ant's clear profit exceed the amount of a reasonable return should be on the appellant. I think that onus should be on the respondents because it is they who allege that \"the rates mentioned by the defondant are exceeding the reasonable return\". The more serious objection to this point, however, is that it does not seem to me that it is competent for a Civil Court to go into the question whether the enhanced rates are illegal because they take the clear profit beyond the amount of the reasonable return, and to give any relief on that basis.\n\nThe reasons for this view will now be stated.\n\nParagraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 no doubt prohibits the licensee from enhancing his rates beyond a figure which would make his clear profit exceed the amount of reasonable return. The Act, however, at the same time provided the consequences of a breach of the prohibition. Thus the fourth and the last proviso in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 states, \"Provided further that if the rates of supply fixed in pursuance of the recommendations of a rating committee constituted under section 57 A are lowef' than those notified by the licensee under and in accordance with the preceeding proviso, the licensee shall refund to the consumers the excess amount recovered by him from them\". One consequence of the breach of the prohibition, therefore, is the liability to refund the difference between the enhanced rate which has to be notified under the third proviso and that fixed by the rating committee. But a rating committee may not have been constituted for it is constituted only where the licensee wants it, or the Government is entitled to constitute it under s. 57(1) of the Act of 1948. Where a rating committing is not constituted, there is no liability to\n\nrefund but the provisions of paragraph II of the Schedule would then apply and this equally whether there is an enhancement of the charge under paragraph I and where there is none. That paragraph is in these terms:\n\nParagraph 11 . . (!) H the clear profit of a licensee in any year of account'is in excess of the amount of\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-17\n\nThe .Amalgamated\n\nEleetrieity Co. Ltd.\n\nN.S. Bhathena and A notlier\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nreasonable return, one-third of such excess, not exceeding five per cent of the amount of reasonable return, shall be at the disposal of the undertaking. Of the balance of the excess. One-half shall be appropriated to a reserve which shall be called the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve and the remaining half shall either be distributed in the form of a proportional rebate on the amounts collected from the sale of electricity and meter rentals or carried forward in the accounts of the licensee for distribution , to the consumers in future, in such manner as the State Government may direct.\n\nThis provision shows that where there was a revised rate and that rate exceeded the limit prescribed in paragraph I, a consumer might get a refund of a part of the excess but that too only at the discretion of the government. l1e had clearly no right to any refund even in such a case. Quite obviously if the consumer could obtain refund of the whole excess as determined by a civil court, these provisions would be completely meaningless. Equally obviously if a civil court could decide that the charne m3de had exceeded the limit and was. therefore. illegal, it could also direct a refund of the amount illegally realised. Therefore, it seems to me clear that the question of a brea, ch of the terms of the first part of paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule was not intended to be canvassed in a civil court; a civil court has no power to decide that question ncr can it give any relief in respect thereof. Indeed if this were not so, the consequences would be most anomalous. If the Civil Court could decide the question whether the enhanced rate resulted in the clear profit exceeding the amount of the reasonable return, then it is , onceivable that different courts might come to different conclusion on different materials placed before them and the result of that would be to destroy the uniformity of rate chargeable by a licensee. Such a situation could not have been intended. Again the Act of 1948 did not give to the consumer the right to have a rating committee constituted. This was obviously because it would be impossible to work a public utility concern like an electric supply business if every consumer could get a rating committee to go into the question of rates. There may then be a continuous succession of rating committees and there would be no fixity of the rates chargeable. The convenience of all had to be kept in mind. Power was hence given only to the Government to take steps when, a licensee committeed a breach of its obligations. Therefore, in my opinion, the High Court was in errot in holding that the appellant should have shown that the enhancement did not result in its clear profit exceeding the amount of reasonable return and in deciding in favour of the\n\nrespondents on that basis.\n\nI hold that the respondents were 1964 not entitled to canvass in a Civil Court any question as The Amalgamal<4 to the rates of a licensee being in excess of 1'\\e Limit pre>- Electricity Co. Lid. cribed in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of N.S. vBnmhena'\n\n1948. A Civil Court could not declare that the rates charged and Another by a licensee were illegal as they made its clear profit exceed the reasonable return. lf there was such excess. the relief could Sarkar, J. be obtained only if the Government set up a. rating committee, a refund became due thereupon under the last proviso to paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948' or if relief was available under paragraph II (!) of that Schedule.\n\nThen it was said that the revision by the notice of September 25, 1958 was bad in any case because under the third proviso to paragraph I in the Sixth Schedule there could be no revision of rates under that paragraph unless a notice in writing of the intention to enhance was given by the licensee to the Government or to the State Electricity Board and no such notice was in fact given. That proviso no doubt requires a notice to be given but the contention is none the less clearly without foundation for. as I shall immediately show such a notice was in fact given. Now Ex. 62 is a copy of a letter received by the appellant from the Secretary of the State\n\nElectricity Board and it refers to a letter \"No. AMAL/BEL/ C-2, dated 7-8-1958\" written by the appellant to the Board and the letter last mentioned, which is Ex. 60, is the notice by the appellant to the Board expressing its intention to revise the rates. It is quite clear, therefore, that notice had been given to the Board of the proposed enhancement. This point it may be stated does not seem to have been taken in the High Court.\n\nIt was also said that the notice was bad as it did not state that the standing charge was being increased from Rs. 2 /- 'to Rs. 2.69 per B.H.P. per month. This again is an unfounded contention for the standing charge had not been increased by the notice at all. Indeed the plaint itself in paragraph 5 states that prior to November !, 1958 the appellant had been levying standing charges at the rate of Rs. 2.69. So there was no enhancement of this charge by the notice and, hence no question of giving any notice of any enhancement of the standing charge arises.\n\nLastly, it was said that in the notice to the consumers it was stated that the power supply would be restricted between certain hours but the notice to the Government did not mention this restriction in the suppl)': The notice to the consumers no doubt stated that the revised unit charge would be in respect of restricted hours of supply but that does not make the contention of any substance. There was nothing in the notice to show that the supply would be restricted. Further L'P(D)ISCI-17(a) •.\n\n1964 it is neither alleged in the plaint nor does it appear from any- ,.,.. Amalgamated thing on the record. that there wa~ in fact ny res!riction in\n\nEleelricityOo. Ltd. the supply. That being so, the failure to give notice to !he\n\nN 8 11ia11it.\n\nGovernment of the restriction in the supply is wholly 1m- a;.., Anotkuna material. I have not, further been shown any provision under which notice to the Government of a restriction in the supply Sarkar, J. of electricity is necessary. It is certainly not required by anything in paragraph I in the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948.\n\nI am, therefore. of the opinion that there is no reason to hold that the appellant was not entitled to levy the charge mentioned in its notice of September 25, 1948.\n\nI come now to the standing charge of Rs. 2.69 per B.H.P. per month. As in the case of fue other charge and for the same reasons, I am not concerned with any qnestio!l as to its legality in respect of any period prior to the suit. It has to be remembered that there is no complaint that this rate had been increased by the notice. Lastly, as already sta.ted, a Civil Court cannot go into the question whether a charge is illegal inasmuch as it has been revised to an amount exceeding the limit mentioned in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 .. The only ground on which this charge is questioned is put in paragraph 23 of the plaint in these words: \"any standing charges along with the usual Unit Charges is against equity and law, it being double charge for the industry to pay for the enrichment of the defendants\"; the legality of the standing charge is not challenged on any other ground. Now where a charge is permitted by a statute no question of its being inequitable can be raised in a Court of law, neither can the question whether the charge is in excess of the limit justified by the statute be canvassed in such a Court. Therefore. the respondents cannot in these cases challenge the legality of the standing charge.\n\nWhat l have said so far disposes of the appeal in the suit concerning' the rates charged for the supply of motive power.\n\nThat appeal must, therefore, be allowed.\n\nThe appeal in the suit with regard to the charges for light and fans can be disposed of substantially on the grounds earlier discussed. The High Court also placed its decision in respect of this matter on the same ground on which it had disposed of the other matter. The only point made in this case is that the appellant had been wrongfully charging a rate in excess of the limit fixed by the order of December 30, 1942 by 0.06 nP. per unit. On this basis a declaration that the excess charge was illegal was sought and also an injunction restraining the appellant from levying it. It will be observed that in this case there was no notice given by the appellant of any increase in the charge. No question of the charge being illegal by reason of any enhancement, therefore, arises. The only complaint is\n\nthat the charge is illegal as it is in excess of the limit fixed by 1964 the Government. As I have said, under paragraphs I and II of The Amalgamated the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 a licensee can charge Eleetridty Go. Ltd. any amount so that his clear profit does not exceed his reasonable return and if he exceeds the limit he only exposes himself to the consequences mentioned in them and a consumer cannot go to a court of law for relief on the ground that the licensee had exceeded this limit. Therefore, the respondent cannot ask for any relief in a civil court on the basis that the appellant had exceeded the limit. As in the other case, in this case also I am not concerned with the legality of any charge made prior to the date of the suit; the only question is the legality of the charge made since March 31. 1959. That question has to be decided under the Act of 1948 as amended in\n\n1956. lt follows that in this case also the respondents can get no assistance from the decision in Babula/ Chhaganlal(') even if that case was rightly decided. I, therefore, think that this appeal also succeeds.\n\nIn the result I would allow both the appeals with costs throughout.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals which come before us by virtue of special leave granted by this Court are against a common judgment of the High Court of Mysore in two Second Appeals preferred to it by the respective respondents in the two appeals. They raise for consideration a question of the legality of certain rates charged by the Appellant-company for the supply of electricity to the respondents for power and\n\nfor light and fans respectively.\n\nThe Appellant-company is a licensee who is eligaged in the business of supplying electricity in the town of Belgaum and other places. A licence for the supply of electricity in the town of Belgaum was granted in 1932 to two persons B. S. Ankle and A.S. Ankle. These two assigned their licence to a concern by name the Belgaum Electricity Co. Ltd. and by a further assignment by these assignees. the licence came to be owned by the Appellant who are now effecting the distribution and sup ply of electricity in Belgaum. The original licence was granted by the Government of Bombay under s. 3 of the Indian Electricity Act of 1910 (Act IX of 1910) which we shall hereafter refer to as the \"Electricity Act, 1910\" tu whose provisions some reference would be necessary to be made later. Broadly speaking, under the provisions of this nactment the maximum and minimum rates which a licensee might charge its consumers were fixed by Government and licensees were affonjed freedom to fix the rates to be actually charged within these limits. Under the powers so vested in them in that behalf the Government of\n\n(') I.L.R. [1955] Born. 42.\n\nN.S.\n\nBhathena and A!iother\n\nAyyan(Jar, J.\n\n1964 Bombay within whose jurisdiction Belgaum then was, passed The Amalgamated an order on December 30, 1942 fixing the maximum rates which ' Electricity Co. Ltd. could be charged by licensees for supply to consumers and these N. s. Bhalliena rates which applied to the Appellant were to be effective from\n\na•d Another February 1, 1943. The maximum rates for the supply of energy under the licence were, under this order, to be (I) where the Ayyangar, J. energy was supplied for lights and fans 5 annas per unit; (21 where energy was supplied for power purposes i.e., for purpose other than lights and fans the maximum rate was to be (a) upto and including 4 B.H.P. one anna per unit in addition to a standing charge of Rs. 2/- per month per B.H.P. connected, and (b) for over 4 B.H.P. rate was 0. 75 annas unit in addition to a standing charge of Rs. 2/- per month per B.H.P. connected.\n\nThereafter charges at the maximum permitted rate were levied and collected by the Appellant. While so, on March, l I, 1943 a notification was issued by the Government.of Bombay in exercise of powers conferred by rule 81 (2)(b) of the Defence of India Rules by which relaxation was made as regards the maximum rates for the supply of electrical energy chargeable by a licensee under the Electricity Act. Such licensees were permitted to charge amounts not exceeding 33t per cent over the permitted maximum rates. Later this surcharge under the Defence of India Rules fixed by the notificatiOn of 1943, was withdrawn and simultaneously what is known as \"War Costs Surcharge\" was permitted to be levied, but it did not make any practical difference as the permitted increases over the maximum was identical. The War Costs Surcharge was continued up to the year 1946 when the Government of Bombay em\\cted a statute entitled the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act of l 946 which came into force on September 30, 1946. It was a temporary enactment which uncler sub-s.(4) of s. l was to be in force for a period of three years only so that it lapsed en October 1, 1949.\n\nThe Provincial Government was under s. 3 of that Act empowered to fix rates of surcharge and under s. 5 of that Act the existing surcharge viz., the War Cost Surcharge were to be deemed surcharges fixed under s. 3. As a result of this piece of legislation the position that emerged was that though the original licence issued under the Electricity Act, 1910 which empowered the Government to fix the maximum of the rates that could be charged by licensees for the supply of energy was 4 determined by the order dated Decem!Jer 30, 1942, still practically almost from the commencement of the operation of that order a 33f per cent. surcharge was permitted to be levied by the licensees over the permitted maximum charge and this state of things continued until October 1, 1949.\n\nNotwithstanding the lapse of the Act of 1946 the Appellant has continued to demand and collect practically the same charges for the supply of energy as it had done during the\n\n, __\n\nperiod when it was in force, with a slight variation by way of 1964\n\nincrase in regard to the supply of power to which we sall im- The Amalgamat.a mediately advert. In the case of supply for power, while the Electricity Co. Liil. standing charges are being levied at the maximum permitted by the notification of December 30, 1942, with the addition of the surcharge, the unit charge has been increased even beyond this figure by resort to the provisions of the Electricity Supply\n\nAct, 1948 (Central Act 54 of 1948) which it will !Je convenien, to refer. to as the Supply Act. The legality of the continuance of the surcharge in regard to the standing charge from and after !st October, 1949 and of the increase in the unit rate even beyond it are challenged in the suit which has given rise to Civil Appeal 590 of 1963. In the case of the charge for the supply of energy for lights and fans there has been no change since the 30th September 1949, but the maximum as increased by 33} per cent still continues and it is the legality of this continuance of the surcharge that is impugned in Civil Appeal No. 591 of 1963. The levy or the rates impugned is in every case justified by the Appellant by reference to the terms of the Supply Act to the relevant provisions of which we shall have to make detailed reference la.ter.\n\nPausing here, we might advert to the fact that the Supply Act was en!lcted to provide \"for the rationalisation of the purchase and supp)y of electricity and generally for taking measures conducive to the electrical development\". The Act ca in~ into force from September JO, 1948. The principal questior. that arises for decision in these appeals relates to the effect of the Supply Act, 1948 and the provisions that it contains on the rates to be charged by licensees which had been fixed under the Electricity Act, 1910-a matter which we shall examine in its proper place. We might even at this stage refer to s. 70 of the Supply Act which enacts.:-\n\n\"(!) No provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, or of any rules made there.under or of any instrument having effect by virtue of such law or rule shall, so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, have any effect; Provided that nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent the State Government from granting, after consultatioit with the Board, a licence not inconsistent with the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, to any person in respect of such area and on such terms and conditions as the State Government may think fit.\n\n(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.\"\n\nN.8.\n\nBhathena and Another\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\n1961 We are drawing attention to this provision to indicate the\n\nThe Amalgamated inter-relation between the .two Acts-the Electricity Act, 1910 Elutricity Co. Lt.a. and the Supply Act, 1948. . v.\n\nN. S. Bhathena\n\nand Another We shall now briefly narrate the course of the proceedings which have led to the present appeals. Two suits were filed by consumers of electrical energy in Belgaum receiving their supplies from the Appellant in the court of Civil Judge, Belgaum, both being representative suits under 0.I.r.8 of the Civil Proce-\n\nAyyanr1fJr, J.\n\n-. dure Code. The first suit no. 133 of 1959 was in relation to the supply of energy for power. In the plaint it was pointed out that\n\nbefore-November 1, 1958 the Appellant was charging the plaintiffs Rs. 2I11 /- per B.H. Power per month as standing charges plus one anna per unit of energy consumed. It was stated that the Appellant had by a notice to the consumers dated September 25, 1958 whose terms were set out, proposed to raise from and after November !, 1958 the unit charge from one anna per unit to 1 ! anna or 9 naye paise per unit. It recited that the plaintiffs had protested and addressed letters to the Government of Mysore, (Belgaum having been made part of this State by the State Reorganisation Act) but without any result. Reference was made to the circumstance that the Appellant justified the increase with reference to the provisions of the Supply Act, particularly after the same was amended by Central Act 101 Of 1956. The material averment on the basis of which relief was claimed in the plaint was that the revision effected by the notice of September 25, 1958 was illegal because it exceeded the maximum prescribed by the Government of Bombay in its order dated December 30, 1942 which, it was stated. still bound the Appellant. The plaintiffs, therefore, sought a declaration that any increase beyond the rates fixed by the notification of the year 1942 was illegal and sought a declaration (a) that the standing charge was illegal to the extent of the excess of 0.69 nP. per B.H.P. over the 2 rupees and the increase by 4 naye paise per unit of energy consumed was also illegal and prayed for an injunctio11 restraining the Appellant from levying or collecting these illegal and excess charges.\n\nThe other suit in relation to supply of energy for lights and fans was no. 135 of 1959. That plaint pointed out that under the order of Government of Bombay dated December 30, 1942 the Appellant could charge only 5 annas per unit or decimal coinage 31 nP. and taking advantage of the!. surcharges that were permitted during the war period and subsequently under the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act, 1946 it had been charging 6 annas per unit, and after the decimal coinage cam11 into force 37 nP. The main point that was urged in the plaint was that on the lapse of the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act, 1956 on September 30, 1959 the right of the Appellan to charge anyhting above 31 11P. ceased but that notwith\n\nstanding this want of legal sanction it had continued to levy the same rates even afterwards. On this basis a prayer was made seeking a declaration about the invalidity of any charge beyond 31 nP. per unit and an injunction restraining the Appellant from charging this illegal excess.\n\nThe defence of the Appellant was based on the provisions contained in the Supply Act of 1948, the contention being that the charges they continued to levy or which they intended to levy by virtue of the notice of September 25, 1958, were well within the limits prescribed by the Supply Act of 1948 and consequently the plaintiffs in neither suit were entitled to any relief.\n\nThe learned trial Judge held on an examination of the provisions of the two Acts-the Electricity Act and the Supply Act-and their schedules that even after the coming into force of the Supply Act the maximum limit of charge fixed by Government under the Electricity Act of 1910 continued to govern the maximum rate that could be charged and as admittedly the rates charged or threatened to be charged by the Appellant were in excess of those rates, it granted to the plaintiffs in each suit the declaration and injunction they sought.\n\nThe Appellant thereupon filed appeals to the learned Dis trict Judge and contended that the Supply Act of 1948 effected such a radical change in. the method of determining the reasonable rate as to completely supersede the rates and the maxima fixed under the Electricity Act of 1910. This contention was accepted by the Appellate Court and the appeals were allowed and the suits directed to be dismi,;; sed. The plaintiffs thereafter filed second appeals to the High Court. The learned Single Judge of the Mysore High Court who heard the appeals accepted in part the submission made by the Appellant that the maxima prescribed by the Government under the powers vested in them by the Electricity Act of 19 IO ceased to be in force on the enactment of the Supply Act. He nevertheless held that the procedure prescribed for the fixing of rates to be charged by the licensees by the Supply Act of 1948 had not been tollowed by the Appellant with the result that it could not sustain the contention that the charges levied or to be levied were legal.\n\nOn this reasoning the learned Jndge allowed the appeals and restored the decrees of the trial Court in the two suits. It is from these judgments of the High Court that the present appeals have been brought by special leave of this Court.\n\nBefore setting out the arguments addressed to us on behalf of the Appellant and to appreciate them it is necessary to read the statutory provisions which bear upon the controversy in the appeal. The Appellant was, as stated earlier, the transferee of a licence granted under the Electricity Act, 1910. Section 3 of\n\nThe Amalgamaled Eleotri<ity Go. Lt4.\n\nN.S. Bhalhena\n\nand An.other\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\n1961 this Act enables the State Government, on application made to TM Amalgamated it, to grant to any person a licence to supply energy in any speci- Eledricity Co. Ltd. lied area. Under sub-s. (2) of that section \"the provisions which\n\nN.S. hathe= shall have effect on licences granted under the Act\" are se~ out andA..other and of these those relevant for our purpose are those contamed in cl. (d) and cl. (f) which read: - .Ayyangar, J,\n\n\"(d) a license under this Part:-\n\n(i) may prescribe such terms as to the limits withir1 which, and the conditions under which, the sup.- ply of energy is to be compulsory or permissive, and as to be limits of price to he charged in respect of the supply of energy, and generally as to such matters as the State Government 1r>ay think fit. ...................... ' ... ' .. ' .. '' .. '.'' '.,,\n\n\"(f) the provisions contained in the Schedule shall j>e\n\ndeemed to be incorporated with, and to form 'part of, every license granred under this Part, save in so far as they are expressly added to, varied or excepted. by the license, and shall, subject to any such additions, variations or exceptions which the State Government is hereby empowered to make, apply to the undertaking authorised by the license:\"\n\n(the clause contains a proviso which is omitted as immaterial).\n\nSection 23 requires the licensee not to show undue preference to any person and enacts that \"save as aforesaid, make such charges for the supply of energy as tnay be agreed upon, not exceeding the limits imposed by his /iceme\".\n\nIn the schedule that is referred to in s.3(2)(f) which is headed \"Provisions to be deemed to be incorporated with, and to form part of, every license granted under Part II, so far as not added to, varied or excepted by the license\", Paragraph XI which is the one material for our purpose reads:\n\n\"Save as provided by clause IX, sub-clause (3) (a saving not now relevant) the prices charged by the licensee for energy supplied by him shall not exceed the maxima fixed by his license, or, in the case of a method of charge approved by the State Government, such maxima as the State Government shall fix on approving the method.\"\n\nIt was in exercise of the powers conferred by the State Government under s.3(2) of this Act that the notification dated December 30, 1942 to which reference has already been made was issued and under it the charges for supply were fixed.\n\nWhile narrating the facts we have already set out the maximum 1964 rate which was fixed as that which could be levied by licensees The Amalgamated under the Act both for the supply of energy for power as well Ekctricity Co. LU. as for lights and fans. This notification came into force on and x.s. was effective from February 1, l943. We have already seen how a1UIA>wt11u by virtue first of the notification under the Defence of India Ayyang'ar, J.\n\nRules and later under the War costs Surcharge and still later under the Bombay Act of 1946, the maximum was raised by\n\n33! per cent. of that specified in the notification of December 30, 1942 and how these rates continued to be validly charged by the Appellant till September 30, 1949 when the Bombay Act of 1946 lapsed.\n\nThe question that now falls to be considered is as regards the legality of the continuance of this rate beyond the maximum prescribed by the notification of December 30, 1942 subsequent to September 30, 1949. For this purpose, it is necessary to refer to the Supply of 1948 and it is on the proper construction of it& provisions and their effect on the limitations prescribed by the previous law on the rates to be charged that the decision o[ these appeals turns. Reference has already been made to s. 70 of the Supply Act, 1948 and this provision would show that where there is any inconsistency between the two Acts, the.Supply Act, 1948 would prevail and it is only to the extent that the two enactments do not cover the same field that the provisions of the Electricity Act, 1910 would continue in operation. Coming now to the provision relating to the fixation of the rates to be charged by a licensee for the supply of energy the relevant provisions of the supply Act dealing with it are those contained in ss.57 and 57 A and read with Sch. VI to the Act.\n\nPausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act of 1948 were amended by Central Act 101 of 1956 and among them was s. 57. Section 57, as originally enacted, contained substantially the same provisions as are after amendment contained in s. 57 and 57 A, and as thus there has been no material change effected by the Amendment for the purposes of the present 'appeal, we shall set out ss. 57 and 57 A which were in force when the present proceedings were commenced: -\n\n\"57. The provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the\n\nSeventh Schedule ; hall be !leemed to be incorporated in the licence of every licensee, not being a local authority-\n\n(a) in the case of a licence granted before the commencement of this Act, from the date or the commencement of the licensee's next succeeding year of acconnt; and\n\n196#\n\nThe Ama/gama!w Electricity Co. Ltd,\n\nN. S. Bhathena\n\nand Ancither\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\n(b) in the case of a licence granted after the commencement of this Act, from the date of the commencement of supply,\n\n\"· ''\n\nand as from the said date, the licensee shall comply with the provisions of the said Schedules accordingly, and any provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and the licence granted to him thereunder and of any other law, agreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall. in relation to the licensee, be void and of no effect in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of section 57 A and the said Schedules.\"\n\n\"57 A (!) Where the provisions of the Sixth Schedule\n\nand the Seventh Schedule are under section 57 deemed to be incorporated in the licence of any licensee, the following provisions shall have effect in relation to the said licensee, r.amely: --\n\n(a) the Board or where no Board is constituted under this Act, the State Govermnenr-\n\n(i) may, if satisfied that the licensee has failed to comply with any of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule; and\n\n(ii) shall, when so requestd by the licensee in writing,\n\nconstitute a rating committee to examine the licensee's charges for the supply of electricity and to make recommendations in that behalf to the State Government.\n\nProvided that where it is proposed to constitute a rating committee under this section on account of the failure of the licensee to comply vvith any provisions of the Sixth Schedule, such committee shall not be constituted unless the licensee has been given a notice in writing of thirty clear days (which period if the circumstances so warrant may be extended from time to time) to show ' buse against the action proposed to be taken,.\n\nProvided further that no such rating c11mmittee shall be constituted if the alleged failure of the licensee to comply with any provisions of the Sixth Schedule raises any dispute or difference as to the interpretation of the said provisions or any matter arising therefrom and such difference or dispute has been referred by the licensee to the arbitration of the Authority under paragraph XVI of that Schedule\n\n. 1964 before the notice referred to in the precedmg pro- _ viso was given or is so referred within the period of The A.malgamat<d the said notice: Eleclnc>tyCo. LUI. v.\n\nProvided further that no rating committee shall be consututed in respect of a licensee within three years from the date on which such a committee has reported in respect of that licensee, unless the State Government declares that in its opinion circumstances have arisen rendering the orders passed on the recommendations of the previous rating committee unfair to the licensee or any of his consumers;\n\n(b) ......................................... .\n\n(c) ............................... ·-·. ··-····\n\n(d) within one month after the receipt of the report under clause (e), the State Government shall cause the report to be publi>hed in the Official Gazette, :ind may at the same time make an order in accordance therewith fixing the licensee's charges for the supply of electricity with effect from such date, not earlier than two months or. later than three months, after the date of publication of the report\n\nas may be specified in the order and the licensee shall forthwith give effect to such order; w ......................................... \"\n\n<The other sub-sections (2) to (8) are not material and so are omitted).\n\nSchedule VI referred to in ss.57 and 57 A has undergone modification as a result of the :imendment effected by Act IOI of 1956 and some argument has turned on these changes. We shall set out para I and also para II of this Schedule as they stood when originally enacted and as they now read. As enacted the first two paragraphs ran:\n\n\"I. The licensee shall so adjust his rates for the sale of\n\nelectricity by periodical revision that his clear profit in any year shall not as far as possible exceed the amount of reasonable return: Provided that the licensee shall not be cons; dered to have failed so to adjust his rates if the clear profit in any year of account has not exceeded the amount of the reasonable return by more than thirty per centum of the amount of the reasonable return.\n\nII. (I) If the clear profit of a licensee in any year of account is in excess of the amount of reasonable return, one-third of such excess, not exceeding 7t per\n\nl!l. S. Bhathena\n\nand Another\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nTM< Amalgamted Electricity Go. Ltd.\n\nN.S. Bhaihena\n\nand Another\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\ncent. of the amount of reasonable return, shall be at the disposal of the undertaking. Of the balance of the excess, one-half shall be appropriated to a reserve which shall be called the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve and the remaining half shall either be distributed in the form of a. proportional rebate on the amorn1ts collected from the sale of electricity and meter rentals or carried forward in the accounts of the licensee for distribution to the consumers in future, in such manner as the State Government may direct.\n\n(2) The Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve shall be available for disposal by the licensee only to the extent by which the clear profit is less than the reasonable return iii any year of account.\n\n(3) On the purchase of the undertaking under the terms of its license any balance remaining in the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve shall be handed over to the purchaser and maintained as such Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve.\" These paragraphs were amended in 1956 to read:-\n\n\"I. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, except sub-section (2) of section 32A, and the provisions in the licence of a licensee, the licensee shall so adjust his rates for the sale of electricity whether by enhancing or reducing them that his clear profit in any year of account shall not, as far as possible, exceed the amount ot reasonabe return: Provided that such rates shall not be enhanced more than once in any year of account: Provided further that the licensee shall not be deemed to have failed so to adjust his rates if the clear profit in any year of a.ccount has not exceeded the amount of reasonable return by fifteen per centum of the amount of reasonable return: Provided further that the licensee shall not enhance the rates for the supply of electricity until after the expiry of a notice in writing of not less than sixty clear days of his intention to so enhance the rates, given by him to the State Government and to the Board: Provided further that if the rates of supply fixed in pursuance of the recommendations of a rating committee constituted under section 57 A are lower\n\nthan those notified by the licensee under and in ac- 1964 cordance with the preceding proviso, the licensee p .-- --··• 11e .nm.alga,,_ shall refund to the consumers the excess amount re- Electricity co. Lid. covered by him from them. v.\n\nN.S. Bhat\"\"\"' II. ( 1) If the clear profit of a licensee in any year of acand .A.1IOl1oer count is in excess of the amount of reasonable re- .\n\nAyyangar, J. turn, one-third of such excess, not exceedmg five per cent. of the amount of reasonable return, shall be at the disposal of the undertaking. Of the balance of the excess, one-half shall be appropriat ed to a reserve which shall be called the Tariffs and Dividends Control Re, erve <.nd the remaining half shall either be distributed in the form of a proportional rebate on the amounts collected from the sale of electricity and meter rentals or carried forward in the accounts bf the licensee for distribution to the consumers in future, in such manner as the State Government may direct.\n\n(2) The Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve sj:lall be available for disposal by the licensee only to the extent by which the clear profit is less than the reasonable return in any year of account. ' ·\n\n(3) On the purchase of the undertaking under the terms of its licence any baiance remaming in the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve shall be handed over to the purchaser and maintained as such Tariffs and DividenJs Control Reserve.\" Paragraph 17 of this Schedule contains the definitions and \"' among the terms there defined is 'clear profit'-an expression used in paragraphs I & II. As nothing material turns on the manner in which the 'clear profit' is to be computed which is described in para 17 we do not think it necessary to refer to the details contained there.\n\nThe questions raised before us are principally three: (1) '[he effect of the Supply Act, 1948 on the maxima of rates fixed by Government under s. J(2) of the Electricity Act, 1910 which could be charged by a licensee. The submission of the appellant which was accepted by the High Court but which was contested by the respondents before us was that any changes that might be effected by a licensee acting under the provisions under s.57 of the Supply Act read with paragraph 1 of Sch. VI in revising his rates so as to derive the reasonable return permitted by these provisions, had still to be within the maxima prescribed by Government under the Electricity Act of 1910; (2) The next point was that assuming that the Appellant was right on poi.Vt no. 1, whether the charges demanded by .the appellant-company from the respondents were legal and\n\n528 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\n1964 justified by the Supply Act: It is on this point that the learned The Amalgamated Single Judge in the High Court has upheld the contention urged Ekctr;<ityCo.Ltd. by the respondent; (3) Closely related to the 2nd point, the v. limits of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to afford relief to con- N.s. Bhatkena\n\nan3Another sumers who complained of excessive charges beincr demanded by licensees. \"' Ayyanqar, J.\n\nSo far as the !st point is concerned viz., whether the maxima prescribed by Government under the Electricity Act.\n\n1910 still continues to bind the licensee after the coming into force of the Supply Act, we feel no hesitation in agreein\" with the submission of the Appellant which found favour with the High Court. Section 57 of the Supply Act, 1948-both as originally enacted and as amended in 1956 expressly provide that the provisions of the Vlth Schedule shall be deemed to be incorporated in the license of every licensee and \"that the p:ovisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the license granted thereunder and any other law, :igreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall be void and of no effect in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the section and the said Schedule\". Read in the light of s.70 of the Supply Act it would follow that if any restriction incorporated in the licence granted under the Electricity Act, 1910 is inconsistent with the rate which a licensee might charge under para I of Sch.\n\nVI of the Supply Act, 1948, the former would, to that extent, be superseded and the latter would prevail.\n\nPara I of Sch. VI both as it originally stood and as amended, as seen already, empowered the licensee \"to adjust his rates, so that his clear profit in any year shall not, as far as possible, exceed the amount of reasonable return\". We shall reserve for later consideration the meaning of the expression \"so adjust bis rates\". But one thing is clear and that is that the adjustment is unilateral and that the licensee has a statutory right to adjust his rates provided he conforms to the requirements of that paragraph viz., the rate charged does not yield a profit exceeding the amount of reasonable return. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that the maxima prescribed by the State Government which bound the licensee under the Electricity Act of\n\n1910 no longer limited the amount which a licensee could charge after the Supply Act, 1948 came into force, since the \"clear profit\" and \"reasonable return\" which determined the rate to be charged was to be computed on the basis of very -· different criteria and factors than what obtained under the Electricity Act. In support of the submission that notwithstanding the Supply Act the maxima fixed by the State Government was still binding on the licensee and that any adjustment within 1st paragraph of Sch. VI should ~~ within the limits of t_his maxima we were referred to a dec1s10n of the Born bay High\n\nCourt reported as Babu/al v. Chopda Electricity Supply Co.(') 1964 It is sufficient to extract the headnote to understand the point The Amalgamated of the decision: Electridty Co. Ltd •\n\n\"Section 57(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, or\n\ncl. l of the Sixth Schedule to the Act, does not confer a right upon a licensee unilaterally to alter the terms and conditions on which supply may be made by a licensee of electrical energy to consumers in the area of supply irrespective of the restrictions contained in the license and the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.\n\nNot only does s. 57(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, impose an obligation upon the licensee to conform to the provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the table appended to the Seventh Schedule to the Act, but the first clause of the Sixth Schedule imposes a further obligation to make periodical revisions and to adjust the profits so that hi~ profits in any year do not as far as possible exceed a reasonable return on his investment. There is nothing in s.57 or in the first clause of the SiXth Schedule which either expressly or by implication amends the provision;; of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, contained in s.3(2)(d) or in s. '.i.1(2) of that Act or the rates and methods of charging the same as fixed by the licence. The provision contained in s.3(2)(d) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, which requires the State Government to prescribe the terms and conditions under which the supply of energy is to be made is not affected by the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The right to amend the license is conferred by the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, upon the\n\nState Government and that right is not affected by the Eectricity (Supply) Act, 1948.\"\n\nWith great respect to the learned Judge we are unable to agree with this decision, for, in our opinion, the provisions of the Supply Act, 1948 to which we have adverted are too strong to permit the construction, that the maxima prescribed under the Electricity Act of 1910 survives as a fetter on the rights of the licensee under paragraph I of the VIth Schedule. ff there was any room for any argument of this kind on the terms of para I of Sch. VI as originally enacted, the matter is placed beyond possibility of dispute by the amendment effected by Act 101 of 1956 to the Vlth Schedule where the opening paragraph commences with the words 'notwithstanding anything\n\n(') 06 Born, L. R. fi94\n\n...\n\nN.S. Bltatli('na\n\nand A11oflur\n\n530 SUPREME COURT REPORTd [1964]\n\n1964 contained in the Indian Electricity Act and the provisions in\n\nTlleA!llalgamatea the lie1_1ce of a licensee'. We, therefore, conside{ that the first Sleclricity ao. Lid. subm1ss10n of learned Counsel for the Appellant that the limit v. imposed by the maxima prescribed by the State Government 1:;!i~:a ceased to be .in force after the Supply Act of 1948 came into\n\nforce is well-founded. • -\"!JYO'fllJO'• •1 The next question for consideration is whether the action of the appellant-company in continuing to charge the rates that it was permitted to charge by virtµe of the War Cost (Surcharge) Rules and the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act. i 946 i.e., by making an addition of 331 per cent. to the maxima which he was permitted by the notification dated December 30, 1942 is lawful. This would have a vital , bearing on the point involved in Civil Appeal 591.of 1963 which relates to the unit charge for light and fans for domestic consumption as well as on the legality of the standing charges for the supply of power which is raised in Civil Appeal 590 of 1963. It would be recalled that in these cases the Appellant has merely continued the charges that it was making before September 30, 1949 even after that date, there being no variation in the rates charged. On October 1, 1949 the position was this. The Bombay Act of .1946 having lapsed by effiux of time, the previous charge which was 331 per cent. in excess of the maxima permitted could not be continued unless recourse was had to the provisions of paragraph I of Sch. VI of the Supply Act of 1948. It was not suggested that on or before that day there was any conscious act on the part of the Appellant to determine (a) the \"clear profit\" on the basis formulated in Sch. VI and (b) an adjustment of its rates so as not to exceed the amount of the reasonable return permitted by paragraph I of that Schedule. In this connection there was some debate in the courts below as to the date the Appellant's license came to be governed by the provisions of s. 57(1) and the VIth Schedule. Section 57(a) fixes the period from which licenses previously in existence would be governed by Sch. VI as \"the commencement of the licensee's next succeeding year of account\". The controversy was as to the period which would be the date of the commencement of the Appellant's \"next succeeding year of account''. Two possible interpretations were suggested of this provision: (1) As the year of account of the Appellant was the financial year it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the AC! became applicable to it from April 1, 1949 onwards, the contention on the side of the Appellant being that it became applicable only on April I. 1950; but for the purposes of the cases before us it makes little difference, because assuming that s. 57 and the Supply Act I 948 became applicable to the Appellant from April I, 1950 onwards, still the\n\name question would arise as to whether at the commencement\n\nof that year the requirements of paragraph 1 of the Vlth Sche- 1964\n\ndule had been complied with.\n\nTh< Amalgamated The material words of paragraph 1 of the Vlth ScheduleElectri~~Yv. 00• Lid. are \"The licensee shall so adjust his rates\". The normal inter- N.S.BhoJhe\"\" pretation of these words would imply that there should be a an<IAnolher\n\nconscious act on the part of the licensee, for the Act and the Awanu:u, J.\n\nSchedule for the first time specified the criteria for determining the maximum profit that shall be made by a company and gave elaborate calculations as to how the 'clear profit' and the reasonable return' were to be computed and determined. It is, however, possible to read the paragraph as meaning that it was only in those cases where either an increase or a decrease of the charge was necessary in order to ensure (a) that a licensee obtained a reasonable return or that the profit that he made exceeded or fell below the amount of reasonable return that the rates had to be modified. In other words, where no change is needed, it might be presumed that no adjustment was needed. In view of the machinery that is provided for complaints in the event of the licensee deriving more than a reasonable return as contemplated by the Vlth Schedule we consider that the failure consciously to adjust the rates by working out the details so as to reach at the same rate as was charged previously does not constitute a failure \"to adjust the rates\" as required by paragraph 1.\n\nThis leads us to the further questions (1) as to whether assuming that the rates had been adjusted by the licensee as required by paragraph 1 and the licensee is charging the rates so adjusted whether the rates now charged (a) for liglifs and fans, and (b) as standing charges for the supply of motive power, could be successfully impugned as not conforming to the requirements of the Vlth Schedule, .(2) and closely related to this, and that is the third question we have specified earlier, whether having regard to the prqvisions contained in ss. 57 and 57 A of the Supply Act, a Civil Court would have jurisdic tion to entertain a suit for the reliefs claimed in the present pJai!1tS.\n\nTaking up, first, the question of lights and fans (and the standing charges for the supply of power would be governed by similar considerations) the position would be that the Appellant must be deemed to have adjusted his rates under paragraph I of the Vlth Schedule when after the lapse of the Bombay Act of 1946 it continued to levy the same charges.\n\nWhen in 1949 or 1950 it is deemed to have made this adjustment paragraph I which empowered it to make this adjustment contained a proviso which we shall recall:\n\n\"Provided that the licensee shall not be' considered to\n\nhave failed so to adjust his rates if the clear profit\n\nThe Amalgamat<d\n\nEleriri<ity Oo. Ltd.\n\nin any year of account has not exceeded by more than 30 per cent of the amount of the reasonable return\". v.\n\nN. 8. BT!athtna\n\naod A nolMr\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nThe proviso, no doubt. uses a double negative \"not be considered to\" have failed\" but expressed in positive terms it would mean that where the licensee adjusted his rates so that his clear profit exceeds by more than 30 per cent the reasonable return to which it was entitled, it could not be $aid to have adjusted his rates. In other words, such an adjustment would not be an adjustment at all as is contemplated by paragraph 1. Paragraph 2 of the VIth Schedule proceeds on the basis that there is an adjustment within paragraph I; in other words, that the rate charged would yield to the licensee a clear profit which would not exceed the reasonable return by more than 30 per cent. It is only on that basis that the percentages specified in paragraph 2 could be properly appreciated, for it proceeds to take the excess over the reasonable return, divide it by 3 and of that lrd allot a proportion not exceeding 7! per cent. over to the licensee himself. Of the balance half is to be appropriated to the Tariffs and Dividend Control Reserve and the other half is directed to be given to the consumers by granting them proportional rebates. From the per- centage named in para II read in conjunction with the absolute prohibition against a rate which would yield more than 30 per cent. over the reasonable return it appears to us that the lawfully adjusted rate contemplated by paragraph 1 is one where the amount of clear profit does not exceed the \"reasonable return\" by more than the maximum specified i.e.,· 30 per cent. The other paragraphs of the Vlth Schedule deal with the creation and disposal of certain funds and reserves to which it is not necessary to refer.\n\nWe thus reach the position that there could be a unilateral adjustment of the rates by a licensee but that such an adjustment must not leave him with more than the reasonable return plus another 30 per cent, this being an absolute limitation on the power to \"adjust\". Whern the amount of \"reasonable return\" is exceeded paragraph 2 comes into play and the excess over the reasonable return is distributed in the manner laid down in that paragraph.\n\nWe have next to consider that effect of the amendment to para 1 of the Vlth Schedule brought about by Central Act 101 of 1956 by which the maximul)l rate permitted to a licensee became reduced from one which yielded him not more than 30 per cent. beyond the \"reasonable return\" to one which yielded him not more than 15 per cent. The result of this would obviously be that there should have been a further\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\n8UPRE1\\1E COURT REPORTS 533\n\nadjustment by licensees so as to conform to the revised pat- 1964 tern. Here again, the question would arise whether there The Amalgamaltd should be a conscious readjustment. Applying the rule of con- ElecJricity Co. Ltd.\n\nstruction we have explained earlier in relation to \"adjustment\"\n\nN 8 '; ihatheM in 1949 or 1950 it would be seen that if the rate previously • .; a A1IOl.\\er charged yielded a profit over the \"reasonable return., of ! 5\n\nper cent. or less there need be no readjustment and if the rate Ayvangar, J. charged yields more than this permitted profit there should be a readjustment. The result. would, therefore, be that unless it is established that. the rate charged by the Appellant for lights and fans and for the standing monthly charge for supply of power resulted in a profit to it of more than 15 per cent. over the \"reasonable return\", the Appellant would be held to have properly adjusted these rates in conformity with the requirements of the relevant provisions of the Supply Act as ;!mended by Act 101 of 1956.\n\nWe shall, when dealing with the question relating to the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain suits relating to infractions by licensees of their obligations under Para 1 of the Vlth Schedule which is the last of the matters debated before us, also examine the question as to the party on whom the burden of proof would lie to establish that the adjustment which is made or which could be deemed to be made by a licensee by the continuance of a pre-existing rate contravenes the statutory provisions.\n\nComing next to the unit charge for supply for power, the impugned rate was that which had been stepped up from that which had been continued from before September 1949, by action taken in compliance with the 3rd proviso to paragraph 1 of Sch. VI as amended by Act 101 of 1956. The licensee notified to the consumers on September 25, 1958 His intention to enhance the unit rate for the supply of power.\n\nPrevious thereto in terms of that proviso a notice in writing had been issued to the State Government intimating its intention to enhance the rate, and thereafter the consumers were notified of -this increase in rates. It would be seen that the 3rd proviso to para 1 requires a notice to the State Government of the intention of the licensee to enhance the rates. On August 7, 1958 the Appellant intimated the Government of Mysore setting out the clear profit it h:id made in 1957-58 and the estimated working position in 1958-59 and its intention to increase the unit rate for supply of power from 6 nP. to 9 nP. unit. Thereafter. on September 25, 1958, it notified the consumers that on and after November 1, 1958 it would be charging the enhanced unit rate together with the previously existing standing charges of Rs. 2.69 per B.H.P. per month. The only point that was suggested as invalidating the notice to the Government was that the Government were not informed that the licensee was effecting an\n\n19 64 enhancement of the rates as regards the standing charges and Th• Am.lgamated that the notice was, therefore, bad. We do not consider that Ekttricitu oo. J., W. there is any substance in this objection. Rs. 2.69 was the v. char~ which had been made prior to the notice as standing\n\nN:;., i, J/:i~\":,.\"\" charges and if, as we have held, that was the rate which must be deemed to have been adjusted and which the appellant Ayya,.g.r, J. was entitled to charge when Sch. VI as it originally stood, the continuance of the same charge after the amendment of the Schedule would not make it an enhancement.\n\nThere is however one circumstance to which it is necessary tb advert. As already stated, the rate charged prior to the Supply Act, 1948 and which was continued thereafter would be a lawful rate only if the profit that it left to the licensee was less than 30% over the reasonable return. This was the position when the Supply Act, 1948 came into force.\n\nBy reason of the amendment effect by Act IOI of 1956 the percentage of permissible profit was reduced to 15 % and so the adjusted rate would be valid if it was within this permissible limit. Unless the-,_adjusted rate prior to the amendment of 1956 was in excess of 15 per cent permitted by the !st proviso to paragraph I the continuance of such rate could not be objected to as an enhancement or as a violation of paragraph I of the Vlth Schedule. The .question as to the burden of proof as regards this requirement and whether the same has been discharged in these cases we shall reserve' for later consideration. Subject to this so far as regards the unit charge, the requirement of the third proviso to paragraph I was complied with. There was thus no illegality or invalidity attaching to the notice to the Government issued under proviso 3 to paragraph I and the contention raised in that behalf by the respondents must be rejected.\n\nThe question next to be examined is as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suits from which these appeals arise for the 'reliefs prayed for therein. Section 57 of the Supply Act, 1948 which incorporates the Vlth Schedule in the licence of every licensee lays an obligation on the licensee to comply with the provisions of the said\n\nchedule. Then comes S. 57-A under which where the Board or the State Government, where there is no Board, \"if sati~ fied that the licensee has failed to comply with any. of the provisions of the Vlth Schedule and shall when so requested hy the licensee in writing, consti'tutc a Rating Committee\". It is unnecessary to refer to the provisions relating to the procedure to be followed by the Rating Committee but it is sufficient to recall that the Rating Committee is empowered to fix the rates to be charged by licensees and the duty is cast on the Rating Committee to recommend a rate which would ensure to the licensee a clear profit sufficient to afford it a reasonable return as defined in the VIth Schedule during the\n\n1964 next three years of account. The provisions in s. 57-A have to be read in conjunction with the last proviso to paragraph '!''\"1gamated\n\n1 of the Vlth Schedule under which where the rates are fixed Electricuy Co. Ltd. in pursuance of the recommendations of the Rating Comx.s. Bhathena mittee and they are lower than those adjusted by the licensee and Another under the Schedule, the licensee is directed to refund to the consumers the excess amount recovered by him from them.\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nThe argument of the learned Solicitor-General was that as the Supply Act had bys. 57 A made special provision and created a special machinery for the determination of a proper rate to be charged by a licensee on its consumers, a suit in a civil court by the consumer for obtaining the same relief was impliedly barred. )'he procedure prescribed by s. 57 A was (I) where a consumer complained that a rate charged was excessively high he should first approach the Board or where there was no Board, the State Government, (2) the Board or the State Government should, on considering the complaint, be prima facie satisfied about the reasonableness of the complaint and it was in their discretion to appoint a Rating Committee, (3) if the Board or the State Government decided that it was not necessary to appoint a Rating Committee there was an end of the matter. If, however, a committee was appointed the Rating Committee would take evidence and, applying the provisions of the Act and the Schedules, would arrive at a rate which would yield the licensee an amount not less than the reasonable return that is provided for him under the Act. It was submitted that this procedure was wholly incompatible with the continued existence\n\nl:lf the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine aily question as to whether a licensee had failed to comply with the requirements of Sch. VI and in particular as tl:l the reasonableness of the rate to be charged. Besides, attention was also drawn to the last proviso to paragrap'l. l of the Vlth Schedule under which provision is made for refund to consumers in cases where an excess amount is colicted from them beyond what was fixed as a reasonable rate by the Rating Committee.\n\nIt is undoubted that these provisions have laid down a specific procedure for violations by the licensee of the requirements of Sch. VI. There being no express bar to the jurisdiction of the Rating Committee; or expressed in other scope and extent of the bar that could be implied from the existence of these provisions. One thing, however, is clear; che bar cannot extend beyond the scope and . limits of the\n\njuridiction of the Rating Committee; or expressed in other words, the jurisdiction of the civil court could not be held to be excluded in respect of those matters which are not assign;. ed by s. 57 A to the Rating Committee, or in regard to which the Rating Committee cannot afford the ccinsumer relief against an infraction of a statutory provision by which he is aggrieved\n\n1964 Before turning to the facts of the present case with a The AMa/gamated view to examine whether the relief sought by the respondents f.'lecJrieily co. Ltd. ; iz., a declaration and injunction could be granted by a civil\n\n'\" court. we shall deal with the major argument of the learned 'J.s.\n\nBhai11uu1 S 1 .\n\nG f • f . b l' f 1 . <mdAnotlur o 1c1toreneral that or no m ractton y a 1censee o us obligations under the schedule could a suit be filed in a civil\n\nA!f'l\"\"~'\"•J. court. This was based on the words of s. 57A-(l)(a)(i) which empowers the Board or the State Government to ::ppoint a Rating Committee if satisfied \"that the licensee bas failed to comply with any of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule\"\n\nThe learned Solicitor-General further contended that the provisions contained in s. 57 A were wholly incompatible with the existence of a right in a consumer to move a civil court for obtaining a refund even of an illegal collectibn which the licensee is prohibited from charging. It was in this connection that he invited our attention to the provision for refund contained in the last proviso to paragraph 1 of Sch.\n\nVI and relying on this he submitted that the scheme of s. 57 A could obviously not have contemplated a procedure by which one consumer went to a civil court and obtained redress, the civil court holding that the rate charged so far as the particular plaintiff was concerned was illegal and therefore entitling him to a refund of a particular-sum, while another consumer approached the Government who appointed a Rating connection that he invited attention to the provision for it did provide, for a different amount of refund. This is doubtless a serious argument which requires careful examination.\n\nIn this. context and in support of this submission stress was laid down on the words \"the licensee has failed to comply with any of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule\" occurring in s. 57 A(l)(a)(i) and it was urged that for any and. every default of the licensee resort must be had to the Board or the Government and cc uld not be had to the civil courts. But from these provisi011\\ it does not, in our opinion, follow that the jurisdiction of a civil cot.'\\'! is barred in respect of the infraction of every obligation cast on a licensee by Sch. VI.\n\nBroadly speaking, the utmost that could be urged would be that the bar to the jurisdiction of a civil court would be coextensive with and be restricted to the powers of the Rating Committee and the reliefs which the committee could grant under s. 57A. A few examples of breaches of Sch. VI which a licensee may commit and in regard to which a reference to the Rating Committee is not contemplated would make our meaning clear. The first proviso to paragraph I specifies that \"such rates shall not be enhanced more than once in any year of account\". Let us suppose that the licensee contravenes this prohibition and enhances the rate more than once.\n\nThere is no provision in s. 57 A for the Rating Committee to control the licensee in the event of his transgressing a positive\n\nprohibition of this sort and. indeed, it would be most anomalous to say that the statute having made a provision that the rates shall not be enhanced more than once in a year, the consumer is left without a remedy if the Government does not choose to appoint a Rating Committee which, as we said earlier, has no power to afford redress to the affected consumer. In such a case it appears to us that by no principle of construction can the jurisdiction of a civil court to grant a declaration and an injunction be denied. It would also follow that if that rate is collected, the court could order a refund of the illegal collection. Take next the case where a licensee in contravention of the 3rd proviso enhances the rates for the supply of electricity without giving the requisite notice of his intention to tbe Government and to the Board. Here again, the Rating Committee does not come into the picture for preventing the continued charging of the rates in contravention of the 3rd proviso and here we consider it impossible to contend that the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant a declaration and an injunction are affected by the provisions of s. 57 A. We therefore arrive at this position that notwithstanding the generality of the words in s. 57AO)(a)(i) referring to the failure on the part of the licensee in complying with the requirements of the Sixth Schedule\" there are some \"failures\" in regard to which the jurisdiction of the civil court. it is clear, not barred.\n\nThe next question would be whether the same principle is not applicable to a case where the 2nd proviso is contravened i.e., where the licensee so adjusts his rates as to yield him a profit beyond 15 % over the reasonable return. The proviso casts an absolute obligation on the licensee not to exceed this limit. There is thus a statutory prohibition against\n\nthe licensee of fixing a rate which would yield such excessive profit, and if he does so he would not be acting in terms of the Vlth Schedule at all or by virtue of a power conferred by that Schedule and therefore he would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court which would .be competent to issue an injunction restraining him from charging that rate.\n\nNo doubt, the proviso also adds that if he does so he would be failing to comply with the requirement of the main part of paragraph I. It would therefore follow that in a case where in adjusting his rate the licensee fixes it so high as to contravene this proviso, it would be open to the aggrieved consumer to approach the Board or the State Government to appoint a Rating Committee. But from this circumstance we are not prepared to hold; (a) that the action of the licensee in charging a prohibited rate is any the less an illegality not .::ountenanced by the statute and (b) that where such an illegality is made out the jurisdiction of a civil court to afford relief is ousted. It is possible to hold, and we do not desire\n\nT,.. Amalgamated Eledri<ity Co. U~.\n\nN.S. Blwt\"\"\"•\n\nand Another\n\nA:JYangar, J.\n\n1964 to express a final opinion on a point which is not directly TM, Amalgamated involved in these appeals, that the jurisdiction of the court El<ctricity Go. Ltd. may be confined to granting a declaration as to the invalidi v. ty of the adjustment and injunction against the violation of N.! ~\"::,~· the statutory prohibition, and not to grant a refund. It is only necessary to add that the relief sought in these 2 suits Ayyangar, J. was merely a declaration regarding the invalidity of the rates charged and an injunction restraining the Appellant from continuing to charge them.\n\nWe are, therefore, satisfied that the mere existence of s. 57 A does not by itself, and without reference to the particular violation complained of by the licensee, bar the jurisdiction of a civil court and the argument in the extreme fomi presented to us by the learned Solicitor-General must be re jected.\n\nThe next and the last question that arises is whether the respondents have established that the appellant has violated any of the provisions of the Supply Act and in particular those contained in Sch. VI, paragraph I of the Supply Act. We have already dealt with the objection that there was no \"adjustment\" of rates in 1949 or 1950. Again, we have already held that in regard to the unit rate for power in regard to which alone there was an enhancement there was a valid notice issued to Government as required by the 3rd proviso to paragraph I. In the circumstances of this case the only ground upon which the respondents would have been entitled to the relief of declaration and injunction that they claimed was that they had established that the rate charged by the Appellant offended the second proviso, in that it yielded a profit in excess of 15 per cent of the reasonable return. The learned Judge in the High Court has held that the onus of proving that the rate which the Appellant charged was within this limit was on it and that as no evidence had been led by it on this point he granted the plaintiffs the declaration and injunction they sought. We consider that the learned Judge was in error in this respect. There is no presumption that the rate charged by a licensee contravenes the statutory prohibi tion. It is for the party who alleges his right to relief to estab lish the facts upon which such relief could be obtained. It was, therefore, for the plaintiffs to prove by facts placed before the court that the rate charged offended the statutory provision. This they admittedly failed to do and. we, there fore, hold that they were not entitled to the declaration and injunction which the learned Judge of the High Court granted. We accordingly allow the appeals and direct the dismissal of the suits. The appellant would be entitled to its costs here and in the High Court-one hearing fee.\n\nAppeals allowed", "total_entities": 269, "entities": [{"text": "503\n\nTHE AMALGAMATED ELECTRICITY CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE AMALGAMATED ELECTRICITY CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Eiectricity Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 57, 57A, 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 211, "end_char": 226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Eiectricity Supply Act, 1948", "statute": "Eiectricity Supply Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Eiectricity Supply Act, 1948", "statute": "Eiectricity Supply Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 512, "end_char": 571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "December 30, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 717, "end_char": 734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The licence fixed the limits rf the prices which the appellant rould charge but these limits were altered by an order made by the Government on December 30, 1942, acting under para XI of the Schedule to that Act, Due to the conditions brought about by the seeond world war, the licensee was permitted to add a surcharge not exceeding 33-1/3 % to the existing charges."}}, {"text": "XI of the Schedule to that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 754, "end_char": 784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 30, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 944, "end_char": 962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 30, 1946, tho Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act, 1946, was passed which continued the surcharges for a period ofthree years."}}, {"text": "Though the Surcharge Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1080, "end_char": 1104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 30, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1124, "end_char": 1142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the Surcharge Act of 1946 expired on September 30, 1949, the appellant continued charging the consumers at rates which included the surcharge and thi' was sought to be justified by resort to the provisions' of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, which came into force on September 10,\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "Electricity Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1301, "end_char": 1329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 10,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1356, "end_char": 1375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the Surcharge Act of 1946 expired on September 30, 1949, the appellant continued charging the consumers at rates which included the surcharge and thi' was sought to be justified by resort to the provisions' of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, which came into force on September 10,\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "September 25, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1380, "end_char": 1398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 25, 1958, the appellant gave notice to its customers that with effect from November 1, 1958, it would charge them at certain rates which the customers considered to be illegal and unauthorised on the ground that they were in excess of those prescribed in the order of December 30, 1942."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1465, "end_char": 1481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 25, 1958, the appellant gave notice to its customers that with effect from November 1, 1958, it would charge them at certain rates which the customers considered to be illegal and unauthorised on the ground that they were in excess of those prescribed in the order of December 30, 1942."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1833, "end_char": 1853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the suits instituted on behalf of the consumers challenging the legality of the rates levied by the appellant in excess of the maximum prescribed by the Government of Bombay in its order dated December 30, 1942, the defence of the appellant was that the charges were well within the limits prescribed by the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, which according to its contention."}}, {"text": "Electricity Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1988, "end_char": 2016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2201, "end_char": 2216, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 57 and 57A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2314, "end_char": 2328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1948", "statute": "the Electricity Supply Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2569, "end_char": 2584, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Electricity Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2653, "end_char": 2681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Per Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3154, "end_char": 3164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March JO\n\n196A Per Sarkar, J.-The respondents were not entitled to canvass TM."}}, {"text": "N.S. Bha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3453, "end_char": 3461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A civil court could not declare that the rates charged by a N.S. Bha<lu:na licensee were illegal as they made its clear profit exceed the reaandAiwther sonable return."}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3803, "end_char": 3809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar, J.\n\nPer Das Gupta and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.-(i) There could be unilateral adjustment of the rates by a licensee but such an adjustment must not leave him with more than the reasonable return.", "canonical_name": "Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Per Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3815, "end_char": 3828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar, J.\n\nPer Das Gupta and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.-(i) There could be unilateral adjustment of the rates by a licensee but such an adjustment must not leave him with more than the reasonable return."}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3833, "end_char": 3852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar, J.\n\nPer Das Gupta and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.-(i) There could be unilateral adjustment of the rates by a licensee but such an adjustment must not leave him with more than the reasonable return."}}, {"text": "s. 57A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4736, "end_char": 4742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5077, "end_char": 5094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "590- 591 of 1963-Appeals from the judgment and decree dated February 6, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Second Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5138, "end_char": 5150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, M. M. Gharekhan and I.N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "M. M. Gharekhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5171, "end_char": 5186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, M. M. Gharekhan and I.N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "M. M. Gharekhan"}}, {"text": "I.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5191, "end_char": 5202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, M. M. Gharekhan and I.N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "M.C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5280, "end_char": 5293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor-General, M.C. Setalvad, M.M.\n\nGharekhan and I.N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "M.M.\n\nGharekhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5295, "end_char": 5310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor-General, M.C. Setalvad, M.M.\n\nGharekhan and I.N. Shroff, for the appellant (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "M. M. Gharekhan"}}, {"text": "Naraindas C Malkani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5371, "end_char": 5390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naraindas C Malkani, J.B. Dadachan/i, 0."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5392, "end_char": 5405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naraindas C Malkani, J.B. Dadachan/i, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5412, "end_char": 5421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5426, "end_char": 5441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5519, "end_char": 5528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of DAS GUPTA and AY- YANGAR JJ."}}, {"text": "AY- YANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5533, "end_char": 5543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of DAS GUPTA and AY- YANGAR JJ.", "canonical_name": "AY- YANGAR"}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR J. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5565, "end_char": 5583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by AYYANGAR J. SARKAR J. delivered a separate opinion."}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5618, "end_char": 5624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR, J.-The appellant is a company carrying on business as supplier of electricity in a certain area in the State of Bombay.", "canonical_name": "Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Bhathena", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5762, "end_char": 5770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents Bhathena and , Tendulkar were consumers of electrical energy supplied by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Bhathena"}}, {"text": "Tendulkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5777, "end_char": 5786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents Bhathena and , Tendulkar were consumers of electrical energy supplied by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Tendulkar"}}, {"text": "These statutes are the Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6207, "end_char": 6251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6330, "end_char": 6339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These statutes are the Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "These statutes are the Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6970, "end_char": 6975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These statutes are the Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "These statutes are the Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7139, "end_char": 7173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 30,\n\n1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8456, "end_char": 8474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at rates in excess of those fixed by the Order of December 30,\n\n1942 and that was illegal."}}, {"text": "N.S. Bhathena", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8531, "end_char": 8544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant on its part claims\n\nN.S. Bhathena\n\nand AnnlMr\n\nSarkar, J.\n\n1964 that its charges after the expiry of the Surcharge Act were air TA< ..A._malganuzted justified under the Act of 1948 the relevant provisions of Electricity Go.", "canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "September 10, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8765, "end_char": 8783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. which came into force on September 10, 1948."}}, {"text": "N.S. Bhathena", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8803, "end_char": 8816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act will v.\n\nN.S. Bhathena be referred to later.", "canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Bathena", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8879, "end_char": 8886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Another\n\nSarkar, J, The respondent Bathena commenced taking electricity from the appellant sometime in\n\n1954."}}, {"text": "November 1. 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9681, "end_char": 9697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 25, 1958, the appellant gave notice to its customers that with effect from November 1."}}, {"text": "March 31. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10197, "end_char": 10211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice gave rise to further disputes as a result of which two suits were filed against the appellant on March 31."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Belgaum", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10232, "end_char": 10252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1959 in the court of the Civil Judge, Belgaum."}}, {"text": "25-9-58", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10996, "end_char": 11003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of these suits was filed by the respondent Bathena acting for himself and all other consumers of electricity supplied by the appellant for purposes of motive power over 4 B.H.P. for the following reliefs:\n\n\"(a) That a declaration be granted by this Hon'able Court thai the standing charges of 2.69 nP. per B.H.P. per month and the excess sum of 0.04 nP. per unit of energy consumed, for motive power whether oonnected or otherwise, are illegal and unauthorised, inoperative and ultra vires of the Defendant company and the Plaintiff is not bound to pay the same and that the Defendant-Company have no 'authority to control or interfere in the supply of electric energy or its use, and that the restrictions imposed in Notice dated 25-9-58 are illegal, bad in law, and,\n\n(b) an injunction restraining the Defendant-Company, its servants, its agents or its representatives from levying and recovering the excess and illegal charges, (such as standing charges and per unit\n\nof consumed energy at 0.04 nP.) from the plain- 1964 tiff, by means of any coercive measures and from The Amalgamai."}}, {"text": "Tandulkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11469, "end_char": 11478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd.\n\nThe other suit was filed by the respondent Tandulkar also s •· N . .", "canonical_name": "Tendulkar"}}, {"text": "Bhathena", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11495, "end_char": 11503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhathena in a representative capacity in respect of the charge of 0.37 andAnother nP. per unit for electricity supplied for lights and fans, and it .", "canonical_name": "Bhathena"}}, {"text": "November I, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13288, "end_char": 13304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In anv case, since the declaration is sought in respect of the charges as revised by the said notice as from November I, 1958 it is clear that no question as to the legality of any charge made before November I, 1958 was sought to be raised."}}, {"text": "Tiie Amalgamated Eltdri<ily Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13862, "end_char": 13898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute is as to the right to enhance them\n\nTiie Amalgamated Eltdri<ily Co. Ltd.\n\nN.S. BhatheM\n\nan:l.A.nofher\n\n8ar'/v."}}, {"text": "N.S. BhatheM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13900, "end_char": 13912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute is as to the right to enhance them\n\nTiie Amalgamated Eltdri<ily Co. Ltd.\n\nN.S. BhatheM\n\nan:l.A.nofher\n\n8ar'/v.", "canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14069, "end_char": 14084, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14481, "end_char": 14486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14512, "end_char": 14526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14535, "end_char": 14551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15076, "end_char": 15104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15352, "end_char": 15362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "S. 57A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15391, "end_char": 15397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15432, "end_char": 15446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15455, "end_char": 15471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15482, "end_char": 15492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15820, "end_char": 15834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16642, "end_char": 16656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16662, "end_char": 16732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17058, "end_char": 17072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17599, "end_char": 17613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Notwitllstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17641, "end_char": 17712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18003, "end_char": 18017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwitllstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "Notwitllstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18459, "end_char": 18473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwitllstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "Notwitllstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "XI of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18527, "end_char": 18556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 70(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18597, "end_char": 18605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "XI of the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "XI of the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "No provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18646, "end_char": 18694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Blectrieity. Go. Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19122, "end_char": 19142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This provision also supports the view that the power t(}\n\nSarkar, J.\n\n1964 enhance the rates given by the Act of 1948 is not in any way The A-;;;;; lgamateil affected by anything in the Act of 1910 or the licence granted Blectrieity."}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19412, "end_char": 19417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "No provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19803, "end_char": 19808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20063, "end_char": 20077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20211, "end_char": 20216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20912, "end_char": 20917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21078, "end_char": 21106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21443, "end_char": 21448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21530, "end_char": 21535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21969, "end_char": 21974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Save as other- TheAmalgammuf wise provided in this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22005, "end_char": 22059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22305, "end_char": 22310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Save as other- TheAmalgammuf wise provided in this Act", "statute": "Save as other- TheAmalgammuf wise provided in this Act"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22354, "end_char": 22368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Save as other- TheAmalgammuf wise provided in this Act", "statute": "Save as other- TheAmalgammuf wise provided in this Act"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22879, "end_char": 22893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Save as other- TheAmalgammuf wise provided in this Act", "statute": "Save as other- TheAmalgammuf wise provided in this Act"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23143, "end_char": 23157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23264, "end_char": 23334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23720, "end_char": 23734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Chhaganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23786, "end_char": 23796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether Chhaganlal's case(') was correctly decided in view of the terms of paragraph I as it stood before the amendment is not a question which arises for determination in this case and on that question I express no opinion."}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24067, "end_char": 24081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Ken to have illegaliy continued the surcharge which it was levying under the Surcharge Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25032, "end_char": 25128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October. 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25154, "end_char": 25170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in\n\n1956 and, therefore, held tha.t the appellant must be taKen to have illegaliy continued the surcharge which it was levying under the Surcharge Act, 1946 even after its expiry on October."}}, {"text": "Novem\n\nber 1, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25966, "end_char": 25984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I repeat that whether the charges made before Novem\n\nber 1, 1958 were illegal or not, is not a question that arises for decision in these cases."}}, {"text": "September 25. 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26600, "end_char": 26618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, however, also held that the appellant was under a statutory duty under the Act of 1948 to adjust its rates so that its ciear profit did not exceed the amount of reasonable return and it had not established that it had done so after the Act was amended, nor had it proved that the enhancement mentioned in the notice of September 25."}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28287, "end_char": 28301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29034, "end_char": 29078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Thus the fourth and the last proviso in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29327, "end_char": 29411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29556, "end_char": 29566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Thus the fourth and the last proviso in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act", "statute": "Thus the fourth and the last proviso in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 57(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30139, "end_char": 30147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Thus the fourth and the last proviso in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act", "statute": "Thus the fourth and the last proviso in paragraph I of the Sixth Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": ".Amalgamated\n\nEleetrieity Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30583, "end_char": 30617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H the clear profit of a licensee in any year of account'is in excess of the amount of\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-17\n\nThe .Amalgamated\n\nEleetrieity Co. Ltd.\n\nN.S. Bhathena and A notlier\n\nSarkar, J.\n\nreasonable return, one-third of such excess, not exceeding five per cent of the amount of reasonable return, shall be at the disposal of the undertaking."}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32004, "end_char": 32018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33711, "end_char": 33725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34108, "end_char": 34122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34357, "end_char": 34371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7-8-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34943, "end_char": 34951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AMAL/BEL/ C-2, dated 7-8-1958\" written by the appellant to the Board and the letter last mentioned, which is Ex."}}, {"text": "November !, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35632, "end_char": 35648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed the plaint itself in paragraph 5 states that prior to November !,"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36922, "end_char": 36936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 25, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37104, "end_char": 37122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the opinion that there is no reason to hold that the appellant was not entitled to levy the charge mentioned in its notice of September 25, 1948."}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37650, "end_char": 37664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "II of The Amalgamated the Sixth Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39471, "end_char": 39522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Eleetridty Go. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39553, "end_char": 39572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As I have said, under paragraphs I and II of The Amalgamated the Sixth Schedule to the Act of 1948 a licensee can charge Eleetridty Go."}}, {"text": "Babula/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40343, "end_char": 40350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt follows that in this case also the respondents can get no assistance from the decision in Babula/ Chhaganlal(') even if that case was rightly decided."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40526, "end_char": 40534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals which come before us by virtue of special leave granted by this Court are against a common judgment of the High Court of Mysore in two Second Appeals preferred to it by the respective respondents in the two appeals.", "canonical_name": "AY- YANGAR"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40664, "end_char": 40684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals which come before us by virtue of special leave granted by this Court are against a common judgment of the High Court of Mysore in two Second Appeals preferred to it by the respective respondents in the two appeals."}}, {"text": "Belgaum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41085, "end_char": 41092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant-company is a licensee who is eligaged in the business of supplying electricity in the town of Belgaum and other places."}}, {"text": "B. S. Ankle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41209, "end_char": 41220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A licence for the supply of electricity in the town of Belgaum was granted in 1932 to two persons B. S. Ankle and A.S. Ankle."}}, {"text": "A.S. Ankle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41225, "end_char": 41235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A licence for the supply of electricity in the town of Belgaum was granted in 1932 to two persons B. S. Ankle and A.S. Ankle."}}, {"text": "Belgaum Electricity Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41295, "end_char": 41323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two assigned their licence to a concern by name the Belgaum Electricity Co. Ltd. and by a further assignment by these assignees."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41563, "end_char": 41567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41582, "end_char": 41597, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41665, "end_char": 41686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "N.S.\n\nBhathena", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42110, "end_char": 42124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.S.\n\nBhathena and A!iother\n\nAyyan(Jar, J.\n\n1964 Bombay within whose jurisdiction Belgaum then was, passed The Amalgamated an order on December 30, 1942 fixing the maximum rates which ' Electricity Co. Ltd. could be charged by licensees for supply to consumers and these N. s. Bhalliena rates which applied to the Appellant were to be effective from\n\na•d Another February 1, 1943.", "canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "February 1, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42473, "end_char": 42489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.S.\n\nBhathena and A!iother\n\nAyyan(Jar, J.\n\n1964 Bombay within whose jurisdiction Belgaum then was, passed The Amalgamated an order on December 30, 1942 fixing the maximum rates which ' Electricity Co. Ltd. could be charged by licensees for supply to consumers and these N. s. Bhalliena rates which applied to the Appellant were to be effective from\n\na•d Another February 1, 1943."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42596, "end_char": 42604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The maximum rates for the supply of energy under the licence were, under this order, to be (I) where the Ayyangar, J. energy was supplied for lights and fans 5 annas per unit; (21 where energy was supplied for power purposes i.e., for purpose other than lights and fans the maximum rate was to be (a) upto and including 4 B.H.P. one anna per unit in addition to a standing charge of Rs.", "canonical_name": "AY- YANGAR"}}, {"text": "March, l I, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43149, "end_char": 43165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While so, on March, l I, 1943 a notification was issued by the Government.of Bombay in exercise of powers conferred by rule 81 (2)(b) of the Defence of India Rules by which relaxation was made as regards the maximum rates for the supply of electrical energy chargeable by a licensee under the Electricity Act."}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43429, "end_char": 43444, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Later this surcharge under the Defence of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43555, "end_char": 43608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44189, "end_char": 44204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was a temporary enactment which uncler sub-s.(4) of s. l was to be in force for a period of three years only so that it lapsed en October 1, 1949."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44243, "end_char": 44247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Later this surcharge under the Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Later this surcharge under the Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44306, "end_char": 44310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Later this surcharge under the Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Later this surcharge under the Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44416, "end_char": 44420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Later this surcharge under the Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Later this surcharge under the Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44543, "end_char": 44558, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Decem!Jer 30, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44724, "end_char": 44742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of this piece of legislation the position that emerged was that though the original licence issued under the Electricity Act, 1910 which empowered the Government to fix the maximum of the rates that could be charged by licensees for the supply of energy was 4 determined by the order dated Decem!Jer 30, 1942, still practically almost from the commencement of the operation of that order a 33f per cent."}}, {"text": "Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45648, "end_char": 45657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "st October, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45842, "end_char": 45858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st October, 1949 and of the increase in the unit rate even beyond it are challenged in the suit which has given rise to Civil Appeal 590 of 1963."}}, {"text": "30th September 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46094, "end_char": 46113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of the charge for the supply of energy for lights and fans there has been no change since the 30th September 1949, but the maximum as increased by 33} per cent still continues and it is the legality of this continuance of the surcharge that is impugned in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46866, "end_char": 46882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46990, "end_char": 47011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47102, "end_char": 47107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "No provision of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47148, "end_char": 47196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47576, "end_char": 47604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47843, "end_char": 47871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Acts-the Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48030, "end_char": 48060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48090, "end_char": 48106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. S. Bhathena", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48114, "end_char": 48128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nN. S. Bhathena\n\nand Another We shall now briefly narrate the course of the proceedings which have led to the present appeals.", "canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ayyanr1fJr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48455, "end_char": 48465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two suits were filed by consumers of electrical energy in Belgaum receiving their supplies from the Appellant in the court of Civil Judge, Belgaum, both being representative suits under 0.I.r.8 of the Civil Proce-\n\nAyyanr1fJr, J.\n."}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49090, "end_char": 49110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It recited that the plaintiffs had protested and addressed letters to the Government of Mysore, (Belgaum having been made part of this State by the State Reorganisation Act) but without any result."}}, {"text": "Belgaum having been made part of this State by the State Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49113, "end_char": 49188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 30, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50814, "end_char": 50832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "surcharges that were permitted during the war period and subsequently under the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act, 1946 it had been charging 6 annas per unit, and after the decimal coinage cam11 into force 37 nP. The main point that was urged in the plaint was that on the lapse of the Bombay Electricity (Surcharge) Act, 1956 on September 30, 1959 the right of the Appellan to charge anyhting above 31 11P. ceased but that notwith\n\nstanding this want of legal sanction it had continued to levy the same rates even afterwards."}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51664, "end_char": 51679, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51833, "end_char": 51848, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52375, "end_char": 52390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52800, "end_char": 52815, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "IO ceased to be in force on the enactment of the Supply Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52822, "end_char": 52881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53682, "end_char": 53703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53705, "end_char": 53714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Amalgamaled Eleotri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53723, "end_char": 53742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3 of\n\nThe Amalgamaled Eleotri<ity Go."}}, {"text": "N.S. Bhalhena", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53757, "end_char": 53770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.S. Bhalhena\n\nand An.other\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\n1961 this Act enables the State Government, on application made to TM Amalgamated it, to grant to any person a licence to supply energy in any speci- Eledricity Co. Ltd. lied area.", "canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": ".Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54226, "end_char": 54235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f) which read: - .Ayyangar, J,\n\n\"(d) a license under this Part:-\n\n(i) may prescribe such terms as to the limits withir1 which, and the conditions under which, the sup.- ply of energy is to be compulsory or permissive, and as to be limits of price to he charged in respect of the supply of energy, and generally as to such matters as the State Government 1r>ay think fit. ...................... ' ... ' .. ' .. '' .. '.'' '.,,", "canonical_name": "AY- YANGAR"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55111, "end_char": 55121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(2)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55379, "end_char": 55388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56041, "end_char": 56047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 1, l943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56524, "end_char": 56540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was effective from February 1, l943."}}, {"text": "Rules and later under the War costs Surcharge and still later under the Bombay Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56657, "end_char": 56739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57479, "end_char": 57484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules and later under the War costs Surcharge and still later under the Bombay Act", "statute": "Rules and later under the War costs Surcharge and still later under the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57492, "end_char": 57508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57603, "end_char": 57619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57742, "end_char": 57763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss.57 and 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57993, "end_char": 58005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58043, "end_char": 58128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58196, "end_char": 58201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act", "statute": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act"}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58203, "end_char": 58213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act", "statute": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act"}}, {"text": "s. 57 and 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58318, "end_char": 58330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act", "statute": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 57 and 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58464, "end_char": 58477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act", "statute": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58575, "end_char": 58589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act", "statute": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58599, "end_char": 58615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act", "statute": "Pausing here it is necessary to mention that some of the provisions of the Supply Act"}}, {"text": "N. S. Bhathena", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58924, "end_char": 58938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "leemed to be incorporated in the licence of every licensee, not being a local authority-\n\n(a) in the case of a licence granted before the commencement of this Act, from the date or the commencement of the licensee's next succeeding year of acconnt; and\n\n196The Ama/gama!w Electricity Co. Ltd,\n\nN. S. Bhathena\n\nand Ancither\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\n(b) in the case of a licence granted after the commencement of this Act, from the date of the commencement of supply,\n\n\"· ''\n\nand as from the said date, the licensee shall comply with the provisions of the said Schedules accordingly, and any provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and the licence granted to him thereunder and of any other law, agreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall.", "canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59229, "end_char": 59257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59493, "end_char": 59503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59570, "end_char": 59584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59594, "end_char": 59610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59621, "end_char": 59631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59961, "end_char": 59975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60370, "end_char": 60384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60786, "end_char": 60800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule VI", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62351, "end_char": 62362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss.57 and 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62378, "end_char": 62390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.S. Bhaihena", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 63385, "end_char": 63398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd.\n\nN.S. Bhaihena\n\nand Another\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\ncent.", "canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64453, "end_char": 64523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 32A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64551, "end_char": 64562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65560, "end_char": 65570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.S. Bhat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65823, "end_char": 65832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nN.S. Bhat\"\"\"' II. (", "canonical_name": "N.S. BHATHENA AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67427, "end_char": 67443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67508, "end_char": 67529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67782, "end_char": 67786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Government under the Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67977, "end_char": 68013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ayyanqar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68637, "end_char": 68645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyanqar, J.\n\nSo far as the !", "canonical_name": "AY- YANGAR"}}, {"text": "Government under the Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68727, "end_char": 68763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68966, "end_char": 68976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government under the Electricity Act", "statute": "Government under the Electricity Act"}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68984, "end_char": 69000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69210, "end_char": 69238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69491, "end_char": 69495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69600, "end_char": 69615, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "VI of the Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69704, "end_char": 69730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70547, "end_char": 70562, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70641, "end_char": 70657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70867, "end_char": 70882, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Electridty Co. Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 71342, "end_char": 71360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VI should ~~ within the limits of t_his maxima we were referred to a dec1s10n of the Born bay High\n\nCourt reported as Babu/al v. Chopda Electricity Supply Co.(') 1964 It is sufficient to extract the headnote to understand the point The Amalgamated of the decision: Electridty Co. Ltd •\n\n\"Section 57(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, or\n\ncl."}}, {"text": "Section 57(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71365, "end_char": 71378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Supply Act, 1948", "statute": "the Supply Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71435, "end_char": 71449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Supply Act, 1948", "statute": "the Supply Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71713, "end_char": 71741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 57(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71758, "end_char": 71766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71881, "end_char": 71895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71926, "end_char": 71942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71983, "end_char": 71997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s.57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72206, "end_char": 72210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72327, "end_char": 72355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.3(2)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72370, "end_char": 72379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "s.3(2)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72508, "end_char": 72517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72525, "end_char": 72553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "right to amend the license is conferred by the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72735, "end_char": 72810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73036, "end_char": 73052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73159, "end_char": 73174, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Electricity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73705, "end_char": 73720, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "VI of the Supply Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75217, "end_char": 75237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 57(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75698, "end_char": 75706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Supply Act", "statute": "VI of the Supply Act"}}, {"text": "Section 57(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75730, "end_char": 75743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Supply Act", "statute": "VI of the Supply Act"}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76477, "end_char": 76482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 57 and 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78677, "end_char": 78690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayvangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82720, "end_char": 82728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or less there need be no readjustment and if the rate Ayvangar, J. charged yields more than this permitted profit there should be a readjustment.", "canonical_name": "AY- YANGAR"}}, {"text": "August 7, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84532, "end_char": 84546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 7, 1958 the Appellant intimated the Government of Mysore setting out the clear profit it h:id made in 1957-58 and the estimated working position in 1958-59 and its intention to increase the unit rate for supply of power from 6 nP. to 9 nP. unit."}}, {"text": "Ekttricitu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85315, "end_char": 85325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not consider that Ekttricitu oo."}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85896, "end_char": 85912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "This was the position when the Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86065, "end_char": 86112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87240, "end_char": 87250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87258, "end_char": 87274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87443, "end_char": 87448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Supply Act, 1948", "statute": "the Supply Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88200, "end_char": 88205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Supply Act, 1948", "statute": "the Supply Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88992, "end_char": 88997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90966, "end_char": 90971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "'lecJrieily co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91289, "end_char": 91309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ed by s. 57 A to the Rating Committee, or in regard to which the Rating Committee cannot afford the ccinsumer relief against an infraction of a statutory provision by which he is aggrieved\n\n1964 Before turning to the facts of the present case with a The AMa/gamated view to examine whether the relief sought by the respondents f.'lecJrieily co. Ltd. ; iz.,"}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91455, "end_char": 91458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91664, "end_char": 91670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91848, "end_char": 91862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91946, "end_char": 91951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92339, "end_char": 92344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93039, "end_char": 93053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93068, "end_char": 93073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93683, "end_char": 93689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94114, "end_char": 94119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95372, "end_char": 95377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 57A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95470, "end_char": 95476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95580, "end_char": 95594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amalgamated Eledri<ity Co. U~.\n\nN.S. Blwt\"\"\"•", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 97157, "end_char": 97202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is possible to hold, and we do not desire\n\nT,.. Amalgamated Eledri<ity Co. U~.\n\nN.S. Blwt\"\"\"•\n\nand Another\n\nA:JYangar, J.\n\n1964 to express a final opinion on a point which is not directly TM, Amalgamated involved in these appeals, that the jurisdiction of the court El<ctricity Go."}}, {"text": "JYangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97219, "end_char": 97226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is possible to hold, and we do not desire\n\nT,.. Amalgamated Eledri<ity Co. U~.\n\nN.S. Blwt\"\"\"•\n\nand Another\n\nA:JYangar, J.\n\n1964 to express a final opinion on a point which is not directly TM, Amalgamated involved in these appeals, that the jurisdiction of the court El<ctricity Go."}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97872, "end_char": 97877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_539_548_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 539\n\nBANARASI DEVI v.\n\nINCOME-TAX OFFICER, CALCUTTA\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. Snau, JJ.J\n\nIncome-tax Act, (11 of 1922), as amended by Income-tax (Amendment) Act (1 of 1959) s. 4-Fiscal enactments-Interpretation of-\"lssued\" in s. 4 of the Amending Act-Meaning of.\n\nFor the assessment year 1947-48 the appellant in the fust case field a return of her income and the assessment was completed sometime in 1948 as a result whereof it was found that no tax was payable by her. On April 2,1956, the appellant was ,; erved with a notice dated March 19, 1956, under s. 34(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, on the ground of escaped assessment.\n\nThe date of the notice fell within' 8 years from the end of the relevant assessment year i.e. March 31, 1948, but it was served beyond 8 years from the date and therefore was clearly out of time under the provisions of the said section. In the second case, the appellant was assessed for the assessment year 1947-48 and the tax thereon was deposited on his behalf. On April 2, 1956, the appellant was also served with a similar notice as aforesaid. The appellants filed two petitions under Art. 22~ for .quashing the said notices and the learned Judge of th• High Court issued rules nisi to the Income-tax Officer, the\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax and the Union of India. On September 11, 1958, the rules were made absolute. The respondents then preferred appeals to a Division Bench of that Court\n\nPending the appeals, on March 12. 1959, s. 34 of the Act wa,; amended by s. 2 of the Amending Act, 1959. After the said amendment the appeals were heard and relying uPOn the said amendment the learned judges held that the. said notices, though served on the appellants after the prescribed time, w<ere served under s. 4 of the . Amending Act. On appeal by Special Leave it was urged on behalf of the appellants that s. 4 of the Amending Act only saved a notice issued after the prescribed time, but did not apply to a situation where notice was issued within but served out of time. The respondents contended that the expression \"issued\" means \"served\" and that, in any view, it was comprehensive enough to take in the entire process of giving and serving of notice.\n\nHeld: To the present case the general rule of construction of fiscal Acts would apply, and not the exception engrafted on the rule; for, s. 4 of the Amending Act, cannot he described as a provision laying down the machinery for the calculation of tax. In substance it enables the Income-tax Officer to reassess a person's income which has escaped assessment, though the time within which he could have so assessed had expired under the Act before the amendmei!t of 1959. It resuscitates barred claims. Therefore, the same stringent . rules of construction appropriate to a chargilig section shill! also apply to such a provision.\n\nCase law discussed.\n\nOn a true construction of s. 4 of the Amending Act, it must be held that the clear intention of the legislature was to save the validity of the notice as well as the assessment from an\n\nlgf4\n\nJlarcli.31\n\n1964 attack on the ground that the notice was given beyond the . . prescribed period. That intention would be effectuated if the Banara.ti. DevJ wider meaning is given to the expression \"issued\".\n\nThe die-· lncotRe-,:; Offictr, tionary meaning of the expression \"issued\" takes in the entire Caktitta 'process of sending the notice as well as the service thereof.\n\nThe said word used in s. 34(1) of the Act itself was interpreted by courts to mean 'served\". The limited meaning, namely, \"sent\" will exclude from the operation of the provision a class cl cases and introduce anomalies. In the circumstances, by interpretation, the wider meaning of the word \"issued\" must be accepted. In this view, though the notices were served beyond the prescribed time, they were saved under s. 4 of the Amending Act.\n\nCase law referred to\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 142 and 143 of 1963. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 13, 1961, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeals from Original Orders No. 41 and 69 of 1959.\n\nS. Chaudhury and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. No. 142/63).\n\nM. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. R.\n\nChaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 143/1963) ..\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent (in b, oth the appeals).\n\nMarch 31, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJMba Rae, J, SUBBA RAo, J.-These two appeals filed by special leave raise the question of the true construction of the provisions of s. 4 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959 (Act No. I of 1959), hereinafter called the Amending Act.\n\nThe material facts lie in a small compass and they are as follows.\n\nFor the asseSGment year 1947-48 the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 142 of 1963 filed a return of her income before the Income-tax Officer, District IV, Calcutta, and the assessment was completed sometime in 1948 as a result whereof it was found that no tax was payable by her. On April 2, 1956, the Income-tax Officer served on her a notice dated March 19, 1956, under s. 34(7) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922. hereinafter called tire Act, on the ground of escaped assessment. The date of the notice fell within 8 years from the end of the relevant assessment year i.e., March 31, 1948; but it was served beyond'8 years from that date and. therefore, was clearly out of time under the provisions of the said section.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 143 of 1963, for the assessment year 1947-48 the appellant was asessed on a total .income\n\n-- ---\n\nof Rs. 28,993 /- on December 30, 1948, by the Income-tax 1964\n\nOfficer and the tax thereon amounting to Rs. 4,747-13-0 was Bat1a,...i Deri deposited on behalf of the appellant in the Reserve Bank of 1 ..,._,;,; OJli India. On April 2, 1956, the appellant was served with a ., aa1e11ua \"'• notice dated March 19, 1956, by the Income-tax Officer purporting to be under s. 34 of the Act on the ground of escaped Svllba Rao, J assessment. The date of the notice fell within 8 years from the end of the relevant asses1iment year, i.e., March 31, 1956; but it was served beyond 8 years from that date and was, therefore, clearly out of time under the provisions of the said section.\n\nThe appellants in the two appeals filed two petitions in the High Court of Calcutta under Aft. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the said notices and for_ other appropriate reliefE. On March 20, 1957, Sinha, J., of that Court issued rules nisi on the said two applications to the Income-tax ' Officer, the Commissioner of Income-tax and the Union of India. On September 11. 1958, the said Judge made the rules absolute. The respondents to the applications preferred appeals from the judgment of Sinha, J., to a Division Bench of that Court. Pending the appeals, on March 12. 1959, s. 34 of the Act was amended bys. 2 of the Amending Act. After the said amendment the appeals were heard by a ..\n\nDivision Bench of the High Court, consisting of Bose, C. J ., and G. K. Mitter. J. Relying upon the said amendment the learned Judges held that the said notices, though served on the appellants after the prescribed time, were saved unc!cr s. 4 of the Amending Act In that view they set aside the orders of Sinha, J ., and dismislled the writ petitions. Hence the appeals.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants contends that the notices under s. 34(1) of the Act were served on the appellants beyond 8 years from the end of the assessment year and, therefore, were barred and that on a true construction of the provisions of s. 4 of the Amending Act, the said notices were not saved thereunder. To appreciate the contention il is necessary to read the relevant provisions of the Act, before and after the amendment.\n\nSection 34(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, before it was amended by the Finance Act No. XVIII of 1956: If-\n\n(a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of hirl income under Section 22 for any year or to disclose fully\n\nBanarcui Devi v . .Income-tax Officer, OalcuUn\n\nS11bba Rao, J.\n\n(b)\n\nSUPRE\"'IE COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\nand truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the year, income, profit or gairi chargeable to incon1e-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-assessed, or assessed at too low a rate or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act or exce\"ivc loss or depreciation allowance has been comp1l<r.l. or\n\nhe may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time within eight years .................. serve on the assessee ............... a notice containing all or any of the requiretrients which may be included in a notice under sub-section 2 of Section 22 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or re-compute the loss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be applied accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub- Seclion . • • • • Provided that where a notice under sub-Sectio11 (]) has been issued within the time therein limited, the assessment or re-assessment to b~ made in pursuance of such notice may be made before the expiry of one year from the date of the service of the notice even if such period exceeds the period of eight years or four years, ari the case may be.\n\nSection 4 of the Amending Act, (Act l of 1959) No notice issued under clause (a) of sub-section (]) of section 34 of the principal Act at any time before the commencement of this Act and no assessment, re-assessment or settlement made or other proceedings taken in consequence of such notice shall be called in question in any Court. tribunal or other authority merely on the ground that at the time the notice was issued or at the time the assessment or re-assessment was made, the time within which such notice should have been issued or the assessment or re-assessment should have been made under that section as in force before its amendment by clause (a) of section 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, and expired.\n\nSection 34(1) (a) of the Act empowered the Incomtax 'Officer to assess concealed income which escaped asse>sment by serving a notice on the assessee at any time within 8 years\n\nof the end of the assessment year in respect whereof the said 1964 income has escaped assessment.\n\nSection 4 of the Amending Banam•i Devi Act debars the court from questioning the validity of notice v. issued or the assessment or re-assessment made under sub-s.\n\n1\"\"(J~:':'//!\"'· (!) (a) of s. 34 of the Act on the ground that the time for the u issue of such notice or the making of such assessment or Bubba Rao, J •. re-assessment had expired under the said sub-section before it was amended by s. 18 of the Finance Act of 1956.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants contends that s. 4 of the Amending Act only saves a notice issued after the prescribed time, but does not apply to a situation where notice is issued within but served out of time.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents argues that the expression \"isued\" means \"served\" and that, in any view, it is comprehensive enough to take in the entire process of giving and serving of notice.\n\nBefore constrnng the section it will be useful to notice the relevant rules of construction of a fiscal statute.\n\nJn Oriental Bank v. Wright(') the Judicial Committee held that if a statute professed to impose a charge, the intention to impose a charge upon a subject must be shown by clear and unambiguous language.\n\nIn Canadian Eagle Oil Co. v. R.,(') Viscount Si:non L. C. observed:\n\n\"In the words of Rowlatt J ................................ . in a taxing Act one has to look at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There , is no equity about a tax.\n\nThere is no presumption as to a tax.\n\nNothing is to be read in. nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.\" In other words, a taxing statute must be couched in express and unambiguous language. The same rule of construction has been accepted by this Court in Gursahai Saigal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab (\"), wherein it was stated:\n\n\"It is well recognized that the rule of construction that if a case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of a taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering wltat was the substance of the matter applies only to a taxing provision has no application to all provisions -in a taxing statute. It does not apply to a provision not creating a charge for the tax but laying down the machinery for im calculation or procedure-\n\n(') (1880) 5 A.C. 842, 856.\n\n(') [1946] A.C. 119, 140. (') 1868 Punj. Rec. Cr!. Case No. 6.\n\nBanaraa' Devi\n\n•• ,.,,,,,.,.t<u Ofli-,\n\nCalc., Ua\n\nSabha Rao, J.\n\n544 SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS (1964]\n\nfor its collection. The provisions in a taxing statute dealing with machinery for assessment have to be construed by the ordinary rules of construction, that is to. say, in accordance with the clear intention of the legislature, which is to make a charge levied effective.\n\nIn that case, the court was called upon to constru.e the provisions of s. ISA of the Income-tax Act, 1922, which laid down the machinery for assessing the amount of interest and, therefore, this court did not apply the stringent rule of construction. Apart from the emphasis on the letter of the law, the fundamental rule of construction of a taxing statute is not different from that of any other statute and that rule is stated by Lord Russell of Killowen C. J. in Attorney-General\n\nv. Calton Ban('), thus:\n\n\"The duty of the court is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . to give effect to the intention of the legislature, as that ' intention is to be gathered from the language employed, having regard to the context in connection with which it is employed.\"\n\nTo the present case the general rule of construction of fiscal Acts would apply, and not the e:tception engrafted on that rule; for, s. 4 of the Amending Act cannot be described as a provision laying down the machinery for the calculation of tax. In substance it enables the Income-tax Officer to reassess a peraon's income which has escaped assessment, though the time within which he, could have so assessed had expired under the Act before the amendment of 1959. It resuscitates barred claims. Therefore, the same stringent rules of construction appropriate to a charging section Shall also apply to such a provi6ion.\n\nBefore the Amending Act of 1959 was passed, lncometax Officers issued notices before April l, 1956, and also after that date for reopening assessments made beyond !!\n\nyears from the issue of such notices. The validity of such notices was questioned. To save the validity of such notices the Amending Act was passed. This Court in S. C. Prashar v.\n\nVasantsen Dwarkadas(') held, on a construction of s. 4 of the Amending Act. that it operated and validated the notices issued under s. 34(1) (a) of the Act, as amended in 1948, even earlier than April l, 1956. In other words, notices issued under s. 34(1) (a) of the Act before or after April l, 1956, could not be challenged on the ground that they were issued beyond the time limit of 8 years from the respective assessment years prescribed by the 1948 amendment Act. Section\n\n( ') (1899] 2. Q.B. 158, 164.\n\n(') [1964] 1 S.C.R. 29.\n\n4 of the Amending Act of 1959, therefore, was enacted for 1964 the sole purpose of saving the validity of such notices in Banamsi D<oi respect of all escaped incomes relating to any year commenc- T. ing from the year ending on March 31, 1941, though theyln'°\"O.%':uta Offer.er, were issued beyond the prescribed time. If the construction sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the appellants Sll1Jba Rao, J. be accepted, it would defeat the purpose of the amendment in some cases. If the words were clear and exclude the class of cases where the notices wee sent before 8 years from the date of assessment, but served thereafter, this Court has to give them the said meaning.\n\nThis bring us to the question of onstruction of the provisions of s. 4 of the Amending Act: The crucial word in the said section is \"i&5ued\".\n\nThe section says that though a notice was issued beyond the time within\" which such notice should have been issued, its validity could not be questioned.\n\nIf the word 'issued\" means \"sent\", we find that there is no prov1>ion in the Act prescribing a time limit for sending a notice, for, under s. 34( !)(a) of the Act a notice could be served only within 8 years from the relevant assessment year ..\n\nIt does not provide any period for sending of the notice.\n\nObviously, therefore, the expression \"issued\" is not used in the narrow sense of \"sent\". Further, the said expression has received, before the amendment, a clear judicial interpretation. Under s. 34(l)(a) of the Act the Income-tax Officer may in cases falling under cl. (a) at any time within 8 years serve on the assessee a notice. The proviso to that section says that where the notice under s. 34(l)(a) is within time therein limited, the assessment or re-assessment to be made in pursuance of such notice may be made before the expiry of one year from the date of the service of the notice even if such period exceeds the period of 8 years or 4 years, as the case may be. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South v.\n\nD. V. Ghurve('), it was argued that a notice sent before 8 years though served beyond 8 years was in compliance with the section; and in support of that argument the expression \"issued\" in the proviso was relied upon to limit the meaning of the word \"served\" in the substantive part of the section.\n\nRejecting that argument, Chagla, C. J., speaking for the Court, observed:\n\n\"In other words, the attempt is to equate the expression \"served\" used in section 34 with the expression \"issued\" used in the proviso to sub-section (3). Now we must frankly confess that we find it difficult to understand why the Legislature has used in the proviso the expression \"where a notice under sub-section (!) has been issued within the\n\n(') (1957) 31 I.T.R. 683, 686.\n\nLP(ll)ISCJ-18\n\nI964\n\nBanarasi Devi v. l11<om<.taz Ojjker,\n\ntime therein limited\".\n\nIn sub-section (1) no time is limited for the issue of the notice: time i;; only limited for the service of the notice; and therefore it is more appropriate that the expression \"issued\" used in the proviso to sub-section (3) should be equated with the expression \"served\" rather than that the expression \"served\" used in sub-section (1) should be equated with the expression \"issued\" used iu the proviso to sub-section\n\nOakutta\n\nBubba Rao J.\n\n(3).\" ' .\n\nThis decision equated the expression \"issued\" with expression \"served\". The Allahabad High Court in Sri Niwas v.\n\nIncome-tax Officer(') has also interpreted the word \"issued\" to mean \"served\". The rele.vant rule of construction is clearly stated by Viscount Buckmaster in Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd.(') thus:\n\n\"It has long been a well established principle to be applied in the consideration of Act of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar cQntext, must be corntrued so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously assigned to it.\"\n\nSection 4 of the Amending Act was enacted for saving the validity of notices issued under s. 34 (I) of the Act. When that section used a word interpreted by courts in the context of such notices, it would be reasonable to assume that the expression was designedly used in the same sense. That apart, the expressions \"issued\" and \"served\" are used as interchangeable terms both in dictionaries and in other statutes. The dictionary meaning of the word \"issue\" is \"the act of sending out, put into circulation, delivery with authority or delivery\". Section 27 of the General Clauses Act (Act X of 1897) reads th us :\n\n\"Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression \"serve\" or either of the expression, \"give\" or \"send\" or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting\n\n(') (1956) 30 I.T.R. 381.\n\n(') [1933) A.C. 402, 411.\n\nby registered post, a letter containing the docu- 1964 ment, and unless the contrary is proved, to have B•narasi Devi been effected at the time at which the letter v. would be delivered in the ordinary course of Income0:_'f\" Officer• post.\" iMC'Utfa\n\nIt would be seen from this provL>ion that Parliament used the words \"serve\", \"give\" and \"send\" as interchangeable words. So too, in ss. 553, 554 and 555 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, the two expressions \"issued to\" or\n\n\"served upon\" are used as equivalent expresiions.\n\nIn the legislative practice of our country the said two expressions are sometimes used to convey the same idea .. In other words, the expression \"issued\" is used in a limited as well as in a wider sense.\n\nWe must, therefore, give the expression \"issued\" in s. 4 of the Amending Act that meaning which carries out the intention of the Legislature in preference to that which defeats it.\n\nBy doing so we will not be departing from the accepted meaning of the expression, but only giving it one of its meanings accepted, which fits into the context or setting in which it appears.\n\nWith this background let us give a closer look to the provisions of s. 4 of the Amending Act. The object of the section is to save the validity of a notice issued beyond the prescribed time. Though the time within which such notice should have been issued under s. 34(1) of the Act, as it stood before its amendment by s. 18 of the Finance Act of 1956, had expired, the said notice would be valid. Under s. 34(1) of the Act, as we have already pointed out, the time prescribed was only for service of the notice. As the notice mentioned in s. 4 of the Amending Act is linked with the time prescribed under the Act, the section becomes unworkable if the narrow meaning is given to the exprer, sion \"issued\". On the other hand, if we give wider meaning to the word, the section would be consistent with the provisions' of s. 34(1) of the Act. Moreover, . the narrow meaning would introduce anomalies in the section: while the notice, assessment or re-assessment were saved, the intermediate stage of service would be avoided. To put it in other words, if the proceedings were only at the stage of issue of notice, the notice could not be questioned, but if it was served, it could be questioned; though it was served beyond time, if the assessment was completed, its validity could not be questioned. The result would be that the validity of an assessment proceeding would depend upon the stage at which the assessee seeks to question it. That could not have been the intention of the Legi>lature. All these anomalies would disappear if the expression was given the wider meaning.\n\nL!'(D)I<CI-!S{•)\n\nSubba Rao, .J.\n\n1964 To summarize: the clear intention of the Legislature is B<111orari DtfJi to save the validity of the notice as well as the assessment ... from an attack on the ground that the notice was given be- J~ OJ!iar, yond the prescribed period. That intention would be effec- - tuated if the wider meaning is given to the expression S.bbo Boo, J. \"issued\" takes in the entire process of sending the notice as well as the service thereof. The said word used in s. 34(1) of the Act itself was interpreted by courts to mean \"served\".\n\nThe limited meaning, namely. \"sent\" will exclude from the operation of the provision a class of cases and introduce an<>- malies.\n\nIn the circumstances, by interpretation, we accept the wider meaning the word \"issued\" bears.\n\nIn this view, though the notices were served beyond the prescribed time, they were served under s. 4 of the Amending Act. No other point was raised before us.\n\nIii the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee. ·\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "539\n\nBANARASI DEVI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BANARASI DEVI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CALCUTTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 147, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216, "end_char": 220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 269, "end_char": 273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 19, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 578, "end_char": 592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 2,1956, the appellant was ,; erved with a notice dated March 19, 1956, under s. 34(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, on the ground of escaped assessment."}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 600, "end_char": 608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 616, "end_char": 636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April 2, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1044, "end_char": 1057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 2, 1956, the appellant was also served with a similar notice as aforesaid."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1166, "end_char": 1173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1331, "end_char": 1345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22~ for .quashing the said notices and the learned Judge of th• High Court issued rules nisi to the Income-tax Officer, the\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax and the Union of India."}}, {"text": "September 11, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1350, "end_char": 1368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 11, 1958, the rules were made absolute."}}, {"text": "March 12. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1498, "end_char": 1512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents then preferred appeals to a Division Bench of that Court\n\nPending the appeals, on March 12."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1514, "end_char": 1519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1547, "end_char": 1551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Amending Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1559, "end_char": 1577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1789, "end_char": 1793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act, 1959", "statute": "the Amending Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1890, "end_char": 1894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act, 1959", "statute": "the Amending Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2379, "end_char": 2383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Amending Act, 1959", "statute": "the Amending Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2920, "end_char": 2924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3484, "end_char": 3492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3875, "end_char": 3879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3924, "end_char": 3952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Case law referred to\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4076, "end_char": 4095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 13, 1961, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeals from Original Orders No."}}, {"text": "S. Chaudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4152, "end_char": 4164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Chaudhury and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4169, "end_char": 4184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Chaudhury and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants (in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "K. R.\n\nChaudhuri"}}, {"text": "M. Rajagopalan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4228, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. R.\n\nChaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chowdhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4244, "end_char": 4265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. R.\n\nChaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "K. R.\n\nChaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4270, "end_char": 4286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. R.\n\nChaudhuri, for the appellants (in C. A. No.", "canonical_name": "K. R.\n\nChaudhuri"}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "143/1963) ..\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent (in b, oth the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4362, "end_char": 4376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "143/1963) ..\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent (in b, oth the appeals)."}}, {"text": "JMba Rae", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4483, "end_char": 4491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJMba Rae, J, SUBBA RAo, J.-These two appeals filed by special leave raise the question of the true construction of the provisions of s. 4 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959 (Act No."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4496, "end_char": 4505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJMba Rae, J, SUBBA RAo, J.-These two appeals filed by special leave raise the question of the true construction of the provisions of s. 4 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959 (Act No.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4616, "end_char": 4620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5163, "end_char": 5171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 31, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5367, "end_char": 5381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The date of the notice fell within 8 years from the end of the relevant assessment year i.e., March 31, 1948; but it was served beyond'8 years from that date and."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6000, "end_char": 6005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Svllba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6042, "end_char": 6052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aa1e11ua \"'• notice dated March 19, 1956, by the Income-tax Officer purporting to be under s. 34 of the Act on the ground of escaped Svllba Rao, J assessment."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6164, "end_char": 6178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The date of the notice fell within 8 years from the end of the relevant asses1iment year, i.e., March 31, 1956; but it was served beyond 8 years from that date and was, therefore, clearly out of time under the provisions of the said section."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6372, "end_char": 6394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants in the two appeals filed two petitions in the High Court of Calcutta under Aft."}}, {"text": "March 20, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6499, "end_char": 6513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution for quashing the said notices and for_ other appropriate reliefE. On March 20, 1957, Sinha, J., of that Court issued rules nisi on the said two applications to the Income-tax ' Officer, the Commissioner of Income-tax and the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6515, "end_char": 6520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution for quashing the said notices and for_ other appropriate reliefE. On March 20, 1957, Sinha, J., of that Court issued rules nisi on the said two applications to the Income-tax ' Officer, the Commissioner of Income-tax and the Union of India."}}, {"text": "September 11. 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6674, "end_char": 6692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 11."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6895, "end_char": 6900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7057, "end_char": 7061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the said amendment the appeals were heard by a ..\n\nDivision Bench of the High Court, consisting of Bose, C. J .,"}}, {"text": "G. K. Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7075, "end_char": 7087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and G. K. Mitter."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7449, "end_char": 7457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7631, "end_char": 7635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7823, "end_char": 7836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7844, "end_char": 7871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8094, "end_char": 8104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8188, "end_char": 8191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8819, "end_char": 8828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8832, "end_char": 8842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9457, "end_char": 9466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9560, "end_char": 9570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10120, "end_char": 10130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10138, "end_char": 10155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10171, "end_char": 10184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10447, "end_char": 10456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s.\n\n1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10607, "end_char": 10612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10639, "end_char": 10644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Bubba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10751, "end_char": 10760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a) of s. 34 of the Act on the ground that the time for the u issue of such notice or the making of such assessment or Bubba Rao, J •. re-assessment had expired under the said sub-section before it was amended by s. 18 of the Finance Act of 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10845, "end_char": 10850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10929, "end_char": 10933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11701, "end_char": 11708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Canadian Eagle Oil Co. v. R.,(') Viscount Si:non L. C. observed:\n\n\"In the words of Rowlatt J ................................ ."}}, {"text": "Banaraa' Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12878, "end_char": 12891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Banaraa' Devi\n\n•• ,.,,,,,."}}, {"text": "Sabha Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12929, "end_char": 12938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ua\n\nSabha Rao, J.\n\n544 SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS (1964]\n\nfor its collection."}}, {"text": "ISA of the Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13327, "end_char": 13358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Russell of Killowen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13691, "end_char": 13710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from the emphasis on the letter of the law, the fundamental rule of construction of a taxing statute is not different from that of any other statute and that rule is stated by Lord Russell of Killowen C. J. in Attorney-General\n\nv. Calton Ban('), thus:\n\n\"The duty of the court is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14165, "end_char": 14169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ISA of the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "ISA of the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Before the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14654, "end_char": 14677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "To save the validity of such notices the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14904, "end_char": 14957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15052, "end_char": 15056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To save the validity of such notices the Amending Act", "statute": "To save the validity of such notices the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15134, "end_char": 15142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To save the validity of such notices the Amending Act", "statute": "To save the validity of such notices the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "April l, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15197, "end_char": 15210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that it operated and validated the notices issued under s. 34(1) (a) of the Act, as amended in 1948, even earlier than April l, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15249, "end_char": 15257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To save the validity of such notices the Amending Act", "statute": "To save the validity of such notices the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "[1964] 1 S.C.R. 29", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15516, "end_char": 15534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 31, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15764, "end_char": 15778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of the Amending Act of 1959, therefore, was enacted for 1964 the sole purpose of saving the validity of such notices in Banamsi D<oi respect of all escaped incomes relating to any year commenc- T. ing from the year ending on March 31, 1941, though theyln'°\"O.%':uta Offer.er, were issued beyond the prescribed time."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16288, "end_char": 16292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34( !)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16659, "end_char": 16671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17018, "end_char": 17029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17219, "end_char": 17230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17874, "end_char": 17880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting that argument, Chagla, C. J., speaking for the Court, observed:\n\n\"In other words, the attempt is to equate the expression \"served\" used in section 34 with the expression \"issued\" used in the proviso to sub-section (3)."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17998, "end_char": 18008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18916, "end_char": 18936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Allahabad High Court in Sri Niwas v.\n\nIncome-tax Officer(') has also interpreted the word \"issued\" to mean \"served\"."}}, {"text": "Viscount Buckmaster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19089, "end_char": 19108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rele.vant rule of construction is clearly stated by Viscount Buckmaster in Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd.(') thus:\n\n\"It has long been a well established principle to be applied in the consideration of Act of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar cQntext, must be corntrued so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously assigned to it.\""}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19269, "end_char": 19279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rele.vant rule of construction is clearly stated by Viscount Buckmaster in Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd.(') thus:\n\n\"It has long been a well established principle to be applied in the consideration of Act of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar cQntext, must be corntrued so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously assigned to it.\""}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19583, "end_char": 19592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19673, "end_char": 19678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20130, "end_char": 20140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20148, "end_char": 20167, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "B•narasi Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20736, "end_char": 20749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by registered post, a letter containing the docu- 1964 ment, and unless the contrary is proved, to have B•narasi Devi been effected at the time at which the letter v. would be delivered in the ordinary course of Income0:_'f\" Officer• post.\""}}, {"text": "ss. 553, 554 and 555", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21015, "end_char": 21035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21043, "end_char": 21071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21417, "end_char": 21421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21807, "end_char": 21811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22001, "end_char": 22009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22058, "end_char": 22063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22143, "end_char": 22151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22279, "end_char": 22283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22559, "end_char": 22567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23337, "end_char": 23346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L!'(D)I<CI-!S{•)\n\nSubba Rao, .J.\n\n1964 To summarize: the clear intention of the Legislature is B<111orari DtfJi to save the validity of the notice as well as the assessment ... from an attack on the ground that the notice was given be- J~ OJ!iar, yond the prescribed period.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "S.bbo Boo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23682, "end_char": 23691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That intention would be effec- - tuated if the wider meaning is given to the expression S.bbo Boo, J. \"issued\" takes in the entire process of sending the notice as well as the service thereof."}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23809, "end_char": 23817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24203, "end_char": 24207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_549_554_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 549\n\nN .. RAGHA VENDRA RAO\n\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER. SOUTH KANARA,\n\nMAN GALORE\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH, N.\n\nRAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.)\n\nFundamental Rights-Conditions of se-rvice changed by the State Government without the previous approval of the Central Government-Loss of benefit of service and increments-\"Previous approval\"-Meaning of-Mysore Generat Services Recruitment Rules, 1959----States Reorganisation Act 1956 (37 of 1956), s. 115(7)-Constitution of India, Arts. 16 and 311(2).\n\nThe petitioner was selected as a Lower Division Clerk under the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in 1949, and was posted in South Kanara District. He was promoted as upper division clerk on April 2, 1956 and according to him, he should have. teen promoted much earlier. According to the State, the petitioner was considered for inclusion in the eligibility list from 1955 onwards, but was not selected as he was not considered fit. The State admitted that he was promoted as Upper Division clerk w>ith effect from April 2, 1956, but alleged that this was on a temporary basis. He was later reverted and then again posted as temporary Upper Division clerk. In August, 1957, the petitioner was considered and included in the eligibility list at serial No. 14. This list was regularised on December 12, 1957, in accordance with Madras State and Subordinate Service Rules, with effect from October 19, 1957.\n\nAccording to the petitioner this resulted in the loss of benefit of service and increments.\n\nIn the meantime, reorganisation of States took place under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and S-Outh Kanara District went to the new Myoore and the petitioner was allotted to it. On May 11, 1957, the Government of India addressed a memorandum to all State Governments and in respect of departmental promotion it said that \"the question whether any protection should be given in respect of rules and conditions applicable to Government Servants affected by reorganisation immediately before the date of reorganisation in the matter of tra'/elling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion was also . considered. The Government of India agree with the view expressed on behalf of the State respresentatives that it would not be ap\"ropriate to provide for any protection in the matter of these conditions. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner (i) that the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959, were not made with the previous approval of the Central Government under s. 115(7) of the States Re-organisation Act, and, therefore, do not govern the petitioner in so far as the conditions of. service have teen varied to his disadvantage and (ii) that the Madras Government had, prior to November 1, 1956, by varoius orders, reduced the petitioner in rank in violation of Art. 311(2) of the Constitutii>n and Art. 16.\n\nMareh31\n\n1964 He!d: (i) In the setting in which the proviso to s. 115(7) of N R h d R the Act is placed, the expression \"previous approval\" would in- • ag a; en ra ao elude a general approval to the variation in the conditions of Deputy oo:nmisioner service ~Nithin certain limits, indicated by the Union Govern- Bouth Kanara Man'. ment. Art. 309 of the Constitution gives, subject to the provigalore ' sions of the Constitution, full powers to a State Government to make rules. The proviso to s.115(7) of the Act limits that power, but that limitation is removable by the Central Government by giving its previous approval. The broad purpose :mderlying the proviso to s. 115(7) of the Act was to ensure that the conditions of service. should not be changed except with the prior approval of the Central Government. In the memorandum, the Central Government, after examining various aspects, came to the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to provide for any protection in the matter of travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion. This amounted to previous approval within the proviso to s.115(7). By this memorandum the State Governments were required to send copies of all new rules to the Central Government for it' information. Therefore, it must be held that the rul.es were validly made.\n\nBikri, J.\n\nIn re Bosworth and COTporation of Gravesend, [1905] 2 K.B. 426 and C. K. Appamna v. State of Mysore, W.P. No. 88 of 1962, held inapplicable.\n\n(ii) The petitioner failed to show how Art. 16 was infringed before he was allotted to !he new Mysore State. The State in its reply had asserted that all the orders complained against were passed ty competent authorities, after considering the merits of the petitioner on each occasion. It was for the competent authorities to judge the merits of the petitioner.\n\nTherefore, it must be held that infringement of Art. 16 was not estal;>lished.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 211 of 1963. , Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights.\n\nR. K. Garg, for the petitioner.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents.\n\nMarch 31, 1964,, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSIKRI. J.-This is a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for enforcing the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Arts. 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution. Although the petition raises various points, before us only two points have been argued by Mr. Garg, on behalf of the petitioner. We are grateful to Mr. Garg, who has argued as amicus curiae, for the assistance he has given. The two points may be formulated as follows:\n\n(I) That the Mysore General Services (Revenue Subordinate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1959, were not made with the previous approval of the Central Government under s. 115(7) of the State\n\nRe-organisation Act, and, therefore, do not 1964 govern the petitioner insofar as the conditions of -- service have been varied to his disadvantage N. Raghavendra Rao • v.\n\n(2) That the Madras-Government had prior to Deput11 Oommi8Sioner ' SouthKanara, Man November 1, 1956, by various orders, reduced galore the petitioner in rank in violation of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and Art. 16.\n\nIn order to appreciate the arguments addressed to us, it is necessary to give a few facts. The petitioner was selected by the Madras Public Service Commission as a Lower Division Clerk under the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in 1949, and was allotted to the Revenue Department and posted in South Kanara District. He was promoted as Upper Division Clerk on April 2, 1956. According to the petitioner, he should have been promoted much earlier as he had rendered outstanding and meritorious service. According to the State, the petitioner was considered for inclusion in the eligibility list from 1955 onwards, but was not selected as he was not considered fit.\n\nThe State admits .that he was promoted as Upper Division Clerk with effect from April 2, 1956, but alleges that this was on a temporary bais. He was later reverted and then again posted as a temporary Upper Division Clerk. In August 1957, the petitioner was considered and included in the eligibility list at Serial No. 14. This list was regularised on December 12, 1957, in accordance with Rules 39(e) and 35 of the Madras State and Subordinate Service Rules. with effect from October 19, 1957. According to the petitioner this remlted in the loss of benefit of service and increments.\n\nIn the meantime, reorganisation of States took place under the State Reorganisation Act (XXXVII of 1956) South Kanara District, except Kasaragod Taluk, went to the new Mysore State and the petitioner was allotted to it. On May 11, 1957, the Government of India addressed a memorandum (No.\n\nS.O. SRDI-1. APM-57) to all State Governments.\n\nBroadly speaking, the Central Government said that some conditions of service :ihould be protected, e.g., substantive pay of permanent employees, certain type of special pay, kave rules unless the Government servant opts for new leave rules, etc. But in respect of departmental promotion it said that \"the question whether any protection should be given in respect of rules and conditions applicable to Government servant;; affected by reorganisation immediately before the date of reorganisation in the matter of travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion was also considered. The, Government of India agree with the view expressed on behalf of the State representatives that it would not be appropriate\n\nSikri, J.\n\n1964 to provide for any protection in the matter of these condi- . N. Raghvenilra Rao tions.\" Therefore, it is evident from this memorandum that\n\nv. . . the Central Government had told the State Government that DeputgComm18\"oner th ht \"f th d h . .\n\nSomh Kanara, Maney m1g , I ey so esrre, c ange service rules as mdigalore cated in the memorandum. But Mr. Garg argues that even so this does not amount to previous approval within s. 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act to the making of the Bikri, J.\n\nMysore General Services (Revenue Subordinate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1959. What then is the true meaning of the expression \"previous approval\" in the proviso to s~ Il5(7).\n\nSub-section (7) of s. 115 provides that:\n\n\"(7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect after the appointed day the operation of the provisions of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation io determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State; Provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in sub-section (]) of subsection (2) shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval bf the Central Government.\" The effect of this sub-section is, inter alia, to preserve the power of the State to make rules under Art. 309 of the Constitution, but the proviso imposes a limitation on the exercise of this power, and the limitation is that the State cannot vary the conditions of service applicable immediately before November I, 1956, to the disadvantage of persons mentio'ned in sub-ss (1) and (2) of s. 115. It is not disputed that the petitioner is one of those persons.\n\nMr. Garg has submitted that the very fact that the Mysore General Services (Revenue Subordinate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1959, as framed, were not sent to the Central Government for a, pproval before being promulgated shows that previous approval has not been obtained. The memorandum, he says, is not approval but an abdication of the powers of the Central Government. In this connection he relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of In re Bosworth and Corporation of Gravesend('), but this, decision has no bearing on the point under discussion.\n\nAn Order in Council had been made under the provisions of the Burial Act, 1853, whereby it was ordered that no new burial ground shall be opened in (amongst other places) Gravesend, without the previous approval of one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State. Permission was sought of the Secretary of State to add additional land to an existing cemeter~\n\n(') [1905] 2 K.B. 426.\n\nThe Secretary of State replied that his sanction to the pro- posed addition was not required. It is thi~ reply. wc~ as N. Riigha•nl raRao\n\ncharacterised by Collins, M. R., as renouncmg of 1unsd1cl!on. 0 •· . . . th' . . . t' th Deputy omm•\"'\"\"'' We cannot appreciate how 1s assists us m mterpre mg e SO'Uth Kanara Ma•· proviso to s. 115(7). He further relied on the unreported galore' judgment of the High Court of Mysore in C. K. Appanna v.\n\nSikri, J.\n\nState of Mysore('), but this proceeds on a concession made by the Government Pleader and does not advance petitioner's case. In our opinion, in the setting in which the proviso to s. 115(7) is placed, the expression \"previous approval\" would include a general approval to the variation in the conditions of service within certain limits, indicated by the Union Government. It has to be remembered that Art. 309 of the Constitution gives, subject to the provisions of the Constitu ti on, full powers to a State Government to make rules. The proviso to s. 115(7) limits that power, but that limitation is removable by the Central Government by giving its previous approval. In this context, we think that it could not have been the intention of Parliament that Service Rules made by States would be scrutinised in the minutest detail by the Central Government. Conditions vary from State to State and the details must be filled by each State according to its requirements.\n\nThe broad purpose underlying the proviso. to s. 115(7) of the Act was to ensure that the conditions of ser vice should not be changed except with the prior approval of the Central Government. In other words, before embark\n\ning on varying the conditions of service, the State Govern ments should obtain the concurrence of the Central Government.\n\nIn the memorandum mentioned above, the Central Government, after examining various aspects, came to the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to provide for any protection in the matter of travelling allowance, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion. In our opinion, this amounted to previous approval within the proviso to s. 115(7). It may be mentioned that by this memorandum the State Governments were required to send copies of all new rules to the Central Government for its information. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no force in the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, and we hold that the rules were validly made.\n\nThere are two preliminary hurdles in the way of the petitioner regarding the second point taken on his behalf. Firstly, the State of Madras has not been made a party to this petition. Secondly, he never raised these points while he was serving under the State of Madras.\n\nIt is difficult at this stage to challenge orders, which if quashed, would affect the rights of other civil servants who are not\n\n(') W.P. No 88 of 1962; judgement dated January 13, 1964.\n\nparties to this petition. At any rate, the petitioner has not 1964 been able to show how Art. 16 was infringed before he Wall N R h::°-d R allotted to the new Mysore State. The State in its reply has • ag :'.\" '\" ao asserted that all the orders complained against were pa8sed ll•puty Oommi88ioner by competent authorities, after considering the merits of the\n\nSouth K;;:;\"· Man petitioner on each occasion. It was for the competent authorities to judge the merits of the petitioner. We find no force llikri, J. in this contention and hold that no infringement of Art. 16 has been established.\n\nAccordingly, in the result, the petition fails. In the circumstances of the case we order that the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 80, "entities": [{"text": "RAO\n\nDEPUTY COMMISSIONER. SOUTH KANARA,\n\nMAN GALORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SOUTH KANARA, MANGALORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. 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SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Meaning of-Mysore Generat Services Recruitment Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 465, "end_char": 495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 510, "end_char": 519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "States Reorganisation Act 1956", "statute": "States Reorganisation Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 520, "end_char": 541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 16 and 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543, "end_char": 562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kanara District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was selected as a Lower Division Clerk under the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in 1949, and was posted in South Kanara District."}}, {"text": "April 2, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 755, "end_char": 768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was promoted as upper division clerk on April 2, 1956 and according to him, he should have."}}, {"text": "December 12, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1352, "end_char": 1369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This list was regularised on December 12, 1957, in accordance with Madras State and Subordinate Service Rules, with effect from October 19, 1957."}}, {"text": "Madras State and Subordinate Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1390, "end_char": 1432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 19, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1451, "end_char": 1467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This list was regularised on December 12, 1957, in accordance with Madras State and Subordinate Service Rules, with effect from October 19, 1957."}}, {"text": "States took place under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1598, "end_char": 1657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Outh Kanara District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, reorganisation of States took place under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and S-Outh Kanara District went to the new Myoore and the petitioner was allotted to it."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1750, "end_char": 1762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 11, 1957, the Government of India addressed a memorandum to all State Governments and in respect of departmental promotion it said that \"the question whether any protection should be given in respect of rules and 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2582, "end_char": 2600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged on behalf of the petitioner (i) that the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959, were not made with the previous approval of the Central Government under s. 115(7) of the States Re-organisation Act, and, therefore, do not govern the petitioner in so far as the conditions of."}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2607, "end_char": 2616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959", "statute": "the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "Madras Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2792, "end_char": 2809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "service have teen varied to his disadvantage and (ii) that the Madras Government had, prior to November 1, 1956, by varoius orders, reduced 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{"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959", "statute": "the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3293, "end_char": 3301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959", "statute": "the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "s.115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959", "statute": "the Mysore General Services Recruitment Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3624, "end_char": 3633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4121, "end_char": 4129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4328, "end_char": 4333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bikri, J.\n\nIn re Bosworth and COTporation of Gravesend, [1905] 2 K.B. 426 and C. K. Appamna v. State of Mysore, W.P. No."}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4520, "end_char": 4527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4893, "end_char": 4900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4996, "end_char": 5003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5081, "end_char": 5091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5114, "end_char": 5128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5148, "end_char": 5164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, B. R. L. Iyengar and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5271, "end_char": 5276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 31, 1964,, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSIKRI.", "canonical_name": "SIKRI"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5306, "end_char": 5313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 16 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5395, "end_char": 5414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5531, "end_char": 5535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the petition raises various points, before us only two points have been argued by Mr. Garg, on behalf of the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Recruitment Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5773, "end_char": 5796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5871, "end_char": 5880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Recruitment Rules, 1959", "statute": "Recruitment Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "Madras-Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6081, "end_char": 6098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two points may be formulated as follows:\n\n(I) That the Mysore General Services (Revenue Subordinate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1959, were not made with the previous approval of the Central Government under s. 115(7) of the State\n\nRe-organisation Act, and, therefore, do not 1964 govern the petitioner insofar as the conditions of -- service have been varied to his disadvantage N. Raghavendra Rao • v.\n\n(2) That the Madras-Government had prior to Deput11 Oommi8Sioner ' SouthKanara, Man November 1, 1956, by various orders, reduced galore the petitioner in rank in violation of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6243, "end_char": 6254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Recruitment Rules, 1959", "statute": "Recruitment Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6279, "end_char": 6286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Recruitment Rules, 1959", "statute": "Recruitment Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "Madras Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6415, "end_char": 6447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was selected by the Madras Public Service Commission as a Lower Division Clerk under the Madras Ministerial Service Rules in 1949, and was allotted to the Revenue Department and posted in South Kanara District."}}, {"text": "States took place under the State Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7577, "end_char": 7629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kasaragod Taluk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7677, "end_char": 7692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, reorganisation of States took place under the State Reorganisation Act (XXXVII of 1956) South Kanara District, except Kasaragod Taluk, went to the new Mysore State and the petitioner was allotted to it."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8656, "end_char": 8661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The, Government of India agree with the view expressed on behalf of the State representatives that it would not be appropriate\n\nSikri, J.\n\n1964 to provide for any protection in the matter of these condi- .", "canonical_name": "SIKRI"}}, {"text": "N. Raghvenilra Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8734, "end_char": 8752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Raghvenilra Rao tions.\"", "canonical_name": "N. Raghvenilra Rao"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8824, "end_char": 8842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Central Government had told the State Government that DeputgComm18\"oner th ht \"f th d h . ."}}, {"text": "Somh Kanara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8917, "end_char": 8928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Somh Kanara, Maney m1g , I ey so esrre, c ange service rules as mdigalore cated in the memorandum."}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9098, "end_char": 9107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9115, "end_char": 9140, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Recruitment Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9226, "end_char": 9249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9368, "end_char": 9374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Recruitment Rules, 1959", "statute": "Recruitment Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10049, "end_char": 10057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Recruitment Rules, 1959", "statute": "Recruitment Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "November I, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10252, "end_char": 10268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "309 of the Constitution, but the proviso imposes a limitation on the exercise of this power, and the limitation is that the State cannot vary the conditions of service applicable immediately before November I, 1956, to the disadvantage of persons mentio'ned in sub-ss (1) and (2) of s. 115."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10337, "end_char": 10343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Recruitment Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10514, "end_char": 10537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order in Council had been made under the provisions of the Burial Act, 1853", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10982, "end_char": 11057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. Riigha•nl raRao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11486, "end_char": 11504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "wc~ as N. Riigha•nl raRao\n\ncharacterised by Collins, M. R., as renouncmg of 1unsd1cl!on.", "canonical_name": "N. Raghvenilra Rao"}}, {"text": "Collins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11523, "end_char": 11530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "wc~ as N. Riigha•nl raRao\n\ncharacterised by Collins, M. R., as renouncmg of 1unsd1cl!on."}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11697, "end_char": 11706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An Order in Council had been made under the provisions of the Burial Act, 1853", "statute": "An Order in Council had been made under the provisions of the Burial Act, 1853"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11768, "end_char": 11788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further relied on the unreported galore' judgment of the High Court of Mysore in C. K. Appanna v.\n\nSikri, J.\n\nState of Mysore('), but this proceeds on a concession made by the Government Pleader and does not advance petitioner's case."}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12001, "end_char": 12010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An Order in Council had been made under the provisions of the Burial Act, 1853", "statute": "An Order in Council had been made under the provisions of the Burial Act, 1853"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12223, "end_char": 12231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12372, "end_char": 12381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament that Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12564, "end_char": 12593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12838, "end_char": 12847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament that Service Rules", "statute": "Parliament that Service Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 115(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13521, "end_char": 13530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament that Service Rules", "statute": "Parliament that Service Rules"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13974, "end_char": 13989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Firstly, the State of Madras has not been made a party to this petition."}}, {"text": "January 13, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14292, "end_char": 14308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is difficult at this stage to challenge orders, which if quashed, would affect the rights of other civil servants who are not\n\n(') W.P. No 88 of 1962; judgement dated January 13, 1964."}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14400, "end_char": 14407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14874, "end_char": 14881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_555_563_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 555\n\nTATA OIL MILLS CO. LTD. v.\n\nITS WORKMEN\n\nIP B. GAJl!M>RAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO AND K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, JJ.]\n\nIndustTiaL Dispute-Assault on co-employee-Whether Standing Order 22(viii) attracted-Domestic enquiry-Findings binding unless shown to be Perverse or enidence lacking- Crimina! Trial also'pending-Failure to stay enquiry, if vitiates\n\nenquiTj/-Standing Order 22(viii).\n\nOn a report that R and M, both timployees of the appellant waylaid A, another employee and assaulted him outside the factory, the appellant held an enquiry ang sought approval for the dismissal of R and M from the Industrial Tribunal, before which an industrial dispute was pending. The Tribunal approved the dismissal of R but not that of M. Thereupon R was di,:- missed. The respondent raised an industrial dispute in rEgard to the propriety and validity of the said dismissal. On refen. ence of this dispute, the Industrial Tribunal held that the assault could be treated as a private matter between R and A with which the appellant was not concerned and as a result Standing Order 22(viii) could not be invoked against R, and it ordered the reinstatement of R. On appeal by special !€ave:\n\nHeld: (i) that It would be unreasonable to include within Standing Order 22(viii) any riotous behaviour without the factory which was the result of purely private and individual dispute and in course of which tempers of both the contestants become hot. In order that standin!ll order 22(viii) may be attracted, the appellant should be able to show that the disorderly or riotous behaviour had some rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim.\n\n(ii) In the present case the assault by R on A was not a purely private or individual matter but was referable to the difference of opinion between the two in regard to the introduction of incentive bonus scheme and that cannot be said to be outside the purview of standing order 22(viii).\n\n(iii) The Tribunal was in error in coming< to the conclusion that the enquiry suffered from the infirmity that it wa~\n\nconducted contrary to the principles of natural justice.\n\nIt is true that if it appears that by refusing to adjourn the hearing at lhe instance of charge-sheeted workmen, the Enquiry Officer failed to give the said workmen a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence, that may in a proper case, be considered to introduce an element of infirmity in the enquiry; but in the circumstances of this case, it would not be pos!rlble to draw such an inference.\n\n(iv) The finding of the Tribunal that the dismissal was malafide, cannot possibly be sustained.\n\nThe Tribunal has completely overlooked an elementary principle of judicial approach that even if a judge or Tribunal may reach an erroneous conclusion either 0£ fact or of law; the mere error of the conclusion does not make the conclusion malafide.\n\nMarch 81\n\nTata Oil MilZ. Oo.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nIts WOl'kmen\n\n(v) Since the domestic enquiry had been fairly conducted, and the findings recorded therein were based on Evidence which was believed, there was no justification for the Industrial Tribunal to consider the same facts f0r itself. Findings properly recorded at such enquiries are binding on parties, unless, of course, it is shown that such findings are perverse or are not based on any evidence.\n\nPhulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, [1960] t S.C.R. 32, referred to.\n\n(vi) Th<! Industrial Tribunal was in error when it characterised the esult' of the domestic enquiry as malafide partly because the enquiry was not stayed pending criminal proceedings against R.\n\nIt is desirable that i~ the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal case. lt would be particularly appropriate to adopt such a course when the charge is of a grave character because it would be untalr to compel the workman to disclose the defence which he may t'1ke oefore the criminal court. But to say that domestlc enquiries may be stayed pending criminal trial is very different from saying that if an employer proceeds with the domestic enquiry inspite of the fact that the cniminal trial is pending, the enquiry for that reason alone is vitiated and the conclusion arrived at in such an enquiry is either bad in law or malafide.\n\nDelhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Kishan Bhan [1960] 3 S.C.R. 227, Ieferred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 517 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the Award dated September 28, 1960 of the Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam, in Industrial Dispute No. 81 of 1958.\n\nG. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nP. Govinda Menon, M. S. K. Iyengar and M. R. K.\n\nPillai, for respondent No. 1.\n\nMarch 31, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajeni.lragadkar o.J GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-This appeal by special leave ' 'raises a short question about the validity of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam, directing the appellant, the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., to reinstate its workman K. K. Raghavan whom it had dismissed with effect from the\n\n14th of November, 1955. The appellant is a public limited concern engaged in the industry of soaps and toilet articles. It owns three factories in addition to 12 sales offices. One of these factories is located at Tatapuram, Emakulam, in the State of Kerala. Mr. Raghavan was working with the appellant at its factory at Tatapuram. It was reported to the appellant that on the 12th November, 1955, Mr. Raghavan and another employee of the appellant, Mr. Mathews by name, waylaid Mr. C. A. Augustine, the Chargeman of the\n\nSoap Plant of the company's factory at Tatapuram while he 1964\n\nwas returning home after his duty in the second shift and Tala Oil MiU. Oo. assaulted hiin. That is why charge-sheets were issued against Lltj, ... both Messrs Raghavan and Mathews on the 14th November, It• Workmeto.\n\n1955. Pursuant to the service of the clurge-sheets, two offi- . - cers were appointed by the appellant to hold an enquiry, but Ga3endragall.1'ar, CJ.\n\nthe respondent Union represented to the appellant that justice would not be done to Raghavan and Mathews unless somebody outside Tatapuram was invited to hold the enquiry. Thereupon, the General Mauager of the appellant appointed Mr. Y. D. Joshi, who is a Law Officer of the appellant in the Head Office, to hold the enquiry. Mr. Joshi held the enquiry from the 27th to 30th December, 1955, and subsequently, he made his report to the General Manager of the appellant on the 7th January, 1956. At that time, an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and its employees, and so, the appellant applied to the Industrial Tribunal for approval of the dismissal of Mei; srs Raghavan and Mathews. The Tribunal approved of the dismissal of Raghavan, but did not accord its approval of the dismissal of Mathews. Acting in pursuance of the approval accorded by the Tribunal, the appellant dismissed Raghavan with effect from the 14th November, 1955. Not satisfied with the order of dismissal, the respondent raised an industrial dispute in regard to the propriety and validity of the said dismissal of Raghavan and that has become the subject-matter of the present reference which was ordered on the 3rd of December,\n\n1958. It is on this reference that the Industrial Tribunal has held that the appellant was not justified in dismissing Raghavan, and so, has ordered his reinstatement. This is the order which has given rise to the present appeal by special leave.\n\nThe first pbint which calls for our decision in this appeal is whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the fac~ proved against Raghavan did not attract the provisions of Standing Order 22( viii) of the Certified Standing Orders of the appellant. The said standing order provides that without prejudice to the general meaning of the term \"misconduct\", it shall be deemed to mean and incltide, inter alia, drunkenness, fighting, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour within or without the factory .. It is common ground that the alleged assault took place outside the factory, and; in fact, at a considerable distance from it. The Tribunal has held that the assault in question can be treated as a purely private matter between Raghav:an and Augustine with which the appellant was not concerned and as a result of which stand ing order 22(viii) cannot be 'invoked against Raghavan. Mr • Menon \\Vho has appeared for the respondent before us, has\n\n1964 contended that in construing standing orders of this charac- Toto Oil ]fals Co. ter, we must take care to see that disputes of a purely private\n\nLtd. or individual type are not brought within their scope. He\n\n11, 1;~, b\"'n argues that on many occasions, individual employees may have to deal with private disputes and sometimes, as a result Gajeodrogadk\", a.J. of these private disputes, assault may be committed. Such an assault may attract the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but it does not fall under standing order 22(viii). l n our opinion. this contention is well-founded. It would, we think. be unreasonable to include within standing order 22(viii) any riotous behaviour without the factory which was the result of purely private and individual dispute and in course of which tempers of both the contestants became hot.\n\nIn order that standing order 22(viii) may be attracted. the appellant should be able to show that the disorderly or riotous behaviour had some rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim.\n\nIn the present case, l10wever, it is quite clear that the assault committed by Raghavan on Augustine was not a purely private or individual matter. What the occasion for this assault was and what motive actuated it, have been considered by the domestic Tribunal and the findings of the domestic Tribunal on these points must be accepted in the present proceedings. unless they are shown to be based on no evidence or are otherwise perverse. Now. when we look at the report of the Enquiry Officer, it is clear that on the evidence given by Mr. M. M. Augustine and K. T. Joseph it appeared that the assault was committed by Raghavan on C. A.\n\nAugustine, because he was in favour of the introduction of the Incentive Bonus Scheme. It appears that the introduction of this incentive bonus scheme was approved by one set of workmen and was opposed by another, with the result that the two rival unions belonging to these two sets respectively were arrayed against each other on that question. The evidence of the two witnesses to whom we have just referred clearly shows that when Raghavan assaulted C. A. Augustine, he expressly stated that Augustine was a black-leg IK.arinkali) who was interested in increased production in the company with a view to obtain bonus; and the report further shows that the Enquiry Officer believed this evidence and came to the conclusion that the assault was motivated by this hostility between Raghavan and C. A. Augustine. In [act, the charge framed clearly suggested that the assault was made for that motive. It was alleged in the charge that Augustine was assaulted to terrorise the workmen who had been responsible for givin~ 'ncreasrr. production under the incentive bonus scheme. f.-· .ord;'.lg to the charge, such acts were highly subversive of disciplinP. The Enquiry Officer has held that in the light of the evidence given by M. M. Augustine and\n\n1964 K. T. Joseph, the charge as framed had been proved. This finding clearly means that the assault was not the result of Tata Oil Mills Oo. a purely individual or private quarrel between the assailant Lid. and his victim, but it was referable to the difference of opi 1,, w:; kme,. nion between the two in regard to the introduction of the - incentive bonus scheme on which the two unions were sharpGajenclragadkar, o.J. ly divided. Therefore, if Raghavan assaulted Augustine wlely for the reason that Augustine was supporting the plea for more production, that cannot be said to be outside the purview of standing order 22(viii).\n\nThe next point which needs to be considered arises out of a plea which has been strenuously urged before us by Mr.\n\nMenon that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Enquiry Otlicer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and so, the Tribunal was entitled to go into the evidence itself and decide whether Ragha van \"s disillissal was justified or not. The legal position in this matter is not in doubt. If it appears that the domestic enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the principles of the natural justice and a reasonable opportunity was not, for instance. given to Raghavan to lead evidence in support of his defence. that would be a valid ground on which the Tribunal can discard the finding of the domestic enquiry and consider the matter on the merits uninfluenced by the said finding. Unfortunately for the respondent, however, on the material on record it is very difficult to sustain the finding'. of the Tribunal that the Enquiry Officer jid not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice.\n\nThe whole of this contention is based on the fact that Raghavan wanted to examine two witresses, Messrs M. P.\n\nMenon and Chalakudi. It appears that Raghavan told the Enquiry Officer that he wanted to examine these two witnesses and he requested him to invite the said two witnesses to give evidence.\n\nThe Enquiry Officer told Raghavan that it was really not a part of his duty to call the said two witnesses and that Raghavan should in fact have kept them ready himself.\n\nEven so, in order to assist Raghavan, the Enquiry Officer wrote letters to the two witnesses. Mr. Menon replied expressing his inability to be present before the Enquiry Officer. and the Enquiry Officer communicated this reply to Raghavan. so that for Raghavan's failure to examine Menon no blame can be attributed to the enquiry officer at all. In regard to Chalakudi. it appears tha.t he sent one letter addressed to the Enquiry Officer and it reached him on the 31st December. 1955, the day on which he wa~ leaving for Bombay. This letter was not signed, and so, the Enquiry Officer took no action on it and gave no time to Chalakudi to appear three or four days later as had been\n\n1964 suggested in that unsigned letter. The Tribunal thought Tata Oil Mill• oo. that this attitude on the part of the Enquiry Officer\n\nLtd. was unsympathetic and that introduced an element of\n\n118 W:;.kme,. unfairness in the enquiry itself. We are unable to appreciate how such a conclusion can follow on facts which are Gajew1ragadkar, O.J. admitted. We do not think the Enquiry Officer was called upon to accept an unsigned letter and act upon it. Besides, the Enquiry Officer had gone to Ernakulam from Bombay for holding this enquiry, because the respondent Union itself wanted that the enquiry should be held by some other officer outside the local station and it was known that the Bombay Officer would go back as soon as the enquiry was over. In such a case, if Raghavan did not take steps to produce his witnesses before the Enquiry Officer, how can it be said that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice? Mr. Menon has suggested that the Enquiry Officer should have taken steps to get the witnesses M. P. Menon and Chalakudi brought before him for giving evidence. This suggestion is clearl} untenable. In a domestic enquiry, the officer holding the enquiry can take no valid or effective steps to compel the attendance of any witness; just as the appellant produced its witnesses bebre the officer, Raghavan should have taken steps to produce his witnesses. His witness Menon probably took the view that it was beneath his dignity to appear in a domestic enquiry, and Chalakudi was content to send an unsigned letter and that too so as to reach the Enquiry Officer on the day when he was leaving Ernakulam for Bombay.\n\nIt would be unreasonable to suggest that in a domestic enquiry, it is the right of the charge-sheeted employee to ask for as many adjournments as he likes. It is true that if it appears that by refusing to adjourn the hearing at the instance of the charge-sheeted workman, the Enquiry Officer failed to give the said workman a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence, that may, in a proper case, be considered to intrtJ.. duse an element of infirmity in the enquiry; but in the circumstances of this case, we do not think it would be possible to draw such an inference. The record shows that the Enquiry Officer went out of his way to assist Raghavan; and if the witnesses did not turn up to give evidence in time, it was not his fault. We must accordingly hold that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry suffered from the infirmity that it was conducted contrary to the principles of natural justice.\n\nLet us then consider whether the dismissal of Ragbavan is actuated by malafides, or amounts to victimisation. In regard to the plea of victimisation, the Tribunal has definitoly found against the respondent. \"I do not for a moment believe\", says the Tribunal, \"that the management foisted a\n\ncase against the ex-worker. Regarding the allegation of victi- 1961 misation, there is no sufficient evidence in the case that the Tata Oil Mills oo. management or its Manager Mr. John was motivated with Ltd. victimisation or unfair labour practice\". This finding is quite v.\n\nIts Workmen clearly in favour of the appellant. The Tribunal, however, thought that because the Enquiry Officer did not give an Gnjcndragadka~, o:J . . adjournment to Raghavan to examine his witnesses, that introduced an element of malafides. It has also observed that since the case against Raghavan did not fall within the purview of standing order 22(viii) and yet, the appellant framed a charge against Raghavan under that standing order, that introduced another element of malatides. It is on thce grounds that the conclusion as to malafides recorded by the Tribunal seems to rest.\n\nIn regard to the first ground, we have already held that the Tribunal was not justified in blaming the Enquiry Officer for not adjourning the case beyond 31st December, 1955. In regard to the second ground, we are surprised that the Tribunal should have taken the view that since in its opinion, standing order 22(viii) did not apply to the facts of this case, the framing of-the charge under the said standing order and the finding of the domestic Tribunal in favour of the appellant on that ground showed malafides. It seems to us that the Tribunal has completely overlooked an elementary principle of judicial approach that even if a judge or Tribunal may reach an erroneous conclusion either of fact or of law, the mere error of the conclusion does not make the conclusion malafiedes. Besides, as we have just indicated, on the merits we are satisfied that the Tribunal was in error in holding that standing order 22(viii) did not apply.\n\nTherefore, the finding of the Tribunal that the dismissal of Raghavan was\n\nmalafiqe, cannot possibly be sustained.\n\nThere isone more point which has been pressed before us by Mr. Menon. In Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen,(') this Court has held that even if a domestic enquiry is found to be defective, the employer may seek to justify the dismissal of his employee by leading evidence before the Tribunal to which an industrial dispute arising out of the impugned dismissal has been referred for adjudication. Mr. Menon contends that by parity of reasoning, in cases where the employee is unable to lead his evidence before the domestic Tribunal for no fault of his own, a similar opportunity should be given to him to prove his case in proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal.\n\nIn our opinion, this contention is not well-founded. The decision in the case of Phulbari Tea Estate\n\n(supra) proceeds on. the basis which is of basic importance in industrial adjudication that findings properly recorded in\n\n(') [1960] I S.C.R. 32.\n\n1964 domestic enquiries which are conducted fairly, cannot be re- Taia Oil Milla co, examined by Industrial adjudication unless the said findings Ltd. are either perverse, or are not supported by any evidence, or v. some other valid reason of that character. In such a case, Its TYorkmen the fact that the finding is not accepted by the Industrial (lajendrag•dknr, C.J. Tribunal would not necessarily preclude the employee from justifying the dismissal of his employee on the merits, provided, of course, he leads evidence before the Industrial Tribunal and persuades the Tribunal to accept his case. That, however. is very different from a case like the present. In the case before us, the enquiry has been fair, the Enquiry Officer gave Raghavan ample opportunity to lead his evidence. If a reasonable opportunity had been denied to the employee, that would have made the enquiry itself bad and then. the employer would have been required to prove his case before the Industrial Tribunal, and in dealing with the dispute, the Industrial Tribunal would have been justified in completely ignoring the findings of the domestic enquiry. But if the enquiry has been fairly conducted, it means that all reasonable opportunity has been given to the employee to prove his case by leading evidence. In such a case, how can the court hold that merely because the witnesses did not appear to give evidence in. support of the employee's case, he should be allowed to lead such evidence before the Industrial Tribunal.\n\nIf this plea is upheld, no domestic enquiry would be effective and in every case, the matter would have to be tried afresh by the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, we are not prepared to accede to Mr. Menon's argument that the Tribunal was justified in considering the merits of the dispute for itself in the present reference proceedings.\n\nSince the enquiry has been fairly conducted, and the findings recorded therein are based on evidence which is believed, there would be no justification for the Industrial Tribunal to consider the same facts for itself. Findings properly recorded at such enquiries are binding on the parties, unless, of course, it is known that the said findings are perverse, or are not based on any evidence.\n\nTh.ere is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been stayed pending the final disp0sal of the said criminal proceedings.\n\nAs this Court has held in the Delhi Cloth and General Mills\n\nLtd. v. Kushal Bhan,(') it is desirable that if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal ourt, the employer, should stay the domestic enquiry pending the fini!l disposal of 'the criminal case. It would be particularly appropriate to\n\n\n. .\n\nadopt such a course where the charge against the workman is 1964 of a grave character, because in such a case, it would be un- Tt1ta Oil Mms Co. fair to compel the workman to disclose the defence which he Ltd. may take before the criminal court. But to say that domestic 11, 11~;, kmrn enquiries may be stayed pending criminal trial is very differ- - ent from saying that if an employer proceeds with the domes-Gajr-ndmaadka' , C.J.\n\ntic enquiry in spite of the fact that the criminal trial is pending, the enquiry for that reason alone is vitiated and the conclusion reached in such an enquiry is either bad in law or malafide. In fairness, we ought to add that Mr.\n\nMenon did not seek to justify this extreme position. Therefore, we must hold that the Industrial Tribunal was in error when it characterised the result of the domestic enquiry as malafide partly because the enquiry was not stayed pending the criminal proceedings against Raghavan. We accordingly hold that the domestic enquiry in this case was properly held and fairly conducted and the conclusions of fact reached by the Enquiry Officer are based on evidence which he accepted as true. That being so, it was not open to the Industrial Tribunal to reconsider the same questions of fact and come to a contrary conclusion.\n\nThe result is, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the Industrial Tribunal is set aside and the reference made to it is answered in favour of the appellant. Before we part with this appeal, we ought to add that Mr. Pai for the appellant has fairly offered to pay ex gratia Rs. 1,000 /- to Raghavan in addition to the amount which has already been paid to him by the appellant in pursuance of the order of this Court granting stay to the appellant pending the final disposal of the present appeal. There would be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed .", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "555\n\nTATA OIL MILLS CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TATA OIL MILLS CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ITS WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ITS WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 S.C.R. 227", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4456, "end_char": 4475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4692, "end_char": 4701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4706, "end_char": 4719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4724, "end_char": 4733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4738, "end_char": 4753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Govinda Menon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govinda Menon, M. S. K. Iyengar and M. R. K.\n\nPillai, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4793, "end_char": 4809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govinda Menon, M. S. K. Iyengar and M. R. K.\n\nPillai, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. R. K.\n\nPillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govinda Menon, M. S. K. Iyengar and M. R. K.\n\nPillai, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4936, "end_char": 4950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajeni.lragadkar o.J GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-This appeal by special leave ' 'raises a short question about the validity of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam, directing the appellant, the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., to reinstate its workman K. K. Raghavan whom it had dismissed with effect from the\n\n14th of November, 1955.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5060, "end_char": 5089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajeni.lragadkar o.J GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-This appeal by special leave ' 'raises a short question about the validity of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam, directing the appellant, the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., to reinstate its workman K. K. Raghavan whom it had dismissed with effect from the\n\n14th of November, 1955."}}, {"text": "Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5120, "end_char": 5143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajeni.lragadkar o.J GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-This appeal by special leave ' 'raises a short question about the validity of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam, directing the appellant, the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., to reinstate its workman K. K. Raghavan whom it had dismissed with effect from the\n\n14th of November, 1955."}}, {"text": "K. K. Raghavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5170, "end_char": 5184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajeni.lragadkar o.J GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-This appeal by special leave ' 'raises a short question about the validity of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam, directing the appellant, the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., to reinstate its workman K. K. Raghavan whom it had dismissed with effect from the\n\n14th of November, 1955."}}, {"text": "14th of November, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5229, "end_char": 5251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajeni.lragadkar o.J GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-This appeal by special leave ' 'raises a short question about the validity of the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Emakulam, directing the appellant, the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., to reinstate its workman K. K. Raghavan whom it had dismissed with effect from the\n\n14th of November, 1955."}}, {"text": "Emakulam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5454, "end_char": 5462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of these factories is located at Tatapuram, Emakulam, in the State of Kerala."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5480, "end_char": 5486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of these factories is located at Tatapuram, Emakulam, in the State of Kerala."}}, {"text": "Raghavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5492, "end_char": 5500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Raghavan was working with the appellant at its factory at Tatapuram.", "canonical_name": "Ragha van"}}, {"text": "Tatapuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5550, "end_char": 5559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Raghavan was working with the appellant at its factory at Tatapuram."}}, {"text": "12th November, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5606, "end_char": 5625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was reported to the appellant that on the 12th November, 1955, Mr. Raghavan and another employee of the appellant, Mr. Mathews by name, waylaid Mr. C. A. Augustine, the Chargeman of the\n\nSoap Plant of the company's factory at Tatapuram while he 1964\n\nwas returning home after his duty in the second shift and Tala Oil MiU. Oo."}}, {"text": "Mathews", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5683, "end_char": 5690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was reported to the appellant that on the 12th November, 1955, Mr. Raghavan and another employee of the appellant, Mr. Mathews by name, waylaid Mr. C. A. Augustine, the Chargeman of the\n\nSoap Plant of the company's factory at Tatapuram while he 1964\n\nwas returning home after his duty in the second shift and Tala Oil MiU. Oo."}}, {"text": "C. A. Augustine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5712, "end_char": 5727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was reported to the appellant that on the 12th November, 1955, Mr. Raghavan and another employee of the appellant, Mr. Mathews by name, waylaid Mr. C. A. Augustine, the Chargeman of the\n\nSoap Plant of the company's factory at Tatapuram while he 1964\n\nwas returning home after his duty in the second shift and Tala Oil MiU. Oo.", "canonical_name": "C. A.\n\nAugustine"}}, {"text": "Tala Oil", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5873, "end_char": 5881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was reported to the appellant that on the 12th November, 1955, Mr. Raghavan and another employee of the appellant, Mr. Mathews by name, waylaid Mr. C. A. Augustine, the Chargeman of the\n\nSoap Plant of the company's factory at Tatapuram while he 1964\n\nwas returning home after his duty in the second shift and Tala Oil MiU. Oo."}}, {"text": "Ga3endragall.1'ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6160, "end_char": 6177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cers were appointed by the appellant to hold an enquiry, but Ga3endragall.1'ar, CJ."}}, {"text": "Y. D. Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6418, "end_char": 6429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the General Mauager of the appellant appointed Mr. Y. D. Joshi, who is a Law Officer of the appellant in the Head Office, to hold the enquiry."}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6514, "end_char": 6519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Joshi held the enquiry from the 27th to 30th December, 1955, and subsequently, he made his report to the General Manager of the appellant on the 7th January, 1956."}}, {"text": "27th to 30th December, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6546, "end_char": 6573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Joshi held the enquiry from the 27th to 30th December, 1955, and subsequently, he made his report to the General Manager of the appellant on the 7th January, 1956."}}, {"text": "7th January, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6659, "end_char": 6676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Joshi held the enquiry from the 27th to 30th December, 1955, and subsequently, he made his report to the General Manager of the appellant on the 7th January, 1956."}}, {"text": "Mei", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6857, "end_char": 6860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time, an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and its employees, and so, the appellant applied to the Industrial Tribunal for approval of the dismissal of Mei; srs Raghavan and Mathews."}}, {"text": "14th November, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7117, "end_char": 7136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting in pursuance of the approval accorded by the Tribunal, the appellant dismissed Raghavan with effect from the 14th November, 1955."}}, {"text": "3rd of December,\n\n1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7388, "end_char": 7410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not satisfied with the order of dismissal, the respondent raised an industrial dispute in regard to the propriety and validity of the said dismissal of Raghavan and that has become the subject-matter of the present reference which was ordered on the 3rd of December,\n\n1958."}}, {"text": "Raghav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8393, "end_char": 8399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal has held that the assault in question can be treated as a purely private matter between Raghav:an and Augustine with which the appellant was not concerned and as a result of which stand ing order 22(viii) cannot be 'invoked against Raghavan.", "canonical_name": "Ragha van"}}, {"text": "Augustine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8407, "end_char": 8416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal has held that the assault in question can be treated as a purely private matter between Raghav:an and Augustine with which the appellant was not concerned and as a result of which stand ing order 22(viii) cannot be 'invoked against Raghavan."}}, {"text": "Menon \\Vho has", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8552, "end_char": 8566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr • Menon \\Vho has appeared for the respondent before us, has\n\n1964 contended that in construing standing orders of this charac- Toto Oil ]fals Co. ter, we must take care to see that disputes of a purely private\n\nLtd. or individual type are not brought within their scope."}}, {"text": "Gajeodrogadk", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8957, "end_char": 8969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He\n\n11, 1;~, b\"'n argues that on many occasions, individual employees may have to deal with private disputes and sometimes, as a result Gajeodrogadk\", a.J. of these private disputes, assault may be committed."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9089, "end_char": 9106, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M. M. Augustine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10220, "end_char": 10235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when we look at the report of the Enquiry Officer, it is clear that on the evidence given by Mr. M. M. Augustine and K. T. Joseph it appeared that the assault was committed by Raghavan on C. A.\n\nAugustine, because he was in favour of the introduction of the Incentive Bonus Scheme."}}, {"text": "K. T. Joseph", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10240, "end_char": 10252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when we look at the report of the Enquiry Officer, it is clear that on the evidence given by Mr. M. M. Augustine and K. T. Joseph it appeared that the assault was committed by Raghavan on C. A.\n\nAugustine, because he was in favour of the introduction of the Incentive Bonus Scheme."}}, {"text": "C. A.\n\nAugustine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10311, "end_char": 10327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when we look at the report of the Enquiry Officer, it is clear that on the evidence given by Mr. M. M. Augustine and K. T. Joseph it appeared that the assault was committed by Raghavan on C. A.\n\nAugustine, because he was in favour of the introduction of the Incentive Bonus Scheme.", "canonical_name": "C. A.\n\nAugustine"}}, {"text": "Tata Oil Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11688, "end_char": 11702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This finding clearly means that the assault was not the result of Tata Oil Mills Oo."}}, {"text": "Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12315, "end_char": 12320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next point which needs to be considered arises out of a plea which has been strenuously urged before us by Mr.\n\nMenon that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Enquiry Otlicer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and so, the Tribunal was entitled to go into the evidence itself and decide whether Ragha van \"s disillissal was justified or not."}}, {"text": "Ragha van", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12555, "end_char": 12564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next point which needs to be considered arises out of a plea which has been strenuously urged before us by Mr.\n\nMenon that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Enquiry Otlicer did not conduct the enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and so, the Tribunal was entitled to go into the evidence itself and decide whether Ragha van \"s disillissal was justified or not.", "canonical_name": "Ragha van"}}, {"text": "M. P.\n\nMenon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13396, "end_char": 13408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole of this contention is based on the fact that Raghavan wanted to examine two witresses, Messrs M. P.\n\nMenon and Chalakudi."}}, {"text": "Chalakudi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13413, "end_char": 13422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole of this contention is based on the fact that Raghavan wanted to examine two witresses, Messrs M. P.\n\nMenon and Chalakudi."}}, {"text": "31st December. 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14229, "end_char": 14248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it appears tha.t he sent one letter addressed to the Enquiry Officer and it reached him on the 31st December."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14286, "end_char": 14292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955, the day on which he wa~ leaving for Bombay."}}, {"text": "Tata Oil Mill•", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14510, "end_char": 14524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal thought Tata Oil Mill• oo."}}, {"text": "Gajew1ragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14770, "end_char": 14784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to appreciate how such a conclusion can follow on facts which are Gajew1ragadkar, O.J. admitted.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "Ernakulam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14940, "end_char": 14949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, the Enquiry Officer had gone to Ernakulam from Bombay for holding this enquiry, because the respondent Union itself wanted that the enquiry should be held by some other officer outside the local station and it was known that the Bombay Officer would go back as soon as the enquiry was over."}}, {"text": "M. P. Menon", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15519, "end_char": 15530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Menon has suggested that the Enquiry Officer should have taken steps to get the witnesses M. P. Menon and Chalakudi brought before him for giving evidence."}}, {"text": "Chalakudi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15535, "end_char": 15544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Menon has suggested that the Enquiry Officer should have taken steps to get the witnesses M. P. Menon and Chalakudi brought before him for giving evidence."}}, {"text": "Raghavan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15820, "end_char": 15828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a domestic enquiry, the officer holding the enquiry can take no valid or effective steps to compel the attendance of any witness; just as the appellant produced its witnesses bebre the officer, Raghavan should have taken steps to produce his witnesses."}}, {"text": "Menon", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15891, "end_char": 15896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His witness Menon probably took the view that it was beneath his dignity to appear in a domestic enquiry, and Chalakudi was content to send an unsigned letter and that too so as to reach the Enquiry Officer on the day when he was leaving Ernakulam for Bombay."}}, {"text": "Ragbavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17122, "end_char": 17130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Let us then consider whether the dismissal of Ragbavan is actuated by malafides, or amounts to victimisation.", "canonical_name": "Ragha van"}}, {"text": "John", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17548, "end_char": 17552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "management or its Manager Mr. John was motivated with Ltd. victimisation or unfair labour practice\"."}}, {"text": "31st December, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18387, "end_char": 18406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to the first ground, we have already held that the Tribunal was not justified in blaming the Enquiry Officer for not adjourning the case beyond 31st December, 1955."}}, {"text": "Phulbari Tea Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20043, "end_char": 20062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in the case of Phulbari Tea Estate\n\n(supra) proceeds on."}}, {"text": "Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24629, "end_char": 24632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we part with this appeal, we ought to add that Mr. Pai for the appellant has fairly offered to pay ex gratia Rs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_55_61_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:IIE COURT REPORTS 55\n\nNAROTIAM KISHORE DEV VARMA AND ORS.\n\n. v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER\n\nIP. B. GAJi:NDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AY\\'ANGAR AND s. M. SIKRI, JJ.I\n\nSuit against Former Ruler-Requirement of consent of Central Gov'ernment-Constitutional validity-£:ode of Civil Pro cedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), ss. 87B, 86-Constitution of India, Arts. 14. 19(1)(f).\n\nThe petitioners applied for the consent of the Central Government under 3. 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure to sue the Maharaja of Tripura, Ruler of a former Indian State, which has merged with India. They wanted to implead the Union of India as \\\\'ell, as party to the suit as their case '\\Vas that they were entitled, as members of a joint Hindu family to receive either from the said Ruler or from the Union appropriate maintenance allowance under the custom of the Ruling family. Consent having been refused, they applied to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Their case was that s. 87B of the Code in granting exemption to Rulern of former Indian Sta.tes from being sued except with the consent of the Central Government contravened Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.\n\nHeld, that in view of the previous decision of this Court s. 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure was no longer open to challenge under Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nMohan Lal Jain v. His Highness Maharaja Shri Sawai Man Singhji (1962] 1 •S.C.R. 702, referred to.\n\nRegard being had to the legislative and historical background of s. 87B of the COde, it could not be said that, that section in giv.ing special treatment to ex-Rulers had imposed\n\na~ unreasonable restriction on th~ petitioner's fundamental rights. !Vlotivated as iit was by the sole object of bringing the entire country including the former Indian States under one Central Government, it must be held to be reasonable and in the mterest of the general public.\n\nBut conidered in the light of the basic principle of equality before law It would be odd to allow the section to continue prospectively for al! time to come. It would therefore. be for the Central Government to consider whether it should not be confined to dealings and transactions previous to January 26 19fil ,\n\nNor should the section be used to stifle claims except such as are ~!early far-fetched or frivolous and consent should ordinarily If i::ot as ma.ter of course, be granted in the case of a genume dispute which prima facie appears to be triable by a court of law such as the present one.\n\n.Marrh 6\n\n1964 ORIGINAL JuRISDJCTION:Writ Petition No. 87 of 1962.\n\nN arottamkiskore Deo Verma and\n\nOthers\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\n\\'.\n\nUnion of India. and\n\nAn-0tiler N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 1.\n\nS. S. Shukla, for the petitioner.\n\nGajendragadkar, O.J.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 2.\n\nMarch 6, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C. J.-This is a writ petition filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution by which the eight petitioners challenged the validity of section 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure. These petitioners claim that they and respondent No. 2, His Highness Maharaja Kirit Vikram Kishore Deb Yarman, are members O'f a joint Hindu family governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. Under a family custom which, it is alleged, has prevailed in this family for centuries, the Raj as well as the Zamindari properties belonging to the family are held by a single individual and the other members of the family are entitled to maintenance according to the status of the family with the right to succession to the Raj as well as the Zamindari properties under the general rule of succession which prevails and which is not inconsistent with the family custom. The head of the family was, by family custom, called the Chief and he was chosen from among the members of the Ruling Deb Barman family and used to be installed on !he Gaddi or Throne. The petitioners further alleged that llje Ruler when so chosen and installed hdd the State and Zarnindari as life tenant subject to the usual charges for maintenance of the members of the Ruling Family.\n\nIn course of time. the maintenance allowance of the members of the Ruling family came to be fixed arbitra'rily by the Rulers without any regard to their status and their legitimate needs, and that led to discontent among them which resulted in a serious agitation raised by them during the lifetime of the late Maharaja Bir Bikram. In consequence, at the time of Regency of Her Highness Rajmata during the minority of the last Ruler Maharaja Kirit Bikram, a Committee was appointed on the 20th June, 1949, to consider the question of allowances payable to the members of the Ruling family.\n\nHowever, before the Committee could submit its report, the State of Tripura merged with and became part of India and was constituted into a separate Province under the Chief Commissioner.\n\nAfter merger, the then Chief Commissioner Mr. Hazra submitted a proposal to the Ministry of States on the 12th April, 1951, recommending a revision of allowance paid to the\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:VIE COURT REPORTS 57\n\nmaintenance-holders. The Ministry of States did not accept 1964 this proposal and refused to make any increase in the total Narouamkisluwe expenditure on the allowances to the maintenance-holders.\n\nDev Verma and This order was passed on the 23rd May, 1951. Later, the then Other• officiating Chief Commissioner Mai. Chatterjee stopped the u . / 1' ,. _, . nion oJ nu.1a anu. maintenance allowances paid to some of the mamtenance- Another holders without justification and that led to the appointment . of another Committee to go into the matter, but the Cornmit-Ga3endragadkar, O.J. tee could never function ith the result that the condition of the majority of the maintenance-holders grew wor.se day by dav. That is why the present eight petitioners destre to file a suft against respondent No. 2 for appropriate reliefs. They want to implead the Union of India also to that suit, because it is their case that either the R u!er or the Union of India is responsible to pay them appropriate and adequate maintenance allowance.\n\nBefore filing a suit in a competent court of law against respondent No. 2, the petitioners are required to obtain the sanction of the Union Government under s. 87B C.P.C., as respondent No. 2 is a Ruler of a former Indian State within the meaning of the said section. A request made by the petitioners for such sanction was rejected by the Central Government. That is how the present petition has been filed challenging the validity of the said section. The petitioners contend that the said section is ultra vires, because it contravenes Arts. 14 and 19(1 )(f) of the Constitution and as such, the condition precedent prescribed by it which requires the previous sanction of the Central Government before filing a suit against the Ruier of an Indian State therein mentioned, is invalid and inoperative. That is the genesis of the present writ petition.\n\nAt the hearing of this writ petition, Mr. Shukla for the petitioners fairly conceded that the challenge to the validity of s. 87B, C.P.C., on the ground that it contravenes Art. J 4 has been repelled by a recent decision of this Court in Mohan Lal Jain v. His Highness Maharaja Shri Sawai Man Singhji(').\n\nHe, however, attempted to argue that some aspects of the problem had not been pressed before the Court when it decided the case of Mohan Lal Jain ('). and so, he wanted us to reconsider that question. We have not allowed Mr.\n\nShukla to raise this contention, because we are satisfied that the decision in Mohan Lal Jain's case concludes the point and _it would not be reasonable to reconsider it as suggested by him. We ought to add that we are dealing with Mr. Shukla's argument that s. 87B. C.P.C., is invalid because it contravenes Art. 19(1)(fl, on the basis that the case of Mohan Lal Jain(') has correctly repelled the challenge against the said sction under Art. 14. ·\n\n(') [1962] 1 S.C.R. 702.\n\n1964 That leaves the challenge under Art. 19(1)(f) to be consi- Naro1tamki<Twre dered. In dealing with this point, it will be necessary to examine Dev Verma and the background, both historical and legislative, of s. 87B. Sec-\n\nOtlter• tion 87B(l) provides that the provisions of s. 85 and of sub-ss.\n\nUnion of ndia and (I) and (3) of s. 86 shall apply in relation to the Rulers of any Another former Indian 'State as they apply in relation to the Ruler of a\n\n0 . d adk 0 J foreign State. Section 87B(2) defines a 'former Indian State' •Jen rag ar, and a \"Ruler\". It is not'necessary to refer to these provisions, because it is common ground that respondent No. 2 is a Ruler of a former Indian State within the meaning of s. 878(2).\n\nIn appreciating the effect of s. 87B(l), it is necessary to consider s. 86. Section 86 deals with suits against foreign Rulers, Ambassadcrs and Envoys. Section 86(1) provides that no Ruler of a foreign State may be sued in any court otherwise competent to try the suit, except with the consent of the\n\nCentral Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government to that effect. The proviso excepts frcm the application of s. 86(1) cases where tenants of immovable property seek to sue such a Ruler. Section 86(2) lays down that the consent prescribed bys. 86(1) may be given either with respect to specified suits or to several specified suits, or with respect to all suits of any specified class or classes .. and it requires that the sanction should specify in the case of any suit or class of suits the court in which the Ruler may be used. It then adds that such consent shall not be given unless it appears to the Central Government that the Ruler satisfies one or the other of the four conditions prescribed by clauses (a) to (d). Section 86(3) prohibits the arrest of any Ruler of a foreign state under the Code and provides that except with the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government, no decree shall be executed against the property of any such Ruler. Section 86(4) extends the application of s. 86 to the persons specified in clauses (a) to (c) of\n\ntht sub-section. The result of the extension of s. 86(1) and\n\n(3) to the cases falling under s. 87B(J) is that the sanction of the Central Government is a condition precedent to the institution of a suit against the Ruler of any former Indian State.\n\nIt is this requirement which the petitioners have not been able to comply with in respect of the suit which they intend to file against respondent No. 2, because the Central Government Jias refused to accord sanction to the said intended suit.\n\nNow, the legislative background of the provisions contained ins. 86 and s. 87B is well known. Prior to the present Constitution, Part IV of the Code of Civil Procedure contained provisions in respect of suits in specified cases. These cases were divided into three parts. Section 79 to 82 covered cases of suits by or against the Crown or Public Oflicers in their official capacity. Sections 83 to 87 dealt with suits by aliens and by or against foreign Rulers and Rulers of Indian States; and\n\n• 1 ,\n\ns. 88 had reference to interpleader suits. After the Constitution 196' crune into force, the President made certain adaptations by the Adaptations of Laws Order, 1950. As a result of Art. 372, ~~; 01~=:!%: the protection afforded to Foreign Rulers and Rulers of Indian Other• States continued, and that is how s. 87B came to be enacted in v. the statute-book. It is in the light of this legislative background Union of India and that the plea raised by the petitioners in the present proceed- Another ings has to be examined.\n\nGajendragadkM. O.J.\n\nThe legislative background to which we have referred cannot be divorced from the historical background which is to be found for instance, in Art. 362. This Article provides that in the exercise of the power of Parliament or of any legislature of any State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (!) of Art. 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of a Ruler of an Indian State. This has reference to the covenants and agreements which had been entered into between the Central Government and the Indian Princes, before all the Indian States were politically completely assimilated with the rest of India. The privilege conferred on the Rulers of former Indian States has its origin in these agreements and wvenants. One of the privileges is that of extra territoriality • and exemption from civil.jurisdiction except with the sanction of the Central Government. It was thought that the privilege which was claimed by foreign Rulers and Rulers of Indian States prior to the independence of the country should be continued even after independence was attained and the States had become part of India, and that is how in 1951. the Civil Procedure Code was amended and the present sections 86, 87, 87A and 87B came to be enacted in the present form.\n\nConsidered in the light of this background, it is difficult to see how the petitioners can successfully challenge the validity of the provisions contained in s. 87B. In the \"case of Mohan Lal Jain(') this Court has held that the ex-Rulers of Indian States form a class by themselves and the special treatment given to them by the impugned provisions cannot be said to be based on unconstitutional discrimination. There is, of course, discrimination between the ex-Rulers and the rest of the citizens of India, but that discrimination is justified having regard to the historical and legislative background to which we have just referred. If that be so, it would follow that the restriction imposed on the petitioners' fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(f) cannot be said to be unreasonable.\n\nThe restriction in question is the result of the necessity to treat the agreements entered into between the Central Government and the ex-Rulers of Indian States as valid and the desirability of giving effect to the assurances given to them during the\n\n\n1984 course of negotiations between the Indian Z.tates and the\n\nNaroUamki8h<>re Central Government prior to the merger of the States with Dev Verma and India. We have to take into account the events which occurred\n\nOthm with unprecedented swiftness after the 15th August, 1947, and Union of \"jndia and we have to bear in mind the fact that the relevant negotiations\n\nAnother carried on by the Central Government were inspired by the . nd -· sole object of . bringing pilder one Central Government the Gaje r<VJ<ldkar, c .. J. whole of this country including the former Indian States. Considered in the context of these events, we do not think it would be possible to hold that the specific provision made by s. 87B granting exemption to the Rulers of former Indian States from being sued except with the sanction of the Central Government, is not reasonable and is not in the interests of the general\n\npublic. It is irue that the restriction works a hardship so far as the petitioners are concerned; but balancing the said hardship against the other considerations to which we have just referred, it would be difficult to sustain the agrument that the section itself should be treated as unconstitutional.\n\nBefore we part with this matter. however, we would like to invite the Centra! Government to consider seriously whether it is necessary to allow s. 87B to operate prospectively for all time. The agreements made with the Rulers of Indian States may, no doubt, have to be accepted and the assurances given to them may have to be observed. But considered broadly in th<- light of the basic principle of the equality before law, it seems somewhat odd that s. 87B should continue to operate for all time. For past dealings and transactions, protection may justifiably be given to Rulers of former Indian States; but the Central Government may examine the question as to whether for transactions subsequent to the 26th of January 1950, this protection need or should be continued. If under the Constitution all citizens are equal. it may be desirable to confine the operation of s. 87B to past transactions and not to perpetuate the anomaly of the distinction between the rest of the citizens and Rulers of former Indian States. With the passage of time. the validity of historical considerations on which s. 87B is founded will wear out and the continuance of the said section in the Code of Civil Procedure may later be open to serious challenge.\n\nThere is also another aspect of the matter to which we must refer in this ccnnection. In considering the question as to whether sanction should be granted to a person who intends to sue a Ruler of a former Indian State, it is advisable that the authority concerned should ordinarily, if not as a matter of course, allow such sanction, because in the present set-up it does not appear very satisfactory that an intended action against the Ruler of a former Indian State should be stifled by refusing to grant the litigant sanction under s. 87B. Where frivolous claims are set up by intending litigants, refusal to\n\ngive sanction may be justified; but where genuine disputes arise 1964 between a citizen and a Ruler of a former Indian State and Naroflamkialwre these disputes, prima facie, appear to be triable in a court of D-. foma ant law, it would not be fair or just that the said citizen should Othe\" be prevented frcrn inviting a court of competent jurisdiction Union ofindia and to deal with his dispute. If the power to grant sanction is exer- Another cised in a sensible way ai:id is not used for stifling claims which Gajendragadkar, o.J. are not far-fetched or fnvolous, that may prevent the growth of discontent in the minds of litigants against the artificial provision prescribed by s. 87B. In the present proceedings, it does appear, prima facie, that the petitioners have a genuine grievance against the Central Government's refusal to accord sanction to them to get a judicial decision on the dispute between them and respondent No. 2. That, naturally is a matter for the Central Government to consider. However, since it is not possible to accede to the petitioner's argument that s. 87B is invalid, we see no alternative but to dismiss the writ petition.\n\nIn the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs.\n\nPetition dismissed .\n\n. ,", "total_entities": 106, "entities": [{"text": "55\n\nNAROTIAM KISHORE DEV VARMA AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAROTIAM KISHORE DEV VARMA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. 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S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2778, "end_char": 2790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and\n\nAn-0tiler N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2795, "end_char": 2807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and\n\nAn-0tiler N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2832, "end_char": 2844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Shukla, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2867, "end_char": 2881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, O.J.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2889, "end_char": 2903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, O.J.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2908, "end_char": 2923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, O.J.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3007, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR C. J.-This is a writ petition filed under Art.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3064, "end_char": 3071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3150, "end_char": 3161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3165, "end_char": 3192, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Maharaja Kirit Vikram Kishore Deb Yarman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3263, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, His Highness Maharaja Kirit Vikram Kishore Deb Yarman, are members O'f a joint Hindu family governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law."}}, {"text": "Zarnindari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4141, "end_char": 4151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners further alleged that llje Ruler when so chosen and installed hdd the State and Zarnindari as life tenant subject to the usual charges for maintenance of the members of the Ruling Family."}}, {"text": "Maharaja Bir Bikram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4561, "end_char": 4580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the maintenance allowance of the members of the Ruling family came to be fixed arbitra'rily by the Rulers without any regard to their status and their legitimate needs, and that led to discontent among them which resulted in a serious agitation raised by them during the lifetime of the late Maharaja Bir Bikram.", "canonical_name": "Maharaja Kirit Bikram"}}, {"text": "Regency of Her Highness Rajmata during the minority of the last Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4613, "end_char": 4681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maharaja Kirit Bikram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence, at the time of Regency of Her Highness Rajmata during the minority of the last Ruler Maharaja Kirit Bikram, a Committee was appointed on the 20th June, 1949, to consider the question of allowances payable to the members of the Ruling family.", "canonical_name": "Maharaja Kirit Bikram"}}, {"text": "20th June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4739, "end_char": 4754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consequence, at the time of Regency of Her Highness Rajmata during the minority of the last Ruler Maharaja Kirit Bikram, a Committee was appointed on the 20th June, 1949, to consider the question of allowances payable to the members of the Ruling family."}}, {"text": "State of Tripura", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4900, "end_char": 4916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, before the Committee could submit its report, the State of Tripura merged with and became part of India and was constituted into a separate Province under the Chief Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Hazra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5076, "end_char": 5081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After merger, the then Chief Commissioner Mr. Hazra submitted a proposal to the Ministry of States on the 12th April, 1951, recommending a revision of allowance paid to the\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:VIE COURT REPORTS 57\n\nmaintenance-holders."}}, {"text": "12th April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5136, "end_char": 5152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After merger, the then Chief Commissioner Mr. Hazra submitted a proposal to the Ministry of States on the 12th April, 1951, recommending a revision of allowance paid to the\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:VIE COURT REPORTS 57\n\nmaintenance-holders."}}, {"text": "Dev Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5440, "end_char": 5449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dev Verma and This order was passed on the 23rd May, 1951."}}, {"text": "23rd May, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5483, "end_char": 5497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dev Verma and This order was passed on the 23rd May, 1951."}}, {"text": "Mai. Chatterjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, the then Other• officiating Chief Commissioner Mai."}}, {"text": "Ga3endragadkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5804, "end_char": 5818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of another Committee to go into the matter, but the Cornmit-Ga3endragadkar, O.J. tee could never function ith the result that the condition of the majority of the maintenance-holders grew wor.se day by dav."}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6427, "end_char": 6433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6434, "end_char": 6439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19(1 )(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6809, "end_char": 6831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Ruier", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7002, "end_char": 7007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 and 19(1 )(f) of the Constitution and as such, the condition precedent prescribed by it which requires the previous sanction of the Central Government before filing a suit against the Ruier of an Indian State therein mentioned, is invalid and inoperative."}}, {"text": "Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing of this writ petition, Mr. Shukla for the petitioners fairly conceded that the challenge to the validity of s. 87B, C.P.C., on the ground that it contravenes Art."}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7256, "end_char": 7261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7562, "end_char": 7576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, however, attempted to argue that some aspects of the problem had not been pressed before the Court when it decided the case of Mohan Lal Jain (')."}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7916, "end_char": 7922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7924, "end_char": 7929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8096, "end_char": 8103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "[1962] 1 S.C.R. 702", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8112, "end_char": 8131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8347, "end_char": 8353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8413, "end_char": 8418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8468, "end_char": 8473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 87B(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8622, "end_char": 8636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 878(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8855, "end_char": 8864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 87B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8897, "end_char": 8906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8936, "end_char": 8941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8943, "end_char": 8953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9019, "end_char": 9032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9303, "end_char": 9311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9380, "end_char": 9393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9918, "end_char": 9931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10192, "end_char": 10205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10233, "end_char": 10238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10338, "end_char": 10346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87B(J)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10383, "end_char": 10392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government Jias", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10707, "end_char": 10730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, because the Central Government Jias refused to accord sanction to the said intended suit."}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10858, "end_char": 10864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part IV of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10915, "end_char": 10934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 79 to 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11058, "end_char": 11074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IV of the Code", "statute": "Part IV of the Code"}}, {"text": "Sections 83 to 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11169, "end_char": 11186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IV of the Code", "statute": "Part IV of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11288, "end_char": 11293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IV of the Code", "statute": "Part IV of the Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11471, "end_char": 11479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part IV of the Code", "statute": "Part IV of the Code"}}, {"text": "Foreign Rulers and Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11521, "end_char": 11544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11598, "end_char": 11604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Rulers and Rule", "statute": "Foreign Rulers and Rule"}}, {"text": "GajendragadkM.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11815, "end_char": 11829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GajendragadkM. O.J.\n\nThe legislative background to which we have referred cannot be divorced from the historical background which is to be found for instance, in Art.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "Art. 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11977, "end_char": 11985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Rulers and Rule", "statute": "Foreign Rulers and Rule"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12046, "end_char": 12056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Article provides that in the exercise of the power of Parliament or of any legislature of any State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (!)"}}, {"text": "Art. 291", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12307, "end_char": 12315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Rulers and Rule", "statute": "Foreign Rulers and Rule"}}, {"text": "sections 86, 87, 87A and 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13208, "end_char": 13236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13436, "end_char": 13442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14028, "end_char": 14041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14591, "end_char": 14608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have to take into account the events which occurred\n\nOthm with unprecedented swiftness after the 15th August, 1947, and Union of \"jndia and we have to bear in mind the fact that the relevant negotiations\n\nAnother carried on by the Central Government were inspired by the ."}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15040, "end_char": 15046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Centra! Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15609, "end_char": 15627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "however, we would like to invite the Centra!"}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15683, "end_char": 15689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15990, "end_char": 15996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th of January 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16246, "end_char": 16266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For past dealings and transactions, protection may justifiably be given to Rulers of former Indian States; but the Central Government may examine the question as to whether for transactions subsequent to the 26th of January 1950, this protection need or should be continued."}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16411, "end_char": 16417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16638, "end_char": 16644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16713, "end_char": 16740, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17318, "end_char": 17324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Naroflamkialwre", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17525, "end_char": 17540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In considering the question as to whether sanction should be granted to a person who intends to sue a Ruler of a former Indian State, it is advisable that the authority concerned should ordinarily, if not as a matter of course, allow such sanction, because in the present set-up it does not appear very satisfactory that an intended action against the Ruler of a former Indian State should be stifled by refusing to grant the litigant sanction under s. 87B. Where frivolous claims are set up by intending litigants, refusal to\n\ngive sanction may be justified; but where genuine disputes arise 1964 between a citizen and a Ruler of a former Indian State and Naroflamkialwre these disputes, prima facie, appear to be triable in a court of D-."}}, {"text": "Union ofindia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17749, "end_char": 17762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "foma ant law, it would not be fair or just that the said citizen should Othe\" be prevented frcrn inviting a court of competent jurisdiction Union ofindia and to deal with his dispute."}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18078, "end_char": 18084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18480, "end_char": 18486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_564_568_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April 1\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!J64-]\n\nDEVJI @ DEVIJI SHIVJI\n\nMAGANLAL R. ATHRANA & OTHERS\n\n[A. K. SARKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.J\n\nPartner#.iip-Sub-lease granted to partner of firm-No intention to bind to firm-Can other partners of firm be liable -Indian Partnership Act, 1932, s. 22.\n\nThe plaintiff appellant instituted a suit agaim.t the defendants respondents for the recovery of a sum of Hs. 57,000/-.\n\nThe appellant was holding permanent lease hold rights over a certain colliery. On January 31, 1949 the appellant granted a sub-lease of the colliery to respondent No. 4 ior a term of 5 years. He joined respondents 1, 2 and 5 as defendants to the suit on the ground that these three persons alcng with respondent No. 4 formed a partnership firm knov..'n as Sa.urashtra Coal Con cern which was joined in the suit as defendant No.\n\n5. The appellant's case \\Vas that respondent No. 4 \\\\as. a be-nami.dar \"- for the partnership firm and. therefore. allthe respondents were liable for the claim.\n\nHespondents 1 and 2 denied the\n\nppellant's claim totally. According to them, respondent No. 4 took the sub-lease in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the other respondents. Respondents 4 and 5 y:ho are father and son, admitted the appellant's case that the lease was obtained b:,• respondent No. 4 on behalf of the partnership firm.\n\nThe trial court passed the decree against all the respondents.\n\nOn appeal. the High Court set aside the decree as against respondents 1 to :{ but affirmed the same against respondents 4 and 5.\n\nHeld: that Section 22 of the Indian Partnership Act, clear ly provides that in order to bind a firm by an l\\ct or an instrument executed b;· a partner on behalf of the firm, the Act should be done or the instrument should be executed in the name of the firm, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm. The sub-lease was not executed in the name of the firm. On the facts of this case it \\Yas held that in obtaining the sub-lease. the parties to it did not intend to bind the firm by that transaction. and therefore the decree should be limited only against respondents 4 and 5.\n\nKarmaii Abdullah Allarakia v. Vora Karimji Jiwanji, I.L.R 39 Born. ~GI. Gouthwaite v.\n\nDuckworth. (1810) 12 East 421.\n\nMathuia l\\'ath Choudhuru\n\nv. Sreej11kta BageS1vari Rani, 46 C.L.J. 362. Pandiri 11eeranna\n\nv. Grandi 11eerflbhadrastvami.\n\nI.L.R. -:i:l 1\\1.Iad .. J:.-7. Lakhtnishankar Deishankar v.\n\nMotiran1 Vishn11rcon, 6 B.L.R. 1106 and Gordhandas Chlwtalal Seth v.\n\nMahant Slzri Raghubirdasi Gangaramji. 3-l B.L.R. 1137, distin- •' guished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1961. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 17. 1958 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 162 of 1952.\n\nSarjoo Prasad and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.\n\nR. C. Prasad, for respondents Nos. 1-3.\n\nApril 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered 1964\n\nby Devji @ De! iji\n\nSMvji MuDHOLKAR, J.-This is an appeal by a certificate v. granted by the High Court of Patna under Art. 133(l)(a) ofMaganlalR.Alhrana C · d f · tdb th andOtl1'rs the onstitut10n, an anses out o a smt mstttu e y e appellant against the respondents for the recovery of a sum Mudhalkw, J. of Rs. 57,000/-. /\n\nThe appellant holds permanent lease-hold rights over a colliery called the J ealgora Govindpur Colliery and had worked the colliery himself for some time. On January 31, 1949, he granted a sub-lease of the colliery to respondent No. 4 for a term of five years. At that time, 2803 tons of slack and rubble coal was lying in the colliery, and under the terms of a separate agreement executed by respondent Nf<l. 4, he was liable to pay for this coal at the rate of Rs. IO/- per ton after selling it. According to the appellant, this coal was sold by respondent No. 4, but he was not paid its price amounting to Rs. 28,030/-. Further, according to him, royalty and commission were due to him from the respondents in respect of the coal extracted by them from the colliery, as also Rs. 1.355/8/3 on account of a loan taken by them from him on February 17, 1949. The total claim was tentatively valued by him at Rs. 57,000/-. He joined respondents I, 2 and 5 as defendants to the suit on the ground that these three persons along with respondent No. 4 formed a partnership firm known as Saurashtra Coal Concern which was joined in the suit as defendant No. 5 and is now respondent No. 3 before us. The appyllant's case was that respondent No. 4 was a benamidar for the partnership firm and, therefore, all the respondents were liable for the claim.\n\nRespondents 4 & 5, who are father and son, admitted the appellant's contention that the lease was obtained by respondent No. 4 on behalf of the partnership firm, but their contention was that they surrendered their lease-hold interest to the appellant on November 1, 1950, which was accepted by him, and that he was, therefore, not entitled to the claim in respect of royalty and commission from them for the period subsequent to November I, 1950. Further, according to them, the coal which was lying in the colliery was not actually weighed at the time of the agreement and the figure of 2803 tons was put down only as a rough estimate. According to them, on the date of the surrP, nder of the lease by them, there was a stock of more than 2803 tons of slack and rubble, etc., as well as soft coke, including the stock left by the appellant at the time of granting the sub-lease, because that could not be sold, and the appellant took possession of the entire stock lying in the colliery in November, 1950, after promising to adjust it towards the dues. They, therefore,\n\n19G4\n\nDctji @ Dev1ji\n\nSkilji\n\ndisclaimed all liability to pay the price of 2803 tons of coal.\n\nThey also denied having taken a loan from the appellant as alleged by him.\n\nMaganlal R. Atltrana No separate written statement was filed on behalf of and Otltccs d N 3 b d 1 h respon ent o. , ut respon ents & 2, w o were defen- Jtadltolka.r, .J. dants 2 & 4 in the trial court, denied the appellant's claim totally. According to them, respondent No. 4 took the sublease in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the other respondents. They averred that there was no privily of contract between them and the appellant and that, therefore. he was not entitled to a decree against them. The real facts, according to them. are that the respondent No. 4 took a sublease of the property from the appellant and gave a managing agency of the same to the Saurashtra Coal Concern of which the first respondent is the financing partner and the second respondent is the working partner. This concern was, they say, never a sub-lessee of the appellant.\n\nThey also denied having anything to do with the stock of coal which the appellant is alleged to have sold to the 4th respondent.\n\nThe trial court negatived the claim of the appellant in respect of the loan but decreed the claim for Rs. 28.030 /- as the price of coal and commission thereon against all the respondents. It further passed a preliminary decree for ascertaining the precise amount of royalty and commission which would be due to the appellant on account cif the sub-lease.\n\nThe trial court further said that the minimum amount under this head would be Rs. 26,000 I. Respondents 1 to 3 preferred an appeal to the High Court and the High Court accepted it. Thus, the position now is that the de;:rce of the trial court stands only against respondents 4 & 5, but has been set aside as against respondents 1 to 3.\n\nIn view of the fact that both the courts below have found concurrently that the sub-lease in question was taken by respondent No. 4 alone, the only point urged by Mr.\n\nSarjoo Prasad in support of the appeal is that respondent No. 4 being a partner in the Saurashtra Coal Concern, all the partners of the firm are liable under the lease inasmuch as the firm admittedly came into possession of the demised colliery. He points out that even according to respondents 1 to 3, they came into possession of the demised colliery immediately after the execution of the sub-lease, .and wants this Court to infer from this Jhat the partnership had already come into existence before the lease was . obtained. This, however, has never been the case of the 'i1ppellant in the courts below. The only case which he put forward was that the lease was taken by respondent No. 4 on behalf of all the respondents. In other words, his case was that respondent No. 4 was a benamidar for the partnership firm. It is only\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS 567\n\nthis case which the respondents had to meet, and in our 1964\n\njudgment, it would not be proper to permit the appellant to JJe1Ji@ Deviji make out an entirely new case at this stage. Apart from that, Shi•ji s. 22 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, clearly provide£ ilfoyvn1\"1R. Atrana\n\nthat in order to bind a firm by an act or an instrument exeand Olhcrs cuted by a partner on behalf of the firm. the act should be Mwlholkar, J. done or the instrument should be executed in the name of the firm, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm. The sub-lease was not executed in the name of the firm, and it has been, found by the courts below that respondent No. 4 in obtaining the lease, did not act 'On\n\nbehalf of the firm. This in substance means :hat in obtaining the sub-lease, the parties to \"it did not intend to bind the firm by that transaction.\n\nIn support of his contention, Mr.\n\nSarjoo Prasad has strongly relied upon the decision in Karmali Abdulla Al/arakia v. Vora Karimji Jiwanji and others('). That was a case in which the question for consideration was whether one of the two partners is liable upon a hundi drawn by one of the partners though the hundi was not drawn in the name of the firm. The\n\nPrivy Council following the decision in Gowhwaite v. Duckworth(') held that the other partner would be liable though on the face of it the hundi did not purport to be on behalf of the firm. That decision, however, does not help the appellant, because while the transaction in connection with which the hundi was drawn, was admittedly a partnership transaction, in the case before us, it has been found that the transaction, that is, the taking of the sub-lease, was not on behalf <if the partnership. The next case relied upon was Mathura Nath Choudhury v. Sreejukta Bageswari Rani and others(').\n\nIn that case, the question was whether the firm is liable for the money borrowed by one of its partners. The High Court pointed out that this is a question of fact and depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In that\n\ncase also, it was found that the liability arose upon a contract entered into by one of the partners in connection with the partnership business. This case is, therefore, similar to the one just referred to above. The third case relied upon is Pandiri Veeranna v. Grandi Veerabhadraswami('). In that q1se, the question was whether the fact tl; tat one of the several partners had authority to acknoWiedge liability to save limitation as against his partners, had to be established only by direct evidence or whether it could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The High Court held that it was\n\n(') ILR 39 Born. 261 at 274, etc. (') (1810) 12 East 421.\n\n(') 46 CLJ 362. (') ILR 41 Mad. 427 (Full Bench).\n\n1964 permissible to establish the existence of authority from the Devji 1$ Deviji surrounding circumstances. The case is thus of no assistance\n\nSh.., ji to the appellant. The next case relied upon was Lakshmi- M•, ganlal ~: Athrana rhankar Devshankar v. Motiram Vishnuram, etc.('). There, it\n\nand OU.era was held that where money borrowed by one partner in the Mudholkar, J. name of the firm but without the authority of the co-partners has been applied to paying off the debts of the firm, the lender is entitled in equity to repayment by the firm of the amount which he can show to have been so applied and the same rule extends to money bona fide borrowed and applied for any legitimate purposes of the firm. It is difficult to appreciate how this case advances the present matter further, because here, the sub-lease has not been obtained in the name of the firm. The last case relied upon was Gordhandas Ch/iota/al Seth v. Mahant Shrj, Raghuvirdasji Gangaramji(') That again is a case in which the firm was held to be bound by the debts contracted by the managing partner for the purposes of the factory run by the firm.\n\nAll the partners were held liable, because the transaction was entered into by the managing partner for the purpose of the partnership business. This case is similar to the one just referred to above and is, therefore, of no assistance to the appellant.\n\nMr. Sarjoo Prasad also referred to two other decisions in Ram Kinkar Banerjee and others v. Satya Charan Srimani and others(') and Raja Sri Sri Jyoti Prasad Singh Deo Bahadur v. Samuel Henry Seddon('). In these cases, the defendants sought to be made liable were assignees of a lease, but that is not the case here. Indeed, Mr. Sarjoo Prasad quite rightly conceded that respondents I to 3 cannot be made liable upon the ground that there was a privity of estate between them and the appellant.\n\nWe, therefore, agree with the High Court that the decree should be limited only against respondents 4 and 5, and dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(') 6 BLR 1106.\n\n(') 34 BLR 1137.\n\n(') AIR 1939 P.C. 14. (') ILR 19 Pat. 433 at 459.", "total_entities": 31, "entities": [{"text": "DEVJI @ DEVIJI SHIVJI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEVJI @ DEVIJI SHIVJI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAGANLAL R. ATHRANA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAGANLAL R. ATHRANA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 268, "end_char": 296, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 298, "end_char": 303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sub-lease granted to partner of firm-No intention to bind to firm-Can other partners of firm be liable -Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "Sub-lease granted to partner of firm-No intention to bind to firm-Can other partners of firm be liable -Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "January 31, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 509, "end_char": 525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 31, 1949 the appellant granted a sub-lease of the colliery to respondent No."}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1566, "end_char": 1576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1584, "end_char": 1606, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pandiri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2359, "end_char": 2366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pandiri 11eeranna\n\nv. Grandi 11eerflbhadrastvami."}}, {"text": "11eeranna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2367, "end_char": 2376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pandiri 11eeranna\n\nv. Grandi 11eerflbhadrastvami."}}, {"text": "11eerflbhadrastvami", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2388, "end_char": 2407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pandiri 11eeranna\n\nv. Grandi 11eerflbhadrastvami."}}, {"text": "Lakhtnishankar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2441, "end_char": 2455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakhtnishankar Deishankar v.\n\nMotiran1 Vishn11rcon, 6 B.L.R. 1106 and Gordhandas Chlwtalal Seth v.\n\nMahant Slzri Raghubirdasi Gangaramji."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2805, "end_char": 2818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2823, "end_char": 2838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2860, "end_char": 2872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. C. Prasad, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Devji @ De", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2965, "end_char": 2975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered 1964\n\nby Devji @ De!"}}, {"text": "SMvji MuDHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2982, "end_char": 2997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iji\n\nSMvji MuDHOLKAR, J.-This is an appeal by a certificate v. granted by the High Court of Patna under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3081, "end_char": 3095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mudhalkw", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3255, "end_char": 3263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133(l)(a) ofMaganlalR.Alhrana C · d f · tdb th andOtl1'rs the onstitut10n, an anses out o a smt mstttu e y e appellant against the respondents for the recovery of a sum Mudhalkw, J. of Rs."}}, {"text": "J ealgora Govindpur Colliery", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3363, "end_char": 3391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant holds permanent lease-hold rights over a colliery called the J ealgora Govindpur Colliery and had worked the colliery himself for some time."}}, {"text": "February 17, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4127, "end_char": 4144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1.355/8/3 on account of a loan taken by them from him on February 17, 1949."}}, {"text": "Saurashtra Coal Concern", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4370, "end_char": 4393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 formed a partnership firm known as Saurashtra Coal Concern which was joined in the suit as defendant No."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4888, "end_char": 4904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 on behalf of the partnership firm, but their contention was that they surrendered their lease-hold interest to the appellant on November 1, 1950, which was accepted by him, and that he was, therefore, not entitled to the claim in respect of royalty and commission from them for the period subsequent to November I, 1950."}}, {"text": "November I, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5063, "end_char": 5079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 on behalf of the partnership firm, but their contention was that they surrendered their lease-hold interest to the appellant on November 1, 1950, which was accepted by him, and that he was, therefore, not entitled to the claim in respect of royalty and commission from them for the period subsequent to November I, 1950."}}, {"text": "Maganlal R. Atltrana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5877, "end_char": 5897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maganlal R. Atltrana No separate written statement was filed on behalf of and Otltccs d N 3 b d 1 h respon ent o. , ut respon ents & 2, w o were defen- Jtadltolka.r, .J. dants 2 & 4 in the trial court, denied the appellant's claim totally."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7738, "end_char": 7751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 alone, the only point urged by Mr.\n\nSarjoo Prasad in support of the appeal is that respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8814, "end_char": 8819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8827, "end_char": 8855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mwlholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9025, "end_char": 9034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the act should be Mwlholkar, J. done or the instrument should be executed in the name of the firm, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_569_586_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 569\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA AND\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\nL. W. RUSSEL\n\nIK. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND s. M. SIKRI, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax-Scheme to effect a-policy of i.nsura.nce for the purpose of ensuring annuity to every employee on his attaini:ng age of superannuation or on happening of a specfied contingency-Contribution's to be made both by employer and employee-Whether amount paid b11 the employer towards premium payable by employee taxable under s. 7(1)-Meamng of perquisite-Indian Income-tax Act. 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 7(1),\n\nThe respondent is an employee of the English and Scottish Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. incorporated in England. The Society established a superannuation scheme for the benefit of the male European members of its staff employed in India by means of deferred rnnuities. Under the terms of the scheme, the trustee has to effect a policy of insurance for the purpose of ensuring an annuity to every member of the Society on his attaining the age of superannuation or on the happening of a specific contingency. The Society contributed one-third of the premium payable by each empioyee. During the year 1956-57, the Society contributed Rs. 3333/- towards the premium payable by the respondent. an employee of the Society. The Income-tax Officer included the said amount in the taxable income of the respondent for the yeaT 1956-57 under s. 7(1), Explanatian 1, sub-cl. (v) of the Act. The appeals of the respondent were dismissed both by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nThe Tribunal referred to the High Court the following three questions of law:-\n\n(1) Whether the contribution paid by lhe employer to the assessee under the terms of a trust deed in respect of a contract for a deferred annuitv on the life of the assessee is a perquisite as conlernplated by s. 7(1) of the Income-tax Act?\n\n(2) Whether the said contributions were allowed to, or due to the applicant by or from the employer in the accounting year'!\n\n(3) Whether the deferred annuity aforesa'd is annuity hit by s. 7(1) and para (v) of Explanation 1 thereto.\n\nThe High Court held that the employer's contribution under the terms of the trust deed was not a perquisite as contemplated by s. 7(1).\n\nThe employer's contributions were not\n\nallwed to or due t? the employee in the accounting year. The legislature not havmg used the word \"deferred\" with annuity m .s. 7(1) and the statute being a taxing one, the deferred annUity would not hit para (v) of Explanation 1 to s. 7-(1) of the Act. Against the decision of High Court. the appellant came to this Court by special leave. Dismissing the appeal,\n\n19G~\n\nApril 1\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Kerala and\n\nCoimbatore v.\n\nL. W. Ruwr::l\n\nHeld: The answers to the questions of law as given by the High Court were correct. Unless a vested interest in the sum accrues to an employee, it is not taxable. In the present ccse, no interest in the sum contributed by the employer under the scheme vested in the employee, as it was only a contingent interest depending upon his reaching the age of superannuafon. lt is not a perqu.isite allowed to him by the employer or an amount due to him from the employer within the meaning of s. 7(1) of the Act. A perquisite is only that amount of money which is allowed to the employee by or is due to him from the employer or is paid to him to elfect an insurance en his life.\n\nSmyth v. Stretton, (1904), 5 T.C. 36, and Edwards (H. M.\n\nInspector of Taxes) v. Roberts, (1935), 19 T.C. 618, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 220/\n\n1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 9, 1961 of the Kerala High Court in I.T.R.\n\nCase No. 17 of 1959.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\nApril I, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSuM, a R.,,,; J.\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This appeal by special leave preferred against the judgment of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam raises the question of the interpretation of s. 7(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (Act No. XI of 1922), hereinafter called the Act.\n\nThe respondent, L. W. Russel, is an employee of the English and Scottish Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd., Kozhikodc, hereinafter called the Society, which was incorporated in England. The Society established a superannuation scheme for the benefit of the male European members of the Society's staff employed in India, Ceylon and Africa by means of deferred annuities.\n\nThe terms of such benefits were incorpcrated in a trust deed dated July 27,\n\n1934. Every European employee of the Society shall become a 1i1e111ber of that scheme as a condition of employment.\n\nUnder the term of the scheme the trustee has to effect a policy of insurance for the purpose of ensuring an annuity to every member of the Society on his attaining the age of superannuation or on the happening of a specified contingency. The Society contributes I / 3 of the premium payable by such employee. During the year 1956-57 the Society contributed Rs. 3,333/- towards the premium payable by the respondent. The Income-tax Officer, Kozhikode Circle, included the said amount in the taxable income of the respondent for the year 1956-57 under s. 7(1), Explanation I Sub-cl.\n\n(v) of the Act. The appeal preferred by the respondent against\n\nthe said inclusion to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Kozhikode, was dismissed. The further appeal preferred to the Income-tax Appellate . Tribunal received the same fate. The assessee threupon filed an application under s. 66(1) of the Act to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for stating a case to the High Court. By its order dated December 1, 1958, the Tribunal submitted a statement of case referring the following three questions of law to the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam : -\n\n(l) Whether the contributions paid by the employer to the assessee under the terms of a trust deed in respect of a contract for a deferred annuity on the life of the assessee is a 'perquisite' as contemplated by s. 7(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act?\n\n(2) Whether the said contributions were allowed to or due to the applicant by or from the employer in the accounting year?\n\n(3) Whether the deferred annuity aforesaid is an annuity hit by section 7(1) and para. (v) of Explanation 1 thereto?\n\nOn the first question the High Court held that the l(mployer's contribution under the terms of the trust deed was not a perquisite as contemplated by s. 7(1) of the Act. On the second question it came tothe conclusion that the employer's contributions were not allowed to or due to the employee in the accounting year. On the third question it expressed the opinion that the Legislature not having used the word\n\n'deferred\" with annuity in s. 7(1) and the statute being a taxing one, the deferred annuity would not be hit by para.\n\n(v) of Explanation 1 to s. 7(1) of the Act. The Commissioner of Income-tax has preferred the present appeal to this Court questioning the correctness of the said answers.\n\nThe three questions formulated for the High Court's opinion are interdependent and the answers to them turn upon the true interpretation of the relevant part of s. 7(1) of the Act.\n\nMr. Rajagopala Sastri, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the amount contributed by the Society under the scheme towards the insurance premium payable by the trustees for arranging a deferred annuity on the respondent's superannuation is a perquisite within the meaning of s. 7(1) of the Act and that the fact that the respondent may not have the benefit of the contributions on the happening of certain contingencies will not make the said contributions anytheless a perquisite. The employer's share of the contributions to the fund earmarked for paying prei_niums of the insurance policy, the argument proceeds, vests m the respondent as soon as\n\n19G4\n\nCo11nni1Jsicmer of Income-fax Kerala and\n\nCoimbatore\n\nL. W. Russel\n\nCom.missionef' of\n\nlncome-ta:r., Kerala and CoimbatGre\n\nL. W. Russel\n\nSubba RafJ, J,\n\nit is paid to the trustee and the happening of a contingency only operates as a defeasance of the vested right. The respondent is ex-parte and .• therefore, the Court has not the benefit of the exposition of the contrary view.\n\nBefore we attempt to construe the scope of s. 7(1) of the Act it will be convenient at the outset to notice the provisions of the scheme, for . the scope of the respondent's right in the amounts representing the employer's contributions thereunder depends upon. it. The trust deed and the rules dated July 27, 1934, embody the superannuation scheme. The scheme is described as the English and Scottish Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited Overseas European Employees' Superannuation Scheme, hereinafter called the Scheme. It is established for the benefit of the male European members of the Society's staff employed in India, Ceylon and Africa by means of deferred annuities. The Society itself is appointed thereunder as the first trustee. The trustees shall act as agents for and on behalf of the Society and the members respectively; they shall effect or cause to be effected such policy or policies as may be necessary to carry out the scheme and shall collect and arrange for the payment of the moneys payable under such policy or policies and shall hold such .moneys as trustees for and on behalf of the person or persons entitled thereto under the rules of the Scheme. The object of the Scheme is to provide for pensions by means of deferred annuities for the members upon retirement from employment on attaining certain age under the conditions mentioned therein, namely, every European employee of the Society shall be required as a condition of employment to apply to become a member of the Scheme from the date of his engagement by the Society and no member shall be entitled to relinquish his membership except on the termination of his employment with Society; the pension payable to a member shall be provided by means of a policy securing a deferred annuity upon the life of such member to be effected by the Trustees as agents for and on behalf of the Society and the members respectively with the Co-operative Insurance Society Limited securing the payment to the Trustees of an annuity equivalent to the pension to which such member shall be entitled under the Scheme and the Rules; the insurers shall agree that the Trustees shall be entitled to surrender such deferred annuity and that, on such deferred annuity being so surrendered, the insurers will pay to the Trustees the total amount of the premiums paid in respect thereof together with compound interest thereon; all moneys received by the Trustees from the insurers shall be held by them as Trustees for and on behalf of the person or persons entitled thereto under the Rules of the Scheme; any policy or policies issued by the insurers in connection with the\n\n7 S.C.R. srPRE~IE COURT REPORTS 57::>\n\nScheme shall be deposited with the Trustees; the Society shall contribute one-third of the premium from time to time payable in respect of the policy securing the deferred annui ty in respect of each member as thereinbefore provided and the member shall contribute the remaining two-thirds; the age at which a member shall no1 mally retire from the service of the Society shall be the age of 55 years and on retirement at such age a member shall be entitled to receive a pension of the amount specified in Rule 6; a member may also, after following the prescribed procedure. commute the pension to which he is entitled for a payment in cash in accordance with the fourth column of tle Table in the Appendix annexed to the Rules; if a member shall leave or be dismissed from the service of the Society for any reason whatsoever or shall die whi:e in the service of the Society there shall be paid to him or his legal personal representatives the total amount of the portions of the premiums paid by such member and if he shall die \\vhilst in the service of the Society there shall be\n\npad to him or his legal personal representatives the total amount of the portions of the premiums paid by such mem ber and if he shall die whilst in the service of the Society or , ha!I leave or be dismissed from the service of the Society on account of permanent breakdown in health (as: to the /Jona /ides of whi ; h the Trustees shall be satislied). such further proportion (if any) of the total amount of the portions of the premiums paid by the Society in respect of that memhr shaH be payable in iiccordance with Table C in the\n\nAp;:inch to the Rules; if the total amount of the pbrtions of ti1e premiums in respect of such member paid by the S iciety together with interest thereon as aforesaid shall not be paid c'J the Trustees to him or his legal personal representatives under sub-s. (I) of r. 15 then such proportion or the whole, as the case may be. of the Society's portion of such premiums and interest thereon as aforesaid as shall not be paid by the Trustees to such member or his legal personal rep; esentatives as aforesaid shall be paid by the Trustees to the SJciety; the rules may be altered, amended or rescinded and new rules may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Trust Deed but not otherwise.\n\nWe have given the relevant part of the Scheme and the Rules. The gist of the Scheme may be stated t)lus: The object of the Scheme is to provide for pensions to its employees. It is achieved by creating a trust. The Trustees ap!)ointed thereunder are the agents of the employer as well as of the employees and hold the mnneys received from the employer. the employee and the insurer in trust for and on behalf of the person or persons entitled thereto under the rules of the Scheme. The Trustees are en joined to take out policies of insurance securing a deferred annuity upon the\n\n1!.Jtu\n\nCom111i8si1; nr1 of\n\n/nr<J111!'-f(l:r, K1r11laa11J1 Coirnfmlnr<'-\n\nL. Tr. Ru.~8el\n\nS11J; b11 Ran, J.\n\nl!J6.J\n\n(,'onimissioner of\n\nlncomelax.\n\nK1:r, tfc1 and\n\nOrJimlmJIJTI~\n\nL. IV. Ru, ssel\n\nSu9b11. R11(J, .J.\n\n574 SUPllEME COURT HEPORTS [1964]\n\nlife of each member, and funds are provided by contributions from the employer as well as from the employees. The Trustees realise the annuities and pay the pensions to the employees. Under certain contingencies mentioned above, an employee would be entitled to the pension only after superannuation. If the employee leave the service of the Society or is dismissed from service or dies in the service of the Society, he will be entltled only to get back the total amount of the portion of the premium paid by him, though the trustees in their discretion under certain circumstances may give him a proportion of the premiums paid by the Society. The entire amount representing the contributions made by the Society or part thereof, as the case may be, will then have to be paid by the Trustees to the Society. Under the scheme the employee has not acquired any vested right in the contributions made by the Society. Such a right vests in him only when he attains the age of superannuation. Till that date that amount vests in the Trustees to be administered in accordance with the rules; that is to say, in case the employee ceases to be a member of the Society by death or otherwise, the amount contributed by the employer with interest thereon, subject to the discretionary power exerciseable by the trustees, become payable to the Society. If he reaches the age of superannuation, the said contributions irrevocably become fixed as part of the funds yielding the pension. To put it in other words, till a member attains the age of superannuation the employer's share of the contributions towards the premiums does not vest in the employee. At best he has a contingent right therein.\n\nIn one contingency the said amount becomes payable to the employer and in another contingency, to the employee.\n\nNow let us look at the provisions of s. 7(]) of the Act in order to ascertain whether such a contingent right is hit by the said provisions. The material part of the section reads:- Section 7(1)-The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"salaries\" in respect of any salary or wages, any annuity, pension or gratuity, and any fees, commissions, perquisites or profits in lieu of. or in addition to, any salary or wages, which are allowed to him by or are due to him. whether paid or not, from, or are paid by or on behalf of, ............... a company ................... \".\n\nExplanation I-For the purpose of this section perquisite includes-. * • • •\n\n(v) any sum payable by the employer, whether directly <lr through a fund to which the pro visions of Chapters IX-A and JX-B do not\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSlTPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 575\n\napply, to effect an assurance on the life of the assessee or in respect of a contract of annuity on the life of the assessees.\n\nThis section imposes a tax on the remuneration of an employee. It presupposes the existence of the relationship of employer and employee.\n\nThe present case is sought to be brought under the head \"perquisites in lieu of, or in addition to, any salary or wages, which are allowed to him by or are due to him, whether paid or not, from, Or are paid by or on behalf of a company\". The expression \"perquisites\" is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as \"casual emolument, fee or profit attached to an office or position in addition to salary or wages\". Explanation I to s. 7(1) of the Act gives an inclusive definition. Clause (v) thereof includes within the meaning of \"perquisites\" any sum payable by the employer, whether directly or through a fund to which the provisions of Chs.\n\nIX-A and IX-B do not apply, to effect an assurance on the life of the asscssee or in respect of a contract for an annuity on the life of the assessee. A combined reading of the substantive part of s. 7(1) and cl. (v) of Exp!. I thereto makes it clear that if a sum of money is allowed to the employee by or is due to him from or is paid to enable the latter to effect an insurance on his life, the said sum would be a perquisite within the meaning of s. 7(1) of the Act and, therefore, would be exigible to 'tax. But before such sum becomes so exigihle. it shall either be paid to the employee or allowed to him by or due to him from the employer. So far as the expression \"paid\" is concerned, there is no difficulty, for it takes in every receipt by the employee from the employer whether it was due to him or not. The expression \"due\" followed by the qualifying clause \"whether paid or not\" shows that there shall be an obligation on the part of the employer to pay that amount and a right on the employee to claim the same.\n\nThe expression \"allowed\", it is said, is of a wider connotation and any credit made in the employer's account is covered therehy. The \\\\:ord \"al1o\\ved'' v.r~s introluced in the sec~\n\ntion by the Finance Act of 1955. The said expression in the legal terminology is equivalent to \"fixed. taken into account, set apart, granted\". It takes in perquisites given in cash or in kind or in money or money's worth and also emenilies which are not convertible into money. It implies that a light is conferred on the employee in respect of those perquisites.\n\nOne cann\"Ot be said to allow a perquisite to an employee if the employee has no right to the same. It rnnnot apply to contingent payments to which the employee has no right till the contingency occurs. In short, the employee must have a vested right therein.\n\nIf that be the interpretation of s. 7(1) bf the Act; it is not possible to hold that the amounts paid by the Society\n\n19(i4\n\nCo1111nis8ioner of\n\nInrume-fax\n\nK1ral11 o.ml Cuimfia.!ore\n\nL. Jr.\n\nRn-~, el\n\n1964 -- \\ Commissioner of\n\nIncome-fax Kerf/.la and Coimbrdore\n\nL.1V. Russel\n\n576 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS (1964]\n\nto the Trustees to be administered by them in accordance with the rules framed under the Scheme are perquisites allowed to the respondent or due to him. Till he reaches the age of superannuation, the amounts vest in the Trustees and the beneficiary under the trust can be ascertained only on the happening of one or other of the contingencies provided for under the trust deed. On the happening of one contingency, the employer becomes the beneficiary, and on the happening of another contingency, the employee becomes the beneficiary. Learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied upon the decision of the King's Bench Division in Smyth v.\n\nStretton('). There, one Stretton, one of the Assistant Masters of Dulwich College, was assessed to income-tax in the sum of £385 in respect of his emoluments as Assistant Master received from the Governors of Dulwich College for the year ended the 5th day of April, 1901. He objected to the assessment on the ground that it included £35 not liable to taxation, being amount placed to his credit by the Governors under the Provident Fund Scheme for the year I 900. Channell, J., with some hesitation, came to the conclusion that the said sum was taxable. That case was dealing with a scheme for the establishment of provident fund for the benefit of the Assistant Masters on the permanent staff of the Dulwich College. Under para. I of the scheme the salaries of Assistant Masters were increased. Clause (a) of para. 1 of the scheme provided that Assistant Masters having not less than five years, but Jess than fifteen years' service, would be allowed an increase of 5 per cent, in their salaries; under cl. (b) thereof, Assistant Masters having not Jess than 15 years' of service and over, would get an increase of 7!· per cent: in their salaries; under cl. (c) thereof, a further addition in their salaries, equal in amount to the above sums, should be granted from the same date to the Assistant Masters alluded to in (a) and (b), such addition being, however, subject to the conditions provided by para. 5. Paragraph 5 read: -\n\n\"That Assistant Masters having Jess than ten years' service who may resign their appointments, or from any other cause than i!I-health cease to belong to the Co1iege, shall be entitled to receive the total increase sanctioned by (al and the accumulations thereof, but shall not receive the additional increase sanctioned by (c), or the accumulations thereof. In the event of anv such Assistant Master retiring from ill-health the Governors, in addition to the increase sanctioned by (a), may grant him the further 5 per cent. sanctioned by (c), and the accumulations thereof. In the event of death of any such Assistant l\\fa, ter whilst in\n\n( ') (1904) 5 T. C. 36. 46.\n\nthe service of the College, the 5 per cent. due by\n\n(c) as well as under (a), with the accumulations thereof, shall be paid to his legal representatives\".\n\nIt was contended that the amount payable under cl. (c) of para. I was a contingent one without any vested character and, therefore, could not be described as income in any way.\n\nThe learned Judge construed the provisions of the scheme and rejected the contention. The main reason for his conclusion is stated thus: -\n\n\"The result seems to me to be that I must take that sum as a sum which really has been added to the salary and is taxable. and it is not the less added to the salary because there has been a binding obligation created between the Assistant Masters and Governors of the Schools that they should apply it in a particular way\".\n\nNo doubt it is possible for another court to come to a different conclusion on the construction of the provisions of the scheme; but the learned Judge came to the conclusion that cl. (c) of para. I of the scheme provided for an additional salary to the Assistant Masters. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Edwards (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Roberts(') construed a similar scheme and came to the contrary conclusion and explained the earlier decision on the basis we have indicated. There, the respondent was employed by a company under a service agreement dated August 2l. 1921, which provided inter a/ia, that, in addition to an annual salary, he should have an interest in a \"conditional fund\", which was to be created by the company by the payment after the end of each financial year of a sum out of its profits to the trustees of the fund to be invested hy them in the purchase of the company's shares or debenture stock. Subject to possible forfeiture of his interest in certain events. the respondent was entitled to ; receive the income produced by the fund at the expiration of each financial year, and to receive part of the capital of the fund, (or, at the trustees' option, the investments representing the same) at the expiration of five financial years and of each succeeding year. and, lln death whilst in the company's service or on the termination of his employment by the company, to receive the whole amount then standing to the credit of the capital amount of the fund (or the actual investments\\. The respondent resigned from the service of the company in September. 1927, and at that date the trustees of the fund transferred to hi.m the shares which they had purchased out of the payments made to them by the company in the years 1922 to 1927. He was assessed to income-tax on the amount of the current market value of the\n\n(') (1935) 19 T.C. 618, 638, 640.\n\nJ, fP(ll)IHCf-17\n\nOommisaiomr of I ncome-taz, Kerala and Coimbatore\n\nL. W. Russel\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nOammissianer of\n\nIncome-tax, Kenda and\n\nCoimbatore\n\nL. W. Russel\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\n578 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l S [1964}\n\nshares at the date of transfer. The assessee contended that immediately a sum was paid by the company to the trustees of the fund he became invested with a beneficial interest In the payment which formed part bf his emoluments for the year in which it was made, and for no other year, and that, accordingly, the amount of the assessment for the year 1927- 28 ought not. in any event, to exceed the aggregate of the sums paid by the company tb the trustees, the difference between the amount and the value of the investments at the date of transfer representing a capital apprnciation not liable to tax for any year. The Court of Appeal rejected the contention. Lord Hanwbrth, M. R., in rejecting the contention, observed: - \" .................. ur:der these circumstances there could not be said to have accrued to this employee a vested interest in these successive sums placed to his credit, but only that he had a chance of being: paid a sum at the end of six years if all went well. That chance has now supervened, and he has got it by reasbn of the fact of his employment, or by reason of his exercising an employment of profit within Schedule E.'\".\n\nMaugham, L. J., said much to the same effect thus:\n\n\"The true nature of the agreement was that he was to\n\nbe entitled in the events, and only in the events mentioned in Clause 8 of the agreement, to the investments made by the Compa1iy out of the net profits of the Company as provided in Clause 6.\"~ The decision of Channell, J., in Smvth v.\n\nSrrettonl') was strongly relied upon before the appellate court. But the learned Judges distinguished that case on the ground that under the scheme which was the subject-matter bf that decision the sums taxed were really additions to the salary of the Assistant Master and that. in any view. that decision should be confined to the facts of that case. The principle laid down by the Court of Appt:.al. namely, that unless a vested interest in the sum accrues to an employee it is not taxable, equally applies to the present case. As we have pointed out earlier, no interest in the sum contributed by the employer under the scheme vested in the employee, as it was only a contingent interest depending upon his reaching the age of superannuation. It is nnt a perquisite allowed to him by the employer or an amount due to him from the tmployer within the meaning of s. 7(]) of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the High Court has given correct answers to the questibns of law submitted to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(') (1904) 5 T.C. 35. 46.\n\n/ .:\n\n1 S.C.R:,\n\nSUPRE)!E COURT REPORTS 579\n\n'-.... -\n\nJ; DALMIA v. \\\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX. NEW DELHI\n\n[K. SUB BA RAo. J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]\n\nCompany Law-Resolution of Board of Directors-Interim dividend-If creates a debt enforceable against the comvanylncome Tax-Payable on the dividend in the year in which it was actually paid, credited, or distributed OT deemed to be :paid-\"Paid\"-Meaning of-Indian Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913), s. 17(2), Art. 95 Sch. I-Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), .s. 16(2).\n\nThe appellant held shares in a company the Board of Directors of which by a resolution dated August 30, 1950 declared interim dividends. The appellant received a dividend warrant dated December 28, 1950 for a certain amount being the interim dividend in respect of its share holdings in the company. The appellant's year of accounting had ended on September 30, 1950. The revenue authorities brought to tax the .amount so received with other income of the appellant in the assessment year 1952-53 after rejecting the objection of the .appellant that it represented income for the assessment year 1951-52. In a reference made under s. 66(1) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, the High Court agreed with the Revenue authority that the dividend was in view of Art. 95 of the First Sche- -dule to Indian Companies Act, 1913, liable to be included in the cassessment year 1952-53.\n\nHeld: A declaration of dividend by a company in a general meeting gives rise to a debt.\n\nIn re Severn and Wye and Severn Bridge Railway Co.\n\n(1896) 1 Ch. 559, referred to.\n\nBut a mere resolution of the Directors resolving to pay a certain amount as interim dividend does not create a debt enforceable against the company for it is always open to the Directors to rescind the resolution before payment of the dividend.\n\nThe Lagunas Nitrate Schroeder and Company, 17 to.\n\nCampany (Ltd.) v.\n\nJ. Henry Times Law Reports 625, referred\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau, 16 I.T.R. 248, distinguished.\n\n• (ii) The test applied by Chagla C. J. (in C.I.T., Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau, 16 I.T.R. 248) that because the dividend becomes due to the assessee who has the right to deal \\vith or dispose of the same in any manner he likes, it is taxable in the year in which it is declared cannot be regarded as correct.\n\n(iii) Dividend may te said to be paid within the meaning of s. 16(2} of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 when the company discharges its liability and makes the amount thereof unconditionally available to the member entitled thereto.\n\nPurshottamdas Thakurdas v. C.I.T., Bombay, 34 I.T.R, 204, referred to.\n\nLiP(D)l8CT-17(a\\\n\n.April I\n\n. I\n\nI .\n\nJ.Dalmia\n\n-- T.\n\nCommi8sioner of\n\nIncome.taz, ·\n\nl!,,..ewDtlhi\n\nSooh, J.\n\n' ' ' ··,,-·.-:-f-,,'/- -~ ;\\- ' -- >:;;; r-\n\n/ \\) - ;·,•,.....;.- ·'\"-~-----~\n\n' ' '580 SUPRE)lE COURT REPORTS (1964} , - _(iv) The declaration of interim dividend capable of being rescinded 'by the directors does not operate as a payment under s. 16(2) of the Income-true Act before the company has parted w<ith the amount of dividend or discharged its obligation by some other act. ·\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 505 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 6, 1961 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in I.T.R. No. 16 of 1959.\n\nS. K. Kapur and B. P. M aheslnvari, for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nApril 1, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nSHAH, J.-The appellant which is a Hindu undivided family was the registered holder of 1,500 shares of M / s Govan Bros. (Rampurl Ltd. in the year of account October\n\n1, 1950 to September 30, 1951.\n\nPursuant to a resolution passed by the board of directors of M/ s Govan Bros. (Rampur) Ltd.-hereinafter called 'Govan Bros.'-at a meeting held on August 30, 1950, the appellant received a dividend warrant dated December 28, 1950 for R.~. 4,12,500/- being interim dividend in respect of its share-holding in Govan Bros. This amount was brought to tax with the other income of the appellant in the assessment year 1952-53 by the Revenue authorities, after rejecting the objection of the appellant that it represented income for the assessment year 1951-52.\n\nAt the instance of the appellant the Appellate Tribunal drew up a statement of the case and referred the question set out hereinbelow to the High Court of Punjab under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act:\n\n\"Whether on a true interpretation of Article 95 of the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the dividend of Rs. 4,12,500/- was liable to be included in the assessment year 1952-53.\"\n\nThe High Court recorded an answer to the question in the affirmative.\n\nAgainst the order of the High Court, this appeal - is preferred by the appellant with certificate granted_ by the High Court.\n\nEven though the question was framed as if article 95 of the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913,-applies to Govan Bros, it i~ common ground that_ the company\n\nwas registered under the Companies Act of the former Rampur State, and it had adopted special Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act. The relevant articles of Govan Bros. dealing with declaration or payment of final and interim dividends were articles 73 and\n\n74. The High Court therefore proceeded to deal with the question on the footing that it was, by the question referred, called upon to interpret article 7 4 of the Articles of Association of Govan Bros. It is common ground between the appellant and the Revenue that the provisions of the Companies Act of the former Rampur State were in terms identical with the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913.\n\nThe appellant contends that the directors of Govan Bros. had in exercise of authority expressly conferred upon them by article 74 declared dividend in their meeting dated August 30, 1950 and on such declaration the dividend became a debt due to the appellant and under the Indian Income-tax Act it became taxable in the year of assessment 1951-52, for the previous year of tlie appellant had ended on September\n\n30, 1951. The Commissioner of Income-tax says that the directors of Govan Bros. had paid by warrant issued on December 28, 1950 pursuant to a resolution dated August 30, 1950, interim dividend and it was only on payment the dividend became taxable under s. 16(2) of the Indian Incometax Act. It is said by the Commissioner that dividend final or interim is taxable not in the year in which it is declared but only in the year in which it is paid, credited or distributed, or deemed to be paid, credited or distributed, and that in any event a resolution by the Board of Directors to pay interim dividend does not create an enforceable obligation. for it is always open to the directors to rescind the resolution for payment of dividend even if it is one in form declaring dividend.\n\nThe Indian Companies Act, 1913 contains no provision for declaration of dividend either interim or final: it does not say as to who shall declare the dividend, nor does it say that dividend may be declared in a general meeting of the company. But s. 17(2) provides that the company may adopt all or any of the regulations contained in Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Act as its articles of association. and shall in any event be deemd to contain regulations identical with or to the same effect, amongst others, as regulation 95 and regulation 97 contained in that T.able.\n\nRegulation 95 of Table A provides that the company in general meeting may declare dividends, but no dividends shall exeed the amount recommended by the directors, and regulation 97 states that no dividends shall be paid otherwise than out of profits of the year or any other undistributed profits. Regulation 96, which is not an obligatory article, provides that the\n\nJ, Dalmia v.\n\nCommiasionef'of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nNew Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\nJ.Dalmia v.\n\nOommi...wn.rof\n\nlntomt-tM, New Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n582 SUPREl\\IE COURT HEPORTS [196iJ\n\ndirectors may from time to time pay to the members such interim dividends as appear to the directors to be justified by the profits of the company. Govan Bros. had in their Articles of Association made the following provision with regard to dividends:\n\n\"Art. 73. The Company in general meeting may declare a dividend to be paid to the members according to their rights and interests in the profits.\n\nArt. 74. When in their opinion the profits of the company permit, the directors may declare an interim dividend.\n\nArt. 77. No dividend shall be payable, except out of the net profits arising from the business of the cempany, and no larger dividends shall be declared than is recommended by the directors.\"\n\nBy Art. 80 it was provided that unless otherwise direded by the company in general meeting any dividends may be paid by cheque or warrant sent through the post to the registered address of the member entitled to the same.\n\nIn Art. 74 relating to payment of interim dividend, there was a slight departure from the regulation under Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act. Whereas under regulation 96 Table A the flirectors are authorised to pay to the members interim dividends, by Art. 74 of the Articles of Association of Govan Bros. the directors are authorised to deClare interim dividend. It may be noticed that under s. 17, adoption of an article in form identical with, or to the same effect as regulation 96 of Table A, is not made obligatory.\n\nThe material part of s. 16(2) of the Income-ta)\\ Act as it stood before it was deleted by s. 7 of the Finance Act, 1959 with effect from April 1, 1960, read as follows:\n\n\"For the purposes of inclusion in the total income of an assessee any dividend shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which it is paid, credited or distributed or deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed to him • • *\"\n\nThe clause in terms made dividend the income of the year in which it was paid, credited or distributed or was deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed.\n\nIn the present case dividend was paid to the appellant on December 28,\n\n1950. It is not the case of the appellant that thj! amount was either credited in the books of account of Govan Bros. to the appellant or was distributed or deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed to the appellant before the close of the appellant's year of account ending September 30, 1950. But Mr. Kapur contends that under the law governing companies\n\n/ - ' 7 _s.c.R:\\ -,~UPRE~[E COURT REPORTS 583\n\n' '. • - \"< .- -- - -;·- -··---_--- on declaration, dividendinterim or final becomes due, and\n\nit must fie regarded for the purpose of the Income-tax Act as paid to the member on the date on which -it is declared.\n\nThere is no doubt that a declaration of dividend by a company in general meeting gives rise to a debt. \"When a company declares a dividend on its shares, a debt imme diately becomes payable to each shareholder in respect of his dividend for which he can sue at law, and the Statute of limitation immediately begins to run\": In re Severn and Wye and Severn Bridge Railway Company('). But this rule applies only in case of dividend declared by the company ill general meeting. A final dividend in general may be sanctioned at an annual meeting when the accounts are presented to the members. But power to pay interim dividend is usually vested, by the articles of association, in the directors.\n\nFor paying interim dividend.a resolution of the company-is not required: if the directors are authorised by the articles of association they may pay such amount as they think proper, having regard to their estimate of the profits made by the company. Interim dividend is therefore paid pursuant to the resolution of the directors on some day between the ordinary general meetings of the company. On payment, undoubtedly interim' dividend becomes the property of the shareholder. But a mere resolution of the directors re:>olving to pay a certain amount as interim dividend does not create a debt enforceable against the company, for it is always open to the directors to rescind the resolution before payment of the dividend. In The Lagunas Nitrate Company (Limited)\n\nv. J. Henry Schroeder and Company (') the directors of a company passed a resolution declaring interim dividend payable on a future date, and reque:>ted the company's bankers to set apart, out of the money of the company in their hand, into a special account entitled \"interim Dividend Account\", a sum sufficient to cover the dividend, pending the company's instructions. But before the date fixed for payment. the directors resolved that pending certain litigation to which the company was a party, payment of dividend be postponed.\n\nIt was held by the Court that the directors had the right even after resolving to pay interim dividend to rescind the resolution and no . enforceable right arose in favour of the members of the company by the declaration of interim dividend.\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws of England, III Edn., Vol. 6 p. 402, Art. 778, it has been stated:\n\n\"A directors' declaration of an interim dividend may be rescinded before payment has been made.\"\n\n(') (1896) 1 Ch. 559. (') 17 Time_s Law Reports 625.\n\nJ.Dalmia ...\n\nCommiuioner of\n\nlncome-taz, }ttwDelhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n196l\n\nJ.Dalmia\n\nCommiaaiO'Ut' of\n\n111.come-taz~ Ne111 Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n' Therefore a declaration by a company in general meeting gives rise to an enforceable obligation, but a resolution of the Board of Directors resolving to pay interim dividend or even resolving to declare interim dividend pursuant to the authority conferred. upon them by. the articles of association gives rise to no enforceable obligation against the company,\n\nbecause the resolution is always capable of being rescinded.\n\nTherefore departure in the text of Art. 7 4 of the Articles of Association of Govan Bros. from the statutory version under Table A of the power in respect of interim dividend which may be entrusted to the directors, makes no real difference in the tnie character of the right arising in favour of the members of the company on execution of the power. The directors by the Articles of Association are entrusted with the administration of the affairs of a company; it is open to them if so authorised to declare interim dividend. They may, but are not bound to, pay interim dividend, even if the finances of the company justify such payment, even if the directors have resolved to pay interim dividend, they may before payment rescind the resolution.\n\nCounsel for the appellant does not rely upon any evidence of actual payment or upon any credit given to the appellant in the books of account of the company nor upon any distribution. Even the resolution of the directors of August 30, 1950 is not on the record, and there is no evidence that it was resolved to pay the dividend on any date before it was actually paid, and the company had taken any step to implement the. resolution within the year of account corresponding to the assessment year 1951-52. There is no statutory provision which gives rise to a fiction that on declaration of interim dividend, it should be deemend to be paid, credited or distributed.\n\nIn support of the plea that interim dividend was taxable in the year of assessment 1951-52, the appellant relies upon two facts only-the power vested in the directors to declare interim dividend, and the passing of a resolution by the directors relating to interim dividend on August 30, 1950 followed by the drawing of dividend warrants dated December 28,\n\n1950. But for reasons already stated a resolution of the board of directors declaring interim dividend, until it is implemented by some step taken by the company, creates no enforceable right in the shareholders. The judgment of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mu/raj Khatau(') on which counsel for the appellant relies, does not assist him either. In that case the company declared a dividend out of its profits, and made it payable a few days later. The dividend was paid on the\n\n('.) 16 I.TR. 248.\n\ndate on which it was made payable by the resolution of the company. The Income-tax Officer treated the amount received by the member as dividend income for the asessment year in which it was actually received. The High Court of Bombay in a reference under s. 66 observed that as soon as the dividend was declared it became the income of the assessee which income the assessee could deal with or dispose of in any manner he liked. Chagla C. J ., speaking for the Court enunciated the law as follows:\n\n\"It L> impossible to give a literal construction to the expression \"paid\" used in this sub-section (sub-s.\n\n(2) of s. 16). If a literal corntruction were to be given, then it would amount to this that \"until the dividend warrant was actually cashed and the dividend amount was actually realised it cannot be stated that the dividend was paid to the shareholder. • • • • • I think the proper construction to give to that word is when the dividend is declared then a liability arises on the part of the company to make that payment to the shareholder and with regard to the shareholder when the income represented by that dividend accrues or arfr; es to him.\n\nThe mere fact that the actual payment of the income is deferred is immaterial and irrelevant.\" But whether dividend-interim or fixed-is income taxable in a particular year of assessment must be determined in the light of s. 16(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The Legislature had not made dividend income taxable in the year in which it becomes due: by express words of the statute, it is taxable only in the year in which it is paid, credited or di;; tributed or is dmed to be paid, credited or distributed. The Legislature has made distinct provisions relating to the year in which different heads of income become iaxable. Salary becomes taxable by s. 7 when it is allowed to the employee or becomes due to him. whether it is actually paid to him or not.\n\nInterest on securities under s. 8 iB taxable when it is received by the asses see. Under s. 9 tax on property becomes payable not on any actual receipt of income from the property but on a purely national computation in the year of account of a bona fide annual value of the property, subject to the adjustments provided in that section. Profits and gains of busines.>, profession or vocation carried on by an assessee are computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee, unless the Income-tax Officer being of the opinion that profits or gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom, directs otherwise.\n\nOther sourcei; of income-and dividends are included in this residuary class-become taxable in the year in which they\n\n196~\n\nJ. Dalmia.\n\nOommisaicmer of\n\nJncqm, e,.tax, New Delk~\n\nShah, J.\n\nJ. Dalmia v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlnconie-tax, '-Yew Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\nare received or accrue or arise or are deemed to be received, accrued or arise, according to the nature of the particular income. The year in which a particular class of income becomes taxable must therefore be determined, in the light of its true character, and subject to the special provision, if any, applicable thereto. The Legislature has enacted an express provfaion making dividend income taxable in the year in which it is paid, credited or distributed or is to be deemed, so paid, credited or distributed. The test applied by Chagla C. J., that because the dividend becomes d11e to the assessee who has the right to deal with or dispose of the same .in any manner he likes, it is taxable in the year in which it t> declared, cannot be resarded as correct. The expression \"paid\" in s. 16(2) it is true does not contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the member. In general, dividend may be said to be paid within the meaning of s. 16(2) when the company discharges its liability and makes the amount of dividend unconditionally available to the member entitled thereto. Chagla C. J., has himself in Purshotamdas Thakurdas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City /(') expressed a different view.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice in delivering the judgment of the court referred to Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau's case (3) and observed that the principle of that case applied only to those cases where in facts the djvidend was paid to the shareholder and not to cases where a contingent liability was undertaken and no payment was made.\n\nHe , observed:\n\n\" * * • one thing is clear from the language used by the Leg1lature that it did not intend to equate \"paid\" with \"declared\" in every case.\n\nTherefore, it is open to us to consider, notwithstanding the Khatau Mills' case, whether on the facts \"of this case, it could be said that dividend has been paid, which although it may have been declared may never be payable and in fact has not been paid.\" If the mere declaration of dividend in general meeting of the company is not to be.regarded as payment within the meaning of s. 16(2), much less can it be said that a resolution declaring interim dividend-which is capable of being rescinded by directors-operates as payment before the company has actually parted with the amount of dividend or discharged obligation by some other act. The High Court was therefore right in recording an affirmative answer to the question propounded for the consideration of the Court.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(') 34 I.T.R. 204.", "total_entities": 152, "entities": [{"text": "569\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA AND\n\nCOIMBATORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA AND COIMBATORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. W. RUSSEL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "L. W. RUSSEL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IK. SUBBA RAO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "c. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "s. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 482, "end_char": 489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Meamng of perquisite-Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 490, "end_char": 532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meamng of perquisite-Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Meamng of perquisite-Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 679, "end_char": 686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1922 (11 of 1922), s. 7(1),\n\nThe respondent is an employee of the English and Scottish Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. incorporated in England."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 806, "end_char": 811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Society established a superannuation scheme for the benefit of the male European members of its staff employed in India by means of deferred rnnuities."}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1408, "end_char": 1415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meamng of perquisite-Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Meamng of perquisite-Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1890, "end_char": 1897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1905, "end_char": 1919, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2284, "end_char": 2291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2457, "end_char": 2464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2565, "end_char": 2569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Kerala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2712, "end_char": 2747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the appeal,\n\n19G~\n\nApril 1\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Kerala and\n\nCoimbatore v.\n\nL. W. Ruwr::l\n\nHeld: The answers to the questions of law as given by the High Court were correct."}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3268, "end_char": 3275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Edwards", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Smyth v. Stretton, (1904), 5 T.C. 36, and Edwards (H. M.\n\nInspector of Taxes) v. Roberts, (1935), 19 T.C. 618, referred to."}}, {"text": "January 9, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3698, "end_char": 3713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 9, 1961 of the Kerala High Court in I.T.R.\n\nCase No."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3721, "end_char": 3738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 9, 1961 of the Kerala High Court in I.T.R.\n\nCase No."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3799, "end_char": 3813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "R. N. Sachthey"}}, {"text": "SuM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3926, "end_char": 3929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSuM, a R.,,,; J.\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This appeal by special leave preferred against the judgment of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam raises the question of the interpretation of s. 7(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (Act No."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3944, "end_char": 3953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSuM, a R.,,,; J.\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This appeal by special leave preferred against the judgment of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam raises the question of the interpretation of s. 7(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (Act No.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4025, "end_char": 4058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSuM, a R.,,,; J.\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This appeal by special leave preferred against the judgment of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam raises the question of the interpretation of s. 7(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (Act No."}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4104, "end_char": 4111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4119, "end_char": 4146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "L. W. Russel", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4214, "end_char": 4226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, L. W. Russel, is an employee of the English and Scottish Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd., Kozhikodc, hereinafter called the Society, which was incorporated in England.", "canonical_name": "L. W. RUSSEL"}}, {"text": "Ceylon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4527, "end_char": 4533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Society established a superannuation scheme for the benefit of the male European members of the Society's staff employed in India, Ceylon and Africa by means of deferred annuities."}}, {"text": "Africa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4538, "end_char": 4544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Society established a superannuation scheme for the benefit of the male European members of the Society's staff employed in India, Ceylon and Africa by means of deferred annuities."}}, {"text": "July 27,\n\n1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4645, "end_char": 4659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The terms of such benefits were incorpcrated in a trust deed dated July 27,\n\n1934."}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5322, "end_char": 5329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kozhikode", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5492, "end_char": 5501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal preferred by the respondent against\n\nthe said inclusion to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Kozhikode, was dismissed."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5659, "end_char": 5667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 1, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5773, "end_char": 5789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its order dated December 1, 1958, the Tribunal submitted a statement of case referring the following three questions of law to the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam : -\n\n(l) Whether the contributions paid by the employer to the assessee under the terms of a trust deed in respect of a contract for a deferred annuity on the life of the assessee is a 'perquisite' as contemplated by s. 7(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act?"}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6161, "end_char": 6175, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6976, "end_char": 6983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7285, "end_char": 7292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7310, "end_char": 7327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Rajagopala Sastri, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the amount contributed by the Society under the scheme towards the insurance premium payable by the trustees for arranging a deferred annuity on the respondent's superannuation is a perquisite within the meaning of s. 7(1) of the Act and that the fact that the respondent may not have the benefit of the contributions on the happening of certain contingencies will not make the said contributions anytheless a perquisite."}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7593, "end_char": 7600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8400, "end_char": 8407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 27, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8658, "end_char": 8671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trust deed and the rules dated July 27, 1934, embody the superannuation scheme."}}, {"text": "Table in the Appendix annexed to the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11729, "end_char": 11771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "have given the relevant part of the Scheme and the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13365, "end_char": 13421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S11J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14034, "end_char": 14038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have given the relevant part of the Scheme and the Rules", "statute": "We have given the relevant part of the Scheme and the Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 7(])", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16033, "end_char": 16040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16178, "end_char": 16190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17523, "end_char": 17530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17935, "end_char": 17942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18189, "end_char": 18196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19608, "end_char": 19615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stretton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20559, "end_char": 20567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, one Stretton, one of the Assistant Masters of Dulwich College, was assessed to income-tax in the sum of £385 in respect of his emoluments as Assistant Master received from the Governors of Dulwich College for the year ended the 5th day of April, 1901."}}, {"text": "Dulwich College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20601, "end_char": 20616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, one Stretton, one of the Assistant Masters of Dulwich College, was assessed to income-tax in the sum of £385 in respect of his emoluments as Assistant Master received from the Governors of Dulwich College for the year ended the 5th day of April, 1901."}}, {"text": "5th day of April, 1901", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20783, "end_char": 20805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, one Stretton, one of the Assistant Masters of Dulwich College, was assessed to income-tax in the sum of £385 in respect of his emoluments as Assistant Master received from the Governors of Dulwich College for the year ended the 5th day of April, 1901."}}, {"text": "Channell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20999, "end_char": 21007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Channell, J., with some hesitation, came to the conclusion that the said sum was taxable."}}, {"text": "August 2l. 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23999, "end_char": 24014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the respondent was employed by a company under a service agreement dated August 2l."}}, {"text": "L. W. Russel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25388, "end_char": 25400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, fP(ll)IHCf-17\n\nOommisaiomr of I ncome-taz, Kerala and Coimbatore\n\nL. W. Russel\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nOammissianer of\n\nIncome-tax, Kenda and\n\nCoimbatore\n\nL. W. Russel\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\n578 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l S [1964}\n\nshares at the date of transfer.", "canonical_name": "L. W. RUSSEL"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25402, "end_char": 25411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, fP(ll)IHCf-17\n\nOommisaiomr of I ncome-taz, Kerala and Coimbatore\n\nL. W. Russel\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nOammissianer of\n\nIncome-tax, Kenda and\n\nCoimbatore\n\nL. W. Russel\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\n578 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l S [1964}\n\nshares at the date of transfer.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Hanwbrth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26200, "end_char": 26208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Hanwbrth, M. R., in rejecting the contention, observed: - \" .................. ur:der these circumstances there could not be said to have accrued to this employee a vested interest in these successive sums placed to his credit, but only that he had a chance of being: paid a sum at the end of six years if all went well."}}, {"text": "Maugham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26690, "end_char": 26697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maugham, L. J., said much to the same effect thus:\n\n\"The true nature of the agreement was that he was to\n\nbe entitled in the events, and only in the events mentioned in Clause 8 of the agreement, to the investments made by the Compa1iy out of the net profits of the Company as provided in Clause 6.\"~ The decision of Channell, J., in Smvth v.\n\nSrrettonl') was strongly relied upon before the appellate court."}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26859, "end_char": 26867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26979, "end_char": 26987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(])", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27898, "end_char": 27905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. SUB BA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28271, "end_char": 28284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NEW DELHI\n\n[K. SUB BA RAo."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28289, "end_char": 28296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]", "canonical_name": "c. SHAH"}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28301, "end_char": 28312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]", "canonical_name": "s. M. SIKRI, JJ."}}, {"text": "Meaning of-Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28563, "end_char": 28600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28614, "end_char": 28622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Meaning of-Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Art. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28624, "end_char": 28631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Meaning of-Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28639, "end_char": 28659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28675, "end_char": 28683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "August 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28779, "end_char": 28794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant held shares in a company the Board of Directors of which by a resolution dated August 30, 1950 declared interim dividends."}}, {"text": "December 28, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28871, "end_char": 28888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant received a dividend warrant dated December 28, 1950 for a certain amount being the interim dividend in respect of its share holdings in the company."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29034, "end_char": 29052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's year of accounting had ended on September 30, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29317, "end_char": 29325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29333, "end_char": 29359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29443, "end_char": 29450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Incometax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "First Sche- -dule to Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29458, "end_char": 29505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Lagunas Nitrate Schroeder and Company", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29986, "end_char": 30023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lagunas Nitrate Schroeder and Company, 17 to."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30214, "end_char": 30220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• (ii) The test applied by Chagla C. J. (in C.I.T., Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau, 16 I.T.R. 248) that because the dividend becomes due to the assessee who has the right to deal \\vith or dispose of the same in any manner he likes, it is taxable in the year in which it is declared cannot be regarded as correct."}}, {"text": "Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30250, "end_char": 30272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• (ii) The test applied by Chagla C. J. (in C.I.T., Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau, 16 I.T.R. 248) that because the dividend becomes due to the assessee who has the right to deal \\vith or dispose of the same in any manner he likes, it is taxable in the year in which it is declared cannot be regarded as correct.", "canonical_name": "Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30587, "end_char": 30601, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "J.Dalmia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30848, "end_char": 30856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.Dalmia\nT.\n\nCommi8sioner of\n\nIncome.taz, ·\n\nl!,,..ewDtlhi\n\nSooh, J.\n\n' ' ' ··,,-·.-:-f-,,'/- -~ ;\\- ' -- >:;;; r-\n\n/ \\) - ;·,•,.....;.- ·'\"-~-----~\n\n' ' '580 SUPRE)lE COURT REPORTS (1964} , - _(iv) The declaration of interim dividend capable of being rescinded 'by the directors does not operate as a payment under s. 16(2) of the Income-true Act before the company has parted w<ith the amount of dividend or discharged its obligation by some other act. ·"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31168, "end_char": 31176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31502, "end_char": 31513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and B. P. M aheslnvari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. M aheslnvari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31518, "end_char": 31536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and B. P. M aheslnvari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31558, "end_char": 31572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31592, "end_char": 31614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31619, "end_char": 31633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "R. N. Sachthey"}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31716, "end_char": 31720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH, J.-The appellant which is a Hindu undivided family was the registered holder of 1,500 shares of M / s Govan Bros. (Rampurl Ltd. in the year of account October\n\n1, 1950 to September 30, 1951.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Govan Bros.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31980, "end_char": 31991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to a resolution passed by the board of directors of M/ s Govan Bros. (Rampur) Ltd.-hereinafter called 'Govan Bros.'-at a meeting held on August 30, 1950, the appellant received a dividend warrant dated December 28, 1950 for R.~. 4,12,500/- being interim dividend in respect of its share-holding in Govan Bros. This amount was brought to tax with the other income of the appellant in the assessment year 1952-53 by the Revenue authorities, after rejecting the objection of the appellant that it represented income for the assessment year 1951-52."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32611, "end_char": 32631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the appellant the Appellate Tribunal drew up a statement of the case and referred the question set out hereinbelow to the High Court of Punjab under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act:\n\n\"Whether on a true interpretation of Article 95 of the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the dividend of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32638, "end_char": 32646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32661, "end_char": 32675, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32715, "end_char": 32725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32733, "end_char": 32781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33114, "end_char": 33124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33132, "end_char": 33180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Govan Bros", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33193, "end_char": 33203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even though the question was framed as if article 95 of the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913,-applies to Govan Bros, it i~ common ground that_ the company\n\nwas registered under the Companies Act of the former Rampur State, and it had adopted special Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33269, "end_char": 33282, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33338, "end_char": 33409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "articles 73 and\n\n74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33520, "end_char": 33539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act", "statute": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33681, "end_char": 33690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act", "statute": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Association of Govan Bros.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33712, "end_char": 33738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court therefore proceeded to deal with the question on the footing that it was, by the question referred, called upon to interpret article 7 4 of the Articles of Association of Govan Bros. It is common ground between the appellant and the Revenue that the provisions of the Companies Act of the former Rampur State were in terms identical with the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33824, "end_char": 33837, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33923, "end_char": 33936, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34064, "end_char": 34074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act", "statute": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34225, "end_char": 34239, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September\n\n30, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34346, "end_char": 34365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant contends that the directors of Govan Bros. had in exercise of authority expressly conferred upon them by article 74 declared dividend in their meeting dated August 30, 1950 and on such declaration the dividend became a debt due to the appellant and under the Indian Income-tax Act it became taxable in the year of assessment 1951-52, for the previous year of tlie appellant had ended on September\n\n30, 1951."}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34611, "end_char": 34619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35144, "end_char": 35170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35387, "end_char": 35395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "The Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35475, "end_char": 35525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36152, "end_char": 36156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regulation 96, which is not an obligatory article, provides that the\n\nJ, Dalmia v.\n\nCommiasionef'of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nNew Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\nJ.Dalmia v.\n\nOommi...wn.rof\n\nlntomt-tM, New Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n582 SUPREl\\IE COURT HEPORTS [196iJ\n\ndirectors may from time to time pay to the members such interim dividends as appear to the directors to be justified by the profits of the company.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Art. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36513, "end_char": 36520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36659, "end_char": 36666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36773, "end_char": 36780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36969, "end_char": 36976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37192, "end_char": 37199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37296, "end_char": 37346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37458, "end_char": 37465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37599, "end_char": 37604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37750, "end_char": 37758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37819, "end_char": 37823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37831, "end_char": 37848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37866, "end_char": 37879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material part of s. 16(2) of the Income-ta)\\ Act as it stood before it was deleted by s. 7 of the Finance Act, 1959 with effect from April 1, 1960, read as follows:\n\n\"For the purposes of inclusion in the total income of an assessee any dividend shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which it is paid, credited or distributed or deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed to him • • *\"\n\nThe clause in terms made dividend the income of the year in which it was paid, credited or distributed or was deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed."}}, {"text": "December 28,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38361, "end_char": 38379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case dividend was paid to the appellant on December 28,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38686, "end_char": 38691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Mr. Kapur contends that under the law governing companies\n\n/ - ' 7 _s.c."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38927, "end_char": 38941, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 778", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41299, "end_char": 41307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42076, "end_char": 42082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 28,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43803, "end_char": 43815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the plea that interim dividend was taxable in the year of assessment 1951-52, the appellant relies upon two facts only-the power vested in the directors to declare interim dividend, and the passing of a resolution by the directors relating to interim dividend on August 30, 1950 followed by the drawing of dividend warrants dated December 28,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44050, "end_char": 44067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mu/raj Khatau(') on which counsel for the appellant relies, does not assist him either."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44574, "end_char": 44594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay in a reference under s. 66 observed that as soon as the dividend was declared it became the income of the assessee which income the assessee could deal with or dispose of in any manner he liked."}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44616, "end_char": 44621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44975, "end_char": 44980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45739, "end_char": 45747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45762, "end_char": 45776, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46170, "end_char": 46174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46306, "end_char": 46310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46366, "end_char": 46370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47967, "end_char": 47975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48120, "end_char": 48128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48469, "end_char": 48492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice in delivering the judgment of the court referred to Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau's case (3) and observed that the principle of that case applied only to those cases where in facts the djvidend was paid to the shareholder and not to cases where a contingent liability was undertaken and no payment was made.", "canonical_name": "Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau"}}, {"text": "Khatau Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48937, "end_char": 48949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, it is open to us to consider, notwithstanding the Khatau Mills' case, whether on the facts \"of this case, it could be said that dividend has been paid, which although it may have been declared may never be payable and in fact has not been paid.\""}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49258, "end_char": 49266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_579_586_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "/ .:\n\n1 S.C.R:,\n\nSUPRE)!E COURT REPORTS 579\n\n'-.... -\n\nJ; DALMIA v. \\\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX. NEW DELHI\n\n[K. SUB BA RAo. J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]\n\nCompany Law-Resolution of Board of Directors-Interim dividend-If creates a debt enforceable against the comvanylncome Tax-Payable on the dividend in the year in which it was actually paid, credited, or distributed OT deemed to be :paid-\"Paid\"-Meaning of-Indian Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913), s. 17(2), Art. 95 Sch. I-Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), .s. 16(2).\n\nThe appellant held shares in a company the Board of Directors of which by a resolution dated August 30, 1950 declared interim dividends. The appellant received a dividend warrant dated December 28, 1950 for a certain amount being the interim dividend in respect of its share holdings in the company. The appellant's year of accounting had ended on September 30, 1950. The revenue authorities brought to tax the .amount so received with other income of the appellant in the assessment year 1952-53 after rejecting the objection of the .appellant that it represented income for the assessment year 1951-52. In a reference made under s. 66(1) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, the High Court agreed with the Revenue authority that the dividend was in view of Art. 95 of the First Sche- -dule to Indian Companies Act, 1913, liable to be included in the cassessment year 1952-53.\n\nHeld: A declaration of dividend by a company in a general meeting gives rise to a debt.\n\nIn re Severn and Wye and Severn Bridge Railway Co.\n\n(1896) 1 Ch. 559, referred to.\n\nBut a mere resolution of the Directors resolving to pay a certain amount as interim dividend does not create a debt enforceable against the company for it is always open to the Directors to rescind the resolution before payment of the dividend.\n\nThe Lagunas Nitrate Schroeder and Company, 17 to.\n\nCampany (Ltd.) v.\n\nJ. Henry Times Law Reports 625, referred\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau, 16 I.T.R. 248, distinguished.\n\n• (ii) The test applied by Chagla C. J. (in C.I.T., Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau, 16 I.T.R. 248) that because the dividend becomes due to the assessee who has the right to deal \\vith or dispose of the same in any manner he likes, it is taxable in the year in which it is declared cannot be regarded as correct.\n\n(iii) Dividend may te said to be paid within the meaning of s. 16(2} of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 when the company discharges its liability and makes the amount thereof unconditionally available to the member entitled thereto.\n\nPurshottamdas Thakurdas v. C.I.T., Bombay, 34 I.T.R, 204, referred to.\n\nLiP(D)l8CT-17(a\\\n\n.April I\n\n. I\n\nI .\n\n-- T.\n\nCommi8sioner of\n\nIncome.taz, ·\n\nl!,,..ewDtlhi\n\nSooh, J.\n\n' ' ' ··,,-·.-:-f-,,'/- -~ ;\\- ' -- >:;;; r-\n\n/ \\) - ;·,•,.....;.- ·'\"-~-----~\n\n' ' '580 SUPRE)lE COURT REPORTS (1964} , - _(iv) The declaration of interim dividend capable of being rescinded 'by the directors does not operate as a payment under s. 16(2) of the Income-true Act before the company has parted w<ith the amount of dividend or discharged its obligation by some other act. ·\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 505 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 6, 1961 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in I.T.R. No. 16 of 1959.\n\nS. K. Kapur and B. P. M aheslnvari, for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nApril 1, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nSHAH, J.-The appellant which is a Hindu undivided family was the registered holder of 1,500 shares of M / s Govan Bros. (Rampurl Ltd. in the year of account October\n\n1, 1950 to September 30, 1951.\n\nPursuant to a resolution passed by the board of directors of M/ s Govan Bros. (Rampur) Ltd.-hereinafter called 'Govan Bros.'-at a meeting held on August 30, 1950, the appellant received a dividend warrant dated December 28, 1950 for R.~. 4,12,500/- being interim dividend in respect of its share-holding in Govan Bros. This amount was brought to tax with the other income of the appellant in the assessment year 1952-53 by the Revenue authorities, after rejecting the objection of the appellant that it represented income for the assessment year 1951-52.\n\nAt the instance of the appellant the Appellate Tribunal drew up a statement of the case and referred the question set out hereinbelow to the High Court of Punjab under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act:\n\n\"Whether on a true interpretation of Article 95 of the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the dividend of Rs. 4,12,500/- was liable to be included in the assessment year 1952-53.\"\n\nThe High Court recorded an answer to the question in the affirmative.\n\nAgainst the order of the High Court, this appeal - is preferred by the appellant with certificate granted_ by the High Court.\n\nEven though the question was framed as if article 95 of the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913,-applies to Govan Bros, it i~ common ground that_ the company\n\nwas registered under the Companies Act of the former Rampur State, and it had adopted special Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act. The relevant articles of Govan Bros. dealing with declaration or payment of final and interim dividends were articles 73 and\n\n74. The High Court therefore proceeded to deal with the question on the footing that it was, by the question referred, called upon to interpret article 7 4 of the Articles of Association of Govan Bros. It is common ground between the appellant and the Revenue that the provisions of the Companies Act of the former Rampur State were in terms identical with the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913.\n\nThe appellant contends that the directors of Govan Bros. had in exercise of authority expressly conferred upon them by article 74 declared dividend in their meeting dated August 30, 1950 and on such declaration the dividend became a debt due to the appellant and under the Indian Income-tax Act it became taxable in the year of assessment 1951-52, for the previous year of tlie appellant had ended on September\n\n30, 1951. The Commissioner of Income-tax says that the directors of Govan Bros. had paid by warrant issued on December 28, 1950 pursuant to a resolution dated August 30, 1950, interim dividend and it was only on payment the dividend became taxable under s. 16(2) of the Indian Incometax Act. It is said by the Commissioner that dividend final or interim is taxable not in the year in which it is declared but only in the year in which it is paid, credited or distributed, or deemed to be paid, credited or distributed, and that in any event a resolution by the Board of Directors to pay interim dividend does not create an enforceable obligation. for it is always open to the directors to rescind the resolution for payment of dividend even if it is one in form declaring dividend.\n\nThe Indian Companies Act, 1913 contains no provision for declaration of dividend either interim or final: it does not say as to who shall declare the dividend, nor does it say that dividend may be declared in a general meeting of the company. But s. 17(2) provides that the company may adopt all or any of the regulations contained in Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Act as its articles of association. and shall in any event be deemd to contain regulations identical with or to the same effect, amongst others, as regulation 95 and regulation 97 contained in that T.able.\n\nRegulation 95 of Table A provides that the company in general meeting may declare dividends, but no dividends shall exeed the amount recommended by the directors, and regulation 97 states that no dividends shall be paid otherwise than out of profits of the year or any other undistributed profits. Regulation 96, which is not an obligatory article, provides that the\n\nJ, Dalmia v.\n\nCommiasionef'of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nNew Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\nJ.Dalmia v.\n\nOommi...wn.rof\n\nlntomt-tM, New Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n582 SUPREl\\IE COURT HEPORTS [196iJ\n\ndirectors may from time to time pay to the members such interim dividends as appear to the directors to be justified by the profits of the company. Govan Bros. had in their Articles of Association made the following provision with regard to dividends:\n\n\"Art. 73. The Company in general meeting may declare a dividend to be paid to the members according to their rights and interests in the profits.\n\nArt. 74. When in their opinion the profits of the company permit, the directors may declare an interim dividend.\n\nArt. 77. No dividend shall be payable, except out of the net profits arising from the business of the cempany, and no larger dividends shall be declared than is recommended by the directors.\"\n\nBy Art. 80 it was provided that unless otherwise direded by the company in general meeting any dividends may be paid by cheque or warrant sent through the post to the registered address of the member entitled to the same.\n\nIn Art. 74 relating to payment of interim dividend, there was a slight departure from the regulation under Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act. Whereas under regulation 96 Table A the flirectors are authorised to pay to the members interim dividends, by Art. 74 of the Articles of Association of Govan Bros. the directors are authorised to deClare interim dividend. It may be noticed that under s. 17, adoption of an article in form identical with, or to the same effect as regulation 96 of Table A, is not made obligatory.\n\nThe material part of s. 16(2) of the Income-ta)\\ Act as it stood before it was deleted by s. 7 of the Finance Act, 1959 with effect from April 1, 1960, read as follows:\n\n\"For the purposes of inclusion in the total income of an assessee any dividend shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which it is paid, credited or distributed or deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed to him • • *\"\n\nThe clause in terms made dividend the income of the year in which it was paid, credited or distributed or was deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed.\n\nIn the present case dividend was paid to the appellant on December 28,\n\n1950. It is not the case of the appellant that thj! amount was either credited in the books of account of Govan Bros. to the appellant or was distributed or deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed to the appellant before the close of the appellant's year of account ending September 30, 1950. But Mr. Kapur contends that under the law governing companies\n\n/ - ' 7 _s.c.R:\\ -,~UPRE~[E COURT REPORTS 583\n\n' '. • - \"< .- -- - -;·- -··---_--- on declaration, dividendinterim or final becomes due, and\n\nit must fie regarded for the purpose of the Income-tax Act as paid to the member on the date on which -it is declared.\n\nThere is no doubt that a declaration of dividend by a company in general meeting gives rise to a debt. \"When a company declares a dividend on its shares, a debt imme diately becomes payable to each shareholder in respect of his dividend for which he can sue at law, and the Statute of limitation immediately begins to run\": In re Severn and Wye and Severn Bridge Railway Company('). But this rule applies only in case of dividend declared by the company ill general meeting. A final dividend in general may be sanctioned at an annual meeting when the accounts are presented to the members. But power to pay interim dividend is usually vested, by the articles of association, in the directors.\n\nFor paying interim dividend.a resolution of the company-is not required: if the directors are authorised by the articles of association they may pay such amount as they think proper, having regard to their estimate of the profits made by the company. Interim dividend is therefore paid pursuant to the resolution of the directors on some day between the ordinary general meetings of the company. On payment, undoubtedly interim' dividend becomes the property of the shareholder. But a mere resolution of the directors re:>olving to pay a certain amount as interim dividend does not create a debt enforceable against the company, for it is always open to the directors to rescind the resolution before payment of the dividend. In The Lagunas Nitrate Company (Limited)\n\nv. J. Henry Schroeder and Company (') the directors of a company passed a resolution declaring interim dividend payable on a future date, and reque:>ted the company's bankers to set apart, out of the money of the company in their hand, into a special account entitled \"interim Dividend Account\", a sum sufficient to cover the dividend, pending the company's instructions. But before the date fixed for payment. the directors resolved that pending certain litigation to which the company was a party, payment of dividend be postponed.\n\nIt was held by the Court that the directors had the right even after resolving to pay interim dividend to rescind the resolution and no . enforceable right arose in favour of the members of the company by the declaration of interim dividend.\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws of England, III Edn., Vol. 6 p. 402, Art. 778, it has been stated:\n\n\"A directors' declaration of an interim dividend may be rescinded before payment has been made.\"\n\n(') (1896) 1 Ch. 559. (') 17 Time_s Law Reports 625.\n\nJ.Dalmia ...\n\nCommiuioner of\n\nlncome-taz, }ttwDelhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n196l\n\nCommiaaiO'Ut' of\n\n111.come-taz~ Ne111 Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n' Therefore a declaration by a company in general meeting gives rise to an enforceable obligation, but a resolution of the Board of Directors resolving to pay interim dividend or even resolving to declare interim dividend pursuant to the authority conferred. upon them by. the articles of association gives rise to no enforceable obligation against the company,\n\nbecause the resolution is always capable of being rescinded.\n\nTherefore departure in the text of Art. 7 4 of the Articles of Association of Govan Bros. from the statutory version under Table A of the power in respect of interim dividend which may be entrusted to the directors, makes no real difference in the tnie character of the right arising in favour of the members of the company on execution of the power. The directors by the Articles of Association are entrusted with the administration of the affairs of a company; it is open to them if so authorised to declare interim dividend. They may, but are not bound to, pay interim dividend, even if the finances of the company justify such payment, even if the directors have resolved to pay interim dividend, they may before payment rescind the resolution.\n\nCounsel for the appellant does not rely upon any evidence of actual payment or upon any credit given to the appellant in the books of account of the company nor upon any distribution. Even the resolution of the directors of August 30, 1950 is not on the record, and there is no evidence that it was resolved to pay the dividend on any date before it was actually paid, and the company had taken any step to implement the. resolution within the year of account corresponding to the assessment year 1951-52. There is no statutory provision which gives rise to a fiction that on declaration of interim dividend, it should be deemend to be paid, credited or distributed.\n\nIn support of the plea that interim dividend was taxable in the year of assessment 1951-52, the appellant relies upon two facts only-the power vested in the directors to declare interim dividend, and the passing of a resolution by the directors relating to interim dividend on August 30, 1950 followed by the drawing of dividend warrants dated December 28,\n\n1950. But for reasons already stated a resolution of the board of directors declaring interim dividend, until it is implemented by some step taken by the company, creates no enforceable right in the shareholders. The judgment of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mu/raj Khatau(') on which counsel for the appellant relies, does not assist him either. In that case the company declared a dividend out of its profits, and made it payable a few days later. The dividend was paid on the\n\n('.) 16 I.TR. 248.\n\ndate on which it was made payable by the resolution of the company. The Income-tax Officer treated the amount received by the member as dividend income for the asessment year in which it was actually received. The High Court of Bombay in a reference under s. 66 observed that as soon as the dividend was declared it became the income of the assessee which income the assessee could deal with or dispose of in any manner he liked. Chagla C. J ., speaking for the Court enunciated the law as follows:\n\n\"It L> impossible to give a literal construction to the expression \"paid\" used in this sub-section (sub-s.\n\n(2) of s. 16). If a literal corntruction were to be given, then it would amount to this that \"until the dividend warrant was actually cashed and the dividend amount was actually realised it cannot be stated that the dividend was paid to the shareholder. • • • • • I think the proper construction to give to that word is when the dividend is declared then a liability arises on the part of the company to make that payment to the shareholder and with regard to the shareholder when the income represented by that dividend accrues or arfr; es to him.\n\nThe mere fact that the actual payment of the income is deferred is immaterial and irrelevant.\" But whether dividend-interim or fixed-is income taxable in a particular year of assessment must be determined in the light of s. 16(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The Legislature had not made dividend income taxable in the year in which it becomes due: by express words of the statute, it is taxable only in the year in which it is paid, credited or di;; tributed or is dmed to be paid, credited or distributed. The Legislature has made distinct provisions relating to the year in which different heads of income become iaxable. Salary becomes taxable by s. 7 when it is allowed to the employee or becomes due to him. whether it is actually paid to him or not.\n\nInterest on securities under s. 8 iB taxable when it is received by the asses see. Under s. 9 tax on property becomes payable not on any actual receipt of income from the property but on a purely national computation in the year of account of a bona fide annual value of the property, subject to the adjustments provided in that section. Profits and gains of busines.>, profession or vocation carried on by an assessee are computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee, unless the Income-tax Officer being of the opinion that profits or gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom, directs otherwise.\n\nOther sourcei; of income-and dividends are included in this residuary class-become taxable in the year in which they\n\n196~\n\nJ. Dalmia.\n\nOommisaicmer of\n\nJncqm, e,.tax, New Delk~\n\nShah, J.\n\nJ. Dalmia v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlnconie-tax, '-Yew Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\nare received or accrue or arise or are deemed to be received, accrued or arise, according to the nature of the particular income. The year in which a particular class of income becomes taxable must therefore be determined, in the light of its true character, and subject to the special provision, if any, applicable thereto. The Legislature has enacted an express provfaion making dividend income taxable in the year in which it is paid, credited or distributed or is to be deemed, so paid, credited or distributed. The test applied by Chagla C. J., that because the dividend becomes d11e to the assessee who has the right to deal with or dispose of the same .in any manner he likes, it is taxable in the year in which it t> declared, cannot be resarded as correct. The expression \"paid\" in s. 16(2) it is true does not contemplate actual receipt of the dividend by the member. In general, dividend may be said to be paid within the meaning of s. 16(2) when the company discharges its liability and makes the amount of dividend unconditionally available to the member entitled thereto. Chagla C. J., has himself in Purshotamdas Thakurdas v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City /(') expressed a different view.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice in delivering the judgment of the court referred to Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau's case (3) and observed that the principle of that case applied only to those cases where in facts the djvidend was paid to the shareholder and not to cases where a contingent liability was undertaken and no payment was made.\n\nHe , observed:\n\n\" * * • one thing is clear from the language used by the Leg1lature that it did not intend to equate \"paid\" with \"declared\" in every case.\n\nTherefore, it is open to us to consider, notwithstanding the Khatau Mills' case, whether on the facts \"of this case, it could be said that dividend has been paid, which although it may have been declared may never be payable and in fact has not been paid.\" If the mere declaration of dividend in general meeting of the company is not to be.regarded as payment within the meaning of s. 16(2), much less can it be said that a resolution declaring interim dividend-which is capable of being rescinded by directors-operates as payment before the company has actually parted with the amount of dividend or discharged obligation by some other act. The High Court was therefore right in recording an affirmative answer to the question propounded for the consideration of the Court.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(') 34 I.T.R. 204.", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "J; DALMIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J. DALMIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX. NEW DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Commissioner of\n\nlnconie-tax, '-Yew Delhi", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUB BA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. 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J. (in C.I.T., Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau, 16 I.T.R. 248) that because the dividend becomes due to the assessee who has the right to deal \\vith or dispose of the same in any manner he likes, it is taxable in the year in which it is declared cannot be regarded as correct."}}, {"text": "Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2090, "end_char": 2112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• (ii) The test applied by Chagla C. J. (in C.I.T., Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mulraj Khatau, 16 I.T.R. 248) that because the dividend becomes due to the assessee who has the right to deal \\vith or dispose of the same in any manner he likes, it is taxable in the year in which it is declared cannot be regarded as correct.", "canonical_name": "Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2427, "end_char": 2441, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sooh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2742, "end_char": 2746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.\n\nCommi8sioner of\n\nIncome.taz, ·\n\nl!,,..ewDtlhi\n\nSooh, J.\n\n' ' ' ··,,-·.-:-f-,,'/- -~ ;\\- ' -- >:;;; r-\n\n/ \\) - ;·,•,.....;.- ·'\"-~-----~\n\n' ' '580 SUPRE)lE COURT REPORTS (1964} , - _(iv) The declaration of interim dividend capable of being rescinded 'by the directors does not operate as a payment under s. 16(2) of the Income-true Act before the company has parted w<ith the amount of dividend or discharged its obligation by some other act. ·"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2998, "end_char": 3006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3332, "end_char": 3343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and B. P. M aheslnvari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. M aheslnvari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3348, "end_char": 3366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and B. P. M aheslnvari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3422, "end_char": 3444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Genera/, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3486, "end_char": 3499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 1, 1964."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3546, "end_char": 3550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH, J.-The appellant which is a Hindu undivided family was the registered holder of 1,500 shares of M / s Govan Bros. (Rampurl Ltd. in the year of account October\n\n1, 1950 to September 30, 1951.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Govan Bros.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to a resolution passed by the board of directors of M/ s Govan Bros. (Rampur) Ltd.-hereinafter called 'Govan Bros.'-at a meeting held on August 30, 1950, the appellant received a dividend warrant dated December 28, 1950 for R.~. 4,12,500/- being interim dividend in respect of its share-holding in Govan Bros. This amount was brought to tax with the other income of the appellant in the assessment year 1952-53 by the Revenue authorities, after rejecting the objection of the appellant that it represented income for the assessment year 1951-52."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4441, "end_char": 4461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the appellant the Appellate Tribunal drew up a statement of the case and referred the question set out hereinbelow to the High Court of Punjab under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act:\n\n\"Whether on a true interpretation of Article 95 of the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the dividend of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4468, "end_char": 4476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4491, "end_char": 4505, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4545, "end_char": 4555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4944, "end_char": 4954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4962, "end_char": 5010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Govan Bros", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5023, "end_char": 5033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even though the question was framed as if article 95 of the First Schedule to the Indian Companies Act, 1913,-applies to Govan Bros, it i~ common ground that_ the company\n\nwas registered under the Companies Act of the former Rampur State, and it had adopted special Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5099, "end_char": 5112, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5168, "end_char": 5239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "articles 73 and\n\n74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5350, "end_char": 5369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act", "statute": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5511, "end_char": 5520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act", "statute": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Association of Govan Bros.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5542, "end_char": 5568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court therefore proceeded to deal with the question on the footing that it was, by the question referred, called upon to interpret article 7 4 of the Articles of Association of Govan Bros. It is common ground between the appellant and the Revenue that the provisions of the Companies Act of the former Rampur State were in terms identical with the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5654, "end_char": 5667, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5753, "end_char": 5766, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5894, "end_char": 5904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act", "statute": "Articles of Association in supersession of Table A of the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6069, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September\n\n30, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6176, "end_char": 6195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant contends that the directors of Govan Bros. had in exercise of authority expressly conferred upon them by article 74 declared dividend in their meeting dated August 30, 1950 and on such declaration the dividend became a debt due to the appellant and under the Indian Income-tax Act it became taxable in the year of assessment 1951-52, for the previous year of tlie appellant had ended on September\n\n30, 1951."}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6441, "end_char": 6449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6974, "end_char": 7000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7217, "end_char": 7225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "The Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7305, "end_char": 7355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7982, "end_char": 7986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regulation 96, which is not an obligatory article, provides that the\n\nJ, Dalmia v.\n\nCommiasionef'of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nNew Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\nJ.Dalmia v.\n\nOommi...wn.rof\n\nlntomt-tM, New Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n582 SUPREl\\IE COURT HEPORTS [196iJ\n\ndirectors may from time to time pay to the members such interim dividends as appear to the directors to be justified by the profits of the company.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Art. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8343, "end_char": 8350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A in the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8489, "end_char": 8496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8603, "end_char": 8610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8799, "end_char": 8806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9022, "end_char": 9029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9126, "end_char": 9176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9288, "end_char": 9295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9429, "end_char": 9434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9580, "end_char": 9588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9649, "end_char": 9653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of the First Schedule to the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9661, "end_char": 9678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9696, "end_char": 9709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material part of s. 16(2) of the Income-ta)\\ Act as it stood before it was deleted by s. 7 of the Finance Act, 1959 with effect from April 1, 1960, read as follows:\n\n\"For the purposes of inclusion in the total income of an assessee any dividend shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which it is paid, credited or distributed or deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed to him • • *\"\n\nThe clause in terms made dividend the income of the year in which it was paid, credited or distributed or was deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed."}}, {"text": "December 28,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10191, "end_char": 10209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case dividend was paid to the appellant on December 28,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10516, "end_char": 10521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Mr. Kapur contends that under the law governing companies\n\n/ - ' 7 _s.c."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10757, "end_char": 10771, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Lagunas Nitrate Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12260, "end_char": 12283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Lagunas Nitrate Company (Limited)\n\nv. J. Henry Schroeder and Company (') the directors of a company passed a resolution declaring interim dividend payable on a future date, and reque:>ted the company's bankers to set apart, out of the money of the company in their hand, into a special account entitled \"interim Dividend Account\", a sum sufficient to cover the dividend, pending the company's instructions."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13095, "end_char": 13102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Halsbury's Laws of England, III Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Art. 778", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13129, "end_char": 13137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J.Dalmia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13312, "end_char": 13320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.Dalmia ...\n\nCommiuioner of\n\nlncome-taz, }ttwDelhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n196l\n\nCommiaaiO'Ut' of\n\n111.come-taz~ Ne111 Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\n' Therefore a declaration by a company in general meeting gives rise to an enforceable obligation, but a resolution of the Board of Directors resolving to pay interim dividend or even resolving to declare interim dividend pursuant to the authority conferred."}}, {"text": "Art. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13896, "end_char": 13902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15870, "end_char": 15887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay\n\nv. Laxmidas Mu/raj Khatau(') on which counsel for the appellant relies, does not assist him either."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16394, "end_char": 16414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay in a reference under s. 66 observed that as soon as the dividend was declared it became the income of the assessee which income the assessee could deal with or dispose of in any manner he liked."}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16436, "end_char": 16441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16795, "end_char": 16800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17559, "end_char": 17567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17582, "end_char": 17596, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17990, "end_char": 17994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18126, "end_char": 18130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18186, "end_char": 18190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of\n\nlnconie-tax, '-Yew Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18943, "end_char": 18984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oommisaicmer of\n\nJncqm, e,.tax, New Delk~\n\nShah, J.\n\nJ. Dalmia v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlnconie-tax, '-Yew Delhi\n\nShah, J.\n\nare received or accrue or arise or are deemed to be received, accrued or arise, according to the nature of the particular income.", "canonical_name": "Commissioner of\n\nlnconie-tax, '-Yew Delhi"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19787, "end_char": 19795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19940, "end_char": 19948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20289, "end_char": 20312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice in delivering the judgment of the court referred to Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau's case (3) and observed that the principle of that case applied only to those cases where in facts the djvidend was paid to the shareholder and not to cases where a contingent liability was undertaken and no payment was made.", "canonical_name": "Laxmidas M ulraj Khatau"}}, {"text": "Khatau Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20757, "end_char": 20769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, it is open to us to consider, notwithstanding the Khatau Mills' case, whether on the facts \"of this case, it could be said that dividend has been paid, which although it may have been declared may never be payable and in fact has not been paid.\""}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21078, "end_char": 21086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_587_595_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 587\n\nGURDEV SINGH SIDHU\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR. [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, M.\n\nH!DAYATULLAH\n\nAND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.]\n\nPublic Servant-CompulsMy retirement-Constitutional validity-If and when dismis•al. or removal from service- Pepsu Services Regulations V oLume 1, as amended bu notification fasued by G<ivernor under Art. 309 of the Constitution- Constitution of India, Art. 311(2).\n\nThe petitioner was appointed as Assistant SUiperintendent of Police in 1942 in the former Patiala State. In 1948 on the formation of Patiala and East Punjab States he was integrated in Pepsu Police Service.\n\nHe was promoted to officiate as Superintendent of Police in 1950 by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu, On March 2&, 1963, respondent No. 2, the Inspector-General of Police a.'ld Joint Secretary to the Government of Punjab, issued a notice upon the petitioner under the second proviso to Art. 9.1 of the Pepsu Services Regulation as amended by the Governor by his noiifrcatlon dated January 19, 1960, to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired. The petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quas.lii!ng the said notice on the ground that the said proviso was ultra vires and inoperative by reason of contravention of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and relied on the decision of thie Court in Moti Rn.m Deka v. General Manager, North East FrOTlltier Railway, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600. The said proviso was a,; follows,-\n\n\" • • • that Government retains an absolute right to retire any Government servant after he has completed ten years qualifying service without giving any reason and to claim to special compensation on this account will be entertained.\n\nThis right will not be exercised except when it is in public interest to dispense with the further services of a Government servant such as on accOU1I1t of inefficiency, dishonesty, COITUPtion or infamous conduct * * *\". Held: Artide 9.1 of the Pepsu Services Regulation in prescribing a minimum period of ten years of service for the purpose of compulsory retirement contravened Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and must be struck down.\n\nThe only two valid exceptions to the protection afforded by Art. 311 (2) -re,-\n\n(1) where a permanent public servant was asked to retire on the ground that he had reached the age of superannuation which was reasonably fixed;\n\n(21) that he was compulsorily retired under the Rules which prescribed the n.ormal age of superannuation and provided a reasonably long period of qualified service after which almo,:; compulsory retirement could be valid, The first would not amount to dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311(2) and the second would be justified l:y the view taken by this Court in a Joni series of decisions. '\\\n\n196l\n\nApril 1\n\n19U It is not permissible for a State while reserving to itself .-.- . the power of compulsory retirement by framing a rule pres- Gurdev 8171gh Sidhu cribing a proper age of superannuation to frame another Stat. o/'Pm•jab giving it the power to compulsorily retire a permanent public\n\nand A...U... servant at the end of ten years of his service, for that rule cannot fall outside Art. 311 (2) of the Conatitution.\n\nMoti Ram .Deka etc. v. General. Manager, North East Frontier Railway etc. A.I..R. 1964 S.C. 600, applied Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. and Union of India, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 26 and State of Bombay v. Saubhag Chand M. Doshi, [1958] S.C.R. 571, referred to.\n\nThis decision should not be taken to mean that a petition like the present one was competent under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 200 of 1963.\n\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the fundamental rights.\n\nK. P. Bhandari and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the petitioner.\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, Gopa/ Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.\n\nApril 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nOajetUlmgo, Jkar, O.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J .-This petition which has been filed by the petitioner S. Gurdev Singh Sidhu under Art 32 of the Constitution, challenges the validity of article 9(1) of the Pepsu Services Regulations, Volume I, as amended by the Governor of Punjab by the notification issued by him on the 19th January, 1960 in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling him in that behalf. The petitioner's contention is that the said article contravenes the constitutional right guaranteed to the persons employed in civil capacities either under the Union or the State, by Art. 311.\n\nThe petitioner was. appointed as Assistant Superintendent of Police in the erstwhile Patiala State by His Highness Maharaja Adhiraj of Patiala on the 4th of February, 1942.\n\nThe conditions of his service were governed by the Patiala State Service Regulations which had been issued by the Ruler of Patiala State who was at the relevant time the sovereign legislature of the State. Later, the petitioner was confirmed in\n\nthe rank on the occurrence of a regular vacancy after he had undergone practical district training courses in the Punjab in 1947. On the formation of Patiala and East Punjab States Union on the 20th August, 1948, the petitioner was integrated in Pepsu Police Service. In due course, he was promoted to officiate as Superintendent of Police in February,\n\n1950 by His Highness the Rajpramukh of the erstwhile State of Pepsu.\n\nOn the 25th March, 1963, respondent No. 2 S. Gurdial 1964 Singh, Inspector General of Police & Joint Secretary to the Gurdev bi\"l!h Bidk• Government of Punjab, issued a notice against the petitioner T. • purporting to act under the second proviso to article 9 .I of 1>1ai:,, i°~::tJ::., ab the Pepsu Services Regulations to show cause why he should \"' _ not be compulsorily retired. The petitioner alleges that the Gajendragadkar, O.J, second proviso to article 9.1 under which the said notice has been issued against' him, is invalid, and so, he has moved this Court under Art. 32 for quashing the said notice on the ground that the article on which it is based is itself ultra vires and inoperative. Respondent No. 1, the State of Punjab, and respondent No. 2 have by their counter-affidavit denied the petitioner's contention that the impugned article 9.1 is constitutionally invalid and they have resisted his claim for quashing the notice issued by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner. That is how the only point which arises for our decision in the present petition is whether the impugned article. is shown to be constitutionally invalid.\n\nBefore dealing with this point, it is necessary to read the said article : -\n\n\"The following shall be added after the first proviso to clause (I) of ; uicle 9.1 of the said regulations:\n\n(ii) \"Provided further that Government retains an absolute right to retire any Government servant after he has completed ten years qualifying service without giving any reason and no claim to special compensation on this account will be entertained. This right will not be exercised except when it is in public interest to dispense with the further services of a. Government servant such as on account of inefficiency, dishonesty, corruption or infamous conduct. Thus the rule is intended for use:\n\n(a) against a Government servant whose efficiency is impaired but against whom it is not desirable to make formal charges of inefficiency or who has ceased to be fully efficient, (i.e. when a Government servant's value is clearly incommensurate with the pay which he draws), but not to such a degree as to warrant his retirement on a compaS>ionate allowance. It is not the intention to use the proviso as a financial weapon, that is to say the proviso should be used only in the case of Government servants who are considered unfit for retention on personal as opposed to financial grounds;\n\nOurd\"' 8i\"9k Sidhu\n\n(b) in cases where reputation for corruption, dishonesty or infamous conduct is clearly established even though no specific instance is likely v.\n\nSlate of Punjah\n\nand Another to be proved under the Punjab Civil Services\n\nGajendr09adkar, O.J.\n\nPunishment and Appeal Rules) Appendix 24 of Volume I, Part II or the Public Servants (Inquiries Act XXXVII of 1850).\n\nThe word 'Government' used in this proviso should be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause the power of removing the Government servant concerned from service under the Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) 'Rules'.\n\n(iii) Provided further that Government servant should be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action under the rule. Ne> Gazetted Government servants shall, however, be retired without the approval of the Council of Ministers. In all cases of compulsory retirement of gazetted Government servants belonging to the State Services, the Public Service Commission shall be consulted. In the case of non-gazetted Gov .. a, lillent servants the Heads of Deplr!T.ents should effect such retirement with the previous approv:il of the State Government\".\n\nThis article clearly shows that the absolute right retained by respondent No. 1 to deal with public servants can be used against them if it appears to respondent No. I that the , said public servants suffer from inefficiency, dishonesty, corruption, or infamous conduct. It is also clear that one of the reasons for making the amendment in the Pepsu Services Regulations was to use the power thereby conferred on respondent No. 1 in cases where reputation for corruption, dishonesty or infamous conduct may be established to the satisfaction of respondent Nb. 1 even though no specific instance is likely to be proved under the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules.\n\nThis power was likewise intended for use in cases where the incompetence of the Government servant may not be of such an extent as to warrant his retirement on a compassionate allowance. The only safeguard provided by the amended article is that it was not contemplated to use the power conferred by it on financial grounds. Grounds on which the said power was intended to be used were all grounds personal to the Government servaul against whom the said power was exercised ..\n\nMr. Bhandari for the petitioner contends that the point raised by the petitoner in this petition is, in substance, eon-· eluded by a recent decision of this Court in Moti Ram Deka.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUl'Rl~~IE COUHT HEl'ORTS 5!)1\n\netc. v. The General Manager, North East Frontier Rail- 1964 way,(') etc. His argument i; i that the trend of the majority 1;,,, dev Singh s; dhu judgment in that case clearly indicates that the impugned . v, Rule is inconsistent with Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. and -''\"'' 01 Punjab h b k d b . . l\"d I . h f , and Another as sue . n1ust e struc own as e1ng 1nva 1 . t 1s, t ere ore. _ necessary to examine briefly the effect of the said judgment. 1:aJ.ndra9adkar, 0.1.\n\nIn that case. thi:; Court was called upon to consider the validity of Rules 148(3) and 149(3) of the Railway Rub These Rules authorised the termination of services of the railway employees concerned by serving them with a notice fnr :the requisite period or paying them their salary for the said period in lieu of notice. Dealing with the question about the\n\nvalidity of the said Rules, the majority judgment ob;; crvcd that a person who substantively holds a permanent post has a right to continue in service subject to two exceptions. The .first exception was in rlation to the rule of superannuation. and the second was in regard t\\) the rule as to compul:iory retirement.\n\nThe majority judgment accepted the position that a rule fixing the age of superannuation which is appli- .cable to all Government servants falling in a particular category was perfectly constitutional because it applies uniformly to the public servants who fall within its scope and it is ba;; ed .on general considerations like life-expectation, mental capacity of the civil servants having regard to the climatic conditions under which they work and the nature of the work they do. They are not fixed on any ad hoc basis and do not involve the exercise of any discretion.\n\nThe second exception was affirmed by \"the majority judgment with the reservation that\n\nruk; of compulsory retirement would be valid if having fixed a proper age of superannuation, they permit the compulsory retirement of the public servant,' provided he has put in a minimum period of service; and while affirming this rule, an express reservation was made that in case a rule of compulsory retirement permitted the authority to retire a permanent servant at a very early stage of his career, the question as to whether ; mch a rule would be valid may have to be considered on a proper occasion.\n\nIn other words, the acceptence of the doctrine that rules for compulsory retirement were valid and constituted an exception to the general rule that the termination of the services of a permanent servant means his removal within the meaning of Art. 311 (2), was not absolute but qualified.\n\nAt this stage, it is necessary to explain why this reservation was made in the majority judgment.\n\nThe question which fell to be decided in the case of Moti Ram Deka(') had no reference to the rule of compulsory retirement; but the argument in support of the validity of the rule proceeded\n\n----~--::-:--cc-,--,-·--------·---\n\n'') A.T.R. 1964 S.C. 600 .\n\nSUPRE:\\!E UOURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 on the basis that the previous decisions of this Court in which Gurdev Singh SWm the validity of the rlevant rules of compulsory retirement v. had been upheld log1cally supported the contention that the State of Punja-Oimpugned Rules 148(3) and 149(3) were also valid, and thi:, and Another argument made it necessary for this Court to examine the Gajem!ragadkar, C.J. said decisions and to decide whether the observations made in the course of those dcciions supported the contention that Rules 148(3) and 149(3) were valid. Let us briefly refer to some of these decisions.\n\nIn Shyam Lal, v. The State of U.P. and the Union of India,(') the article which was examined was 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations. Note 1 to the said article gave the Government an absolute right to retire any officer after he has completed 25 years of service without giving any reasons, and provided that no claim to special compensation can be entertained from the public 8ervant who has been compulsorily retired under it; this article was held to be valid.\n\nIn the State of Bombay v. Saubhag Chand M. Dcshi,(') the rule which was considered was 165-A of the Bombay Civil Services Rules as amended by the Saurashtra Gmernment.\n\nThis rule gave the Government a :; imilar right to retire a Government servant ;1fter he has completed 25 years of qualifying service or 50 years of age, and it permitted the Government to ask the Government servant to retire compulsorily without giving any reason and without giving him the right to claim special compensation, • The rule further made it clear that the right conferred by it will not be exercised except when it is in the public interest to dispense with the further services of a Government servant such as on account of inefficiency or dishonesty. This rule was also upheld.\n\nReverting then to the argument which was urged in support of the validity of the Railway Rults challenged in the case of Moti Ram Deka(') the position taken by the learned Additional Solicitor-deneral was that in upholding the impugned rules. the cariier decisions had substantially pro ceeded on the basi; that the premature termination of the services of a permanent Government servant would not in every case amount to his removal within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, and that is how it became necessary to refer to the said decisions which dealt with the question of compulsory retirement. though the problem of compulsory retirement did not fall for the decision of the Court in Moti Ram Deka'sCl case.\n\nThe approach adopted by the majority decision in Moti Ram Deka's(\") case indicates that the Court was not prepared\n\n(') [1955] I.S.C.R. 26.\n\n(') [1958] S.C.R. 571.\n\n(\") A.LR. 1964 S.C. 600.\n\nro examine the question as to whether the relevant Rules l964 in respect of compulsory retirement which had been upheld Gurdei Singh Bidh\" were valid or not. The trend of the majority judgment shows v. . that logically, it would be consistent to hold that the prema-\n\n8~ 1 ;:/~?aiiJ/ 6 ture termination of the services of a permanent Government servant would not amount to hL3 removal under Art. 311(2)Gajendragadkar, O.J. only where such termination is the result of the fixation of a general rule of superannuation. In all other cases where a permanent Government servant is asked to retire compulsorily whether on account of his incompetence, inefficiency, or dishonesty, it may, logically, be open to be suggested that such compuL-, ory retirement is removal within Art. 311(2).\n\nBut since 1953, when the case .of Satish Chandra Anand v.\n\nThe Union of India(') was decided by this Court there appeared to be a consistent course of decisions which had up held the validity of the rules in regard to compulsory retire ment. No ifoubt, the case of Satish Chandra Anand was one where a person had been employed by the Government of India on a five-year contract in the Reiettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour; but some observations were made in that judgment and similar observations were made in subsequent decisions dealing .with the question of compulsory retirement. The majority judgment in Moti Ram Deka's(') case took the view that it would be inappropriate and inexpedient to reopen an issue which was\n\ncovered by several prior reported decisions of the Court.\n\nBesides, the point covered by the said decisions did not directly arise in the case of Moti Ram Deka. Even so, the majority judgment took the precaution of adding a note of caution that if a rule of compulsory retirement purported to give authority to the Government to terminate the services \"\"' of a permanent public servant at a very early stage of his career, the question about the validity of such a rule may have to be examined. That is how in accepting the view that a rule of compulsory retirement can be treated as valid and as constituting an exception to the general rule that the termination of the services of a permanent public servant would amount to his removal under Art. 311(2), this Court added a rider and made it perfectly clear that if the minimum period of service which was prescribed by the relevant rules upheld by the earlier decL3ions was 25 years, it could not be unreasonably reduced in that behalf. In other words, the majority judgment indicates that what influenced the deci sion was the fact that a fairly large number of years had been prescribed by the rule of compulsory retirement as constitut ing the minimum period of service after which alone the said rule could be invoked. Therefore, it seems to us that Mr. Bhandari is right when he contends that the preient\n\n(') [1953] S.C.R. 655.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600.\n\nJ9a4 article which reduces the minimum period of service to 10 Gurdeu Singh Sidhu years, is open to challenge in the light of the majority decision v. pronounced in the case of Moti Ram Deka(').\n\nSl<li<' of Punjab\n\n\"'\"J Another In this connection, it is hardly necessary to emphasise Gajendragadkar, o.J. that for the efficient administration of the State, it is absolutely esiential that permanent public servants should enjoy a sens~ of security of tenure.\n\nThe safeguard which Art. 311(2) affords to permanent public servants is no more than this that in case it is intended to dismiss, remove or reduce them in rank, a reasonable opportunity should be given to them of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to them. A claim for security to tenure does not mean security of tenure for dishonest, corrupt, or inefficient public servants. The claim merely insists that before they are removed, the permanent public servants should be given an opportunity to meet the charge on which they are sought to be removed. Therefore, it seems that only two exceptions can be treated as valid in dealing with the scope and effect of the protection afforded by Art. 311(?). If a permanent public servant is asked to retire on the ground that he has reached the age of superannuation which has been reasonably fixed, Art. 311(2) does not apply, because such retirement is neither dismissal nor removal of the public servant.\n\nIf a permanent public servant is compuL>orily retired under the rules which prescribe the normal age of superannuation and provide for a reasonably long period of qualified service after which alone compulsory retirement can be ordered, that again may not amount to dismissal or removal under Art. 311 (2) mainly because that is the effect of a long series of decisions of this Court. But where while reserving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public ser\n\nvant, a rule is framed prescribing a proper age of superan nuation, and another rule is added giving the power to the\n\nState to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant at the end of 10 years of his service, that cannot, we think, be treated as falling outside Art. 311(2). The termination of the service of a permanent public servant under such a rule, though called compulsory retirement, is, in substance, removal under Art. 311(2). It is because it was apprehended that rules of compulsory retirement may purport to reduce the prescribed minimum period of service beyond which compulsory retirement can be forced against a public servant that the majority judgment in the case of Moti Ram Deka(') clearly indicated that if such a situation arose, the validity of the rule may have to be examined, and in doing so, the im\n\npugned rule may not be permitted to seek the protection of the earlier decisions of this Court in which the minimum\n\n(') A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600.\n\nqualifying period of service was prescribed as high as 25 1964 years, or the age of the public servant at 50 years. We are, c.,.dsv Singh Siiln.- therefore, satisfied that Mr. Bhandari is right in contending v. . that the effect of the majority decision in the case cf Moti s1ai:. 0~ Pr;:.b Rallr Deka(') clearly is that the impugned article 9.1 contraa no ' venes Article 311(2) of the Constitution and must be struck Gajendragadkar, C.J. dow:1 as invalid.\n\nThe result is, the petition succeeds and article 9 .I as ame'!ded by the Governor of Punjab by a notification issued on the 19th January, 1960, is struck down as invalid.\n\nIn con:>equence, the notice issued by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner on the 25th March, 1963 must be cancelled.\n\nBefore we part with this petition we ought to add that the respondents did not urge before us that the writ petition was not competent under Art. 32 and that the proper remedy available to the petitioner was a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution to the Punjab High Court; that is presumably. because the respondents were anxious to have a decision from this Court on the question about the validity of the impugned article in the Regulations in question. We would, therefore, make it clear that our decision in th~ present writ\n\npetition should not be taken to mean that we have held that a petition like the present is competent under Art. 32 of the Con, titution.\n\nIn the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is entitled !o his costs from respondents I and 2.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1964 s.c. 600.", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "587\n\nGURDEV SINGH SIDHU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GURDEV SINGH SIDHU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 176, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Pepsu Services Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 287, "end_char": 313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 378, "end_char": 386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pepsu Services Regulations", "statute": "Pepsu Services Regulations"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 408, "end_char": 429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 431, "end_char": 442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pepsu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 739, "end_char": 744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was promoted to officiate as Superintendent of Police in 1950 by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu, On March 2&, 1963, respondent No."}}, {"text": "March 2&, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 749, "end_char": 763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was promoted to officiate as Superintendent of Police in 1950 by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu, On March 2&, 1963, respondent No."}}, {"text": "Art. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 930, "end_char": 936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1138, "end_char": 1145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1296, "end_char": 1304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2113, "end_char": 2121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2232, "end_char": 2240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2706, "end_char": 2717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3215, "end_char": 3223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 26", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3402, "end_char": 3420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3600, "end_char": 3607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3700, "end_char": 3707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3715, "end_char": 3736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. P. Bhandari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3785, "end_char": 3799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. P. Bhandari and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "R. Gopa/akrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3804, "end_char": 3821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. P. Bhandari and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3844, "end_char": 3855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, Gopa/ Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3903, "end_char": 3917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, Gopa/ Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3941, "end_char": 3954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 1, 1964."}}, {"text": "OajetUlmgo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4000, "end_char": 4010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nOajetUlmgo, Jkar, O.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J .-This petition which has been filed by the petitioner S. Gurdev Singh Sidhu under Art 32 of the Constitution, challenges the validity of article 9(1) of the Pepsu Services Regulations, Volume I, as amended by the Governor of Punjab by the notification issued by him on the 19th January, 1960 in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4024, "end_char": 4038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nOajetUlmgo, Jkar, O.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J .-This petition which has been filed by the petitioner S. Gurdev Singh Sidhu under Art 32 of the Constitution, challenges the validity of article 9(1) of the Pepsu Services Regulations, Volume I, as amended by the Governor of Punjab by the notification issued by him on the 19th January, 1960 in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the proviso to Art.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "S. Gurdev Singh Sidhu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4100, "end_char": 4121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nOajetUlmgo, Jkar, O.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J .-This petition which has been filed by the petitioner S. Gurdev Singh Sidhu under Art 32 of the Constitution, challenges the validity of article 9(1) of the Pepsu Services Regulations, Volume I, as amended by the Governor of Punjab by the notification issued by him on the 19th January, 1960 in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "Art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4128, "end_char": 4134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4183, "end_char": 4195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4399, "end_char": 4407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4663, "end_char": 4671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4759, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appointed as Assistant Superintendent of Police in the erstwhile Patiala State by His Highness Maharaja Adhiraj of Patiala on the 4th of February, 1942."}}, {"text": "4th of February, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4824, "end_char": 4845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appointed as Assistant Superintendent of Police in the erstwhile Patiala State by His Highness Maharaja Adhiraj of Patiala on the 4th of February, 1942."}}, {"text": "Patiala State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4899, "end_char": 4912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conditions of his service were governed by the Patiala State Service Regulations which had been issued by the Ruler of Patiala State who was at the relevant time the sovereign legislature of the State."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5208, "end_char": 5214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, the petitioner was confirmed in\n\nthe rank on the occurrence of a regular vacancy after he had undergone practical district training courses in the Punjab in 1947."}}, {"text": "Patiala and East Punjab States Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5244, "end_char": 5280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the formation of Patiala and East Punjab States Union on the 20th August, 1948, the petitioner was integrated in Pepsu Police Service."}}, {"text": "20th August, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5288, "end_char": 5305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the formation of Patiala and East Punjab States Union on the 20th August, 1948, the petitioner was integrated in Pepsu Police Service."}}, {"text": "Pepsu Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5340, "end_char": 5360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the formation of Patiala and East Punjab States Union on the 20th August, 1948, the petitioner was integrated in Pepsu Police Service."}}, {"text": "S. Gurdial 1964 Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5560, "end_char": 5581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 S. Gurdial 1964 Singh, Inspector General of Police & Joint Secretary to the Gurdev bi\"l!h Bidk• Government of Punjab, issued a notice against the petitioner T. • purporting to act under the second proviso to article 9 .I of 1>1ai:,, i°~::tJ::.,"}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5768, "end_char": 5777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5933, "end_char": 5947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner alleges that the Gajendragadkar, O.J, second proviso to article 9.1 under which the said notice has been issued against' him, is invalid, and so, he has moved this Court under Art.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5972, "end_char": 5981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6092, "end_char": 6099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6242, "end_char": 6257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, the State of Punjab, and respondent No.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR"}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6365, "end_char": 6374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gajendr09adkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8189, "end_char": 8203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not the intention to use the proviso as a financial weapon, that is to say the proviso should be used only in the case of Government servants who are considered unfit for retention on personal as opposed to financial grounds;\n\nOurd\"' 8i\"9k Sidhu\n\n(b) in cases where reputation for corruption, dishonesty or infamous conduct is clearly established even though no specific instance is likely v.\n\nSlate of Punjah\n\nand Another to be proved under the Punjab Civil Services\n\nGajendr09adkar, O.J.\n\nPunishment and Appeal Rules) Appendix 24 of Volume I, Part II or the Public Servants (Inquiries Act XXXVII of 1850).", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Punishment and Appeal Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8211, "end_char": 8238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Inquiries Act XXXVII of 1850", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8297, "end_char": 8325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhandari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10294, "end_char": 10302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grounds on which the said power was intended to be used were all grounds personal to the Government servaul against whom the said power was exercised ..\n\nMr. Bhandari for the petitioner contends that the point raised by the petitoner in this petition is, in substance, eon-· eluded by a recent decision of this Court in Moti Ram Deka."}}, {"text": "Moti Ram Deka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10456, "end_char": 10469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grounds on which the said power was intended to be used were all grounds personal to the Government servaul against whom the said power was exercised ..\n\nMr. Bhandari for the petitioner contends that the point raised by the petitoner in this petition is, in substance, eon-· eluded by a recent decision of this Court in Moti Ram Deka.", "canonical_name": "Moti Ram Deka'sCl"}}, {"text": "General Manager, North East Frontier Rail- 1964 way", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10526, "end_char": 10577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The General Manager, North East Frontier Rail- 1964 way,(') etc."}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10748, "end_char": 10759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "aJ.ndra9adkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10969, "end_char": 10982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1:aJ.ndra9adkar, 0.1."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13083, "end_char": 13091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gurdev Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13586, "end_char": 13598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRE:\\!E UOURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 on the basis that the previous decisions of this Court in which Gurdev Singh SWm the validity of the rlevant rules of compulsory retirement v. had been upheld log1cally supported the contention that the State of Punja-Oimpugned Rules 148(3) and 149(3) were also valid, and thi:, and Another argument made it necessary for this Court to examine the Gajem!ragadkar, C.J. said decisions and to decide whether the observations made in the course of those dcciions supported the contention that Rules 148(3) and 149(3) were valid."}}, {"text": "Gajem!ragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13870, "end_char": 13884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRE:\\!E UOURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 on the basis that the previous decisions of this Court in which Gurdev Singh SWm the validity of the rlevant rules of compulsory retirement v. had been upheld log1cally supported the contention that the State of Punja-Oimpugned Rules 148(3) and 149(3) were also valid, and thi:, and Another argument made it necessary for this Court to examine the Gajem!ragadkar, C.J. said decisions and to decide whether the observations made in the course of those dcciions supported the contention that Rules 148(3) and 149(3) were valid.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15788, "end_char": 15799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Moti Ram Deka'sCl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16034, "end_char": 16051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "though the problem of compulsory retirement did not fall for the decision of the Court in Moti Ram Deka'sCl case.", "canonical_name": "Moti Ram Deka'sCl"}}, {"text": "Gurdei Singh Bidh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16370, "end_char": 16387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ro examine the question as to whether the relevant Rules l964 in respect of compulsory retirement which had been upheld Gurdei Singh Bidh\" were valid or not."}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16641, "end_char": 16652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17020, "end_char": 17031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Satish Chandra Anand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17299, "end_char": 17319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No ifoubt, the case of Satish Chandra Anand was one where a person had been employed by the Government of India on a five-year contract in the Reiettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour; but some observations were made in that judgment and similar observations were made in subsequent decisions dealing .with the question of compulsory retirement."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17368, "end_char": 17387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No ifoubt, the case of Satish Chandra Anand was one where a person had been employed by the Government of India on a five-year contract in the Reiettlement and Employment Directorate of the Ministry of Labour; but some observations were made in that judgment and similar observations were made in subsequent decisions dealing .with the question of compulsory retirement."}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18531, "end_char": 18542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19682, "end_char": 19693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(?)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20379, "end_char": 20390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20534, "end_char": 20545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20936, "end_char": 20944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21391, "end_char": 21402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21553, "end_char": 21564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22374, "end_char": 22376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22434, "end_char": 22443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22465, "end_char": 22479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22600, "end_char": 22609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "19th January, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22683, "end_char": 22701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result is, the petition succeeds and article 9 .I as ame'!ded by the Governor of Punjab by a notification issued on the 19th January, 1960, is struck down as invalid."}}, {"text": "25th March, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22816, "end_char": 22832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 against the petitioner on the 25th March, 1963 must be cancelled."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22994, "end_char": 23001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23078, "end_char": 23086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23114, "end_char": 23131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution to the Punjab High Court; that is presumably."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23497, "end_char": 23504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_596_605_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "..Aprill\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [196f)\n\nHOCHTIEF GAMMON\n\nINDUSTRIAL l'RIBUNAL, BHUBANESHWAR, ORISSA\n\nAND ORS.\n\n[P. 13. GAJENDRAGADKAR, 'C. J., K. N. WANCHOO AND K. C.\n\nDAS, GUPTA, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Addition and Summoning of Partie$- Reference-Powers of Industrial Tribunal-Test and Limitation-Who$e liability to pay Workmen's claim-Who is Employer-Disputes, whether different and substantial-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), Ss., 10, 18.\n\nOn reference of an Industrial Dispute between the appellants and the respondents, its workmen, the office of the Industrial Tribunal issued notice not only to the appellant and its workmen, the respondents but also to Hindustan Steel Ltd.\n\nThis was done apparently because a copy of the notification of the Government containing the order of reference had been served on the said Hindustan Steel Ltd. The Hindustan Steel Ltd. appeared .and urged that it was not concerned or interested in the dispute and should not be added a party to the reference.\n\nThe appellant contended, inter alia, that the interests of Hindustan Steel Ltd. and the appellant were common in the pending proceedings, and the material documents which may have to be proved were with the said concern. The Tribunal considered the question and held that it would decide the matter later; meanwhile it directed Hindustan Steel to be present during the hearing of the reference on merits. The appellant, who was dissatisfied with this order as it wanted a specific direction to add Hindustan Steel as a party to the reference, moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This writ petition failed as the High Court held that the petition was premature as the Tribunal had not yet passed a final order under s. 18 (3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On appeal by special Leave: Held: (i) S. 18(b) as it originally stood postulates that the Tribunal had an implied power to summon parties, other than parties to the industrial dispute to appear in the proceedings before it.\n\n(ii) Where certain points of dispute have been referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, it may while dealing with the said points deal with matters incidental thereto, and than parties to the industrial dispute to appear in the proceedthe Tribunal feels that some persons who are not joined to the reference should be brought before it, it may be able to make an order in that behalf under s. 18 .(3)(b) as it now stands.\n\n(iii) Section 10(5) has now conferred power on the appropriaJte Government to add to the reference other establishments, groups or classes of establishments of a similar nature, if it is satisfied that establishments are likely to be interested in, or affected by such dispute. The appropriate Government may add them to the said reference either at the time when the reference is initially made or during the pendency of the said reference proceedings; but in every case, such additions can be made before the award is submitted. Now, if su.ch\n\n_ ..\n\npersons are added to the reference, the Industrial Tribunal may 1964 in exercise of Hs powers under s. 18 (3)(b) summon them to HochtiifGam\"'°\" appear before 1t. v.\n\n(iv) The material words in s. 18 (3)(b) are the same as they In~';:talT~;\"'l, were originally included in s. 18(b), and so, the implied power Ori,.a':::z\" Othd• which could be exercised by the Industrial Tribunal under s. 18(b) can now be exercised by it under s. 18(3}(b). If the Tribunal thinks that the parties who were summoned to appear before it were so summoned without proper cause, it may record its opinion to that effect and then the award which it pronounces would not be binding on them.\n\n(v) What the Tribunal can consider in addition to the disputes specified in the order of reference, are only matters incidental to the said disputes and that naturally suggests certain obvious limitations on the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties to the reference before it, purporting to exercise its implied power under s. 18(3) (b). If it appears to the Industrial Tribunal that a party named in the order of reference does not completely or adequately represent the interest either of the employer or of the employee, it may direct the joining of other persons necessary to represent such interest. Similarly if the union specified in the reference does not represent all the employees it may be open to the Tribunal to add such other unions as it may deem necessary. The test always must be, is the addition of the party necessary to make the adjudication itself effective and enforceable? It is in the light of this test that the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties must be held to be limited.\n\nP. G. Brooks, Receiver appointed by the Trustees for the mortgagee debenture holders of the Madras Electric Tramways\n\n(1904) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, A.l.R. 1954 Mad. 369, Radhakrishna Mills Ltd., Peelamadu, Coimbatore Ltd. v. Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras, .A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 606 and Anil Kumar Upadhaya v. P. K. Sarkar. A.l.R., 1961 Cal. 60, referred\n\n~ ...\n\n(vi) The question on whom would rest the liability to pay the respondents' claim as a result of contract between the appellant and. Hindustan Steel raises an entirely different dispute and such dispute would be wholly foreign to the industrial disn.utA which has been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication.\n\n(vii) The question s to who is the employer as betweei'I the appellant and Hmdustan Steel is a substantial dispute between them and cannot be regarded as incidental in any\n\nsnse. Where the appropriate Government desires that the quest10n as to who the employer is should be determined it generall~ makes a reference in wide enough terms and in'cludes as parties to the reference different Persons who are alleged to be the employers.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE .JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 611 of\n\n1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 10, 1962, of the Orissa High Court in o J c No. 128 of 1961. ·\n\nHocht, ief Gammon\n\nN. C. Chatter; ee, G. Narayanaswamy, l. B. Dadachanii,\n\n0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nIndustrial Tribuiial,\n\nBliubaneshwa.-r, Ori8sa and Othtr8\n\nJanordhan Sharma, for respondent No. 2 S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. {J. Pai and R. H. Dehbar. for respondent No. 3.\n\nApril 1. 1964 The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar, C.J. GAJENURAGADKAR, C. J.-The short question which this appeal by special leave raises for our decision is in relation to the construction of s. 18 (3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\n!947 (No. 14 of\n\n1947) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). This question arises in this way. An industrial dispute in regard to the payment of bonu.s arose between the appellant Hochtief Gammon and the respondents, its workmen, represented by the Rourkela Workers Union, Rourkela. This dispute was referred for adjudication to the Indu:; trial Tribunal, Orissa by the Government of Orissa on the 14th November, 1960. After the reference was received by the Tribunal. it passed an order on the 17th November, 1960 that notice of the reference should be issued to the parties concerned. Purporting to give effect to this order, the office of the Tribunal im1ed notices not only to the appellant and the respondents, but also to the Deputy General Manager of MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. This was so done apparently because a copy of the notification of the Government of Orissa containing the order of reference had been served on the said Dy. General Manager. After the notice issued by the Tribunal was received by the Dy. Gener~!\n\nManager of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. he appeared before the Tribunal and urged that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. was not concerned or interested in the dispute and should not be added as a party to the. reference.\n\nMeanwhife, the appellant made an application to the Tribunal on the 21st March, 1961 and contended that the interests of MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. and the appellant were common in the proceedings pending before the Tribunal, and so, MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd;. should be joined as a party. In this application, the appellant alleged that M /s Hindustan Steel Ltd. was a necessary party, because the material documents which may have to be proved in the proceedings were with the said concern and, in fact, the enquiry in question would not be complete without the said concern being joined as a party. The Tribunal then considered the question of joining MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. as a party and held that it would decide the mtter later. Meanwhile. the Tribunal directed that MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. which had appeared in response to the notice issued to it should remain present during the hearing of the reference on the merits.\n\nThis order did not satisfy the appellant, because it want- 1964 ed a specific direction from the Tribunal to add ~/s Hindu- Hoohti<JGamm•• stan Steel Ltd. as a party to the reference. That 1s why the v. appellant moved the Orissa High Court under Art. 226 of the Industrial Tribu11a.1.\n\nC . . d d h h d d b h T 'b I Bhubaneshwar, onslitutmn an praye t at t e or er passe y t e n una Orissa and 0111.,, refusing to deal with the matter should be set aside and M ! s . - Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be joined as a party to theG•;•ndr09adkar, O.J. reference before it. This writ petition, however, failed, because the High Court took the view that it was premature. The High Court observed that the Industrial Tribunal had not yet passed a final order under s. 18(3)(b) of the Act, and so, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties, the High Court treated the application as incompetent because it was premature.\n\nAgainst this decision, the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and on its behalf, Mr. Chatterjee has contended that the I!!dustrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to add a party to the proceedings before it and that on the merits, Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be added as a necessary party. That is how the main question which arises for our decision is to determine the scope and effect of the provisons of s. 18(3)(b) of the Act.\n\nIn dealing with this question, it is necessary to consider the provisions of s. 18(b) in the Act as it was first enacted. and then consider the provis(ons of s. 18(3)(b) as they now stand. Under the original Act, section 18 consisted of four clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d). We are concerned in the present appeal with Clause (a) and (b).\n\nSection 18(a) and (b) read thus:-\n\n\"A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act, or an award which is declared by the appropriate Government to be binding under sub-section (2) of section 15 shall be binding on :\n\n:(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;\n\n(bl all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute unless the Board of Tribunal, as the case ay be records the opinion that they were so sum'. moned without proper cause\".\n\nThe first q_uestion which we have to consider is, did s. !8(b), as 1t then stood, postula_te an implied power in the Tnbunal to add persons as par!ies to the proceedings who are other ban those who were parties to the industrial dispute? It w1.ll be. noticed that clause (a) refers to all parties to the !ndustrial dispute, whereas clause (b) refers to all other parties summoned to appear. The word \"other\" seems to suggest that the parties summoned to appear to whom clause\n\n(b) refers are not identical with the parties to the industrial Hochtief Gamm°\"' dispute specified by clause (a). Section 2(k) of the Act defines v. an 'industrial dispute', inter alia, as meaning any dispute or Industrial Tribunal, difference between employers and workmen; so that parties\n\nBhuban., hwcr h d I d' d J ( ) Id Orissa and Oth•s to t e m ustna 1spute un er c a use a wou mean persons - between whom the disp,µte has arisen as prescribed by s. 2(k), Gajendragadkar, O.J. and so, clause (b) contemplates persons other than those who are actually and directly involved in the dispute which is the subject-matter of reference under section 10. Thus, s. 18(b) seems io contemplate that persons other than parties to the industrial dispute may be summoned before the Tribunal.\n\nThat takes us to the question as to who can summon these parties'? Section 11(3) of the Act prescribes, inter alia, that the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, when trying a suit in respect of the matters specified in clauses (a) to (d); clause (a) refers to enforcing the a.ttendance of any person and examining him on oath; cl. (b) has reference to the power to compel the production of documents and material objects; cl. (c) is in respect of issuing commissions for thf' examination of witnesses; and clause (d) is in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed. It is thus clear that the power to add a party to the proceedings pending before a Tribunal which may be exercised under the Code of Civil Procedure under 0.1 r. 10 is not included in s. 11 (3), and there is no other section which confers such a power on the Tribunal Therefore, if s. 18(b) contemplates that persons other than parties to the industrial dispute can be summoned, there is no specific provision conferring power on the Tribunal to summon them, and that inevitably suggests that the power must be read as being implicit in s. 18(b) itself. 1-\n\nIn this connection, it is necessary to refer to s. 10 as it then stood. Section lO(i) then consisted of three clauses which read thus:-\n\n\"If any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government may, by order in writmgs :-\n\n(a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or\n\n(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or\n\n(c) refer the dispute to Tribunal for adjudication''.\n\nIt is significant that so far as the reference to the Tribunal is concerned, s. lO(i)(c) empowered the appropriate Government to refer the dispute to the Tribunal, and unlike clause (b), this clause did not take within its sweep any matter\n\n• ..\n\nappearing to be coµnected with or re!evan_t to the dipute; 1964 so that in regard to the power to refer an mdustnal dispute HochtiefGammon to the Government Tribunal for its .adjudication, the approv.\n\nPriate Government could make a reference of the disputelndustrialTribiinal. .\n\nBhubanesltwar, itself and was not expressly clothed with the power to refer Orissa am!. Other• any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, . - such a dispute. The result of these relevant provisions clearly Ga1e1Ulragadkar, G.J. seems to be that if the Industrial Tribunal, while dealing with an industrial dispute, came to the conclusion that persons other than those mentioned as parties to the industrial dispute were necessary for a valid determination of the said dispute, it had the power to summon them; and if such persons were summoned to appear in the proceedings, the award that the Industrial Tribunal may ultimately pronounce would be binding on them. Since in cases where persons were added as parties to an industrial dispute were likely to raise the question as to whether the joinder of the parties was justified or not, s. l 8(b) required that the Tribunal should record its opinion as to whether these persons had been summoned without proper cause. Thus, we are inclined to take the view that Mr. Chatterjee is right in contending that s. 18(b) as it originally stood, postulates that the Tribunal had an implied power to summon parties, other than parties to the industrial dispute, to appear in the proceedings before it. That naturally raises the question about the extent of this power.\n\nIn dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in mind one essential fact, and that is that the Industrial Tribunal is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is to tr;• an industrial dispute referred to it for its adjudication by the appropriate Government by an order of reference passed under s. 10. It is not open to the Triqunal to travel materially beyond the terms of reference, for it is well-settled that the terms of reference determine the scope of its power and jurisdiction from case to case. Section 10 itself has been subse quently amended from time to time. Act 18 of 1952 made substantial amendments in s. 10. One of these amendments was that s: lO(l)(d) now empowers the appropriate Governwent to refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication. In other words, under s. lO(J)(d), t]).e appropriate Government can refer to the Industrial Tribunal not only a specific industrial dispute, but can a.lso refer along with it matters appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the said dispute. In that sense. !he power of the appropriate Government has been enlan>ed m regard to the reference of industrial disputes to the Tribunal.\n\n1964 Seeton 10(4) which was also added by the same amend- Hochtief '1ammo• ing Act provides, inter alia, that the jurisdiction of the Indus- •· trial Tribunal wouldl be confined to the points of dispute IndU81rial Tribunal, specified by the order of reference, and adds that the said\n\n~'!::':10:~;,,., jurisdictiorr may take within its sweep matters incidental to - the said points. In other words, where certain points of dis- <Jajendrugadkar, O.J. pute have been referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudi\n\ncation, it may, while dealing with the said points, deal with matters incidental thereto, and that means that if, while dealiug with such incidental matters, the Tribunal feels that scme persons who are not joined to the reference should be brought before it, it may be able to make an order in that behalf under s. 18(3)(b) as it now stands.\n\nSection 10(5) has now conferred power on the appropriate Government to add to' the reference other establishments, groups or classes of establishments of a similar nature, if it is satisfied that these establishments are likely to be interested in, or affected by, such dispute. In other words, if industrial dis pute is referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, and in the area within the territorial jurisdicton of the appropriate Government there are other establishments which would be affect· ed by, or interested in, such a dispute, the appropriate Government may add them to the said reference either at the time when the reference is initially made, or during the pendency of the said reference proceedings; but in every case; such additions can be made before the award is submitted. Now, if such persons are added to the reference, the industrial Tribunal may in exercise of its powers under s. 18(3)(b) summoru them to appear before it.\n\nSection 18(b) with which we began, has also been amended by Act 36 of 1956, and it has now been renumbered. As a result, s. 18(b) is now included in s. 18(3)(b). Section 18(3) provides, inter alia, that an award passed by an Industrial Tribunal which has becpme enforceable shall be binding on:\n\n(a) all parties to the industrial disputes;\n\n(b) al! other partis summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Tribunal records the opinion that they were so called without proper cause.\n\nThe material words in s. 18(3)(b) are the same as they were originally included in s.18(b), and so, the implied power which could be exercised by the 1 ndustrial Tribunal under s. 18(b) can now be exercised by it under s. 18(3)(b). If the Tribunal thinks that the parties who were summoned to appear before it were so summoned without proper cause, it may record its opinion to that effect and then tlie award which it pr; mounces would not be binding on them.\n\n'7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE!\\U~ COURT REPORTS 603\n\nReverting then to the question as to the effec~ of the 1964 power which is implied in s. 1~(3).(b). it is clear that this PO\\yer llochtiefGammon .cannot be exercised by the Tribunal so as to enlarge matenalv. • Jy the scope of the reference itself, because basically the juris-Indu•trialTribunal, . . . 1 d 1 . h . d tr\" 1 d\" t .\n\nBhuban., hwar, diction of the Tnbuna to ea wit an Ill us Ia !Spu e IS Ori.so and ou,,,78 derived solely from the order of reference passed by the ap- . - propriate Government under s. 10(1). What th~ Tribunal can GaJendragadkar, C.J. consider in addition to the disputes specified m the order of\n\nreference, are only ma, ttern incidental to the said disputes; and that naturally suggests certain obvious limitations on the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties to the reference before it, purporting to exercise its implied power under s. 18-\n\n(3)(b). H it appears to the Tribunal that a party to the industrial dispute named in the order of reference does not completely or adequately represent the interest either on the side of the employer, or on the side of the employee, it ma, y direct that other persons should be joined who would be necessary to represent such interest. If the employer named in a reference does not fully represent the interests of the employer as such, other persons who are interested in the undertaking of the employer may be joined. Similarly, if the unions specified in the reference do not represent all the employees of the undertaking, it may be open to the Tribunal to add such other unions as it may deem necessary. The test always must be, is the addition of the party necessary to make the adjudication itself effective and enforceable? In other words, the test well be, would the non-joinder of the party make the arbitration proceedings ineffective and unenforceable? It is in the light of this test that the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties must be held to be limited.\n\nThis question has been considered by the Madras High Court in two reported decisions .. In P. G. Brooks, Receiver appoin!ed by the Trustees for the' mortgage debenture holders of the Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Ors.,(') the .Division Bench of the said High Conrt has held that s. 18(b) by necessary implication gives power to the Tribunal to add parties. It can add necessary or proper party. He need not be the employer or the employee. In that particular case, the party added was the Receiver and it was found .that unless the Receiver was a.dded as a party to the reference proceedings, the adjudical!on. itself would become ineffective. In the words used by the Judgement, the party added was not a rank outsider or a disinterested spectator, but was a Receiver who was vitally concerned with the proceedings before the Tribunal and whose presence was necessary to make the ultimate award effective valid and enforceable. '\n\n(') A.LR. 1954 Mad. 369.\n\n196' In Radhakrishna Mills Ltd. Peelamedu, Coimbatore Dt.\n\nHO<ktie/Gammon v. The Special Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Ors.(') a single v.\n\nJudge of the Madras High Court followed the earlier decision, Jnd., trial Tribunal, though in this case, a party that was summoned by the Tribuo:f!;:~;::~=; nal had been added to the reference by the State Government under s. 10(5) of the Act. <Jajendragadkar, C.J.\n\nIn Anil Kuinar Upadhaya v. V. P. K. Sarkar & Ors.('),\n\n11 learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has accepted the same view. In that case, the Trustee of the Provident Fund in question who had not been impleaded originally to the reference were summoned by the Tribunal and the Court held that in the absence of the Trustees, the award would have become nugatory. ltwould be noticed that in all these decisions. the implied power of the Tribunal to summon additional parties in the reference proceedings is confined onlyto cases where such addition appeared to be necessary for making the reference complete and the award effective and enforceable. Such a power cannot be exercised to extend the scope of the reference and to bring in matters which are not the subject-matter of the reference and which qre not incidental to the dispute which has been referred.\n\nThat takes us to the question as to whether the appellant is justified in contending that Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party fo the present proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal, and should, therefore, be. added as such.\n\nMr. Chatterji has raised two contentions in support of his plea that Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party. The first contention is that if it is ultimately found that the respondent's claim for bonus for the relevant year is well founded, as a result of the contract betwee.n the appellant and Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. the liability to pay the said bonus would rest with the said concern and not with the appellant. The appellant, according to Mr. Chatterjee, is a firm constituted only for a single venture for undertaking the execution of the work of construction and foundation and civil engineering works at Rourkela: it has been engaged by the said concern of M / s Hindustan Steel Ltd. as its agent and in that behalf an agreement has been executed between the parties. Mr.\n\nChatterjee referred us to some of the relevant clauses of. this a crreement in support of his plea that the liability for bonus. i{ established by the respondents against the appellant. would be not the appellant's but of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. We do not propose to examine the merits of this oten.tion, bcaue\n\nwe are satisfied that even if Mr. Chatterjee s contention 1s well-founded by reference to the relevant clauses of te agreement between the parties, that cannot make Ml s Hindustan\n\nSteel Ltd. a necessary party within the meaning of s. 18(3)(b).\n\n(') A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 606. (') A.I.R. 1961 Cal. 60.\n\nThis contention raises an entirely different dispute between ~~ the appellant and its alleged principal and such a dispute Horluie/Gammo•·\n\nwould be wholly foreign to the industrial dispute which has . v. . been referred to tile Tribunal for its adjudication.\n\n1 \"fi~':,~F,',!:',':'\"· \"' The next contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee is that Mis OT\"1saand0thera Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party because it is the Gajendr,;; adkar, o.J. said concern which is the employer of the respondents and\n\nnot the appellant.\n\nIn either words, this contention is that though in form the appellant engaged the workmen whom the respondent union represents, the appellant was acting as the agent of its principal and for adjudicating upon the industrial dispute referred to the Tribunal by the State of Orissa, it is necessary that the principal, viz., Ml s Hindustan Steel Ltd. ought to be added as a: party. In dealing with this argument, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the appellant does not dispute the respondent Union's case that the workmen were employed by the appellant. It would have been open to the State Government to ask the Tribunal to consider who was the employer of these workmen and in that case, the ierms of reference might have been suitably framed.\n\nWhere the appropriate Government desires that the question as to who the employer is should be determined, it generally makes a reference in wide enough terms and includes as parties to the .. reference different persons who are alleged to be the employers. Such a course has not been adopted in the present proceedings, and so, it would not be possible to hold that the question as to who is the employer as between the appellant and Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a question incidental to the industrial dispute which has been referred under s. 10- (1 )(d). This dispute is a substantial dispute between the appellant and MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. and cannot be regarded as incidental in any sense. and so, we think that even this ground is not sufficient to justify the contention that M f s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party which can be added and summoned under the implied powers of the Tribunal under s. 18(3)(b).\n\nThe\"result is, though we accept Mr. Chatterjee's argument that s. 18(3)(b) postulates the existence of an. implied power • in the Tribunal to add parties and summon them, in the present case that power cannot be exercised, because havino regard to the limited nature of the implied power, Ml~ Hindustan Steel Ltd. cannot be regarded as a necessary party under the provisions of s. 18(3)(b). The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 104, "entities": [{"text": "HOCHTIEF GAMMON", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HOCHTIEF GAMMON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "INDUSTRIAL l'RIBUNAL, BHUBANESHWAR, ORISSA\n\nAND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDUSTRIAL lRIBUNAL, BHUBANESHWAR, ORISSA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. 13. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 183, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 399, "end_char": 428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindustan Steel Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 675, "end_char": 695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On reference of an Industrial Dispute between the appellants and the respondents, its workmen, the office of the Industrial Tribunal issued notice not only to the appellant and its workmen, the respondents but also to Hindustan Steel Ltd.\n\nThis was done apparently because a copy of the notification of the Government containing the order of reference had been served on the said Hindustan Steel Ltd. The Hindustan Steel Ltd. appeared .and urged that it was not concerned or interested in the dispute and should not be added a party to the reference."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Steel", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1337, "end_char": 1352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal considered the question and held that it would decide the matter later; meanwhile it directed Hindustan Steel to be present during the hearing of the reference on merits."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1579, "end_char": 1587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1745, "end_char": 1750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1765, "end_char": 1788, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1828, "end_char": 1836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2418, "end_char": 2423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2457, "end_char": 2470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3103, "end_char": 3108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3196, "end_char": 3201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3275, "end_char": 3283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3}(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4003, "end_char": 4011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. G. Brooks", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4691, "end_char": 4703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. G. Brooks, Receiver appointed by the Trustees for the mortgagee debenture holders of the Madras Electric Tramways\n\n(1904) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, A.l."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Steel", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5201, "end_char": 5216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hindustan Steel raises an entirely different dispute and such dispute would be wholly foreign to the industrial disn.utA which has been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication."}}, {"text": "Hmdustan Steel", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(vii) The question s to who is the employer as betweei'I the appellant and Hmdustan Steel is a substantial dispute between them and cannot be regarded as incidental in any\n\nsnse."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6086, "end_char": 6095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Janordhan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6196, "end_char": 6212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Industrial Tribuiial,\n\nBliubaneshwa.-r, Ori8sa and Othtr8\n\nJanordhan Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6235, "end_char": 6246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. {J. Pai and R. H. Dehbar."}}, {"text": "G. {J. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6278, "end_char": 6288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. {J. Pai and R. H. Dehbar."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dehbar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6293, "end_char": 6305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. {J. Pai and R. H. Dehbar."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar, C.J. GAJENURAGADKAR, C. J.-The short question which this appeal by special leave raises for our decision is in relation to the construction of s. 18 (3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.", "canonical_name": "Ga1e1Ulragadkar"}}, {"text": "GAJENURAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6409, "end_char": 6423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar, C.J. GAJENURAGADKAR, C. J.-The short question which this appeal by special leave raises for our decision is in relation to the construction of s. 18 (3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.", "canonical_name": "Ga1e1Ulragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6547, "end_char": 6552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6567, "end_char": 6590, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hochtief Gammon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6767, "end_char": 6782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An industrial dispute in regard to the payment of bonu.s arose between the appellant Hochtief Gammon and the respondents, its workmen, represented by the Rourkela Workers Union, Rourkela.", "canonical_name": "HOCHTIEF GAMMON"}}, {"text": "Rourkela Workers Union, Rourkela", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6836, "end_char": 6868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An industrial dispute in regard to the payment of bonu.s arose between the appellant Hochtief Gammon and the respondents, its workmen, represented by the Rourkela Workers Union, Rourkela."}}, {"text": "Government of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6957, "end_char": 6977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This dispute was referred for adjudication to the Indu:; trial Tribunal, Orissa by the Government of Orissa on the 14th November, 1960."}}, {"text": "14th November, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6985, "end_char": 7004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This dispute was referred for adjudication to the Indu:; trial Tribunal, Orissa by the Government of Orissa on the 14th November, 1960."}}, {"text": "17th November, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7082, "end_char": 7101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it passed an order on the 17th November, 1960 that notice of the reference should be issued to the parties concerned."}}, {"text": "MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7345, "end_char": 7370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purporting to give effect to this order, the office of the Tribunal im1ed notices not only to the appellant and the respondents, but also to the Deputy General Manager of MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. This was so done apparently because a copy of the notification of the Government of Orissa containing the order of reference had been served on the said Dy."}}, {"text": "Meanwhife", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7828, "end_char": 7837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhife, the appellant made an application to the Tribunal on the 21st March, 1961 and contended that the interests of MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. and the appellant were common in the proceedings pending before the Tribunal, and so, MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd;."}}, {"text": "21st March, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7896, "end_char": 7912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhife, the appellant made an application to the Tribunal on the 21st March, 1961 and contended that the interests of MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. and the appellant were common in the proceedings pending before the Tribunal, and so, MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd;."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Steel Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7954, "end_char": 7973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhife, the appellant made an application to the Tribunal on the 21st March, 1961 and contended that the interests of MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd. and the appellant were common in the proceedings pending before the Tribunal, and so, MI s Hindustan Steel Ltd;."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8985, "end_char": 9002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That 1s why the v. appellant moved the Orissa High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9009, "end_char": 9017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9517, "end_char": 9528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9816, "end_char": 9826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decision, the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and on its behalf, Mr. Chatterjee has contended that the I!!dustrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to add a party to the proceedings before it and that on the merits, Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be added as a necessary party.", "canonical_name": "Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9956, "end_char": 9980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decision, the appellant has come to this Court by special leave; and on its behalf, Mr. Chatterjee has contended that the I!!dustrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to add a party to the proceedings before it and that on the merits, Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. should be added as a necessary party."}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10136, "end_char": 10147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10238, "end_char": 10246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10319, "end_char": 10330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10374, "end_char": 10384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10499, "end_char": 10512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10716, "end_char": 10726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11594, "end_char": 11606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhuban", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11772, "end_char": 11778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2(k) of the Act defines v. an 'industrial dispute', inter alia, as meaning any dispute or Industrial Tribunal, difference between employers and workmen; so that parties\n\nBhuban.,"}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11934, "end_char": 11941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12122, "end_char": 12132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12140, "end_char": 12148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12333, "end_char": 12346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12464, "end_char": 12491, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13028, "end_char": 13055, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13091, "end_char": 13096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13189, "end_char": 13197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13444, "end_char": 13452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13513, "end_char": 13518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhubanesltwar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14474, "end_char": 14487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhubanesltwar, itself and was not expressly clothed with the power to refer Orissa am!."}}, {"text": "Ga1e1Ulragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14696, "end_char": 14711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of these relevant provisions clearly Ga1e1Ulragadkar, G.J. seems to be that if the Industrial Tribunal, while dealing with an industrial dispute, came to the conclusion that persons other than those mentioned as parties to the industrial dispute were necessary for a valid determination of the said dispute, it had the power to summon them; and if such persons were summoned to appear in the proceedings, the award that the Industrial Tribunal may ultimately pronounce would be binding on them.", "canonical_name": "Ga1e1Ulragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15545, "end_char": 15553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16118, "end_char": 16123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16328, "end_char": 16338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16442, "end_char": 16447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16680, "end_char": 16695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16704, "end_char": 16718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jajendrugadkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17570, "end_char": 17584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, where certain points of dis- <Jajendrugadkar, O.J. pute have been referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudi\n\ncation, it may, while dealing with the said points, deal with matters incidental thereto, and that means that if, while dealiug with such incidental matters, the Tribunal feels that scme persons who are not joined to the reference should be brought before it, it may be able to make an order in that behalf under s. 18(3)(b) as it now stands."}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17967, "end_char": 17978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17998, "end_char": 18011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18899, "end_char": 18910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18946, "end_char": 18959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19067, "end_char": 19075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19095, "end_char": 19106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19108, "end_char": 19121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19483, "end_char": 19494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19544, "end_char": 19551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19638, "end_char": 19646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19680, "end_char": 19691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20049, "end_char": 20053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20475, "end_char": 20483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GaJendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20507, "end_char": 20521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What th~ Tribunal can GaJendragadkar, C.J. consider in addition to the disputes specified m the order of\n\nreference, are only ma, ttern incidental to the said disputes; and that naturally suggests certain obvious limitations on the implied power of the Tribunal to add parties to the reference before it, purporting to exercise its implied power under s. 18-\n\n(3)(b).", "canonical_name": "Ga1e1Ulragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20837, "end_char": 20842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21966, "end_char": 21983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question has been considered by the Madras High Court in two reported decisions .. In P. G. Brooks, Receiver appoin!ed by the Trustees for the' mortgage debenture holders of the Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Ors.,(')"}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22248, "end_char": 22256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23290, "end_char": 23298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23312, "end_char": 23326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<Jajendragadkar, C.J.\n\nIn Anil Kuinar Upadhaya v. V. P. K. Sarkar & Ors.('),", "canonical_name": "Ga1e1Ulragadkar"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23420, "end_char": 23439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11 learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has accepted the same view."}}, {"text": "Chatterji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24448, "end_char": 24457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterji has raised two contentions in support of his plea that Mis Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party.", "canonical_name": "Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Rourkela", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25065, "end_char": 25073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, according to Mr. Chatterjee, is a firm constituted only for a single venture for undertaking the execution of the work of construction and foundation and civil engineering works at Rourkela: it has been engaged by the said concern of M / s Hindustan Steel Ltd. as its agent and in that behalf an agreement has been executed between the parties."}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25234, "end_char": 25244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nChatterjee referred us to some of the relevant clauses of.", "canonical_name": "Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Hindustan\n\nSteel Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25717, "end_char": 25738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "would be not the appellant's but of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. We do not propose to examine the merits of this oten.tion, bcaue\n\nwe are satisfied that even if Mr. Chatterjee s contention 1s well-founded by reference to the relevant clauses of te agreement between the parties, that cannot make Ml s Hindustan\n\nSteel Ltd. a necessary party within the meaning of s. 18(3)(b)."}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25779, "end_char": 25790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26641, "end_char": 26647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In either words, this contention is that though in form the appellant engaged the workmen whom the respondent union represents, the appellant was acting as the agent of its principal and for adjudicating upon the industrial dispute referred to the Tribunal by the State of Orissa, it is necessary that the principal, viz.,"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27667, "end_char": 27672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28039, "end_char": 28050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28116, "end_char": 28127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28431, "end_char": 28442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_606_617_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".Aprill\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nRA.MACHANDRA NARASIMHA KULKARNI v .\n\nSTATE OF MYSORE\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nPost Offices Act-WilfU:lly detaining postJal articles--The meaning of the exvression \"wilful\"-Mere negligence or inadvertance not enougl>-Detention must be for a purpose- Post Offices Act, 1898 (VI of 1898) s. 53.\n\nThe appellant was a registration clerk in a post office. He was prosecuted on the allegation that he committed theft of a half of a ten rupee note contained in a registered letter along with a petition for exchanging it, for altering the petitic, n and for detaining the registered letter for a day with the purpose of committlng the theft and making the alteration. He was charged under Ss. 52, 53 and 54 respectively of the Post Offices Act, 1898. The Sessions Judge who tried the case found him not guilty of the offence under s. 52 but guilty under Ss. 53 and\n\n55. On appeal to the High Court he was found not to be guilty of the offence under s. 55; the conviction under s. 53 was maintained. Thereupon he appealed to this Court.\n\nIt was contended by the appellant before this Court that assuming that he detained the envelope he cannot be said to have detained it \"wilfully\", unless it is shown that he had some purpose in doing it and since the purpose alleged by the .Prosecution has not been proved the appellant cannot be said to have committed the offence under s. 53.\n\nHeld: per K.\n\nSubba Rao and K. C. Das Gupta, JJ.\n\nA review of the case law brings out clearly the guiding principle that the meaning to be attached to the words \"wilful' or\n\n\"wilfully\" has to be ascertained on a close examination of the scheme and nature of the legislation in which the words appear and the context in which they are used.\n\nRe Young and Harston, 31 Ch. D. 174 Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills, [1933] (2) K.B. 669 United States of America v.\n\nHarry Murdock, 78 Law, Ed. 689, Hudson v. Official Liquidator, A.LR. 1929 All. -826, In re T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty, 19ol\n\n2 S.T.C. 27 and In re Jayarama Chettiar, I.L.R. 1949, Mad. 121 referred to.\n\n(ii) A comparison of the various sections of the Act shows that the legislature took a more serious view of the offence of wilful detention of postal articles than any of the offences in Ch. X and has, therefore, prescribed a comparatively heavy punishment. Hence it is reasonable to think that in s. 53 when the word \"wilfully\" was used the legislature also intended that the detention would be punishable only if made for some purpose.\n\n(iii) The prosecution alleged in the Jlresent case that the purpose was theft of the note but the existence of that purpose has not been established and detention was not deliberate and hence the appellant cannot be said to have detained the arti- .cle wilfully.\n\nPer Raghubar Dayal, J. (dissenting}-- The legislature where it intended to make the purpose behind an act an ingredient expressly stated so, as for example in s. 52. If the word \"wilful\" or \"wilfully\" is used in the Act as\n\na synonym for an act done deliberately and for some purpose, the expression wilful could have been used in the place of \"for any purpose whatsoever\". This the legislature did not do though it used that in s. 53.\n\n(ii) The mere act of detaining a postal article by any person other than a postal officer is made punishable with only fine under s. 67 and a higher punishment is provided under s. 53 because the culprit is an officer of the post office who has opportunities to detain the, postal articles and who acts contrary to his duties.\n\n(iii) The expression \"wilfully\" in s. 53 means \"intentionally and deliberately\" and not \"accidently\" or 'lnegligently''.\n\n(iv) From the facts of the case it is proved that the appellant deliberately detained the registered letter. His intention and deliberation were directed towards the detaining of the registered Jetter and to the non-forwarding of it in due course with the mail that day. Every intentional and relevant act must be with some purpose or object. He, therefore obtained the letter wilfully and is guilty of the offence under s. 53.\n\nTaylor v. Verget>te\n\n(861) 30 L.J. Ex. 400, Reg. v. Senior\n\n(1899) 1 Q.B 283, Tamboli v. Great India Peninsular Railway Company, L.R. 55 I.A. 67, Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills Ltd. [1933] 2 K.B. 669, Hudson v. Official Liquidator, A.LR., J.929 All. 826 and T. N. K. Govindaraju!u Chetty, 1951 S.T.C. Vol. 2, 26, referred to.\n\nCRlMINAL APPELLATE JuR)SDICTION: Ctiminal Appeal No. 202 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated August 1, 1962, of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1961.\n\nW. S. Bar/ingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appelbnt.\n\nR. Gopalakrislman and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent.\n\nApril ], 1964. The Judgment of SUBBA RAO and OAS GUPTA JJ. was delivered by OAS GUPTA J. RAGHUBAR DAYAL J delivered a dissenting opinion.\n\nRamad1andra•\n\nNarasimha\n\nJ[ulkarni ...\n\nState of Mysore\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant, who was a registration DasGupta, J clerk in the Haveri Post Office in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53\n\nnd s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act. The prosecution case 1s that on the 18th October 1955 a registered letter contuining half portion of a ten-rupee note and petition on behalf of one M uppayyagonda asking for the said note to be exchanged for a fresh note was received at the Haveri Post Office at 4.30 p.m. from the Branch Post Office at Kabbur. he appellant who was a, registration clerk at Haveri at the time, however, detained the registered envelope instead of\n\nBamachandm\n\nNara8imha\n\nKulkarni\n\nStare of Mg•ore\n\nDa8 Gupta, J,\n\ndespatching it that very day as he should have done. He despatched it the next day. It was the prosecution case that the appellant removed the half portion of the ten-rupee currency note from inide the envelope and to cover up his misconduct ma.de alterations in the petition contained in the envelope and in the list of registered articles. All this was discovered, it is said; when the Reserve Bank of India, to which this envelope was addressed made enquiries in the matter on finding that no note had been enclosed with the petition. The appellant admitted that the envelope was received at the Haveri Post Office on October 18, 1955 and also that he did not despatch it on that date. His case was that it was received at about 5.30 p.m. on the 18th and so it was too late for despatch on that date but that he despatched it duly on the 19th ..\n\nOn a consideration of the evidence the Sessions Judge held that the charge under s. 52 of the Indian Post Office Act for the theft of currency note and for secreting the registered articles had not been established and acquitted him of that charge. He, however, found it proved that the appellant had fraudulently altered the lists of registered articles and thereby committed an offence under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act. He also held that the appellant had wilfully detained the envelope and thus committed an offence under s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act. He accordingly convicted the appellant of the charges under Ss. 53 and 55 of the Indian Post Office Act and sentenced him to undergo two months' imprisonment on each charg~. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court of Mysore set aside the appellant's conviction under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act but maintained his conviction under s. 53, being of opinion that while the wilful detention of the envelope by the appellant had been proved. the alleged alterations by him in the\n\nlit of registered articles had not been established. Against the High Court's decision the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant, Ramchandra Narasirnha Kulkarni.\n\nIn support of the appeal it is contended by Dr. Barlingey that as the allegations of theft of the note or of alterations in the list of registered articles by the appellant have not been established, the appellant must be held not to have committed any offence under s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act. It is argued that assuming that the envelope was detained by the appellant as alleged, he cannot be said to have detained it 'wilfully\" unless it is shown that he had some purpose in doing it. But, the purpose alleged by the prosecution was that he wanted to commit theft of the currency note, and to cover this up, to make alterations in the list of registered articles, these purposes have not been established. So, argues the learned Counsel, the detention of the envelope should be held\n\nto have been made without any purpose but only through inadvertance or mere carelessness. That would not constitute, according to the learned Counsel, a. wilful detention.\n\nThe words \"wilful\" and \"wilfully\" are frequently used in many statutes and have come up for judicial consideration in the courts of this country as also elsewhere. The meaning given to these words have differed in different contexts. Sometimes, any intentional act has been held to be a wilful a.ct. (Re Young and Harston)('). Often, it has been said that the word wilful suggests bad conduct or action though it does not necessarily connote blame. (Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills)('). Not infrequently the word has been used to mean that the act had been done with a bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely. (United States of America v. Harry Murdock)(').\n\nSome decisions stress the requirement of deliberation or reckless disregard of the fact whether the act was or was not in breach of duty in deciding whether it has been wilful. (Hudson v. Official Liquidator('); and In re T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty)('). In the last mentioned case, viz., In re T.N.K.\n\nGovindarajulu Chetty's case, -the Madras High Coui:t held that .a submission of a false return cannot be a wilful submission unless the dealer has deliberately made the return with the knowledge that he was e)\\cluding a taxable item, though in almost similar circumstances another Bench of the same High Court took a different view and held that even though when an assessee, under the impression that a particular item is not taxable and, therefore, need be excluded in the return, omits to make a mention' of it in the return which he furnished with the full knowledge of his having committed the same, he has \"wilfully\" omitted it. Un re Jayarama Chettiar) (').\n\nA review of these various decisions brings out clearly the guiding principle that the meaning to be attached to the words\n\n\"wilful\" or \"wilfully\" has to be ascertained on a close examination of the scheme and nature of the legislation in which the words appear and the context in which they are used.\n\nTurning now, for this purpose, to the Indian Post Office Act, we notice that s. 53 which makes punishable the wilful detention or delay of a postal article by an officer of the post office in one of the several sections which create offences under this Act. There are 21 such sections, being sections 49\n\n(') 31 Ch. D. 174.\n\n(') 78 Law E. 389.\n\n(') 1951 2 S.T.C. 27.\n\nLIP(D)lSC!-20\n\n(') 1933(2) K.B. 669.\n\n(') A.I.R. 1929 All. 826.\n\n(') I.L.R. 1949 Madras, 121.\n\n196'\n\nRam~\n\nNararimha\n\nKolkarni\n\nStat.of Mg..,.\n\nV..Gwpla, J.\n\nRamackandra\n\nNaro.aimha Kull:arni\n\nBlatt ~I Myaore\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nto 56 and 58 to 70, all in Chapter X of the Act. Some of these offences, viz., those under Ss. 49, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65. 66 and 67 are punishable only with fine. The offences under Ss. 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 68 and 69 are made punishable also with imprisonment.\n\nOf these again, the offences under s. 53, are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven. years; offences under Ss. 53, 54, 55, 56.\n\n60, and 68 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years; offences under Ss. 61 and 62 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year while offences under Ss. 51 and 69 are punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months only. An offence under s. 50 is punishable with imprisonment extending to one month or with fine extending to Rs. 50 /-.\n\nThis comparison clearly shows that the legislature took a more serious view of t!ie offence of wilful detention of a postal articles (s. 52) than of many other offences in this Chapter. Delay in the conveyance or delivery of a mail bag or other postal articles in the course of transmission by a person employed to car.y the same is made punishable with only a fine of Rs. 50 /- (s. 49). Withdrawal from duties of office without permission or without having given a month's previous notice in writing by a person employed to carry or deliver a mail bag or postal article is also made punishable only with imprisonment extending to one month or with fine extending to Rs. 50 /-. Making of a false entry in the register with intention to induce the belief that an article has been delivered is ma.de punishable with imprisonment extending to only six months or with fine extending to Rs. 100/-. But wilful detention of a postal article is made punishable with imprisonment extending to two years. Is it reasonable to think that the legislature would prescribe this heavy punishment for detention of a postal article which was not deliberate and on purpose, while prescribing lighter punishment as mentioned above for the offences under Ss. 49, 50 and 51. We do not think so. The very fact that this comparatively heavy punishment of two years' imprisonment has been prescribed for wilful detention while lighter punishment has been prescribed under Ss. 49, 50 and 51, justifies, in our opinion, the conclusion that the word \"wilful\" was used by the legislature to mean only such detention which was deliberate and for S•lme purpose.\n\nIt is interesting to notice in this connection that in the preceding section 52 the legislature after making punishable\n\nthe offence of theft of a postal article or of dishonest misappropriation of the same, also made punishable the secretion, destruction or throwing away any postal article if done \"for any purpose whatsoever\". It is, in our opinion, reasonable to think that in s. 53 when the word \"wilfully\" was used, the\n\n,.., l\n\n'7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRElllE COURT REPORTS 611\n\nlegislature also intended that the detention would be punishable only if made for some purpose.\n\nComing now to the facts of the present case, we find that the prosecution alleged a definite purpose. viz .• the purpose of theft of the contents of the envelope-as the purpose with which the postal article was detained. The existence of that\n\npurpose has not, however, been established. Nothing was suggested before us as W what other purpose the appellant could have had in detaining the article. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the detention was not deliberate and on purpose, but as a result of either inadvertence or carelessness or negligence. So, the appellant cannot be said to have detained or delayed the article 'wilfully'.\n\nAccordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court and order that the appellant be acquitted of the charge against him.\n\nRamachan&ra\n\n... ~arasimha\n\nKtlkarni\n\nState of .Jf ysore\n\n/J(H Oupl.a, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The main question to determine, Raghnhar DayaJ, J, in this case, is what the expression 'wilfully detains or delays' in s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898), hereinafter called the Act, means.\n\nI do not agree that it means such detention which was deliberate and for some purpose. I am of opinion that the detention or delay would be 'wilful' if it was intentional and. deliberate on the part of the officer of the post office, as opposed to detention or delay on account of negligence or inadvertence. The word 'wilful' or 'wilfully' used in other enactments have been construed by Court in this manner. I may refer to some of these cases.\n\nJn Taylor v. Vergette(') 'wilful delay' has been construed to mean 'intentional delay'.\n\nIn Reg. v. Senior(') Lord Russel said:\n\n•• 'Wilfully' means that the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it\".\n\nIn Tamboli v. Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company('> the Privy Coqncil had to construe the expression 'wilful negiect' in determining the responsibility of the railway administration or its servants and approved of what was said by Lord Russel in Reg. v. Senior(').\n\n(') (1861) 30 L.J. Ex. 400.\n\n(') [1889] 1. Q.B. 283, 290. ' (') L.R. 55 I.A. 67=!.L.R. 52 Born. 169.\n\nJ. P(D)I~CI-20(•)\n\nRamachaw:lra\n\nNaraftmha\n\nKulkarni\n\nStale of My•ore\n\n.la971.War Dayal, J.\n\nIn Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd.(') it was said:-\n\n\" 'Wilful act' is plain English, and I can entertain no doubt that the installing of this machine without guard or fence for use in .the factory was a wilful act by some one. It was an act, and it was intentional. It is true that though 'wilful' and 'inten- . tional' are synonymous ...... 'wilful' is more commonly used in modern speech of bad conduct or actions than of good, though it does not necessarily connote blame; but that is far from supporting the stra.nge contention that wilful act in s. 29, sub-s. 1, must be confined to something done with intent to injure\".\n\nIn Hudson v. Official Liquidator(') 'wilful default' was construed and it was said at p. 930:\n\n\"The adjective 'wilful' in 'wilful acts or defaults' has\n\nevidently been used as a description and not as a definition. The idea intended to be conveyed is that the default .is occasioned by the exercise of volition or as the result of the non-exercise of will due to supine indifference, although the defaulter knew or was in a position to know that loss or harm was likely to result. The word does not necessarily suggest the idea of moral turpitude.\n\nWe ha.ve also to eliminate the elements of accident or inadvertence or honest error of judgrment. The default must be the result of deliberation or intent or be the consequence of a reckless omission. 'Wilful default', therefore, is indicative of some misconduct in the transaction of business or in the discharge of duty by omitting to do some, thing either deliberately or by a reckless disregard of the fact whether the act or omission was tor was not a breach of duty\".\n\nThis view was accepted by the Madras High Court in T.N.K. Govindaraju/u Chetty, ln reO.\n\nThe words 'wilful' and 'wilfully' have been used in th<' various provisions of the Act do not lead to any different interpretation of these words.\n\nSection 6 of the Act provides, inter a/ia, that no officer of the Post Office shall incur any liability by reason of any loss, mis-delivery, delay or damage, unless he has caused the same fraudulently or by his wilful act or default.\n\n(') [1933] 2 K.B. 669. (') A.I.R. 1929 All. 826.\n\n(') 1951 2. S.T.C. 27.\n\nSection 48(c) provides that no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against the Government or any officer of the post office in respect of the payment of any money order being refused or delayed by, or on account of, any accidental neglect, omission or mistake _by, or on the part of an Officer of the post office, or for any other cause whatsoever, other than the fraud or wilful act or default oi such officer; and brings out effectively the contradistinction between wilful act or default of an officer and an act done on account of accidental neglect, omission or mistake.\n\nSection 49 to 70 provide for offences. Sections 49, 50 and 51 deal with offences which are committed by persons who arc employed to carry or deliver any mail bag or any postal article, in course of transmission by post. They are thus offences by carriers of postal articles. They can be committed both by the officers of the postal department and by others as well. Such of the acts contemplated by those sections which can also fall under the other sections exclusively applicable to officers of the post office, will naturally be dealt with under those sections. The persons who will be dealt with under Ss. 49 to 51 or other sections providing for lighter punishments will be those who are not officers of the postal department but are concerned in any manner with the transmission of the post.\n\nClause (c) of s. 49 makes punishable the loitering or making delay in the conveyance or delivery of any mail bag or postal article, and thus emphasizes the neceity of prompt transport of postal articles.\n\nSections 52 to 66 provide for offences by officers of a post office.\n\nSection 52 provides punishment for committing theft or dishonestly misappropriating in respect of or, for any purpose whatsoever, secreting, destroying or throwing away any postal article in the course of transmission by post or anything contained therein. The offence is punishable with imprisonment upto seven years and also with fine. This is the most serious offence.\n\nIt is to be noted for our purpose that the secreting, destroying or throwing away of the postal article for any purpose whatsoever is an offence. An act done with a purpose must be a deliberate act and a. deliberate act must also be one done with some purpose: The legislature, where it intended to make the purpose behind an act an ingredient of the offence, expressly stated so. If the word 'wilful' or 'wilfully' is used in the Act as a synonym for an act done deliberately and for some purpose, the expression 'wilfully' could have been used in the place of 'for any purpose whatsoever' .\n\nThis, however, the legislature did not do, though it used that word in the very next section, viz., s. 53 which reads:\n\nEanuichandra\n\n].; arasimha ]{ulkarni v. .State of JJf ysore\n\nughuhar 1Jr1y1,1.l,\n\nll unachrin.drri\n\nNara8imlia Kulkarni\n\nShite of My.m,,\n\nRagltubrir Doyal, J.\n\n\"Whoever, being an officer of the Post Office, contrary to his duty, opens. or causes or suffers to be opened, any postal article in course of transmission by post. or wilfully detains or delayed or cau.>es or suffers to be detained or delayed, any such postal article, sball be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with botb:\n\nProvided that nothing in this section shall extend to the opening, detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of this Act or in obedience to the order i(l writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court\".\n\nSections 54, 55 and 56 make certain acts done fraudulently, knowingly or with intent, punishable with imprisonment upto two years or fine. Section 55 makes the fraudulent altering or secreting or destroying of a document which an officer of the post office is entrusted with keeping, punishable with imprisonment upto two years and with fine. This act is considered less heinous than that of secreting, destroying or throwing away of any postal article in the course of transmission by post, for any purpose whatsoever.\n\nSection 66(1) makes the master of a ship who, in certain circumstances, knowingly has in his baggage or in his possession or custody, any postal article within the exclusive privilege conferred on the Central Government by s. 4, punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 50/- for every such postal article. Here a certain act committed knowingly is made >- an offence. Sub-s. (2) of s. 66 makes the detention of any postal article, after a demand for it has been made by an officer of the post office, punishable. Here, the mere detention after a demand is made penal irrespective of the intention or purpose behind such detention.\n\nSection 67 makes the detention of mails or any postal article in the course of transmission by post by anyone except under the various circumstances mentioned in the section, an offence. Here again, mere detention is made an offence irrespective of the circumstances in which it is made, excepting for reasons mentioned in the section iteself.\n\nSection 68 reads :\n\n\"Whoever, fraudulently retains, or wilfully secretes or makes away with. or keeps or detains, or when required by an officer of the post office, neglects\n\n.!I or refuses to deliver up, any postal article in\n\ncourse of transmission by post which ought to have been delivered to any other person, or a mail bag containing a postal article, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be punishable with tine\".\n\nIt is to be noticed that 'wilfully' secreting any post\"! article in the course of transmission by post is an offence under this section. A comparison with the provisions of s. 52 of the Act indicates that the legislature must have used the expressions 'wilfully' and 'for any purpose whatsoever' in different senses.\n\nLastly, s. 69 makes certain acts committed wilfully and maliciously with intent to injure any person, offences. 'Wilfully' here is used as something distinct from 'maliciously' and is. further used in addition to the expression 'with intent to injure any person', that is to say, the particular purpose or intent is an ingreuient of the offence in addition to 'wilfully'.\n\nSections 6 and 48(c) provide that an o!licer of a post oftice would be liable for the loss, .misdelivery, delay or of damage to any postal article in the course of transmission or for the delay in the payment of a money order, only when this happens as a result of his wilful act or default. The person suffering from such misdelivery etc., has no claim against\n\nthe o!licer cf the post office if that thing has been the result of something which could not be said to be the wilful act or default of a postal officer. It is no concern of the addressee or recipient of an article in transit by post that the wilful act or default of the postal officer was with a certain purpose or not and whether that officer succeeded in that purpose or not.\n\nHe should be successful in his claim if the postal officer has deliberately not acted in the manner he is required to act under the Act or the rules framed thereunder or if he has deliberatelv acted in violation of the duties entrusted to him. In either case. the a.ct d the ollicer concerned would be wilful inasmuch as he would act intentionally in violation of his duty or in a manner in which he is not to act and not accidently or inadvertently.\n\nThe provisions of s. 53 of the Act require that the officer 1vilfully detains' the postal article and that the act of detention be contrary to his duty prescribed by or under the Act. Section 21 (2)(c) empowers the Central Government to make rules providing for the detention and disposal of articles in course of transmission by post in certain circumstances. Sections 22(1), 23, 26, 27B and 37(2) provide for the circumstances in which postal articles can be detained or delayed. It is not necessary to detail those circumstances. The clause 'contrary to his duty' governs both the act of opening;\n\nRomad1andra\n\nli, araBitnlta\n\nKulkarni\n\nState of Mysore\n\nR11{Jhubar Dayal, J ..\n\n616 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n19111 of the Postal article and to the act of detaining it. The first Runarlumdra necessary ingredient of the offence under s, 53 is that\n\nN\"\"'';,,,1,,, the postal officer should act contrary to his duty. Such an act, K,,!k<lrni however. can take place by accident or negligence also, with-\n\nS1<1te rrlfy, orc out the officer's knowing it or even giving any thought to it -- :rnd therefore without his exercising his will in that matter.\n\nRaglru7.ar D\"!f'11• J. The legislature. therefore, felt that accidental or negligent acts be not made offences and that/detention of the postal article, even if it be contrary to duty; be protected and that only such detention of the articles be made punishable which be\n\nwmmitted wilfully, i.e., when the officer applied his mind towards the act and has committed it deliberately with the intention of committing it.\n\nThe mere act of detaining mails or postal articles by any person other than a postal officer is made punishable only with fine under s. 67 of the Act. This indicates that the punishment under s. 53 is severe because the culprit is an officer of the post office who has opportunities to detain the postal article and who acts contrary to his duty.\n\nThe proviso to s. 53 refers to cases which would have come within the main provisions, and provides that the main provisions do not extend to the opening. detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of the Act or in obedience to the order in writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court. Such acts would be undoubtedly deliberate and without any criminal purpose.\n\nThe use of the expression 'for any purpose whatsoever' in s. 52 is no guide to construe the word 'wilfully' in s. 53.\n\nIt appears to have been used in s. 52 in contradistinction t0 the mens rca necessary for the commission of the offence of theft or of dishonest misappropriation. Its use makes it clear that the act of secreting, destroying or throwing away of the postal article will be punishable if with a purpose, whatever that may have been.\n\nI. therefore. construe 'wilfully' in s. 53 to mean 'intentiomilly and deliberately' and not accidently or negligently and hold that the appellant has been rightly convicted of the offence under that section.\n\nI am further of opinion that even if the expression 'wilfully detains' in s. 53 of the Act means, a detention deliberate and for some purpose, the appel(ant is not entitled to an acquittal on the findings the Courts have arrived at.\n\nThe appellant. in ordinary course of business,.would have forwarded the registered letter by the mail on October 18, 1955 when it had been received at the usual hour and the appellant's contention that it was received after the despatClh\n\nof the mail has not been accepted. It follows that the appel- 1964 !ant deliberately detained the registered letter. The intention Ramacltandra and deliberation was directed towards tlie detaining of the Narasimlin registered Jetter and to the non-forwarding of it in due course Kulkarni with the ma.ii that day. Every intentional and deliberate act Stale of Mysore must be with some purpose or object. It may be that in some -- cases the object be achieved by the mere doing of the act Ragliul>ar Dayal, J. intended, that is to say, the object was just the doing of that act. In other cases, an act may be done with some further object also. The appellant's purpose behind his intentional act of detaining the registered letter must ha.ve been to remove what he might have suspected the letter to contain. If he did not have any such object, he could not have any reason to depart from his duty and detain the letter instead of sending it by the next mail in the ordinary course of his duties. His act, therefore, .in detaining the letter, amounted to his detaining it wilfully.\n\nThe fail\\Jre of the prosecution to establish successfully that he himself opened the letter, tempered with its contents and removed the half currency note, facts which have been proved to have been committed by someone, does not mean that his detaining the letter was not on purpose.\n\nA person may do an act with a c.ertain purpose and yet may not succeed in his purpose. Even if he succeeds it may not be possible for any otherperson to establish tha, t he did that act for that purpose and did succeed in achieving that purpose.\n\nI would. therefore, dismiss the appeal.\n\nORDER BY COURT In accordance with th~ i_najority opinion, the appeal is allowed, the order of conv1cl!on and sentence set aside and\n\nte appellant ordered to be acquitted of the charge against him.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 139, "entities": [{"text": "RA.MACHANDRA NARASIMHA KULKARNI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMACHANDRA NARASIMHA KULKARNI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MYSORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "State of .Jf ysore", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Post Offices Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Detention must be for a purpose- Post Offices Act, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 288, "end_char": 343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Detention must be for a purpose- Post Offices Act, 1898", "statute": "Detention must be for a purpose- Post Offices Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "Ss. 52, 53 and 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 753, "end_char": 770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Detention must be for a purpose- Post Offices Act, 1898", "statute": "Detention must be for a purpose- Post Offices Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "Post Offices Act, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 791, "end_char": 813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 895, "end_char": 900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Post Offices Act, 1898", "statute": "the Post Offices Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "Ss. 53 and\n\n55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 918, "end_char": 932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Post Offices Act, 1898", "statute": "the Post Offices Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1013, "end_char": 1018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Post Offices Act, 1898", "statute": "the Post Offices Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1041, "end_char": 1046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Post Offices Act, 1898", "statute": "the Post Offices Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1438, "end_char": 1443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Post Offices Act, 1898", "statute": "the Post Offices Act, 1898"}}, {"text": "T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1998, "end_char": 2027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-826, In re T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty, 19ol\n\n2 S.T.C. 27 and In re Jayarama Chettiar, I.L.R. 1949, Mad."}}, {"text": "Jayarama Chettiar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2057, "end_char": 2074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-826, In re T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty, 19ol\n\n2 S.T.C. 27 and In re Jayarama Chettiar, I.L.R. 1949, Mad.", "canonical_name": "Jayarama Chettiar"}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2410, "end_char": 2415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2819, "end_char": 2833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Raghubar Dayal, J. (dissenting}-- The legislature where it intended to make the purpose behind an act an ingredient expressly stated so, as for example in s. 52.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 2979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3244, "end_char": 3249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3382, "end_char": 3387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3615, "end_char": 3620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4123, "end_char": 4128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 55 I.A. 67", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4260, "end_char": 4275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4608, "end_char": 4625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated August 1, 1962, of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "W. S. Bar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4663, "end_char": 4672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W. S. Bar/ingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appelbnt."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W. S. Bar/ingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appelbnt."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrislman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4721, "end_char": 4738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Gopalakrislman and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4743, "end_char": 4760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Gopalakrislman and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SUBBA RAO and OAS GUPTA JJ."}}, {"text": "OAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4828, "end_char": 4837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SUBBA RAO and OAS GUPTA JJ.", "canonical_name": "OAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "J. RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4869, "end_char": 4886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by OAS GUPTA J. RAGHUBAR DAYAL J delivered a dissenting opinion."}}, {"text": "Ramad1andra•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4922, "end_char": 4934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramad1andra•\n\nNarasimha\n\nJ[ulkarni ...\n\nState of Mysore\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant, who was a registration DasGupta, J clerk in the Haveri Post Office in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53\n\nnd s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act."}}, {"text": "Narasimha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4936, "end_char": 4945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramad1andra•\n\nNarasimha\n\nJ[ulkarni ...\n\nState of Mysore\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant, who was a registration DasGupta, J clerk in the Haveri Post Office in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53\n\nnd s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act."}}, {"text": "J[ulkarni", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4947, "end_char": 4956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramad1andra•\n\nNarasimha\n\nJ[ulkarni ...\n\nState of Mysore\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant, who was a registration DasGupta, J clerk in the Haveri Post Office in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53\n\nnd s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act."}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4962, "end_char": 4977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramad1andra•\n\nNarasimha\n\nJ[ulkarni ...\n\nState of Mysore\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant, who was a registration DasGupta, J clerk in the Haveri Post Office in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53\n\nnd s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act.", "canonical_name": "State of .Jf ysore"}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramad1andra•\n\nNarasimha\n\nJ[ulkarni ...\n\nState of Mysore\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant, who was a registration DasGupta, J clerk in the Haveri Post Office in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53\n\nnd s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act.", "canonical_name": "OAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "DasGupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5031, "end_char": 5039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramad1andra•\n\nNarasimha\n\nJ[ulkarni ...\n\nState of Mysore\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant, who was a registration DasGupta, J clerk in the Haveri Post Office in the Mysore State, was tried by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, on charges under s. 52, s. 53\n\nnd s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act.", "canonical_name": "OAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5155, "end_char": 5160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5172, "end_char": 5177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5185, "end_char": 5207, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "18th October 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5245, "end_char": 5262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case 1s that on the 18th October 1955 a registered letter contuining half portion of a ten-rupee note and petition on behalf of one M uppayyagonda asking for the said note to be exchanged for a fresh note was received at the Haveri Post Office at 4.30 p.m. from the Branch Post Office at Kabbur."}}, {"text": "M uppayyagonda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5357, "end_char": 5371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case 1s that on the 18th October 1955 a registered letter contuining half portion of a ten-rupee note and petition on behalf of one M uppayyagonda asking for the said note to be exchanged for a fresh note was received at the Haveri Post Office at 4.30 p.m. from the Branch Post Office at Kabbur."}}, {"text": "Haveri Post Office", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5450, "end_char": 5468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case 1s that on the 18th October 1955 a registered letter contuining half portion of a ten-rupee note and petition on behalf of one M uppayyagonda asking for the said note to be exchanged for a fresh note was received at the Haveri Post Office at 4.30 p.m. from the Branch Post Office at Kabbur."}}, {"text": "Kabbur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5513, "end_char": 5519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case 1s that on the 18th October 1955 a registered letter contuining half portion of a ten-rupee note and petition on behalf of one M uppayyagonda asking for the said note to be exchanged for a fresh note was received at the Haveri Post Office at 4.30 p.m. from the Branch Post Office at Kabbur."}}, {"text": "Haveri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5567, "end_char": 5573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he appellant who was a, registration clerk at Haveri at the time, however, detained the registered envelope instead of\n\nBamachandm\n\nNara8imha\n\nKulkarni\n\nStare of Mg•ore\n\nDa8 Gupta, J,\n\ndespatching it that very day as he should have done."}}, {"text": "Da8 Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5691, "end_char": 5700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he appellant who was a, registration clerk at Haveri at the time, however, detained the registered envelope instead of\n\nBamachandm\n\nNara8imha\n\nKulkarni\n\nStare of Mg•ore\n\nDa8 Gupta, J,\n\ndespatching it that very day as he should have done.", "canonical_name": "OAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6094, "end_char": 6115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All this was discovered, it is said; when the Reserve Bank of India, to which this envelope was addressed made enquiries in the matter on finding that no note had been enclosed with the petition."}}, {"text": "October 18, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6327, "end_char": 6343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant admitted that the envelope was received at the Haveri Post Office on October 18, 1955 and also that he did not despatch it on that date."}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6637, "end_char": 6642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6650, "end_char": 6672, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6950, "end_char": 6955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6963, "end_char": 6985, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7090, "end_char": 7095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7103, "end_char": 7125, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ss. 53 and 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7187, "end_char": 7200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7208, "end_char": 7230, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7366, "end_char": 7386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the High Court of Mysore set aside the appellant's conviction under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act but maintained his conviction under s. 53, being of opinion that while the wilful detention of the envelope by the appellant had been proved."}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7430, "end_char": 7435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7443, "end_char": 7465, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7502, "end_char": 7507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramchandra Narasirnha Kulkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7790, "end_char": 7820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the High Court's decision the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant, Ramchandra Narasirnha Kulkarni."}}, {"text": "Barlingey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7871, "end_char": 7880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the appeal it is contended by Dr. Barlingey that as the allegations of theft of the note or of alterations in the list of registered articles by the appellant have not been established, the appellant must be held not to have committed any offence under s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act."}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8090, "end_char": 8095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8103, "end_char": 8125, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9718, "end_char": 9745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hudson v. Official Liquidator('); and In re T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty)(').", "canonical_name": "T.N.K.\n\nGovindarajulu Chetty"}}, {"text": "T.N.K.\n\nGovindarajulu Chetty", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9791, "end_char": 9819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In re T.N.K.\n\nGovindarajulu Chetty's case, -the Madras High Coui:t held that .a submission of a false return cannot be a wilful submission unless the dealer has deliberately made the return with the knowledge that he was e)\\cluding a taxable item, though in almost similar circumstances another Bench of the same High Court took a different view and held that even though when an assessee, under the impression that a particular item is not taxable and, therefore, need be excluded in the return, omits to make a mention' of it in the return which he furnished with the full knowledge of his having committed the same, he has \"wilfully\" omitted it.", "canonical_name": "T.N.K.\n\nGovindarajulu Chetty"}}, {"text": "Jayarama Chettiar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10440, "end_char": 10457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Un re Jayarama Chettiar) (').", "canonical_name": "Jayarama Chettiar"}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10805, "end_char": 10827, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10844, "end_char": 10849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11059, "end_char": 11070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nararimha\n\nKolkarni", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11242, "end_char": 11261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196'\n\nRam~\n\nNararimha\n\nKolkarni\n\nStat.of Mg..,."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11345, "end_char": 11354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V..Gwpla, J.\n\nRamackandra\n\nNaro.aimha Kull:arni\n\nBlatt ~I Myaore\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nto 56 and 58 to 70, all in Chapter X of the Act.", "canonical_name": "OAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Chapter X of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11387, "end_char": 11407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 49, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11451, "end_char": 11477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11673, "end_char": 11678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X of the Act"}}, {"text": "Ss. 53, 54, 55, 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11762, "end_char": 11780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X of the Act"}}, {"text": "Ss. 61 and 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11873, "end_char": 11886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X of the Act"}}, {"text": "Ss. 51 and 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11970, "end_char": 11983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12071, "end_char": 12076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12304, "end_char": 12309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter X of the Act", "statute": "Chapter X of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12550, "end_char": 12555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 49, 50 and 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13404, "end_char": 13421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 49, 50 and 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13617, "end_char": 13634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13871, "end_char": 13881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14183, "end_char": 14188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramachan&ra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15210, "end_char": 15221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramachan&ra\n\n... ~arasimha\n\nKtlkarni\n\nState of .Jf ysore\n\n/J(H Oupl.a, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The main question to determine, Raghnhar DayaJ, J, in this case, is what the expression 'wilfully detains or delays' in s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898), hereinafter called the Act, means."}}, {"text": "~arasimha\n\nKtlkarni", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15227, "end_char": 15246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramachan&ra\n\n... ~arasimha\n\nKtlkarni\n\nState of .Jf ysore\n\n/J(H Oupl.a, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The main question to determine, Raghnhar DayaJ, J, in this case, is what the expression 'wilfully detains or delays' in s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898), hereinafter called the Act, means."}}, {"text": "State of .Jf ysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15248, "end_char": 15266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramachan&ra\n\n... ~arasimha\n\nKtlkarni\n\nState of .Jf ysore\n\n/J(H Oupl.a, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The main question to determine, Raghnhar DayaJ, J, in this case, is what the expression 'wilfully detains or delays' in s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898), hereinafter called the Act, means.", "canonical_name": "State of .Jf ysore"}}, {"text": "Raghnhar DayaJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15336, "end_char": 15350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramachan&ra\n\n... ~arasimha\n\nKtlkarni\n\nState of .Jf ysore\n\n/J(H Oupl.a, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The main question to determine, Raghnhar DayaJ, J, in this case, is what the expression 'wilfully detains or delays' in s. 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898), hereinafter called the Act, means.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15424, "end_char": 15429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Post Office Act, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15437, "end_char": 15465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Russel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16083, "end_char": 16089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Senior(') Lord Russel said:\n\n•• 'Wilfully' means that the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it\"."}}, {"text": "L.R. 55 I.A. 67", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16606, "end_char": 16621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17297, "end_char": 17302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17308, "end_char": 17312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18428, "end_char": 18445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view was accepted by the Madras High Court in T.N.K. Govindaraju/u Chetty, ln reO.\n\nThe words 'wilful' and 'wilfully' have been used in th<' various provisions of the Act do not lead to any different interpretation of these words."}}, {"text": "T.N.K. Govindaraju", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18449, "end_char": 18467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view was accepted by the Madras High Court in T.N.K. Govindaraju/u Chetty, ln reO.\n\nThe words 'wilful' and 'wilfully' have been used in th<' various provisions of the Act do not lead to any different interpretation of these words.", "canonical_name": "T.N.K.\n\nGovindarajulu Chetty"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18635, "end_char": 18644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 48(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18944, "end_char": 18957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49 to 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19536, "end_char": 19552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 49, 50 and 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19575, "end_char": 19597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 49 to 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20142, "end_char": 20154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20349, "end_char": 20354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 52 to 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20540, "end_char": 20557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20610, "end_char": 20620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21677, "end_char": 21682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Eanuichandra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21697, "end_char": 21709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. 53 which reads:\n\nEanuichandra\n\n].;"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22426, "end_char": 22444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or wilfully detains or delayed or cau.>es or suffers to be detained or delayed, any such postal article, sball be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with botb:\n\nProvided that nothing in this section shall extend to the opening, detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of this Act or in obedience to the order i(l writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court\"."}}, {"text": "Sections 54, 55 and 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22486, "end_char": 22508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22625, "end_char": 22635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23007, "end_char": 23020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23230, "end_char": 23234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23393, "end_char": 23398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23643, "end_char": 23653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23988, "end_char": 23998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24641, "end_char": 24646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24794, "end_char": 24799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 6 and 48(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25159, "end_char": 25179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26374, "end_char": 26379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26540, "end_char": 26550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 22(1), 23, 26, 27B and 37(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26717, "end_char": 26754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26996, "end_char": 27011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The clause 'contrary to his duty' governs both the act of opening;\n\nRomad1andra\n\nli, araBitnlta\n\nKulkarni\n\nState of Mysore\n\nR11{Jhubar Dayal, J ..\n\n616 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n19111 of the Postal article and to the act of detaining it."}}, {"text": "R11{Jhubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27013, "end_char": 27029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The clause 'contrary to his duty' governs both the act of opening;\n\nRomad1andra\n\nli, araBitnlta\n\nKulkarni\n\nState of Mysore\n\nR11{Jhubar Dayal, J ..\n\n616 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n19111 of the Postal article and to the act of detaining it."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27365, "end_char": 27367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raglru7.ar D\"!f'11• J. The legislature", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27512, "end_char": 27550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raglru7.ar D\"!f'11• J. The legislature."}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28064, "end_char": 28069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28123, "end_char": 28128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28294, "end_char": 28299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28749, "end_char": 28754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28802, "end_char": 28807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28842, "end_char": 28847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29177, "end_char": 29182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29423, "end_char": 29428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kulkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30101, "end_char": 30109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The intention Ramacltandra and deliberation was directed towards tlie detaining of the Narasimlin registered Jetter and to the non-forwarding of it in due course Kulkarni with the ma.ii that day."}}, {"text": "Ragliul>ar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30309, "end_char": 30325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be that in some -- cases the object be achieved by the mere doing of the act Ragliul>ar Dayal, J. intended, that is to say, the object was just the doing of that act."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_618_625_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nK. NARASIMHIAH v.\n\nH. C. SINGRI GOWDA\n\nIK. SuBBA Rl\\D, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.]\n\nMunicipality-No confidence resolution against President- Enactment providing tl'lree clear days notice jor holding special general meeting-Provision if mandatory-Failure to give such notice-Effect-Validity-Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951, ss. 23(9), 24(1) (a). 24(3) and 27(3).\n\nThe ap!J€1lant was the elected President of the Municipality.\n\nIn a special general meeting of the councillors a resolution expressing no confidence in him as President \\Vas moved and passed. In the High Court as well as in this Court, the legality of the proceedings of the meeting and the validity of the resolution was. challenged by the appellant on the grounds, (i) that the requisite three days notice under the Act was not served on all the members and so the meeting was not validly held, (ii) that the meeting was not properly held as the appellant was not allowed to preside and thus s. 24(1) (a) of the Act was contravened and (iii) that the requisition for moving the resolution did not comply with the proviso to s. 23(a) of the Act as fifteen days notice was not given of the intention to move the resolution. The last two contentions were rejected by the High Court. On the main contention it held that as the notices were sent to the councillors on the 10th October 1963, they must be held to have been given on that date even though they were actually served on the 11th, 12th and 13th; but, apart from that it was of opinion that the provisions abOut three days notice was only directory and not mandatory and so the omission to give notice would not affect the validity of the resolution.\n\nHeld: (i) The High Court was wrong holding that \"sending!! a notice amounts to \"giving\" the notice. There is no authority or principle for the proposition that as soon as the person in the legal duty to give the notice despatches the notice to the address of the person to whom it has to be given, the giving is complete. Therefore, it must be held that the notice given to some of the councillors was of less than three clear days.\n\n(ii) The provision as regards any motion or proposition of which notice must be given in s. 27 (3) of the Act is only directory and not mandatory. Therefore the fact that some of the councillors received less than three clear days notice of the meeting did not by itself made the proceedings of the meeting or the resolution !>\"SSed there invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. In the present case, nineteen of the twenty councillors attended the meeting and of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the resolution of no confidence against the appellant. There is thus no reason for holddng that the proceedings of the meeting were prejudicially affected by the \"irregularity in the service of notice\".\n\nState of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, (1958) S.C.R. 533, referred to.\n\n(iii) On a consideration of the material on the record. it must be held that it was after the appellant left the meeting that the Vice President took the chair and thereafter the no confidence resolution was moved and passed. There could therefore\n\nbe no question of any contravention of the requirement under s.24(1) (a) of the Act that the President shall preside.\n\nllr arasinihiaA\n\n(iv) The proviso to s.23(9) of the Act was not contravened.\n\nAll that is required is that before the resolut10n is actually moved, the President has got fifteen days notice. In the present case, the meeting was held on October 14 and the appellant received the notice on the 25th September. There was thus more than 15 days notice given to him.\n\nH. C, Singri Gowda\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 223 of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated December 6, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ\n\nPetition No. 2273 of 1963.\n\nS.K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrislman, for the appellant.\n\nN.S. Krishna Rao and Girish Chandra, for respondents No. I, 2, 4--10, 12-15.\n\nApril 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs GUPTA, J.-Is the requirement of three clear days' Das Gupta, J. notice for the holding of a special general meeting as embodied in s. 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act 1951, a mandatory provision? That is the main question which arises\n\nfor decision in this appeal.\n\nThe appellant was elected as the President of Holenarsipur Municipality on September II, 1962. At a special general meeting of the Municipal Council held on October 14, 1963, a resolution was passed in the following terms:-\n\n\"This Council has no confidence in the Municipal\n\nPresident of Holenarsipur Municipality.\"\n\nOn November 2, I 963 Mr. Narasimhiah, the President of the Council applied to the High Court of Mysore under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of an appropriate writ quashing the proceedings of the meeting which culminated in the resolution of no confidence against him. Prayers\n\nwere made also for some consequential reliefs.\n\nHolenarsipur Municipality has twenty Councillors. Thirteen out of the them sent a request to the President to convene a special general meeting to discuss a resolution expn; ssing no confidence in him as President. This request was handed over to the President on 25th September 1963. As however he did not take any steps for convening the meeting the Vice President acted in the matter-calling a meeting to discuss the resolution to express no confidence in the President.\n\nA notice under the Vice-President's signature stating that it was prgposed to hold a special general body meeting\n\nH.O. Si1t!Jri Gou'tla\n\nof the Municipality on the 14th October 1963 at 10 A.M. in the office premises and asking the members to be present in time was served on the Councillors. One copy of the notice was also posted up at the Municipal Office as required by 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951 (herein- Das Gupta, .1. after referred to as \"the Act\"). The notice bore the d; tte 10th October 1963. On fifteen of the twenty Councillors the notice was personally served on that very date, i.e., the 10th October.\n\nOn three of the Councillors, v_iz., the President Narasimhiah, Mr. Dasappa and Mr. Sanniah, the notice was served on the 13th October. It was served on Councillor Mirza Mohammad Hussain on the 12th October and on the Councillor R. G.\n\nVaidyanatha on the I Ith October 1963.\n\nWhen the meeting was held on October I 4, 1963, nineteen of the twenty Councillors were present. The President, Mr. Narasimhiah was among them. He claimed to preside over the meeting. But, ultimately, he appears to have left the meeting. The meeting was then held under the presidentship of the Vice President Mr. Singri Gowda. The no-confidence motion against the President was moved and was passed, fifteen members having voted for it.\n\nIn challenging the legality of the proceedings of this meeting of I 4th October and the validity of the resolution of no confidence passed there, the petitioner urged three principal grounds. The first is that the requisite three days' notice was not served on all the members and so the meeting was not validly held. The second ground urged was that the meeting cannot be said to be properly held as be was not allowed to preside and the Vice-President presided, and thus s.24(1)(a) of the Act was contravened. Thirdly, it was urged that the requisition for moving the resolution of no confidence did not comply with the proviso to s.23(9) of the Act as 15 days' notice was not given of the intention to move the resolution.\n\nThe High Court held that on the materials before it, it was not possible to pronounce as to the circumstances under which the Vice-President presided at the meeting. So, the High Court rejected the contention that there was any contravention of s.24(l)(a) of the Act. The case made in the pe_tition that 15 days' notice had not been given of the intention to move the resolution does not appear to have been pressed at the bearing; as there is no mention in the judgment of any such argument. On the question regarding the failure. to serve three days' notice of the meeting on all the Councillors, the High Court followed its own decision in another Writ Petition No. 2280 of 1963 and rejected the petitioner's contention. The judgment in Writ Petition No .. 2280 of 1963 which was produced before us shows that the High Court took the view that\n\nas the notices were sent on the 10th October they must he 1964 held to have been given on that date even though they were NarairimhW. actually served on the I Ith, 12th and 13th; but, apart from . v: that the High Court was of opinion that the provision about H.c. 8•119\"- three days' notice was only directory and not mandatory and na. lhpta, J. so the omission to give notice would not affect the validity of the resolution.\n\nAll the three grounds raised in the petition were urged before us in support of the appeal. As regards the petitioner's contention that the meeting was not held in accordance with law as he was not allowed to preside, we are of opinion, on a consideration of what material there is on the record, that it was after he left the meeting that the Vice President took the chair and thereafter the no confidence resolution was moved and passed. There can therefore be no question of any contravention of the requirement that the President shall preside.\n\nThere is, our opinion, no substance also in the contention that the prOIViso to s.23(9) was contravened. The proviso runs thus:-\n\n\"Provided that no such resolution shall be moved unless notice of the resolution is signed by not less than one-third of the whole number of the Councillors and at least fifteen days' notice has been given of the intention to move the resolution.\"\n\nAdmittedly, the notice was signed by more than one-third of the whole number of Councillors. It is said, however, that fifteen days' notice of the intention to move the resolution was not given. This argument which Mr. Iyengar addressed to us, but which does not appear to have been urged before the High Court-proceeds on th6 assumption that fifteen days' notice of the intention to move the resolution has to be given not only to the President but also to the other Councillors. We do not think that that assumption is justified. In our opinion, what. is required is that fifteen days' notice of the intention to move the resolution has to be given to the .President. In other words, all that is required is that before the resolution is actually moved the President has got fifteen days' notice. In the present case, the meeting was held on October 14 and the President received the notice on the 25th September. There was thus more than 15 days' notice given to him.\n\nThis brings us to the main contention that three days' notice of the special general meeting was not given and so the meeting is invalid. We find it difficult to agree with the High Court that \"sending\" the notice amounts to 'crivina\" the • Q Q notice.\n\nJ.l arasimhiah\n\nH.C. Singri Gowda\n\nDa.s Gupta, J.\n\n\"Giving\" of anything as ordinarily understood in the English language is not complete unless it has reached the hands of the person to whom it has to be given. In the eye of law however giving is complete in many matters where it has been offered to a person but not accepted by him. Tendering of a notice is in law therefore giving of a notice e\".en\n\nthough the person to whom it is tendered refuses to accept it.\n\nWe can find however no authority or principle for the proposition that as soon as the person with a legal duty to give the notice despatches the notice to the address of the person to whom it has to be given, the giving is complete. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was wrong in' thinking that the notices were given to all the Councillors on the !0th October. In our opinion, the notice given to five of the Councillors was of less than three clear days.\n\nThe question then is: Is the provision of three clear days• notice mandatory, ie., does the failure to give such notice make the proceedings of the meeting and the resolution passed there invalid? The use of the word \"shall\" is not conclusive on the question. As in all other matters of statutory construction the decision of this question depends on the ascertainment of the legislature's intention. Was it the legislature's intention in making the provision that the failure to comply with it shall have the consequence of making what is done invalid in law? That is the question to be answered. To ascer-· tain the intention the Court has to examine carefully the object of the statute, the consequence that may follow from insisting on a strict observance of the particular provision and above all the general scheme of the other provisions of which it forms a part. In the State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (') where the question arose whether the provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution are mandatory (which provides that the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission shall be consulted on certain disciplinary matters), this Court laid stress on the fact that the proviso to. the Article contemplates that the President or the Governor as the case may be make regulations specifying the matters in which either in general or in any particular class or in any particular circumstances, it shall not be necessary for the Public Service Commission to be consulted: Speaking for the Court Sinha J. observed:-\n\n\"If the provisions of Art. 320 were of a mandatory character, the Constitution would not have left it to the discretion of the Head of the Excutive Government to undo those provisions by making regulations to the contrary.\"\n\n(') [1908] S.C.R. 533.\n\n'l S.C.R.\n\nSUPRElIE COURT REPORTS 623\n\nThis appears to have been the main reason for the court's 1961 decision that the provisions of Article 320 (3)(c) are not man- Xamimhiah datory. Naturally, strong reliance has been placed on this deci- . v •. sion on behalf of the respondents. It is pointed out that while Il.O. Smgn Gowda\n\nproviding that three clear days' notice of special general meet Daa Gupta, J. ing shall be given to the Councillors, the legislature said in the same breath that \"in cases of great urgency, notice of such shorter period as is reasonable should be given to the Councillors of a special general meeting.\" The decision of what should be considered to be a case of \"great urgency\" was left enlirely to the President or the Vice-President on whom the duty Lo call such a meeting is given under s.27(2). It is urged by the learnecl Counsel that if the intention of the legislature\n\nhad been to make the service of three clear days' notice mandatory it would not, have left the discretion of giving notice for a shorter priod for some of the special general meetings in this manner. We see considerable force in this argument.\n\nThe very fact that while three clear days' notice is not to be given of all special general meetings and for some such meet\n\nings notice only of such shorter period as is reasonable has to be given justifies the conclusion that the \"three clear days\", mentioned in the section was given by the legislature as only a measure of what it considered reasonable.\n\nIt is necessary also to remember that the main object of giving the notice is to make it possible for the Councillors to so arrange their other business as to be able to attend the meeting. For an ordinary general meeting the notice provided is of seven clear days. That is expected to give enough time for the purpose. But a lesser period-of three clear days'---is considered sufficient for \"special general meetings\"' generally.\n\nThe obvious reason for providing a shorter period for such meetings is that these are considered more important meetings and Councillors are expected to make it convenient to attend these meetings even at the cost of some inconvenience to themselves. Where the special general meeting is to dispose of some matter of great urgency it is considered that a period of even less than three clear days' notice would be sufficient.\n\nA consideration of the object of these provisions and the manner in which the object is sought to be achieved indicates that while the legislature did intend that crdinarily the notice as mentioned should be given it could not have intended that the fact that the notice is of less than the period men. tioned in the section and thcs the Councillors had less time than is ordinarily considered reasonable to arrange his other business to be free to attend the meeting, should have the serious result of making the proceedings of the meeting invalid.\n\nNarasimhiah\n\nIt is important to notice in this connection one of the provisions in s. 36 of the Act. lt is in these words : -\n\nH. 0. Singri Gowda \"No resolution of a municipal council or any committee appointed under this Act shall be deemed invalid on account of any irregularity in the service of notice upon any councillor or member provided the proceedings of the municipal council or committee were not prejudicially affected by such irregularity.\"\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\n• v It is reasonable to think that the service of notice mentioned in this provision refers to the giving of notice to the Councillors. Quite clearly, any irregularity in the manner of giving the notice would be covered by the words \"irregularity in the service of the notice upon any Councillor\". lt appears to us however reasonable to think that in making such a provision in s.36 the legislature was not thinking only of irregularity of the mode of service but also of the omission to give notice of the full period as required.\n\nIt is interesting to notice in this connection that the . English law as regards meetings of. borough councils and county councils contain a specific provision that want of service of a summons to attend the meeting (which is required to be served on every member of the council) will not affect the validity of the meeting. It may be presumed that the legislature which enacted the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951, was aware of these provisions in English law. It has not gone to the length of saying that the failure to serve the notice will not make the meeting invalid. It has instead said that any irregularity in the service of notice would not make a resolution of the Council invalid provided that the proceedings were not prejudicially affected by such irregularity. The logic of making such a provision in respect of irregularity in the service of notice becomes strong if the fact that the notice given was short of the required period is considered an irregularity\n\nThe existence of this provision in s.36 is a further reason for thinking that the provision as regards any motion or proposition of which notice must be given in s.27(3) is only directory and not mandatory.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the fact that some of the Councillors received less than three clear days' notice of the meeting did not by itself make the proceedings of the meetin!! or the resoluion passed there invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. As already stated. nineteen of the twentv Councillors attended the meeting. Of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the resolution of no-confidence against the appellant. There is\n\nthus absolutely no reason for thinking that the proceedings of the meeting were prejudicially affected by the \"irregularity in the service of notice.\"\n\nWe have therefore come to the conclusion that the failure\n\n19G4\n\nIJ. C. Singri Gou•d(_.\n\nto give three clear days' notice to some of the Councillors did n,,.., Gup'\"• J. not affect the validity of the meeting or the resolution of no confidence passed there against the appellant.\n\nIn the result, we dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "K. NARASIMHIAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. NARASIMHIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "H. C. SINGRI GOWDA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "H. C. SINGRI GOWDA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 23(9), 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 380, "end_char": 396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provision if mandatory-Failure to give such notice-Effect-Validity-Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951", "statute": "Provision if mandatory-Failure to give such notice-Effect-Validity-Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1014, "end_char": 1022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provision if mandatory-Failure to give such notice-Effect-Validity-Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951", "statute": "Provision if mandatory-Failure to give such notice-Effect-Validity-Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 23(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1146, "end_char": 1154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provision if mandatory-Failure to give such notice-Effect-Validity-Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951", "statute": "Provision if mandatory-Failure to give such notice-Effect-Validity-Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "10th October 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1389, "end_char": 1406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the main contention it held that as the notices were sent to the councillors on the 10th October 1963, they must be held to have been given on that date even though they were actually served on the 11th, 12th and 13th; but, apart from that it was of opinion that the provisions abOut three days notice was only directory and not mandatory and so the omission to give notice would not affect the validity of the resolution."}}, {"text": "11th, 12th and 13th;", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1503, "end_char": 1523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the main contention it held that as the notices were sent to the councillors on the 10th October 1963, they must be held to have been given on that date even though they were actually served on the 11th, 12th and 13th; but, apart from that it was of opinion that the provisions abOut three days notice was only directory and not mandatory and so the omission to give notice would not affect the validity of the resolution."}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2252, "end_char": 2257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3314, "end_char": 3321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.23(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3409, "end_char": 3416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. C, Singri Gowda", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3735, "end_char": 3753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. C, Singri Gowda\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "H. C. SINGRI GOWDA"}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3897, "end_char": 3914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated December 6, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ\n\nPetition No."}}, {"text": "S.K. Venkataranga Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3952, "end_char": 3977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrislman, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrislman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3982, "end_char": 3999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrislman, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N.S. Krishna Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4021, "end_char": 4037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.S. Krishna Rao and Girish Chandra, for respondents No."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4042, "end_char": 4056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.S. Krishna Rao and Girish Chandra, for respondents No."}}, {"text": "DAs GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4157, "end_char": 4166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs GUPTA, J.-Is the requirement of three clear days' Das Gupta, J. notice for the holding of a special general meeting as embodied in s. 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act 1951, a mandatory provision?", "canonical_name": "Da.s Gupta"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4211, "end_char": 4220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs GUPTA, J.-Is the requirement of three clear days' Das Gupta, J. notice for the holding of a special general meeting as embodied in s. 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act 1951, a mandatory provision?", "canonical_name": "Da.s Gupta"}}, {"text": "s. 27(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4292, "end_char": 4300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore Town Municipalities Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4308, "end_char": 4343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Holenarsipur Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4726, "end_char": 4751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a special general meeting of the Municipal Council held on October 14, 1963, a resolution was passed in the following terms:-\n\n\"This Council has no confidence in the Municipal\n\nPresident of Holenarsipur Municipality.\""}}, {"text": "November 2, I 963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4758, "end_char": 4775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 2, I 963 Mr. Narasimhiah, the President of the Council applied to the High Court of Mysore under Art."}}, {"text": "Narasimhiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4780, "end_char": 4791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 2, I 963 Mr. Narasimhiah, the President of the Council applied to the High Court of Mysore under Art.", "canonical_name": "K. NARASIMHIAH"}}, {"text": "High Court of Mysore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4837, "end_char": 4857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 2, I 963 Mr. Narasimhiah, the President of the Council applied to the High Court of Mysore under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4864, "end_char": 4872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mysore Town Municipalities Act 1951", "statute": "the Mysore Town Municipalities Act 1951"}}, {"text": "Holenarsipur Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5100, "end_char": 5125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Holenarsipur Municipality has twenty Councillors."}}, {"text": "25th September 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5364, "end_char": 5383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This request was handed over to the President on 25th September 1963."}}, {"text": "Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5962, "end_char": 5998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One copy of the notice was also posted up at the Municipal Office as required by 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951 (herein- Das Gupta, .1.", "canonical_name": "Da.s Gupta"}}, {"text": "Dasappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6283, "end_char": 6290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the President Narasimhiah, Mr. Dasappa and Mr. Sanniah, the notice was served on the 13th October."}}, {"text": "Sanniah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6299, "end_char": 6306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the President Narasimhiah, Mr. Dasappa and Mr. Sanniah, the notice was served on the 13th October."}}, {"text": "Mirza Mohammad Hussain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6379, "end_char": 6401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was served on Councillor Mirza Mohammad Hussain on the 12th October and on the Councillor R. G.\n\nVaidyanatha on the I Ith October 1963."}}, {"text": "R. G.\n\nVaidyanatha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was served on Councillor Mirza Mohammad Hussain on the 12th October and on the Councillor R. G.\n\nVaidyanatha on the I Ith October 1963."}}, {"text": "Narasimhiah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6607, "end_char": 6618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The President, Mr. Narasimhiah was among them.", "canonical_name": "K. NARASIMHIAH"}}, {"text": "Singri Gowda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6805, "end_char": 6817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The meeting was then held under the presidentship of the Vice President Mr. Singri Gowda."}}, {"text": "s.24(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7403, "end_char": 7413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.23(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7563, "end_char": 7570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.24(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7902, "end_char": 7912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lhpta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8842, "end_char": 8847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lhpta, J. so the omission to give notice would not affect the validity of the resolution."}}, {"text": "s.23(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9563, "end_char": 9570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10081, "end_char": 10088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument which Mr. Iyengar addressed to us, but which does not appear to have been urged before the High Court-proceeds on th6 assumption that fifteen days' notice of the intention to move the resolution has to be given not only to the President but also to the other Councillors."}}, {"text": "J.l arasimhiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11088, "end_char": 11102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.l arasimhiah\n\nH.C. Singri Gowda\n\nDa.s Gupta, J.\n\n\"Giving\" of anything as ordinarily understood in the English language is not complete unless it has reached the hands of the person to whom it has to be given.", "canonical_name": "K. NARASIMHIAH"}}, {"text": "H.C. Singri Gowda", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11104, "end_char": 11121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.l arasimhiah\n\nH.C. Singri Gowda\n\nDa.s Gupta, J.\n\n\"Giving\" of anything as ordinarily understood in the English language is not complete unless it has reached the hands of the person to whom it has to be given.", "canonical_name": "H. C. SINGRI GOWDA"}}, {"text": "Da.s Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11123, "end_char": 11133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.l arasimhiah\n\nH.C. Singri Gowda\n\nDa.s Gupta, J.\n\n\"Giving\" of anything as ordinarily understood in the English language is not complete unless it has reached the hands of the person to whom it has to be given.", "canonical_name": "Da.s Gupta"}}, {"text": "Art. 320(3)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13002, "end_char": 13016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13076, "end_char": 13107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "320(3)(c) of the Constitution are mandatory (which provides that the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission shall be consulted on certain disciplinary matters), this Court laid stress on the fact that the proviso to."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13565, "end_char": 13570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Article contemplates that the President or the Governor as the case may be make regulations specifying the matters in which either in general or in any particular class or in any particular circumstances, it shall not be necessary for the Public Service Commission to be consulted: Speaking for the Court Sinha J. observed:-\n\n\"If the provisions of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13608, "end_char": 13616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 1961", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13930, "end_char": 13936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13969, "end_char": 13980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Il.O. Smgn Gowda", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14147, "end_char": 14163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is pointed out that while Il."}}, {"text": "Daa Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14229, "end_char": 14238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O. Smgn Gowda\n\nproviding that three clear days' notice of special general meet Daa Gupta, J. ing shall be given to the Councillors, the legislature said in the same breath that \"in cases of great urgency, notice of such shorter period as is reasonable should be given to the Councillors of a special general meeting.\"", "canonical_name": "Da.s Gupta"}}, {"text": "s.27(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14654, "end_char": 14661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16838, "end_char": 16843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17603, "end_char": 17607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "may be presumed that the legislature which enacted the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18086, "end_char": 18177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18776, "end_char": 18780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It may be presumed that the legislature which enacted the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951", "statute": "It may be presumed that the legislature which enacted the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s.27(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18903, "end_char": 18910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It may be presumed that the legislature which enacted the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951", "statute": "It may be presumed that the legislature which enacted the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "C. Singri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19667, "end_char": 19676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Singri Gou•d(_."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_626_632_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "J964\n\n..4.pril 2\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\nBHARAT FIRE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nNEW DELHI\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.J\n\nInco-rne Tax-Dividend declared out o.f premitl1ns on shares receii; ed hu a company--Amount vJhether receipt o.f dividend- Whether tuxab!e-What is dividend-Effect of s. 78. Companie•\n\nAct, 1956-Indian Income-tax Act. 1922, s. 2(6A).\n\nThe Rohtas Industries Ltd. i'5ued in 1945 shares at a premium and the share premiums so received were kept separate under the head Capital Reserve. In the calendar year ending Decemb2r 31, 1953, the company peid a sum of Rs. 50,787/- as dividend to the apn2llant company, For the year 1954-55, th's sum was taxed in the hands of appellant as dividend by the Income-tax Officer. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner set aside the order of the Income-tax Officer, but the same was restored by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal referred to the Punjab High Court the question whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the receipt cf Rs. 50,787 /- was a receipt of dividend and was taxable under the Indian Income-tax Act. The High Court answered the question against tho appellant and the latter appealed this Court with special leave. Dismissing the appeal.\n\nHeid: The receipt of Rs. 50,787 /- was a receipt of dividend and \"'as taxable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It was well-established before the Companies Act, 1956, that premiums received on the issue of shares were profits available for distribution and the word \"profits\" in Regulation 97 of Table A of Companies Act 1913 should be understood to include share premiums also. S. 78 of the Companies Act does not in any way change the taxability of dividends declared out of premiums on shares received by a Company before the Act of 1956 came into force. If it was taxable; apart from s. 78, it remains so taxable.\n\nRe Hoare & Co. Ltd., (1904) 2 Ch. 208; Drown v. Gaumint- British Picture Corporation, (1937) Ch. 402; re Duff's Settlements.\n\nNational Provincial Bank Ltd., vs. Gregson, (1961) 1 Ch. 923; Land Revenue Commissioners v. Reids Trustees, (1949) 1 All E.R. 354, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 613 /\n\n1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment dated December 12. 1960, of the Punjab High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 2 of 1958.\n\nS. K. Kapur, K. K . . Jain, Bishambar Lal Khanna and S. Murthy, for the appellant.\n\nC.K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R.N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nApril 2, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered 1964\n\n~ ~-~~ General Insurance SIKRJ, J.-The appellant is a Joint Stock Company, hereco. Ltd .• inafter referred to as the assessee, having its registered office in New Del/ii Delhi. It held 11950 'B' Preference shares in another com-The oom~·;.,,; on., pany, called Rohtas Industries Ltd., in the previous year of l; icome Ta•, (calendar year ending December 31, 1953). The latter coml.cu•Ddhi pany paid a sum of Rs. 50,787 /- as dividend on the said Pre- Sikri, J. ference Shares to the assessee, and for the assessment year 1954-55. this sum was taxed in the hands of the <issessee as dividend, within s. 2(6A) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, by the Income Tax Officer. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, on appeal by the assessee, held it not to be taxable.\n\nThe Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, on an appeal by the\n\nDepartment, however. agreed with the Income Tax Officer and allowed the appeal. On the application of the assessee, the Appellate Tribunal stated a case for the opinion of the Punjab High Court. The High Court upheld the contention of the Department and answered the question referred to it against the assessee. The assessee. after failing to get a certificate under s. 66A(2) of the Income Tax Act. obtained special leave from this Court and now the appeal is before us for dis- posal.\n\nThe question referred to the High Court is as follows:-\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the receipt of Rs. 50,787 /- was a receipt of dividend and is taxable under the Indian Income Tax Act.\" The facts and circumstances referred to in the questicn are as follows. Rohtas Industries Ltd .. hereim1ftr referred to as the declaring company. had in the year 1946 issued shares at a premium and the share premiums so received by it were\n\nkept separate under the head 'Capital Reserve'. The declaring company declared a dividend in the previous year of the a;.\n\nsessee out of the above capita 1 reserve.\n\nThe learned counsel for the assessee contends before us that the sum received by the assessee is not dividend witliin the definition of the word in s. 2(6A) of the Income Tax Act.\n\nH~ 'Says. tht the share premim~ were not profits capable of bemg distributed as profits w1thm Regulation 97 of Table A of Companies Act of 1913 which lays down that \"no dividend shall be paid otherwise than out of the profits of the year or any other undistributed profits.\" He argues further that it was a capi!al gain in the hands of the dcclaing company and capital gams are expressly excluded from the definition of 'dividend' by the explanation to s. 2(6A) which provides that 'the\n\nBharat Fire and General I nmrance\n\nCo. Ltd., ..1.Yew Delhi v.\n\nThe Commi.s.siontr\n\nof lnco11u.Ta'e,\n\nllew Delhi\n\nSil:ri, J.\n\nexpression \"accumulated profits\" wherever it occurs in this clause shall not include capital gains arising before the l st day of April, 1946\\ or after the.31st day of March, 1948'. Lastly, he urges that in any event, s. 78 of the Companies Act, 1956, has placed this sum beyond the reach of the Revenue.\n\nBefore adverting to the arguments addressed to us. it is necessary to reproduce the relevant statutory provisions. Section 2(6A) of the Income Tax Act defines 'dividend' as follows:~\n\n\"(6A) 'diidend' includesfa) any distrib4tion by a company of accumulated profits, whether capitalised or not. if such distribu tion entails the release by the company to its shareholders of all or any part of the assets of the company;\n\n(b). , ...... ,. \"\"\" ..\n\n(c) ....... :: ...... , .. :\n\nProvided that\n\n(d) ................. .\n\nProvided that .......... .\n\nProvided further that the expression \"accumulated profits\", wherever it occurs in this clause. shall not include capital gains arising before the !st day of April, 1946, or after the 31st day of March, 1948.\"\n\nSection '78~ of the Companies Act, 1956, reads:-\n\n\"78; (I) Where a -company issues shares at a premium, . whether for cash or otherwise, a sum equal to the aggregate amount or value of the premiums on . those .shares shall be transferred to an account, to be called \"the share premium account\"; and the provisions of this Act relating to the reduction of the share capital of a company shall, except as provided in this section';°apply as if the share pre mium account were paid-up share capital of the company.\n\n(2) The share premium account may, notwithstandi11g anything in sub-section (!), be applied by the com pany-\n\n(a) in paying up unissued shares of the company to be issued to members of the company as fully paid bonus shares; {b) in writing off the preliminary expenses of the com\n\npany;\n\n(c) in writing off the expenses of, or the commission paid 1lr discount allowed on, any issue of shares or debentures of the company: or\n\nBharat Fire and General J nsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.,\n\n(d) in providing for the premium payable on the re Xew Del/Ii demption of any redeemable preference shares or The 00,!;.;.,.wner of any debentures of the compJ of Inwm.-Ta , • bT ew lJeT.ki\n\nl) Where a company has, before the commencement of this Act, issued any shares at a premium, this section shall apply as if the shares had been issued after the commencement of this Act: Provided that any part of the premiums which has been so applied that it does not at the commencement of this Act from an identifiable part of the company's reserves within the meaning of Schedule VI, shall be disregarded in determining the sum to be included in the share premium account.\"\n\nIt is evident from the definition of the word 'dividend' that if a distribution of accumulated profits, whether capita lised or not, entails the release by the company to its shareholder of all or any part of its assets, it is dividend. It is not disputed that the distribution of Rs. 50,787 /- entails the release of the assets of the declaring company. But it is contended that there was no distribution of accumulated profits, because by virtue of Regulation 97, Table A of the Companies Act, 1913, no dividend could be paid otherwise than out of the profits of the year or any other undistributed profits. It is said that the premiums received by the declaring company were not profits within Regulation 97. We are unable to accede to this contention. Previous to the enactment of s. 78 of the Companies Act of 1956, and the corresponding section in the English , Companies Act, it was recognised that a company could distribute premiums received on the issue of shares as\n\ndividend~ (vide Palmer's Company Law, Twentieth Edition).\n\nAt page 637, it is stated:\n\n\"It is evident from the preceding observations that it is legally permissible for the company to distribute dividend out of assets which do not represent profits made as the result of its trading or business.\n\nThe connotation of divisible profits, or profits in the legal sense, is much wider than that of profits\n\nin the business sense: the former term includes, e.g., reserves accumulated from past profits, from realised capital profits indeed, before the requirement of a share premium account by the 194 7-48 legislation, from premiums obtained on issue of\n\nSikri, J.\n\nBharat Fire and Gene.ral lns?.1rar.:;,,\n\nl'o. Ltd., .Yen' .Delhi\n\nTlie Gonunissioner\n\nof lru:ome-11a.r,\n\n, Yen' Del/ii\n\nSi!.1i, J.\n\nnew shares, whereas none of these items is regarded-and rightly so-by the businessman or accountant as trading profits.\"\n\nPalmer relies on two cases: Re Hoare & Co. Ltd.,(') and Drown v.\n\nCaumin-Britislz Picture Corporation('). In Re Hoare'.1 (') case the company had created a reserve fund consisting partly of premiums received on the issue of preference shares. It having incurred a loss arising from the depreciation in the value of the public houses below the amount stated in the company's balance sheet, applied for sanction of the Court to a scheme for reduction of capital whereby the company, while retaining a small portion of the reserve, attributed to the reserve more than its rateable proportion and to capital account less than that of its rateable proportion Buckley J. apparently held that these premiums were not 'profits' in the strict sense; and, en appeal, the counsel for the company contended befort' the Court of Appeal that this was wrong.\n\nRomer, L.J., disposed of this contention in the following \\.vords\";\n\n\"The surplus which was carried to the reserve fund represented that which might have been properly applied at the time, if the company had so thought fit, in paying further dividends to shareholders and no person could have complained if they had done so\". ·\n\nThus, Romer, L.J., thought that there was nothing objectionable in utilising premiums received on the issue of shares for the purpose of declaring dividend.\n\nIn Drown's case('), a company proposed to pay a dividend on its preference s:iares and utilise in part premiums received by the company on the issue of shares, which had in fact been invested in the assets of the company. The plaintiff asked for an injunction to restrain the company from paying the dividend. Clauson, J., held that part of a reserve fund consisting of moneys paid by way of premiums on shares, unless set aside in some particular fund which has been wholly spent, is available for dividend purposes. We are not concerned with other points that arose in the case and we have only set out the facts and findings relevant to the question before us. We may here set out Article 129 of the Gaumont-British Picture Corporation Ltd. Article 129 reads thus; -\n\n\"The Directors may, with the sanction of a general. meeting, from time to time declare dividends or bonuses, but no such dividend shaU (except as by\n\n--------,-----=---::-:~- -- (') [1904] 2 Ch. 208. . (') (1937] Ch. 402.\n\nthe statutes expressly authorised) be payable 1964 otherwise than out of the profits of the company m,\"\"\" Fi\" awl\n\n\" •••• , , , , , •• , • • • • • • , ()\\nrr11l ft1J>urance Mr. Kapur, learned counsel for the appllant, had cong;•;,, 1flii,; tended that the English Law was different inasmuch as what v. was prohibited in English Law was payment of dividends out\n\n1 '~1 ?:::;,:,~':~:;:-;:' of capital and that it <lid not enjoin directors to pay dividends New Delhi ' out of profits. This case refutes Mr. Kapur's contention. In re Duff's Sett/eme11ts, National Provincial Bank Ltd .. vs. Gregson,(') which is strongly relied on behalf of the appellant, and which we will advert to in detail later, Jenkins, L.J., says at p. 926:---\n\n\"The share premiums would have been profits available for distribution (see Druwn v. Gaumo11t-Britislz Picrure Corporation)\"(').\n\nIt was thus well-established before the Act of 1956 and the corresponding English Act that premiums received on the issue of shares were profits available for distribtion. We are of the opinion that the same connotation should be attached to the word 'profits' in Regulation 97 of Table A. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to pronounce on the question whether even if these premiums were not profits within Regulation 97, would this necessarily exclude them from coming with the words 'accumulated profits' within s. 2(6A)(a).\n\nThis takes up to the next point raised before us: Are the premiums received on the issue of shares capital gains within the explanation to s. 2(6A)? This point was not urged before the High Court or the Appellate Tribunal and we did not allow it to be developed.\n\nThe last point may now be dealt with. In this connection it is necessary to appreciate the scheme of s. 78 of the Companies Act, 1956. Sub-section (!) enjoins a company, when it issues shares at a premium, to transfer the premiums to an account called 'the Share Premium Account' and it then applies the provisions of the Act relating to the reduction of the share capital of a company as if the share premium account were paid-up capital of the company. Sub-section (2) then provides how the share premium account may be applied. It I~ said that it impliedly provides that it cannot be used for the purpose of p:.ying dividends. Sub-section (3) then deals with the issue of shares at a premium before the commencement of this Act. It deems them to have been issued after the commencement cf the Act and applies the provisions of s. 78. The effect of this would be that company which has issued shares at a premium before the commencement of the Act would by\n\n(') [1937] Ch. 402. (') [1951] 1 Ch. 923.\n\n1':1ikri, .].\n\n632 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n[1964J\n\nBharat Fire ancl General lnsurawe\n\nGo. Ltcl..\n\nvirtue of s. 78, have to open a share premium account. and transfer to it the premium so received. What is to happen if before the commencement of tire Act the company has already dealt with the premiums in such a way that they had ceased to remain as an identifiable part of the company's reserves? The sub-section says that in that event the premiu.ms so dealt with\n\nNew Del/ti\n\nP!tt Com11tissionrr\n\nof Incmne-1'a:v,\n\nNew Ddhi shall be disregarded in determining the sum to be included in the share premium account. If such premiums are to be disregarded for the creation of the share premium account, it means that they fall outside the purview of s. 78. It has no ap- plication to them. If this is so, it is difficult to appreciate how the appellant can utilise this section for the purpose of showing that the premiums which have already been distributed became invested with the character of capital in the hands of the distributing company. We do not say that for the purpose of income tax any future application of the share premium account in one of the ways mentioned in sub-section (2) will be treated as distribution of capital. No such question arises for our determination in this case. But we do hold that s. 78 of the Companies Act does not in any way change the taxability of dividends declared out of premiums on shares received by a Company before the Act of 1956 came into force. If it was taxable. apart from s. 78; it remains so taxable.\n\nThe case of Duff's Settlements(') referred to above, on which the learned counsel strongly relied, might or might not help him if the declaration of dividend had taken place after the Act of 1956. We are of the opinion that what was decided in this case has no relevance to the facts of this appeal.\n\nBefore concluding. we may refer to the decision of the House of Lords in Land Revenue Con11nissio11ers v. Reids Trustees('). relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents. This case would be relevant if we were considering generally whether the receipt of Rs. 50,781 !- was income or capital in the hands of the assessee. The question, however, referred to the High Court is limited. and that is whether the receipt of Rs. 50, 787 /- was a receipt of dividend and taxable.\n\nIt is, therefore, unnecessary to say more about this case.\n\nIn the result, we agree with the High Court that the answer to question referred to it is in the affirmative. The appeal • fails and is dismissed with cost.\n\nl'l [1951] 1 Ch. 923.\n\nAppeal dismissed ..\n\n(') [1949] 1 All E.R. 354.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "BHARAT FIRE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nNEW DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHARAT FIRE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO. 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Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2519, "end_char": 2536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R.N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R.N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2541, "end_char": 2554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R.N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SIKRJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2663, "end_char": 2668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered 1964\n\n~ ~-~~ General Insurance SIKRJ, J.-The appellant is a Joint Stock Company, hereco."}}, {"text": "s. 2(6A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3237, "end_char": 3245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3253, "end_char": 3280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3406, "end_char": 3435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, on an appeal by the\n\nDepartment, however."}}, {"text": "s. 66A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3826, "end_char": 3835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Rohtas Industries Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4240, "end_char": 4261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rohtas Industries Ltd .. hereim1ftr referred to as the declaring company."}}, {"text": "s. 2(6A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4723, "end_char": 4731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Table A of Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4867, "end_char": 4891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(6A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5209, "end_char": 5217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Bharat Fire and General I nmrance\n\nCo. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5244, "end_char": 5287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He argues further that it was a capi!al gain in the hands of the dcclaing company and capital gams are expressly excluded from the definition of 'dividend' by the explanation to s. 2(6A) which provides that 'the\n\nBharat Fire and General I nmrance\n\nCo. Ltd., ..1.Yew Delhi v.\n\nThe Commi.s.siontr\n\nof lnco11u.", "canonical_name": "BHARAT FIRE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nNEW DELHI"}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5587, "end_char": 5592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of Companies Act", "statute": "Table A of Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5600, "end_char": 5619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(6A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5790, "end_char": 5803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6449, "end_char": 6468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bharat Fire and General J nsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7368, "end_char": 7412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be applied by the com pany-\n\n(a) in paying up unissued shares of the company to be issued to members of the company as fully paid bonus shares; {b) in writing off the preliminary expenses of the com\n\npany;\n\n(c) in writing off the expenses of, or the commission paid 1lr discount allowed on, any issue of shares or debentures of the company: or\n\nBharat Fire and General J nsurance\n\nCo. Ltd.,\n\n(d) in providing for the premium payable on the re Xew Del/Ii demption of any redeemable preference shares or The 00,!;.;.,.wner of any debentures of the compJ of Inwm.-Ta , • bT ew lJeT.ki\n\nl) Where a company has, before the commencement of this Act, issued any shares at a premium, this section shall apply as if the shares had been issued after the commencement of this Act: Provided that any part of the premiums which has been so applied that it does not at the commencement of this Act from an identifiable part of the company's reserves within the meaning of Schedule VI, shall be disregarded in determining the sum to be included in the share premium account.\"", "canonical_name": "BHARAT FIRE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.\n\nNEW DELHI"}}, {"text": "Schedule VI", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7981, "end_char": 7992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Table A of the Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8551, "end_char": 8585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8870, "end_char": 8875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Table A of the Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Table A of the Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8883, "end_char": 8896, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8953, "end_char": 8966, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Palmer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9978, "end_char": 9984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Palmer relies on two cases: Re Hoare & Co. Ltd.,(') and Drown v.\n\nCaumin-Britislz Picture Corporation(')."}}, {"text": "Buckley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10632, "end_char": 10639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It having incurred a loss arising from the depreciation in the value of the public houses below the amount stated in the company's balance sheet, applied for sanction of the Court to a scheme for reduction of capital whereby the company, while retaining a small portion of the reserve, attributed to the reserve more than its rateable proportion and to capital account less than that of its rateable proportion Buckley J. apparently held that these premiums were not 'profits' in the strict sense; and, en appeal, the counsel for the company contended befort' the Court of Appeal that this was wrong."}}, {"text": "Romer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10823, "end_char": 10828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Romer, L.J., disposed of this contention in the following \\.vords\";\n\n\"The surplus which was carried to the reserve fund represented that which might have been properly applied at the time, if the company had so thought fit, in paying further dividends to shareholders and no person could have complained if they had done so\". ·"}}, {"text": "Drown", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11313, "end_char": 11318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Drown's case('), a company proposed to pay a dividend on its preference s:iares and utilise in part premiums received by the company on the issue of shares, which had in fact been invested in the assets of the company."}}, {"text": "Clauson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11620, "end_char": 11627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clauson, J., held that part of a reserve fund consisting of moneys paid by way of premiums on shares, unless set aside in some particular fund which has been wholly spent, is available for dividend purposes."}}, {"text": "Article 129", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11994, "end_char": 12005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 129", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12054, "end_char": 12065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12481, "end_char": 12486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the statutes expressly authorised) be payable 1964 otherwise than out of the profits of the company m,\"\"\" Fi\" awl\n\n\" •••• , , , , , •• , • • • • • • , ()\\nrr11l ft1J>urance Mr. Kapur, learned counsel for the appllant, had cong;•;,, 1flii,; tended that the English Law was different inasmuch as what v. was prohibited in English Law was payment of dividends out\n\n1 '~1 ?:::;,:,"}}, {"text": "Duff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12834, "end_char": 12838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In re Duff's Sett/eme11ts, National Provincial Bank Ltd .. vs. Gregson,(') which is strongly relied on behalf of the appellant, and which we will advert to in detail later, Jenkins, L.J., says at p. 926:---\n\n\"The share premiums would have been profits available for distribution (see Druwn v. Gaumo11t-Britislz Picrure Corporation)\"(')."}}, {"text": "Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13001, "end_char": 13008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In re Duff's Sett/eme11ts, National Provincial Bank Ltd .. vs. Gregson,(') which is strongly relied on behalf of the appellant, and which we will advert to in detail later, Jenkins, L.J., says at p. 926:---\n\n\"The share premiums would have been profits available for distribution (see Druwn v. Gaumo11t-Britislz Picrure Corporation)\"(')."}}, {"text": "s. 2(6A)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13695, "end_char": 13706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(6A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13848, "end_char": 13856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14074, "end_char": 14079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14087, "end_char": 14106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14803, "end_char": 14808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Bharat Fire", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15028, "end_char": 15039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "632 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n[1964J\n\nBharat Fire ancl General lnsurawe\n\nGo."}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15085, "end_char": 15090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15726, "end_char": 15731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16296, "end_char": 16301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16309, "end_char": 16322, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16505, "end_char": 16510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_62_69_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ", J/arch 6\n\n62 SUPRElE COURT REPORTS [196<1]\n\nGIRDHARILAL BANSIDHAR v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND s. M. SIKRI JJ.J\n\nSea Customs Act, 1878(8 of 1878)-PTohibition on. import of ceTtain aTticle-Component paTts of that aTtic!e if within\n\npTohibition-Conc!usitms of Customs authorities based on seveTal items of Hand-book-CoTTectness theTeo.f, whetheT can be consideTed by High Coum-Constitution of India, ATt. 226.\n\nEvidence taken into consideTation though not mentioned in notice to show cause-NatuTal justice, if violated.\n\nThe appellant who was granted a license to import \"iron and steel bolts, nuts, set screws, machine screws and machine studs, excluding bolts, nuts and screws adopted for use on cycles\", imported nuts and bolts which were the components. of \"Jackson Type Single bolt oval plate belts fasteners\" which . were described in the bill of Entry as \"Stove Bolts and Nuts.\"\n\nThe importation of \"Jackso!). Type Single bolt oval plate belt fasteners\" had been prohibited. When the goods were attempted to be passed through the customs, the collector issued notice to the appellant to show cause why penalties should not be imposed on him(a) for misdescribing the goods and (b) for attempting to import goods without a proper import license.\n\nAfter receiving his explanation, penalties were imposed on the appellant. One of the facts which the Collector of Customs had taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion that the nuts and bolts imported were in reality the actual components of the prohibited articles was that washers, the third component of the prohib:ted art'cles were imported by a firm owned 0r controlled by clcse relations of the appellant.\n\nAn appeal to the Central Board 'of Revenue from the order o~ the Collector imposing the penalties was dismissed. Thereafter, the appellant filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court which was dismissed in limine. On appeal by si; ecial leave:\n\nHeld: (i) A component part which has no use other than as a component of an article whose importation is prohibited is included in a ban or restriction as regards the importation of that article.\n\nD. P. Anand v. M/s. T. M. ThakoTe and Co .. Appeal No. 4 of 1959 of Bombay High Court referred to.\n\n(ii) There was no force in the content.ion that the decision of the Collector of Custcms was vitiated by a patent error, in that he misconstrued the sccpe of Entry 22 of Part I of the Import Trade Control Hand-book.\n\nA court dealing with a petition under Article 226 is not sitting in appeal over the decision cf the Customs Authorities and therefore the correctness of the conclusion reached by those authorities. on the appreciation of the several items in the Hand-boPk or in the Indian Tariff Act which is referred to in these items, is not a matter which falls w!thin the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.\n\nA. V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v.\n\nRamchand Sobhraj Wadhiwani, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 753, referred to.\n\n(iii) Taking into consideration the importation of washers by another firm was merely evidence to confirm the conclusion reached by the Collector that the nuts and bolts imported were in reality the components of the prohibited article. The charge which the importer was called upon to answer did specify the nature of offence which he was alleged to have committed and lf the evidence which the appellant could have rebutted was brought on record and considered in his presence and that evidence conclusively proved the real nature of the articles imported, there could oe no justifiable complaint of violation of the principles of natural justice.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 318 of 1962.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 27, 1959 of the Punjab High Court <Cir cuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Writ Petition No. 545-D of 1959.\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas, M. V. Goswami and B. C.\n\nMisra, for the appellant.\n\nW. S. Barlingay and R. H. Dhebar. for the respondent.\n\nMarch 6, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered\n\nAYYANGAR, J.--There are no merits in this appeal by special leave and it deserves tv be dismissed. The appellant obtained, in November 1951, an import licence from the Joint Chief Controller of Imports at Calcutta, for importing \"iron and steel bolts, nuts. set screws, machine screws and machine studs, excluding bolts, nuts and screws adapted for use on cycles\". In purported conformity with this licence the appellant imported from Japan through the Bedi port 221 cases of bolts and nuts during the period April 4. 1952 to July 14. 1952. The cases were described in the Bills of Entry which he filed as \"Stove Bolts and Nuts,. and he produced the import licence; of November 1951 as his authority to clear the goods. One hundred and ninety-two of these cases were cleared out of the port customs but before the rest of the 89 cases could be cleared, the Customs authorities got suspicious that the goods were 'mis-described and though called 'Stove Bolts and Nuts\" in the invoices and relative documents they were really identifiable parts of bolts and nuts of the \"Jackson Type sinl!le bolt oval platebelt fasteners\" whose importation . had been prohibited by a Noti.fication. <?f the Ministry of Trade issued in January 1952.\n\nTheir susp1c10ns got confirmed after examination of the samples of the. nuts and bolts imported and thereafter a notice was issued to the appellant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against (a) for mis-describing the\n\nGirdharilal Bansidltar\n\nUnion of lndi<>\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nGirdharilal Btln8\"lkar\n\nUnion of India\n\n.A. yyangar, J_.\n\n64 StJPHE?IIE COURT .REPORTS [1964)\n\ngoods as '\"stove bolts and nuts\" and <2) for importing and attempting to import goods without a proper import licence this being an offence under s. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act.\n\nThe appellant showed cause and in the written flleas which he iiled, he raised two defences; (I) that the description of\n\nthe goods as \"stove and nuts\" was merely a dcscriptian given by the manufacturers in their invoices and he himself not being acquainted with the technical details could not be held responsible for the description given in the invoices which was copied in the Bill of Entry not being precise or exact and (2) that even if the bolts and nuts which he imported were identifiable parts of the \"single bolt belt fasteners\" whose importation was banned, there had been, on a proper construction of the import licence, read in conjunction with the Import Trade Regulations under which it was issued, no contravention since the ban on importation by the notification was confined to a complete \"Jackson type single bolt belt fastener\" and did not extend to the importation of the component parts of such a belt fastener.\n\nThese two defences were examined by the Collector of Central Excise. As regards the first he found from the correpondence exchanged between the appellant and his foreign suppliers and produced by the appellant himself in his defence at the hearing, that the name ·stove bolts and nuts\"\n\nh?.d been decided upon by the appe!lant himself after samples of the nuts and bolts which he desired to import had been received and. examined by him. Practically therefore during the hearing before the Collector the appellant conceded that the name \"stove bolts and nuts\" was a misdescription of the articles which he actually imported. The next question was whether the appellant was guilty of an offence of the nature described in s. 16718) of the Sea Customs Act.\n\nThe Collector recorded a finding that the appellant was guilty of a contravention of this provision which reads:\n\n.. If any goods, the importation or exportation of\n\nwhich is for the time being prohibited or restricted by or under. Chapter IV of this Act, be imported into or exported from India contrary to such prohibition or restriction; or\n\nif any attempt be made so to import or export any such goods~ ...... ''\n\nIn reaching this finding the Collector was satisfied from the samples which were forwarded . to the appellant and which were approved by him before finalising the indent, that the appellant was really ordering and importing nuts\n\nand bolts which were identifiable components of \"Single bolt belt fasteners\" whose importation was prohibited. He arrived\n\nat this c.onclusion because (I) the bolts and screws imported by the appellant were those specially adapted by reason of their structure and details for use as \"single bolt belt fasteners\" and (2) these nuts and bolts could not be put to any use other than as components of a belt fastener of the type whose import was prohibited.\n\nIn further support of his conclus_ion tbat the appeJJant really intended to evade the prohibition imposed by the Notification of January 1952 by which the importation of \"single bolt belt fasteners\" was prohibited, the Collector referred to the fact that tbese single bolt belt fasteners were composed of three components (!) a bolt (2) a nut and (3) washers, The washers to fit into the bolts and nuts imported by the appellant were found to have been separately imported by a firm called Nawanagar Industries Ltd. which was owned or controlled by close relations of the appellant.\n\nHaving thus received confirmation about the real intention of the appellant to evade the prohibition contained in the Notification and thus contravene the provisions of s. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, the Collector imposed the penalty of confiscation of the goods and gave the owner under s. 183 of the Sea Customs Act)he option to pay a fine of Rs. 51.000 to redeem the confiscated goods. He also imposed a personal penalty of Rs. 1.000 on the appellant under s. 167(37)(c) of the Sea Customs Act for misdescribing the goods in the Bills of Entries which he had filed. The appellant filed an appeal to the Central Board of Revenue which was dismissed.\n\nThe argument before the appellant authority again was that what was prohibited was an assembled \"Jackson Type single belt oval plate belt fasteners\" but that this notification could not be read as imposing a ban on the importation of the parts of such a belt fastener though these parts may be identifiable and the parts could have no use other than as components of the article whose importation was prohibited. This submission was rejected, and appeal was dismissed. Thereafter the appellant applied to the High Court of\n\nPunjab for the issue of a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution and this having been dismissed in limine, moved this Court for special leave which was granted. That is how the appeal is before us. .\n\nTwo points were urged by Mr. Purshottam on behalf of the appellant. The first was that the appellant having been granted a licence to import \"nuts and bolts\" falling under item 22 of Part I of the Import Trade Control Hand-book for the relevant year, the appellant was entitled to import iron and steel bolts and nuts, whatever be the purpose they\n\nL'P(D)ISCI-~\n\nGirdlsarilol Ban.Miia•\n\nUnion of India\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\n01rdharilal\n\nBa\"\"idhar\n\nUnion of Indio\n\nA.yyoo.gar, J •\n\nserved. The only limitation imposed upon the appellant by the import licence which was granted to him and which reproduced the terms of Entry 22 in the Hand-book was that he could not import bolts and nuts adapted for use on cycles.\n\nThe limitation thus imposed, it was urged, also indicated that if the nuts and bolts were adapted for use on articles other than on cycles they could still import them unless the importation not merely of the other article but its components was also prohibited or restricted. In this connection our attention was drawn to item 28 of Part II in the same Hand-book reading 'Belting for machinery, all sorts, including belt laces and belt fasteners'. The Notification dated January 12, 1952 was a clarification issued in respect of licensing policy for January-June, 1952. Dealing with serial No. 28 of Part II which we have extracted just now, the notification stated: \"Jackson type. oval plate belt fasteners (other than single bolt). General licences will be granted freely subject to the provisions of Public Notice No. 189-ITC(PN)/51, dated the 28th December, 1951.\n\nJackson type oval plate sing!~ bolt belt fasteners. No imports will be granted from any source.\" It was not disputed that having regard to the terms of the import licence issued to the appellant the Notification as regards the prohibition against the importation of \"Jackson Oval Plate Single Bolt belt fasteners\" would apply to the appellant's licence and these belt fasteners could not be imported after January. 1952.\n\nFor the import licence specifically stated:\n\n\"This licence is granted under Government of India, Ministry of Commerce, Notification No. 23-ITC I 43, dated the 1st July, 1943, and is without prejudice to the application of any other prohibition or regulation affecting the importation of the goods which may be in force at the time of their\n\narrival.\"\n\nThe point, however, sought to be made was that the components of such a belt fastener could. still be imported because it was said that the scheme of the Import Trade Control Hand-book was to specify wherever it was so intended \"component parts\" along with the articles of which they formed components, when a restriction or prohibition was intended to be imposed upon them also. It is, no doubt, true that in some cases component parts are specifically included in some of the items in the Hand-book. It might very well be that this feature might be explained on the ground\n\n'. '-,'\n\n' . \\ ·..\n\n- -\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS'--. ·---~· 67 -\n\nof the specification being by. way of , abundant caution, or possibly because in them the coniponenf parts might have . an independent use other .than as components. of the articles specified. It a.EJlears to us that it does not stand to reason that• a component part which has no use other than as a component of an article whose importation is prohibited is not included in a ban or restriction as regards the importation of that article. Expressed in other terms, we cannot accede to the position tha.t it is the intention of the rule that importers are permitted to do indirectly what they are forbidden to do directly, and that it permits the importation separately of components which have no use other than as components of an article whose importation is prohibited, and that an importer is thereby enabled to assemble them here as a complete article though if. they were assembled beyond the Customs Frontiers the importation of the assembled article into India is prohibited. Learned Counsel, however, relied upon an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court delivered by Mr. Justice Mudholkar when a judge of that Court, in Appeal No. 4 of 1959 (D. P: Anand v. M fs. T. M.\n\nThakore & Co.) in support of his submission that a ban on a completed article, having regard to the phraseology employed in the Hand-book cannot be, read as a restriction or prohibition of the separate importation . of the component parts which when assembled result in. the article whose import is prohibited. We do not read the judgment in the manner suggested by learned Counsel. The learned Judge in the judgment recorded an admission that the articles imported which were components of _a motor-bicycle, .would not .when assembled form a complete cycle which was the article whose importation was . restricted, because of the lack: of certain essential parts which were admittedly not available in India and could not be imported.\n\nThe next submission of the learned Counsel was that the decision of the Customs Collector was vitiated by a patent error, in that he misoonstrued the scope of Entry 22 of Part I of the Import Trade Control Hand-book. In support of this submission the learned Counsel invited our attention to the decision of this Court in A. V. Venkateswaran Collector of Customs. Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and A nr.('). We see no force in this argument. The decision of this Court referred to proceeded on the basis set out on page 757 of the Report where this Court said:·\n\n\"The learned Solicitor-General appearing for the\n\n appellant argued the appeal on the basis that the view of the learned Judges of the Bombay\n\n(') (1962] 1 S.C.R. 753.\n\nL, IP(D)-?(a)\n\n, '\n\nGirdliarilal Bamidlia,.\n\nUniQ71. of India\n\n!\"'J-\n\n- Ayyanga,., J.\n\n,-\\\n\n' ' \"· r ., . ' .\\\n\nGinllwrilal\n\nBa'Midhar\n\nUnio-n Of India\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\nHigh Court that on any reasonable interpreta- . tion of the items in the Schedule to the Tariff Act the consignment imported by the respondent could have been foible only to a duty of 30 per cent under item 45(3) was correct.\" •\n\nLearned Counsel cannot therefore derive any support from this decision. Besides, what we have said earlier should suffice to show that the conclusion reached by. the authority that the offence under s. 167(8) has been made out, is not incorrect. This apart, we must emphasise that a court dealing with petition under Art. 226 is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the Customs authorities and therefore the correctness of. the conclusion .reached. by those authorities on the appreciation of the several items_ in the Hand-book or in the Indian Tariff Act which is referred to in these items, is not a matter which falls within the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. There is, here, no complaint of any procedural irregularity of the kind which would invalidate the\n\norder, for the order of the Collector shows by its contents that there has been an elaborate investigation and personal hearing accorded before the order now impugned was passed.\n\nLearned Counsel next submitted that the Collector of Customs had taken into consideration the importation of the washers by the Nawanagar Industries Ltd. in arriving at the conclusion that the appellant had violated s. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and that as in the notice that was serv.\n\ned upon him to show cause this was not adverted to, the order adjudging confiscation was illegal and void for the reason that there had been a violation of the principles of natural . justice and procedural irregularity in the hearing.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument. This submission proceeds upon a total misapprehension of the significance of the separate import of the washers by the sister concern. That import was not and could not be the subject of any charge against the appellants, and the appellants were not punished for that importation. It was merely evidence to confirm the conclusion reached by the Collector that the nuts and bolts imported were in reality the actual components of the Jackson type belt fastener whose importation was prohibited.\n\nThe charge which the appellant was called on to answer did specify the nature of the offence which he was alleged to have contravened, and if evidence which the appellant could have rebutted .was brought on record and considered in his presence and that evidence conclusively proved the real nature of the articles imported, there could certainly be no justifiable complaint of violation of the principles of natural justice. The misdescription of the article imported in the Bill of Entry having. practically been admitted and there being\n\nnot much dispute that the . goods imported were really components of the Jackson type single belt fasteners, nothing more was needed to establish a contravention of s. 167(8).\n\nThe reference therefore to the Nawanagar Industries Ltd. which imported the washers merely confirmed the finding.\n\nIn these circumstances we do not consider that there is any substance in this objection.\n\nThe result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nGit'tlllarilal Bansidlw\n\nUn.ion of Ind.ia\n\nA11!1\"ngor, J.", "total_entities": 63, "entities": [{"text": "GIRDHARILAL BANSIDHAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Girdharilal Bansidltar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 168, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. M. SIKRI JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 187, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 453, "end_char": 474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1921, "end_char": 1929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2582, "end_char": 2593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. V. Venkateswaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2942, "end_char": 2961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v.\n\nRamchand Sobhraj Wadhiwani, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 753, referred to."}}, {"text": "[1962] 1 S.C.R. 753", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3024, "end_char": 3043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court <Cir cuit Bench) at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3854, "end_char": 3897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 27, 1959 of the Punjab High Court <Cir cuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3941, "end_char": 3961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas, M. V. Goswami and B. C.\n\nMisra, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Trikamdas"}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3963, "end_char": 3976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas, M. V. Goswami and B. C.\n\nMisra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. C.\n\nMisra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3981, "end_char": 3993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas, M. V. Goswami and B. C.\n\nMisra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "W. S. Barlingay", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4015, "end_char": 4030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W. S. Barlingay and R. H. Dhebar."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4035, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W. S. Barlingay and R. H. Dhebar."}}, {"text": "March 6, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4070, "end_char": 4083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 6, 1964."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4126, "end_char": 4134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered\n\nAYYANGAR, J.--There are no merits in this appeal by special leave and it deserves tv be dismissed.", "canonical_name": ".A. yyangar"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4331, "end_char": 4339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant obtained, in November 1951, an import licence from the Joint Chief Controller of Imports at Calcutta, for importing \"iron and steel bolts, nuts."}}, {"text": "Japan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4561, "end_char": 4566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In purported conformity with this licence the appellant imported from Japan through the Bedi port 221 cases of bolts and nuts during the period April 4."}}, {"text": "April 4. 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4635, "end_char": 4648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In purported conformity with this licence the appellant imported from Japan through the Bedi port 221 cases of bolts and nuts during the period April 4."}}, {"text": "July 14. 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4652, "end_char": 4665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1952 to July 14."}}, {"text": "Girdharilal Bansidltar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5587, "end_char": 5609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nuts and bolts imported and thereafter a notice was issued to the appellant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against (a) for mis-describing the\n\nGirdharilal Bansidltar\n\nUnion of lndi<>\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nGirdharilal Btln8\"lkar\n\nUnion of India\n\n.A. yyangar, J_.", "canonical_name": "Girdharilal Bansidltar"}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5628, "end_char": 5636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nuts and bolts imported and thereafter a notice was issued to the appellant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against (a) for mis-describing the\n\nGirdharilal Bansidltar\n\nUnion of lndi<>\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nGirdharilal Btln8\"lkar\n\nUnion of India\n\n.A. yyangar, J_.", "canonical_name": ".A. yyangar"}}, {"text": "Girdharilal Btln8\"lkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5642, "end_char": 5664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nuts and bolts imported and thereafter a notice was issued to the appellant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against (a) for mis-describing the\n\nGirdharilal Bansidltar\n\nUnion of lndi<>\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nGirdharilal Btln8\"lkar\n\nUnion of India\n\n.A. yyangar, J_.", "canonical_name": "Girdharilal Bansidltar"}}, {"text": ".A. yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5682, "end_char": 5693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nuts and bolts imported and thereafter a notice was issued to the appellant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against (a) for mis-describing the\n\nGirdharilal Bansidltar\n\nUnion of lndi<>\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nGirdharilal Btln8\"lkar\n\nUnion of India\n\n.A. yyangar, J_.", "canonical_name": ".A. yyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5883, "end_char": 5892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5904, "end_char": 5915, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 16718", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7575, "end_char": 7583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7596, "end_char": 7607, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chapter IV of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7842, "end_char": 7864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7900, "end_char": 7905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter IV of this Act, be imported into or exported from India contrary to such prohibition or restriction; or\n\nif any attempt be made so to import or export any such goods~ ...... ''\n\nIn reaching this finding the Collector was satisfied from the samples which were forwarded ."}}, {"text": "Nawanagar Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9203, "end_char": 9228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a bolt (2) a nut and (3) washers, The washers to fit into the bolts and nuts imported by the appellant were found to have been separately imported by a firm called Nawanagar Industries Ltd. which was owned or controlled by close relations of the appellant."}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9466, "end_char": 9475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9487, "end_char": 9498, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9588, "end_char": 9594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 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"regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Purshottam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10722, "end_char": 10732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two points were urged by Mr. Purshottam on behalf of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Trikamdas"}}, {"text": ".Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11096, "end_char": 11105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miia•\n\nUnion of India\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\n01rdharilal\n\nBa\"\"idhar\n\nUnion of Indio\n\nA.yyoo.gar, J •\n\nserved.", "canonical_name": ".A. yyangar"}}, {"text": "01rdharilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11111, "end_char": 11122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miia•\n\nUnion of India\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\n01rdharilal\n\nBa\"\"idhar\n\nUnion of Indio\n\nA.yyoo.gar, J •\n\nserved."}}, {"text": "A.yyoo.gar,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11151, "end_char": 11162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miia•\n\nUnion of India\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\n01rdharilal\n\nBa\"\"idhar\n\nUnion of Indio\n\nA.yyoo.gar, J •\n\nserved."}}, {"text": "January 12, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11874, "end_char": 11890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Notification dated January 12, 1952 was a clarification issued in respect of licensing policy for January-June, 1952."}}, {"text": "28th December, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12250, "end_char": 12269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "189-ITC(PN)/51, dated the 28th December, 1951."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12770, "end_char": 12789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the import licence specifically stated:\n\n\"This licence is granted under Government of India, Ministry of Commerce, Notification No."}}, {"text": "1st July, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12853, "end_char": 12867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23-ITC I 43, dated the 1st July, 1943, and is without prejudice to the application of any other prohibition or regulation affecting the importation of the goods which may be in force at the time of their\n\narrival.\""}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14751, "end_char": 14768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Counsel, however, relied upon an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court delivered by Mr. Justice Mudholkar when a judge of that Court, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14794, "end_char": 14803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Counsel, however, relied upon an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court delivered by Mr. Justice Mudholkar when a judge of that Court, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "(1962] 1 S.C.R. 753", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16338, "end_char": 16357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ayyanga", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16432, "end_char": 16439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J-\nAyyanga,.,", "canonical_name": ".A. yyangar"}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16957, "end_char": 16966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17075, "end_char": 17083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17930, "end_char": 17939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17951, "end_char": 17962, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 167(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19482, "end_char": 19491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Git'tlllarilal Bansidlw", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19785, "end_char": 19808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Git'tlllarilal Bansidlw\n\nUn.ion of Ind.ia\n\nA11!1\"ngor, J."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_633_638_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRElVIE COURT REPORTS 633\n\nBASMATI DEVI v,\n\nCHAMROO SAO AND ORS. lK. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ J\n\nMortgage-Execution of mortgage bonds--Liabi!ity to pay rent to both mortgagor and mortgagees-Mortgaged !ands sold for default of payment of rent-Purchase by mortgagees-If the .-right to redeem exists-If the principle of s. 90 Trusts Act applies -Trusts Act, s. 90.\n\nThe plaintiff brought a suit for redemption of a large number of usufntctuary mortgages in favour of the defendants. The Case of the plaintiff was•that under the terms of the mortgage bonds the mortgagees were liable to pay rent to the land lord.\n\nThe mortgagees, however, defaulted in the payment of rent for .some years. A suit for arrears of rent was brought by the land lord and a decree obtained. In execution of the decree the lands were sold. According to the plaintiff, the purchasers of the mortgaged lands were only benamidars of defendants 1 and 2 and other mortgagees. The plaintiff claimed that the right of re- demption was not afl'ected by the Court sale because the purchase was for the benefit of the plaintiff. The suit was contested by defendants 1 and 2 only. Their case was that the right of re- -demption had been extinguished by the court sale; that the purchasers were not the benamidars of the defendants. The Trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Additional District Judge set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and passed a preliminary decree for redemption.\n\nAgainst this decree the two defendants appealed to the High Court. The appeal was heard by the Division Bench.\n\nTne High Court held that in the present case s. 90 of the Trusts Act did not apply because the court sale took place due to the default oftte mortgagor as well as the mortgagees. In this view the High Court set aside the decree of the first Appellate Court and restored the decree of the trial court.\n\nHeld: The fact that the mortgagor had made a default, does not alter the position that the mortgagee had also defaulted in paying the rent he was liable to pay. By his default he has contributed to the position that a suit had to be brought for arrears of rent, and ultimately to the position that the property was put to sale in execution of the decree obtained in the suit. This contribution to the bringing about of the sale was a direct result of his position as a mortgagee. When therefore he purchased the property himself at the sale in execution of the rrnt decree he clearly gained an advantage by availing himself of his position as a mortgagee. This is the position of law even if the mortgagee's liability was to pay less than the major portion of the rent of the holdings. In this view s. 90 of the Trusts Act applies to the facts of this case.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 241 of '196L Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 4, 1958, of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 1335 of 1952.\n\nApril 3\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19641\n\n1964 R.S. Sinha and R.C. Prasad, for the appellants.\n\nBasmati Dni Sarjoo Prasad and B. P. ]ha, for the respondents nos. I. v. and 2. Okamroo Bmi a 11d\n\nOthers , April 3. 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered Das Uupta, J. by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal arises out of a suit for re demption of a large number of usufructuary mortgages in. favour of the defendants. The plaintitf who owned 1.67 acres. of lands which were recorded in Khata 56 and J0.56 acres in Khata 57 in village Sarifabad gave 1.27 acres out of Khata 56 and 8.24 acres out of Khata 57 lands in mortgage to the several defendants by separate mortgage bonds. Part of the remaining land was sold by him and the rest settled by him with the first defendant on Batai terms.\n\nThe plaintiff's case is that under the terms of the mortgage bonds the mortgagees were liable to pay rent to the landlord.\n\nThe mortgagees however defaulted in the payment of rent for some years. A suit for the arrears of rent was brought by the landlord and a decree obtained. In execution of the decree the lands were sold. The purchasers were one Besolal and Mst.\n\nKirti Kuer, who according to the plaintiff. were only benami- <- dars of defendants I and 2 and other mortg:igees: It is his case\n\nthat this purchase enured for the benefit of the mortgagor. that is. the plaintiff. and so the right of redemption of the mortga gees has not been affected. The prayers were for a declaration that the purchase was for the benefit of the plaintiff and for redemption of the mortgagees.\n\nThe suit was contested by defendants 1 and 2 only. O! these defendants, Chamroo Sao is the purchaser, and Besolal, defendant 2 is t.he son of the other purchaser Mst. Kirti Kuer.\n\nThey denied the allegation that Besolal and Mst. Kirti Kuer were their benamidars and contended that the right of redemption has been extinguished by the court sale.\n\nThe Trial Court held that the plaintiff had failed to show that the auction purchasers were benamidars of the mortga gees and in that view dismissed the suit.\n\nOn appeal, the Additional District Judge, Patna. came to a contrary conclusion. He held that the purchase. though in the name of Besolal and Mst. Kirti Kuer was really by the first and the second defendants. He also accepted the plaintiff's case that under the terms of the mortgage bonds the mort· gagees were liable to pay the rent and the rent sale having been brought about due to the default of the mortgagor and the mortgagee they could not be allowed to take advantage of the sale. So, according to the learned Judge, the equity of\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\n\\ /\n\nSUPRK\\IE COURT REPOHTS 635\n\nredemption in favour of the plaintiff still subsisted and that he was entitled to redeem the mortgaged property, Accordingly, he set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and passed a _preliminary decree for redemption.\n\nAgainst this decree the two defendants appealed to the High Court of Patna. The appeal came up for hearing in the first instance before a Single Judge (Mr. Justice Sahai). On a consideration of the evidence, he was of opinion that the liabi- 1ity of rent of 2.67 acres was upon defendant I and that payment of rent of .87 acres which was purchased and 1.76 acres which was taken in ijra, the total being 2.43 acres, was upon defendant 2, that for payment of rent of 3.83 acres was upon the other defendants, and the plaintiff was liable to pay the rent of only about 3.39 acres out of the entire area of 1.67 acres of Khata no. 56 and 10.65 acres of Khata no. 57. The , question which therefore arose was whether s. 90 of the Trusts Act would operate to keep the equity of redemption alive in cases where the sale took place due to the default of the mortgagor as well as the mortgagees, the default on the part of the mortgagees, who purchased the properties at the sale being also substantial, The learned Judge referred this point for decision to a Division Bench.\n\nThe Division Bencl:i of the High Court held that s. 90 of the Trusts Act did not apply to these circumstances, In this view the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the first appellate court and restored the decree of the Trial Court.\n\nThe present appeal by Mst. Basmati Devi, who is the legal representative of the original plaintiff who was substitut- -ed in his place, is against !he High Court's decision dismissing the suit.\n\nIn coming to a conclusion that s, 90 of the Trusts Act did not apply to cases where the sale took place due to the default of the mortgagor as well as the mortgagee, the High Court appears to have followed a number of previous decisions of the same High Court.\n\nIn support of the appeal it is urged that the view taken by the High Court in the present case as well as the previous decisions of the Patna High Court is incorrect and defeats the very object of s, 90 of the Indian Trusts Act. Section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act is in these words:-\n\n\"'Where a tenant for life, co-owner, mortgagee or other qualified owner of any property, by availing himself of his position as such, gains an advantage in\n\nBasrnati Devi\n\n'\" Chaniroo Sao and\n\nOthers\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nBasmati Dem\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REFORTS [19641.\n\nderogation of the rights of the other persons interest-·\n\ned in the property, or where any such owner, as re-\n\nGhamroo Sao and\n\nher\n\npresenting all persons interested in such property,. gaips any advantage, he must hold, for the benefit of alt persons so interested, the advantage so gained\n\nDas Gupta, J. but subject to repayment by such persons of their due share of the expenses properly incurred, and to an indemnity by the same persons against liabilities properly contracted, in gaining such. advantage.\"\n\nThe question for consideration is whether in circumstances like the present where the decree and the sale in execution of it are brought about by the default of both the mortgagor and the mortgagee, the mortgagee can be said to have taken advantage of his positjon by purchasing the property at the sale. The High Court appears to think that unless the sale was brought about by the default of the mortgagee alone the mortgagee cannot be said to have taken advantage of his pgsition in making the purchases. What seems to have weighed with the learned Judges is that even if the mortgagee had done his duty by paying the rent he was liable to pay, the sale would stilt have taken place as the mortgagor did not pay that portion of the rent which he was liable to pay. So, they thought that the mortgagees, though they took advantage of the fact that the property had been brought to sale, could not be said to have taken advantage of their position as mortgagees.\n\nWith this view we are unable to agree. Jn our opinion, the fact that the mortgagor had made a default, does not alter the position that the mortgagee had also defaulted in paying the rent he was liable to pay. By his default he has contributed to the position that a suit had to be brought for arrears of rent and ultimately to the position that the property was put to sale in execution of the decree obtained in the suit. This contribution to the bringing about of the sale was a, direct result of his position as a mortgagee. When therefore he purchased the property himself at the sale in execution of the rent decree he clearly gained an advantage by availing himself of his position as a mortgagee. ·\n\nThis, in our opinion, is the position in law even if the mortgagee's liability was to pay less than the major portion of the rent of the holdings. Whether this would be true even where the portion which the mortgagee is liable to pay is so very small that the property is not ordinarily likely to be brought to sale for that amount, it is unnecessary for us to decide in the present case.\n\nTn the present case, the finding is that the liability of the defendants I and 2 was to pay a substantial portion of the rent. To say in such circumstances that they did not take\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT HF.PORTS 637\n\nadvantage of their position as mortgagees is entirely unrealistic\n\nSuch a construction would put a premium on dishonesty on the part of mortgagees whenever the entire burden of payment of rent was not left .squarely on the mortgagee as under the provision of s. 76 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nMr. Sarjoo Prasad, who appeared before us on behalf of the respondents, tried to persuade us that in any case the plaintiff's suit should fail as regards the lands recorded in Khata No. 57. As, according to him, these mortgagees were not at all liable to pay any portion of the rent of this holding. He drew our attention in this connection to Ex. 2, the mortgage bond executed in favour of Chamroo Sao, and to the statement made therein: \"Annual rent payable to the zamindar is the concern of me, the executant\". This argument proceeds on the basis that the holding recorded in Khata No. 57 continued to. be separate and distinct from the Khata No. 56. It is thus in direct conflict with the plea of these very defendants in their written statement that the two holdings had been consoiidated into one holding with one rental. As the oral and documentary evidence on the Paper Book prepared in the appeal did not clearly show whether or not these two holdins had become one, we called for one of the documents,\n\nE~. B which seemed likely to throw some light on the\n\nmatter. The document has now been received. It is the copy of a judgment of a suit bet\\veen these parties in which this very question, viz., whether the two holdings had been consolidated into one or not, was raised. It was decided that such consolidation had taken place. It is clear that it was after such consolidation that the second rent suit was brought in respect of that consolidated holding and it was that consolidated holding which was sold in execution of the decree. It is clear therefore that the mortgage bond Ex.2 in which the mortgagor accepted liability to pay rent to the zamindar in respect of the mortgaged land in Kha ta No. 57 does not affect the correctness of the High Court's finding that the liability to pay rent of the holding that was sold was partly of the mortgagor and partly of the mortgagees ar.d that it was the. default of both the mortgagor and the mortgagees that brought about the sale.\n\nAccordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree made by the Additional District Judge, Patna. A Pleader Commissioner shall be appointed by the trial court on a deposit of Rs. 50 /- as his fees by the present appellant within two months from this date for taking accounts as to the amount due to the defendants on the date of th_e decree. A preliminary decree for redemption shall be passed in the usual terms.\n\nAs the suit as also the appeal before the District Judge had been brought in forma pauperis the High Court made an order\n\n1[H]4\n\nv, Cltamnm ~'i'ao ancf\n\nVthfrs\n\nna~ Gn11to, J.\n\n638 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1904 directing the plaintiff to pay the court-fee on the plaint as well Ba\"\"\"'' Devi as on the memorandum of appeal. That order is set aside. In-\n\n~ v. stead, we order the first and the second defendants in the suit hamroo Sao awl h f bl h 1 1 h Other• to pay t e courtee pa ya eon t e p amt as a so on t e memorandum of appeal. The present appeal to this Court has also Da• Gup'a, J. been brought by the appellant as a pauper. As she has succeeded in the appeal, we ortler the contesting respondents, i.e., the first and the second defendants, to pay the court fee payable on the memorandum of appeal to this court. The appellant will get her costs from the first and the second defendants throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed_", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "633\n\nBASMATI DEVI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "633\n\nBASMATI DEVI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHAMROO SAO AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHAMROO SAO AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 354, "end_char": 359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trusts Act applies -Trusts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 360, "end_char": 390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392, "end_char": 397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Trusts Act applies -Trusts Act", "statute": "Trusts Act applies -Trusts Act"}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1656, "end_char": 1661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2712, "end_char": 2717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 4, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2874, "end_char": 2887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "241 of '196L Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 4, 1958, of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2896, "end_char": 2912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "241 of '196L Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 4, 1958, of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No."}}, {"text": "R.S. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3008, "end_char": 3018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 3\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19641\n\n1964 R.S. Sinha and R.C. Prasad, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R.C. Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3023, "end_char": 3034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 3\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19641\n\n1964 R.S. Sinha and R.C. Prasad, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Basmati Dni Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3057, "end_char": 3082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basmati Dni Sarjoo Prasad and B. P. ]ha, for the respondents nos."}}, {"text": "B. P. ]", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3087, "end_char": 3094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basmati Dni Sarjoo Prasad and B. P. ]ha, for the respondents nos."}}, {"text": "Okamroo Bmi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Okamroo Bmi a 11d\n\nOthers , April 3."}}, {"text": "Das Uupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3219, "end_char": 3228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered Das Uupta, J. by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal arises out of a suit for re demption of a large number of usufructuary mortgages in.", "canonical_name": "Das Uupta"}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3237, "end_char": 3246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered Das Uupta, J. by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal arises out of a suit for re demption of a large number of usufructuary mortgages in.", "canonical_name": "Das Uupta"}}, {"text": "Sarifabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3490, "end_char": 3499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of lands which were recorded in Khata 56 and J0.56 acres in Khata 57 in village Sarifabad gave 1.27 acres out of Khata 56 and 8.24 acres out of Khata 57 lands in mortgage to the several defendants by separate mortgage bonds."}}, {"text": "Besolal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4098, "end_char": 4105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The purchasers were one Besolal and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Besolal"}}, {"text": "Kirti Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4116, "end_char": 4126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kirti Kuer, who according to the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Chamroo Sao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4605, "end_char": 4616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "these defendants, Chamroo Sao is the purchaser, and Besolal, defendant 2 is t.he son of the other purchaser Mst.", "canonical_name": "CHAMROO SAO AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Besolal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "these defendants, Chamroo Sao is the purchaser, and Besolal, defendant 2 is t.he son of the other purchaser Mst.", "canonical_name": "Besolal"}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5055, "end_char": 5087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the Additional District Judge, Patna."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5899, "end_char": 5918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decree the two defendants appealed to the High Court of Patna."}}, {"text": "Sahai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal came up for hearing in the first instance before a Single Judge (Mr. Justice Sahai)."}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6557, "end_char": 6562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6962, "end_char": 6967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Basmati Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7194, "end_char": 7206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basmati Devi, who is the legal representative of the original plaintiff who was substitut- -ed in his place, is against !", "canonical_name": "633\n\nBASMATI DEVI"}}, {"text": "Indian Trusts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7834, "end_char": 7851, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7853, "end_char": 7863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Trusts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7871, "end_char": 7888, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Basrnati Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8067, "end_char": 8080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act is in these words:-\n\n\"'Where a tenant for life, co-owner, mortgagee or other qualified owner of any property, by availing himself of his position as such, gains an advantage in\n\nBasrnati Devi\n\n'\" Chaniroo Sao and\n\nOthers\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nBasmati Dem\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REFORTS [19641.", "canonical_name": "633\n\nBASMATI DEVI"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8111, "end_char": 8120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act is in these words:-\n\n\"'Where a tenant for life, co-owner, mortgagee or other qualified owner of any property, by availing himself of his position as such, gains an advantage in\n\nBasrnati Devi\n\n'\" Chaniroo Sao and\n\nOthers\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nBasmati Dem\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REFORTS [19641.", "canonical_name": "Das Uupta"}}, {"text": "Basmati Dem", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8126, "end_char": 8137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act is in these words:-\n\n\"'Where a tenant for life, co-owner, mortgagee or other qualified owner of any property, by availing himself of his position as such, gains an advantage in\n\nBasrnati Devi\n\n'\" Chaniroo Sao and\n\nOthers\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nBasmati Dem\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REFORTS [19641.", "canonical_name": "633\n\nBASMATI DEVI"}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11224, "end_char": 11229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11237, "end_char": 11261, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11268, "end_char": 11281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, who appeared before us on behalf of the respondents, tried to persuade us that in any case the plaintiff's suit should fail as regards the lands recorded in Khata No."}}, {"text": "Gup'a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14319, "end_char": 14324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present appeal to this Court has also Da• Gup'a, J. been brought by the appellant as a pauper."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_639_645_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 639\n\nTHE MOTOR TRANSPORT CONTROLLER. MAHA-\n\nRASHTRA STATE, BOMBAY AND OTHERS\n\nI'.\n\nPROVINCIAL RASHTRIY A MOTOR KAMGAR UNION,\n\nNAGPUR AND ORS IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO AND K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Termination of Service-Validity of nof.ice--AboMion ot al! posts of an establishment-If amounts to reduction of posts-Road Transport Corporations Act 1950(64 of 1950), as amended by Act 87 of 1956, s. 47-A-Central Provinc.s and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (C.P. & l:lerar 23 of 1947), s. 31 Sch. II, Item 1.\n\nAs a result of the passing of the States Reorganisation Act. 1956, Vidharbha area which was in the State of Madhya Pradesh became part of the State of Bombay and when the State of Bo:nba.v was divided under the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1950, the said area remained in the State of Maharashtra. Before 1956. the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation and Provincial Services established under the Road Transport Corporations Act. 1950, \\\\'ere operating in the States of Bombay and Madhya Pradesh respectively. To meet the situation arising from these territorial changes, Parliament made amendments to the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, by which, inter alia s. 47-A i,.vas introduced providing for the reconstitution, reorganisation and dissolution of the corporations established under the Act.\n\nOn May, 27, 1961, the Central Government made an Order under s. 47-i\\ of the Act, inter alia, approving a scheme for the reorganisation of the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation and\n\nnnalgamating with it the Provincial Transport Services v:hich had, under the Reorganisation Act, 1956, become a. commercial undertaking of the State of Bombay and which had been operating in the Vidharba area. Clause 9(1) of this provided for the abolition of all the posts in the Provincial Transport Services and for discharge of all persons. holding such posts for service but giving such people an option of continuing in the service of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. Notice ter-\n\n1ninating the services of the persons einployed by the Provincial Trnnsport Services (operating in Vidharba) were issued. Thereupon. t\\vo former employees of the Provincial Transport Services and the Union of the workmen of that concern made an application before the High Court of Bombay under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. challenging the validity, inter alia, of the notices of termination of service served on the employees on the ground that the action taken by the Government in abolish- _. ing the posts and issuing notices of termination ofservices of the employees was bad as it contravened, inter alia, the pro-- visions of s. 31 of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Di~\n\nputes Settlement Act. 1947.\n\nHeld: Abolition of all posts of an establishment did not amount to reduction of posts within the meaning of Item 1 of the Schedule II of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act._ 1947; and the Government order aboiishing the posts and terminating the services of the employees\n\n19GI\n\nApril S\n\nJ96l\n\nThe Motor\n\nTransport\n\n640 SUPREl\\IE COURT Rl~PORTS\n\n[1964 J\n\ndid not aiinount to a change within the meaning of s. 31 of the Act. The Government was, therefore, not required to follow the procedure• mentioned in s. 31.\n\n_lfali:r~:;~~~\",; tate CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 742 of Bomh\"\" a .. d Ot1\"r; 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 4. 5,\n\n' 1961 of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) at Nagpur in Prnl.'inrial - Ra.hlriya Jfotor Special Civil Application No. 150 of 1961.\n\nKan11.J<Lr Unicm, Jfagpur and Otlura\n\nDas Gupta, J,\n\nS. v: G11pte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. B. Pai, and R. H. Dliebar, for the appellants.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\nApril 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs. GUPTA, J.-A short point arises for consideration in this appeal. But to understand how the point arises it is necessary to embark on a somewhat lengthy statement of facts.\n\nThree Road Transport Corporations established under the Road T(ansport Corporation Act, 1950 were operating in the States of Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Hyderabad in J 956 when the States E.eorganisation Act, 1956 was enacted. These three cdrporations were known as the Bombay State Road\n\nfransport Corporation, the Provincial Transport Service and the State Transport Marathewada respectively. As a result of the reorganisation of the States under the States Reorganisation Ac,, 1956 the former State of Bombay Jost certain of its territories to the newly formed State of Mysore and some areas to, the State of Rajasthan. On the other hand, the State oi Bombay gained the Marathewada from the State of Hyderabad and the Vidharbha area from the State of Madhva Pradesh and certain other areas from the then existing State of Saurashlra and the State of Kutch.· To meet the situation ;; rising from these territorial changes, Parliament passed the Road Transport Corporation Amendment Act, 1956, thus amending the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Section 47; A which was introduced by the amending Act provides fqr the reconstitution, reorganisation and dissolution of the Corporations established under s. 3 of the Act. On December 3 L l 956 an order was made by the Central Government under (he provisions of this section approving a scheme for reorganisation submitted by the Government of Bombay.\n\nBy thi~ scheme those areas in which the Bombay State Road transport Corporation had been operating but were transferred under the State Reorganisation Act to the States .of Mysore and Rajasthan were excluded from the area of the operation of the Bombay State Road Transport\n\nCorpoation. This came into force from the !st January, 1957.\n\nAnother consequence of the States Reorganisation Act was that the two commercial undertakings which were known as\n\n' '\n\n':..-~J;-'._.;.--;-··\": ;\\\n\n.- . ' \"-'\" - ' . ~- . / \\ /\n\n7 S.C.R.· . SUPREThIB. COURT :REPORTS 641 ,,\n\nthe Provincial Transport Services. and . the State Transport, 1961 Marathewada •. became the commercial iindertakings of the Tho J!otor State of Bombay. Further, territorial changes occurred in the Tra.,, por1 State of Bombay in the year 1960. By the Bombay Reorgani- Controller, sation Act, No. 11 of 1960, the State of Bombay was again f{.':!b;;~'!~;; g~;. divided; part of what was in the former State, was formed v. into a new State by the name of the State of Gujarat, while Pnnincial the remaining area. was named, the State of Maharashtra. In :~~~::cl,{~\":\" consequence of this scme: other. areas were excluded by an Nagpur and Otn.ra order under s. 47-A of the Act from the area of operation of the Bombay State Road Transport CorjJoiation. The' situa- Da• Gupta, J, tion then was the State Transport, Marathewada, . was operating in the Maharashtra area, the Provincial Transport Service was operating in the Vidharbha area while in the rest of the Maharashtra State the Bombay ·State Transport Corporation was operating. It was when things stood like this that the Central Government made an order on the.27th May; 1961 under s. 47-A of the Amending Act. By this. orde~ it approved a scheme for the ree1rganisation of the Bombay State Road Transport COrporation and amalgamation with' itof the two other transport undertakings of the State Government, viz .. the Provincial Transport Services, and the State Trans; port, Mara.thewada. After the reorganisation the Corporation was to be known as. the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. Clause 9(1) of this Order provided' for the abolition of all the posts in the two undertakings, the Provincial Transport Services. and. the : State Transport Marathewada; and for discharge of all persons holding such postsfrom service. There was a provision, however. , giving such people option either of taking terminal benefits .such as compensation. pension, or gratuity to which they may. be entitled under the rules applicable to them or of continuing as from the !st July 1961 in the service of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. Sub-clause 2 of cl. 9 provided that every person who as a result of the exercise of such option is continued in the service of the Maharashtra State Transport Corporation shall be entitled to be employed by that Corporation on the same terms and conditions, including pay. as were applicable to him immediately before the appointed day and to count his service under the previous . corporations, for ... a!L purposes .. Sub. clause 3 'of cl. 9 was in these words:.:... . . . . . . . \"Nothing '.in; , sub-paragraph (2) shall be deemed to\n\n. affect the right of the Maharashtra State Road -. Transport. Corporation, subject to the provisions . of s. 77 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960\n\n(11 of. 1960) to determine or vary after the appointed day, the conditions of service of any person who is continued.in the service of the CofPO' _ration\". i_:_, . - I.II' Jl)!SCI-21 ._ ,\n\nThe .. lfolvr TraiMporl Controller. }.!alwrashtra State.\n\nBombay a11tl Of/1Pf.>J\n\nProviiicirrl Rashtriya Jlotor\n\nKamgar 'fJnion, ),? agpur and Others\n\nDas G1lpta, .J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1964]\n\n\"Provided that the conditions of service ap plicable immediately before the aJtlointed day. to anv such person shall not be varied to his disadvantage. except with the previous approval of the Central Government\".\n\nNotices terminatiqg the services of the employees employed by the Provincial Transport Services (operating in Vidharbha) were issued.\n\nOn 12th June 1961 an applica lion was made under Art. 226 and Art. 227 of the Constitu\n\ntion by two former employees of the Provincial Transport Services and the Union cf the workmen of that concern -::hal\n\n!enging the validitv of the order of reorganisation made on -the 27th Mav. 1961 and the notices of ter'illination of ser vice served on the employees. The following reliefs were prayed for: (a) that the notices of termination be quashed; ib) that the amalgamation of the Provincial Transport Services with the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation as directed under s. 47-A be not carried out, and {c) that \"a writ of mandamus be also issued to respondents 1 to 3 directing them to carry out the obligations under s.25-F and other provisions of retrenchment of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and other provisions of law before taking any action as required by law . and also by paragraph 9 of the order even assuming that the amalgamation order is legal and proper.\"\n\nThree contentions were raised in support of these prayers. lt was first urged that the order made on the 27th May violated the provisions of s.47-A of the Act and was therefore bad in law, The second contention was thnt the proviso to subcl.3 of cl.9 of the order contravenes the provisions of s.77 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act. Lastly, it was contended that the a.ction taken by the Government in abolishing the posts and issuing notices of termination of services of the employees was bad-firstly because it contravened s.25F (b) and le) of the Industrial Disputes Act and secondly, because it contravened the provisions of s.31 of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947.\n\nThe High Court rejected the first contention that the Government Order violated s.47-A of the Act. It also rejected \\he petitioner's contention that the action taken by the Government was bad because of contravention of s.25F (b) and\n\n(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court was however of opinion that the proviso to sub-cl. 3 of cl. 9 of the order was bad in law, being in conflict with s.77 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, but it held that the proviso was severable and its illegality did not affect the working of the ; cheme. The Hi?h Court also accepted the petitioner's contention that the action taken by the Government in issuing notices of termination of services on abolition of posts did not comply with the provision> of s.3 l of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes\n\nSettlement Act and was accordingly invalid. In the result, the 196# High Court quashed the Government resolution for abolition 1'1'e fo10, of posts and the notices of termination that were issued in J'ran.<pc.it consequence thereof. It also ordered the issue of a directi0n, ,1 f 0\"''; llcr,, . .\n\nT C . .:1 a11oras11lra ._.., fate dtrectmg the Maharashtra State Road ransport orporahon Homb\"'' '\"\"' un,,.~ 'not to take any action under the proviso to sub-paragraph ':· . (3l of paragraph 9 of the Order relating to varying the condi- 1, P, r, 0 ~·· 11\", 0 1\n\n1 • • . ,.aeu1 riya J' u vr lions of services to the disadvantage of any of the employees Xnmyar L\"nion, who were employees of the first respondent immediately be- Xaypnr and 011, era fore the appointed day, i.e., Ist July 1961.\" Against these\n\n1,,,, G,,-;,11, J. orders of the High Court, the State of Mahrashtra, the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and the Moter Transport Controller, Maharashtra, have appealed. At the hearing of the appeal nobody appeared before us on behalf of the petitioners in the High Court. The correctness of the High Court's decision that the order of the 27th May, 19\"1il did not violate s. 47-A of the Act was not challenged before us.· Nor was the High Court's decision that the Government's action in abolishing posts and terminating services of employees was not bad because of contravention of s. 25F(b) and (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, que'- tioned before us. We have, therefore, not examined the correctness or otherwise of these conclusions and shall dispose of the appeal on the basis that the decision on these points are correct.\n\nThe first contention urged in support of the appeal is that the High Court was wrong in thinking that in ordering the abolition of posts and terminating the services of employees in those posts the Government had contravened the provisions of s. 31 of the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act. That section is in these words:-\n\n\"31. (I) If an employer intends to effect a change in any standing orders settled under s. 30 or in respect of any industrial matter mentioned in Schedule II, he shall give fourteen days' notice of such intention in the prescribed form to the representative of employees.\n\n(2) The employer shall send a copy of the notice to the Labour Commissioner, Labour Officer and to such other person as may be prescribed and shall a !so affix a. copy of the notice at a conspicuous place on the premises where the employees affected by the proposed change are employed and at such other places as may be specially directed by the Labour Commissioner in any case.\n\n(3) On receipt of such notice the representative of employees concerned shall negotiate with the employers\".\n\nL'PiD)IKCT-l(a)\n\n1964 Schedule II of this Act mentions a number of matters, Tht.'llotor the first of which is \"Reduction intended to be of permanent Transport or semi-permanent character in the number of persons employ-\n\nMa/j,~':,':e;~'state, ed or tho be emJ? 1lol?I nhot dHll:ehtoCforce majeuhre\". bTh 1 _e. arguf- Bomliay and Others ment t at preva1 eu m t e 1g ourt was t at a o 1tton o all posts amounted to permanent reduction within the meanv.\n\nProvin<ial ing of this Item in Schedule II. If that be correct it would Raihtriya Motor, necessarily follow that the Government had to observe the\n\nN~;::;:;,, p0f::, procedure prescribed in s. 31. Admittedly, that was not done.\n\nThe short question, therefore, is whether the abolition of all Dal Gupta, J. posts of an establishment amount to reduction of posts. In our opinion. the word reduction can only be used when something is left after reduction. To speak of abolition as a reduction of the whole thing does not sound sensible or reasonable. We are unable to agree with the High Court that the term \"reduction in the number cf persons employed or to be employed\" as mentioned in Item l of Schedule II covers abolition of all posts. In our opinion, the Government Order in abolishing the posts and terminating the services of the employees did not amount to a change within the meaning of s~ 31 of the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act. The Government was, therefore, not required to follow the procedure mentioned in s. 31.\n\nThis brings us to the que~, tion about the validity of the proviso to sub-cl. 3 of cl. 9 of the Order. As already indicated\n\nthf' workmen's contention was that the proviso contravened the provisions of s. 77 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act.\n\nThat section contained a prcJvision . that on transfer or reemployment of any workman in consequence of reconstitution, reorganisation, amalgamation or dissolution by any body rnrporate, cooperative society or any commercial undertaking or industrial undertaking the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workman after such transfer or reemployment shall not be less favourable to the workman than those applicable to him immediately before the transfer of reemployment.. It was apparently apprehended by the workmen that though sub-cl. 3 of cl. 9 of the Order did state definitely that the right of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation to determine or vary the conditions of service of any person who is continued in the service of the corporation was subject to the provisions of s. 77 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, advantage might be taken of the proviso to the sub-clause, which seems at least at first sight to suggest that with the approval of the Central Govern .. ment thtconditions of service of a workman might be varied to his disadvantage notwithstanding the provisions of s. 77 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act. We are informed, however. that there has been no such variation. The petition itself did not contain any specific assertion that there had been any -\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:~IE COURT REPORTS 645\n\nvariation to the disadvantage of any workman. Only an ap- 1vu1 prehension that there might be a change in future was expressn, Mo'\"' ed. In the counter-affidavit the Government stated that •he\n\nT\"\"\"P'\"' Order passed in the notices issued clearly gave a guarantee that a,,,,,.o/hr. the conditions of service will not be changed. If there was any 1!\"\"\"'.\"\"\"',.,, \"\"\"' • • • iJ111n9a11 rtnrl Otlu, rs reason to thmk that there had been any change m any cond1- v. tions of service or that in the immediate future there was any p,.\"';,.d,, l l.k l\"h d f I 1 . b . d h h f n,,4, i,; ya Motw i e .1 oo o any sc l. c 1ange erng ma e on t e strengt o 1.:_,1111y,1r t.:, iinn, the impugned proviso 1t would have been necessary for us to Sagpw and Ulh•r.• examine the question about the validity of this proviso. As h h b d d . d iJa.\\' Ou1Jfrt, .J. owever, no change appears to ave een ma e an 1t oes not appear that there was any apprehension of any change being made in the immediate future, we have thought it desirable to leave this question open-particularly in view of the fact that the workmen were not represented before us in this appeal. We have, therefore, not heard full arguments on this question from the learned Counsel for the appellant.\n\nThe decision of the High Court that the proviso is bad is therefore, set aside and the question is left open for decision if and when it becomes really necessary to do so. In view of our decision that the High Court erred in thinking that s. 31 of the C P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act had to be applied the High Court's order quashing the abolition of posts and the notices of termination cannot be sustained.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court quashing the Government resolution of the 29th May, 1961 directing the abolition of posts and also its order quashing the notices of termination. As we have set aside the High Court's decision as regards the validity of the proviso to sub-cl. 3 of cl. 9 of the Order and left the matter open, the High Court's direction that no action should be taken under the proviso is also set aside. There will be no order as to costs. ·\n\nAppeal allowed .", "total_entities": 124, "entities": [{"text": "639\n\nTHE MOTOR TRANSPORT CONTROLLER. MAHA-\n\nRASHTRA STATE, BOMBAY AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE MOTOR TRANSPORT CONTROLLER. MAHA RASHTRA STATE, BOMBAY AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PROVINCIAL RASHTRIY A MOTOR KAMGAR UNION,\n\nNAGPUR AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 172, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PROVINCIAL RASHTRIYA MOTOR KAMGAR UNION, NAGPUR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 203, "end_char": 216, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 232, "end_char": 242, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "If amounts to reduction of posts-Road Transport Corporations Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 349, "end_char": 418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 462, "end_char": 467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "If amounts to reduction of posts-Road Transport Corporations Act 1950", "statute": "If amounts to reduction of posts-Road Transport Corporations Act 1950"}}, {"text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 492, "end_char": 538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 568, "end_char": 573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 626, "end_char": 651, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Vidharbha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 659, "end_char": 668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956, Vidharbha area which was in the State of Madhya Pradesh became part of the State of Bombay and when the State of Bo:nba.v was divided under the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1950, the said area remained in the State of Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 803, "end_char": 834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 875, "end_char": 886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956, Vidharbha area which was in the State of Madhya Pradesh became part of the State of Bombay and when the State of Bo:nba.v was divided under the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1950, the said area remained in the State of Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "Bombay State Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 905, "end_char": 944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation and Provincial Services established under the Road Transport Corporations Act."}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 991, "end_char": 1022, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1064, "end_char": 1070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950, \\\\'ere operating in the States of Bombay and Madhya Pradesh respectively."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1075, "end_char": 1089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950, \\\\'ere operating in the States of Bombay and Madhya Pradesh respectively."}}, {"text": "Parliament made amendments to the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1166, "end_char": 1237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1260, "end_char": 1265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament made amendments to the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "statute": "Parliament made amendments to the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "May, 27, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1402, "end_char": 1415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May, 27, 1961, the Central Government made an Order under s. 47-i\\ of the Act, inter alia, approving a scheme for the reorganisation of the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation and\n\nnnalgamating with it the Provincial Transport Services v:hich had, under the Reorganisation Act, 1956, become a. commercial undertaking of the State of Bombay and which had been operating in the Vidharba area."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1421, "end_char": 1439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May, 27, 1961, the Central Government made an Order under s. 47-i\\ of the Act, inter alia, approving a scheme for the reorganisation of the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation and\n\nnnalgamating with it the Provincial Transport Services v:hich had, under the Reorganisation Act, 1956, become a. commercial undertaking of the State of Bombay and which had been operating in the Vidharba area."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1460, "end_char": 1465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament made amendments to the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950", "statute": "Parliament made amendments to the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Reorganisation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1730, "end_char": 1745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May, 27, 1961, the Central Government made an Order under s. 47-i\\ of the Act, inter alia, approving a scheme for the reorganisation of the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation and\n\nnnalgamating with it the Provincial Transport Services v:hich had, under the Reorganisation Act, 1956, become a. commercial undertaking of the State of Bombay and which had been operating in the Vidharba area."}}, {"text": "Vidharba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1782, "end_char": 1790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May, 27, 1961, the Central Government made an Order under s. 47-i\\ of the Act, inter alia, approving a scheme for the reorganisation of the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation and\n\nnnalgamating with it the Provincial Transport Services v:hich had, under the Reorganisation Act, 1956, become a. commercial undertaking of the State of Bombay and which had been operating in the Vidharba area."}}, {"text": "Clause 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1797, "end_char": 1808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2032, "end_char": 2076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "holding such posts for service but giving such people an option of continuing in the service of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2359, "end_char": 2379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t\\vo former employees of the Provincial Transport Services and the Union of the workmen of that concern made an application before the High Court of Bombay under Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2386, "end_char": 2403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Reorganisation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Reorganisation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2411, "end_char": 2432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2743, "end_char": 2748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3267, "end_char": 3272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3367, "end_char": 3372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3706, "end_char": 3715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kan11.J<Lr Unicm, Jfagpur and Otlura\n\nDas Gupta, J,\n\nS. v: G11pte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. B. Pai, and R. H. Dliebar, for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "DAs. GUPTA"}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3765, "end_char": 3774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kan11.J<Lr Unicm, Jfagpur and Otlura\n\nDas Gupta, J,\n\nS. v: G11pte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. B. Pai, and R. H. Dliebar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dliebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kan11.J<Lr Unicm, Jfagpur and Otlura\n\nDas Gupta, J,\n\nS. v: G11pte, Additional Solicitor-General, G. B. Pai, and R. H. Dliebar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "DAs. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3907, "end_char": 3917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs.", "canonical_name": "DAs. GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Corporation Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4156, "end_char": 4177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three Road Transport Corporations established under the Road T(ansport Corporation Act, 1950 were operating in the States of Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Hyderabad in J 956 when the States E.eorganisation Act, 1956 was enacted."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the reorganisation of the States under the States Reorganisation Ac,, 1956 the former State of Bombay Jost certain of its territories to the newly formed State of Mysore and some areas to, the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4687, "end_char": 4705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the reorganisation of the States under the States Reorganisation Ac,, 1956 the former State of Bombay Jost certain of its territories to the newly formed State of Mysore and some areas to, the State of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "State oi Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4730, "end_char": 4745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the State oi Bombay gained the Marathewada from the State of Hyderabad and the Vidharbha area from the State of Madhva Pradesh and certain other areas from the then existing State of Saurashlra and the State of Kutch.·"}}, {"text": "Madhva Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4838, "end_char": 4852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the State oi Bombay gained the Marathewada from the State of Hyderabad and the Vidharbha area from the State of Madhva Pradesh and certain other areas from the then existing State of Saurashlra and the State of Kutch.·"}}, {"text": "Saurashlra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4909, "end_char": 4919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the State oi Bombay gained the Marathewada from the State of Hyderabad and the Vidharbha area from the State of Madhva Pradesh and certain other areas from the then existing State of Saurashlra and the State of Kutch.·"}}, {"text": "State of Kutch", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4928, "end_char": 4942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the State oi Bombay gained the Marathewada from the State of Hyderabad and the Vidharbha area from the State of Madhva Pradesh and certain other areas from the then existing State of Saurashlra and the State of Kutch.·"}}, {"text": "Parliament passed the Road Transport Corporation Amendment Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5097, "end_char": 5133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5135, "end_char": 5145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950", "statute": "the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "December 3 L l 956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5312, "end_char": 5330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 3 L l 956 an order was made by the Central Government under (he provisions of this section approving a scheme for reorganisation submitted by the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5467, "end_char": 5487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 3 L l 956 an order was made by the Central Government under (he provisions of this section approving a scheme for reorganisation submitted by the Government of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay State Road transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5530, "end_char": 5569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By thi~ scheme those areas in which the Bombay State Road transport Corporation had been operating but were transferred under the State Reorganisation Act to the States .of Mysore and Rajasthan were excluded from the area of the operation of the Bombay State Road Transport\n\nCorpoation."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5674, "end_char": 5683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By thi~ scheme those areas in which the Bombay State Road transport Corporation had been operating but were transferred under the State Reorganisation Act to the States .of Mysore and Rajasthan were excluded from the area of the operation of the Bombay State Road Transport\n\nCorpoation."}}, {"text": "st January, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5808, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st January, 1957."}}, {"text": "Another consequence of the States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5827, "end_char": 5879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6705, "end_char": 6710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Another consequence of the States Reorganisation Act", "statute": "Another consequence of the States Reorganisation Act"}}, {"text": "State Transport, Marathewada", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6844, "end_char": 6872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The' situa- Da• Gupta, J, tion then was the State Transport, Marathewada, ."}}, {"text": "Bombay ·State Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7031, "end_char": 7066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was operating in the Maharashtra area, the Provincial Transport Service was operating in the Vidharbha area while in the rest of the Maharashtra State the Bombay ·State Transport Corporation was operating."}}, {"text": "the.27th May; 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7162, "end_char": 7180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was when things stood like this that the Central Government made an order on the.27th May; 1961 under s. 47-A of the Amending Act."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7187, "end_char": 7192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7607, "end_char": 7618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8163, "end_char": 8171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8175, "end_char": 8180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra State Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8290, "end_char": 8329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 provided that every person who as a result of the exercise of such option is continued in the service of the Maharashtra State Transport Corporation shall be entitled to be employed by that Corporation on the same terms and conditions, including pay."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8584, "end_char": 8592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8597, "end_char": 8602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra State Road -. Transport. Corporation", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8723, "end_char": 8771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "affect the right of the Maharashtra State Road -."}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8804, "end_char": 8809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8817, "end_char": 8848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Das G1lpta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9190, "end_char": 9200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "agpur and Others\n\nDas G1lpta, .J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1964]\n\n\"Provided that the conditions of service ap plicable immediately before the aJtlointed day.", "canonical_name": "DAs. GUPTA"}}, {"text": "12th June 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9590, "end_char": 9604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12th June 1961 an applica lion was made under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9636, "end_char": 9644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960", "statute": "the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9649, "end_char": 9657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960", "statute": "the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10162, "end_char": 10167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10310, "end_char": 10314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10361, "end_char": 10390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10709, "end_char": 10713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "cl.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10814, "end_char": 10818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s.77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10862, "end_char": 10866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10874, "end_char": 10899, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11094, "end_char": 11099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11119, "end_char": 11142, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11198, "end_char": 11202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11219, "end_char": 11265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11348, "end_char": 11352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s.25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11488, "end_char": 11493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11514, "end_char": 11537, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11601, "end_char": 11606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "cl. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11610, "end_char": 11615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s.77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11668, "end_char": 11672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11680, "end_char": 11705, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12015, "end_char": 12018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Settlement Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12064, "end_char": 12078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Mahrashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12918, "end_char": 12937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against these\n\n1,,,, G,,-;,11, J. orders of the High Court, the State of Mahrashtra, the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and the Moter Transport Controller, Maharashtra, have appealed."}}, {"text": "27th May, 19\"1il", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13222, "end_char": 13238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The correctness of the High Court's decision that the order of the 27th May, 19\"1il did not violate s. 47-A of the Act was not challenged before us.·"}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13255, "end_char": 13260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13466, "end_char": 13475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13491, "end_char": 13514, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13959, "end_char": 13964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13982, "end_char": 14022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14146, "end_char": 14151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14204, "end_char": 14215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule II of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14844, "end_char": 14867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15305, "end_char": 15316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II of this Act", "statute": "Schedule II of this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15464, "end_char": 15469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II of this Act", "statute": "Schedule II of this Act"}}, {"text": "Dal Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15566, "end_char": 15575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The short question, therefore, is whether the abolition of all Dal Gupta, J. posts of an establishment amount to reduction of posts.", "canonical_name": "DAs. GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15970, "end_char": 15981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16192, "end_char": 16232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16315, "end_char": 16320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16397, "end_char": 16402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16406, "end_char": 16411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16525, "end_char": 16530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16538, "end_char": 16563, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17111, "end_char": 17116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17120, "end_char": 17125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17372, "end_char": 17377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17385, "end_char": 17410, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17679, "end_char": 17684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17692, "end_char": 17717, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19393, "end_char": 19398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19415, "end_char": 19455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29th May, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19695, "end_char": 19709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court quashing the Government resolution of the 29th May, 1961 directing the abolition of posts and also its order quashing the notices of termination."}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19892, "end_char": 19897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19901, "end_char": 19906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "statute": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_646_655_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".April 6\n\n646 SUPREME COu\"'RT REPORTS [19641\n\nD. C. DEWAN MOHIDEEN SAHIB AND SONS\n\nv .\n\nTHE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, MADRAS\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. W ANCHOO AND K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Employer and Emp!oyee-Relaticnship -Depends upon circumstances of each case.\n\nOn a reference of industrial disputes between the appellants, the proprietors of bidi concerns, and their workmen, the appellants contended before the Industrial Tribunal that the workers in question were not their workmen but were the workmen of independent contractors. The Tribunal found on the basis of evidence led, that the modus operandi was that contractors took leaves and tobacco from the appellant and employed workmen for manufacturing bidis. After bdis were manufactured, the contractors took them back from the workmen and delivered them to the appellants. The workmen took the leaves home and cut them there; however the process of actual rolling by filling the leaves with tobacco took place in what was called contractors' factories.\n\nThe contractors kept no attendance register for the workmen, there was no condition for their coming and going at fixed hours, nor were they bound to come for work every day: sometimes they informed the contractors if they wanted to be absent and some times they did not. The contractors said that they could take no action if the workmen absented themselves even without leave. The payment was made to the workmen at piece rates after the bidis woere• delivered to the appellants. The system was that the appellant • paid a certain sum for the manufactured bidis, after deduct ing therefrom the cost of tobacco and the leaves already fixed. to the contractors who in their turn paid to the workmen, who rolled bidis, their wages. Whatf)ver remained after paying the workmen would be contractors' 'commission for the work done.\n\nThe Tribunal held that there was no sale either of the raw materials or of the finished products, for, according to the agreement, if the bidis were not rolled, raw materials had to te returned to the appellants and the contractors were forbidden from selling the raw materials to anyone else. Further the manufactured bidis' could only be delivered to the appellants who Siu.pplied the ra~N materials. Further price of ra\\\\\" materials and finished products fixed by the appellants always remained the same and never :fluct11ated according to market rate. The Tribunal concluded that the bidi workers \"\"re the employees of the appellants and not of the so-called contrac- • tors who were themselves nothing more then employees o-· branch managers of the appellants. Thereupon, the appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court, which held that neither the bidi roller nor the intermediary was an employee of tho appellants and allowed the writ petitions. On appeal by the workmen the appeal court allowed the appeal and restored the order and conclusion of the Tribunal.\n\nOn appeal by certificate: Held: On the .facts found the appeal court w•is right in holding that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the intermediaries were merely branch managers appointed by the\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COUHT REPOHTS 647\n\nmanagement and the relationship of employers and employees subsisted between the appellants and the bidi rollers was correct.\n\nDharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd., v. State of Saurashtra, [1957] S.C.R. 152, Shri Chintsman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1958] S.C.R. 1340, Shri Birdhiclwnd Sharma v. First Civil Judge Nagpur, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 161, Shankar Ba!a.ji Waje\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 721 and 791 of 1963.\n\nAppeals by certificate and special leave from the judgment and order dated February 16, 1962 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 16 and 15 of l 959 respectively.\n\nV. P. Raman and R. Gmwpathy Iyer, for the appellant lin C.A. No. 721 of 1953).\n\nG. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant lin C.A. No. 791/63).\n\nT. S. Venkataraman, for the respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals).\n\nApril 6, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n196l\n\nD.O. Dewa\" lll ohidcen Sahib\n\nand Sons\n\nThe Ind11 . .strial Tribitnal, Madrm\n\nWANCHoo; J.-These two appeals by special leave raise Wam:hoo, J. a common question and will be decided together. The appel !ants are proprietor:> of two bidi concerns. A reference was made by the Government of Madras of dispute between the appellants and their workmen with respect to three matters.\n\nIn the present appeals however we are concerned with only one matter, namely, whether reduction of annas two in the wages of worker;; employed under the agents of the appellants • was justified and to what relief the workers were entitled.\n\nThe contention of the appellants before the tribunal was that the workers in question were not their workmen and therefore there being no relation of employers and employees be.tween them and the workmen, the reference itself was incompetent and there could be no industrial dispute between them and the workmen concerned, their case being that the workmen concerned were the workmen of independent contractors.\n\nIt was found by the tribunal on the basis of evidence led before it by both parties that the modus operandi with respect to manufacture of bidis in the appellants' concerns was that contractors took leaves and tobacco from the\n\nappellant~ and employed workmen for manufacturing bidis.\n\nAfter bid, is were manufactured, the contractors took them back fro:n the workmen and delivered them to the appellants.\n\nD.C. lJltoan M oltidetn Sa/1£b\n\nand 8cnt8\n\nThe lnd1tstrial Tribunal, Madras\n\nWanclwo, J,\n\nThe workmen took the leaves home and cut them there; however the process of actual rolling by filling the leaves with tobacco took place in what were called contractors' factories.\n\nThe contractors kept no attendance register for the workmen.\n\nThere was-also no condition that they should come and go at fixed hours. Nor were the workmen bound to come for work every day; sometime.-; the workmen informed the contractors if they wanted to be absent and sometimes they did not. The contractors however said that they could take no action if the workmen absented themselves even without leave. The payment was made to the workmen at piece rates. After the bidis were delivered to the appellants payment was made therefor.\n\nThe system was that the appellants fixed the price of tobacco and leaves supplied to the contractors who took them to the places where work 9f rolling was done and gave them to the workmen. Next day, the manufactured bidis were taken by the contractors to the appellant:; who paid a certain price for the manufactured bidis after deduct- . ing therefrom the cost of the tobacco and the leaves already fixed.\n\nThe balance was paid to the contractors who in their turn paid to the workmen, who rolled bidis. their wages.\n\nWhatever remained after paying the workmen would be the contractors' commission for the work done. It may also be mentioned that there were written agreements on the same pattern between the appellants and the contractors in that behalf. though no such. agreement has been printed in the paper books.\n\nOn these facts the appellants wanted to make out a case as if there was a sale of leaves and tobacco by the appellants to contractors and after the bidis were rolled there was a resale of the bidis to the appellants by the contractors. The tribunal however held that it wa.s clear that there was no sale either of the raw materials or of the finished products. for, according to the agreement, if bidis were not rolled, raw materials had to be returned to the appellants and the contractors were forbidden from selling the raw materials lo any one else.\n\nFurther after the bidis were manufactured they could only be delivered to the appellants who supplied raw materials and not to any one else.\n\nFurther price of raw materials fixed by the appellant; as well as the price of the finished products always remained the same and never fluctuated according to market rates. The tribunal therefore concluded that there was no sale of raw materials followed by resale of the finished products and this system was evolved in order to avoid regulations under the Factorirn Act. The tribunal also found that the contractors generally got only annas two per thousand bidis for their trouble. The tribunal\n\nalso referred to a clause in the agreement that the appellants would have no concern with the workers who rolled bidis for whom only the contractors would be responsible.\n\nBut it was of the view that these provisiorn were deliberately put into the agreement by the appellants to escape such statutory duties and obligatiom as may lie on them under the Factories Act or under the Madras Shops and Establishments Act.\n\nFinally on a review of the entire evidence, the tribunal found that this 1; ystem of manufacture of bidis through the so-called contractors was a mere camouflage devised by the appellants.\n\nThe tribunal also found that the contractors were indigent persons and served no particular duties and discharged no special functions.\n\nRaw materials were supplied by the appellants to be manufactured into tin\"hed products by the workmen and the contractors had no other function except to take the .raw materials to the workmen and gather the manufactured material.\n\nIt therefore held that the so-called contractors were not independent contractors and were mere employees or were functioning as branch man\"gers of various factories. their remuneration being dependent upon the work turned out.\n\nIt therefore came to the conclusion that the bidi workers were the employees of the appellants and not of the so-called contractors who were themselves nothing more than employees or branch managers of the appellants.\n\nIt finally held that reduction in the wages by two annas per thousand bidis was not justified and the workmen were entitled to the old rates. It therefore ordered the reduction in wages to be restored\n\nThereupon the appellants filed two writ petitions in the High Court, their contention being that the tribunal was wrong in holding that the contractors and the workmen employed by the contractors were Jhe workmen of the appellants. It seems that a sample agreement was produced before the High Court. which provided inter alia for the following terms : -\n\n(\\) That the proprietor should supply the tobacco and the bidi leaves;\n\n12) th.at the intermediary should engage premises of\n\nhis own and obtain the requisite license to carry on the work of having the bidis rolled there;\n\n(3) that at. no time sh.ould more than nine bidi rollers work m the premises of that intermediary;\n\n14) that the intermedia.ry should meet all the incidental charges for rolling the bidis including the cost of thread and the remuneration paid t~ the b'd' rollers\n\n1 I •\n\nD.G. Dewan\n\n... ~I ohideen Sahib\n\nand Sona\n\nThelnduatrial Tribunal, Mad,...\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nD.C. Dewan M ohideen Sahib\n\nand Sons\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, Madras\n\nlfanclwo, J.\n\n(5) that for every unit of 1,000 bidis rolled and delivered by the intermediary to the proprietor, the latter should pay the stipulated amount, after deducting the cost of the tobacco and the bidi leaves supplied by the proprietor;\n\n(6) that the intermediary i>hould not enter into. similar engagement with any other industrial concern;\n\n(7) that the price of the raw materials and price to be paid for every unit of 1,000 bidis rolled and delivered were to be fixed at the discretion of the proprietor.\n\nBesides these conditions, the contract also provided that it was liable to termination on breach of any of the conditions. and that the proprietors had no connection with and that they a;; sumed no responsibility for the bidi workers who had to look to the intermediary for what was payable to them for rolling the bidis.\n\nThe learned Single Judge on a review of the terms of the contract and the evidence on record held that neither the bidi roller nor the intermediary was an employee of the appellants. In consequence there could be no industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the appellants and the bidi rollers.\n\nThe petitions were therefore allowed and the award of the tribunal was set aside.\n\nThereupon there were two appeals by the workmen. The appeal court on a con;; ideration of the terms of the contract and the findings of the tribunal came to the conclusion that the so-called contractors were really the agents of the appellants and that there. was no utter lack of control by the appellants on the bidi workers who actually rolled the bidi.\n\nThe appeal court also found that the intermediaries were impecunious and according to the evidence could hardly afford to have factories of their own. It also found that the evidence revealed that the appellants took the real hand in settling all matters relating to the workem. and the intermediary was a mere cipher and the real control over the workers was that of the appellants.\n\nThe appeal court therefore held that the appellants were the real employers of the workmen and the so-called intermediaries or so:called independent contractors who were in some cases ex-employees. were no more than agents of the appellantfi. In this view of the matter the appeal ; ourt held that the conclusion reached by the tribunal that the intermediaries were merely branch managers\n\n~ I ,.\n\n.. i\n\n- ' :7 .S.C.R. \\ '. SUPRElIE COURT REPORTS . 651 -- \\ ' \\.\n\n'.,, '.apoin; ed by the :manageent and ·.the relation~i;-of em- 1964 . ployer and employees subsisted. between the appellants and D.(,. D, wan JJidi rollers was. correct. \\ The appeals were -therefore allow- .Moltidun Sahib .ed, and the order of the tribunal was restored. The appellants andv~\"\"' .have come _before ur; ori certificates -granted by the High The 1.a., trial .Court.\n\nTribunal, Madraa\n\nThe question whether 'relationship of master and servant subsists between an employer and employee .has .been. the subject of consideration by this Court in a number of cases.\n\nJn Dharangadhara Chemical, Works- Limited v. State of Saurashtra(') it WaJil held_ that the question _whether a person was a workman depended on whether he had been employed by the employer and the relationship of employer and employee or master and servant subsisted between them. It was well settled that a prima facie test of such relationship Wat> _the existence of the right in the employer not merely to direct what work was to be done but also to control the manner in which it was to be done, the nature or extent of such con-· trol varying in -different industries_ and being -by its very - nature incapable of being preCinely defined. , The correct approach therefore was to consider whether, having regard to the nature of the work there was due control and superviision by the employer. It was - further held that the question whether the relation between the parties was -one as between an employer and employee or master and servant was a pure question of fact. depending upon the circumstances of. each case. In that case, the dispute was whether certain agarias who were a class of professional labourers, were workmen or independent contractors. The facts found in that case - were that the agarias worked themselves with members of their families and were free to engage extra labour on their own account. No houn; of work were prescribed. No muster rolls were maintained; nor were working hours controlled by the master. There were no _rules as regards leave or holidays and the agarias were free to go out of the factory after making arrangements for the manufacture of salt. Even so. though certain features which -were usually to be found in a contract of service _were absent, the tribunal held that on the _whole the status of agarias was that of workmen and not that of independent contractors. particularly as supervision and control was exercised by' the master extending to all stages of manufacture from beginning to end. __ This Court' upheld the view of the tribunal on a review of the facts found in that case.\n\nThe next case to which reference has been -made -is Sh;; Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya_ Pradesh(').\n\n(') [1957] S.C.R 152.\n\n(')_[1958] S.C.R 1340.\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nD.O. Liewan Mvhideen Sahib\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, JJ<I adra&\n\nJfanchoo, J.\n\nThat was a case of bidi manufacture, and the question that arose for determination was whether certain persons known as sattedars and those who worked under the sattedars were workmen or not. It was found that the sattedars undertook to supply bidifl by manufacturing them in their own factories. or by entrusting the work to third parties at a price to be paid by the management' after delivery and approval. Reference was made to tlje principles laid down in D/zarangadhara Chemical Works Limited's case(') to determine whether the persons employed were workmen or not, and it was found that the sattedars were not under the control of the factory management and could manufacture the bidis wherever they pleased. It was therefore held that the coolies were neither employed by the management directly nor by the management through the sattedars.\n\nA special feature of that case was that none of the workmen under the sattedars worked in factories. The bidis could be manufactured anywhere and there was no obligation on the sattedars to work in the factory of the management. The sattedars were even entitled to distribute tobacco to the workers for making bidis in the workers' respective homes. It wa6 in these circumstances that this Court held that the sattedars were independent contractors and the workers employed by them were not the workers of the management.\n\nThen we come to the case of S/zri Bird/zichand Sharma\n\nv. First Civil Judge Nagpur('). That was also a case of bidi manufacture. The facts found were that the workmen who rolled the bidis had to work at the factory and were not at liberty to work at their house6; their attendance was noted in the factory and they had to work within the factory hours. though they were not bound to work for the entire period and could come and go away when they liked; but if they . came after midday they were not supplied with tobacco and thus not allowed to work even though the factory closed at 7 p.m. Further they could be removed from service if absent for eight days.\n\nPayment was made on piece rates accordin• to the amount of work done, and the bidis which did not\n\nco~1e upto the proper standard could be rejected. On these facts it was held that the workers were workmen under the Factories Act and were not independent contractom. This Court pointed out that the nature and xtent of control varied in different industries and could not by its very nature be precisely defined.\n\nWhen the oprtion was 'of simple nature and did not require superv1s10n all the time. control could be exercised ai the end of day by the method of rejecting bidis which did not come upto proper standard,\n\n(') [957] S C.R. 152.\n\n\nsuch supp-vision by the employer was sufficient to make the workers, employees of the employer and not independent contractors. The nature of the control required to make a person a servant of the master would depend upon the facts of each case.\n\nThe next case is Shankar Balaji Waje v. State of Maharashtrai'). That was also a bidi manufacturing case. On the facts of that case the majority held that decision in Shri Birdhichand Shanna's case(') was distinguishable and the appellant was not a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. It may be noted however that that case also followed the line of decisions of this Court since the decision in the case Dharangadlwra Chemical Works Limited(\") as to the criteria for coming to the conclusion whether a person was an employee or an'independent contractor.\n\nThe last case to which reference has been made is again a bidi manufacturing case, namely, Bhikusa Y amasa Kash-· tril'a (Pl Limited v. Union of India('). In that case the main question raised was about the constitutionality of s. 85 of the Factories Act and the notification issued by the State of Maharashtra thereunder. The Constitutionality of s. 85 and the notification made thereunder was upheld. The question: there involved was about the application of s. 79 of the Factories Act with reference to leave and the difficulty felt in Shankar Balaji Waje's case(') as to how leave could be calculated in the circumstances was explairied with reference to the decision in Shl'i Birdhic/wnd Shanna's case(').\n\nIt is in the light of these decisions that we have to decide whether the workmen who work under the so-called independent contractors in these cases are the workmen of the appellants. It has been found by the tribunal and this view has been confirmed by the appeal court that so-called independent contractors were mere agents or branch managers of the appellants.\n\nWe see no reason to disagree with this view taken by the tribunal arid confirmed by the appeal court on the facts of these cases. We are not unmindful in this connection of the view taken by the learned Single Judge when he held that on the agreements and the facts found the so-called intermediaries were independent contractors. We are however of opinion that the view taken by the appeal court in this connection is the right one. As the appeal court has rightly pointed out the\n\n(') [1957] S.C.R. 152.\n\n\nD.O. Dewan Moliirleen Saltib\n\nand Sons ...\n\nThe lndustrial Tribunal, Madraw\n\nJJ'ani::hoo, J,\n\nJfJGJ\n\nD.O. I>•uwa .11/rJlii•lrtn S1t/1il,\n\nund ,<.,'on~\n\nThe J, idu; ir'ritil Tri1>un•il, Jln•l1·1M\n\n654 BUPRE)IE COURT REPpRTS [1964]\n\nso-calld independent contractors were indigent pemons who were in all respects under;. the cont'rol of the appellants. There is in our opinion little doubt that this system has been evolved to avoid regulations ur, der the Factories Act. Further there is also no doubt from whatever terms of agreement are available on the )ecord that the so-called independent contractors have really no independence at all.\n\nAs the appeal court hm; pointd !lpt they are impecunious persons who could harcjly afford to have factories of their own. Some of them are even ex-employees of the appellants. The contract is practically one sided in that the proprietor can at J1is'choice supply the raw niaterials or refuse lo do so. the so-ll<; d contract.or IHt\\ing no right to insist upori the :rnpply of raw _!.l]aJerials to him.\n\nThe socalled independent contract6r--iif even bound not LO employ more than nine persons in his so-called factory.\n\nThe sale of raw materials to the so-called independent contractor and resale bv him of the manufactured biois is also a mere camouftage, the nature of which is apparent from the fuct that the so-called contractor never paid for the materials.\n\nAll that happens is that when the manufactured bidis are <lclivcred by him to the appellants. amounts due for the socalled sale of raw materials is deducted from the so-called price fixed for the bidis.\n\nIn effect all that happened is that the so-called independent contractor is supplied with tobacco and leaves and is paid certain amountE for the wages of the workers employed and for his own trouble. We can therefore\n\nee no difjiculty in holding that the so-called contractor is merely an employee or an agent of the appellants as held by the appeal court and as such employee or agent he employs workers to roll bidis on behalf of the appellants. The work is distributed between a number of r, o-called independent contractors who ate told not to employ more than nine persons at one place to avoid re&ulations µnder the Factories Act. We are not however concerned with that aspect of the matter in the present appeals.\n\nBut there can be no doubt' that the workers employed b..y the so-called con1ractors are really the workmen of the appellants who are em\n\n0ployed through their agents or serv?nts whom they choo:; e io call independent contractors.\n\nIt is however urged that there is no control by even the agent over the bidi workers. Now the evidence shows that the bidi workers are permitted to take the leaves homes in order to cut them so that they might be in proper shape and size for next day's work; but the real work of filling the leaves with tobacco (i.e. rolling the bidir,) can only be doh.e in Jhe so-called factory of the , so-called independent contracior. No tobacco is ever given to the workers to be take11 home to be rolled into bidis as and when they liked. They have to\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 655\n\nattend the so-called factory of the so-called independent contractor to do the real work of rolling bidis. As was pointed out hv this Court in Shri Birdhichand Shanna's case(') the work is of such a simple nature that GUpervision all the time is net required. In Birdhichand Sharma's case(') supervision was made through a system of rejecting the defective bidis, at the end of day. Jn the present cases we have not got the full terms of the agreement and it is therefore not possible to say that there was no kind of supervision or control over the workers and that the so-called independent contractors had to accept all kinds of bidis whether made upto standard or not. It is hardly likely that the so-called independent contractor will accept bidis which are not upto the standard; for that is usually the system which prevailr, ip this trade as will be apparent from the facts of the many bidi manufacturing cases to which we have referred. We are therefore not prepared to hold in the absence of any evidence one way or the other that there is no supervision whatsoever of the work done by the workers. Jn the circumstances we are of opinion that the relationship of master and servant between the appellant; and the workmen employed by the so-called indepen- _dent contractors is established.\n\nAs the appeal court has pointed out whenever there was a dispute in connection with the manufacture of bidis the workers looked to the appellants for redress.\n\nIn one of the cases the manager of one of the appellants ent a letter to the labour officer that the factory was agreeable to increase the wages of the workers from Rs. 1!14/- to Rs. 2/- per thousand bidis. In the other case also a similar letter was addressed showing that whenever there was increar; c or decrease in wages of the workers who work under the so-called independent contractors the real decision was taken by the appellants. This conduct on the part of the appellants is clearly inconsisterlt with their plea that the workers are not their employees and there is no privily between them and the said workers.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that on the facts found in the cases the appeal court was right in holding that the conclusion reached by the tribunal that the intermediaries were merely branch managers appointed by the management and the relationship of employers and employees subsisted between the appellants and the bidi rollers is correct. In this view the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed with costs-one set of hearing costs.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n(') [1961) 3 S.C.R. 161.\n\n]J.C. Dncr:rn Mohidee.n :Safdb\n\nan!! Sun.s\n\nTle I ndi1rBfrial Trilninrd, .JJia.draB\n\nTranrfwo, J.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "D. C. DEWAN MOHIDEEN SAHIB AND SONS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. C. DEWAN MOHIDEEN SAHIB AND SONS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.C.R. 161", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3517, "end_char": 3536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. P. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3805, "end_char": 3816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. P. Raman and R. Gmwpathy Iyer, for the appellant lin C.A. No."}}, {"text": "R. Gmwpathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3821, "end_char": 3837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. P. Raman and R. Gmwpathy Iyer, for the appellant lin C.A. No."}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3885, "end_char": 3894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3896, "end_char": 3912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3917, "end_char": 3926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant lin C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3931, "end_char": 3946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant lin C.A. No."}}, {"text": "T. S. Venkataraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3989, "end_char": 4007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Venkataraman, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Wam:hoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".strial Tribitnal, Madrm\n\nWANCHoo; J.-These two appeals by special leave raise Wam:hoo, J. a common question and will be decided together."}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4397, "end_char": 4417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reference was made by the Government of Madras of dispute between the appellants and their workmen with respect to three matters."}}, {"text": "lnd1tstrial Tribunal, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5610, "end_char": 5638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.C. lJltoan M oltidetn Sa/1£b\n\nand 8cnt8\n\nThe lnd1tstrial Tribunal, Madras\n\nWanclwo, J,\n\nThe workmen took the leaves home and cut them there; however the process of actual rolling by filling the leaves with tobacco took place in what were called contractors' factories."}}, {"text": "Wanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5640, "end_char": 5647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.C. lJltoan M oltidetn Sa/1£b\n\nand 8cnt8\n\nThe lnd1tstrial Tribunal, Madras\n\nWanclwo, J,\n\nThe workmen took the leaves home and cut them there; however the process of actual rolling by filling the leaves with tobacco took place in what were called contractors' factories."}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8745, "end_char": 8758, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10946, "end_char": 10953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "no time sh.ould more than nine bidi rollers work m the premises of that intermediary;\n\n14) that the intermedia.ry should meet all the incidental charges for rolling the bidis including the cost of thread and the remuneration paid t~ the b'd' rollers\n\n1 I •\n\nD.G. Dewan\n\n... ~I ohideen Sahib\n\nand Sona\n\nThelnduatrial Tribunal, Mad,...\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nD.C. Dewan M ohideen Sahib\n\nand Sons\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, Madras\n\nlfanclwo, J.\n\n(5) that for every unit of 1,000 bidis rolled and delivered by the intermediary to the proprietor, the latter should pay the stipulated amount, after deducting the cost of the tobacco and the bidi leaves supplied by the proprietor;\n\n(6) that the intermediary i>hould not enter into."}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11001, "end_char": 11028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "no time sh.ould more than nine bidi rollers work m the premises of that intermediary;\n\n14) that the intermedia.ry should meet all the incidental charges for rolling the bidis including the cost of thread and the remuneration paid t~ the b'd' rollers\n\n1 I •\n\nD.G. Dewan\n\n... ~I ohideen Sahib\n\nand Sona\n\nThelnduatrial Tribunal, Mad,...\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nD.C. Dewan M ohideen Sahib\n\nand Sons\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, Madras\n\nlfanclwo, J.\n\n(5) that for every unit of 1,000 bidis rolled and delivered by the intermediary to the proprietor, the latter should pay the stipulated amount, after deducting the cost of the tobacco and the bidi leaves supplied by the proprietor;\n\n(6) that the intermediary i>hould not enter into."}}, {"text": "lfanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11030, "end_char": 11038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "no time sh.ould more than nine bidi rollers work m the premises of that intermediary;\n\n14) that the intermedia.ry should meet all the incidental charges for rolling the bidis including the cost of thread and the remuneration paid t~ the b'd' rollers\n\n1 I •\n\nD.G. Dewan\n\n... ~I ohideen Sahib\n\nand Sona\n\nThelnduatrial Tribunal, Mad,...\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nD.C. Dewan M ohideen Sahib\n\nand Sons\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, Madras\n\nlfanclwo, J.\n\n(5) that for every unit of 1,000 bidis rolled and delivered by the intermediary to the proprietor, the latter should pay the stipulated amount, after deducting the cost of the tobacco and the bidi leaves supplied by the proprietor;\n\n(6) that the intermediary i>hould not enter into."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12129, "end_char": 12133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12145, "end_char": 12168, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": ".Moltidun Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13713, "end_char": 13728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals were -therefore allow- .Moltidun Sahib .ed, and the order of the tribunal was restored."}}, {"text": "D.O. Liewan Mvhideen Sahib", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16295, "end_char": 16321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wanchoo, J.\n\nD.O. Liewan Mvhideen Sahib\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, JJ<I adra&\n\nJfanchoo, J.\n\nThat was a case of bidi manufacture, and the question that arose for determination was whether certain persons known as sattedars and those who worked under the sattedars were workmen or not.", "canonical_name": "D.O. Dewan Moliirleen Saltib"}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, JJ<I adra&\n\nJfanchoo, J.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16327, "end_char": 16372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wanchoo, J.\n\nD.O. Liewan Mvhideen Sahib\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, JJ<I adra&\n\nJfanchoo, J.\n\nThat was a case of bidi manufacture, and the question that arose for determination was whether certain persons known as sattedars and those who worked under the sattedars were workmen or not."}}, {"text": "D/zarangadhara Chemical Works Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16835, "end_char": 16872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to tlje principles laid down in D/zarangadhara Chemical Works Limited's case(') to determine whether the persons employed were workmen or not, and it was found that the sattedars were not under the control of the factory management and could manufacture the bidis wherever they pleased."}}, {"text": "On these facts it was held that the workers were workmen under the Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18558, "end_char": 18638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Birdhichand Shanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19471, "end_char": 19489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the facts of that case the majority held that decision in Shri Birdhichand Shanna's case(') was distinguishable and the appellant was not a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act.", "canonical_name": "Birdhichand Shanna"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19581, "end_char": 19594, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dharangadlwra Chemical Works Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19716, "end_char": 19752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted however that that case also followed the line of decisions of this Court since the decision in the case Dharangadlwra Chemical Works Limited(\") as to the criteria for coming to the conclusion whether a person was an employee or an'independent contractor."}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20096, "end_char": 20101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20109, "end_char": 20122, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20167, "end_char": 20178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the main question raised was about the constitutionality of s. 85 of the Factories Act and the notification issued by the State of Maharashtra thereunder."}}, {"text": "s. 85", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20216, "end_char": 20221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20329, "end_char": 20334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20342, "end_char": 20355, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shankar Balaji Waje", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20407, "end_char": 20426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question: there involved was about the application of s. 79 of the Factories Act with reference to leave and the difficulty felt in Shankar Balaji Waje's case(') as to how leave could be calculated in the circumstances was explairied with reference to the decision in Shl'i Birdhic/wnd Shanna's case(')."}}, {"text": "Shl'i Birdhic", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20543, "end_char": 20556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question: there involved was about the application of s. 79 of the Factories Act with reference to leave and the difficulty felt in Shankar Balaji Waje's case(') as to how leave could be calculated in the circumstances was explairied with reference to the decision in Shl'i Birdhic/wnd Shanna's case(')."}}, {"text": "Shanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20561, "end_char": 20567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question: there involved was about the application of s. 79 of the Factories Act with reference to leave and the difficulty felt in Shankar Balaji Waje's case(') as to how leave could be calculated in the circumstances was explairied with reference to the decision in Shl'i Birdhic/wnd Shanna's case(')."}}, {"text": "D.O. Dewan Moliirleen Saltib", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21454, "end_char": 21482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.O. Dewan Moliirleen Saltib\n\nand Sons ...\n\nThe lndustrial Tribunal, Madraw\n\nJJ'ani::hoo, J,\n\nJfJGJ\n\nD.O. I>•uwa .11/rJlii•lrtn S1t/1il,\n\nund ,<.,'on~\n\nThe J, idu; ir'ritil Tri1>un•il, Jln•l1·1M\n\n654 BUPRE)IE COURT REPpRTS [1964]\n\nso-calld independent contractors were indigent pemons who were in all respects under;.", "canonical_name": "D.O. Dewan Moliirleen Saltib"}}, {"text": "lndustrial Tribunal, Madraw", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21502, "end_char": 21529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.O. Dewan Moliirleen Saltib\n\nand Sons ...\n\nThe lndustrial Tribunal, Madraw\n\nJJ'ani::hoo, J,\n\nJfJGJ\n\nD.O. I>•uwa .11/rJlii•lrtn S1t/1il,\n\nund ,<.,'on~\n\nThe J, idu; ir'ritil Tri1>un•il, Jln•l1·1M\n\n654 BUPRE)IE COURT REPpRTS [1964]\n\nso-calld independent contractors were indigent pemons who were in all respects under;."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21582, "end_char": 21584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21908, "end_char": 21921, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23684, "end_char": 23697, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Birdhichand Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24861, "end_char": 24879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Birdhichand Sharma's case(') supervision was made through a system of rejecting the defective bidis, at the end of day.", "canonical_name": "Birdhichand Shanna"}}, {"text": "[1961) 3 S.C.R. 161", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 27142, "end_char": 27161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".JJia.draB\n\nTranrfwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27237, "end_char": 27257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sun.s\n\nTle I ndi1rBfrial Trilninrd, .JJia.draB\n\nTranrfwo, J."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_656_663_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".April 7 •\n\n- -- --- ----~-----~-~\n\n'; ''\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT ..\n\n;; . \\ , v . . ' . \\ ~.\n\nKANSARA MANILAL BHIKHALAL\n\n[1964]\n\n[M. HIDAYATULLAH AND N. RA.JAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JI.]\n\n Factories Act, 1948 (Act 63 of 1948, ss. 61, 63, 101 and 117- System of. work-Hours changed-Failure to notify-Applicabi. lity of s. '61(10)-Protective clause-Scope Responsibility of offence-Mens Rea, if necessary to establish.\n\nOn. insp.; ction three of the worlanen were found working in a factory before their shift commenced. It was stated that the Inspector of Factories was informed by a letter written . a day prior. to this inspection . about. the change of the timing though the letter did not reach the Inspector till the day after the inspection. This. change in the hours Of v.; ork -\\vas not notified and displayed as required by s. 61(1) of the Factories Act. The Tespondent as the occupied/manager of the factory Was convicted. under s. 63 of the Act. On appeal, the Sessions .Judge acquitted the respondent holding that the second :Part\n\nof s. 61(10) of. the Act applied to a case of second or subsequent change in the. system of. work in a factory and this being the first change there was no need to wait for a week or to obtain the previous sanction of the Inspector as required by the later part of s. 61(10), and further s. 117 of the Act protected the action. because it was bonafide. The State appealed to the High Court which agreed.with the Sessions Judge in his inter pretation of s. 61(10) but expressed no opinion on s. 117 of the ·\n\nAct and it dis!Ilissed .the .appeal. On appeal by spec!al leave:\n\nHeld:· (i) The respondent, was not saved from the operac ti on of s. 63 which is peremptory,· by reason of anything. contained in S. 61,(10) and the sending of the letter to the Inspector of Factories v.1aS -therefore misconceived. The :words \"change in the system of work in any factory which. will necessitate a change in the notice\" in s. 61(10) refer not. to departure from the notice but to a -change in the system,, a change which would require the notice to be recast;. The notice shows \"the\n\nperiod during which adult workers may t e required to work\" and these words are descriptive 0f the scheme of employment <>f labour in the factory but are not apt to contemplate the time of employment for each individual worker. That can only be. found by referring_ to the register whilch goes with the notice.-. Sub-section (1) makes no mention of the change in the' register but of the change in the notice and thereby indicates• that the change which is . contemplated is an over. all change affective to a whole group and not an individual worker •. The latter .. part of the sub-section also points in, the same direction because it lnip!ies that such changes should not be frequent and if the change is for the second time it should .. not be made until one week has elapsed since the last change.\n\n(iti) The language of s. 117 of the Act is not limited to officers but is made wide to include \"any person\". The protection conferred can onlv be claimed by a person who can plead that he was required to do or omit to do something under the Act or that he intended to comply with any of its provisions. It cannot confer immunity in respect of actions which are not done under the Act but are done contrary to it.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE)IE COURT REPOHTS 657\n\n(iii) The occupier and. manaer,' are exempted from lia?ility in certain cases ment1oned in s. 101. her~ an occupier State of Guja.ral. <>r a manager is charged with an ?ffence he is entitled to make v. a complaint in his own turn against any person who \\vas the J[ansara Manila! actual offender and on such proof the occupier or th_e rnanaer Bhil.:!1alal is atsolved from liability. This shows that compliance with the peremptory provisions of the Act is essential and unless the occupier or the manager brings the real offender to book he must bear the responsibility. It is not necessary that rnens rea must always be established. The responsibility exists without a guilty mind.\n\nRanjit Singh v. Emperor, Al.R. (1943) Oudh 308, Ranjit Singh v. Emperor, A.LR. (1943) Oudh 311, Public Prosecutor v.\n\nMangaldas Thakkar, A'.I.R. [1958] Andh. Pra. 79, In re P.\n\nLakshmaiah Naidu. I.L.R. [1958] Andh. Pra. 925, Public Prosecutor v. Vattem Venkatramayya, A.I.R. 1963. Andh. Pra. 106,\n\nProvfncial Government C.l\\ and Berar v. Seth Chapsi Dhan.ii Oswal Bhate and Anr. IL.R. [1940] Nag. 257 and Superinten dent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v. H. E.\n\nWatsrii?. A.T.R. 1934 Cal. 730, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 21, 1962 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 383 of 1961.\n\nD. R. Prem and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant.\n\nM. V. Goswami, for the respondent.\n\nApril 7, 1962. The Judgment of the Court was delivered\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-On June 21, 1960 at 5-50 AM. the Inspector of Factories, Bhavnagar, visited Saurashtra Metal and Mechanical Works, Wadhwan City, which is a factory within the meaning of s. 2(m)(i) of the Factories Act, 1948.\n\nHe found seven workmen working on a machine and on examining the notice of period of work for adult workers and the register of workers he found that three of the workmen belonged to a group which was expected to begin work from 7 AM. He commenced proceedings under s .. 63 of the Factories Act. 1948 against the respondent Mr. Kansara Manila! Bhikhalal as the occupier I manager of the factory, after i>lming notice to him to show cause. He asked for en hanced penalty under s. 94 of the Factories Act because the said Mr. Manila! Bhikhalal was convicted on a previous occasion in three cases. As three workmen were concerned three separate complaints were filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Wadhwan City.\n\nThe defence of the respondent was that he was not the occupier and manager of the factory. It may be pointed out that one Mr. Dangi and the respondent are partners. They have another factory at Dharangadhra and the defence was that Mr. Bhikhalal was manager at the Dharangadhra factory\n\nHidayalullah, J.\n\nSlate of <Jujarr1t\n\nv. ](an.sara Jfanilal\n\nBltil:lwTnl\n\nHida!Jalullali, .f.\n\nand Mr. Dangi was manager at Wadhwan. Another defence was that a machine had gone out of order the previous day and after it was repaired work was started a little earlier the next day, because production had suffered and goods were required.\n\nThe Inspector, it was stated, was informed by a letter (Ext. I]) written on the 2,0th about the change of timing though the letter, unfortunately, did not reach the ln:; pector till the 22nd. It was admitted that this change in the hours of work was not notified and displayed as required bys. 61(1). It was urged thats. 61(10) permitted a change to be made in the system of work in a factory and as this provision was fully complied with, there was no offence. The Judicial Magistrate did not accept these defences.\n\nAccording to him, Mr. Dangi's letter (Ext. 15) showed that the respondent was the occupier and the manager of the factory at Wadhwan. On the second defence the Magistrate was of the opinion that the hours of work could not be changed without the permission of the Inspector of Factories under sub-s. (10) of s. 61. The contention on behalf of the respondent that this being the first change it was not neces.5ary to wait for one week before making another change, was not accepted because it was held that the factcry manager must always wait for one week before introducing a change. The respondent was, therefore, convicted under s. 63 of the Factories Act in respect of three offences and under s. 94, enhanced punishment wa:> imposed upon him by ordering him to pay a fine of Rs. JOO in respect of each offence.\n\nOn appeal the Sessions Judge of Surendranagar ordered the acquittal of the respondent. The learned Sessions Judge held that the second part of s. 61(10) applied to a case of second or subsequent change and this being the fimt change it did not fall within the second part.\n\nAccording to the Sessions Judge. it fell in the first part of the sub-section and the change could not be said to have been effected in breach of that part since the Inspector of Factories was informed about the change. The learned Ses:<; ions Judge was also of the opinion that s. 117 of the Factories Act protected the action because it was bonafide. The conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside. The State of Gujarat appealed against the acquittal but was unsuccessful. A Division .Bench of the High Court which heard the appeal agreed w•!h the Sessions Judge in hi:; interpretation of s. 61 (10) and did not express any opinion on s. 117 of the Act. In this appeal filed by special leave of this Court these two points have again arisen for our consideration.\n\nThe scheme of the Factories Act bearing upon the pre sent matter may now be examined. It is convenient to do so\n\nin the reverse orde!-.\n\nSection 92 is a section providing generally for penalties and 6. 94 provides for enhanced penalty ; ifter previous conviction. These sections prescribe penalties for contravention of any of the provisions of tlie Act or of any rule made or of any order in writing given thereunder.\n\nThe breach here is stated to bt: of s. 63 of the Act which lays down that the hours of work must correspond with notice required to be displayed under s. 61 and the register directed to be 1!1aintained under s. 62. It provides:\n\n\"S. 63. Hours of work to correspond with notice under section 61 and register under section 62 .. -\n\nNo adult worker shall be required or allowed to work jn any f~1ctory' other\\visc than in accordance with the notice of period;; of work for adults displayed in the faclorv and the entries made beforehand\n\n~.gainst his name in the register of adult workers of the factory.\"\n\nSection 61 deals with the notice of periods of work for adults. It is di, ided into 10 sub-sections of which sub-ss. m. (2) and ()()1 alone are relevant here. They are as follows:-\n\n\"6 l. Notice of periods. of work for adult5.-\n\n(l) There shall be displayed and correctly maintained in every factory in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 108, a notice of periods of work for adults showing clearly for\n\nvery day the periods during which adult workers may be required to work.\n\n(21 The periods shown in the notice required by subsection <I) :; hall be fixed beforehand in accordance with the following provisions of this section, and shall be such that workers working for those periods would not be workin!! in contravention of any of the provisions of sctions Si, 52, 54, 55, 56 and 58 . • * *· • •\n\n(JO) Any proposed change m the system of work in any factory which will necessitate a chane in the notice referred to in sub-section (!) shail be notified to the Inspector in duplicate before the change is made, and except with the previous sanction of the Inspector, no such change shall be made until one week has elapsed since the last change.\"\n\nStat< of Gujaral v. .\n\nJ[ansara Manila.l\n\nBhikhaJ.al\n\nIlidayafullak, J.\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nYo Kanaara .Manilal\n\nBhil:halal\n\nSection 62 next provides that a register of adult workers. shall be maintained irr which will be shown (a) name of each adult workers in the factory; (b) the nature of his work; (c) the group, if any! in which he is included; (d) where his groupworks on shifts, the relay to which he is allotted and (e) such other particulars as may be prescribed. Section 51 to which reference is made in the second sub-section of s. 61, already quoted, prescribes a 48 hours week; s. 52 refers to weekly holidays; s. 54 generally fixes a maximum of 9 hours a day for work; s. 55 fixes the interval for rest and prescribes that working hours shall not exceed 5 hours at one stretch; s. 56 fixes generally that the period or work and rest should be spread over IOt hours and s. 58 prohibits the overlapping of shifts.\n\nThe Sessions Judge and the High Court concurred in holding that the provisions of sub-s. (10) were complied with and there was thus no offence under s. 63. They treated this as a change in the system of work in the factory necessitating: a change in the notice referred to in sulHi. (I) and held that as the change was notified to the Inspector before it was made there was nothing illegal in employing the three workers before their shift commenced. They also held that as this: was the first change there was no need to wait for a week or to obtain the previous sanction of the Inspector as required by the latter part of the tenth sub-section. With due res• pect to the High Court, we do not agree that this sort of case is contemplated by the tenth -sub-section. That sub-section speaks of \"change in the system of work in any factory which will necessitate a change in the notice\" and these words refer not to a departure from the notice but to a change in the system, a change which would require the notice to be recast. The notice shows \"the periods during which adult workers may be required to work\" and these word'S are descriptiveof the scheme of the employment of labour in the factory but are not apt to contemplate the time of employment for each individual worker. That can only be found by referring to the register which goes with the notice. Sub-s. (l) makes no mention of the change in the register _but of the change in the notice and thereby indicates that the change which is contemplated is an overall change affecting a whole group and not an individual worker. The latter part of the sub-section also points in the same direction because it implies that such changes should not be frequent and if the change is for the second time it should not be made until one week has elapsed since the last change. This cannot possibly refer to a casual change in the hours of work of an individual worker.\n\nThe learned counsel ro\\Jght to justify the action by 1964 referring to s. 59 which provides that extra wages for overstate of Guiarot time shall be paid. No such claim was made earlier in this v. \"fi h n] f h · f Kamara Manilal case and justJ cation was soug t o y rom t e prov1s1ons o Bhiklialal sub-s. (10) of s. 61 and s. 117 of the Act. Section 59 cannot be considered in isolation: It has to be read with s. 64, where Hidaya1, t11a1., J. the State Government has been given the power to make 'exempting rules'. Under those rules a departure from the provisions of ss. 51, 52, 55 and 56 can be made but only in accordance with the rules so framed; as for example, overtime work may be taken from workers engaged on urgent repairs in spite of the provisions of ss. 51, 54, 55 and 56, but must be in accordance with rule 91 and the urgency which is referred to in this section and the rule is 'an urgency relating to the factory and not an urgency felt by the constituents of the factory'.\n\nA departure from the hours of work as laid down in .s. 61(2) can only be made in those cases in which the exempting provisions of the rules cover the case and not otherwise.\n\nIt would, therefore, appear that the offence which was committed in the case was the employment of workers contrary to the notice displayed under s. 61 (I) without any justification by reason of any exempting provisicn. The respondent was not saved from the operation of s. 63, which is peremptory, by reason of anything contained in sub<>. (10) and the sending of the letter to the Inspector of Factories was therefore mis-conceived.\n\nIt was contended before us that the respondent was not the occupier I manager of the factory and, in any event, s. 117 of the Act protected him because he was not present there and his action was bonafide. As to the first part of this argument it is sufficient to say that the Magistrate found that he was the occupier and manager. The letter of Mr. Dangi (Ext. 15) quite clearly establishes this. The argument under s. 117 of the Act requires a more detailed consideration.\n\nThat section reads as follows:-\n\n\" 17. Protection to persons acting µnder this Act.-\n\nNo suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act.\"\n\nlt is argued by Mr. M. V. Goswami on the authority of cases abo_ut to be mntioed that this section gives protection agamst prosecution m respect of anything which is done in good faith under the Act. He referred us to two decisions of\n\nJf)1;.J\n\nState of fluja.rut\n\nK11n-s(trr1 J[unilal\n\nBl!ild1nlal\n\nHiduya(ullal1, .].\n\nThomas, C. J. in Ranjit Singh v. Emperor(') and Ranjit Singh\n\nv. Emperor,(') in which the learned Chief Justice observes that the language of s. 117 is not limited to the inspecting staff but is wide enough to include occupiers, managers, foremen, workers etc. Mr. Goswami also refers to two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor v.\n\nMangaldas Thakker(i and In re. P. Lakshmaialz Naidu(') in which the same view has been expressed. Mr. D. R. Prem on behalf of the State of Gujarat relies on The Public Prosecutor v. V11tte111 Venkatramayya(\") and Provincial Gmemment, C.P. and Berar v. Seth Chapsi Dhanji Oswal Bhate and A11r('). Reference was also made to Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v. H. E. Watson(').\n\nIt is not necessary to refer to the lines of reasoning adopted in these cases. The language of this protecting clause is not limited to officers but is made wide to include \"any person\". It thus gives protection hot only to an officer doing or intending to do something in pursuance or execution of this Act but also to \"any person\". But the critical words arc \"any thing\n\n* * • done or intended to be done\" 1111der the Act. The protection conferred can only be claimed by a person who can plead that he was required to do or omit to do something under the Act or that he intended to comply with any of its provisions. It cannot confer immunity in respect of action~ which are not done under the Act but are done contrary to it. Even assuming that an act includes an omission as stated in the General Clauses Act, the omission also must be one which is enjoined by the Act.\n\nIt is not sufficient to say that the act was honest. That would bring it only within the words \"good faith\". It is necessary further to establish that what is complained of is something which the Act requires should be done or should be omitted to be done.\n\nThere must be a compliance or an intended compliance with a provision of the Act, before the protection can be claimed. The section cannot cover a case of a breach or an intended breach of the Act however honest the conduct otherwise.\n\nIn this connection it is necesary to point out. as was done in the Nagpur case above referred to, that the occupier and manager are exempted from liability in certain cases mentioned in s. 101. Where an occupier or a manager is charged\n\n('I A.LR. (1943) Oudh 308. ('I A.I.R. (1943) Oudh 311. (l A.LR. (1958) Andh. Pra. 79. ( 'J I.L.R. (1958) Andh. Pra. 925. ('I A.LR. (1963) Andh. Pra. 106). (') I.L.R. (1940) Nag. 257=A.I.R. (1938) Nag. 408. (') A.I.R. (1934) Cal. 730.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE1\\1E COURT REPORTS 663\n\nwith an offence he is entitled to make a complaint in his own\n\nWG4 turn against any person who was the actual offender and on S1·11< 1 !:11jan1t proof of the commi~ion of the offence by such person the . ,.. . . l . b l . d f )\" b\"l\" Tl .\n\nKnn.~\"r\" 1J11?11!11l occupier or t 1e manager 1s a so ve rom ia 1 1ty. 11s m,;1.-1,,,,,, 1 shows that compliance with the peremptory provisions of the Act is essential and unless the occupier or the manager brings Il>\"•10?1\"'1111\"i.. J. the real offender to book he must bear the responsibility.\n\nSuch a provision largely excludes the operation of s. 117 in respect of persons guilty of a breach of the provisions of the Act. It is not necessary that mens rea must always be established as has been said in some of the cases above referred to.\n\nThe responsibility exists without a guilty mind.\n\nAn adequate safeguard, however, exists in s. IOI analysed above and the occupier and manager can save themselves if they prove that they are not the real offenders but who, in fact. is.\n\nNo such defence was offered here.\n\nFor these reasonr, we are of the opinion that the res-\" pondent is not saved by s. 117. We, accordingly, set aside his acquiital and convict him under s. 63 read with s. 94 of the Factories Act. He is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50 !- in respect of each of the offences, or in default to undergo 15 days' simple imprisonment.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 103, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KANSARA MANILAL BHIKHALAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KANSARA MANILAL BHIKHALAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RA.JAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 193, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. 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R. Prem", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4788, "end_char": 4798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "D. R. Prem"}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4803, "end_char": 4820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Prem and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4842, "end_char": 4855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "M. V. Goswami"}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-On June 21, 1960 at 5-50 AM.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Bhavnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5008, "end_char": 5017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Inspector of Factories, Bhavnagar, visited Saurashtra Metal and Mechanical Works, Wadhwan City, which is a factory within the meaning of s. 2(m)(i) of the Factories Act, 1948."}}, {"text": "Saurashtra Metal and Mechanical Works, Wadhwan City", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5027, "end_char": 5078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Inspector of Factories, Bhavnagar, visited Saurashtra Metal and Mechanical Works, Wadhwan City, which is a factory within the meaning of s. 2(m)(i) of the Factories Act, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 2(m)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5121, "end_char": 5131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5442, "end_char": 5455, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kansara Manila! Bhikhalal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5489, "end_char": 5514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1948 against the respondent Mr. Kansara Manila!", "canonical_name": "KANSARA MANILAL BHIKHALAL"}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Factories Act, 1948", "statute": "the Factories Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5650, "end_char": 5663, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Manila! Bhikhalal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5685, "end_char": 5702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He asked for en hanced penalty under s. 94 of the Factories Act because the said Mr. Manila!"}}, {"text": "Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Wadhwan City", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As three workmen were concerned three separate complaints were filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Wadhwan City."}}, {"text": "Dangi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6020, "end_char": 6025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out that one Mr. Dangi and the respondent are partners."}}, {"text": "Dharangadhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6088, "end_char": 6100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have another factory at Dharangadhra and the defence was that Mr. Bhikhalal was manager at the Dharangadhra factory\n\nHidayalullah, J.\n\nSlate of <Jujarr1t\n\nv. ](an.sara Jfanilal\n\nBltil:lwTnl\n\nHida!Jalullali, .f."}}, {"text": "Bhikhalal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6130, "end_char": 6139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have another factory at Dharangadhra and the defence was that Mr. Bhikhalal was manager at the Dharangadhra factory\n\nHidayalullah, J.\n\nSlate of <Jujarr1t\n\nv. ](an.sara Jfanilal\n\nBltil:lwTnl\n\nHida!Jalullali, .f."}}, {"text": "Hidayalullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6181, "end_char": 6193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have another factory at Dharangadhra and the defence was that Mr. Bhikhalal was manager at the Dharangadhra factory\n\nHidayalullah, J.\n\nSlate of <Jujarr1t\n\nv. ](an.sara Jfanilal\n\nBltil:lwTnl\n\nHida!Jalullali, .f.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "an.sara Jfanilal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6224, "end_char": 6240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have another factory at Dharangadhra and the defence was that Mr. Bhikhalal was manager at the Dharangadhra factory\n\nHidayalullah, J.\n\nSlate of <Jujarr1t\n\nv. ](an.sara Jfanilal\n\nBltil:lwTnl\n\nHida!Jalullali, .f."}}, {"text": "Wadhwan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6305, "end_char": 6312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Mr. Dangi was manager at Wadhwan."}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7346, "end_char": 7351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7670, "end_char": 7675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7683, "end_char": 7696, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7736, "end_char": 7741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Surendranagar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7869, "end_char": 7900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the Sessions Judge of Surendranagar ordered the acquittal of the respondent."}}, {"text": "s. 61(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7998, "end_char": 8007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8408, "end_char": 8414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8422, "end_char": 8435, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8542, "end_char": 8558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Gujarat appealed against the acquittal but was unsuccessful."}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8728, "end_char": 8733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8774, "end_char": 8780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8922, "end_char": 8935, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9041, "end_char": 9051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9360, "end_char": 9365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9475, "end_char": 9480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9532, "end_char": 9537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9554, "end_char": 9559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9607, "end_char": 9617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9637, "end_char": 9647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9928, "end_char": 9938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10284, "end_char": 10295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ilidayafullak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11158, "end_char": 11171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J[ansara Manila.l\n\nBhikhaJ.al\n\nIlidayafullak, J.\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nYo Kanaara .Manilal\n\nBhil:halal\n\nSection 62 next provides that a register of adult workers."}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11177, "end_char": 11193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J[ansara Manila.l\n\nBhikhaJ.al\n\nIlidayafullak, J.\n\nState of Gujarat\n\nYo Kanaara .Manilal\n\nBhil:halal\n\nSection 62 next provides that a register of adult workers.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT"}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11228, "end_char": 11238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11577, "end_char": 11587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11644, "end_char": 11649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11695, "end_char": 11700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11728, "end_char": 11733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11787, "end_char": 11792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11896, "end_char": 11901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11987, "end_char": 11992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12180, "end_char": 12185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14024, "end_char": 14029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kamara Manilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14166, "end_char": 14180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No such claim was made earlier in this v. \"fi h n] f h · f Kamara Manilal case and justJ cation was soug t o y rom t e prov1s1ons o Bhiklialal sub-s. (10) of s. 61 and s. 117 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14265, "end_char": 14270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14275, "end_char": 14281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14294, "end_char": 14304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14363, "end_char": 14368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hidaya1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14376, "end_char": 14383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 59 cannot be considered in isolation: It has to be read with s. 64, where Hidaya1, t11a1.,"}}, {"text": "ss. 51, 52, 55 and 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14522, "end_char": 14543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 51, 54, 55 and 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14717, "end_char": 14738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14998, "end_char": 15006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15267, "end_char": 15272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15392, "end_char": 15397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15669, "end_char": 15675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15974, "end_char": 15980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16297, "end_char": 16310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt is argued by Mr. M. V. Goswami on the authority of cases abo_ut to be mntioed that this section gives protection agamst prosecution m respect of anything which is done in good faith under the Act.", "canonical_name": "M. V. Goswami"}}, {"text": "State of fluja.rut\n\nK11n-s(trr1 J[unilal\n\nBl!ild1nlal\n\nHiduya(ullal1, .].", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16522, "end_char": 16595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred us to two decisions of\n\nJf)1;.J\n\nState of fluja.rut\n\nK11n-s(trr1 J[unilal\n\nBl!ild1nlal\n\nHiduya(ullal1, .]."}}, {"text": "Thomas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16597, "end_char": 16603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thomas, C. J. in Ranjit Singh v. Emperor(') and Ranjit Singh\n\nv. Emperor,(') in which the learned Chief Justice observes that the language of s. 117 is not limited to the inspecting staff but is wide enough to include occupiers, managers, foremen, workers etc."}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16739, "end_char": 16745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16862, "end_char": 16869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Goswami also refers to two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor v.\n\nMangaldas Thakker(i and In re."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16906, "end_char": 16931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Goswami also refers to two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor v.\n\nMangaldas Thakker(i and In re."}}, {"text": "P. Lakshmaialz Naidu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16988, "end_char": 17008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Lakshmaialz Naidu(') in which the same view has been expressed."}}, {"text": "D. R. Prem", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17059, "end_char": 17069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. D. R. Prem on behalf of the State of Gujarat relies on The Public Prosecutor v. V11tte111 Venkatramayya(\") and Provincial Gmemment, C.P. and Berar v. Seth Chapsi Dhanji Oswal Bhate and A11r(').", "canonical_name": "D. R. Prem"}}, {"text": "State of Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17087, "end_char": 17103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. D. R. Prem on behalf of the State of Gujarat relies on The Public Prosecutor v. V11tte111 Venkatramayya(\") and Provincial Gmemment, C.P. and Berar v. Seth Chapsi Dhanji Oswal Bhate and A11r(')."}}, {"text": "Even assuming that an act includes an omission as stated in the General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18087, "end_char": 18170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18794, "end_char": 18800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as was done in the Nagpur case above referred to, that the occupier and manager are exempted from liability in certain cases mentioned in s. 101."}}, {"text": "s. 101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18913, "end_char": 18919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Even assuming that an act includes an omission as stated in the General Clauses Act", "statute": "Even assuming that an act includes an omission as stated in the General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19364, "end_char": 19366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19826, "end_char": 19832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 117", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20375, "end_char": 20381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20446, "end_char": 20451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20462, "end_char": 20467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20475, "end_char": 20488, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_664_667_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April 8\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nABDUL BAKHI AND BROS. [K. SuBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.] Sale.• Tax-Total Turnover included price for buying tanning bark-That price is taxable--Dealer-Meaning of-- Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950, s. 2(c), 2(m)-Sales Tax Rules, rr. 5-(1), 5(2).\n\nThe respondents are registered dealers carrying on the business of tanning hides and skins and selling the tanned skins. The authorities under the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950 assessed the respondent for the total turnover which included the price paid by the respondent for purchasing, tanning bark used in the tanning process. The respondent contended that the price paid for the purchase of trnning bark should be excluded from -the taxable turnover because the tanning bark was bought by the respondent for consumption and not for sale and hence the respondent was not \"dealer\" qua the •tanning bark.\n\nHis contention was not accepted by the Tax authorities. In a petition to the High Court under s. 22(1) of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act the contention of the respondent was accepted and the assessment was modified. In appeal filed with special leave, Held: The High Court was in error in holding that a purchaser is liable to pay tax under r. 5(2) of the Saks Tax Rules only when he is carrying on a business of buying and . selling a commodity specified in sub-r. (2) and not when he buys it for consumption in a process for manufacturing a commodity to be sold by him.\n\n(ii) To regard an activity as a business there must be a course of dealing either actually continued or con lemplated to be continued with a profit motive and not for sport or pieasure.\n\nBut to be a dealer a person need not follow the activity of buying, selling and supplying the same commodity. The Act requires merely that buying of the commodity mentioned in r. 5(2) must be in the course of business; that is it must be for sale or use with a view to take profit out of the integrated activity of buying. and disposal. The commodity may itself be converted into another saleable commodity or it may be used as an ingredient or in p. id of a manufacturing process leading to the production of such saleable commodity.\n\n(iii) In the present case the tanning bark was not bought by the respondent for any purpose unconnected with the business. Consumption of the tanning bark in the manufacturing: process did not therefore exclude the respondents from the definition of dealer qua the tanning hark.\n\nSadak Thamby and Companu v. State of Madras, 14 S.T.C. 153, approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 473 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order March 22, 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tax Revision Case No. 88 of 1960.\n\nA. Ranganadham Chetty, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellant.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPOH'l'S 6()5\n\nApril 8. 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-The respondents who are registered as dealers under the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act. 1950 carry on the business of tannin2 hides and skins and of selling the tanneJ skins in the town of Hyderabad. For the purposes bf their business the respondents purchase undressed hides am! skins and also tanning bark and other materials required in their tannery. For theassessment year 1954-55 the Sales-tax Officer, Circle IV, Hyderabad. found that the total turnover of the respondents was Rs. 5,70,417-12-4 (0.S.) in respect of the hides, skins, wool and tanning bark. The respondents disputed their liability to pay tax on Rs. 6 J ,431-14-9 (O.S.1 included .in the turnover contending that this amount represented the price paid for buying tanning bark required in their tannery. They submitted that tanning bark was bought for consumption in the tannery and not for sale, and they were accordingly not dealers in tanning bark and therefore the price paid for buying tanning bark was not liable to duty under the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act. The Sales-tax Officer rejected the contention of the respondents. and his order was confirmed in appeal by the Deputy Commissioner.\n\nC. T .. Hyderabad Division and also by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. Hyderabad. But the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a petition under s. 22(1) read with rule 40 framed under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act VII ol'\n\n1957 modified the order passed by the taxing authorities and excluded from the computation of the taxable turnover the price paid by the respondents for the tanning b::.rk used in the tannery. With special leave, the State of Andhra Pradesh bas appealed to this Court.\n\nSection 2(e) of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act defines \"dealer\" as meaning any person. local authority. company, firm, Hindu undivided family or any association or associatibns of persons engaged in the l; usiness of buying. selling or supplying goods in the Hyderabad State whether for a commission, remuneration or otherwise and includes a State Government which carries on such business and anv society. club or association which buys or sells or supplies goods to its members. Section 2(m) defines \"turnover\" as meaning an aggregate amount for which goods are either\n\nbouht by or sold by a dealer, whether for a cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration. By. s. 4 a tax at the rate of three pies in the rupee in T. G. currency on so much of the turnover for the year as is attributable to transactions in goods other than exempted goods is imposed.\n\nRule 5(1) provides that save as provided in sub-rule i2l the turno, er of a dealer for the purpose of the rules shall be the amount for which goods are sold by the dele:ir. Rule 5(21 provides that in the case of certain commodities the turnover\n\nl!JG4\n\n8fnlc of .And/ira l't; tds!.\n\n' AUdal 1>111:/ii a116-\n\n]Jrolh£rs\n\n:$.ha! .. , J.\n\nBkdeof Andkra Pradesli\n\nv . .4/ld.Z Bakhi awl.\n\nBrofhtrs\n\nShah, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nof a dealer for the purpose of the rules shall be the amount for which the goods are bought by the dealer. Those commodities are : -\n\n(a) Groundnut (shelled or unshelled);\n\n(b) Bidi leaves;\n\n(c) Tarwar and other tanning barks;\n\n(d) Tit; karad and castor seed;\n\n(e) Cotton including kappas; (f) Linseed, turmeric, dhania and other agricultural produce including all kinds of dhals and paddy (husked or unhusked) not otherwise exempted under the said Act, but excluding cotton seed, sugarcane, tea and coffee seeds;\n\n(g) Hides and skins;\n\n(h) Wool, bones and horns.\n\nThe High Court of Andhra Pradesh rejected the claim of the taxing authories to tax the tanning bark bought by the respondents on the ground that a purchaser is liable to pay tax under Rule 5(2) only when he is carrying on business of buying and selling a commodity specified in the sub-rule\n\n(2) and not when he buys it for consumption in a process for manufacturing an article to be sold by him. Therefore, in the view of the High Court if a dealer buys any commodity included in Rule 5(2) for consumption in his business but not for sale, he is not to be regarded as engaged in the business of buying, selling or supplying that commodity and the price paid for buying the commodity is not liable to tax.\n\nWe are unable to agree with this view of the High Court.\n\nA person to be a dealer must be engaged in the business of buying or selling or supplying goods. The expression \"business\" though extensively used a word of indefinite import, in taxing statutes it is used in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and labour of a person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as business there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated tb be continued with a profit motive, and not for sport or pleasure. But to be a dealer a person need not follow the activity of buying selling and supplying the same commodity. Mere buying for personal consumption i.e. without a profit motive will not make a person, dealer within the meaning of the Act, but a person who consumes a commodity bought by him in the wurse of his trade, br use in manufacturing another commodity for sale, would be regarded as a dealer. The Legislature has not made sale of the very article bought by a person a condition for treating him as a dealer: the definition merely requires that the buying of the commodity mentioned in Rule 5(2) must he in the course of business, i.e. must be for sale\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE'.\\IE COURT REPORTS 667\n\nor use with a view to make profit out of the integrated activity of buying and disposal. The commodity may itself be converted into another saleable commodity, or it may be used as an ingredient or in aid of a manufacturing process leading to the production of such saleable commodity.\n\nIt cannot be said in the present case that the tanning bark was bought by the respondent for any purpose unconnected with the business carried on by them, viz .. manufacture and sale of dressed hides and skins. Consumption in the business and not sale of the commodity bought therefore does not exclude the respondents from the definition of dealer\n\na11a the tanning bark. This is the view which has, in our judgment, been rightly taken by the Madras Hight Court in the int, erpretation of a similar statute in operation in the State of Madras in L.M.S. Sadak Tliamby and Compa1n v.\n\nThe State of Madras(').\n\nThe appeal is therefore allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside and order passed by the Sales-tax Appellate Tribunal restored. No order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nSfolr t•f\n\nA1111/,,1: p,.,~{!(~11 '\"· Abdul /J11klii onil\n\nJ/rolj,, ;8", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ABDUL BAKHI AND BROS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ABDUL BAKHI AND BROS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 2(c), 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax-Total Turnover included price for buying tanning bark-That price is taxable--Dealer-Meaning of-- Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "Tax-Total Turnover included price for buying tanning bark-That price is taxable--Dealer-Meaning of-- Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 294, "end_char": 309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "authorities under the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1038, "end_char": 1046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The authorities under the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "The authorities under the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "A. Ranganadham Chetty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2796, "end_char": 2817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2819, "end_char": 2836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N.\n\nSachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2841, "end_char": 2856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Ranganadham Chetty, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S 6()", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2942, "end_char": 2947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3009, "end_char": 3013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-The respondents who are registered as dealers under the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3208, "end_char": 3217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1950 carry on the business of tannin2 hides and skins and of selling the tanneJ skins in the town of Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3659, "end_char": 3662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. T .. Hyderabad Division and also by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4286, "end_char": 4314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a petition under s. 22(1) read with rule 40 framed under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act VII ol'\n\n1957 modified the order passed by the taxing authorities and excluded from the computation of the taxable turnover the price paid by the respondents for the tanning b::.rk used in the tannery."}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4335, "end_char": 4343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4642, "end_char": 4665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With special leave, the State of Andhra Pradesh bas appealed to this Court."}}, {"text": "Section 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4695, "end_char": 4707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5181, "end_char": 5193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5382, "end_char": 5386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bkdeof Andkra Pradesli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5908, "end_char": 5930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nBkdeof Andkra Pradesli\n\nv ."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5966, "end_char": 5970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brofhtrs\n\nShah, J.\n\nof a dealer for the purpose of the rules shall be the amount for which the goods are bought by the dealer.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Madras Hight Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9300, "end_char": 9318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is the view which has, in our judgment, been rightly taken by the Madras Hight Court in the int, erpretation of a similar statute in operation in the State of Madras in L.M.S. Sadak Tliamby and Compa1n v.\n\nThe State of Madras(')."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_668_675_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".April 9\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\nDR. SHAMLAL NARULA v.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.J\n\nIncome Tax-Land acquired-Award made. by Collector- Interest on compensation awarded-If interest amounted to a part of compensation-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 o.f 1922), ss. 3, 4-Land Acquisition Act, 1894, s. 34.\n\nThe State acquired the land of the appellant. Tne Collector made an award under the Land Acquisition Act as a result of which the appellant received Rs. 2,81,822/c, which included a sum of Rs. 48,660/- as interest upto the date of the award. The Income-tax Officer included Rs. 48,660/- (the said interest) in the total income of the appellant on the ground that the said amount was not a capital receipt. The matter went upto the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal excluded the said interest from the total income of the assessee (appellant) on the ground that it was a capital receipt. On a reference the High Court held that the said interest was not a capital but a revenue receipt and as such liable to tax under the Indian Income-tax Act. The High Court granted a certificate to the appellant to file an appeal to the Supreme Court. Hence the appeal.\n\nHeld: (i) The scheme of the Land Acquis'tion Act and the express provisions thereof establish that the statutory interest payable under s. 34 is not compensation paid to the owner for depriving him of his right to possession of the land acquir- ed, but that given to him for the deprivation of the use of the money representing the compensation for the land acquired.\n\nIn other words the statutory interest paid under s. 34 of the Act is interest paid for the delayed payment of the compensation amount and, therefore, is a revenue receipt liable to tax under the Income-tax Act.\n\nBehari Lal Bhargava v. Commissioner of Income-tax .. C.P . .and U.P., (1941), 9 I, T.R. and P. V. Kurien v. Commissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Kerala, (1962), 46 I.T.R. 288, overruled.\n\nWestminister Bank Vtd. v. Riches, (1947), 28 T.C. 159. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras\n\nv. CT. BM. N. Narayanan Chettiar, (1943), 11 I.T.R. 470 and Commissioner of Income-tax\n\nBihar and Orissa v. Maharajadhiraj Sir !(ameshwar Singh~ (1953), 23 I.TR. 212, approved. ·\n\nInglewood Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. v. New Brunswaick Electric Power Commission, A.LR. 1928 P.C. 287 and Revenue Divisiqnal Officer, Trichinopoly v. Venkatarama Ayyar, A.LR. 1936 Mad. 199, distinguished.\n\nShaw Wallace's case, A.LR. 1932 P.C. 138, Schulze v.\n\nBensted, (1915), 7 T.C. 30, and Commissioner of Inland Revenue\n\nv. Barnato, (1934--36), 20 T.C. 455, referred to.\n\n(ii) The interest under s. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act shall be paid on the amount awarded from the time the Collector take possession until the amount is paid or deposited. It\n\n'7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 669\n\nmakes no difference in the legal position between a case where 1964 possession has been taken before and that where possession Dr Shamlal Nanda has been taken after the award, for in either case the title vests T. in the Government only after possession has been taken.\n\nOommi88ioner of In no sense of the term can it (interest) be described as lncome-Taz, Punjah <iamages or compensation for the owner's right to retain possession, for as he has no right to retain possession after possession was taken under s. 16 or s. 17 of the Act.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 503 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January JI, 1962, of the Punjab High Court in I.T.R. No. 28 of 1960.\n\nB. N. Kripal and A. N. Kripal, for the appellant.\n\nGopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nApril 9, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered •\n\nSuBBA RAO, J .-This appeal by certificate granted by the Su!Jba Rao, J.\n\nHigh Court of Punjab raises the question whether interest paid under s. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter called the Act, is of the nature of a capital receipt or of a revenue receipt.\n\nThe relevant facts are not in dispute and they may be briefly stated. The appellant, Dr. Shamlal Narula, is the Manager of a Hindu uncH.vided family, which owned, inter alia, 40 bighas and 11 biswas of land in the town of PatiaJa.\n\nThe Patiala State Government initiated land acquisition proceedings for acquiring the said land under Regulation then prevailing in the Patiala State. It is common case that the .State Regulations are in pari materia with the provisions of the Act. The State of Patiala first merged into the Union of Pepsu and later the Union of Pepsu merged into the State of Punjab. It is also common case that there was a Land Acquisition Act in the Union of Pepsu containing provisions similar to those obtaining in the Act. On October 6, 1953, the Act was extended to the Union of Pepsu. On September 30,\n\n1955, the Collector of Patiala made an award under the Act as a result of which the appellant received on December 1, 1955, a sum of Rs. 2,81,822 I-, which included a sum of 48,660 /- as interest up to the date of the award. For the year 1956-57, the Income-tax Officer included the said interest in the incme of the Hindu undivided family of which the appellant is the manager, and assessed the same to income-tax, after overruling the appellant's contention that the said interest was a capital receipt and, therefore, not liable to tax.\n\nOn June 14, 1957, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the order of the Income-tax Officer. The Appellant\n\npreferrd an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nThe said Tribunal by its order dated July 9, 1957, held that ·\n\n1964 the said amount representing the interest was a capital re-\n\nDr. Shamlal Narula ceipt and. on that finding the said amout was excluded from v. the total mcome of the assessee. At the mstance of the Com- Commissioner of missioner of Income-tax the said Tribunal referred the follow- Income-1'\"\"· Pnnjab ing question tcr the High Court of Punjab under s. 66-(1) of\n\nSubba Rao, J. the Income-tax Act, 1922:\n\n\"Whether on a tre interpretation of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Award given by the Collector of Pepsu on the 30th September, 1955, the sum of Rs. 48,660/-, was captital receipt not liable to tax under the Indian lncometax Act?\" The said reference was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and it held that the said amount was not a capital but a revenue receipt and as such liable to tax under the Indian Income-tax Act. Hence the present appeal.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant raised before us two contentions, namely, (i) the sum of Rs. 48.660/- received by the appellant under the award was compensation for deprivinr; him of his right to possession of his property and was therefore, a capital receipt not liable to tax; and (ii) whatever may b~ the character of the amount awarded under s. 34 of the .Act by way of interest in a case where possession of the land has been taken by the State after the award, in a case where possession of the land acquired has been taken before the award, it would be a capital receipt, for it is said that in the latter the interest necessarily t<:kes the character of compensation for depriving the owner of the land his right to possession.\n\nbn behalf of the Revenue the order of the High Court is sought to be sustained for the reasons stated therein.\n\nThe question raised turns upon the true meaning of the provisions of s. 34 of the Act. It reads:\n\n\"When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land. the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of six per centum per annum from the time ,Jf s.1 taking possession until it should have been so paid or deposited\".\n\nThe section itself makes a distinction between the amtmnt awarded as compensation and the interest payable on the amount so awarded. The interest shall be paid on the amount awarded from the time the Collector takes possession until the amount is paid or deposited. To appreciate the scope of the section it is necessary to notice brietly the scope of an award and the manner in which possession is taken under the Act. After the statutory notifications are issued and the\n\n. '\n\nI . ; ......... - ' ' , . -... .• ··• , f / , L - i\" , ·- ·-- ) / . ..\n\n7 S.C.R~ \"\"'· .\n\n' ' . -_,,-., '- '. t : I ' ; i SUPRE:\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n-. ·-- -\n\n671 __ ..\n\nrequisite notice is given to the persos interested in the land 1964 :so . acquired, the Collector, afte.r holding h_e . necessary en- /Jr. Shaffllal Narula . qmry, makes an award, inter aba. determmmg the amount v. of compensation payable for the land so acquired. Section 15 Oommi .. irmer 0/. f th A h d · h f IncomeTax Punjab o e ct sayst at m etermmmg t e amount o compensa- _' tion the Collector shall be guided by the provisions contained Subba Rao, J . in ss. 23 and. 24. Section 23 provides for the matters to be considered dn determining compensation; s. 24 describes the matters to be neglected in determining the compensation. A perusal of the provisions of s. • 23 shows that interest is not an item included in the compensation for any of the matters mentioned therein; nor is it mentioned as a consideration for the acquisition of the land. Under cl .. (2) of s. 23, the Legislature in express terms states that in addition to the market value of the land the court shall in every case award a sum of 15 per cent. of such market value in . consideration of the compulsory. nature of the acquisition. If interest on the amount of compensation determined under s. 23 is consider- ed to be a part of the compensation or given consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition, the Legislature would have. provided for it in s. 23 itself. But instead, payment of interest is provided for separately under s. :14 in Part V of the Act under the heading \"Payment\". It is so done, because interest pertains to the domain of payment after the compensation has been ascertained. It is a conside- -ration paid either for the use of the money or forbearance from demanding it after it has fallen due. Therefore, the Act itself makes a clear distinction between the compensation payable for the land acquired and the interest payable on. the .compensation awarded.\n\nAnother approach to the problem leads to the same :result. Under s. 16 of the Act when the Collector has made an award under s. 11 he may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely iii the Government :free from all encumbrances. Under s. 17 thereof:\n\n\"In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication· of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section • (1), take possession of any waste land or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company.\n\nSuch land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances\".\n\nUnder both the sections the land acquired vests absolutely in 1he Government after the Collector has taken possession-in •One case after the making of the award and in the other, even\n\n- -- -- ---\n\n- -· ,. ..\n\n··;-, ·/.- :\"\": 1\\\n\n' ...... • '\n\n- ... :-:'-\"\".\" __ - c ( '. _ __ ,, . ':;::·\"- \" -. .. , t . 672 --._' --_---__ -.. SUPREl\\IE -COURT REPORIS\n\n' .- .. ,\n\n[1931}\n\n1961 before -the making of the award. _In either case. some time: llr. 8,,,,-;;;;; J Narula may lapse between the taking of possession of. the -acquired\n\n- ..-. _ land by the Collector and the payment or deposit of the com- Oommissianer oJ. pensation to -the person interested in the land -acquired. As. 1•comeTax, Pun; ab the land acquired vests absolutely in the Government only\n\nS\"1iba Rao, J. after the Collector has taken possession of it. no interest\n\n- therein will be outstanding in the claimant after the taking.\n\n-of such possession: he is divested of his title to the land and his right to possession thereof. and both of them vest thereafter in -the Government. Thereafter he will be entitled only to be paid compensation that has been or will be awarded to him. He will be entitled to compensation, though the ascertainment thereof may be postponed, from the date his. title to the land and the right to possession thereof have been divested and vested in the Government. It is as it were that from that date the Government .withheld the compensation amount which the . claimant would be entitledto under the provisions of the Act.\n\nTherefore. a statutory liability has. been irilposed upon the Collector_ to pay interest on the amount awarded from the time of the-taking possession until the ainoun( is paid or deposited. This amount is not •. therefore, compensation for the land acquired or for depriving theclaimant of his right to possession. -but is that paid to the claimant for the use of his money by the State. In this view there cannot be any difference in the legal position betweerr a case where possession has been taken before and that wherepossession has been taken after the award. for in either case -the title vests in the Government only after possession has been taken.\n\nThe Legislature expressly used the word \"interest\" with its well konwn connotation under s. 34 of the Act. It is. therefore. reasonable to give that expression the naturar meaning it bears. There is an illuminating exposition of the: expression '.'interest .. by the House of Lords in Westminster-\n\nBank. Ltd. v. -Riches('). The question there was whether where in an action for recovery of any debt or damages thecourt exercises: its discretionary power under a statute and orders that there shall be included in the suin for which the judgment is given interest on -the debt -or damages. the sum of interest so included is taxable under the Income-tax -Acts.\n\nIf the said amount was \"interest of money\" within Schedule D and the General Rule 21 of the All Schedules Rules of the Income Tax. Act. 1918,-income-tax was payable thereon. lnthat context it was contended that .money awarded as <lama~ ges forthe detention of money was not interest and had not the quality of interest: Lord Wright observed:\n\n_\"The general idea is that he is entitled to compensation for _the deprivation. Fromthat point of view\n\n(') (1947) 28 T~C. 159,-189. --\n\nit would seem immaterial whether the money was 1964 due to him under a contract express or implied, •/Jr. sam/al N....i.. or a statute, or whether the money was due for v. any other reason in law. In either case the money Commiuioner 0f d h. d 'd . h Income-Tax, Punjab was ue to 1m an was not pa1 or, m ot er _ words, was withheld from him by the debtor after Subba R<UJ, J. the time when payment should have been made, in breach of his legal rights, and interest was a compensation, whether the compensation was liquidated under an agreement or statute, as for instance under section 57 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, or was unliquidated and claimable under the Act as in the present case. The essential quality of the claim for compensation is the same, and the compensation is properly described as interest\".\n\nThis passage indicates that interest, whether it is statutory or\n\n.,; ontractual, represents the profit the creditor might have made if he had the use of the money or the loss he suffered, because he had not that use. It is something in addition to the capital amount, though it arises out of it. Under s. 34 of the Act when the Legislature designedly used the wbrd \"interest\"\n\nin contradistinction to the amount awarded, we do not see any reason why the expression should not be given the naturnl meaning it bears.\n\nThe scheme of the Act and the express provisions thereof establish that the statutory interest payable under s. 34 is nbt compensation paid to the owner for depriving him of his right to possession of the land acquired, but that given to him for the deprivation of the use of the money representing the compensation for the land acquired.\n\nWe shall now proceed to consider the case law cited at the Bar. Where a Tribunal directed the Improvement Trust, under the provisions of s. 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, to pay interest to the assessee from the date of taking possession of the prbperty to the date of payment, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held, in Behari Lal Bhargava '\" Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. and U. P. ('), that the interest so awarded was in the nature of compensation for the loss of the assessee's right to retain possession of the property acquired and, therefore, was no income liable to tax.\n\nThe reason for the said conclusion is stated thus:\n\n\"It ls not the \"fruit of a tree\"-to borrow the simile used in Shaw Wal/ace's case (')-but was compensation or damages for loss of the right to re-\n\n('l (1941) 9 l.T.R. 9, 24.\n\n1') A.LR. 1932 P.C. 138.\n\nL P(D)i8C-\"'J\n\nDr. Shamlal Naro/a\n\n. v.\n\ntain possession; and it seems to us that Section 28 was designed as a convenient method of measuring such damages in terms of interest\" .\n\nCommiuioner of 11!!'-0me.Tax, Punjab . , As we have pointed out earlier, as soon as the Collector has B.V, ba Rao, J, taken possession of the land either before or after the award the title absolutely vests in the Government and thereafter owner of the land so acquired ceases to have any title or right of possession to the land acquired. Under the award he gets compensation for both the rights. Therefore, the interest awarded under s. 28 of the Act, just like under s. 34 thereof. cannot be a compensation or damages for the less of the right to retain possession but only compensation payable by the State for keeping back the amount payable to the owner.\n\nAdverting to the said decision a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. CT.\n\nRM. N. Narayanan Chettiar(') observed:\n\n\" ......... with great respect we find ourselves unable to follow the reasoning. Certainly we are not prepared to accept the judgment as a guide to the decision in the present case\".\n\nSo was the interest granted to an assessee under s. I SA of\n\nthe Income-tax Act on the advance payment of tax by him under the provision of that section held to be incame taxable in his hand: see Commissioner of Income-tax, Bilwr and Orissa v. Mahara}µdhiaj Sir Kameshwar Singh('). There. when the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Behari Lal Bhargava's case(') was relied upon, the learned Judges, refusing to follow it, observed thus i\n\n\"It is not a matter of discussion for the Central Government but the duty to pay interest is imposed by statute. Apart from this I think (with grat respect) that the Allahabad decision is of doubtful authority. The decision is not consistent with the principle laid down in Schulze v. Bensted(') and Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Barnato(').\n\nThe Madras High Court expressly declined to follow the Allahabad case in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Nm•ayanan Chettiar(').\"\n\nThe Kerala High Court in P. V. Kurien v. Commissioner of !11co111e-tax, Kera/a(\") held that interest paid on the enhancl'd amount of compensation directed to be paid by an appellate\n\n(') (1943) 11 I.T.R. 470, 477.\n\n(') (1953) 23 I.T.R. 212, 225.\n\n(') 9 I.T.R. 9. i') (1915) 7 T.C. 30.\n\n(') (1934-36) 20 T.C. 455.\n\n(') (1962) 46 I.T.R. 288.\n\ncourt in an appeal against an award of compensation for 196' compulsory acquisition of land under the Land Acquisi- Dr. SlwmJal Narul~\n\ntion Act represented capital and was not income liable to he _v.. ,, d h I d.\n\nI A I d h Oommts\"\"\"'' o, taxed un er t e n ian ncome-tax ct. t was argue t ere, Imome-Tax Puniab as is argued before us, that the interest awarded was a capital ' sum estimated in terms of interest. In coming to the conclu- Suhba R''°• J. sion which they did, the learned Judges relied upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co., Ltd. v. New Burmwick Electric Power Commission(') and that of the Madras High Court in Re•'enue Dhisional Officer, Trichinopoly v.\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar(\").\n\nIn the former, the Judicial Committee directed the purchaser who had taken delivery and possession of the property he had purchased before the sale to pay interest to the vendor on the purchase money from the date he had taken possession on the ground that \"the right to receive interest takes the place of the right to retain possession and is within the rule\"; and in the latter, though it arose under the Land Acquisition Act. possession was taken by the Government under circumstances falling outside the scope of ss. 16 and 17 of the said Act. In both the cases the title did not pass to the vendee in one case and to the State in the other when possession was taken by them and, therefore, it may be said that the owner was given interest in place of his right to retain possession of the property.\n\nBut in a case where title passes to the State. the statutory interest provided thereafter can only be regarded either as representing the profit which owner of the land might have made if he had the use of the money or the loss he suffered because he had not that use. In no sense of the term can it be described as damages or compensation for the owner's right to retain possession, for he has no right to retain possession after possession was taken under s. J 6 or s. J 7 of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the statutory interest paid under s. 34 of the Act is interest paid for the delayed payment of the compensation amount and, therefore, is a revenue receipt\n\n~ liable to tax under the Income-tax Act.\n\nThe order of the\n\n~ High Court is, therefore, correct.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n<') A.LR. 1928 P.C. 287. (') A.LR. 1936 Mad. 199.\n\nJ4P{D)ISCI-22n).", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "SHAMLAL NARULA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Shamlal Narula ceipt", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 284, "end_char": 298, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 320, "end_char": 328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Collector- Interest on compensation awarded-If interest amounted to a part of compensation-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Collector- Interest on compensation awarded-If interest amounted to a part of compensation-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 357, "end_char": 362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Tne Collector made an award under the Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 411, "end_char": 469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1103, "end_char": 1117, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1198, "end_char": 1211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court granted a certificate to the appellant to file an appeal to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1368, "end_char": 1373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tne Collector made an award under the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Tne Collector made an award under the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1650, "end_char": 1655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1796, "end_char": 1810, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2048, "end_char": 2082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras\n\nv. CT.", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PUNJAB"}}, {"text": "Shaw Wallace", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2467, "end_char": 2479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shaw Wallace's case, A.LR."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2660, "end_char": 2665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamlal Nanda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2987, "end_char": 3000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It\n\n'7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 669\n\nmakes no difference in the legal position between a case where 1964 possession has been taken before and that where possession Dr Shamlal Nanda has been taken after the award, for in either case the title vests T. in the Government only after possession has been taken.", "canonical_name": "Shamlal Narula ceipt"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3367, "end_char": 3372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3376, "end_char": 3381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3521, "end_char": 3538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order dated January JI, 1962, of the Punjab High Court in I.T.R. No."}}, {"text": "N. Kripal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3569, "end_char": 3578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Kripal and A. N. Kripal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. N. Kripal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3583, "end_char": 3595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Kripal and A. N. Kripal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3633, "end_char": 3647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3728, "end_char": 3737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered •\n\nSuBBA RAO, J .-This appeal by certificate granted by the Su!Jba Rao, J.\n\nHigh Court of Punjab raises the question whether interest paid under s. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter called the Act, is of the nature of a capital receipt or of a revenue receipt.", "canonical_name": "Su!Jba Rao"}}, {"text": "Su!Jba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3785, "end_char": 3795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered •\n\nSuBBA RAO, J .-This appeal by certificate granted by the Su!Jba Rao, J.\n\nHigh Court of Punjab raises the question whether interest paid under s. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter called the Act, is of the nature of a capital receipt or of a revenue receipt.", "canonical_name": "Su!Jba Rao"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3801, "end_char": 3821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered •\n\nSuBBA RAO, J .-This appeal by certificate granted by the Su!Jba Rao, J.\n\nHigh Court of Punjab raises the question whether interest paid under s. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter called the Act, is of the nature of a capital receipt or of a revenue receipt."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3870, "end_char": 3875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3883, "end_char": 3909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shamlal Narula", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4092, "end_char": 4106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Dr. Shamlal Narula, is the Manager of a Hindu uncH.vided family, which owned, inter alia, 40 bighas and 11 biswas of land in the town of PatiaJa.", "canonical_name": "Shamlal Narula ceipt"}}, {"text": "PatiaJa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4225, "end_char": 4232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Dr. Shamlal Narula, is the Manager of a Hindu uncH.vided family, which owned, inter alia, 40 bighas and 11 biswas of land in the town of PatiaJa."}}, {"text": "Patiala State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Patiala State Government initiated land acquisition proceedings for acquiring the said land under Regulation then prevailing in the Patiala State."}}, {"text": "State Regulations are in pari materia with the provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4414, "end_char": 4482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Patiala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Patiala first merged into the Union of Pepsu and later the Union of Pepsu merged into the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Union of Pepsu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4527, "end_char": 4541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Patiala first merged into the Union of Pepsu and later the Union of Pepsu merged into the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4587, "end_char": 4602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Patiala first merged into the Union of Pepsu and later the Union of Pepsu merged into the State of Punjab."}}, {"text": "October 6, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4751, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 6, 1953, the Act was extended to the Union of Pepsu."}}, {"text": "September 30,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4815, "end_char": 4834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 30,\n\n1955, the Collector of Patiala made an award under the Act as a result of which the appellant received on December 1, 1955, a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "December 1, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4936, "end_char": 4952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 30,\n\n1955, the Collector of Patiala made an award under the Act as a result of which the appellant received on December 1, 1955, a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "June 14, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5374, "end_char": 5387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 14, 1957, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the order of the Income-tax Officer."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant\n\npreferrd an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Shamlal Narula ceipt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Tribunal by its order dated July 9, 1957, held that ·\n\n1964 the said amount representing the interest was a capital re-\n\nDr. Shamlal Narula ceipt and.", "canonical_name": "Shamlal Narula ceipt"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5965, "end_char": 5970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5979, "end_char": 5988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the mstance of the Com- Commissioner of missioner of Income-tax the said Tribunal referred the follow- Income-1'\"\"· Pnnjab ing question tcr the High Court of Punjab under s. 66-(1) of\n\nSubba Rao, J. the Income-tax Act, 1922:\n\n\"Whether on a tre interpretation of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Award given by the Collector of Pepsu on the 30th September, 1955, the sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Su!Jba Rao"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5997, "end_char": 6017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6056, "end_char": 6066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Pepsu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6135, "end_char": 6140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the mstance of the Com- Commissioner of missioner of Income-tax the said Tribunal referred the follow- Income-1'\"\"· Pnnjab ing question tcr the High Court of Punjab under s. 66-(1) of\n\nSubba Rao, J. the Income-tax Act, 1922:\n\n\"Whether on a tre interpretation of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Award given by the Collector of Pepsu on the 30th September, 1955, the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "30th September, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6148, "end_char": 6168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the mstance of the Com- Commissioner of missioner of Income-tax the said Tribunal referred the follow- Income-1'\"\"· Pnnjab ing question tcr the High Court of Punjab under s. 66-(1) of\n\nSubba Rao, J. the Income-tax Act, 1922:\n\n\"Whether on a tre interpretation of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Award given by the Collector of Pepsu on the 30th September, 1955, the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6450, "end_char": 6464, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6841, "end_char": 6846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7413, "end_char": 7418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7672, "end_char": 7675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8655, "end_char": 8665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8853, "end_char": 8859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8869, "end_char": 8879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8951, "end_char": 8956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9264, "end_char": 9269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9563, "end_char": 9568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9733, "end_char": 9738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part V of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9823, "end_char": 9840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10330, "end_char": 10335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part V of the Act", "statute": "Part V of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10390, "end_char": 10395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part V of the Act", "statute": "Part V of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10523, "end_char": 10528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part V of the Act", "statute": "Part V of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10748, "end_char": 10757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part V of the Act", "statute": "Part V of the Act"}}, {"text": "S\"1iba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11719, "end_char": 11729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1•comeTax, Pun; ab the land acquired vests absolutely in the Government only\n\nS\"1iba Rao, J. after the Collector has taken possession of it."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13231, "end_char": 13236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule D and the General Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13854, "end_char": 13885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14129, "end_char": 14135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lnthat context it was contended that .money awarded as <lama~ ges forthe detention of money was not interest and had not the quality of interest: Lord Wright observed:\n\n\"The general idea is that he is entitled to compensation for the deprivation."}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14862, "end_char": 14872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule D and the General Rule", "statute": "Schedule D and the General Rule"}}, {"text": "Bills of Exchange Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14880, "end_char": 14907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15407, "end_char": 15412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882", "statute": "the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15730, "end_char": 15735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882", "statute": "the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16098, "end_char": 16103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16264, "end_char": 16284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a Tribunal directed the Improvement Trust, under the provisions of s. 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, to pay interest to the assessee from the date of taking possession of the prbperty to the date of payment, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held, in Behari Lal Bhargava '\" Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. and U. P. ('), that the interest so awarded was in the nature of compensation for the loss of the assessee's right to retain possession of the property acquired and, therefore, was no income liable to tax."}}, {"text": "Behari Lal Bhargava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16294, "end_char": 16313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a Tribunal directed the Improvement Trust, under the provisions of s. 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, to pay interest to the assessee from the date of taking possession of the prbperty to the date of payment, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held, in Behari Lal Bhargava '\" Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. and U. P. ('), that the interest so awarded was in the nature of compensation for the loss of the assessee's right to retain possession of the property acquired and, therefore, was no income liable to tax."}}, {"text": "Shamlal Naro", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16831, "end_char": 16843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L P(D)i8C-\"'J\n\nDr. Shamlal Naro/a\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Shamlal Narula ceipt"}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16894, "end_char": 16904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B.V, ba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17094, "end_char": 17105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have pointed out earlier, as soon as the Collector has B.V, ba Rao, J, taken possession of the land either before or after the award the title absolutely vests in the Government and thereafter owner of the land so acquired ceases to have any title or right of possession to the land acquired."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17428, "end_char": 17433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17462, "end_char": 17467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17709, "end_char": 17726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Adverting to the said decision a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. CT."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18062, "end_char": 18076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18484, "end_char": 18502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Behari Lal Bhargava's case(') was relied upon, the learned Judges, refusing to follow it, observed thus i\n\n\"It is not a matter of discussion for the Central Government but the duty to pay interest is imposed by statute."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18608, "end_char": 18617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart from this I think (with grat respect) that the Allahabad decision is of doubtful authority."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18922, "end_char": 18939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kerala High Court in P. V. Kurien v. Commissioner of !"}}, {"text": "ss. 16 and 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20510, "end_char": 20523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21344, "end_char": 21349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21493, "end_char": 21507, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_676_692_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "' '\n\nApril 10\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRATTAN LAL\n\n\\'.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, K.C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.t\n\nProbation of Offenders Act, 1958, ss. 611-Criminal Law- Conviction of accused by trial court before the coming into force of the Act-Whether High Court can exercise powers conferred on Court under s. 6.\n\nThe appellant, a resident of Palwal in Gurgaon District, committed house trespass and tried to outrage the modesty of a girl aged 7 years. By an order dated May 31, 1962, he was convicted by magistrate and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment.\n\nHe was also ordered to pay fine. At the time of his conviction, he was 16 years old.\n\nThe Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 was extended to Gurgaon on September 1, 1962 and hence at the time of his conviction the magistrate had no power or duty to make any order under the Act. The appeal of the appellant was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon by his order dated September 22, 1962. His revision petition was also dismissed by the High Court on September 27, 1962. No ground was taken either before the Additional Sessions Judge or High Court that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 should be applied in the case. After the dismissal of the revision petition, appellant filed a criminal miscellaneous petition requesting the High Court to exercise its powers under s. 11 of the Act and pass orders under ss. 3, 4 or 6 of the Act. The application was also dismissed by High Court. The appellant filed a petition in the High Court for the grant of a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court and one of the grounds taken was that High Court should have acted under s. 11\\0f the Act and passed orders under ss. 3, 4 or 6 of t!J.e Act. The certificate having been refused by High Court, the appellant came to this Court by special leave.\n\nAccepting the appeal, Held (Per Subba Rao and Das Gupta, JJ.): The order of the High Court be set aside and High Court be directed to make an order under s. 6 or if it so desires, remand the case to the Sessions Court for doing so. It is true that ordinarily, this court is reluctant to. allow a party to raise a point for the first time before it, but in this case. both the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court ignored the mandatory provisions of the Act. It i< true that the appellant did not bring the provisions of the Act to the notice of the Court till after the disposal of the revision . petition, but that does not absolve the court from discharging its . duty under the Act.\n\nThe appellate court in appeal or the High Court on revision can, in exercise of the powers conferred under s. 11 of the Act, make an order under s. 6(1).\n\nThe Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. The Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COURT REPORTS 677\n\nabove that age and offenders who are guilty of committing an offence punishable with death or •imprisonment for life and\n\nthose who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard .to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under ss. 3 and 4 of the Act.\n\nAn order under s. 11(1) of the Act can be made by any court empowered to try and sentence the offender to imprisonment and also by High Court or any other court when case comes before it on appeal or in revision. The sub-section ex fade does not circumscribe the jurisdiction of an appellate court to make an order under the Act only in a case where the trial court could have made that order. The phraseology used therein is wide enough to enable the appellate court or High Court, when the case come before, it, to make such an order. It was purposely made comprehensive as the Act was made to implement a social reform. As the Act does not change the quantum of the sentence, but only introduces a provision to reform the offender, there is no reason why the legislature should have prohibited the exercise of such a power even if the case was pending against the accused at one stage or other in the hierarchy of tribunals.\n\nThe term \"court\" in s. 6(1) includes an appellate court as well as revisional court.\n\nPer Raghubar Dayal, J. (dissenting}---When a person has been found guilty for the first time of an offence to which the provisions of ss. 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 could apply, and such finding, be it of the trial court or of the appellate court, is arrived at before the application of the Act, the court of appeal or revision cannot take action under s. 11 (1) of the Act when the case comes before it in appeal or revision.\n\nIt is true that appellate courts have allowed parties to take advantage of a Jaw enacted during the pendency of the case, but this is done when .parties can litigate further in view of the changed law and is done to save multiplicity of proceedings.\n\nSuch a 'ground is not available in the present case.\n\nRamji Missar v. State of Bihar, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 745. referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 1962. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated Septen2ber 27, 1962 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1172 of 1962.\n\nNanak Chand, for the appellant.\n\nGopal Singh, R.N. Sachthey and R.H. D/rebar, for the respondent.\n\nApril 10, 1964. The Judgment of Subba Rao and Das Gupta JJ. was delivered by Subba Rao J. Raghubar Dayal, J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.\n\nRattan Lal .,, State of Pv•jab\n\nRattan Lal v.\n\nState of Punjab\n\nSubb<• Rao, J.\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This a(>peal by special leave raises the question of jurisdiction of an appellate court to exercise its power under s.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act. 1958 (Act, No: 20 of 1958), hereinafter called the Act, in respect of an accused who was convicted by the trial court before the Act came into force.\n\nThe facts are not now in dispute. The appellant, a resident of Palwal in Gurgaon District, committed house trespass and tried to outrage the modesty of a girl aged 7 years. He was sent up for trial before the Magistrate, First Class. Palwal. The said Magistrate. on May 31, 1962, convicted him under ss. 451 and 354 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment under each count and directed that the sentences should run concurrently. He further imposed a fine of Rs. 200/- on the appellant under s. 451 of the Indian Penal Code and ordered that, in default of payment of tine. he should undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. The appellant was 16 years old at the time of his conviction. The Act was extended to Gurgaon District on September I. 1962 and, therefore, at the time the appellant was convicted by the Magistrate, the Magistrate had no power or duty to make any order under the Act. The appellant preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentences to the Additional Sessions Judge. Gurgaon, who by his judgment dated September 22, 1962. dismissed the appeal. Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act had come into force, neither the appellant relied upon the provisions of the Act nor did the learned Additional Sessions Judge exercised his power thereunder. The revision filed in the High Court by the appellant was dismissed on September 27, 1962. The revision petition was dismissed in /i111i11e. but no ground was taken in the revision petition that the Additional Sessions Judge should have acted under s.6 of the Act. After the revision petition was disposed of. it appears that the appellant filed Criminal l\\focellaneous Petition No. 793 of 1962 requesting the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under s.11 of the Act and to pass orders under ss. 3, 4 or 6 thereof. The said application was also dismissed. Unfortunately the said application is not on the record and we are not in a position to know the exact scope of the relief asked for in the application and the reasons for which it was dismissed. The appellant tiled a petition in the High Court under Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution for a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court. One of the grounds for seeking such a certificate was that the High Court should have acted under s. 11 of the Act and passed orders under ss .. 3, 4 or 6 thereof. That petition having been dismissed. the nppellant has preferred the present appeal to this Court by obtaining special leave.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contends that, having 1964 regard to the admitted facts 'in the case, the High Court should Hauan Lal have acted under s.11 of the Act and released the appellant on v. probation of good conduct instead of sending him to prison. 61•1• 01 Punjab On the other hand. learned counsel for the State argues that Subba Rao, J. the Act is not retrospective in opcratioQ and, therefore, it wil ! not apply to the appellant, as he was convicted before it came into force in Gurgaon District. Further. he contends that neither s.11 of the Act nor s.6 thereof, on the. basis of the express phraseology used therein, can be invoked in the circumstances of the present case. In any view, he says that the appellant, not having raised this plea till after the revision petition was disposed of by the High Court, is precluded by his default to raise this contention at this very late stage.\n\nThe Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of . the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him.\n\nBroadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence.\n\nWhile in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct. subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is atisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under ss. 3 and 4 of the Act.\n\nWith this short background we shall now read the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 6. (l) When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonn_ient unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the l'ffender, it would not be desirable to deal with him Hnder section 3 or section 4. and if the Court passes ally sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its r.easons for doing so.\n\nRaltan Lal ...\n\nBlot• of Punjab\n\n8ubba Rao, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1964]\n\n(2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under section 3 or section 4 with an offender referred to in sub-section (I) the Court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender.\n\nSection I I. (!) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, an order under this Act may be made by any Court empowered to try and sentence the offender to imprisonment and also by the High Court or any other Court when the case comes before it on appeal or in revision.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, where an order under section 3 or section 4 is made by any Court trying the offender (other than a High Court), an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former Court.\n\n(3) In any case where any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence and the Court by which he is found guilty declines to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and passed against him any sentence of imprisonment with or without fine from which no appeal lies or is preferred, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former Court may, either of its own motion or on an application made to it by the convicted person or the probation officer, call for and examine the record of the case and pass such order thereon as it thinks fit.\n\nIG x x x x x x The first question is whether the High Court, acting under s.11 of the Act. can exercise the power conferred on a court under s.6 of the Act. It is said that the jurisdiction of the High Court under s.11(3) of the Act is confined only to a case that has been brought to its file by appeal or revision and, therefore. it can only exercise such jurisdiction as the trial court had, and in the present case the trial court could not have made any order under s.6 of the Act, as at the time it made the order the Act had not been extended to $Jurgaon District. On this assumption, the argument proceeds. the Act should not be given retrospective operation, as, if so given, it would affect the criminal liability of a person for an act committed by him before the Act came into operation. In support of this contention a numbr of decisions bearing on the question of retroactivity of a\n\n.....-\n\nRaUanLal ...\n\nstatute in the context of vested rights have been cited. Every law that takes away or impairs a vested right is retrospective.\n\nEvery ex post facto law is necessarily retrospective. Under Art. 20 of the Constitution, no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subject ed to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. But an ex post facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal law does not fall within the said prohibi\n\nlion. If a particular law makes a provision to that effect, though retrospective in operation, it will be valid. The question whether such a. law is retrospective and if so, to what extent depends upon the interpretation of a particular statute, having regard to the well settled rules of construction. \"Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes\", I Ith edition, at pp. 274-275, summarizes the relevant rule of construction thus: -\n\nStal< o/ l'llnjd\n\n\"The tendency of modern decision, upon the whole, is to narrow materially the difference between what is called a strict and a beneficial construction. All statutes are now construed with a more attentive re\n\ngard to the language, and criminal statutes with a more rational regard to the aim and intention of the legislature, than formerly. It is unquestionably right that the distinction should not be altogether erased from the judicial mind, for it is required by the spirit of our free institutions that the interpretation of all statutes should be favourable to personal liberty, and this tendency is still evinced in a certain reluctance to supply the defects of language, or to eke out the meaning of an obscure passage by strained or doubtful influences. The effect of the rule of strict construction might almost be summed up in the remark that, were an equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a reasonable doubt of its meaning which the canons of interpretation fail to solve. the benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject and against the legislature which has failed to explain itself. But it yields to the paramount rule that every statute is to be expounded according to its expressed or manifest intention and that all cases within the mischiefs aimed at are, if the language permits. to be held to fall within its remedial influence.\"\n\nLet us now proceed to consider the question raised in the present case. This is not a case where an act, which was not an offence before the Act, is made an offence under the Act; nor\n\n/JublJa llalJ, J.\n\n11~4\n\nRalta~ Lal\n\nv. ' Sim of Pttt<j<W\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nis this a case where under the Act a punishment higher than that obtaining for an offence before the Act is imposed. This is an instance where neither the ingredients of the offence nor the limits of the sentence are disturbed, but a provision is made to help the reformation of an accused through the agency of the court. Even so the statute affects an offence committed before it was extended to the area in question. It is, therefore, a post facto law and has retrospective operation. In considering the scope of such a provision we must adopt the rule of beneficial construction as enunciated by the modern trend of judicial opinion without doing violence to the provisions of the relevant section. Section 11 (3) of the Act, on the basis of which the learned counsel for the State advances most of his arguments, has no relevance to the present appeal: the said subsection applies only to a case where no appeal lies or is preferred against the order of a court declining to deal with an accused under s.3 or s.4 of the Act, and in the instant case an appeal lay to the Sessions Judge and indeed an appeal was preferred from the order of the Magistrate. The provision that directly applies to the present case is s.11 (I) of the Act, whereunder an order under the Act may be made any Court empowered to try and sentence the offender to imprisonment and also by the High Court or any other court when the case comes .before it on appeal or in revision. The sub-section ex facie does not circumscribe the jurisdiction of an appellate court to make an order under the Act only in a case where the. trial court could have made that order. The phraseology usi:a therein is wide enough to enable the appellate court or the High Court, when the case comes before it, to make such an order. It was purposely made comprehensive, as the Act was made to implement a social reform. As the Act does not change the quantum of the sentence, but only introduces a provision to reform the offender, there is no reason why the Legislature should have prohibited the exercise of such a power, even if the case was pending against the accused at one stage or other in the hierarchy of tribunals. If the provisions of s.6(1) of the Act were read along with s.11, we would reach the same result.\n\nWhen s.J 1(1) says that an appellate court or a revisional court can make an order under the Act, it means that it can make an order also under s.6(1) of the Act. If so, \"court\" in s.60) will include an appellate court as well as a revisional court. If an appellate court or a revisional court finds a person guilty, under that section it shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless the conditions laid down in that section are satisfied.\n\nCan it be said that the expression \"the court by which the person is found guilty\" does not include the appellate or revision al court? When an appellate court or a revisional court confirms a conviction made by a trial court or sets aside an acquittal made by it and convicts the accused, in either case it\n\nfinds the accused guilty, for without finding the accused guilty 1964 it cannot either confirm the conviction or set aside the order Baltan Lal of acquittal and convict him. If the contention advanced by v. learned counsel for the State, namely, that the Act will apply State 01 Punjab only to convictions made by the trial court after the Act ca!Ile S11b1K1 Bao, J. into force, be accepted, it would lead to several anomalies; it would mean that the Act would apply to a conviction made by a trial court after the Act came into force, but would not apply to an accused, though his appeal was pending after the Act came into force; it would apply to the accused if the appellate court set aside the conviction and sent back the case to the trial court for fresh disposal, but would not, if the appel\n\nlate court itself convicted him. On the other hand if the expression \"found guilty\" was given the natural meaning, it would take in the finding of guilty made by any court in a, pending criminal proceeding in the hierarchy of tribunals after the Act came into force. This view gets support from the judgment of this Court in Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar('). The facts of that case relevant to the present case were as follows: The Assistant Sessions Judge, Arrah, convicted one Basist under s.307 and s.326 of the Indian Penal Code. As the offences under the said sections were punishable with imprisonment for life, the provisions of the .Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, were not applicable to Basist and, therefore, the Assistant Sessions Judge sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 years under s.307 of the Tndian Penal Code\n\nand for 4 years rigorous imprisonment under s.326 of the said Code and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. But the High Court on appeal found Basist guilty of an offence under s. 324 of the Indian Penal Code. It was contended that the High Court could not make an order under s.6(1) of fhe Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, on the ground thats. 11 of tht> Act did not confer such a power on the High Court. Dealing with this argument, this Court observed : -\n\n\"It is however possible that the words in s.11 (I) \"pass\n\nan order under the Act\" are not to be construed so strictly and literally, but to be understood to mean \"to exercise the powers or jurisdiction conferred by the Act.\" This wide interpretation might perhaps be justified by the scope and object of this section. Section 11 is to apply \"notwithstanding anything in the Code or any other law\" to all courts empowered to sentence offenders to imprisonment. To read a beneficial provision of this universal type in a restricted sense, so as to confine the power of these courts to the exercise of the\n\n('l [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 745, 755.\n\n1lallo1o Lal ... 8'41< of Punjab\n\n8t!.l; ba Roo, J.\n\npowers under ss. 3 and 4 alone would not, in our opinion, be in accord with sound principles of statutory interpretation. We are therefore inclined to hold that the Courts mentioned in s.II be they trial courts or exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction are thereby empowered to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on Courts not only under ss. 3 and 4 and the consequential provisions but also under s.6.\"\n\nWhen it was contended that the word \"may\" in' s. I I of the Act empowers the appellate court or the High Court to exercise the power at its option and the words \"any order under the Act\" empower it to make an order without reference to the standards laid down in the Act, this Court rejected both the contentions. It held that the expression \"may\" has compulsory force and that the power conferred on the ap- pellate court was of the same nature and characteristic and subject to the same criteria and limitations as those .conferred on courts under ss. 3 and 4 of the Act. This decision lays down three propositions, namely, (i) an appellate court or a revisional court can make an order under s.6(1) of the Act in exercise of its power under s. II (I) thereof; (ii) it can make such an order for the first time even though the trial , court could not have made such an order, having regard to the finding given by it; and (iii) in making such an order it is .subject to the conditions laid down in ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the Act.\n\nThe only distinguishing feature. between the present case and the said decision is that in the present case the trial court did not make the order as the Act was not extended to the area within its jurisdiction and in the said decision the trial court did not make the order as it could not, on its finding that the accused was guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life. But what is important is that this Court held that the High Court for the first time could make such an order under s. 11 of the Act, as such a power was expressly conferred on it by s. I I of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court in appeal or the High Court in revision can, in exercise of the power conferred under s. II of the Act, make an order under s.6(1) thereof, as the appellate court and the High Court, agreeing with the Magistrate, found the accused guilty of the offences for which he was charged.\n\nThe next question is whether this Court can exercise the same power under s.11(1) of the Act. This Court in disposing of an appeal against an order of the High Court would be deciding what the High Court should have held in the revision before it. This Court's power would also be confined to the scope of the power exercisable by the High Court. This Court, therefore, can either make an order under s.6(1) of the Act or\n\ndirect the High Court to do so. But whether this Court direct- 1961 Jy makes an order under s.6(1) or directs the High Court to do Rattan Lal so, it is bound to comply with the provisions of s.6 of the Act.\n\nA court cannot impose a sentence of imprisonment on a per st .. t• 01 Punjab\n\nson under 21 years of age found guilty of having committed Subba &w, J. an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with im\n\nprisonment for life) unless it is satisfied that, having regard to .the .circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it 'would not be desirable to deal with him under s.3 or s.4 of the Act. For 1he purpose of satisfying itself in regard to the said action, under subs. (2) of s. 6 of the Act the Court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information avail.able to it relating to the character and physicd and mental condition of the offender. After considering the said material the court shall satisfy itself whether it is desirable to deal with the offender under s. 3 or s. 4 of the Act. If it is not satisfied that the offender should be.dealt with under either of the said two sections, it can pass the sentence of imprisonment on the offender after recording the reasons for doing so. It is suggested that the expression \"if any\" in sub-s. (2) of s.6 indicates that it is open to the court to call for a report or not; but the word \"shall\" makes it a mandatory \\ condition and the expression \"if any\" can in the context only cover a case where notwithstanding such requisition the Probation Officer for one reason or other, has not submitted a report.\n\nBriefty stated the calling for a report from the Probation Qffi. cer is a condition precedent for the exercise of the power under s.6(1) of the Act by the Court. We think that in the circumstances of the case the best course is to remand the matter to the High Court to make an order after complying with s. 6(1) of the Act.\n\nLastly it is contended that we should not at this very late stage of the proceeding, and especially in view of the observations of the Additional Sessions Judge in sentencing the accused, interfere with the order of the High Court. Ordinarily this Court would be reluctant to allow a party to raise a point for the first time-before it. But in this case both the Additional\n\nSessi?s Judge and the High Court ignored the mandatory prov1s1ons of the Act. n is true that the accused did not bring the provisions of the Act to the notice of the court till after the revision was disposed of. But that does not absolve the court from discharging its duty under the Act. The observa\n\ntions made by the Additional Sessions Judge in sentencing the accused were tnade de hors the provisions of the Act. From\n\ntese obseations it cannot be held that the learned Additt?nal Sessons Judge had satisfied himself of the conditio11s Ja1d down m s.6(1) of the Act. That apart, as we have pointed\n\nJlaltan Lal\n\nSW. of Pnj<lb\n\n8vbba Rao, J.\n\nDayal, J,\n\nBaghar\n\nout, he could not have legally satisfied himself of the matters mentioned in s.6(1) of the Act without complying with the conditions laid down therein. We are satisfied that, as the Act was recently extended to Gurgaon District, its existence had escaped the attention of the Additional Sessions Judge as well as of the High Court and, therefore, it is a fit case for our interference under Art. 136 of the Constitution. We set aside the order of the High Court and direct it to make an order under s.6 of the Act, or, if it so desires, to remand it to the Sessions Court for doing so. We should also make it clear that we do not intend to question the correctness of the find-· ing of the courts in regard to the guilt of the accused; indeed, the learned counsel for the appellant did not question the said finding. ·\n\n.RAGHUBAR DA~AL, J.-1 do not agree, and am of opinion that when a person has been found guilty for the first time of an offence to which the provisions of ss. 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (Act No. XX of 1958), hereinafter called the Act, could apply,.and such finding, be it of the trial Court or of the appellate Court, is arrived at before the application of the Act, .the Court of appeal or revision cannot take ac!ion under s. 11 (!) of the Act when the case comes before it in appeal or revision.\n\nJn this case, the trial Court had convicted the appellant prior to the application of the Act in that area and could not take into consideration the provisions of that Act in the passing of the sentences on convicting the appellant.\n\nThe appellant was convicted by the trial Court on May 31, 1962, prior to the application of the Act to that area .. The Act was applied on September 1, 1962, by a Government Notification, when the appellant's appeal was pending in the Court of the Sessions Judge. The appeal was dismissed on September 22, 1962. The appellant did not draw the attention of the Court to the provisions of the Act. The Court did not consider them.\n\nThe appellant went in revision to the High Court. The revision was dismissed on September 27, 1962. The High Court also did not refer to the provisidns of the Act.\n\nOn September 28. 1962 the appellant filed a petition praying that under ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the Act the petitioner be released or that he be dealt with under s. 562(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter, called the Code. That application was rejected. Neither this petition nor the order of rejection was mentioned in the petition for special lea.ve to appeal. Reference to these is found in the petition filed in the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court under Art. 134- (l)(c) of the Constitution dated October 3, 1962, printed at\n\np. 25 of the appeal record and in the grounds of appeal accom- 1964 panying it. The petition for special leave filed in this Court RaUan Lal sought leave to appeal against the order and judgement dated v.\n\nSeptember 27, 1962 in the main revision case and not against State 01 Punjab the order rejecting the petition, Criminal Miscellaneous, No. RagkWxi7Daya1, J. 793 of 1962. It was not a correct statement in paragraph 9 of the special leave petition, to the effect that the petitioner filed an applica.tion under Art. 134(l)(c) of the Constitution for grant of certificate of fitness for leave to appeal to this Court, but it was refused on October 19, 1962. The ground, as recorded. prima facie showed that such an application was for leave to appeal against the order in the Criminal Revision, No. 1172 of 1962. In these circumstances, the special leave granted is liable to be revoked. '.\n\nThe appellate Court sees that the order of the Court below on the material on record is correct or not and has to pass a correct order on that material. If the trial Court could not have taken action under the provisions of the Act which was not in force at the time it found the accused guilty, the appellate Court could not have taken action under those provisions unless the Act specifically provided for those provisions to be applicable to cases which had. been decided earlier, prior to its application. There is no such express provision in the Act and I do not find any necessary implication from the provisions of the Act in that regard.\n\nIt is true that appellate Courts have allowed parties to take advantage of a law enacted during the pendency of the case. but thi~ is done when parties can litigate further in view of the changed law and is done to save multiplicity of proceedings. Such a ground is not available in the present case.\n\nOrdinarily, it takes a few years for a case decided by a Magistrate who tries it in the first instance, and the passing of 1he final order by the High Court in revision. Ordinarily, an appeal lies to the Sessions Judge from the order of the Magistrate and a revision against the Sessions Judge's order to the High Court. The two pro'ceedings before the Sessions Judge and the High Court do take time. The Act is an all-India Act and there would be a very large number of persons convicted by trial Courts prior to the enforcement of the Act. It is too much to suppose that the legislature intended that all the orders of the Magistrates in such cases of conviction against persons under 21 years of age automatically become illegal and liable to correction by the Courts of appeal and revision. Not only would they be liable to be set aside, the setting aside of the Magistrates' orders about sentences would not have ended the matters but would have led to further proceedings to be taken by the Magistrates or the appellate Courts for the purpose of coming to a conclusion whether action can be taken .in accordance with the provisions of ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the\n\nRauanLal\n\nSlate of Punjab\n\nAct. All those numerous cases would have to be reopened and f cannot believe that the legislature would have intended such a result and would not have expressed itself very clearly if it had really intended so.\n\nR\"!P\"'bar IJr; yal. J, Section 3 of the Act empowers the Court to release certain offenders after admonition and s. 4 empowers the Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct. The Court which is to take action under these sections is the Court by which the person is found guilty of the offences in the respective sections and in circumstances specified in the respective sections. Such orders are made instead of sentencing the person found guilty to any punishment which could be awarded to him. It is clear that action under these sections can be taken by the Court which finds a person guilty of the offence for the first time. A person may be found guilty of the respective offence by the trial Court or by appellate Court if it alters his conviction for an offence which did not fall under either of those sections to one which falls under any of them, or by the High Court if it finds the accused person guilty on appeal against acquittal. It is in these circumstances that it can be said that the trial Court or the appellate Court or the High Court has found an accused guilty. A Court of revision cannot convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction and therefore no such case can arise in which a Court of revision for the first time finds an accused guilty of an offence to which the provisions of ss. 3 and 4 of the Act apply.\n\nWhen an appellate Court confirms the conviction of a person it is not the Court which finds him guilty but is the- Court which confirms the finding of the trial Court about the person being guilty on forming an opinion that the order of the trial Court is correct. If the expression 'the Court by which the person is found guilty' was to include the appellate Court confirming the conviction of a person for the offence which fell under any of the two sections, it would not have been necessary to clothe the appellate Court with a power to take action under these sections, as sub-s. (I) of s. 11 does. This subsection reads: \"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, an order under this Act may be made by any Court empowered to try and sentence the offender to irnprisonmeht and also by the High Court or any other Court when the case comes . before it on appeal or in revision.\" ·\n\nJt is clear from the language of this sub-section that the Court which is empowered to order under the Act in the first instance is the Court which is empowered to try a.nd sentence the offender to imprisonment, i.e., the original trial\n\nCourt. It is given the power to take a.ction under the Act. 1964 Orders under the Act can also be made by the High Court or Ra1tan Lal any other Court when the case comes before it on appeal or v. in revision. The question is as to in which case the High Court State 0! Punjab or any other Court, can exercise its power. It can exercis_e it Raghubar Daial, J. when the case in which the trial Court could have exercised the power comes before it. This is to be deduced from the use of the word 'also' and from the occasion when the High Court or any other Court can make such an order, it being when the ca5e comes before it on appeal or in revision. It must, therefore, be the case in which the trial Court could ta.ke a Lertain action in which the High Court or a.ny other Court could also take action only when it came before it on appeal or .in revision. I do not consider it reasonable to construe the language of sub-s. (!) to mean that the High Court or any other Court could take action in all cases of appeal or revision before it irrespective of the fact whether the trial Court could have made an order under the Act in those cases or not.\n\nThe scheme of s. 11 seems to support this view. Subsection (!) mentions the Courts which can make orders under the Act. Sub-section (2) provides an appeal where an order under s. 3 or s. 4 is made by any Court in trying an offender.\n\nThis means that when a Court trying an offender convicts him and takes action under s. 3 or s. 4, an appeal in that case will lie. Of course no question of the appellate Court taking action under s. 3 or s. 4 arises in such appeals because a, ction has already been taken by the trial Court and the appellate Court would only look to the correctness of the conviction and in case it finds action under s. 3 or s. 4 to be unjustified, may even set aside that order and pass suitable sentence as provided in sub-s'. (4). Sub-section (2) makes provision for an appeal and sub-s. (4) makes provision for the appellate Court to consider the propriety of any order made under ss. 3 or 4 of the Act. These provisions in sub-s. (2) and sub-s. (4) exhaust the cases in which orders under ss. 3 or 4 could b\"\n\nmade by the High Court or any othrr Court.\n\nWhile ss. 3 and 4 confer a discretionary power in the Court to make an order under those sections in certain drcumstances, sub-s. (l) of s. 6 makes it incumbent on the Court finding a person under 21 years of age guilty of offences\n\npunihable with imprisonment not to sentence such per.on convicted of such an offence to imprisonment unless it is satisfied, having regard to the facts mentioned in the sub-section that it would not be desirable to deal with him under s. 3 or s .. 4 and. in tat case it has to rcord its reasons for sentencing\n\nhim to 1mpnsonment. Sub-section (2) makes it incumbent on the Court to get a report from the Probation Officer and consider it in order to satisfy itself whether it would not be desir able to deal under s. 3 or s. 4. These provisions of s. 6 restrict\n\n1964 the discretion of the trial Court for taking action under s. 3\n\nRauan Lal and s. 4 in regard to persons under 21 years of age and conv. victed of all offences except offences punishable with impri- State 01 Punjab sonment for life. A Court can, however, sentence such a\n\nR\"Yh•'\"\" 11,,,101 J person to imprisonment only after considering various matters\n\n and finally satisfying itself that it would not be desirable to make an order under s. 3 or s. 4 in regard to that person.\n\nA case to which the provisions of s. 6 apply is dealt with by sub-s. (3) of s. 11 which provides that when a Court has declined to deal with the person under s. 3 or s. 4 and has passed a sentence of imprisonment and when no appeal lies or none has been preferred from that order, the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentence of the Court may, mo motu or on an application made to it by the convicted person or the Probation Officer, call for and examine the record of the case and pass such order thereon as it thinks fit. Of course, if the order is appealable, the appellate Court can consider the matter in view of the power conferred under sub-s. (!), which enables the appellate Court when the case comes before it to make any order under the Act. Action under sub-s. (3), it is clear, can be taken by the appellate Court only in cases in which the trial Court has declined to take action under s. 3 or. s. 4, that is to say, the trial Court, at the time of conviction and sentencing a person, had the power to make an order under s. 3 or s. 4 and had felt satisfied that such an order was not desirable. If it has no such power at the time and has passed a non-appealable order, or when the convicted person does not appeal, action cannot be taken under sub-s. (3) because it cannot be said with any propriety that the trial Court had declined to take action under s. 3 or s. 4. This is a strong indication of the fact that powers conferred on the High Court or any. Court of appeal or revision under s, 11 are to be exercised in the cases coming before them in which the trial Court itself could have made an order under the Act.\n\nReference may also be made to an incidental matter. An order of admonition under s. 3 puts an end of the case it being the final order against the convicted person. subject of course to the orders of the appellate Court in case the con victed person appeals against his conviction. This cannot be said with respect to an oraer under s. 4, an order which would direct that the convicted person be released on his enter ing into a bond to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding 3 years, as the Court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. The passing of the sentence provided for the offence is put off and the convicted person stands the risk of a proper sentence being passed against him in future in\n\ncertain circumstances. Section 9 provides in case of the con- 11164 vict's failure to observe the conditions of the bond that he Batta• Lal and his sureties be summoned to Conrt which may remand T. the a.ccused to custody or grant him bail and, if satisfied that Stal< 01 hnjab he had failed to observe any of the conditions of the bond, Raghha-;[,.yal, J. forthwith to sentence him for the original offence and where the failure is for the first time to impose upon him a penalty not exceeding Rs. 50 /- without prejudice to the continuance in force of the bond. In case a convicted person has not been able to observe the conditions of the bond, he, in a way. stands to suffer larger punishment than what he would have got in the first instance in case in addition to the sentence which would be passed upon him he J:iad already, for a certain period, observed the conditions of the bond and had also. in view of the provisions of s. 5. paid compensation to the victim of the offence and rosts of the proceedings which are recovered as fine. The Code does not provide for the payment of costs and provides for the payment of compensation when ordered out of the fine imposed on an accused; vide ss. 545 and 546A of the Code.\n\nThis Court considered certain provisions of the Act in Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar(') and held that the crucial date for the application of the aforesaid sections viz., ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the Act IOI the case of an accused whose conviction by the trial Coyrt of offences to which those sections do not apply, was altered by the appellate Court to an offence to which the provisions of those sections applied, would be the <late of the decision of the trial Court in view of the terms of the section on grounds of logic as well as on the theory that the order passed by an appellate Court was the correi order which the trial Court should have passed. This tends to support. the view I have expressed above. It may be mentioned that in tha.t case the trial Court could make an order under s. 4 of the Act at the time it convicted one Basist, who was then under 21 years of age, if it had convicted him of the offence to which the provisions of s. 4 applied. The High Court altered the conviction to such an offence but held that it was not competent to pass an order under s. 6 of the Act This Court held that it could. In the instant case, the trial Court could not take any a.ction in accordance with the provisions of the Act for the simple reason that the Act was not in force on the day it convicted the appellant.\n\nI am, therefore of opinion that the point f()r determination before us. that is, whether the appellate Court can make an order under the Act in cases in which the trial Court on the date of conviction could not ha.ve made an order under the Act did not arise for decision in that case. This question\n\n('} [1963) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 745.\n\n1964 is very different from the question whether an appellate Court can make an order under the Act when it alters the convic- Ra~~ Lal tion of an appellant to an offence with respect to which an Slak of Punjub order under the Act could have been made by the trial Court\n\n.Raghvb-;;_;-Dayal, J. as arose in Ramii's Case(').\n\nI am therefore of opinion that the High Court could not have made an order under the Act in this case and that therefore this appeal should fail. I would accordingly dismiss it.\n\nORDER\n\nIn accordance with the opinion of the majority, we set aside the order of the High Court and direct it to make an order under s. 6 of the Probation of: Offenders Act, 1958, or, if it so desires, to remand it to the Sessions Court for doing so.\n\nAppeal allowed .\n\n(') [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 745.", "total_entities": 203, "entities": [{"text": "RATTAN LAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K.C. 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"label": "COURT", "start_char": 901, "end_char": 935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal of the appellant was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon by his order dated September 22, 1962."}}, {"text": "September 22, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 955, "end_char": 973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal of the appellant was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon by his order dated September 22, 1962."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1037, "end_char": 1055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His revision petition was also dismissed by the High Court on September 27, 1962."}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1162, "end_char": 1194, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1377, "end_char": 1382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No ground was taken either before the Additional Sessions Judge or High Court that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "No ground was taken either before the Additional Sessions Judge or High Court that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1416, "end_char": 1424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No ground was taken either before the Additional Sessions Judge or High Court that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "No ground was taken either before the Additional Sessions Judge or High Court that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1680, "end_char": 1685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No ground was taken either before the Additional Sessions Judge or High Court that the provisions of the 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Subba Rao and Das Gupta, JJ.):"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2006, "end_char": 2010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No ground was taken either before the Additional Sessions Judge or High Court that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "No ground was taken either before the Additional Sessions Judge or High Court that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2654, "end_char": 2659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2692, "end_char": 2699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3711, "end_char": 3722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3751, "end_char": 3759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4685, "end_char": 4692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4755, "end_char": 4769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Raghubar Dayal, J. (dissenting}---When a person has been found guilty for the first time of an offence to which the provisions of ss.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ"}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4885, "end_char": 4896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4904, "end_char": 4936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5126, "end_char": 5131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5788, "end_char": 5799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Chand, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5821, "end_char": 5832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh, R.N. Sachthey and R.H. D/rebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R.N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5834, "end_char": 5847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh, R.N. Sachthey and R.H. D/rebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R.H. D", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5852, "end_char": 5858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh, R.N. Sachthey and R.H. D/rebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rattan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6029, "end_char": 6039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rattan Lal .,,", "canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL"}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6109, "end_char": 6118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Pv•jab\n\nRattan Lal v.\n\nState of Punjab\n\nSubb<• Rao, J.\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This a(>peal by special leave raises the question of jurisdiction of an appellate court to exercise its power under s.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6239, "end_char": 6242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6250, "end_char": 6276, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Palwal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6492, "end_char": 6498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a resident of Palwal in Gurgaon District, committed house trespass and tried to outrage the modesty of a girl aged 7 years."}}, {"text": "Gurgaon District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6502, "end_char": 6518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, a resident of Palwal in Gurgaon District, committed house trespass and tried to outrage the modesty of a girl aged 7 years."}}, {"text": "Magistrate, First Class. Palwal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6638, "end_char": 6669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was sent up for trial before the Magistrate, First Class."}}, {"text": "May 31, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6695, "end_char": 6707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on May 31, 1962, convicted him under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 451 and 354", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6729, "end_char": 6744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6752, "end_char": 6769, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 451", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6961, "end_char": 6967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6975, "end_char": 6992, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September I. 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7204, "end_char": 7221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act was extended to Gurgaon District on September I. 1962 and, therefore, at the time the appellant was convicted by the Magistrate, the Magistrate had no power or duty to make any order under the Act."}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge. Gurgaon", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7444, "end_char": 7478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentences to the Additional Sessions Judge."}}, {"text": "Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7548, "end_char": 7632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8041, "end_char": 8044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act", "statute": "Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act"}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8248, "end_char": 8252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act", "statute": "Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8289, "end_char": 8297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act", "statute": "Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8604, "end_char": 8615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act", "statute": "Though by the time the Additional Sessions Judge disposed of the appeal the said Act"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8792, "end_char": 8797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hauan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9111, "end_char": 9120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellant contends that, having 1964 regard to the admitted facts 'in the case, the High Court should Hauan Lal have acted under s.11 of the Act and released the appellant on v. probation of good conduct instead of sending him to prison.", "canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL"}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9138, "end_char": 9142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9534, "end_char": 9538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9554, "end_char": 9557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10965, "end_char": 10976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11072, "end_char": 11081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11531, "end_char": 11540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11544, "end_char": 11553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raltan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11670, "end_char": 11680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raltan Lal ...\n\nBlot• of Punjab\n\n8ubba Rao, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1964]\n\n(2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under section 3 or section 4 with an offender referred to in sub-section (I) the Court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender.", "canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL"}}, {"text": "8ubba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11703, "end_char": 11712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raltan Lal ...\n\nBlot• of Punjab\n\n8ubba Rao, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1964]\n\n(2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under section 3 or section 4 with an offender referred to in sub-section (I) the Court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11837, "end_char": 11846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11850, "end_char": 11859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12488, "end_char": 12497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12501, "end_char": 12510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12869, "end_char": 12878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12882, "end_char": 12891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13438, "end_char": 13442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13505, "end_char": 13508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13578, "end_char": 13585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13835, "end_char": 13838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jurgaon District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13918, "end_char": 13934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it can only exercise such jurisdiction as the trial court had, and in the present case the trial court could not have made any order under s.6 of the Act, as at the time it made the order the Act had not been extended to $Jurgaon District."}}, {"text": "RaUanLal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14270, "end_char": 14278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this contention a numbr of decisions bearing on the question of retroactivity of a\n\n.....-\n\nRaUanLal ...\n\nstatute in the context of vested rights have been cited.", "canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL"}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14472, "end_char": 14479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "/JublJa llalJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16909, "end_char": 16922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is not a case where an act, which was not an offence before the Act, is made an offence under the Act; nor\n\n/JublJa llalJ, J.\n\n11~4\n\nRalta~ Lal\n\nv. ' Sim of Pttt<j<W\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nis this a case where under the Act a punishment higher than that obtaining for an offence before the Act is imposed."}}, {"text": "Ralta~ Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16934, "end_char": 16944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is not a case where an act, which was not an offence before the Act, is made an offence under the Act; nor\n\n/JublJa llalJ, J.\n\n11~4\n\nRalta~ Lal\n\nv. ' Sim of Pttt<j<W\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nis this a case where under the Act a punishment higher than that obtaining for an offence before the Act is imposed.", "canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17686, "end_char": 17696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17990, "end_char": 17993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17997, "end_char": 18000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18201, "end_char": 18205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19185, "end_char": 19191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19224, "end_char": 19228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19407, "end_char": 19413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19444, "end_char": 19448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baltan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20147, "end_char": 20157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When an appellate court or a revisional court confirms a conviction made by a trial court or sets aside an acquittal made by it and convicts the accused, in either case it\n\nfinds the accused guilty, for without finding the accused guilty 1964 it cannot either confirm the conviction or set aside the order Baltan Lal of acquittal and convict him.", "canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20365, "end_char": 20368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20373, "end_char": 20376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the contention advanced by v. learned counsel for the State, namely, that the Act will apply State 01 Punjab only to convictions made by the trial court after the Act ca!Ile S11b1K1 Bao, J. into force, be accepted, it would lead to several anomalies; it would mean that the Act would apply to a conviction made by a trial court after the Act came into force, but would not apply to an accused, though his appeal was pending after the Act came into force; it would apply to the accused if the appellate court set aside the conviction and sent back the case to the trial court for fresh disposal, but would not, if the appel\n\nlate court itself convicted him."}}, {"text": "Assistant Sessions Judge, Arrah", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21248, "end_char": 21279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of that case relevant to the present case were as follows: The Assistant Sessions Judge, Arrah, convicted one Basist under s.307 and s.326 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Basist", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21295, "end_char": 21301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of that case relevant to the present case were as follows: The Assistant Sessions Judge, Arrah, convicted one Basist under s.307 and s.326 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "s.307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21308, "end_char": 21313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21318, "end_char": 21323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21331, "end_char": 21348, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21457, "end_char": 21489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21631, "end_char": 21636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21651, "end_char": 21661, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21707, "end_char": 21712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21846, "end_char": 21852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21860, "end_char": 21877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21946, "end_char": 21952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21960, "end_char": 21992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22172, "end_char": 22176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22448, "end_char": 22458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Roo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22815, "end_char": 22818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1lallo1o Lal ... 8'41< of Punjab\n\n8t!.l; ba Roo, J.\n\npowers under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22837, "end_char": 22848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23172, "end_char": 23183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23232, "end_char": 23235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23789, "end_char": 23800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23934, "end_char": 23940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24239, "end_char": 24253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24771, "end_char": 24776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25026, "end_char": 25032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25257, "end_char": 25264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25584, "end_char": 25590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25698, "end_char": 25704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rattan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25737, "end_char": 25747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But whether this Court direct- 1961 Jy makes an order under s.6(1) or directs the High Court to do Rattan Lal so, it is bound to comply with the provisions of s.6 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL"}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25797, "end_char": 25800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25951, "end_char": 25956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A court cannot impose a sentence of imprisonment on a per st .. t• 01 Punjab\n\nson under 21 years of age found guilty of having committed Subba &w, J. an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with im\n\nprisonment for life) unless it is satisfied that, having regard to .the .circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it 'would not be desirable to deal with him under s.3 or s.4 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26242, "end_char": 26245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26249, "end_char": 26252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26351, "end_char": 26355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26703, "end_char": 26707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26711, "end_char": 26715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26990, "end_char": 26993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Briefty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27296, "end_char": 27303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Briefty stated the calling for a report from the Probation Qffi."}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27426, "end_char": 27432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27601, "end_char": 27608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28551, "end_char": 28557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jlaltan Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28602, "end_char": 28613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That apart, as we have pointed\n\nJlaltan Lal\n\nSW."}}, {"text": "8vbba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28630, "end_char": 28639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Pnj<lb\n\n8vbba Rao, J.\n\nDayal, J,\n\nBaghar\n\nout, he could not have legally satisfied himself of the matters mentioned in s.6(1) of the Act without complying with the conditions laid down therein.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28645, "end_char": 28650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Pnj<lb\n\n8vbba Rao, J.\n\nDayal, J,\n\nBaghar\n\nout, he could not have legally satisfied himself of the matters mentioned in s.6(1) of the Act without complying with the conditions laid down therein."}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28741, "end_char": 28747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29055, "end_char": 29063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29163, "end_char": 29166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".RAGHUBAR DA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29484, "end_char": 29496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".RAGHUBAR DA~AL, J.-1 do not agree, and am of opinion that when a person has been found guilty for the first time of an offence to which the provisions of ss.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ"}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29639, "end_char": 29650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29658, "end_char": 29690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29931, "end_char": 29936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958", "statute": "the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "September 28. 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30838, "end_char": 30856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 28."}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30907, "end_char": 30921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court had convicted the appellant prior to the application of the Act in that area and could not take into consideration the provisions of that Act", "statute": "Court had convicted the appellant prior to the application of the Act in that area and could not take into consideration the provisions of that Act"}}, {"text": "s. 562(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30991, "end_char": 31000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court had convicted the appellant prior to the application of the Act in that area and could not take into consideration the provisions of that Act", "statute": "Court had convicted the appellant prior to the application of the Act in that area and could not take into consideration the provisions of that Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31008, "end_char": 31034, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31314, "end_char": 31322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RaUan Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31517, "end_char": 31526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition for special leave filed in this Court RaUan Lal sought leave to appeal against the order and judgement dated v.\n\nSeptember 27, 1962 in the main revision case and not against State 01 Punjab the order rejecting the petition, Criminal Miscellaneous, No.", "canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL"}}, {"text": "State 01 Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31653, "end_char": 31668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition for special leave filed in this Court RaUan Lal sought leave to appeal against the order and judgement dated v.\n\nSeptember 27, 1962 in the main revision case and not against State 01 Punjab the order rejecting the petition, Criminal Miscellaneous, No."}}, {"text": "Art. 134(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31901, "end_char": 31915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 19, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32029, "end_char": 32045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134(l)(c) of the Constitution for grant of certificate of fitness for leave to appeal to this Court, but it was refused on October 19, 1962."}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34372, "end_char": 34386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34657, "end_char": 34666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34747, "end_char": 34751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35978, "end_char": 35989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36601, "end_char": 36606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ra1tan Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37281, "end_char": 37291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 Orders under the Act can also be made by the High Court or Ra1tan Lal any other Court when the case comes before it on appeal or v. in revision.", "canonical_name": "RATTAN LAL"}}, {"text": "High Court State 0! Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37407, "end_char": 37433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question is as to in which case the High Court State 0!"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Daial", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37498, "end_char": 37512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It can exercis_e it Raghubar Daial, J. when the case in which the trial Court could have exercised the power comes before it.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38323, "end_char": 38328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38485, "end_char": 38489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38493, "end_char": 38497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38627, "end_char": 38631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38635, "end_char": 38639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38739, "end_char": 38743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38747, "end_char": 38751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38945, "end_char": 38949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38953, "end_char": 38957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39213, "end_char": 39218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39322, "end_char": 39327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39393, "end_char": 39404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39524, "end_char": 39528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39855, "end_char": 39859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40134, "end_char": 40138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40142, "end_char": 40146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40168, "end_char": 40172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40246, "end_char": 40250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40266, "end_char": 40270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40627, "end_char": 40631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40635, "end_char": 40639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40701, "end_char": 40705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40743, "end_char": 40748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40825, "end_char": 40829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40833, "end_char": 40837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41582, "end_char": 41586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41591, "end_char": 41595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41718, "end_char": 41722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41726, "end_char": 41730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42053, "end_char": 42057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42061, "end_char": 42065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42401, "end_char": 42405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42653, "end_char": 42657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43121, "end_char": 43130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44031, "end_char": 44035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 545 and 546A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44295, "end_char": 44311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44498, "end_char": 44512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45116, "end_char": 45120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45271, "end_char": 45275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45400, "end_char": 45404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lal tion of an appellant to an offence with respect to which an Slak of Punjub order under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46113, "end_char": 46211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46288, "end_char": 46293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 is very different from the question whether an appellate Court can make an order under the Act when it alters the convic- Ra~~ Lal tion of an appellant to an offence with respect to which an Slak of Punjub order under the Act could have been made by the trial Court\n\n.Raghvb-;;_;-Dayal, J. as arose in Ramii's Case(')."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46618, "end_char": 46622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lal tion of an appellant to an offence with respect to which an Slak of Punjub order under the Act", "statute": "Lal tion of an appellant to an offence with respect to which an Slak of Punjub order under the Act"}}, {"text": "Offenders Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46644, "end_char": 46663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_693_705_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "78.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 693\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA v.\n\nMALAYALAM PLANTATION LTD.\n\nJK. SUBBA RAo, J. c. SHAH AND s. M. Snrn, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax-Assessee treated as agent-Estate duty of non-resident paid bu assessee-If an allowable deduction-Expression \"for the purpose of the bushess\"-Meaning of- Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 10(2)(xv}-Estate Duty Act, 1953 (34 of 1953),, s. 34. ·\n\nFor the two accounting periods the assessee, a residenf company, incorporated outside India paid estate duty payable on the death of its certain share holders not domiciled in India and debited the said amounts to r€irenue in its accounts in ascertaining the profits and gains of its business for the said years. The Income-tax Officer included the said amounts so paid towards estate d'uty in the profits and gains of the company for the said two accounting periods and assessed the company to income-tax for 1955-56 and 1956-57 on that basis.\n\nThe appeals by the assessee to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were dismissed but on further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the said orders and held that the assessee was entitled to deduct the said amount in computing its profits. On an application by the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Tribunal stated a case under s. 66(1) of the Act to the High Court and referred the following question of law for its opinion: ''Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the estate duty paid by the company under s. 84 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, is a revenue expenditure deductible in computing the assessee's business income for the assessment years in question.\" The High Court agreed with the view of the Tribunal and answered the question in the affirmative. On appeal by special leave it was urged on behalf of the appellants, (i) that the sum paid by the assessee under s. 84 of the Estate Duty Act wete not expenditure of the assessee company and therefore, they could not be deducted from its profits in computing its assessable income under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act; and (2) that even ii it was revenue expenditure, It was not laid out or expended wholly or exclusiwly for the purpose of the assessee's business within the meaning of the said sub-clause.\n\nHeld: (i) There was nothing on the record to show whether in England, where the concerned share holders died th<! resident company could recover the amount representing the estate duty paid by it in India from the legal representative of the deceased share holders. Therefore, the assessee who, as a statutory agent paid to the State the estate duty, could not recover the same from the legal representative of the deceased non-resident share holders. In that situation the company would be out of pocket to the extent it paid the estate duty of tire said persons. Therefore, it cannot be held that the amounts paid by the assessee towards estate duty were wot' expenditur_e incurred by it, but only amounts paid by it on account with a right to recover the same from the persons on whose behalf it paid.\n\n(ii) The expression \"for the purpose of the business\" in s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act is wider in scope than the expression \"for the purpose of earning profits\". Its range is wide: it may\n\n191J4\n\n.April ID\n\nOommiuiomr of lftCOmt'-lax, Kuala\n\nMaiaydam Planlalion J, i, J,.\n\nBubba Bao, J.\n\ntake in not only the day to day running of a business but also the rationalization of its administration and modernization of its machinery; it may include measures for the preservation of the business and for the protection of its assets and property from expropriation, coercive process or assertion of hostile title; it may also comprehend payment of statutory dues and taxes imposed as a pre-condition to commence or for carrying on of a business; it may comprehend many other acts incidental to the carrying on of a business. However wide the meaning of the expression may be, its limits are implicit in it. The purpose shall be for the purpose of the business, that is to say, the expenditure incurred shall be for carrying on the business and the assessee shall incur it in his capacity as a person carrying on the bu9iness. It cannot include sums spent by the assessee as agent of a third party, whether the origin of the agency is voluntary or statutory; in that event, he pays the amount on behalf of another and for a purpose unconnected with the business.\n\nIn the present case, the amounts in question were paid by the assessee as a statutory agent to discharge a statutory duty unconnected with the business, though the occasion for the imposition arose because of the territorial nexus afforded by the accident of its doing business in India. Therefore, it must be held that the estate duty paid by the respondent was not an allowable deduction under s. 10(2) (xv) of the Act.\n\nCase law reviewed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 384 and 385 of 1963. Appeals by special Jeave from the judgment and Decree dated January 19, 1961, of tbe Kerala High Court in Income-tax Referred case No. 20 of 1959.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant Bishan Narain, G. 8. Pai. T. A. Ramachandran, ]. B.\n\nDadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents.\n\nApril 10, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-These two appeals by special leave raise the question whether the estate duty paid by the resident Company, hereinafter called tbe assessee. incorporated outside India, on behalf of members not domiciled in India is deductible from its profiis in computing its assessable income under s. 10(2)(xv) of tbe Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called tbe Act\n\nThe material facts are not in dispute and they may be briefly stated. The assessee is a resident Company icorpo rated outside India. Most of its shareholders are m the United Kingdom. During the accounting period ending March 31, 1955, it paid £ 1,302-94 and £ 1,303 towards estate duty which was payable on tbe death of certain shar~\n\nholders who were not domiciled in India. The assessee debited tbe said amounts to revenue in its accounts in ascertain-\n\n7 S.C.R. 'suPREME COURT REPORTS 695\n\n1964 ing the profits and gains of its business for the said year.\n\nSimilarly, for the accounting year ending March 31, 1956, it paid a sum of .£ 3.809-1-5 towards estate duty payable on the death of certain shareholders and debited the said amount to revenue in its accounts in ascertaining the profits and gains of its business for that year. The Income-tax Officer included the said amounts so paid towards estate duty in the profits and gains of the company for the said two accounting periods and assessed the company to income-tax for 1955-56 and 1956-57 on that basis. The appeals preferred by the assessee to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were dismissed. On further appeal to the Appellate Tribunal it held that the assessee was entitled to deduct the said amount in computing its profits; and on that finding it set aside the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nOn an application made by the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Appellate Tribunal stated a case under s. 66(i) of the Act to the Kerala High Court, and referred the following question of law for its opinion:\n\nOommiBaioner of lncomt-tax, Kerala\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the estate duty paid by the Company under Section 84 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, is a revenue expenditure deductible in computing the assessee's business income for the assessment years in question?\"\n\nThe High Court agreed with the view expressed by the Appellate Tribunal and answered the question referred to it in the affirmative. The present appeals by special leave have been filed against the said order of the High Court.\n\nMr. Ra jagopala Sastri, learned counsel for the Commissioner of Income-tax, raised before us the following two points; (!) The sums paid by the assessee under s. 84 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, are not expenditure of the assessee- Company and, therefore, they cannot be deducted from its. profits in computing its assessable income under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act; and (2) even if it is revenue expenditure, it is not laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purpose of the assessee's business within the meaning of the said sub-clause.\n\nMr. Bishan Narain, learned counsel for the respondent, supported the judgment of the High Court and contended that the said estate duty was revenue expenditure incurred by the assessee as it. was put out of pocket to that extent and that it had not 'been proved that the assessee could legally recover the said amounts from the legal representatives of the deceased shareholders. He further argued that\n\nMalayalam Plantation Ltd.\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\n1P64 the said expenditure was wholly and exclusively for the pur- OommiMi<>mr of pose of the assessee's business within the meaning of Incomtlaz, Kerala s. I 0(2)(xv) of the Act inasmuch as it discharged its statu-\n\nM.Z:; ai.m tory obligation in order to preserve the assets of the com- Plantalitm Lid. pany.\n\nSubba Roo, J. The question raised turns upon the provis.ions of s. 10(2}\n\n(xv) of the Act. It reads: Section IO. Business-The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation\" in respect of the profits and gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him.\n\n(2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after making the following allowances, namely: - • * * * •\n\n(xv) any expenditure (not being an allowance of the nature described in any of the clauses (i) to (xiv) inclusively, and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee) laid out or expended wholly or exclusively for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation.\" The first facet of the argument turns upon the question whether the estate duty paid by the assessee is an expenditure incurred by it within the meaning of the said provision.\n\nUnder s. S of the Estate Duty Act the property of every person dying after the commencement of the said Act shall be liable to a duty called \"estate duty\" at the rates fixed in accordance with s. 35 thereof. Under s. 2'1 of the said Act there shall not be included in the property passing on the death of the deceased, inter alia, movable property situated outside the territories to which the said Act extends at the time of the death of the person. Under s. 53 of the said Act, where any property passes on the death of the deceased,\n\nvery legal representative to whom such property so passes for any. beneficial interest in possession or in whom any interest in the property so passing is at any time vested and others mentioned in the section shall be accountable for the whole of the estate duty on the property passing on the death. Section 84 thereof is aimed to reach the property of a member of a company dying outside India: the section before amendment read: Section 84. Company to furnish particulars of deceased members to the Controller- .\n\n(i) Where a company incorporated outside India carried on business in the territories to which this Act extends and has been. treated for the -\n\npurposes of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 1964 (XI of 1922), as resident for two out of three Oommls.ioner of completed assessments immediately preceding, Int.ometall:, K•rala such company shall, within three months of the\n\nM.;:· receipt of intimation of the death of a member P1an1a1r.:L:a. dying after the commencement of this Act, furnish to the Controller such particulars as may Subba Rao, 1• be prescribed in respect of the shares of the deceased member in the company, and shall be liable to pay estate duty at the rates mentioned in Part III of the Second Schedule, on the princi pal value of the shares held by the deceased in the company except in cases where the deceased member was a person domiciled in India and the person accountable has obtained a certificate from the Controller showing that either the estate duty in respect thereof has been paid or will be paid or that none is due, as the case may be.\"\n\nUnder this section in the circumstances mentioned therein ; a company is liable to pay estate duty in respect of the shares of the deceased member of the company on the princi pal value of the share held by the deceased in the company: under this section a statutory obligation is imposed on the company to pay the estate duty on the shares of a deceased non-resident member. If such a member of the company had died in India, subject to the conditions mentioned in the section, the company would not be liable to pay the estate duty payable on the shares held by the deceased. In substance the. company is made a statutory agent to pay the said duty payable in respect of property belonging to another. Section 77 of the Estate Duty Act enables a person authorised or required to pay estate duty in respect of any property to transfer the said property for the purpose of paying the duty. This section cannot .have extra-territorial operation. Prima facie the company cannot transfer tlie shares or the property of a person domiciled in a country , outside India. Nor sub-s. (2) of s. 77, which says that a person having an interest in any property, who pays the estate duty in respect of that property, shall be entitled to the like charge, as the estate duty in respect of that property had been (aised by means of a mortgage to him, has application, for it -cannot be said that the company has any legal interest in the shares owned by a third party. That apart, the said sub-section also cannot have extra-territorial operation. Nothing has been placed before us to enable us to come to the conclusion whether in England, where the concerned shareholders died, the resident company could re- <:over the amount representing the estate duty paid by it in\n\n1964 India from the legal representatives of the deceased share- Commissioner of holders. We, therefore, assume that the assessee who, as a Income-tax, Kera/a statutory agent pays to the State the estate duty, cannot re-\n\n,, 1 v. 1 cover the same from the legal representatives of the deceased ~• ayn am \"d h h Id I h · h Plantation Ltd. non-rest ent s are o ers. n t at s1tuat10n t e company would be out of pocket to the extent it paid the estate duty Subba Rao, J. of the said persons. We cannot, therefore. accede to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the amounts paid by the assessee towards estate duty were not expenditure incurred by it, but only amounts paid by it on aocount with a right to recover the same from the persons. on whose behalf it paid.\n\nThe next question is whether the said expenditure was. expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee within the meaning of s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. The crucial words of the section relevant to the present enquiry are \"for the purpose of such business.\" Subsection (2) cl. (xv) is a residuary clause which provides for allowing the items of business expenditure not covered by the other clauses of sub-s. (2) of s. 10 of the Act. Before the Amending Act of 1939, the language of the predecessor of this clause read thus:\n\n\"not being in the nature of capital gains incurred solely, for the purpose of earnmg such profits or gains.\" The Amending Act of 1939 substituted the present clause and made it more comprehensive by using the expression \"for the purpose of such business\". Some of the decisions cited at the Bar, both English and Indian, throw some light on the construction of the said expression and we would, therfeore, briefly notice them.\n\nThe House of Lords in Strong and Company of Rom sey, Limited v. Woodifield(') construed a corresponding provision in the Income-tax Act of the United Kingdom, the relevant part whereof read : \"money wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of such concern.\" There, a brewing company, which also owned licensed houses in which it carried on the business of innkeepers. incurred damages and costs to the amount of £ 1,490 on account of injuries caused to a visitor staying at one of its houses by faiiing in of a chimney. The House of Lords held that the damages and costs were not allowable as a deduction in computing the company's profits for income-tax purposes. The learned Lord Chancellor said :\n\n\"They cannot be deducted if they are mainly incidental to some other vocation, or fall on the\n\n(') (1906) 5 T.C. 215, 219, 220.\n\ntrader in some character other than that of a trader.\"\n\nLord Davey, whose dictum was the basis for some of the subsequent decisions in that country, referring to the expression \"for the purpose of trade\" observed as follows:\n\n\"It is not enough that the disbursement is made in the course of, or arises out of, or is connected with, the trade or is made out of the profit• of the trade. It must be made for the purpose of earning the profits.\"\n\nLord Davey's definition appears to be much narrower than that of the Lord Chancellor, for the former restricts the expression to mean that the expenditure should have .been made only for the purpose of earning profits. Finlay, J., in Allen v. Farquharson Brothers Limited('), noticed that the qualifictaion \"for the purpose of earning profits\" was a slight expansion of the words of the statute, though he expressed the view that it brought out the real import of the relevant section. In Rowntree and Company, Ltd. v. Curtis (ff.M. Inspector of Taxes)('). in disallowing the deduction claimed by a company of a sum set aside for the relief of the invalid employees, Rowlatt. J ., applied the test whether the said expenditure incurred by the company was for the purpose of earning profits. In Cooke v. Quick Shoe Repair Service('), the court allowed a deduction in respect of sums paid by the respondent-firm in discharging the liabilities of the business outstanding at the date of the said respondent purchased the business from a third party on the ground that the said expenditure, having been incurred for the . purpose of preserving the goodwill and for ensuring the ccntinuity of supply of raw-material and labour, was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of its business. After referring to earlier decisions, Croom-Johnson, J., made the following observation:\n\n\"Here is a payment made in the circumstances of this case in order to ensure a supply of leather for the business, a payment made in order to ensure '.I cotinuace of labour willing to be employed m this business, and payment for rent in order to ensure that the landlord's consent to assignment of the premises, of the premises in which the business was carried on. should not be refused. I find it quite impossible to say that there is no evidence to justify those findings.\"\n\n(') 17 T.C. 59. 65.\n\n(') (1924) 8 T.C. 678.\n\n(') (1949) 30 T.C. 460, 466.\n\nCom, miasioner of lncome.tax, Kertzla\n\nMalayalam Plantatwn IMJ.\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\n1964 Here it will be noticed that the learned Judge went beyond aommis.Joner of the limited scope given by Lord Davey to the expression in Income-tax, Kerola the statute and did not confine it to the amounts spent only\n\nMai:· la for earning profits, but to expenditure incurred in connec- Plantatl'::. I::d. tion with the business. where a company incurred an expenditure in defending its title to property, it was held in Bub/Ja Rao, J. Southern (11.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd.(') that the said amount was spent wholly and exclu-- sively for the purpose of the company's trade and was, therefore, an allowable deduction for the purpose of computing the profits of the company for income-tax purposes.\n\nThis decision gives a more liberal meaning to the expression \"for the purpose of the trade\" than that given by Lord Davey. \"Purpose\" of the trade includes the purpose to pro-· tect the assets of the company carrying on the trade. The House of Lords resurveyed the legal position in Morgan ·\n\n(Inspector of Taxes) v. Tate and Lyle Ltd.(') in the context of the questions whether the expenditure incurred by a company engaged in sugar refining in a propaganda campaign to oppose the threatened nationalization of the industry was. an admissible deduction. Lord Morton, after referring to the relevant case-law and to Lord Davey's formula, made the following observations:\n\n\" ......... this seems to me to be an assumption wholly\n\nunwarranted by the evidence. There is no evi- dence that a transfer of the assets to a national body or authority would not destroy or adversely affect the company's business ................ It is clear on the authorities that Lord Davey's formula includes expenditure for the purpose of\n\npreventing a person from being disabled from carrying on and earning profits in the trade.\"\n\nLord Reid laid down the relevant test thus:\n\n\"A general test is whether the money was spent by the person assessed in his capacity of trader or in some other capacity-whether on the one hand the expenditure was really incidental to the trade itself or on the other hand it was mainly incidental to some other vocation or was made by the trader in some other capacity than that of trader.\"\n\nThis decision also restated the two tests, namely, (i) that the expenditure should be for carrying on the business to• earn profits in the trade, and (ii) that the expenditure shall' be inurred by the assessee in his capacity of a: person\n\n(') (1942) 10 I.T.R. (Suppl.) 1, 8.\n\n(') (1954) 26 I.T.R. 195, 205, 206, 219.\n\ncarrying on the business. Lord Greene, M.R., in Rushden 1964 Heel Co., Ltd. v. Keene(') reaffirmed the second test in the Commi., ionero/ following words: Income-tax, Kerala.\n\nv. \"I find, however, in Strong and Company's case(') pf!::r::!:~1.1. what appears to me to be a clear answer to the present appeal. It is, I think, a matter not of Subba Bao, J. dictum but of decision in that case that an expense is not deductible if it falls on a trader in some character other than that of a trader. This was the ground of the opinion of Lord Loreburn, L.C., with which Lords Macnaghten and Atkinson agreed. Their Lordships held that the expense there in question fell upon the appellants in their character not of traders but of householders.\"\n\nIn Smith v. Lion Brewery Co., Ltd.('), the question was whether a brewery company, which was owner and lessee of a number of licensed premises where business was carried on on the tide-house basis, was entitled to deduct for the purposes of income tax its liability in respect of compensation fund charges under the Licensing Act, 1904.\n\nIt was contended by the -Crown that the liability to which the Company became subject was in its capacity as landlord of the property and not as trader carrying on the trade of brewer. When the case ultimately came up before the House of Lords, the House was equally divided. The view of two of the members who agreed with the view of the Court of Appeal prevailed. The basis of the judgment was that the liability was wholly and exclusively related to the carrying on of the company's business, because on the facts of that case the company had assumed the position of landlonl for the purpose of its trade. If the finding was that the company paid the tax in its capacity as landlord as opined by the learned Lords who dissented, the result would have been the other way. In Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. v. Taylor-\n\nGooby <H.M. lnspectc, r of Taxes)('), Buckley, J., covered\n\nth~ entire ground over again in the context of a question whether the appellant-company therein which was incorporated ad resident in the United Kingdom and carrying on the busmess of a large general stores in Buenos Aires, having paid in Argentina a tax known as the \"substitute tax\" to which it was liable, could claim deduction under the Income-tax Act, 1952 (15 and 16 Geo. VI and I Eliz. II, c. 10, s. 137(a)). The learned Judge held on the facts of that case-\n\n(') (1947) 30 T.C. 298, 316.\n\n(') 11905) 5 T.C. 215. ('l (1910) 5 T.C. 568. (') Appeal No. 2048 (Ch. D.) decided on 25th March, 1963- (unreported).\n\n1964 that incurring liability for that tax was a pre-condition of\n\nCommiBBiontr of the Company's earning profits in the Argentina, for without fncome-tax, Kera'a incurring liability for that tax the Company could not carry\n\nJI ,:· 1 _ on business in the Argentina at all. On that finding the\n\nPln~., fo~ °L7a. learned Judge came to conclusion that it was a liability which the Company had undertaken for the purpose of its Subba Rao, J. trade, and was, therefore, a payment made wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the company's trade. It will be seen that in that case the tax was paid by the Company in its capacity as company doing business and unless that tax was paid the company could not carry on its business. The two tests laid down are satisfied.\n\nPausing here, we shall briefly recapitulate the legal position in England. The relevant wordings of section with which the English Judges were concerned are, in effect, similar to the terms of s. 10(2J(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nThe test laid down by Lord Davey in Strong and Company of Ramsey, Ltd. v. Woodifie/d('), namely, the disbursement\n\nmust be made for the purpose of earning profits, has been accepted and followed throughout, though the content. of that test has been expanded to meet diverse situations.\n\nBroadly, the English courts applied two tests to ascertain whether a deduction was permissible or not, namely, (i) whether the expenditure was incurred for th~ purpose of carrying on of the business and for removing obstacles and impediments in the conduct of the business, and (ii) whether the assessee paid the amount in his capacity as businessman or in his personal capacity.\n\nNow coming to the Indian decisions, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Tata Sons Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncome-ta:r:, Bombay(') held that the share of bonus voluntarily paid by a company, which held the managing agency of another company, to some of the officers of the managed company was a permissible deduction under s. I 0(2)(xv) of the Act. The reason for the conclusion is stated thus:\n\n\"But having considered the whole case and the question submitted to us I am satisfied that looking purely at it from the point of view of commercial prinoiples what the assessee company has done is something which had as its object increasing the profits of the Tata Iron and Steel Co. and thereby increasing its own share of the commission.\"\n\n(') (1906) 5 T.C. 215.\n\n(') (1950) 18 I.T.R. 460, 472.\n\nIn Badridas Daga v. Commissioner of Income-tax('), where 1964 the agent of the assessee misappropriated his money and the Oommi,.ioner of assessee claimed the part of the amount misappropriated Income-tax. Kerala and not recovered from the agent as a deduction under Mal:; aiam s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act for the purpose of income-tax, this Plantation Ltd. Court held that it was not allowable under 8. 10(2)(xi) or Subba Rao, J .. s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., observed:\n\n\"The result is that when a claim is made for a deduction for which there is no specific provision in section 10(2), whether it is admissible or not will depend, on whether having regard to accepted commercial practice and trading principles, it can be said to arise out of the carrying on of the business and to be incidental to it.\"\n\nThis decision, though not direct in point, lays down the principle that an expenditure can be deducted only if it arises out of the carrying on of the business and is incidental to it. In Indian Molasses Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, W.B.('), this Court held that s. 10(2) (xv) of the Act enacted affirmatively what was stated in the negative form in the English statute and was substantially in pari materia with the English enactment and the courts might consider the English authorities as aids to the interpretation thereof. The decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Abdul/abhai Abdulkadar(\"), though turns upon the provisions of s. 10(1) of the Act, gives some assistance in deciding the question raised. One of the questions raised was whether the tax paid by the assessee-firm as an agent of the non-resident principle could be claimed as a bad debt or a trading loss. In the words of Kapur, J., \"the loss which the appellant has incurred is not in its own business but the liability arose because of the business of another person and that is not permissible deduction within s. I 0(1) of the Act\". It is true that this decision did not arise under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act, but the principle that the expenditure incurred by the assessee in his capacity as agent of another is not a deductible item equally applies to the present case. This Court in The Commissioner of Jncometax, W.B. v. Royal Calcutta Turf Club(') had to consider the question whether an expenditure incurred by a race club for the purpose of training jockeys of the club was an allowable deduction within the meaning of s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act.\n\n( ') [1959] S.C.R. 600.\n\n(') [1961] 2 S.C.R. 949. ('l (1959) 37 I.T.R. 66.\n\n\nKapur, J., speaking for the Court, after considering the rele- Oommissioner of vant decisions, concluded thus: Jl.ncome.tax. Kerala\n\n•· \"Applying the law, as laid down in those cases, to .Malayalam h 1 ' h th .Plantn6on Ltd. the present case t e cone us10n 1s t at e amount\n\nSu'>ba Rao, J, in dispute was laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the resp(mdent's business because if the supply of jockeys of efficiency and skill failed the business of the respondent would no longer be possible. Thus the money was spent for the preservation of the respondent's business.\"\n\nThis decision gives a liberal interpretation to the relevant expression. In MI s. Haji Aziz and Abdul Shakoor Bros. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City 1/('), this Court disallowed deduction of the amount paid by a firm as penalty to release the consignment confiscated by the Customs authorities. In coming to the conclusion, Kapur, J., speaking for the Court, observed:\n\n\"The words \"for the purpose of such business\" have been construed in Inland Revenue v. Anglo Brewing Co., Ltd.(') to mean \"for the purpose of keeping the trade\" going and of making it pay.\" ...\n\nAfter considering the relevant decisions, the learned Judge proceeded to state thus:\n\n\"They cannot be deducted it they fall on the assessee in some character other than that of a trader.\n\nTherefore, where a penalty is incurred for the contravention of any specific statutory provision, it cannot be said to be a commercial loss falling on the assessee as a trader the test being that the expenses which are for the purpose of enabling a person to carry on trade for making profits in the business are permitted but not if they are merely connected with the business.\"\n\nNo doubt this judgment is really based upon the fact that an expense which is paid by way of penalty for breach of law .cannot be said to be an amount wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business; but the observations in the decision go further and indicate that the expenditure, if .incurred by the trader in some character other than that of a\n\ntrader, is not an allowable deduction.\n\n(') [1961] 2 S.C.R 651. 657, 663.\n\n(') (1925) 12 T.C. 803. 813.\n\nThe aforesaid discussion leads to the following result: 1964 The expression \"for the purpose of the business\" is wider o,,,,,,.;,,;.,,..,. of in scope than the expression \"for the purpose of earning 1,.,,.,,,,.ta•, KerOJa profits''. Its range is wide: it may take in not only the day M 1 'Y.1am to day running of a business but also the rationalization of Pin•~:,,.,. Lid. its administration and modernization O, f its machinery; it may inciude measure for the preservation of the business Suboa Ba<>, 1• and for the protection of its assets and property from expropriation, coercive procss or assertion of hostile titles; it may also comprehend payment of statutory dues and taxes imposed as a pre-condition to commence or for carrying on of a business; it may comprehend many other acts incidental to the carrying on of a business. However wide the meaning of the expression may be, its limits are implicit in it. The purpose shall be for the purpose of the business, that is to say. the expenditure incurred shall be for carrying on of the business and the assessee shall incur it in his capacity as a person carrying on the business. It cannot include sums spent by the assessee as agent of a third party, whether the origin of the agency is voluntary or statutory; in that event, he pays the amount on behalf of another and for a purpose unconnected with the business. In the present rose, the company, as a statutory agent of the deceased owners of the shares, paid the sums payable by the legal representatives of the deceased shareholders. The payments have nothing to do with the conduct of the business. The fact that on his default, if any, in the payment of the dues the Revenue may realise the amounts from the business assets is a consequence of the default of the assessee in not discharging his statutory obligation, but it does not make the expenditure any the more expenditure incurred in the conduct of the business. It is manifest that the amounts in question were paid by the assessee as a statutory agent to discharge a statutory duty unconnected with the business, though the occasion for the imposition arose because of the territorial nexus afforded by the accident of its doing business in India.\n\nWe, therefore. hold that the estate duty paid by the respondent was not an allowable deduction under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. We answer the question in the negative. The order of the High Court is wrong and is set aside. ·\n\nIn the result, the appeals are allowed with costs. One set of hearing fees.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nI.f P(D)ISCI-43", "total_entities": 93, "entities": [{"text": "693\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MALAYALAM PLANTATION LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MALAYALAM PLANTATION LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JK. SUBBA RAo, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Meaning of- Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 302, "end_char": 341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv}-Estate Duty Act, 1953 (34 of 1953)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 356, "end_char": 403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of- Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Meaning of- Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 406, "end_char": 411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of- Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Meaning of- Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1295, "end_char": 1303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of- Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Meaning of- Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1496, "end_char": 1501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Estate Duty Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1509, "end_char": 1530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1862, "end_char": 1867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2036, "end_char": 2048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2311, "end_char": 2318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (i) There was nothing on the record to show whether in England, where the concerned share holders died th<!"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2449, "end_char": 2454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "resident company could recover the amount representing the estate duty paid by it in India from the legal representative of the deceased share holders."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3113, "end_char": 3125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maiaydam Planlalion", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3293, "end_char": 3312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its range is wide: it may\n\n191J4\n\n.April ID\n\nOommiuiomr of lftCOmt'-lax, Kuala\n\nMaiaydam Planlalion J, i, J,."}}, {"text": "Bubba Bao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3324, "end_char": 3333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bubba Bao, J.\n\ntake in not only the day to day running of a business but also the rationalization of its administration and modernization of its machinery; it may include measures for the preservation of the business and for the protection of its assets and property from expropriation, coercive process or assertion of hostile title; it may also comprehend payment of statutory dues and taxes imposed as a pre-condition to commence or for carrying on of a business; it may comprehend many other acts incidental to the carrying on of a business."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5069, "end_char": 5091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant Bishan Narain, G. 8."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5096, "end_char": 5110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant Bishan Narain, G. 8."}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5130, "end_char": 5143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant Bishan Narain, G. 8.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Narain"}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5156, "end_char": 5174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. A. Ramachandran, ]."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nDadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5179, "end_char": 5193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.\n\nDadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5198, "end_char": 5207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5212, "end_char": 5227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5311, "end_char": 5320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-These two appeals by special leave raise the question whether the estate duty paid by the resident Company, hereinafter called tbe assessee.", "canonical_name": "Su'>ba Rao"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5610, "end_char": 5622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5630, "end_char": 5657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5855, "end_char": 5869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Most of its shareholders are m the United Kingdom."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5907, "end_char": 5921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the accounting period ending March 31, 1955, it paid £ 1,302-94 and £ 1,303 towards estate duty which was payable on tbe death of certain shar~\n\nholders who were not domiciled in India."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6290, "end_char": 6304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, for the accounting year ending March 31, 1956, it paid a sum of .£ 3.809-1-5 towards estate duty payable on the death of certain shareholders and debited the said amount to revenue in its accounts in ascertaining the profits and gains of its business for that year."}}, {"text": "s. 66(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7172, "end_char": 7180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7199, "end_char": 7216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an application made by the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Appellate Tribunal stated a case under s. 66(i) of the Act to the Kerala High Court, and referred the following question of law for its opinion:\n\nOommiBaioner of lncomt-tax, Kerala\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the estate duty paid by the Company under Section 84 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, is a revenue expenditure deductible in computing the assessee's business income for the assessment years in question?\""}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7417, "end_char": 7427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Estate Duty Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7435, "end_char": 7456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ra jagopala Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7811, "end_char": 7829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ra jagopala Sastri, learned counsel for the Commissioner of Income-tax, raised before us the following two points; (!)"}}, {"text": "s. 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7966, "end_char": 7971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Estate Duty Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7979, "end_char": 8000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8146, "end_char": 8158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953", "statute": "the Estate Duty Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Bishan Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8358, "end_char": 8371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bishan Narain, learned counsel for the respondent, supported the judgment of the High Court and contended that the said estate duty was revenue expenditure incurred by the assessee as it.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Narain"}}, {"text": "Malayalam Plantation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8758, "end_char": 8783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further argued that\n\nMalayalam Plantation Ltd.\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\n1P64 the said expenditure was wholly and exclusively for the pur- OommiMi<>mr of pose of the assessee's business within the meaning of Incomtlaz, Kerala s. I 0(2)(xv) of the Act inasmuch as it discharged its statu-\n\nM.Z:; ai.m tory obligation in order to preserve the assets of the com- Plantalitm Lid."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8785, "end_char": 8794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further argued that\n\nMalayalam Plantation Ltd.\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\n1P64 the said expenditure was wholly and exclusively for the pur- OommiMi<>mr of pose of the assessee's business within the meaning of Incomtlaz, Kerala s. I 0(2)(xv) of the Act inasmuch as it discharged its statu-\n\nM.Z:; ai.m tory obligation in order to preserve the assets of the com- Plantalitm Lid.", "canonical_name": "Su'>ba Rao"}}, {"text": "Subba Roo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9110, "end_char": 9119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Roo, J. The question raised turns upon the provis.ions of s. 10(2}\n\n(xv) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Su'>ba Rao"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2}\n\n(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9174, "end_char": 9188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10221, "end_char": 10226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10242, "end_char": 10246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10485, "end_char": 10490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10867, "end_char": 10877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10998, "end_char": 11008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11244, "end_char": 11271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11614, "end_char": 11623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "treated for the -\n\npurposes of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 1964 (XI of 1922), as resident for two out of three Oommls.ioner of completed assessments immediately preceding, Int.ometall:, K•rala such company shall, within three months of the\n\nM.;:· receipt of intimation of the death of a member P1an1a1r.:L:a. dying after the commencement of this Act, furnish to the Controller such particulars as may Subba Rao, 1• be prescribed in respect of the shares of the deceased member in the company, and shall be liable to pay estate duty at the rates mentioned in Part III of the Second Schedule, on the princi pal value of the shares held by the deceased in the company except in cases where the deceased member was a person domiciled in India and the person accountable has obtained a certificate from the Controller showing that either the estate duty in respect thereof has been paid or will be paid or that none is due, as the case may be.\"", "canonical_name": "Su'>ba Rao"}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11787, "end_char": 11802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12858, "end_char": 12868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13237, "end_char": 13242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14284, "end_char": 14286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14858, "end_char": 14870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15146, "end_char": 15151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Before the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15164, "end_char": 15187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15805, "end_char": 15819, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Davey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16595, "end_char": 16600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Davey, whose dictum was the basis for some of the subsequent decisions in that country, referring to the expression \"for the purpose of trade\" observed as follows:\n\n\"It is not enough that the disbursement is made in the course of, or arises out of, or is connected with, the trade or is made out of the profit• of the trade."}}, {"text": "Finlay", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17197, "end_char": 17203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finlay, J., in Allen v. Farquharson Brothers Limited('), noticed that the qualifictaion \"for the purpose of earning profits\" was a slight expansion of the words of the statute, though he expressed the view that it brought out the real import of the relevant section."}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17645, "end_char": 17652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in disallowing the deduction claimed by a company of a sum set aside for the relief of the invalid employees, Rowlatt."}}, {"text": "Croom-Johnson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18308, "end_char": 18321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to earlier decisions, Croom-Johnson, J., made the following observation:\n\n\"Here is a payment made in the circumstances of this case in order to ensure a supply of leather for the business, a payment made in order to ensure '.I cotinuace of labour willing to be employed m this business, and payment for rent in order to ensure that the landlord's consent to assignment of the premises, of the premises in which the business was carried on."}}, {"text": "Malayalam Plantatwn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18952, "end_char": 18971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Com, miasioner of lncome.tax, Kertzla\n\nMalayalam Plantatwn IMJ.", "canonical_name": "MALAYALAM PLANTATION LTD"}}, {"text": "Morton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20278, "end_char": 20284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Morton, after referring to the relevant case-law and to Lord Davey's formula, made the following observations:\n\n\" ......... this seems to me to be an assumption wholly\n\nunwarranted by the evidence."}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20835, "end_char": 20839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Reid laid down the relevant test thus:\n\n\"A general test is whether the money was spent by the person assessed in his capacity of trader or in some other capacity-whether on the one hand the expenditure was really incidental to the trade itself or on the other hand it was mainly incidental to some other vocation or was made by the trader in some other capacity than that of trader.\""}}, {"text": "Greene", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21570, "end_char": 21576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Greene, M.R., in Rushden 1964 Heel Co., Ltd. v. Keene(') reaffirmed the second test in the Commi.,"}}, {"text": "Subba Bao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21879, "end_char": 21888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, I think, a matter not of Subba Bao, J. dictum but of decision in that case that an expense is not deductible if it falls on a trader in some character other than that of a trader.", "canonical_name": "Su'>ba Rao"}}, {"text": "Loreburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22077, "end_char": 22085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was the ground of the opinion of Lord Loreburn, L.C., with which Lords Macnaghten and Atkinson agreed."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22110, "end_char": 22120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was the ground of the opinion of Lord Loreburn, L.C., with which Lords Macnaghten and Atkinson agreed."}}, {"text": "Atkinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22125, "end_char": 22133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was the ground of the opinion of Lord Loreburn, L.C., with which Lords Macnaghten and Atkinson agreed."}}, {"text": "Licensing Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22596, "end_char": 22615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Buenos Aires", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23404, "end_char": 23416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. v. Taylor-\n\nGooby <H.M. lnspectc, r of Taxes)('), Buckley, J., covered\n\nth~ entire ground over again in the context of a question whether the appellant-company therein which was incorporated ad resident in the United Kingdom and carrying on the busmess of a large general stores in Buenos Aires, having paid in Argentina a tax known as the \"substitute tax\" to which it was liable, could claim deduction under the Income-tax Act, 1952 (15 and 16 Geo."}}, {"text": "Buckley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23473, "end_char": 23480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. v. Taylor-\n\nGooby <H.M. lnspectc, r of Taxes)('), Buckley, J., covered\n\nth~ entire ground over again in the context of a question whether the appellant-company therein which was incorporated ad resident in the United Kingdom and carrying on the busmess of a large general stores in Buenos Aires, having paid in Argentina a tax known as the \"substitute tax\" to which it was liable, could claim deduction under the Income-tax Act, 1952 (15 and 16 Geo."}}, {"text": "Argentina", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23734, "end_char": 23743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. v. Taylor-\n\nGooby <H.M. lnspectc, r of Taxes)('), Buckley, J., covered\n\nth~ entire ground over again in the context of a question whether the appellant-company therein which was incorporated ad resident in the United Kingdom and carrying on the busmess of a large general stores in Buenos Aires, having paid in Argentina a tax known as the \"substitute tax\" to which it was liable, could claim deduction under the Income-tax Act, 1952 (15 and 16 Geo."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23836, "end_char": 23856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 137(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23899, "end_char": 23908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1952", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2J(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25068, "end_char": 25080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25088, "end_char": 25115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tata Iron and Steel Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26452, "end_char": 26475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reason for the conclusion is stated thus:\n\n\"But having considered the whole case and the question submitted to us I am satisfied that looking purely at it from the point of view of commercial prinoiples what the assessee company has done is something which had as its object increasing the profits of the Tata Iron and Steel Co. and thereby increasing its own share of the commission.\""}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26868, "end_char": 26880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27019, "end_char": 27031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27044, "end_char": 27061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Ayyar, J., observed:\n\n\"The result is that when a claim is made for a deduction for which there is no specific provision in section 10(2), whether it is admissible or not will depend, on whether having regard to accepted commercial practice and trading principles, it can be said to arise out of the carrying on of the business and to be incidental to it.\""}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27179, "end_char": 27192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27694, "end_char": 27702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28090, "end_char": 28098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28348, "end_char": 28353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Kapur, J., \"the loss which the appellant has incurred is not in its own business but the liability arose because of the business of another person and that is not permissible deduction within s. I 0(1) of the Act\"."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28613, "end_char": 28625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29054, "end_char": 29066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 949", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29109, "end_char": 29128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Su'>ba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29432, "end_char": 29442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kerala\n\n•· \"Applying the law, as laid down in those cases, to .Malayalam h 1 ' h th .Plantn6on Ltd. the present case t e cone us10n 1s t at e amount\n\nSu'>ba Rao, J, in dispute was laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the resp(mdent's business because if the supply of jockeys of efficiency and skill failed the business of the respondent would no longer be possible.", "canonical_name": "Su'>ba Rao"}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R 651", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31300, "end_char": 31318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33686, "end_char": 33698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_706_723_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".April 10\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nBEN GORM NILGIRI PLANTATIONS COMPANY,\n\nCOONOOR AND ORS . v.\n\nSALES TAX OFFICER, SPECIAL CIRCLE, ERNAKU-\n\nLAM AND ORS.\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)\n\nSales Tax-Sale of tea to local agents of Foreign buyers- Sales whether exempt under Art. 286(l)(b) of the Constitution-Constitution of India, Art. 286(1) (b)-Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, s. 5.\n\nThe appellants were carrying on the business o'f growing and manufacturing tea in their estates. The sellers of tea were the appellants; the purchasers were local agents of Foreign buyers. The sales were by public auction at Fort Cochin. They were conducted by brokers of tea. The sales were in conformity with the provisions of Tea Act of 1953.\n\nThe Sales-tax Officer assessed the appellants to pay sales tax on transactions of sale of tea chests at the auctions held at Fort Cochin in the years 1956-57 to 1958-59. Against the orders of assessment the appellants filed petitions before the High\n\nCourt for writs of certiorari and for writs of prohibition restraining the Sales-tax Officer from proceeding with the collection of sales tax. The petitions were dismissed by the High Court. With special leave the appellants appealed to this c., urt.\n\nIt was the common case of all the appellants that the purchases by the local agent of foreign buyers were with a view to export the goods to their principals abroad and that the goods were in fact exported out of India.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellants that the sales of tea were \"in the course of export 0ut of the territory of India\", and thus exempt from taxation under Art. 286(l)(b) of the Constitution.'\n\nHeld: (per Gajendragadkar, C. J., Shah and Sikri, JJ.)\n\n(i) A transaction of sale which occasions export, or which is effected by a transfer of documents of title after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers, is exempt under Art. 286(l)(b) of the Constitution from sales tax levied under any\n\nState legislation. A transaction of sale which is a preliminary to expert of the commodity sold may be regarded as a sale for export, but is not necessarily to be regarded as one i'l the course of export, unless the sale occasions export. Etymologieally the expression \"in the course of expert'', contemplates an integral relation or bond between the sale and th~ export.\n\nIn general where 4 sale is effected by the seller, and the seller is not connected with the export which actually takes place, it is a sale for export. Where the export is the result of sale, the export being inextricably linked up with •ale so that the bond cannot be dissociated without a breach of the obligations arising by statute. contract of mutual understanding between the parties arising from the nature of the transaction the sale is in the course of export. -\n\n(ii) A sale in the course of export predicates a connection 1964 between the sale and export, the two activities being so integrated that the connection between the two cannot be volun- . ~· q.,,,. . tarily interrupted, without a breach of the contract or the gz.P\"'t\"..:::: co\"lpulsion arising from the nature of the transaction. In the alld1lithra present casr there was between the sale and the export no v. such bond as would justify the inference that the sale and the Baka Ta:c OJ!i<a export formed parts of a single transaction or that the sale Bp<eiol Oirck, ' and export were integrally connected. The appellants were Ernolwlam aw4 not concerned with the actual exportation of the goods, and OU..ra the sales were intended to be complete without the export, and as such it cannot be said that the said sales occasioned export. The sales were rtherefore for export .and not in the course of export. Therefore the sales by the appellant to the agents of foreign buyers do not come with the purview of Art. 286(i)(b) of the Constitution.\n\nState of Travancore.Cochin v. Bombay Company Ltd. [1952] S.C.R. 1112, distinguished.\n\nState of Trav:incore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew N \"t Factory. [1954] S.C.R. 53, State of Madras v. Gurviah N'aidu and Company Ltd. A.LR. 1956 S.C. 158, State of Mysore\n\nv. Mysore Shipping and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 13 S.T.C. 529 and B.K. Wadear v. M/s. Daulatram Rameshwarlal fl951] 1 S.C.R. 924, relied on.\n\nM. R. K. Abdul Salem and Company v. Government of Madras, 13 S.T.C. 629, explained.\n\nPer Ayyangar, J. In the present case the sale and the export being related to each other in the sense of one leading to the other are therefore within Art. 286(l)(b) of the Constitution. There could be no difference in legal effect betw-een a salo to a Foreign buyer present in India to take delivery of the goods for transport to his country and a sale to his resident agent for that purpose. The buyer was an agent, who was not free to deal with th~ tea purchased by effecting a local sale, but was under an obligation to his Foreign principal to export the goods purchased to a Foreign destination.\n\nThe goods purchased were in fact exported from this country.\n\nIt was with such a buyer that the appellants entered into the transaction of sale. In other words it was a part of understanding between the seller and the buyer, inferrable from all the circumstances attendant on these transactions that the buyer was bound to export.\n\nState o.f Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew [1954] S.C.R. 53, State of Madras v. Gurviah Naidu and Co.\n\nLtd. A.LR. 1956 S.C. 158, State of Mysore v. Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. A.I.R. 191!6 S.C. 1002 and East India Tobacco Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, f1963] 1 S.C.R. 404, referrP<l to.\n\n(ii) Even though the Tea Act does not in terms prohibit internal sale of tea purchased alongwith export quota rights this could be explained by the circumstance that the rights t~ export tea is considered a privilege which secures an economic ad~ vantage to the exporter and hence there was no need for any statutorv compulsion to do so.\n\nL'P(D)ISCI-2~(o)\n\n1964 CIVIL APPELLATE JuRJSDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.\n\nBen IJon• 396-413 of 1963. Appeals by special leave from the judgx;1g;,; Plantation• ment and order dated October 26, 1961 of the Kerala High Com!.', i\"!'i, f::-'' Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 104--106, 107, 109, 112, 108,\n\nv. 113, 114, 111, 115, 116, 119, 120, 123, 124 and 122 of 1964.\n\nSalea Tax Officer,\n\nSpecial Circle,\n\nErMhlam aad Otkera\n\nBAall, J.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, I. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in all the appeals).\n\nV. P. Gopa/an Nambiar, Advocate-Genera/, Kera/a and V. A. Seyid Muhammed, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\nApril 10, 1964. The judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .• SHAH AND SIKRJ JJ. was delivered by SHAH J. The dissenting Opinion of WANCHOO and AYYANGAR JJ. was delivered by AYYANGAR J.\n\nSHAH. J .-The Sales-tax Officer, Special Circle Ernakulam assessed the appellants under the Travancore- Cochin General Sales Tax Act XI of 1125 M.E., to pay sales-tax on transactions of sale of tea chests at the auctions held at Fort Cochin in the years 1956-57 to 1958-59, rejeeting their contention that 'the sales were exempted from tax by virtue of Art. 286(l)(b) of the Constitution. The appellants then petitioned the High Court of Kerala for writs of certiorari quashing the orders of assessment and for writs of prohibition restraining the Sales-tax Officer from proceeding with the collection of tax in pursuance of the orders of assessment. Vaidialingam J., rejected the petitions and his order was confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala. With special leave, the appellants have appealed to this Court.\n\nThe transactions of sale sought to be taxed by the Revenue authorities are in tea, wpich is a controlled commodity.\n\nThe Parliament enacted the tea Act (19 of 1953) to provide for the control by the Union of the tea industry, including the control of cultivation of tea in. and of export of tea from, lndia and for that purpose to establish a Tea Board and to levy customs duty cin tea exported from India. By s. 3(f) \"export\" is defined as taking out of India by land. sea or air to any place outside India other than a country or territory notified in that behalf by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette. \"Exp01t allotment\" is defined by s. 3(g) as the total quantity of tea which may be exported during any one financial year. Section 17(1) places an embargo upon exportation of tea unless covered by a licence issued by or on behalf of the Board.\n\nSection 18 provides that no consignment of tea shall be shipped or water-borne to be shipped for export or shall be exported until the owner has delivered to the Customs.Collector a valid export licence or special export licence or a\n\nvalid permit issued by or on behalf of the Board or the 1964 Ccntial Goverih\"ne:1t a:s the case may be~ covernig the Ben. Gom quantity to be shipped. Section 19 authorises the Central Nilgiri Pla1'lalioM Government to declare export allotments of tea for ead1 Oomn~:\"\"\"'\n\nfinancial year, and by s. 20 it is provided that any tea estate a v. shall, subject to conditions as may be prescribed, have the 8't' Ti0 '?~·· fight to receive under the Act an export quota for each ~m financial year. Section 21 provides that the owner of a tea and O!Au1 estate to which an export quota has been allotted for any financial year shall have the right to obtain at any time export licences during that year to cover the export of tea upto the amount of the unexhausted balance of the quota.\n\nThe export quota right is, by cl. (2) of s. 21. transferable, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed and the transferee of such right may again transfer the whole or any part of his right provided that nothing in the sub-section shall operate to restrict the issue of licences for the export of tea expressed to be sold with export rights. The other provisions are not material in deciding this group of appeals.\n\nTrade in tea in the State of Kerala-intemal as well as export-is carried on through certain defined channels.\n\nA manufacturer of tea applies for and obtains from the Tea Board allotment of export quota rights on payment of the necessary licence fee. The manufactured tea in chests is then sent to Mis. T. Stanes & Company Ltd. who warehouse the chests at Willingdon Island. Chests of tea are then sold by public auction through brokers at Fort Cochin. With the chests of tea for which export quota rights are obtained, export quota rights are sold by the auctioneer. At the auction sale, bids for tea chests with export quota rights are given by the agents or intermediaries in Cochin of foreign buyers.\n\nTea chests are delivered at the warehouses by MI s. T.\n\nStanes & Company Ltd. to the purchasers whose bids are accepted. The agents or intermediaries of the foreign buyers then obtain licences from the Central Government for export of tea chests under the export quota rights vested in them under the purchases made at the auction sales.\n\nTea cannot therefore be exported otherwise than under a licence: such a licence may be issued to a manufacturer or to the purchaser of the quota granted by the Central Government to the manufacturer when tea is sold with export rights. When auctions of tea with the export rights are held at Fort Cochin, it is in this group of appeals common ground, sellers on whose behalf the auctioneer acts as the agent know that bids are offered by the buyers of tea for the purpose of export. It is also known that the bidder is an agent . or an intermediary of a foreign buyer.\n\n81wA, J.\n\n11161 !~ t!:e ~!!!e. hy !!!!C!!~!! to the agent or intermediary of Be.• 11onr& the foreign buyer, in 'the course of export wiihin foe mean- ~~~~ ing of Art. 286(1) of the Constitution? If the sale is in the ..,.. 0t1o<r°\":\"\"' course of export out of the territory of India, any State law\n\nv. which imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on such ~.i'c~' sale is, because of Art. 286(1)(b), invalid. Before the Consti- ' tution was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment> a..i ou.u.\n\nAct, 1956, there was no legislative guidance as to what were\n\nJ transactions of sale in the course of export out of the terri-\n\nBW. • tory of India. But by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment> Act, cl. (2) of Art. 286 was substituted for the original clauses, and thereby the Parliament was authorised to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in cl ()).\n\nThe Parliament has under the Central Sales Tax Act (74 of\n\n1956) enacted by s. 5 that \"a sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India only if the sale or p_urchase either occasions such export or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India.'.' This was legislative recognition of what was said by this Court in the .State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. The Bombay Company Ltd(') and State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory and others(') about the true connotation of the expression \"in the course of the export of tlie goods out of the territory of India\" in Art. 286(1) (b)., A transaction of sale which occasions export, or which is effected by a transfer of documents of title after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers, is therefore exempt from sales-tax levied under any State legislation.\n\nThe appellants set out in their respective petitions the manner in which sales tax of tea chests were conducted at Fort Cochin and in certain petitions affidavits in rep)y even were not filed by the State of Kerala. In the remaining petitions in which affidavits in reply were filed it was contend-· . ed that the export of goods was made. by the purchasers who had taken delivery of the goods from the manufacturers in Travancore-Cochin and in pursuance of the export licences obtained by the purchasers goods were exported_ but such subsequent export by the purchasers did not affect the character of the sales by the manufacturers to the purchasers. It is true that there is no finding by the Sales-tax authorities that the respective purchasers at the auction were agents of foreign buyers, but the Advocate appearing on behalf of the State argued the case before the High Court on the footing that the bids were offered at the auctions by\n\n(') [1952] S.C.R. 1112.\n\n(') [1954] S.C.R. 53.\n\nthe agcnt5 or intermediaries or foreign buyers, and the Court 1964 proceeded to dispose of the case before it on that footing.\n\nBen Garno Vaidialingam J., held that transactions of sale were g;~;,:,:; 1•;/:!;:; complete when bids for purchase of tea together with the and bu,.,, export quota rights were accepted, and the sellers had no B<Uu T;;;. Oifi-,\n\nconcern with the actual export which was effected by the Special Oirck, auction purchasers to their foreign principals. It could not, ErnakulaM therefore, in the view of the learned Judge, be held that and OtMra the sales in question had as an integral part thereof occas1u.i., J. sioned export; that is, , the sales preceded the export and were not in the course of export. The High Court in appeal held that the ban imposd by Art. 286(l)(b) predicated a casual connection between the sale and the export-a connection which is intimate and real. The sale, it was said, must inextricably be bound up with the export and form an integral part thereof, so that without export the sale is not effectuated; but as the sale imposed or involved no obligation to export, there was no movement under 'the contract of sale and exemption claimed was not admissible. Correctness of this view is chaJlenged in this appeal.\n\nTo constitute a sale in the course of export of goods out of the territory of India, common intention of the parties to the transaction to export the goods followed by actual export of the goods, to a foreign destination is necessary.\n\nBut intention to export and actual exportation are not sufficient to POnstitute a sale in the course of export, for a sale by export \"involves a series of integrated activities commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and ending with the delivery of the goods to a common carrier or transport out of the country by land or sea. Such a sale cannot be dissociated from the export without which it cannot be effectuated, and the sale and resultant export form parts of a single transaction\": State of Travancore- Cochin and others v. The Bombay Company Ltd.('). A sale in the course of export predicates a connection between the sale and export. the two activities being so integrated that the connection between the two cannot be voluntarily interrupted, without a breach of the contract or the compulsion arising from the nature of the transaction. In this sense to constitute a sale in the course of export it may be said that there must be an intention on the part of both the buyer and the seller to export, there must be obligation to export, and there must be an actual export. The obligation may arise by reason of statute, contract between the parties, or from mutual understanding or agreement between them, or even . from the nature of the transaction which links the sale to export. A transaction of sale which is a preliminary to exp:lrt of the commodity sold may be regarded as a sale for\n\n(') (1952] S.C.R. 1112,\n\n1964 export, but is not necessarily to be regarded as one in the Ben GoNn course of export, unless the sale occasions export. And to Nilgiri Plantation• occasion export there must exist such a bond between the\n\nO°\"'!.d\"lftoonoor contract of sale and the actual exportation, that each link\n\na v. \" is inextricably connected with the one immediately precedsai.. Tax Olflcer, ing it. Without such a bond, a transaction of sale cannot be\n\n~~·· called a sale in the course of export of goods out of the\n\nand Dlh<r• territory of India. There are a variety of transactions in which\n\nShah, J. the sale of a commodity is followed by export thereof. At one end are transactions in which there is a sale of goods in India and the purchaser immediate or remote exports the goods out of India for foreign consumption. For instance, the foreign purchaser either by himself or through his agent purchases goods within the territory of India and exports the goods and even if the seller has the knowledge that the goods are intended by the purchasers to be exported, such a transaction is not in the course of export, for the seller does not export the goods, and it is not his concern as to l;!ow the purchaser deals with the goods. Such a transaction 'Vithout more cannot be regarded as one in the course of export because etymologically, \"in the course of export\", contemplates an integral relation or bond between the sale and the export. At the other end is a transaction under a contract of sale with a foreign buyer under which the goods may under the contract be delivered by the seller to a common carrier for transporting them to the purchaser. Such a sale' would indisputably be one for export, whether the contract and delivery to the common carrier are effected directly or through agents. But in between lie a variety of transactions in which the question whether the sale is one for export or is one in the course of export i.e., it is a transaction which has occasioned the export, may have to be determined on a correct appraisal of all the facts. No single test can be laid as decisive for -determining that question. Each case must depend upon its facts. But that is not to say that the distinction between transactions which may be called sales for export and sales in the course of export is not real. In general where the sale is effected by the seller, and he is not connected with the export which actually takes place, it is a sale for export. Where the export is the result of sale, the export being inextricably linked up with the sale so that the bond cannot be dissociated without a breach of the obligation arising by statute, contract or mutual understanding between the parties arising from the nature of the transaction, the sale is in the course of export.\n\n. It may be conceded that when chests of tea out of the export quota are sold together with the export rights, the goods are earmarked for export, and knowledge that the goods were purchased by the bidders for exporting them to\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\'IE COURT REPORTS 713\n\nthe foreign principals of the bidders must clearly be attri-\n\nJ.9G4 butable to them. Does the co-existence of these circumstances, Ben Gorm impress upon the transactions of sale with the character of N(ilgiri Plan0tatio ..\n\nf h . f .ompan11. oonoor a transaction in the course of export out o t e terntory o and 'other• India? We are unable to hold that it does. That the tea , v. h Id h h ht t k ales 'l'e\"O\"ii:ir, c ests are so toget er wit export ng s 1mpu_.es no~- Special cfrc1e. ledge to the seller that the goods are purchased with the m- Ernal-ulam tention of exporting. But there is nothing in the transaction and Othm from which springs a bond between the sale and the in- Shah, J, tended export linking them up as part of the same transaction. Knowledge that the goods purchased are intendd to be exported does not make the sale and export parts of the same transaction, nor does the sale of the quota with 'the sale of the goods lead to that result. There is no statutory obligation upon the purchaser to export the chests of tea purchased by him with tile export rights. The export quota merely enables the purchaser to obtain export licence, which he may or may not obtain. There is nothing in Jaw or in the contract between the parties, or even in the nature of the transaction which prohibits diversion of the goods for internal consumption. The sellers have no concern with the actual export of the goods, once the goods are sold. They have no control over the goods. There is therefore no direct connection between the sale and export of the goods which would make them parts of an integrated transaction of sale in the c011rse of export.\n\nDecided cases on which reliance was placed at the Bar have mainly been of cases in which the benefit of the exemption of Art. 286~1 )(b) was claimed in respect of sales preceding the export sale. Such a sale preceding the export could not, it was held, without doing violence to the language of Art. 286(1)(b), be given the benefit of the exemption from tax imposed by State legislation merely because of its historical connection with the export sale. In a majority of the cases to be presently referred there were at least two salessale under which goods were procured followed by a sale\n\nuner which the goods so procured were exported, and the\n\nclaim of the Revenue to tax the first transaction was upheld.\n\nIt may be regarded as therefore settled law that where there are two sales leading to export-the first under which goods are procured for sale and the property in the goods passes with_in the territory ?f I1:1dia, and the second by the buyer to a foreign party_ resultmg m export-the first cannot be regarded as a sale m the course of export, for a sale in the course of export must be directly and integrally connected with the\n\nexpor~. It cannt also be predkted that every sale which results m export 1s !o be regarded as sale in the course of export. We may bnefly refer td the cases whidh have come before this Court. Justification for 'citation of the cases is\n\n1964 not to evolve a pinciple from the actual decisions, but t<> Btm Gorm highlight the grounds on which the decisions were rendered.\n\nNilgiri PZanta1iona The first case which came before this Court in which Art.\n\n0\"\"'!; d\"og,,\"°:\"\"' 286(l)(b) fell to be construed was the State of Tmvancorev.\n\nCochin and others v. The Bombay Company Ltd.('). The Sa1u Ta:. Ofoo,-, ;;;;;~;;;;~ who had exported coir products to foreign purcha- Bp\"ial Circle, Brnaktl/a\"' sers claimed exemption from sales-tax relying upon Art. an4 OU....1 286(l)(b). The Revenue authorities held that property in 8haA the goods having passed within the State, the transactions\n\n' J. were liable to tax. The High Court disagreed with that view, holding that a sale in the course of export was not merely a sale when the goods had crossed the customs frontiers, but included a transaction which precede export. This Cou.rt agreed with the High Court. In appeal Patanjali Sastri C.J., speaking for the Court observed that sales which occasioned export were within the scope of the exemption under Art. 286(1)(b). But that was a case in which on the facts found there could be no dispute that the sale by the assessee occa- .. sioned export, for in pursuance of the contract the assessee had exported the goods sold.\n\nThe next case which came before this Court was the State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory and others('). It was held by this Court that purchases in the State made by the exporters for the purpose of export are not v1ithin the exemption , granted by Art. 286(1)(b) of the Constitution. Patanjali Sastri C.J., speaking for the majority of the Court observed: . \"The word 'course' etymologically denotes movement from one point to another, and the expression 'in the couhe of' not only implies a period of time during which the movement is in progress but postulates also a connected relation. • • • • A siile in the course of export out of the country should similarly be understood in the context of clause (!)(b) as meaning a sale taking place not only during the activities directed to the end of exportation of the goods out of the country but also as part of or connected with such activities.\" He further observed that the phrase \"integrated activities' cannot be dissociated from the export without which it cannot be effectuated, and the sale and the resultant export form parts of a single transaction. It is in that sense that the two activities-the sale and the export-were said to be integrated. But a purchase for the purpose of . export like production or manufacture for export, being only an act\n\n(') [1952] S.C.R. 1112. (') h954] S.C.R. 53.\n\npreparatory to export could not be regarded as an act done 1964 \"in tJ...- -·-.... _,.. ... ._ ____ ..,._.. ... , .. 1.~ n .... .. -~, t r.& .. i. ... terr't --- .. u\"' ~Ulo>C UL i.UC eApu11. \\.11. Lil\" C'-'VU~ Vw. .. ...,1. LlJV 1 ory Ben Gorm of India\".\n\nNilgiri Planta1io ..\n\nCompany, OOMtOOr In the State of Madras v. Gurviah Naidu and Company an<i 01/Nr• Ltd.('), S. R Das, Actg. C.J., observed that an assessee who sa1u'1'\",;,,0lfar, goes about purchasing goods after securing orders from Sl\"<ial Oircla. foreign purchasers is not exempt from liability to pay tax by !::= virtue of Art. 286(1)(b) of the Constitution in respect of the purchases made by him because those purchases do not them- ShaA, J. selves occasion the export. Goods were undoubtedly bought for the purpose of export, but the purchase did not occasion the export within the meaning of Art. 286(1)(b) of the Constitution.\n\nJn State of Mysore and another v. Mysore Shipping and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and others('), it was held that where goods were sold to a Jicenced exporter by the assessee and the licenced exporter sold the goods to a foreign purchaser it could not be said that the first was in the course of export. The licenced exporter was not an agent of the lissessee\n\nand the two sales could not have both occasioned the export : it was only the second sale which did that, and the assessec not being a party to it either directly or through the exporter or through his agents, the first sale with which alone the assessee was associated did not \"Occasion the export. .If it did not, then it hardly matters whether the goods were exported through the instrumentality of the exporter or not, because all sales that precede the one that occasioned the export were taxable. In this case the Court expressed the opinion that for the sale to be one which occasions the export it must directly concern the assessee as an exporter.\n\nIn East India Tobacco Company v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and another(') this Court held that only the sale under which the export is made that is protectea by Art. 286(!)(b) of the Constitution and a purchase made locally by a firm doing business of exporting tobacco, which preceded the export sale did not fall within its purview though it is made for the purpose of or with a view to export.\n\nOne more judgment of this Court may be .noticed: B. K. Wadeyar v. Mis. Daulatram Rameshwarlal('). The assessees in that case sold goods to an Indian purchaser, who had .ag£ee<!, to sell them to a foreign buyer. The sales by the\n\nasssees were on F.O.B. conttacts under which they\n\n(') A.LR. (1956) S.C. 158.\n\n(') A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 1002.\n\n(') [1963] 1 S.C.R. 404.\n\n\n' 1961 continued to be the owners\" till the goods crossed the cus- Ben Gorm toms barrier, and entered the export stream. It was heid by Nilgiri Plantations this Court that since the goods remained the property of the\n\nCof.'itflth~'::,\" 00 ' assessees till they reached the export stream, the sales were v. exempt from tax imposed by a State under Art. 286{1)(a). &! .. T\"\" Officer, This was undoubtedly a case of two sales resulting in ex- Special Circle,\n\nErnakulam port, and the first sale was 'held immune from State taxaand OU.era tion: but that was so because the property in the goods had passed to the Indian purchaser when the goods were in the\n\nBW, J. . export stream. The first sale itself was so inextricably connected with the export that it was regarded as a sale in the course of export.\n\nMr. Setalvad on behalf of the appellants placed strong reliance upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in M. R. K. Abdul Salam and Company v. 'The Government of Madras('). That was a case in which a dealer in the State of Madras in hides and skins after purchasing raw hides tanned them and sent them to Kovai Tanned Leather Co.\n\nMadras who acted as the dealer's agent for sale. Kovai Tanned Leather Company sold the goods to Dharamsee Parpia . who acted as an agent of Srivan Brothers <Eastern) Ltd .•\n\nLondon. There was another transaction between Kovai Tanned Leather Co. and Gordon Woodrolle and Company Ltd. who acted as agents for a foreign principal. The Salestax Tribunal refused to accept the transaction to Dharamsi Parpia as an export sale on the ground that Kovai Tanned Leather Company delivered the goods to the exporter- Dharamsi Parpia-and thereafter the xporter obtained the bills of lading, and that the sale became complete in the Madras State before shipment, and it was on that account not a sale in the course of export. The High Court disagreed with that view. Jagadisan J .. speaking for the Court observed.:\n\n\"Where there is. privity of contract between the\n\nforeign buyer and the seller in the taxing territory and the concluded sale between them occasions the export even if the property in the goods sold passes within the territory the transaction is nevertheless one in respect of which Article 286 imposes a ban on the State to levy tax.\" We are not concerned to decide whether there was evidence in that case on which the High Court could come to the conclusion that the sale occasioned the export. But Mr.\n\nSetalvad relied upon the observation in support of the proposition that in all cases where there is a contract for purchase of goods in the taxing territory, between a local merchant and a foreign buyer acting through his agent, and the\n\n(')13 S.T.C. 629.\n\ngoods are after purchasing the same exported by the agent,\n\nI961 the transaction must be deemed to be one in the course of Ben Gorm export. We are unable to accept that contention. We do notNi!giri Plantations read the judgment as laying down any such proposition, and\n\n00 \":!,.'d\"bih~;:noor none such is legitimately deducible. The second transaction v. in'favour of Gordon Woodrolfe & Co. was found to be one Sal8 \"T.ax 0 0r. h\" h th ods ed be d th to pecia! '\"1'• m w 1c property m e go pass yon e cus ms Erna1:o,1a,. frontier. Such a transaction would indisputably be a sale and Otliera in the course of export.\n\nIn our view the transactions of sale in the present case did not occasion the export of the goods, even though the appellants knew that the buyers in offering the bids for chests of tea and the export quotas were acting on behalf of foreign principals, and that the buyers intended to export the goods. There was between the sale and the export no such bond as would justify the inference that the sale and the export \"formed parts of a single transaction or that the sale and export were integrally connected. The appellants were not concerned with the actual exportation of the goods. and the sales were intended to be complete without the export, and as such it cannot be said that the said sales occasioned export. The sales were therefore for export, and not in the course of export.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne hearing fee.\n\nSlla/1, J.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-We regret our inability to concur in Ayyangar, J. the order that these appeals should be dismissed. We are clearly of the opinion that the appeals should be allowed.\n\nThis batch of 18 appeals which have been heard together are directed against a common judgment of the High Court of Kerala and are before this Court by virtue of special leave granted to the appellants. The appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court which were dismissed by the learned Single Judge whose judgment was affirmed on appeal by a Bench of the High Court. It is from this judgment that these appeals have been brought.\n\nThe appeHants. are 18 tea estates wn1cn llft: carrywg on the busi; iess f jlfOwing and manuracmnng rea m 1nm estates. Thelf clallll IS that the teas grown by them have i:>een sold by them \"in the course of the export of goods out of the territory of IRdia\" within Art. 286(1)(b) of the Constitution and they, therefore, claim that the State of Travancorhin in which these sales took place was not entitled to impose sales tax upon these sales.\n\nThe question for consideration is whether these sales effected by the fpella.nts are, as they claim, sales \"in the course of export . It is common ground that the tea sold\n\n1964 under the transactions involved in these appeals was actual-\n\nB•~ Gorm ly exported out of the territory of India. Doubtless, this cir- N;/giri PlamaJio•• cumstance would not per se render the sales which preceded\n\nCompany Coonoor the export \"sales in the course of export\" but the argument\n\nand Ut11e'8 b . d . d\" ti d v. su 1111tte to us 1s that these exports are so rrec y an 1m- Sales Tax O.tfiur, mediately linked up with the sales effected by the appellants\n\n8 PE,~!f,,'{.';;;· and so integrated with them that the two form part of the and Others same transaction as to render the sales \"sales in the course of export\".\n\nAyyarigar, J.\n\nIt was presented in this form, relying on the decision of this Court in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Nut Factory(') where the learned Chief Justice observed:\n\n\"The word 'course' etymologically denotes movement from one point to another and the expression 'in the course of' not only implies a period of time during which the movement is in progress but postulates also a connected relation ... . . .. . .. . . A sale in the course of export out of the country should be understood in the context of Art. 2860 )(b) as meaning a sale taking place 'not only during the activities directed to the end of exportation of the goods out of the country, but also as part of or connected with such activities.' ............ The previous decision ............ emphasised the integral relation between the two where the contract of sale itself occasioned the export as the ground for holding that such a sale was one taking place in the course of export.\"\n\nIt is this integrality that is involved in the concept which is expressed by the words that \"the sale that occasions the export\" is \"a sale in the course of export\".\n\nThe details of the sales on which tax is sought to be levied by the respondent, together with the facts relating thereto, as well as the several contentions urged before us and the decisions on which reliance is placed on either side have all been narrated in the judgment just now pronounced and we do not think it necessary to restate them. Similarly, the provisions of the Tea Act, 1953 and the rules framed thereunder so far they are relevant for the decision of the question involved in these appeals have also been set out and so we are not repeating them either. We shall confine ourselves to the very restricted area of our disagreement with our learned brethren which has occasioned this separate judgment.\n\n( ') [1954] S.C.R. 53.\n\nAs preliminary to the discussion of the question involved, we shall put aside certain types of transactions as reg!l!ds . ft Gorm • which there is no dispute that they clearly fall on one side ilgiri P~ of the line of the other. On the one side of the line would °\"!'d\"~':\" be the case where a seller in pursuance of a contract of sale v. with a foreign buyer puts the goods sold on board a ship 8'J/;:.:f.f0'/!!:: •\n\nbound for a foreign destination. Such a sale would be an Emahlam \"export sale\" which would undoubtedly be within the conand Other• stitutional protection of Art. 286(l)(b). In regard to this type,\n\nAW\"\"''\"· J. however, we would make this observation. In such a case we consider that it would be immaterial whether or not with reference to the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, read in conjunction with the terms and stipulations of any particular contract, the property in the goods passes to the buyer on the Indian side of the customs frontier or beyond it. In either event the sale would have occasioned the export, for the sale and the export form one continuous series of trans- . actions, the one leading to the other-not merely in point of time but integrated by reason of a common intention which is given effect to. In such a case it would be seen that there is but one sale-to the foreign buyer \"which occasions the export\", and which is implemented in accordance with the terms of the contract by an actual export which is the sine qua non of \"a sale in the course of export\".\n\nA case on the other side of the line would be one where the sale is e.ffected to a resident purchaser who effects the export by sale of the goods purchased to a foreign buyer.\n\nHere the first sale to the buyer who enters into the export sale would not be a \"sale in the coutse of export\" for it would not be the particular sale which occasions the export, notwithstanding that the purchase might have been made with a view to effect the export sale, or to implement a contract of sale already entered into with a foreign buyer.\n\nThat such a sale is not one \"in the course of export\" has been repeatedly held by this Court (See State of Travancore- Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory('), State of Madras v. Gurviah Naidu and Co. Ltd.('), State of Mysore\n\nv. Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.(') and East India Tobacco Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh(').\n\nThis second type of case involves two sales-one to a resident purchaser who purchases it with a view to effect an export and the second, the export sale or sale in the course of export. by the purchaser to a foreign buyer. The existence of the two sales and the consequent dissociation between the\n\n(') [1954] S.C.R. 5a.\n\n(')A.LR. 1956 S.C. 158 = 6 S.T.C. 717.\n\n(')A.LR. 1958 S.C. 1002.\n\n\nl9ii4 first sale and the export causes a hiatus between that sale Ben Gorm . and the export and destroys the integrality of the two events Nitgiri J'/,.n/a1fo,., or transactions viz., the sale and the factual export.\n\nCompany, Q•mnoor\n\n and C/l\"rs The sales involved in the present appeals are not of the v, 2nd type for here there is a single sale 'direct to a foreign Sale'3 Tr1.x Officr>r,\n\nBpecinl Circle, buyer, the contract being concluded with and the goods sold Er\"\"\"\"\"\"\" delivered to his agent. It is hardly necessary to add that for and Otltm purposes relevant to the decision of the question before us\n\nAyyanga,-, J. there could be no difference in legal effec~ between a saie to a foreign buyer present in India to take delivery pf the goods for transport to his country and a sale to his resident agent for that purpose. Pausing here we should mention that there is no dispute (!) that the persons who bid at the auction at Fort Cochin and purchased the teas of the assessees were agents of foreign buyers or (2) regarding their having made these purchases under the dire'Ctions of their foreign principals in order to despatch the goods to the latter-a contractual obligation that they admittedly fulfill ed.\n\nUnder the sales here involved, though to foreig)l buyers and intended for export, the goods were not under the terms of the contract of sale placed by the seller on board the ship in the course of its outward voyage and that is the only reason why they do not conform strictly to the first type <>f an export sale which we have described earlier.\n\nBut the question is, do. not these sales also \"occasion the export\" and in that.sense sales \"in the course of export\".\n\nThe test which has been laid down by this Court for determining the proximity of the connection between the sale and the export so as to bring the sale within the constitutional exemption in Art. 286(J)(b) is the integrality of the two events-the sale and the export. The question to be answered is therefore whether the sales now under consideration do not form part and parcel of a single integrated transaction with the export or are they distinct, distant and mediate, the sale and the export being r.elated to each other only in sense of one leading to the other or the one succeeding the other merely in point of time. If the former, the sales are within Art. 286(1)(b), but if the connection between the two is as described later, they are outside the exemption.\n\nWhat then are the facts of the present case. Before restating them for their being examined in the light of the criteria we have. just specified, it is necessary to emphasise certain matters. When the assessees sought an opportunity to adduce evidence as to the facts which they offered to prove to establish their claim to the constitutional protection, the assessing authorities accepted their statements as correct and did not desire them to adduce evidence and so\n\nno detailed evidence was led. If therefore on an examination 1964 of the legal position it is now found that there is any lacunae Ben Gorm in the statement of facts or in the evidence whose existence Nilgiri Plant-Olio•• would have brought the sales within the exemption, it ap- Ccm:::; Yog;:,\"'ior pears to us that the appellant-assessees should in fairness v. be afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence to establish Sales Tax OJfiw,\n\nI I b .\n\nId b Special Circle, their case. We say so particu ar y ecause 1t cou y no Ernal..Jam means be said that the law was clear as to the facts necesand Others sary to be proved to claim exemption in the case of sales of the type now before us. ·\n\nTo proceed with the facts, the assessees had applied for and obtained export quotas with a view to effect exports of a quantity of tea grown and processed by them. The sales at Fort Cochin were effected along with the export 'rights granted to the Appellant estates, the contract being that the purchaser at the auction would obtain a transfer of the export quota right of that estate whose tea he purchased to the extent needed to effect export of the tea purchased. The purchases were thus made only on the basis that the export rights of the seller would be transferred to the buyer and on the basis of these transfers the purchasers obtained export licences from Government for exporting the tea and effected the exports. The purchases were made by agents of foreign principals and it was part of the contractual duty of these agents vis-a-vis the principals to consign the goods purchased to them without avoidable delay. There was proof by the certificates produced that these agents had fulfilled their obligations to their principals and had shipped the goods bought as early as practicable to foreign destinations.\n\nThe principal contention urged by the learned Advocate-General of Kerala to persuade us to hold that the sales did not \"occasion the export\" was based on two circumstances: (!) that it was not part of the contract between the assessees and their buyers that the goods shall only be exported and not sold in the local market. In other words., it was urged that in the absence of such a specific term of contract it would have been open to the . buyers to have diverted the goods from being exported and to have sold them locally. This was so far as the contractual relationship between the assessee-sellers and the buyers from them under the sale was concerned, (2) dealing next with the effect of the provisions of the Tea Act, 1953 and the rules framed thereunder on the sales effected by the assessees, the submission was that s. 21 and other provisions of the Tea Act, 1953 merely enabled an export to be effected and did not require the goods in regard tci which they were issued to be exported. In other words, it was stressed that the Tea Act did not impose any obligation on the quota holder or his transferee\n\nAyYangar, J.\n\nBenGorm Nilgiri Plantations Company, Ooonoor\n\ntind Otlier1J\n\nBalu Tax Ojficer,\n\nSpecial Circle,\n\nEfflllkulam\n\nand Othf'rs\n\nAlf!lllngar; J.\n\nto export the goods covered by the quota and that consequently the buyer-even after taking a transfer of the export quota rights alongwith his purchase was not compelled by law to exp?rt and was not precluded from failing to export and sellmg the goods locally, On this reasoning the argument was that here was a purchase under which the purchaser was free to export or not to export and the mere fact that he chose to export would not render the sale to him one which occasioned the export or one \"in the course of export\".\n\nWe consider that these arguments do not sufficiently take into account the actualities of the situation, but proceed on investing on formal requirements a significance which is not warranted.\n\nWhen learned counsel says that there was no term in the contract between the seller and the buyer that the goods purchased were not to be sold locally but have to be exported, he is right only in the sense that it is not any express term of the contract. But could it be said that that was not the implicit common understanding on which the entire transaction was concluded. The buyer was not interested in the purchase except on terms of the export quota rights being transferred to him and that was why the transfer of the export right was effected or contracted to be effected as part and parcel of the sale of the goods. Again, the buyer was an agent, who as we have stated earlier was not free to deal with the tea purchased by effecting a loGal sale, but was under an obligation to his foreign principal to export the goods purchased to a foreign destination. It was with such a buyr that the assessee entered into the transaction of sale.\n\nOn these facts we are satisfied that it was part of the understanding between the selle~ and the buyer, inferrable from all the circumstances attendant on the transaction that the buyer was, bound to export. Pausing here, we would add that, we understand that importance is attached in this context to the need of a term in the sale contract laying an obligation on the part of the buyer to export only for the purpose of demonstrating the intimate connection between the sale and the export for establishing that it was the sale that occasioned the export. If we are right, then what is of significance is the real and common intention of the two parties to the transaction-whether they contemplated the good~ purchased being sold locally, or whether they intended the goods sold being only exported and not whether there is such a term in the contract between the parties.\n\nComing next to the contention that the Tea Act does not compel export of goods covered by the quotas granted, we might mention that no evidence was led as to the prices\n\n' •\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS 723\n\nprevailing in the local market as compared to that in the 1964 foreign countries where the principals of the resident buyers Ben Gorm resided, which would have disclosed whether a local sale of Nilgiri Plantations\n\nthe tea bought ostensibly fo\"r export was in a commercial Company, Coonoor\n\n. . h b d f 'b'I' h h 'f \"nd Othm sense w1thm t e oun s o poss1 11ty, t oug 1 one went v, by the rationale underlying the provisions of the Tea Act Sales Tax Officer, and in particular ss. 17. 21 and 22, one gets the impression s~~~:i,,,?'~ 1 '• that export quota rights were considered to have a considerand 011, rs able value in the market which would be some indication that a buyer with an export quota would never sell in the Ayyangar, J. local market. Thus it might be that even though the statute does not in terms prohibit internal sale of tea purchased alongwith export quota rights, this could be explained by the circumstance that the right to export tea is considered a privilege which secures economic advantages to the exporter and hence there was no need for any statutory compulsion to do so. We are making this observation because Parlianient and the Central Government are keen on promoting exports and in the case of some commodities like sugar where the external price is lower than the local price. the regulations framed in that behalf require exports to be effected under compulsion. We consider therefore that the absence of a compulsive provision in the Tea Act requiring export of the quantity allotted to the estates, is not very material and that Parliament might well have left it optional with the estate owners• to export seeing that economic factors provided the requisite compulsion.\n\nIf there was a contract or understanding between the buyer and seller by which the latter was to export the goods bought, it is conceded the sale of the assessee did occasion the export and in our view on the facts established, we consider this condition satisfied.\n\nWe would therefore allow the appeals and set aside the assessment in so far as they included the sales involved in these appeals.\n\nORDER\n\nIn accor.dace wit!i the opinion of the majority, the appeals are d1Sm1ssed with costs. One hearing fee.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 123, "entities": [{"text": "BEN GORM NILGIRI PLANTATIONS COMPANY,\n\nCOONOOR AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BEN GORM NILGIRI PLANTATIONS COMPANY, COONOOR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SALES TAX OFFICER, SPECIAL CIRCLE, ERNAKU-\n\nLAM AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SALES TAX OFFICER, SPECIAL CIRCLE, ERNAKULAM AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 187, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 206, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. 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J., Shah and Sikri, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1765, "end_char": 1769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (per Gajendragadkar, C. J., Shah and Sikri, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1774, "end_char": 1779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (per Gajendragadkar, C. 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In the present case the sale and the export being related to each other in the sense of one leading to the other are therefore within Art.", "canonical_name": "Ayyanga,-"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4558, "end_char": 4572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1963] 1 S.C.R. 404", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5627, "end_char": 5645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Even though the Tea Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Salea Tax Officer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6361, "end_char": 6378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Salea Tax Officer,\n\nSpecial Circle,\n\nErMhlam aad Otkera\n\nBAall, J.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, I. B. 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The dissenting Opinion of WANCHOO and AYYANGAR JJ.", "canonical_name": "Ayyanga,-"}}, {"text": "Special Circle Ernakulam assessed the appellants under the Travancore- Cochin General Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6868, "end_char": 6967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7188, "end_char": 7202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Circle Ernakulam assessed the appellants under the Travancore- Cochin General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Special Circle Ernakulam assessed the appellants under the Travancore- Cochin General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7259, "end_char": 7279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants then petitioned the High Court of Kerala for writs of certiorari quashing the orders of assessment and for writs of prohibition restraining the Sales-tax Officer from proceeding with the collection of tax in pursuance of the orders of assessment."}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7486, "end_char": 7498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaidialingam J., rejected the petitions and his order was confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala."}}, {"text": "Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vaidialingam J., rejected the petitions and his order was confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7799, "end_char": 7809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Parliament enacted the tea Act (19 of 1953) to provide for the control by the Union of the tea industry, including the control of cultivation of tea in."}}, {"text": "tea Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7822, "end_char": 7829, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8088, "end_char": 8095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8251, "end_char": 8269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sea or air to any place outside India other than a country or territory notified in that behalf by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette. \""}}, {"text": "s. 3(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8344, "end_char": 8351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8434, "end_char": 8447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8556, "end_char": 8566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8941, "end_char": 8951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Nilgiri Pla1'lalioM Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8967, "end_char": 9005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 19 authorises the Central Nilgiri Pla1'lalioM Government to declare export allotments of tea for ead1 Oomn~:\"\"\"'\n\nfinancial year, and by s. 20 it is provided that any tea estate a v. shall, subject to conditions as may be prescribed, have the 8't' Ti0 '?"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9086, "end_char": 9091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9282, "end_char": 9292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9611, "end_char": 9616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala-intemal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10022, "end_char": 10036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Trade in tea in the State of Kerala-intemal as well as export-is carried on through certain defined channels."}}, {"text": "Mis. T. Stanes & Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10290, "end_char": 10319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The manufactured tea in chests is then sent to Mis."}}, {"text": "Willingdon Island", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10348, "end_char": 10365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. Stanes & Company Ltd. who warehouse the chests at Willingdon Island."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10671, "end_char": 10677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the auction sale, bids for tea chests with export quota rights are given by the agents or intermediaries in Cochin of foreign buyers."}}, {"text": "MI s. T.\n\nStanes & Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10744, "end_char": 10775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tea chests are delivered at the warehouses by MI s. T.\n\nStanes & Company Ltd. to the purchasers whose bids are accepted."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11769, "end_char": 11780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11997, "end_char": 12011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12319, "end_char": 12327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12567, "end_char": 12588, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12614, "end_char": 12618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13296, "end_char": 13307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13749, "end_char": 13755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants set out in their respective petitions the manner in which sales tax of tea chests were conducted at Fort Cochin and in certain petitions affidavits in rep)y even were not filed by the State of Kerala."}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13961, "end_char": 13978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the purchasers who had taken delivery of the goods from the manufacturers in Travancore-Cochin and in pursuance of the export licences obtained by the purchasers goods were exported_ but such subsequent export by the purchasers did not affect the character of the sales by the manufacturers to the purchasers."}}, {"text": "Ben Garno Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14662, "end_char": 14684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ben Garno Vaidialingam J., held that transactions of sale were g;~;,:,:; 1•;/:!;:;"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15318, "end_char": 15332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ben Gorm", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20658, "end_char": 20666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Does the co-existence of these circumstances, Ben Gorm impress upon the transactions of sale with the character of N(ilgiri Plan0tatio ..\n\nf h ."}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20980, "end_char": 20983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22306, "end_char": 22314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22480, "end_char": 22494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nilgiri PZanta1iona", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23698, "end_char": 23717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nilgiri PZanta1iona The first case which came before this Court in which Art.", "canonical_name": "Nilgiri PZanta1iona"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23771, "end_char": 23778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24489, "end_char": 24505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal Patanjali Sastri C.J., speaking for the Court observed that sales which occasioned export were within the scope of the exemption under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24624, "end_char": 24638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25131, "end_char": 25145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ben Gorm of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26475, "end_char": 26492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LlJV 1 ory Ben Gorm of India\"."}}, {"text": "Nilgiri Planta1io", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26496, "end_char": 26513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nilgiri Planta1io ..\n\nCompany, OOMtOOr In the State of Madras v. Gurviah Naidu and Company an<i 01/Nr• Ltd.('), S. R Das, Actg.", "canonical_name": "Nilgiri PZanta1iona"}}, {"text": "S. R Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26608, "end_char": 26616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nilgiri Planta1io ..\n\nCompany, OOMtOOr In the State of Madras v. Gurviah Naidu and Company an<i 01/Nr• Ltd.('), S. R Das, Actg."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26827, "end_char": 26841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27100, "end_char": 27114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(!)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28314, "end_char": 28328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1963] 1 S.C.R. 404", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 28893, "end_char": 28912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29263, "end_char": 29271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29723, "end_char": 29731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the appellants placed strong reliance upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in M. R. K. Abdul Salam and Company v. 'The Government of Madras(')."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29808, "end_char": 29825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the appellants placed strong reliance upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in M. R. K. Abdul Salam and Company v. 'The Government of Madras(')."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29945, "end_char": 29951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was a case in which a dealer in the State of Madras in hides and skins after purchasing raw hides tanned them and sent them to Kovai Tanned Leather Co.\n\nMadras who acted as the dealer's agent for sale."}}, {"text": "Kovai Tanned Leather Co.\n\nMadras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30027, "end_char": 30059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was a case in which a dealer in the State of Madras in hides and skins after purchasing raw hides tanned them and sent them to Kovai Tanned Leather Co.\n\nMadras who acted as the dealer's agent for sale."}}, {"text": "Kovai Tanned Leather Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30102, "end_char": 30130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kovai Tanned Leather Company sold the goods to Dharamsee Parpia ."}}, {"text": "Dharamsee Parpia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30149, "end_char": 30165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kovai Tanned Leather Company sold the goods to Dharamsee Parpia .", "canonical_name": "Dharamsee Parpia"}}, {"text": "Srivan Brothers <Eastern) Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30193, "end_char": 30222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who acted as an agent of Srivan Brothers <Eastern) Ltd .•\n\nLondon."}}, {"text": "Kovai Tanned Leather Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30273, "end_char": 30297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was another transaction between Kovai Tanned Leather Co. and Gordon Woodrolle and Company Ltd. who acted as agents for a foreign principal."}}, {"text": "Gordon Woodrolle and Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30302, "end_char": 30335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was another transaction between Kovai Tanned Leather Co. and Gordon Woodrolle and Company Ltd. who acted as agents for a foreign principal."}}, {"text": "Dharamsi Parpia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30440, "end_char": 30455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Salestax Tribunal refused to accept the transaction to Dharamsi Parpia as an export sale on the ground that Kovai Tanned Leather Company delivered the goods to the exporter- Dharamsi Parpia-and thereafter the xporter obtained the bills of lading, and that the sale became complete in the Madras State before shipment, and it was on that account not a sale in the course of export.", "canonical_name": "Dharamsee Parpia"}}, {"text": "Jagadisan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30807, "end_char": 30816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagadisan J .. speaking for the Court observed.:"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31140, "end_char": 31151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gordon Woodrolfe & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31988, "end_char": 32010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second transaction v. in'favour of Gordon Woodrolfe & Co. was found to be one Sal8 \"T.ax 0 0r."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33997, "end_char": 34011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Travancorhin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34068, "end_char": 34089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286(1)(b) of the Constitution and they, therefore, claim that the State of Travancorhin in which these sales took place was not entitled to impose sales tax upon these sales."}}, {"text": "Ayyarigar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34982, "end_char": 34991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyarigar, J.\n\nIt was presented in this form, relying on the decision of this Court in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Nut Factory(') where the learned Chief Justice observed:\n\n\"The word 'course' etymologically denotes movement from one point to another and the expression 'in the course of' not only implies a period of time during which the movement is in progress but postulates also a connected relation ... . . .. . .. . ."}}, {"text": "Art. 2860", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35513, "end_char": 35522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tea Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36502, "end_char": 36515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37442, "end_char": 37456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tea Act, 1953", "statute": "the Tea Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37646, "end_char": 37663, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nitgiri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39781, "end_char": 39788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the export and destroys the integrality of the two events Nitgiri J'/,.n/a1fo,.,"}}, {"text": "Ayyanga,-", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40256, "end_char": 40265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is hardly necessary to add that for and Otltm purposes relevant to the decision of the question before us\n\nAyyanga,-, J. there could be no difference in legal effec~ between a saie to a foreign buyer present in India to take delivery pf the goods for transport to his country and a sale to his resident agent for that purpose.", "canonical_name": "Ayyanga,-"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(J)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41525, "end_char": 41539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41995, "end_char": 42009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tea Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45109, "end_char": 45122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45219, "end_char": 45224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tea Act, 1953", "statute": "the Tea Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Tea Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45253, "end_char": 45266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tea Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45431, "end_char": 45438, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "AyYangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45508, "end_char": 45516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, it was stressed that the Tea Act did not impose any obligation on the quota holder or his transferee\n\nAyYangar, J.\n\nBenGorm Nilgiri Plantations Company, Ooonoor\n\ntind Otlier1J\n\nBalu Tax Ojficer,\n\nSpecial Circle,\n\nEfflllkulam\n\nand Othf'rs\n\nAlf!lllngar; J.\n\nto export the goods covered by the quota and that consequently the buyer-even after taking a transfer of the export quota rights alongwith his purchase was not compelled by law to exp?rt and was not precluded from failing to export and sellmg the goods locally, On this reasoning the argument was that here was a purchase under which the purchaser was free to export or not to export and the mere fact that he chose to export would not render the sale to him one which occasioned the export or one \"in the course of export\".", "canonical_name": "Ayyanga,-"}}, {"text": "Coming next to the contention that the Tea Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48204, "end_char": 48250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Nilgiri Plantations", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48610, "end_char": 48629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming next to the contention that the Tea Act does not compel export of goods covered by the quotas granted, we might mention that no evidence was led as to the prices\n\n' •\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS 723\n\nprevailing in the local market as compared to that in the 1964 foreign countries where the principals of the resident buyers Ben Gorm resided, which would have disclosed whether a local sale of Nilgiri Plantations\n\nthe tea bought ostensibly fo\"r export was in a commercial Company, Coonoor"}}, {"text": "Coonoor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48698, "end_char": 48705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming next to the contention that the Tea Act does not compel export of goods covered by the quotas granted, we might mention that no evidence was led as to the prices\n\n' •\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS 723\n\nprevailing in the local market as compared to that in the 1964 foreign countries where the principals of the resident buyers Ben Gorm resided, which would have disclosed whether a local sale of Nilgiri Plantations\n\nthe tea bought ostensibly fo\"r export was in a commercial Company, Coonoor"}}, {"text": "Tea Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48847, "end_char": 48854, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48892, "end_char": 48898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Coming next to the contention that the Tea Act", "statute": "Coming next to the contention that the Tea Act"}}, {"text": "Parlianient", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49555, "end_char": 49566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are making this observation because Parlianient and the Central Government are keen on promoting exports and in the case of some commodities like sugar where the external price is lower than the local price."}}, {"text": "consider therefore that the absence of a compulsive provision in the Tea Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49817, "end_char": 49893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_70_81_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "March 6\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nSUNIL KUMAR PAUL\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.f\n\nCriminal Law-Offence under s. 409 I.P.C.-Case allotted for trial to Special Court-Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, if could try offences under Criminal Procedure Code, at the same trial-Alteration of conviction by High Court to one under s. 420-Legality thereof- Absence of charge under s. 420-Indian Penal Code 1860 (45. of 1860), ss. 409, 420-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 236, 231-West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 (XXI of 1949) s. 4(2).\n\nThe appellant was tried and convicted by the Special Judge for an offence under s. 409 I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000. On appeal, the High Court altered his conviction from an offence under s. 409 to one under s. 420 I.P.C. for cheating the employees of the State Bank, by representing a bll! as a genuine bill drawn by the Sub-Divisional Health Officer, and thereby dishonestly inducing the Bank's Staff to make over the sum of Rs. 1,763-6-0 to hlin and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year and to a fine of Rs. 2,000.\n\nOn appeal by certificate the appellant mainly contended\n\n(i) that a case under s. 420 I.P.C. could not be allotted for 'trial to a Special Court by the Government when such an offence was not committed by a public servant while purporting to act as such public servant; (ii\\ that the Special Court could not take recourse to the provision of s. 237 Code of Criminal Procedure and if it could, the requirements of s. 237 Code of Criminal Procedure were not satisfied and .consequently the High Court could not have altered the conviction from s. 409 I.P.C. to one under s. 420 and (iii) that the accused had been prejudiced on account of the absence of a charge under s. 420\n\nI.P.C.\n\nHeld (i) that on the facts proved it must be held that the offence under s. 420 committed by the appellant would be committed by him as a public servant purporting to act as such, and that a case involving this offence also could have been allotted to the Special Court by the Government for trial. The Special Court was, therefore, competent to try the accused for this offence if the facts proved established it. Besides, the appellant could be tried by the Special Court for this offence in view of the proviso to s. 4 of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act.\n\nBhajahari Monda! v. State of West Bengal, [1959] S.C.R. 1276, distinguished.\n\n(ii) that at the trial of the appellant for an offence under s. 409 I.P.C., in this case, the appellant could have also been charged for an offence under s. 420 l.P.C., in view of s. 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COURT REPORTS 71\n\n1n view of the proviso to sub-s. (I) of s. 4 of the Act, the 1964 Special Court could have tried the appellant for the offence .1 Kp 1 under s. 420 I.P.C. It did not actually try him for that offence. ' \"\"' ; mar au It was however, open to it and to the appellate court to con-state of w; st Ben9'JI vict him of the offence under s. 420 l.P.C., when trying for an - offence under s. 409 I.P.C., in view of s. 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n(iii) that fin the present case the appellant could not be said to be prejudiced in his conviction under s. 420 I.P.C. on account of the non-framing of the charge, and consequent nontrial, under s. 420 I.P.C. In fact, no question of i!Tegularity in the trial arises. The framing of the charge under s. 420 I.P.C. was not essential and s. 237 Code of Criminal Procedure itself justifies his conviction of the offence under s. 420 if that be proved on the findings on the record.\n\nCase Law discussed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1961.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated June 15,\n\n1961. of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 745 of 1959.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.\n\nP. K. Chakraborty and P. K. Bose, for the respondent.\n\nMarch 6, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was deliver ed by\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-Sunil Kumar Paul has pre RaghubarD.1yat, I ferred this appeal, after obtaining a certificate from the Calcutta High Court under Art. 134(l)(c) of the Constitution.\n\nThe facts leading to the appeal are these.\n\nThe appellant was a clerk in the office of the Sub-Divisional Health Officer at Barrackpore in 1955-56. He used to prepare bills of the establishment, to present them at the Sub-treasury and later present them at the State Bank at Barrackpore, to receive payment in cash and to make over that amount to the Sub-Divisional Health Officer. Certain bills were drawn under the heading '38-Medical'. Certain bills were to be drawn under the heading '39-Public Health'.\n\nSome other bills were drawn under other headings.\n\nOn October 5. 1956, the appellant presented a bill for Rs. 1.769 out of which a sum of Rs. 5-10-0 was to be credited in the Postal Life Insurance Ledger and the balance of Rs. 1,763-6-0 was to be received in cash. This bill was duly passed by the Sub-Treasury and was subsequently presented to the Bank on October, 6, 1956 for payment of Rs. 1,763-6-0.\n\nThe Bank paid this amount to the appellant. The amount was\n\n1964 not paid to the Sub-Divisional Health Officer. In fact, the &nil Kumar Paul records of the Office of ~~ Sl!b-Divisional Health Ocer did v. not refer to any such bill bemg prepared and submitted to 81a1e of Ww Bengal the Sub-Treasury and the Ban~ for payment. .\n\nBagAubar Dayal, J.\n\nA bill for practically the same items which were mentioned in the bill cashed on October 6, was however presented on October I, 1956. It was for an amount of Rs. 1,767 out of which Rs. 5-10-0 were to be credited to the PLI account ledger and the balance of Rs. 1,761-6-0 were to be paid in cash. The amount of this bill was received on October 1, and was duly handed over to the Sub-Divisional Health.\n\nOfficer. It may be mentioned that this bill cashed on October 1, 1956 was at first prepared for Rs. 1,769 and the amount to be received in cash was to be Rs. 1.763-6-0 but prior to this encashment, a correction was made at some stage, and the bill was reduced by Rs. 2 in the total amount and consequently in the amount to be paid in cash.\n\nThe fact of the presentation of a bill for its encashment of Rs. 1,763-6-0 on October 6, 1956 came to the notice of the Sub-Divisional Health Officer a.t the instance of the Accoul)tant General and on enquiry it was found that no such bill had been actually presented by his office for encashment and that rio such amount was received by him. This led to a complaint and further enquiries and investigation which ended in the prosecution of the appellant.\n\nThe case was made over to the Special Judge by the Government in view of the provisions of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 (W. B. Act XXI of 1949), hereinafter called the Act, as it involved an offence punishable under s. 409 I.P.C. The Special Judge tried the appellant for that offence and convicted him and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000. The appellant went in appeal to the High Court of Calcutta. The High Court agreed with the appellant's contenion that no offence under s. 409 l.P.C. had been made out, but held that he was proved to have committed an. offence under s. 420 I.P.C. It accordingly altered his conviction from an offence under s. 409 l.P.C. to one under s. 420 l.P.C., for cheating the employees of the State Bank, Barrackpore, by representing that the bill for Rs. 1,769 gross and Rs. 1.763-6-0 cash drawn on October 6, 1956, was a genuine bill drawn by the Sub-Divisional Health Offieer, and thereby dishonestly inducing the Bank's staff to make over the sum of Rs. 1,763-6-0 to him and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year and to a fine of Rs. 2,000. It is against this order that this appeal ha.s been preferred.\n\nThe facts found by the High Court are sufficient to 1964 justify the finding that the appellant committed the offence Suni! Kumar Pa.J\n\nunder s. 420 l.P.C. Learned counsel for the appellant has 811 ,, wY't 8 1 I h f II , . aeo, \" maa 'llrgec t e o owing pomts: __\n\n(I) A case involving an offence unde1 s. 420 l.P.C. cannot be allotted for trial to a Special Court by the State Government when such an offence is not committed by a public servant while purporting to act as such public servant.\n\n(2) The Special Court could not take recourse to the provisions of s. 237 Cr. P.C., and if it could, the requirements of s. 237 Cr. P.C. were not satisfied in the present case, and that consequently the High Court could not have altered the conviction of the appellant from ari. offence under ' s. 409 l.P.C. to one under s. 420.\n\n(3) The ingredients of an offence under s. 420 I.P.C.\n\nere neither lleged nor proved by the prosecution. \\\n\n(4) The accused has 'been prejudiced on account of the absence of the necessary allegations and the omission to frame a charge for an offence under s. 420 l.P.C. and therefore the provisions of s. 537 Cr. P. C. would not cure this defect in trial.\n\nTo appreciate the first contention, reference may be made to the relevant provisions of the Act. They are:\n\n\"4(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, or in any other law, the offences specified in the Schedule shall be triable by Special Courts only:\n\nProvided that when trying any case, a Special Court may also try any offence other than an offence specified in the Schedule. with which the accused may under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same trial.\n\n(2) The distribution amongst Special Courts of cases involving offences specified in the Schedule, to be tried by them, shall be made by the State Government\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\n19Gl 5.\n\ntt; unil Kumar Paul\n\nSlate of U' est lJen.g{(l\n\n(2) Save as provided in sub-section (I) ......... the provi- Rauhubar Dayal, J, sions the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings of a Special Court; and for the purposes of the said provisions, a Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a Jury, and a person conducting a proseC1Jtion before a Special Court snail be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.\"\n\nTHE SCHEDULE • • • * •\n\n2. An offence punishable under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, if committed by a public servant or by a person dealing with property helonging to Government as an agent of Government in respect 9f propertywith which he is entrusted, or over which he has dominion\n\nin his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as such agent.\n\n3. An offence punishable under section 417 or section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, if committed by a public servant or by a person dealing with property belonging to Government as an agent of Government, while purporting to act as such public servant or agent.\n\n• ' The Government notification allotting the present case to the Special Court is not on the record and therefore what its actual contents were cannot be stated with any precision.\n\nIt may however be assumed that it mentioned the offence involved in the case to be that under s. 409 I.P.C., and, possibly, did not state the various facts which went to establish that offence against the appellant.\n\nSection 409 1.P.C. is mentioned in the Schedule referred to in sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the Act. The State Government was therefore competent to allot the case involving that offence to the Special Court. In fact it had ((JI allot the case to the Special Court in view of the provision of sub-s. (!) of s. 4 to the effect that the offences specified in the Schedule shall be triable by Special Courts only. The question therefore really is whether the Special Court could try the appellant\n\n- ' ·.,. '\n\n7 S.C.R. ... SUPRfilIE COURT REPORTS 75\n\nfor the offence uder s'. 420 I.P.C. An -offence under s. 420 196l l.P.C. when committed in certain circumstances is also mensunil Kumar Paul tioned in the Schedule. It has to be tried by Special Courts v. 1 only when it is committed by a public servant while purport- 81\"\" a/ West Benga ing to act as such. There is no doubt that the appellant is a Raghubar Dayal, J. pub!ic servant. This has not been disputed.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Mukherjee, has urged that the expression 'while purporting to act as such public servant' be construed to mean 'while purporting to act in the discharge of official duties' and that presentation of a false bill could not be in the discharge of official duty.\n\nSuch presentation may not be in the discharge of official duty, but the question is different and is as to whether the presentation of a false bill was made by the public servant purporting to do so in the discharge of his duties. The appellant did present the false bill purporting to present it in the discharge of his duties as a clerk of the Office of the Sub-\n\nDivisional Health Officer who was duly authorised to present bills and cash them.\n\nReliance is placed on the case reported as Bhajahari Monda! v. The State or West Bengal(') in support of the contention that the appellant should not have been tried by the Special Court of the offence under s. 420 _ I.P.C. when the case was allotted as one involving an offence under s. 409 I.P.C. The facts of that case were very different. The order allotting the case mentioned the offence of which the accused was to be tried to be an offence under s. 161 read withs. 116 I.P.C. The order was made on November 27, 1952. Prior to this date, on July 28, 1952, abetment of an offence under s. 161 I.P.C. was made a distinct offence under s. 165-A I.P.C. by the Criminal Law Amendment Act XLVI of 1952.\n\nAn offence under s. l 65A was not mentioned in the Schedule to the Act as it stood on November 27, 1952. This Court held that the notification of the Government making over the case to the Special Court was bad as the case made over related to no existing offence. Such cannot be said of the Government notification allotting the case in the present appeal to the Special Court, as on the date of such notification there existed an offence under s. 409 I.P.C. and it was included in the Schedule to the Act.\n\nOn the facts proved, it is not to be doubted that the appellant presented the bill for Rs. 1,763-6-0 at the State Bank on October' 6, purporting to act -as the clerk of the Sub-Divisional Health Officer. The bill presented was on behalf of that officer. The Bank made the payment to him as\n\n(') [1959] S.C.R 1276.\n\n·-~-:'J/./\\\"_'\": ; \\\n\n- ( ' ' >, I\n\n',\".,) \\'.'k-' ' '\"· ~-~'-.- ('~-~:.\"; . \\ ·>t\" ,· . \\ . ' .76 \\''. • . SUPREME COtJR~ REPORTS [1964\n\n~.\\ '----o-~---- \" . '1954 . the messenger of that officer duly authorised to receive pay- SunilK;;;;;;,. Paul ment in cash. It follo-ws that the offence under s. 420 com-\n\n.· v. mitted by the appellant would be committed by him as a State of IV est Be1VJal public servant purporting to act as such, and that a case in-\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J. volving this olfence also could have been allotted to the\n\nSpecial Court by the State Government for trial. The Special Court was therefore competent to try the accused for \"this offence if the facts proved established it.\n\nApart from the consideration that the offence of cheating of which the appellant-accused has been convicted fell within the offences mentioned in the Schedule, the appellant could be tried by the Special Court for this offence in view of the proviso to s. 4. The proviso authorizes the Special Court, when trying a case involving an offence specified in the Schedule to try any offence other than that offence with which the accused may be charged at the same trial in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe accused could be charged with an offence under s. 420 I.P.C. if he could be tried for this offence at the trial for an offence under s. 409 I.P.C. He could be so tried in view of ss. 236 and 237 Cr. P. C.\n\nIt is urged for the appellant that the prov1S1ons of s. 236 Cr. P. C. would apply only to those cases where there be no doubt about the facts which can be proved and a doubt arises as to which of the several offences had been committed on the proved facts. Sections 236 and 237 read:\n\n\"236. If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences.\n\nIllustrations\n\n(a) A is accused of an act which may amount to theft; or receiving stolen property, or criminal breach\n\ndf trust or chea.ting.\n\nHe may be charged with theft, receiving stolen property, criminal breach of trust and cheating, or he may be charged with having committed theft, or receiving stolen property, or criminal breach of trust or cheating .\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'I'S 77\n\n237. If. in the case mentioned in section 236, the 1964\n\naccused is charged with one offence, and it s..,.il Kumar Pam appears in evidence that he committed a different Staie of ;;;,,1 Bengal offence for which he might have been charged - under the provisions of that section, he may be h.OOr Dayal, J. convicted of the offence' which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it.\n\nIllustration\n\nA is charged with theft. It appears that he committed the offence of criminal breach of trust, or that of receiving stolen goods. He may be convicted of criminal breach of trust or of receiving stolen goods (as the case may be) though he was not charged with such offence.\"\n\nThe framing of a charge under s. 236 is, in the nature of things, earlier than the stage when it can be said what facts have been proved, a stage which is reached when the court delivers its judgment. The power of the Court to frame various charges contemplated by s. 236 Cr. P. C. therefore arises when it cannot be said with any definiteness, either by the prosecutor or by the Court, that such and such facts would be proved. The Court has at the time of framing the\n\nchar; es, therefore to consider what different offences could be-made out on the basis of the allegations made by the prosecution in the complaint or in the charge submitted by the investigating agency or by the allegations made by the various prosecution witnesses examined prior to the framing of the charge. All such possible offences could be charged in view of the provisions of s. 236 Cr. P. C. as it can be reasonably said that it was doubtful asto which of the offences the facts which could be ultimately proved would constitute. The facts which must have been alleged prior to the stage of the framing of the charge in the present case must have been what had been stated in the charge-sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer, 24-Parg'anas, which is printed at p. 3 of the appeal record. This charge-sheet narrates in the column meant for the name of offences and circumstances connected with it:\n\n\"that on the 6th October 1956 Sunil Kumar Paul, a\n\nPublic servant in the employment of the office of the Sub-Divisional Health Officer. Barrackpore i.e., (clerk) dishonestly drew Rs. 1,763-6-0 excluding Postal Life Insurance deduction of Rs. 5-10-0 from the State Bank of India, Barrackpore Branch by submitting a false duplicate Estt. Pay Bill\n\nBunil Kumar Paul ...\n\nStale of WeBI Bengal\n\nunder head 39 for the month of September 1956 for the office of the said S.D.H.O., Barrackpore.\n\nThe money drawn was not credited to the office of the Sub-Divisional Health Officer, Barrackpore.\"\n\nllO(IAul>ar Dayal, J. I .\n\n. II . h f h h . . t 1s practlca y on t ese acts t at t e conviction of the appellant for an offence under s. 420 I.P.C. has been founded. It follows that the Special Court could therefore have framed a charge under s. 420 I.P.C. at the relevant time if it had been of the opinion that it was doubtful whether these facts constitute an offence under s. 409 I.P.C. as stated in the charge-sheet or an offence under s. 420 I.P.C.\n\nWhen a charge under s. 420 I.P.C. could have been framed by the trial Court by virtue of s. 236 Cr. P.C. that Court or the appellate Court can, in law, convict the appellant of this offence instead of an offence under s. 409 I.P.C. if it be of the view that the offence of cheating had been established. This would be in accordance with the provisions of s. 237 Cr. P. C.\n\nIn Begu v. The King Emperor(') ss. 236 and 237 were construed by Viscount Haldane thus:\n\n\"The illustration makes the meaning of these wore.ls\n\nquite plain. A man may be convicted of an offence, although there has been no charge in respect of it, if the evidence is such as to establish a charge that might have been made. That is what happened here. The three men who 'were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment were convicted of making away with the evidence of the crime by assisting in taking away the body. They were not charged with that formally, but they were tried on evidence which brings the case under s. 237.\"\n\nThis was approved by this Court in Ramaswamy Nadar\n\nv. The State of Madras('). In this case, the accused, acquitted of an offence under s. 420 1.P.C. was convicted by the High Court of an offence under s. 403 J.P.C. This Court held that the High Court could do so. On facts, however, this Court did not find the offence under s. 403, proved.\n\nIn the State of A ndhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbaiah(') it was held that while a Special Judge appointed under s. 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XL VI of 1952) had jurisdiction to try cases under s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, he could, under s. 7(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment\n\n(') 52 I.A. 191.\n\n(') [1958] S.C.R. 739.\n\n(') [1962] 1 S.C.R. 194, 203.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREi\\IE COURT REPORTS 79\n\nAct try other offences under the Code of C:riminal Pro- 1964 cedure if the accused could be charged with them atsunil Kumar Paul the same trial and that therefore the accused could be tried 8\n\nv. B al at the trial for an offence under s. 5 of the Preventale of West \"\"!! tion of Corruption Act for an offence under s. 120B read R09hu!>ar Dayal, J. with ss. 466, 467: 420 I.P.C. and that the other accused who had abetted the commission of these offences could also be tried. Sub-s. (3) of s. 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act provided that when trying any case a Special Judge might also try any offence other than an offence specified in • s. 6 with which the accused might, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same trial.\n\nIn support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellant referred to the case reported as Nanak Chand v.\n\nThe State of Punjab(') wherein it was stated at p. 1212: . \"The provisions of section 236 can apply only in cases where there is no doubt about the facts which can be proved but a doubt arises as to which of several offences have been committed on the proved facts in which case any number of charges can be framed and tried or alternative charges can be framed .............. .In the present case there is no doubt about the facts and if the allegation against the appellant that he had caused the injuries to the deceased with takwa was established by evidence, then there could be no doubt that the offence of murder had been committed.\" This does not help the appellant's contention as the allegations in that case if proved could establish, according to the Court, the offence of murder only and therefore there was no room for any doubt about the nature of offence committed and for the application of s. 236 Cr. P. C. In that case, the appellant was tried along with others for an offence under s. 302 read with s. 149 I.P.C. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant and a few others under s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. The High Court acquitted the others and altered the conviction of the appellant to the offence under s. 302 I.P.C. It was, in this setting, that this Court held that on the basis of the specific allegation that the appellant had struck the deceased with a takwa, there could be no doubt of that fact constituting an offence under s. 302 and not an offence under s. 302 read with s. 149 I.P.C.\n\nWe therefore hold thatiit the trial of the appellant for an offence under s. 409 I.P.C., in this case, the appellant could have also been charged for an offence under s. 420 I. P. C. in view of s. 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n\n1984 It is then urged for the appellant that under the proviso Su .. il Kumar Paul to s. 4 of the Act, the Special Court can try any other offence s1a1e of ;;,1 Be al only when the accused is spifically charged with that . _ ng offence. The language of the proviso does not lead to such a /laglobar Dayal, J. conclusion. It provides for the trial of the accused for any other offence provided the accused could be charged with that offence at the san.e trial under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The proviso does not say that the charge must be framed, though of course, if the trial Court itself tries the accused for a certain offence, it will ordinarily frame a charge. The proviso empowers a Court to try the accused for that offence and has nothing to do with the power of the trial court or of the appellate Court to record a conviction for any other offence when an accused is being tried with respect to an offence mentioned in the Sch.edule. The Court's power to take recourse to the provisions which empower it to record a conviction for an offence not actually charged, depends on other provisions of the Code and the Act.\n\nSection 5(2) of the Act provides that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act, would apply to the proceedings of the Special Court and for the purposes of _these provisions, the Special Court could be 4eemed to be a Court of Sessions.\n\nThere is nothing in the provisions of s. 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Section 237 simply empowers the Court to convict an accused of the offence with which he could have been charged under s. 236, even when he had not been charged with it. Section 237 really deals with the final orders which the Court can pass on a trial of an accused for a certain offence. In view of the proviso to sub-s. (!) of s. 4, the Special Court could have tried the appellant for the offence under s. 420 I.P.C. It did not actually try him for that offence .. It was however open to it and to the appellate Court to convict him of the offence under s. 420 I.P.C. when trying for an offence under s. 409 l.P.C. in view of s. 237 of the Code.\n\nIt has also been urged for the appellant that the proviso to s. 4 does not give any power to the Special Court to try an offence which be independent of the offence mentioned in the allotment order. That -is to say, the Special Court, in this case, could have tried the appellant only for such offences which will be ill' some way related to the offence under s. 409 I.P.C. It is further urged that the in'gredients of the offence under s. 420 I.P .C. are absolutely different from the ingredients of the offence under s. 409 I.P.C.\n\nThe ingredients of two offences must be different fom 1964 one another and it is therefore not necessary to consider Sunil Kumar Paul whether the ingredients of the two offences are in any way 8 .r wv.\n\nB 1 late oJ es~ enJ, Ja related. The Court has to see, for the purpose of the proviso, _ whether the accused could be charged with any offenceRaghubar Dayal, J. other than the one referred to in the allotment order, in view of the provisions of the Code. There is nothing in the proviso which could lead to the construction that any limitations other than those laid down by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were to affect the nature of the offence which could be tried by the Special Court.\n\nWe are theref9re of opinion that the Special Court could try the appellant for the offence under s. 420 I.P.C. and that therefore the High Court was right in altering his conviction from that under s. 409 to s. 420 1.P.C.\n\nWe have already referred to the statement in the chargesheet that the appellant presented a false bill to the State Bank and cashed it. This allegation is sufficient for the purpose of the offence under s. 420 I.P.C. It was not necessary to allege or to prove that the appellant himself had prepared the false bill. Such an allegation could not be made in the present case in particular, as the bill which was cashed on October 6, could not be traced. The presentation of the bill for encashment carries with it the representation that it is a genuine bill and therefore the allegations in the case attri buted misrepresentation to the appellant at the time he presented the bill.\n\nIt may be mentioned here that if the bill had been a genuine bill, the offence made out in the present case would have been an offence under s. 409 f P.C. In the circumstances, therefore, the appellant cannot be said to be prejudiced in his conviction under s. 420 l.P.C. on account bf the non-framing of the charge, and consequent non-trial, under s. 42~ I.P.C. In fact, in the circumstances of the case, no questwn of irregularity in the trial arises. The framing of the charge under s. 420 I.P.C. was not essential and s 237 Cr. P. C. itself justifies his conviction of the offence nder s. 420 if that be proved on the findings on the record.\n\nThe last contention for the appellant was that the sentnce is evee. We do not consider a sentence of I year's ngorous 1mpnsonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000 severe.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 237, "entities": [{"text": "SUNIL KUMAR PAUL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUNIL KUMAR PAUL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. 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unil Kumar Paul\n\nSlate of U' est lJen.g{(l\n\n(2) Save as provided in sub-section (I) ......... the provi- Rauhubar Dayal, J, sions the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings of a Special Court; and for the purposes of the said provisions, a Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a Jury, and a person conducting a proseC1Jtion before a Special Court snail be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.\"", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10053, "end_char": 10085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10483, "end_char": 10494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10502, "end_char": 10519, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10835, "end_char": 10846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10850, "end_char": 10861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10869, "end_char": 10886, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11344, "end_char": 11350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11351, "end_char": 11356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11467, "end_char": 11478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11544, "end_char": 11548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11767, "end_char": 11771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12037, "end_char": 12042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12062, "end_char": 12068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12460, "end_char": 12469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Mukherjee, has urged that the expression 'while purporting to act as such public servant' be construed to mean 'while purporting to act in the discharge of official duties' and that presentation of a false bill could not be in the discharge of official duty."}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13377, "end_char": 13383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13386, "end_char": 13391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13454, "end_char": 13460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13461, "end_char": 13466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13623, "end_char": 13629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13646, "end_char": 13651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "November 27, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13675, "end_char": 13692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "116 I.P.C. 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under the provisions of that section, he may be h.OOr Dayal, J. convicted of the offence' which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it."}}, {"text": "s. 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17932, "end_char": 17938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18167, "end_char": 18173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18757, "end_char": 18763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th October 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19299, "end_char": 19315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This charge-sheet narrates in the column meant for the name of offences and circumstances connected with it:\n\n\"that on the 6th October 1956 Sunil Kumar Paul, a\n\nPublic servant in the employment of the office of the Sub-Divisional Health Officer."}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar Paul", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19316, "end_char": 19332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This charge-sheet narrates in the column meant for the name of offences and circumstances connected with it:\n\n\"that on the 6th October 1956 Sunil Kumar Paul, a\n\nPublic servant in the employment of the office of the Sub-Divisional Health Officer.", "canonical_name": "SUNIL KUMAR PAUL"}}, {"text": "State Bank of India, Barrackpore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19544, "end_char": 19576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5-10-0 from the State Bank of India, Barrackpore Branch by submitting a false duplicate Estt."}}, {"text": "Bunil Kumar Paul", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19632, "end_char": 19648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pay Bill\n\nBunil Kumar Paul ...\n\nStale of WeBI Bengal\n\nunder head 39 for the month of September 1956 for the office of the said S.D.H.O., Barrackpore.", "canonical_name": "SUNIL KUMAR PAUL"}}, {"text": "llO(IAul>ar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19873, "end_char": 19890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llO(IAul>ar Dayal, J. 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"end_char": 20559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20684, "end_char": 20690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 236 and 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20733, "end_char": 20748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Viscount Haldane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20767, "end_char": 20783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "236 and 237 were construed by Viscount Haldane thus:\n\n\"The illustration makes the meaning of these wore.ls\n\nquite plain."}}, {"text": "s. 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21312, "end_char": 21318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21458, "end_char": 21464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21524, "end_char": 21530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21648, "end_char": 21654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21778, "end_char": 21782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21790, "end_char": 21816, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21869, "end_char": 21873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21881, "end_char": 21909, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": 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{"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "/laglobar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24994, "end_char": 25009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The language of the proviso does not lead to such a /laglobar Dayal, J. conclusion."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25192, "end_char": 25218, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25859, "end_char": 25871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25919, "end_char": 25945, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26191, "end_char": 26197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26205, "end_char": 26231, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26286, "end_char": 26297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26405, "end_char": 26411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26456, "end_char": 26467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26616, "end_char": 26620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26693, "end_char": 26699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26700, "end_char": 26705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26844, "end_char": 26850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26851, "end_char": 26856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26891, "end_char": 26897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26916, "end_char": 26922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26998, "end_char": 27002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27297, "end_char": 27303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27304, "end_char": 27309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27374, "end_char": 27380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27456, "end_char": 27462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27463, "end_char": 27468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "offenceRaghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27809, "end_char": 27830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court has to see, for the purpose of the proviso, _ whether the accused could be charged with any offenceRaghubar Dayal, J. other than the one referred to in the allotment order, in view of the provisions of the Code."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28071, "end_char": 28097, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28280, "end_char": 28286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28287, "end_char": 28292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28381, "end_char": 28387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28391, "end_char": 28397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28609, "end_char": 28615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28616, "end_char": 28621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "October 6,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28826, "end_char": 28836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an allegation could not be made in the present case in particular, as the bill which was cashed on October 6, could not be traced."}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29229, "end_char": 29235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29346, "end_char": 29352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29437, "end_char": 29442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29444, "end_char": 29449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29574, "end_char": 29580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29581, "end_char": 29586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29610, "end_char": 29615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29678, "end_char": 29684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_724_733_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April J4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [196i}\n\nSTATE. BY NILRATAN SIRCAR, ENFORCEMENT\n\nOFFICER\n\nLAf91HMI NARAIN RAM NIWAS (M. HIDAYATULLAH AND RAGBUBAll DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Doculnents seized-Period JJTOVided by statute for retention of seized documents-Whether can be extended by Magistrate-Power of Magistrate in respect of retention of documents-Seizure made under special Act-Prot!isioas of Code relating to search whether applicable-Foreign E:l:-\n\nchange Regulation Act, 1947, sub-\". (3) of s. 19, s. 19-A-Code of; Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), ss. 5(2), 96, 98. 101, 102, 103.\n\nOn May 14, 1959, a number of documents were seized from the possession of the respondent by the Enforcement Officer in execution of a search warrant. The search warrant was issued by the Chief Presidency Magistrate under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The Dire<>- tor of Enforcement with the permission of the Chief Presidency Magistrate retained those seized documents far a period exceeding four months. On October 5, 1959, the respondent filed an application before the Chief Presidency Magistrate in which he claimed the return of the seized documents on the basis of the provision of s. 19-A of the Foreign Exchange ReguJation Act. On this applic.:tion the Chief Presidency Magistrate directed the return of all the documents to the respondent except those mentioned at items 2 and 7 of the search list. The respondent went up in revision against this order for the continued retention of the two documents, and the High Court allowed the revision and ordered the return of these documents also to the respondent. Against this order appeal was filed in this Court.\n\nHeld': (i) The Magistrate has no jurisdiction over the articles seized in execution of the search warrant issued under s. 19(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and that he cannot permit the retention of such documents by the Director of Enforcement after the expiry of the period he is entitiE<l to keep them in accordance with the provisions of s. 19-A 0£ the Act. The Enforcement Officer has a right under s. 19-A to retain the articles seized for a period not exceeding four months and it is not necessary for him to obtain permission from the Magistrate for retaining the seized documents within the stlFtutory period. Therefore, the Magistrate issuing the search warrant has nothing to do with the retention or disJ>osal of the documents seized in execution of the search warrant either during the statutory period of four months or after the expiry of that period. Mohammad Serajuddin v. R. C. Mishm, (1962] 1 Supp.\n\nS.C.R. 545, distinguished.\n\n(ii) In view of the specific provision for the issue of a search warrant under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, the provisions of ss. 96, 98 and Form No. 8 of Schedule V of the Code would not be applicable to the search\n\nwarrants issued under sub-s. (3) of s. 19. The provisions of ss. 101, 102, 103 of the Code will apply to searches under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act as there is no specific provision in the Act with respect to the conduct of the search.\n\n{iii) The provisions of s. 5(2) of the Code will not apply 1964 to an investigation conducted under the Act because the Act is , . a special Acll and it provides under s.19-A for the necessary in- tale, by N•lratan vestigation into the alleged suspected commission of an offence Si rear' 0;\":{orcemtnl\n\nunder the Act, by the DirectOr of Enforcement. ,\n\nv. r\n\n(iv) No express provision is necessary in the statute for the return of documents after the expiry of the statutory period.\n\nProvisions .are necessary for retaining documents of others and not for returning them to persons entitled. Therefore the docu ments seized have to be returned to the person from whose\n\npossession they had been seized after the expiry of the statutory period.\n\n(v) Under s.19-A of the Act the Director of Enforcement can justifiably retain with himself the documents seized till the final disposal of the proceedings taken under s.23 of the Act if the proceedings had commenced before the period of four months, during which he could keep the documents. In the present case he could not h1'.ve retained those documents beyond four months because no such p110ceeding had been commenced within 4 months.\n\nIn the present case proceedings under s.23 did start prior to the ocder for the return of documents. On the facts of this case it was held that the direction of the Magistrate in regard to the retention of documents was en order giving effect to the spirit behind the provision of s. 19-A.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 196 I. Appeal from the judgment and order dated June 20. 1960. of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1525 of 1959. ,.\n\nH. R. Khanna. K. L. Hathi and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nG. S. Pathak, R Datta. J. B. Dadacha11ji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.\n\nApril 14. 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nLakshmi Narain\n\nRamNiwaa\n\nRAGIRJBAll DAYAL, J.-This appeal, on certificate grant-.Ragh!War Dayal, J ed by the Calcutta High Court. is directed against an order of the High Court dated June 20. 1960 reversing the Order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate directing return of certain documents to the respondent. and has arisen in the following circumstances: On April 6. 1959. the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcuna. owered the issue of search warrants on the application of the Enforcement Ollicer. Enforcement Directnrate, Ministry of Finance. under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. 1947 (Act VII of 1947). The search warrant was issued on May 6, 1959. It required the production of documents seiz.ed. before the Magistrate. In execution of the search warrant. a, number of documents were seized from the possession of the respondent on May 14. 1959. The\n\nSltrte, by 1iilratJin Sircar, Enforcement\n\nOfficer\n\nLaksloni Jtarain\n\nRani .. Yiuw\n\nllagh11bar Duya.1, J.\n\nEnforcement Officer reported that day that a certaiJ room could not be searched and therefore further action on the search warrant was to be taken. He also noted in his application, for the Chief Presidency Magistrate's information:\n\n\"that the seized documents as per enclosed Seizure Memo have been kept with us. for scrutiny and those will be retained till the completion of the enquiry or the adjudication proceeding~ as the case may be and a report will be submitted lo Your Honour tpereafter.\"\n\nOn May 28, 1959, the Enforcement Officer applied to the Chief Presidency Magistrate for permission for the retention of the seized documents for a period of two months for the submission of further report in the matter. The Chief Presidency Magistrate granted the necessary permis; ion.\n\nSimilar permission was again granted on applications, by tl1e Chief Presidency Magistrate, on July 28 and September 28, )959.\n\nOn October 5, 1959, the respondent applied to the Chief Presidency Magistrate for an order of return of the said documents as the statutory period of 4 months during which the Director of Enforcement could keep the documents had expired, and no proceedings had been commenced against him under s. 23 of the Act. The claim for the return of the docun11mts was based on the provisions of s. 19-A. On October 20, 1959 the Chief Presidency Magistrate ordered the return of the seized files to the respondent. He, however, modified this order the same day, when his attention was drawn to his earlier order dated September 28, 1959 permitting the Enforcement Officer to retain the documents till November 28, 1959. He directed the matter to be heard nn October 26, 1959 and on that day, in view of the Investigating Officer being on leave, adjourned the matter for decision to November 10, 1959.\n\nIn his application presented on November 10, 1959 the Enforcement Officer stated that the Director of Enforcement had started adjudication proceedings against the respondent for alleged violation of s. 4(1) of the Act and had issued notice to him to show cause and that in connection with the adjudication proceedings seized files items Nos. 2 and 7 of the Seizure Memo would be required and that he had no objection to the return of the remaining seized files though they might have some distant bearings on those proceedings.\n\nThe Chief Presidency Magistrate ordered, on.November 10; 1959, the return of all the documents except those mentioned at items 2 and 7 of the search list. The respondent went up in revision against this order for the continued retention\n\nof the two documents, and the High Court allowed the revi- 1964 sion and ordered the return bf these documents also to the Stai., by Nilratan respondent. It is against this order that this appeal has been Bircar, Enforcem•n• Iii d Officer e . v.\n\nWe may first refer to the relevant provisions of ss. 19 Lashmi f.arain. and 19-A of the Act, and later to certain provisions of the am l>i•-1 Code of Criminal Prbcedure, hereinafter called the Code, to R01Jh\"h;; Dayal, J. appreciate the contention for the parties.\n\n\"19(]). The Central Government may, at any time by notification in the Official Gazette, direct owners, subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, of such foreign exchange br foreign securities as may be so specified, to make a return thereof to the Reserve Bank within such period, and giving such particulars, as may be so specified.\n\n(2) Where for the purposes of this Act the Central Government or the Reserve Bank considers it necessary or expedient to obtain and examine any informatibn, book or other document in the possession of any person or which in the opinion of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank it is possible for such person to bbtain and furnish, the Central Government or, as the case may be, the Reserve Bank may, by order in writing, require any such person (whose name shall be specified in the order) to furnish, or to obtain and furnish, to the Central Government or the Reserve Bank or any person specified in the brder with such information, book or other document.\n\n(3) If on a representation in writing, made by a person authorised in this behalf by the Central Government br the Reserve Bank, a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrale, Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, has reason to believe that a contravention of any of the provisions of this A, ct has been, or is being or is about to )le, committed in any place, or that a person to whom an order under sub-section\n\n(2) of this section has.been tir might be addressed, will not or would no' produce the information, book or other document, or where such information, book or other document is not known to the Magistrate to be in the possession of any person,\n\nor where th.e Ma.gistate considers .that the purposes\n\no~ any mvestigatton or prbceedmg under this Act w 11! be served by a general search or inspection,\n\nState, b.11 .i.V ilratan Sircar, Enforcement\n\nOjficer\n\nLalc&hmi Narain\n\nRamNiwas\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nhe may issue a search warrant and the person to whom such warrant is directed may search er inspect in accordance therewith and seize any book or other document, and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 relating to searches under that Code shall, so far as the same are applicable, apply to searches under this sub-section:\n\nProvided that such warrant shall not be issued to any police officer below the rank of sub-inspec:or.\n\nExplanation.-In this sub-section, 'place' includes a house, building, tent. vehicle, vessel or aircraft.\n\n• • • • 19-A. Where in pursuance of an order made under sub-section (2) of section 19 or of a search warrant issued under sub-section (3) of the said section, any book or other document is furnished or seized, and the Director of Enforcement has reasons to believe that the said document would be evidence of the contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder, and that it would be necessary to retain the document in his custody, he may so retain the said document for a period not exceeding four months or if, before the expiry of the said period of four nfonths, any proceedings under section 23 : -\n\n(a) have been commenced before him, until the disposal of those proceedings, including, the proceedings before the Appellate Board, if any, or\n\n(b) have been commenced before a Court, until the dbcument has been filed in that Court.\" Chapter VII of the Code provides for processes to compel the production of documents etc. Section 94 empowers the Court to issue a summons to a person in pbssession of the document or whose production is considered necessary or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other prbceeding under the Code to produce the same before it. In certain circumstances mentioned in s. 96 it may issue a search warrant, for conducling the search for such documents or articles as are mentioned in s. 94. The combined effect of the two sections is that the articles seized in execution of the search warrant have to be produced before the Magistrate and the Magistrate thereafter passes suitable orders abbut the custody or return of those documents. Form 8, Schedule V, of the Code gives the form of the search warrant and contains a direction that the articles seized cbe produced forthwith before the Court. Sections 98 and 99-A deal with search\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE::.VIE COURT REPORTS 729\n\nwarrants in special circumstances and ss. IO 1 to 103 come under the general provisions relating to searches. s\"''' b•t Nilratan Sircar, Enforcemen.f The appellant's main contentions are: Officer I. The provisions of s. 19-A limit the period for retain- L k h v: \"arai· . hd \"d\" . f h t\"''\"\"\" .• mg t e ocuments seize m execution o a searc warran Ram Niwas issued under s. 19 to 4 months by the Director of Enforce- - ment but does not limit the power of the Court issuing the Raglrubar Dayal, 1• search warrant to pass any orders for the retention of the seized documents or with respect to the disposal of those documents.\n\n2. In the absence of any prescribed procedure for the issue of a search warrant under s. 19, the provisions of ss. 96, 98 and Form 8 of Schedule V of the Code would be applicable to the search warrants issued under s. 19.\n\n3. lihe Court has inherent power to pass proper orders with respect to the retention of the documents seized for the purposes of investigation and proceedings following it.\n\nThe respondent contends: I. Section 19 and 19-A are special provisions which provide for special procedure for investigation of the several offences created by the statute and were enacted in order to remove certain difficulties in investigation which led to the keeping of documents of citizens unduly long and thus causing them inconvenience and harassment, and to relieve the Magistrate of his repeatedly dealing with police reports for permission to retain the documents and that therefore when s. 19-A fixes the maximum duration for the retention of the documents by the Director of Enforcement at 4 months and thus prohibits further detention except in certain circumstances by the officer concerned, the Magistrate cannot allow the Director of Enforcement to keep the documents beyond four months.\n\n2. There is no provision in the Act empowering the Court to extend the period for the detention of documents and any such power in the Magistrate will defeat the very object of the Act.\n\n3. The provisions of the Code relating to searches under the Code apply so far as the same be applicable to searches under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act and therefore the provision of the Code giving jurisdiction to the Magistrate over the property seized in execution of a search warrant issued by him will not fully apply to property seized in execution of the search warrant issued under sub-s. (3) of s. 19.\n\nThe first question to determine is whether Magistrate issuing the search warrant has control over the disposal of the articles seized in execution of the warrant. The provisions of the Code relating to searches apply to search warrants issued under sub-s. (3) 'of s. 19 but only in so far as they bi.!\n\nI964 applicable. The provisions dealing with the circumstances State, by Nilratan in which, and the authorities by which, search warrants can Sircar, Enforament be issued cannot apply, in view of the specific provision for\n\n0~'.\" the issue of a search warrant under the Act in sub-s. (3) of Lakshmi Narain s. 19. Sect10ns 96, 98 and Form 8 of Schedule V, do not Ram NiWM therefore operate in connection with searches under sub-s. 19. - It is therefore the provisions which deal with what is done Raghubar Dayal, J. after the issue of a search warrant which have been made applicable to searches under the Act and such provisions therefore would be the provisions relating to the mode of conducting searches. The object of the aforesaid provision in sub-s. (3) of s. 19 is to provide how the searches are to be conducted as it deals with the issue of search warrant in sub-s. (3) of s. 19. It is only with respect to the intervening stage, that is the stage of actual search that no specific provision is made in the Act. We are therefore of opinion that the provisions relating to searches under the Code which apply to searches under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 are the provisions relating to the conduct of searches and that these provisions are ss. IOI,\n\n102 and 103 of the Code. What is to be done with the articles seized does not strictly come within the expression 'searches'.\n\nIt is dealt with in s. 19-A. It is therefore not correct for the appellant to say that the Magistrate can exercise his powers under the Code . in connection with property seized under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act.\n\nIt follows that any further reference to the Magistrate, as made by the Enforcement Officer in this case, for permission to retain the documents seized was not necessary. The Enforcement Officer has a right under s. 19-A to retain the articles seized in accordance with its provision. What course\n\nis to be adopted by the person aggrieved when the Enforcement Officer contravenes the provisions of s. 19-A, is a different matter. The fact that such a contingency may arise does not mean that it is the Magistrate issuing the search warrant who is to be approached and who is competent to deal with the grievance. Any way, such a contingency is insufficient to warrant the finding that the Magistrate issuing the warrant has control and possession over the documents seized and that therefore he can pass any orders with respect to their disposal. He has no such power, in any case, till the period mentioned in s. 19-A has expired. There is no provision in the Act which gives him any power to deal with the situation arising after the expiry of that period.\n\nOne should, however, presume that the Director of Enforcement will not by his order act against the provisions of s. 19.\n\nSection l 9A deals with the ci.stody oi documents which come into the possession of t.he Director of Enforcement in two ways. Documents are furnished to the Director of Enforcement in pursuance of an order made under subs. (2) •\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 731\n\nof s. 19 under the directions of the Central Government or 1964 the Rserve Bank. No Magistrate as .such has i.urisdiction over State. by Nilratan the cl1sposal of such documents which come mto the posses- Sircar, ){nforcemen~ sion of the Director of Enforcement in pursuance bf orders Officer under sub-s. (2} of s. 19. The Director of Enforcement also Laksh:,; Narain gets possession of documents in execution of search warrants Ram ll'i\"a' under sub-s. (3) of s. 19. The provisions with respect to his R h b n\n\n1 J retaining in his possession the documents which come in his ag \" ar aya' • possession are the same, whether they come so one way or the other. It follows that, in the latter case too, the Magistrate issuing the search warrant has nothing to do with the retention or disposal of the documents seized in execution of the search warrant.\n\nIt was also urged for the appellant that the provisions of s. 5(2) of the Code apply to the present case in matters which are not provided by the Act. This contention too has no basis. Section 5 provides that all offences under any law other than the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into,\n\ntrving: or otherwise dealing with such offences. The Act is a special Act and it provides under s. 19-A for the necessary investigation into the alleged suspected-commission of an offence under the Act, by the Director of Enforcement. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure therefore will not apply to such investigation by him, assuming that the expression 'investigation' includes the retaining of lhc documents for the purposes of the investigation.\n\nReliance has also been placed for the appellant on the case reported as Mohammatl Seraiuddin v. R. C. Mishra(') in support of the contention that the Magistrate retains control over the disposal of the articles seized in connection with the search warrant issued by him. In that case the Court was considering the question of the disposal of the documents seized in execution of a search warrant under s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act. The provisions of that section are different from those of sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act. A search warrant issued by a Magistrate under s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act has the same effect as a search warrant i>sued under the Code of Criminal Procedure and thus assumes the character . of a search warrant issued under the Code of Criminal Pro-\n\n. cedure. The same is not the case with respect to the search warrant issued under sub-s: (3) of s. 19. Further, there is no section corresponding to s. 19-A of the Act in the Sea Customs Act. This case, therefore, is not of help to the appellant.\n\n(') (1962] 1 Suppl. S.C.R. 545.\n\nSUPRE:IIE COURT REPORTS [1004]\n\n1964 In this view of the matter, the order of the Magistrate\n\n81 \" b N'l 1 with respect to the disposal of the documents was beyol)d\n\nSira:, J.10:/,':.::, his jurisdiction and the High Court was right in setting aside\n\nOfficer his order directing the retaining of certain documents by the\n\nLokshm\"i.Narain Director of Enforcement , Ram :qiwas The question however remains whether the crder of the\n\nBaghubar Dayal, J. High Court. directing the return of the two documents to the respondent 1s a correct order.\n\nIt has been urged for the appellant that there is no provision under s. 19-A or any other section of the Act that the documents be returned to the party from whose custody they were seized, without an order from the Ma!!istrate and that therefore no order for their return can be - made by any authority. No such express provision is necessary. Documents seized have to be returned if the Jaw pro'lides that they are not to be retained after a certain period of time. Such a direction under the statute is sufficient justification and authority for the person in possession of the documents to return them to the person from whose possession they had been seized. Provisions are necessary for retaining documents of others and not for returning them to the persons entitled.\n\nSection 19-A authorises the Director o[ Enforcement to retain a document for a period of not exceeding 4 months. or, if before the expiry of the said period of 4 months, any proceedings under s. 23(i) have been commence.:! before him. until the disposal of those proceedings, including the proceedings before the Appellate Board, if any, or (ii) if such proceedings have been commenced before a Court. until the document has been Ii led in that Court. This means that the Director of Enforcement can justifiably retain with himself the document seized till the final disposal of the proceedings taken under s. 23 of the Act if the proceedings had commenced before the period of 4 months, during which he could keep the documents. In the present case such proceedings had not been commenced within the period of 4 months of the Director of Enforcement getting possession of the documents. He could not have therefore, on his own. retained those documents after the expiry of the fourth month. He could have taken legal steps for the retention of those documents. He did not keep those documents with himself on his own. He had been obtaining the permission of the Chief Presidency Magistrate for retaining the documents from the time of their seizure under the impression that the Magistrate -:ould legally order the retention of the documents, presumably as the warrant had directed the production of documents seized, before him.\n\nProceedings under s. 23 did start prior to the order for the return of the documents. Considering the real intention\n\nI .\n\nof s. 19-A tn be that the Director of Enforcement can retain 1964\n\nthe doct!ments seized till the final disposal of proceedings State., b;; Nilratan\n\nunder s. 23 of the Act. the Magistrate's order, even if he had Sircar, 0 Enf0\"\"\"'\"' not the authority to pass orders for the retention of the docu- 'ff!,'.\" ments by the Director of Enforcement, till the final disposal Lakshmi Narain of the proceedings under s. 23, was an order giving effect Ram N•WM to the spirit behind the provisions of s. 19-A. The order of Raghu1mr Dayal, J. the High Court directing the return of the documents to the respondent therefore appears to us to be unjustified in the special circumstances of the case.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to consider in this case what legal steps the Director of Enforcement could take for retaining p<>ssession (If the 'documents seized on the expiry of the 4 months' period in case his investigation in connection with those documents is not complete within that period.\n\nOne of the methods possibly can be his applying to the Central Government to make an order under sub-s. (2) of s. 19 directing the owner of those documents to furnish them to the Director of Enforcement. Such an order will be legal justification for the Director of Enforcement to retain in\n\npossession any of the documents which notionally he would be deemed to have returned to the owner on the expiry of the four months and to have got fresh possession over those doct•ments not by virtue of a search warrant but by virtue of ;;:1 order of the Central Government under sub-s. (2) of s. 19.\n\nWe therefore hold that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction over the articles seized in execution of the search warrant issued under s. 19(3) of the Act and that he cannot permit the retention of such documents by the Director of Enforcement after the expiry of the period he is entitled to keep them in accordance with the provisions of s. 19-A. In the special circumstances of the case, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and order that the docurbents men-\n\n!ioned at items Nos. 2 and. 7 of the Seizure Memo can be retained by the Director of Enforcement till the final conclusion of the pnx--eedings commenced under s. 23 of the Act.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 136, "entities": [{"text": "STATE. BY NILRATAN SIRCAR, ENFORCEMENT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE. BY NILRATAN SIRCAR, ENFORCEMENT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LAf91HMI NARAIN RAM NIWAS (M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAf91HMI NARAIN RAM NIWAS (M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGBUBAll DAYAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Regulation Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 460, "end_char": 480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 496, "end_char": 501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "ss. 5(2), 96, 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 562, "end_char": 578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "May 14, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 599, "end_char": 611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 14, 1959, a number of documents were seized from the possession of the respondent by the Enforcement Officer in execution of a search warrant."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 831, "end_char": 836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 844, "end_char": 881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 941, "end_char": 968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Dire<>- tor of Enforcement with the permission of the Chief Presidency Magistrate retained those seized documents far a period exceeding four months."}}, {"text": "October 5, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1040, "end_char": 1055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 5, 1959, the respondent filed an application before the Chief Presidency Magistrate in which he claimed the return of the seized documents on the basis of the provision of s. 19-A of the Foreign Exchange ReguJation Act."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1220, "end_char": 1225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 19(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1821, "end_char": 1829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947", "statute": "the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2055, "end_char": 2060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2117, "end_char": 2122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2753, "end_char": 2758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 96, 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2817, "end_char": 2827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule V of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2846, "end_char": 2868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2944, "end_char": 2949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule V of the Code", "statute": "Schedule V of the Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 101, 102, 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2969, "end_char": 2986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule V of the Code", "statute": "Schedule V of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3042, "end_char": 3047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule V of the Code", "statute": "Schedule V of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3172, "end_char": 3179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule V of the Code", "statute": "Schedule V of the Code"}}, {"text": "s.19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3316, "end_char": 3320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule V of the Code", "statute": "Schedule V of the Code"}}, {"text": "s.19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3903, "end_char": 3907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4061, "end_char": 4065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4373, "end_char": 4377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4616, "end_char": 4621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 20. 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4733, "end_char": 4746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "83 of 196 I. Appeal from the judgment and order dated June 20."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4755, "end_char": 4774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No."}}, {"text": "H. R. Khanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4818, "end_char": 4830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4832, "end_char": 4843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Hathi and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4848, "end_char": 4862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Hathi and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4884, "end_char": 4896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, R Datta."}}, {"text": "R Datta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4898, "end_char": 4905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, R Datta."}}, {"text": "B. Dadacha11ji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4910, "end_char": 4924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. B. Dadacha11ji, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4929, "end_char": 4938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Narain\n\nRamNiwaa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5041, "end_char": 5065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nLakshmi Narain\n\nRamNiwaa\n\nRAGIRJBAll DAYAL, J.-This appeal, on certificate grant-.Ragh!War Dayal, J ed by the Calcutta High Court.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Narain\n\nRamNiwaa"}}, {"text": "RAGIRJBAll DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5067, "end_char": 5083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nLakshmi Narain\n\nRamNiwaa\n\nRAGIRJBAll DAYAL, J.-This appeal, on certificate grant-.Ragh!War Dayal, J ed by the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "April 6. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5401, "end_char": 5414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and has arisen in the following circumstances: On April 6."}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcuna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5420, "end_char": 5456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcuna."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 6, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5710, "end_char": 5721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The search warrant was issued on May 6, 1959."}}, {"text": "1iilratJin Sircar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5937, "end_char": 5954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nSltrte, by 1iilratJin Sircar, Enforcement\n\nOfficer\n\nLaksloni Jtarain\n\nRani .. Yiuw\n\nllagh11bar Duya.1, J.\n\nEnforcement Officer reported that day that a certaiJ room could not be searched and therefore further action on the search warrant was to be taken."}}, {"text": "Laksloni Jtarain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5978, "end_char": 5994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nSltrte, by 1iilratJin Sircar, Enforcement\n\nOfficer\n\nLaksloni Jtarain\n\nRani .. Yiuw\n\nllagh11bar Duya.1, J.\n\nEnforcement Officer reported that day that a certaiJ room could not be searched and therefore further action on the search warrant was to be taken."}}, {"text": "Rani .. Yiuw\n\nllagh11bar Duya.1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5996, "end_char": 6027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nSltrte, by 1iilratJin Sircar, Enforcement\n\nOfficer\n\nLaksloni Jtarain\n\nRani .. Yiuw\n\nllagh11bar Duya.1, J.\n\nEnforcement Officer reported that day that a certaiJ room could not be searched and therefore further action on the search warrant was to be taken."}}, {"text": "May 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6536, "end_char": 6548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 28, 1959, the Enforcement Officer applied to the Chief Presidency Magistrate for permission for the retention of the seized documents for a period of two months for the submission of further report in the matter."}}, {"text": "July 28 and September 28, )", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6915, "end_char": 6942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar permission was again granted on applications, by tl1e Chief Presidency Magistrate, on July 28 and September 28, )959."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7242, "end_char": 7247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7334, "end_char": 7339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 20, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7346, "end_char": 7362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim for the return of the docun11mts was based on the provisions of s. 19-A. On October 20, 1959 the Chief Presidency Magistrate ordered the return of the seized files to the respondent."}}, {"text": "September 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7556, "end_char": 7574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, however, modified this order the same day, when his attention was drawn to his earlier order dated September 28, 1959 permitting the Enforcement Officer to retain the documents till November 28, 1959."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7639, "end_char": 7656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He, however, modified this order the same day, when his attention was drawn to his earlier order dated September 28, 1959 permitting the Enforcement Officer to retain the documents till November 28, 1959."}}, {"text": "October 26, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7696, "end_char": 7712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He directed the matter to be heard nn October 26, 1959 and on that day, in view of the Investigating Officer being on leave, adjourned the matter for decision to November 10, 1959."}}, {"text": "November 10, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7820, "end_char": 7837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He directed the matter to be heard nn October 26, 1959 and on that day, in view of the Investigating Officer being on leave, adjourned the matter for decision to November 10, 1959."}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8039, "end_char": 8046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".November 10; 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8412, "end_char": 8430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Presidency Magistrate ordered, on."}}, {"text": "Nilratan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8740, "end_char": 8748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Nilratan respondent.", "canonical_name": "Nilratan Sircar"}}, {"text": "ss. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8903, "end_char": 8909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R01Jh\"h;; Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9056, "end_char": 9071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and 19-A of the Act, and later to certain provisions of the am l>i•-1 Code of Criminal Prbcedure, hereinafter called the Code, to R01Jh\"h;; Dayal, J. appreciate the contention for the parties."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9132, "end_char": 9150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government may, at any time by notification in the Official Gazette, direct owners, subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, of such foreign exchange br foreign securities as may be so specified, to make a return thereof to the Reserve Bank within such period, and giving such particulars, as may be so specified."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10270, "end_char": 10282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) If on a representation in writing, made by a person authorised in this behalf by the Central Government br the Reserve Bank, a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrale, Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, has reason to believe that a contravention of any of the provisions of this A, ct has been, or is being or is about to )le, committed in any place, or that a person to whom an order under sub-section\n\n(2) of this section has.been tir might be addressed, will not or would no' produce the information, book or other document, or where such information, book or other document is not known to the Magistrate to be in the possession of any person,\n\nor where th.e Ma.gistate considers .that the purposes\n\no~ any mvestigatton or prbceedmg under this Act w 11!"}}, {"text": "V ilratan Sircar, Enforcement", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11006, "end_char": 11035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V ilratan Sircar, Enforcement\n\nOjficer\n\nLalc&hmi Narain\n\nRamNiwas\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nhe may issue a search warrant and the person to whom such warrant is directed may search er inspect in accordance therewith and seize any book or other document, and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 relating to searches under that Code shall, so far as the same are applicable, apply to searches under this sub-section:\n\nProvided that such warrant shall not be issued to any police officer below the rank of sub-inspec:or."}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11073, "end_char": 11087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V ilratan Sircar, Enforcement\n\nOjficer\n\nLalc&hmi Narain\n\nRamNiwas\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nhe may issue a search warrant and the person to whom such warrant is directed may search er inspect in accordance therewith and seize any book or other document, and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 relating to searches under that Code shall, so far as the same are applicable, apply to searches under this sub-section:\n\nProvided that such warrant shall not be issued to any police officer below the rank of sub-inspec:or."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11281, "end_char": 11313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11720, "end_char": 11730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12288, "end_char": 12298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Chapter VII of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12538, "end_char": 12561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12628, "end_char": 12638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter VII of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12933, "end_char": 12938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter VII of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13047, "end_char": 13052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter VII of the Code"}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13308, "end_char": 13318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter VII of the Code"}}, {"text": "Sections 98 and 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13460, "end_char": 13478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter VII of the Code"}}, {"text": "Nilratan Sircar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13660, "end_char": 13675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s\"''' b•t Nilratan Sircar, Enforcemen.f The appellant's main contentions are: Officer I. The provisions of s. 19-A limit the period for retain- L k h v: \"arai· .", "canonical_name": "Nilratan Sircar"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13757, "end_char": 13762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19 to 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13910, "end_char": 13920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14252, "end_char": 14257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 96, 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14277, "end_char": 14287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule V of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14302, "end_char": 14324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14381, "end_char": 14386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule V of the Code", "statute": "Schedule V of the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 19 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14591, "end_char": 14608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule V of the Code", "statute": "Schedule V of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15062, "end_char": 15067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule V of the Code", "statute": "Schedule V of the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15693, "end_char": 15698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15962, "end_char": 15967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16234, "end_char": 16239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Narain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16564, "end_char": 16578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the issue of a search warrant under the Act in sub-s. (3) of Lakshmi Narain s. 19.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Narain\n\nRamNiwaa"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16579, "end_char": 16584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16616, "end_char": 16626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16700, "end_char": 16705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17036, "end_char": 17041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17155, "end_char": 17160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17422, "end_char": 17427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17670, "end_char": 17675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17848, "end_char": 17853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18080, "end_char": 18085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18265, "end_char": 18270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18778, "end_char": 18783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19041, "end_char": 19046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19321, "end_char": 19326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19468, "end_char": 19471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19631, "end_char": 19636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19680, "end_char": 19686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Director of Enforcement also Laksh:,; Narain gets possession of documents in execution of search warrants Ram ll'i\"a' under sub-s. (3) of s. 19."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19780, "end_char": 19785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20230, "end_char": 20237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20356, "end_char": 20365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20422, "end_char": 20439, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20554, "end_char": 20580, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20801, "end_char": 20806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20962, "end_char": 20988, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21571, "end_char": 21577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21589, "end_char": 21600, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21675, "end_char": 21680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21739, "end_char": 21745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21757, "end_char": 21768, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21826, "end_char": 21852, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22043, "end_char": 22048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22096, "end_char": 22101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22126, "end_char": 22137, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Baghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22658, "end_char": 22672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narain Director of Enforcement , Ram :qiwas The question however remains whether the crder of the\n\nBaghubar Dayal, J. High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22839, "end_char": 22844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23546, "end_char": 23556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23738, "end_char": 23746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24153, "end_char": 24158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24996, "end_char": 25001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25104, "end_char": 25109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25257, "end_char": 25262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sircar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25314, "end_char": 25320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Magistrate's order, even if he had Sircar, 0 Enf0\"\"\"'\"' not the authority to pass orders for the retention of the docu- 'ff!,'.\""}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25510, "end_char": 25515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25592, "end_char": 25597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghu1mr Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25614, "end_char": 25628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ments by the Director of Enforcement, till the final disposal Lakshmi Narain of the proceedings under s. 23, was an order giving effect Ram N•WM to the spirit behind the provisions of s. 19-A. The order of Raghu1mr Dayal, J. the High Court directing the return of the documents to the respondent therefore appears to us to be unjustified in the special circumstances of the case."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26196, "end_char": 26201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26671, "end_char": 26676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26810, "end_char": 26818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27015, "end_char": 27020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27320, "end_char": 27325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_734_744_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April z, j\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\nSTATE OF U.P. v.\n\nCOL. SUJAN SINGH AND ORS. [K. SuBBA RAO, K .. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ.]\n\nCriminal Trial-Sanction by Central Government-Proceeding pending before special Judge-Accused asking for production of document fr\"m the Union Government-Privilege claimed by Government-Special Judge and High Coort in revision reiccting the claim of privilege~Order if a \"fina.! order',. -Petition for grant of certificate-Maintainability-Petition for special !eave barred by !imitation-Petition for excusing delay on wrong legal advice-If a sufficient ground-Constituticn of India, Art. 134(1)(c)-Supreme Court Rules, 1959, 0.21. r. 1(1) .\n\n. The respondents were prosecuted in the court of the special Judge after obtaining the sanction of the Central Government,. for an offence under s. 6(l)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. They put an objection that the sanctioning authority did not apply his mind properly when sanction was granted. One of the respondents asked the Court to summon the concerned record of the Home Department for, it would substantiate his assertion that the concerned officer did not apply his mind earliar in according sanction for his prosecution. The Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs, claimed privilege. The Special Judge and the High Court in revision rejected the claim of privilege of the Union Government. The appellant then filed a petition in the High Court for grant of a certificate. The High Court held that the order sought to be appealed against was an interlocutory one and, therefore, the petition nas not maintainable under Art. 134(l)(c) of the Constitution. Against the order of the High Court in revision the appell'ant filed a petition for special leave to appeal stating that he apolied for a certificate to the High Court but it was refused. The appellant did not bring tothe notice of this Court that the petition for special leave was out of time. The Registry could not point out the defect as in the petition it was stated that the application under Art. 134(1)(c) was dismissed by the High Court without indicating on what ground it did and this Court assumed that it was in time and granted special leave. However after obtaining the perrrJission of this Court the apdlant filed a petition for excusing the delay on the ground that the Law Officer, who was at the relevant time in charge of the matter in the High Court, advised the Government that the order under appeal was a final order and that an application should be filed under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution and that the appellant acted bonafide. The appellant contended 0) that the o\"der of the High Court in the criminal revision was a final order within the meaning of Art. 134 (lJ(c) of the Constitution and (2) that the rule 1(1) of 0. XX! of the Supreme Court Rules does not say in express terms that the order of refusal to give a certificate must be on an annlication which is maintainable and, therefore, if in fact the High Court refused to give a certificate. whether on merits or on the ground that it was not maintainable, the party could take advantage of the said rnle.\n\nHdd (per K. Subba Rao and K. C. Das Guota, JJ): (i) The order under appeal was not a final order \\\\, ithin the meaning of Art. 134(1) of the Constitution. It did not purport to decide\n\nthe rights of the parties. namely. the State U.P. and the accused.\n\nAssuming that it decided some right of the Union Government. the Union Government was neither a party to the criminal proceedings nor was it a party either before the High Court .or before this Court. The indirect effect of the order of a third party to the proceedings, who did not seek to question that order, did not deprive the order of dts interlocutory character.\n\nCol. Su.jan Singh\n\nando:lwr\n\nSeth Premchand Satramdas v. State of Bihar f1950] S.C.R. 799, relied on.\n\n(ii) Rule 1(1) of 0. XXI presupposes that the application for the certificate is maintainable and the Court refuses to give it on the ground that the condition laid down in Art. 134(1) of the Constitution have not been complied with. On a reasonable dnterpretation of the rule, it could only mean that the refusal of the certificate must be in an application maintainable under the said Article.\n\n(iii) The order ex facie was an interlocutory order and so far as the Government of U.P. was concerned it could not possibly be held that any of its rights had been affected by that order. In the circumstances, it must be held that a wrong legal advice is not a sufficient ground for excusing the delay, and the appeal therefore must be dismissed as barred by limitation.\n\nPer Raghubar Dayal, J. (dissenti)nq:): The appellant should te given the advantage of the opinion of its legal advisers as the error, if any, could not be said to be of such a character which a legal adviser could not have poss; bly given.\n\nThe rule does not expressly state that limitation would be counted from the date of refusal of the certificate only when an application for a certificate under Art. 134 would be maintainable. It is true that an application under Art. 134 is cmltenipilated to be an application against the judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding and that refusal of a certificate under Art. 134, for purpases of ru, le 1(1) of 0. XXI, refers to the refusal of an application for certificate against the judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding. But this does not necessarily mean that the rule will not be applicable in cases of refusal of a certificate when one applied for it on the ground that the ordef sought to be appealed against amounted to a judgment, final order or sentence while'the High Court\n\ncame to a different opmion. The rule does not specifically shte that the date of the refusal of'the certificate would be taken to be the starting point of limitation only when the High Court :iefuses ce:rtificate on the ground that it was not a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. If it were so, the rule would have\n\nbee11 limited to those cases.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 71 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 23, 1962 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench at Lucknow) in Criminal Revision No. 251 of 1962.\n\nS T. Desai, 0. P. Rana, Atiqur Rahman and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.\n\nC. B. Agarwala, Ravinder Narain, 0. C. Mathur and J. B. Dadachanji, for respondents nos. 1 and 2.\n\nApril 15, 1964. The Judgment of SuBBA RAO and DAS GUPTA JJ. was delivered by SUB BA RAO J. RAG HUB AR DAYAL J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.\n\nan~ Otller\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question of the privilege raised by the Government of fodia in respect of certain documents called for from i!S Home Department in a criminal proceeding pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (East), U.P., Lucknow.\n\nThe respondents were prosecuted in the said Court, after obtaining the sanction of the Central Government under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for an offence under s. 6(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 11 of 1947). An objection was taken before the said court on behalf of the respondents that the sanctioning authority did not apply his mind properly when sanction for the prosecution was granted. It was stated on behalf of the respondents that on a representation made by one of the accused, Col. Sujan Singh, for reconsideration of the order of his prosecution, the Deputy Secretary in the Home Department reconsidered the matter and made notings on his application to the effect that the sanction accorded earlier for his prosecution was given on insufficient data. He\n\nfiled a petition before the Special Judge to summon the concerned record of the Home Department on the ground that the said record would substantiate his a5sertion that the concerned officer did not apply his mind earlier in according sanction for his prosecution. The Secretary, Ministry of Home.\n\nAffairs, claimed privilege on the ground that the production of the record containing the said notings of the Deputy Secretary would not be in the interests of the State. The Special Judge in the first instance and the High Court in revision rejected the claim of privilege raised by the Union Govern meat. The State of U.P. has preferred the present appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court.\n\nThe respondents filed criminal petition No. 149 of 19Ti4 for condonation of delay in filing appearance and the statement of case. The facts relevant to this application are briefly as follows. Respondents 1 and 2 received the notice granting special leave by this Court on January 16. 1964. After the receipt of the notice they conta.cted their local advocate at Lucknow and, on his advice, the !st respondent. along with his local advocate, came to Delhi on January 28, 1964, and made necessary arrangements with Messrs. J. B. Dadachanji & Co., Advocates. On January 16, 1964, respondents 1 and 2 received a notice from the High Court intimatin~ them that the records of the case had been despatched to the Supreme Court. On February 11, 1964, they filed their appearance and on February 18, 1964, their statement of case. If January 16, 1964, was the date of service on them, there would not be any delay in making their appearartce or filing their statement of case. But the notice of the despatch of the records\n\nwas served on the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 on November 4, 1963. Under Ch. V, r. 4(l)(c), read with r. 2, of the Rules of the High Court, Allahabad, where a party is represented by an advocate, a service of notice of despatch of record on such advocate is deemed to be sufficient service.\n\nAs the present appeal arises out of an interlocutory order it may be said. that the advocate representing the respondents in the High Court still continues to represent them. We assume for the purpose of this case that the rule is valid and the notice was duly served on the advocate. If that be so, the respondents should have filed their appearance and lodged their statement of case within a month from the said date.\n\nBut they filed their appearance on February 11, i 964, which is clearly beyond time. It will be seen from the said facts that the respondents had filed their appearance within one month from the date of service of notice on them, but beyond time from the da(e the notice was served on their advocate. The said delay is not in the presentation of any appeal but only in following the procedural steps for making the case ready for disposal. We are satisfied by perusing the record that the delay was not due to negligence on the part of the respondents. It is not suggested that the appellant is in any way prejudiced by this delay. In the circumstances we thlnk that this is a fit case for excusing the delay. We excuse the delay in filing respondents' appearance and also in lodging the statement of case. Whether the delay of the respondents in entering appearance is excused or not, we are at the outset confronted with the situation that this Court gave special leave when the appeal was prima facie barred by limitation without the appellant filing an application for excusing the delay and the Court excusing the same. A few facts would make the position clear. The Judgment of the High Court in the criminal revision is dated November 23, 1962. A certified copy of the Judgment was delivered to the appellant on December 5, 1962.\n\nOn December 19. 1962, the appellant filed a petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. On February 18, 1963, the High Court held that the order sought to be appealed against was an interlocutory one and, therefore, the petition was not maintainable under Art. 134 (l)(c)\n\nof the Constitution of India. On April 16, 1963 the appellant filed a petition in this Court for special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court in the criminal revision. In para. 19 of that petition it was stated that the appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court but the High Court by order dated February 18, 1963, refused to grant the certificate applied for. The appeal J,•r(l')ISCT-24\n\n81, ateof U. P.\n\nand Othera\n\nSubba Rao, J,\n\n1964 would be in time if that application was maintainable in Stale of U.P. the High Court, but would be out of time if that application\n\n001• 8::.,. Si\"flh was not maintanable there, for in the latter event the time\n\nand 3,,.,,, would have exp!fed on March 5, 1963, and the appeal would have been out of time by 42 days.\n\nSuboo Rao, J.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contends that special leave was granted on May 10, 1963, and that, as the respondents have not taken objection on the ground that it was barred by limitation till they filed their petition in this Court on February 26, 1964, we shall not permit them to raise this plea at this very late stage. We are not impressed by this argument. This is not a case where the Supreme Court excmed the delay in filing the petition for special leave and the respondents with the knowledge of that fact permitted the appellant to incur heavy expenditure and after a long delay raised the objection at the time of hearing of the appeal that the delay should not have been excused. But this is a case where the appellant did not bring to the notice of the Court that the petition for special leave was out of time. The Registry could not point out the defect as in the petition it was stated that the application under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India was dismissed by the High Court without indicating on what ground it did and this Court assumed that the petition for special leave was in tirhe and gave special leave. Order XXI, r. 2, of the Supreme Court Rules reads:\n\n\"Where the period of limitation is claimed from the date of refusal of a certificate, it shall not be necessary to file the order refusing a certificate, but the petition for special leave shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating the date of the judgment sought to be appealed from, the date on which the application for a certificate was made to the High Court, the date of the order refusing the certificate and the ground or grounds on which the certificate was refused and in particular whether the application for a certificate was dismissed as being out of time.\" Under the said rule it is incumbent upon the petitioner to state in the affidavit filed in support of the petition the date of the order of the High Court refusing the certificate and the ground or grounds on which the certificate was refused.\n\nIf the appe!Jant had complied with this rule, the Registry of this Court would have noticed the delay in filing the special leave petition and brought that to the notice of the Court.\n\nIn the circumstances there are two courses open to us: one is to dimiss the appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation, and the other is to permit the appellant to file\n\na petition at this very late stage for excusing the delay in filing the special leave petition and consider that petition on merits. Ordinarily no indulgence should be given to a party when the said party with open eyes filed a petition for special leave without disclosing a material circumstance in the affidavit on the basis of a wrong view of law that the appeal was in time. With some hesitation we gave liberty to the appellant to file a petition for excusing the delay and they have done so.\n\nWe shall now consider the petition for excusing the delay on merits, as this Court would have done if that application had been filed along with the special leave petition.\n\nTwo reasons are given in the application for excusing the delay, namely, (1) the Law Officer, who was at the relevant time in charge of the matter in the High Court, advised the Government that the order under appeal was a final order and that an application should be filed under Art.\n\nI 34(l)(c) of the Constitution in the first instance so that the other side might not contend that the appellant did not approach the High Court for a certificate, and that the said advice was accepted by the Government; and (2) the appellant acted bona fide, as it believed on legal advice that the perio:I of limitation would be counll'.d from February 18, 1963, i.e .. the date of the order of the High Court refusing to give certificate and that the order was also filed along with the petition in this Court. The respondents filed a counteraffidavit denying that the order was a final order and stating that there was not sufficient reason for excusing the delay.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order of .the High Court dated November 23, 1962, in the criminal revision was a final order within the meaning of Art. 134(1) of the Constitution. The material part of the said article reads :\n\n\"An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any rudgment. final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India .................. \".\n\nWe find it difficult to hold that the order under appeal i5 a final order within the meaning of the said article. In Seth Premchand Satramdas v. The State of Bihar(') it was held that an order of the Patna High Court dismissing an application under s. 21(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944. to direct the • Board of Revenue, Bihar, to state a case and to refer it to the\n\n(') [1950] S.C.R. 799, 804.\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-24(a)\n\nState of U.P. v.\n\nCoi Svjan Singl\n\naM Otkesa\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\n196'\n\nand Othe.ra\n\nSubba RM, J.\n\nSUPRE:.IIE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nHigh Court was not a \"final ordec\". This Court, speaking through Faz! Ali, J., defined the expression 'final order\" thus:\n\n\"It seems to us that the order appealed against in this case. cannot be regarded as a final order, because it does not of its own force bind or affect the rights of the parties\".\n\nThough this definition is given in a different context, it will equally apply to that expression in Art. 134 of the Constitution.\n\nCan it be said that the Special Judge in allowing the petition of the respondents to call for the production of a document from the Union Government is a final order in the criminal proceeding? The criminal proceeding>. were taken against the respondents for an offence under s. 6(l)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The proceedings are now pending in the court of the Special Judge.\n\nIn the course of those proceedings the respondents filed an application .for the production of a document by the Union Government and that was allowed by the court. The said order is only an interlocutory order pending the proceedings. It does not purport to decide the rights of the parties, namely, the State of U.P. and the accused. It enables the accused to have the said document duly proved and exhibited in the case. It relates only to a procedural step for adducing evidence. The High Court confirmed that order in revision. But the learned counsel contents that it negatives the claim of prjvilege made by the Union Government and, therefore, it decides against the right ot the Union Government to withhold the production of the document.\n\nAssuming that the order decides some right of the Union Government, on which we do not express any opinion, the Union Government is neither a party to the criminal proceedings nor fa it a party either before the High Court or before us. The indirect effect of that order on a third party to the proceedings, who does not seek to question that order, does not deprive the order of .its interlocutory character. We, therefore, hold that the order made by the High Court is not a final order within the meaning of Art. 134(1) of the Constitution.\n\nThat apart the order of the High Court holding that the order sought to be appealed from was not a final order within the meaning of Art. 134(1) of the Constitution has become final. The appellant has not filed any appeal against that order. It cannot ignore that order for the purpose of special leave and contend that the application before the High Court was maintainable and the order made by the High Court must be deemed to have been made on merits, though in express terms it rejected the petition for the reason that it was not maintainable. In either view the period of limitation for filing the special leave petition could not be computed from\n\nthe date of the order of the High Court refusing to give a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court. It is then contended that the rule does not say in express terms that the said order of refusal to give a certificate must be on an application which is maintainable and, therefore, if in fact the High Court refused to give a certificate, whether on merits or on the ground that it was not maintainable, the party can take advantage of the said rule. We cannot accede to this argument. The rule presupposes that the application for the certificate is maintainable, and the court refuses to give it on the ground that the conditions laid down in Art. 134(1) of the Constitution have not been complied with. If the construction put forth by the appellant be accepted, it will give room for fraud and evasion of the rule.\n\nA party whose appeal has become barred can file a petition with the knowledge that it is not maintainable, get an order of dismissal and then seek to take advantage of the additional period of limitation provided by the ruie. The rule, therefore, must be interpreted reasonably and if so interpreted. it could only mean that the refusal of the certificate must be in an application maintainable under the said Article.\n\nNow we shall proceed to consider the application for excusing delay on its merits. The reason for the delay given in the affidavit is that the Law Officer was of the opinion that the application for a certificate was maintainable under Art. 134(1) of the Constitution. We do not see any justification for this opinion. There is no conflict of judicial opinion on this question. The only question that was before the Law Officer was whether the order sought to be appealed from was a final order. The order ex facie was an interlocutory order and so far as the Government of U.P. was concerned it could not possibly be held that any of its rights had been affected by that order. In the circumstances we cannot hold that a wrong legal advice is a sufficient ground for excusing the delay. What • is more, on February 18, 1963, the High Court in a considered order held that the order sought to be appealed from was not a final order and, therefore, an application under Art. 134(1) of the Constitution was not maintainable. The time for preferring an appeal from the main order of the High Court would expire only on March 5. 1963, that is to say, the appellant had 15 days time more for taking steps for preferring the appeal. Even so no steps were taken to file the appeal and instead an appeal was filed on the basis of the original opinion of the Law officer that the time can be computed from the date of the order refusing to issue the certificate. From the information supplied by the counsel for the appellant it appears that the Government decided to file the appeal only on March 8, 1963, i.e., after the time for filing the appeal had\n\nStole of U.P. v.\n\nCol. Sujan Si1197'\n\nand Others\n\nBubba Rao, J.\n\nCol. Buja\" Singh\n\nand 01/lera\n\n742 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nexpired. After further correspgndence between the Government of U.P. and the counsel representing it in the Supreme Court the special leave petition was filed only on April 16. 1963, completely ignoring the reasons given by the High Court in dismissing the application for certificate of fitness.\n\nOn the said facts we do not see any justification for excusing the long delay of 42 days. So, the appeal is clearly barred by limitation and should be dismissed. Accorcfmgly the appeal is 'dismissed .\n\n.Bagkubar Dayal, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-1 agree that the delay in filing the respondents' appearance and also in lodging the statement of case be excused.\n\nI am, however, of opinion that the appellant's application for excming the delay in the presentation of the petition for special leave to appeal be allowed. '\n\nIt has to be assumed, for the purposes of disposing of this application, that the order under appeal was not a final order within the meaning of Iha t expression in art. 134(1) of the Constitution. The High Court held so and refused the certificate. The appellant has neither preferred an appeal against that order nor questioned its correctness in its petition for special leave. The reason urged for condoning the delay is that the legal advisers of the appellant were of opinion that limitation for the presentation of the petition for pecial leave would be governed by the provisions of r. 1(1) of 0. XXI,\n\nSupreme Court Rules, hereinafter called the rules, and that in accordance with those provisions the period of limitation would be 60 days from the date of refusal of the certificate by the High Court. If that rule applied, the petition for special leave would be in time. The certificate was refused on February 18, 1963, and the special leave petition was filed on April 16. The question then is whether the appellant can • take advantage of the opinion of its legal advisers, assuming that this opinion was erroneous. I am of opinion that it should be given that advantage, as the error, if any, cannot be said to be of such a character which a legal adviser could not have possibly given.\n\nThe rule does not expressly state that limitation would be counted from the date of refusal of the certificate only when an application for a certificate under Art. 134 would be maintainable as an application against an order which is held by the High Court to be a 'judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding'. It is true that an application under art. 134 is contemplated to be an application .against the judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding, and that refusal of a certificate under art. 134, for purposes of rule I( D of O.XXI. refers to the refusal of an application\n\nfor certificate against the judgment, final order or sentence in 1964 a crimmai proceeding. But this does not necessarily mean that Stal• of u. P. the rule will not be applicable in cases of refusal of a certifi v. cate when one applied for it on the ground that the order Col. Sujan Singh\n\n....., ancZ Othera sought to be appealed against amounted to a judgment, final order or sentence while the High Court came to a differentRaghubar Dayal, J. opinion. The rule does not specifically state that the date of the refusal of the certificate would be taken to be the starting point of limitation only when the High Court refuses certi jicate on the ground that it was not a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. If it were so, the rule would have been limite:I to those cases.\n\nFurther, there is indication in sub-r. (2) itself that such was not contemplated by sub-r. (!) of r. 1. Sub-rule (2) of r. 1 requires the petitioner, in case he desires limitation to be counted from the date of refusal of the certificate, to mention the grounds for the refusal of the certificate and, in particular, whether the application for certificate was rejected as being out of time.\n\nAn application presented after the expiry of limitation is not maintainable till the Court allows the application for the condonation of delay. There must be a reason for providing, in sub-r. (2), that the fact of the refusal of the certificate on ground of limitation mmt be expressed. The reason is that proviso (iii) to sub-r. (!) of r. 1 provides that when an application for a certificate is dismissed on the ground of its being out of time. limitation for the petition for special leave to appeal will not be counted from the date of the dismissal of the application. There is no corresponding provision with respect to the limitation being not counted from the date of refusal, if the refusal be on the ground that the order sought to be appealed against did not amount to a 'judgment, final .order or sentence' in a criminal proceedings.\n\nIn view of these considerations, the advice of the appellant's coumel, even if it be erroneous, should not go against the appellant to the extent that the delay in filing of the special leave petition be not condoned. I do not think that the omission to state the ground of refusal in the petition for special leave was deliberate in order to keep back from the Court that the application had been presented after the expiry of the period of limitation.\n\nIt would not be irrelevant to consider the nature of the point sought to be urged in the appeal. The question is whether the High Court was right in considering the order of the trial Court rejecting the claim of privilege raised by the Union Government in accordance with s. 123 of the Evidence Act with respect to the production of certain documents summoned, on the ground that the disclosure would not be in public\n\n1964 interest. If the view of the Courts below is wrong, the result Bleile of u.P. of refusing to condone the delay would be that public interest v. will suffer and that consideration should, in my opinion, out- Ool. Sujan Singh weigh the lapse on the part of the appellant in not filing the and Others petition for special leave to appeal within time and that too, in llaghubar Dayal, J. view of the wrong advice or opinion given by its legal advisers.\n\nI would therefore allow the application and condone the appellant's delay in presentation of the petition for special leave.\n\nORDER\n\nIn accordance with the opinion of the majority, the delay in filing the special leave petition is not condoned. The appeal is barred by limitation and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 99, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COL. SUJAN SINGH AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COL. SUJAN SINGH AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SuBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K .. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 629, "end_char": 643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 644, "end_char": 669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 834, "end_char": 844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Supreme Court Rules, 1959", "statute": "Supreme Court Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 852, "end_char": 880, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1233, "end_char": 1267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs, claimed privilege."}}, {"text": "Art. 134(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1622, "end_char": 1636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Supreme Court Rules, 1959", "statute": "Supreme Court Rules, 1959"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2546, "end_char": 2560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2745, "end_char": 2753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2825, "end_char": 2838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Supreme Court Rules does not say in express terms that the order of refusal to give a certificate must be on an annlication which is maintainable and, therefore, if in fact the High Court refused to give a certificate."}}, {"text": "K. Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3168, "end_char": 3180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hdd (per K. Subba Rao and K. C. Das Guota, JJ): (i) The order under appeal was not a final order \\\\, ithin the meaning of Art.", "canonical_name": "K. SuBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "K. C. Das Guota", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3185, "end_char": 3200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hdd (per K. Subba Rao and K. C. Das Guota, JJ): (i) The order under appeal was not a final order \\\\, ithin the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3281, "end_char": 3292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Su.jan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3788, "end_char": 3800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Su.jan Singh\n\nando:lwr\n\nSeth Premchand Satramdas v. State of Bihar f1950] S.C.R. 799, relied on.", "canonical_name": "Su.jan Singh"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4059, "end_char": 4070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4353, "end_char": 4371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) The order ex facie was an interlocutory order and so far as the Government of U.P. was concerned it could not possibly be held that any of its rights had been affected by that order."}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Raghubar Dayal, J. (dissenti)nq:): The appellant should te given the advantage of the opinion of its legal advisers as the error, if any, could not be said to be of such a character which a legal adviser could not have poss; bly given.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5057, "end_char": 5065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5126, "end_char": 5134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5285, "end_char": 5293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench at Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6226, "end_char": 6272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 23, 1962 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench at Lucknow) in Criminal Revision No."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6328, "end_char": 6335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, Atiqur Rahman and C. P. Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Atiqur Rahman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6337, "end_char": 6350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, Atiqur Rahman and C. P. Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6355, "end_char": 6364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana, Atiqur Rahman and C. P. Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6386, "end_char": 6400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Ravinder Narain, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6402, "end_char": 6417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala, Ravinder Narain, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6422, "end_char": 6431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and J. B. Dadachanji, for respondents nos."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6436, "end_char": 6452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and J. B. Dadachanji, for respondents nos.", "canonical_name": "J. B. Dadachanji"}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6517, "end_char": 6526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SuBBA RAO and DAS GUPTA JJ.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAO"}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6531, "end_char": 6540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of SuBBA RAO and DAS GUPTA JJ."}}, {"text": "SUB BA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6562, "end_char": 6572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by SUB BA RAO J. RAG HUB AR DAYAL J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAO"}}, {"text": "RAG HUB AR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6576, "end_char": 6592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by SUB BA RAO J. RAG HUB AR DAYAL J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6641, "end_char": 6650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "an~ Otller\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question of the privilege raised by the Government of fodia in respect of certain documents called for from i!S Home Department in a criminal proceeding pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (East), U.P., Lucknow.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAO"}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6656, "end_char": 6665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "an~ Otller\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question of the privilege raised by the Government of fodia in respect of certain documents called for from i!S Home Department in a criminal proceeding pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (East), U.P., Lucknow.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAO"}}, {"text": "Court of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (East), U.P., Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6878, "end_char": 6943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "an~ Otller\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the question of the privilege raised by the Government of fodia in respect of certain documents called for from i!S Home Department in a criminal proceeding pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (East), U.P., Lucknow."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7033, "end_char": 7051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents were prosecuted in the said Court, after obtaining the sanction of the Central Government under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for an offence under s. 6(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 11 of 1947)."}}, {"text": "s. 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7058, "end_char": 7064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7072, "end_char": 7098, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7121, "end_char": 7131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7139, "end_char": 7173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sujan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7477, "end_char": 7488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sujan Singh, for reconsideration of the order of his prosecution, the Deputy Secretary in the Home Department reconsidered the matter and made notings on his application to the effect that the sanction accorded earlier for his prosecution was given on insufficient data.", "canonical_name": "Su.jan Singh"}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8362, "end_char": 8375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of U.P. has preferred the present appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court."}}, {"text": "January 16. 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8737, "end_char": 8753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 1 and 2 received the notice granting special leave by this Court on January 16."}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8827, "end_char": 8834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the receipt of the notice they conta.cted their local advocate at Lucknow and, on his advice, the !"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8914, "end_char": 8919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "along with his local advocate, came to Delhi on January 28, 1964, and made necessary arrangements with Messrs. J. B. Dadachanji & Co., Advocates."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8923, "end_char": 8939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "along with his local advocate, came to Delhi on January 28, 1964, and made necessary arrangements with Messrs. J. B. Dadachanji & Co., Advocates."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8986, "end_char": 9002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "along with his local advocate, came to Delhi on January 28, 1964, and made necessary arrangements with Messrs. J. B. Dadachanji & Co., Advocates.", "canonical_name": "J. B. Dadachanji"}}, {"text": "January 16, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9024, "end_char": 9040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 16, 1964, respondents 1 and 2 received a notice from the High Court intimatin~ them that the records of the case had been despatched to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "February 11, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9190, "end_char": 9207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 11, 1964, they filed their appearance and on February 18, 1964, their statement of case."}}, {"text": "February 18, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9244, "end_char": 9261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 11, 1964, they filed their appearance and on February 18, 1964, their statement of case."}}, {"text": "November 4, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9542, "end_char": 9558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the notice of the despatch of the records\n\nwas served on the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 on November 4, 1963."}}, {"text": "High Court, Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9621, "end_char": 9642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V, r. 4(l)(c), read with r. 2, of the Rules of the High Court, Allahabad, where a party is represented by an advocate, a service of notice of despatch of record on such advocate is deemed to be sufficient service."}}, {"text": "February 11, i 964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10242, "end_char": 10260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But they filed their appearance on February 11, i 964, which is clearly beyond time."}}, {"text": "November 23, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11440, "end_char": 11457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the High Court in the criminal revision is dated November 23, 1962."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A certified copy of the Judgment was delivered to the appellant on December 5, 1962."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11605, "end_char": 11642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1962, the appellant filed a petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "February 18, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11725, "end_char": 11742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 18, 1963, the High Court held that the order sought to be appealed against was an interlocutory one and, therefore, the petition was not maintainable under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11890, "end_char": 11898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11914, "end_char": 11935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 16, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11940, "end_char": 11954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 16, 1963 the appellant filed a petition in this Court for special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court in the criminal revision."}}, {"text": "Suboo Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12731, "end_char": 12740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suboo Rao, J.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contends that special leave was granted on May 10, 1963, and that, as the respondents have not taken objection on the ground that it was barred by limitation till they filed their petition in this Court on February 26, 1964, we shall not permit them to raise this plea at this very late stage."}}, {"text": "May 10, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12823, "end_char": 12835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suboo Rao, J.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contends that special leave was granted on May 10, 1963, and that, as the respondents have not taken objection on the ground that it was barred by limitation till they filed their petition in this Court on February 26, 1964, we shall not permit them to raise this plea at this very late stage."}}, {"text": "February 26, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12986, "end_char": 13003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suboo Rao, J.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant contends that special leave was granted on May 10, 1963, and that, as the respondents have not taken objection on the ground that it was barred by limitation till they filed their petition in this Court on February 26, 1964, we shall not permit them to raise this plea at this very late stage."}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13680, "end_char": 13694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13702, "end_char": 13723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13917, "end_char": 13936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Order XXI, r. 2, of the Supreme Court Rules reads:\n\n\"Where the period of limitation is claimed from the date of refusal of a certificate, it shall not be necessary to file the order refusing a certificate, but the petition for special leave shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating the date of the judgment sought to be appealed from, the date on which the application for a certificate was made to the High Court, the date of the order refusing the certificate and the ground or grounds on which the certificate was refused and in particular whether the application for a certificate was dismissed as being out of time.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16933, "end_char": 16944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17159, "end_char": 17164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India .................. \"."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17388, "end_char": 17404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Seth Premchand Satramdas v. The State of Bihar(') it was held that an order of the Patna High Court dismissing an application under s. 21(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944."}}, {"text": "s. 21(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17437, "end_char": 17445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17453, "end_char": 17478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Subba", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17654, "end_char": 17659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L/P(D)ISCI-24(a)\n\nState of U.P. v.\n\nCoi Svjan Singl\n\naM Otkesa\n\nSubba Rao, J.\n\n196'\n\nand Othe.ra\n\nSubba RM, J.\n\nSUPRE:.IIE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nHigh Court was not a \"final ordec\".", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAO"}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17800, "end_char": 17808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, speaking through Faz!"}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18138, "end_char": 18146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "s. 6(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18445, "end_char": 18455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18463, "end_char": 18497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Union Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19367, "end_char": 19383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming that the order decides some right of the Union Government, on which we do not express any opinion, the Union Government is neither a party to the criminal proceedings nor fa it a party either before the High Court or before us."}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19828, "end_char": 19839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19995, "end_char": 20006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21166, "end_char": 21177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21997, "end_char": 22008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22730, "end_char": 22741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 5. 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22877, "end_char": 22890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The time for preferring an appeal from the main order of the High Court would expire only on March 5."}}, {"text": "Bubba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23457, "end_char": 23466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sujan Si1197'\n\nand Others\n\nBubba Rao, J.\n\nCol."}}, {"text": "Buja\" Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23477, "end_char": 23488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Buja\" Singh\n\nand 01/lera\n\n742 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nexpired."}}, {"text": ".Bagkubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24039, "end_char": 24054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Bagkubar Dayal, J.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-1 agree that the delay in filing the respondents' appearance and also in lodging the statement of case be excused."}}, {"text": "art. 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24520, "end_char": 24531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24966, "end_char": 24985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25819, "end_char": 25827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26024, "end_char": 26032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26183, "end_char": 26191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "differentRaghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26689, "end_char": 26712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sujan Singh\n\n....., ancZ Othera sought to be appealed against amounted to a judgment, final order or sentence while the High Court came to a differentRaghubar Dayal, J. opinion."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29019, "end_char": 29025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "llaghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29535, "end_char": 29550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sujan Singh weigh the lapse on the part of the appellant in not filing the and Others petition for special leave to appeal within time and that too, in llaghubar Dayal, J. view of the wrong advice or opinion given by its legal advisers.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_745_755_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 745\n\nOUSEPH POULO AND THREE OTHERS\n\nCATHOLIC UNION BANK LTD. AND ORS.\n\nIP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO AND DAS\n\nGUPTA, JJ.]\n\nContract-Documents executed in favour of Bank as secu.\n\nTity for debts-Withdrawal.' of criminal complaint by Bank- Documents, if executed for stifling prosecution-Test-Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), s. 23.\n\nTwo of the defendants in the two suits out of which the present appeals arose borrowed a sum of Rs. 80,024-4-9 from the respondent Bank in course of their tusiness by pledging their goods. The Bank discovered that there was shortage in the goods deposited and through its Secretary lodged a com plaintwith the police that the said defendants, their father and brother had in collusion with the local agent of the Bank fraudulently removed part of the goods or, in the alternative, had made a grossly inadequate deposit to cheat the Bank. The Police restered the case and started investigation. The parties, thereafter settled their differences by a transaction which con sisted, among others, of a hypothecation bond for Rs. 30,000/·\n\ncovering immovable property and a Karar for Rs. 35,000/-, which were executed in favour of the Bank by the parent of the said defendants, by the said defendants themselves and their brother and his wife. On the Secretary of the Bank stating to the Police that the Bank's claim had be'€n settled and any further action would be unnecessary the criminal proceeding was dropped. Thereafter the said relatives of the two defendants who had executed the hvpothecation bond and the Karar brought a suit for the cancellation of the said documents on the ground that they had been executed to stifle the criminal prosecution and were as such unenforceable under s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The Bank sued for recovery of the amount due on the Karar which was resisted on the same ground that the document was unenforceable under s. 23 of the Contract Act.\n\nThe said defendant-debtors did not examine themselves.\n\nThey did not raise the plea of unenforceabibty in respect of a hire-purchase agreement which formed a part of the transaction in question and on which the Bank brought a suit against them and got a decree. After the sa.id settl<ement these defendants applied for further loan from the Bank. There was evidence to show that an agreement to furnish addiltional security had been reached between the said defendants and the Bank even before the complaint was filed.\n\nThe trial Court held that both .the documents fell within th~ mISch:ef of s. 23 of the Contract Act and decreed the first suit and dism1s.sed the second. The High Court on appeal took the cotrary view and reversed the decision of the tri<al Court accordmgly. The plamt1ffs m the first suit appealed to this Court.\n\nHeld: It was well settled that agreements made with the sole pupose of stifling prosecution were opposed to nublic\n\npohc>: smce th~ consideration which supported such agreements was itself agamst public policy and could not, thernfore, be\n\nApril16\n\n0...ph Poulo and\n\n30thm\n\nCatholic Union Bank LW.. and\n\nOtherr,\n\nenforced. In India however this doctrine was not applicable either to compoundable offences or to offences which could be compounded with the leave of the Court.\n\nThe onus was strictly on the party that impugned the transaction to prove that it was based on an agreement to stifle the prosecution. It must be able to show that on a certain consideration proceeding from it the complainant in return promised to discontinue the criminal proceeding and then alone the transaction would be one against public policy.\n\nV. Narasimha Raju v. V. Gurumurthy Raju, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 687 Maharaja Srish Chandra Nandy v. Sapravat Chandra A.LR. 1940 Cal. 337 Sudhindra Kumar Ray Chaudhuri v. Ganesh Chandra Gaguli, 1939 I.L.R. 1 Cal. 241 and Kamini Kumar Basu v. Birendra Nath Basu, A.LR. 1930 P.C. 100, referred to.\n\nBhowanipur Banking Corporation Ltd. v. Duresh Nandini Dasi, (1942) I.L.R. 1 Cal. 1, c0nsidered.\n\nBut in judging a particular agreement distinction must be made between the motive for the agreement and the consideration for it and subsequent events should not be allowed to confuse the issue.\n\nIt was clear in the present case that the plaintiffs had failed to discharge the onus that lay on them and the decision of the High Court was, therefore, correct.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 51 and 52 of 1962.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated June 12, 1959 of the Kerala High Court in A.S. Nos. 538 and 539 of 1954. '\n\nV. A. Seyid Muhammad. for the appellants.\n\nS. T. Desai and A.G. Pudissery, for the respondent No. L April 15, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n<Jajen-lra9adkar, OJ.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-These two appeals arise from two suits Nos. 5 of 1947 and 32 of 1951; and the main point which they raise for our decision is whether the two documents executed by the appellants and two of the respondents are unenforceable as being opposed to public policy under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act (hereinafter called 'the Act). The trial Court has answered this question in the affirmative; while the High Court of Kera la has ta ken a contrary view.\n\nPoulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi who are the sons of Ouseph Poulo were carrying on trade in hill produce at Alwaye and in the course of their business, they nad borrowed from the branch of the Catholic Union Bank Ltd. at Alwaye large amounts. In that connection, they had pledged goods with the Bank as security for the loan and the same had been deposited in a godown the key of which remained with the Bank. It appears that on the 10th February, 1947.\n\nthe Officers of the Head Office of the Bank inspected the 1964\n\n_godown and it was discovered that there was considerable OUS£ph Poulo and\n\nshortage of the goods pledged. Thereupon, the Secretary of 3 Othm 1he Bank lodged a complaint with the Police that Ouseph Oatltoli:union\n\nPoulo and his two sons who had dealings with the Bank as Bank Lid. and well as Poulo Joseph, another son of Ouseph Poulo, had col- Othe~ luded with the local Agent of the Bank and had fraudulently Gajendragadkar, 0.1. 'femove:I a substantial part of the pledged articles from the godown. The complaint also alleged alternatively that if the goods had not been fraudulently removed, then the security offered by Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi was grossly inadequate to cover the large amounts advanced to them, and that was the result of cheating. The Police registered this <:ase and investigations began. At that time the parties settled their diffetences and the two documents in question were executed.\n\nThe criminal complaint was filed on the 13th February and the First Information Report was made on the 16th February, 1947. On the 22nd February, a hypothecation bond (Ext. 26) was executed by Ouseph Poulo, his wife, his three sons and the wife of another son in favour of the Bank for Rs. 30,000 /-.\n\nThis bound covered immovable properties belonging to the executants.\n\nOn the 27th February, 1947, another document was executed by the same parties in favour of the Bank for Rs. 35,000/-; this document was called Kollappirivu Karar (Ext. B.). On the fiame day a receipt was executed by Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi which showed that the goods in the godown were valued at Rs. 10,000 /- and were surrendered to the Bank in partial satisfaction of the debts due from them to the Bank.\n\nThis was followed by a hire-purchase agreement by which the car owned by Poulo Thommi was transferred to the Bank and the same was conveyed back to him on a hire-purchar, e aree\n\nment, the value of this car was taken to be Rs. 5,000/-. The total amount due from Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi to the Bank was Rs. 80,024-5-9. As a result of the transactions in which the parties entered, Rs. 10,000 /- were made good by surrendering to the Bank the goods in the godown; Rs. 5,000 /- by trall6ferring the car; Rs. 30,000 /- and Rs. 35.000/- by the hypothecation deed and the Karar respectively; that left a balance of Rs. 24-5-9 which was paid in cash. After this transaction had thus been concluded, on the 28th February the Secretary of the Bank made a statement before the police that the Bank's claim had been settled and that he and the Managing Director of the Bank was satisfied that no goods had been removed from the godown as alleged in the complaint and that in co!Iur; ion with the Agent of the Bank, the debtors Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi had\n\nOtutph Paulo and\n\n3 Others\n\nOaUiolie Union\n\nBank Ltd. and\n\nOthers\n\ncheated the Bank by over-valuing the goods pledg.ed, but that no further action was necessary to be taken in that behalf. In consequence, the crhninal proceedings were dropped. That. in substance, is the nature of the transactions,. the character of which falls to be detennined in the present appeals.\n\nGajendrol,/adlt:M, o.J.\n\nOn the 15th December, 1947, Ouseph Poulo, the father. his son Joseph, Poulo's wife Aelia and Joseph's wife Thressia filed a suit in forma pauperis seeking cancellation of the two documents in question on the ground that they had been executed to stifle criminal prosecution and that they were also vitiated by undue influence. coercion and threat. The first defendant to this suit was the Bank and defendants 2 and J were the two debtors Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi, the sons of OU6eph Poulo. This was suit No. 5/ 1947.\n\nWhile this suit was pending, the Bank instituted suit No. 32 of 1951 on the 26th February, 1951 and claimed to recover the amount due on the Karar from all its executants.\n\nThe persons who had filed suit No. 5 /1947 were defendants\n\nl. 2. 5 & 6 in this suit and defendants 3 & 4 were the debtors Poulo Varghei; c and Poulo Thommi. These two sets of defendants filed two separate written statements; but the common plea raised by them was that the document on which the Bank's suit was based was unenforceable under s. 23 of the Act. The trial Court substantially upheld this defence with the result that suit No. 5/1947 was decreed and suit No. 3211951 was dismissed. The Bank took this matter before the High Court by preferring two appeals Nos. 538 & 539 of\n\n1954. The Hil!h Court has reversed the conclusion of the trial Court in regard to the character of the impugned transaction and in consequence. suit No. 5 /1947 has been dismised and suit No. 32/1951 has been decreed. That is how the plaintiffs in suit No. 5/1947 have come to this Court with a certificate issued by the High Court. During the course of this judgment, we will refer to the Bank as the Bank. the versons who brought 1mit No. 5 /J 947 as the plaintiffs and the two debtors as defendants 2 & 3.\n\n13efore dealing with the merits of the controversy between the parties, it is necessary to state briefly the true legal position in regard to the agreements which are held to be unenforceable on the ground that the consideration for which they are made is opposed to public policy. It is well-settled th:!! agreement~ which are made for stifling prosecution are opposed to public policy and as such, they cannot be enforced.\n\nThe basis for this position is that the consideration which sup ports such agreements is itself opposed to public policy. In J ndia. this doctrine is not applicable to compoundable offences, nor to offences which are compoundable with the leave of the\n\ncourt where the agreement in respect of such offences is entered 1964 into by the parties with the leave of the Court. With regard Omeph Poulo and to non-compoundable offences, however, the position is clear 3 Other• that no court of law can allow a private party to take the ad- Oatholi:union ministration of law in its own hands and settle the question Bank Ltd. and as to whether a particular offence has been committed or not, Other• for itself. It is obvious that if such a course is allowed to be Gajendragadkar, o.J. adopted and agreements made between the parties based solely on the consideration of stifling criminal prosecutions are sustained, the basic purpose of criminal law would be defeated; such agreements may enable the guilty persons to escape punishment and in some others they may conceivably impose an unconscionable burden on an innocent party under the coercive process of a threat of the criminal prosecution. In substance, where an agreement of this kind is made, it really means that the complainant chooses to decide the fate of the complaint which he has filed in a criminal court and that is clearly opposed to public policy.\n\nIn dealing with such agreements, it is, however, necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the motive which may operate in the mind of the complainant and the accused and which may indirectly be responsible for the agreement and the consideration for such an agreement. It is only where the agreement is supported by the prohibited consideration that it falls within the mischief of the principle that agreements which intend to stifle criminal prosecutions are invalid. The sequence of events, no doubt, has relevance in dealing with this question; but from mere sequence it would not be safe to infer the existence of the prohibited consideration. If in order to put an end to criminal proceedings, an agreement is made in the execution of which persons other than those who are charged in a criminal court join, that may afford a piece of evidence that the agreement is supported by the consider.ation that the criminal proceedings should be terminated. n the nature of the liability imposed upon a debtor by a previoUB dealing is substantially altered with a view to terminate the criminal proceedings, that itself may be another factor which the Court may take into account in deciding whether the agreement is supported by the prohibited consideration.\n\nBut in weighing the different relevant considerations in such a case, courts must inevitably enquire: did one party to the transaction make his promiBe in exchange or part exchange of pro- . mise of the other \"not to prosecute or continue prosecuting\"?\n\nAs Lord Atkin observed in Blrowanipur Banking Corporation Lftl. v. Durgeslr Nandini Desi('). \"In all criminal cases reparation where possible is the duty of the offender, and is to be encouraged. It would be a public mischief if on reparation\n\nf') (1942) I.L.R. I Cal. 1.\n\n1964 being made or promised by the offender or his frienm or rela- °'\"'Ph Pouw and tives mercy shown by the injured party should be used as a 3 Other! pretext for avoiding the reparation promised\". That, however, ·\n\nOatlwli~Union is not to say that if reparation is made as a consideration for Bank Ltd. and a promise to give up criminal proceedings, it would not Ou.era amount to an abuse of the right of private prosecution and Gajendragadkar, o.J. would not attract the provisions of s. 23 of the Act. The main point to remembyr is that the party challenging the validity of the impugned transaction must show that it was based upon an agreement to stifle prosecution. If it is shown that there was an agreement between the parties that a certain consideration should proceed from the accused person to the complainant in return for the promise of the complainant to discontinue the criminal proceedings, that clearly is a transaction w'1ich is opposed to public policy (vide V. Narasimha Raju v. V.\n\nGurumurthy Raju('), Maharaja Srish Chandra Nandy v.\n\nSupravat Chandra('), Sudhindra Kumar Ray Chaudhuri v.\n\nGanesh Chandra Ganguli('); and Kamini Kumar Basu, v.\n\nBirendra Nath Basu(').\n\nWhat then are the facts in this case on which the plaintiffs seek to challenge the correctness of the conclusion of the High Court that the impugned transactions are not invalid?\n\nDr. Seyid Muhammed for the plaintiffs has urged that in dealing with the present dispute between the parties, it is essential to remember that the complaint filed by the Bank against defendants 2 & 3 is found to be not a bonafide complaint and that, according to him, shows the true complexion of the impugned transactions. It is true that the trial Court has found that the complaint made by the Bank was not bonafide and the High Court has not in terms reversed that finding because the High Court disbelieved the direct evidence led by the plaintiffs and held that the agreement alleged by them was not proved. Dr. Seyid Muhammed, therefore, contends that there is a finding recorded by the trial Court which has not been reversed in appeal, and so, we should deal with the main point in the light of this finding. If we had been satisfied that the complaint filed by the Bank was deliberately and dishon.estly filed, that no doubt would have assisted the plaintiffs to a very large extent; but after carefully considering the material evidence on this point, we are satisfied that the trial Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the Bank had filed the complaint ma/afide. The complaint in terms made three material allegations. It alleged that though the goods pledged by defendants 2 and 3 were of a very low value, they were\n\n\n(') A.I.R 1930 P.C. 100.\n\nentered in the godown and in the relevant books as being 1961 worth a much larger amount. It also alleged that the goods, Ousepk Paula a.d though of a cheap quality, were described as a very superior 3 Otker• quality; and it also said that substantial part of the goods Oatlioli!'unio• pledged had been removed from the godowns for the purpose Bank Ltd. of causing loss to the Bank and for making unlawful profit. ou..r, 1:his complaint was filed against defendants 2 and 3 an.d plain-Gajendr;,;; ikar, o.J, ttffs 1 and 2, and another son Ouseph Poulo who 1s not a party to the present litigation. In regard to thi~ last allegation of theft, the complaint also averred that the key of the godown used to be with the agent of the Bank at Alwaye and the 6aid agent had absconded. The complaint mentioned that the lorry in which the goods were removed bore the registration No. 2923 and it belonged to the Qunani Motor Service.\n\nWhen the Secretary of the Bank gave evidence he stated that on an enquiry being made on the spot, it was learnt that the goods had been removed in the particular lorry; but, later, no evidence was forthcoming to support that report. He, however, adhered to the case of the Bank that the goods which were found in the godown were hopelessly inadequate to serve as a security for the advance made to defendants 2 and 3. The .. argument ;; that the allegation as to theft was dishonesty made by the Bank in its complaint in order to apply coercive pressure against defendants 2 and 3 and the members of their family.\n\nPrima facie, this argument does appear to be attractive, and if it had been sustained, it might have helped the plaintiffs a good deal.\n\nThere is, however, clear evidence on the record which negatives this contention. As we have already seen, a receipt was poosed in favour of the Bank surrendering the goods which were found in the godown to the Bank and these goods have been priced at Rs. 10,000 I-. It is common ground that the goods which were pledged with the Bank were intended to serve as a security for as much as Rs. 80,000 and odd; and so, there can be no doubt whatever that the goods found did not satisfy that requirement. The number of bags which were mentioned in the receipt is 534; that again does not represent the total bags of goods pledged with the Bank. So, it is absolutely clear that the Bank realised on inspection of the godown that the security offered was wholly in-adequate and it may well be that on the spot some people reported that the pledged goods had been removed.\n\nThat is why the Bank stated aJ.l the material facts and alleged that either the substantial part of the goods which had been pledged had been removed, or the goods which had been pledged were not at all enough to cover the amount advanced. In any case, the agent of the Bank may have colluded with the debtors. Now, in the view of the receipt passed by the debtors and the members of their family in favour of the Bank in which the value\n\n1961 of the goods found in the godown has been determined at Ousepll. Paulo awl Rs. 10,000 /-, it would be unreasonable to suggest that the\n\ni: Others complaint made by the Bank was not bonafide. v.\n\nOatbAJlie Union.\n\nBaal: Lid. and ou.e,.,\n\nGajewlragadkar, 0.\n\nBesides, in dealing with this dispute, it essential to remember that defendants 2 and 3 have not entered the witness-box at all. They have left it to their father, mother, \"brothers and sister-in-law to fight this litigation. At every stage of the proceedings in both the suits, we come across poinlB of dispute on which defendants 2 and 3 alone could have given evidence. Did they pledge goods worth the amount advanced to them? If yes, did the Agent remove them, or were the goods which were originally pledged not of enough value and by collusion with the Agent, representation was made and accepted that they were valuable? On all these matters, it was necessary that defendants 2 and 3 should have taken the oath to support the case made by the plaintiffs when they challeng .. ed the validity of the transactions in question. The High Court has seriously commented on the fact that defendants 2 and 3 have deliberately avoided to face the witness-box. In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case, this comment is fully justified.\n\nThere is another piece of evidence which is equally material and which is in favour of the Bank and that evidence relates to the subsequent conduct of defendants 2 and 3.\n\nWe have already noticed that a motor car belonging to one of the debtors was sold to the Bank for Rs. 5 ,000 I - and taken back on hire-purchase agreement. Indeed, this hire-purchase agreement is a part of the transaction which settled the dispute between the parties. It appears that the debtors failed to pay the instalments under the hire-purchase agreement and that led to a suit by the Bank. In this suit, the debtors filed an elaborate written statement containing 21 paragraphs; but we do not see any allegation that the hire-purchase agreement was a part of a transaction which was invalid and as such, the claim made by the Bank was not sustainable. In fact, this suit was decreed in favour of the Bank. The conduct of defendants 2 and 3 in not raising a plea agaimt the validity of the hire-purchase agreement is not without significance.\n\nSimilarly, it appears that after the impugned transaction took place between the parties, defendants 2 and 3 applied to the Bank for further advance on the 11th April, 1947 and Mr. Ramakrishna Nair who is the principal witness for the plaintiffs in the present litigation and who was the Legal Adviser of the Bank, 1mpported the debtor's request for advance.\n\nThis request was, however, turned down and it is obvfous that the failure of the Bank to accommodate the debtors ultimately led to the present plea that the transactions in question are\n\ninvalid. Therefore, we are satisfied that the subsequent con- duct of defendants 2 and 3 clearly showrs that they are not O....pA Paulo •nil prepared to take the risk of facing cross-examination and that a Otlier• is the reason that they have left it to their relatives to fight the aalllol:-union Present litigation.\n\nBalli: Lid. anli\n\nOtTier.\n\nIt is in the light of this background that we have to consi-aenclragadkar, O.I, der the oral evidence in the case. The main witnesses on whose teritimony Dr. Seyid Muhammed has relied are Mr. Nair P.W. I and Mr. Pillai P.W. 3. Mr. Nair is a practising lawyer and was at the relevant time the Municipal Chairman of Alwaye, whereas Mr. Pillai was a Municipal Councillor at that time.\n\nAccording to Mr. Nair, he took part in the execution of the relevant documents and advised the Bank. He stated that the documents were so executed for settling the criminal case. He also added that he told defendants 2 and 3 that if the mortgage deed and the agreement were got executed, the criminal case could be dropped and his explanation wars that he made that statement because the Managing Director and the Bank's Secretary Joseph had told him to that effect.\n\nIt appears that for assisting the Bank in filing the criminal complaint, this lawyer had claimed Rs. 500 /-, but the Bank paid him only Rs. 200 /-. That was one reason why he was dissatisfied. It also appears that he recommended to the Bank to give a loan to some persons including defendants 2 and 3 and his recommendation letters were ignored by the Bank. That was another reason why he was not feeling happy with the Bank. The High Court has taken the view that the statements made by this witness cannot be regarded as reliable or trustworthy; and we are not prepared to hold that the view taken by the High Court is so erroneous that we should reverse it.\n\nIn any case, reading the evidence of this witness ars a whole, we would be reluctant to come to the conclusion that there was an agreement between the Bank and defendants 2 and 3 at the relevant time which would attract the provisions of s. 23 of the Act. Our reluctance is based on the somewhat unsatisfactory character of the evidence given by this witness as well as on the fact that defendants 2 and 3 ho could .have given evidence on this point have not stepped mto the witness-box. The onus to prove the illegal character of the transactions was obviously on the plaintiffs and their failure to examine defendants 2 and 3 must largely contribute to the final decision on the issue .\n\n. ~· Pillai who is the other witness on whose evidence the plamtiffs rely has been characterised by the High Court as !-mtrustw?rth}'.; but the infirmity in the evidence of this witness 1s that !tis eV!dence does not clearly or expreS6ly lead to the C10nclus1on that there was an agreement between the parties\n\n011aeph Poulo and 3 Other&\n\nthat the document should be executed by the debtors in consideration for the Bank withdrawing the criminal proceedings.\n\nThe answers which he gave are somewhat vague and indefinite, and it would be unsafe to make the said answers the basis of a definite finding against the Bank.\n\nOarlwlic Union\n\nBanl Llci. and\n\nOtllera . - The last witness on whose evidence Dr. Seyid Muham- Gajendragadkar, C.J. med has relied is plaintiff No. I, the father, P.W. 7.\n\nHis evidence is obviously interested and the fact that he has taken upon himself to speak to a traw, action when di; fendants 2 and 3 who were directly concerned in the transaction did not come to give evidence, considerably detracts from the value of his statements. Therefore, having carefully considered the evidence in the light of criticism made by the High Court, we are not prepared to accept Dr. Seyid Muhammad's argument that he has made out a case for reversing the conclusion of the High Court.\n\nIn this connection, we ought to mention another point w4icl:i is not irrelevant. The evidence given by the Secretary of the Bank, Joseph, shows that soon after the godown w:is im; pected and before the complaint was filed, defendants 2 and 3 offered to the Bank to make up for the deficiency in the value of the pledged goods. They appealed to the Bank that the discovery made by the bank on inspection of the godown should not be disclosed to anybody and that they would immediately furnish sufficient additional security. In order . .-to carry out this promise, they in fact delivered to the Bank certain documents of title in respect of the property which was ultimately mortgaged to the Bank; but all the documents of title were not handed over and that is where the matter stood when the complaint was filed.\n\nLater, the two impugned documents were executed and the complaint was withdrawn. The point on which Mr. Desai for the Bank has relied is that the evidence of the Secretary shows that an agreement to furnish additional security had been reached between defendants 2 and 3 on the one hand and the Bank on the other even before the complaint was filed, and so, it would be unreasonable to suggest merely from the sequence of subsequent events that the impugned documents were executed with the object, and for the consideration, of stifling the criminal prosecution. Mr. Desai argues, and we think rightly, that where the validity of an agreement is impeached on the ground that it is opposed to public policy under s. 23 of the Act, the party setting up the plea must be called upon to prove that plea by clear and satisfactory evidence. Reliance on a mere r, equence of events may tend to obliterate the real difference between the motive for the agreement and the consideration for it. Did the parties offer to give security and execute the documents in consideration for the withdrawal of the criminal complaint by the Bank?-that is the question which has to be decided in the present appeals,\n\n.... ...\n\n. u;·\n\nand in proving their case, the plaintifis are expected to lead 1964 satisfactory evidence; and in our opinion, the High Court is, Otueph Paulo and on the whole, right when it came to the conclusion, that the a Other• evidence led by the plaintiffs iJS far from satisfactory. Thereh 1 .v.u . fore, we are satisfied that the view taken by the High Court CiJ..:k~14~::,, is right and cannot be reversed. 0111ers\n\nThe result is, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costsGojerwlragadkar, C.J. one set of hearing fees.\n\nThe appellants have been allowed to file their appeals in forma pauperis, and so, we direct that they should pay court-fees which they would have had to pay if they had not been allowed to appeal as paupers.\n\nAppeals dismissed .", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "745\n\nOUSEPH POULO AND THREE OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "OUSEPH POULO AND THREE OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CATHOLIC UNION BANK LTD. AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CATHOLIC UNION BANK LTD. AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Test-Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 332, "end_char": 362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376, "end_char": 381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Test-Indian Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "Test-Indian Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1773, "end_char": 1778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1786, "end_char": 1805, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1945, "end_char": 1950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2567, "end_char": 2572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Catholic Union Bank", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3082, "end_char": 3101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: It was well settled that agreements made with the sole pupose of stifling prosecution were opposed to nublic\n\npohc>: smce th~ consideration which supported such agreements was itself agamst public policy and could not, thernfore, be\n\nApril16\n\n0...ph Poulo and\n\n30thm\n\nCatholic Union Bank LW.. and\n\nOtherr,\n\nenforced.", "canonical_name": "CATHOLIC UNION BANK LTD. AND ORS"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3134, "end_char": 3139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India however this doctrine was not applicable either to compoundable offences or to offences which could be compounded with the leave of the Court."}}, {"text": "[1963] 3 S.C.R. 687", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3677, "end_char": 3696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4382, "end_char": 4410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the judgment and order dated June 12, 1959 of the Kerala High Court in A.S. Nos."}}, {"text": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4569, "end_char": 4589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. A. Seyid Muhammad."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4612, "end_char": 4623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and A.G. Pudissery, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "A.G. Pudissery", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4628, "end_char": 4642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and A.G. Pudissery, for the respondent No."}}, {"text": "Jajen-lra9adkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4730, "end_char": 4745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n<Jajen-lra9adkar, OJ."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4752, "end_char": 4766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-These two appeals arise from two suits Nos.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5038, "end_char": 5048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5056, "end_char": 5075, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Kera la", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5180, "end_char": 5201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Court has answered this question in the affirmative; while the High Court of Kera la has ta ken a contrary view."}}, {"text": "Poulo Varghese", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5231, "end_char": 5245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi who are the sons of Ouseph Poulo were carrying on trade in hill produce at Alwaye and in the course of their business, they nad borrowed from the branch of the Catholic Union Bank Ltd. at Alwaye large amounts.", "canonical_name": "Poulo Varghese"}}, {"text": "Poulo Thommi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5250, "end_char": 5262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi who are the sons of Ouseph Poulo were carrying on trade in hill produce at Alwaye and in the course of their business, they nad borrowed from the branch of the Catholic Union Bank Ltd. at Alwaye large amounts."}}, {"text": "Ouseph Poulo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5283, "end_char": 5295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi who are the sons of Ouseph Poulo were carrying on trade in hill produce at Alwaye and in the course of their business, they nad borrowed from the branch of the Catholic Union Bank Ltd. at Alwaye large amounts.", "canonical_name": "Ouseph Oatltoli"}}, {"text": "Alwaye", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5338, "end_char": 5344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi who are the sons of Ouseph Poulo were carrying on trade in hill produce at Alwaye and in the course of their business, they nad borrowed from the branch of the Catholic Union Bank Ltd. at Alwaye large amounts."}}, {"text": "Catholic Union Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5423, "end_char": 5447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi who are the sons of Ouseph Poulo were carrying on trade in hill produce at Alwaye and in the course of their business, they nad borrowed from the branch of the Catholic Union Bank Ltd. at Alwaye large amounts."}}, {"text": "10th February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5663, "end_char": 5682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on the 10th February, 1947."}}, {"text": "Ouseph Oatltoli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5940, "end_char": 5955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the Secretary of 3 Othm 1he Bank lodged a complaint with the Police that Ouseph Oatltoli:union\n\nPoulo and his two sons who had dealings with the Bank as Bank Lid.", "canonical_name": "Ouseph Oatltoli"}}, {"text": "Poulo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the Secretary of 3 Othm 1he Bank lodged a complaint with the Police that Ouseph Oatltoli:union\n\nPoulo and his two sons who had dealings with the Bank as Bank Lid."}}, {"text": "Poulo Joseph", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6042, "end_char": 6054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and well as Poulo Joseph, another son of Ouseph Poulo, had col- Othe~ luded with the local Agent of the Bank and had fraudulently Gajendragadkar, 0.1. '"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6160, "end_char": 6174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and well as Poulo Joseph, another son of Ouseph Poulo, had col- Othe~ luded with the local Agent of the Bank and had fraudulently Gajendragadkar, 0.1. '", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Poulo Varghese", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6374, "end_char": 6388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint also alleged alternatively that if the goods had not been fraudulently removed, then the security offered by Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi was grossly inadequate to cover the large amounts advanced to them, and that was the result of cheating.", "canonical_name": "Poulo Varghese"}}, {"text": "16th February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6774, "end_char": 6793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The criminal complaint was filed on the 13th February and the First Information Report was made on the 16th February, 1947."}}, {"text": "27th February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7050, "end_char": 7069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th February, 1947, another document was executed by the same parties in favour of the Bank for Rs."}}, {"text": "Otutph Paulo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8521, "end_char": 8533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this transaction had thus been concluded, on the 28th February the Secretary of the Bank made a statement before the police that the Bank's claim had been settled and that he and the Managing Director of the Bank was satisfied that no goods had been removed from the godown as alleged in the complaint and that in co!Iur; ion with the Agent of the Bank, the debtors Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi had\n\nOtutph Paulo and\n\n3 Others\n\nOaUiolie Union\n\nBank Ltd. and\n\nOthers\n\ncheated the Bank by over-valuing the goods pledg.ed, but that no further action was necessary to be taken in that behalf."}}, {"text": "OaUiolie Union\n\nBank Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8549, "end_char": 8574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this transaction had thus been concluded, on the 28th February the Secretary of the Bank made a statement before the police that the Bank's claim had been settled and that he and the Managing Director of the Bank was satisfied that no goods had been removed from the godown as alleged in the complaint and that in co!Iur; ion with the Agent of the Bank, the debtors Poulo Varghese and Poulo Thommi had\n\nOtutph Paulo and\n\n3 Others\n\nOaUiolie Union\n\nBank Ltd. and\n\nOthers\n\ncheated the Bank by over-valuing the goods pledg.ed, but that no further action was necessary to be taken in that behalf."}}, {"text": "15th December, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8924, "end_char": 8943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendrol,/adlt:M, o.J.\n\nOn the 15th December, 1947, Ouseph Poulo, the father."}}, {"text": "Ouseph Poulo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8945, "end_char": 8957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendrol,/adlt:M, o.J.\n\nOn the 15th December, 1947, Ouseph Poulo, the father.", "canonical_name": "Ouseph Oatltoli"}}, {"text": "Joseph", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8979, "end_char": 8985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his son Joseph, Poulo's wife Aelia and Joseph's wife Thressia filed a suit in forma pauperis seeking cancellation of the two documents in question on the ground that they had been executed to stifle criminal prosecution and that they were also vitiated by undue influence."}}, {"text": "Aelia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9000, "end_char": 9005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his son Joseph, Poulo's wife Aelia and Joseph's wife Thressia filed a suit in forma pauperis seeking cancellation of the two documents in question on the ground that they had been executed to stifle criminal prosecution and that they were also vitiated by undue influence."}}, {"text": "Thressia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9024, "end_char": 9032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his son Joseph, Poulo's wife Aelia and Joseph's wife Thressia filed a suit in forma pauperis seeking cancellation of the two documents in question on the ground that they had been executed to stifle criminal prosecution and that they were also vitiated by undue influence."}}, {"text": "26th February, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9518, "end_char": 9537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of 1951 on the 26th February, 1951 and claimed to recover the amount due on the Karar from all its executants."}}, {"text": "Poulo Varghei", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9738, "end_char": 9751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 & 6 in this suit and defendants 3 & 4 were the debtors Poulo Varghei; c and Poulo Thommi.", "canonical_name": "Poulo Varghese"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9957, "end_char": 9962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Omeph Poulo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11523, "end_char": 11534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard Omeph Poulo and to non-compoundable offences, however, the position is clear 3 Other• that no court of law can allow a private party to take the ad- Oatholi:union ministration of law in its own hands and settle the question Bank Ltd. and as to whether a particular offence has been committed or not, Other• for itself.", "canonical_name": "Ouseph Oatltoli"}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14080, "end_char": 14085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Lord Atkin observed in Blrowanipur Banking Corporation Lftl."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14775, "end_char": 14789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That, however, ·\n\nOatlwli~Union is not to say that if reparation is made as a consideration for Bank Ltd. and a promise to give up criminal proceedings, it would not Ou.era amount to an abuse of the right of private prosecution and Gajendragadkar, o.J. would not attract the provisions of s. 23 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14832, "end_char": 14837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seyid Muhammed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15719, "end_char": 15733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Seyid Muhammed for the plaintiffs has urged that in dealing with the present dispute between the parties, it is essential to remember that the complaint filed by the Bank against defendants 2 & 3 is found to be not a bonafide complaint and that, according to him, shows the true complexion of the impugned transactions.", "canonical_name": "Seyid Muhammed"}}, {"text": "Qunani Motor Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17991, "end_char": 18011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2923 and it belonged to the Qunani Motor Service."}}, {"text": "Ousepll. Paulo", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20132, "end_char": 20146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, in the view of the receipt passed by the debtors and the members of their family in favour of the Bank in which the value\n\n1961 of the goods found in the godown has been determined at Ousepll."}}, {"text": "Gajewlragadkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20313, "end_char": 20327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajewlragadkar, 0.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "11th April, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22554, "end_char": 22570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, it appears that after the impugned transaction took place between the parties, defendants 2 and 3 applied to the Bank for further advance on the 11th April, 1947 and Mr. Ramakrishna Nair who is the principal witness for the plaintiffs in the present litigation and who was the Legal Adviser of the Bank, 1mpported the debtor's request for advance."}}, {"text": "Ramakrishna Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22579, "end_char": 22595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, it appears that after the impugned transaction took place between the parties, defendants 2 and 3 applied to the Bank for further advance on the 11th April, 1947 and Mr. Ramakrishna Nair who is the principal witness for the plaintiffs in the present litigation and who was the Legal Adviser of the Bank, 1mpported the debtor's request for advance."}}, {"text": "Seyid Muhammed", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23449, "end_char": 23463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main witnesses on whose teritimony Dr. Seyid Muhammed has relied are Mr. Nair P.W. I and Mr. Pillai P.W. 3."}}, {"text": "Nair", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23483, "end_char": 23487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main witnesses on whose teritimony Dr. Seyid Muhammed has relied are Mr. Nair P.W. I and Mr. Pillai P.W. 3."}}, {"text": "Pillai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23503, "end_char": 23509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main witnesses on whose teritimony Dr. Seyid Muhammed has relied are Mr. Nair P.W. I and Mr. Pillai P.W. 3."}}, {"text": "Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23625, "end_char": 23631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Nair is a practising lawyer and was at the relevant time the Municipal Chairman of Alwaye, whereas Mr. Pillai was a Municipal Councillor at that time."}}, {"text": "Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23691, "end_char": 23695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Nair, he took part in the execution of the relevant documents and advised the Bank."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25042, "end_char": 25047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "011aeph Poulo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25805, "end_char": 25818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tis eV!dence does not clearly or expreS6ly lead to the C10nclus1on that there was an agreement between the parties\n\n011aeph Poulo and 3 Other&\n\nthat the document should be executed by the debtors in consideration for the Bank withdrawing the criminal proceedings."}}, {"text": "Oarlwlic Union\n\nBanl Llci.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26114, "end_char": 26140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oarlwlic Union\n\nBanl Llci."}}, {"text": "Seyid Muham- Gajendragadkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26197, "end_char": 26224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last witness on whose evidence Dr. Seyid Muham- Gajendragadkar, C.J. med has relied is plaintiff No."}}, {"text": "Seyid Muhammad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26691, "end_char": 26705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, having carefully considered the evidence in the light of criticism made by the High Court, we are not prepared to accept Dr. Seyid Muhammad's argument that he has made out a case for reversing the conclusion of the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Seyid Muhammed"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27713, "end_char": 27718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point on which Mr. Desai for the Bank has relied is that the evidence of the Secretary shows that an agreement to furnish additional security had been reached between defendants 2 and 3 on the one hand and the Bank on the other even before the complaint was filed, and so, it would be unreasonable to suggest merely from the sequence of subsequent events that the impugned documents were executed with the object, and for the consideration, of stifling the criminal prosecution."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28322, "end_char": 28327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "costsGojerwlragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29287, "end_char": 29307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0111ers\n\nThe result is, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costsGojerwlragadkar, C.J. one set of hearing fees."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_756_759_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April IS\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS fl964}\n\nSANT RAM AND ORS.\n\nLABH SINGH AND ORS. [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYAT-'\n\nULLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYAN\n\nGAR, JJ.] Pre-emption-Based on custom-Whether infringes Constitution of Jndia-\"Laws in force\"-W:hether includes custom and usage-Constitution of India, Arts. 13, 19.\n\nIn a suit filed by the respondent, the Munsif though holding that there was a general custom of pre-emption in the locality and that the respondent had a right to pre-empt, under that custom, dismissed the suit because the sale did not include a strip of land 3 feet 6 inches wide between the respondent's h'.:use and the property sold. The respondent's appeal was allowed by the District Judge. The appellants appealed to the High Court which was unsuccessful because of the answer of the Division Bench to which the question was referred. The Division Bench held that the law relating to pre-emption on the ground of vicinage was saved by Art. 19(5) and was not void 1.1nder Art. 13 of the Constitution. The appellant relied on the decision of this Court in Bhau Ram v. Baijnath and claimed that pre-emption on the ground of vicinage could not be claimed. The respondents in reply contended (a) that Bhau Ram's case was concerned with a legislative measure whereas the present case arose from custom and was thus distinguishable and (b) that Art. 13(1) dealt with \"all laws in force'~. and custom was not included in the definition of the phrase \"laws\n\nin force\" in cl. (3)(b) of Art. 13.\n\nHeld: (i) In so far as statute law is concerned Bhau Ram's case decides that a law of pre-emption based on vicinage is void. The reasons given by this Court to hold statute law void apply equally to a custom.\n\nBhau Ram v. B. Baijnath Singh, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R 724, followed. Digambar Singh v. Ahmad Said Khan, L.R. 42 I.A. 10, referred to.\n\n(ii) Custom and usage having in the territory of India the '- force of law are included irt the expression \"all laws in force\".\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 299 of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 26, 1961 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 620 of I 957.\n\nJ. P. Goyal, for the appellants.\n\nB. C. Misra. for the respondent No. I.\n\nApril 15, 1964. The judgment of the C'.ourt was delivered by Hiilayatullah, J.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-In this appeal by certificate from the -\n\nHigh Court of Judicature at Allahabad the appellants are the four original defendants in a suit for pre-emption filed by '>-- the first respondent. Kaiseri Begam (respondent No: 2) sold a plot and two houses in mohalla Gher Abdul Rahman Khan,\n\nQasba Milak, Tehsil Milak, District Rampur, to the appellants on December 4, 1953. The first respondent Labh Singh owned the adjacent house and he claimed pre-emption on the ground of vicinage after making the usual demands. The suit' was filed by Labh Singh in the court of Munsif, Rampur who by his judgment dated September 25, 1955 held that there was a general custom of preemption in the town of Milak. He also held that Labh Singh was entitled to preempt and had performed the Talabs. He, however, dismissed the suit because the sale did not include a strip of land 3 feet 6 inches wide between Labh Singh 's house and the property sold. He made no order about costs. 'There was an appeal by Labh Singh and the present appellants objected.\n\nThe District Judge, Rampur allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-objections. The appellants then filed a second appeal in the High 'Court of Allahabad, Mr. Justice V. D.\n\nBhargava, who heard the appeal, referred the following question to a Division Bench: -\n\n\"Whether after coming into operation of the Constitution, the right of pre-emption is contrary to the provisions of Art. l 9(l)(f) read with Art. 13 of the Constitution, or is it saved by clause (5) of Art. 19?\" The Divisional Bench held that the law relating to pre-emption on the ground of vicinage was saved by clause (5) of Art. 19 and was not void under Art. 1:1 of the Constitution.\n\nIn view of this answer, the second appeal was dismissed. The High Court, however, certified the case and the present appeal has been filed.\n\nThe question which was posed by Mr. Justice V. D.\n\nBhargava was considered by this Court in connection with s. JO of the Rewa State Pre-emption Act. 1946 in Bhau Ram\n\nv. B. Baijnath Singh ('). This Court held by majority that the law of pre-emption on the ground of vicinage illlposed unreasonable restrictions on the right to acquire. hold and to dispose of property guaranteed by Art. l 9(i)(fl of the Constitution and was void. It was pointed out that it placed restrictions both on the vendor and on the vendee and there was no advantage to the general public and that the only reason given in support of it, that it prevented person~ belonging to different religions, races or castes from ucquiring property in any area peopled by persons of other religions. races or castes, could not be considered reasonable in view of Art. 15 of the Constitution.\n\nIf this ruling applies the present appeal must succeed.\n\nMr. B. C. Misra, who appears for Labh Singh attempts to distinguish Bhau Ram's case('). He contends that the earlier case was concerned with a legislative measure whereas the\n\nOlhe'8\n\nLa/Jh Singh ani\n\nOthm\n\nHiclayatullah, J\n\nOther1\n\nLab! Si1UJh and\n\nOtMrs\n\nHidayatu/bJh, J.\n\npresent case of pre-emption arises from custom. He refers to the decision in Digambar Singh v. Ahmad Said Khan(') where the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has given the early history of the law of pre-emption in village communities in India and points out that the law of pre-emption had its origin in the Mohammedan Law and was the result, some times, of a contract between the sharers in a village.\n\nMr. Misra contends that Arts. 14 and 15 are addressed to the \"State as defined in Art. 12 and are not applicable to custom or contract as neither. according to him, amounts to law within the definition given in Art. 131J)(bl of the Constitution. He submits that the ruling of this Court does not cover the present case and that it is necessary to consider the question of the validity of the customary law of pre-emption based on vicinage.\n\nIt is hardly necessary to go into ancient law to discover the sources of the Jaw of pre-emption whether customary or the result of contract or statute. In so far as statute law is concerned Bhau Ram's case(') decides that a Jaw of pre-emption based on vicinage is void. The reasons given by this Court to hold statute law void apply equally to a custom.\n\nThe only question thus is whether custom as such is affected by Part III dealing with fundamental rights and particularly Art. 19(i)(f). Mr. Misra ingeniously points out in this connection that Art. 13(1) deals with \"all Jaws in force\" and custom is not included in the definition of the p:1rase \"laws in force\" in clause (3)(b) of Art. 13. It is convenient to read Art. 13 at this stage:\n\n\"13. (!) All laws in force in the territory of India intmediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.\n\n(2) The State shall. not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in cOntra vention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.\n\n(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise rerequire&,-\n\n(a) \"Jaw\" includes any Ordinance, order, bye-Jaw, rule, regulation. notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of Jaw;\n\n(b) \"law in force\" includes laws passed or made by a Legislative or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously\n\n(') L.R. 42 I.A. 10, 18. (') [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 724. -\n\nrepealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.\" The argument of Mr. Misra is that the definition of \"law''. in Art. 13(3)(a) cannot be used for purposes of the first clae. because it is intended to define the word \"law\" in the second clause. According to him. the phrase \"laws in force\" which is used in clause (I) is defined in (3)(b\\ and that definition alone governs the first clause, and as that definition takes no account of customs or usage, the law of pre-emption based on custom is unaffected by Art. l 9(i)(f). In our judgment, the definition of the term \"law\" must be read with the first clause.\n\nIf the definition of the phrase \"laws in force\" had not been given. it is quite clear that the definition of the word \"law\" would have been read with the first clause. The question is whether by defining the composite phrase \"laws in force\" the intention is to exclude the first definition. The definition of the phrase \"laws in force\" is an inclusive definition and is intended to include laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority before the commencement of the Constitution irrespective of the fact that the law or any part thereof was not in operation in particular areas or at all. In other words, laws, which were not in operation, though on the statute book, were included in the phrase \"laws in force\".\n\nBut the second definition does not in any way restrict the ambit of the word \"law\" in the first clause as extended by the definition of that word. It merely seeks to amplify it by including something which, but for the second definition, would not be included by the first definition. There are two compelling reasons why custom and usage having in the territory of India the force of the law must be held to be contemplated by the expression \"all laws in force\". Firstly, to ho!d otherwise, would restrict the operation of the first clause in such ways that none of the things mentioned in the first definition would be affected by the fundamental rights.\n\nSecondly, it is to be seen that the second clause spea-ks of \"laws\" made by the State and custom or usage is not made by the State. If the first definition governs only cl. (2) then the words \"custom or usage\", would apply neither to cl. (I) nor to cl. (2) and this could hardly have been intended. It is obvious that both the definitions control the meaning of the fits! clause of the Article. The argument cannot, therefore, be accepted. It follows that respondent No. I cannot now sustain the decree in view of the prescriptions of the Constitution and the determination of this Court in Bhau Ram's case('). The appeal will be allowed but in the circumstances of the case parties will bear their costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nSan/ Ram and .. Others\n\nLablt Sin.gh r, ind\n\nOthers\n\nHidaynluflail, .T.", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "SANT RAM AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SANT RAM AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LABH SINGH AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LABH SINGH AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. 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D.\n\nBhargava, who heard the appeal, referred the following question to a Division Bench: -\n\n\"Whether after coming into operation of the Constitution, the right of pre-emption is contrary to the provisions of Art."}}, {"text": "V. D.\n\nBhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3574, "end_char": 3589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants then filed a second appeal in the High 'Court of Allahabad, Mr. Justice V. 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HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5804, "end_char": 5809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Misra contends that Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5824, "end_char": 5839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5882, "end_char": 5889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 131J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6011, "end_char": 6020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(i)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6718, "end_char": 6731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6790, "end_char": 6800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6928, "end_char": 6935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6962, "end_char": 6969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "L.R. 42 I.A. 10", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7828, "end_char": 7843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 13(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8078, "end_char": 8091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hidaynluflail", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10756, "end_char": 10769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "San/ Ram and .. Others\n\nLablt Sin.gh r, ind\n\nOthers\n\nHidaynluflail, .T."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_760_766_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April 15\n\n71)0\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19.64)\n\nRUP CHAND GUPTA\n\nRAGHUVANSHI PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. (P.9b. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J. AND K. C. DAS GUPTA, J.)\n\nDecree-Collusion-Ingredients of collusimt-A . party who need not be impleaded was not impleaded-Does not constitute collusi<>'l-Two limited companies-All directors common- Suit by one-Other does not defend-Does not make the suit collusive.\n\nRespondent No. 2 is the lessee of Respondent No. 1 and the appellant is the sub-lessee. Both the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had the same directors. Respondent No. 1 brought a suit against respondent No. 2 for eviction in which the appellant was not impleaded as a party. By agreement between the pr£sent respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that suit was not defended and ex-parte decree was obtained in favour of respondent No. 1. By virtue of this decree the appellant as a sub-lessee of respondent No. 2 became a tresspasser and had no right to remain on the land.\n\nTo avoid this situation the appellant filed a suit to set aside the decree on the ground that it was obtained by collusion.\n\nThe Trial Judge accepted his contention and gave a direction that the appellant still remained a tenant and directing the tlefendants in that suit from taking any steps in execution of the ex-parte decree. On appeal the trial Court's decree was set aside on the ground that the present appellant had failed to prove that the ex-parte decree was obtaind collusively.\n\nBefore this Court the same contentions as in the courts below were raised.\n\nHeld: (i) The mere fact that the defendant agreed with the plaintiff that if a suit is brought he would not defend it would not necessarily prove coJ.lusion. It is only if this agreement is done improperly in the sense that a dishonest purpose was intended to be achieved that they can be said to have colluded.\n\nScott v. Scott. 1913 Law Reports (Probate Division) 52 and Nagubai Ammaz & Ors. v. B. Shamma Rao, [1956) S.C.R 451, referred to.\n\n(ii) The law allows a landlord to institute a suit against a lessee for the possession of the land on the basis of a valid notification without impleading the sub-lessee and the decree in such suit would bind the sub-lessee and hence the suit instituted by respondent No. 1 in the present case cannot be said to have constituted an improper act.\n\n(iii) The omission of the respondent No. 2 to defend the earlier suit was not also an improper act because even if it had a good defence it was not bound to take it.\n\n(iv) Even if the appellant was a Thika tenant within the meaning of the Calcutta Thika Tenants Act, 1949, it would have protected him against eviction by respondent No. 2 but It would not have given protection against the evictim1 by respondent No. 1 because the Act was designed to protect the Thika Tenant from eviction by the landlord only and not against eviction from any other source.\n\nShamsuddin Ahmad v. Dinanath l\\fa!iick, Appeal from 1964 original decree No. 123 of 1957, decided on 13-8-59.\n\nBup Chand Guplal\n\n. (v) The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are two distinct legal Baghvra:.hi Pri .. ie entitles and therefore simply because both had the same d:rec- Ltd. \"' Anolhu tors it cannot be said that the purpose of the suit was dishonest or sinlster.\n\n(vi) The appellate Bench of the High Court has correctly decided that the present appellant has failed to establish that the impugned decree was procured collusively.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 172 of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 6, 1962 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 213 of 1959.\n\nS. T. Desai, B. Sen and B. P. Maheslnvari, for the appellant.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, Ajit Kumar Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the ; espondent No. I.\n\nApril 15, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The subject-matter of this litigation. is Do.! 1Jv¥o, J. a piece of land in the heart of the business centre of the city of Calcutta. This was part of a block of 52 cottahs of land taken on lease on January 21. 1950 from the Official Trustee, West Bengal, by a private limited company. Raghuvanshi Private Ltd. The lease was a building lease for a period of 75 years commencing from January 21, 1950. The lessee .was required to complete the construction of a three or four storeyed building on the land within 10 years. In September 1960, Raghuvanshi Private Limited in its turn leased 10! cottahs out of the 52 cottahs to a public limited company, Land and Bricks Ltd. This lease by Raghuvanshi Private Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as \"Raghuvanshi\") in favour of Land & Bricks Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as \"Land & Bricks\") created a monthly tenancy commencing froin the !st October 1950. Land and Bricks in its turn sub-let the entire IO! cottahs to the present appellant, Rupchand Gupta in his business name of Hind Airways. The lease was on the terms as settled by two letters dated August 19, 1950 and September 5, 1950 between Hind Airways and Land and Bricks. By the terms of the sub-lease, the sub-lessee undertook not to sub-let the land to anybody, to vacate the land as soon as it was required by Land and Bricks for any purpose and not to construct anything on the land but only to' use the open land for \"garage purpose for mo_tor vehicles\". lnspite of this undertaking however the appellant constructed a pacca structure on the land. Land and Bricks protested unsuccessfully and then started proceedings under the Calcutta\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT R'EPORTS (1964)\n\n1964 Municipdity Act for demolition of the structures. Those pro- Rup c/lanci '111pta ceedings were also unsuccessful. Land and Bricks, it appears,\n\n•· also served on the appellant in February 1953 a notice to Rauhum1u/li Private .\n\nTl . r' II d b . .\n\nB Ltd . .c- .dnotl.er qlllt. 11s was not o owe up y any smt m court. ut a suit for arrears of rent was instituted by Land and Bricks o,., Gupta, J. against the appellant in September 1955 and another in 1957.\n\nConsent decrees were passed in both of these suits. It appears that in about May or June 1954, Raghuvanshi was desirous of getting possession of the land it has leased to Land and Bricks. The difficulty was that Land and Bricks having sublet to the appellant was not in a position to deliver possession to its lessor Raghuvanshi until anj unless possession was obtained from the appellant. It was in these circumstance;\n\nthat Rahuvanshi determined its lease in favour of Land and Bricks by a notice to quit dated the J J th April 1955.\n\nRaghuvanshi then instituted a suit No. 3283 of 1955 in the High Court of Calcutta against Land and Bricks for possession of the land. The appellant was not impleaded in the suit and Land and Bricks did not contest it. An ex parte decree was made by the Court in favour of Raghuvanshi on the l lth May l 956.\n\nThe necessary legal consequences of that decree is that the plaintiff as the sub-lessee of Land and Bricks has no right to stay on the land and has become a trespass€r. It is to avoid the consequence of that decree, that the present suit was brought by Rupchand Gupta. His case is that the decree\n\nhad been obtained \"by fraud and collusion between the defenJants in order to injure the plaintiff and to evict the plaintiff from the said premises without any decree being passed against the plaintiff.\" Both Land and Bricks and Raghuvanshi have been impleaded in the suit-Land and Bricks as the first defendant. and Raghuvanshi as the second defendant.\n\nBoth of them denied the allegations of fraud and collusion.\n\nThe case that the decree was obtained , by fraud was given up at the hearing and only the allegation that it was a collusive suit was presse(l.\n\nThe Trial Judge held that there was collusion between defendant No. l and defendant No. 2 in the matter of obtaining an ex-parte decree in suit No. 3283 of 1955 nd that the plaintiff was not bound by that decree. He gave a declaration that the plaintiff was still a tenant under defendant No. I and was not liable to be ejected under the ex-parte decree.\n\nHe also ordered the issue of an injunction restraining the defendants from taking any steps in execution of the ex-parte decree.\n\nOn appeal by the defendant No. 2, Raghuvanshi, the decree made by the Trial Judge was set aside. The learned Judges, who heard the appeal, came to the conclusion that\n\nRup Oltand Gupl4'\n\nthe plaintiff had failed to prove that the decree in suit No. 3283 of 1955 had been procured collusively. So, they held that the plaintiff was bound by the decree in that suit.\n\nRaghuvafUJhi Prioolt' It is against this decree of the appellate Bench of the Ltd. \"' A\"°\"\"' High Court that the present appeal has been filed by the Das Gupta, J. plaintiff Rupchand Gupta.\n\nThe only question for decision in the appeal is whether the plaintiff had establislied his allegation that the ex-parte decree had been obtained as a result of collusion between Raghuvanshi and Land and Bricks. The main circumstances on which the plaintiff relied to i prove collusion and which according to _the learned Judge established his case were these: Raghuvanshl and Land and Bricks though distinct entities had the same persons as directors. The construction of building in terms of indenture of lease with Official Trustee was necessarily in the interests of shareholders of Raghuvanshi and so this was in the interest of Land and Bricks also as the main shareholders were the same. The Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 was a serious impedil)lent in the way of the plaintiff's eviction in any suit by Land and Bricks. So, Land and Bricks attempted to get possession of the land by obtaining an order of demolition of structures by proceedings under the Calcutta Municipality Act. When these failed and it was apprehended that a suit for ejectment by Land and Bricks might not succeed against the plaintiff that this device of having a suit by Raghuvanshi against Land and Bricks was decided upon by agreement between Raghuvanshi and Land and Bricks. By arrangement between the two, Land and Bricks did not contest the suit and to avoid any risk of any defence being raised by the plaintiff he was not implead~ ed in the suit at all.\n\nAll the circumstances taken together justify, it was- . urged by the appellant. the conclusion that the defendant\n\nNo. 2 colluded with-defendant No. l to procure the ex-parte decree for the purpose of executing that decree against the plaintiff.\n\nOne of the simplest definitions of collusion was given by Mr. Justice Bucknill in Scott v. Scott('). \"Collusion may be defined\", said the learned Judge, \"as an improper act done or an improper refraining from doing an act, for a dishonest purpose\". Substantially the same idea is expressed in the definition given by Whatron's Law Lexicon, 14th Edition,_ p. 212, viz., \"Collusion in judicial proceedings is a secret arrangement between two persons that the one should institute a suit agaimt the other in order to obtain the decision\n\n(') [1913] Law Reports (Probate Division) 52.\n\n1964 of a judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose\". This defini- 1\n\nRup Clland Gupta non of collusion was approved by the Court in Nagubai v.\n\nAmmal & ors., v. B. Shamma Rao and ors.(').\n\nRaghui1anshi Private\n\nLid. &> A1IOlher Thus the mere fact that the defendant agrees with the plaintiff that if a suit is brought he would not defend it, would Dtu Gupta, J. not necessarily prove collusion. It is only if this agreement is done improperly in the sense that a dishonest purpose is intended to be achieved that they can be said to have colluded. - There is little doubt that in the present case Land and Bricks agreed with Raghuvanshi that the suit for ejectment would not be contested. When the suit was instituted Land and Bricks did not contest and the ex-parte decree was passed.\n\nRaghuvanshi did not implead this 11ppellant in that suit. Can any of these acts, viz., Land and Bricks agreeing with Raghuvanshi that it would not contest the suit, the actual refraining by Land and Bricks from contesting the suit or the act of Raghuvanshi in not impleading the appellant, be an improper act or improper refraining from an act? We do not see how any of these things can be said to be in1proper.\n\nTaking the last action first, viz., Raghuvanshi's omission to implead the appellant, it is quite clear that the la~ does not require that the sub-lessee need be made a party. it has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that in all cases where the landlord institutes a suit against the lessee for possession of the land on the basis of a valid notice to quit served on the lessee and does not implead the sub-lessee as 11 party to the suit, the object of the landlord is to eject the sub-lessee from the land in execution of the decree and such an object is quite legitimate. The decree in such a suit would bind the sub-lessee. This may act harshly on the sub-lessee; but this is a position well understood by him when he took the sub-lease. The law allows this and so the omission cannot be said to be an improper act.\n\nNor is it possible, in our opinion, to say that the omission of Land and Bricks to contest the ejectment suit was an improper act. It has not been suggested that Land and Bricks had a good defence against the claim for ejectment but did not take it for the. mere purpose of helping Raghuvanshi to get possession of the land. Even if it had a good defence, we do not think it was bound to take it. It may be that if Land and Bricks had a defence and the defence was such which if brought to the notice of the court would have stood in the way of any decree being passed in favour of Raghuvanshi there would be reason to say that the omission to implead the sub-lessee was actuated by a dishonest purpose and consequently was improper. It is not necessary for\n\n(') [1956] S.C.R. 451.\n\nus however to consider the matter further as neither in t1le 1964 courts below nor before us was any suggestion made on R•p o;;;;; llflf'l4 behalf of the appellant sub-lessee that Land and Bricks had ... . . eyen a plausible defence against Raghuvanshi's claim for~\"\";'~~;:''\" eiectment.\n\nWe have already mentioned the fact thai one of the circumstances which the plaintiff claimed showed collusion was that the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act stood in the way of the plaintiff's eviction of Land and Bricks. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or not the appellant was a Thika tenant within the meaning of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. If he was, that Act would undoubtedly have protected him against eviction by Land and Bricks.\n\nThat Act could however have no operation in a suit brought by Raghuvanshi against Land and Bricks. It has been held by the High Court of Calcutta that the Thika Tenancy Act was designed to protect the Thika renant from eviction by his landlord only and not against viction from any source. (Shamsuddin Ahmed v. Dinal!ilth Mullick & ors., Appeal from Original Decree No. 123 of 1957. decided on August 13, I 959). The correctness of this view has not been challenged before us. Nor is it the appellant's case that Land and Bricks was a Thika tenant of Raghuvanshi. Obviously, this could not be suggested, because Land and Bricks never erected any structure at all. (See the definition of a Thika tenant ins. 2. cl. 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act; 1949).\n\nOn the materials on the record we are satisfied that there was no defence that Land and Bricks could have raised for resisting Raghuvanshi's claim for ejectment.\n\nThe crux of the matter is: Was thi~ attempt by Raghuvanshi to get possession of the land a dishonest or sinister purpose? We are asked by Mr. Desai to spell dishonesty out of the fact that the directors of Raghuvanshi and Land and Bricks were common and so the persons who were interested in La net and Bricks were also interested in seeing that Raghuvanshi had not to suffer for forfeiture of his lease for failure to comply with the covenant to construct a building by 1960.\n\nAll this may be taken to be true. But, we are unable to see how this would make Raghuvanshi's attempt to get possession of the land dishonest or sinister. It is not as if Raghuvanshi did not actually want to get possession of the land but wanted to help Land and Bricks to get possession. lt has also to be remembered that the identity of the directors and the identity of the main shareholders do not in any way affect the position that in law and in fact Raghuvanshi and Land and Bricks were distinct and separate entities. It is not even remotely suggested that Raghuvanshi and Land and Bricks were really one and the same person with two names.\n\nDal llvpla, J.\n\n1961 If that had been so, there might have been g'JOd reason for Rup Chand o.,,1a thinking that it was in an attempt to surmount the obstacle R h v.h. P . presented by the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, that \"/,1t\"':;,'A'...Ih::\" this mode of Raghuvanshi suing Land and Bricks for ejectment was resorted to. Indeed, if Raghuvanshi and Land and Daa Gupta, J.\n\nBricks were one and the same person possession of Land and Bricks would be possession of Raghuvanshi and a suit by Raghuvanshi to eject Land and Bricks would be meaningless.\n\nBut, that is not the appellant's case. It appears from the High Court's judgment that the plaintiff's counsel made it plain before the court that it was not his client's case that the plaintiff's real lessor was Raghuvanshi Private Ltd., and not Land and Bricks Ltd. In the present appeal before us also Mr.\n\nDesai argued on the basis that Land and Bricks and Raghuvanshi were distinct entities and that the lease of Land and Bricks under Raghuvanshi was a real subsisting lease at the time of Suit No. 3283 of 195 5.\n\nIn our judgment, the appellate Bench of the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the decree in Suit No. 3283 of 1955 was procured collusively. The suit was therefore rightly dismissed.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n' '", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "RUP CHAND GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Rup Clland Gupta", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUVANSHI PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUVANSHI PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Even if the appellant was a Thika tenant within the meaning of the Calcutta Thika Tenants Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2479, "end_char": 2578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "13-8-59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2967, "end_char": 2974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "123 of 1957, decided on 13-8-59."}}, {"text": "Bup Chand Guplal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2977, "end_char": 2993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bup Chand Guplal\n\n. ("}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3523, "end_char": 3542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 6, 1962 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3592, "end_char": 3603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. Sen and B. P. Maheslnvari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. Sen and B. P. Maheslnvari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheslnvari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3616, "end_char": 3633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. Sen and B. P. Maheslnvari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3655, "end_char": 3667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, Ajit Kumar Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the ; espondent No."}}, {"text": "Ajit Kumar Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3688, "end_char": 3702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, Ajit Kumar Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the ; espondent No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3707, "end_char": 3722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, Ajit Kumar Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the ; espondent No."}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3812, "end_char": 3821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The subject-matter of this litigation.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1Jv¥o, J. a piece of land in the heart of the business centre of the city of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "January 21. 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4025, "end_char": 4041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was part of a block of 52 cottahs of land taken on lease on January 21."}}, {"text": "Raghuvanshi Private Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghuvanshi Private Ltd. The lease was a building lease for a period of 75 years commencing from January 21, 1950."}}, {"text": "January 21, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4209, "end_char": 4225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghuvanshi Private Ltd. The lease was a building lease for a period of 75 years commencing from January 21, 1950."}}, {"text": "Raghuvanshi Private Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4366, "end_char": 4393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In September 1960, Raghuvanshi Private Limited in its turn leased 10!"}}, {"text": "Land and Bricks Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4476, "end_char": 4496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cottahs out of the 52 cottahs to a public limited company, Land and Bricks Ltd. This lease by Raghuvanshi Private Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as \"Raghuvanshi\") in favour of Land & Bricks Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as \"Land & Bricks\") created a monthly tenancy commencing froin the !"}}, {"text": "Land & Bricks Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cottahs out of the 52 cottahs to a public limited company, Land and Bricks Ltd. This lease by Raghuvanshi Private Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as \"Raghuvanshi\") in favour of Land & Bricks Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as \"Land & Bricks\") created a monthly tenancy commencing froin the !"}}, {"text": "Rupchand Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4808, "end_char": 4822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cottahs to the present appellant, Rupchand Gupta in his business name of Hind Airways.", "canonical_name": "Rup Clland Gupta"}}, {"text": "Hind Airways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4847, "end_char": 4859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cottahs to the present appellant, Rupchand Gupta in his business name of Hind Airways."}}, {"text": "August 19, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4920, "end_char": 4935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease was on the terms as settled by two letters dated August 19, 1950 and September 5, 1950 between Hind Airways and Land and Bricks."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4940, "end_char": 4957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease was on the terms as settled by two letters dated August 19, 1950 and September 5, 1950 between Hind Airways and Land and Bricks."}}, {"text": "Land and Bricks", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4983, "end_char": 4998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease was on the terms as settled by two letters dated August 19, 1950 and September 5, 1950 between Hind Airways and Land and Bricks."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5894, "end_char": 5899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gupta, J. against the appellant in September 1955 and another in 1957."}}, {"text": "Raghuvanshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6061, "end_char": 6072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in about May or June 1954, Raghuvanshi was desirous of getting possession of the land it has leased to Land and Bricks.", "canonical_name": "Raghuvanshi"}}, {"text": "Rahuvanshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6392, "end_char": 6402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in these circumstance;\n\nthat Rahuvanshi determined its lease in favour of Land and Bricks by a notice to quit dated the J J th April 1955.", "canonical_name": "Raghuvanshi"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6562, "end_char": 6584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3283 of 1955 in the High Court of Calcutta against Land and Bricks for possession of the land."}}, {"text": "Rupchand Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7065, "end_char": 7079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to avoid the consequence of that decree, that the present suit was brought by Rupchand Gupta.", "canonical_name": "Rup Clland Gupta"}}, {"text": "Raghuvanshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7339, "end_char": 7350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Land and Bricks and Raghuvanshi have been impleaded in the suit-Land and Bricks as the first defendant.", "canonical_name": "Raghuvanshi"}}, {"text": "RaghuvafUJhi Prioolt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8522, "end_char": 8542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RaghuvafUJhi Prioolt' It is against this decree of the appellate Bench of the Ltd. \"' A\"°\"\"' High Court that the present appeal has been filed by the Das Gupta, J. plaintiff Rupchand Gupta."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8672, "end_char": 8681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RaghuvafUJhi Prioolt' It is against this decree of the appellate Bench of the Ltd. \"' A\"°\"\"' High Court that the present appeal has been filed by the Das Gupta, J. plaintiff Rupchand Gupta.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Rupchand Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8696, "end_char": 8710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RaghuvafUJhi Prioolt' It is against this decree of the appellate Bench of the Ltd. \"' A\"°\"\"' High Court that the present appeal has been filed by the Das Gupta, J. plaintiff Rupchand Gupta.", "canonical_name": "Rup Clland Gupta"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9411, "end_char": 9443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bucknill", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10475, "end_char": 10483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the simplest definitions of collusion was given by Mr. Justice Bucknill in Scott v. Scott('). \""}}, {"text": "Whatron", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10722, "end_char": 10729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Substantially the same idea is expressed in the definition given by Whatron's Law Lexicon, 14th Edition,_ p. 212, viz., \""}}, {"text": "Rup Clland Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11059, "end_char": 11075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This defini- 1\n\nRup Clland Gupta non of collusion was approved by the Court in Nagubai v.\n\nAmmal & ors.,", "canonical_name": "Rup Clland Gupta"}}, {"text": "Dtu Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11338, "end_char": 11347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "> A1IOlher Thus the mere fact that the defendant agrees with the plaintiff that if a suit is brought he would not defend it, would Dtu Gupta, J. not necessarily prove collusion."}}, {"text": "Land", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13433, "end_char": 13437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be that if Land and Bricks had a defence and the defence was such which if brought to the notice of the court would have stood in the way of any decree being passed in favour of Raghuvanshi there would be reason to say that the omission to implead the sub-lessee was actuated by a dishonest purpose and consequently was improper."}}, {"text": "Bricks", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13442, "end_char": 13448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be that if Land and Bricks had a defence and the defence was such which if brought to the notice of the court would have stood in the way of any decree being passed in favour of Raghuvanshi there would be reason to say that the omission to implead the sub-lessee was actuated by a dishonest purpose and consequently was improper."}}, {"text": "August 13, I 959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14937, "end_char": 14953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "decided on August 13, I 959)."}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15253, "end_char": 15258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or not the appellant was a Thika tenant within the meaning of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949", "statute": "It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or not the appellant was a Thika tenant within the meaning of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15607, "end_char": 15612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are asked by Mr. Desai to spell dishonesty out of the fact that the directors of Raghuvanshi and Land and Bricks were common and so the persons who were interested in La net and Bricks were also interested in seeing that Raghuvanshi had not to suffer for forfeiture of his lease for failure to comply with the covenant to construct a building by 1960."}}, {"text": "Dal llvpla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16593, "end_char": 16603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dal llvpla, J.\n\n1961 If that had been so, there might have been g'JOd reason for Rup Chand o.,,1a thinking that it was in an attempt to surmount the obstacle R h v.h."}}, {"text": "Rup Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16674, "end_char": 16683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dal llvpla, J.\n\n1961 If that had been so, there might have been g'JOd reason for Rup Chand o.,,1a thinking that it was in an attempt to surmount the obstacle R h v.h.", "canonical_name": "Rup Clland Gupta"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16781, "end_char": 16813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Daa Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16956, "end_char": 16965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, if Raghuvanshi and Land and Daa Gupta, J.\n\nBricks were one and the same person possession of Land and Bricks would be possession of Raghuvanshi and a suit by Raghuvanshi to eject Land and Bricks would be meaningless.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_767_775_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 767\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOMETAX, MADRAS v.\n\nA. GAJAPATHY NAIDU\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]\n\nIndian Incometax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 4(1)(b)(ii)- Construction of-Analogy from English Statuaes-\"Accrue\" or \"arise\", meaning of-Income arising out of earlier :transaction-\n\nProper year of assessment.\n\nA certain sum of money was received by the assessee as payment of compensation for the loss sustained by him in respect of a supply during the previous accounting year.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer included the amount in the assessment year it was received. Appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and to the Income-tax Tribunal were unsuccessful. But on a reference, the High Court held that though in fact the right to receive the amount did not accrue during the accounting year of the contract, it should be deemed to have related to the year of contract in respect whereof the amount was paid.\n\nOn appeal by certificate, Held: (i) The decision of the High Court was deflected by its reliance on English decisions delivered under circumstances peculiar to that country and on the construction of provisions which were not in pari materia with the provisions obtaining in India.\n\nThe provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act shall be construed on their own terms without drawing any analogy from English statutes whose terms may superficially appear to be similar but on a deeper scrutiny may reveal differences not only in the wording but also in the meaning a particular expression has acquired in the context of the development of law in that country.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax v. Vazir Sultan & Sons, [i959] Supp, 2 S.C.R., 375, followed;.\n\n(ii) under the definition accepted by this Court of the word \"accrue\" or \"arise\" in s. 4(1)(b)(i) of the Indian Income-- tax Act. an income accrues or arises when the assessee acquires a right to receive the same.\n\nS. D. Sassoon and Co. Ud. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, [1955) 1 S.C.R. 313, followed.\n\nRogers Pyatt She!lack. & Co. v. Secretary of State for India.\n\n(1925) IL.R. 52 Cal. 1, approved.\n\nWhen an Income-tax Officer proceeds to include a particular income in the assessment, he should ask himself, inter alia, two\n\nqueshons, namely (i) what is . the system of accountancy adopted by the assessee? and (ii) it it is mercantile system of accountancy, subject to the deemed provisions when has the right to receive that amount accrued? If he comes to the conclusion that such a right accrued or arose to the assessee in a particular accounting year, he shali include the said income in the assessment of the succeeding assessment year. No power is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act, to relate\n\nApril 16\n\n1964 back an income that accrued or arose in a later year to an earlier f'Atofyear on _the ground that the said income arose out of an earlier I\"\"\"\"\"taz, MOllrM transaction.\n\n. v. '.d\n\n(iii) The meaning of the word \"accrue\" or \"arise\" in s. 4(1)- .A.Gajapalhy Na• u (b)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act cannot be extended so as to - take in amounts received by the assessee in a later year, though the receipt was not on the basis of the right accrued in the earlier year. Such amounts are in law received by the assessee only in the year when they are paid.\n\nBub/JG Rao, J.\n\nJ. P. Hall & Co. v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, (1921) 12 T. C. 382 and Severns (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dadawa!l, (1954), 35 T. C. 649, referred to.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax. U.P. v. P. V. Kalichara.oi Jagannath, [1961] 41 I.T.R. 40, approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 617 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order, dated March 15, 1960, of the Madras High Court in Case referred No. 87 of 1955.\n\nGopal Singh and R.N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nK. Rajinder Chaudhuri and K.R. Chaudhuri, for the respondent.\n\nApril 16, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSuBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by certificate is preferred against the order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras holding that a sum of Rs. 12,447 /- received by the respondent from the Government during the accounting year 1950-51 was not assessable to tax for the asses;:ment year 1951-52.\n\nGajapathy Naidu, the respondent, was supplying provisions to the Government Stanley Hospital, Royapuram, Madras. During the financial year April 1, 1948 to March 31, 1949, he entered into a contract with the Government for the supply of bread to the said hospital at the rate of Rs. 0-4-6 per lb. As the respondent was maintaining his accounts on mercantile basis, it is common case that the amount due from the Government under the terms of the said contract was credited in the accounts of the respondent for that year. For the assessment year 1949-50 the Income-tax Officer assessed the respondent to income-tax on the basis of the accounts somade. It appears that some time after March 31, 1949, representations were made to the Government for relieving the respondent from the loss sustained in the supply of bread to the hospital.\n\nThe Government by its order dated November 24, 1950, directed payment of compensation for the loss sustained by the respondent in respect of the supply of bread to the hospital during the year 1948-49 under the said contract. The respondent received on that account payment of Rs. 12.447 /- during the 1964 year of account 1950-51. In the assessment year 1951-52 theTkeCommiasionuo/\n\nIncome-tax Officer included the said amount in the assess- Income-tax, Madr., ment of that year. The assessee, inter alia, contended that he A.GayNaid• received the said sum in respect of the contract that was enter- - ed into by him with the Government during the accounting BubbaRao, J. year 1948-49 and, therefore, it could not be included in the assessment year 1951-52. This contention was rejected by the Income-tax Officer and, on appeal, by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and also, on further appeal, by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. But the contention received favour with the High Court on a reference made to it under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act. The following two questions were referred to the High Court :\n\n\"l. Whether the sum of Rs. 12.447 /- is assessable to income-tax?\"\n\n\"2. If so, whether it has been rightly assessed in the assessment year 1951-52.\"\n\nOn the first question the High Court held that the said amount was directly related to the business of the assessee and, therefore, was taxable as a trade receipt. It answered the first question in the affirmative. No argument was raised before us on the question of the correctness of this finding. Therefore, nothing further need be said about it.\n\nThe High Court answered the second question in the negative. Its conclusion is based upon the following three steps:\n\n1. \"The only right of the assessee on the date, when he supplied the bread, was to debit the Government the contract rate. He was entitled to nothing further. The Government Order which raised the rates, came into existence long after , payment thereunder was e; ic gratia, and not on the basis of a right. Therefore, the amount of Rs. 12,447 was not, and indeed could not have been debited in the books of the assessee for the year, when the supply of bread was made to the hospital, namely, 1948-49. Those accounts have been closed.\"\n\n2. But where a receipt is correlated to and arises out of a commercial transaction between the parties, the right or liability should be deemed to have been established in the past accounting period.\n\nThat principle is based not only on any theory of accrual, because there was no legal right existing then; but being correlated to the transaction, it\n\nL/P(D)ISCI-~5\n\nTkCo mtlli#ioatr of\n\nJ~IQ, Jlaj)u\n\nshould properly belong to it, and the account should be re-opened when the payment came in.\n\nJ. \"Being a receipt of an earlier year, the amount could not be included in the assessment for the year 1951-52.\" •.\n\nA. GajapalAy .1.Vaid•\n\nOn the said reasoning the High Court held that though in fact the right to receive the amount did not accrue during the accounting year 1948-49, it should be deemed to have related to the year of contract in respect whereof the amount was paid.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax has preferred the present appeal against the said order of the High Court.\n\nLearned counsel for the Revenue contended that the High Court misdirected itself on the basis of English decisions and that on its finding that the amount accrued to the assessee only during the accounting year 1949-50 it should have held that the Income-tax Officer had correctly included it in the assessee's income for the year 1950-51. Learned cqunsel for\n\n1 the respi>ndent argued that the said amount was paid in respect of the contract entered into between the assessee and the Government and, therefore, the said amount should properly\n\nbelong to the accounting year 1948-49, and should not have been included in the assessment of the year 1951-52. To rnstain his argument he relied upon certain English decisions referred to by the High Court which held that in such circumstances the relevant account of the year when the amount was due under the contract could be reopened and the additional amount, though an ex gratia payment, could be included therein. ·\n\nWith great respect to the learned Judges of the High Court we must point out that the decision of the High Court is deflected by its reliance on English decisions delivered under circumstances peculiar to that country and on the construction of provisions which are not in pari materia with the provisions obtaining in India. Th cobservaticns made by this Court in Commi5sioner of Income-tax v. Vazir Sultan & Sons(') may usefully be restated:-\n\n\"While considering the case law it is necessary to bear in mind that the Indian Income-tax Act is not in pari materia with the British income-tax statutes. it is less elaborate in many ways, subject to fewer refinements and in arrangement and language it differs greatly from the provisions with which the courts in England have had to deal. Little help can therefore be gained by attempting to construe\n\n(') [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 375.\n\n...\n\n'\"'\n\n...\n\nthe Indian In.x>me-tax Act in the light of deci- sions bearing upon the meaning of the income-taxTA<CoO..;,.;._q(\n\nlegislation in England. But on analogous provi-1\"\"°\"''\"'\"\"· Jl.W.. sions, fundamental concepts and general principle .l. Gaja;;,., Naid-o unaffected by the specialities of the English incometax statutes, English authorities may be useful Sr.IJbaIW>, J. guides.\" The cauticn administered by this Court shall always be borne in mind in construing the provisions of the Indian statute. The provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act shall be construed on their own terms without drawing any analogy from Englisl1 statutes whose terms may superficially appear to be similar but on a deeper scrutiny may reveal differences not only in the wording but also in the meaning a particular expression has acquired in the context of the development of law in that country.\n\nThe problem raised before us can only be answered on the true meaning of the express words used in s. 4 (l)(b)\\i) of the Act. 1t reads:-\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the total income of any previous year of any person includes all income, profits and gains from whatever source derived whichif such person is resident in the taxable territories during such year.- accrue or arise' or are deemed to accrue or arise to him in the taxable territories during such year.''\n\nWe are not concerned in this case with the expression \"deemed to accrue or arise to him\", as that expressfon refers to cases set out in the statute itself introducing a fiction in respect of certain incomes. In regard to the question when and whether an income accrues or arises within the meaning of the first part of the said clause, we have a decision of this Court which has clearly enunciated the principles underlying the said expression: that is the decision in E. D. Sassoon and Company, Ltd., v. The Commissioner of lnrome-tax, Bombay City('). In that decision this Court accepted the definition given to the words \"accrue\" and \"arise\" by Mukerji, J., in Roger.f Pyatt She1/ack &: Co. v. Secretary of State for lndiaf), which is as follows: - • \". . . . . . . . . . . . both the words are used in contradistinction to the word \"receive\" and indicate a right to\n\n(') [1955] 1 S.C.R. 313, 342:(1954) 26 LT.R. Ti 50 (') (1925) 1 I.T.C. 363, 371:(1925) LI.R 52 ea't 1: L!P(D)i8Cl-20(a)\n\nTic 0-Uaiarlff of l nco.....W .Madrat1\n\nv. .t. IJajapatig Nails\n\nBllM>a 1/ao, J.\n\nreceive. They represent a stage anterior to the point of time when the income becomes receivable and connote a character of the income which is more or less inchoate.\"\n\nUnder this definition accepted by this Court, an income accrues or arises when the assessee acquires a right to receive the same. It is common place that there are two principal methods of accounting for the income, profits and gains of a business; one is the cash basis and the other, the mercantile basis. The latter system of accountancy \"brings into credit what is due immediately it becomes legally due and before it is actually received; and it brings into debit expenditure the amount for which a legal liability has been incurred before it is actually disbursed.\" The book profits are taken for the purpose of assessment of tax, though the credit amount is not realized or the debit amount is not actually disbursed. If an income accrues within a particular year, it is liable to be assessed in the succeeding year. When does the right to receive an amount under a contract accrue or arise to the assessee i.e., come into existence? That depends upon the terms of a particular contract No other relevant provision of the Act has been brought to our notice-for there is none-which provides an exception that though an assessee does not acquire a right to receive an income under a contract in a particular accounting year, by some fiction the amount received by him in a subsequent year in connection with the contract, though not arising out of a right accrued to him in the earlier year, could be related back to the earlier year and made taxable along with the income of that year. But that legal position is sought to be reached by a process of reasoning found favour with English courts. It is said that on the basis of proper commercial accounting practice, if a transaction takes place in a parti cular year, all that has accrued in respect of it, irrespective of the year when it accrues, should belong to the year of transaction and for the purpose of reaching that result closed accounts could be reopened. Whether this principle is justified in the English law. it has no pla~ under the Indian Incometax Act. When an Income-tax Officer proceeds to include a particular income in the assessment. he should ask himself inter alia, two questions, namely. (i) what is the system of accountancy adopted by the assessee? and (ii) if it is mercantile system of accountancy, subject tO the deemed provisions, when has the right to recei~ that amount accrued? If he comes to the conclusion that such a right accrued or arose to the assessee in a particular accounting year. he shall include the said income in the assessment of the succeeding assessment year. No power is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act, to relate back an income that accrued or arose in a\n\nsubsequent year to another earlier year on the ground that the 1964 said income arose out of an earlier transaction. Nor is the The Commis.!ioner of question of reopening of accounts relevant in the matter of _as-foe\"\"\"-\"\"' Madraa certaining when a particular income accrued or arose. Section , a .,,.:;, N ,,\n\n.\".1, O.Jr-11Y al(l• 34 of the Act empowers the Income-tax Officer to assess the - income which escaped assessment or was under-assessed in the Sr/Jba Rao, J. relevant assessment year. Subject to the provisions of the section and following the procedure prescribed thereunder, he can include the escaped income and re-assess the asscssee on the basis of which the earlier assessment was made. So too, under s. 35 of the Act the officers mentioned therein can rectify mistakes either of their own motion or when such mistakes are brought to their notice by a party to the proceedings, For that purpose the correct item may be taken into consideration in the matter of assessment. But strictly speaking even in those cases there is no reopening of the accounts of the asscssee. but a re-assessment is made or the rnistake ts corrected on the basis of the actual income accrued or received by the assessee. We do not see any relevancy of the question of reopening of accounts in considering the question when an assessee acquired a right to receive an amount.\n\nWe shall now proceed to notice some of the decisions cited at the Bar. J.P. Hall & Co. v. Commissioner of Inland\n\nRevem1e\\ ') is a decision of the Court of Appeal under s. 38 of the Finance \\No. 2) Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo. V, c. 89) dealing with excess profits duty. There it was held that for the purpose of Excess Profits Duty, the profits from the contracts for the purchase and sale of the control gear arose to the appellantcompany in the accounting years in which the gear was actually delivered and not in the pre-war period ending the 30th June, 1914, in which the contracts were made. The price of the control gear in that case was increased later without there being any contractual obligation but purely by a voluntary act of the purchaser. Though the additional amounts accrued to the assessee in a later year, it was regarded as analogous to a trade debt due in respect of the trading operation of the earlier year. On that principle the accounts were reopened in order to bring the increase into profits of the assessce in the year of transaction. This decision was accepted and extended in Severns (H.M. lrlspector of Taxes) v. Dad.swell(')_ As this decision i~ the basis fo_r the High Court's view we shall give its facts m s0me detul. The respondent therein was !!ranted a licence to mill flour in October. 1941. and carried on-the trade of flour milling until September, 1945. As he had not been a\n\n(') (1921) 12 T.C. 382.\n\n(') (1954) 35 T.C. 649.\n\n11114 miller at the outbreak: of war, he was not entitled to the benefit n. a..-..- ., of a remuneration agreement whereby millers were compensat- ,,_, , raz, JLailrru ed by the Ministry of Food for losses incurred under warbme La.;;,,. NOW. arrangements for the purchase of wheat and sale of flour. _! •Having, however, been informed by the Ministry in 1943 and &Ma Jrao, J. twice later that the remuneration of millers who bad begun milling during the period of control was under consideration. be made a claim in 1949 on the same basis as that laid down in the remuneration agreement and received payments in settlement. The respondent contended that the sums received in 1949 were not trading receipts but ex gratia payments, and alternatively, that they were received after the cessation of his trade and that if there was a debt arising to the trade at the date of cessation its value at that date was nil. The Court held that the said payments were ex gratia; and it further held that. if on the discontinuam; e of a trade payment for work already done in a year had nOt been finaDy settled, accounts for that year could be reopened so as to bring in a gratuitous payment for such work made in a subsequent year. This judgment certainly supports the respondent. Though it could be distinguished on the ground in that case it was found that the payment for the work already done had not been finally settled whereas in the present case there is nothing on the record to disclose that it was not finally settled. We would prefer to base our conclusion on the ground that we cannot extend the meaning of the word \"accrue\" or \"arise\" in s. 4(1)(b)(i) of the Act so as' to take in amounts received by the assessee in a later year, though the receipt was not on the basis nf the right accrued in the earlier year. Such amounts are in law received by the a'lSeSSeC only in the year when they are paid. We cannot apply the English decisions in the matter of construction of_ the provisions of the Indian Act, particularly when they have received an authoritative interpretation from this Court, in this view, it is not necessary to consider further English decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contention. Before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income tax, U.P. v. Kalicharan Jagannath('), when a similar question arose, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue relied upon the said English decisions. but the High Court, rightly, refused to act on them on the ground that they were not relevant in interpreting s. 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act. It further n•ade an attempt to distinguish those decisions on grounds based upon the alleged difference in the scope of the provisions nf the respective countries. It was said that under the relevant English Act the excess profits duty was payable on computation of profits arising from a trade or business in different chargeable accounting periods and, therefore, the emphasis there was more\n\n(') {1961) 41 1.T.R 40.\n\nupon the carrying on of the trade within the chargeable 19\" period than on the income accruing during that period. But Tl.<lo•..U.Waf we do not propose to express our view on this aspect of the 1.,,,..,.,_, Madra question, as the relevant sections of the English Acts have A a,;,...::;, ..,, not been placed before us. The learned Judges, after having '\n\n4,..,...-_1 B rightly refused to rely upon the English decisions, construed s.ua &w, J. the provisions of the Indian statute. There. during the accounting period April I, 1945 to March 31, 1946, the assessee eatered into a contract with and supplied fruits and bullock carts to. the military authorities at two different places at rates fixed by the agreement. The assessee incurred a loss and he submitted a petition for review under the terms of the agreement. On November 6, 1947, the military authorities sanctioned the payment of an additional sum which was paid to the assessee on February 17 and 24, 1948. The Income-tax Department sought to include this additional sum in the assessment for the accounting year 1945-46. The High Court held that until the order of review the only right that the assessee had was to claim the money payable at the rates laid down in the agreement itself and that the additional amount became payable to the assessee not by virtue of any right conferred by the agreement, but because of the order passed in review directing the payment of the amount and thus creating a right to this amount in favour of the assessee.\n\nAs the right to receive the payment of the additional sum arose after the closing of the accounting year 1945-46. the High Court proceeded to hold that the income did not accrue or arise to the assessee in the accounting yi:ar. It may be pointed out that in that case the original agreement gave a right to apply for review and notwithstanding that fact the court held that the additional payment could not be held to have accrued during the accounting year. For the reasons already stated by us, we are entirely in agreement with the view e•pressed by the Allahabad High Court.\n\nIn the result. we hold that the High Court in the present case should have answered the second question referred to it in the affirmative. The order of lhe High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "767\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOMETAX, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. GAJAPATHY NAIDU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. GAJAPATHY NAIDU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)(b)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189, "end_char": 203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Incometax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Incometax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1234, "end_char": 1239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by certificate, Held: (i) The decision of the High Court was deflected by its reliance on English decisions delivered under circumstances peculiar to that country and on the construction of provisions which were not in pari materia with the provisions obtaining in India."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1271, "end_char": 1285, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)(b)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1792, "end_char": 1805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955) 1 S.C.R. 313", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1993, "end_char": 2012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "No power is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2667, "end_char": 2728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2989, "end_char": 2996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No power is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act", "statute": "No power is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3038, "end_char": 3052, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bub/JG Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3310, "end_char": 3320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bub/JG Rao, J.\n\nJ. P. Hall & Co. v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, (1921) 12 T. C. 382 and Severns (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dadawa!l, (1954), 35 T. C. 649, referred to."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3708, "end_char": 3725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order, dated March 15, 1960, of the Madras High Court in Case referred No."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3760, "end_char": 3771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh and R.N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R.N. Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3776, "end_char": 3789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh and R.N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Rajinder Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3811, "end_char": 3832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rajinder Chaudhuri and K.R. Chaudhuri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K.R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3837, "end_char": 3851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Rajinder Chaudhuri and K.R. Chaudhuri, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3934, "end_char": 3943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSuBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by certificate is preferred against the order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras holding that a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4013, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSuBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by certificate is preferred against the order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras holding that a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Gajapathy Naidu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4227, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajapathy Naidu, the respondent, was supplying provisions to the Government Stanley Hospital, Royapuram, Madras."}}, {"text": "Government Stanley Hospital, Royapuram, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4292, "end_char": 4338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajapathy Naidu, the respondent, was supplying provisions to the Government Stanley Hospital, Royapuram, Madras."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4366, "end_char": 4379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the financial year April 1, 1948 to March 31, 1949, he entered into a contract with the Government for the supply of bread to the said hospital at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4383, "end_char": 4397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the financial year April 1, 1948 to March 31, 1949, he entered into a contract with the Government for the supply of bread to the said hospital at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5099, "end_char": 5116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government by its order dated November 24, 1950, directed payment of compensation for the loss sustained by the respondent in respect of the supply of bread to the hospital during the year 1948-49 under the said contract."}}, {"text": "BubbaRao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5725, "end_char": 5733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee, inter alia, contended that he A.GayNaid• received the said sum in respect of the contract that was enter- - ed into by him with the Government during the accounting BubbaRao, J. year 1948-49 and, therefore, it could not be included in the assessment year 1951-52."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5971, "end_char": 6000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention was rejected by the Income-tax Officer and, on appeal, by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and also, on further appeal, by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6089, "end_char": 6097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6105, "end_char": 6132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A. GajapalAy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7995, "end_char": 8007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. GajapalAy .1.Vaid•\n\nOn the said reasoning the High Court held that though in fact the right to receive the amount did not accrue during the accounting year 1948-49, it should be deemed to have related to the year of contract in respect whereof the amount was paid."}}, {"text": "While considering the case law it is necessary to bear in mind that the Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9788, "end_char": 9881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10103, "end_char": 10110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it is less elaborate in many ways, subject to fewer refinements and in arrangement and language it differs greatly from the provisions with which the courts in England have had to deal."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10766, "end_char": 10780, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11212, "end_char": 11216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukerji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12242, "end_char": 12249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that decision this Court accepted the definition given to the words \"accrue\" and \"arise\" by Mukerji, J., in Roger.f Pyatt She1/ack &: Co. v. Secretary of State for lndiaf), which is as follows: - • \". . . . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 313", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12469, "end_char": 12488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "IJajapatig Nails", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12633, "end_char": 12649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IJajapatig Nails\n\nBllM>a 1/ao, J.\n\nreceive."}}, {"text": "No power is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15406, "end_char": 15467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15980, "end_char": 15987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N ,,\n\n.\".1, O.Jr-11Y al(l• 34 of the Act empowers the Income-tax Officer to assess the - income which escaped assessment or was under-assessed in the Sr/Jba Rao, J. relevant assessment year."}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16240, "end_char": 16245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No power is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act", "statute": "No power is conferred on the Income-tax Officer under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17060, "end_char": 17065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th June, 1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17431, "end_char": 17446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There it was held that for the purpose of Excess Profits Duty, the profits from the contracts for the purchase and sale of the control gear arose to the appellantcompany in the accounting years in which the gear was actually delivered and not in the pre-war period ending the 30th June, 1914, in which the contracts were made."}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18128, "end_char": 18130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ministry of Food", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18533, "end_char": 18549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of a remuneration agreement whereby millers were compensat- ,,, , raz, JLailrru ed by the Ministry of Food for losses incurred under warbme La.;;,,."}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)(b)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19995, "end_char": 20008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20626, "end_char": 20646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income tax, U.P. v. Kalicharan Jagannath('), when a similar question arose, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue relied upon the said English decisions."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20934, "end_char": 20938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20953, "end_char": 20967, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.ua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21820, "end_char": 21824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges, after having '\n\n4,..,...-_1 B rightly refused to rely upon the English decisions, construed s.ua &w, J. the provisions of the Indian statute."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21923, "end_char": 21937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "during the accounting period April I, 1945 to March 31, 1946, the assessee eatered into a contract with and supplied fruits and bullock carts to."}}, {"text": "November 6, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22210, "end_char": 22226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 6, 1947, the military authorities sanctioned the payment of an additional sum which was paid to the assessee on February 17 and 24, 1948."}}, {"text": "February 17 and 24, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22331, "end_char": 22355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 6, 1947, the military authorities sanctioned the payment of an additional sum which was paid to the assessee on February 17 and 24, 1948."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_776_789_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".April 16\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS.\n\nA. KRISHNASW AMI MUD ALI AR AND OTHERS\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI. JJ.J\n\nIncome-tax-Trading adventure-Profits of business Computation-Value of stock-in-trade-Inclusion of Value at the end of year of account-Necessity-Assessee's method of accountancy-Powers in Income-tax Officer in computing profits-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922) s. 13 proviso.\n\nThe assessee firm acquired for Rs. 1,00,000/- the exploitation rights of a cinematograph film which were to enu're for four years. For the period, December 25, 1947 to August 2, 1948, which was the previous year corresponding to the assessment year 1949-50 the firm filed a voluntary return declaring that Rs. 28,643/- were earned by the exploitation of the film. In the statement submitted by the firm the total receipts credited in the firm's books were Rs. 1,46,849/- and against that amount were debited Rs. 18,206/- as expenditure and Rs. 1,00,000/- as the amount disbursed for acquiring the exploitation rights. The Income-tax Officer was of the view that from the statement of account which omitted to include at the close of the account year the value of the right in the film for the unexpired period, the profits of the firm could not properly be deduced. Accordingly, he estimated the value of the rights for the unexpired period of exploitation to which the firm was entitled on August 2, 1948, at Rs. 65,000/- and computed the net profits of the firm .as an unregistered firm at Rs. 93.642/- and assessed income-tax and super-tax payable by the firm on that footing. In the appeals filed against the order or assessment, only the correctness of the estimated value of the rights of the film at Rs. 65,000/- was challenged. and the Appellate Tribunal reduced the valuation to Rs. 40,000/-. On reference, the High Court of Madras took the view that it was the cash system that the assessee had adopted, that valuation of the closing stock was not an incident of that system for ascertaining the profits and that the Incometax Officer had no power under the proviso to s. 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, to force a different system on the assessee either the mercantile system or a hybrid system of cash plus valuation of closing stock.\n\nHeld: In a trading venture, for computing the true profits of the year, the stock-in-trade must be taken into account, whatever method of book-keeping was adopted; and the High Court was in error in holding that because the assessee had maintai.ned his accounts in the cash system it was not open to the Incometax Officer to add to the receipts from the business the value of the stock-in-trad• at the end of the year for the purpose of properly deducing the profits of the business for the year in question.\n\nThere was not warrant in the case of assuming that the Incometnx Officer sought to displace the method of accountancy adopted by the assessee; it was only by applying the proviso to s. 13 of the Indian IncomHax Act, 1922, that the Income-tax Officet made the computation upon the basis and in the manner in which in his opinion profits rould be properly deduced.\n\nCIVIL A'PPEALLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1'64 250 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and The Comm.......,.\n\nQfder dated February 2, 1960 of the Madras High Court in °1 i:;; a\"• Case Referred No. 1 of 1955. v.\n\nA. Krilh.......,,..\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the appel- Mudaliar and OtA.,, lant. -\n\nS. Narayanaswamy and R. Gopalakrislman, for respondent nos. 1 and 3-6.\n\nApril 16, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nSHAH, J.-Respondents to this appeal are a firm constituted under a deed dated December 12, 1947. The firm originally consisted. of three partners: K. N.\n\nDamodara Mudaliar. A. Krishnaswami Mudaliar and v. Thangaraja Mudaliar. K.N. Damodara Mudaliar acquired for the firm for Rs. 1,00,000 /- the exploitation rights which were to ensure for four years in a cinematograph film \"Apoorva\n\nChinthamani\" for the North Arco!, the South Arcot and the Chingleput districts and for Pondicherry. For the period, December 25, 1947 to August 2, 1948--which was \"the previous year\" corresponding to the assessment year 1949-50the firm filed a voluntary return declaring that Rs. 28,643 /- were earned by the exploitation of the film. In the statement\n\nmbmitted by the firm the total receipts . credited in the lrm's books were Rs. 1,46,849 /-, and against that amount\n\n; vere debited Rs. 13,206/- as expenses and Rs. 1,00,000/- as :he amount disbursed for acquiring the exploitation rights. rhereby in the computation of the profits of the business, the irm debited the amount paid for acquiring the rights of ex- J!oitation of the film. but did not take credit for the value\n\nf the unexpired exploitation rights at the end of the \"previous year\". On August 15, 1948, a deed of dissolution of the partnership was executed. and Damodara Mudaliar sold with effect from August 6, 1948, his half interest in the assets of the partnership to Krishnaswami Mudaliar for Rs. 2,000/- and retired from the partnership. On August 27, 1948 a trial balance-sheet of the firm's books of account was prepared showing a cash balance of Rs. 190 /12 i 4, a debit against Krishnaswami Mudaliar for Rs. 2.64 Ii 8 / 8 and credits in favour of Damodara Mudaliar and Thangaraja Mudaliar respectively for Rs. 1.888/2/11 and Rs. 944/2/ I. Thereafter Krishnaswami Mudaliar, Thangaraja Mudaliar and V. S.\n\nLakshmanan (an outsider) formed themslves info another partnership to exploit the film for the unexpired period.\n\nFrom this , partnership Krishnaswami Mudaliar retired on February 22, 194? agreeing to receive Rs. 12000 /- for his\n\nShah, J.\n\n778 SUPREJ\\ffi COURT REPORTS\n\n(1964J\n\n1964 six sixteenth share in the assets of the fmn on the date of PM Oommisaione' retirement. of lncome-taz,\n\nMo4ra1 h v.\n\nIn t e assessment of the respondent firm for the year .d. Krishruiswami 1949-50 the Second Additional Income-ta\" Officer, Vellore Mtuialiar•ml Olhet-sdeclined to accept the statement of account that the firm had\n\nShah, J. earned till August 2, 1948, a net profit of only Rs. 28,643/- as truly representing the profits of the firm. He observed that \"no stock valuation of the picture has been taken but only the excess collection over purchase value has been returned'', indicating thereby that in his view from the statement of account which omitted to include at the close of the year the value of the rights in the tilm for the unexpired period the profits of the firm could not properly be deduced.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer estimated the value of the rights for the unexpired period of exploitation to which the firm was entitled on August 2, 1948 at Rs. 65.l)()O,. and computed net profits of the firm as an unregistered firm at Rs. 93,642/- and assessed income-tax and super-tax payable by the firm on that footing.\n\nIn appeal by the firm to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the correctness of the estimated value of the exploitation rights of the film at Rs. 65.000.1was alone challenged and it wa~ submitted that the sum of Rs. 4,000 /- was the true value of the assets at the end of the previous year, Damodara Mudaliar the retiring partner having relinquished his rights representing half share for Rs. 2.000!- only. The Appellate' Assistant Commissioner rejected the contention, holding that the valuation of the exploitation rights for the unexpired period in the deed of dissolution dated August 15, 1948 was \"dictated by extra-commercial considerntions\". and confirmed-the valuation of Rs. 65,000/- made by the Incometax Officer. Even in appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, the respondent firm merely contended that the valuation of the exploitation rights for the unexpired period was excessive. The Tribunal partially upheld the plea, and reduced the valuation to Rs. 40.000!- as on August 2, 1948, and directed modiHcation of the assessment on that footing.\n\nPursuant to an order issued by the High Court of Madras in a petition under s. 66(2) the Tribunal stated the case and referred the following question: --\n\n\"Whether on the facts and circumstances of this case\n\nthe Tribunal was justified in applying the proviso\n\nto s. 13 of the Income-tax Act and in confirming the assessment on a mercantile basis of accounting.\"\n\nThe High Court held that it was open to the assessee to 1964 maintain accounts according to a recognised system of ac- Ti.. Oommi#imur counting and the assessee having adopted the cash system of 01 Irt.; taz, accounting, and the Tribunal having a~igned no reasons for v.\"\" discarding that system in the computation of the profits the A. K~\"\"\"\"\"'\"\"'\n\nTribunal was in error in making the assessment on the basis Mudaloa• a.a Oilier• ()f the mercantile system of acct>unting.\n\nShah, J.\n\nThe High Court observed: -\n\n\"When we reach the position that it was the cash system that the assessee had adopted in this case, and that valuation of the closing stock was not an incident of that system for ascertaining the profits, it should be obvious that the Income-tax Officer had no power under the proviso to s. 13 to force a different system on the assessee either the mercantile system or a hybrid system of cash plus valuation of closing stock.\"\n\nThe High Court accordingly answered the question referred in the negative. Against the order, with pccial, leave, this appeal is preferred.\n\nThe question to be determined in this appeal is whether in the computation of the income of the firm under the head\n\n\"Profits and gains of business\" the Income-tax Officer was bound by the method of accounting in which the cost of acquisition of the film of which the exploitation rights were . held was debited at the commencement of the year, but the value of the film at the end of the year was ignored. Section\n\n10 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, provide~ that tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation\" in respect of the profits or gains of any business, profession or vocatibn carried on by him. Such profits or gains have to be computed after making the allowances set out in sub-s .. (2). Section 13 provides that the income, profits and gains shall be computed, for the purposes of ss. 10 and 12, in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. provided that. if no method of accounting has been regularly employed or if the method employed is such that, in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer. the income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom, then the com\n\nputation shall be made upon such basis and in such manner as the Income-tax Officer may determine.\n\nIt may be recalled that the Income-tax Officer had in the order of assessment observed that the firm had not made a stock valuation of the film and had merely taken the excess c:ollcction over the purchase value and had submitted its\n\n1964 return of income on that basis. No express order was re- T ht Oommi,.i<mer corded by the Income-tax Officer that in his opinion the in-\n\n0/ J_;':._m•ta>, come, profits or gains of the business could not properly be\n\nv • ..., deduced from the method of accounting employed by the A. Krj-ahnaswami firm, but it is implicit in what is stated by him that without Mudaltar and 011,, rs valuation of the unexpired exploitation rights the profits of\n\nShah, J. the year of account could not be computed. With this view, it appears, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed.\n\nIn appeal to the Appellate Tribunal the only plea raised was that the Income-tax Officer had erred in estimating the value of the unexpired exploitation rights at Rs. 65,000 /-.\n\nThat was partially accepted, and the value was reducro to Rs. 40,000 /-. It is difficult to appreciate how any question about the regularity of the proceedings of the Income-tax Officer by the adoption of the mercantile system of accounting and by the application of the proviso to s. 13 of the Incometax Act arose from the order of the Tribunal. The High Court has ur, der the Income-tax Act power to call upon the Appellate Tribunal to state a case, only if the High Court is not satisfied about the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal that no question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal. The grounds of appeal filed before the Tribunal and before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner make it abundantly clear that the question as to the applicability of the proviso to s. 13 to the profits disclosed by the respondent firm was never challenged. Nor can it be said that the Tribunal \"forced the x x x firm to adopt ror the purpose of computation of its profits\" a &ystem of accounting other than the one adopted by the firm. Jn the title of the order by the Income-tax Officer it was recited that the method of accounting adopted by the firm was \"mercantile\", but that does not amount to saying that he proposed tc compute the income on the basis that the accounts should be re-written on the mercantile system.\n\nThe question referred to the High Court asks fur advice on the justification for applying the proviso to s. 13, and computation of the income on the basis of the mercantile system of accounting. On neither of these two branches there was any argument raised by the firm before the Tribunal. But we do not propose to dispose of this appeal on the limited ground that the question s framed did not arise oUt of the order of the Tribunal and need not be answered. The grounds given by the High Court in support of their answer to the question referred raise a matter of principle of some importance in the computation of income of an assessee carrying on a trading venture with the aid of a wasting asset. and we have heard elaborate arguments advanced by counsel at the Bar and we deem it necessary to express our opinion on the questions debated. '\n\nIt is true that the Revenue authorities and the Tribunal 1964 did take into consideration the stock valuation at the end TMOommi4Wm<r of the year of account, but that was not because in their view of I\"\"\"\"\"-taz, the system of accounting adopted was or should be mercan-\n\nM';!\"\" tile: the truth of the matter is that in their view, profits of A. Kri4h;.,,.,,,,,,., the firm for the year could not, having regard to the nature Mudaliar and01hm of the business, properly be deduced from the accounts, \"un 8.~ •wh, J. less the Opening and closing stocks were brought into the picture\". This is made clear by the observations of the Tribunal in paragraph-IS of the statement of the case:\n\n\" x x x in all trading cases the true profits cannot be deduced from any system of maintaining accounts whether cash or mercantile, unless the opening and closing stocks are brought into the picture at cost or market price whichever is lower; it will not avail an assessee to say that in his cash system, he had not made any profit on his cash sales till all his stock is disposed of.\n\nIncome-tax is an annual levy and the profits of each year require to be ascertained for that purpose as accurately as circumstances permit. If , i1erefore, in any system of accounting maintained by the assessec, otherwise acceptable, the stocks are left out of account, the aforesaid proviso, it is humbly submitted, necessarily has to be invoked, even if it were for the sole purpose of ad justing the book figures for the stock figu res.\" Correctness of this view especially in the context of a trading venture by the exploitation of a wasting asset, but which is the assessee's stock-in-trade, falls to be considered.\n\nSection 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act was incorporat ed for the first time in the Income-tax legislation in India by the Income-tax Act 11 of 1922, because in a case decidea under the Income-tax Act, 1918, Wallis, C. J.,, delivering the principal judgment of the Full Bench in Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v. Arunachalam Chettiar(') expressed the view that whatever may be the system of accounting adopted bv an assessee, income assessable to tax means the income actually or constructively received and that the words of the charging section placed limits upon the succeeding sections specifying the different classes of income liable to tax. To supersede this exposition of the law the Legislature while enacting Act 11 of 1922 found it necessary to enact s. 13. The section leaves it to the assessee to adopt any compute of accounting and obliges the Income-tax Officer to compute tli.e income, profit~ and gains for the purposes of ss. IO and\n\n(') I.L.R. 44 Mad. 65.\n\n1964 12 in accordance with such method of accounting regularly Th< Commi88foner employed, if profits of the business can properly be deduced of Income-tax, therefrom. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ob- .Madras ..,, served in Commissioner of Income-tax, 8fJmbay v. Sarang- A. x,;,1., w., va111i pur Cotton Manufacturing Company Ltd, Ahmedabad('): Mud1'1iar and Otl1rra\n\nShalt,.!. \" x x x the section relates to a method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee for his own purposes x x x and does not relate to a method of making up the statutory return for assessment to income-tax. Secondly. the section clearly makes such a method of accounting a compulsory basis of computation. unless. in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer. the income, profits and gains cannot properly be deduced therefrom. It may well be that, although the profit brought out in the accounts is not the true figure for . income-tax purposes. the true figure can be accurately deduced therefrom.\"\n\nThe Board also observed: -\n\n\"It is the duty of the Income-tax Officer.&where there is such a method of accounting '\"\"> consider whether the income, profits and gains can properly be deduced therefrom, and to proceed according to his judgment on this question_\"\n\nAgain as observed by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mcmi//an & Co.fl the expression \"in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer\" in the proviso to s. 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, does not confer a mere discretionary power; in the context it imposes a statutory duty on the Income-tax Officer to examine in every case the method of accounting employed by the assessee and to see whether or not it has been regularly employed and to determine whether the income, profits and gains of the assessee could properly be deduced therefrom.\n\nBut the section only deals with the computation of income, profits and gains for the purposes of ss. 10 and 12 and does not purport to enlarge or restrict the content of taxable income, profit and gains under the Act Section 2(15) of the Act defines \"total income\" as meaning total amount of in come, profits and gains referred to in sub-s. (I) of s. 4 computed in the manner laid down in the Act. Section 4(1) lays down what income shall be included in the total income. and ss. 10(2), 12(2), 12B(2), 14, ISA, 15B, 15C and 16 prescribe the manner of computation of income, profits and gains in\n\n(') L.R. 65 I.A. 1.\n\n(') 33 I.T_R. 182.\n\ndifferent circumstances, and also prescribe special excep- 191'.!_ tions. Section B does not directly impinge upon the applica- The Gcnnmi4rione1 tion of these provisions: it merely prescribes that the com- 01 I; r:j-taz, putation of taxable profits shall be made according to the ~-,... method of accounting regularly employed. Where in the A. Krisk\"\"\"\"\"\"'' opinion of. the Income-tax Officer the incbme, profits and Mudaliaratld Olhera gains cannot properly be deduced from the method of ac- Shah, J. counting, it is open to the Income-tax Officer to compute the income upon such basis in such manner as he may determine.\n\nThe section does not compel the Income-tax Officer to accept a balance-sheet of cash receipts and outgoings prepared from the books of account; he has to compute the income in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee.\n\nThe only departure made by s. l 3 bf the Indian Incometax Act from the tax legislation in England is that whereas under the English legislation the Commissioner is not obliged to determine the profits of a business venture, according to the: method of accounting adopted by the assessee, under the Indian Income-tax Act, prima facie, the Income-tax Officer has for the purpose of ss. 10 and 12 to compute the income, profits and gains in accordance with the method of account ing regularly employed by the assessee. If, therefore, there is a system of accounting regularly employed and by appro priate adjustments from the accounts maintained taxable profits may properly be deduced, the Income-tax Officer is bound to compute the profits in accordance with the method of accounting. But where in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer the profits cannot properly be deduced from the system accounting adopted by the assessee it is open to him to adopt a more suitable basis for computation of the true profits.\n\nAmong Indian businessmen, as elsewhere, there are current two principal systems of book -keeping There is, firstly, the cash system in which a record is maintained of actual receipts and actual disbursements, entries being posted when money or money's worth as actually received, collected or disbursed. There is secondly the mercantile system, in which entries are posted in the books of account on the date of the transaction i.e. on the date on which rights accrue or liabilities are incurred, irrespective of the date of payment.\n\nFor example, when goods are sold on credit, a receipt entry is posted as of the date of sale. although no cash is received immediately in payment of such goods; and a debit entry is similarly posted when a liability is incurred although payment on account of such liability is not made at the time. There may have to be appropriate variations when this system is adopted by an assessee who carries on a profession. Whereas\n\n1964 -· under the cash -system no account of what are called the TIM Commi., ioner outstandings of the business either at the commencement of Income-tax, h l f h Jlladr.., or at t e c ose o t e year 1s taken; according to the mercan- . ~- tile method actual cash receipts during the year and the actual A. K~· ' 1\"'a.wami outlays during the year are treated in the same way as under .MudaZ.ar and Other& h h . . . __ t e cas system, but to the balance thus ansmg, there 1s added Shah, J. the amount of the outstandings not collected at the end of the year and from this is deducted the liabilities incurred or accrued but not discharged at the end of the year. Both the methods are somewhat rough. In some cases these methods may not give a clear picture of the true profits earned and certainly not of taxable profits. The quantum of allowances permitted to be deducted under diverse heads under s. 10(2) from the income, profits and gains of a business would differ according to the system adopted. This is made clear by defining in sub-s. (5) the word \"paid\" which is used in several clauses of sub-s (2) as meaning actually paid or incurred according to the method of accounting upon the basis of which the profits or gains are computed under s. 10. Again where the cash system as adopted, there is no question of bad debts or outstandings at all: in the case of mercantile system against the book profits some of the bad debts may have to be set off when they are found to be mercantile system, there are innumerable other systems of accounting which may be called hybrid or heterogeneous-in which certain elements and incidents of the cash and mercantile systems are combined.\n\nBut whatever method of book-keeping is adopted, in the case of a trading venture, for computing the true profits of the year the stock-in-trade must be taken into account. If the va!ue of stock-in-trade is not taken icto account, in the ultimate result the profit or loss resulting f1 om trading is bound to get absorbed or reflected in the stock-in-trade unless the value of the stock-in-trade \"emains ur:r!-?ned at the commencement of the year and at the end of theyear. It must be remembered that under the Income-tax Act, tax is levied on income, protits and gains, and not on re.:eipts: taxable profits therefore cannot ordinarily be deduced from cash receipts alone. If in the computation of profits of a trading venture, only the cash receipts and outgoings are taken into account, in substance emergence of profits would be deferred, till the firm's capital outlay is completely recouped, thereby transforming what in truth are profits of the business into capital, by book-keeping entries.\n\nIn this case it is unnecessary to consider whether the method of accounting adopted cif ignoring the value of the stock-in-trade may be regarded as regularly employed by the respondent firm, when it is the first year of account. It is common ground that the method of accounting was not mercan- 1964\n\ntile. but was wholly or primarily cash. The Income-tax Officer PM Oommi••io•er was of the view that in the absence of stock-valuation of the 011; o.:;•lax, film which was a wasting asset of the partnership and which v.\"\"' was exploited for earning profits, the income of the firm could A. Kr.ishnaswami not properly be deduced and with that view the Appellate As-'Mudaliar and O!hera sistant Commissioner and the Tribunal have agreed. The High Shah, J.\n\nCourt, however, held that the maintenance of account on cash basis being a recognised method of accounting, the Income-tax Officer was bound by the choice of the assessee who had adopted that system of accounting, and to compute the income in accordance with that method, unless the Income-tax Officer was satisfied that the assessee had not regularly adopted that system. The High Court also observed that what the Department had done was to make the assessment on the basis that the system of accounting adopted by the assessee was mercantile-a system which the assessee had never adopted, and thereby computed the profits of the assessee, by taking into considera lion valuation of the closing stock which was not an incident of the cash system. The Income-tax Officer had in the view of the High Court no power under the proviso to s. 13 \"to force . a different system on the assessee either the mercantile system\n\nor a hybrid system of cash plus valuation of closing stock\".\n\nIn coming to that conclusion, in our judgment, the High Court erred. Note the facts: an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid by the firm for acquiring a wasting asset, which was to be exploited for the benefit of the partnership. The price paid for acquiring the asset was debited as an outgoing. At the end of /the year there was a total collection of Rs. 1,46,849 /- by the\n\nexploitation of the asset. The expenses for carrying on the business amounted to Rs. 18,206 /-. The result according to the respondent firm was a net profit of Rs. 28,647 /-. This was arrived at by posting the outgoing for acquiring its stock-in-trade as a proper debit. and ignoring the value of that asset at the end of the year altogether. Under the Income-tax Act for the purpose of the assessment each year is a self-contained unit, and if out of the receipts the cost of the film was to be deducted ih the absence of an entry crediting the value of the asset at the end of the year, for arriving at the income of the profit of !ht' firm '-'; ould either wholly or substantially be absorbed in the amortization of the capital value of the asset. The result of the accounting would therefore give a false picture of the partnership, however lucrative the business may in reality be.\n\nThe methods of computation of taxable incomes prescribed by the Act of different kinds of income are undoubtedly highly artificial, but the Act does not compel the Income-tax Officer\n\no accept a statemnt of accoun.t which is not prepared accordmg to any recogmsed accountmg practice .\n\nT!te Crn11missioner\n\nof I mom~-tax,\n\nMadra.B\n\n786 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nIn Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Cock B11ssell cu1d Co. Ltd.('). Croom-Johnson J., in dealing with valuation of stock-in-trade for purposes of taxation observed:\n\nA. Kli.~11nas10a111i Mu•ltdiar tind Ollil'I>'\n\n\"there is no word in the statutes or rules which deals with this question of valuing stock-in-trade. There. is nothing in the relevant legislation which indicates that in computing the profits and gains of a commercial concern the stock-in-trade at the start of the accounting period should be taken in an<! that the amount of the stock-in-trade at the end of the priod should also be taken in. It wculd be fantastic not to do it: it would be utterly impossible accurately to assess profits and gains merely on a statement of receipts and payments or on the basis of turnover. It has long been recognised that the right method of assessing profits and gain~ is to take into account the value of the stock-in-trade at the beginning and the value of the stock-in-tra<lc at the end as two of the items in the computation. l need not cite authority for the general proposition. which is admitted at the Bar. that for the purposes of ascertaining profits and gains the ordinary principles of commercial accounting should be applied. so long as they do not conflict with any express prevision of the relevant statutes \"\n\nSlialt,, l.\n\nWe have already said that in England there is no provision which compels the tax officer to adopt in the computation of income the system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. But whatever may be the system-whether it is cash or mercantile-as observed by Croom-fohnson J.-in a trading venture it would be impossible accurately to assess the true profits without taking into account the value of the stock in trade at the beginning and at the end of the year. Reference may also be made to Whimsier & Co.\n\nv. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue(') in which Lord President Clyde observed at p. 823: -\n\n\"In computing the balance of profits and gains for the purposes of Income Tax, x x x two general and fundamental commonplaces have always to be kept in mind. In the first place, the profils of any particular year or accounting period must be taken to consist of the difference between the receipts from the trade or business during uch year or accounting period and the expenditure laid out to earn those receipts. In the second place, the\n\n(') 29 T.C. 387.\n\n(') T.C. 813.\n\naccount of profit and loss to be made up for tbe 1964 purpose of ascertaining that difference must be T!ie Com111fasio., r framed consistently with the ordinary principles 01 Inco111e-tax, of commercial accounting, so far as applicable.\n\nM\":~\"' and in conformity with the rules of the Income-tax A. Kri8/1nasu:ami Act, or of that Act as modified by the provisions Mwl<lli<.r and 0th\" and schedules of the Acts regulating Excess Pro si;;;: J. fits Duty as the case may be. For example the ordinary principles of commercial accounting require that in the profit and loss account a merchant's or manufacturer's business the values of the stock-intrade at the beginning and at the end of the period covered by the account should be entered at cost or market price, whichever is the lower: although there is nothing about this in the taxing statuteS.\" Similarly in Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras v. Messrs. Chari and Ram, Madura(') Rajamannar C.J., observed that stock-in-trade in hand is an essential item in the computation of the profits for a period.\n\n\"Profits\" as ob.served by Fletcher-Moulton, L.J ., in the Spanish Prospecting Co_mpany Ltd. in re.(').\n\n\"implies a comparison between the state of a business at two specific dates usually separated by an interval of a year. The fundamental meaning is the amount of gains made by the business during the year. This can only be ascertained by a comparison of the assets of the business at the two dates. \"We start therefore with this fundament~) definition of profits, namely. if the total assets of the business at the two dates be compared. the increase which they show at the later date as compared with the earlier date x x x x represents in strictness the profits of the business . during the period in question.\" It is true that in that case Fletcher-Moulton, L.J., made the observations not in dealing with a profit and loss account in a case relating to taxation, but with a, balance-sheet of a company intended to show the actual financial condition of a business at the end of a year_ The observations however do show that in ascertaining profits what may be regarded as nornial book-keeping practice has to be observed. Whether in the case of trading in special classes of assets appropriate adjustments may have to be made it beside the point.\n\nThe Income-tax Act makes no provision with regard to tl; e valuation of stock. Jt charges for payment of tax the income,\n\n(') 17 I.T.R. 1. (') [1911] 1 Ch. 92.\n\nSUPREME COURT UEPORTS [1964]\n\n19G4 profit> and gains which hae to be computed in the manner Ti<e c.\";;;;;; issianer provided by the Income-tax Act. In the case of a trading \\en·\n\nof ln~>me-tax, turc these profits have to be adjusted in the light of the provi- Madras sions of !he Income tax Act permitting allowances prescribed A. Krish:;,, aarr.i thereby. For that purpose it is the duty of the Income-tax Mwlaliar anti Othm Officer to find out what profits the business has made accord-\n\nShah, J. ing to true Accountancy practice, in the light of the system adopted, and thereafter lo make. the requisite adjustments, and even appropriate modificat'on of the rule suggested by Fletcher-Moulton, L.J. to ascertain the taxable profits. It is true as observed by Lo:d Buckmaster in Tlze Naval Colliery C n. Ltil .Y--The Commissioner of Inland Revenue(') that the principle of determining the profits of the trade by valuing everything at the beginning and the end of the accounting period and by finding the difference may not be universally\n\n~•pplicable in all cases, and needs material modification. The formula suggested in the Spanish Prospecting Company's case(') was sought to be applied lo a case in which Excess\n\nProfits duty was assessed. The assessee a mining ccmpany was unable to work its colliery on account of a strike. The asscsscc sought lo introduce into its account which normally ended on June 30, 1921, the estimated expenses for repairing the damage (which though arising in the account period was restored laterl on the plea that the expenses were in the nature of liability of business and properly debitablc before they were actually incurred. The House of Lords rejected that contention. lt was in this context that Lord Buckmaster observed that the accountancy rules. applicable to wise and prudent trading could not be used in connection with the working of a mining lease.\n\nThese observations do not affect the true character of the profits of a business. Adjustments may have to be made in the principle having regard to the special character of the asets, the nature of the business and the appropriate allowances permitted, in order to arrive at the taxable profits. They do not support the proposition that in the case of a trading venture. you can arrive at the true profits of a year by ignoring altogether the valuation of the stock-in-trade at the end of the year, while debiting its value at the commencement of the year . , as an oulgoing, for determination of the profits by ignoring the valuation of the stock at the end of the year and debiting the value of the assets at the commencement of the year would not give a true picture of the profit for the year of account.\n\nThere is no warrant in this case for assuming that the Revenue authorities and the Tribunal had sought to displace the method of accountancy adopted by the assessee. By applying ; the proviso to s. 13, they made the computation upon the basis\n\n(') 12 T.C. 1017. (') [19111 1 Ch. 92.\n\n7 S.C.H.\n\nSUPHE1IE COURT REPORTS -789\n\nand in the manner in which in their opinion profits would be 1964 properly deduced. That they were entitled to do. We are there The Oommi.,;,,,..r fore of the view that the High Court was in error in holding 0/ lnrome-tax,\n\nMadras that because the assessee had maintained his accounts in the •. r.ash system it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to add A. x,;.,,,,.,,,., .• .,; to the receipts from the business the value of the stock-in-trade , ltudalwr and Otlem at the end of the year for the purpose of properly deducing the s1i0 1, J. profits of the business for the year in question.\n\nThe appeal therefore must be allowed and the answer to the question referred to the High Court will be in the affirmative. The Commissioner will be entitled to his costs in this Court s well as in the High Court.\n\nAppeal aiiQ1red", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. KRISHNASW AMI MUD ALI AR AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. KRISHNASWAMI MUDALIAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Powers in Income-tax Officer in computing profits-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 350, "end_char": 427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 441, "end_char": 446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Powers in Income-tax Officer in computing profits-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Powers in Income-tax Officer in computing profits-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "December 25, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 604, "end_char": 621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the period, December 25, 1947 to August 2, 1948, which was the previous year corresponding to the assessment year 1949-50 the firm filed a voluntary return declaring that Rs."}}, {"text": "August 2, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 625, "end_char": 639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the period, December 25, 1947 to August 2, 1948, which was the previous year corresponding to the assessment year 1949-50 the firm filed a voluntary return declaring that Rs."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1877, "end_char": 1897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On reference, the High Court of Madras took the view that it was the cash system that the assessee had adopted, that valuation of the closing stock was not an incident of that system for ascertaining the profits and that the Incometax Officer had no power under the proviso to s. 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, to force a different system on the assessee either the mercantile system or a hybrid system of cash plus valuation of closing stock."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2136, "end_char": 2141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2149, "end_char": 2176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3004, "end_char": 3009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian IncomHax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3017, "end_char": 3042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL A'PPEALLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL A'PPEALLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qfder dated February 2, 1960 of the Madras High Court in °1 i:;; a\"• Case Referred No."}}, {"text": "A. Krilh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3420, "end_char": 3428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nA. Krilh.......,,..\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the appel- Mudaliar and OtA.,, lant. -"}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3441, "end_char": 3458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nA. Krilh.......,,..\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the appel- Mudaliar and OtA.,, lant. -"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3463, "end_char": 3477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nA. Krilh.......,,..\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the appel- Mudaliar and OtA.,, lant. -"}}, {"text": "S. Narayanaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3523, "end_char": 3539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Narayanaswamy and R. Gopalakrislman, for respondent nos."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrislman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3544, "end_char": 3561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Narayanaswamy and R. Gopalakrislman, for respondent nos."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3656, "end_char": 3660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH, J.-Respondents to this appeal are a firm constituted under a deed dated December 12, 1947.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "K. N.\n\nDamodara Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3803, "end_char": 3827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of three partners: K. N.\n\nDamodara Mudaliar.", "canonical_name": "K. N.\n\nDamodara Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "K.N. Damodara Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3882, "end_char": 3904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.N. Damodara Mudaliar acquired for the firm for Rs.", "canonical_name": "K. N.\n\nDamodara Mudaliar"}}, {"text": "Pondicherry", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4128, "end_char": 4139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the South Arcot and the Chingleput districts and for Pondicherry."}}, {"text": "August 15, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4893, "end_char": 4908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 15, 1948, a deed of dissolution of the partnership was executed."}}, {"text": "Damodara Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4969, "end_char": 4986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Damodara Mudaliar sold with effect from August 6, 1948, his half interest in the assets of the partnership to Krishnaswami Mudaliar for Rs."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Damodara Mudaliar sold with effect from August 6, 1948, his half interest in the assets of the partnership to Krishnaswami Mudaliar for Rs."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswami Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Damodara Mudaliar sold with effect from August 6, 1948, his half interest in the assets of the partnership to Krishnaswami Mudaliar for Rs."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5154, "end_char": 5169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 27, 1948 a trial balance-sheet of the firm's books of account was prepared showing a cash balance of Rs."}}, {"text": "Thangaraja Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5386, "end_char": 5405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2.64 Ii 8 / 8 and credits in favour of Damodara Mudaliar and Thangaraja Mudaliar respectively for Rs."}}, {"text": "V. S.\n\nLakshmanan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "944/2/ I. Thereafter Krishnaswami Mudaliar, Thangaraja Mudaliar and V. S.\n\nLakshmanan (an outsider) formed themslves info another partnership to exploit the film for the unexpired period."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5752, "end_char": 5756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12000 /- for his\n\nShah, J.\n\n778 SUPREJ\\ffi COURT REPORTS\n\n(1964J\n\n1964 six sixteenth share in the assets of the fmn on the date of PM Oommisaione' retirement.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7691, "end_char": 7728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, the respondent firm merely contended that the valuation of the exploitation rights for the unexpired period was excessive."}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8094, "end_char": 8102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8282, "end_char": 8287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8295, "end_char": 8309, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9182, "end_char": 9187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9871, "end_char": 9882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9890, "end_char": 9917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10229, "end_char": 10239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "ss. 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10323, "end_char": 10336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "A. Krj-ahnaswami firm", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11271, "end_char": 11292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No express order was re- T ht Oommi,.i<mer corded by the Income-tax Officer that in his opinion the in-\n\n0/ J;':.m•ta>, come, profits or gains of the business could not properly be\n\nv • ..., deduced from the method of accounting employed by the A. Krj-ahnaswami firm, but it is implicit in what is stated by him that without Mudaltar and 011,, rs valuation of the unexpired exploitation rights the profits of\n\nShah, J. the year of account could not be computed."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12023, "end_char": 12028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12119, "end_char": 12133, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12531, "end_char": 12536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13179, "end_char": 13184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15615, "end_char": 15625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15633, "end_char": 15638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act was incorporat ed for the first time in the Income-tax legislation in India by the Income-tax Act 11 of 1922, because in a case decidea under the Income-tax Act, 1918, Wallis, C. J.,, delivering the principal judgment of the Full Bench in Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v. Arunachalam Chettiar(') expressed the view that whatever may be the system of accounting adopted bv an assessee, income assessable to tax means the income actually or constructively received and that the words of the charging section placed limits upon the succeeding sections specifying the different classes of income liable to tax."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15640, "end_char": 15654, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15738, "end_char": 15752, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15801, "end_char": 15821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Wallis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15823, "end_char": 15829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act was incorporat ed for the first time in the Income-tax legislation in India by the Income-tax Act 11 of 1922, because in a case decidea under the Income-tax Act, 1918, Wallis, C. J.,, delivering the principal judgment of the Full Bench in Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v. Arunachalam Chettiar(') expressed the view that whatever may be the system of accounting adopted bv an assessee, income assessable to tax means the income actually or constructively received and that the words of the charging section placed limits upon the succeeding sections specifying the different classes of income liable to tax."}}, {"text": "To supersede this exposition of the law the Legislature while enacting Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16268, "end_char": 16342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16382, "end_char": 16387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To supersede this exposition of the law the Legislature while enacting Act", "statute": "To supersede this exposition of the law the Legislature while enacting Act"}}, {"text": "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ob- .Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16767, "end_char": 16818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ob- .Madras ..,, served in Commissioner of Income-tax, 8fJmbay v. Sarang- A. x,;,1.,"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18011, "end_char": 18016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18024, "end_char": 18051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18504, "end_char": 18517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 2(15)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18624, "end_char": 18637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18755, "end_char": 18759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18805, "end_char": 18817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "ss. 10(2), 12(2), 12B(2), 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18883, "end_char": 18911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "L.R. 65 I.A. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19007, "end_char": 19021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20013, "end_char": 20020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only departure made by s. l 3 bf the Indian Incometax Act from the tax legislation in England is that whereas under the English legislation the Commissioner is not obliged to determine the profits of a business venture, according to the: method of accounting adopted by the assessee, under the Indian Income-tax Act, prima facie, the Income-tax Officer has for the purpose of ss."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20228, "end_char": 20242, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20303, "end_char": 20316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".MudaZ.ar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22277, "end_char": 22286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~- tile method actual cash receipts during the year and the actual A. K~· ' 1\"'a.wami outlays during the year are treated in the same way as under .MudaZ.ar and Other& h h . . ."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22791, "end_char": 22799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23141, "end_char": 23146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24088, "end_char": 24102, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26169, "end_char": 26174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27041, "end_char": 27055, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Croom-Johnson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28013, "end_char": 28026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Croom-Johnson J., in dealing with valuation of stock-in-trade for purposes of taxation observed:\n\nA. Kli.~11nas10a111i Mu•ltdiar tind Ollil'I>'\n\n\"there is no word in the statutes or rules which deals with this question of valuing stock-in-trade.", "canonical_name": "Croom-Johnson"}}, {"text": "Croom-fohnson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29553, "end_char": 29566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But whatever may be the system-whether it is cash or mercantile-as observed by Croom-fohnson J.-in a trading venture it would be impossible accurately to assess the true profits without taking into account the value of the stock in trade at the beginning and at the end of the year.", "canonical_name": "Croom-Johnson"}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Inland Revenue(')", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29810, "end_char": 29843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference may also be made to Whimsier & Co.\n\nv. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue(') in which Lord President Clyde observed at p. 823: -\n\n\"In computing the balance of profits and gains for the purposes of Income Tax, x x x two general and fundamental commonplaces have always to be kept in mind."}}, {"text": "Clyde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29868, "end_char": 29873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference may also be made to Whimsier & Co.\n\nv. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue(') in which Lord President Clyde observed at p. 823: -\n\n\"In computing the balance of profits and gains for the purposes of Income Tax, x x x two general and fundamental commonplaces have always to be kept in mind."}}, {"text": "Rajamannar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31325, "end_char": 31335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For example the ordinary principles of commercial accounting require that in the profit and loss account a merchant's or manufacturer's business the values of the stock-intrade at the beginning and at the end of the period covered by the account should be entered at cost or market price, whichever is the lower: although there is nothing about this in the taxing statuteS.\" Similarly in Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras v. Messrs. Chari and Ram, Madura(') Rajamannar C.J., observed that stock-in-trade in hand is an essential item in the computation of the profits for a period."}}, {"text": "Fletcher-Moulton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31475, "end_char": 31491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Profits\" as ob.served by Fletcher-Moulton, L.J .,"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32708, "end_char": 32722, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32997, "end_char": 33011, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tlze Naval Colliery", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33646, "end_char": 33665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true as observed by Lo:d Buckmaster in Tlze Naval Colliery C n. Ltil .Y--The Commissioner of Inland Revenue(') that the principle of determining the profits of the trade by valuing everything at the beginning and the end of the accounting period and by finding the difference may not be universally\n\n~•pplicable in all cases, and needs material modification."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34272, "end_char": 34285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The asscsscc sought lo introduce into its account which normally ended on June 30, 1921, the estimated expenses for repairing the damage (which though arising in the account period was restored laterl on the plea that the expenses were in the nature of liability of business and properly debitablc before they were actually incurred."}}, {"text": "Buckmaster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34610, "end_char": 34620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt was in this context that Lord Buckmaster observed that the accountancy rules."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35771, "end_char": 35776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36432, "end_char": 36434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_790_799_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April 17\n\n790-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nKULTAR SINGH\n\nMUKHTIAR SINGH\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYAT\n\nULLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYAN\n\nGAR, JJ.) .\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951 \\43 of 1951) s. 123(3)- Election Petition-Allegation of publication and d1strtbutwn of posters contain~:tg an appeal to voters to vote on the ground of religion-If amounts to corrupt practice-Word \"panth\". w; ed in the Pamphlet-Meaning of- The respondent challenged the appellant's election before the Tribunal alleging that it was void inasmuch as for the pur 'pose of securing votes the appellant had appealed to his religion and had thereby committed a corrupt practice. He had addressed seven election meetings and in those meetings he and his supporters had asked the voters to vote for him as he was the proper representative of the Sikh Panth, and so, he would be able to protect the Sikh religion and the Sikh language. It was further alleged that at five of the seven election meetings organised by him, the printed posters (Exts. p. 1 to p. 10) had been distributed by him and they contained an appeal to the voters to vote for him on the ground of his religion. The appellant denied both these allegations. He disputed the respondent's case that at these meetings any appeal to religion was made. In regard to the posters, he denied that he had anything to do with the said posters, except one Ext. p. 9 and piaded that the said poster was innocent and its publication .and distribution would not attract the provisions of s. 123(3) of the Act. Both these questions were answered by the Tribunal in favour of the respondent. On appeal, the High Court reversed the conclusion of the Tribunal on the first question. In regard to the pcs\\\"ers, it held that all the ten posters had been distributed by him, but, in its opinion, except Ext. p. 10, none of the others ofTenried the provisions of s. 123(3f of the Act. In regard to poster Ext. p, 10. however, it agreed with the conclusion of the Tribunal and held that the said poster contained an appeal to the votes to vote for the appellant on the ground of his religion. and so, by publishing and distributing it at his election meetings. he had committed a corrupt practice under s. 123(3) of the Act.\n\nIn this Court the appellant contended that the view taken by the Election Tribunal and the High Court was based on a misconstruction of the impugned pamphlet.\n\nHeld: In considering the question as to whether a parti- . cular appeal made by a candidate falls within the mischief of - s. 12~(3f of the Act, courts should not be astute to read into the words used in the appeal anything more than can be attributed to them on its fair and reasonable construction.\n\nThe view taken by the High Court and the Tribunal was inconsistent with a fair and reasonable construction of the impugned poster. In fact, the High Court did not consider the di!Terent places in the poster where the word \"Panth\" had been used ; md no attempt was made to co-relate these sentences and to enquire whether the meaning attributed by the High Court\n\nto the \\\\'md \"Panth\" was justified in regard to all the sentences In which that word occurred.\n\n. 'l'he significance of the reference to the Punjabi Suba in the impugned poster arises from the fact that it giv'Cs clue to the meaning which the poster intended to assign to the word\n\n\"Panth\". Therefore, the word \"Panth\" in this poster did not mean. Sikh religion and so, it would not be possible to accept the view that by distributing this poster, the appellant had appealed to voters to vote for him because of his religion.\n\nIn construin~ the impugned poster, the High Court did not take into account the oral evidence. !t is true that oral evidentc wo~1ld not be of any mate11ial assistance in construing the. words in the pamphlet; but. the wcrd \"Panth\" used in six places in the pamphlet could be properly interpreted only to mean the Akali Dal party and it was in that context that the statements made by the witnesses as to the name bv which the Akali Dal Party was known in popular minds, might have some relevance.\n\nSardul. Singh Caveesliar v. Hukam Sing/1, (1953) VT. E.\n\nL. R. 316 and Baba Gurdit Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, Indian Election Cases by Doabia. Vol. I. p, 92, referred to.\n\nPolitical issues which form the subject-ma.tlr'r of controversies at election medtings 1nay indirectly and incidentally introduce consideration of language or religion, but in deciding the question as to \\Vhether corrupt practice had been ron1mittcd under s. 123(3), care must be taken to consider th\" impugnrd speech or appeal carefully and always in the light of th<' r1lc'\n\nvant political controversy. Therefore, the I-Iigh Court ,, as in error in coming to the conclusion that the in1pugned poster Ext. p. 10 attracted the provision of s. 123(3) of the Aet.\n\nJag:lev Shgh Sidhanti v. Partap Singh Danlte. A.LR. rnG5 s.c. 183.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 29& of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 31, 1963, of the Punjab High Court in F.A.O. No. 5-E of 1962.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, and B. P. Maheslnvari, for the appdlant.\n\nBawa Sl1iv Charan Singh, Hardel' Singh and Y. Kumar, for the respondent.\n\nApril 17, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKtdtar Singh\n\nv • Mukllliar Slrr, gb ,\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR. C. J.-The short question of law which aa arises in this appeal by special leave is whether by publish- ndragaalcm.C.J. ing and distributing a poster (Ext. p. }O) in furtherance of his election, the appcliant. Kultar Singh has committed a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 195! (Na. 43 of 195)) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The Election Tribunal which tried the election petition\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\n1964 tiled by the respondent Mukhtiar Singh challenging the vali- Kullar Singh dity of the appellant's election, as well as the High Court of . v. .\n\nPunjab which heard the appellant's appeal against the deci- }lluklu.ar Smgh sion of the Election Tribunal have answered this question\n\nGajendragadkar, c.J. against the appellant. Accordingly, the election of the appellant has been declared to be void. Mr. Setalvad for the appellant contends that the view taken by the Election Tribunal and the High Court is based on a misconstruction of the impugned pamphlet. The appellant was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Dharamkot Constituency and he defeated his nearest rival. the respondent, by a margin of nearly 8,000\n\nvotes. The appellant had stood for election on the Akali Dal ticket, while the respondent had been officially adopted by the Congress Party. After the election of the appellant was declared, the respondent filed an election petition alleging that the appellant's election was void inasmuch as for the purpose of securing votes, he had appealed to his religion and had thereby committed a corrupt practice. It appears that the election petition had also alleged that the appellant had appealed to J1is language and community, but with that part of the case we are no longer concerned in the present appeal, because the petition has not succeeded in that behalf. According lo the respondent, the appellant had addressed seven election\n\nmetings held in different places and on different dates and at those meetings, he and his supporters had made speeches asking the voters to vote for the appellant as he was the proper representative of the Sikh Panth. whereas the respondent represented the Hindu-ridden Party. and so. the appellant would be able to protect the Sikh religion and the Sikh language. The petition further alleged that at five of the seven election meetings organised by the appellant, the printed posters (Ext. p. I to p. 10) had been distributed by the appellant and these posters contained an appeal to the voters to vote for tl1e appellant on the ground of his religion.\n\nThe appellant denied both these allegations. He admitted that election meetings were held on his behalf and were addressed by him and his supporters, but he disputed the respondent's case that at these meetings any appeal to religion was made. In regard to the posters, the appellant denied that he had anything to do with the said posters, except one Ext. p. 9 and he pleaded that the said poster was innocent and its publication and distribution would nat attract the provisions of s. J 23(3) of the Act.\n\nOn these pleadings, two broad questions arose for decision. The first question was whether the speeches alleged to have been made by the appellant and his supporters at the election meetings included appeals to the voters to vote for the arpellaht on the grQUnd of his religion; and the second\n\n....\n\nwas whether the impugned posters Exts. p. 1 to p. 10 were 1961 published or distributed by the appellant at the election meet- K11llar Singh ings, and if yes, whether any one or more of them contained M Mr T. 8 . h an. appeal to the voters on the ground of the appellant's reliu ~\n\n•\"!I gion. Both these questions were answered by the Tribunal Gaj<nd\"'i/adka,, 0.1. in favour of the respondent. The High Court, however, has reversed the conclusion of the Tribunal on the first question; it has held that the evidence led by the respondent in support of his case that at the election meetings an appeal was made to the voters to support the candidature of the appellant on the ground of his religion, did not establish the respondent; s case. Jn regard to the posters, the High Court has held that all the ten posters had been distributed by the appellant, but, in its opinion, except Ext. p. IO, none of the others offended the provisions of s. I 23(3). An argument was urged before the High Court by reference to the two posters in particular Exts. p. 9 and p. 1 O. The High Court rejected the respondent's case with regard to poster Ext. 9, beca.use it held that it was not clear that the poster contained an appeal to the voters on the ground of the appe!lant's religion .. In regard to poster Ext. p. 10, however, the High Court agreed with the conclusion of the Tribunal and held that the said poster contained an appeal to the voters to vote for the appellant on the ground of his religion, and so, by publishing and distributing it a.t his election meetings, the appelhint had committed a corrupt practice under s. 123(3) of the Act. That is how on this narrow ground, the decision of the Tribunal was confirmed by the High Court and that raises the question about the construction of the impugned poster Ext. p. 10.\n\nBefore dealing with this question, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of s. 123(3). Section 123 provides for different acts which constitute corrupt practices under the Act. Section 123(3) lays down, inter alia, that the appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, would amount to a corrupt practice. It is thus, plain that if it is shown that the impugned poster which the appellant is proved to have published and distributed at his election meetings contained an appeal to the voters of his constituency to vote for him on the j!round of his religion. that would amount to a comipt practice under s. 123(3) of the Act and in !ha.t case, the election of the appellant would be void under s. IOO(l)(d)(ii) ..\n\nIt is true that a corrupt practice under s. 123(3) can be committed by a candidate by appealing to the voters to vote for him on the ground of his religion even though his rivaf candidate may belong to the same religion. If, for instance, a Sikh candidate were to appeal to the voters to vote for him. because he was a Sikh and add that his rival candidate.\n\n1964 though a Sikh in name, was not true to the religious tenets of Sikhism or was a heretic and as such, outside the pale of K ullar SingA v. the Sikh religion, that would amount to a corrupt practice Mv.ltAliar s; ng11 under s. 123(3), and so, we cannot uphold the contention that Gofi-11Ylilatlka C.J. s. 123(3) is in applicable because both the appellant and the\n\n'• respondent are Sikhs. In fairness, we ought, however, to add that Mr Setalvad did not press this contention before us.\n\ntfhe corrupt practice as prescribed by s. 123(3) undoubtedly constitutes a. very healthy and salutary provision which is intended to serve the cause of secular democracy in this country. In order that the democratic process should thrive and succeed, it is of utmost importance that our elections to Parliament and the different legislative bodies must be free from the unhealthy influence of appeals to religion, race, ::aste. community, or language. If these considerations are allowed any sway in election campaigns, they would vitiate the secular atmosphere of democratic life, and so, s. 123(3) wisely prcvides a check on this undesirable development by providing that an appeal to any of these factors made in furtherance of the candidature of any candidate as therein prescribed would constitute a corrupt practice and would render the election of the said candidate void.\n\nIn considering the question as to whether the distribution of the impugned poster by the appellant constitutes corrupt practice under s. 123(3), there is one point which has to be borne in mind. The appellant had been adopted as its candidate by the Akali Dal Party. This Party is recognised as a p.:ilitical party by the Election Commission notwithstanding the fa.ct that all of its members are only Sikhs. It is well-known that there are several parties irt this country which subscribe to different political and economic ideologies, but the membership of them is either confined to, or predominantly held by, members of particular communities or religions. So long as law does not prohibit the formation of such parties and in fact recognises them for the purpose of election and parliamentary li(e, it would be necessary to remember that an appeal made by candidates of such parties for votes may, if successful, lead to their election and in an indirect way, may coneeivably be influenced by considerations of religion, race, caste, community or language.\n\nThis infirmity cannot perhaps be avoided so long as parties are allowed to function and are recpgnised, though their composition may be predominantly based on membership of particular communities or religion. That is why we think, in considering the question as to whether a particular appeal made by a candidate falls within the mischief of s. 123(3), courts should not be astute to read into the words used in the appeal anything more than can be attributed to them on its fair and reasonable -construction.\n\n(}hat takes us to the question of construing the impugn 1964 ed poster. The principles which have to be applied in constru- Kvltar Singl> ing such a document are well-settled. The document must be M Mr\"· 8 . ,. read as a whole and its purport and effect determined in a u '.'.'.'.'___ •\"9 fair, objective and reasonable manner. In reading such docu-Gajendrogadl:ar, O.>. ments, it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that when election meetings are held and appeals are made by candidates of opposing political parties, the atmosphere is usually surcharged with partisan feelings and emotions and the use of hyperboles or exaggerated language, or the adoption of metaphors, and the extravagance of expression in attacking one another, are all a part of the game, and so, when the question about the effect of speeches delivered or pamphlets distributed at election meetings is argued in the cold atmosphere of a judicial chamber. some allowance must be made and the impugned speeches or pamphlets must be construed in that light. In doing so, however, it would be unreasonable to ignore the question as to what the effect of the said speech or pamphlet would be on the mind of the ordinary voter who attends such meetings and reads the pamphlets or hears the speeches. It is in the light of these well-established nciples that we must now turn to the impugned pamphlel.:.J\n\nExt. p. 10 has been translated by the High Court. The correctness of this translation is not challenged by either party before us. It reads thus:-\n\n\"Dear resident Sikhs,\n\nWe, who are living itlt Singapore, Malaya, and South East Asia, place this before you, most respectfully, that at this critical juncture it is your duty to keep high the honour of the Panth. This is not the time to criticise the weaknesses of the leaders of the Panth; the need is that irl the coming General Elections you should defeat the opponents of the Panth the same way as you did in the last Gurdwara Elections. Every Sikh vote should go to the representatives of the Akali Dal. and we hope that this prayer of ours from far off wilf be accepted by you and you will once again preserve the honour' of the Panth. Victory of the Pa nth will. maintain the honour of the Pan th. Ry maintaining such honour we will reach our final goal, that is Punjabi Suba''.\n\nThe poster then ends thus : -\n\nwe remain anxious to keep the honour and prestige of'the Panth ever high..\n\nYours, Non-resident brother ..\n\n1964 The respondent's contention before the Tribunal and the Kullar Si\"'Jh High Court was that this appeal plainly and unambiguously !· . invites the voters to vote for the appellant in order to pre- .Mukk'.'.'.:_ 8•\"1Jh serve the honour and prestige of the Panth and it was urged 4aj•ndra1adkar, o, J, that in the context. the Pan th meant the Sikh religion. Since\n\nthe pamphlet clearly appeals to the voters to vote for the appellant and proceeds on the assumption that the election of the appellant would uphold the honour and prestige of the Sikh religion, that amounts to a corrupt practice, because the appeal is based on the !,'found of the appellant's religion. The courts below have accepted this contention.\n\nThe word 'Panth' is one of Sanskrit origin and etymologically ft means the path or the way. It must be conceded that by itself it has come to indicate the Sikh religion, because it has been used by Sikhs to denote their religion and their denomination as the followers of that Panth.\n\nIn that context, Panth may mean the Sikh religion and the followers of the Panth would be the persons who follow the path prescribed by the Sikh-gurus and as such, would signify the Sikh community. Panthic is an adjective which means, of the Panth or belonging to the Panth, and so, prima facie, the glory or prestige of the Panth may mean the glory or prestige of the Sikh religin.\n\nThe question which calls for our decision, however, is not what the word 'Panth' in the abstract may mean in the Punjab. The question which we ha.ve to answer is, what d0es the word \"Panth\" mean in the context of the pamphlet the distribution of which is alleged to constitute corrupt practice?\n\nIt would be noticed that the word \"Panth\" occurs in six places in this pamphlet. First, reference is made to the honour of the Panth; then .it is said that it is not the time to criticise the leaders of the Panth. In both these places, the word \"Panth\" may conceivably mean the Sikh religion. But when we go to the use of the word \"Panth\" in the next sentence, it becomes clear that the said word cannot possibly mean the Sikh religion. The relevant portion of the pamphlet says to the electors: you should defeat the opponents of the Panth the same way as you did in the last Gurdwara Elections. It is common ground that the Gurdwara Elections were fought between different parties of the Sikhs and the Akali Dal party triumphed at the said Elections. Therefore, there is no doubt whatever that in this sentence, the Panth cannot possibly mean the Sikh religion. The expression \"the opponents of the Panth\" obvious! y means the opponents of the Akali Dal party and: what the pamphlet purports to tell the electors is, just as at 'the last Gurdwara Elections the Akali Dal Party succeeded over its opponents, so should the Akali Dal Party triumph 1n the election in question. The next sentence makes it still clearer that the Panth and the Akali Dal Party are treated as\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 797\n\n1964 synonymous in this portion because it says \"every Sikh vote should go to the representatives of the Ai Dal\", and tht Kti/lar Singh can be reconciled with the previous sentence only on the basis v.\n\nM u!Aliar Sillflh that in the minds of those who drafted the impugned poster, the Akali Dal Party and the Panth are the same. Then theQq/tllclragadiliar, O.J. poster says that the prayer made in the poster, if accepted, will once again preserve the honour of the Panth; the words \"once again\" take us back to the triumph which the Akali Dal Party achieved at the last Gurdwara Elections, and so, the Panth in this context must mean the Akali Dal Party; and in the end when the pamphlet refers to the victory of the Panth and the honour of the Panth. it must be taken to refer to the victory and honour of the Akali Dal Party. The last sentence is very significant. It says tha.t by maintaining such honour, meaning the honour of the Panth which is the Akali Dal, we will reach our final goal, that is, the Punjabi Suba. It is not disputed that at these elections, the Akali Dal Party propagated for the crea.tion of the Punjabi Suba and the crux of the appeal made by the impugned poster is that if the voters returned the Akali Dal candidate, the honour and prestige of the Akali Dal would be maintained and the ideal of the Punjabi Suba attained. In the end, the poster also says that those who issued it were anxious to keep the honour and prestige of the Panth ever high.\n\nWe have carefully considered the view taken by the Punjab High Court and the Tribunal. but we are satisfied that the said view is inconsistent with a fair and reasonable construction of the impugned poster. In fa.ct, the High Court does not appear to have considered the different places in the poster where the word \"Panth\" has been used and no attempt has been made to co-relate these sentences and to enquire whether the meaning attributed by the High Court to theword \"Panth\" is justified in regard to all the sentences in which that word occurs.\n\nIt is an elementary rule of construction that the same word cannot have two different meanings in the same document, unless the context compels the adoption of such a course. Afterall, the impugned poster was issued in furtherance of the appellant's candidature at an election, and the plain object which 1t has placed before the voters is .that the Punjabi Suba can be achieved if the appellant is elected; and that necessarily means that the appellant belongs to the Akali Dal Party and the Akali Dal Party is the strong supporter of the Punjabi Suba. In these proceedings, we are not concerned to consider the. propriety, the reasonableness or the desirability of the claim for Punjabi Suba. That is a political issue and it is per f.ectly competent to political parties to hold bona fide divergnt and conflicting views on such a . political issue. The sigmficance of the reference to the Punjabi Suba in the impugned\n\n1964 poster arises from the fact that it gives a clue to the mean- Kul1ar Singh ing which the poster intended to assign to the word \"Panth'\".\n\n_v. .\n\nTherefore, we are satisfied that the word \"Panth\" in this poster Muklu•ar B•ngh does not mean Sikh religion, and so\" it would not be possible\n\nGaj, o.dragadkar, C.J. to accept the view that by distributing this poster, the appellant appealed to his voters to vote for him because of his reli gion.\n\nIn this connection, it may be relevant to refer to the oral evidence led in this case. Kartar Singh has stated that since the last 30 years the other name of the Akali Party is Panthic Party. This witness had been actively helping the appellant in his election, and he added that at the said election, there was a common front of all the opposition parties against the Congress. These parties were Jan Sangh, Swatantra Party, Akali Party and others. Another witness Ajmer Singh admitted that Shiromani Akali Dal was a political party of the Sikhs.\n\nHe also stated that excepting 1957 elections, for which there was settlement with the Congress, the Akali Dal had been fighting in all the elections. In 1957, the Akali candidates contested the election on the Congress ticket. In 1958, the Akali Dal started an agitation for getting Punjabi Suba because it thought that the Regional Formula had not been properly implemented by the GQ1yernment. This evidence would show that the Akali Dal Party is also known as the Panthic Party and that one of. the major issues on which it fought the Congress party at the election in question was\n\nthe creation of a separate province which it calls the Punjabi Suba. In construing the impugned poster, the High Court does not appear to have taken into account this oral evidence.\n\nIt is true that oral evidence would not be of any material assistance in construing the words in pamphlet; but as we have just indicated, the word \"Panth\" used in six places in the pamphlet can be properly interpreted only to mean the Akali Dal Party and it is in that context that the statements made by the witnesses as to the name by which the Akali Dal Party is known in popular minds, may have some relevance.\n\nIt .appears that a similar question has been considered bv the Election Tribunals on two occasions in the past. In Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. Hukam Singh and Ors.(') the Election Tribunal had to consider the denotation of the words \"Panth\" and \"Panthic\" candidate and it has observed that though the words \"Panthic candidate\" would literally signify a candidate of the Sikh Community, after the Akali Dal Party came to be known as the Panthic Party in the popular minds, the word \"Panthic\" candidate came to signify a candidate of the Akali Dal Party. It appears from this judgment\" that the Aka Ii Da I Party called itself the Panthic Party even at the time when there were separate Sikh electorates, and that has\n\n(') (1953) VI E.L.R., 316 at 326.\n\na significance of its own. When there were separate Sikh elec- I~ torates, the candidates who fought against each other would Kultar Siogh all be Sikh and yet. the Akali Dal Party which set up its own '!· . candidates, described itself as a Panthic Party and its candi- Muk~Siogll -Oates as Panthic candidates, (vide Baba Gurdit v. Sardaraa,; endragad/car, O.J.\n\nPartap Singh Kairon)('). These decisions tend to show that the Akali Dal Party is known as Panthic Party and its candidates as Panthic candidates, and that incidentally may be of some help to determine the true denotation of the word \"Panth\" used in the impugned poster in the present case. Unfortunately, these decisicns also do not appear to have been placed before the High Court.\n\nBefore we part with this appeal, we may refer to a recent decision of this Court in Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Pratap Singh\n\nDau/ta and Ors.('). In that case, the election of the successful candidate was challenged on the ground that he had committed a corrupt practice under s.123(3) of the Act in that he had appealed to the voters to vote for him on the ground of his language, and the High Court had upheld that contention. In reversing the conclusion of the High Court, this Court pointed out that the reference to the language on which the challenge to the successful candidate's election was based, had to be considered in the context of the main controversy between the parties and that controversy was that the Hariana Lok Samiti which had sponsored the candidature of the successful candidate wanted to resist the imposition of Punjabi in the Hariana region and that was clearly a political issue. If in propagating its views on such a political issue, a candidate introduces an argument based on langu' age. the context of the speech in which the consideration of language has been introduced must not be ignored, and that is how this Court held that the corrupt practice alleged against the successful candidate had not been established.\n\nPolitical issues which form the subject-matter of controversies at election meetings may indirectly and incidentally introduce considerations of language or religion, but in deciding the question as to whether corrupt practice has been committed under s.123(3), care must be taken to consider the impugned speech or appeal carefully and always in the Jfoht of _th~ relevant political controversy. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the impugned poster Ext. P-10 attracted the provisions of s.123(3) of the Act. . The reslt is, te appeal is allowed, the decision of the High Court 1s set aside and the election petition filed by the respondent is dismissed with costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed. (')Indian Election Cases by Doabia Vol I p 92\n\n(')A.LR. 1963 S.C. 183. . ' . .", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "KULTAR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KULTAR SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MUKHTIAR SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUKHTIAR SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 246, "end_char": 255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1567, "end_char": 1576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2579, "end_char": 2584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjabi Suba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3262, "end_char": 3274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'he significance of the reference to the Punjabi Suba in the impugned poster arises from the fact that it giv'Cs clue to the meaning which the poster intended to assign to the word\n\n\"Panth\"."}}, {"text": "Akali Dal party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3961, "end_char": 3976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the wcrd \"Panth\" used in six places in the pamphlet could be properly interpreted only to mean the Akali Dal party and it was in that context that the statements made by the witnesses as to the name bv which the Akali Dal Party was known in popular minds, might have some relevance."}}, {"text": "Akali Dal Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4074, "end_char": 4089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the wcrd \"Panth\" used in six places in the pamphlet could be properly interpreted only to mean the Akali Dal party and it was in that context that the statements made by the witnesses as to the name bv which the Akali Dal Party was known in popular minds, might have some relevance."}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4584, "end_char": 4593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4868, "end_char": 4877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5127, "end_char": 5141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, and B. P. Maheslnvari, for the appdlant."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheslnvari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5147, "end_char": 5164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, and B. P. Maheslnvari, for the appdlant."}}, {"text": "Bawa Sl1iv Charan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5185, "end_char": 5208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bawa Sl1iv Charan Singh, Hardel' Singh and Y. Kumar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Hardel' Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5210, "end_char": 5223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bawa Sl1iv Charan Singh, Hardel' Singh and Y. Kumar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Y. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5228, "end_char": 5236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bawa Sl1iv Charan Singh, Hardel' Singh and Y. Kumar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ktdtar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5319, "end_char": 5331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKtdtar Singh\n\nv • Mukllliar Slrr, gb ,\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR.", "canonical_name": "KULTAR SINGH"}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5359, "end_char": 5373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKtdtar Singh\n\nv • Mukllliar Slrr, gb ,\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Kultar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5584, "end_char": 5596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kultar Singh has committed a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 195! (", "canonical_name": "KULTAR SINGH"}}, {"text": "section 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5636, "end_char": 5650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5658, "end_char": 5690, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of . v. .\n\nPunjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Election Tribunal which tried the election petition\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\n1964 tiled by the respondent Mukhtiar Singh challenging the vali- Kullar Singh dity of the appellant's election, as well as the High Court of ."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab which heard the appellant's appeal against the deci- }lluklu.ar Smgh sion of the Election Tribunal have answered this question\n\nGajendragadkar, c.J. against the appellant.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6241, "end_char": 6249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setalvad for the appellant contends that the view taken by the Election Tribunal and the High Court is based on a misconstruction of the impugned pamphlet."}}, {"text": "K11llar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8896, "end_char": 8909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 1 to p. 10 were 1961 published or distributed by the appellant at the election meet- K11llar Singh ings, and if yes, whether any one or more of them contained M Mr T. 8 ."}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10388, "end_char": 10397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10675, "end_char": 10684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10686, "end_char": 10697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10776, "end_char": 10790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11347, "end_char": 11356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11499, "end_char": 11508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12044, "end_char": 12053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12122, "end_char": 12131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12347, "end_char": 12356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12608, "end_char": 12618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order that the democratic process should thrive and succeed, it is of utmost importance that our elections to Parliament and the different legislative bodies must be free from the unhealthy influence of appeals to religion, race, ::aste."}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12898, "end_char": 12907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13323, "end_char": 13332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13511, "end_char": 13530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Party is recognised as a p.:ilitical party by the Election Commission notwithstanding the fa.ct that all of its members are only Sikhs."}}, {"text": "s. 123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14594, "end_char": 14603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Singapore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16336, "end_char": 16345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads thus:-\n\n\"Dear resident Sikhs,\n\nWe, who are living itlt Singapore, Malaya, and South East Asia, place this before you, most respectfully, that at this critical juncture it is your duty to keep high the honour of the Panth."}}, {"text": "Malaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16347, "end_char": 16353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads thus:-\n\n\"Dear resident Sikhs,\n\nWe, who are living itlt Singapore, Malaya, and South East Asia, place this before you, most respectfully, that at this critical juncture it is your duty to keep high the honour of the Panth."}}, {"text": "South East Asia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16359, "end_char": 16374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads thus:-\n\n\"Dear resident Sikhs,\n\nWe, who are living itlt Singapore, Malaya, and South East Asia, place this before you, most respectfully, that at this critical juncture it is your duty to keep high the honour of the Panth."}}, {"text": "Akali Dal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16788, "end_char": 16797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Every Sikh vote should go to the representatives of the Akali Dal."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18717, "end_char": 18723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question which calls for our decision, however, is not what the word 'Panth' in the abstract may mean in the Punjab."}}, {"text": "Panth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20126, "end_char": 20131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next sentence makes it still clearer that the Panth and the Akali Dal Party are treated as\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 797\n\n1964 synonymous in this portion because it says \"every Sikh vote should go to the representatives of the Ai Dal\", and tht Kti/lar Singh can be reconciled with the previous sentence only on the basis v.\n\nM u!Aliar Sillflh that in the minds of those who drafted the impugned poster, the Akali Dal Party and the Panth are the same."}}, {"text": "Ai Dal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20314, "end_char": 20320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next sentence makes it still clearer that the Panth and the Akali Dal Party are treated as\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 797\n\n1964 synonymous in this portion because it says \"every Sikh vote should go to the representatives of the Ai Dal\", and tht Kti/lar Singh can be reconciled with the previous sentence only on the basis v.\n\nM u!Aliar Sillflh that in the minds of those who drafted the impugned poster, the Akali Dal Party and the Panth are the same."}}, {"text": "lar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20335, "end_char": 20344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next sentence makes it still clearer that the Panth and the Akali Dal Party are treated as\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 797\n\n1964 synonymous in this portion because it says \"every Sikh vote should go to the representatives of the Ai Dal\", and tht Kti/lar Singh can be reconciled with the previous sentence only on the basis v.\n\nM u!Aliar Sillflh that in the minds of those who drafted the impugned poster, the Akali Dal Party and the Panth are the same.", "canonical_name": "KULTAR SINGH"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21740, "end_char": 21757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have carefully considered the view taken by the Punjab High Court and the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Gaj", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23456, "end_char": 23459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, we are satisfied that the word \"Panth\" in this poster Muklu•ar B•ngh does not mean Sikh religion, and so\" it would not be possible\n\nGaj, o.dragadkar, C.J. to accept the view that by distributing this poster, the appellant appealed to his voters to vote for him because of his reli gion."}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23699, "end_char": 23711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kartar Singh has stated that since the last 30 years the other name of the Akali Party is Panthic Party."}}, {"text": "Akali Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23774, "end_char": 23785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kartar Singh has stated that since the last 30 years the other name of the Akali Party is Panthic Party."}}, {"text": "Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23981, "end_char": 23989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This witness had been actively helping the appellant in his election, and he added that at the said election, there was a common front of all the opposition parties against the Congress."}}, {"text": "Jan Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24010, "end_char": 24019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These parties were Jan Sangh, Swatantra Party, Akali Party and others."}}, {"text": "Swatantra Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24021, "end_char": 24036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These parties were Jan Sangh, Swatantra Party, Akali Party and others."}}, {"text": "Ajmer Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24078, "end_char": 24089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another witness Ajmer Singh admitted that Shiromani Akali Dal was a political party of the Sikhs."}}, {"text": "Shiromani Akali Dal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24104, "end_char": 24123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another witness Ajmer Singh admitted that Shiromani Akali Dal was a political party of the Sikhs."}}, {"text": "Aka Ii Da I Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25936, "end_char": 25953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from this judgment\" that the Aka Ii Da I Party called itself the Panthic Party even at the time when there were separate Sikh electorates, and that has\n\n(') (1953) VI E.L.R., 316 at 326."}}, {"text": "s.123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27117, "end_char": 27125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hariana Lok Samiti", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27561, "end_char": 27579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reversing the conclusion of the High Court, this Court pointed out that the reference to the language on which the challenge to the successful candidate's election was based, had to be considered in the context of the main controversy between the parties and that controversy was that the Hariana Lok Samiti which had sponsored the candidature of the successful candidate wanted to resist the imposition of Punjabi in the Hariana region and that was clearly a political issue."}}, {"text": "s.123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28344, "end_char": 28352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.123(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28642, "end_char": 28650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_800_809_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Api/ 17\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [196~]\n\nAMBAPRASAD v.\n\nABDUL NOOR KHAN AND ORS.\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)\n\nU. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, s. 20-Explanation II to s. 20-Suit for possession by occupant on the basis of entry in Khasra for 1356F-Entry not corrected before date of vesting-Its effect-Whether correctness of entry be questioned subsequently-Whether plaintiff required to prove actual possession.\n\nOn October 10, 1953, the respondents filed suits under s. 232 read with s. 20 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition, and Land Reforms Act, 1950 against the appellant before the Sub-Divisional Officer. Before the coming into operation of the Abolition Act the appellant (Amba Prasad) was Zamindar of the disputed land. The names of the respondents were recorded in column 23 (miscellaneous) in the Khasra for the year 1356 Fasli as persons in possession of the disputed land. The respondents claimed ad!hivasi rights under s. 20 of the Abolition Act because they were recorded as occupants of the fields in dispute in the Khasra for 1356 Fasli. The common case of the respondents was: (i) that they were in possession of the suit land (ii) that they were dispossessed after June 30, 1948 by the appellant,\n\n(iii) that as they were recorded occupants in 1356F they were not required to prove actual possession. The case of the appellant was that the entry was fraudulently made after July 1,\n\n1949. Th1'5e suits were dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer.\n\nOn appeal, the Additional Commissioner held ·.that the respondents had acquired the adhivasi rights.\n\nAgainst this order Amba Prasad (the appellant) appealed to the Board of Revenue.\n\nThe Board of Revenue dismissed the appeals. The appellant then filed appeals in this Court.\n\nHeld: (i) Under s. 20 of the Abolition Act (U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act) a person continues as an adhivasi after July 1, 1952. provided he is in possession or was evicted after June 30, HMS. If he was evicted after June 30, 1948 he is entitled to regain possession in spite of any order or decree to the contrary. '\n\n(ii) The words \"recorded as occupants\" in s. 20 of the Abolition Act mean persons recorded as occupants in the Khasra or Khatauni for 1356 Fasli (1-7-48 to 30-6-49). Such persons do not include an intermediary. The word \"occupant\" must mean a person holding the land in possession or actual enjoyment.\n\nMediate possession (except where che immediate possessor holds on behalf of the mediate possessor) is of no consequence.\n\n(iii) The appellant was not entitled to raise the plea of the correctness of the entry in Khasra because the entry was not corrected before the date of vesting (1-7-52) as required by Explanation (ii) to s. 20 of the Abolition Act.\n\n(iv) The title to possession as adhivasi depends on the entries in the Khasra or Khatauni for the year 1356 Fasli. Section 20 of the Abolition Act does not require the proof of actual possession. Therefore, s. 20 eliminates inquiries into disputed possession by accepting the record in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356F. or its correction before July 1, 1952.\n\ni.l\n\n1961 The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-u!-Rehman, {1961] 1 S.C.R. 564, referred to.\n\nAmba Pmaad T.\n\nLala Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue, U. P., 1955 A.L.J. Abdul Noor Klia11 408, Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukh Ram, 1963 A.L.J. 667, and Otli<r• Bhal Singh v. Bhop and Anr., 1963 A.L.J. 288 and Sugriva v.\n\nMuhi etc., 1963 A.L.J. 17 (Rev.), approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE Jua1sDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 680 to 682 of 1963. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated February ~. 1960 of the Board of Revenue, U. P. in petitions Nos. 203 to 205 of 1958-59.\n\nJ. P. Goyal, for the appellant (in all the appeals).\n\nBrijbans Kishore and Ramesh B. Saxena, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (in all the appeals).\n\nApril 17, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHmAYATULLAH, J.-This judgment shall also govern the HidayaJul/.ak, J disposal of C. A. 681 of 1963. These are appeals by special leave of this Court against a common order of the Board of Revenue, U.P. dated February 3, 1960 disposing of three .appeals. Civil Appeal No. 682 of 1963 (since compromised) was also against the same decision. The appellant in each of these appeals is one Amba Prasad who was the Zamiridar of village Rhonda, Pargana and Tehsil Khurja, District Buland- 11hahr, before the coming into operation of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The opposite parties (who will be referred to as the answering respondents in this judgment) are persons whose names were recorded in column 23 (miscellaneous) in the Khasra for the year 1356 F asli, as persons in possession and who claim, by reason of the entry, to be the recorded occupants of the fields in dispute, and to have bbtained adhivasi rights in the fields under s. 20 of the Abolition Act. Though the point in dispute appears to lie within a very narrow compass the history of litigation in respect of these plots is as tedious as it is long.\n\nIt must unfortunately be told to get a true measure of the arguments in the appeals.\n\nAmba Prasad brought two suits under s. 180 of the U.P.\n\nTenancy Act, 1939 for ejectment from the fields now in dispute and for damages, against Mohammad Ali and Mst.\n\nSharifan respectively because their names were recorded in the Khasra as tenants 'bi/a tasfia laan'. These suits were dismissed by the trial Judge and Amba Prasad's appeal to ; the Commissioner failed on November 30, 1943. Amba Prasad then appealed to the Board of Revenue, U.P. and suc- -ceeded .. The order of the Board of Revenue, U. P. is dated March 19, 1949 (item No. 25). Mohammad Ali had died by l,/P(D)!SCJ-26 ..\n\n.Amba p....,,,; v • .Abd..Z Noor Klwn\n\na\"'1 Others\n\nBidayalullah, J.\n\nthen and was represented by one Faiyazali and six ot •• rs.\n\nMst. Sarifan had also died and was represen:ed by one Abdul Sattar alias Chunna Khan and two others. As a result of the decision of the Board of Revenue possession of the fields was delivered to Amba Prasad on July I. 1949--the day of the commencement of the year 1357 Fasli. The dakha/namas are items Nos. 44 and 45 in this record and they mention fields Nos. 427 / 2, 428 /2, 429, 430 and 380 (item No. 441 and fields Nos. 416, 418/1 and 418/2 <item No. 45) of village Rhonda, Pargana and Tehsil Khurja, District Bulandshahr.\n\nImmediately after obtaining possession of the fields Amba Prasad was required to commence proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Anupshahr against Faiyazali and Abdul Sattar and others and on January 13. 1951 these proceedings terminated in favour of Amba Prasad (item No. 28). The Sessions Judge Bulandshahr made a reference to the High Court of Allahabad recommending that the order be vacated but the High Court declined to interfere. The order of the High Court is dated October 20, 1951 (item No. 29). Meanwhile, Amba\n\nPrasad started a prosecution under s. 218. Indian Penal Code against the Lekhpa/ alleging that he had made false entries in the Revenue papers but the Magistrate, 1st Class. Bulandshahr discharged _him by his order dated Jnly 24, 1950 (item No. 26). An application for revision of the order filed by Amba Prasad was dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr on October 10, 1950 (item No. 27).\n\nDuring the pendency of the proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code these fields remained under attachment from August 23, 1949 (1358 F.J to November 6, 1951 (1359 F.). Two suits were then commenced in the court of the Munsif, Khurja for declaration that crops of the fields under attachment belonged to the plaintiffs. One suit (97 of\n\n1951) was filed by Abdul Noor Khan and others (answering respondents) and the other (67 of 1952) was filed by Sarfraz Ali Beg and 8 others (respondents in C. A. 682 of 1963since compromised). These suits were directed against Amba Prasad and the plaintiffs claimed to be in possession of the fields by virtue of entries to this effect. in the remarks column of the Khasras of the relevant years. These sµits failed on August 9, 1952 and Aulll!st 8, 1953 respectively (vide items.\n\nNos. 30 and 32). It appears that proceedings under s. 107,.\n\nCriminal Procedure Code were also started against A. Noorkhan and others before Magistrate, I st Class, Bulandshahr and they were bound over to keep the peace. There is on the file of this case an order of the Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr dismissing their application in revision on February 24, 1953 (item No. 31),\n\nMeanwhile, the answering respondents and Sarfraz Ali l964 and others commenced on November 6, 1951 thr.ee suits Amba Praaad under s. 61 read with s. 183 of the U. l'. Tenancv Act, 1939 v. ha for declaration of Sirdar rights and to claim hereditary rights Abd:!z Ng:r.,1f, \" under s. 180/2 ibid. These suits were decreed against Amba - Prasad by the Judicial Officer, Anupshahr on July 14, 1953. Hidayatullah, J.\n\nHe held that the Dak/ialdehi of July 1, 1949 did not affect .the plaintiffs and since they were shown to be in possession they were entitled to succeed (item No. 33). Amba Prasad filed an appeal and the Commissioner, Meerut Division reversed the decision by his order dated April 1, 1954 (item No. 35).\n\nThe Board of Revenue, U. P. also dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs on September 17, 1955 (item No. 38).\n\nOn October JO, 1953 two suit> were filed by the answering respondents in these two appeals and a third by the respondents in C. A. No. 682 of 1963 which has been compromised. These suits were under s. 232,120 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It is with these suits that we are concerned in the appeal~. Two suits also under s. 232/20 of the Abolition Act were filed by Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar Khan and others against Amba Prasad.\n\nThe answering respondents and Sarfraz Ali and others were joined as defendants in those suits. The plaints in these two suits are dated December 28, i954 and December 20, 1954 (items Nos. 36 and 38). They were dismissed by the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Khurja on l'lfay I 6, 1955. The Additional Commissioner, Meerut, dismissed the appeals on January 30, 1950 in default of appearance (item No. 39).\n\nOn September 4, 1958 the Sub-Divisional Officer, Khurja dismissed the three suits filed. by the answering respondents and the respondents in the companion appeal. In these suits the answering respondents relied on extracts from the Klwsras of 1355F, !356F, 1357F, 1358F and 1359F as showing their possession. These lands, however, were under attachment from August 23, 1949 (l 358Fl to November 6, 1959 (1359F) and could not be in the possession of the answering respondents in the years 1358F and 1359F. This fact was noticed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, in his order dated April I, 1954 and he cast doubts on the entries in 1355F and 1356F. The Sub-Divisional Ollicer took up the same line of reasoning and pointed out that in years subsequent to 1355F the entry would have found place in column 6 of the Klwsra and .not the remarks column. He accordingly held that the entncs of 1355 F and 1356 F were unreliable and the answering respondents had not acquired adhivasi rights.\n\nOn Appeal, the Additional Commissioner, Meerut, reversed the decision m April 19, 1959 and decreed the suits. Before the Comnrns1011cr the answering respondents claimed that a~ L/P( I)} ISCl--:!l'{n)\n\n.dmba Pr<U<Ul v . .dbdtil Noor Khan\n\nand Others\n\nHidayalilllah, J.\n\n804 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n(1964 J\n\nthey were recorded occupants in !356F they were not required to prove actual possession. This proposition, it appears • was conceded by the counsel for Amba Prasad.\n\nHe only argued that the entries were not in accordance with paragraph 87 of the Land Records Manual and they were considered spurious in earlier litigation. He aho claimed that the answering respondents were barred by the principle of res judicata because though they were parties to the suits of Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar they did not claim adhivasi rights in those suits.\n\nThe learned Commissioner pointed out that the entries were no doubt suspected to be spurious by the Commissioner on April I, 1954, but this was after July I. : 952 which was the date of vesting and the case therefore was outside Explanations II and III of s. 20(b) of the Abolition Act. The learned Commissioner, therefore, was of the opinion that the entries could not be discarded as thev must have been completed under the rules before April 3o, 1949, that is to say, even before the Dakhaldehi. He held that the answering respondents (appellants before him) had acquired adhivasi rights.\n\nAmba Prasad appealed to the Board of Revenue. The Board dismissed his appeal on February 8, 1960 by the order now impugned. This time the learned counsel for Amba Prasad conceded that the entry was made but contended that it was fraudulently made after July 1, 1949 and referred to the prosecution of the Lekhpal. The Board of Revenue pointed out that there was no order for the correction of the entry before the date of vesting and the Lekhpal was acquitted of the charge under s. 218, Indian Penal Code. Since the entries were not corrected as required by Explanation II to s. 20 the conditions of s. 20(b) of the Abolition Act were held to be satisfied and the appeal was dismissed.\n\nMr. Goyal on behalf of Amba Prasad contends that these suits were barred by res judicata. He submits that in the previous suits filed by Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar and others, the answering respondents were made defendants . and could have raised the plea that they had acquired adhivasi rights and as they did not raise such a plea they cannot now raise it. We do not accept this contention. The answering respondents had filed these suits even before Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar had filed their suits. Further, the\n\nsuit~ filed by Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar did not decide anything because they were dismissed owing to a technical flaw in the plaint. Even the appeal was dismissed in default of appearance. Lastly, the answering respondents and Amba Prasad were co-defendants and no issue between them was tried or decided even if one was neces.ary to be tried.\n\nMr. Goyal next contends that the answering respondents 1964 must show that they were in possession and that under Ex- Amba Prasad planation I to s. 20 they were evicted after June 30, 1948. Abd 1 Nv.\n\nKha He submits that these conditions are not fulfilled by them. ::..i 3~{.,, \" Mr. Goyal also wishes to withdraw the concession made on behalf of Amba Prasad before the Tribunals below that the Hidayatullah, J. answering respondents need not prove their possession. He says that the concession was made because there were rulings of the Allahabad High Court which bound the Revenue Tribunals. He submits that these rulings should be considered and urge that possession in 1356 F asli must be proved. He further submits that even entries in the Khasra and Khatauni to be tJf value must be made in accordance with ss. 28 and 33 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act and he relies on paragraph 87 of the Land Record Manual to contend that the entries in favour of the answering respondents were irregular. These contentions though they appear to be many are really two.\n\nThe first questions the entry and the other the right of the answering respondents even if the rectJrd be correct to claim adhivasi rights under s. 20 of the Abolition Act. We shall consider them separately.\n\nThe first question is whether these entries were regularly made. It is pointed out that they were doubted by the Revenue Tribunals in some other proceedings and that the Lekhpa/ was also prosecuted under s. 218, Indian Penal Code.\n\nThat, however, does not prove in these proceedings that the entries are spurious. The Lekhpal was discharged and the Additional Commissioner has held here:\n\n\"By making the entry in the remarks column it is also not possible to attribute any dishonest . or collusive entry. It appears that Shri Amba P'rasad had filed a criminal case against the patwari but this was after the entries in the remarks ctilumn in favour of appellants had been made. The entry in 1356 fasli cannot be discarded on the remarks in the judgments referred by the learned counsel for the respondent. It appears that Sri Mohammad Ali and Srimati Sharifan were the proprietors and they mortgaged their share with present respondents and Sri Amba Prasad purchased the equity of redemption and got the share partitioned. There was litigation between Sri Amba Prasad and Sri Mohammad Ali and Srimati Sharifan upto High Court. Sri Amba Prasad and others filed suits against Srimati Sharifan and Sri Mohammad Ali under section 180 and it was decreed in the 2nd appeal on 19-3-49. The possession was delivered on 1-7-1949, in execution of the decree. The Khasra for 1356 Iasli under\n\n..d mba Pnuad v . .Abdul Noor Kha1'\n\nand Ofhers.\n\nBidayatullah, J.\n\nthe rules may have been deposited some time before 31st July 1950 but the entries in the Khasras had to be completed upto 30th April\n\n1949\".\n\nMr. Goyal relies upon paragraph 87 of the Land Records Manual and argues that the names of persons occupying land without the consent of persons whose names are recorded in column 5 of the khasra should have been entered in cqlumn 6 but column 6 is crossed out. It is, however, to be seen that when a tenant leaves the neighbourhood without leaving in charge of his holding, a person responsible for the payment of his rent as it falls due and without giving a written notice to the land holder of such arrangement, the Lekhpal is required to show the name of the actual cultivator in the column of remarks preceded by the word 'qabiz' (see Para. 85(c)). That is how the entry stands and there is nothing on the record of this case on the strength of which it can be said that the entry in 1356F was not regularly made. If it was wrong' Amba Prasad ought to have got it corrected but the doubts cast on the entry cannot be said to have corrected it as required by Explanation III to s. :.:.0 of the Abolition Act.\n\nThere is thus no doubt that the answering respondents were recorded as 'qabiz' in 1356F. There is also no doubt that if they were • qabiz' they were dispossessed after June 30, 1948. The possession of Amba Prasad did not begin earlier than July l, 1949. There is nothing to show that t}le possession of the answering respondents was disturbed between these two dates, because the attachment came much later. Mr. Goyal, however, contends that the burden is on the answering respondents to prove their possession and eviction after June 30, 1948 before they can regain possession as adhivasis under s. 20. Mr. Brij Bans Kishore, ht>wever, joins issue and claims that the answering respondents have done enough when they show that they are recorded as 'occupants' in the year 1356F. He contends that it is not necessary to show possession though he does not admit that the lands were not in his clients' possession. ·\n\nWe have pointed out above that the eviction could not have taken place before. July I, 1949. The Dakhalnamas show that possession was given to Amba Prasad on July I, 1949.\n\nIn so far as the appellant is concerned he was not in possession before that date and the khasra for 1356F shows that the answering respondents were 'qabiz' (in possession). It is contended that the suit is for possession and the date of dispossession has not been given as required by rule 183. No such objection appears to have been made at any time. In any event. that date is useful only to calculate limitation and it is not Amba Prasad's cases that there is any such bar.\n\nThe real dispute thus is whether a person who is record- 191i4 ed as 'qabiz' but not as a tenant or a sub-tenant can get the Amb\" Prasad\n\nadvange ?f s._ 20 of te Aboliti?n Act and claim rights as Abdul N';,,, Khan an adhrvast. It 1s convement at this stage to set out the mateand 011\"\" rial portions of s. 20:\n\n\"20. Every person who-\n\n(a) * • • • •\n\n(b) was recored as occupant-\n\n(i) of any land (other than grove land or land to which section 16 applies) in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F prepared under sections 28 and 33 respectively of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, or who was on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting entitled to regain p0ssession thereof under clause (c) of subsection (!) of section 27 of the United Provinces.\n\nTenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, or (ii) * • • \" be called adhivasi of the land and shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled to take or retain possession thereof.\n\nExplanation I-Where a person referred to in clause\n\n(b) was evicted from the land after, June 30, 1948, he shall notwithstanding anything in any order or decree, be deemed to be a person entitled to regain possession of the land.\n\nExplanation II-Where any. entry in the records re-·\n\nferred to in clause (b) has been corrected before the date of vesting under or in accordance with the provisions bf the U. P. Land Revenue Act,\n\n1901, the entry so corrected shall for the purposes of the said clause, prevail.\n\nExplanation III-For the purposes of explanation II an entry shall be deemed to have been corrected before the date of vesting if an order or decree of a competent court requiring any correction in records has been made before the said date and had become final even though the correction may not have been incorporated in the records.\n\nExplanation IV-For the purposes of this section\n\n\"occupant\" as respects any land does not include a person who was entitled as an intermediary to the land or any share therein in the year 1356 Fasli.\" The scheme of the section may now be noticed. The section, speaking generally, says that certain persons \"recorded\" as \"cccupants\" of lands (other than grove lands or lands to which section 16 applies) shall be known as adhivais and\n\nH idayatullaA, J\n\n1964 shall be entitled to retain or to regain possession of them, Ambu Pmsad after the date of vesting which was July 1, 1952. Such persons •· do not include an intermediary (Explanation IV). Such per- Abd;1.; l07k,,.!han sons must be recorded as occupants in the khasra or khatauni\n\n for 1356F 0-7-48 to 30-6-49). If such a person is in posses- Hidayoi.izoi., J. sion be continues in possession. If he is evicted after June\n\n30, 1948 he is to be put back in possession notwithstanding anything in any order or decree. By fiction such persons are deemed to be entitled to regain possession (Explanation l).\n\nThe emphasis has been laid on the record of khasra or khatauni of 1356F and June 30, 1948 is the datum line. The importance of 'an entry in these two documents is further apparent from explanations II and III. Under the former, if the entry is corrected before the date of vesting 0-7-52), the corrected entry is to prevail and under the latter the entry is deemed to be corrected (even though not actually corrected) if an order or decree of a competent court ordering the correction had been made before the date of vesting and the order or decree had become final. There are thus two date lines. They are June 30, 1948 and July l, 1952, and the title to possession as adhivasi depends on the entries in the khasra or khatauni for the year 1356F.\n\nBefore we proceed to decide whether the answering respondents satisfy the above tests we must consider what is meant by the terms 'occupant' and 'recorded'. The word 'occupant' is not defined in the Act. Since khasra records possession and enjoyment the word 'occupant' must mean a person holding the land in possession or actual enjoyment.\n\nThe khasra, however, may mention the proprietor, the tenant, the sub-tenant and other person in actual possession, as the case may be. If by occupant is meant the person in actual possession it is clear that between a proprietor and a tenant the tenant, and between a tenant and the sub-tenant the latter and between him and a person recorded in the remarks column as \"Dawedar qabiz\" the dawedar qabiz are the occupants. This is the only logical way to interpret the section which does away with all intermediaries. If rights are not to be determined except in the manner laid down by the section, the entries must be construed as explained by the four explanations. Once we find out the right person in the light of the explanations, that person continues as an adhivasi after July 1, 19 52, provided he is in possession or was evicted after June 30, 1948. If he was evicted after June 30;• 1948 \"he is entitled to regain possession in spite of any order or decree tb the contrary. The word 'occupant' thus signifies occupancy and enjoyment. Mediate possession, (except .where the immediate possessor holds on behalf of the mediate possessor) is of no consequence. In this way even persons who got into occupation when lands were abandoned get recognition. The\n\n196' section eliminates inquiries into disputed possession by accepting the records in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F, or Amba Prasa4 its correction before July 1, 1952. It was perhaps thought Abdu! N:~, Kha,. that all such disputes would have solved themselves in the and Others four years between June 30, 1948 and June 30, 1952.\n\nThere was, however, for some time a difference of opinion, on the point whether possession in 1356F should be proved, between the High Court of Allahabad and the Board of Revenue. Section 20 came before this Court in The Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-ul-Rehman and others(') where the correctness of Lala Nanak Chand v. The Board of Revenue, U.P.(') was challenged on the ground that it had held that a mere entry in 1356F without possession in that year was sufficient. This Court did not decide the question and left it open. Subsequently, the Allahabad High Court in several decisions including the Full Bench decision in Ram Dular Singh and another v. Babu Sukh Ram and others(') has endorsed the earlier view in Nanakchand v.\n\nBoard of Revenue, U.P.(') In L. Bha/ Singh v. Bhop and another(') the following passage from Nanak Chand's case was expressly approved: -\n\n\"It seems to us that clauses (b)(i) and (b)(ii) of Sec.\n\n20 do not require the. proof of actual possession in the year 1356F. What they require merely is the entry of a person's name as an occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356F. The words of the section are clear. (Every rson who was recorded as occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni in 1356F. etc.).\n\nThe words are not \"every person who was an occupant in l 356F\": nor are the words \"every person who was recorded as an occupant in the year 1356F and who was also in possession in that year''. There is no warrant for introducing words in the section which are not there. This conclusion is reinforced by what is stated in Explanation II\".\n\nThe Board of Revenue in Sugriva v. Mukhi etc.(') has also adopted the same view. In view of the long established line of cases we see no justification for reopening of this question.\n\nThe decision of the Board of Revenue was therefore right.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with osts. One set of hearing fees.\n\nA ppea/ dismissed.\n\n(') [1961] 1, S.C.R. 564.\n\n(') 1955 A.L.J. 408.\n\n(') 1963 A.L.J. 667. (') 1963 A.L.J. 288 at p. 291. (') 1963 A.L.J. 17 (Rev.).\n\nHidayntu7fal1, J~", "total_entities": 153, "entities": [{"text": "ABDUL NOOR KHAN AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ABDUL NOOR KHAN AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. 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P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act) a person continues as an adhivasi after July 1, 1952."}}, {"text": "June 30, HMS", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1980, "end_char": 1992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "provided he is in possession or was evicted after June 30, HMS."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2162, "end_char": 2167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "1-7-48", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2266, "end_char": 2272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) The words \"recorded as occupants\" in s. 20 of the Abolition Act mean persons recorded as occupants in the Khasra or Khatauni for 1356 Fasli (1-7-48 to 30-6-49)."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2749, "end_char": 2754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2893, "end_char": 2903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2985, "end_char": 2990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1961] 1 S.C.R. 564", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3203, "end_char": 3221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE Jua1sDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3501, "end_char": 3529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE Jua1sDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3720, "end_char": 3731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. P. Goyal, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Brijbans Kishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3774, "end_char": 3790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brijbans Kishore and Ramesh B. Saxena, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Ramesh B. Saxena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brijbans Kishore and Ramesh B. Saxena, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "HmAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3924, "end_char": 3935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHmAYATULLAH, J.-This judgment shall also govern the HidayaJul/.ak, J disposal of C. A. 681 of 1963.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Board of Revenue, U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4103, "end_char": 4125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These are appeals by special leave of this Court against a common order of the Board of Revenue, U.P. dated February 3, 1960 disposing of three .appeals."}}, {"text": "Amba Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4309, "end_char": 4320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in each of these appeals is one Amba Prasad who was the Zamiridar of village Rhonda, Pargana and Tehsil Khurja, District Buland- 11hahr, before the coming into operation of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Amba - Prasad"}}, {"text": "Rhonda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4354, "end_char": 4360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in each of these appeals is one Amba Prasad who was the Zamiridar of village Rhonda, Pargana and Tehsil Khurja, District Buland- 11hahr, before the coming into operation of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "Pargana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4362, "end_char": 4369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in each of these appeals is one Amba Prasad who was the Zamiridar of village Rhonda, Pargana and Tehsil Khurja, District Buland- 11hahr, before the coming into operation of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "Khurja", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4381, "end_char": 4387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in each of these appeals is one Amba Prasad who was the Zamiridar of village Rhonda, Pargana and Tehsil Khurja, District Buland- 11hahr, before the coming into operation of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "Buland-", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4398, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in each of these appeals is one Amba Prasad who was the Zamiridar of village Rhonda, Pargana and Tehsil Khurja, District Buland- 11hahr, before the coming into operation of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950."}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4460, "end_char": 4506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4884, "end_char": 4889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5188, "end_char": 5194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Tenancy Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5208, "end_char": 5225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mohammad Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5296, "end_char": 5308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amba Prasad brought two suits under s. 180 of the U.P.\n\nTenancy Act, 1939 for ejectment from the fields now in dispute and for damages, against Mohammad Ali and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Mohammad Ali"}}, {"text": "Sharifan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5319, "end_char": 5327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sharifan respectively because their names were recorded in the Khasra as tenants 'bi/a tasfia laan'.", "canonical_name": "Sharifan"}}, {"text": "November 30, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5523, "end_char": 5540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These suits were dismissed by the trial Judge and Amba Prasad's appeal to ; the Commissioner failed on November 30, 1943."}}, {"text": "Board of Revenue, U. P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5635, "end_char": 5658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amba Prasad then appealed to the Board of Revenue, U.P. and suc- -ceeded .. The order of the Board of Revenue, U. P. is dated March 19, 1949 (item No."}}, {"text": "Mohammad Ali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohammad Ali had died by l,/P(D)!SCJ-26 ..\n\n.Amba p....,,,; v • .Abd..Z Noor Klwn\n\na\"'1 Others\n\nBidayalullah, J.\n\nthen and was represented by one Faiyazali and six ot •• rs.", "canonical_name": "Mohammad Ali"}}, {"text": ".Amba", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5742, "end_char": 5747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohammad Ali had died by l,/P(D)!SCJ-26 ..\n\n.Amba p....,,,; v • .Abd..Z Noor Klwn\n\na\"'1 Others\n\nBidayalullah, J.\n\nthen and was represented by one Faiyazali and six ot •• rs."}}, {"text": ".Abd..Z Noor Klwn", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5762, "end_char": 5779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohammad Ali had died by l,/P(D)!SCJ-26 ..\n\n.Amba p....,,,; v • .Abd..Z Noor Klwn\n\na\"'1 Others\n\nBidayalullah, J.\n\nthen and was represented by one Faiyazali and six ot •• rs."}}, {"text": "Bidayalullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohammad Ali had died by l,/P(D)!SCJ-26 ..\n\n.Amba p....,,,; v • .Abd..Z Noor Klwn\n\na\"'1 Others\n\nBidayalullah, J.\n\nthen and was represented by one Faiyazali and six ot •• rs.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Faiyazali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5844, "end_char": 5853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohammad Ali had died by l,/P(D)!SCJ-26 ..\n\n.Amba p....,,,; v • .Abd..Z Noor Klwn\n\na\"'1 Others\n\nBidayalullah, J.\n\nthen and was represented by one Faiyazali and six ot •• rs.", "canonical_name": "Faiyazali"}}, {"text": "Sarifan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5878, "end_char": 5885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarifan had also died and was represen:ed by one Abdul Sattar alias Chunna Khan and two others.", "canonical_name": "Sharifan"}}, {"text": "Abdul Sattar alias Chunna Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5927, "end_char": 5957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarifan had also died and was represen:ed by one Abdul Sattar alias Chunna Khan and two others."}}, {"text": "July I. 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6083, "end_char": 6095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the decision of the Board of Revenue possession of the fields was delivered to Amba Prasad on July I. 1949--the day of the commencement of the year 1357 Fasli."}}, {"text": "Bulandshahr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45) of village Rhonda, Pargana and Tehsil Khurja, District Bulandshahr."}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6518, "end_char": 6541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Anupshahr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6553, "end_char": 6589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately after obtaining possession of the fields Amba Prasad was required to commence proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Anupshahr against Faiyazali and Abdul Sattar and others and on January 13."}}, {"text": "Faiyazali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6598, "end_char": 6607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately after obtaining possession of the fields Amba Prasad was required to commence proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Anupshahr against Faiyazali and Abdul Sattar and others and on January 13.", "canonical_name": "Faiyazali"}}, {"text": "Abdul Sattar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6612, "end_char": 6624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately after obtaining possession of the fields Amba Prasad was required to commence proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Anupshahr against Faiyazali and Abdul Sattar and others and on January 13.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Sattar Khan"}}, {"text": "January 13.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6643, "end_char": 6654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately after obtaining possession of the fields Amba Prasad was required to commence proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Anupshahr against Faiyazali and Abdul Sattar and others and on January 13."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge Bulandshahr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6733, "end_char": 6759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge Bulandshahr made a reference to the High Court of Allahabad recommending that the order be vacated but the High Court declined to interfere."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6784, "end_char": 6807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge Bulandshahr made a reference to the High Court of Allahabad recommending that the order be vacated but the High Court declined to interfere."}}, {"text": "October 20, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6926, "end_char": 6942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the High Court is dated October 20, 1951 (item No."}}, {"text": "Amba\n\nPrasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6969, "end_char": 6981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, Amba\n\nPrasad started a prosecution under s. 218.", "canonical_name": "Amba - Prasad"}}, {"text": "s. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7010, "end_char": 7016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7018, "end_char": 7035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Lekhpa/", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indian Penal Code against the Lekhpa/ alleging that he had made false entries in the Revenue papers but the Magistrate, 1st Class."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7308, "end_char": 7335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application for revision of the order filed by Amba Prasad was dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr on October 10, 1950 (item No."}}, {"text": "October 10, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7339, "end_char": 7355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application for revision of the order filed by Amba Prasad was dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr on October 10, 1950 (item No."}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7417, "end_char": 7423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 23, 1949 (1358 F.J to", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7493, "end_char": 7521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code these fields remained under attachment from August 23, 1949 (1358 F.J to November 6, 1951 (1359 F.)."}}, {"text": "November 6, 1951 (1359 F.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7522, "end_char": 7547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code these fields remained under attachment from August 23, 1949 (1358 F.J to November 6, 1951 (1359 F.)."}}, {"text": "Abdul Noor Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7737, "end_char": 7752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One suit (97 of\n\n1951) was filed by Abdul Noor Khan and others (answering respondents) and the other (67 of 1952) was filed by Sarfraz Ali Beg and 8 others (respondents in C. A. 682 of 1963since compromised).", "canonical_name": "ABDUL NOOR KHAN AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Sarfraz Ali Beg", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7828, "end_char": 7843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One suit (97 of\n\n1951) was filed by Abdul Noor Khan and others (answering respondents) and the other (67 of 1952) was filed by Sarfraz Ali Beg and 8 others (respondents in C. A. 682 of 1963since compromised).", "canonical_name": "Sarfraz Ali Beg"}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8250, "end_char": 8256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8260, "end_char": 8283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. Noorkhan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8310, "end_char": 8321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Criminal Procedure Code were also started against A. Noorkhan and others before Magistrate, I st Class, Bulandshahr and they were bound over to keep the peace."}}, {"text": "February 24, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8542, "end_char": 8559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is on the file of this case an order of the Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr dismissing their application in revision on February 24, 1953 (item No."}}, {"text": "Sarfraz Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8617, "end_char": 8628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31),\n\nMeanwhile, the answering respondents and Sarfraz Ali l964 and others commenced on November 6, 1951 thr.ee suits Amba Praaad under s. 61 read with s. 183 of the U. l'.", "canonical_name": "Sarfraz Ali Beg"}}, {"text": "November 6, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8658, "end_char": 8674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31),\n\nMeanwhile, the answering respondents and Sarfraz Ali l964 and others commenced on November 6, 1951 thr.ee suits Amba Praaad under s. 61 read with s. 183 of the U. l'."}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8706, "end_char": 8711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 183", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8722, "end_char": 8728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Tenancv Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8743, "end_char": 8760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8856, "end_char": 8862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancv Act, 1939", "statute": "Tenancv Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Amba - Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8904, "end_char": 8917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These suits were decreed against Amba - Prasad by the Judicial Officer, Anupshahr on July 14, 1953.", "canonical_name": "Amba - Prasad"}}, {"text": "Anupshahr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8943, "end_char": 8952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These suits were decreed against Amba - Prasad by the Judicial Officer, Anupshahr on July 14, 1953."}}, {"text": "July 14, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8956, "end_char": 8969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These suits were decreed against Amba - Prasad by the Judicial Officer, Anupshahr on July 14, 1953."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8971, "end_char": 8983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah, J.\n\nHe held that the Dak/ialdehi of July 1, 1949 did not affect .the plaintiffs and since they were shown to be in possession they were entitled to succeed (item No.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "July 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9021, "end_char": 9033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah, J.\n\nHe held that the Dak/ialdehi of July 1, 1949 did not affect .the plaintiffs and since they were shown to be in possession they were entitled to succeed (item No."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9263, "end_char": 9276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amba Prasad filed an appeal and the Commissioner, Meerut Division reversed the decision by his order dated April 1, 1954 (item No."}}, {"text": "September 17, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9368, "end_char": 9386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board of Revenue, U. P. also dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs on September 17, 1955 (item No."}}, {"text": "October JO, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9406, "end_char": 9422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October JO, 1953 two suit> were filed by the answering respondents in these two appeals and a third by the respondents in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "s. 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9601, "end_char": 9607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenancv Act, 1939", "statute": "Tenancv Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9625, "end_char": 9665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 232", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9749, "end_char": 9755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "Ayub Ali Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9794, "end_char": 9807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is with these suits that we are concerned in the appeal~. Two suits also under s. 232/20 of the Abolition Act were filed by Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar Khan and others against Amba Prasad."}}, {"text": "Abdul Sattar Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9812, "end_char": 9829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is with these suits that we are concerned in the appeal~. Two suits also under s. 232/20 of the Abolition Act were filed by Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar Khan and others against Amba Prasad.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Sattar Khan"}}, {"text": "Amba Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9849, "end_char": 9860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is with these suits that we are concerned in the appeal~. Two suits also under s. 232/20 of the Abolition Act were filed by Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar Khan and others against Amba Prasad.", "canonical_name": "Amba - Prasad"}}, {"text": "December 28, i954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9999, "end_char": 10016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaints in these two suits are dated December 28, i954 and December 20, 1954 (items Nos."}}, {"text": "Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Khurja", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10090, "end_char": 10124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were dismissed by the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Khurja on l'lfay I 6, 1955."}}, {"text": "Meerut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10175, "end_char": 10181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Additional Commissioner, Meerut, dismissed the appeals on January 30, 1950 in default of appearance (item No."}}, {"text": "January 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10208, "end_char": 10224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Additional Commissioner, Meerut, dismissed the appeals on January 30, 1950 in default of appearance (item No."}}, {"text": "September 4, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10269, "end_char": 10286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 4, 1958 the Sub-Divisional Officer, Khurja dismissed the three suits filed."}}, {"text": "August 23, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10624, "end_char": 10639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These lands, however, were under attachment from August 23, 1949 (l 358Fl to November 6, 1959 (1359F) and could not be in the possession of the answering respondents in the years 1358F and 1359F. This fact was noticed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, in his order dated April I, 1954 and he cast doubts on the entries in 1355F and 1356F. The Sub-Divisional Ollicer took up the same line of reasoning and pointed out that in years subsequent to 1355F the entry would have found place in column 6 of the Klwsra and .not the remarks column."}}, {"text": "November 6, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10652, "end_char": 10668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These lands, however, were under attachment from August 23, 1949 (l 358Fl to November 6, 1959 (1359F) and could not be in the possession of the answering respondents in the years 1358F and 1359F. This fact was noticed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, in his order dated April I, 1954 and he cast doubts on the entries in 1355F and 1356F. The Sub-Divisional Ollicer took up the same line of reasoning and pointed out that in years subsequent to 1355F the entry would have found place in column 6 of the Klwsra and .not the remarks column."}}, {"text": "April 19, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11328, "end_char": 11342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Appeal, the Additional Commissioner, Meerut, reversed the decision m April 19, 1959 and decreed the suits."}}, {"text": ".dbdtil Noor Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11475, "end_char": 11492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".dbdtil Noor Khan\n\nand Others\n\nHidayalilllah, J.\n\n804 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n(1964 J\n\nthey were recorded occupants in !"}}, {"text": "Hidayalilllah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11506, "end_char": 11519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".dbdtil Noor Khan\n\nand Others\n\nHidayalilllah, J.\n\n804 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n(1964 J\n\nthey were recorded occupants in !", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Abdul Sattar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12044, "end_char": 12056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He aho claimed that the answering respondents were barred by the principle of res judicata because though they were parties to the suits of Ayub Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar they did not claim adhivasi rights in those suits.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Sattar Khan"}}, {"text": "April I, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12225, "end_char": 12238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Commissioner pointed out that the entries were no doubt suspected to be spurious by the Commissioner on April I, 1954, but this was after July I. : 952 which was the date of vesting and the case therefore was outside Explanations II and III of s. 20(b) of the Abolition Act."}}, {"text": "s. 20(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12365, "end_char": 12373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 3o, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12548, "end_char": 12562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Commissioner, therefore, was of the opinion that the entries could not be discarded as thev must have been completed under the rules before April 3o, 1949, that is to say, even before the Dakhaldehi."}}, {"text": "February 8, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12782, "end_char": 12798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board dismissed his appeal on February 8, 1960 by the order now impugned."}}, {"text": "s. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13182, "end_char": 13188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13190, "end_char": 13207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13279, "end_char": 13284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 20(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13303, "end_char": 13311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Goyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13394, "end_char": 13399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Goyal on behalf of Amba Prasad contends that these suits were barred by res judicata."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14411, "end_char": 14416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14804, "end_char": 14824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He says that the concession was made because there were rulings of the Allahabad High Court which bound the Revenue Tribunals."}}, {"text": "ss. 28 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15079, "end_char": 15092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15106, "end_char": 15122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15472, "end_char": 15477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "s. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15740, "end_char": 15746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15748, "end_char": 15765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Amba P'rasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16062, "end_char": 16074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Shri Amba P'rasad had filed a criminal case against the patwari but this was after the entries in the remarks ctilumn in favour of appellants had been made.", "canonical_name": "Amba - Prasad"}}, {"text": "Srimati Sharifan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16379, "end_char": 16395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Sri Mohammad Ali and Srimati Sharifan were the proprietors and they mortgaged their share with present respondents and Sri Amba Prasad purchased the equity of redemption and got the share partitioned."}}, {"text": "section 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16754, "end_char": 16765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "19-3-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16806, "end_char": 16813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Amba Prasad and others filed suits against Srimati Sharifan and Sri Mohammad Ali under section 180 and it was decreed in the 2nd appeal on 19-3-49."}}, {"text": "1-7-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16847, "end_char": 16855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The possession was delivered on 1-7-1949, in execution of the decree."}}, {"text": "Bidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16968, "end_char": 16980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bidayatullah, J.\n\nthe rules may have been deposited some time before 31st July 1950 but the entries in the Khasras had to be completed upto 30th April\n\n1949\".", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "July l, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18383, "end_char": 18395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The possession of Amba Prasad did not begin earlier than July l, 1949."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18740, "end_char": 18745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brij Bans Kishore", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18751, "end_char": 18768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Brij Bans Kishore, ht>wever, joins issue and claims that the answering respondents have done enough when they show that they are recorded as 'occupants' in the year 1356F. He contends that it is not necessary to show possession though he does not admit that the lands were not in his clients' possession. ·"}}, {"text": "July I, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19217, "end_char": 19229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Dakhalnamas show that possession was given to Amba Prasad on July I, 1949."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20014, "end_char": 20019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20147, "end_char": 20157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 28 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20217, "end_char": 20235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20261, "end_char": 20283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20426, "end_char": 20436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act, 1901", "statute": "Land Revenue Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21052, "end_char": 21068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21872, "end_char": 21882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act,\n\n1901", "statute": "Land Revenue Act,\n\n1901"}}, {"text": "H idayatullaA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21924, "end_char": 21937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The section, speaking generally, says that certain persons \"recorded\" as \"cccupants\" of lands (other than grove lands or lands to which section 16 applies) shall be known as adhivais and\n\nH idayatullaA, J\n\n1964 shall be entitled to retain or to regain possession of them, Ambu Pmsad after the date of vesting which was July 1, 1952.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Ambu Pmsad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22008, "end_char": 22018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The section, speaking generally, says that certain persons \"recorded\" as \"cccupants\" of lands (other than grove lands or lands to which section 16 applies) shall be known as adhivais and\n\nH idayatullaA, J\n\n1964 shall be entitled to retain or to regain possession of them, Ambu Pmsad after the date of vesting which was July 1, 1952."}}, {"text": "30-6-49", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22247, "end_char": 22254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l07k,,.!han sons must be recorded as occupants in the khasra or khatauni\n\n for 1356F 0-7-48 to 30-6-49)."}}, {"text": "July l, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23176, "end_char": 23188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are June 30, 1948 and July l, 1952, and the title to possession as adhivasi depends on the entries in the khasra or khatauni for the year 1356F.\n\nBefore we proceed to decide whether the answering respondents satisfy the above tests we must consider what is meant by the terms 'occupant' and 'recorded'."}}, {"text": "July 1, 19 52", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24420, "end_char": 24433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Once we find out the right person in the light of the explanations, that person continues as an adhivasi after July 1, 19 52, provided he is in possession or was evicted after June 30, 1948."}}, {"text": "June 30;• 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24524, "end_char": 24538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If he was evicted after June 30;• 1948 \"he is entitled to regain possession in spite of any order or decree tb the contrary."}}, {"text": "Abdu! N:~, Kha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25099, "end_char": 25113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was perhaps thought Abdu!"}}, {"text": "June 30, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25223, "end_char": 25236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that all such disputes would have solved themselves in the and Others four years between June 30, 1948 and June 30, 1952."}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25419, "end_char": 25429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26074, "end_char": 26085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the Allahabad High Court in several decisions including the Full Bench decision in Ram Dular Singh and another v. Babu Sukh Ram and others(') has endorsed the earlier view in Nanakchand v.\n\nBoard of Revenue, U.P.(') In L. Bha/ Singh v. Bhop and another(') the following passage from Nanak Chand's case was expressly approved: -\n\n\"It seems to us that clauses (b)(i) and (b)(ii) of Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec.\n\n20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26171, "end_char": 26179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hidayntu7fal1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27278, "end_char": 27291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayntu7fal1, J~"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_810_815_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".April 17\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964)\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADHYA\n\nPRADESH, NAGPUR\n\nSWADESHI COTTON AND FLOUR MILLS\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKR!, JJ.]\n\nlncome Tax-Deduciion of bonus-Bonus relating to 1947 paid in 1949-Claim for deduction for account year 1949-System of accounting by assessee-Principle of reopening of acc-ounts-lf applicable-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), ss. 10(2)(x), 10(5).\n\nThe respondent company paid to its employees Rs. 1,08,325/- as bonus for tbe year 1947 in the calendar year 1949, as a result of tbe award of the Industrial Tribunal dated January 13, 1949. This amount was debited by the company in its profit and loss account for the year 1948 and the corresponding credit was given to the bonus p'l)'able account. The books for 1948 were not closed till the date of the award of the Industrial Tribunal. For the relevant assessment year, 1950-51, the company claimed that under s. 10(2)(x) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, it was entitled to an allowance in respect of the amount paid as bonus, but the claim was reiecte9 by the Income-tax authorities on the ground that according to the mercantile system of accounting which was followed by the assessee the year to which the liability was properly attributable was the calendar year 1947 and not 1949. It was the case of the Income-tax authorities that it was a legal liability of the assessee which arose in 1947 and should have been estimated and put into the accounts for 1947, and that, if necessary, the amounts for the year 1947 should be reopened. It was admitted that the bonus in the instant case was a: profit bonus.\n\nHeld: (i) It was only when the claim to profit bonus, if made, was settled amicably or by industrial adjudication that a liability was incurred by the employer, who followed the mercantile system, within s. 10(2)(x), read with s. 10(5), of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922; and as it was only in 1949 that the claim to profit bonus was settled by an award of the\n\nIndustrial 'Tribunal, the only year the liability could be properly attributed to was 1949.\n\n(ii) The system of reopening accvunts was not applicable under the scheme of the Indian Tncome-tax Act.\n\n(iii) The words \"year in question' in proviso (b) to s. 10 :2)(x) of the Act incant \"year in respect of which bonus was paid''. -\n\nC!V!L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 587 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and nrder dated November 30, 1960 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 73 of 1960.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N.\n\nSachthev, for the appellant.\n\nS. K. Kapoor, S. Murty and K. K. Jain, for the respondent\n\nApril 17, 1964. The judgment of the Court was elivered by Tl1e Commis3ioner\n\nl11come-tax, SJKRI, J.-The respondent, Swadeshi Cotton & Flour Madl•11~• Pradeah, Mills, hereinafter referred to as the assessce, is a limited 1\\apur company which owns and runs a textile mill at Indore. For Swadrsl1iv(o11on a11d the assessment year 1950-51 (accounting year calendar year Flour Jlill• 1949), which was its first year of assessment under the Indian Sikri, J.\n\nIncome-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) it claimed that under s. I0(2)(x) of the Act it was entitled to an allowance in respect of the sum of Rs. 1,08,325 /- which it had paid as bonus for the year 1947 in the calendar year 1949, as a result of the award of the Industrial Tribunal, dated January 13, 1949. The claim of the assessee was not accepted by the Income Tax authorities. The Appellate Tri bunal held that it was a liability relating ttJ an earlier year and not the year 1949. However, on an application by the assessee it stated a case and referred two questions. We are concerned only with one which reads thus:\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee is entitled to claim a deduction of bonus of Rs. 1,08,325 /- relating to the calendar year 1947 in the assessment year 1950-51?\n\nThe High Court of Madhya Pradesh answered the question in the affirmative. The appellant, having failed to get a certificate under ~. 66A(2) of the Act, obtained special leave from this Court, and that is how the appeal is before us.\n\nThe facts and circumstances referred to in the question have been set out in the statement of the case. Unfortunately, the facts are meagre, but since the apel!ant is content to base his case on a few facts, which will be referred to shortly, it is not necessary to call for a further statement of the case.\n\nThe facts, in brief, are as follows. The assessce paid as bonus to its employees the sum of Rs. 1,08,325/9/3 for the calendar year 1947 in terms of an award made on January 13, 1949 under the Industrial Disputes Act. This amount was debited by the assessee in its profit and loss account for the year 1948 and the corresponding credit was given to the bonus payable account. The books for 1948 had not been closed till the date of order of the Industrial Tribunal, January 13,\n\n1949. This bonus was in fact paid to the employees in the calendar year 1949. the relevant assessment year being 1950- 51.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner had further found that upto 1946 when the order for payment of bonus used to be received before the company's accounts for the year were finalised, the amount of bonus used to be in fact\n\n1901 debited to the profit and loss account of the respective year.\n\nTh, rommissionerojThis finding is repeated by the Appellate Tribunal in its aplncome-ta•, pellate order.\n\nMadhya Pradesh, Xapgur On these facts the learned counsel for the appellant, Su deshtcottonarul Mr. Sastri, contends that according to the mercantile system a Fleur .Mills of accounting. which is followed by the assessee, and on which its profits have been computed for the accounting Sikri,\n\nJ calendar year 1949, the year to which the liability is properly attributable is the calendar year 1947 and not 1949. He says that it was a legal liability of the ;1ssess?.e which arose in 1947 and should have been estimated and put into the accounts for 1947. In the alternative he has invited us to reopen the accounts for the year 1947, following the practice which, according to him, obtains in England.\n\nIn our opinion,. the answer to the question must depend on the proper interpretation of s. 10(2)(x), read with s. 10(5), of the Act. These provisions read as follows : -\n\n\"s. I 0(2)(x)-Any sum paid to an employee as bonus or commission for services rendered, where such sum would not have been payable to him as profits or dividend if it had not been paid as bonus or commission; Provided that the amount of the bonus or commission is of a reasonable amount with reference to-\n\n(a) the pay of the employee and the conditions of his service;\n\n(b) the profits of the business, profession or vocation for the year in question; and\n\n(c) the general practice in similar businesses, professions or vocations.\" \"s. 10(5}-ln sub-section (2), \"paid\" means actually paid or incurred according to the method of ac counting upon the basis of which the profits or gains are computed under this section; ... \" If we insert the definition of the word 'paid' in sub-cl. (x), it would read as follows:\n\n\"any sum actually paid or incurred according to the method of accounting upon the basis of which the profits or gains are computed under this section, to an employee as bonus ... \" As the assessee's profits and gains have been computed according to the mercantile system, the question, using for the time being the terms 6f the clauses, comes to this: -\n\n\"Has this sum of Rs. 1,08,325/- been incurred by the assessee according to the mercantile system in the calendar year 1947 or 1949?\"\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 813\n\nAt first sight the sentence does not read well, but the 1964 meaning of the word 'incur' includes 'to become liable to'. The Commi.s8ioner of Therefore, the question boils down to: Madhlncom<Ptaxad, . ya r ear., \"In what year did the liability of this sum of Rs.\n\nNagpur 1,08,325 /- arise, according to the mercantile swa.ie..1/oo11ona..i system?\" Fkntr Mill<\n\nThe mercantile system of accounting was explained in .a judgment of this Court in Keshav Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay(') thus:-\n\n\"That system brings into credit what is due, immediately it becomes legally due and before it is actually received, and it brings into debit expenditure the amount for which a legal liability has been incurred before it is actually disbursed.\"\n\nThese observations were quoted with approval in Calcutta Co. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal(').\n\nOn the facts of this case, when did the legal liability arise in respect of the bonus? This depends on the facts of the case and the nature of the bonus awarded in this case.\n\nThis Court has examined the nature of profit bonus-it is common ground that the bonus with which we are concerned with was a profit bonus-in various cases. It is explained in Muir Mills v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union(') that \"there are two conditions which have to be satisfied before a demand for bonus, can be justified and they arc (I) when wages fall short of the living standard, and (2) the industry makes huge profits part of which are due to the contribution which the workmen make in increasing production. The demaud for bonus becomes an industrial claim when either or both these conditions are satisfied.\"\n\nThis matter was again considered in the case of Associated Cement Co. v. Their ' Workmen('). This Court observed:-\n\n\"It is relevant to add that in dealing with the concept of bonus this Court ruled that bonus is neither a gratuitous payment made by the employer to his workmen nor can it be regarded as a deferred wage. According to this decision, where wages fall short of the living standard and the industry makes profit part of which is due to the contribution of labour, a claim for bonus can be legitimately made.\"\n\n(') (1953] S.C.R. 950.\n\n(') [1955] 1 S.C.R. 991.\n\n\n(') [1959] S.C.R. 925.\n\nBibi, J.\n\n1984 In 1961, this Court was able to say that \"the right to fie Commissioner of claim bonus which has been universally recognised by indus • .ii\"\"0j,';::;\\ trial adjudication in cases of employment falling under the M 1!; agpr es ' said Act has now attained the status of a legal right. Bonus v. can be claimed as a matter of right provided of course by Swade&hi Oouo/'and the application of the Full Bench formula it is shown that\n\nFlour Mills for the relevant year the employer has sufficient available sur- Sikri, J, plus in hand.\" (Vide Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, in Workmen v. Hercules Insurance Co.(').\n\nThe Indian Tea Association v. Workmen(') this Court held that \"the profit bonus can be awarded only by reference to a relevant year and a claim for such bonus has therefore to be made from year to year and has to be settled either amicably between the parties or if a reference is made, it has to be. determined by Industrial adjudication. A general claim for the introduction of profit bonus cannot be made or entertained in the form in which it has been done in the present proceedings.'' It follows from the above decisions of this Court that: -\n\n(a) workmen are entitled to make a claim to profit bonus if certain conditions are satisfied;\n\n(b) the workmen have to make a claim from year to year;\n\n(c) this claim has either to be settled amicably or by industrial adjudication; and\n\n(d) if there is a loss or if no claim is made, no bonus will be permissible.\n\nIn our opinion it is only when the claim to profit bonus, if made, is settled amicably or by industrial adjudication that a liability is incurred by the employer, who follows the mercantile system of accounting, within s. !0(2)(x), read with s. 10(5) of the Act.\n\nOn the facts of this case, it is clear that it was only in 1940 that the claim to profit bonus was settled by an award of the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, the only year the liabi ltty can be properly attributed to .is 1949, and hence we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in answering the question in favour of the assessee.\n\nThe second contention of the learned counsel does not appeal to us. We are of the opinion that this system of reopening accounts does not fit in with the scheme of the Indian Income Tax Act. We have already held in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. A. Gajapathy Naidu, Madras(') that as far as receipts are concerned, there can be no reopening\n\n\n(')A.LR 1964 S.C. 1653.\n\nof accour.t3. The same would be the position in respect of 1961 expense;. But even in England accounts are not opened in The Commis•i°\"\" of every case. Habbury gives various instances in footnote (m) MaA\"'\"\"''\"h at p. 148. Vol. 20. Mr. Sastri has relied on various English 'aupur ' cases but it is unnecessary to refer to them as Lord Radcliffe .... explains the position in England. in So1, thern Railway of Swadept;\"\"M:U.\"\" Peru Ltd. v. Owen(') thus:\n\n\"The courts have not found it impossible hitherto to make considerable adjustments in the actual fall of receipts or payments in order to arrive at a truer statement of the profits of successive years.\n\nAfter all, that is why income and expenditure accounting is preferred to cash accoun, ting for this purpose. As I understand, the matter, the principle that justified the attribution of something that was in fact, received in one year to the profits of an earlier year, as in such cases as Isaac Holden and Sons v. Inland Revenue Comrs. 0924)\n\n12 Tax Cas. 758 and Newcastle Breweries Ltd.\n\nY. Inland Revenue Comrs. 0927) 12 Tax Cas. 927 was just .this, that the payment had been earned by services given in earlier year and, therefore, a true statement of profit required that the year which had borne the burden of the cost should have appropriated to it the benefit of the receipt.\"\n\nThe principle mentioned by Lord Radcliffe would not apply to a profit bonus. As stated above, a profit bonus is strictly not wages, at least not for the purpose of computing liability to income tax; it is not an expense, in the ordinary sense of the term, incurred for the p.urpose of earning profits.\n\nA fortiori profits have already been made. It is mtlre like sharing of profits on the basis of a certain f01mula.\n\nOne other point raised by Mr. Sastri remains. He urged that the word \"for the year in question\" in the proviso to sub-s. 10(2)(x) mean \"for the year in which allowance is claimed.\" We are unable to agree with him. The words 'for the year in question' mean the year in respect which bonus is paid.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n('} [1957) A.C. 334.\n\nSil:ri, J.", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADHYA\n\nPRADESH, NAGPUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADHYA PRADESH, NAGPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SWADESHI COTTON AND FLOUR MILLS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SWADESHI COTTON AND FLOUR MILLS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. 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N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2560, "end_char": 2582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N.\n\nSachthev, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N.\n\nSachthev", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2587, "end_char": 2602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N.\n\nSachthev, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2624, "end_char": 2636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapoor, S. Murty and K. K. Jain, for the respondent\n\nApril 17, 1964."}}, {"text": "S. Murty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2638, "end_char": 2646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapoor, S. Murty and K. K. Jain, for the respondent\n\nApril 17, 1964."}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2651, "end_char": 2661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapoor, S. Murty and K. K. Jain, for the respondent\n\nApril 17, 1964."}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2956, "end_char": 2962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was elivered by Tl1e Commis3ioner\n\nl11come-tax, SJKRI, J.-The respondent, Swadeshi Cotton & Flour Madl•11~• Pradeah, Mills, hereinafter referred to as the assessce, is a limited 1\\apur company which owns and runs a textile mill at Indore."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3983, "end_char": 4011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Madhya Pradesh answered the question in the affirmative."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4715, "end_char": 4738, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 13,\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4988, "end_char": 5005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The books for 1948 had not been closed till the date of order of the Industrial Tribunal, January 13,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "Su deshtcottonarul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5602, "end_char": 5620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh, Xapgur On these facts the learned counsel for the appellant, Su deshtcottonarul Mr. Sastri, contends that according to the mercantile system a Fleur .Mills of accounting."}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5625, "end_char": 5631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh, Xapgur On these facts the learned counsel for the appellant, Su deshtcottonarul Mr. Sastri, contends that according to the mercantile system a Fleur .Mills of accounting."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6218, "end_char": 6225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the alternative he has invited us to reopen the accounts for the year 1947, following the practice which, according to him, obtains in England."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(x)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6316, "end_char": 6327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6339, "end_char": 6347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(5}-ln sub-section (2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6933, "end_char": 6960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7871, "end_char": 7873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 991", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9953, "end_char": 9972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bibi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10000, "end_char": 10004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bibi, J.\n\n1984 In 1961, this Court was able to say that \"the right to fie Commissioner of claim bonus which has been universally recognised by indus • .ii\"\"0j,';::;\\ trial adjudication in cases of employment falling under the M 1!;"}}, {"text": "Vide Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10546, "end_char": 10565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, in Workmen v. Hercules Insurance Co.(')."}}, {"text": "s. 10(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11736, "end_char": 11744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Habbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12628, "end_char": 12635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Habbury gives various instances in footnote (m) MaA\"'\"\"''\"h at p. 148."}}, {"text": "Radcliffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12811, "end_char": 12820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sastri has relied on various English 'aupur ' cases but it is unnecessary to refer to them as Lord Radcliffe .... explains the position in England."}}, {"text": "Newcastle Breweries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13497, "end_char": 13521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "758 and Newcastle Breweries Ltd.\n\nY. Inland Revenue Comrs."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(x)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14355, "end_char": 14366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14642, "end_char": 14644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sil:ri, J."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_816_819_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".April 21\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSTATE OF ORISSA\n\nv .\n\nM.A. TULWCH AND CO.\n\n[1964}\n\n[K. SUBB~ RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKR•, JJ.] Sales Tax-Sale to Registered deale.r-Claim for deduction- Production of declaratio71. under r. 27(2) if obligatory-Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Orissa 14 of 1947), s. 5(2)(a) (ii), Orissa Sales;\n\nTax Rules, 1947 r. 27(2)-0rissa Sales Tax (Amendment} Act (Orissa 10 of 1957).\n\nAssessment orders were passed by the Sales Tax Officer allowing the deductions of two amounts claimed by the respondent-dealer under s. !>(2)(a)(ii) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act in: respect of goods sold to a registered dealer. The respondentdealer filed appeals to the Assistant Collector Sales Tax, challenging the assessment on grounds which were not relevant and against those decisions revisions were filed by the dealer. While the revisions were pending the Orissa Sales Tax Act was amended by Orissa Sales Tax (Amendment) Act (Orissa Act, 10' of 1957) with the result that revisions were treated as appeals to the Sales Tax Tribunal, and it enabled the Government to file cross-objections. In pursuance, the State filed cross-objections challenging the deductions on the ground that the dealer had not produced any declaration as required under r. 27(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947. The Tribunal upheld this objection and directed that fresh assessments be made.\n\nOn statement of the case, the High Court answered that the assessing officer was not wrong in allowing the deductions.\n\nOn appeal by special leave).\n\nHeld: (i) There is nothing in s. 5(2)(a) (ii) itself that disentitles a selling dealer to a deduction, but if the contingency provided in the proviso occurs, then the price of goods is included in the taxatle turnover of the buying dealer.\n\n(ii) The production of a declaration under r. 7(2) is not always obligatory on the part of a selling dealer when claiming the exemption. It is open to him to claim exemption by adducing other evidence so as to tring the transaction w1thin the scope of s. 5(2)(a)(ii). Rule 27(2) must be reconciled with the section and the rule can be reconciled by treating it as directory. But the rule must be substantially complied with in every case. It is for the Sales-tax Officer to be satisfied that, in fact. the certificate of registration of the buying dealer contains the requisite statement, and if he has any doubts about it, the selling dealer must satisfy his doubts. But if he is satisfied from other facts on the record, it is not necessary that the selling dealer should produce a declaration in the form required in r: 27(2)~\n\nbefore being entitled to a deduction.\n\nMember, Sales-tax Tribunal, Orissa v. M/s. S. Lal & Co.\n\n(1961) 12 S.T.C. 25, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 507-508 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 4, 1950, of the Orissa High Court in Special Jurisdiction Cases Nos. 38 and 39 of 1958.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in both the appeals). ·\n\nB. Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents (in both 1961 the appeals).\n\nStaie of on ...\n\nApril 21, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered JI.A.Tu~'oclrnndCo. by\n\nSJKRI. J.-The respondent, hereinafter referred to as the the dealer, filed a return for the quarter ending June 30, 1951. under the OriGsa Sales Tax Act (Orissa Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He claimed a deduction of Rs. 2,40,000/- under s. 5(2)(a)(ii) in respect of the goods sold to a registered dealer, named Mis. Lal & Co. Ltd., BA\n\n1335. Similarly, for the quarter ending September 30. 1951, he claimed a deduction of Rs. 15,677 JI/ 3.\n\nBy two assessment orders passed under s. 12(2) of the Act, the Sale;> Tax Officer, Cuttack III circle, Jaipur, Orissa, determined the tax payable allowing the deduction of Rs. 2,40.000 /- and Rs. 15,677/1/3, under s. 5(2)(a)(ii). The dealer filed appeals to the Assistant Collector, Sales Tax, challenging the asses;;.\n\nment on grounds which are not relevant. The dealer later filed revisions against the decision of the Assistant Collector.\n\nWhile the revisions were pending, the legislature amended the Orissa Sales Tax Act, in 1957, by Orissa Sales Tax <Amendment) Act (Orissa Act XX of 1957). The effect of this amendment was that revisions were treated as appeals to Sales Tax Tribunal, and it enabled the Government to file croos-objections. The State of Orissa, in pursuance of this amendment, filed memorandum of cross-objections challenging the deduction of Rs. 2,40,000/- and Rs. 15,677 JI /3, on the ground that the dealer had not produced any declaration, as required under r. 27(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947, as evid.nc ed from the Check Sheet kept on record. The Tribunal upheld this objection and directed that freiih assessments be made.\n\nCertain other questions were raised before the Tribunal by the dealer, but as nothing turns on them as far as these appeals are concerned, they are not being mentioned. The Tribunal stated a case to the High Court and one of the questions\n\neferred. to was \"hether the asseiising officer was not wrong m allowing deducl!on of Rs. 2,40,000/- for the quarter ending on•30-6-51 and Rs. 15,6771113 for the quarter ending on 30-9-51. from the respective gross turnover of the applicant.\" The High Court, following its earlier decision in Member, Sales-tax Tribunal, Orissa v. Messrs S. Lal & Co. Limited(')\n\nanrswered the question in the affirmative. The State of Orissa having obtained special leave from this Court, these appeals are now before us for disposal.\n\nMr.Ganapathy Iyer, on behalf of the State of Orissa, has contended before us that it is clear that r. 27(2) was not complied with, and, therefore, the Sales Tax Officer was wrong\n\n( 1) (1961) 12 S.T.C. 25.\n\nSilri, J.\n\n~ in. allowing the said deduction. The answer to the question\n\n.fJIJIU of °\"\"\" referred depends on the correct interpretation of s. 5(2)(a)(ii),\n\nm ... ~~-' _, 0 . and r. 27(2). They read thus:- Jr.A. , na- O.\n\n.8ilw1, J. \"s. 5(2)(a)(ii)-sales to a registered dealer of goods specified in the purchasing dealer's certificate of registration,. as being intended for resale by him in Orissa and on sales to a registered dealer of con tainers or other materials for the packing of such goods.\n\nProvided that when such goods are used by the registered dealer for purposes other than those speeified in his certificate of registration, the price of goods so utilised shall be included in his taxable turnover.\" \"Rule 27(2). Claims for deduction of turnover under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 5- A dealer who wishes to deduct from his gross turnover on sales which have taken place in Ori8sa the amount of a sale on the ground that he is entitled to make such deduction under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act, shall produce a copy of the relevant cash receipt or bill according as the sale is a cash sale or a sale on credit in respect of such sale and a true declaration in writing by the purchasing dealer or by such responsible person as may be authorised in writing in this behalf by such dealer that the goods in question are specified in the purchasing dealer's certificate of registration as being required for resale by him or in the execution of any contract: Provided that no dealer whose certificate of registration has not been renewed for the year during which the purchase is made shall make such a declaration and that the selling dealer shall not be entitled to claim any deduction of sales to such a dealer.\" It ill plain from the terms of s. 5(2)(a)(ii) that a selling dealer is entitled to a deduction in respect of sales to a registered dealer of goods, if the goods are specified in the purchasing dealer's certificate of registration as being intended for re-sale by him in Orissa. No other condition is imposed by the above r, ection. The proviso deals with consequences that follow if the purchasing dealer uses them for purposes other than those specified in his certificate of registration, and directs that, in that event, the price of goods so utilised shall\n\n.. '\n\nbe included in his turnQIVer. Therefore, there is nothing in 1964\n\nthe section i16eli that disentitles a selling dealer to a deduction, Stale of Orri•sa but if the contingency provided in the proviso occurs, then H..A Tu~ ndO the price of goods is includc; d in the taxable turnover of the _ 0 0 • buying dealer. But Mr. Ganapathy Iyer says, be it so, but Sikri, J. the rule making authority is entitled to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act, and r. 27(2) is designed to ensure that a buying dealer's certificate of registration does, in fact, mention that the goods are intended for resale by him, and for that purpose it has chosen one exclusive method of proving the fact before a Sales Tax Officer. He further urges that no other method of proving that fact is permissible. Rule 27(2) is mandatory and if there is breach of it the selling dealer is not entitled to deduction. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends that r. 27(2) is directory.\n\nHe points out that the word 'shall' should be read as 'may', in the context. He further says that supposing the selling dealer brought the original certificate of registration of a buying dealer and produced it before the Sales Tax Officer, according to the appellant, this would not be enough, but this could never have been intended. In our opinion, r. 27(2) must be reconciled with the section and the rule can be reconciled by treating it as directory. But the rule must be substantially complied with in every case. It is for the Sales Tax Officer to be satisfied that, in fact, the certificate of registration of the buying dealer contains the requisite statement, and if he has any doubts about it, the selling dealer must satisfy his doubts. But if he is satisfied from other facts on the record, it is not necessary that the selling dealer should produce a declaration in the form required in r. 27(2), before being enti tied to a deduction.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court came to a correct conclusion. The High Court is correct in holding that the production of a declaration under r. 27(2) is not always obligatory on the part of a selling dealer when claiming the exemption. It is open to him to claim exemption by adducing other evidence so as to bring the transaction within the scope of s. 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act In this case, the Sales Tax Officer was satisfied by a mere statement of the dealer and it has not been shown that in fact the registration certificate of the buying dealer, Mis S. Lal & Co., did not contain the statement that the goods were intended for resale by him in Orissa.\n\nThe appeais accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fee.\n\nAppeat~ dismissed .", "total_entities": 37, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF ORISSA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ORISSA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M.A. TULWCH AND CO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M.A. TULLOCH AND CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBB~ RAO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. 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Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3555, "end_char": 3574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,40,000/- under s. 5(2)(a)(ii) in respect of the goods sold to a registered dealer, named Mis."}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3723, "end_char": 3731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Orissa Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By two assessment orders passed under s. 12(2) of the Act, the Sale;> Tax Officer, Cuttack III circle, Jaipur, Orissa, determined the tax payable allowing the deduction of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3899, "end_char": 3913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Orissa Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Orissa Act XX of 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4258, "end_char": 4279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4437, "end_char": 4452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Orissa, in pursuance of this amendment, filed memorandum of cross-objections challenging the deduction of Rs."}}, {"text": "Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4687, "end_char": 4715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "on•30-6-51", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5213, "end_char": 5223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,40,000/- for the quarter ending on•30-6-51 and Rs."}}, {"text": "30-9-51", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5269, "end_char": 5276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,6771113 for the quarter ending on 30-9-51."}}, {"text": "Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5612, "end_char": 5626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.Ganapathy Iyer, on behalf of the State of Orissa, has contended before us that it is clear that r. 27(2) was not complied with, and, therefore, the Sales Tax Officer was wrong\n\n( 1) (1961) 12 S.T.C. 25.", "canonical_name": "Ganapathy Iyer"}}, {"text": "Silri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5816, "end_char": 5821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Silri, J.\n\n~ in."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5956, "end_char": 5970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6050, "end_char": 6064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6637, "end_char": 6646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6880, "end_char": 6889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7649, "end_char": 7663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8507, "end_char": 8521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Mr. Ganapathy Iyer says, be it so, but Sikri, J. the rule making authority is entitled to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act, and r. 27(2) is designed to ensure that a buying dealer's certificate of registration does, in fact, mention that the goods are intended for resale by him, and for that purpose it has chosen one exclusive method of proving the fact before a Sales Tax Officer.", "canonical_name": "Ganapathy Iyer"}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8542, "end_char": 8547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Mr. Ganapathy Iyer says, be it so, but Sikri, J. the rule making authority is entitled to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act, and r. 27(2) is designed to ensure that a buying dealer's certificate of registration does, in fact, mention that the goods are intended for resale by him, and for that purpose it has chosen one exclusive method of proving the fact before a Sales Tax Officer."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10506, "end_char": 10520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mis S. Lal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10706, "end_char": 10722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is open to him to claim exemption by adducing other evidence so as to bring the transaction within the scope of s. 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Act In this case, the Sales Tax Officer was satisfied by a mere statement of the dealer and it has not been shown that in fact the registration certificate of the buying dealer, Mis S. Lal & Co., did not contain the statement that the goods were intended for resale by him in Orissa."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_820_830_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I9ti4J\n\nNAROTIAMDAS v.\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n(P. B.\n\nGAJEN!>RAGADKAR, c. J., K. N.\n\nWANCHOO, M.\n\nHIDAYATIJLLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR, JJ.J •\n\nWages-Law passed fixing rates of minimum wages Tetrospecti7J11ly-Effect of-Validity-Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (Act 11 of 1!!48}-Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation Act, 1001 (Act 23 of 1961), s. 31A-Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 4 of 1962-Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962 (Act No. 16. of 1962), ss. 2, 3 and 4-Constitution of India, Art. 19(l)(f) and (g).\n\nThe aopellant was the manager of a Bidi counting and labelling factory. Jn 1951, the State of Madhya Pradesh fixed rates of minimlJ!ll wages payable to workmen in accordance with the provisibns of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. These rates were revised in the year 1956 and new rates were notified by the Government ty a notification dated December 30, 1958 directing that these rates would come into force from January 1, 1959. The validity of this notification was successfully cllallenged by the appellant before the High Court. To meet the situation the Legislature enacted the Minimum Wages Act, 1961 giving effect to the impugned notification. Qn.challenge of this Act by the appellant and other Bidi manufactories, the High Court allowed the applications and restrained the Government from giving effect to the impugned notification. Thereafter, the Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 4 of 1962 was PasOOd fixing rates of minimum wages retrospectively. The ordinance was later replaced by ; m Act, the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962. On challenge of the validity ol. this Act by the appellant, the High Court held the Act to be valid and disallowed the application. Jn this Court the validity of the Act was challenged on the ground (l) that in enacmng the Act of 1962 the Legislature was not exercising its independent legislative power but only validating the notification dated December 30, 1958 which it was not competent to do, (2) that by giving retrospective effect to the rates of wages fixed bv this Act the State had put unreasonable restrictions on the appellant's fundamental rights under Art. 19(l)(f) & (g) and (31 that by making the provisions of ss. 20 and 22 of the Central Act of 1948 applicable to the wages now fixed the Act had contravened Art. 20(1) of the Constitution.\n\nHeld: (i) The contention that the Act was not independent legislation cannot be accepted. Section 2 of the Act merely says that the expressions used in this Act shall have the same meaning for the purpose of this Act as defined in the Minimum Wages Act of 1948. The definition of expressions used in an Act with reference to another Act is a well known device in legislative practice generally adopted for the sake of brevity.\n\nThe definition would remain effective even after the other Act with reference to which the definition was given ceases to exist.\n\nThis fact of defining expressions in an Act with reference to some other Act cannot therefore have the etr.., ct of making this Act dependent on such other Act.\n\nIt is clear from s. 3 of the impugned Act that the legislature was fixing for itself the minimum rates of wages in certain scheduled employments. The fact that the rates mentioned in the Table appended to the Act happened to t e the same as the rates fixed elsewhere cannot reasonably justify a conclusion that the validation of the old rates was being affected. Independent legislation does not cease to be so, merely because its effect is the same as it would have been if a validating Act had been passed.\n\n(ii) The retrospective operation of legislation is a relevant circumstance jn deciding its reasonableness. It is, however, not necessarily a decisive test. Section 3 of the Act does not make the new rates of w'1ges payable on the 1st January 1959. The proviso to s. 4 is a clear statement of the legislature's intention that it is on the 21st June 1962 that the rates which had become enforceable under s. 3 with effect from 1st January 1959 became payable. The appellant's aDPrehension that he might be made liable for payment of compensation under s. 20(3) or to prosecution under s. 22 of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 as a result of mere passing of the Act must therefore be held to be groundless. The contention therefore that ss. 3 and 4 of the impugned Act impose unreasonatle restrictions on the appellant's fundamental rights must be rejected.\n\nRai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar, [1964] 1 S.C.R. 897, applied.\n\n(iii) On a proper construction of ss. 3 and 4 of the impugned Act, the attack on the validity of the section on the ground of a contraventicn of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution must also fail.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 221 of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 5, 1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.\n\nPetition No. 334 of 1962.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, B. V. Shukla, Rameshwar Nath, S. N.\n\nAndley, and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant\n\nB. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for. the respondents.\n\nApril 21, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs GUPTA, J.-This appeal raises the question of the Daa G,, pla, J. validify of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962 (Act No. 16of1962). The appellant is the Manager of a Bidi counting and labelling factory of M/s. Mohanlal Hargovindas, Jabalpur, who are engaged in the trade of purchase and sale of Bidi in the State of Madhya Pradesh and other States of India. In 1951 the State of Madhya Pradesh fixed rates of minimum wages payable to workmen engaged in Bidi making manufactories. This was done in accordance with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (Central Act 11 of 1948). These rates of minimum wages were revised in the year 1956 by a notification of the Madhya Pradesh Government dated the 23rd February 1956. New rates of minimum\n\nNarouanttla& ...\n\nSlate of Madhya\n\nl'ratkah .\n\nV.. Gupla, J.\n\nwages for workmen engaged in the Bidi making manufactories were notified by the Madhya Pradesh Government by a notification dated the 30th December 1958. The notification directed that these rates would come into force from January 1, 1959. The validity of this notification was however successfully challnged by the present appellant before the Madhya Pradesh Htgh Court. To meet the situation the Madhya Pra desh Legislature enacted the Minimum Wages (Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1961-(Madhya Pradesh Act No. 23 of 1961). Section 3 lA which was introduced by this Act into the Central Act (No. 11 of 1948) provided that the rates of minimum wages fixed or revised under the notification of the 30th December 1958 \"shall be and shall always be deemed to have been validly fixed and revised and shall be deemed to have come into force on the date mentioned in the said notification, notwithstanding any judicial decision to the contrary or any defect or irregularity in the constitution of the Advisory Board under s. 7 of the principal Act read with s. 9 thereof or publication of the notification in the Gazette or non-compliance with any other requirement of law and shall not be called in question in any court merely on the ground that there was failure to comply with the provisions of the principal Act.\"\n\nThe appellant and some other Bidi manufactories of Madhya Pradesh challenged the validity of this Act before the High Court by petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court allowed the applications, struck down s. 31A . as invalid and restrained the Government from enforcing the section and from giving effect to the impugned notification dated the 30th December, 1958.\n\nThe High Court gave its decision on the 2nd May 1962.\n\nOn the 21st June 1962 the Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 4 of 1962 was passed fixing rates of minimum wages retrospectively. The Ordinance was later replaced by an Act, the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962. On the 5th October 1962, the appellant made an application to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Art. 226 and Art. 227 of the Constitution challenging the validity of this Act and praying for a declaration that the Act is ultra vi.res, void and inoperative and a writ in the nature of mandamus restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh and the other respondents from giving effect to or enforcing the provisions of the Act. The High Court has held that the Act is valid and has disallowed his application. Against that decision the present appeal has been preferred.\n\nThe challenge to the validity of the Act is based on three principal grounds. The first is that in enacting Act No. 16\n\nof 1961 the Madhya Pradesh Legislature was really not exercising its independent legislative power but only validating the notification dated the 30th December 1958 which it was not competent to do.\n\nThe second ground is that by giving retros pective effect to the rates of wages fixed by this Act the State has put unreasonable restrictions on the appellant's funda mental rights under Art. l 9(J)(f) & (g) of the Constitution. The last ground on which the Act was challenged as invalid is that by making provisions of s. 20 and s. 22 of the Central Act No. II of 1948 applicable to the wages now fixed the Act has contravened Art. 20(1) of the Constitution.\n\nThe impugned Act is a short Act of five sections only. The first section givoo the title of the Act and the fifth section repeals the Ordinance to rplace which this Act was passed.\n\nThree remaining sections are in the following words: -\n\n\"2. The expression used in this Act and defined in the minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948), in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh shall have the meanings assigned to them in the said Act.\n\n3. Notwithstanding anythfog contained in s. 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948), in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh (here inafter referred to as the said Act) or any other provisions contained therein relating to the fixation or revision of minimum rates of wages in scheduled employments and any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary, the mini mum rates of wages in respect of employments in items 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act shall be and shall always, in respect of each employment, be deemed to be as specified in Table appended hereto and it is hereby enacted that the said minimum rates of wagoo shall be payable by the employer in the said scheduled em ployments and be enforceable against him with effect from the 1st January 1959, as if the provi sions herein contained have been in force at all material times.\n\n4. The provisions of section 4-A, section SA, in so far as they relate to revision of minimnm rates of wages, and of sections 12 to 30.A of the said .. Act, and the rules made thereunder shall apply to miriimum rates of wages specified in section 3 as they apply to minimnm wages in respect of sche duled employments fixed in accordance with the said Act;\n\nNarollamda.\n\nStal< of Madhya\n\nPraduh\n\nD .. Gupta, J.\n\n'1964\n\nNarotta't'tUlaa\n\nBtate of Madhya\n\npw; J.,, h\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nProvided that with reispect to claims arising out of payment of minimum rates of wages specified in section 3 pertaining to a period prior to the publication of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) in the Gazette, the period of one year referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 20 of the said Act Ghall be counted with effect from the 21st June, 1962, the date of the publication of the said Ordinance in the Gazette.\"\n\nIt is not disputed that the Madhya Pradesh legislature had the legislative competence to make a law as regards minimum wages under Entry 24 of List III (Sch. Seventh). Mr.\n\nSetalvad contends that this power of independent legislation was not really exercised by the legislature and that in the guir, e of independent legislation it has in substance passed a validating Act, after an attempt to validate the notification of the 30th December, 1958, had failed. In support of his argument that it is not independent legislation Mr. Setalvad laid stress on the language of s. 2. That section merely says that the expressions used in this Act shall have the same meaning for the purpose of this Act as defined in the Minimum Wages Act of 1948. According to the learned counsel, this shows that this was really a dependent and not independent legislation. We can find no substance in this argument.\n\nThe definition of expressions used in an Act with reference to other Act is a well known device in legislative practice generally adopted for the sake of brevity. The definition would remain effective even after the other Act with reference to which the definition was given ceases to exist. This fact of defining expressions in an Act with reference to some other Act cannot therefore have the effect of making this Act dependent on such other Act.\n\nMr. Setalved next urged that. quite clearly the object of s. 3 was to validate the minimum rates of wages as fixed by the notification dated the 30th December 1958 and nothing more.\n\nAs we read the section we find that it merely fixed wages in respect of certain employments at the rates mentioned in the Table appended to the Act. We are informed that the rates mentioned in the Table are identical with the rates mentioned in the notification dated the 30th December, 1958. The effect 'of enactment of s. 3 would therefore be the same as if the notification of 1958 had been validated. To say that, however, i~ not to say that this Act has validated or that even it seeks to validate the 30th December 1958 notification. On the face of it the legislature was fixing for itself the minimum rates of wages in certain scheduled employments. That is stated in the preamble and is plain from s. 3 itself. The fact\n\nNarottamda1\n\nthat rates mentioned in the Table appended to the Act happened to be the same as rate; i fixed elsewhere cannot reasonably justify a conclusion that the validation of the old rates was being affected. Independent legislation does not cease to be so, merely because its effect is the same as it would have been if a validating Act had been passed. The contention that thL> Act was not independent legislation cannot therefore be accepted.\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPrade.h\n\nNor is it possible to accept the argument that the Act is an unreasonable restriction on the appellant's fundamental rights under Art. 19(!)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. Restriction there undoubtedly is, but we are not satisfied that the restriction is unreasonable. Section 3 of the Act makes the new rate.> of wages effective from January 1, 1959. Section 4 makes the various provisions of the Central Act No. 11 of 1948 available for revision and enforcement of the rates as .specified in s. 3. The consequence is that if an employer does not pay the rates as specified, an application may be made under s. 20 of Act 11 of 1948 to enforce such payment. He will\n\nbe liable aloo to prosecution and penalties under s. 22 of the Act. What according to the learned counsel makes the Act unreasonable is that such application can be made and such prosecution and penalties can be imposed even in respect of the past period-from 1st January 1959 upto the date of the Act. How is it possible for the employer, it is urged, to pay such arream which might amount in many cases to consi• derable sums of money when the accounts for the past years had been closed, profits had been distributed and the available surplus had either been spent or invested in other ways?\n\nWe have no hesitation in agreeing to the proposition that the retrospective operation of legislation is a relevant circumstance in deciding its reasonableness. It is, however, clearly established by a long series of decisions of this Court that this is not neces.-iarily a decisive test. We may mention in this connection the decision of this Court in Rai Ramkrishna v.\n\nState of Bihar('). There the Court had to consider the question whether the retrospective operation of the Bihar Taxation of Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961 put such an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. l 9(1)(f) and (g) of the Comtitution as to make the Act invalid to the extent of its retrospective operation. The Bihar Finance Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XVII of 1950) had imposed a tax on passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles in Bihar. In an appeal arising out of a suit filed by the passengers and owners of goods, this Court struck down Part Ill of the aid Act as unconstitutional. This judgment was pronounced on the 12th\n\n(') [1964] 1 S.C.R 897.\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nN arottamdas\n\nState of Mad Ii ya\n\nPradesh\n\nDaa Gupta, J.\n\n. December 1960. Then an Ordinance, viz., Bihar Ordinance\n\nNo. II of 1961 was issued on August 1, 1961. By this Ordinance the material provisions of the earlier Act of 1950 were validated and brought into force retrospectively from the date when the earlier Act had purported to come into force. Subsequently, the provisiono of this Ordinance were incorporated in the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961. Section 23 of the Act provided that any amount paid, collected or recovered or purported to have been paid, co)lected or recovered as tax or penalty under the provisions' of Part III of the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 or rules made thereunder during the period beginning with the first day of April 1950 and ending on the thirtyfirst day of July 1961, shall be deemed to have been validly levied, paid, collected or recovered under the provisions of this Act. It was urged that thio retrospective operation for such a long period like IO years itself made the provisions unconstitutional. In repelling this contention, Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed thus:-\n\n\"If a statute paBsed by the legislature is challenged in proceedings before a court and the challenge is ultimately sustained and the statute is struck down. it is not unlikely that the judicial proceedings may occupy a fairly long period and the Legislature may well decide to await the final decision in said proceedings before it uses its legllilative power to cure the alleged infirmity in the earlier Act. In such a case, if after the final judicial verdict is pronounced in the matter the legislature passes a validating Act, it may well cover a long period taken by the judicial proceedings in court and yet it would be inappropriate to hold that because the retrospective operation covers a long period, therefore, the restriction imposed by it is unreasonable.\"\n\nThese observations which were made in resoect of a validating Act apply fully to a legislation as in the Act now under consideration.\n\nIt is not also possible to accept the picture presented by Mr. Setalvad of the employers' financial difficulties in making payment for the past period as a fair repreBentation of the true facts. For practically the entire period from the !st April 1959 to the date of the present Act the employers had before them the provisions of what purported to be a good law requiring them to pay at these very rates. As good businessmen they are expected to have made provisions\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRElIE COURT REPORTS 827\n\nfor payments on these very rates, even though they intended to challenge the validity of the previous Act a_nd ultimately succeeded in that attempt. We are not prepared to believe that such provisions are not generally made. The hardship which according to Mr. Setalvad the employers would have to face in making the payments for the past periods is, in our judgment, more imaginary than real.\n\nBut, urges the learned counsel, s. 3 of the Act while giving to the rates of wages fixed by the Act retrospective effect from the lst January 1959 has afsb made wages at these new rates payable on January l, 1959 for the past period.\n\nThe result of this, according to the learned counsel, is that as soon as an application is made under s. 20 of Act 11 of\n\n.1948 the employer would be liable not only to pay the arrears t>f wages but also compensation as provided in sub-s. 3 of s. 20.\n\nSub-section 3 of s. 20 of Act ll of 1948 provides, inter alia, that the minimum wage authority may direct:\n\n\"In the case of a claim arising out of payJ!lent of less than minimum rates of wages, the payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceed the amount actually paid, together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount of such excess.\" It has further provided that the authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases where the excess or the amount due is paid by the employer to the employee before the disposal of the application.\n\nIf the legal position were as urged by the learned counsel,' that s. 3 made the new rates of wages for the past period payable on January I, 1959 or the apprehension that the employer might be made to pay heavy compensation may well be true. Another consequence of that legal position would be that the employer would also be liable to prosecution under s. 22 of the Act for his omission to pay on January I, 1959 the rates which were fixed first by the Ordinance and then by the impugned Act. We are satisfied however that s. 3 of the impugned Act does not make the new rates of wages payable on the lst January 1959. The words used are ...... \"and it is hereby enacted that the said minimum rates of wages shall be payable by the employer in the said scheduled employments and be enforceable against him with effect from the !st January 1959. as if the provisions herein contained have been in force at all material times.\" By these words, it is urged on behalf of the appellant, the legislature not only made the minimum wages effective from the 1st January 1959 but also made them payable on that date for the past period. In other words, the sentence is sought to be read as saying: -\n\nN a.rottam.tku\n\n•• Sta•e of Madhya\n\nPradMh\n\nDrt-9 Gupta, J.\n\nNarottamdas\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPtadesh\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\n\"the said minim um rates of wages shall be payable by the employer in the said scheduled employments with effect from !st January 1959 and shall be enforceable against him with effcet from Isl January 1959.\" If that had been the intention of the legislature the appropriate words to use would have been \"the said minimum rates of wages shall be payable by the employer in the said scheduled employments and enforceable against him with effect from 1st January 1959.\" No purpose would be served by the word \"be\" before the word \"enforceable\" if the phrase \"with effect from the !st January\n\n1959\" was intended to apply both to \"payable\" and to \"enforceable\". The very fact that the legislature took care to say \"be enforceable\" in the latter part of the sentence shows clearly that while it was intended that the new rates would be enforceable against the employer with effect from the 1st January 1959 no date was being prescribed by s. 3 as regards the date on which it became payable.\n\nAn examination of s. 4 of the Act further makes it clear beyond any reasonable doubt that it was the intention of the legislature that new rates became payable only on the 21st June 1962, the date of the publication of the Ordinance which was later replaced by the Act. Section 4 makes applicable to the minimum rates of wages as fixed by s. 3, the provisions of s. 4A and s. 5 of the Minimum Wages Act (Act II of 1948). that is, the provisions as regards the revision in future of the rates fixed by the impugned Act, and of sections 12 to 30A.\n\nAmong the sections thus included is therefore s. 20 which prescribes the procedure for claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages. The first proviso to sub-section 2 of s. 20 prescribes a period of limitation within which an application on such claims has to be made. The period prescribed is one year from the date on which the minimum wages became payable. It was thus necessary for the legislature when giving retrospective effect to the rates fixed bys. 3 of the.impugned Act to indicate the date on which the new rates would become payable. This indication is clearly given by the proviso to s. 4. The proviso (which has already been set out) is in these words: -\n\n\"Provided that with respect to claims arising out of payment of minimum rates of wages specified in s. 3 pertaining to a period prior to the publication of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance 1962 (4 of 1962) in the Gazette, the period of one year referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 20 of the said .Act shall be counted with effect from the 21st June 1962, the date of publication of the said Ordinance in the Gazette.\"\n\nNarnrt-nmda&\n\nThe above provision that \"the period of one year referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (2) of s. 20 of the said Act shall be counted with effect from the 2 lst June 1962\"' is a clear statement of the legislature\"s intention that it is on lhe 21st June 1962 that the rates which had become enforceable under s. 3 with effect from lst January 1959 became payable.\n\nThat is how the High Court has construed the section and in our judgment that construction is correct. The appellant's apprehension that he might be made. liable for payment of compensation under s. 20(3) or to prosecution under s. 22 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (Act II of 1948) as a result of the mere passing of the Act is therefore groundless.\n\nStale of ModhyA\n\nPradesh\n\nIt is clear that the duty to pay at these rates arose only on and from the 21st June 1962 and no liability to pay compensation under s. 20(3) or to prosecution under s. 22 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 would arise if payment was made on the 21st June 1962.\n\nIt was then urged that it would be unreasonable to expect the employer to be able to make such payment on the 2 lst June 1962, the date of publication of the Ordinance. Some time would elapse, it is pointed out, before the employer could acquaint himself with the detailed provisions of the Act amt some further time in making arrangements for payment; there was thus the risk of an application being made against him under s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and an order directing him to pay compensation. While there is no doubl a theoretical possibility of .such a thing happening, the risk appears to us practically non-existent. It is to be noticed that it is discretionary with the minimum wage authority to make an order for payment of compensation. It is very unlikely that the authority will in the use of his discretion make aa order for payment of compensation when he finds that the employer has made the payment within a few days after the 21st June 1962.\n\nThe risk of prosecution under s. 22 because of failure to pay exactly on the 21st June 1962 is even less.\n\nBut such prosecution, it may be pointed out, will be entertained by courts only after an application under s. 20 as reg:; rds. the facts had been made and partly succeeded and the appropriate Government or an officer authorised by it has sanctioned . the making of a complaint. It does not appear to us likely . that prosecution will be launched because of failure to pay exactly on the 21st June 1962. The contention that s. 3 and s. 4 of the impugned Act impose unreasonable restrictions on the appellant's fundamental rights must therefore be rejected.\n\nThe last ground urged in support of the appeal. viz., that the impugned Act contravenes Art. 20(1) of the Constitution, is based on the assumption that the new rates of wages became payable on the Ist Januar~ 1959 even as regards the\n\nDo• o.., ta, J •.\n\n191J4\n\nNaroftamd1is\n\nStak of MadAya\n\nJ>,(u, wi\n\nDas Gupl.a, J.\n\npast period. If that assumption were correct it would no doubt be also correct to say that the combined effect of ss. 3 and 4 of the impugned Act was to make the employer liable to conviction for offences for violation of a law which was not in force at the time of the commission of the act charged. We have already held however that on a proper construction of ss. 3 and 4. the new rates of wages for the past period became payable not on the !st January 1959 but on the 21st June\n\n1962. The attack on the validity of the sections on the ground of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution therefore fails.\n\nAll the points raised in the appeal fail. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 167, "entities": [{"text": "NAROTIAMDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Naroftamd1is", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "State of Mad Ii ya\n\nPradesh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 186, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Effect of-Validity-Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 257, "end_char": 299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation Act, 1001", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 318, "end_char": 367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 386, "end_char": 392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation Act, 1001", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation Act, 1001"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 432, "end_char": 479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2, 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 518, "end_char": 539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 541, "end_char": 554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 650, "end_char": 673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn 1951, the State of Madhya Pradesh fixed rates of minimlJ!ll wages payable to workmen in accordance with the provisibns of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948."}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 766, "end_char": 789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "January 1, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 975, "end_char": 990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These rates were revised in the year 1956 and new rates were notified by the Government ty a notification dated December 30, 1958 directing that these rates would come into force from January 1, 1959."}}, {"text": "To meet the situation the Legislature enacted the Minimum Wages Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1095, "end_char": 1168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1566, "end_char": 1613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1747, "end_char": 1784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 30, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1962, "end_char": 1979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act was challenged on the ground (l) that in enacmng the Act of 1962 the Legislature was not exercising its independent legislative power but only validating the notification dated December 30, 1958 which it was not competent to do, (2) that by giving retrospective effect to the rates of wages fixed bv this Act the State had put unreasonable restrictions on the appellant's fundamental rights under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182, "end_char": 2195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act", "statute": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 20 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2243, "end_char": 2256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act", "statute": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2342, "end_char": 2352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act", "statute": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2465, "end_char": 2474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act", "statute": "Jn this Court the validity of the Act"}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2610, "end_char": 2627, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3112, "end_char": 3116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3761, "end_char": 3770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st January 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3835, "end_char": 3851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3 of the Act does not make the new rates of w'1ges payable on the 1st January 1959."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3868, "end_char": 3872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "21st June 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3943, "end_char": 3957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proviso to s. 4 is a clear statement of the legislature's intention that it is on the 21st June 1962 that the rates which had become enforceable under s. 3 with effect from 1st January 1959 became payable."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4008, "end_char": 4012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4155, "end_char": 4163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4201, "end_char": 4223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4334, "end_char": 4345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act 1948"}}, {"text": "[1964] 1 S.C.R. 897", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4555, "end_char": 4566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act 1948"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4666, "end_char": 4676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act 1948"}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4903, "end_char": 4917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, B. V. Shukla, Rameshwar Nath, S. N.\n\nAndley, and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant\n\nB. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for."}}, {"text": "B. V. Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4919, "end_char": 4931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, B. V. Shukla, Rameshwar Nath, S. N.\n\nAndley, and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant\n\nB. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4933, "end_char": 4947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, B. V. Shukla, Rameshwar Nath, S. N.\n\nAndley, and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant\n\nB. Sen and /. N. Shroff, for."}}, {"text": "S. N.\n\nAndley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4949, "end_char": 4962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, B. V. Shukla, Rameshwar Nath, S. N.\n\nAndley, and P. 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Shroff, for."}}, {"text": "DAs GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5108, "end_char": 5117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs GUPTA, J.-This appeal raises the question of the Daa G,, pla, J. validify of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962 (Act No.", "canonical_name": "Das Gupl.a"}}, {"text": "Daa G", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5161, "end_char": 5166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs GUPTA, J.-This appeal raises the question of the Daa G,, pla, J. validify of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962 (Act No.", "canonical_name": "Das Gupl.a"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5193, "end_char": 5240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jabalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5361, "end_char": 5369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the Manager of a Bidi counting and labelling factory of M/s. Mohanlal Hargovindas, Jabalpur, who are engaged in the trade of purchase and sale of Bidi in the State of Madhya Pradesh and other States of India."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the Manager of a Bidi counting and labelling factory of M/s. Mohanlal Hargovindas, Jabalpur, who are engaged in the trade of purchase and sale of Bidi in the State of Madhya Pradesh and other States of India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5480, "end_char": 5485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the Manager of a Bidi counting and labelling factory of M/s. Mohanlal Hargovindas, Jabalpur, who are engaged in the trade of purchase and sale of Bidi in the State of Madhya Pradesh and other States of India."}}, {"text": "This was done in accordance with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5609, "end_char": 5687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "23rd February 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5834, "end_char": 5852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These rates of minimum wages were revised in the year 1956 by a notification of the Madhya Pradesh Government dated the 23rd February 1956."}}, {"text": "V.. Gupla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.. Gupla, J.\n\nwages for workmen engaged in the Bidi making manufactories were notified by the Madhya Pradesh Government by a notification dated the 30th December 1958."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Htgh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6284, "end_char": 6309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of this notification was however successfully challnged by the present appellant before the Madhya Pradesh Htgh Court."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pra desh Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6337, "end_char": 6364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To meet the situation the Madhya Pra desh Legislature enacted the Minimum Wages (Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1961-(Madhya Pradesh Act No."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "Act into the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6522, "end_char": 6546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6971, "end_char": 6975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act into the Central Act", "statute": "Act into the Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act into the Central Act", "statute": "Act into the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7412, "end_char": 7420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act into the Central Act", "statute": "Act into the Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7496, "end_char": 7502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act into the Central Act", "statute": "Act into the Central Act"}}, {"text": "30th December, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7635, "end_char": 7654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as invalid and restrained the Government from enforcing the section and from giving effect to the impugned notification dated the 30th December, 1958."}}, {"text": "2nd May 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7697, "end_char": 7709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court gave its decision on the 2nd May 1962."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7883, "end_char": 7930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "5th October 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7939, "end_char": 7955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th October 1962, the appellant made an application to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Art."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7998, "end_char": 8026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th October 1962, the appellant made an application to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8033, "end_char": 8041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8046, "end_char": 8054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8246, "end_char": 8269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 of the Constitution challenging the validity of this Act and praying for a declaration that the Act is ultra vi.res, void and inoperative and a writ in the nature of mandamus restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh and the other respondents from giving effect to or enforcing the provisions of the Act.", "canonical_name": "State of Mad Ii ya\n\nPradesh"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8634, "end_char": 8660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16\n\nof 1961 the Madhya Pradesh Legislature was really not exercising its independent legislative power but only validating the notification dated the 30th December 1958 which it was not competent to do."}}, {"text": "30th December 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8768, "end_char": 8786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16\n\nof 1961 the Madhya Pradesh Legislature was really not exercising its independent legislative power but only validating the notification dated the 30th December 1958 which it was not competent to do."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9142, "end_char": 9147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9152, "end_char": 9157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9250, "end_char": 9260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "expression used in this Act and defined in the minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9529, "end_char": 9599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9764, "end_char": 9768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The expression used in this Act and defined in the minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "The expression used in this Act and defined in the minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9776, "end_char": 9799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10185, "end_char": 10270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10686, "end_char": 10695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act", "statute": "II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act"}}, {"text": "sections 12 to 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10782, "end_char": 10799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act", "statute": "II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10904, "end_char": 10913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act", "statute": "II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act"}}, {"text": "D .. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11060, "end_char": 11070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stal< of Madhya\n\nPraduh\n\nD .. Gupta, J.\n\n'1964\n\nNarotta't'tUlaa\n\nBtate of Madhya\n\npw; J.,, h\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nProvided that with reispect to claims arising out of payment of minimum rates of wages specified in section 3 pertaining to a period prior to the publication of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) in the Gazette, the period of one year referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 20 of the said Act Ghall be counted with effect from the 21st June, 1962, the date of the publication of the said Ordinance in the Gazette.\""}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11129, "end_char": 11138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stal< of Madhya\n\nPraduh\n\nD .. Gupta, J.\n\n'1964\n\nNarotta't'tUlaa\n\nBtate of Madhya\n\npw; J.,, h\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\nProvided that with reispect to claims arising out of payment of minimum rates of wages specified in section 3 pertaining to a period prior to the publication of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) in the Gazette, the period of one year referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 20 of the said Act Ghall be counted with effect from the 21st June, 1962, the date of the publication of the said Ordinance in the Gazette.\"", "canonical_name": "Das Gupl.a"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11244, "end_char": 11253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act", "statute": "II in Part I and in res pect of employment in Part II of the Schedule to the said Act"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11309, "end_char": 11362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11469, "end_char": 11479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance, 1962", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance, 1962"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11647, "end_char": 11673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the Madhya Pradesh legislature had the legislative competence to make a law as regards minimum wages under Entry 24 of List III (Sch."}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11792, "end_char": 11800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nSetalvad contends that this power of independent legislation was not really exercised by the legislature and that in the guir, e of independent legislation it has in substance passed a validating Act, after an attempt to validate the notification of the 30th December, 1958, had failed.", "canonical_name": "Setalvad"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12189, "end_char": 12193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance, 1962", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance, 1962"}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12332, "end_char": 12349, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Setalved", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12969, "end_char": 12977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Setalved next urged that.", "canonical_name": "Setalvad"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13023, "end_char": 13027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13469, "end_char": 13473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13854, "end_char": 13858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14329, "end_char": 14344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madhya\n\nPrade.h\n\nNor is it possible to accept the argument that the Act is an unreasonable restriction on the appellant's fundamental rights under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(!)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14485, "end_char": 14498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14625, "end_char": 14634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14708, "end_char": 14717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14850, "end_char": 14854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14965, "end_char": 14970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15073, "end_char": 15078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16388, "end_char": 16411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XVII of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16413, "end_char": 16435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16523, "end_char": 16528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bihar Finance Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XVII of 1950) had imposed a tax on passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles in Bihar."}}, {"text": "Court struck down Part Ill of the aid Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16615, "end_char": 16656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 1 S.C.R 897", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16724, "end_char": 16742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Mad Ii ya\n\nPradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16774, "end_char": 16801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das Gupta, J.\n\nN arottamdas\n\nState of Mad Ii ya\n\nPradesh\n\nDaa Gupta, J.\n\n.", "canonical_name": "State of Mad Ii ya\n\nPradesh"}}, {"text": "Daa Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16803, "end_char": 16812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das Gupta, J.\n\nN arottamdas\n\nState of Mad Ii ya\n\nPradesh\n\nDaa Gupta, J.\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Das Gupl.a"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17279, "end_char": 17289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court struck down Part Ill of the aid Act", "statute": "Court struck down Part Ill of the aid Act"}}, {"text": "Part III of the Bihar Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17453, "end_char": 17492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "first day of April 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17555, "end_char": 17578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 23 of the Act provided that any amount paid, collected or recovered or purported to have been paid, co)lected or recovered as tax or penalty under the provisions' of Part III of the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 or rules made thereunder during the period beginning with the first day of April 1950 and ending on the thirtyfirst day of July 1961, shall be deemed to have been validly levied, paid, collected or recovered under the provisions of this Act."}}, {"text": "thirtyfirst day of July 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17597, "end_char": 17625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 23 of the Act provided that any amount paid, collected or recovered or purported to have been paid, co)lected or recovered as tax or penalty under the provisions' of Part III of the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 or rules made thereunder during the period beginning with the first day of April 1950 and ending on the thirtyfirst day of July 1961, shall be deemed to have been validly levied, paid, collected or recovered under the provisions of this Act."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17894, "end_char": 17908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In repelling this contention, Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed thus:-\n\n\"If a statute paBsed by the legislature is challenged in proceedings before a court and the challenge is ultimately sustained and the statute is struck down.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19812, "end_char": 19816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These observations which were made in resoect of a validating Act apply fully to a legislation as in the Act", "statute": "These observations which were made in resoect of a validating Act apply fully to a legislation as in the Act"}}, {"text": "January l, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19977, "end_char": 19992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, urges the learned counsel, s. 3 of the Act while giving to the rates of wages fixed by the Act retrospective effect from the lst January 1959 has afsb made wages at these new rates payable on January l, 1959 for the past period."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20117, "end_char": 20122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20251, "end_char": 20255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20259, "end_char": 20264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20271, "end_char": 20280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20284, "end_char": 20289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20983, "end_char": 20987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January I, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21047, "end_char": 21062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the legal position were as urged by the learned counsel,' that s. 3 made the new rates of wages for the past period payable on January I, 1959 or the apprehension that the employer might be made to pay heavy compensation may well be true."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21271, "end_char": 21276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21441, "end_char": 21445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22158, "end_char": 22163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the sentence is sought to be read as saying: -\n\nN a.rottam.tku\n\n•• Sta•e of Madhya\n\nPradMh\n\nDrt-9 Gupta, J.\n\nNarottamdas\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPtadesh\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\n\"the said minim um rates of wages shall be payable by the employer in the said scheduled employments with effect from !"}}, {"text": "Narottamdas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22169, "end_char": 22180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the sentence is sought to be read as saying: -\n\nN a.rottam.tku\n\n•• Sta•e of Madhya\n\nPradMh\n\nDrt-9 Gupta, J.\n\nNarottamdas\n\nState of Madhya\n\nPtadesh\n\nDas Gupta, J.\n\n\"the said minim um rates of wages shall be 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23550, "end_char": 23554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23574, "end_char": 23579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23584, "end_char": 23588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23596, "end_char": 23613, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 12 to 30A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23737, "end_char": 23755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23804, "end_char": 23809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23941, "end_char": 23950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23954, "end_char": 23959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24382, "end_char": 24386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24555, "end_char": 24559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24615, "end_char": 24667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24774, "end_char": 24784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance 1962", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25038, "end_char": 25043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance 1962", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25536, "end_char": 25541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance 1962", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Ordinance 1962"}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25549, "end_char": 25572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25818, "end_char": 25826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25851, "end_char": 25856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25864, "end_char": 25887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26368, "end_char": 26373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26381, "end_char": 26404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26947, "end_char": 26952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27131, "end_char": 27136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27447, "end_char": 27451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27456, "end_char": 27460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27669, "end_char": 27679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Naroftamd1is", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27842, "end_char": 27854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20(1) of the Constitution, is based on the assumption that the new rates of wages became payable on the Ist Januar~ 1959 even as regards the\n\nDo• o.., ta, J •.\n\n191J4\n\nNaroftamd1is\n\nStak of MadAya\n\nJ>,(u, wi\n\nDas Gupl.a, J.\n\npast period.", "canonical_name": "Naroftamd1is"}}, {"text": "Das Gupl.a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27883, "end_char": 27893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20(1) of the Constitution, is based on the assumption that the new rates of wages became payable on the Ist Januar~ 1959 even as regards the\n\nDo• o.., ta, J •.\n\n191J4\n\nNaroftamd1is\n\nStak of MadAya\n\nJ>,(u, wi\n\nDas Gupl.a, J.\n\npast period.", "canonical_name": "Das Gupl.a"}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28013, "end_char": 28024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28262, "end_char": 28273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "!st January 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28344, "end_char": 28360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the new rates of wages for the past period became payable not on the !"}}, {"text": "21st June\n\n1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28372, "end_char": 28387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st January 1959 but on the 21st June\n\n1962."}}, {"text": "Art. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28449, "end_char": 28459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_82_88_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "lrlarch 9\n\nSUPREJ\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\nA. P. KRISHNASAMI NAIDU ETC. v.\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS (With connected Petitions)\n\n[J 964]\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR. C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKR!, JJ.J\n\nMadras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Mad. 58 of 1961) ss. 5(1), 50-Provisions for land ceiling and compensation-If violative of Art. 14--Constitution. of India, Arts. 14, 19, 31(2).\n\nThe constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 was attacked on the ground that it violated Arts. 14, 19, 31 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nHeld (i) The provisions of s. 5(1) of the Act result' in discrimination between persons equally circumstanced and are thu& violative of Art .. 14 of the Constitution. As this section is the basis of Chapter II of the Act, the whole chapter must fall along with it.\n\nThe ratio of Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R 829 applies with full force to the present case.\n\n(ii) The provisions in s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act with respect to compensc.tion are discriminatory and violate Art. 14 of the Constitut'on.\n\nKarimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala [1962] Supp. l S.C.R 829, followed.\n\n(iii) Ss. 5 'and 50 are the pivotal provisions of the Act, and as they fall, the whole Act must be struck down as unconstitutional.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions 1, 7, 8, 10, 53 and 76 of 1963.\n\nPetitions under Art 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nR. V. S. Mani and K. R. Shama, for the petitioner (in W.P. Nos. 1 and 76 of 1963).\n\nR. V. S. Mani and T. R. V. Sastri, for the petitioner (in W.P. Nos. 7, 8, 10 and 53).\n\nA. V. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam. for the respondent (in the petitions).\n\nI. N. Shroff, for the interveners Nos. I and 5 (in all the petitions).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for intervener No. 2 (in W.P. No. I of 1963).\n\nC. P. Lal, for intervener No. 3 (in W.P. No. 1 of 1963).\n\nR. H. Dhebar, for intervener No. 4 (in W.P. No. 1 of ' 1963).\n\nS. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-Genera/, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for intervener No. 6 (in W.P. No. 1 of 1963).\n\nMarch 9, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO, J.-These six petitions under Art. 32 of Constitution raise a common question about the contitution . ality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act, No. 58 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which was assented to by the President on April 13, 1962 and came into force on publication in the Fort. St. George Ga1.ette on May 2. 1962. The constitutionality of the Act is attacked on the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution. It is not necessary to set out in full the attack made on the constitutionality of the Act in these petitions. It will be enough if we indicate the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act under Art. 14. The first of these is with respect to s. 5 of the Act which lays down the cejling area. The second is on s. 50 of the Act read with Sch. III thereof, which provides for compensation. It is urged that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and is terefore open to attack in case it violates Art. 14, 19 or 31. The petitioners in this connection rely on the judgment of tliis Court in Karimbil Kwihikoman v. State of Kera/a(').\n\nBefore we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act. Chapter I is preliminary, Section 3 thereof provides for various definitions, some of which we shall refer to later.\n\nChapter II deals with fixation of ceiling on land holdings.\n\nSection 5 thereof fixes the ceiling area. The other sections provide for determining surplus land, and s.18 provides for the acquisition of surplus land which vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. Chapter III provides for ceiling on future acquisition and restriction on. certain transfers. Chapter IV provides for the constitution and functions of the land board. Chapter V provides for the constitution and functions of the sugar factory board. Chapter VI provides for compensation. Section 50 thereof read with Sch. III lays down the mode for determining compensation for the land acquired by the overnment and other ancillary matters. Chapter VII proV1des for survey and settlement of lands in the transferred territory which came to the State of Madras by virtue of the\n\nStats eorganisation ct of 1956. Chapter VIII provides for.\n\ncultJvag tenants' ceiling area. Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act.\n\nChapter X provides for land tribunals and Chapter XI for a_ppeals and revision. Chapter XII provides for certain penalties and ocedure while Chapter XIII provides for :disposal of land aC<Jurred. by the Governme!1t under the Act. Chapter XIV d~ with mJSCCllaneous proVISions, including s.IIO, which proV1des for the framing of rules .\n\n..4.P.K,;,-.,.;\n\nNaid• do.\n\nStal< of JI adnlf\n\nWaidoo, J.\n\n.A .P. Kriali...,.mi\n\nNaitl• etc.\n\nBlale of Jladras\n\nw-.J.\n\nSBPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]'\n\nThe main purpose of the Act is to provide for a ceiling on land holdings, for determining surplus land which would be acquired by Government and for payment of compensation therefor. The Act is applicable to agricultural land as defined in s. 3(22) and is mainly concerned with persons holding lands in ryotwari settlement or in any other wa, y subjc; ct to payment of revenue direct to the Government. It is not in dispute that the Act is not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and it is in this background tha.t we shall consider the attack based on Art. 14 on the two main provisions of the Act relating to ceiling area under s. 5 and compensation under s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act.\n\nIt is first necessary to read certain definitions in s 3. Section 3(14) defines family as follows:-\n\n\" 'family' in relation to a person means the person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and his or her-\n\n(i) minor sons and unmarried daughters; and\n\n(ii) Minor grandsons and unmarried grand daughters in the male line, whose father and mother are dead.\" It is unnecessary to refer to the explanation of s. 3(14), for present purposes. Section 3 (34) is in these terms: -\n\n\" 'person' includes any trust, company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not.\" Section 3 (45) is as follows: -\n\n\" 'surplus land' means the land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area and declared to be sur plus land under sections 12, 13 or 14.\" Section 5 is in these terms : -\n\n\"5. (!) {a) Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII,' the ceiling area in the case of every person and, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members. shall be 30 standard acres .\n\n(b) The ceiling area In the case of every family consisting of more than five members shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII, be 30 standard acres together with an additional S standard acres for every member of the family in excess of five.\n\n(2) For the purposes of this section, all the lands held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family.\n\n(3) (a) In calculating the extent of land held by a\n\n1P64 member of a family or by an individual person, A. P. Kn.A ...... > the share of the member of the family or of the Naid• ttc. individual person in the land held by an undivided Bum ef Mlldtv Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanthana family or a Nambudiri Illom shall Wane.loo, J. be taken into account.\n\n(b) In calculating the extent of land held by a family or by an individual person, the share of the family or of the individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not) or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company) shall be taken into account.\n\nExplanation-For the purposes of this section-\n\n(a) the share of a member of a family or of an individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakkattayam tarwad, an Aliyasanathana family or a Nambudiri Illom. and\n\n(b) the share of a family or of an individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not), or by a company (other than a non-agricultural company), shall be deemed to be the extent of Jand-\n\n(i) which, in case such share is held on the date of the commencement of this Act, would have been allotted to such member, person or family had such land been partitioned or divided, as the case may be, on such date; or (ill which, in case such share is acquired in any manner whatsoever after the date of the commencement of this Act. would be allotted to such member, person or. family if a partition or division were to take place on the date of the preparation of the draft statement under sub-section (I) of section 10. ·\n\n\"(4) ..\n\nIt is unnecessary to consider the rest of s. 5 for present purposes .\n\n. The. attack o~ s. 5 (I) is that it is hit by Art. 14 inasmuch as 1t demes qahty fore the Jaw or equal protection of law to prsons sunilarly. s.1tuate, and reliance is placed in this connect10n on the decmon of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman('~. In tha~ case this Court was considering the Kerala Agranan Relat10ns Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the\n\n1961 Kerala Act). The argument is that as in the Kerala Act, so in A P Kriai . the present Act, the word \"family\" has been given an artificial Naidv. ;:::-.., definition which does not conform to any kind of natural ... families prevalent in the State. namely. Hindu undivided .si.u. •I lladwu family, Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanathana family or Waachoo, J Nambudiri Illom, and that a double standard has been fixed in s. 5(1) in the matter of providing ceiling. It is therefore .urged that the ratio of that decision fully applies to the present Act. Therefore, s. 5(1) should be struck down as violative of Art l 4 in the same manner as s. 58 of the Kerala Act was struck down.\n\nWe are of opinion that this contention is correct and the .ratio of that case applies with full force to the present case.\n\nIt was observed in that case that \"where the ceiling is fixed . . . . . . . . . by a double standard and over and above that the family has been given an artificial definition which dces not correspond with a natural family as known to personal' law, there is bound to be discrimination resulting from such a provision\". In the present case also \"family\" has been given an artificial definition as will immediately be clear on reading .s. 30 4), which we have set out above. It is true that this definition of \"family\" in s. 3(14) is not exactly the same as in the Kerala Act. Even so there can be no doubt that the definition -0f the word \"family\" in the present case is equally artificial'.\n\nFurther in the Kerala Act s. 58 fixed a double standard for the purpose of ceiling; in the present case s. 5(l)(a) fixes a double standard though there is this distinction that in s. SU) the same ceiling is fixed in the case of a person as in the case of a family consisting of not more than five members. namely. 30 standard acres while in the Kerala Act, the ceiling fixed for a family of not more than five was double that for an adult unmarried person. But that in our opinion makes no difference in substance. The provision of s. 5(0 results in discrimination between persons equally circumstanced and is thus\n\nviola.le of Art. l 4 of the Constitution. This will be clear from a simple example of an undivided Hindu family, which we may give. Take the case of a joint Hindu family consisting of a father. two major sons and two minor sons. and assume that the mother is dead. Assume further that this natural family has 300 standard acres of Janel. Oearly according to tl1e personal Jaw, if there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head.\n\nNow apply s. 5(1) to this family. The two major sons being not members of the family because of the artificial definition given to \"family\" in s. 304) of the Act will be entitled to . 30 standard acres each as individuals and the rest of their holdings i.e. 30 standard acres in the case of each will be -surplus land. But the father and the two minor sons being an artificial family as defined in s. 3(14) will be entitled to 30\n\nstandard acres between them and will thus lose 150 standaru 1964 acres, which will becoine surplus land. This shows clearly A.P. Kriahmuam; how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with Naidu etc. the artificial definition of \"family\" will result in complete is- State ; j Madras crimination between these five members of a natural family.\n\nUnder the Hindu law each member would be entitled to one- Wanchoa, tifth share in the 300 standard acres belooging to the family.\n\nUnder the Act however the two major sons will keep 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons together will keep 30 standard acres which work out to 10 standard acres each. The two major sons will thus lose 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons will lose lifty standard acres each. No justification has been shown on behalf of the State for such discriminatory treatment resulting in the case of members of a joint Hindu family; nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly results from the application of s. 5 (l) of the Act is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Examples can be multiplied with reference to joint Hindu families which would show that discrimination will result on the application of this provision. Similarly we are of opinion that discrimination will result in the case of Marumakkattayam family, Aliyasanthana family and a Nambudiri Illom, particularly in the case of the former two where the husband and wife do not belong to the same family. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of s. 58 of the Kerala Act so in the case of s. 5 (1) of the Act discrimination is writ large on the consequences that follow from s. 5()). We therefore hold that s. 5(1) is violative of the fundamental' right enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. As the section is the basis of Chapter II of the Act, the whole Chapter must fall along with it.\n\nNext we come to the provisions as to compensation contained in s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act. Here again we are of opinion that the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's(') case fully applies to the scheme of compensation provided in the Act which is as discriminatory as was the scheme in the Kerala Act. Learned counsel for the respondent however contends that Sch. III does not provide for any cut in the purchase price as was the case in the Kerala Act, and therefore the provisions in the Act are not discriminatory. If we look at the substance of the matter, however, we find that there is really no difference between the provisions for compenation in the Kerala Act and the provisions in respect thereof m the Act, though the provisions in the Act are differently worded. What was done m the Kerala Act was to arrive at the figure. of compensation .on certain principles, and a cut was then _1mpoed on the figure thus arrived at and this cut progressively mcreased by slabs of Rs. 15,000. Jn the present\n\n1964 case, a converse method has been adopted and the provision A. p, Kriahnasami is that first the net annual income is .arrived at and thereafter\n\nNaidu etc. compensation is provided for slabs of Rs. 5,000 ea.ch of net Stal• o/itaaras income. For the first slab of Rs. 5.000, the compensation is 12 times the net annual income, for the second slab of WancAoo, J.\n\nRs. 5.000 it is 11 times, for the third slab of Rs. 5,000 it is ten times and thereafter it is nine times.\n\nLet us now work out this slab system. Take four cases where the net annual income is respectively Rs. 5,000, Rs. 10,000, Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 20,000. The first person whose net annnal income is Rs. 5,000 will get Rs. 60,000 as compensation, the second person whose net annual income is Rs. 10,000 will get Rs. 1,15,000, the third person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 will get Rs. 165,000 and the person with a net annual income of Rs. 20.000 will get Rs. 2, l 0,000. Jf the same multiplier had been applied as in the case of the first slab of Rs. 5,000 to the other three slabs also, these persons would have got compensation of Rs. 1,20.000, Rs. 1,80,000 and Rs. 2,40,000. This will show that in effect there is a cut of about 4 per cent on the total compensation which corresponds to the purchase price in the Kerala Act in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 10,000, of about 8 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000 and about L?. per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 20.000. Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act, its effect is the same, namely, as the total net income goes up after the first slab of Rs. 5,000 there is a progressive cut in the total compensation just as was the case in the Kerala Act. The argument that the cut is justified on. the same basis as higher rates of income-tax on higher slabs of income has already been rejected by this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's case('). Therefore, for the reasons given in that case, we are of opinion that the provisions contained in s. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act with respect to compensation are discriminatory and violate Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nSections 5 and 50 are the pivotal provisions of the Act, and if they fall, then we are of opinion that the whole Act must be struck down as unconstitutional. The working of the entire Act depends on s. 5 which provides for ceiling and s. 50 which provides for compensation. If these sections are unconstitu- . tional, as we hold they are, the whole Act must fall.\n\nWe therefore allow the petitions and strike down the Act as unconstitutional. The petitioners will get their costs from the State of Madras-one set of hearing fee.\n\nPetitio111 allowed. (') [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 829.", "total_entities": 93, "entities": [{"text": "A. P. KRISHNASAMI NAIDU ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. P. 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V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1522, "end_char": 1535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani and K. R. Shama, for the petitioner (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "K. R. Shama", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1540, "end_char": 1551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani and K. R. Shama, for the petitioner (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "T. R. V. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1624, "end_char": 1639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani and T. R. V. Sastri, for the petitioner (in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "A. V. Ranganadham Chetty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1693, "end_char": 1717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam.", "canonical_name": "A. V. Ranganadham Chetty"}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1722, "end_char": 1734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. 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Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2063, "end_char": 2074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-Genera/, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2243, "end_char": 2250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO, J.-These six petitions under Art.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2281, "end_char": 2288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2387, "end_char": 2418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 13, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2515, "end_char": 2529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which was assented to by the President on April 13, 1962 and came into force on publication in the Fort."}}, {"text": "May 2. 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2601, "end_char": 2612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St. George Ga1.ette on May 2."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2690, "end_char": 2712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act", "statute": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2941, "end_char": 2948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act", "statute": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2988, "end_char": 2992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act", "statute": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act"}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3055, "end_char": 3060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act", "statute": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3181, "end_char": 3188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act", "statute": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3262, "end_char": 3273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act", "statute": "Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3548, "end_char": 3557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act", "statute": "Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3701, "end_char": 3710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act", "statute": "Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act"}}, {"text": "s.18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3804, "end_char": 3808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act", "statute": "Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4200, "end_char": 4210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act", "statute": "Before we consider the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act we may briefly indicate the scheme of the Act"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4466, "end_char": 4472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter VII proV1des for survey and settlement of lands in the transferred territory which came to the State of Madras by virtue of the\n\nStats eorganisation ct of 1956."}}, {"text": "Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4583, "end_char": 4665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Waidoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5051, "end_char": 5057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stal< of JI adnlf\n\nWaidoo, J.\n\n.A .P. Kriali...,.mi\n\nNaitl• etc."}}, {"text": "s. 3(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5394, "end_char": 5402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5614, "end_char": 5621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IX provides for exemption of certain lands from the application of the Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5717, "end_char": 5724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5822, "end_char": 5827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5913, "end_char": 5916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5918, "end_char": 5931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6285, "end_char": 6293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6477, "end_char": 6486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 12, 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6628, "end_char": 6643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6652, "end_char": 6661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9159, "end_char": 9169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9225, "end_char": 9229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9271, "end_char": 9275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9301, "end_char": 9308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9397, "end_char": 9400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karimbil Kunhikoman('~.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9480, "end_char": 9503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s.1tuate, and reliance is placed in this connect10n on the decmon of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman('~. In tha~ case this Court was considering the Kerala Agranan Relat10ns Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the\n\n1961 Kerala Act).", "canonical_name": "Karimbil Kunhikoman('~."}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10040, "end_char": 10047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10184, "end_char": 10191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10260, "end_char": 10265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10862, "end_char": 10867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10948, "end_char": 10956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Further in the Kerala Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11120, "end_char": 11145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11146, "end_char": 11151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Further in the Kerala Act", "statute": "Further in the Kerala Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11224, "end_char": 11234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Further in the Kerala Act", "statute": "Further in the Kerala Act"}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12369, "end_char": 12375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12624, "end_char": 12632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.P. Kriahmuam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12781, "end_char": 12795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This shows clearly A.P. Kriahmuam; how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with Naidu etc."}}, {"text": "Naidu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12857, "end_char": 12862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This shows clearly A.P. Kriahmuam; how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with Naidu etc."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13717, "end_char": 13721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13757, "end_char": 13764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14235, "end_char": 14240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14277, "end_char": 14281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5()", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14363, "end_char": 14369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14395, "end_char": 14402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14455, "end_char": 14462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14645, "end_char": 14650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karimbil Kunhikoman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14746, "end_char": 14765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here again we are of opinion that the decision of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman's(') case fully applies to the scheme of compensation provided in the Act which is as discriminatory as was the scheme in the Kerala Act.", "canonical_name": "Karimbil Kunhikoman('~."}}, {"text": "III does not provide for any cut in the purchase price as was the case in the Kerala Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14966, "end_char": 15054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "What was done m the Kerala Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15378, "end_char": 15408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "WancAoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15964, "end_char": 15971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5.000, the compensation is 12 times the net annual income, for the second slab of WancAoo, J.\n\nRs.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17744, "end_char": 17749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act", "statute": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17840, "end_char": 17847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act", "statute": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 5 and 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17870, "end_char": 17887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act", "statute": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18069, "end_char": 18073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act", "statute": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act"}}, {"text": "s. 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18105, "end_char": 18110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act", "statute": "Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18359, "end_char": 18374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners will get their costs from the State of Madras-one set of hearing fee."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_831_837_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "' '\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME 001.;'RT REPORTS\n\nGURBUX SINGH\n\nBHOORALAL\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J .• K.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA\n\nAYYANGAR, JJ.J\n\nW ANCHOO.\n\nAND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nCivil Procedure-Suit filed for recovery of possession m•d mesne profits-In a previous suit a decree for mesne profits u:as passed in respect of the same land-Wht!ther cause of action same in both suits-Subsequent suit whether barred under provisions of the Code-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), Order 2 rr. (2) and (3).\n\nThe plaintiff-respondent brought a suit against the appellant for recovery of possession of certain property and for mesne profits. The plaintiff claimed recovery of possession and mesne profits on the ground that he was the absolute owner of the property .described in the plaint and the defendant was in wrongful possession of t)le same. fo the plaint the plaintiff made reference to a previous suit that had been filed by him and his mother (C.S. 28 of 1950) wherein a claim had been made against the defendant for the recovery of the mesne profits in regard to the same property for the period ending February l 0,\n\n1950. fa the previous suit the mense profits had been decreed.\n\nIn his written statement in the present suit the defendantappellant raised a technical plea under Order 2 rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code to the maintainability of the suit.\n\nBefore evidence was led by the parties the trial court decided this preliminary issue raised by the defendant. The trial court held that the suit was barred under 0. 2 r. 2 of the Code.\n\nOn appeal, the Appellate Court held that the plea of a bar under Order 2 rule 2. Civil Procedure Code should not have teen entertained at all because the pleadings in the earlier suit\n\nC.S. 28 of 1950 had not been filed in the present case.\n\nTherefore, the Appellate Court set aside the order of the trial Court. Against this order the defendant preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the High Court. The appellant obtained special leave against the judgment of the High Court.\n\nHence the appeal:- Held: (i) A plea under Order 2 rule 2 of the Code based on the existence of a former pleading cannot be entertained when the pleading on which it rests has not been produced. It is for this reason that a plea of a bar under 0. 2 r. 2 of the Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. In other words a plea under 0. 2 r. 2 of the Code cannot be made out except on proof of the plaint in the previous suit the filing of which is said to create the bar. Wlithout placing before the court the plaint in which those facts were alleged, the defendant cannot invite the court to speculate or infer by a process of deduction what those facts might be with refer€nce to the reliefs which were then claimed. On the facts. of this case it has to be held that the plea of a bar under 0, 2 r. 2 of the Code should not have been entertained at all by\n\nApril 22\n\n196l\n\nGurbux Singh v.\n\nJJluJQralal\n\nthe trial Court because the pleadings in civil suit No. 28 of liJ]iO_ were not filed by the appellant in support of this plea.\n\n(ii) in order that a plea of a bar under 0. 2 r. 2(.•\\ of the Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out (i) that the second suit was in !espect. of the sa::de cause of action as that on which the previous suit v.:as _bas •\n\n(ii) that in respect of that cause of act10n he plamllff. was entitled to more than one relief. (iii) tht bemg thus ent:tle~ w more than one relief the plamtiff, without leave obtame from the Court omitted to sue for the rellef for which the second suit had been filed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 583 of\n\n1961. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and decree dated August 12, 1959, of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Misc. First Appeal No. 50 of 1956.\n\nGopal Singh, for the appellant.\n\nB. P. Maheshwari, for the respondent.\n\nApril 22, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyan9ar, J.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.--The facts giving rise to this appeal, by special leave, are briefly as folows: The respondent- Bhooralal-brought a suit-Civil Suit 20 1954-in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Kekri against the appellant claiming possession of certain property which was described in the plaint and for mesne profits. The allegation in the plaint was that the plaintiff was the absolute owner of the said property of which the defendant was in wrongful possession and that in spite of demands he had failed to vacate the same and was therefore liable to pay the mesne profits claimed. In the plaint he made reference to a previous suit that had been filed by him and his mother (C.S.\n\n28 of 1950) wherein a claim had been made against the defendant for the 'recovery of the mesne profits in regard to the same property for the period ending with February 10,\n\n1950. It was also stated that mesne profits had been decreed in the said suit. In the Written Statement that was filed by the present appellant, besides disputing the claim of the plaintiff to the reliefs prayed for on the merits, a technical plea. to the maintainability of the suit was also raised in these terms:\n\n\"That 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code is a bar to the suit. When the suit referred to in paragraph 2 of the plaint was filed the plaintiff had a cause of action for the reliefs also. He having omitted to sue for possession in that suit, is now barred from claiming relief of possession. No second suit for recovery of mesne profits is maintainable in law.\n\n... •\n\nSince the plaintiff had lost his remedy for the relief of possession he cannot seek recovery of mesne profits also.\" On these pleadings the learned Subordinate Judge frameli 5 issues and of these the 4th issue ran :\n\n\"Whether 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code is a bar?\".\n\nBefore evidence was led by the parties issue no. 4 was argued before the learned trial Judge as a preliminary issue and the Court recorded a finding that the suit was barred by the provision named and directed the dismissal of the suit.\n\nThe plaintiff preferred an appeal from this decree to the additional District Judge and the appellate Court considered this plea as regards the bar under 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code on two alternative bases. In the first place, the learned District Judge pointed out that the pleadings in the earlier suit-C.S. 28 of 1950-had not been field in the case and made part of the record, so that it was not known what the precise allegations of the plaintiff in his previous suit were.\n\nFor this reason the learned District Judge held that the plea of a bar under 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code should not have been entertained at all. He also considered the question as to whether, if the plea was available, it could have succeeded.\n\nOn this he referred to the conflict of Judicial opinion on this point and held that if the point did arise for decision he would have decided in favour of the plaintiff and treated the cause of action for a suit for mesne profits as different from the cause of action for the relief of possession of property from a trespasser. In view, however, of his finding on the first point as to there being no material on the record to justify the plea of a bar under 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code the learned District Judge did not rest his decision on his view of the law as regards the construction of 0. 2. r. 2(3). In the circumstances he set aside the dismissal of the suit and remanded it to the trial Court for being decided on the merits in accordance with the law.\n\nThe defendant-the appellant before us-preferred a second appeal to the High Court of Rajasthan and th•~ learned Single Judge dismissed this appeal. It is from this judgment that the appellants have preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave .\n\nAs already indicated, there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question whether a suit for possession of immoveable property and a suit for the recovery of mesne profits from the same property are both based on the same cause of action, for it is only if these two reliefs are based on \"the same cause of action\" that the plea of 0. 2. r. 2., Civil Procedure Code\n\nL 'P(D)ISCT-2;\n\nGurbu:e Singl v.\n\nBliooralal\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nGurbux Singh\n\n•• Bhooralal\n\nA'!J\"J<Jnya;, J.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nthat was raised by the appellant could succeed. Clause (3) of\n\n0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code that is relevant in this context reads:\n\n\"(3) A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any reliefs so omitted.\"\n\nSome of the High Courts, notably Madras, have in this connection, referred to the terms of 0. 2. r. 4 which runs:\n\n\"R. 4. No cause of action shall, unless with the leave of the Court. be joined with a suit for the recovery of immoveable property, except-\n\n(a) claims for mesne profits or arrears of rent in respect of the property claimed or any part thereof; lb) claims for damages for breach of any contract under which the property or any part thereof is held; and ·\n\n(c) claims in which the relief sought is based on the same cause of action:\n\nProvided that nothing in this rule shall be deemed to prevent any party in a suit for foreclosure or redemption from asking to be put into possession of the mortgaged property\".\n\nas an aid to the construction of the term 'cause of action' and the expression 'relief based on the same cause of action' in\n\n0. 2. r. 2(3).\n\nReading these two provisions together it has been held that the cause of action for suits for possession of immoveable property and the cause of action for a suit in respect of mesne profits from the same property are distinct and different.\n\nOn the other hand, it has been held. particularly by the High Court of Allahabad that the basis of a claim for mesne profits is wrongful possession of property and so is a claim for possession and thus the cause of action for claiming either relief is the same viz., wrongful possession of property to which the plaintiff is entitled. On this reasoning it has been held that a plaintiff who brings in the first instance a suit for possession alone or for mesne profits alone is afterwards debarred from suing for the other relief under 0. 2. r. 2(3).\n\nThe learned trial Judge had, after referring to the conflict of authority,' expressed his preference for the Allahabad view and had, therefore, upheld the defence.\n\nAt the stage of the appeal the learned District Judge had, as already pointed out, expressed his preference for the other view. The\n\nlearned Single Judge expressed his concurrence with the learned District Judge in preferring the Madras view as against the decisions of the Allahabad High Court.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant sought to argue that the Allahabad view was more in accordance with principle and with the proper construction of 0. 2. r. 2(3), Civil Procedure Code. We do not consider it necessary to examine this conflict of judicial opinion in this case as, in our opinion, the learned District Judge was right in holding that the appellant had not placed before the Court material for the purpose of founding a plea of 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nIn order that a plea of a bar under O. 2. r. 2(3), Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out (!) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based, (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief, (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court, omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the later suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarly be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule.\n\nAs the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that we consider that a plea of a bar under O. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. It is common ground that the pleadings in C.S. 28 of 1950 were not filed by the appellant in the present suit as evidence in support of his plea under 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code. The learned trial Judge,· however, without these pleadings being on the record inferred what the cause of action should have been from the reference to the previous suit contained in the plaint as a matter of deduction .. At the stage of the appeal the learned District Judge noticed this lacuna in the appellant's case and pointed out, in our opinion rightly, that without the plaint in the previous suit being on the record, a plea of a bar under 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code was not maintainable. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, drew our attention to a passage in the judgment of the learned Judge in the High Court which read: \"\n\nJ, IP(D) !SCI-27(\")\n\nGurbux Sing•\n\nBkooralal\n\nAyuangar, J.\n\nGvb11x Si11gh\n\nBkoor11lal\n\nAyyangnr, J.\n\n\"The plaint, written statement or the judgment of the earlier court has not been filed by any of the parties to the suit.\n\nThe only document filed was the judgment in appeal in the earlier suit. The two courts have, however, freely cited from the record of the earlier suit. The counsel for the parties have likewise done so. That file is also before this Court.\" It was his submission that from this passage we should infer that the parties had, by agreement, consented to make the pleadings in the earlier suit part of the record in the present suit. We are unable to agree with this interpretation of these observations. The statement of' the learned Judge \"the two courts have, however, freely cited from the record of the earlier suit\" is obviously inaccurate as the learned District Judge specifically pointed out that the pleadings in the earlier suit were not part of the record and on that very ground had rejected the plea of the bar under 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code. Nor can we find any basis for the suggestion that the learned Judge had admitted these documents at the second appeal stage under 0. 41. r. 27, Civil Procedure Code by consent of parties. There is nothing on the record to suggest such an agreement or such an order, assuming that additional evidence could legitimately be admitted in a second appeal under 0. 41. r. 27, Civil Procedure Code. We can therefore proceed only on the basis that the pleadings in the earlier suit were not part of the record in the present suit.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant, however, urged that in his plaint in the present suit the respondent had specifically referred to the previous suit having been for mesne profits and that as mesne profits could not be claimed except from a trespasser there should also have been an allegation in the previous suit that the defendant was a trespasser in wrongful possession of the property and that alone could have been the basis for claiming mesne profits. We are unable to accept this argument. In the first place, it is admitted that the plaint. in the present suit was Jn Hindi and that the word 'mesne profits' is an English translation of some expression used in the original. The original of the plaint is not before us and so it is not possible to verify whether the expression 'mesne profits' is an accurate translation of the expression in the original plaint. This apart, we consider that learneµ counsel's argument must be rejected for a more basic reason.\n\nJust as in the case of a plea of res judicata which cannot be established in the absence on the record of the judgment and decree which is pleaded as estoppel, we consider that a plea under 0. 2. r. 2, Civil Procedure Code cannot be made out except on proof of the plaint in the previous suit the filing of which is said to create the bar. As the plea is basically founded '\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREllIJ~ COURT HEPOHTS 837\n\non the identity of the cause of actin in the two suits the defence which raises the bar has necessarily to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. The cause of action would be the facts which the plaintiff had then alleged to support the right to the relief that he claimed. Without placing before the Court the plaint in which those facts were alleged, the defendant cannot invite the Court to speculate or infer by a process of deduction what those facts might be with reference to the reliefs which were then claimed. It is not im- .possible that reliefs were claimed without the necessary averments to justify their grant. From the mere use of the words 'mesne profits' therefore one need not necessarily infer that the possession of the defendant was alleged to be wrongful. 1t is also possible that the expression 'mesne profits' has been used in the present plaint without a proper appreciation of its significance in law. What matters is not the characterisation of the particular sum demanded but what in substance is the allegation on which the claim to the sum was based and as regards the legal relationship on the basis of which that relief was sought. If is because of these reasons that we consider that a plea based on the existence of a former pleading cannot be entertained when the pleading on which it rests has not been produced. We therefore consider that the order of remand passed by the learned Additional District Judge which WM confirmed by the learned Judge in the High Court was right. The merits of the suit have yet to be tried and this has .been directed by the order of remand which we are affirming.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n1~1/j).\n\nUwl_ux Si1h\n\n' Ul1u<1r11ffJ", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "GURBUX SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GURBUX SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHOORALAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHOORALAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AYYANGAR, JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 440, "end_char": 469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 960, "end_char": 965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Order 2 rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1295, "end_char": 1309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Order 2 rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1627, "end_char": 1641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1643, "end_char": 1663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1749, "end_char": 1754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Order 2 rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3949, "end_char": 3960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Singh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3982, "end_char": 3998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ayyan9ar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4081, "end_char": 4089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyan9ar, J.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.--The facts giving rise to this appeal, by special leave, are briefly as folows: The respondent- Bhooralal-brought a suit-Civil Suit 20 1954-in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Kekri against the appellant claiming possession of certain property which was described in the plaint and for mesne profits.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR, JJ"}}, {"text": "Bhooralal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4204, "end_char": 4213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyan9ar, J.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.--The facts giving rise to this appeal, by special leave, are briefly as folows: The respondent- Bhooralal-brought a suit-Civil Suit 20 1954-in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Kekri against the appellant claiming possession of certain property which was described in the plaint and for mesne profits.", "canonical_name": "BHOORALAL"}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Kekri", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4255, "end_char": 4305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nAyyan9ar, J.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.--The facts giving rise to this appeal, by special leave, are briefly as folows: The respondent- Bhooralal-brought a suit-Civil Suit 20 1954-in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Kekri against the appellant claiming possession of certain property which was described in the plaint and for mesne profits."}}, {"text": "S.\n\n28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4788, "end_char": 4794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 10,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4953, "end_char": 4971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the plaint he made reference to a previous suit that had been filed by him and his mother (C.S.\n\n28 of 1950) wherein a claim had been made against the defendant for the 'recovery of the mesne profits in regard to the same property for the period ending with February 10,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5302, "end_char": 5322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6325, "end_char": 6345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6472, "end_char": 6477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6734, "end_char": 6754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7367, "end_char": 7387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7737, "end_char": 7760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant-the appellant before us-preferred a second appeal to the High Court of Rajasthan and th•~ learned Single Judge dismissed this appeal."}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8268, "end_char": 8288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8336, "end_char": 8344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Civil Procedure Code\n\nL 'P(D)ISCT-2;\n\nGurbu:e Singl v.\n\nBliooralal\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nGurbux Singh\n\n•• Bhooralal\n\nA'!J\"J<Jnya;, J.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nthat was raised by the appellant could succeed.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR, JJ"}}, {"text": "Gurbux Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8350, "end_char": 8362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Civil Procedure Code\n\nL 'P(D)ISCT-2;\n\nGurbu:e Singl v.\n\nBliooralal\n\nAyyangar, J.\n\nGurbux Singh\n\n•• Bhooralal\n\nA'!J\"J<Jnya;, J.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nthat was raised by the appellant could succeed.", "canonical_name": "GURBUX SINGH"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8501, "end_char": 8521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8862, "end_char": 8868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of the High Courts, notably Madras, have in this connection, referred to the terms of 0."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9998, "end_char": 10021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "particularly by the High Court of Allahabad that the basis of a claim for mesne profits is wrongful possession of property and so is a claim for possession and thus the cause of action for claiming either relief is the same viz.,"}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10602, "end_char": 10611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned trial Judge had, after referring to the conflict of authority,' expressed his preference for the Allahabad view and had, therefore, upheld the defence."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10932, "end_char": 10952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nlearned Single Judge expressed his concurrence with the learned District Judge in preferring the Madras view as against the decisions of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11118, "end_char": 11138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11408, "end_char": 11428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11482, "end_char": 11502, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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"label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13833, "end_char": 13841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SCI-27(\")\n\nGurbux Sing•\n\nBkooralal\n\nAyuangar, J.\n\nGvb11x Si11gh\n\nBkoor11lal\n\nAyyangnr, J.\n\n\"The plaint, written statement or the judgment of the earlier court has not been filed by any of the parties to the suit.", "canonical_name": "AYYANGAR, JJ"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14809, "end_char": 14829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14975, "end_char": 14995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15201, "end_char": 15221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16529, "end_char": 16549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_838_845_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April 22\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [196t]\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS.\n\nSIRAJUDDIN KHAN\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. S1KRI, JJ.]\n\nMadhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates ..\n\nMahals, Ali&\"tated Lands) Act, 1950 (M. P. Act No. 1 of 1951) Sch. I, r. 2(2)(c).\n\nThe respondent was an owner of an estate in Madhya Pradesh. Under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Aboli-· tion of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 the respondent's estate was vested in the State and he became entitled to compensation. The compensation was to be paid at the rate of ten times the net income. The net income would be calculated by deducting from the gross in-· come, inter alia, the average of the income tax paid in respect of the income from big forest during 30 agricultural years proceeding March 31, 1951. In calculating the net income the Compensation Officer deducted not only income tax but also super tax and the r, espondent appealed to the Settlement Commissioner against the deduction of super tax. On the rejection of the appeal the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court and the High Court held that on a construction of the various provisions of the Act it was wrong to deduct the supertax while calculating tire compensation payable to the respondent. The appellant filed this appeal on special leave granted by this Court.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellant that the object of the r. 2(2) (c} of Schedule I to the Act is to provide a method for ascertaining the net income of an estate and therefore there cannot be any distinction between income tax and super-tax and the expression \"income-tax\" has been used comprehensively to include super-tax also. The contention on behalf of the respondent was that from a historical point as well as from the provisions of the Act it is seen that income tax and super-tax were distinct and separate and the former does not include the latter.\n\nHeld: (i) There are two essential differences between in-- come-tax and super-tax. They are (1) though both the taxes are assessed on the total income of a person, the total income for the purpose of income tax is computed on the basis of income classified chargeable under the different heads mention-ed in s. 6 of the Income-tax Act whereas super-tax is not concerned with the different heads, but is payable on the total income so ascertained and (2) while super-tax 1, except in a few cases, is payable by the assessee direct, the income tax is payabl.e by him direct as well as by deduction.\n\n(ii) Examining the provisions of r. 2(2)(c) Schedule I of the Act it is evident that with the knowledge that under the Income-tax Act two seperate duties namely income-tax and super-tax are imposed the Legislature has used the expression \"income tax\". If the intention was to refer to both the talreS. it would have stated income-tax and super-tax. The menticn or the one and the omission of the other is a sure indication of its intention. The qualification that income-tax paid should have been in respect of the income received from the big ..\n\nforests necessarily excludes super-tax for under the Income- 1964 tax Act no super-tax is payable in respect of the income re- State >I Ma4k\n\nceived from big forest but only in respect of the total income. p,.0.::Aana0t'f:..\n\n(iii) Having regard to the terms of r. 2(2)(c) of Sche- 8 . .., J Kha• dule I to the Act it is clear that income-tax does not take in \"\"' in .super-tax. - Case law reviewed.\n\nBrooks v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, (1914) 7 T.C. 236, Bates. In re: Salmea v. Bates, 1925 Ch. D. 157 and Reckitt\n\nv. Reckitt, (1933) 1 LT.R. 1.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5101\n\n1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 22, 1960 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 35 of 1959.\n\nB. Sen and J. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the .respondent.\n\nApril 22, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSueeA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the Subba Baa, J. question whether the expression \"income-tax\" in cl. (c) of sub-r. (2) of r. of Schedule I to the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estate, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (M.P. Act No. 1 of 1951), hereinafter called the Act, includes super-tax.\n\nThe facts are as follows: The respondent was the zamindar of Bhadra Estate in Balaghat District of Madhya Pradesh. His estate was known as Bahela Zamindari consisting of 78 villages. The Act came into force on January 26,\n\n1951. Under the Act the proprietary rights of the zamindari vested in the State and he became entitled to compensation in respect of the said rights in the said villages under s. 8 .of the Act The compensation was to be determined in accordance with the rules contained in Schedule I to the Act.\n\nUnder r. 8 of Schedule I the zamindar would be entitled to compensation at 10 times the net income. The net income would be calculated by deducting from the gross income, inter alia, the average of the income-tax paid in respect of the income from big forest during 30 agricultural years preceding March 31, 1951. On November 30, 1951, the Compensation Officer determined the compensation payable to the respondent at Rs. 2,21,330-12-6. In arriving at that figure he deducted not only the income-tax payable by the respondent but also the super-tax and sur-charge payable by him. 1:he average of the income-tax paid by him during the material 30 years was only Rs. 3.760-2-9, but if the average of 'the super-tax and sur-charge was included, the average came\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 to Rs. 7,070-8-0. The result was that the net yearly income State of Jfadhya of the estate was reduced by Rs. 3, JJ 0-5-3 and compensation Prud\"h aml. Other• was paid to him on the basis of the amount so reduced. The\n\nSirajud~\",. 1'ha• respondent moved the Settlement Commissioner under s. 15\n\n- of the Act for enhancement of the compensation. but the Subba Rao, J. Commissioner confirmed the order of the Compensation\n\nOfficer. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application in the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Compensation Officer. ThC' High Court held. on a construction of the relevant provisions of the Act, that super-tax should not be taken into account while calculating the compensation payable to the respondent. The State of Madhya Pradesh has filed the present appeal against the order of the High Court.\n\nMr. Sen. learned counsel for the State, contends that the object of r. 2(2)(c) is to provide a method for ascertaining the net income of an estate, that in that context there cannot be any justifiable distinction between income-tax and super-tax. for both of them have, inter a/ia, to be deducted -from the gross income to arrive at the net income. and that the Legislature used the word \"income-tax\" in/ its comprehensive sense so as to take in super-tax. He adds that under the Income-tax Act super-tax is only an additional duty of income-tax and, therefore. a part of it.\n\nMr. Rajagopala Sastri. learned counsel for the respondent-assessee, argues that in construing a provision of an exproprietary Act. the Court will have to construe such a pro-- vision strictly and if so construed, super-tax cannot be included in the expression \"income-tax\". He took us through the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act to support his contention that super-tax is different in its origin, description. scope, incidents and collection from the income-tax.\n\nThe question turns upon the correct interpretation of r. 2(2)(c) of the rules of Schedule I to the Act. The relevant provisions of the Act and the rule read: Section 8(1) of the Act: \"The State Government shall pay to every proprietor, who is divested of proprietary rights, compensation determined in accordance with the rules contained in Schedule\n\nI.\" Schedule I to the Act Rule 2. (2). The net income of an estate or mahal in the Central Provinces shall be calculated by deducting from the gross income the sums under the following heads, namely:- • * * • *\n\n(c) the average of the income-tax paid in respect of the income received from big forest during\n\nthe period of thirty agricultural years preceding\n\n1!J64 the agricultural year in which the relevant date Statc of A!..U.ya falls; Pradesh ,, nd Othera\n\nv • • • • • • 8ir11juddin Khan Rule 8. (!) The amount of compensation in the Cen Subba Rao, J. tral Provinces and in Berar shall be ten times the net income determined in accordance with the rules herein contained.\n\nThe combined effect of the said provisions is that for the purpose of ascertaining the net income of an estate one of the deductible items is the average of the income-tax paid in respect of the income received from the big forest. That average is ascertained on the basis of the income-tax paid during the 30 agricultural years preceding the agricultural year in which the relevant date falls. The compensation payable is ten times the net income ascertained under the rules.\n\nThe relevant date for the purpose of ascertaining the average\n\nis the date specified by notification by the State Government under s. 3 of the Act: for instance, if the relevant date falls in the year 1951, the income-tax paid during the years 1921 to 1951 will afford the basis for arriving at the average.\n\nTo appreciate the distinction between the concepts of income-tax and super-tax a brief history of their incidents will not be inappropriate. Under the Income-tax Act of 1886 the total income from various sources was not the criterion for assessment but the different sources alone were the basis for it. For the first time the 1918 Act introduced the scheme -0f total income for the purpose of determining the rate of tax. Under that Act several heads were enumerated, under which the income of an assessee fell to be charged.\n\nThe 1922 Act went further and enacted that loss under one head of \"income\" can be set off against the profit under another head. Till the 1922 Act super-tax was separately levied. It was first introduced by the Super-tax Act of 1917 and then it was replaced by the 1920 Act. Only in 1922, for the first time, it was incorporated in the Income-tax Act. Though both the taxes are dealt with by the same Act, their distinctive features are maintained. As regards income-tax, in the words of a learned author, \"s. 3 charges the total income, s. 4 define its range, s. 6 qualifies it and ss. 7 to 12 quantify it.\" There are various other sections which provide the machinery for the ascertainment of the total income for assessment and recovery pf tax. As regards super-tax, a separate chapter viz., Ch. IX, deals with it; it comprises ss. 55 to 58. Section 55 is the charging section for the purpose of super-tax; under that section. \"In addition to the inwme-tax charged for any year, there shall be charged, levied\n\nand paid for that year in respect of the total income of the\n\n1964 previous year ............... an additional duty of income-tax\n\nStale of MIU!.hya (in this Act referred to as super-tax) at the rate or rates laid Pradesh and Other• down for that year by a Central Act\". Section 56 says that\n\n8 . . dJ: Kh for the purpose of super-tax, except in specified cases, the\n\n''\"J\" \"' an total income shall be the total income as assessed for the S.Wba Rao, J. purpose of income-tax. Section 56A exempts from super-tax certain dividends. Section 58(1) applies by reference to supertax certain provisions of the Act relating to the charge, assessment, collection and recovery of income-tax. It would be seen from this Chapter that though super-tax is described as an additional duty of income-tax it is not incorporated in the income-tax; its identity is maintained. A self-contained chapter deals .with the charge, assessment, collection and recovery of super-tax. There are essential differences between the two taxes emanating not only from the express provisions contained in Ch. IX but also from the omission to apply the specified sections of the Act to the said tax. Successive Finance Acts also made a distinction between the two taxes. This is not the occasion to notice in detail the differences between the two taxes. It is enough to state that there are pronounced differences between the incidents of the two taxes. But two relevant differences may be noticed, namely, (i) though both the taxes are assessed on the total income of a person, the total income for the purpose of income-tax is computed on the basis of income classified and chargeable under the different heads mentioned in s. 6 of the Act, whereas super-tax is not concerned with the different heads, but is payable on the total income so ascertained; and (ii) while super-tax, except in a few cases, is payable by the assessee direct, the income-tax is payable by him direct as well as by deduction. While in the case of income-tax by reversing the process the tax attributable to a particular source can be ascertained, in the case of super-tax no such process is possible as the said liability springs into legal existence ollly after the total income is ascertained. The only possible method by which the said tax may be split up is by working out the proportion of the tax payable by the assessee in respect of an income from a particular source on the basis of the ratio the said income bears to the total income. But this method is not sanctioned by the Act. It is not legally possible to predicate what particular part of the super-tax is attributable to an income from a particular source. for, unlike in the case of income-tax, total jncome alone is the criterion and the income from different sources is not relevant. To illustrate: super-tax is now levied on income over certain level-at present Rs. 25,000/-. If \"A's\" total income is Rs. 35.000/- made up of Rs. 20.000/- from big forest and Rs. 15,000 /- from other sources, what is the super-tax attributable to the income from the big forest?\n\nThe answer is, it is not possible to do so.\n\nWith this background Jet us give a close look to the\n\nJ9G4 provisions of r. 2(2)(c) of Schedule I to the Act. The Jegls- StaJe of Mrulky• Jative intention is manifest from the express language used Pradesh and Otli<n and also by internal evidence. With the knowledge that Sirajwl;. Kha•\n\nunder the Income-tax Act two separate duties, namely, in- - come-tax and super-tax, are imposed, the Legislature has Subba Rao, J, used the expression \"income-tax\". If the intention was to refer to both the taxes, it would have stated \"income-tax and super-tax\". The mention of the one and. the omission of the other is a sure indication of its intention.\n\nThe qualification that income-tax paid should have been in respect of the income received from the big forest necessarily excludes super-tax, for under the Income-tax Act no super-tax is payable in respect of the income received from big forest, but only in respect of the total income. As we have pointed out earlier, it is not legally possible to disintegrate and allocate a portion of the super-tax to the income .attributable to the big forest. It is not paid in respect of the income from the big forest, but is paid only in respect of the total income. If the contention of the appellant prevails, though the income from big forest falls below the taxable income, it will be deducted if, in combination with the income from other sources, the income goes up to the taxable level. In that event super-tax not payable in respect of the income from big forest will have to be deducted. That apart, the rules made under the Act do not provide for any machinery for allocating the super-tax payable on the total income among the different sources. It is said that the same difficulties are present even in the case of income-tax. Though income-tax is also a tax on the total income of an assessee, the Act, as we have indicated earlier, provides for computing the income under different heads and, therefore, it is not in- appropriate to describe a particular tax as attributable to an income from a particular head, but it would wholly be inappropriate to describe that a part of the suj:ler-tax is payable in respect of an income from a particular source.\n\nThe argument of Mr. Rajagopala Sastri, learned coun- sel for the respondent, that the 30 years mentioned in the rule takes us back to a period when there was no super-tax appears to be not sound, for, as we have stated earlier, supertax was payable in one form or other from the year 1917.\n\nThat apart, if the income-tax takes in super-tax, the nonexistence of super-tax in a particular year does not make any difference in ascertaining the average, for the income-tax for that year will be the income-tax without the addition of super-tax. This circumstance is not, therefore, of much relevance and we exclude it from our. consideration.\n\n844 SUPREi\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n[1964J\n\n964 The argument that if the Legislature intended not to Sia!' nJ Madllya exclude super-tax from the gross-income, it would have ex-\n\nProd<.1' ...i Oll1m pressly stated so in the rule is an attempt to put the shoe\n\nS. . . 1-:: K'- on the wrong foot. The proper approach, particularly in the\n\n\"\"J\"' \"\"' min f . . k h . h case o an expropnetary statute, is to as t e question w y 8.bba Bao, J. the Legislature did not expressly mention super-tax, if it intended to do so. The use of one of the two well understood expressions is, on the other hand, an indication that the Legislature provided for the deduction of the one used and not of the other omitted. The reason for the rule, if it is. legitimate to speculate, appears to be that as it is concerned with the calculation of the net-income from the estate after making certain deductions, only those deductions which have a direct relation to that income are allowed. If the other construction prevails, speculation would take the place of certainty and super-tax not paid factually in respect of the income from big forest would have to be deducted. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the rule.\n\nSome of the decisions cited at the Bar may now be noticed. Lord Sumner pithily remarks in Brooks v. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue('):\n\n\" ............ for super-tax is another and a new tax none the less, though it is an additional duty of Income Tax.\" In Bates, In re: Se/mes v. Bates('), a testator gave to his wife by his will \"such a sum in every year as after deduction of the income tax for the time being payable in respect thereof will leave a clear sum of £ 2000.\" It was held that the wife was entitled to the £ 2000 free of income-tax only and was not entitled to payment of any sum in respect of super-tax. There the trustees were directed to pay the annuity after deducting the inoome tax in respect of that annuity.\n\nRejecting the argument advanced on behalf of the wife that the said annuity should be free from super-tax also, Russell.\n\nJ.. observed :\n\n\"Now super-tax was not a charge in respect of any particular annuity or sum, but was a charge in respect of the recipient's whole income and was not a matter with which the trustees would be charged or concerned at all, and, in his opinion, what the testator had done was to give the widow the yearly sum of £ 2500 clear of all deductions for which the trustees were accountable, but that did not include super-tax, which she must pay herself ... ---\n\n1') (1914) 7 T.C. 236. 258. (') [1925] Ch. D. 157. 159-160, 161.\n\n196i The learned Judge proceeded to state:\n\n\"No super-tax is really payable\n\nsum.\"\n\n'in respect of this State ofMadhga\n\nP-raduli and Ol4et'a\n\nIt is true that the said judgtpent turned upon the provisions of a particular will, but the reasoning is helpful. There, income-tax was deductible in respect of the sum bequeathed, here income-tax is deductible in respect of the income received from big forest. As super-tax is not a charge in respect of the income from big forest, on the parity of reasoning it shall be held that the word \"income-tax\" used in cl. (c) of r. 2(2) of Schedule I to the Act excludes super-tax. In Reckitt, In re: Reckitt v. Reckitt('), a fund was bequeathed to trustees upon trust for investment and to pay out of the income of the investments \"the annual sum of £ 5000 free of income-tax\" during the life of the annuitant. The Court of Appeal held that the annuitant was entitled to have the sum paid to her without deduction on account of super-tax and that the trustees must pay the super-tax payable in respect of that sum out of the income of the fund. The conclusion turned upon the provisions of the will. Lord Hanworth, M.R., distinguished the decision in Bates, In re: Se/mes v. Bates(') on the ground that Russell, J., founded his judgment upon the reference to deductions and also upon the direction to the trustees that specified sum should be paid after deduction of income-tax in respect thereof and proceeded to observe that in the case before them no reference was made to the system, or the power of the trustees to make deductions;. and that it was simply that a total sum in each year was to be paid free of income-tax. That decision may be right or wrong on the construction of the will before the Court of Appeal. but the features which distinguished Bates case from the decision in Reckitf s case are also present in the case before us now. Here also the rule empowers the prescribed authority to deduct from the gross income incometax paid in respect of the income received from big forest.\n\nThe earlier decision is more in point to the present case than the later. Be that as it may, the English decisions on the construction of will are not of much help in construing the express provisions of r. 2(2)(c) of Schedule I to the Act: they shall be construed on their own terms. Having regard to the terms of the rule. we have come to the conclusion that income-tax does not take in super-tax .\n\n. h1 the result, the appeal fails and is dismised with costs.\n\nA ppea/ dismissed.\n\n(' )(1933) 1 I.T.R. 1.- (') [1925] Ch. 0. 157.\n\nSira.jud<lin Kha\"*\n\nSobba Rao, J.", "total_entities": 68, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SIRAJUDDIN KHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIRAJUDDIN KHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 829, "end_char": 843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The net income would be calculated by deducting from the gross in-· come, inter alia, the average of the income tax paid in respect of the income from big forest during 30 agricultural years proceeding March 31, 1951."}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1469, "end_char": 1490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2266, "end_char": 2270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2278, "end_char": 2292, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule I of the Act it is evident that with the knowledge that under the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2600, "end_char": 2689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3657, "end_char": 3685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3859, "end_char": 3865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and J. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3870, "end_char": 3882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and J. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3904, "end_char": 3926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the .respondent."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3931, "end_char": 3948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the .respondent."}}, {"text": "SueeA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4032, "end_char": 4041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSueeA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the Subba Baa, J. question whether the expression \"income-tax\" in cl. ("}}, {"text": "Subba Baa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4086, "end_char": 4095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSueeA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the Subba Baa, J. question whether the expression \"income-tax\" in cl. (", "canonical_name": "Subba Baa"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4179, "end_char": 4189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are as follows: The respondent was the zamindar of Bhadra Estate in Balaghat District of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "January 26,\n\n1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act came into force on January 26,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4762, "end_char": 4766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4859, "end_char": 4869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4897, "end_char": 4907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 30, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 30, 1951, the Compensation Officer determined the compensation payable to the respondent at Rs."}}, {"text": "Sirajud~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5898, "end_char": 5906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nSirajud~\",."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5967, "end_char": 5972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6032, "end_char": 6041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but the Subba Rao, J. Commissioner confirmed the order of the Compensation\n\nOfficer.", "canonical_name": "Subba Baa"}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6181, "end_char": 6198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6464, "end_char": 6487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madhya Pradesh has filed the present appeal against the order of the High Court."}}, {"text": "adds that under the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7015, "end_char": 7049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7136, "end_char": 7153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Rajagopala Sastri."}}, {"text": "took us through the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7409, "end_char": 7470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7688, "end_char": 7709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7765, "end_char": 7777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule\n\nI", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7948, "end_char": 7959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule I to the Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Act Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7962, "end_char": 7988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "8ir11juddin Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8434, "end_char": 8450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The net income of an estate or mahal in the Central Provinces shall be calculated by deducting from the gross income the sums under the following heads, namely:- •   • *\n\n(c) the average of the income-tax paid in respect of the income received from big forest during\n\nthe period of thirty agricultural years preceding\n\n1!J64 the agricultural year in which the relevant date Statc of A!..U.ya falls; Pradesh ,, nd Othera\n\nv • • • • • • 8ir11juddin Khan Rule 8. (!)"}}, {"text": "Cen Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8497, "end_char": 8510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amount of compensation in the Cen Subba Rao, J. tral Provinces and in Berar shall be ten times the net income determined in accordance with the rules herein contained."}}, {"text": "Berar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8537, "end_char": 8542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amount of compensation in the Cen Subba Rao, J. tral Provinces and in Berar shall be ten times the net income determined in accordance with the rules herein contained."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9245, "end_char": 9249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9574, "end_char": 9588, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10287, "end_char": 10301, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10458, "end_char": 10462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10489, "end_char": 10493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10512, "end_char": 10516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 7 to 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10534, "end_char": 10545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 55 to 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10782, "end_char": 10794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10796, "end_char": 10806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11236, "end_char": 11246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.Wba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11404, "end_char": 11413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dJ: Kh for the purpose of super-tax, except in specified cases, the\n\n''\"J\" \"' an total income shall be the total income as assessed for the S.Wba Rao, J. purpose of income-tax."}}, {"text": "Section 56A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11441, "end_char": 11452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 58(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11495, "end_char": 11508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Successive Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12130, "end_char": 12152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12657, "end_char": 12661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Successive Finance Act", "statute": "Successive Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14175, "end_char": 14196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14386, "end_char": 14400, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14889, "end_char": 14903, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "8.bba Bao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17348, "end_char": 17357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h case o an expropnetary statute, is to as t e question w y 8.bba Bao, J. the Legislature did not expressly mention super-tax, if it intended to do so."}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18191, "end_char": 18197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Sumner pithily remarks in Brooks v. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue('):\n\n\" ............ for super-tax is another and a new tax none the less, though it is an additional duty of Income Tax.\""}}, {"text": "Bates", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18387, "end_char": 18392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bates, In re: Se/mes v. Bates('), a testator gave to his wife by his will \"such a sum in every year as after deduction of the income tax for the time being payable in respect thereof will leave a clear sum of £ 2000.\""}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18974, "end_char": 18981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting the argument advanced on behalf of the wife that the said annuity should be free from super-tax also, Russell.", "canonical_name": "Russell"}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20094, "end_char": 20115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Reckitt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20139, "end_char": 20146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Reckitt, In re: Reckitt v. Reckitt('), a fund was bequeathed to trustees upon trust for investment and to pay out of the income of the investments \"the annual sum of £ 5000 free of income-tax\" during the life of the annuitant.", "canonical_name": "Reckitt"}}, {"text": "Hanworth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20660, "end_char": 20668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Hanworth, M.R., distinguished the decision in Bates, In re: Se/mes v. Bates(') on the ground that Russell, J., founded his judgment upon the reference to deductions and also upon the direction to the trustees that specified sum should be paid after deduction of income-tax in respect thereof and proceeded to observe that in the case before them no reference was made to the system, or the power of the trustees to make deductions;."}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20758, "end_char": 20765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Hanworth, M.R., distinguished the decision in Bates, In re: Se/mes v. Bates(') on the ground that Russell, J., founded his judgment upon the reference to deductions and also upon the direction to the trustees that specified sum should be paid after deduction of income-tax in respect thereof and proceeded to observe that in the case before them no reference was made to the system, or the power of the trustees to make deductions;.", "canonical_name": "Russell"}}, {"text": "Reckitf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21346, "end_char": 21353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but the features which distinguished Bates case from the decision in Reckitf s case are also present in the case before us now.", "canonical_name": "Reckitt"}}, {"text": "Schedule I to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21775, "end_char": 21796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sobba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22110, "end_char": 22119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sira.jud<lin Kha\"*\n\nSobba Rao, J.", "canonical_name": "Subba Baa"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_846_857_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April 24\n\nSUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nMIR MOHD. ALI, BUS OWNER, VELLORE IK. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHA!-1 AND s. M. StKRI, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax-Depreciation allowance-Replacement of petrol engine in a bus by new Diesel engine-If amounts to installation of machin.ery-\"Installation of mJchinery\" Meaning of-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), ss. 10(2)(vi). 10(2)(vial.\n\nThe assessee, who was the owner of a fleet of buses, replaced the petrol engines in two of his buses by new Diesel engines incurring an expenditure of Rs. 18,544/- in this connection, during the year of account ending with March 31,\n\n1950. For the relevant assessment year he claimed depreciation allowance under the second para of cl. (vi) and cl. (via) of s. 10(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, apart from the normal depreciation under the first para of cl. (vi), but he was allowed only 25 per cent depreciation under the first para of cl. (vi) on the ground that he was not entitled to extra depredation under s. 10(2) (vi) or s. 10(2)(via) because the engine was only part of an equipment and could not by itself become machinery and that when an engine was fixed in a motor vehicle it could not be said to be installed within the meaning of those sub-sections.\n\nHeld: (per Subba Rao and Sikri, JJ.) (i) The assessee was entitled to extra depreciatiLon under ss. 10(2)(vi) and 10(2)\n\n(via) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in respect of the diesel oil engine fitted to the motor vehicles in replacement of the esting engines.\n\n(ii) The definition of \"machinery\" given by the Privy Council in the case of Corporation of Calcutta v. Chairman, Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality \\1922) L.R. 48 I.A. 435, is applicable, and according to that definition a diesel engine is clearly \"machinery\". And when an engine is fixed in a vehicle it is installed within the meaning of the expression in els. (vi) and (via).\n\nPer Shah, J. (dissenting)-Replacement of a petrol engine by a new diesel engine in a 1notor car cannot be said to be installation of machinery. To be installed, the machinery must for the purpose of the business be. brought into service as a self-contained unit, and it would be difficult to regard the introduction of a mere part, which has no independent use in the business conducted by the assessee, as machinery installed for the purpose of the second para of cl. (vi) of s. 10(2).\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 145 of 1963. Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 16. '1959, of the Madras High Court in Case Reference No. 82 of'1956. S. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nS. Swaminathan and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondent.\n\nS. T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravin- 1961\n\nder Narain, for the intervenor.\n\nCammi., ioner of lncome-t<n. JJ!adra• April 24, 1964. The judgment of SUBBA RAO and SJKRI v. .\n\nJJ was delivered by S1KRI J. SHAH J. delivered a dissentingMir Molid.Afi, n •• . . 0u'11er, 1 rllort Op1mon. Sikri, J, SJKRI, J .-This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, against the judgment of the High Court, dated November 16, 1959, on a certificate granted by the High 0'ourt under s. 66A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.\n\nThe respondent. Mir Mohd. Ali, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a bus owner and transport operator at Vellore, North Arcot District. He had a fleet of buses, and during the year of account ending with March 31, 1950\n\n(relevant to assessment year 1950-51) he replaced the petrol engines in two of his buses (MDJ 583 and MDJ 723) by new Diesel engines. incurring an expenditure of Rs. 18,544/- in this connection. Before the Income Tax Officer, apart from claiming normal depreciation under the first paragraph of cl. (vi) of s. 10(2), he also claimed depreciation under the second paragraph of cl. (vi) and cl. (via) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. The Income Tax Officer only allowed 25 per cent depreciation under the first paragraph of cl. (vi). The assessee appealed unsuccessfully to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on this point. There were other points involved in the appeal but as we are not concerned with them in this appeal, they are not being mentioned. On further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal held that \"the\n\nassessee is not entitled to extra depreciation under s. 10(2>\n\n(vi) or s. 10(2)(via) because however important the engfoe might be for running of a motor, it is after all part of an equipment and it cannot by itself become \"machinery\" for the purpose of claiming extra depreciation, as envisaged in these sub-sections. We have to hold that the \"installation of the new engines is only a capital addition, for the above reasons the assessee was rightly refused the extra depreciation he claims\". The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, on the application of the assessee, referred the following question to the High Court:\n\n\"Whether extra depreciation is admissible under the provisions of section 10(2)(via) of the Income Tax Act, in respect of a diesel oil engine fitted to a motor vehicle in replacement of the existing engine.\"\n\nWe may mention that another question regarding disallowance of interest had also been referred to the High Court but we are not concerned with that in the present appeal.\n\n1964 As the High Court felt that there had been an acci- Commt .. ion<r of dental slip in framing the question, it amended the questian Income-ta.•, Mad,.. and the amended question reads: ...\n\nJlir .11/oii.d.A.li, Bu\"\n\nOwner, VeUore \"Whether extra depreciation i:s admissible under the provisions of s. 10(2)(vi) and section 10(2)(via) of the Income Tax Act in respect of the diesel oil engines fitted to the motor vehicles in replacement of the existing engines\".\n\n8ikri, J.\n\nThe High Court answered this question in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner of Income Tax, on obtaining a certificate under s. 66A(2) of the Income Tax Act, has filed this appeal.\n\nBefore attempting to answer the question, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Inoome Tax Act. The relevant provisions, as in force at the relevant time, were:\n\n\"s. 10(2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after making the following allowances, namely: -\n\n(iv) in respect of insurance against risk of damage or destruction of buildings, machinery, plant, furniture, stocks or stores, used for the purposes of the business, profession or vocation, the amount of any premium paid;\n\n(v) in respect of current repairs to such buildings, machinery, plant or furniture, the amount paid on account thereof;\n\n(vi) in respect of depreciation of such buildings, machinery, plant, or furniture being the property of the assessee, a sum equivalent, where the assets are ships other than ships ordinarily plying on inland waters, to such percentage on the original cost thereof to the assessee as may in any case or class of cases be prescribed and in any other case, to such percentage on the written down value thereof as may in any case or class of cases be prescribed; and where the buildings have been newly erected, or the machinery or plant being new has been installed, after the 31st day of March, 1945, a further sum (which shall however not be deductible in determining the written down value for the purposes of this clause) in respect of the year of erection or installation equivalent,-\n\n(a) in the case of buildings the erection of which is begun and completed between the !st day\n\n'1 S.C.R.\n\n&UPREME COURT REPORTS 849\n\nof April 1946 and the 31st day of March 1952 1964 (both dates inclusive), to fifteen per cent of Commiasioner of the cost thereof to the assessee; Income-tax, Madraa y.\n\n(b) in the case of other buildings, to ten per cent Mir Mohd-Ali, B .. of the cost thereof to the assessee; Owner_:_!<llore\n\n(c) in the case of machinery or plant, to twenty per cent of the cost thereof to the assessee:\n\nProvided that-\n\n(via) in respect of depreciation of buildings newly erected, or of machinery or plant being new which has been installed, after the 3 lst day of March, 1948, a further sum (which shall be deductible in determining the written down value) equal to the amount admissible under clause (vi) (exclusive of the extra allowance for double or multiple shift working of the machinery or plant and the initial depreciation allowance admissible under that clause for the first year of erection of the building or the installation of the machinery or plant) in the assessments for such of the five years commencing on the !st day of April, 1949, and ending with the 31st day of Mar9h, 1954:\n\nProvided that where, in respect of such machinery or plant, the assessee establishes that the market value of similar machinery or plant on the 3 lst day of March, 1953, is lower than the original cost, then, subject to the provisions of clause (vi), there shall be made in the assessment for the year commencing next after that date a further allowance (which shall be deductible in determining the written down value) of an amount by which the written down value of the machinery or plant as on that date (without deduction of the initial depreciation admissible in the first year) would have exceeded the corresponding written down value thereof as on the same date -if the market price of the machinery or plant had been taken as the actual cost of the assessee;\n\n(vii) in respect of any such building, machinery or plant which has been sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed, the amount by which the written down value thereof exceeds the amount\n\nSikri, J.\n\nSUPRI<.£IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nl!J6J\n\nl'oJ1nui&>ci11111 r of /t1t'OJ1tt-lf/.r, Jl11dr1t\"\n\nfor which the building, machinery or plant. as the case may be. is actually sold or its scrap value: Jlir Aloltd. A.ti: JJ11 . ..,\n\nOt1wtr. rdlor• Provided that.. ......... .\n\nSikri. .f. (51 In sub-section (2) ........ .'plant' includes vehicles, books. scientific apparatus and surgical equipment purchased for the purpose of the business, profession or vocation; ...... \"\n\nThe point at issue before us has been considered by three High Courts. The Bombay and Andhra Pradesh High Courts have held against the assessee while in the judgment under appeal. the Madras High Court has held in favour of the assessee. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in the case of B. Srika11tiah v. Commissioner of Income-Tax Andhra Prades/1\\'l. followed the Bombay case and expressly dissented from the Madras case.\n\nIn the judgment under appeal (reported as Mr. Mo/id.\n\nAli v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madrm('), the High Court arrived at the conclusion by the following steps:\n\n(al Machinery must be given the same meaning with reference to each of the statutory provisions, in s. I0(2)(vi) and s. I 0(2)(vial;\n\n(b) A diesel engine is machinery by the test laid down in the case of Corporation of Calcutta v.\n\nChairma11, Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality(');\n\n(c) Machinery does not cease to be machinery merely because it )las to be used in conjunction with one or more machines. Nor does it cease to be machinery merely bec.ause it is, for instance, installed as part of a manufacturing or industrial plant;\n\n(d) The statutory provision for depreciation is in the alternative. Whether it is plant or whether it is machinery without its being itself a plant, the assessee is entitled to claim the statutory allowance for depreciation.\n\nThe question then is: Which is the correct view? First. the history of para two of cl. (vi) may be noticed. The object of the Income Tax (Amendment) Act. 1946 (VIII of\n\n1946), which first inserted the provisions regarding extra depreciation. was to encourage the modernisation and .rehabilitation of industry and trade. The Second World War\n\n(') (1961) 41 I.T.R. 518. (') (1960l 38 I.T.R. 413.\n\n( 3 ) (1922) LL.R. 49 Cal. 190. .:\n\n• nad ended recently and during the long war machinery and :!_Ii.!_ plant had not only not been replaced or modernised but CmnmisM<>n\" of had been subjected to excessive wear and tear and needed Income-tax, Madras rehabilitation. During the War. there had also been great .fir Mo/J. Ali, Bus advance in technology.\n\nOwner, I' ellote\n\nIt is then pertinent to point out that the word 'ma chinery'. occurs in els. (iv), (v), (vi) and (via) of s. 10(2).\n\nPrima facie the same meaning must be given to the word 'machinery' in all these clauses. If a machine is machinery for purposes of giving an allowance in respect of insurance or for repairs or in respect of normal depreciation or for the purpose of para one of cl. (vi), it must also be machinery for the purpose of second para of cl. (vi) and cl. (via).\n\nBut it is said that the scheme of para two of cl. (vi) and\n\ncl. (via) is different from that of para one of cl. (vi) inasmuch as before it can qualify for extra depreciation, the machinery must be new and must be installed, and the rate of depreciation is provided in the Act itself. Keeping in view this scheme, it is urged that the word 'machinery' must be given a restricted meaning in para two of cl. (vi) and\n\ncl. (via), and the meaning suggested is that it must be a\n\n\"self contained unit capable of being put to use in the busi ness, profession or vocation for the benefit of which it was installed\". That this is the true meaning, it is further said, is evidenced by the definition of the word 'plant' in s. 10(5). It is argued that this definition indicates that for purposes of para two of cl. (vi) and cl. (via), 'plant', including a vehicle should be viewed as a unit and component parts thereof are excluded from its purview, and 'machinery' should also be considered in the same light\n\nLet us now examine these contentions. First. we do not think that there is anything in the scheme of the second para of cl. (vi) and cl. (via) that throws any light on the construe tion of the word 'machinery' in these clauses. It is true that the machinery must be new and it must be installed and the rate of allowance is prescribed in the Act itself. But the requirement that the machinery must be new does not tell us what is 'machinery'. Assuming for the present that a diesel engine is machinery, if an assessee buys and instals a secondhand diesel engine, he . will not be given the extra allowance under the second para of cl. (vi), and the ground would be that the engine is not new and not that because it is second-hand, it is not machinery. Similarly, if it is purchased but not installed, the ground of refusal would be that it has not been installed and not that because it has not been\n\nintalled. it has ceased to be machinery. Suppose a new machmery 1s purch~S:d but not installed, it would not qualify for extra deprecmtmn on the ground that it has not been\n\nS-ikri, ,/.\n\n1964 installed and not because it has ceased to be machinery due OommiBrion\" of to its non-installation. The fact that. the rate of depreciation Inc.,,.._iax, MadrM is provided for in the Act has also no bearing on the ques-\n\nMir Mo;:;: Ali, s., tion of the construction of the word 'machinery'. This fact\n\nOwner, Vellore only indicates that the legislature had made up its mind as Bikri, J. to the extent of encouragement to be given to industry and, therefore, it did not consider it necessary to delegate this to the rule-making authority.\n\nThe definition of the word 'plant' in s. 10(5) equally does not throw any light on the meaning of the word 'machinery'. The word 'plant' is of wide import, but even so it may be argued that vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment are not 'plant' in all businesses, professim, is and vocations. The legislature settled this possible contr<'iversy, but without throwing any light on the true meaning of the word 'machinery'.\n\nWhat then is the test for determining whether a mechanical contrivance is machinery for the purposes of second para of cl. (vi) and cl. (via)? The Privy Council in the case of Corporation of Calcutta v. Chairman, Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality(') hazarded the following definition of 'machinerv':\n\n\"The word 'machinery', when used in ordinary language prima facie, means some mechanical contrivances which, by themselves or in combination with one or more other mechanical contrivances, by the combined movement and inter-dependent operation of their respective parts generate power. or evoke, modify, apply or direct natural forces with the object in each case of effecting so definite and specific a result.\"\n\nThey had already observed that the word 'machinery' must mean more than a collection of ordinary tools. The Privy Council case was not a tax case but prima facie the ordinary meaning of the word 'machinery'-and the word 'machinery' is an ordinary and not a technical word-must, unless there is something in the context, prevail in the Indian Income Tax Act also.\n\nAccording to the above definition, a diesel engine is clearly 'machinery'. Indeed, r. 8 of the Income Tax Rules treats aero-engines separately from aircraft. It is true that this rule cannot be used to interpret the clauses in the Act but it does show that components of an aircraft, -, vhich are machinery, can be treated separately.\n\n(') (1922) IL.R. 49 Cal. 190.\n\nFurther, when the assessee purchased the diesel engines, 1964 they were not 'plant' or part of a plant, because the>' had Oomm;88;0,.., of not been installed in any vehicle. They were, accordmg tOJncomc-tax. Madras the definition given by the Privy Council, machinery. TheyM_ M, v1. Al•- B , ir Ori'. , us were not yet part of a plant, and, accordmg to the Act, 20 Owner, rel/ore per cent of the cost thereof was allowable to the assessee.\n\nAll the conditions required by the Act are satisfied. If we look at the point of time of purchase and installation, what was purchased and installed was machinery.\n\nThe learned counsel next contended that the assessee is not entitled to extra depreciation because a diesel engine cannot be said to be installed. He urges that the word 'installed' is wholly inappropriate to cover the fixing of a diesel engine in a motor vehicle. We are of the opinion that there is no force in this contention_ As observed by the Bombay Hi£h Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax v.\n\nSa; mpur Mills Ltd.(') the expression 'installed' did not necesariiy mean 'fixed in position' but was also used in the sense of 'inducted or introduced'; or to use the language of the Madras High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-\n\nTax, Jfatlras v. Sri Ram Vilas Services (Pvt) Ltd.('), installed would certainly mean 'to place an apparatus in position for service or use'. We are of the opinion that when an engine is fixed in a vehicle it is installed within the meaning of the expression in els. (vi) and (via)_\n\nAccordingly, we hold that the High Court was correct in answering the question referred to it in the affirmative.\n\nThe appeal, therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nSHAH, J.- I am unable to hold that the respondent is entitled to the allowance under s. 10(2)(vi) paragraph 2. in respect of the diesel engines claimed by him.\n\nSction 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act provides that tax shall be payable on the profits and gains of an assessee under the had 'profits and gain of business, profession or\n\nvocation\". By sub-s. (2) in the computation of taxable profits certain allowances prescribed therein are permissible. We are primarily concerned in this appeal with the initial allow- :mce permissible under the second paragraph of cl. (vi) of\n\n~ sub-s. (2). But els. (iv). (v), (vi). (vi)(a) and (vii) are inter-related and it may be necessary briefly to refer to those provisioris By cL (iv) allowance for premium paid in respect of insurance against risk of damage or destruction of buildings, machinery. plant. furniture. stocks or stores, used for the purposes of the business. profession or vocation is admissible. Under cL (v) an amounr paid on account of any current repairs to such buildings, .machinery, plant or furniture is\n\n('), (1959) 36 LT.R 580.\n\n(') (]960) 38 I.T.R 25.\n\nSikri, J.\n\nS!wli, J.\n\nSUPUE:ME COURT REPORTS (196lJ\n\nl!!tU an admissible allowance. Oause (vi) recognises by the first\n\n0.,,,,,.,,.,;,,,.,, of paragraph a right to normal depreciation of a percentage on lnco.,,.1,, x, Mwlrn• the prescribed valuation of such buildings, machinery, plant\n\n11. M ,.;· 41' B or furniture, which are the property of the assessees. The \"o:,.,.: v, ion,,., second paragraph at the material time stood as follows:\n\nShah, J. \"and where the buildings have been neY<lY erected, or the machinery or plant being new has been installed. after the 31st day of March, 1945. a further sum (which shall however not be deductible in determining the written down value for the purposes of this clause) in respect of the year of erection or installation equivalent, etc. etc.\" Clause (vi)(a) which was inserted by Act 67 of 1949 permitted a further depreciation allowance in respect of buildings newly erected or of machinery or plant being new which had been erected or installed after March 31, 1948, in not more than five successive assessments, for the financial years next following the previous year in which such buildings were erected; or machinery or plant installed. Clause (vii) permitted as an allowance the difference betY<een the written down value and the sale price or scrap value of such buildings, machinery or plant which had been sold, discarded, demolished or destroyed.\n\nAll these clauses dealt with allowances in respect of assets of the specified description and used for the purpose of business, profession or vocation. The depreciation aTiowance permitted under the first paragraph of cl. (vi) which may be called the normal allowance is in respect of all buildings, machinery, plant and furniture of the assessee used for the purpose of his business. By the second paragraph of cl. (vi) an initial allowance in the year in which buildings have been newly erected or the machinery or plant being new has been installed after March 31, 1945, is allowable. Use of the definite article \"the\" in the second paragraph indicates that the buildings, machinery or plant referred to in that paragraph must also be used for the purpose of the busines. profession or vocation of the assessec. However to qualify for the initial allowance under paragraph two, the buildings must be newly erected or the machinery or plant being new must have been installed, after March 31, 1945.\n\nTwo rival views are pressed upon us in support of the respective cases of the Commissioner and the assesse~ '.'s to the meaning of the second paragraph. The Comm1ss10ner contends that the buildings, machinery or plant for which the initial allowance is admissible must be a self-contained unit capable of being put to use in the business, profession or vocation for the benefit of which it is erected or installed.\n\nIt is submitted that the second paragraph of cl. (vi) was en-\n\n...\n\nacted with the object of giving a fillip to industry which had 1961 be7n . starved _during the war_ yrs of ne:-v machinery and Cumn•i\"•i,,., r of bu!ldmg act1V1ty. But the buildmgs, machinery, or plant to focomda.r. Madr,,. qualify for the initial allowances were not intended to be in . '\"· . f I' dd. · · Mir Mohd. Al'- Bv• the nature o rep acement, a 1t10n, or repair to extstmg 0\"\"'\" Ve/lore units : they had to be buildings newly erected or machinery ' or plant being new installed. On behalf of the assessee it Shah, J. was contended that the Legislature has not put any restriction of the nature suggested on behalf of the Commissioner and, therefore, any building or a part thereof newly erected or any new machinery or plant or a part thereof installed, qualified for the benefit of the initial allowance.\n\nThe question to be decided is one about the intention of the Legislature. Can it be said that when to an existing building a room even a floor is added, that the additional construction is a building newly erected? In my view, that does not appear to be the intention. Such an addition to an existing structure, becomes a part of the structure, and cannot be said to be a building newly erected. If every alteration or addition in an existing building is covered by the second paragraph of cl. (vi) mere repairs falling within the words of\n\ncl. (vi) may also qualify for initial allowance. If a mere addition to a building cannot be regarded as such an erection as is contemplated by the second paragraph of cl. (vi), it would be difficult to hold that the machinery or plant would include part of machinery or plant.\n\nCounsel for the assessee concedes that replacement of a petrol engine by a diesel engine in a motor transport vehicle is not installation of plant. The question is whether it is installation of machine. In my view replacement. of a petrol engine by a new diesel engine in a motor-car cannot be said to be installation of machinery within the meaning of the relevant clause. To be installed the machinery being new must for the purpose of the business be brought into service as a self-contained unit. If the argument of the assessee is sound. every bolt, nut, rod or flywheel which constitute a part of machinery would qualify for the initial allowance and the difference between the allowance for repairs and initial allowance may be obliterated. Counsel for the assessee also did not, as I understood him, contend that replacement of a mere part of machinery was installation of machinery within the meaning of the second paragraph of cl. (vi). The Legislature has not given any definition for that expression, and the expressi.gn \"machinery\" is otherwise somewhat difficult to define. The Judicial Committee in Corporation of Calcutta v. Cossipore and Chitpore Municipality(') when it was called upon to consider whether a tank supported on\n\n(.;\\ L. R. 48 I.A. 435.\n\nJVGl columns, and which could be filled by pumping from a rec0,,.,,;.,, fow, of servor belogig to the C:orporation could be regarded as '\"\"\"\"\"'\"\"· Jfodms machinery w1thm the meanmg of the Bengal Municipal Act,\n\nJI . ,, ;;· ,1. B 1884, observed at p. 445: ir ..t.tOti(v. ~\"1 t, US Own•,, Vdlo\" \"If their Lordships were obliged to run the hazard st.,•h, .1. of the attempt (to define machinery) they would be inclined to say that the word 'machinery' when used in ordinary language, prima facie means some m.chanical contrivances which, by themselves or in combination with one or more other mechanical contrivance, by the combined movement and inter-dependent operation of their respective parts generate power, or evoke, modify, apply or direct natural forces with the object in each case of effecting so definite and specific a result.\"\n\nBut we 11re n.ot called upon in this case to decide whether a diesel engine is in the abstract machinery: the question is whether a diesel engine, which is used for replacing a petrol engine, in a vehicle used by a transport operator for the purpose of his business is machinery installed within the meaning of s. I 0(2)(vi) paragraph 2. Whether \"machinery\" is some contrivance for supplying motive power to another contrivance which directly produces an article or is a mechanical contrivance which produces or assists in the production of an article, it would be difficult to regard introduction of a mere part, which has no independent use in the business conducted by the assessee, as machinery installed for the purpose of the second paragraph oi cl. (vi). The Legislature has provided for the normal depreciatiqn by paragraph 1 of\n\ncl. (vi) and in respect of newly installed machinery it has provided for the initial allowance, the object being to induce i.ndustrialists to start new industries or to extend their existing industries by erecting new buildings, or installing new machinery or plant.\n\nA diesel engine by itself may undoubtedly be used in a business other than that of a transport operator, for instance. for working a pump to draw underground water and may for that purpose be regarded as a self-contained unit But that is not decisive of the question whether in the business \"' of a transport operator a diesel engine used to replace a petrol engine may be regarded as machinery installed. Machinery installed within the meaning of paragraph 2 of s !0(2)(vi) is qualified by the expression \"used for the purposes of the business'', and therefore unss as a self-contained unit the machinery is used for the purposes of the business, initial _depreciation would not be admissible in respect thereof. That it may be capable of being used in another\n\n. 7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:'.IIE GOURT UEPORTS 857\n\nbusiness by th~ same or another assessee as a self-contained 1964 - unit is irrelevant in considering its admissibility for initial Cummi.\"i\"\"\" of allowance in the business in which it is actually used.\n\nIncome.tux, Mudras\n\nIt would be fruitless to refer to the schedule under rule 8 fir Mohd. Ali, Buo of the Income-tax Rules for computing the allowance in res- Ouna, Vtllore pect of the depreciation under s. 10(2)(vi). The schedule Sha/•, J. catalogues different items in respect of which depreciation is admissible at the rates prescribed. But whether a particular item is admissible for initial allowance in the second paragraph must depend upon two factors-(i) that it is in respect of the year of erection or installation that the initial allowance is permissible; and (ii) the building or the machinery is used for the purposes of the business. If it is a predicate of admissibility to initial allowance that the machinery must be new and a self-contained unit in the particular business in the carrying on of which the initial allowance is claimed, the fact that in certain conditions that machinery may be regarded as self-contained for the purpose of another business in which it is used, would furnish no guide in ascertaining whether initial allowance is permissible as a deduction in the assessment of taxable income of the business in which it is actually used.\n\nIn my view the appeal should be allowed and the question referred for opinion should be answered in the negative.\n\nORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MIR MOHD. ALI, BUS OWNER, VELLORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MIR MOHD. 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SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 10(2)(vi) and 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1378, "end_char": 1401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1416, "end_char": 1443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "L.R. 48 I.A. 435", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1706, "end_char": 1722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2408, "end_char": 2416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2547, "end_char": 2564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1959, of the Madras High Court in Case Reference No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2615, "end_char": 2629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Swaminathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2651, "end_char": 2665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Swaminathan and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Swaminathan and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2710, "end_char": 2721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "der Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2771, "end_char": 2781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravin- 1961\n\nder Narain, for the intervenor."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2874, "end_char": 2883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of SUBBA RAO and SJKRI v. ."}}, {"text": "SJKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2888, "end_char": 2893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of SUBBA RAO and SJKRI v. ."}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2920, "end_char": 2923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3206, "end_char": 3215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3223, "end_char": 3250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mir Mohd. Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3269, "end_char": 3282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mir Mohd."}}, {"text": "Vellore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3366, "end_char": 3373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a bus owner and transport operator at Vellore, North Arcot District."}}, {"text": "Arcot District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3381, "end_char": 3395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a bus owner and transport operator at Vellore, North Arcot District."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3465, "end_char": 3479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had a fleet of buses, and during the year of account ending with March 31, 1950\n\n(relevant to assessment year 1950-51) he replaced the petrol engines in two of his buses (MDJ 583 and MDJ 723) by new Diesel engines."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3788, "end_char": 3796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2>\n\n(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(via)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4368, "end_char": 4381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4796, "end_char": 4825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, on the application of the assessee, referred the following question to the High Court:\n\n\"Whether extra depreciation is admissible under the provisions of section 10(2)(via) of the Income Tax Act, in respect of a diesel oil engine fitted to a motor vehicle in replacement of the existing engine.\""}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(via)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4981, "end_char": 4999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5596, "end_char": 5608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(via)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5613, "end_char": 5631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8ikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5762, "end_char": 5767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8ikri, J.\n\nThe High Court answered this question in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee."}}, {"text": "s. 66A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5928, "end_char": 5937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6168, "end_char": 6176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7186, "end_char": 7209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant provisions, as in force at the relevant time, were:\n\n\"s. 10(2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after making the following allowances, namely: -\n\n(iv) in respect of insurance against risk of damage or destruction of buildings, machinery, plant, furniture, stocks or stores, used for the purposes of the business, profession or vocation, the amount of any premium paid;\n\n(v) in respect of current repairs to such buildings, machinery, plant or furniture, the amount paid on account thereof;\n\n(vi) in respect of depreciation of such buildings, machinery, plant, or furniture being the property of the assessee, a sum equivalent, where the assets are ships other than ships ordinarily plying on inland waters, to such percentage on the original cost thereof to the assessee as may in any case or class of cases be prescribed and in any other case, to such percentage on the written down value thereof as may in any case or class of cases be prescribed; and where the buildings have been newly erected, or the machinery or plant being new has been installed, after the 31st day of March, 1945, a further sum (which shall however not be deductible in determining the written down value for the purposes of this clause) in respect of the year of erection or installation equivalent,-\n\n(a) in the case of buildings the erection of which is begun and completed between the !"}}, {"text": "st day of April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8551, "end_char": 8572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st day of April, 1949, and ending with the 31st day of Mar9h, 1954:\n\nProvided that where, in respect of such machinery or plant, the assessee establishes that the market value of similar machinery or plant on the 3 lst day of March, 1953, is lower than the original cost, then, subject to the provisions of clause (vi), there shall be made in the assessment for the year commencing next after that date a further allowance (which shall be deductible in determining the written down value) of an amount by which the written down value of the machinery or plant as on that date (without deduction of the initial depreciation admissible in the first year) would have exceeded the corresponding written down value thereof as on the same date -if the market price of the machinery or plant had been taken as the actual cost of the assessee;\n\n(vii) in respect of any such building, machinery or plant which has been sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed, the amount by which the written down value thereof exceeds the amount\n\nSikri, J.\n\nSUPRI<.£IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nl!J6J\n\nl'oJ1nui&>ci11111 r of /t1t'OJ1tt-lf/.r, Jl11dr1t\"\n\nfor which the building, machinery or plant."}}, {"text": "31st day of Mar9h, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8594, "end_char": 8617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st day of April, 1949, and ending with the 31st day of Mar9h, 1954:\n\nProvided that where, in respect of such machinery or plant, the assessee establishes that the market value of similar machinery or plant on the 3 lst day of March, 1953, is lower than the original cost, then, subject to the provisions of clause (vi), there shall be made in the assessment for the year commencing next after that date a further allowance (which shall be deductible in determining the written down value) of an amount by which the written down value of the machinery or plant as on that date (without deduction of the initial depreciation admissible in the first year) would have exceeded the corresponding written down value thereof as on the same date -if the market price of the machinery or plant had been taken as the actual cost of the assessee;\n\n(vii) in respect of any such building, machinery or plant which has been sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed, the amount by which the written down value thereof exceeds the amount\n\nSikri, J.\n\nSUPRI<.£IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nl!J6J\n\nl'oJ1nui&>ci11111 r of /t1t'OJ1tt-lf/.r, Jl11dr1t\"\n\nfor which the building, machinery or plant."}}, {"text": "3 lst day of March, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8764, "end_char": 8788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st day of April, 1949, and ending with the 31st day of Mar9h, 1954:\n\nProvided that where, in respect of such machinery or plant, the assessee establishes that the market value of similar machinery or plant on the 3 lst day of March, 1953, is lower than the original cost, then, subject to the provisions of clause (vi), there shall be made in the assessment for the year commencing next after that date a further allowance (which shall be deductible in determining the written down value) of an amount by which the written down value of the machinery or plant as on that date (without deduction of the initial depreciation admissible in the first year) would have exceeded the corresponding written down value thereof as on the same date -if the market price of the machinery or plant had been taken as the actual cost of the assessee;\n\n(vii) in respect of any such building, machinery or plant which has been sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed, the amount by which the written down value thereof exceeds the amount\n\nSikri, J.\n\nSUPRI<.£IE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nl!J6J\n\nl'oJ1nui&>ci11111 r of /t1t'OJ1tt-lf/.r, Jl11dr1t\"\n\nfor which the building, machinery or plant."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10298, "end_char": 10326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in the case of B. Srika11tiah v. Commissioner of Income-Tax Andhra Prades/1\\'l."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10466, "end_char": 10472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "followed the Bombay case and expressly dissented from the Madras case."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12277, "end_char": 12285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13357, "end_char": 13365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15115, "end_char": 15120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This fact\n\nOwner, Vellore only indicates that the legislature had made up its mind as Bikri, J. to the extent of encouragement to be given to industry and, therefore, it did not consider it necessary to delegate this to the rule-making authority."}}, {"text": "s. 10(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15315, "end_char": 15323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Hi£h Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18125, "end_char": 18142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of the opinion that there is no force in this contention_ As observed by the Bombay Hi£h Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax v.\n\nSa; mpur Mills Ltd.(') the expression 'installed' did not necesariiy mean 'fixed in position' but was also used in the sense of 'inducted or introduced'; or to use the language of the Madras High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-\n\nTax, Jfatlras v. Sri Ram Vilas Services (Pvt) Ltd.('), installed would certainly mean 'to place an apparatus in position for service or use'."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18888, "end_char": 18892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH, J.- I am unable to hold that the respondent is entitled to the allowance under s. 10(2)(vi) paragraph 2.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18973, "end_char": 18985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19073, "end_char": 19087, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S!wli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20021, "end_char": 20026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sikri, J.\n\nS!wli, J.\n\nSUPUE:ME COURT REPORTS (196lJ\n\nl!!tU an admissible allowance."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20450, "end_char": 20454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "second paragraph at the material time stood as follows:\n\nShah, J. \"and where the buildings have been neY<lY erected, or the machinery or plant being new has been installed.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21009, "end_char": 21023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (vi)(a) which was inserted by Act 67 of 1949 permitted a further depreciation allowance in respect of buildings newly erected or of machinery or plant being new which had been erected or installed after March 31, 1948, in not more than five successive assessments, for the financial years next following the previous year in which such buildings were erected; or machinery or plant installed."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21973, "end_char": 21987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vi) an initial allowance in the year in which buildings have been newly erected or the machinery or plant being new has been installed after March 31, 1945, is allowable."}}, {"text": "L. R. 48 I.A. 435", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25786, "end_char": 25803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "fir Mohd. Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28841, "end_char": 28854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Income.tux, Mudras\n\nIt would be fruitless to refer to the schedule under rule 8 fir Mohd."}}, {"text": "Buo of the Income-tax Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28856, "end_char": 28883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28965, "end_char": 28977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Buo of the Income-tax Rules", "statute": "Buo of the Income-tax Rules"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_858_866_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "April :!.J.\n\n858 SUPRE:.\\ll~ COURT REPOHTS\n\n(I 964]\n\nSILLA CHANDRA SEKHARAM v.\n\nRAMCHANDRASAHU\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ.]\n\nSpecific Performance-Perfection of title after contract to sell-Applicability of s. IB(a)-'Subsequentlu to the sale or lease. meaning of-Specific Relief Act, 1877 (Act I of 1877), s. 18(a). / The respondent executed an agreement to sell his house in order to meet family necessities for a certain sum on the condition that he and his mother would execute a sale deed in favour of the appellant. On the failure of the execution of the sale-deed the appellant instituted a suit for specific performance of the contract. The trial court hel<l that the sale was not for legal necessity and therefore decreed the suit in part directing that the respondent would execute the sale deed for the alienation of his interest in the enuire house and that the appellant would be entitled to get possession of the same jointly with the respondent's mcther. The appellant appealed to the High Court and <luring its pendency the respondent's mother died and therefore the onlv question urged on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent. having perfected his title to the entire house. be made to sell the same. The High Court did not agree with the contention and held that s. 18(a) of the Specific R-elief Act did not apply to the facts of thc case as it comes into operation subsequent to the sale having takenplace. On appeal by special leave.\n\nHeld: The High C0urt was wrong in not applying the provisions of s. 18(a) of the Act to the facts of the case.\n\nThe expression 'subsequently to the sale or lease' in s. 18(a) means subsequently to the contract to sell or let. This clause cannot be restricted in •its application to cases ,, here actual sale or lease of property had taken place.\n\nKaluanpur Lime Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar. [1954] S C.R. 958. referred to.\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 398 of 196~. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated January 7. 1959. of the Orissa High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 57 of 1953.\n\nB. R. L. /yengal', S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta. for the appellant.\n\nK. Bhimsankaram. B. Parthasarthy, J. B. Dadachanji,\n\n0. C. Mathur and Ral'inde,. Narain, for the respondent.\n\nApril 24. 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nR>gk1<bar ])nyal • .I.\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal. by special leave, raises the question of the correct interpretation of s. !R(a) of the Specific Relief Act. 1877 (Act I of 18771. hereinafter called the Act. ·\n\n7 s.c.u. ::lUPREME COURT REPORTS 859\n\nd d II\n\n]:'J(j.J Ramchandra, respon ent, execute an agreement to se _ the house in suit to the appellant. on February 21, 1951. s; u,, 1·1mnh• The agreement stated that he was in sole possession and ens, u''.\"\"'\" joyment of the house which was his paternal property, that 11,,,,,,.,,,~; d\"' Sahu he was the Managing Member and Karla of the family and - that for meeting family necessities and discharging certain 11\"\"1\" 1\"\"' LJ,,,,,, z, 1• loans he agreed to sell his undisputed house for Rs. 6,000 /- on condition that he and hi~ mother would execute a deed of sale in favour of the appellant with respect to the house within a period of one year from the date of the execution of the deed of agreement Ramchandra did not execute the sale deed and the appellant instituted the suit for specific performance of the contract.\n\nThe trial Court held that the sale was not to be for legal necessit.\" and therefore decreed the suit in part, on the appellant's depositing a sum of Rs. 6,000 /- less .the sum of Rs. 300/- paid before the Sub-Registrar at the time of the execution of the agreement to sell and less the amount of costs granted to the appellant against Ramchandra within a month and directed that defendant No. 1 would execute the sale deed for the alienation of his interest in the entire house as covered by the agreement and that the plaintiff would be entitled to get possession of the same jointly with defendant No. 2, mother of Ramchandra.\n\nThe appellant went up in appeal to the High Court against the dismissal of his suit with respect to the sale of half the house. During the pendency of the appeal Ramchandra's mother died and therefore the only question urged on behalf of the appellant at the hearing of the appeal was that Ramchandra, respondent, having perfected his title to the entire house, be made to sell the same. The High Court did not agree with the contention and held that s. 18(a) of the Act did not apply to the facts of the case as it comes into operation subsequent to the sale having taken place. The High Court therefore dismissed the appeal. It is against this order that this apeal has been filed.\n\nSection 18(a) of the Act reads: )\n\n\"Where a person contracts to sell or let certain property, having only an imperfect title thereto, the purchaser or lessee (except as otherwise provided by this Chapter) has the following rights: -\n\n(a) if the vendor or lessor has subsequently to the sale or lease acquired any interest in the property, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest;\"\n\n1964 The question is whether the expression 'subsequently to the Silla C!tandra sale or lease' means 'subsequently to the contract to sell or Bekharam let' or means 'subsequently to the execution of the sale deed Ramcha:dra Sahu or lease deed by the vendor or the lessor, as the case may be'\n\n--,.-- in pursuance of the contract to sell or let. It is contended for Raghub\"'' D<1yal, J.the appellant that this expression means subsequently to the contract to sell or let, while the contention for the respondent is that it means subsequent to the actual sale or lease. We are inclined to agree with the contention for the appellant.\n\nThe case, in a way, is concluded by the decision of this Court in Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd. v. State of Bihat(').\n\nIn that case the Government agreed to let the lease of the hills to Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd., but the lease could not be executed as the forfeiture of the lease of a previous lessee was held invalid by the Court. When the lease of the previous lessee expired, Kalyanpur Works Ltd., wanted the execution of the lease for a period during which the lease to it would have continued if it had been granted in 1934.\n\nThis Court held that the case fell within s. 18(a) of the Act.\n\nIt said at p. 972:\n\n\"We agree with the High Court that section 18(a) of the Specific Relief Act applies to the case. That section lays down that where a person contracts to sell or let certain property having only imperfect title thereto, if the vendor or lessor has subsequently to the sale or lease acquired any interest in the property, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest. There can be no doubt whatever . that when the Government entered into the contract to grant leases to the Lime Co. in 1934, it had an imperfect title, inasmuch as it could not grant a fresh lease to anyone during the existence of the previous lease in favour of Kuchwar Co. No doubt the Government thought it had the right to forfeit those leases and did in fact order forfeiture but it having been found subsequently that the forfeiture was legally invalid, rights of the previous lessees were restored. As already pointed out above this is not the case of absence of title but is one of imperfect title and hence falls within the meaning of section I 8. After the 31st March, 1948, when the leases in favour of Kuchwar Co. expired, the impediment in the way of the Government to grant leases of tbe property stood removed, and the Lime Company's right to get the leases revived in its favour. This right\n\n(') [1954] S.C.R. 958.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRE:\\IJ~ COURT REPOHTS . 861\n\nof the plaintiff was resisted by the Government who. on the other hand, granted the leases to defendant No. 2.\n\n,')'ilia Chandra Bckliarnrn\n\nThe High Court of Patna rightly took the view that flamcliandm &hu\n\nsection 18(a) was applicable to the facts of this llaqhubar Dm, at J. case and although defendant No. 1 was not in a · ' position to grant a lease from the time it agreed to do, the impediment being now removed and a suit for specific performa nee not being barred. the Lime Company was entitled to sue for that relief. We have already held in agreement with the view of the High Court that section 18 is attracted to the facts of this case, and the contract of which specific performance can be decreed in favour of the plaintiff is the one embodied in Exhibits 22 and 22(a).\" It is urged for the respondent that in that case it was not contended before this Court that s. l 8(a) could not apply to the facts of the case as no lease in favour of Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd. had been executed and that therefore the question now before us was not discussed. It is also urged that the Patna High Court had not actually applied the provisions of s. 18(a) to the facts of the case but had decreed the specific performance of the contract 'on the basis of the general principle that the purchaser in a contract to sell entered into in the circumstances of the case, was entitled to sue for specific performance against such interest as the vendor might afterwards acquire in the property and support was found in what was said in Art. 994 in Fry's 'Specific Performance', 5th Edition. In these circumstances, we would like to consider the question directly before us ..\n\nSections 12 to 20 of Chapter II of the Act deal with contracts which may be specifically enforced. Section 18(a) deals with the rights of the purchaser or lessee in cases where the vendor has imperfect title to the property which he has contracted to sell or let. Apparently this must deal with the rights of the would be purchaser or lessee, and not of those who have already got the sale or lease of the property in pursuance of the contract to sell or let. If the person who contracted to sell or let has completed the sale or the lease transaction, nothing is left for the vendee or the lessee to seek by way of specific performance of the contract. This is when he himself acts according to the contract. If he does not act according to the contract, the person who has agreed to purchase or take on lease the property will have to seek enforcement of the contract through Court and then it may be that the Court might not enforce the contract. The Court will not, in view of the provisions of ss. 14 to 17 be able to\n\n19G4\n\nSillrr r:f/f/11dr11.\n\ni~:id.:llarcii1i\n\nRumrlutndra S11iat\n\n862 SUPHEME COUHT HEl'ORTS [19641\n\nenforce the contract even with respect to the property over which the person contracting to sell or let had perfect title, except in certain special circumstances, dealt with in ss. 14, 15 and 16.\n\nRag/, uJm,. Day\"l, J.\n\nSection 14 deals with cases where the part of the contract which could not be performed bears only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in money. Section 16 deals, with the specific performance of a part of a contract wJien that stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot or ought not to be specifically performed. Cases coming under these two sections are not expected to give rise to circumstances In which provisions of sub-cl. (a) of s. 18 .:an be applied. Section 15 deals with the specific performance of a contract where the part unperformed is large. The Court has discretion in such circumstances to direct the party in default to perform specifically so much part of the contract as it could perform provided that the plaintiff relinquishes all claims to further performance, and all right to compensation either for the deficiency, or for the loss or damage sustained by him through the default of the defendant. When a Court has dealt with a case under s. 15, no question can however arise for action under s. 18(a). It follows, from the consideration of both the sets of circumstances, viz .. when the person contracting to sell or let him self performs his part of the contract and when he is made to perform the contract wholly or partially by Court, the occasion to apply for specific performance of the contract with respect to the property over which the person contracting to sell or let had originally imperfect title, does not arise. This points to the conclusion that this clause cannot therefore be restricted in its application to cases where actual sale or lease of property had taken place.\n\nIf clause (a) of s. 18 was to apply after the completion of the sale or lease and on the vendor or lessor acquiring interest in the property in which he had imperfect title to start with. there would be considerable overlapping between the provisions of cl. (a) of s. 18 and s. 43 of. the. Transfer of Property Act.\n\nSection 43 of the Transfer of Property Act comes into piay when a prson fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immoveable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, while cl. (a) of s. 18 would come into play when the person with imperfect title has sold or leased the property. There is some sort of representation whenever a person sells or leases property. the representation being implicit and to the\n\n'-. .-,.-:i-, ' ...... ~-. .,,. ',\\_ ', -( _-,4. _..,_ ·-- ',\n\n,-\\, I / _,_ - -. -\n\n.. 7 s.c.R., -, suPRE:IIE coufiT REPo.ttrs 863\n\n.,_,.\n\n' : • '-. 4 - ---,._-- -_ .----:-. - 'effect that he is competent to sell or let the property. Thus 1964 there is over-lapping of the provisions of the two sections. .\n\nSilla Ohawlra The actual right of the tranfere under s. 43 and cl. (a) S'kharam v. of s. 18 is however expressed in different language. In cases Ramchawlra Sahu where s. 43 operates, the transferee, at his option, cari have - the transfer operate on any interest which the transferor may R09huhar Dayal, 1• acquire in . the property at any time during which the contract for transfer subsists. The illustration to the section indicates that the transferee can require the transferor to deliver the property acquired _to him._ The purchaser or lessee on the other hand, acting under cl. (a) of s. 18, can compel the seller or the lessor to make good the contract out of such interest. The difference between the two provisions is this that in the case of the operation of s. 43, no recourse to Court is necessary. The transfer operates on_ the property transferred and the transferee can call upon the transferor to deliver the property to him. The purchaser i:fr the lessor having the right mentioned in cl. (a) of s. 18 has to go to l Court to compel the vendor or lessor to perform the con- ' tract out of the interest subsequently acquired by him. The purchaser or lessee goes to the Court to enforce the contract and the contract in cl. (a) of s. 18 must refer to the contract to sell or let and not to the contract of sale or lease, which, as indicated earlier, if voluntary, would have covered the entire property contracted to be sold or leased, and if enforced through Court no occasion for the operation of' clause\n\n(a) of s. 18 would arise.\n\nThe expession in cl._ (a) of s. 18 should preferably be construed in a way so that there will be no overlapping between the provisions of this clause and of s. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, as ordinarily the legislature does not intend to make duplicate provisions for similar situations.\n\nThe use of the words 'vendor or lessor' in cl. (a) are no definite pointers to the conclusion that the expression 'subsequently. to the sale -or 1ease' be given the meaning 'subsequently to the actual sale or lease'.\n\nThe sections preceding s. 18 deal with specific performance of contracts in general and . therefore use the expression 'party to a contract'. Section 18 deals with the cases of contracts to sell or let and therefore appropriately uses the simple word 'vendor' or 'lessor' with respect to the party contracting to sell or let and 'purchaser' or 'lessee' with respect to the party agreeing to purchase or take the property on lease. There is no incongruity in using such expressions so Jong as one knows to whom those expressions refer. In fact the word 'purchaser' or .'lessee' can be appropriately applied to persons agreeing to purchase or take the property ' • on lease.\n\n--~ - ':\n\n1964 in thiS connection reference may also be made to the.\n\nSilla--o;:;; ndra provisions of cl. (d) of s. 18 which uses the words 'vendor Sekharam or lessor' and provides that where the vendor or lessor sues.\n\nRam<h ,\":d, s 1 for specific performance of the contract and the suit is dis- • \"' missed on the ground of his imperfect title. the defendant.\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J, has a right to a return of his deposit ...... and to a lien for\n\nsuch deposit, ...... on the interest of the vendor or lessor in the property agreed to be sold or let. It is clear that the words vendor or lessor in this clause refer to the person contracting to sell or let the property and who did not perform his part of the contract.\n\nSection 25 of the Act also uses the expression 'vendor or lessor' who has not actually sold or leased the property.\n\nIt provides inter alia that a contract for the sale or letting of property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of the vendor or lessor who comes within the provisions of els. (a} to (c) of the section. The provisions of s.c 27 A also use the expression 'lessor and lessee' in connection with provisions relating to the contract to let when actually no lease is executed.\n\nThere may be another reason for using the expression 'sale or lease' in cl. (a) of s. 18. Section 13 and illustration (a) read:\n\n\"13. Notwithstanding anything contained in section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject matter, existing at its date. has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.\n\nIllustrations (al A, contracts to sell a house to B, for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B, may be compelled to perform his part of the contract by paying the purchase-money. • • • • • In Pollock & Mulla's 'Specific Relief Act', 8th edition. under s. 13. is a note:\n\n\"Illustration (a) assumes that a contract for the sale of a house does, of itself, transfer the beneficial -·· interest in the house to the purchaser, and make him owner in equity in the English phrase. This was also the law here before the Transfer of Property Act. 1882, came .into force. By s. 54 of that Act it is provided that a contract for the sale of immoveable property does not, of itself, ~\n\ncreate any interest in or charge on such property. iilal By s. 55(5) it is enacted that the risk of destruc- Silla Chandra lion is borne by the purchaser only from the date Sekliaram when the ownership appears to pass on execu- R , ndv.\n\nSah amc11u ra • tton of a proper conveyance by the vendor [see _ s. 55(l)(d)]. It would, therefore, seem that the Raghubar Dayal, J. illustration cannot now be applied where the Transfer of Property Act is in force.\"\n\nIt may be that just as illustration (a) to s. 13 continues in the Act, the expression 'sale or lease' continued in cl. (a) of s. 18 as at the time cl. (a) of s. 18 was originally enacted -some sort of beneficial interest had passed 'to the person agreeing to purchase the property by the mere agreement to sell, arrived at between the parties.\n\nIt has also been urged for the respondent that cl. (a) of -s. 18 of the Act applies only when the person contracting to\n\nsell or let lias imperfect title to the property and not when he is not entitled to the property as is the case in this suit, , as Ramchandra had no title to half the house. We do not consider it necessary to decide this question as we are of opinion that it cannot be said that Ramchandra had no interest in half the house. He had interest in the entire house and so had his mother, though in case of actual partition the interest of each would have been fixed at half. If Ramchandra was not competent to pass title with respect to the entire house during the life time of his mother, he can be said to have imperfect title to it.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that on the death of the mother, Ramchandra obtained title to and interest in the portion of the house which on a private partition subsequent to the contract to sell had taken place between Ramchandra and his mother and that therefore he has to make good his contract out of the property he acquired subsequent to the contract to sell.\n\nIt has been submitted for the respondent that it need not be taken for granted that Ramchandra g!Jt title to the property which belonged to his mother as it might be that the mother had executed some will. No such allegation appears to have been made before the High Court where it was urged that Ramchandra had acquired title to that portion of the house. It was in view of this allegation that the appellant did not argue the appeal on the basis of the ground that had been taken in the memorandum of appeal, the ground being that Ramchandra had agreed to sell for Ieasons of legal necessity. We therefore do not consider any forr~\n\nin this contention.\n\nL P(D)JSCI-28\n\n1964 We hold that the High Court was wrong in not applying Silla Olurn<lra the provisions of cl. (a) of s. 18 of the Act to the facts of Srklu., aa• the case. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the orders\n\nRamc1,.,~; a Sahu of the Courts below and decree the plaintiff's suit and order -- that on payment of Rs. 6,000/- minus Rs. 300/- paid to the llagluhar Dayal, J.respondent at the time of the execution of the agreement for sale :ind such other costs to which the appellant be entitled within a month from the date of the costs being taxed, the respondent will be directed to execute the sale deed of the entire house covered by the agreement in favour of the appellant. The appellant will get his costs of the trial Court, as decreed by that Court, and of the appeal in this Court, the parties bearing their own costs of the appeal in the High Court. In case the appellant fails to deposit the amount aforesaid within the time allowed, his suit will stand dismissed with costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed •", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "SILLA CHANDRA SEKHARAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SILLA CHANDRA SEKHARAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMCHANDRASAHU\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRASAHU\n", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 291, "end_char": 316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 334, "end_char": 342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "s. 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1319, "end_char": 1327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1558, "end_char": 1566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1659, "end_char": 1667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. R. L. /yengal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2127, "end_char": 2143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. /yengal', S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2146, "end_char": 2157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. /yengal', S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2162, "end_char": 2173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. /yengal', S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta."}}, {"text": "K. Bhimsankaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2195, "end_char": 2210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Bhimsankaram."}}, {"text": "B. Parthasarthy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2212, "end_char": 2227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Parthasarthy, J. B. Dadachanji,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2232, "end_char": 2245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Parthasarthy, J. B. Dadachanji,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2251, "end_char": 2260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ral'inde,."}}, {"text": "Ral'inde,. Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2265, "end_char": 2282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ral'inde,."}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2527, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "lUPREME COURT REPORTS 859", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2593, "end_char": 2618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lUPREME COURT REPORTS 859\n\nd d II\n\n]:'J(j."}}, {"text": "Ramchandra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3324, "end_char": 3334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,000 /- on condition that he and hi~ mother would execute a deed of sale in favour of the appellant with respect to the house within a period of one year from the date of the execution of the deed of agreement Ramchandra did not execute the sale deed and the appellant instituted the suit for specific performance of the contract.", "canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRASAHU\n"}}, {"text": "Ramchandra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4366, "end_char": 4376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the appeal Ramchandra's mother died and therefore the only question urged on behalf of the appellant at the hearing of the appeal was that Ramchandra, respondent, having perfected his title to the entire house, be made to sell the same.", "canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRASAHU\n"}}, {"text": "s. 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4527, "end_char": 4535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4761, "end_char": 4774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6005, "end_char": 6030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the Government agreed to let the lease of the hills to Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd., but the lease could not be executed as the forfeiture of the lease of a previous lessee was held invalid by the Court."}}, {"text": "Kalyanpur Works Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6198, "end_char": 6218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the lease of the previous lessee expired, Kalyanpur Works Ltd., wanted the execution of the lease for a period during which the lease to it would have continued if it had been granted in 1934."}}, {"text": "s. 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6392, "end_char": 6400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6469, "end_char": 6482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6490, "end_char": 6509, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kuchwar Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7104, "end_char": 7115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that when the Government entered into the contract to grant leases to the Lime Co. in 1934, it had an imperfect title, inasmuch as it could not grant a fresh lease to anyone during the existence of the previous lease in favour of Kuchwar Co. No doubt the Government thought it had the right to forfeit those leases and did in fact order forfeiture but it having been found subsequently that the forfeiture was legally invalid, rights of the previous lessees were restored."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7508, "end_char": 7524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the 31st March, 1948, when the leases in favour of Kuchwar Co. expired, the impediment in the way of the Government to grant leases of tbe property stood removed, and the Lime Company's right to get the leases revived in its favour."}}, {"text": "ilia Chandra Bckliarnrn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7931, "end_char": 7954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",')'ilia Chandra Bckliarnrn\n\nThe High Court of Patna rightly took the view that flamcliandm &hu\n\nsection 18(a) was applicable to the facts of this llaqhubar Dm, at J. case and although defendant No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7960, "end_char": 7979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",')'ilia Chandra Bckliarnrn\n\nThe High Court of Patna rightly took the view that flamcliandm &hu\n\nsection 18(a) was applicable to the facts of this llaqhubar Dm, at J. case and although defendant No."}}, {"text": "section 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8024, "end_char": 8037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8415, "end_char": 8425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8906, "end_char": 8922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also urged that the Patna High Court had not actually applied the provisions of s. 18(a) to the facts of the case but had decreed the specific performance of the contract 'on the basis of the general principle that the purchaser in a contract to sell entered into in the circumstances of the case, was entitled to sue for specific performance against such interest as the vendor might afterwards acquire in the property and support was found in what was said in Art."}}, {"text": "s. 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8966, "end_char": 8974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 994", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9348, "end_char": 9356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 12 to 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9489, "end_char": 9506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9510, "end_char": 9531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9588, "end_char": 9601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 14 to 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10488, "end_char": 10500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10571, "end_char": 10574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 14, 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10792, "end_char": 10809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10835, "end_char": 10845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11012, "end_char": 11022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11358, "end_char": 11363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11381, "end_char": 11391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11885, 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("}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13689, "end_char": 13694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13722, "end_char": 13727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Ramchawlra Sahu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13781, "end_char": 13796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In cases Ramchawlra Sahu where s. 43 operates, the transferee, at his option, cari have - the transfer operate on any interest which the transferor may R09huhar Dayal, 1• acquire in .", "canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRASAHU\n"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13803, "end_char": 13808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 18", 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"Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17097, "end_char": 17107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17675, "end_char": 17680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17682, "end_char": 17692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17764, "end_char": 17774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17782, "end_char": 17801, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18217, "end_char": 18224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pollock & Mulla's 'Specific Relief Act', 8th edition."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18227, "end_char": 18232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pollock & Mulla's 'Specific Relief Act', 8th edition."}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18236, "end_char": 18255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18277, "end_char": 18282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18537, "end_char": 18561, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18590, "end_char": 18595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "s. 55(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18759, "end_char": 18767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "s. 55(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19002, "end_char": 19013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19115, "end_char": 19139, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19198, "end_char": 19203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19281, "end_char": 19286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19313, "end_char": 19318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19559, "end_char": 19564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21395, "end_char": 21400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "llagluhar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21645, "end_char": 21660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "300/- paid to the llagluhar Dayal, J.respondent at the time of the execution of the agreement for sale :ind such other costs to which the appellant be entitled within a month from the date of the costs being taxed, the respondent will be directed to execute the sale deed of the entire house covered by the agreement in favour of the appellant."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_867_878_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "' •\n\n78.0.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 867\n\nNEW ASIATIC INSURANCE CO. LTD. v.\n\nPESSUMAL DHANAMAL ASWAN! AND ORS. fK. SUBBA RAO, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ.J\n\nMotor Vehicles Act-(4 of 1939), ss. 93 to 96-Scope of.\n\nA had insured his car with the appellant under a comprehensive policy. A permitted B, (who had insured his own car with another company) to drive his car and while B was driving the car it met with an accident. As a result of the accident C died and D sustained serious injuries. Both C and D were in the car. The heirs of C and D filed suits for damages. Notices under s. 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were issued to the appellant who thereon took out a Chamber Summons contending that the notice was bad in law. Alternatively it was contended that the appellant be permitted to defend the suit in the name of the defendant. The Court held that the notices were bad. The plaintiffs filed Letters Patent appeals with success and the Chamber Summons were dismissed and the trial Judge was directed to hear the alternative prayer.\n\nAgainst this Order the present appeal was filed with special leave.\n\nThe contention of the appellant was that in view of paragraph 4 of B's own policy issued by the other company which indemnified B against any liability incurred by him whilst personally driving a private car not belonging to him or hired by him under a Hire-Purchase agreement, B was not included among persons indemnified in para. 3 of A's policy which the appellant had issued on account of proviso (a) to the said para. The respondent contended that this proviso is not a limitation on the class of persons indemnified under para. 3 that class being the drivers driving A's car insured under the policy but merely amounted to a condition affecting the liability of the company vis a vis the driver who was entitled to be indemnified under any other policy.\n\nHeld: (i) From a consideration of ss. 93, 94, 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act it follows that if under the terms of the policy B can be said to be the person insured under Para 3 of the policy, the company would be liable to satisfy the decree if any passed against B.\n\n(ii) The appellant by agreeing with the person who effects the policy, to insure him against liability to third parties, takes upon itself the entire liability of the person effecting the insurance. It os open to the insurer not to extend the indemnity to the insured to other persons but if it extends it to other persons, it cannot restrict it vis o, vis the right of the third party entitled to damages to recover them from the insured, a right which is not d; ted. A proviso meant to e!Xempt certain persons from the general classification will have to be related to considerations affecting it and is not to be related to such classified person's right to indemnity from any other insurer.\n\n(iii) The cl. (4) of s. II of B's policy with the other company does not make that policy to be a policy within the meaning of LIP(D)lSCI-28(a)\n\nApril 24\n\ns. 94 of the Act in relation to A's car by whose user B incurred N ... A.rialic liabilities sought to be established in the two suits. Such a policy 1 ........... Co. Lld. and any indemnity under it cannot be used for sul>-classifying p.....:Z\" Dhattamal drivers specified in the policy issued to A by the appellant.\n\nA..,...miand Ollters\n\n(iv) The High Court was correct in holding that the appellant had insured B. in view of para. 3 of s. II of that policy and that it comes within the expression in&urer in s. '96 of the Act..\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1043-1044 of 1963. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 8, 1963 of the Bombay High Court in Appeals Nos. 10 and 11 of 1962.\n\nS. T. Desai, V. N. Thakar, 1. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in both the appeals).\n\nG. S. Pathak, 0. P. Malhotra and I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).\n\nV. J. Merchant, for respondents Nos. 2 and 4 to 7 (in C.A. No. 1043/ 1963).\n\nApril 24, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJlaflobarDayal, J.\n\nR.AGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-These appeals, by special leave. arise in the following circumstances:\n\nS. N. Asnani owned Chevrolet Car bearing registered No.\n\nAA 4431. He insured it with !lie New Asiatic Insurance Co.\n\nLtd., hereinafter referred to as the company, under a policy dated November 26, 1957. Asnani permitted Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani, hereinafter called Pessumal, to drive that car.\n\nWhen Pessumal was driving the car with Daooji Radhamohan Meherotra and Murli Dholandas in the car, the car met with an accident as a result of which Meherotra died and Murli received injuries.\n\nPessumal himself owned a Pontiac car which had been insured with the Indian Trade & General Insurance Co. Ltd., under policy No. Bombay P.C. 42733-2, dated November 18, 1957.\n\nTh~ heis of Meherotra instituted suit no.70 of 1959 against Pessumal for the recovery of Rs. 2,50,000 /- by way of damages with interest. Murli instituted suit no. 71 of 1959 against Pessumal to recover Rs. 1,50,000/- by way of damages. ' Notices under s. 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act IV of 1939), hereinafter called the Act, were issued to the New Asiatic Insurance Co, Ltd. The notice was given to the company as the defendant's liability to third parties had been insured with it under its policy no. MV I 4564. The company then took out Chamber Summons and it was contended that notice under s. 96(2) of the Act was bad in law and shouid be set aside and that the company was not liable to satisfy any\n\njudgment which might be passed in the suit against the defen 1964 dant. Alternatively, it was prayed that the company be added Ne\"' .A.aiatic as a party defendant to the suit and I or be authorised to defend 1 ........ Co. IM. the suit in the name of the defendant. Tarkunde J., held the P ~Dh al notice issued to the company in the suits under s. 96(2) of A::.\":.~ and O:A:.... the Act, to be bad in law and, accordingly, set them aside. . . .\n\nRagl1vbar Dayal, J.\n\nThe plamtdfs then filed Letters Patent Appeals which were allowed and the Chamber Summonses were dismissed.\n\nIt was directed that the. trial Judge would hear the alternative prayers in the Chamber Summonses and make the necessary orders. It is against this order in each of the appeals that the company has preferred these appeals, after obtaining special leave.\n\nTo appreciate the contentions of the parties in these appeals, reference may be made to certain provisions in the two policies. The various provisions in the two policies are identi cal in matters affecting the question for determination before us. We, therefore, set out the relevant provisions from the policy issued by the company and would refer to differences, if any, at the proper place.\n\nThe policy is described as 'Private Car (Comprehensive Policy)'. The policy issued by the other company does not so describe it, but it is also a Comprehensive Policy as the premium charged is on that basis. The policy insures, under Section I against IGss or damage, under Section II against lia bility to third parties and under Section III against liability for medical expenses. Thereafter, follow the general exceptions and conditions.\n\nPara I of Section II indemnifies the insured, i.e. Asnani who effected the policy, in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the motor car, against all sums which he may become legally liable to pay in respect of death or of bodily injury to any person. Paras 3 and 4, generally known as 'Other drivers' 'Extension Clause' and 'Other Vehicles Extension Clause' respectively, are material and are set out in full:\n\n\"3. In terms of and subject to the limitations of the indemnity which is granted by this section to the Insured the Company will indemnify any driver who is driving the Motor Car on the Insured 's order or with his permission provided that such Driver:-\n\n(a) is not entitled to indemnity under any other policy.\n\n(b) shall as though he were the Insured observe, ful'\n\nIii and be subject to the terms, exceptions and conditions of the policy in so far as they can apply.\n\nJ.Vtw AsiaJic\n\nlnsirance Co. Ltd.\n\nPuaiimal Dhanamal .datcani and Otliera\n\nBaghubar Da1JUl, J.\n\n4. In terms of and subject to the limitations of the indemnity which is granted by this Section in connection with the Motor Car the Company will indemnity which is granted by this Section in con- Private Motor Car (but not a Motor Cycle) not belonging to him and not hired to him nnder a Hire Purchase Agreement\".\n\nUnder the heading 'Avoidance of certain terms and right of recovery', the policy states: -\n\n\"Nothing in this Policy or any endorsement hereon shall affect the right of any person indemnified by this Policy or any other person to recover an amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, section 96.\n\nBut the Insured shall repay to the Company all sums paid by the Company which the Company would not have been liable to pay but for the said provisions.\" Condition 6 reads:\n\n\"6. If at the time any claim arises under this Policy\n\nthere is any other existing insurance covering the same loss damage or liability the Company shall not be liable to pay or contribute more than its rateable proportion of any loss dam11ge compensation costs or expense. Provided ·always that nothing in this Condition shall impose on the Company any liability from which but for this Condition it would have been relieved under proviso (a) of Section 11-3 of this Policy\".\n\nThe Schedule to the policy mentions the limitations as to use and under heading 'Driver' notes: -\n\n(a) Any person: -\n\n(b) The insured may also drive a motor car not belonging to him and not hired to him under a Hire Purchase Agreement.\n\nProvided that the person driving holds a licence to drive the Motor Car or has held and is not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence\".\n\nAt the end of the Schedule is an important notice which reads:\n\n\"The insured is not indemnified if the Vehicle is used or driven otherwise than in accordance with this Schedule. Any payment made by the Company by reason of wider terms appearing in the Certificate in order to comply with Motor Vehicles Act 1939 is recoverable from the Insured. See the clause headed 'Avoidance of certain terms and right of recovery'.\"\n\nThe contention for the appellant is that in view of para 1964\n\n4 of Pessumal's policy issued by the other company, Pessumal New Asiatic was indemnified against any liability incurred by him whilst 1 .. urane,· Co. Ltd. personally driving a private motor car not belonging to himp,.,.ni:i'm.anamal and not hired to him under a Hire Purchase Agreement, and A .. ani and Other.\n\nat, terefore, he was not nclded aong the person~ indem- Raaha,,,;; D,, yal, J.\n\nmfied-m para 3 of the policy 1t had JSsued to Asnam on account of proviso (a) to para 3 which reads:\n\n\"provided that such driver is not entitled to indemnity under any other policy\".\n\nThis contention is met by the respondent on the ground that this [>roviso is not a limitation on the class of persons indemnified under para 3, that class being the drivers driving the Chevrolet car insured under the policy, but merely amounted to a condition affecting the liability of the company vis a vis the driver who was entitled to indemnity under any other policy. The question thus reduces itself to the determination of whether Pessumal comes within the persons indemnified in para 3 of the policy issued by the company.\n\nWe may now set out the relevant provisions of the Act which have a bearing on the contention between the parties.\n\nChapter VIII of the Act provides for insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks. Section 93 defines the ex\n\npressions 'authorised i.tJsureil'; 'certifidate of in$ltlance' andi reciprocating country'. The relevant portions of the various sections are :\n\n\"94. (1). No person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be. a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter.\n\nExplanation-A person driving a motor vehicle merely as a paid employee, while there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle no such policy as is required by this subsection, shall not be deemed to act in contravention of the\n\nsub-setion unless he knows or has reason to believe that there is no such policy in force.\n\n(2) Sub-section (l) shall not apply to any vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes uncpnnecte<l with any commercial enterprise.\n\n(3) The appropriate Government may. by order, exempt from the operation of sub-section (!) any\n\n196l\n\nNew A.giatic\n\nl1i,~1iranr-e Co. Ltd,.\n\nPe$, mmnl Dkat1amal\n\nAawani an!l Olht.ra\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nvehicle owned by any of the following authorities. namely:- • • • • • Provided that no such order shall be made in relation to any such authority unless a fund has been established and is maintained by that authority in accordance with the rules made in that behalf under this Act for meeting any liability arising out of the use of any vehicle of that authority which thiit authority or any person in its employment may incur to third parties. • • • • •\n\n95. (I) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which-\n\n(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer or by a co-operative society allowed under section 108 to transact the business of an insurer, and\n\n(b) insures the person or classes of person specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section\n\ni2) against any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of tbe use of the vehicle in a public pla.ce: • • • • •\n\n(4) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until there is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed parjiculars of any conditions subject to which the policy is issued and of any other prescribed matters; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases . • • • • •\n\n(5) Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in any law, a person issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the ·~ person or classes of person specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of person.\n\n96. (!). If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (4) of section 95 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability\n\nas is required to be covered by a policy , under ' 1964 clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95 (being New Asia!lc a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is ln•urance Oo. Lid. obtained al!ainst ay person insur~ by the policy, Puaumal \".Dhawa...; l\n\nthen, notw1thstandmg that the msurer ma.y. be Aswani and Other• entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject Raghu/mr Dayal, J. to the provisions of this section. pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments.\n\n(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under subsection (1) in respect of any judgment unless before or after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given the insurer had notice through the Court of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of any judgment so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely:-\n\n• • • • •\n\n(3) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued\n\nunder sub-section (4) of 11ection 95 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any conditions other than those in clause (b) of subsection (2) shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under clause\n\n(b) of sub-section (1) of section 95, be of no effect: Provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this sub-section shall be recoverable by the ininsurer from that person.\n\n(4) If the amount which an insurer becomes IJable\n\nmder this section to pay in respect of a liability rncurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would apart from the provisions of this section be liable under\n\n:rew Asiaek\n\nIn.urroit!e Co. LW..\n\nthe policy in respect of that lia.bility, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from that person. • • • • • Pessunwl Dlutn'lmol\n\nAswani and Others\n\n(6) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in subsection (2) or sub-section (2A) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (I) or sub-section (2A) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2), or in the corresponding law of the State of J ammu and Kashmir or of the r~ ciprocating country, as the case may be\".\n\nChapter VII! of the Act, it appears from the heading. makes provision for insurance of the vehicle against third party risks, that is to say, its provisions ensure that thirdparties who suffer on account of the user of the motor vehick would be also to get damages for injuries suffered and that their ability to get the damages will not be dependent on the financial condition of the driver of the vehicle whose user led to the causing of the injuries. The provisions have to be construed in such a manner as to ensure this object of the enactment.\n\nSection 94 prohibits, as a matter of necessity, for insurance against third-party risk, the use of a motor vehicle by any person unless there exists a policy of insurance in felation lo the use of the vehicle by that particular person and the policy of insurance complies with the requirements of Chapter VIII. The policy must therefore provide insurance against any liability to third party incurred by that person when using that vehicle. The policy should therefore be with respect ta that particular vehicle. It may, however, mention the perso11 specifically or generally by specifying the class to which that person may belong, as it may not be possible to name specifically all the persons who may have to use the vehicle with the permission of the person owning the vehicle and effecting the policy of insurance. The policy of insurance contemplated by s. 94 therefore must be a policy by which a particular car is insured.\n\nSection 95 lays down the requirements which are to be complied with by the policy of insurance issued in relation to the use of a particular vehicle. They are: (1) the policy must specify the person or classes of person who are insured with respect to their liability to third-parties; (2) the policy must specify the extent of liability which must extend to the extent specified in sub-s. (2); and (3) the liability which be 1 incurred by the specified person or classes of person in respect of death or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle insured in a public place.\n\nr '\n\n7 s.c.R.\n\nSUPREl\\lE COURT REPORTS 873\n\nSub-section (4) of s. 95 requires the issue of a certificate of 1961 msnrance, in the prescribed form, to the person who effects Neu hiaJi' the policy. The form of the certificate prescribed by th~ Motor lnsuran\" Cn. Lid,\n\nVehicles Third Party Insurance Rules, 1946, . requires _the p,88,.,,,,.;•j,1\"'\"\"'\"'l specification of persons _or classes of rs_ons entitle~ to dnve. Aswani and Otl.eTB\n\nThe authorised insurer 1s also to certify m the certificate that -- , , . . .fi I te II th c r RH9liulwr Daya ••• the pohcy to which the ert1 ca_te re a s. as we. as e e: tificate of insurance, are issued m accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Act.\n\nSub-secticn (5) of s. 95 makes the insurer liable to indemnify the person or classes of person specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of person. If the policy covers the insured for his liability to third parties, tbe insurer is bound to indemnify the person or classes of person specified in the policy The same is the effect of sub-s. (!) of s. 96 which provides that the insurer is bound to pay to the-- person entitled to the benefit of a decree he obtains in respect of any liability covered by the terms of the policy against any person insured by the policy irrespective of the fact whether the insurer was entitled to avoid or cancel or might have avoided or cancelled the policy. This means that once the insurer has issued a certificate of insurance in accordance\n\n.vith sub-s. (4) of s. 95 he has to satisfy any decree which a oerson receiving injuries from the use of the vehicle insured obtains against any person insured by the policy. He is however liable to satisfy the decree only when he has been served with a notice under sub-s. (2) of s. 96 about the proceedings in which the judgment was delivered. It is for this reason that a notice under sub-s. (2) of s. 96 was issued to the company and it is on account of the consequential liability ill case the plaintiffs' claim is decreed against Pessumal that the appellant challenged the correctness of the allegation that Pessumal was a person insured under the policy issued by it in respect or the Chevrolet car. It follows from a consideration of these various provisions of the Act-and this is not really disputed for the appellant-that if under the terms of the policy Pessumal can be said to he the person insured under para 3, the company would he liable to satisfy the decree if any passed against Pessumal.\n\nThe whole question then is whether Pesumal comes within the terms of para 3 of Section II of the policy.\n\nUnder this paragraph. the company indemnifies any person who is driving the motor-car on the insured's order or with his permission. Pessumal was driving the car with the permission of Asnani who had effected the policy and therefore the company undertook to indemnify Pessumal in accordance with this provision of para 3. The appellant, however. '\n\n1964 contends that this provision should not be read as defining N•w A•iatic by itelf the class of persons insured under it, in viw of the lnMance Co. Lid. further classification of this class of drivers by proviso (a). It n _, v. is contended that only such drivers were indemnified as were ~'\"\"\"\"\" D/&anamal • • • d h l\" d th A•IDani and Otkera not entitled to mdemmty un er any ot er po icy an . us -. - drivers who were entitled to indemnity under any other poltcy RafAMbar Deya!, J. were taken out of the general class of drivers driving the car on the insured's order or with his permission. We do not ..... agree with this contention.\n\nThe proviso is not really a classification of driers but 1s a restriction on the right of the driver to recover any dam\n\nages he had to pay, from the company. The driver who can get indemnity from any other company under any other policy is, under this contractual term, not to get indemnity from the company. The proviso thus, affects the question of indemnity between a particular driver and the company and has noth ing to do with the liability which the driver has incurred to the third party for the injuries caused to it and against which liability was provided by s. 94 of the Act and was affected by the policy issued by the company. The company, by agree ing with the person who affects the policy, to insure him against . liability to third parties, takes upon itself the entire liabilit]' of the person effecting the insurance. it is open to the insurer not to extend this idemnity to the insured to other persons but if it extends it to other persons, it cannot restrict it vis a vis the right of the third party entitled to damages, to recover them from the insured, a right which is not disputed. A proviso meant to exempt certain persons from the general classi fication will have to be related to considerations affecting it and is not to be related to such classified persons right to indemnity from any other insurer. In this connection reference may be made to proviso (b) which cannot in any case be a proviso relating to the classification of persons to be indemni fied. It provides that the person indemnified under para 3 will observe, fulfil and be subject to the terms. exceptions and conditions of the policy in so far as they can apply to him.\n\nWe are further of opinion that clause (4) of Section II of Pessumal's policy with the other company does not make that policy to be a policy within the meaning of s. 94 of the Act in relation to the Chevrolet car by whose user Pessumal incurred liabilities sought to be established in the two suits. The para\n\ngr~h indemnifi_es the insured, i.e., Pessumal, wp.iist pe!50nally dnvmg any pnvate motor car. It does not indemnify him against the liability incurred when driving any particular car and therefore, in view of what we have said earlier, Pessumal's policy cannot be a policy of insurance in relation to the Chevro- • let car as required by s. 94 of the Act Such a policy and any W indemnity under it cannot be used for sub-classifying driven specified in the policy of the company.\n\nThe Act contemplates the possibility of the policy of in- 1961 surance undertaking liability to third parties providing such a New Asiatic contract between the insurer and the insured, that is, the person 1...,.,.a ... Oo. Lid. who effected the policy, as would make the mpan>'. entitled p.,.., ... i\"iJ,,_1 to recover the whole or part of the amount 1t has paid to the ;1 .... 3 ; and ou.er, third party from the insured. The insurer thus acts as security - for the third party with respect to its realising damages for the Raghtlbu.r Dayqj, J\n\ninjuries suffered, but vis a vis the insured, the company does not undertake that liability or undertakes it to a limited extent. It is in view of such a possibility that various conditions are laid down in the policy. Such conditions, however, are effective only between the insured and the company, and have to be ignored when considering the liability of the company to third parties. This is mentioned prominently in the policy itself and is mentioned under the heading 'Avoidance of certain terms and rights of recovery', as well as in the form of 'An Important Notice' in the Schedule to the policy. The avoidance clause says that nothing in the policy or any endorsement thereon shall affect the right of any person indemnified by the policy or any other person to recover an amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Act. It also provides that the insured will repay to the company all sums paid by it which the company would not have been liable to pay but for the said provisions of the Act. The 'Important Notice' mentions that any payment made by the company by reason of wider terms appearing in the certificate in order to comply with the Act is recoverable from the insured, and refers to the avoidance clause.\n\nThus the contract between the insured and the company may not provide for all the liabilities which the company has to undertake vis a vis the third parties, in view of the provisions of the Act. We are of opinion that once the company had undertaken liability to third parties incurred by the per sons specified in the policy, the third parties' right to recover any amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Act is not affected by any condition in the policy. Considering this aspect of the terms of the policy, it is reasonable to conclude that proviso (a) of para 3 of Section II is a mere condition affecting the rights of the insured who effected the policy and the persons to whom the cover of the policy was extended by the company, and does not come in the way of third parties: claim against the company on account of its claim against a person specified in para 3 as one to whom cover of the policy was extended.\n\nIt has been contended for the appellant that it was not incumbent on the owner of a car to take out a poli_cy of insurance indemnifying himself or any person permitted to drive the car and that if he does not insure the car and uses it he . runs the risk of prosecution under s. 125 of the Act. This is\n\n878 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\n1961 true, but has no relevant effect on the question for decision N\"v A,;,,,; c before us. Asnani did insure his car with respect to liability Jn.,.mnrc On. Lid. against third persons. We have to see whether the company. p,,,,.,,,,,111,.,.,,,,,,,1 on account of .undertaking that liability can be said to have\n\nAmani and Ot/\"\"' insured Pessumal on account of his driving the car with the R 1 d - 1 permission of Asnani. The same may be said about the other \"ii\" \"\"Daya' J. contention for the appellant that there is nothing in the Act which makes it compulsory for an insurer to insist that the owner of the car takes out a policy in the widest terms possible covering any person who qrives the car with his permission. The company did agree under the policy to indemnify drivers who drove the car with the insured's permission. The question is whether that undertaking covers PessumaL\n\nLastly, we may mention that the question about the proper stage at which the question raised by the company in the Chamber notice is to be decided, came up for consideration at the hearing. We however do not propose to express any opinion on that point in this case.\n\nWe are of opinion that the High Court rightly held that the company had insured Pessumal in view of para 3 of Section II of the policy and that it comes within the expression 'insurer' in s. 96 of the Act. We therefore dismiss the appeals with costs of hearing one set.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 73, "entities": [{"text": "867\n\nNEW ASIATIC INSURANCE CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NEW ASIATIC INSURANCE CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v.\n\nPESSUMAL DHANAMAL ASWAN! AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PESSUMAL DHANAMAL ASWANI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 93 to 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "s. 96(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 594, "end_char": 602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 610, "end_char": 634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 93, 94, 95 and 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1926, "end_char": 1947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1955, "end_char": 1973, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3017, "end_char": 3022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3698, "end_char": 3715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 8, 1963 of the Bombay High Court in Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3752, "end_char": 3763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, V. N. Thakar, 1."}}, {"text": "V. N. Thakar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3765, "end_char": 3777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, V. N. Thakar, 1."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3782, "end_char": 3795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3800, "end_char": 3809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3814, "end_char": 3829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3873, "end_char": 3885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, 0."}}, {"text": "P. Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra and I. N. Shroff, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3906, "end_char": 3918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra and I. N. Shroff, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. J. Merchant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3965, "end_char": 3979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. J. Merchant, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "JlaflobarDayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4102, "end_char": 4116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJlaflobarDayal, J.\n\nR.AGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-These appeals, by special leave."}}, {"text": "R.AGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4122, "end_char": 4137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJlaflobarDayal, J.\n\nR.AGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-These appeals, by special leave.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ"}}, {"text": "S. N. Asnani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4214, "end_char": 4226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "arise in the following circumstances:\n\nS. N. Asnani owned Chevrolet Car bearing registered No."}}, {"text": "Asnani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4417, "end_char": 4423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asnani permitted Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani, hereinafter called Pessumal, to drive that car."}}, {"text": "Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4434, "end_char": 4458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asnani permitted Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani, hereinafter called Pessumal, to drive that car."}}, {"text": "Pessumal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Pessumal was driving the car with Daooji Radhamohan Meherotra and Murli Dholandas in the car, the car met with an accident as a result of which Meherotra died and Murli received injuries.", "canonical_name": "Pessumal"}}, {"text": "Daooji Radhamohan Meherotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4548, "end_char": 4575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Pessumal was driving the car with Daooji Radhamohan Meherotra and Murli Dholandas in the car, the car met with an accident as a result of which Meherotra died and Murli received injuries."}}, {"text": "Murli Dholandas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4580, "end_char": 4595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Pessumal was driving the car with Daooji Radhamohan Meherotra and Murli Dholandas in the car, the car met with an accident as a result of which Meherotra died and Murli received injuries."}}, {"text": "Indian Trade & General Insurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4772, "end_char": 4813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pessumal himself owned a Pontiac car which had been insured with the Indian Trade & General Insurance Co. Ltd., under policy No."}}, {"text": "s. 96(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5132, "end_char": 5140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5148, "end_char": 5172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "New Asiatic Insurance Co, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notices under s. 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act IV of 1939), hereinafter called the Act, were issued to the New Asiatic Insurance Co, Ltd. The notice was given to the company as the defendant's liability to third parties had been insured with it under its policy no."}}, {"text": "s. 96(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5489, "end_char": 5497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5866, "end_char": 5874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tarkunde J., held the P ~Dh al notice issued to the company in the suits under s. 96(2) of A::.\":.~ and O:A:.... the Act, to be bad in law and, accordingly, set them aside. . . ."}}, {"text": "s. 96(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5945, "end_char": 5953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Ragl1vbar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6046, "end_char": 6061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ragl1vbar Dayal, J.\n\nThe plamtdfs then filed Letters Patent Appeals which were allowed and the Chamber Summonses were dismissed.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ"}}, {"text": "Puaiimal Dhanamal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8211, "end_char": 8228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.Vtw AsiaJic\n\nlnsirance Co. Ltd.\n\nPuaiimal Dhanamal .datcani and Otliera\n\nBaghubar Da1JUl, J.\n\n4."}}, {"text": "Baghubar Da1JUl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8251, "end_char": 8266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.Vtw AsiaJic\n\nlnsirance Co. Ltd.\n\nPuaiimal Dhanamal .datcani and Otliera\n\nBaghubar Da1JUl, J.\n\n4."}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8879, "end_char": 8897, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8905, "end_char": 8915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9539, "end_char": 9549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10246, "end_char": 10264, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Asnam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10881, "end_char": 10886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at, terefore, he was not nclded aong the person~ indem- Raaha,,,;; D,, yal, J.\n\nmfied-m para 3 of the policy 1t had JSsued to Asnam on account of proviso (a) to para 3 which reads:\n\n\"provided that such driver is not entitled to indemnity under any other policy\"."}}, {"text": "Chapter VIII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11667, "end_char": 11690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 93", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11759, "end_char": 11769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Act"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12947, "end_char": 12961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pe$, mmnl Dkat1amal\n\nAawani an!l Olht.ra\n\nRaghubar Dayal, J.\n\nvehicle owned by any of the following authorities.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL,\n\nJJ"}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13634, "end_char": 13645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14866, "end_char": 14876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15069, "end_char": 15079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghu/mr Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15406, "end_char": 15420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be Aswani and Other• entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject Raghu/mr Dayal, J. to the provisions of this section."}}, {"text": "section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16790, "end_char": 16800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17842, "end_char": 17869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pessunwl Dlutn'lmol\n\nAswani and Others\n\n(6) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in subsection (2) or sub-section (2A) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (I) or sub-section (2A) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2), or in the corresponding law of the State of J ammu and Kashmir or of the r~ ciprocating country, as the case may be\"."}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18477, "end_char": 18487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19337, "end_char": 19342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19409, "end_char": 19419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20084, "end_char": 20089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vehicles Third Party Insurance Rules, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20288, "end_char": 20330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chapter VIII of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20699, "end_char": 20722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20744, "end_char": 20749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21161, "end_char": 21166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21612, "end_char": 21617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21873, "end_char": 21878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21994, "end_char": 21999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pesumal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22636, "end_char": 22643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole question then is whether Pesumal comes within the terms of para 3 of Section II of the policy.", "canonical_name": "Pessumal"}}, {"text": "RafAMbar Deya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23526, "end_char": 23539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "drivers who were entitled to indemnity under any other poltcy RafAMbar Deya!,"}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24271, "end_char": 24276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25535, "end_char": 25540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26020, "end_char": 26025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghtlbu.r Dayqj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26688, "end_char": 26704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The insurer thus acts as security - for the third party with respect to its realising damages for the Raghtlbu.r Dayqj, J\n\ninjuries suffered, but vis a vis the insured, the company does not undertake that liability or undertakes it to a limited extent."}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29155, "end_char": 29161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Daya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29684, "end_char": 29688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same may be said about the other \"ii\" \"\"Daya' J. contention for the appellant that there is nothing in the Act which makes it compulsory for an insurer to insist that the owner of the car takes out a policy in the widest terms possible covering any person who qrives the car with his permission."}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30563, "end_char": 30568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_879_891_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "78.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 879\n\nBISHESHW AR DAY AL SINHA\n\nUNIVERSITY OF BlHAR & ORS.\n\nJP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HiDAYAT-\n\nULLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYAN\n\nGAR, JJ.)\n\nBihar Staie Universities (Patna, University of Bihar, Bhaga!pur and Ranchi Act). 1960 (Bihar 14 of 1960), ss. 2(d), 4(10)\n\n~O(d) and (e), 60(a)(ii)-Amendment Act, 1961 (Bihar II of 1962), s. 35, Statutes 2(4), 3(1)-0rder by Vice-Chancellor reconstituting Governing Bodu of alftliated college-Validity.\n\nThe Vice-Chancellor of the Bihar University by an order dated January 13, 1963 directed the reconstitution of the Governing Body of the Rajendra College, Chapra, which was a public institution founded by public charities and was affiliat<>d to the University under s. 2(d) of the Bihar State Universities (Patna, University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Act, 1960, removed the appellant, who was the Secretary of the College and nominated certain persons as members of the Governing Body. The Act of 1960 was amended by Act II of 1962 and s. 35 of the Amending Act provided for the dissolution of the Senate Syndicate and Acadt>mic Council functioning prior to it and for the constitution of new bodies in their place and authorised the Vice-Chancellor pending such reconstitution to exercise their powers for a period not exceeding, nine months. In exercise of the power conferred by this section the Vice-Chancellor framed new statutes under which he purported to pass the impugned arders. Clause 2(4) of the new statutes canferred an the Vice-Chancellor the power to amend or revise the canstitutian of the affiliated calleges and cl. 3(1) empowered the syndicate either on its own !notion or at the instance of the Vice-Chancellor ta dissolve; and order constitutian of Governing Badies. It further empowered the cancellation af grants-in-aid ta the colleges concerned. The proviso to. cl. 3(1) required that reasonable opportunity must be given to the Governing Body before any action was taken under the clause.\n\nThe appellant moved the Patna High Court for a writ quashing JJie impugned order and the statutes on which it was made.\n\nHis case was that the relevant statutes were ultra vires and as such the order was unsustainable. The High Court held that the impugned order could not be justified under cl. 3(1) as the proviso had not bt>en complied with but that the order was valid under cl. 2(4). It further held that the impugned statutes could be justified by s. 60(a)(ii) which was introduced by Act II of 1962, empowering the Vice-Chancellor to make adaptations or modification in the pre-existing statutes.\n\nHeld: The Bihar State University Act of 1960 made a clear distinction between two categories of collegiate institutions,\n\n(1) those owned and maintained by the university and (2) others o.dmitted or affiliated to the University, as was apparent from ss. 4(10) and 30(d) and (e) of the Act. While the University had undoubtedly the power to disaffiliate an institution belonging to the second category on its failure to conform to reasonable and legitimate conditions under the Act subject to which the affiliation was granted, it had no power to dissolve and\n\n.4.prif 81\n\n196,\n\nBW.W.,..r Dayal\n\nSinlia\n\nUniveraitg o/ Bi/oar and Othera\n\nconstitute the Governing Body of such an institution itself.\n\nClause 2(4) of the Statutes was inconsistent with s. 30(d) of the Act and must be held to be invalid. The impugned order passed under it therefore must be invalid and inoperative.\n\nClause 3(1) of the statute in so far as it proceeded on the basis that the syndicate could itself dissolve the Governing: Body and order its reconstitution suffered from the same in-· firmity as cl. 2(4). That clause in so far at it gave the syndicate the power to dissolve and reconstitute the Governing Body and cancel grants-in-aid to an affiliated college for non-compliance with its direction issued in that behalf must, conse-· quently, be held to be invalid.\n\nThe power conferred by s. 60(ii) of the Act must be rea:d' in the Jig.ht of the provisions of s. 30(d) in regard to affiliated colleges and since statute 2(4) was itself invalid, the section could not justify the impugned order.\n\nIn resolving disputes between affiliated colleges and theuniversity, attempt should be made to respect the autonomy of the colleges and reconcile the same with the supervisory powers of the University intended to be exercised in the interest of efficiency and progress.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 279' of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 23, 1963 of the Patna High Court in M. J. C. No. 86 of 1963.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthy, for the appellant.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, and S. P. Varma, for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4.\n\nS. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthy, for respondent No. 5.\n\nSarjoo Prasad, S. L. Chhibber and B. P. Jlia, for respondent No. 8.\n\nD. Goburdhun, for respondent No. 16.\n\nS. P. Varma, for intervener No. I.\n\nDipak Datta Choudhri and A. K. Nag, for intervener No. 2.\n\nApril 24, 1964. The judgment of the Court was delivered by '\n\nG•}•nd\"\"JQ<lkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.- The writ petition from which this appeal by special leave arises had been filed by the appellant Bisheshwar Dayal Sinha by which he challenged the validity of the order issued by the Vice-Chancellor of the Bihar University directing the recbnstitution of the Governing Body of the Rajendra College, Chapra, and of the rele- , vam new statutes framed by him under which the said order is purported to have been issued. His case was that the relevant\n\n new statutes are ultra vires the authority of the Vice-Chan-\n\n19G4\n\ncellor and the impugned order passed by him in pursuance Bislieshwar Dayal of. the said relevant statutes is, therefore, illegal, inoperative Sinha - Vand void. Along with the petition filed by the appellant, four University of other petitions had been filed by other persons seeking to Biluir a1ui Otliera obtain similar relief. The Patna High Court ha.s, in subsnce, Gaj•ndragadkar, C.J, rejected the appellant's case and has accordmgly d1sm1ssed the appellant's writ petition as well as the other petitions filed by other persons. On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Setalvad has contended that the view taken by the Patna High Court about the validity of the relevant statutes is not sustainable and that the said statutes are ultra vires with the inevitable consequence that the impugned order directing the reconstitution of the Governing Body of the Rajendra College must also be held to be invalid.\n\nThe Rajendra College is an educational institution which has been admitted by the Bihar University as a College, as defined in section 2(d) of the Bihar State Universities (Patna, University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Aet (Bihar Act XIV of 1960) (hereinafter called 'the Act') read with Article I of Chapter XII of the Statutes framed under the Act. The said college is a public institution founded by public charities and is conducted under the management of a Governing Body. The first Governing Body of the College was formed by the citizens of Chapra who had assembled for that purpose in a meeting on the 31st July 1938. The Governing Body thus constituted consisted of 18 members; it continued to function until the 24th July, 1940, with additions in the personnel made from time to time by co-option. Later. in 1941, the Governing Body adopted a constitution framed by the Principal of the College at its request and that constitution governed the administration of the collee. In due course, some further amendments were made in !950. After the passing of the University of Bihar Act, 1951 (Bihar Act XXVII of 1951) and. the framing of Chapter XIII of the Statutes. under the said. Act: the University suggested to the Gover!'mg Body to bnng its constitution in line witil the\n\nprov!~1on~ of Chapter XI~! of said Statutes.\n\nAccordingly, m0.d1ticatlons wre made 111 the constitution, and the constitution .thus modified and amended from time to time was in operation at the relevant time.\n\nThe appellant had been elected Secretary to the Governing Body on the 3rd of June, 1961, and under the relevant rvles of the constitution, his term of office wa$ to be three academic sesst?ns, and as such, it was to last until 31st May,\n\n1964. Meanwhile, by the impugned order passed by the Vice- Chancellor on th~ 13t~ !anuary, 1963, the appellant has been removed _from. his P?Stlt?n as Secretary and another person has been appomted m his place. That is the reason why the\n\n196.J appellant moved the Patna High Court for appropriate writ BishMhaar Dayal or order quashing the impugned order and the relevant sa-\n\nSinlia tutes on which it purports to be based. To his writ petition,\n\nUnive~; ity of the appellant impleaded 18 persons amongst them being !lihar and Othu\" respondent No. I, the University of Bihar, respondent No. 2\n\nGa'e1ulra--:11car C.J. Mr. Srivastava, Vice-Chancellor of the University. of !3ihar,\n\n~ ya ' and respondent No. 3 the Chancellor of the Umvers1ty of Bihar.\n\nBefore dealing with the contentions raised by the a ppellant in the present appeal, it is necessary to refer briefly to the relevant statutory provisions governing the affairs of the University of Bihar and its constituent colleges. The first Act to which reference must be made is the Universitv of Bihar Act (Bihar Act _XXVII of 1951). This Act was passed in August, 1951, and the provisions enacted by it were intended to furnish a comprehensive code to establish and incorporate an affiliating-cum-teaching University in the State of Bihar at Patna. In 1960, Bihar Act XIV of 1960, which we are describing as the Act in the course of this judgment, came to be passed. This Act was intended to help the establishment aud incorporation of affiliating-cum-teaching Universities at 7atna, Muzaffarpur, Bhagalpur and Ranchi in the State of Bihar.\n\nThis Act was later amended by Acts II of 1962. XIII of 1962, and XVII of 1962. The first of these Amending Acts came into force on the Isl of March, 1962; the second on 21st April, 1962 and the third on the 16th October, 1962.\n\nAt this stage, we m, ay conveniently mention the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2(d) defines a \"college~ as meaning an institution admitted to or maintained by the University, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, in which instruction is given, subject to the provisions contained in cl. (15) of s. 4, lo the students of the college up to and including a standard below the post-graduate standard under conditions prescribed in the Statutes. This definition shows that the Act applies to two categories of colleges, the first category consisting of collegiate institutions admitted to the University. and the other maintained by the University. Section 4 prescribes the purposes and powers of the University.\n\nSection 4(] 0) provides that one of the purposes and powers of the University is to institute, maintain and manage colleges and hostels and to recognise colleges and hostels not maintained by the University. This provision brings out the fact that two kinds of collegiate institutions would be functioning under the University-those that are instituted by the University, and those that are admitted.\n\nIn regard to the first category of colleges, the power and purposes of the University would be to institute, maintain and manage the colleges and hostels, and in regard to the other, the power and purpose would be to recognise them, subject, of course, to the\n\nconditions imposed in that behalf. For the purpose of dealing 1964\n\nwith the main controversy between the parties in the present Bi•h .. hwur Dayal\n\nappeal. it is necessary to bear in mind this distincrion between Sinha two categories of collegiate instituticms functioning under Unive;;;111 of the Bihar University.\n\nBiharand Other• Section 7 prescribes the Officers of the University whb G•jemlmgadkar, C.J. are: the Chancellor; the Vice-Chancellor; the Treasurer; the Registrar; the Deans of Faculties; the Finance Officer and such other persons as may be declared by the Statutes to be the officers of the University. Section 16 defines the authorities of the University which are six; they are: the Senate; the Syndicate; the Academic Council; the Faculties; the Examination Board; and such other authorities as may be declared by the Statutes to be the authorities of the University. Section 20 deals with powers and duties of the Senate. Under s. 20(1). the Senate shall be the supreme governing body of the University and shall have the entire management of. and superintendence over. the affairs, concerns and property of the University; shall exercise all the powers of the University, not otherwise provided for, to give effect to the provisions of the Act. Section 20(2) prescribes in particular some of the powers and duties of the Senate; amongst them is included the powe1 of making the Statutes. and amending or repealing the same.\n\nSection 21 deals with the Syndicate and its composition; and s. 22 prescribes the powers and duties of the Syndicate.\n\nSection 30 deals with statutes. Section 30(d) provides !hat subject to the provisions of the Act, the Statutes may provide for the admission of educational institutions as colleges and the withdrawal of privileges from colleges so admitted; and s. 30(e) provides that the statutes may provide for the institution of colleges and hostels and their maintenance and management. It would thus be seen that proceeding on the basis of the broad distinction between collegial~ institutions instituted by the University and those admitted 'or recognise:! by, it, s. 30 makes two separate provisions in that . behalf. In regard to the institutions admitted or recognised, the St.atutes .can provide for the admission or recognition of such ms~1tut10ns and the withdrawal of such recognition, whereas in regard to the institutions instituted by the University, the Statutes may provide for the institution of such colleges and their maintenance and management.\n\nSection 49 deals with the prbblem of relations of affiliated c'?lleges with the University, and it provides that the said rek!t1ons shall b.e governed by the. Statutes to be made in tha! behalf. and 11 prescnbes in particular some of the matters which may be covered by the said Statutes .\n\n. Section 60 prov.ides for the continuance of Statutes, Ordinances, Regulat10ns and Rules which were in force\n\nunder the Bihar Acts XXV and XXVII of 1961. Section 60 Biihe•hwar Duyal (ii) empowers the Vice-Chancellor to make adaptations or\n\nSinha modifications in the said Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations Univc;;; iy of and Rules with the approval of the Chancdlor in so far as Bihor and Otltm they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, and\n\nG • d adka 0 J when such adaptations or modifications are made, they would aJ\"' 'tlfl '' be deemed to have been made under the appropriate provisions of the Act. In other words, while continuing the operation of the pre-existing Statutes, power has been conferred on the Vice-Chancellor to make adaptations or modifications in the said Statutes, subject to the conditions which we have just indicated. This provision came into force on the 1st March, 1962 by virtue of the amending provision prescribed oy Act II of 1962.\n\nThere is one more provision to which reference must be made before we part with this topic. Section 35 of Act II of 1962 provides for dissolution of the Senate, Syndicate and Academic Council functioning prior to the commena::ment of the _said Act and constitution of new Senate, Syndicate and Academic Council in their place. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Bihar Act XIV of\n\n1960, the respective bodies established under s. 3 of the said Act in regard to the Universities covered by the Act shall stand dissolved on the commencement of this Act and thereafter, as soon as may be, they shall be reconstituted, and pending their reconstitution, the Vice-Chancellor shall exercise their powers and perform their duties under the said Act for a period not exceeding nine months from such commencement. The result of this provision is to authorise the Vice- Chancellor to exercise the powers and functions of the respective bodies which. stood dissolved, for nine months from the date of the operation of this Amending Act, or until the said bodies were duly reconstituted. It is by virtue of the power conferred on him by this section that the Vice-Chancellor has purported to frame new Statutes some of which are challenged in the present proceedings and has issued the impugned order in pnrsuance of the said new Statutes. That, in brief, is the position with regard to the statutory provisions in the light of which the dispute between the parties has to be settled in the present appeal.\n\nThe two statutes whi£h have been challenged before us may now be set out. This body of new Statutes came to be promulgated on the 18th November, 1962. After they were thus promulgated, the Registrar of the University of Bihar wrote to the Secretaries and Principals of all Admitted Colleges, except Constituent and Government College~. enquiring from them what action had to be taken by the Vice-Chancellor or the Syndicate in regard to the constitution of the. Governing Body of the respective Colleges and the appointment of\n\nOffice-bearers. The new Statutes consist of 24 clauses, but for\n\nthe purpose of the present appeal, we are concerned only with Bi<hu; wa,;. Dayal two of them. Clause 2, sub-clause (4) provides: \"in the case ·~. of the constitution of the Governing Bodies of admitted col- .un;..,..,; i& of leges (except colleges owned and maintained by Government) B•har ,_\n\nframed prior to the making of these Statutes, the Vice-Chan-a.; mc1raga<1hr, O.J. cellor shall have the power to amend or revise the constitution wherever necessary in order to bring it, as far as possible, in conformity with the provisions of these Statutes\" Gause 3(1) reads thus: -\n\n\"The Syndicate may on its motion or at the instance of the Vice-Chancellor dissolve and order constitution of Governing Body in admitted colleges or cancel its grant-in-aid to the college concerned for any one or more of the following reasons:\n\n(a) that the college has failed to comply with the directions issued by the Syndicate under the laws of the University within the specified time;\n\n<b) that the college has failed to observe the provisions of the laws of the University;\n\n(c) improper utilisation of the various funds of the\n\ninstitution;\n\n(d) that the affairs of the college have been. grossly mismanaged.\n\nProvided, however, that before ordering dissolution of the Governing Body or before passing such order against the Governing Body the Syndicate shall give a reasonable opportunity to the Governing Body to show cause against such action.\" It is clear that cl. 2(4) of the new Statutes expressly confers on the Vice-Chancellor the power to amend or revise the constitution of the affiliated colleges; and cl. 3(1) empowers the Syndicate to dissolve and order constitution of their Governing Bodies either on it~ own motion or at the instance of the Vice-Chancellor. Gause 3(1) also empowers the Syndicate to cancel its grant-in-aid to the college concerned for one or more of the four reasons specified by it. The proviso to cl. 30) requires that before the dissolution of the Governing Body is ordered, or any similar order is passed under cl. 3(1), reasonable opportunity has to be given to the Governing Body to show cause why such action should not be taken.\n\nIn substance, the High Court has come to the conclusion that these two Statutes and the impugned order are valid.\n\nAccording to the High Court, the impugned order cannot be justified under Statute 3(1) because an opportunity had not\n\n1961 been given to the Governing Body of the Rajendra College Bia/iuhtMr Dayal as required by the proviso. It has, how.::vcr, held that the\n\nBinlta impugned order is valid having regard to the powers conferu.;.,.;; ity of red on the Vice-Chanllor under Statute 2(4). It also appears Bihar awl Otlwra that the High Court took the view that the impugned Statutes\n\n0 ·...iragac11:a 0 J can be justified by reason of the fact that power has been\n\n•3 ' conferred on the Vice-Chancellor to make adaptation or modifications in the pre-existing Statutes by s. 60(ii).\n\nThe question which arises for our decision is whether the impugned Statute 2(4)' is valid, and if yes, whether the impugned order is justified. We may also have to decide whether the impugned Statute 3(1) is invalid either wholly or in part. The question as to whether the power to make adaptations or modifications justifies the impugned order presents no difficulty, because we have come to the conclusion that the impugned Statute 2(4) is itself invalid, and so, the impugned order must be struck down on that ground. If the statute, on the authority of which the impugned order has been passed\n\nis itself invalid, the power to make adaptations and modifications cannot help to sustain the validity of the impugned order. The power to make adaptations and modifications conferred on the Vice-Chancellor by s. 60(ii) of the Act must be read in the light of the substantive provisions contained in s. 30(d) in regard to affiliate4 college, and they cannot obviously justify the impugned order if the impugned Statute 2(4) itself is invalid. This position cannot be disputed, and so, we go back to the question as to whether the impugned . statute 2(4) is valid.\n\nThe decision of this question presents also no difficulty. because, on the face of it, the impugned statute is inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the Act. It will be recalled that the Act proceeds on a broad and well-recognised distinction between two categories of collegiate institutions, one instituted by the University and the other admitted to the University or affiliated to it. Section 4(10) of the Act is based on this distinction, and s. 30(d) & (e) also proceed on the same distinction. Where the University instituted collegiate institutions, naturally the task of instituting is the task of the University, and so, the management and the maintenance of the said institutions is also the University's responsibility.\n\nThe position is substantially different where collegiate institutions are started by other autonomous bodies and they seek admission or affiliation to the University. In regard to this class of collegiate institutions, their institution as well as their management and maintenance is not the direct concern of the University; that is the concern of the autonomous educational bodies which have sponsored them and which have undertaken the task of instituting, managing and maintaining them. It is, of course, true that when admitting or\n\n,....\n\n' -\n\naffiliating such institutions, the University can impose reason- 1964 able and legitimate conditions subject to the provisions of Bishuhwar Dayal\n\nthe Act, and it follows that on the failure of such college Sinha either to conform to those conditions or on their committing u,.;.,~;; ty of breach of any of those conditions, it would be competent to Bihor and 0t4,,. the University under its relevant powers to disaffiliate them a . _, -'1:a a.J d II b h' a.ie-rag~ r, ' and deny them the status of adm1tte co eges; ut t 1s power is very different from the power to constitute the Governing Bodies of such autonomous educational bodies. The University may insist upon the observance of conditions in respect of the composition of the Governing Bodies, but it cannot direct the composition of the Governing Bodies itself; the two powers are distinct and separate. Whereas in the case of institutions started by the University, the University has to decide who would constitute the Governing Bodies, in the case of affiliated institutions, the University can only lay down conditions and regulations which must be satisfied before the Governing Bodies are constituted; who should constitute the Governing Bodies is a matter for the autonomous educational bodies, which spons0r the collegiate institutions, to decide; how they should be formed, on what principle, and on what basis, are matters which may well form the subjectmatter of conditions imposed by the University while admitting such colleges or affiliating them. This position, in our opinion, is plain and has to be borne in mind in considering the validity of the impugned Statute 2(4).\n\nNow, what does the said statute purport to do? It purports to authorise the Vice-Chancellor lo amend or revise the constitution wherever it is necessary. It would be noticed that this power is inconsistent with s. 30(d) of the Act. It is a power which can be exercised under s. 30(e), but that would ha\".e relatin only to collegiate institutions started by the Umvers1ty itself. It can have no relevance to affiliated colleges. If Statute 2(4) had merely authorised the Vice-Chancellor to lay ?own conditions as to how the Governing Bodies of the affihated colleges should be constituted, it would have been another mtter. The Un!\".ersity can effectively bring about a change m the compos1tlon of the Governinu Bodies of affiliated collc:ges if it is thought necessary and desirable to do so under its relevant powers. but that must inevitablv take the form of prescribing general conditions in that behaif an.d leavin.g. it to the affiliated colleges to comply with the said cori~1t10ns .. N~~-compliance with the said conditions ay entall the .hb1hty to be disaffiliated; but that is very\n\nd1ffren~ from g1vmg the power to the Vice-Chancellor of the Umers1ty to mak.e the necessary changes in the Governing\n\nod1es of the affiliated colleges itself. It is plain as we have JUst seen, that this power is inconsistent with s. '30(d) of the Act and as such, is invalid.\n\nHow this power has been worked out is evident from the Bi•hes/, war Dayal impugned order itself. This order purports to direct the re-\n\n8~• constitution of the Governing Body of the Rajendra College\n\nUniversity a/ with immediate effect in order to bring it in conformity with Bihar and Others the provisions of the new Statutes. Then, it virtually purports Gajendragadkar O.J. to nominate some members of the Governing Body. It provides ' that two staff representatives would continue on the Governing Body as at present. Then, it adds five persons to the said Governing Body. Then, it purports to make a change in regard to the three seats reserved for the Founders, Donors, Benefactors or Sponsors, and nominates three persons in that behalf. It also directs that the co-opted member Mr. Bishwanath Prasad Mishra will also continue till the fresh co-option is held; then it nominates Mr. Ganga Prasad Sinha, Advocate, Chapra, as the Secretary of the Governing Body of the College with immediate effect. Thus, it is plain that the power conferred on the Vice-Chancellor by statute 2(4) has been exercised by him by not only directing how the Governing Body should be constituted on principle, but by nominating different persons on the Governing Body. The basis on which a Governing Body should be constituted is very different from nominating several persons on the said Governing Body. It is the latter course which has been adopted by the Vice-Chancellor and which is inconsistent with s. 30(d) of the Act. At this stage, it is necessary to add that the coure adopted by the Vice-Chancellor in the present case is als6 inconsistent with Statute 2(4) itself. The said Statute merely authorises the Vice-Chancellor to amend or revise the constitution of the Governing Bodies of admitted colleges whenever necessary, and as we have already held, even the conferment of this power is ultra vires. the Statute. But what the Vice-\n\nChancellor has done has gone beyond even Statute 214); he has not only amended or revised the constitution of the Governing Body, but has also nominated certain persons on it. Thus, this action of the Vice-Chancellor suffers from the double infirmity that it is inconsistent even with Statute 2(4) and is purported to have been issued under Statute 2(4) which itself is invalid. Unfortunately, the High Court appears to have failed to take into account the basic difference between the two categories of collegiate institutions, and the powers conferred on the University severally in respect of them. The view taken by the High Court about the validity of Statute 2(4) completely obliterates the difference between the two kinds of collegiate institutions and treats all collegiate institutions, whether instituted by the University, or affiliated to it, as falling completely under the manageme~1t of the University itself. We accordingly hold that Statute 2(4) is invalid, and the impugned order passed under it is, therefore, invalid and inoperative.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPHK'liE COUHT HEPOHTS 889\n\nThen, as to statute 3(1), the Syndicate may have the 1964 power to cancel its grant-in-aid to the callege concerned, but Biskesh:;; Dayal in so far as 3(l)(a) seems to contemplate that if the affiliated Sinka college refuses to submit to the order passed by the Syndicate u . v •. 1 dissolving and ordering reconstitution of its Governing Body, a; h:,~\"::d.$/f,,. the pena.lty of the cancellation of grant-in-aid may follow, . - it must be held that that part of Statute 3(1) is invalid. It Ga; endragadkar, O.J.\n\nwould b~ open to the University to direct that the composition of the Governing Body should conform to conditions which may be changed by the University under its relevant powers and if the said conditions are not duly complied with by the affiliated college or its Governing Body, suitable and permissible action may be taken; but in so far as Statute 3 (I) procr:eds on the basis that the Syndicate can itself dissolve the: Governing Body and order its reconstitution, it suffers from the same infirmity as Statute 2(4). That is why we hold that Statute 3(1) in so far as it gives power to the Syndicate to dissolve and reconstitute the Governing Body and enables it to cancel its grant-in-aid to an affiliated college under 3(J!)(a) for the reason that the direction issued by the Syndicate in that behalf has not been complied with, is invalid.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General has relied on the fact that the Vice-Chancellor was compelled to pass the impugned order, because the affairs of the Rajendra College were mismanaged and a very grave situation arose as a result of which the authorities were faced with a serious law and order problem. In that connection, he invited our attention to the statements made in the impugned order in regard to the background of circumstances which compelled the issue of that order.\n\nThese statements were, however, disputed by the appellant in his writ petition. The High Court has not considered the question as to whether the statements made in the impugned order are proved to be true and we propose to express no opinion on that aspect of the matter ourselves. We are, however, prepared t.:> assume that the Vice-Chancellor - elt con_ipelled to issue the order and that he acted bonafide m the mterests of the students studying in the Rajendi'a College. It is quite possible that the affairs of an affiliated college may be mismanaged and a situation may arise where eitherthe University or the Vice-Chancellor may feel justified in taking drastic action to save the situation, because, afterall, in dealing with the problem of efficient management of affiliated colleges, th7 consideration of paramount importance .. must always be the mter7sts of the students studying in such\n\ncollege~; an.d so,. theoretically, there can be no objection to the Umers1ty bemg empowered to take suitable and reasonable action to meet emergencies arising from mismanagement of affiliated colleges which expose the students to the grave\n\n1964 risk of interruption in their smooth academic work. But the Bis4es/•war Dayal question which we have to decide in the present appeal is not\n\nSinka whether the University or the Vice-Chancellor should not u . v .. 1 have such power; the question is whether such a power can\n\nBi,.;'.~~;,:) l/; lf,,. be claimed by the Statute under the provisions of the Act, . -- and that question, in our opinion, admits oj only one answer 11•Jewdragadkar, O.J. under the Act as it now stands. The Legislature may consider whether any suitable amendment should be made in that behalf. That, however, is irrelevant to the point with which we are concerned.\n\nThere is another consideration which we may incidentally mention in this connection. The autonomous bOdies which institute colleges and help the progress of higher education in this country, are generally run by disinterested persons, and it is of some importance that the autonomy of such bodies should not be unduly impaired. When colleges run by such autonomous bodies seek affiliation to a University, the University undoubtedly has a right to impose reasonable conditions for affiliation and normally, the supervision exercised by the University over the affairs and administration of its affiliated colleges effectively serves the purpose of requiring the said colleges to conform to the pattern of management and education in force in the Government colleges or colleges instituted by the University. In resolving a possible dispute between affiliated colleges and the University, attempt should be made to respect the autonomy of the colleges and reconcile the same with the supervisory powers ot the University which are intended to be exercised in order to make functioning of the affiliated colleges efficient and progressive. Both the University and the affiliated colleges seek to serve the cause of higher education and there should really be no serious dispute as to the principles on which their mutual relations should be regulated. Unfortunately, in the present case, the Vice-Chancellor appears to have acted with some haste and he has exercised powers under Statutes which were themselves hastily framed and which are plainly inconsistent with the provisions of the parent Act.\n\nThere is one more point to which we must refer before we part with this appeal. The validity of the Statutes was challenged by the appellant on the additional ground that when they were made by the Vice-Chancellor, the power conferred on him by s. 35 of Act II of 1962 had come to an end.\n\nThe said section empowered Jhe Vice-Chancellor to exercise the powers bf the appropriate Bodies of the University for a period not exceeding nine months, or until the respective Bodies were reconstituted. The appellant's case before the High Court was that the Senate had heen reconstituted in the first week of November, 1962 and in fact. notices had been issued to call for a meeting of the said Senate on the\n\n30th November. That being so, with the reconstitution of the l964 Senate the statutory power of the Vice-Chancellor under s. Bis/i\"hwar Dayal 35 came to an end, and so, the Statutes which were promul- Sin/1a gated on the 18th November, 1962 were invalid. The High un;,.,;;,, Y of Court has rejected this contention mainly on the ground that Biha1tmd Other• the Senate was not duly constituted even on the 30th Novem- . -- ber, 1962 \"inasmuch as the application of Mr. Baleshwar 0•; ewiragadkar, O.J.\n\nPrasad Choudhary filed in the High Court was still pending and the question had still to be decided as to whether he was entitled to be a member of the Senate as being a donor of the Dalsingsarai College\". The High Court thought that since an order of stay had been passed by it, there could b;: no meeting of the Senate even on the 30th November, 1962, and so, after address of the Chancellor, the meeting had to be adjourned. It appears that the stay order passed by the High Court was in relation to the direction issued by the Chancellor prohibiting Baleshwar Prasad Choudhary from acting as a member of the Senate and that strictly may not have a material bearing on the question as to whether the Senate had been properly constituted before the 18th November, 1962 or not. The appellant's case is that since a meeting of the new Senate had been called for the 30th November, by a notice issued in that behalf on the 8th November, it postulates that the Senate had been duly constituted before . the 8th of November and for the proper reconstitut.ion of the Senate, it was not necessary that it should actually hold its first meeting. On the other hand, the learned Attorney-General contends that the material adduced on the record of these proceedings is wholly insufficient to justify the finding that the Senate had been duly constituted bdore the 18th November, 1962. We are satisfied that the contention raised by the Attorney-General is sound. On the available material, we see no evidence on which it could be held that a Senate had been reconstituted on any particular date, and so, we q.o not propose to record any conclusion on this part of the appellant's case. All that we would like to add is that the finding of the High Court on this point should not be taken to be binding, and if in future this question arises, it may have to be decided on the merits afresh.\n\nThe result is, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside, and the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed. An order will accordingly be issued restraining the respondents from giving effect to the impugned order (Annexure A), because the said order, and Statute 2(4) and a part of Statute 3(1) on which it is based are invalid and inoperative. The appellant would be entitled to his costs from respondent No. 1 throughout. ·\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 125, "entities": [{"text": "879\n\nBISHESHW AR DAY AL SINHA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BISHESHWAR DAYAL SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNIVERSITY OF BlHAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNIVERSITY OF BIHAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 170, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 2(d), 4(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313, "end_char": 328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 355, "end_char": 374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 395, "end_char": 400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1961", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "January 13, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 572, "end_char": 588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Vice-Chancellor of the Bihar University by an order dated January 13, 1963 directed the reconstitution of the Governing Body of the Rajendra College, Chapra, which was a public institution founded by public charities and was affiliat<>d to the University under s. 2(d) of the Bihar State Universities (Patna, University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Act, 1960, removed the appellant, who was the Secretary of the College and nominated certain persons as members of the Governing Body."}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 775, "end_char": 782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1961", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1961", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Clause 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1504, "end_char": 1515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1646, "end_char": 1654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1902, "end_char": 1910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2055, "end_char": 2071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant moved the Patna High Court for a writ quashing JJie impugned order and the statutes on which it was made."}}, {"text": "cl. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2323, "end_char": 2331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2410, "end_char": 2418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 60(a)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2485, "end_char": 2497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4(10) and 30(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2886, "end_char": 2905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3334, "end_char": 3345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3384, "end_char": 3392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3515, "end_char": 3526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3710, "end_char": 3718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 60(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4005, "end_char": 4014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4076, "end_char": 4084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 23, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 23, 1963 of the Patna High Court in M. J. C. No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4673, "end_char": 4687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthy, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4689, "end_char": 4699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthy, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthy, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "D. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4714, "end_char": 4727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthy, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "S. C. Agarwal"}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4732, "end_char": 4748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthy, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "M. K. Ramamurthy"}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4770, "end_char": 4784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, and S. P. Varma, for the respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4808, "end_char": 4819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, and S. P. Varma, for the respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "S. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4858, "end_char": 4871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthy, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S. C. Agarwal"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4873, "end_char": 4883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthy, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4885, "end_char": 4896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthy, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "D. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4901, "end_char": 4917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthy, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "M. K. Ramamurthy"}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4942, "end_char": 4955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad, S. L. Chhibber and B. P. Jlia, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. L. Chhibber", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4957, "end_char": 4971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad, S. L. Chhibber and B. P. Jlia, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Jlia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad, S. L. Chhibber and B. P. Jlia, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Goburdhun, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Dipak Datta Choudhri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5085, "end_char": 5105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nDipak Datta Choudhri and A. K. Nag, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Nag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5110, "end_char": 5119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nDipak Datta Choudhri and A. K. Nag, for intervener No."}}, {"text": "lkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by '\n\nG•}•nd\"\"JQ<lkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.- The writ petition from which this appeal by special leave arises had been filed by the appellant Bisheshwar Dayal Sinha by which he challenged the validity of the order issued by the Vice-Chancellor of the Bihar University directing the recbnstitution of the Governing Body of the Rajendra College, Chapra, and of the rele- , vam new statutes framed by him under which the said order is purported to have been issued."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5229, "end_char": 5243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by '\n\nG•}•nd\"\"JQ<lkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.- The writ petition from which this appeal by special leave arises had been filed by the appellant Bisheshwar Dayal Sinha by which he challenged the validity of the order issued by the Vice-Chancellor of the Bihar University directing the recbnstitution of the Governing Body of the Rajendra College, Chapra, and of the rele- , vam new statutes framed by him under which the said order is purported to have been issued.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Bisheshwar Dayal Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5349, "end_char": 5371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was delivered by '\n\nG•}•nd\"\"JQ<lkar, C.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.- The writ petition from which this appeal by special leave arises had been filed by the appellant Bisheshwar Dayal Sinha by which he challenged the validity of the order issued by the Vice-Chancellor of the Bihar University directing the recbnstitution of the Governing Body of the Rajendra College, Chapra, and of the rele- , vam new statutes framed by him under which the said order is purported to have been issued."}}, {"text": "Bislieshwar Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5828, "end_char": 5845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His case was that the relevant\n\n new statutes are ultra vires the authority of the Vice-Chan-\n\n19G4\n\ncellor and the impugned order passed by him in pursuance Bislieshwar Dayal of."}}, {"text": "Gaj•ndragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6140, "end_char": 6154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Patna High Court ha.s, in subsnce, Gaj•ndragadkar, C.J, rejected the appellant's case and has accordmgly d1sm1ssed the appellant's writ petition as well as the other petitions filed by other persons.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6337, "end_char": 6345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Setalvad has contended that the view taken by the Patna High Court about the validity of the relevant statutes is not sustainable and that the said statutes are ultra vires with the inevitable consequence that the impugned order directing the reconstitution of the Governing Body of the Rajendra College must also be held to be invalid."}}, {"text": "Rajendra College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6679, "end_char": 6695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rajendra College is an educational institution which has been admitted by the Bihar University as a College, as defined in section 2(d) of the Bihar State Universities (Patna, University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Aet (Bihar Act XIV of 1960) (hereinafter called 'the Act') read with Article I of Chapter XII of the Statutes framed under the Act."}}, {"text": "Bihar University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6757, "end_char": 6773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rajendra College is an educational institution which has been admitted by the Bihar University as a College, as defined in section 2(d) of the Bihar State Universities (Patna, University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Aet (Bihar Act XIV of 1960) (hereinafter called 'the Act') read with Article I of Chapter XII of the Statutes framed under the Act."}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6802, "end_char": 6814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XIV of 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6903, "end_char": 6924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article I of Chapter XII of the Statutes framed under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6967, "end_char": 7028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chapra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7228, "end_char": 7234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first Governing Body of the College was formed by the citizens of Chapra who had assembled for that purpose in a meeting on the 31st July 1938."}}, {"text": "31st July 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7290, "end_char": 7304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first Governing Body of the College was formed by the citizens of Chapra who had assembled for that purpose in a meeting on the 31st July 1938."}}, {"text": "24th July, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7402, "end_char": 7417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governing Body thus constituted consisted of 18 members; it continued to function until the 24th July, 1940, with additions in the personnel made from time to time by co-option."}}, {"text": "After the passing of the University of Bihar Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7723, "end_char": 7777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XXVII of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7779, "end_char": 7802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "3rd of June, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8247, "end_char": 8264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant had been elected Secretary to the Governing Body on the 3rd of June, 1961, and under the relevant rvles of the constitution, his term of office wa$ to be three academic sesst?ns, and as such, it was to last until 31st May,\n\n1964."}}, {"text": "Srivastava", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9037, "end_char": 9047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2\n\nGa'e1ulra--:11car C.J. Mr. Srivastava, Vice-Chancellor of the University."}}, {"text": "Chancellor of the Umvers1ty of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9128, "end_char": 9164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 the Chancellor of the Umvers1ty of Bihar."}}, {"text": "University of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9350, "end_char": 9369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before dealing with the contentions raised by the a ppellant in the present appeal, it is necessary to refer briefly to the relevant statutory provisions governing the affairs of the University of Bihar and its constituent colleges."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9714, "end_char": 9719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was passed in August, 1951, and the provisions enacted by it were intended to furnish a comprehensive code to establish and incorporate an affiliating-cum-teaching University in the State of Bihar at Patna."}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XIV of 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9730, "end_char": 9751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhagalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9969, "end_char": 9978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was intended to help the establishment aud incorporation of affiliating-cum-teaching Universities at 7atna, Muzaffarpur, Bhagalpur and Ranchi in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Ranchi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9983, "end_char": 9989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was intended to help the establishment aud incorporation of affiliating-cum-teaching Universities at 7atna, Muzaffarpur, Bhagalpur and Ranchi in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10006, "end_char": 10011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was intended to help the establishment aud incorporation of affiliating-cum-teaching Universities at 7atna, Muzaffarpur, Bhagalpur and Ranchi in the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "21st April, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10183, "end_char": 10199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of these Amending Acts came into force on the Isl of March, 1962; the second on 21st April, 1962 and the third on the 16th October, 1962."}}, {"text": "16th October, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10221, "end_char": 10239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first of these Amending Acts came into force on the Isl of March, 1962; the second on 21st April, 1962 and the third on the 16th October, 1962."}}, {"text": "Section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10323, "end_char": 10335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XIV of 1960", "statute": "Bihar Act XIV of 1960"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10555, "end_char": 10559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XIV of 1960", "statute": "Bihar Act XIV of 1960"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10904, "end_char": 10913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(] 0)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10969, "end_char": 10983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11846, "end_char": 11851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it is necessary to bear in mind this distincrion between Sinha two categories of collegiate instituticms functioning under Unive;;;111 of the Bihar University."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11966, "end_char": 11975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G•jemlmgadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12022, "end_char": 12035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Biharand Other• Section 7 prescribes the Officers of the University whb G•jemlmgadkar, C.J. are: the Chancellor; the Vice-Chancellor; the Treasurer; the Registrar; the Deans of Faculties; the Finance Officer and such other persons as may be declared by the Statutes to be the officers of the University."}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12254, "end_char": 12264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12522, "end_char": 12532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Senate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12569, "end_char": 12575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 20 deals with powers and duties of the Senate."}}, {"text": "s. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12583, "end_char": 12591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12901, "end_char": 12914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13081, "end_char": 13091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13142, "end_char": 13147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13200, "end_char": 13210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13232, "end_char": 13245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13445, "end_char": 13453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13755, "end_char": 13760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14152, "end_char": 14162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14445, "end_char": 14455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rules which were in force", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14527, "end_char": 14552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14598, "end_char": 14608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules which were in force\n\nunder the Bihar Act", "statute": "Rules which were in force\n\nunder the Bihar Act"}}, {"text": "1st March, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15342, "end_char": 15357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This provision came into force on the 1st March, 1962 by virtue of the amending provision prescribed oy Act II of 1962."}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15517, "end_char": 15527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules with the approval of the Chancdlor in so far as Bihor and Otltm they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act", "statute": "Rules with the approval of the Chancdlor in so far as Bihor and Otltm they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XIV of", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15811, "end_char": 15827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15875, "end_char": 15879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XIV of\n\n1960", "statute": "Bihar Act XIV of\n\n1960"}}, {"text": "18th November, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17073, "end_char": 17092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This body of new Statutes came to be promulgated on the 18th November, 1962."}}, {"text": "Bi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17598, "end_char": 17600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The new Statutes consist of 24 clauses, but for\n\nthe purpose of the present appeal, we are concerned only with Bi<hu; wa,;."}}, {"text": "hu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17601, "end_char": 17603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The new Statutes consist of 24 clauses, but for\n\nthe purpose of the present appeal, we are concerned only with Bi<hu; wa,;."}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17630, "end_char": 17638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18989, "end_char": 18997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19137, "end_char": 19145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19457, "end_char": 19463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19573, "end_char": 19581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 60(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20479, "end_char": 20488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 60(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21300, "end_char": 21309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21390, "end_char": 21398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22051, "end_char": 22064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22110, "end_char": 22118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23096, "end_char": 23099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 30(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24804, "end_char": 24812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24868, "end_char": 24876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26319, "end_char": 26333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, it virtually purports Gajendragadkar O.J. to nominate some members of the Governing Body.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Bishwanath Prasad Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26752, "end_char": 26776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also directs that the co-opted member Mr. Bishwanath Prasad Mishra will also continue till the fresh co-option is held; then it nominates Mr. Ganga Prasad Sinha, Advocate, Chapra, as the Secretary of the Governing Body of the College with immediate effect."}}, {"text": "Ganga Prasad Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26852, "end_char": 26870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also directs that the co-opted member Mr. Bishwanath Prasad Mishra will also continue till the fresh co-option is held; then it nominates Mr. Ganga Prasad Sinha, Advocate, Chapra, as the Secretary of the Governing Body of the College with immediate effect."}}, {"text": "s. 30(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27452, "end_char": 27460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Biskesh:;; Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29108, "end_char": 29124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPHK'liE COUHT HEPOHTS 889\n\nThen, as to statute 3(1), the Syndicate may have the 1964 power to cancel its grant-in-aid to the callege concerned, but Biskesh:;; Dayal in so far as 3(l)(a) seems to contemplate that if the affiliated Sinka college refuses to submit to the order passed by the Syndicate u ."}}, {"text": "endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29482, "end_char": 29493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It Ga; endragadkar, O.J.\n\nwould b~ open to the University to direct that the composition of the Governing Body should conform to conditions which may be changed by the University under its relevant powers and if the said conditions are not duly complied with by the affiliated college or its Governing Body, suitable and permissible action may be taken; but in so far as Statute 3 (I) procr:eds on the basis that the Syndicate can itself dissolve the: Governing Body and order its reconstitution, it suffers from the same infirmity as Statute 2(4)."}}, {"text": "11•Jewdragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32396, "end_char": 32411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that question, in our opinion, admits oj only one answer 11•Jewdragadkar, O.J. under the Act as it now stands."}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34457, "end_char": 34462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baleshwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35383, "end_char": 35392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ber, 1962 \"inasmuch as the application of Mr. Baleshwar 0•; ewiragadkar, O.J.\n\nPrasad Choudhary filed in the High Court was still pending and the question had still to be decided as to whether he was entitled to be a member of the Senate as being a donor of the Dalsingsarai College\"."}}, {"text": "ewiragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35397, "end_char": 35408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ber, 1962 \"inasmuch as the application of Mr. Baleshwar 0•; ewiragadkar, O.J.\n\nPrasad Choudhary filed in the High Court was still pending and the question had still to be decided as to whether he was entitled to be a member of the Senate as being a donor of the Dalsingsarai College\"."}}, {"text": "Prasad Choudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35416, "end_char": 35432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ber, 1962 \"inasmuch as the application of Mr. Baleshwar 0•; ewiragadkar, O.J.\n\nPrasad Choudhary filed in the High Court was still pending and the question had still to be decided as to whether he was entitled to be a member of the Senate as being a donor of the Dalsingsarai College\"."}}, {"text": "30th November, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35749, "end_char": 35768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court thought that since an order of stay had been passed by it, there could b;: no meeting of the Senate even on the 30th November, 1962, and so, after address of the Chancellor, the meeting had to be adjourned."}}, {"text": "Baleshwar Prasad Choudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35970, "end_char": 35996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the stay order passed by the High Court was in relation to the direction issued by the Chancellor prohibiting Baleshwar Prasad Choudhary from acting as a member of the Senate and that strictly may not have a material bearing on the question as to whether the Senate had been properly constituted before the 18th November, 1962 or not."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_892_919_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".April 28\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [I96iJ\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nGWALIOR RAYON SILK MANUFACTURING (WEAV-\n\nING) CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYAT-\n\nULLAH, K. C. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYAN-\n\nGAR, JJ.]\n\nlncome Tax-Exemption from taxation-Agreement with erstwhile Indian State-Indian State becoming a Part B State under the Constitution of India.-Binding nature of the agreement-Finance Act, .1950 (25 of 1950), s. 13-Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950, cl. 16-Constitution of India, Arts. 278, 295, 372. .\n\nIn October 1946, B wrote to the Government of thi! erstwhile> State of Gwalior stating that certain industries would be established in Gwalior if the Government gave certain facili-· ties including exemption from taxation. The matter was eventually put up before the Ruler who on January 18, 1949, made an,\n\norder .sanctioning the proposals made by the minister which ._ included exemption from taxation as desired by B. On April 7, 1947, an agreement was entered into between the Government and B in accordance with the order of the Ruler dated January 18, 1947, under whlch certain facilities and concessions were granted to B for the establishment of industries in Gw,.-· lior, which included exemption from any iorm of taxation on the income for a period of 12 years from the date of starting of the factories. In pursuance of the agreement the appellant company was started and actual production began sometime in June 1949 so far as the weaving section of manufacturing: cloth from artificial silk yarn was concerned, while the staple fibre section of the company started actual working on or about February 18, 1954. In April 1948 the Ruler of Gwalior enterecll into a covenant with the rulers of certain other States for the formation of a United State called Madhya Bharat, under which the Rulers made over the administration to the Raj Pramukh ..\n\nArticle VI of the Covenant provided, inter alia, that the duti5 and obligations of the Ruler pt!rtaining or incidental to the> Government of the covenanting states •hall devolve on th<> United State and sha)) be discharged by it. On December 13,. 1948, the Madhya Bharat Act, No. 1 of 1948, was passed which provided, inter alia, that alI laws of the covenanting states f shall continue to remain in force until repealed' -Or amended ..\n\nOn January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India cae into force>\n\nand the State of Madhya Bharat became a Part B 1State under the Constitution. On April 1, 1950, the Indian Income-tax Act. 1922, was extended to the Part B State of Madhya !Bharat, and from the same date Finance Act, 1950, also became applicable to that State. The effect of s. 13 of the Act of 1950 v.!as to repeal ail laws relating to income-tax prevailing in te pa, rts of India to which the Indian Income-tax Act was e nded. On February 25, 1950, an agreement was entered into tween the * Pre•ident of India and the State of Madhya Bhara~ which was to be in force for a period of ten years under which certain recommendations of Indian States Finances Enquir\\r Committee were accepted. The Government of India also issued the Part\n\n1961 B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950, by cl. 16 of which, certain concessions were given to industri3.1 ulldertaklngs Union of lndfa which had beerr granted exemption from income-tax by the anti Ot1'era Ruler of an Indian State. In December 1950, the company . v. applied under cl. 16 of the Concessions 6rder fpr an exemption . Gwah~1;;, Y'\"! from payment of income-tax for the full period of twelve years B•lk Man. ) :',\"\"9 as provided in the agreeme.nt dated April 7, 1947, but the Gov- Jl•a•,; nnr;.., ernment of India decided to exempt the company from income- an tax and super-tax for the ', assessment years 1950-51 to 1954-55 in respect of the weaving section and rejected the cl\"im for • exemption of the staple 1ibre section which began working in April 1954. On November 23, 1956, the company filed a suit against the Uriion of India for a declaration _that under the a, greement W:ted Apnl 7, 1947, it was entitled to exemption from income-tax and super-tax for a period of 12 years frbm June 1949 with respect to the weaving section and for a period of 12 years from February 1954 with respect to the staple fibre section of the company. The company all; p filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Madhya <- PradeW. for the same reliefs. --~\n\nHeld: (i) Tbe order of January 18, 1947, was not a law by which the.Edler of Gwalior granted exemption from income-tax to the company to be established. It only amounted to a signification of the Ruler's acceptancie of the request for concessions made by B and an order to his officers to proceed further in the matter after the signification of the Ruler's &cceptance 6f the request.\n\n(i!J 'In finding out whether a particular order of a Ruler <eontjnued under Art 372 of the Constitution of India as law, the jurisprudential distinction between legislative. judicial and executive acts had to be considered; and only those orders of the Ruler which were jurisprudentially legislative acts would continue as laws under Art. 372. ·\n\n/ (iii} Tbe factthat the obligE.tion of the Ruler of Gwalior under the agree!Ilent of :April 7. 1947, devolved on the Government of India eventually by virtue of Art. 295(1)(b). did not take away the power of Parliament to pass a valid l\"w within its competence which did not transgress the constitutional limitations, and which might affect the obligation arising out of the agreement of April 7, 1947, and even completely supersede it.\n\nI .(iv} After the extension of the Indi'!_n- Income-tax Act to Pali: B State of Madhya Bharat and the passing of the Finance Act, 1950, the exemption claimed by the company under the\n\ngreement of April 7, 1947, must fall.-and the company would: only be entitled to (i) reduction in rates provided by the Concessions Order end (ii) such exemption or concessions as the Central Government might grant under cl. 16 of the Conces-. si9ns Order.\n\n(v} Art. 278(1)(a) merely contemplated an agreement between the Centre and Part B States with respect to levy, collection and distribution of public revenues which were leviable by the Government of India and had nothing to do with any contract between a former Indian State and another person with respect to such revenues which might have become the obligation of the Goverrup:ent of India under Art. 295(1)(1!}.\n\n'\" 1061\n\n\"- - . ..... ,_\n\n' \\\n\n' . '\n\n' . ' . '_ ~<,~\\ .\" 894 ;\n\nSUPRE)IE COURT-REPORTS\n\n\\ .\n\n~ I .· .. . '\n\n-----·-.,,\n\n[1964]\n\n(vi) The Agreement of February 25. 1950, .with respect to con.cessions ., to corporations 1 must be deemed to ha.ve been en ..\n\nUn~;,/{i.1,;';;~ tered under Art. 295(1)(b) and not under Art: 278(1}(a) and, v. hence, the company could not rely on that agreement and con- Gwalior Rayon tend that the agreement of 'April 7, 1947, was binding for at Silk Manufacturing least ten years thereunder. (Wearing} Co.\n\nLtd. and An'Jther -- . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 934-\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\n935 of 1963. Appeals from the judgment and orders dated August 12, 1960, and April 30, 1960, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1958 and Misc. Petition No. 101 of 1958 respectively.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorneeneral, R. Ganapathy. Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants tin both the appeals).- ·\n\nM. C. Setalvad, K. A. Chitale, M. K. Nambyar. Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the respondents (in both the appeals). ·\n\n- · \"--- · -\n\nApril 28, 1964. The judgment_of_the Court was-delivered by W ANCHOO, J.-These two appeals on certificates granted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court raise common questions of law and will be , dealt with together. The respondent the Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing . <Weaving) Company\n\nLimitd (hereinafter referred to as the company) is registered under the Indian Companies Act. It is necessary to set out how. the company came to be established in order to understand \"the case put forward by the company. In October _1946 Messrs. Bfrla Brothers'Limited, Gwalior, wrote to the.Government of Gwalior that they intended to establish at some suitable place in Gwalior a kind of. industrial centre in which they intended to set up certain industries provided certain facilities were granted to them by, the Government of Gwalior. The facilities for which they made the request were (iJ free adequate land at a suitable site; (ii) free processing water if obtainable from a river and at a specially concessional - rate if obtainable. from a dam; and (iii) exemption from any form of taxation on income for a period offifteen years from the date of the starting of the factories. On this letter being received, the matter was processed in the Secretariat of .the former State of Gwalior. The. Secretariat n_oting shows that the decision. to establish industries in. Gwalior was largely to be influenced by the decision of the Gwalior Government - as to the facilities asked for: The Secretariat also noted that-. no positive scheme regarding the proposed industrial centre had been submitted but that only. tentative proposals were made to ascertain if the State was willing to grant the concessions asked_ for. It was pointed out that the main question that. required consideration . was with respect. to exemption from any form of taxation on income for a. period of fifteen ' years. It was also pointed out that no income-tax was leviable\n\n.... -----~\n\n_,; .'.~· ·--\n\nI''\n\n' ' ,\"\\ ' \\ '\\ ' \\ ' - ', \\ 7 S.C.R. ' \"SUrRE.'.\\IE COURT REPORTS-- -. ··-· 895\n\n\\ ·:' . '. - -. . ' ' ' --_ •\\. . ' : in that State at that time and that exemption from income- 1964 tax for period of fifteen years would lea'cl to the establishment Unian of India of the industries which thereafterwould yield income in the and. Others _shape .of taxes to the. State.' It was therefore proposed by the_ Gwali\":,;. Rayon Secretariat that the concessions asked for might be granted.SilkManufacturi\"!1 Later, however, the period of exemption from taxation on in-. L(dW.a:nAg) Goh. . . d d fr fif\n\n. I d 1 ·•'~ not,,.. come was re uce om teen to twe ve years an 1t was recommended that this might be granted in order to attract Wanchoo, J. the establishment of industries in the State. The matter was eventually put up before the-_ Ruler on_ January 18, 1947, and he passed the following order:- ,. •\n\n \"The Guzarish of t1ie Minister for Industries, Commerce and .Communications dated .15-11-1946 is sanctioned. Exemption from any form of taxation on the income.for a period of J2 years from the date of starting of the factories is granted:' The other two concessions he has asked for should be given and-attempt should be made to establish and start these factories as early as possible.\"\n\n. The substance of this - order . \\vas communicated to Messrs. Birla Brothers Limited and eventuaily an agreement was entered into on April 7, 1947 between the Government of Gwalior and Messrs. Birla Brothers Limited, which stated that in accordance with the orders of the Ruler dated January 18, 1947; it was hereby agreed to grant and accord the facilities; priVileges, concessions and benefits hereinafter mentioned to the said oompany. These facilities, privileges; conces- . sions and. benefits in the. agreement weni three: namely::..:. ·\n\n(!) provision for suffident and adequate land or lands :absolutely free of anycost, revenueor cess whatsoever,· for _the construction and erection of factory_ etc; for starting the industries mentioned in the agreement; . . : .\n\n{2) making of airangemenis for the supply of adequate and sufficient quantities of suitable water, whatever available. for the above-mentioned industries on most concessional and suitable terms;\n\n(3) granting of exemption to the above mentioned industries and/or any concern or concerns promoted or started or to be_ hereinafter. promoted or started for the establishment and starting of all or any of the above-mentioned industries from the payment of all taxes and I or. duties, in any form or nature whatsoever, on their incomes, profits, gains or business, levied or to be hereinafter levied in the Gwalior State, or any part thereof, for a period of twelve years reckoned from the date on which the factory or factories of _the abovementioned industries has or have: started working or' starts or start working. -\n\n1964 In consequence of this agreement, the company was Union of India started and actual production began sometime in June 1949 and Other' so far as the weaving section for manufacturing cloth from Gwali;; Rayon artificial silk yan was concerned. It may be added that he ./Jilk Manufacturing staple fibre section of the company started actual workmg (Weaving) Go. on or about February 18, 1954. That is how the company Ltd. and Another b bl\" h d d d 1 • • h th _ came to e esta 1s e an starte worxmg m w at was e\n\nWanchoo, J. former Gwalior State in pursuance of the agreement of April 7, 1949.\n\nBefore however the company actually started working even the weaving section for manufacturing cloth from artificial silk yarn, certain constitutional changes took place in India to which it is now necessary to refer. On August 15, 1947, India became a Dominion and the process of mergers which eventually resulted in the emergence of the Republic of India and its Constitution on January 26, 1950, began. In that process, the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in what was known as Central India, entered into a covenant for the formation of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (also known as Madhya-Bharat) in April\n\n1948. Article VI of that covenant provided that the Ruler of each covenanting State shall, as soon as may be practicable, and in any event not later than the first day of July 1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh, and thereupon (1) all rights, authority and jurisdic- . tion belonging to the Ruler, which appertain or are incidental to the Government of the covenanting State shall vest in the United State; (2) all duties and obligations of the Ruler pertaining or incidental to the Government of the covenanting State shall devolve on the United State and shall be discharged by it; (3) all the assets and liabilities of the covenanting State shall be the assets and liabilities of the United State; and (4) the military forces, if any, of the covenanting State shall be the military forces of the United State. Clause <2) of this Article also provided that where in pursuance of any agreement of merger, the administration of any other State was made over to the Raj Pramukh, the provisions of .cl. (!) would apply to such State as they applied in relation to a covenanting State.\n\nOn July 19, 1948, the State of Madhya Bharat acceded to the Dominion of India. On November 24, 1949, the Raj Pramukh of Madhya Bharat issued a proclamation accepting the provisions of the Constitution of India to be framed for the State of Madhya Bharat also. On January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and the United State of Gwalior, Indore, Malwa became the Part B State of Madhya Bharat.\n\nMeanwhile on December 13, 1948, the United State of Gwalior, Indore, Malwa (Madhya-Bharat) Regulation of\n\n~-··\n\nGovernment Act, No. I of 1948 was passed. Section 4 of that 196;\n\nA.ct provided that \"when the administration of any covenant- Union of Indio ing State has been taken over by the Raj Pramukh or when and Others any State has merged in the United State as aforesaid, all Gwolio~Rayon laws, Ordinances, Acts, Rules, Regulations etc., having the8ilk Manufacturing force of Law in the said State shall continue to remain in df'\n\n0\"J\"1) ~~· force until repealed or amended under the provisions of the · an \"' er next succeeding section, and shall be construed as if refer- W!!nchoo, J. ences in them to the Ruler or Government of the State were references to the Raj Pramukh or the Government of the\n\nUnited State respectively\". The company contended that by virtue Of this Act read with Art. VI of the covenant, the liabilities of the covenanting States devolved on the United State of Gwalior, Indore, Malwa (MadhvaBharat). Further it was contended that under cl. (b) of Art. 295(1), when the Constitution came into force all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of any Indian State corresponding to a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule, became the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of India, if the purposes for which such rights were acquired or liabilities or obligations were incurred before such commencement would thereafter be purposes of the Government of India relating to any of the matters enumerated in the Union List. This was subject to any agreement entered into in that behalf by the Government of India with the Government of the State concerned. It was therefore contended on behalf of the company that the obligation incurred by the Ruler of Gwalior by virtue of the agreement of April 7, 1947 became the obligation of the Government of India under cl. (b) of Art. 295(1) on January 26, 1950.\n\nOn April I, 1950, the Indian Income-tax Act was extended to the Part B State of Madhya Bharat. From the same date the Finance Act (No. XXV of 1950) also became applicable to the Part B State of Madhya Bharat by which incometax became chargeable as provided therein on any income accruing or arising in Madhya Bharat, which by then had become part of India. Further s. 13 to the Finance Act, 1950 provided that \"if immediately before the 1st day of April,\n\n1950, there is in force in any Part B State other than Jammu and Kashmir or in Manipur, Tripura or Vindhya Pradesh or in the merged territory of Cooch.Behar any law relating to income-tax or super-tax or tax on profits of business, that law shall cease to have effect except for the purposes of the levy, assessment and collection of income-tax and super-tax in respect of any period not included in the previous year for the purposes of assessment under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for the year ending on the.31st day of March, 1951 or for any subsequent year, or, as the case may be, the levy, assessment and collection of the tax on profits of business\n\nL.'P(D)ISOI-29\n\nT!n1'.on of India\n\nand Others\n\nv. flu:alior Rayon ,..,'ilk llfrtnufacturing\n\n( W caving) Oo. itd. a.nd Another\n\nlVanclwo, J.\n\nfor any chargeable accounting period ending on or before the 31st day of March, 1949\". The effect of this provision was to repeal all laws relating to income-tax in its broadest sense prevailing in those parts of India to which the 1 ndian Income-tax Act was extended from April 1, I 950.\n\nIn the meantime, however, agreements were entered into by the Government of India with Part B States in accordance with the recommendation of the Indian States Finances Enquiry Committee, 1948-49 (hereinafter rferred to as the Enquiry Committee). The agreement with the State of Madhya Bharat provided that the recommendations of the said Committee contained in Part I of its report read with Chapters I, II, III of Part II of its report insofar as they apply to the State of Madhya Bharat together with the recommendations contained in Chapter IX of Part II of its report were accept ed by the parties subject to certain modifications and this agreement was in force for a period of ten years. Further in order to overcome difficulties which might arise on the application of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 to Part B States and other areas which became merged with India, s. 60-A was introduced in the Income-tax Act in the following terms:-\n\n\"Power to make exemption etc., in relation to merged territories or to any Part B State or to Chander nagore-If the Central Government considers it necessary or expedient, so to do for a voiding any hardship or anomaly, or removing any difficulty that may arise as a result of the extension of this Act to the merged territories ...... or to any Part B State ...... , the Central Government may, by general or special order, make an exemption, reduction in rate or other modification in respect of income-tax in favour of any class of income, or in regard to the whole or any part of the income of any person or class of persons.\" In pursuance of this power, the Central Government issued the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Concessions Order), which fixed reduced rates of income-tax and super-tax for Part B States.\n\nClause 16 of that Order is material for our purpose and war. in these terms : -\n\n\"Concession to industrial undertakings-(!) Where any industrial undertaking situated in any State claims that it has been granted any exemption from or concession in respect of income-tax or super-tax by the Ruler of an Indian State and was enjoying such exemption or concession immediately before the appointed day it shall submit\n\n' \\\n\nr '\n\nan application to the Commissioner of Income 1964 tax giving the following particulars : - Union of India and Others\n\nl. Name of the industrial undertaking. v ..\n\n2. Status (ie. whether public or private company, Gwalior Rayon.\n\nfi , d' 'd l H' d . 'd d f .\n\nSilk Manufacturing rm, m 1v1 ua or m u und1v1 e am1ly). (Weavil!11) Co.\n\n3. Nature of the business.\n\nLtd. and Another\n\n4. Date of commencement of the business.\n\n5. Nature of the concession granted.\n\n6. Period for which concessions granted.\n\n7. Unexpired period of the concessions after the appointed day.\n\n~2) Every such application shall be accompanied by the orders in original of the Indian State grantmg the concession together with a certified copy of\n\nthe order.\n\n(3) The Commissioner shall. after obtaining such other information as he may require, forward the application to the Central Government which, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, may grant such relief, if any, as it thinks appropriate.\" In December 1950, the company applied under cl. 16 of the Concessions Orders for concessions regarding income-tax and super-tax. In November 1951, the company was informed that the Government of India had decided to exempt it from income-tax and super-tax for the assessment years 1950-51 to 1954-55 in respect of the weaving section. The company wanted exemption for the full period of twelve years as provided in the agreement of 1947, but was asked to apply later and eventually the Central Government granted exemption to\n\nthe weaving section for another five years from 1955-56 to\n\n1959-60. The company's request for exemption of the staple fibre section which began working in April 1954 was rejected by the Government of India.\n\nIn the meantime assessment proceedings had been initiat ed by the Income-tax Officer, A Ward, Gwalior against the company and assessment orders were passed in March 1955, March 1956 and March 1957 with reference to the weaving section for the assessment years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53.\n\nThe company appealed to the Assistant Appellate Commis- -sioner against these orders. As the contention of the company was that it was entitled to exemption in accordance with the agreement of April 7, 1947 consequent on the order of the Ruler of Gwalior dated January 18, 1947, it filed a suit on November 23, 1956 against the Union of India .for a declaration that under the order dated January 18, 1947 and the agreement\n\nL.1P(D)ISCI-30\n\nWanehoo, J.\n\nUnion of India and Others ...\n\n?,·.\" v\n\n[196! J\n\nOwal£or Rayon iilk Manufacturing (Weaving) Co.\n\nfollowing thereon, the company was entitled to exemption from iRcome-tax and super-tax and for other reliefs in the alternative. This suit was transferred in 1958 to the High Court on the application of the company under Art 228 of the Constitution. While this suit was pending, the company filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on September 11, 1957 in which also it claimed that by virtue of the order of the Ltd. and Another\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nRuler of Gwalior dated January 18, 1947 and the agreement following thereon, it was entitled to exemption from incometax and super-tax for a period of 12 years from June 1949 with respect to the weaving section and for a period of 12 years from February 1954 with respect to the staple fibre section of the company and for other consequential reliefs in the alternative. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh accepted the petition of the company and a direction was issued restraining the Union of India and its officers from making any assessment under the Income-tax Act and levying or collecting income-tax or super-tax in contravention of the exemption given by the agreement dated April 7, 1947. Further the proceedings taken by the income-tax authorities in contravention of the said exemption were quashed. In view of this decision on the writ petition, the High Court decreed the suit in the same terms. The High Court however gave certificates to the Union of India and its officers to appeal to this Court; and that is how there are two appeals before us, one against the decree passed in the suit and the other against order in the writ petition, though as we have said already, the points involved in the two appeals are exactly the same.\n\nThree main contentions were raised on behalf of the company in the High Court. In the first place it was urged that the order dated January 18, 1947 was a special law. It was continued by the State of Madhya Bharat by Act No. 1 of 1948 and it continued after the Constitution came into force by virtue of Art. 372.\n\nIt was not repealed either by the extension of the Income-tax Act to the State of Madhya Bharat from April 1, 1950 or by s. 13 of the Finance Act, 1950, which applied to the State of Madhya Bharat from the\n\nsame date.\n\nIn this connection reliance was placed on the ,-\n\nagreement between the President of India and the State of Madhya Bharat dated February 25, 1950 to show that there could be no intention to repeal this special law merely by the extension of the Income-tax Act to the State of Madhya Bharat or by s. 13 of the Finance Act.\n\nIn the alternative it was submitted that if the order of January 18, 1947 did not have the force of law the agreement of April 7, 1947 between the Ruler of Gwalior and the company created an obligation which was binding on the former State of Gwalior.\n\nThat obligation continued to be binding\n\non the State of Madhya Bharat as it was before the Constitu- 1964 tion came into force by virtue of Act No. I of 1948 read with Union of India Art. VI of the covenant. Further that obligation of the State and Others of Madhya Bharat devolved on the Government of India by Gwalio; Rayon\n\ncl. (b) of Art. 295 (I) of the Constitution. The obligation thus Silk Man_ufacturing being a constitutional obligation was not and could not be (Weaving) Oo. <II .\n\nLtd. and An.otker affected by the extens10n of the Income-tax Act to the Part B ___ . ,.\n\nState of Madhya Bharat read with the Finance Act, 1950, and Wanckoo.J-: could only be got rid of by an amendment of the Constitution, as cl. (b) of Art. 295 (I) made it into a constitutional obligation which could not be affected even by law.\n\nThirdly reliance was placed on the agreement between the President of India and the State of Madhya Bharat dated February 25, 1950 under Art. 278 of the Constitution and it was contended that this agreement was binding under Art. 278\n\n(1) (a) of the Constitution and the result of the agreement was that the concessions granted in the agreement in favour of industrial corporations would continue and could not be affected even by the enactment of a law in the shape of the extension of the Income-tax Act to the Part B State of Madhya Bharat read with the Finance Act, 1950.\n\nThe High Court held that the order dated January 18, 1947 was a law and that it continued in force by virtue of Act I of 1948 of the State of Madhya Bharat and Art. 372 of the Constitution and that it was not repealed by the extension of the Income-tax Act to the State of Madhya Bharat read with s. 13 of the Finance Act, 1950. It further held that in view of\n\ncl. (b) of Art. 295 (I) of the Constitution there was a clear positive instruction in the Constitution that the obligations devolving thereby would be fulfilled and therefore the Government of India was bound to fulfil them irrespective of the extension Df the Income-tax Act read with the Finance Act to the State of Madhya Bharat from April I, 1950. The High Court summed up its conclusion as follows: -\n\nI. that the order dated January 18, 1947 of the Ruler Df Gwalior State exempting the company from taxation had the effect of law and the agreement executed on April 7, 1947 cast an obligation on the Gwalior Government to exempt the company from taxation;\n\n2. that by virtue of ss. 3 and 4 of Madhya Bharat Act No. I of 1948, the company's right to get the exemption received legislative recognition and the State of Madhya Bharat was bound to discharge the obligation undertaken by the Ruler of the Gwalior State which devolved on it;\n\n3. that it was this obligation of the Madhya Bharat Government to fulfil the obligation undertaken by the Ruler Df Gwalior State of granting exemption to the company that\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Others\n\nGwalior Rayon -Silk Manufacturing\n\n(Weaving) Co.\n\nLU. an<i Anolher\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\ndevolved on the Government of India under Art. 295 (]) (b) and became a constitutional obligation of that Government;. and\n\n4. that on a• true construction of the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act, s. 13 of the Finance Act of 1950. and\n\ncl. 16 of the Taxation Concessions Order 1950, they did not repeal the specific exemption granted to the company by special statutory provisions and that therefore the company's claim for exemption from taxation was well founded.\n\nThe argument based on Art. 278 does not seem to have been considered by the High Court; but it has been urged before us by learned counsel for the company in support of the conclusions of the High Court.\n\nThe questions that were raiSed in the High Court have all been raised before us and we now proceed to deal with them seriatim.\n\nThe first question that falls for consideration is whether the order of January 18, 1947, is a law.\n\nIn this connection it is contended on behalf of the company that the order must be looked at independently of the agreement of April 7, 1947 which followed it and looked at in that way it must be held to be a law.\n\nOn the other hand, learned Attorney-General urges that the order was passed by the Ruler in connection with a process which started with the letter of Birla Brothers Limited dated October 17, 1946 and ended with the agreement of April 7, 194 7. Birla Brothers Limited had asked for certain concessions in order to enable them to start certain industries in Gwalior and that matter was processed in the Secretariat of the former State of Gwalior. Naturally as concessions could not be granted without the sanction of the Ruler, the matter was put up before the Ruler whether he would agree to grant concessions and the order of January 18, 1947 is nothing more than the Ruler's acceptance of the prayer for grant of concessions which eventually cnhninated in the agreement of April 7, 1947. The learned Attorney-General therefore contends that the order must be read in the context in which it was passed and if so read, it cannot be law.\n\nBefore we consider the rival contentions in this behalf\n\nw~ would like to clear the ground with respect to orders of absolute Rulers. The High Court has relied in this connection on two decisions of this Court, viz., Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Mehboob Begum('), and the Director of Endowments Government of Hyderabad v. Akram Ali('). In these cases it was observed that the F.irmans were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were binding in the same way as any other law; and therefore so long as a particular Firman\n\n(')A.LR. 1955 S.C::. 352.\n\n(')A.LR. 1956 S.C. 60.\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPORTS\n\nI 903\n\nheld the field, that alone would govern or regulate the nghts ot 1964\n\nthe parties concerned and that the word of the Nizam was law.\n\nUnion of India It was on these general observations that the High Court relied and Others to hold that \\he order of January 18, 1947 was law. Since then, Gwali;; Rayon however, this Court had occasion to consider these observations Silk Manufacturing in three cases namely-(!) Mahara1a Shree Umaid Mills Ltd (Weaving) Oo. . ' . · Ltd. and Anoth.,.\n\nv. Unwn of Indra('), (2) the State of Gujarat v. Vara Fiddali Badruddin Mithibar(') and (3) Rajkumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo v. The State of Orissa('). It has been pointed out in these cases that the observations in the earlier cases were not intended to lay down a general proposition that in the case of an absolute monarch no distinction can be made between his legislative and his executive acts. In Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Limited('), the agreement between the Ruler and the Mills pursuant to the order of the Ruler was held to be a mere :ontract and not a law within the meaning of Art. 372. The same view has been expressed by four learned Judges in the case of Vara Fiddali Badruddin Mithibar('). Finally in Rajkumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo's case(') it was held that this Court had not laid down a general proposition about the irrelevance or inapplicability of the well-recognised distinction between legislative and executive acts in regard to the orders issued by absolute monarchs and that the true legal position was that whenever a dispute arose as to whether an order passed by an absolute monarch represented a legislative act all relevant factors must be considered before the question was answered. These relevant factors were, the nature of the order, the scope and effect of its provisions, its general setting and context, the method adopted by the Ruler in promulgating legislative as distinguished from executive orders, these and other allied matters would have to be examined before the character of the order is judicially determined. We need only add that this must be so when the contention is that a particular order of the Ruler has been continued as a law by Art. 372 of the Constitution. We cannot impute to the Constitution-makers an intention to continue each and every order of an absolute Ruler as a law whatsoever be its nature.\n\nWhen Art. 372 of the Constitution speaks of continuance of laws in 1950 the jurisprudential distinction between legislative, judicial and executive acts must have been present in the mind of the Constitution-makers and that distinction must always be kept in mind by courts in deciding whether a particular order of an absolute Ruler is law for the purpose of its continuance under Art. 372. It may be that the order might not be liable to challenge by any one in the State, while the Ruler was there and in that sense the word of a Ruler might be law in his State. But when we are\n\n(') [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 515.\n\n(')A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1043.\n\n(')A.LR. 1964 S.C. 17~3.\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Others\n\nGwalior 'Rayon Silk J.l!anufacturing (Weaving) Co.\n\nLtd. and A not her\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nconsidering whether a particular order of a Ruler continues under Art. 372 as law we cannot forget the jurisprudential distinction between legislative, judicial and executive acts and only those orders of the Ruler which are jurisprudentially legislative acts will continue as laws under Art. 372 of the Constitution.\n\nTherefore simply because the order dated January 18, 1947 was passed by an absolute Ruler it does not necessarily follow that it is law for the purpose of Art. 372 and we have to see after looking into all the various considerations referred to above whether the order can be jurisprudentially said to be a law in order that it may continue as law under Art. 372 of the Constitution.\n\nLet us therefore see the circumstances in which the order came to be passed. We have already referred to the fact that on October 17, 1946. Birla Brothers Limited wrote to the Government of Gwalior saying that they intended to establish in some suitable place in Gwalior a kind of industrial centre in which certain new industries would be located provided certain facilities requested by them were granted by the Government. .\n\nThe facilities requested were three namely, (i) provision for adequate land free at a suitable place (ii) Supply of water free or at a concessional rate, and (iii) exemption from any form of taxation on income for a period of fifteen years from the date of the starting of the factory. It also appears that the industries would have been started in Gwalior only if the concessions were granted. This request in the letter of October 17, 1946 was processed in the Secretariat of the former Gwalior 5tate. The entire file has apparently not been placed before the court but from whatever material is available on the record it appears that there was first a note by the office. Thereafter the Secretary of the department concerned gave his opinion in which it was pointed out that Birla Brothers Limited would only establish industries in Gwalior State if they got the concessions. Then there is the vinanti by the Minister concerned.\n\nThe Minister made it clear that no positive scheme had been submitted but only tentative proposals were made to ascertain if the State would be willing to grant the concessions asked for.\n\nThe Minister also pointed out that there was no income-tax in the State at that time and so if concession from such taxation was granted it would lead to establishment of industries which after fifteen years might be made lia1'1e to such taxes yielding additional income to the State. Therefore the Minister recommended that the concessions as to income-tax as well as the other two concessions might be granted.\n\nThis report was made on November 15, 1946. On November 17, 1946, the Ruler made the following note thereon: -\n\n\"Submit personally on my return\". It cannot be the ( case of the company that even this order of the Ruler requiring papers to be s1;1bmitted on his return was a Jaw, though\n\nit was certainly an order requiring the Minister to submit 1964 papers again when the Ruler returned from somewhere. Then Union of India on January 17, 1947, there was a Guzarish. In this Guzarish and Other• it was said that the concessions which had been asked for a 0\n\n,.~· R period of fifteen years would be accepted if granted for twelve Silk ':,,~';;'fact\":I;;':.i, years.\n\nIt was also made clear that unless such concessions (Weaving) Oo. were granted Birla Brothers Limited would not be induced Lta. and Anothe, to open factories within the State. Then followed the order wach0o, .r. of the Ruler dated January 18, 1947, headed Darbar Order, which we have already set out.\n\nThis order is apparently on the relevant file and it is not in dispute that it was never published, though it was usual by that time in the State of Gwalior to publish laws in some form or other: see, M adhaorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat('). Apart however from the fact that this order was never published in any form the circumstances in which it came to be made also clearly show that the Ruler while passing the order was merely telling his officers that they could go ahead to comply with the request of Birla Brothers Limited for the three concessions that. they wanted. The form of the order also shows that it could not be law.\n\nThe order consists of three sentences. The hrst sentence says that \"the Guzarish of the Minister. ..... dated 15-11-1946 is sanctioned\". Obviously such a sanction for certain concessions cannot be law. Then comes the sentence: \"exemption from any form of taxation on the income for a period of 12 years from the date of starting of the factories is granted\". It is this sentence which according to the company is law. It may however be mentioned that there was no law as to income-tax in Gwalior State at the time and all that this sentence could mean in the circumstances was that the Ruler was telling his officers that they might assure Birla Brothers Limited that he would not subject them to income-tax for 12 years, even if a law as to incometax came to be passed later on.\n\nIn the circumstances we do not think that this sentence which was a promise to exempt Birla Brothers Limited from income-tax, if and when a law of income-tax was passed in future, can jurisprudentially be called a law. Looking at the matter jurisprudentially, the sentence means that if and when the Ruler came to pass a law as to income-tax he would include therein a provision exempting Birla Brothers Limited for the period mentioned in the order. We are therefore of opinion that this sentence even by itself cannot amount to law.\n\nThen follows the third sentence, which is divided into two parts. The first part says that \"the other two concessions he has asked for should be given\". This cannot obviously be law and it is not even contended on behalf of the company t]Jat the concessions as to giving of land free and giving of water free or at concessional • rate were law. Then follows the second part of the sentenc~\n\n(') [1961] I S.C.R. 957, at 966-67.\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Others ...\n\nGws h\"or Rayon Silk Manu/a<Wnng\n\nI Weaving) Oo.\n\nLid. and Another\n\nWa11ehoo, J.\n\n906 SUPRE;\\fE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nwhich says that \"attempt should be made to establish and start these factories as early as possible\". This cannot possibly be called law and even the company does not contend that this part of the sentence. is a law promulgated by the Ruler of Gwalior. Reading the order as a whole therefore it is obvious that the officers of the Ruler put up the request of Birla Brothers Limited for certain concessions for his order in order that they might be able to go forward and in particular make provision for land and water for the company to be started by Birla Brothers Limited. Therefore as we read this order of January 18, 1947, it appears that by this order the Ruler of Gwalior was saying that he was agreeable to the request of Birla Brothers Limited asking for concessions in order to enable them to start certain industries in Gwalior and that he would grant them concessions if they started industries in Gwalior. This order was apparently communicated to Birla Brothers Limited and it was followed on April 7, 1947 by a formal agreement between the State and Birla Brothers Limited. Whatever doubt might there have been as to the nature of the order, that is in our opinion completely set at rest by the fact that it was followed 2! months later by an agreement which specifically recited that in accordance with the orders of the Darbar dated January 18, 1947, the agreement was being entered into in order to grant and accord certain facilities etc. to the company. Looking at the matter therefore in the entire context beginning with the letter of Birla Brothers Limited of October 17, 1946 and ending with the agreement of April 7, 1947, all that in our opinion the order of January 18, 1947 says is that the Ruler was agreeable to grant the concessions and that his officers could proceed to take further steps necessary for the purpose. We are not prepared to accept the argument on behalf of the company that the order of January 18, 1947 must be read independently of the agreement of April 7, 1947 simply because the order did not say that an agreement should be taken from Birla Brothers Limited. The absence in the order of any reference to any agreement in our opinion makes no difference in the context in which the order came to be passed and we have no difficulty in holding that the order of January 18, 1947 was not a law by which the Ruler of Gwalior granted exemption from income-tax to the company to be established.\n\nIt only amounted to a signification of the Ruler's acceptance of the request for concessions made by Birla Brothers Limited and an order to his officers to proceed further in the matter after this signification of the Ruler's acceptance of the request.\n\nThat the matter was processed further is clear from the fact that on April 7, 1947 an agreement was entered into between the Government of Gwalior and Birla Brothers Limited incorporating the terms acceptance of which had been signified by the Ruler of Gwalior on January 18, 1947.\n\nThe fact that the\n\norder is called a Darbar Order is again of no significance for\n\n19G4 it was the Ruler who was signifying his acceptance of the re- Union of India quest and the matter was cast in the form of a Darbar Order and others because his officers would have to carry out what he had G 1.v. R d 'd d h h f h h wa ior ayon ec1 e . T ere 1s t ere ore no doubt t at t e order of Janu- Silk Manufacturing ary 18, 1947 cannot be read independently of the agreement Weaving) Go. of April 7, 1947 and must be read in the context of the entire Ltd. and Another set of circumstances beginning from the letter of Birla wanchoo, J.\n\nBrothers Limited dated October 17, 1946 and ending with the agreement of April 7, 1947 and so read the order must be held to be a mere signification of the acceptance of the request and cannot be held to be a law even with respect to that par\\ of it which dealt with exemption from income-tax. Further the form and content of the order are against its being a law.\n\nFinally the fact that it was never published and remained only on the file concerned has also a bearing on the question and shows that it was not a law but a mere signification of the Ruler's acceptance of the request made by Birla Brothers Limited. It is plain that the order must in the context be treated as one step in the negotiations between the parties which ultimately led to the agreement; and so it would be idle to dissociate it from the said negotiations and treat it as a law.\n\nBesides the fact that the parties entered into a formal contract in writing embodying these concessions by the Ruler as consideration for the obligation on the part of Birla Brothers Limited to start the named industries in Gwalior State, is really decisive to negative the argument urged by the company. The agreement having force as a contract-undoubtedly that was the intention both of the Government of the Ruler and Birla Brothers Limited-is wholly irreconcilable with a law operating side by side simultaneously and de hors the con tract.\n\nAs we have come to the conclusion that the order of January 18, 1947 is not a law, we think it unnecessary to consider whether if it was a law it could be said to have been repealed by the extension of the Income-tax Act read with s. 13 of the Finance Act, 1950 to the State of Madhya Bharat. Nor is it necessary to consider what the effect of the agreement between the President of India and the State of Madhya Bharat dated February 25, 1950 would be on the question of repeal and whether that agreement supports the view that in the circumstances there could be no repeal.\n\nThis brings us to the alternative argument based on Art. 295 (1) (b) of the Constitution read with the agreement of April 7, 1947. The argument on behalf of the company is that in view of Art. 295(l)(b) the obligation cast on the Ruler of Gwalior by the agreement of April 7, 1947 became the obligation of the Government of llldia through the Government of Madhya Bharat, and this was a constitutional obligation which could not be affected by the extension of the\n\nUnion of India\n\narid Others'\n\nIncome-tax Act to the Part B State of Madhya Bharat, from April I, 1950. It is contended that the obligation being cast by the Constitution its binding force could only be taken away\n\n(Gwalior Rayon Bilk Manufacturing (Weaving) Go.\n\nLtd. and Another\n\nby the amendment of the Constitution and that no law, even if it was good law, could take away the exemption granted by the agreement. On the other hand, learned Attorney- Gcncral contends that Art. 295 (1) merely provides in the context of the coming into existence of the sovereign State of the Republic of India for the devolution of the property and assets, and the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Governments of the former Indian States corresponding to State specified in Part B of the First Schedule to the Constitution. He, therefore, contends that Art. 295 (!) (b), when it provides that the liabilities and obligations of any Indian State corresponding to a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule to the Constitution shall in the circumstances mentioned therein be the liabilities and obligations of the Government of India, it only means that for the purposes of the rights and liabilities arising for example out of an agreement between the previous Indian State and any other person, the Government of India will in the circumstances mentioned in Art. 295 (!) (b) be substituted for the Indian State concerned. He further contends that Art. 295 (1) (b) does not in any manner make the liabilities and obligations arising particularly out of contract any the more binding on the Government of India than would have been the case as against the State which originally entered into the contract and that it is not correct to say that Art. 295 (!) (b) cast any constitutional obligation on the Government of India to honour the liabilities and obligations. It is urged that Government of India woula have the same defences against a contract as the previous Indian State which originally entered into it would have had, and that Art. 295 (1) (b) is not a fetter on the power of Parliament to legislate in respect of matters with which such contract is concerned and that such legislation would prevail against contract if Paliament was competent to enact it and it did not in any way transgress the constitutional limitations.\n\nw-hoo, J.\n\nWe are of opinion that the submission of the learned Attorney-General is correct. Art. 295 appears in Part XII of the Constitution dealing with finance, property, contracts and suits. This Part is divided into three chapters. The first chapter deals with finance and provides for a consolidated fund (Art. 266), a contingency fund if necessary (Art. 267), and for the distribution of public revenues between the Union and the States (Arts. 268 to 272) and grants by the Union to the States (Arts. 273 and 275). Article 277 provides for savings with respect to certai>i taxes, duties, cesses and fees which were being lawfuly levied by any Government before the Constitution came into force and Art. 278 provides for an\n\nagreement between the Union and the States for a period not 1964 exceeding ten years, with respect to certain matters. The other Union of India Articles upto Art. 284 in this chapter provide for the Finance .and Others Commission and make other miscellaneous provision in . v. fi 1 tt 1 bl Th Gwalior Ra.yon .nancia a ers re atmg to pu IC _revenues. ese prov1- Silk Manufaeti, ring s10ns dealmg with finances have nothmg to do with Jeg1siauve (Weaving) Oo. competence of Parliament or of State legislatures. Articles 285 Ltd, and Another to 289 certainly affect legislative competence but that is wanchoq, J. because they make provision in express terms in that behalf.\n\nArticles 290 and 291 deal with certain financial adjustments and privy purses of Rulers. Chapter II relates to borrowing and has nothing to do with legislative competence. Then comes Chapter III, which deals with property, contracts, rights, liabilities, obligations and suits. Article 294 provides for the devolution of property and assets, and rights, liabilities and obligations as between the Union and the previous Provinces which became Part A States when the Constitution came into force. Similarly Art. 295 provides for devolution of property and assets, and rights, liabilities and obligations between the Union and what were Part B States when the .Constitution came into force. These provisions as to devolution of property and assets, and rights, liabilities and obligations were necessary when the Republic of India came into existence. But there is nothing either in Art. 294 or Art. 295 which in any way fetters the legislative competence either of the Union or of the State legislatures. These provisions had to be made in view of List I and List II which defined the ambit of the power of the Union and the States respectively; but the effect of these provisions so far as rights, liabilities and obligations are concerned, was only to substitute the Union or the States, as the case may be, in place of the old British Indian Provinces or the old Indian States which became respectively Part A and Part B States under the Constitution.\n\nThese provisions relating to devolution of rights, liabilities and obligations were therefore made only to substitute in place of the old British Indian Provinces and the old Indian States either the Uni.Qn or Part A or Part B States in accordance with the scheme of division contained in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. They did not confer any greater sanctity on contracts, for example,. entered into by an old Indian State with other persons, and did not cast any fresh obligation on the Union or the new Part A or Part B State over and above what was already cast on the previous States by contracts when they were made.\n\nThe defences which would have been open to the old Indian States or the old British Indian Provinces would still be open to the Union or Part A or Part B States against such contracts and the fact that Arts. 294 and 295 provided for devolution made no change in their essential nawre as contracts merely.\n\nWe have not therefore been able to understand what exactly\n\n1961 is meant by saying that contracts existing from before were Union of India converted into constitutional obligations which could only be\n\nand Othm changed by an amendment of the Constitution and could not\n\nG l . v.R be affected even by law validly passed after the Constitution wa wr agon t f S h 1 1 b 1 \"d h Silk Manufacturing came m o orce. tress as parhcu ar y een ai on t e (Weaving) Oo. words \"shall be the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Ltd. and Another Government of India\" in Art. 295 (!) (b) and it is suggested\n\nW --' J that that means that there was clear positive instruction that an<11100, •\n\nthe obligations so devolving shall be fulfilled. We do not read any such meaning in these words and as we see them they only provide that liabilities and obligations on the Government of India shall be the same as in the case of the previous Indian State which originally entered into contract and therefore the Government of India will have the same defences to such a contract as the previous Indian State would have had; further if the contract could be affected by legislation previously it could equally be affected by legislation after the provision in Art. 295(1)(b). If contracts entered into by the Union could be overborne or nullified by law competently enacted, the obligations devolving on the Union under Art. 295 (!) (b) do not enjoy any higher sanctity or immunity from the effect of legislation. Similar words occur in Art. 294 (b), and what we have said about Art. 295 (1) (b) may be illustrated with respect to Art. 294 (b). Suppose a contract had been entered into by the Dominion of India which was not in accordance with s. 175 of the Government of India Act, 1935, corresponding to Art. 299 of the Constitution. Surely it cannot be contended that simply because Art. 294 (b) says that liabilities and obligations of the Dominion of India shall be the liabilities and obligations of the Government of India, under the Constitution, it would not be open to the Government of India to raise the defence that the contract was not binding on it as it was not entered into in accordance with s. 175 of the Government of India Act, 1935, because these words in Art. 294 (b) amounted to a clear positive instruction that obligations devolving shall be fulfilled.\n\nWe have no doubt therefore that neither Art. 294 nor Art. 295 cast any such obligation to the effect that the obligation shall be fulfilled, even though it might not have been binding on the previous Indian State which entered into it and even though the previous State might have the right to affect the contract by legislation provided the law passed was valid. The position in our opinion is the same even after the devolution provided in Arts. 294 and 295, and all that these Articles have done is to substitute in place of the previous States or the British Indian Provinces, the Government of India or Part A or Part B States, as the case may be.\n\nThe devolution of the rights and liabilities prescribed by Art. 295 does not involve •and is not intended to involve any change in the character of the said rights and liabilities; and\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS 911\n\nso pleas which could have been raised in respect of the said 1964 ; igh. ts and liabilities prior to the devolution remain entirely ff q~ una ected.\n\nThere is therefore no question of any constituand Otkm tional obligation being cast by the provisions contained in . v.\n\nArt. 295 (!) (.b) on the Government of I_ndi.a to fulfil th~ on- Silw; i~\":.ufaiurinu\n\ntracts JTrespecttve of whether they were bmdmg on the ongmal I Weaving) Oo.\n\nState which entered into them and whether they can be Ltd. and Another\n\naffected by 1aw validly passed after the Constitutfon came w J anchoo, . into force.\n\nWe may in this connection refer to the decision in Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd.(') where it was held that there was nothing in Art. 295 to show that it fettered for all time to come, the power of the Union legislature to make modifications or changes in the rights, liabilities and obligations which had vested in the Government of India. The legislative competence of the Union legislature or even of the\n\nState legislature could only be circumscribed by express prohibition contained in the Constitution itself and unless and until there was any provision in the Constitution expressly prohibiting legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally, there was no fetter or limitation on the plenary powers which the legislature enjoyed to legislate on the topics enumerated in the relevant lists. There is nothing in Art. 295 which expressly prohibits Parliament from enacting a Jaw as to income-tax in territories which became Part B States and which were formerly Indian States, and such a prohibition cannot be read into Art. 295 by virtue of some contract that might have been made by the then Ruler of an Indian State with any person.\n\nFurther in State of Rajasthan v. Shyam Lal('), this Court pointed out that even though liability or obligation may be cast on the Government of India or Part A or Part B State by Arts. 294 and 295 of the Constitution, such liability or obligation was always subject to any law made by the new State repealing the old laws and the liabilities arising thereunder or even otherwise, provided the law so made was within the competence of the new State and did not transgress the constitutional limitations.\n\nThe fact that the obligation of the Ruler of Gwalior under the agreement of April 7, 1947, devolved on the Government of India eventually by virtue of Art. 295 (]) (b) therefore would not take away the power of parliament to pass a valid law within its competence which does not transgress the constitutional limitations, and which n_iight affect the obligation arising out of the agreement of Apnl 7, 1947, and even completely superseding it.\n\n(') [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 515.\n\n(') A.I.R 1964 S.C. 1495.\n\nSUPRE:VIE COURT REPORTS [1964)\n\n1964 We have therefore to see what happened after the ConstilJnion of India tution came into force and whether any law was passed by and Others Parliament which in any way affected the agreement of 1947.\n\n0 r v. R Reliance in this connection has been placed on behalf of the\n\n.Silkw; I;; ufai:ng company on the agreement of February 25. 1950 between the\n\n(Wea.ving) Go.\n\nPresident of India and the State of Madhya Bharat to which Ltd. and Another we have already referred. That agreement accepted the wanchoo, J. recommendations of the Enquiry Committee. Our attention is drawn to Part II, Chapter II of the recommendations, where the following recommendation was made in para. 11 (4) (ii):-\n\n\"Any special financial privileges and immunities affecting federal revenues conferred by the .State upon other individuals and corporations . should ordinarily be continued on the same terms by the Centre, subject to <i maximum period of ten (or fifteen) years, and subject also to limiting in other ways any such concessions as may be extravagant or against the public interest.\"\n\nThis recommendation is undoubtedly part of the agreement made between the President of India and the State of Madhya Bharat. on February 25, 1950. It is therefore urged that in view of this recommendation in the agreement it was not open to the Government of India to take away the exemp tion granted by the agreement of April 7, 1947. The agreement between the President of India and the State of Madhya Bharat was entered under Arts. 278, 291, 295 and 306 of the Constitution. It may be accepted that the provision to which we have referred above was entered into by virtue of Art. 295\n\n0) which provided for devolution of property and assets, and fights, liabilities and obligations subject to any agreement en tered into in that behalf by the Government of India with the Government of that State, and to that extent the Government of India was bound to honour the agreement of February 25, 1950. But we have to see what exactly this agreement provides with respect to any special financial privileges and immunities conferred on corporations\n\nby the old Indian States. The provision is that privileges and immunities should ordinarily be continued on the same terms by the Centre subject to a maximum period of ten (or fifteen) years. We may emphasise the word \"ordinarily\" in this provision which shows that the Centre was not bound to continue the privileges and immunities exactly in the same form though \"ordinarily\" it was expected to do so. Even so, the use of the word \"ordinarily\" shows that it was open to the Centre to examine the privileges and immunities and decide for itself whether they should be continued and if so in what form and to what extent. Further the provision as to the continuance of the privileges and immunities was subject also to the power of\n\nthe Government of India to limiting in other ways any such 1964 concession as might appear to it to be extravagant or against Union of India the public interest. There was thus a double limitation on the and Others continuance of e privileges. and im?rnnities of orp?ratios.\n\nGwati;; Rayon Firstly,. these pnvdeges and 1mmumhes were ordinarily to oe Silk Manufactu:ring continued and that in itself imports that in some cases they (Weaving) Go. might not be continued. In the second place the Government Ltd. and Another of India was given power to limit these privileges and immuni- Wanohoo, J. ties if it was of the opinion that the privileges and immunities were extravagant or against the public interest. This again is a very wide power which the Government of India had even under the agreement of February 25, 1950. Therefore, the argument that the Government of India was bound to con-' tinue the privileges and immunities without any modification because of the agreement of February 25, 1960 cannot prevail.\n\nLet us therefore see if any provision was made by the Government of India in this behalf, to carry out this recommendation of the Enquiry Committee. 1t may be mentioned that the recommendation was made on July 22, 1949 though it was brought into the agreement on February 25, 1950. Sec, tion 60-A was introduced in the Income-tax Act by s. 19 of the Taxation Jaws (Extension to Merged States and Amendment) Act, (No. LXVII of 1949). Originally it only applied to merged territories, but when the Income-tax Act was extended to part B States on April 1, 1950 by the Finance Act, 1950. s. 60-A was amended from the same date and applied to part B States also. Thus it seems to us clear that the provision with respect to immunities a.nd privileges of corporations .to which we have already referred was given effect to by the application of s. 60-A which we have already set out above to Part B States: That section provides that if the Central Government considers it necessary or expedient so to do for avoiding any hardship or anomaly or removing any difficulty that may arise as a result of the extension of the Income-tax Act to Part B States, the Central Government may, by general or special' order, make an exemption, reduction in rate or other modification in respect of income-tax in favour of any class of income or in regard to the whole or any part of the income of any per-. son or class of persons. Section 60-A therefore clearly provides for the continuance of exemptions where the Central Govern-\" ment thought it necessary so to do. This provision is clearly in accord with the recommendation of the Enquiry Com- mittee to which we have already referred above. This was followed by the Concessions Order. cl. 16 of which specifically referred to concessions. to industrial undertakings and provided that the Central Government having regllrd to all the circumstances of the case might gra11t such rehef if any as .it thought appropriate. It may be mentioned further that the same Order •\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COURT REPORTS [1964}\n\n1964 provided for lower rates of income-tax for some time with respect to all incomes accruing in a Part B State.\n\nUnion of India an(l Others\n\nThe position therefore which emerges on April 1, 1950 is ,.Gwrdior Rayo~ that the income-tax Act was extended to Part B States as from Bilk Manufa.cturing . . (Weaving) Go. that date by the Finance Act, 1950, and thus income-tax be- Ltd. and Another came payable on all income accruing in Part B States subject\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nto the terms of the Finance Act, 1950. Further by the Conces· sions Order relief was given generally to all income-tax payers in Part B States by reducing the rates of income-tax and there was a special provision in cl. 16 of the Concessions Order with respect to industrial undertakings situated in Part B States which had been granted any exemption from or any concession in respect of income-tax or super-tax by the Ruler of an Indian State and was enjoying such exemption or concession immediately before April L 1950. It is not in dispute tha.t it was within the competence of Parliament to extend the Income-tax Act to Part B States and to subject incomes accruing in Part B States t-0 income-tax and super, tax by the Finance Act of 1950. A specific provision was also made in the Income-tax Act by s. 60-A to provide for exemption. reduction in rates or other modifications in respect of income-tax accruing in Part B States, in order to avoid any hardship or anomaly or removing any difficulty which might arise as a result of the extension of the Income-tax Act to Part B States. Lastly by the Concessions Order issued under s. 60-A of the Income-tax Act rates were reduced generally for sometimes and special provision was made with respect to concessions to industrial undertukings in cl. 16. These provisions were all within the competence of parliament and it is not the case of the company that they transgress any constitutional limitation. Therefore as soon as these provisions came into force from April 1, 1950, the result must be that the exemption claimed by the company under the agreement of April 7. 1947 must fall in the face of these legislative provisions and the company would only be entitled to ii} reduction in rates provided by the Concessions Order and (ii) such exemption or concessions as the Central Government might grant under cl. 16 of the Concessions Order. These provisions of law therefore clearly affect the exemption granted by the agreement of April 7. 1947 and after these provisions came into force from April 1, 1950 the company could only\n\net such concessions as were allowable generally under the Concessions Order or specifically under cl. 16 thereof to industrial undertakings covered by that clause. These provisions clearly affect and supersede the agreement and it is not the case of the company that these provisions are not valid.\n\nThe agreement must threfore be held to have been superseded and the company could only get such benefits as it was entitled to under the Concessions Order. The argument therefore that the obligation arising out of the agreement of 1947 could\n\nnot be affected by the extension of the Income-tax Act to Part 1961 B State of Madhya Bharat read with Finance Act of 1950 Union of India must fail. We have already pointed out what the scope of Art. and Others 295 (1) (b) is and we ae of opinion that it was not necessary Gwali;; Rayon to amend the Constitution m order to affect the agreement of Silk Manufacturing April 7, 1947. The argument that the Union of India was still Ll!J''0:::t2 o~ bound by the agreement of April 7, 1947 in spite of the legisla-. 0 not \" tive provisions made from April 1, 1950 to which we have Wanchoo, J. already referred must therefore fail. The company is therefore not entitled to rely on the agreement of April 7, 1947 for the ourpose of exemption and that it can only take advantage of the Concessions Order with respect to income accruing to it in Madhya Bharat. It may be mentioned that the company applied under cl. 16 of the Concessions Order and was given certain exemptions with respect to the weaving section and that is all that the company is entitled to. As to the staple fibre section, the company did apply for exemption under cl. 16, but in all the circumstances the Government of India did not think it fit to grant exemption in that behalf. As that order was -' fo accordance with law the company cannot rest on the agreement cf April 7, 1947 which must be deemed to have been superseded by legislative provisions made from April 1, 1950 with respect to income-tax and super-tax in the Part B State of Madhya Bharat. In this connection our attention is drawn to The South India Corporation Ltd. v. The Secretary, Board of Revenue(') on behalf of the company. We find nothing in that case which in any way militates against the view that we have taken and it is therefore unnecessary to consider that case in detail. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was not correct in holding that the Government of India was bound to fulfil the obligation undertaken by the Ruler of Gwalior and was bound to grant exemption to the company under the agreement of April 7, 1947, irrespective of the legislative provisions made with respect to income-tax and super-tax from April 1, 1950.\n\nThis brings us to the last contention based on Art. 27& of the Constitution. In this connection the company relies on the agreement of February 25, J 950 to which we have already referred and on the recommendation of the Enquiry Committee, which was made part of the agreement and to which also we have already referred. The argument is that that recommendation must be treated to be an agreement under Art. 27& and would therefore be binding for ten years under that Article &nd thus the company would be entitled ta exemption for at least ten years by virtue of the agreement. We are of opinion that there is no force in this argument. In the first place, the ngreement of February 25, 1950 ms not merely under Art. 278; it was a composite agreement under Arts. 278, 291, 295\n\n(')A.LR. 1964 S.C. 207. •\n\n1964 and 306. We have already pointed out while dealing with the Unfon -;; j India argument based on Art. 295 (1) (b) that this provision of the and Others agreement relating to corporations as to exemptions and con- 0 r v.R cessions to be granted to them may be treated as an agree- Silk \";0~:10:i1:.':'/ng ment under Art. 295 (]), for it dealt with matters of obliga-\n\n(lfeaving) Co. tion devolving on the Government of India and such devolu- Ltd. a.nd Another tion was subject to any agreement entered into in that behalf\n\nWaiwhoo, J. by the Government of India with the Government of the State concerned. But we are unable to see how the provision relating to exemptions or concessions to corporations can be said to be an agreement under Art. 278. The relevant part of Art. 278 (]), on which reliance is placed on behalf of the company is as follows: -\n\n\"(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the Government of India may, subject to the provisions of clause (2), enter into an agreement with the Government of a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule with respect to-\n\n(a) the levy and collection of any tax or duty leviable by the Government of India in such State and for the distribution of the proceeds thereof otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter;\n\n(b) ............................................. \" Clause (2) of Art. 278 to which cl. (!) is subject merely prescribes the period for which the agreement will remain in force, the maximum being ten years in all. Article 278 appears in Ch. I of Part XII with which we have already dealt with briefly. As we read Art. 278 (!) (a) we find nothing in it which has any relevance with respect to any agreement between\n\nRuler of an Indian State and a corporation. Article 278(\\)(a) provides for an agreement between the Government of India and the Government of a Part B State for the levy or collection of any tax or duty leviable by the Government of India in such State and for the distribution of the proceeds thereof otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Chapter I, Part XII; and this provision is \"notwithstanding anything in the Constitution.\" The earlier provisions in this Chapter provide for the levy and collecrton of certain taxes and duties leviable by the Government of India and for their distribution between the Government of India and the States. Article 268 (1) deals with such stamp duties and such duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations as are mentioned in the Union List and provides that they shall be levied by the Government of India but shall be collected by the States within which such duties , are leviable and the proceeds of such duties are to be assigned to that State. Similarly Art. 269 deals with certain other duties and says that they shall be levied and collected by the Government of India but shall\n\nbe assigned to the States as provided therein. Article 270 1964 speaks of taxes on income other than agricultural inccme and Union of India lays down that they shall be levied and collected by the and Others Government of India and distributed between the Union and v. h S h d d h d Art• 1 272 Gwaliar Rayon t e tales m '. e manner prov1. e t ereun er. .\n\nIC Si! k Manufacturing speaks of Umon du!tes of Excise other than such duties of • (Weaving) Go. excise on medicinal and toilet preparations as are mentioned in Ltd. and Another\n\nthe Union List and lays down that they shall be levied and col- Wonchoo, J. lected by the Government 6f India, but, if Parliament by Jaw so provides, there shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India, to the States to which the law imposing the duty extends sums equivalent to the whole or any part of the net proceeds.\n\nIt will be clear therefore that the earlier part of the Chapter has provided for !ivy and collection of certain taxes and duties leviable by the Government of India and the distribution of the proceeds between the Government of India and the States. All. that Art. 278 (!) does is to permit by agreement variation in the manner of levy and collection as compared to the provision in the. earlier part of the Chapter and also variation in the manner of distribution of the proceeds as compared to the provision in the earlier part. Article 278 (I) (a) only deals with levy and collection of certain public revenues and their distribution between the Government of India and the States.\n\nIt gives power to the Government of India to enter into agreement with any Government of a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule by which variation may be made in the manner of levy and collection of any tax or duty Ieviable by the Gov~ ernment of India and the distribution of the proceeds, even though that might not be in accordance with the earlier provisions in the Chapter. Article 278 (I) (a) thus has nothing to do with any obligation arising out of agreements between Rulers of former Indian States and other persons with respect to exemption from any tax or duty. Nor do we see anything in Art. 278 (!) which in any way affects the legislative competence of Parliament or of State Legislatures to pass any law within their respective powers. Aii that it provides is that the earlier provisions in the Chapter relating to levy, collection and distribution of any tax or duty may be varied for a certain period on an agreement between the Government of India and the Government of a Part B State. This was clearly necessary in view of the fact that many sources of revenue of States which came to form part B States had to be taken over by the Government of India in view of the division of powers of taxation\n\ni11 List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that might have created a gap in the revenues of • Part B States. Therefore the Government of India was given the power for a period of ten years at the outside to dome to an agreement with any Part B State Mi the matter of levy or collection of any tax or duty leviable by it and its distribution.\n\n'.9I8 SUPREME COURT ItEPORTS [I96'i]\n\n1964 Article 278(1)(a) would also affect Art. 266 which provides Union of India that all revenues received by the Government of India shall atld Others forni one consolidated fund except the proceeds of certain taxes\n\nGwalio~· Rayon and duties which were assigned in whole or in part to the States Silk Manujacturing by the other provisions of this Chapter. What Art. 278 (1) does\n\nLtw:c;::;\"1~Z~;, is that it permits _the Government of India to _enter into. agreements not only with respect to levy and collection of duties and Wanchoo, J. taxes specifically dealt with in this Chapter but also with respect to other taxes and duties leviable by the Government of India which would ordinarily go to the Consolidated Fund of India and to provide how such taxes and duties which are made part of the agreement may be levied and collected and in what manner they should be distributed between the Government of India and the Part B State concerned. But for this provision it may not have been open to the Government of India to give help to Part B States which required it beyond what is provided in the earlier provisions of this Chapter. All that Art. 278 (!) does is to provide for further help to Part B States in case it was necessary l)y entering into agreements with them as to the manner of levy and collection of any tax and duty leviable by the Government of India and for the distribution of its proceeds in spite of the provision in Art 266 requiring all such proceeds to be credited in the Consolidated Fund of India.\n\nWhen Art. 278 (I) (a) speaks of levy and collection it does not deal with legislative competence but only with the actual levy of tax and its collection; and this in our opinion is clear from the later provision which relates to the distribution of the proceeds resulting from such levy and collection. It is true that sometimes the word \"levy'' also includes imposition of tax and not merely its assessment and collection; but in the context in which the words \"levy and collection\" have been used in Art. 278(1), it seems to us that they only cover the assessment and collection not the imposition of a tax. We may in this connection refer to the words of Art. 277 which speaks of any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which were being lawfully levied by the Government of any State or by any municipality or other local authority or body. Those words came up for consideration by this Court in The Town Municipal Committee v. Ramchandra Vasudeo Chimote (') and it was held that in the context the { words \"being lawfully levied\" in Art. 277 meant that the tax\n\nwas actually levied and not merely that a law imposing a tax had been made. Similarly in the context of Art. 278 (1) (a) the levy and collection of any tax, followed as it is by the distribution of its proceeds, mean the actual assessment and collection of the tax and the way in which that should be done and have no reference to legislative competence as to the imposition of the tax. We are of opinion that Art. 278 (1) (a) deals only with public revenues and how they should be assessed and collected\n\n(')A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1166. ~\n\nand distributed between the Union of India and Part B States 1964 in case there is an agreement in that behalf between the Union Union of J?Ulia of India and Par: B States. It further provides that in case of and Others such agreement tle earlier. pr~JVisions of the Chaple~ relating Gwali;· Rayon to the levy, collect10n and d1stnbut10n of taxes and duties would Silk Manufacturing not apply and the agreement would prevail for a maximum L'~WeavdingA) Oho. d ft ~.an noler per10 o . en years.\n\nAs to the non obstante clause with which Art. 278 (!) (a) Wanchoo, J. opens, that was apparently necessary in view of certain provisions of the Constitution as to the extent of the executive power of the Union and the States. Thus it becomes possible to the Government of India if it so decides to enter into an agreement with a Part B State with respect to a tax leviable by the Government of India that the tax shall be assessed and collected by the State through its own officers and the State may retain the entire proceeds so assessed and collected even though the executive power of the Union under Art. 73 extends to matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws and ordinarily if a law as to taxat:on is passed by Parliament within its power its assessment and collection would be by officers under the Government of India. Article 278 (!) (a) however permits that such assessment and collection may also by agreement be left to the States in spite of the provisions in other part of the Constitution. The nonobstante clause however with which Art. 278 (!) opens does not in our opinion affect the legislative competence of Parliament even with respect to duties and taxes which are dealt with by an agreement under Art. 278(l)(a). We are therefore of opinion that in the first place che agreement of February 25, 1950 on which the company relies with respect to concessions to corporations must be deemed to have been entered under Art. 295 (1) (b), and not under Art. 278 (1) (a). In the second place, Art. 278 (!) (a) merely contemplates an agreement between the Centre and Part B States with respect to levy collection or distribution of public revenues which are Jeviable by the Government of India and has nothing to do with any contract between a for mer Indian State and another person with respect to such revenues which may have become the obligation of the Govern ment of India under Art. 295 (!) (b). The company therefore cannot rely on the agreement of February 25, 1950 in this connection and contend that the agreement of April 7, 1947 was binding for at least ten years thereunder.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the view taken by the High Court is incorrect. The appeals are therefore allowed and the order of the High Court in the writ petition and the decree of the High Court in the suit are set aside, and the writ petition and the suit are dismissed. In the cirfumstances we order parties to bear their own cost;; throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 309, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GWALIOR RAYON SILK MANUFACTURING (WEAV-\n\nING) CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GWALIOR RAYON SILK MANUFACTURING (WEAV-\n\nING) CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 179, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 216, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 374, "end_char": 395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 462, "end_char": 467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 518, "end_char": 524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 525, "end_char": 546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 278, 295, 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 548, "end_char": 567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gwalior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 643, "end_char": 650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "erstwhile> State of Gwalior stating that certain industries would be established in Gwalior if the Government gave certain facili-· ties including exemption from taxation."}}, {"text": "January 18, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 852, "end_char": 868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was eventually put up before the Ruler who on January 18, 1949, made an,\n\norder .sanctioning the proposals made by the minister which ._"}}, {"text": "April 7, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 996, "end_char": 1009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "included exemption from taxation as desired by B. On April 7, 1947, an agreement was entered into between the Government and B in accordance with the order of the Ruler dated January 18, 1947, under whlch certain facilities and concessions were granted to B for the establishment of industries in Gw,.-· lior, which included exemption from any iorm of taxation on the income for a period of 12 years from the date of starting of the factories."}}, {"text": "January 18, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "included exemption from taxation as desired by B. On April 7, 1947, an agreement was entered into between the Government and B in accordance with the order of the Ruler dated January 18, 1947, under whlch certain facilities and concessions were granted to B for the establishment of industries in Gw,.-· lior, which included exemption from any iorm of taxation on the income for a period of 12 years from the date of starting of the factories."}}, {"text": "February 18, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1677, "end_char": 1694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the agreement the appellant company was started and actual production began sometime in June 1949 so far as the weaving section of manufacturing: cloth from artificial silk yarn was concerned, while the staple fibre section of the company started actual working on or about February 18, 1954."}}, {"text": "Raj Pramukh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1914, "end_char": 1925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In April 1948 the Ruler of Gwalior enterecll into a covenant with the rulers of certain other States for the formation of a United State called Madhya Bharat, under which the Rulers made over the administration to the Raj Pramukh ..\n\nArticle VI of the Covenant provided, inter alia, that the duti5 and obligations of the Ruler pt!rtaining or incidental to the> Government of the covenanting states •hall devolve on th<> United State and sha)) be discharged by it."}}, {"text": "December 13,. 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2163, "end_char": 2181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 13,."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1948, was passed which provided, inter alia, that alI laws of the covenanting states f shall continue to remain in force until repealed' -Or amended ..\n\nOn January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India cae into force>\n\nand the State of Madhya Bharat became a Part B 1State under the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2393, "end_char": 2414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2440, "end_char": 2462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1948, was passed which provided, inter alia, that alI laws of the covenanting states f shall continue to remain in force until repealed' -Or amended ..\n\nOn January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India cae into force>\n\nand the State of Madhya Bharat became a Part B 1State under the Constitution."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2513, "end_char": 2526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 1, 1950, the Indian Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2539, "end_char": 2553, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madhya !Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2597, "end_char": 2611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1922, was extended to the Part B State of Madhya !"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2636, "end_char": 2653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2707, "end_char": 2712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "India to which the Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2808, "end_char": 2848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "February 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2864, "end_char": 2881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 25, 1950, an agreement was entered into tween the * Pre•ident of India and the State of Madhya Bhara~ which was to be in force for a period of ten years under which certain recommendations of Indian States Finances Enquir\\r Committee were accepted."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3126, "end_char": 3145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India also issued the Part\n\n1961 B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950, by cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3221, "end_char": 3227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India to which the Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "India to which the Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3458, "end_char": 3464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India to which the Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "India to which the Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "November 23, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3953, "end_char": 3970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 23, 1956, the company filed a suit against the Uriion of India for a declaration _that under the a, greement W:ted Apnl 7, 1947, it was entitled to exemption from income-tax and super-tax for a period of 12 years frbm June 1949 with respect to the weaving section and for a period of 12 years from February 1954 with respect to the staple fibre section of the company."}}, {"text": "Uriion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4009, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 23, 1956, the company filed a suit against the Uriion of India for a declaration _that under the a, greement W:ted Apnl 7, 1947, it was entitled to exemption from income-tax and super-tax for a period of 12 years frbm June 1949 with respect to the weaving section and for a period of 12 years from February 1954 with respect to the staple fibre section of the company."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4373, "end_char": 4381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya <- PradeW.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4413, "end_char": 4444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Madhya <- PradeW. for the same reliefs."}}, {"text": "Art 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4934, "end_char": 4941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4949, "end_char": 4970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5192, "end_char": 5200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 7. 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore as soon as these provisions came into force from April 1, 1950, the result must be that the exemption claimed by the company under the agreement of April 7."}}, {"text": "Art. 295(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5367, "end_char": 5381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5414, "end_char": 5424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "did not take away the power of Parliament to pass a valid l\"w within its competence which did not transgress the constitutional limitations, and which might affect the obligation arising out of the agreement of April 7, 1947, and even completely supersede it."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5689, "end_char": 5703, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat and the passing of the Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5715, "end_char": 5778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6012, "end_char": 6030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I .(iv} After the extension of the Indi'!_n- Income-tax Act to Pali: B State of Madhya Bharat and the passing of the Finance Act, 1950, the exemption claimed by the company under the\n\ngreement of April 7, 1947, must fall.-and the company would: only be entitled to (i) reduction in rates provided by the Concessions Order end (ii) such exemption or concessions as the Central Government might grant under cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6049, "end_char": 6055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Madhya Bharat and the passing of the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "State of Madhya Bharat and the passing of the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 278(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6090, "end_char": 6104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Madhya Bharat and the passing of the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "State of Madhya Bharat and the passing of the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6788, "end_char": 6802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7117, "end_char": 7124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "934-\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\n935 of 1963.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7334, "end_char": 7348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorneeneral, R. Ganapathy."}}, {"text": "Attorneeneral", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7350, "end_char": 7363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorneeneral, R. Ganapathy."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy. Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7365, "end_char": 7383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorneeneral, R. Ganapathy."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7388, "end_char": 7400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants tin both the appeals).- ·\n\nM. C. Setalvad, K. A. Chitale, M. K. Nambyar."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7448, "end_char": 7462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants tin both the appeals).- ·\n\nM. C. Setalvad, K. A. Chitale, M. K. Nambyar."}}, {"text": "K. A. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7464, "end_char": 7477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants tin both the appeals).- ·\n\nM. C. Setalvad, K. A. Chitale, M. K. Nambyar."}}, {"text": "M. K. Nambyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7479, "end_char": 7492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants tin both the appeals).- ·\n\nM. C. Setalvad, K. A. Chitale, M. K. Nambyar."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7494, "end_char": 7508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the respondents (in both the appeals). ·"}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7513, "end_char": 7525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the respondents (in both the appeals). ·"}}, {"text": "W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7646, "end_char": 7654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgmentofthe Court was-delivered by W ANCHOO, J.-These two appeals on certificates granted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court raise common questions of law and will be , dealt with together.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing . <Weaving) Company", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7818, "end_char": 7870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent the Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing .", "canonical_name": "GWALIOR RAYON SILK MANUFACTURING (WEAV-\n\nING) CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7951, "end_char": 7964, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bfrla Brothers'Limited,", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8119, "end_char": 8142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In October 1946 Messrs. Bfrla Brothers'Limited, Gwalior, wrote to the."}}, {"text": "Government of Gwalior", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8165, "end_char": 8186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of Gwalior that they intended to establish at some suitable place in Gwalior a kind of."}}, {"text": "Gwalior Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9008, "end_char": 9026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gwalior was largely to be influenced by the decision of the Gwalior Government - as to the facilities asked for: The Secretariat also noted that-."}}, {"text": ".15-11-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10539, "end_char": 10550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The Guzarish of t1ie Minister for Industries, Commerce and .Communications dated .15-11-1946 is sanctioned."}}, {"text": "Birla Brothers Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10909, "end_char": 10931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\vas communicated to Messrs. Birla Brothers Limited and eventuaily an agreement was entered into on April 7, 1947 between the Government of Gwalior and Messrs. Birla Brothers Limited, which stated that in accordance with the orders of the Ruler dated January 18, 1947; it was hereby agreed to grant and accord the facilities; priVileges, concessions and benefits hereinafter mentioned to the said oompany."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12496, "end_char": 12510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 In consequence of this agreement, the company was Union of India started and actual production began sometime in June 1949 and Other' so far as the weaving section for manufacturing cloth from Gwali;; Rayon artificial silk yan was concerned."}}, {"text": "Gwali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12639, "end_char": 12644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 In consequence of this agreement, the company was Union of India started and actual production began sometime in June 1949 and Other' so far as the weaving section for manufacturing cloth from Gwali;; Rayon artificial silk yan was concerned."}}, {"text": "./Jilk Manufacturing", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12712, "end_char": 12732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be added that he ./Jilk Manufacturing staple fibre section of the company started actual workmg (Weaving) Go."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13021, "end_char": 13034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is how the company Ltd. and Another b bl\" h d d d 1 • • h th _ came to e esta 1s e an starte worxmg m w at was e\n\nWanchoo, J. former Gwalior State in pursuance of the agreement of April 7, 1949."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13210, "end_char": 13215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before however the company actually started working even the weaving section for manufacturing cloth from artificial silk yarn, certain constitutional changes took place in India to which it is now necessary to refer."}}, {"text": "August 15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13258, "end_char": 13273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 15, 1947, India became a Dominion and the process of mergers which eventually resulted in the emergence of the Republic of India and its Constitution on January 26, 1950, began."}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13483, "end_char": 13489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that process, the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in what was known as Central India, entered into a covenant for the formation of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (also known as Madhya-Bharat) in April\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "Central India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13536, "end_char": 13549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that process, the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in what was known as Central India, entered into a covenant for the formation of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (also known as Madhya-Bharat) in April\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "Malwa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13636, "end_char": 13641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that process, the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in what was known as Central India, entered into a covenant for the formation of the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (also known as Madhya-Bharat) in April\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "Article VI of that covenant provided that the Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13688, "end_char": 13738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14106, "end_char": 14118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion belonging to the Ruler, which appertain or are incidental to the Government of the covenanting State shall vest in the United State; (2) all duties and obligations of the Ruler pertaining or incidental to the Government of the covenanting State shall devolve on the United State and shall be discharged by it; (3) all the assets and liabilities of the covenanting State shall be the assets and liabilities of the United State; and (4) the military forces, if any, of the covenanting State shall be the military forces of the United State."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14800, "end_char": 14813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 19, 1948, the State of Madhya Bharat acceded to the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14857, "end_char": 14874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 19, 1948, the State of Madhya Bharat acceded to the Dominion of India."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14879, "end_char": 14896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1949, the Raj Pramukh of Madhya Bharat issued a proclamation accepting the provisions of the Constitution of India to be framed for the State of Madhya Bharat also."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14917, "end_char": 14930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1949, the Raj Pramukh of Madhya Bharat issued a proclamation accepting the provisions of the Constitution of India to be framed for the State of Madhya Bharat also."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14985, "end_char": 15006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15082, "end_char": 15103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "United State of Gwalior", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15128, "end_char": 15151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and the United State of Gwalior, Indore, Malwa became the Part B State of Madhya Bharat."}}, {"text": "December 13, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15223, "end_char": 15240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile on December 13, 1948, the United State of Gwalior, Indore, Malwa (Madhya-Bharat) Regulation of\n\n~-··\n\nGovernment Act, No."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15364, "end_char": 15373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "W!!nchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15889, "end_char": 15897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "having the8ilk Manufacturing force of Law in the said State shall continue to remain in df'\n\n0\"J\"1) ~~· force until repealed or amended under the provisions of the · an \"' er next succeeding section, and shall be construed as if refer- W!!nchoo, J. ences in them to the Ruler or Government of the State were references to the Raj Pramukh or the Government of the\n\nUnited State respectively\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 295(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16289, "end_char": 16300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16470, "end_char": 16484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of the State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16897, "end_char": 16920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was subject to any agreement entered into in that behalf by the Government of India with the Government of the State concerned."}}, {"text": "Art. 295(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17147, "end_char": 17158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April I, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17184, "end_char": 17197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April I, 1950, the Indian Income-tax Act was extended to the Part B State of Madhya Bharat."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17210, "end_char": 17224, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "From the same date the Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17276, "end_char": 17310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17546, "end_char": 17551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the same date the Finance Act", "statute": "From the same date the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17559, "end_char": 17576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st day of April,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17618, "end_char": 17641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further s. 13 to the Finance Act, 1950 provided that \"if immediately before the 1st day of April,\n\n1950, there is in force in any Part B State other than Jammu and Kashmir or in Manipur, Tripura or Vindhya Pradesh or in the merged territory of Cooch."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17692, "end_char": 17709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further s. 13 to the Finance Act, 1950 provided that \"if immediately before the 1st day of April,\n\n1950, there is in force in any Part B State other than Jammu and Kashmir or in Manipur, Tripura or Vindhya Pradesh or in the merged territory of Cooch."}}, {"text": "Manipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17716, "end_char": 17723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further s. 13 to the Finance Act, 1950 provided that \"if immediately before the 1st day of April,\n\n1950, there is in force in any Part B State other than Jammu and Kashmir or in Manipur, Tripura or Vindhya Pradesh or in the merged territory of Cooch."}}, {"text": "Tripura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17725, "end_char": 17732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further s. 13 to the Finance Act, 1950 provided that \"if immediately before the 1st day of April,\n\n1950, there is in force in any Part B State other than Jammu and Kashmir or in Manipur, Tripura or Vindhya Pradesh or in the merged territory of Cooch."}}, {"text": "Vindhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17736, "end_char": 17751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further s. 13 to the Finance Act, 1950 provided that \"if immediately before the 1st day of April,\n\n1950, there is in force in any Part B State other than Jammu and Kashmir or in Manipur, Tripura or Vindhya Pradesh or in the merged territory of Cooch."}}, {"text": "Cooch.Behar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17782, "end_char": 17793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further s. 13 to the Finance Act, 1950 provided that \"if immediately before the 1st day of April,\n\n1950, there is in force in any Part B State other than Jammu and Kashmir or in Manipur, Tripura or Vindhya Pradesh or in the merged territory of Cooch."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18096, "end_char": 18123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "alior Rayon", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18353, "end_char": 18364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Behar any law relating to income-tax or super-tax or tax on profits of business, that law shall cease to have effect except for the purposes of the levy, assessment and collection of income-tax and super-tax in respect of any period not included in the previous year for the purposes of assessment under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for the year ending on the.31st day of March, 1951 or for any subsequent year, or, as the case may be, the levy, assessment and collection of the tax on profits of business\n\nL.'P(D)ISOI-29\n\nT!n1'.on of India\n\nand Others\n\nv. flu:alior Rayon ,..,'ilk llfrtnufacturing\n\n( W caving) Oo."}}, {"text": "lVanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18427, "end_char": 18435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "itd. a.nd Another\n\nlVanclwo, J.\n\nfor any chargeable accounting period ending on or before the 31st day of March, 1949\"."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18681, "end_char": 18695, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "April 1, I 950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18714, "end_char": 18728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect of this provision was to repeal all laws relating to income-tax in its broadest sense prevailing in those parts of India to which the 1 ndian Income-tax Act was extended from April 1, I 950."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19519, "end_char": 19533, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19605, "end_char": 19610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Further in order to overcome difficulties which might arise on the application of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Further in order to overcome difficulties which might arise on the application of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19635, "end_char": 19649, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chander", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19770, "end_char": 19777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in relation to merged territories or to any Part B State or to Chander nagore-If the Central Government considers it necessary or expedient, so to do for a voiding any hardship or anomaly, or removing any difficulty that may arise as a result of the extension of this Act to the merged territories ...... or to any Part B State ...... , the Central Government may, by general or special order, make an exemption, reduction in rate or other modification in respect of income-tax in favour of any class of income, or in regard to the whole or any part of the income of any person or class of persons.\""}}, {"text": "Clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20544, "end_char": 20553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21059, "end_char": 21073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where any industrial undertaking situated in any State claims that it has been granted any exemption from or concession in respect of income-tax or super-tax by the Ruler of an Indian State and was enjoying such exemption or concession immediately before the appointed day it shall submit\n\n' \\\n\nr '\n\nan application to the Commissioner of Income 1964 tax giving the following particulars : - Union of India and Others\n\nl. Name of the industrial undertaking.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Nature of the business.\n\nLtd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21303, "end_char": 21332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nature of the business."}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21994, "end_char": 22000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23305, "end_char": 23319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the contention of the company was that it was entitled to exemption in accordance with the agreement of April 7, 1947 consequent on the order of the Ruler of Gwalior dated January 18, 1947, it filed a suit on November 23, 1956 against the Union of India .for a declaration that under the order dated January 18, 1947 and the agreement\n\nL.1P(D)ISCI-30\n\nWanehoo, J.\n\nUnion of India and Others ...\n\n?,·.\"", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Wanehoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23418, "end_char": 23425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the contention of the company was that it was entitled to exemption in accordance with the agreement of April 7, 1947 consequent on the order of the Ruler of Gwalior dated January 18, 1947, it filed a suit on November 23, 1956 against the Union of India .for a declaration that under the order dated January 18, 1947 and the agreement\n\nL.1P(D)ISCI-30\n\nWanehoo, J.\n\nUnion of India and Others ...\n\n?,·.\"", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Art 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23749, "end_char": 23756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23842, "end_char": 23850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "September 11, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23874, "end_char": 23892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution on September 11, 1957 in which also it claimed that by virtue of the order of the Ltd. and Another\n\nWanchoo, J.\n\nRuler of Gwalior dated January 18, 1947 and the agreement following thereon, it was entitled to exemption from incometax and super-tax for a period of 12 years from June 1949 with respect to the weaving section and for a period of 12 years from February 1954 with respect to the staple fibre section of the company and for other consequential reliefs in the alternative."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24359, "end_char": 24387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Madhya Pradesh accepted the petition of the company and a direction was issued restraining the Union of India and its officers from making any assessment under the Income-tax Act and levying or 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"statute": "State of Madhya Bharat read with the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 278", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27394, "end_char": 27402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Madhya Bharat read with the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "State of Madhya Bharat read with the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27660, "end_char": 27674, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27906, "end_char": 27914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Madhya Bharat read with the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "State of Madhya Bharat read with the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27988, "end_char": 28002, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28043, "end_char": 28048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28056, "end_char": 28073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28119, "end_char": 28127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28369, "end_char": 28383, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28792, "end_char": 28803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28807, "end_char": 28824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29089, "end_char": 29113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that it was this obligation of the Madhya Bharat Government to fulfil the obligation undertaken by the Ruler Df Gwalior State of granting exemption to the company that\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Others\n\nGwalior Rayon -Silk Manufacturing\n\n(Weaving) Co.\n\nLU."}}, {"text": "Gwalior Rayon -Silk Manufacturing\n\n(Weaving) Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29251, "end_char": 29299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that it was this obligation of the Madhya Bharat Government to fulfil the obligation undertaken by the Ruler Df Gwalior State of granting exemption to the company that\n\nUnion of India\n\nand Others\n\nGwalior Rayon -Silk Manufacturing\n\n(Weaving) Co.\n\nLU.", "canonical_name": "GWALIOR RAYON SILK MANUFACTURING (WEAV-\n\nING) CO. 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AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29374, "end_char": 29382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29522, "end_char": 29536, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29538, "end_char": 29543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29577, "end_char": 29583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 278", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29830, "end_char": 29838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "October 17, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30637, "end_char": 30653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, learned Attorney-General urges that the order was passed by the Ruler in connection with a process which started with the letter of Birla Brothers Limited dated October 17, 1946 and ended with the agreement of April 7, 194 7."}}, {"text": "April 7, 194", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30686, "end_char": 30698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, learned Attorney-General urges that the order was passed by the Ruler in connection with a process which started with the letter of Birla Brothers Limited dated October 17, 1946 and ended with the agreement of April 7, 194 7."}}, {"text": "Silk Manufacturing", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32387, "end_char": 32405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since then, Gwali;; Rayon however, this Court had occasion to consider these observations Silk Manufacturing in three cases namely-(!)"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32910, "end_char": 32944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Limited('), the agreement between the Ruler and the Mills pursuant to the order of the Ruler was held to be a mere :ontract and not a law within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33097, "end_char": 33105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vara Fiddali Badruddin Mithibar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33178, "end_char": 33209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view has been expressed by four learned Judges in the case of Vara Fiddali Badruddin Mithibar(')."}}, {"text": "Rajkumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33225, "end_char": 33259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally in Rajkumar Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo's case(') it was held that this Court had not laid down a general proposition about the irrelevance or inapplicability of the well-recognised distinction between legislative and executive acts in regard to the orders issued by absolute monarchs and that the true legal position was that whenever a dispute arose as to whether an order passed by an absolute monarch represented a legislative act all relevant factors must be considered before the question was answered."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34202, "end_char": 34210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34384, "end_char": 34392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We cannot impute to the Constitution-makers an intention to continue each and every order of an absolute Rule", "statute": "We cannot impute to the Constitution-makers an intention to continue each and every order of an absolute Rule"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34761, "end_char": 34769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We cannot impute to the Constitution-makers an intention to continue each and every order of an absolute Rule", "statute": "We cannot impute to the Constitution-makers an intention to continue each and every order of an absolute Rule"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35238, "end_char": 35246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We cannot impute to the Constitution-makers an intention to continue each and every order of an absolute Rule", "statute": "We cannot impute to the Constitution-makers an intention to continue each and every order of an absolute Rule"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35460, "end_char": 35468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35646, "end_char": 35654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35845, "end_char": 35853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 15, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37866, "end_char": 37883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This report was made on November 15, 1946."}}, {"text": "November 17, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37888, "end_char": 37905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 17, 1946, the Ruler made the following note thereon: -\n\n\"Submit personally on my return\"."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38083, "end_char": 38085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 17, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38268, "end_char": 38284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then Union of India on January 17, 1947, there was a Guzarish."}}, {"text": "15-11-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39566, "end_char": 39576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dated 15-11-1946 is sanctioned\"."}}, {"text": "Janu- Silk Manufacturing", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44717, "end_char": 44741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T ere 1s t ere ore no doubt t at t e order of Janu- Silk Manufacturing ary 18, 1947 cannot be read independently of the agreement Weaving) Go."}}, {"text": "Birla wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44944, "end_char": 44957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of April 7, 1947 and must be read in the context of the entire Ltd. and Another set of circumstances beginning from the letter of Birla wanchoo, J.\n\nBrothers Limited dated October 17, 1946 and ending with the agreement of April 7, 1947 and so read the order must be held to be a mere signification of the acceptance of the request and cannot be held to be a law even with respect to that par\\ of it which dealt with exemption from income-tax."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46572, "end_char": 46586, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46597, "end_char": 46602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46610, "end_char": 46627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46995, "end_char": 47003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47131, "end_char": 47145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47439, "end_char": 47453, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gcncral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47862, "end_char": 47869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, learned Attorney- Gcncral contends that Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47884, "end_char": 47892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Republic of India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47987, "end_char": 48004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "295 (1) merely provides in the context of the coming into existence of the sovereign State of the Republic of India for the devolution of the property and assets, and the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Governments of the former Indian States corresponding to State specified in Part B of the First Schedule to the Constitution."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48193, "end_char": 48207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48258, "end_char": 48266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48402, "end_char": 48416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48770, "end_char": 48778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48859, "end_char": 48867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49154, "end_char": 49162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49448, "end_char": 49456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Paliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49641, "end_char": 49650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "295 (1) (b) is not a fetter on the power of Parliament to legislate in respect of matters with which such contract is concerned and that such legislation would prevail against contract if Paliament was competent to enact it and it did not in any way transgress the constitutional limitations."}}, {"text": "w-hoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49747, "end_char": 49752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "w-hoo, J."}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49840, "end_char": 49848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 266", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50059, "end_char": 50067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 267", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50103, "end_char": 50111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 268 to 272", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50192, "end_char": 50208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 273 and 275", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50249, "end_char": 50266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50269, "end_char": 50280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 278", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50452, "end_char": 50460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 284", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50636, "end_char": 50644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50860, "end_char": 50863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 285", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50986, "end_char": 50998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 290 and 291", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51149, "end_char": 51169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51427, "end_char": 51438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51655, "end_char": 51663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52030, "end_char": 52038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52042, "end_char": 52050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52919, "end_char": 52935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 294 and 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53464, "end_char": 53481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54130, "end_char": 54138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54811, "end_char": 54825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54971, "end_char": 54979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55088, "end_char": 55096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55130, "end_char": 55138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55182, "end_char": 55190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55295, "end_char": 55301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55309, "end_char": 55338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55357, "end_char": 55365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55437, "end_char": 55445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55761, "end_char": 55767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55775, "end_char": 55804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55829, "end_char": 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1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57079, "end_char": 57087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57452, "end_char": 57483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may in this connection refer to the decision in Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd.(') where it was held that there was nothing in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57531, "end_char": 57539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58234, "end_char": 58242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58441, "end_char": 58449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 294 and 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58737, "end_char": 58754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59213, "end_char": 59221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59273, "end_char": 59283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "295 (]) (b) therefore would not take away the power of parliament to pass a valid law within its competence which does not transgress the constitutional limitations, and which n_iight affect the obligation arising out of the agreement of Apnl 7, 1947, and even completely superseding it."}}, {"text": "Arts. 278, 291, 295 and 306", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61103, "end_char": 61130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61252, "end_char": 61260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62947, "end_char": 62962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the second place the Government Ltd. and Another of India was given power to limit these privileges and immuni- Wanohoo, J. ties if it was of the opinion that the privileges and immunities were extravagant or against the public interest."}}, {"text": "Wanohoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63038, "end_char": 63045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the second place the Government Ltd. and Another of India was given power to limit these privileges and immuni- Wanohoo, J. ties if it was of the opinion that the privileges and immunities were extravagant or against the public interest."}}, {"text": "February 25, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63438, "end_char": 63455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the argument that the Government of India was bound to con-' tinue the privileges and immunities without any modification because of the agreement of February 25, 1960 cannot prevail."}}, {"text": "22, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63683, "end_char": 63691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1t may be mentioned that the recommendation was made on July 22, 1949 though it was brought into the agreement on February 25, 1950."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63792, "end_char": 63806, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63810, "end_char": 63815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63969, "end_char": 63983, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64038, "end_char": 64055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64057, "end_char": 64062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64312, "end_char": 64317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64587, "end_char": 64601, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64885, "end_char": 64895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65194, "end_char": 65200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65735, "end_char": 65749, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65843, "end_char": 65860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65998, "end_char": 66015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66194, "end_char": 66200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1950", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Parliament to extend the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66560, "end_char": 66599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66766, "end_char": 66780, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66784, "end_char": 66789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to extend the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Parliament to extend the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67035, "end_char": 67049, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67113, "end_char": 67118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to extend the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Parliament to extend the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67128, "end_char": 67142, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67275, "end_char": 67281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to extend the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Parliament to extend the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67843, "end_char": 67849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68165, "end_char": 68171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68650, "end_char": 68664, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Bharat read with Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68680, "end_char": 68724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69513, "end_char": 69519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Madhya Bharat read with Finance Act", "statute": "State of Madhya Bharat read with Finance Act"}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69737, "end_char": 69743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70846, "end_char": 70853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "February 25, J 950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70934, "end_char": 70952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection the company relies on the agreement of February 25, J 950 to which we have already referred and on the recommendation of the Enquiry Committee, which was made part of the agreement and to which also we have already referred."}}, {"text": "Art. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71202, "end_char": 71209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 278", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71512, "end_char": 71520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 278, 291, 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71557, "end_char": 71576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71706, "end_char": 71714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 295", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71924, "end_char": 71932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution 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proceeds.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Art. 278", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75602, "end_char": 75610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 278", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75873, "end_char": 75884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76152, "end_char": 76166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 278", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76418, "end_char": 76429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 278", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76638, "end_char": 76646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the 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{"document_id": "1964_7_89_96_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nS!J\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR. v.\n\nAUDH NARAIN SINGH AND ANR.\n\n[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.J\n\nGovernment Servant-Relationship of master and servant- Tahvildars whether Government Sewants-Whether provisioas of Art. 311 (2) applicable' to them-Constitution of India Art. 311(2).\n\nThe respondent was appointed 'in 1949 a Tahvildar in the District of Azamgarh in the State of Uttar Pradesh and he worked in the Cash Department of the Government Treasury of that District. His appointment was made by Government Treasurer with the approval of Collector of the District. In 1956, he was removed from service under instructions from the Collector. He filed a writ petition in the High Court in which he challenged the legality of the order removing him from service on tbe ground that he was a member of the civil service of the State of Uttar Pradesh or held a civil post under the State and hence was not liable to be removed from service .. without being afforded a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. The High Court held that the respondent was an employee of the State Government and as the provisions of Art. 311 (2) had not been observed, the order terminating his services was illegal. The appellant has come to this Court by special leave.\n\nThe only question raised before this Court was, whether a Tahvildar appointed in the Cash Department in the State of Uttar Pradesh is a civil servant of the State of Uttar Pradesh or holds a civil post in the State. Dismissing the appeal,\n\nHeld: The respondent was a civil servant of the State of Uttar Pradesh and as the requirements of Art. 311 (2) were not conformed to, the order terminating his services was, invalid.\n\nThe Government Treasurer is a civil servant of the State holding a specific post and he is authorised by the ter1J1s of his employment to employ Tahvildars to assist him in discharging his duties. Payment of r, emuneraiion to Tahvildars is for services rendered in the Cash Department of the District Treasury of the State. The Tahvildars receive their remuneration directly from the State and are subject to the control of the District Officers in the matter of transfer, removal and disciplinary action. Employment of Tahvildars being for the purpose of carrying out the work of the Stafe, even though a degree of control is exercised by the Government Treasurer and the appointment is in the first in, sta!'ce made by the Treasurer subject to the approval of the D:str1ct Officers, the Tahviidar is entitled to the protection of Art. 311.\n\nWhether in a given case, the relationship of master and servant exists is a question of fact which must be determined on a cons!deration of all m.aterial and relevant circumstances having a bearing n that question. In. general, selection by the employer, coupled with payment by him of remuneration or wages, the\n\n19U\n\n1964 right to control the method of work and a power to susp€nd or St 1 Utt remove from employment are indicative of the relation of master\n\nl'rad~eh\n\n0and A:;. and servant. However, co-existence of all these indicia is not v. predicted in every case to make the relation one of master and .Audh Narain Singh. servant. In special classes of employment, the contract of service\n\nand Anr. may exist, even in the absence of one or more of these indicia.\n\nSloli, J.\n\nBut ordinarily, the right of an employer to control the method of doing the work and the power of superintendence and control may be treated as strongly indicative of the relation of master and servant, for that relation imports the power not only to direct the doing cf some work, but also to direct the manner in which work is to be done. If the employer has such power. prima fade, the relation is one of master and servant.\n\nShivana.ndan Sharma v. The Punjab National Bank Ltd. [1955] l S.C.R. 1427, Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra [1957] S.C.R. 152 and Mfs Piyare Lal Adiswar Lal\n\nv. Commissioner of Incometax, Delhi (1960] 3 S.C.R. 669, referred to.\n\nClVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 120 of\n\n1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decrecdated December 13, 1960, of the Allahabad Hi11h Court in Special Appeal No. 204 of 1957.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General of India and C. P. Lal. for the appellants.\n\nM. C. Setalvad and J.P. Goyal, for the respondents.\n\nMarch 9, 1964. The Judment of the Court was delivered by ~\n\nSHAH. J.-Audh Narain Singh-hereinafter called 'Singh' -was appointed in 1949 a Tahvildar in the District of Azamgarh in the State of U.P. and worked in the Cash Department of the Government treasury of that District. The appointment of Singh was made by Dhanpat Singh Tandon, Government Treasurer, with the approval of the District Magistrale. By order dated April 20. 1956, Singh who was then working as. a Tahvildar in the sub-treasury at tahsil Lalganj in the District of Azamgarh was informed that he was, under instructions from the Collector, removed from service. Against the order of removal, Singh preferred an appeal to the Collector but the same was rejected, and a representation made to the Commissioner of the Banaras Division was unsuccessful. Singh then preferred a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of removal passed against him and for a writ of mandamus or an order directing the Collector of Azamgarh and the State of Uttar Pradesh, Dhanpat Singh Tandon, Government Treasurer, and the Commissioner of Bimaras Division to treat him as Tahvildar in the sub-treasury at Lalganj in the District of Azamgarh. Singh claimed that he was a member of the civil service of the State of Uttar Pradesh or\n\nheld a civil post under the State, and was not liable to be 1964 removed from service without being afforded a reasonable State of Utl4r opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to Pradeah and Anr. be taken in regard to him under Art. 311(2) of the Constitu- Awlh Na;.;; n Si11g.ll tion. Mehrotra J., who heard the petition held that the Governan4 Anr. ment Treasurer being an employee of the State, a Tahvildar employed by the Government Treasurer to carry out the work entrusted by the State, subject to the control of the State Government, was an employee of the State Government. and the impugned order of removal was invalid because Singh was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.\n\nThe order of Mehrotra J ., was confirmed in appeal by the High Court of Allahabad. In the view of the High Court, no direct relationship of master and servant between Singh and the State was established because Singh was appointed by the Treasurer, but the Treasurer having authority to employ him in order to carry out the work of the State, Singh was as much under the control of the State as he was under the control of the Treasurer and therefore he could claim to hold a civil post under the State and to have the benefit of Art. 311 of the Constitution. Against the order passed by the High Court, this appeal is preferred with special leave.\n\nThe question which falls to be determined is whether a.\n\nTahvildar appointed in the Cash Department in the State of Uttar Pradesh is a civil servant of the State of Uttar Pradesh or holds a civil post in the State. ln the State of Uttar Pradesh, contracts for administering the Cash Department of the District treasuries are given to persons who are called Government Treasurer. The Treasurer holds a post specifically created in the District Treasury: he is appointed by the Collector subject to the approval of th~ Finance Secretary. On lx; ing appointed, the Treasurer enters mto an engagement for the due performance of bis duties, and executes a bond in favour of the State.\n\nThe tenure of a Government Treasurer is temporary and he is not entitled to privileges of leave and pension, but he performs various duties connected with the executive functions of the State. His appointment is made by the Collector subject to the approval of the Finance Secretary. He has to maintain a true and faithful account of the property entrusted to him and his dealings therewith and to submit returns as prescribed. He is also bound by the conditions. rules and regulations of the 9overnment ad also. departmental rul7s and .orders as may be m. force, espec1~1ly with !eference. to his relat10ns and dealings with and the nght of his subordmates. He has to attend the Government Treasury for the purpose of discharging his duties and to show to his surior officers whenever called upon th; property entrusted to him. A Government Treasurer is not in\n\nShah, J.\n\nSUPREME DOURT. REPORTS [1964)\n\n1964 the position of an independent contractor; he does not merely\n\nState of uitar undertake to produce a given result, without being in the actual Praduhnd Anr. execution under the control of the person for whom he: does udh N v.. s' h the work. He is in the execution of his duties, and in the 1 andarl~~ 1 \"'!I manner, method and mode of his work under the control of _, the State Government.\n\nShah, .J A Government Treasurer is entitled to appoint Tahvi/dars to assist him in the discharge of his duties, but the appointment is made with the approval of the District Collector.\n\nOriginally Tahvildars were directly appointed by the Government of the Province to specific posts for performing duties in the District Treasuries. In 1927, however, Government Order dated July 25, 1927, was issued by the Secretary to Government Uttar Pradesh, Finance Department, reciting that Tahvildars in sub-treasuries were appointed on the nomination of the Treasurer of the District Treasury, who was responsible for their work and honesty, the intention of the Government being that a Treasurer might dispense with the services of a Tahvil dar as soon as he had Jost confidence in him, but it had not been possible to put this intention into practice, because the Tahvildars were paid from the general revenue and were whole-time Government servants and entitled to the protection given to all Government servants by the Classification Rules, and it .was difficult to hold the usual enquiry for the removal of a Tahvildar for he must be removed from service as soon as he lost the confidence of the Treasurer, otherwise the responsibility of the Treasurer to the Government would be impaired.\n\nIn the circumstances, the best solution was to abolish the post of Tahvildars, to increase the remuneration of the Treasurer by an amount equal to the pay given to Tahvildars and to make him responsible for carrying on the work at sub-treasuries through his own servants. A reservation, however was made that the Treasurer must not employ any person in the treasury or sub-treasury without the approval of the District Officer and the Treasurer shall, when required by slich District Ollieer remove without delay any person so employed. Pursuant to this Government Order, in the Manual of Orders the following paragraph-1561 wasincorporated: ·\n\n\"Tahvildars at sub-treasuries are no longer Government servants. They are employed by the Treasurer who receives an allowance from Government to cover their pay and leave salary. The Treasurer however, shall not. empfoy any pepon as a Tahvildar without the a111lroval of the District Officer. The Treasurer shall remove a T ahvi/dar or transfer him from one Tahsil to another if required (by the District Officer to do so on any ground which in the latter's opinion would justify such a step.\"\n\nEven after the posts of Tahvildar were abolished the 1964 Government of Uttar Pradesh did not adopt a consistent atti- State of uttar tude and from time to time issued orders which indicate that a Pradesh aad Anr. considerable degree of control was maintained by the DistrictA dh N v., 8 . , . . • u J.. arain inglf Officers upon the Tahv1ldars m the matter of appomtment, aad Anr. removal from service, suspension and transfers and in the matter of payment of remuneration, dearness allowance and making available certain medical benefits, Tahvildars were treated on a par with other civil servants of the State. On December 9, 1939, a Government Order was issued for payment of remuneration to the Tahvildars directly from the Government Treasury. It had come to the notice of the Govc; rnment that the Treasurers paid to the cashier staff of the treasuries less than what they received on their account from the Government, after obtaining receipts for full amount. It was therefore directed that the Treasurer should prepare a statement showing in detail the emoluments of the staff, but payment of emoluments was to be made to the persons concerned by the Treasury Officer personally and their acknowledgment taken. In 1945 the Government of Uttar Pradesh raised with effect from April l, 1945, the allowance to be paid tO Government Treasurers for the pay of \"the cashier staff of treasuries.\" By para 3(a) a scheme for payment of gratuity on retirement was also devised for the benefit of permanent Tahvildars. It was provided that when a permanent Tahvi/dar retired, a gratuity of one month's pay will be given to him for each completed year of service, subject to a maximum of Z5 years' completed service, the gratuity being admissible to permanent incumbents of posts and also to future entrants when appointed permanently, but not if the service of a Tahvildar was found either unsatisfactory, or if he resigned or was removed or dismissed from service. Gratuity was to be paid in the same manner as salaries were paid to the Tahvildars, and provisions on account of the increase due to the pay of Government Treasurers and allowances payable for the pay of the cashier staff of treasuries and for the grant of gratuity to the cashier staff were made under the Heads \"25-General Administration-B-District Administration\n\n(a) General Establishment, Pay of Establishment-Contract and Extra Contract Establishment\" and \"55-Superannuation Allowances and Pensions and Gratuities Voted\" respectively in the budget. By a letter dated June 17, 1953, addressed by the Joint Secretary to the Government, it was broughi to the notice of the Collectrs of Distr!cts that the. Government Treasurers had frequently\n\ndtpensed with the services of T ahvildars working under them without sufficient reasons justifying such a course of action and attempts had been made to harass such staff and that as a result of such arbitrary action on the part of the Government Treasurers, hardship had been caused to those employees. The Government therefore informed the Collectors to bring to the\n\nShah, J.\n\n1961 notice of the Treasurers that adverse notice of such action is -·- likely to be taken by the Government in future in case it was\n\n/;:J,,~'(.u,:; a;.., established that the Government Treasurers had indulged in v. ' high-handedness in their dealings with their staff. It was also Aodh Narain Sing/• recorded by the Collector of Azamgarh that instances had\n\nand Anr. come to his notice in which the services of the employees in\n\nSioah, J. the Cash Department of the treasuries had been dispensed with arbitrarily without framing specific charges against them or obtaining explanations, and it was ordered that in future when services of the employees in the Cash Department were to be dispensed with. a report for their suspension should be made and specific charges framed against them and they should be given time to explain the charges and their services should not be dispensed with as a result of arbitrary action of the subordinate staff or the Treasurer. Orders have also been lately issued in 1959, by which the scale of dearness allowance of the Tahvildars was revised and certain facilities for free medical attendance were also provided.\n\nIt also appears that in some cases in which the Tahvi/dars who had been dismissed or suspended were reinstated by order of the Collector. For instance, under Treasury Officer, Azamgarh's order dated August 14, 1948. it was recorded that under the Collector's order Naunidh/ Prasad, Tahvildar, Phulpur (under suspension), was reins(ated with effect from the date of taking over charge. There is also an order passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad, in 1952 deputing one Ganesh Prasad working as Ta/1vildar in Handia sub-treasury for Kumbha Mela duty. There is also the record of the disciplinary proceeding held by the District Magistrate on April 12, 1948, against Tahvildar Ganesh Prasad for improper conduct.\n\nIt is therefore clear from the record that T ahvildars were appointed to perform the duties of cashiers in Government Treasuries. Their appointment was made by the Government Treasurer with the approval of the District Collector, but it was made for performance of public duties, and remuneration was paid to them by the State directly. Tahvildars were liable to be transferred under orders of the Collector and to be suspended or removed from service under his orders. An instance already referred to shows that a Tahvildar who hadi been suspended by the Treasurer was ordered to be reinstated by the Collector. It is from these circumstances that the relationship between the Government of Uttar Pradesh and Tahvildars has to be ascertained.\n\nWhether in a given case the relationship of master and servant exists is a question of fact, which must be determined on a consideration of all material and relevant circumstances having a bearing on that question. In general selection by the employer, coupled with payment by him of remuneration or wages, the right to control the method of work, and a power\n\nto suspend or remove from employment are indicative •of the 1961 relation of master and servant. But co-existence of all these State of uuar indicia is not predicated in every case to make the relation Pmde<o and Anr. one of master and servant. In special classes of employment •. fodh .Var:in Singh a contract of service may exist, even in the absence of one or and Anr. more of these indicia. But ordinarily the right of an employer to control the method of doing the work, and the power of superintendence and control may be treated as strongly indicative of the relation of master and servant, for that relation imports the power not only to direct the doing of some work, but also the power to direct the manner in which the work is to be done. If the employer has the power, prima facie, the relation is that of master and servant.\n\nThe work of the Government Treasurers has to be conducted according to the Rules and Regufations framed by the Government, and directions issued from time to time. The Government Treasurer holds a post in a public employment and he is assisted by Tahvi/dars in the performance of his duties. The Tahvi/dar acts not on behalf of the Treasurer in performing his duties, but on behalf of the State. Undoubtedly the Trei.surer undertakes responsibility for the loss which may be occasioned by the Tahvildar, but solely on that account it cannot be held Iha I the Tahvildar is merely an appointee of the Treasurer and is not a servant of the State. The selection of T ahvildar though made by the Treasurer is controlled by the Collector; the Tahvi/dar is remunerated by the State, method of his work is controlled by the State, and the State exercises the power to suspend, dismiss and reinstate him. In Shivanandan Sharma v. The Punjab National Bank Ltd.(') it was held that a head cashier in one of the branches of the Punjab National Bank Ltd., who was appointed by the Treasurer in-charge cf the Cash Department under an agreement with the Bank, was an employee of the Bank. In the view of the Court, the direction and control of the cashier and of the ministerial staff in charge of the Cash Department the Bank being entirely vested in the Bank, the cashier must be deemed to be an employee of the Bank. Sinha J., observed at p. 1442:\n\n\"If a master employs a servant and authorizes him to employ a number of persons to do a particular job and to guarantee their fidelity and efficiency for a cash consideration, the employees thus appointed by the servant would be equally with the employer, servants of the master.\"\n\nSimilarly in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra(') it was held that \"the prima facie test of\" the\n\n(') [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1427.\n\n(']) [1957] S.C.R. 152.\n\nShah J.\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v.\n\nAw; li,, Narain Singh\n\nand Anr.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19641 • relationship of master and servant \"is the existence of the right in the employer not merely to direct what work is to be done but also to control the manner in which it is to be done, the nature or extent of such control varying in different industries and being by its nature incapable of being precisely defined.\" In MI s Piyare Lal Adishwar Lal v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi(') it was held that the Treasurer appointed by the Bank who was to carry out the duties as directed by the Bank was a servant of the Bank, and not an independent contractor.\n\nThe Government Treasurer is a civil servant of the State holding a specific post, and he is authorised by the terms of his employment to employ Tahvildars to assist him in discharging his duties. Payment of remuneration to the Talzvildars is for services rendered in the \"cashier department of the District treasury\" of the State. The Tahvildars receive their remuneration directly from the State, and are subject to the control of the District Officers in the matter of transfer, removal and disciplinary action. Employment of Tahvildars being for the purpose of carrying out the work of the State, even though a degree of control is exercised by the Government Treasurer and the appointment is in the first instance made by the Treasurer subject to the approval of the District Officers, it must be held that the Tahvildar is entitled to the protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution.\n\nThe order removing Singh from service was made at the instance of the Collector, and did not conform to the requirements of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and was on that account invalid.\n\nWe therefore agree with the High Court, that the impugned order must be declared invalid.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed. with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "J\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AUDH NARAIN SINGH AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AUDH NARAIN SINGH AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 182, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321, "end_char": 329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 354, "end_char": 375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376, "end_char": 387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 934, "end_char": 956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He filed a writ petition in the High Court in which he challenged the legality of the order removing him from service on tbe ground that he was a member of the civil service of the State of Uttar Pradesh or held a civil post under the State and hence was not liable to be removed from service .. without being afforded a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1177, "end_char": 1185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1316, "end_char": 1324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1573, "end_char": 1586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only question raised before this Court was, whether a Tahvildar appointed in the Cash Department in the State of Uttar Pradesh is a civil servant of the State of Uttar Pradesh or holds a civil post in the State."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1794, "end_char": 1802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2712, "end_char": 2720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".Audh Narain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3332, "end_char": 3350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, co-existence of all these indicia is not v. predicted in every case to make the relation one of master and .Audh Narain Singh."}}, {"text": "Sloli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3494, "end_char": 3499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sloli, J.\n\nBut ordinarily, the right of an employer to control the method of doing the work and the power of superintendence and control may be treated as strongly indicative of the relation of master and servant, for that relation imports the power not only to direct the doing cf some work, but also to direct the manner in which work is to be done."}}, {"text": "(1960] 3 S.C.R. 669", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4152, "end_char": 4171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ClVIL APPELLATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4187, "end_char": 4202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ClVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4390, "end_char": 4402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General of India and C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4435, "end_char": 4444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General of India and C. P. Lal."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4467, "end_char": 4481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and J.P. Goyal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "J.P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad and J.P. Goyal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "SHAH. J.-Audh Narain Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4580, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judment of the Court was delivered by ~\n\nSHAH."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4816, "end_char": 4821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appointment of Singh was made by Dhanpat Singh Tandon, Government Treasurer, with the approval of the District Magistrale.", "canonical_name": "Singh"}}, {"text": "Dhanpat Singh Tandon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4834, "end_char": 4854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appointment of Singh was made by Dhanpat Singh Tandon, Government Treasurer, with the approval of the District Magistrale."}}, {"text": "April 20. 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4939, "end_char": 4953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order dated April 20."}}, {"text": "Lalganj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5028, "end_char": 5035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Tahvildar in the sub-treasury at tahsil Lalganj in the District of Azamgarh was informed that he was, under instructions from the Collector, removed from service."}}, {"text": "Azamgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5055, "end_char": 5063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Tahvildar in the sub-treasury at tahsil Lalganj in the District of Azamgarh was informed that he was, under instructions from the Collector, removed from service."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5377, "end_char": 5385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5413, "end_char": 5450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of removal passed against him and for a writ of mandamus or an order directing the Collector of Azamgarh and the State of Uttar Pradesh, Dhanpat Singh Tandon, Government Treasurer, and the Commissioner of Bimaras Division to treat him as Tahvildar in the sub-treasury at Lalganj in the District of Azamgarh."}}, {"text": "Pradeah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6090, "end_char": 6097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh claimed that he was a member of the civil service of the State of Uttar Pradesh or\n\nheld a civil post under the State, and was not liable to be 1964 removed from service without being afforded a reasonable State of Utl4r opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to Pradeah and Anr."}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mehrotra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6197, "end_char": 6205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mehrotra J., who heard the petition held that the Governan4 Anr."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6729, "end_char": 6752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was confirmed in appeal by the High Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tahvildar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7378, "end_char": 7387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question which falls to be determined is whether a.\n\nTahvildar appointed in the Cash Department in the State of Uttar Pradesh is a civil servant of the State of Uttar Pradesh or holds a civil post in the State."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8865, "end_char": 8869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Government Treasurer is not in\n\nShah, J.\n\nSUPREME DOURT."}}, {"text": "July 25, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9678, "end_char": 9691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1927, however, Government Order dated July 25, 1927, was issued by the Secretary to Government Uttar Pradesh, Finance Department, reciting that Tahvildars in sub-treasuries were appointed on the nomination of the Treasurer of the District Treasury, who was responsible for their work and honesty, the intention of the Government being that a Treasurer might dispense with the services of a Tahvil dar as soon as he had Jost confidence in him, but it had not been possible to put this intention into practice, because the Tahvildars were paid from the general revenue and were whole-time Government servants and entitled to the protection given to all Government servants by the Classification Rules, and it .was difficult to hold the usual enquiry for the removal of a Tahvildar for he must be removed from service as soon as he lost the confidence of the Treasurer, otherwise the responsibility of the Treasurer to the Government would be impaired."}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11789, "end_char": 11816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even after the posts of Tahvildar were abolished the 1964 Government of Uttar Pradesh did not adopt a consistent atti- State of uttar tude and from time to time issued orders which indicate that a Pradesh aad Anr."}}, {"text": "December 9, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12348, "end_char": 12364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 9, 1939, a Government Order was issued for payment of remuneration to the Tahvildars directly from the Government Treasury."}}, {"text": "April l, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13016, "end_char": 13029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1945 the Government of Uttar Pradesh raised with effect from April l, 1945, the allowance to be paid tO Government Treasurers for the pay of \"the cashier staff of treasuries.\""}}, {"text": "June 17, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14269, "end_char": 14282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a letter dated June 17, 1953, addressed by the Joint Secretary to the Government, it was broughi to the notice of the Collectrs of Distr!cts that the."}}, {"text": "Aodh Narain Sing/•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15107, "end_char": 15125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also Aodh Narain Sing/• recorded by the Collector of Azamgarh that instances had\n\nand Anr."}}, {"text": "Sioah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15255, "end_char": 15260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "come to his notice in which the services of the employees in\n\nSioah, J. the Cash Department of the treasuries had been dispensed with arbitrarily without framing specific charges against them or obtaining explanations, and it was ordered that in future when services of the employees in the Cash Department were to be dispensed with."}}, {"text": "Azamgarh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16153, "end_char": 16161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance, under Treasury Officer, Azamgarh's order dated August 14, 1948."}}, {"text": "August 14, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16176, "end_char": 16191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance, under Treasury Officer, Azamgarh's order dated August 14, 1948."}}, {"text": "Phulpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16270, "end_char": 16277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was recorded that under the Collector's order Naunidh/ Prasad, Tahvildar, Phulpur (under suspension), was reins(ated with effect from the date of taking over charge."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16399, "end_char": 16429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also an order passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad, in 1952 deputing one Ganesh Prasad working as Ta/1vildar in Handia sub-treasury for Kumbha Mela duty."}}, {"text": "Ganesh Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16452, "end_char": 16465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also an order passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad, in 1952 deputing one Ganesh Prasad working as Ta/1vildar in Handia sub-treasury for Kumbha Mela duty."}}, {"text": "April 12, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16624, "end_char": 16638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also the record of the disciplinary proceeding held by the District Magistrate on April 12, 1948, against Tahvildar Ganesh Prasad for improper conduct."}}, {"text": "Tahvildar Ganesh Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16648, "end_char": 16671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also the record of the disciplinary proceeding held by the District Magistrate on April 12, 1948, against Tahvildar Ganesh Prasad for improper conduct."}}, {"text": "Iha I", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19189, "end_char": 19194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Undoubtedly the Trei.surer undertakes responsibility for the loss which may be occasioned by the Tahvildar, but solely on that account it cannot be held Iha I the Tahvildar is merely an appointee of the Treasurer and is not a servant of the State."}}, {"text": "Punjab National Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19565, "end_char": 19590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shivanandan Sharma v. The Punjab National Bank Ltd.(') it was held that a head cashier in one of the branches of the Punjab National Bank Ltd., who was appointed by the Treasurer in-charge cf the Cash Department under an agreement with the Bank, was an employee of the Bank."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20045, "end_char": 20050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sinha J., observed at p. 1442:\n\n\"If a master employs a servant and authorizes him to employ a number of persons to do a particular job and to guarantee their fidelity and efficiency for a cash consideration, the employees thus appointed by the servant would be equally with the employer, servants of the master.\"", "canonical_name": "Singh"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1427", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20484, "end_char": 20504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22064, "end_char": 22072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22219, "end_char": 22227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_920_929_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".April 28\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964]\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PATNA\n\nRANI BHUWANESHWARI KUER\n\n[K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. S!KRI, JJ.]\n\nIndian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922) s. 16(l)(cl and its proviso th1ee-Deed of trust by assessee-Beneficiaries of the Trust are assessees and other persons-Trust and revocable within siX years-If the income of the Trust can be included as part of the income of the assessee.\n\nThe assessee (respondent) owner of an estate known as \"Tekari Raj\" exe:uted an indenture of trust d\"ted January 20, 1941 whereby the \"Tekari Raj\" and certain Zarnindari properties owned by her were conveyed to certain named trustees to be held in trust, subject to conditions specified therein. This deed was created with a view to liquidate the debts of the Tekari Raj. The beneficiaries under the deed were the settlor, her husband ahd her five sons. This original deed was modified by a deed of rectification dated December 22. 1941. It was prov:ided in the original cl. 43 of the deed of trust dated January\n\n20, 1941, that the settlor may at any time during her life revoke or vary either wholly or partly the trust or any provisions of the deed but not before the payment and discharge of certain debts and liabilities. Clause 43 of the original deed was subsequently modified by the 45th clause which was added by the deed of amendment dated January 12, 1942. By cl. 45 of the deed of amendment the right of revocation was not exercisable till the Thica leases in favour of the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga and - Capt. Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh rema; ned good and effective. It was the common ground that the lease in favour of the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga was to enure till 1965 and the lease in favour of Capt. Maharnj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh till 1954.\n\nIn assessing the assessee to income-tax for the year 1947-48, the Income-tax Officer incltuded in her total income the income of the trust. The matter went up to the High Court and the High Court set aside the assessment order passed by the Income-tax Officer. The High Court held that as the trust was not revocable for a period of six years, the income received by the beneficiaries (other than the assessee) was not liable to be taxed as the assessee's income till the power to revoke arose in her favour. The appellant obtained special leave against the order passed by the High Court. Hence the appeal.\n\nThe principal question for consideration before this Court was whether the income received by the beneficiaTies other than the assessee could be included in the total income of the assessee under s. J6(1}(c) of the Act.\n\nHeld: (i) In terms the third prov!so to s. 16-(l)(c) of the Income-tax Act excludes from the operation of the principal clause that part of the income alone which arises to any person under deed of settlement: it does not remove from its protection the entire deed of trust, if part of the income is not covered by the conditions prescribed or if the settlor has in a part of the income interest direct or indirect. The third proviso does not operate to exclude the income which the settlor receives as a beneficiary from liability to tax.\n\n'(.\n\n(ii) The third proviso to s. 16-(l)(c) of the Act does operate in respect of settlements, dispositions, or transfers which Oommiuion<r of are by thQ first proviso revocable for the purpose of that Income-ta>:, Paino clause. v.\n\n(iii) Two conditions are necessa:ry for the application of the 3rd proviso to s. 16-(l)(c) of the Income-tax Act: (i) that the trtlst should not be \"'vocable for a period exceeding 6 years or during the life time of the beneficiary and (ii) the settlor or disponer should have no direct or indirect benefit from the income given to the beneficiary. The effect of the two coaditions is that, that part of the income which arises to any person by virtue of the settlement which is not revocable for a period of six years or which is not revocable during the life time of the beneficiary will not be included in the settlor's income, provided that from. the income of such person the settlor derives no benefitairect or indirect.\n\nOn the construction of the deed of trust it was held that the deed was not revocable within six yea:rs provided by s. 16\n\n(l)(c) of the Act. Ramji Keshavii v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, 13 I.T.R. 105, relied on.\n\n(iv) On the facts of this case it was held that by virtue of the third proviso to s. 16-(l)(c) of the Act the income received by the beneficiaries under the deed of trust other than the assessee could not until the power of revocation arose to the assee, be deemed to be the income of the assessee for the purpOse of assessment to income-tax.\n\nQVJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 620 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated 9, 1961 of the Patna High Court in M.J.C. No. 497 of 1957.\n\nN. D. Karkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nSarjoo Prasad, B. D. Singh and D. Goburdhan, (or the r1&pondent.\n\nApril 28, 1964. The judgment of the Court was deliv, ered\n\nSHAH, J.-Rani Bhuwaneshwari Kuer-hereinafter re- .,. ferred to as 'the assessee' was the proprietor of a seven-sixteenth share in an estate known as 'Tekari Raj', having inherited that estate from her parents.\n\nThe assessee later acquired by purchase a major portion of the remaining ninesixteenth share in the Raj. The estate held by the assessee was heavily encumbered, and with a view to arrange for liquidation of the debts the assessee executed an indenture of trust dated January 20, 1941, whereby the Tekari Raj\n\n~ and certain zamindari properties owned by the assessee werg\n\nconveyed to certain named trustees to be held in trust, subject to conditions specified therein. The principal beneficiaries under the deed after payment of the debts were the assessee, her husband and her five sons.\n\nRa11i BhuwaneB1nca1 i x,,..\n\n1961 By the 23rd clause of the deed it was directed that after a\"\"\"\";,.'°\"'• of making certain payments, the trustees shall divide the sur- 1.._.ia,,, Patna plus of the net rents, issues and profits thereof in the propori',;,., tions set out in the clause. The 24th and the 25th clauses Blu.,,..,...h..,,; dealt with the devolution of the beneficial interest in the Kevent of death of any of the beneficiaries. By the 4lst clause Shah, J. it was provided that after the debts and liabilities set out in Sch. 'D' to the deed were paid off and discharged, the settlor < shall be entitled to make a permanent trust of some of the villages demised under the deed . for the maintenance and up-keep of the 'lekari Forts, observance of Durga Puja and other purpQses specified . therein, and in the event of the settlor dying before payment and discharge of the debts and liabilities set out in Sch. 'D', and without making any permanent trust for the purposes enumerated, the settlor enjoined the trustees after discharge of the debts mentioned in Sch.\n\n'D' to set apart property fetching a net income of Rs. 20,000 ! • to form the corpus of the permanent trust to meet the expenses relating to the repair of the Tekari Forts, celebration of Durga Puja and other purposes specified. By the 42nd clause it was provided that the trust under the deed shall terminate after payment of the debjs and liabilities set out in Sch. 'D' or after the death of the last amongst the sons, whichever event shall last occur, and by the 4Jrd clause it was provided that if any of the beneficiaries under the deed or their heirs in future shall challenge the Indenture of Release and Agreement dated December 6, 1939, executed by the settlor in favour of her husband and the action taken thereunder. the said beneficiary shall on making such objection forfeit his. right as a beneficiary under the deed. lt was also provided that if there shall be any breach by any of the beneficiaries or of the covenants or conditions and limitations imposed under the deed, he, or she. shall not be entitled to any money or to any share in the rents, issues or usufruct of the trust property and he or she shall be deemed\n\n,,..\n\nto have been excluded from the categories of beneficiaries and his or her share of the rents, issues and profits will be , dealt with or enjoyed by the settlor in her entire discretion, provided always that the settlor may at any time during her life by any deed revocable or irrevocable revoke or vary either wholly or partly the trust or any provisions of the deed, but not before the payment and discharge of the debts and liabilities as mentioned in Sch. 'D'. and provided further that notwithstanding such revocation. of the trust the settlement made under the deed remained good and effective -l subject to the forfeiture clause set out therein. ·\n\nThis deed. was modified by a deed of rectification dated December 22. 1941, reciting that with the consent of all persons who were parties to the deed of trust, it was direeted\n\n...\n\n7 S.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COU:RT REl'OHTS 923\n\nthat at any time during the lifetime of the assessee the asses-\n\n19~ see had the power to revoke or vary, either wholly or partly, Oommi88ioner of the trust or any provisions of the deed of trust, but nof so Income-tax, Pain• as to effect the payment and discharge of the debts and liabi-\n\nR;;, lities as mentioned in Sch. 'D' thereto and the original deed Bhu•\"aneahwa>i\n\nof trust shall be read and construed as if it containej a Kuer _ power vested in the settlor (the assessees) during her life sh, h, J. by deed to revoke or vary, either wholly or partly, the trust or any provisions of the said trust, but not so as to effect the payment and discharge of the debts and liabilities as mentioned in Sch- 'D'.\n\nAnother deed called a deed of amendment was executed by the assessee on January 12, 1942. By this deed paragraphs 22, 32, 33, 35, 36 and 37 of the original deed were cancelled and other paragraphs including paragraphs 23, 24 and 42 were amended and modified and paragraphs 42(a), 44 and 45 were added. By the amendment of paragraph-23 the Sur plus rents, issues and profits of the trust property were to be divided in seven equal shares and by the amendment made in cl. 24 it was provided that in the event of the death of any of the sons, his share of the rents, issues and profits shall become payable to his heir or heirs. By the modifications in paragraph-42 it )!as provided that the trust under the deed may terminate after payment of the debts and liabilities df the trust that would then be outstanding or a{ter extinguishment of the Thicca leases in favour of the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga or in favour of Capt Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh of Tekari, whichever event shall occur last. Paragraph 42(a) provided that after the provisions as laid down in para 41 had been carried out and when the last contingency set out in para 42 as modified had arisen, the\n\nbeefic!ar!es or the heirs or successors-in-interest or representattves-m-mterest of such of them as had acquired any right from any of the beneficiaries under the deed shall be entitled to pai?tion the trust property according to their shares. The material part of paragraph-45 provided :\n\n\"That the settlement made under these presents shall be anent, unalterable and irrevocable so far the mterest created under these presents are concerned, but each beneficiary shall have full riaht I? make any !!Ort of arrangement about devlu tion or. succession or make such alienation, as he may thmk fit. about his share, but the trust created under these presents shail be mevocable so l?n!l .e debts mentioned above including all the liabihtles on the Trust property up to date are\n\nno~ fully paid _up or discharged or so long as the cca leases in favour of Hon'ble Maharajadhira1 of Darbhanga or Capt. Maharaj Kumar Gopal\n\nOommiarirmer of lncontt-tazt Pattm\n\nY, Rani Bhuuonul&wari\n\nKmr\n\nShall, J,\n\nSaran Narain Singh remain good and effective whichever event shall happen last\".\n\nProvided that always para 43 of the Indenture of Trust dated 20th January, 1941, shall hence forth be read subject to this para.\n\n• • • •\n\nIn proceedings for assessment for the assessment year 1947-48 the Income-tax ()_fficer, Gaya-Palamau Circle, Ga ya, rejected the contention raised by the assessec that the income under the trust was taxable in the hands of the trustees under the deed of settlement and applying the provision of s. J 6(J)(c) of the Indian Inoome-tax Act, 1922, brought the income of the trust to tax as part of the assessee's income.\n\nThe order passed by the Income-tax Officer was confirmed in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Comm!ssioner. but the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal reversed that order.\n\nThe Tribunal observed that \"revocation involved taking back that which was given once, but in the present case there was nothing done by the assessee by which it could be said that she had taken back what she had given by the original deed of trust\", and the trost was therefore not a revocable trust as contemplated by s. 16 (I) (c) of the Income-tax Act.\n\nThe High Court of Judicature at Patna directed the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66(2) of the Act to state a case and to refer the following questions:\n\n(I) Whether the trus( created by the assessee is a revocable trust within the meaning of s. lb(l)(c) of the Income-tax t ct?\n\n(2) Whether the income from the property which is the subject-matter of the settlement mentioned in question (I) can be deemed to be the income of the assessee under s. 16 (I) (c) of the Income-tax . .A.ct? ·\n\nThe High Court held that the deed of trustdated January 20,\n\n1941 (as modified by the subsequent deed dated January 12,\n\n1942) was within the meaning of s. 16 (I) (c) of the Incometax Act a revocable trust, but not being revocable for six years from the date of its creation, bv virtue of the third proviso to s. 16 (I) (c) which controlled not merely the substantive provisions of s. 16 (I) (c) but the first proviso to that section as well, the income received by the beneficiaries (other than the settlor) under the deed of trust was not liable to be included in the income of the assessee. Th?. High Court accordingly directed that the income of the trust property which is the subject-matter of the settlement of the trust was not liable to be assessed to tax under the third proviso to s.\n\n. 1964 16(l)(c), but only so long as the power of revocation granted _ by the deed was not exercised by the assessee under theterms Oommi<ai\"\"\"r of of the deed of trust. The High Court also declared that the Tncome..iax, Palwa assessee was liable to pay tax on the income received by her\n\nR;,;. in the character of a beneficiary out of the trust properties.\n\nBhu.,.,...h- . g,....\n\nAgainst the order passed by the High Court, with special leave, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Patna, has appealed to this Court.\n\nThe principal question which falls to be determined in this appeal is whether by the third proviso to cl. (c) of s. 16(1), income received by the beneficiaries other than the assessee is income arising to them by virtue of a settlement which is not revocable for a period exceeding six years, and from which income the assessee. derives no benefit direct or indirect.\n\nSection l 6(l)(c) provides :\n\n\"(l) In computing the total income of an assessee-\n\n(a) • • • (b) • • •\n\n(c) all income arising to any person by virtue of a settlement or disposition whether revocable or not, and whether effected before or after the commencement of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939, <VII of 1939), from assets remaining the property of the settlor or disponer, shall be deemed to be income of the settlor or disponer, and all income arismg to any person by virtue of a revocable transfer of assets shall be deemed to be income of the transferor : Provided that for the purposes of this clause a settlement, disposition or transfer shltU be deemed. to be revocable if it COlrtaiDt Ml¥ provisions for the retransfer directly or indirectly of the income or assets to the settlor, \"disponer or transferor, or in any way gives the settlor,. disponer or transferor a right to reassume power directly or, indirectly over the income or assets : Provided further that the expression \"settlement or disposition\" shall for the purpose of this clause include any disposition, trust, covenant. agreement, or arrangement, and the expression ''settlor or disponer\" in relation to a settlement or disposition shall include any person by whom the settlement or disposition Will! made: Provided further that this clause shall not apply to any income arising to any person by virtue of a settl~\n\nment or disposition which is not revocable for a\n\nShah, J,\n\nConnniioner of Jncome-la:i, Patna\n\nperiod exceeding six years or during the lifetime of the person and from which income the settlor or disponer derives no direct or indirect benefit but .that the settlor shall be liable to be assessed v.\n\nBat&i.\n\nBkuwa'nUkwari\n\nKuer\n\nShah, J.\n\non the said income as and when the power to revoke arises to him.\"\n\nThe High Court held that the deed of trust was one in which the assets remained the property of the sett I or, but as the trust was not revocable for a period of six years the income received by the beneficiaries (other than the assessee) was not liable to be taxed as the assessee's income till the power to revoke arose in his favour.\n\nThe point in dispute in this appeal is about the applicability of the third proviso to s. J 6(l)(c), which seeks to exempt from the operation of the principal clause income which arises to any person under the deed of settlement executed by the assessee. Two conditions are necessary for the application of the third proviso-(i) that the trust should not be revocable for a period exceedig six years or during the lifetime of the beneficiary and (ii) the settlor or disponer should have no direct or indirect benefit from the income given tq the beneficiary. • Counsel for the Commissioner contended in the first instance that the third proviso to s. l6(l)(c) applied to the trust created by the assessee because in fact within six years of the date of its execution the deed was revoked, and that in any event on a true interpretation of the covenants of the deed of trust it was revocable within six years. The plea that the trust was in fact revoked within six years was never raised before the Revenue authorities, the Tribunal or even the High Court, and is plainly unsustainable. There are, it is true, certain recitals made in the deed dated September 18, 1946, executed by the assessee, which is styled \"Deed for further alteration of terms & constitution of trust\" by the assessee, that the liabilities referred to in Sch. 'D' to the deed of trust dated January 20, 194 l had been fully discharged and the beneficiaries had been, receiving the surplus rents, issues and profits according to their respective shares in the same and the settlor had by a deed of trust dated May 28, 1946 conveyed and settled a portion of her seventh share in the rents, issues and profits of the trust properties, as well as in the corpus of Shri Bhubneshwari Hari Haresh Private Trust for meeting certain expenses. But those recitals do not even primq facie indicate that the trust was revoked at any time.\n\nWe cannot therefore entertain this new ground raised for the first time in this Court. ·\n\nIt may be noticed that whereas under the original cl. 43 of the deed of trust dated January 20, 1941 even though the\n\n7 s.c.a.\n\nSUPRE.'.\\IE COURT REPORTS 927\n\ntrust was expressly made revocable, it could not be revoked 1964 before payment of the debts and discharge of the liabilities aommi.!.rioner ol mentioned in Sch. 'D'. By the 45th. clause which. was added lllCO!Jl<laz, Pa1by the deed of amendment dated January 12, 1942, the settle- &ni ment made under the deed was declared permanent, unalter- Blluwaneshwan. able and irrevocable so far as the interest created under the x.,,, deed of amendment was concerned, and was also to stand irrevocab.le so long as the debts mentioned in Sch. 'D' and other liabilities of the trust including all the liabilities on the trust properties were not fully paid up and discharged and so long as the leases in favour of the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga or Capt. Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh remained good and effective, whichever event last happened.\n\nIt is conceded that the lease in favour of the Maharajadhira, i of Darbhanga was to ensure till 1965 and the lease in favour of Capt. Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh till 1954.\n\nBy cl. 45 of the deed of amendment the right of revocation was not exercisable till the Thicca leases in favour of the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga and Capt. Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh remained good and effective, and we are unable to hold that the deed of trust was revocable within six years as provided by s. !6(l)(c) of the Act.\n\nIt was urged on behalf of the Commissioner in the alternative that the third proviso to s. 16(\\)(c) did not protect the assessee against the application of the substantive part of that clause, because the assessee was deriving under the terms of , the deed of trust a direct benefit. There are in the third proviso, two cumulative conditions on the existence of which the exemption from liability to have the. income arising from a -. settlement included in the asseSsee's income. The effect of the two conditions is that, that part of the income which arises to any person by virtue of the settlement which is nN revocable for a period of six years or which is not revocable during the lifetime of the beneficiary will not be included in the settlor's income, provided that from the income of such person the settlor derives no benefit direct or indirect. The third proviso to s. 16(l)(c) does not operate to exclude the\n\n~ income which the settlor receives as a beneficiary' from liability to income-tax : it merely excludes that part of the ipcome which is under the deeaof settlement given to another person from liability to tax in the hands of the settlor, if the conditions prescribed by the third proviso are fulfilled.\n\nThe contention raised by the Commissioner that if under the deed of trnst the settlor has reserved to himself as a beneficiary any part of the income of the property settled, the third proviso will not apply to the deed of trust runs contrary to :the plain •• words of the statute. In terms the third proviso excludes from the operation of the principle clause that part of the income alone which adses to any person under a deed of\n\nShah, J.\n\nl!t(jJ\n\ntQmmi., sioncr of n·imfta.r, P1itw; a •. '\n\nUr,1i Ill 1;1.1·1tnei::l1wari\n\nKt1tr\n\n.-~1t11li, '\n\nsettlement: it does not remove from its protection the entire deed of trust, if part of the income is not covered by the conditions prescribed or if the settlor has in a part of the income interest direct or indirect.\n\n, ...\n\nFinally, it was contended that the third proviso only operates in respect of deeds of settlement or disposition which are referred to in cl. (c), but nofi to deeds of settlement or disposition which by the first proviso are deemed to be revocabk in the conditions mentioned by the first proviso. In other words. it is submitted the benefit of the proviso is not available in those cases where the settlement or disposition is deemed by the proviso to be revocable, because it contains a provision for the retransfer directly or indirectly of the income or assets to the settlor, or in any way it gives the settlor, disponer or transferor a right to reassume power directly or indirectly over the income or assets. We are unable to agree with this contention also. By the first proviso, settlements, dispositions or transfers of the character described therein, are deemed revocable for the purpose of the principal clause. The function of proviso I and proviso II is plainly explanatory. The second proviso in terms says that the expression \"settlement or disposition\" is to include any disposition, trust, covenant, agreement. or ~; rrangement, and the expression \"settlor or disooner\" is to include any person by whom the settlement or disposition was made.\n\nSimilarly the first proviso states that sen!ements. dispositions or transfers, if they are of the characttt described, shall for the purpose of the principal claus, e be r!!l'Ocable transfers. If that be the tfoelnterpretation, and we think it is, it would be impossible to hold that the third proviso does not operate in respect of settlements, dispositions or transfers which are by the first proviso revocable for the purpo.•:e of that cln•ise.\n\nIn a case decided by the Bombay High Court Ramji Keslwvji v. Commissidflo of Income-tax, Bombay(') Kania, J., in considering the scheme of s. 16(1)(c) observed:\n\n\"The first stage is that when there is a revocable transfer of assets, the income derived from such assets is still to be considered the income of the settlor.\n\nThe law next specifies by proviso I what would be deemed a revocable transfer. in spite of the deed being apparently irrevocable. The relevant question for that proviso is this: Is this transfer revocable because it fulfils the conditions contained in the proviso? The answer to that question can be only, it is revocable, or it is not. If the answer \" is in the negative, no further discussion can arise\n\n(') 13 I.T.R 105.\n\n~ 7 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COYRT REPORTS 929\n\nbeeause, on the face of it, the deed is not revocable 1964 and, therefore, it does not come under Section Oommi., ivmr of l 6(l)(c). If, however, the answer to the question lncome-tnx, P\"\"\"'\n\nis in the affirmative, the deed although ostensibly iI,.\",, i irrevocable, is deemed to be revocable, and thus Bhuwa••\"hwari becomes a revocable transfer of assets, within the Kiw meaning of the substantive provision of Section Shah, J. 16(l)(c). Having reached that stage, the law proceeds to consider further what is found in proviso\n\n3. The scheme appears to be that although in fact, after reading the provisions of Section 16(l)(c) with proviso I, the transfer is revocable, the law will not still consider the income derived from such a settlement the income of the settlor, provided the settlement is not revocable for a period exceeding six years or during the lifetime of the person for whom the income is settled, and further, from which income the settlor derives no direct or indirect benefit.\"\n\nIn our view that passage correctly summarises the effect of the ird proviso to s. 16(l)(c).\n\nThe High Court was therefore right in holding that by virtue of the third proviso to s. 16(1)(c) of the Indian lncometax Act, 1922, the income received by the beneficiaries under the deed of trust other than the assessee could not until the power of revocation arose to the assesssee, be deemed to be the income of the assessee for the purpose of assessment to income-tax.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismiued.", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PATNA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PATNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANI BHUWANESHWARI KUER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.-Rani Bhuwaneshwari Kuer", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tekari Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 788, "end_char": 798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This deed was created with a view to liquidate the debts of the Tekari Raj."}}, {"text": "December 22. 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 947, "end_char": 964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This original deed was modified by a deed of rectification dated December 22."}}, {"text": "cl. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "January\n\n20, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1033, "end_char": 1050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "43 of the deed of trust dated January\n\n20, 1941, that the settlor may at any time during her life revoke or vary either wholly or partly the trust or any provisions of the deed but not before the payment and discharge of certain debts and liabilities."}}, {"text": "Clause 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1255, "end_char": 1264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 12, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1378, "end_char": 1394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 43 of the original deed was subsequently modified by the 45th clause which was added by the deed of amendment dated January 12, 1942."}}, {"text": "cl. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1399, "end_char": 1405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Darbhanga", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1532, "end_char": 1541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45 of the deed of amendment the right of revocation was not exercisable till the Thica leases in favour of the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga and - Capt."}}, {"text": "Maharaj Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1554, "end_char": 1567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh rema; ned good and effective.", "canonical_name": "Maharnj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh"}}, {"text": "Maharnj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1764, "end_char": 1802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharnj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh till 1954.", "canonical_name": "Maharnj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2685, "end_char": 2690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2705, "end_char": 2719, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3217, "end_char": 3222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3497, "end_char": 3502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3517, "end_char": 3531, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4262, "end_char": 4267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4451, "end_char": 4456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. D. Karkhanis", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4891, "end_char": 4906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. D. Karkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4911, "end_char": 4925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. D. Karkhanis and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4947, "end_char": 4960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad, B. D. Singh and D. Goburdhan, (or the r1&pondent."}}, {"text": "B. D. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4962, "end_char": 4973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad, B. D. Singh and D. Goburdhan, (or the r1&pondent."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4978, "end_char": 4990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad, B. D. Singh and D. Goburdhan, (or the r1&pondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5072, "end_char": 5076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was deliv, ered\n\nSHAH, J.-Rani Bhuwaneshwari Kuer-hereinafter re- .,.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "J.-Rani Bhuwaneshwari Kuer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5078, "end_char": 5104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Court was deliv, ered\n\nSHAH, J.-Rani Bhuwaneshwari Kuer-hereinafter re- .,.", "canonical_name": "J.-Rani Bhuwaneshwari Kuer"}}, {"text": "January 20, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5550, "end_char": 5566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The estate held by the assessee was heavily encumbered, and with a view to arrange for liquidation of the debts the assessee executed an indenture of trust dated January 20, 1941, whereby the Tekari Raj\n\n~ and certain zamindari properties owned by the assessee werg\n\nconveyed to certain named trustees to be held in trust, subject to conditions specified therein."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the 4lst clause Shah, J. it was provided that after the debts and liabilities set out in Sch. '", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "December 6, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7578, "end_char": 7594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D' or after the death of the last amongst the sons, whichever event shall last occur, and by the 4Jrd clause it was provided that if any of the beneficiaries under the deed or their heirs in future shall challenge the Indenture of Release and Agreement dated December 6, 1939, executed by the settlor in favour of her husband and the action taken thereunder."}}, {"text": "cl. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10150, "end_char": 10156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharajadhiraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10557, "end_char": 10571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as provided that the trust under the deed may terminate after payment of the debts and liabilities df the trust that would then be outstanding or a{ter extinguishment of the Thicca leases in favour of the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga or in favour of Capt Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh of Tekari, whichever event shall occur last."}}, {"text": "Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10606, "end_char": 10644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as provided that the trust under the deed may terminate after payment of the debts and liabilities df the trust that would then be outstanding or a{ter extinguishment of the Thicca leases in favour of the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga or in favour of Capt Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh of Tekari, whichever event shall occur last.", "canonical_name": "Maharnj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh"}}, {"text": "Tekari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10648, "end_char": 10654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as provided that the trust under the deed may terminate after payment of the debts and liabilities df the trust that would then be outstanding or a{ter extinguishment of the Thicca leases in favour of the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga or in favour of Capt Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh of Tekari, whichever event shall occur last."}}, {"text": "Maharaj Kumar Gopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11761, "end_char": 11780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharaj Kumar Gopal\n\nOommiarirmer of lncontt-tazt Pattm\n\nY, Rani Bhuuonul&wari\n\nKmr\n\nShall, J,\n\nSaran Narain Singh remain good and effective whichever event shall happen last\".", "canonical_name": "Maharnj Kumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh"}}, {"text": "Shall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11846, "end_char": 11851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharaj Kumar Gopal\n\nOommiarirmer of lncontt-tazt Pattm\n\nY, Rani Bhuuonul&wari\n\nKmr\n\nShall, J,\n\nSaran Narain Singh remain good and effective whichever event shall happen last\"."}}, {"text": "Saran Narain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11857, "end_char": 11875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharaj Kumar Gopal\n\nOommiarirmer of lncontt-tazt Pattm\n\nY, Rani Bhuuonul&wari\n\nKmr\n\nShall, J,\n\nSaran Narain Singh remain good and effective whichever event shall happen last\"."}}, {"text": "Indian Inoome-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12393, "end_char": 12420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12984, "end_char": 12989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Inoome-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Inoome-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13005, "end_char": 13019, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13026, "end_char": 13059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Judicature at Patna directed the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66(2) of the Act to state a case and to refer the following questions:\n\n(I) Whether the trus( created by the assessee is a revocable trust within the meaning of s. lb(l)(c) of the Income-tax t ct?"}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13109, "end_char": 13117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Inoome-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Inoome-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13476, "end_char": 13481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 12,\n\n1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13628, "end_char": 13645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held that the deed of trustdated January 20,\n\n1941 (as modified by the subsequent deed dated January 12,\n\n1942) was within the meaning of s. 16 (I) (c) of the Incometax Act a revocable trust, but not being revocable for six years from the date of its creation, bv virtue of the third proviso to s. 16 (I) (c) which controlled not merely the substantive provisions of s. 16 (I) (c) but the first proviso to that section as well, the income received by the beneficiaries (other than the settlor) under the deed of trust was not liable to be included in the income of the assessee."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13673, "end_char": 13678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13830, "end_char": 13835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13902, "end_char": 13907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14794, "end_char": 14799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "g,....\n\nAgainst the order passed by the High Court, with special leave, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Patna, has appealed to this Court."}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14943, "end_char": 14951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 18, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18496, "end_char": 18514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are, it is true, certain recitals made in the deed dated September 18, 1946, executed by the assessee, which is styled \"Deed for further alteration of terms & constitution of trust\" by the assessee, that the liabilities referred to in Sch. '"}}, {"text": "January 20, 194", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18710, "end_char": 18725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D' to the deed of trust dated January 20, 194 l had been fully discharged and the beneficiaries had been, receiving the surplus rents, issues and profits according to their respective shares in the same and the settlor had by a deed of trust dated May 28, 1946 conveyed and settled a portion of her seventh share in the rents, issues and profits of the trust properties, as well as in the corpus of Shri Bhubneshwari Hari Haresh Private Trust for meeting certain expenses."}}, {"text": "May 28, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18928, "end_char": 18940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D' to the deed of trust dated January 20, 194 l had been fully discharged and the beneficiaries had been, receiving the surplus rents, issues and profits according to their respective shares in the same and the settlor had by a deed of trust dated May 28, 1946 conveyed and settled a portion of her seventh share in the rents, issues and profits of the trust properties, as well as in the corpus of Shri Bhubneshwari Hari Haresh Private Trust for meeting certain expenses."}}, {"text": "Bhubneshwari Hari Haresh Private Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19084, "end_char": 19122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D' to the deed of trust dated January 20, 194 l had been fully discharged and the beneficiaries had been, receiving the surplus rents, issues and profits according to their respective shares in the same and the settlor had by a deed of trust dated May 28, 1946 conveyed and settled a portion of her seventh share in the rents, issues and profits of the trust properties, as well as in the corpus of Shri Bhubneshwari Hari Haresh Private Trust for meeting certain expenses."}}, {"text": "cl. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19386, "end_char": 19392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20528, "end_char": 20534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(\\)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20958, "end_char": 20969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21748, "end_char": 21759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24608, "end_char": 24625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a case decided by the Bombay High Court Ramji Keslwvji v. Commissidflo of Income-tax, Bombay(') Kania, J., in considering the scheme of s. 16(1)(c) observed:\n\n\"The first stage is that when there is a revocable transfer of assets, the income derived from such assets is still to be considered the income of the settlor."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24682, "end_char": 24687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a case decided by the Bombay High Court Ramji Keslwvji v. Commissidflo of Income-tax, Bombay(') Kania, J., in considering the scheme of s. 16(1)(c) observed:\n\n\"The first stage is that when there is a revocable transfer of assets, the income derived from such assets is still to be considered the income of the settlor."}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24722, "end_char": 24733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25982, "end_char": 25998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26449, "end_char": 26460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26548, "end_char": 26559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian lncometax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26567, "end_char": 26593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_7_97_102_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "1 s.c.n.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 97\n\nVRAJLAL MANILAL & CO.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANR.\n\nIP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J .• K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,\n\nN. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.]\n\nMines and Minerals-State Government refuses to renew certificate of approval-Review ; petition to Central Government -Central Government receives report and information from the State Government behind the back of the appellants-Central Government acting quasi-iudiciaUy-Violation of natural justice -Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (No. XLIII of 1948)-Mines Concession Rules, 1949 rr. 57, 59.\n\nThe appellants constitute a partnership engaged in mining and they held a prospecting license as well as a certificate of approval from the State Government under the Mineral Concessions Rules, 1949 framed under the Mines and Minerals (Regula tion and Development) Act, 1948. The approval certificate was granted for one year and , until December 1955 it had been renewed from year to year when the State Government refused to renew it on the ground that the partners composing the firm had changed. Thereupcn the appellants applied under r. 57 of the -Minerals Concession Rules to the Union Government for the\n\nreview of the order of the State Government refusing to renew the certificate of approval. While this application was pending the Union Government corresponded with the State Government and gathered information and received the latter's remarks regarding the merits of the matter behind the appellants' back.\n\nThe request made by the appellants for copies of the correspondence and for an opportunity to be heard was refused by the Union Government. Ultimately the Union Government refused the review application on the ground that there was no valid ground to interfere with the decision of the State Government.\n\nThe present appeal was filed on special leave granted by this Court. On behalf of the appellants it was contended that the Union Government while disposing of an application under r. 57(2) in terms of r. 59 acts as a quasi-judicial authority and the order which was passed taking into consideration the report of the State Government behind the appellants' back and without affording a reasonable opportunity for presenting their case was contrary to natural justice and was therefore void.\n\n Held: (i) The Union Government when disposing of an application for review under r. 59 is functiolling as a quasi-judicial authority.\n\nShivji Nathubhi v. Union of India, [1960)' S.C.R. 775, relied on.\n\n(ii) Though Shivji Nathubhai's case was concerned with a case where an order had been passed prejudicial to the respondents before the Central Government without affording them\n\nLIP(D)ISCI-4 ..\n\nMarch 10\n\nSUPRE!VIE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 an opportunity to meet the case of an applicant for review the . -. same principle would apply even where a petition for review is VraJlal .Manila! 4' rejected based on materials which were not made available to\n\nCo. the applicant for review.\n\nT, Union J1 1tdia an.;\n\n(iii) Applying the above principle to the present case the no \" order of the Central Government is vitiated as being contrary to the principles of natural justice in that the decision wa\" rendered without affording to the appellants a reasonable opportunity of being heard which is a sine qua non of a fair hearing.\n\n.Ayyangar, J.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 115 & 1I6 of I 963. Appeals by special leave from the .iudgment and orders dated July 9, 1958, September 24, 1958 of the Union of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel, New Delhi) and the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi respectively.\n\nG. S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andie)', for the appellant (in both the appeals).\n\nS. G. Patwardhan and B. R. K. G. Achar, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appi; als).\n\nI. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 116/1963).\n\nMarch 10, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-Civil Appeal No. 115 is by special leave granted by, this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution and is against an order of the Union of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel) dated July 9, 1958 rejecting an application filed by the appellants under rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 to review an order passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh rejecting their application for the renewal of the Certificate of Approval granted to them. The appellants filed a petition to the High Court Punjab under Art. 226 <if the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the above order of the Unieln of India. This petition was dismissed by the High Court in /imine and Civil Appeal No. 116 of 1963 is by special leave of this Court against this order of the High Court, Punjab. It would thus be seen that both the appeals are directed to challenge the validity of the same order and we shall therefore deal with them together.\n\nThe appellants, who constitute a partnership, are engaged inter alia in the business of mining and they held a prospecting licence in the State of Madhya Pradesh. They hold concessions in regard to prospecting and working minerals in seviraJ areas of the State to the details of which it is not necessary to refer.\n\nUnder the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (Act No. XLIII of 1948) and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 framed thereunder, in order that a prospecting licence may be granted to a person he has\n\nto hold a certificate of approval from the State Government 1964 concerned and similarly the rules provide that no mining lease vrajlal Manila! \"' shall be granted to any person unless he held a similar certifi- Oo. cate of approval. To enable them to do the prospecting in lands u . if] d'\n\n1111 in which they had obtained mineral concessions, the appellants nion no7h,';' • applied for and obtained from the Government of Madhya Pradesh a certificate of approval under the Mineral Concession Ayyangar, J.\n\nRules from 1952 onwards. The duration of the certificate is one calendar year and the same has to be renewed every year, if it is to be in force. The original certificate granted to the appellants for the year 1952 was being renewed from year to year and as a result they held a valid certificate of approval up to the period ending on December 31, 1955. Being desirous of having the same renewed for the following calendar year 1956 they made an application to the Government of Madhya Pradesh on November 22, 1955. The information required by the form of application prescribed by the rules was furnished and the necessary documents were filed and this application was recommended by the District Officer, Bhandara. The State Government. however, by an order dated September 21, 1956 rejected the application, the reason given being that the partners composing the firm had changed. This order was communicated to the appellants on October 6, 1956 and thereupon the appellants made an application on November 15, 1956 to the Union Government for a review of the order of the State Government under rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules ..\n\nRule 57(2) which was invoked by the appellants provides:\n\n\"Where a State Government has failed to dispose of an application for grant of renewal of a certificate of approval or prospecting licence or a mining lease within the period prescribed therefor in these Rules, such failure shall, for the purpose of these rules, be deemed to be a refusal to grant or renew such certificate, licence or lease, as the case may be, and any person aggrieved by such failure ma.y, within two months of the expiry of the period aforesaid, apply to the Central Govermnent for reviewing the case.\" The procedure for review is laid down by rule 59 which reads:\n\n\"Review-Upon receipt of such application, the Central Govermnent may, if it thinks fit, call for the relevant records and other information from the\n\nSta.te Govermnent, and after considering any explanation that may be offered by the State Government cancel or revise the order of the State GOIVermnent, or pass such order as the Central Government may deem just and proper.\"\n\nL/P(D)ISCI--41•)\n\nVrajlal Manilal Ja\n\nCo. v.\n\nUnion of India an!l\n\nA:notker\n\nAyyangor, J.\n\nThereafter correspondence seems to have ensued between the Central Government and the Government of Madhya Pradesh in regard to the propriety of granting the application for review. The appellants having come to know from a letter addressed to them by the Government of India that the State Government had been required to send a report of their remarks in connection with their application for review made enquiries as to what had happened and also requested that they might be informed as to the progress of their application and that they might be given an opportunity of a personal hearing at which they would be able to satisfy the Government about the genuineness of their case. Some portions of this correspondence between the Government of India. and the Government of the State as to the merits of the appellants' application are now on record but it is common ground that the appellants were not informed of these documents prior to the O'fder now impugned rejecting the applica.tion for review was passed. On July 9, 1958 the application of the appellants was rejected by the Union Government, the order stating:\n\n\"The Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Madhya Pra- ,. desh rejecting your application for renewal of a certificate of approval for the year 1956.\"\n\nThe appellants thereafter applied to the Government of India requesting for a copy of the report of the State Government on the basis of which the application was rejected. The reply that the appellants received was that the Government of India regretted their inability to accede to their request. It is the validity of this order dated July 9, 1958 that is challenged in appeal No. 115 of 1963.\n\nMr. Pathak, learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that the Union Government when disposing of an application under s .. 57(2) in terms of rule 59 is acting.as a quasi-judicial a.uthority and the order which was passed taking into consideration the report of the State Government and without their knowing the contents of the report and without affording them a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case was contrary to natural justice and was therefore void. In this connection learned Counsel relied on the decision of this Court: Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India('). Mr. Pa.thak is well-founded in his submission as to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Union Government when disposing of an.application for review under Rule 59 and the decision referred to does\n\n(') [1960] 2 S.C.R 775.\n\nsupport him that the Central Government acting under the rule 1964 referred to is functioning as a quasi-judicial authority. It does v 'lal 11!1 1.,,. follow therefore that they could not act on the basis of material rai i.~· • as regards which the appellants had no opportunity to make . v. . their representation. No doubt, the decision in Shivji Nathu- Union ';{;, f;: and bhai v. The Union of India and Ors.(') was concerned with a case where an order had been passed prejudicial to the respon- Ayyangar, J. dents before the Central Government without affording them an opportunity to meet the case of an applicant for review but the same principle would, in our opinion, apply even where a petition for review is rejected based on materials which were not made available to the applicant for review.\n\nAs we have already indicated, the State Government had refused renewal of the certificate of approval because they considered that there had been a change in the composition of the firm which destroyed its identity. On the other hand, the case of the appellants was that the terms of the partnership deed made express provisions for the continuance of the identity of the firm. notwithstanding changes in the persons composing the firm by death, retirement or because of the accession of new members to replace deceased or retiring partners or even otherwise. If the report of the State Government made any points against the representations made by the appellants, and these were being taken into consideration by the Union Government, in common fairness, the appellants were entitled to be informed as to what these were and an opportunity to point out how far they militated against the contentions raised by them.\n\nLearned Counsel for the respondent-Union of India, did not seek to support the position taken by the Central Government that they were justified in refusing to disclose the contents of the report they obtained from the Sta.te Government . which afforded them the factual basis on which they rejected the application for review. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the order of the Central Government now under\n\nppal i~ vitiated as be!1Jg contrary to the principles of natural 1usttce, m that the dectsion was rendered without affording to the appellants a reasonable opportunity of being heard which is a sine qua non of a fair hearing.\n\nThe learned Judges of the Punjab High Court dismissed the petition filed before them under Art. 226, apparently because they proceeded on the view that the exercise of jurisdiction of the Central Government under rules 57 and 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules was really administrative in character so that the reasonable opportunity that is an essential requisite of quasi-judicial procedure was not attracted to the\n\n(') [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775.\n\n1964 case. That was the view taken by that Court in the Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India and Ors.(') which decision Vrajl<ll '1t~'.' 1\" 1 \"' was reversed by this Court. It might be mentioned that the v. decision of this Court was rendered subsequent to their judg- Uaim• 01 Ii. T; a ani ment now under appeal and therefore the learned Judges had\n\nA11nfhtr not the advantage of the pronouncement of this Court.\n\nAyyang((r, J.\n\nThe result is that the appeals are allowed and order of the Central Government dated July 9, 1958 and of the High Court dated September 24, 1958 are set aside. The Central Government will consider the review application afresh and dispose of the same in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The appellants are entitled to their costs in this Court (Hearing fee one set).\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "97\n\nVRAJLAL MANILAL & CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VRAJLAL MANILAL & CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 184, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Mines Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 566, "end_char": 594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Minerals Concession Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union Government", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2342, "end_char": 2358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held: (i) The Union Government when disposing of an application for review under r. 59 is functiolling as a quasi-judicial authority."}}, {"text": "Shivji Nathubhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2542, "end_char": 2558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) Though Shivji Nathubhai's case was concerned with a case where an order had been passed prejudicial to the respondents before the Central Government without affording them\n\nLIP(D)ISCI-4 ..\n\nMarch 10\n\nSUPRE!VIE COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\n1964 an opportunity to meet the case of an applicant for review the . -."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3117, "end_char": 3135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) Applying the above principle to the present case the no \" order of the Central Government is vitiated as being contrary to the principles of natural justice in that the decision wa\" rendered without affording to the appellants a reasonable opportunity of being heard which is a sine qua non of a fair hearing."}}, {"text": ".Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3357, "end_char": 3366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Ayyangar, J.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "July 9, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3502, "end_char": 3514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the .iudgment and orders dated July 9, 1958, September 24, 1958 of the Union of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel, New Delhi) and the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi respectively."}}, {"text": "September 24, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3516, "end_char": 3534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the .iudgment and orders dated July 9, 1958, September 24, 1958 of the Union of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel, New Delhi) and the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi respectively."}}, {"text": "Union of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel, New Delhi)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the .iudgment and orders dated July 9, 1958, September 24, 1958 of the Union of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel, New Delhi) and the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi respectively."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3612, "end_char": 3654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the .iudgment and orders dated July 9, 1958, September 24, 1958 of the Union of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel, New Delhi) and the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi respectively."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3670, "end_char": 3682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andie)', for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3684, "end_char": 3698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andie)', for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3703, "end_char": 3714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andie)', for the appellant (in both the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. G. Patwardhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3760, "end_char": 3776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. G. Patwardhan and B. R. K. G. Achar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. R. K. G. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3781, "end_char": 3798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. G. Patwardhan and B. R. K. G. Achar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3847, "end_char": 3859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3964, "end_char": 3972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4047, "end_char": 4055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4107, "end_char": 4121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of the Constitution and is against an order of the Union of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel) dated July 9, 1958 rejecting an application filed by the appellants under rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 to review an order passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh rejecting their application for the renewal of the Certificate of Approval granted to them."}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4247, "end_char": 4277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4311, "end_char": 4339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of the Constitution and is against an order of the Union of India (Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel) dated July 9, 1958 rejecting an application filed by the appellants under rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 to review an order passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh rejecting their application for the renewal of the Certificate of Approval granted to them."}}, {"text": "High Court Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4471, "end_char": 4488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants filed a petition to the High Court Punjab under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4495, "end_char": 4503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "statute": "the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949"}}, {"text": "High Court, Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4756, "end_char": 4774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "116 of 1963 is by special leave of this Court against this order of the High Court, Punjab."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5073, "end_char": 5087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, who constitute a partnership, are engaged inter alia in the business of mining and they held a prospecting licence in the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Mineral Concession Rules, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5356, "end_char": 5386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 22, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6483, "end_char": 6500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being desirous of having the same renewed for the following calendar year 1956 they made an application to the Government of Madhya Pradesh on November 22, 1955."}}, {"text": "Bhandara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6693, "end_char": 6701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The information required by the form of application prescribed by the rules was furnished and the necessary documents were filed and this application was recommended by the District Officer, Bhandara."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6752, "end_char": 6770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "however, by an order dated September 21, 1956 rejected the application, the reason given being that the partners composing the firm had changed."}}, {"text": "October 6, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6919, "end_char": 6934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was communicated to the appellants on October 6, 1956 and thereupon the appellants made an application on November 15, 1956 to the Union Government for a review of the order of the State Government under rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules ..\n\nRule 57(2) which was invoked by the appellants provides:\n\n\"Where a State Government has failed to dispose of an application for grant of renewal of a certificate of approval or prospecting licence or a mining lease within the period prescribed therefor in these Rules, such failure shall, for the purpose of these rules, be deemed to be a refusal to grant or renew such certificate, licence or lease, as the case may be, and any person aggrieved by such failure ma.y, within two months of the expiry of the period aforesaid, apply to the Central Govermnent for reviewing the case.\""}}, {"text": "November 15, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6987, "end_char": 7004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was communicated to the appellants on October 6, 1956 and thereupon the appellants made an application on November 15, 1956 to the Union Government for a review of the order of the State Government under rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules ..\n\nRule 57(2) which was invoked by the appellants provides:\n\n\"Where a State Government has failed to dispose of an application for grant of renewal of a certificate of approval or prospecting licence or a mining lease within the period prescribed therefor in these Rules, such failure shall, for the purpose of these rules, be deemed to be a refusal to grant or renew such certificate, licence or lease, as the case may be, and any person aggrieved by such failure ma.y, within two months of the expiry of the period aforesaid, apply to the Central Govermnent for reviewing the case.\""}}, {"text": "Union Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7012, "end_char": 7028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was communicated to the appellants on October 6, 1956 and thereupon the appellants made an application on November 15, 1956 to the Union Government for a review of the order of the State Government under rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules ..\n\nRule 57(2) which was invoked by the appellants provides:\n\n\"Where a State Government has failed to dispose of an application for grant of renewal of a certificate of approval or prospecting licence or a mining lease within the period prescribed therefor in these Rules, such failure shall, for the purpose of these rules, be deemed to be a refusal to grant or renew such certificate, licence or lease, as the case may be, and any person aggrieved by such failure ma.y, within two months of the expiry of the period aforesaid, apply to the Central Govermnent for reviewing the case.\""}}, {"text": "Vrajlal Manilal Ja", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8169, "end_char": 8187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L/P(D)ISCI--41•)\n\nVrajlal Manilal Ja\n\nCo. v.\n\nUnion of India an!l\n\nA:notker\n\nAyyangor, J.\n\nThereafter correspondence seems to have ensued between the Central Government and the Government of Madhya Pradesh in regard to the propriety of granting the application for review."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8197, "end_char": 8211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L/P(D)ISCI--41•)\n\nVrajlal Manilal Ja\n\nCo. v.\n\nUnion of India an!l\n\nA:notker\n\nAyyangor, J.\n\nThereafter correspondence seems to have ensued between the Central Government and the Government of Madhya Pradesh in regard to the propriety of granting the application for review.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8498, "end_char": 8517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants having come to know from a letter addressed to them by the Government of India that the State Government had been required to send a report of their remarks in connection with their application for review made enquiries as to what had happened and also requested that they might be informed as to the progress of their application and that they might be given an opportunity of a personal hearing at which they would be able to satisfy the Government about the genuineness of their case."}}, {"text": "Government of the State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9005, "end_char": 9028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the Government of the State as to the merits of the appellants' application are now on record but it is common ground that the appellants were not informed of these documents prior to the O'fder now impugned rejecting the applica.tion for review was passed."}}, {"text": "Government of Madhya Pra-", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9490, "end_char": 9515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 9, 1958 the application of the appellants was rejected by the Union Government, the order stating:\n\n\"The Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Madhya Pra- ,."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10015, "end_char": 10021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pathak, learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that the Union Government when disposing of an application under s .. 57(2) in terms of rule 59 is acting.as a quasi-judicial a.uthority and the order which was passed taking into consideration the report of the State Government and without their knowing the contents of the report and without affording them a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case was contrary to natural justice and was therefore void.", "canonical_name": "Pa.thak"}}, {"text": "Pa.thak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10604, "end_char": 10611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pa.thak is well-founded in his submission as to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Union Government when disposing of an.application for review under Rule 59 and the decision referred to does\n\n(') [1960] 2 S.C.R 775.", "canonical_name": "Pa.thak"}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10814, "end_char": 10832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shivji Nathu- Union", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11177, "end_char": 11196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, the decision in Shivji Nathu- Union ';{;, f;: and bhai v. The Union of India and Ors.(')"}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11334, "end_char": 11342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was concerned with a case where an order had been passed prejudicial to the respon- Ayyangar, J. dents before the Central Government without affording them an opportunity to meet the case of an applicant for review but the same principle would, in our opinion, apply even where a petition for review is rejected based on materials which were not made available to the applicant for review.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13301, "end_char": 13309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13634, "end_char": 13653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ayyang((r", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14073, "end_char": 14082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyang((r, J.\n\nThe result is that the appeals are allowed and order of the Central Government dated July 9, 1958 and of the High Court dated September 24, 1958 are set aside.", "canonical_name": ".Ayyangar"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_121_133_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".S S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 121\n\nin principle is disclosed. Where on a consideration of the 196'# circumstances, payment is made to compensate a person Kettlew-; u-Bullen\n\nfor cancellation of a contract which does not affect the and Co. v. trading structure of his business, nor deprive him of what\n\nCJ.T. in substance is his source of income, termillation of the Shah 1• -contract being a normal incident of the business, and such\n\ncancellation leaves him free to carry on his trade (freed from tbe contract terminated) the receipt is revenue: Where by the cancellation of an agency the trac! ing structure of the assessee is impaired, or such cancellation results in loss -Of what may be regarded as the source of the assessee's income, tbe payment made to compensate for cancellation of the agency agreement is normally a oapital receipt.\n\nIn the present case, on a review of all the circumsc:mces, we have no doubt that what the assessee was paid was to compensate him for loss of a capital asset. It matters little whether the assessee did continue after the determination of its agency with tbe Fort William Jute Co. Lid to conduct the remaining agencies.\n\nThe transaction was not in the nature of a trading transaction, but was one in which the. assessee parted with an asset of an enduring value.\n\nWe are, therefore, unable to agree with the High Court that the amount received by the appellant was in the nature of a revenue receipt.\n\nWe accordingly record the answer on the question submitted by the Tribunal in the negative.\n\nThe appellant would be entitled to its costs in this Court.\n\nGILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD. v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Capital or revenue-Termination of agencY-Compensa~ tion-Business of several agencies-Cancellation of single agency-\n\nNature of compensation.\n\nThe appellant company was carrying on business in diverse Jines as managing agents of some concerns, distributing agents of others and u secretaries of still other class of concerns. It also dealt as an ex-\n\nMay I.\n\nGillanders Arbuthnot and Co.\n\n\"· C.l.T.\n\nShah J.\n\nporter and importer. shipping agent, and as buyer and dealer in dive\"\"\n\ncommodities. A large amount of business wu done by the appellant as an agent of foreign companies in respect of different kinda of goods.\n\nIn respect of explosives manufactured by the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ll'd .• Glasgow, Scotland, the appellant wu acting u the sole agent and distributor of that company. The agency agreement was terminable at the option of the principal company, and by a Jetter dated March 11, 1947. the latter informed the appellant that the agency would stand terminated from April I, 1948 and that compensation would be paid for termination of the agency.\n\nThe appellant was be paid an amount which was computed on the basis of the profits of the business.\n\nIn the course of the proceedings 'for asaessment to income-tax appellant claimed that the amount was received on determination of the agency being receipt of a capital nature and was not liable to be included in total income of the appellant, but the Incometax Officer rcjcctett the claim holding that cancellation of a single contract of agency out of a number of selling agencies held by the appellant was in the ordinary course of business and that the sum received as compensation was revenue taxable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 .\n\n. Held: Having regard to the vast array of business done by the appellant as agents, the acquisition of agencies was in the normal course of business and the determination of individual agencies, a normal incident, could not affect or impair the trading structure of the appallant, nor involve a loss of an enduring trading asset. and the compensation received by the appellant, therefore, did not represent the price paid for loss of a capital asset but only a payment made for the loss of profit it suffered by the cancellation of its agency and was income chargeable to the income-tax.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 825-828 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated January 10, 1962, of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 33 of 1957.\n\nB. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the respondent.\n\nMay 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-The appellant which is a public limited com pany incorporated under the Indian Companies _Act, 1913, has its registered office at Calcutta, and branches m Bo.mbay, Madras, New Delhi and Kanpur. The appellant earned on\n\nbusiness in diverse lines, which may broadly be classified as 1964\n\n(1) buying and selling on its own account, ( 2) introducing Gilland;;;- Arbucustomers to principals ( 3) acting as managing agents, ( 4) thnot and Co. acting as shipping agents, ( 5) acting as purchasing agents, c.1:T. ( 6) acting as sole importers and distributors on behalf of Ullited Kingdom principals liaving no organisation in India and ( 7) acting as secretaries.\n\nSince January 21, 1886, M/s. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. predecessors-in-interest of the appellant were the sole agents and distributors in India of explosives manufactured by the Imperial. Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. Glasgow, Scotland, hereiaaftet called 'the principal company'. There was no written agreement between the principal company and M/s Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. incorporating the terms of the agency agreement. It is however coriimon ground that the agency agreement was terminable at the option of the principal company. The appellant was incorporated for taking over the business of M/ s Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. and since it took over the \"distributing agency the appellant acted as the sole agent and distributor of explosives manufactured by the principal company, but without a written agreement.\n\nIn May 1945 the principal company desired to set up its own organisation for distributing its products, and intimated the appellant that the agency of the appellant may be cancelled after two or three years. By letter dated March, 11, 1947, the principal company informed the appellant that the agency will stand terminated from April 1, 1948, and that it desired to compensate the appellant for termination of the agency on the following basis: ( 1) \"For the first three post-transfer years\" the principal company shall pay to the appellant two-fifths of the commission accrued on actual sales in the territory of the latter's agency taken over the principal company, such commission to be computed at the commission rates formerly paid to the appellant;\n\n(2) That \"in the third post-transfer year\", the principal company shall pay the appellant in\n\nShalt J.\n\nGillander1 Arbu\n\nthnot and Ct>.\n\nC.l.T\n\nShah I.\n\naddition a sum equivalent to full commission on the sales for that year effected by the principal company in the appellant's territory calculated at the same rates.\n\n( 3) That payments would be made to the appellant after the end of each year as soon as the amount due was ascertained.\n\nCertain other matters in the letter which have a bearing on the dispute, may be reproduced:\n\n\"For the purpose of calculating the commission due to you, the post-transfer will be deemed to run as from the date of the transfer of your agency to Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Ltd., We trust that you will find these proposals acceptable.\n\nAs a condition of our paying you compensation on the basis outlined above, we would request you to be good enough to give us a formal undertaking to refrain from selling or accepting any agency for explosives or other commodities competitive with those covered by the agency agreement now being terminated.\n\nIn this connection, we are asking our Legal Depart\n\nment to prepare a formal agreement which we will submit to you for signature as soon as possible.\"\n\nIt is common ground that no ormal agreement in writing, which was contemplated to be taken from the appellant, was executed: not even a draft of the agreement was submitted by the principal company to the appellant.\n\nPursuant to conditions (1) and (2) incorporated in the letter dated March 11, 194 7, which have been set out earlier, the appellant received the following amounts from the principal company\n\nI !\n\n1964 For the previous year corresponding to the asscsment year ending 31st March, 1949. .. .... Rs. 1' 53'47l/II/- Gilland;;:;- Arbuthnot and Co. v.\n\nFor the previous year corresponding to the assessment yrar ending 31st March, 1950. .. .... Ro. l,59,>71/4/-\n\nC.1.T.\n\nFor the previous year corresponding to the assessment year ending 31st March, 1951 ...... Rs. 6,20,131/2/-\n\nThese amounts were included in its profit & loss account by the appellant as commission received by it.\n\nBut in the course of the proceedings for assessment to income-tax and Business Profits Tax, the appellant claimed that the amounts\n\nwe:e compensation received on determination of the agency being receipts of a capital nature and were not liable to be included in the total income of the appellant. The Incometax Officer, Companies District IV, Calcutta, rejected the contention of the appellant, holding that cancellation of a single contract of agency out of a riumber of selling agencies held by the appellant was in the ordinary course of business and the sums received by the appellant as compensation for\n\nf ancellation were revenue, taxable under the Indian Incomet ax Act, 1922. The Income-tax Officer also assessed the\n\nl elevant amount of compensation to Business Profits tax for the chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1949.\n\nIn appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the contention of the appellant was accepted principally on the ground that the amounts received by the appellant were compensation for termination of the agency with the principal company and as consideration for agreeing to refrain from carrying on in future competitive business in explosives.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal held that the_ compensation received by the appellant was merely incidental to the carrying on of the business. The Tribunal negatived the contention of the appellant that the explosives agency was a separate business or that termination of that business amounted to loss of an enduring asset. The Tribunal also held that the covenant referred to in the letter dated March, 11, 194 7, about the appellant agreeing to refrain from carrying on a competitive business in explosives did not form consdera tion for the amount paid, because although proposed m the\n\nShah J.\n\n~ ldter dated March 11, 1947, there was no formal acceptance Gilland.,• Arbu- <>f the offer or an undertaking in writing given by the\n\nthnot and Co. appellant agreeing not to carry on a competitive business. v.\n\nC.1.T. 'Jn the view of the Tribunal the offer relating to the under- Shah 1. talcing not to carry ori a competitive business contained in the letter was not accepted, and. the amounts paid by the principal company could not therefore be regarded as forming consideration partially or wholly for acceptance of that offer.\n\nThe Tribunal thereafter referred three questions under s. 66 ( 1 ) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 to the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. These questions were:\n\n( 1) Whether the assessee's agency of the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. was a separate business by itself, the closure of which resulted in the destruction of a capital asset of the assessee;\n\n(2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances\n\nof this case, the compensation sums received by the assessee from the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. are income chargeable in the hands of the assessee; and\n\n(3') Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case no part of the compensation money was received by the assessee on the condition not to carry on a competitive business in the same line of activity in explosives and as such no part of the money was in the nature of capital being exempt from Indian Income-tax levy?\n\nThe High Court recorded answers to the question as follows:\n\n\"Qu;:.; tion 1.-The assessee's agency of the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. was not a separate business by itself and th~ closure of this business did not result in the destruction of a capital asset of the assesee.\n\nQuestion 2.-The amounts of compensation received !964 by the assessee from the Imperial Chemical Gilllin;;;;\"Arbu Industries (Export) Ltd. were income chargethnot and Co. v. able in the hands of the assessee. c.1. r.\n\nQuestion 3.-No part of the compensation money was received by the assessee on condition not to carry on a competitive business in explosives and consequently no part thereof was exempt from Indian Income-tax levy.\"\n\nWith certificate of fitness granted by the High Court, these appeals have been preferred by the appellant.\n\nThe principal question in dispute is whether the amount received by the appellant as compensation for loss of agency are of the nature of capital or revenue. It is necessary in the first instance to eliminate two subsidiary contentions raised by the appellant. It was urged that the amounts received by the appellant were in lieu of compensation for cancellation of the agency by the principal company, for Joss of goodwill of the appellant's business, and also in consideration of the appellant's agreeing not to carry on any competitive business in explosives or other commodities in which business was carried on by the appellant under the agency agreement.\n\nIt cannot seriously be disputed that compensation paid for agreeing to refrain from carrying on competitive business in the commodities in respect of which the agency was terminated, or for loss of goodwill would, prima facie, be off the nature of a capital receipt. But there is no evidence that compensation was paid to the appellant as consideration for giving the undertaking not to carry on a competitive business, or as compensation for loss of goodwill.\n\nIn the letter dated March 11, 194 7, it was expressly recited that as a condition of payment of compensation on the basis outlined therein the principal company had called upon the appellant to give a formal undertaking to refrain from selling or accepting any agency for explosives or other commodities competitive with those covered by the agency agreement, but no such formal undertakin~ was ever given.\n\nIt was recited in the last paragraph of the letter that the prin\n\nShah/.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [rgp4J\n\n1'6'1 cipal company will submit a fonnal agreement to the ap- Gillandm Arbupellant for execution. But it appears that at the time of thnot and Co. payment of the compensation and thereafter also both sides cJ:T. ignored this condition. Payment of compensation was\n\nShah J. spread over a period of three years, but that will not give rise to an inference that the object behind the payment was. to enforce the undertaking, for the undertaking, if any, would have operated pennanently whereas full compensation was payable within three years. If importance was attached to the undertaking the principal company would have declined to make even the first payment without insisting upon a fonnal agreement incorporating the undertaking.\n\nWhether the appellant did not in fact carry on any competitive business was never investigated, and the absence of evidence on that point may reasonably justify the inference that the appellant never attempted to establish that part of its case. Granting that an agreement to refrain from carrying on a competitive business may be implied from subsequent c.onduct, in the absence of any material at any stage of the proceedings before the Revenue authorities, it would be reasonable to hold that the .appellant did not place any reliance upon the case that part of the compensation was attributable to an undertaking not to engage in competitive business.\n\nNo part of the compensation may be attributed to loss of goodwil! suffered by the appellant. It is true that the agency had continued in the hands of the predecessors of the_ appellant and thereafter with the appellant for upwards of sixty years.\n\nIt was urged that an extensive market had been built up in India and the goodwill of that business was on termination of the appellant's agency taken over by the new agents of the principal company and compensation paid in _that behalf must be regarded as\n\ncapital.\n\nBut this question also was never raised before the Revenue authorities, nor even before the Tribunal.\n\nThe Tribunal observed that it had not been supplied with \"any\n\nmaterial regarding the basis of the value of the goodwill, nor anything to indicate as to what the written down value of the goodwill was, due to the tennination of the agency\".\n\nIt therefore held that the inference sought to be drawn by 1964 the appellant that compensation was referable to the Joss Gilland;;;-A.rbuof goodwill, was based on no evidence and the High Court thnot •M Co. agreed with that conclusion.\n\nWe are unable to hold that cir. the High Court was, in so holding in error. If it was the case of the appellant that a part of the compensation was in fact paid for loss of goodwill of the business, the appellant couid have led evidence to establish hat it was the intentioo of the parties that the loss of good will was to be compensated by payment of an amounit which was included in the compensation ultimately paid by the principal company to the appellant.\n\nThe business of agency had undoubtedly continued for more than sixty years, but there is no evidence about the terms of the agency agreement. There was no written agreement, and it is common ground that tl1e agency was terminable at will.\n\nThe principal company had, as early as 1945, informed the appellant that the distribution arrangement \"would be terminated after two or three years\". The appellant had sufficient notice of the proposed determination.\n\nThereafter the agency was cancelled with effect from April 1, 1945, and in -the correspondence which is tendered in evidence, there is not even an indirect reference to any negotiation for payment of Compensation for loss of goodwill, or any agreement in that behalf.\n\nWe may now address ourselves to the question, whether eompensation paid by the principal company for cancellation of the agency may be regarded as a capital or revenue receipt. We have in a recent case in Kettlewell Dullen & Co.\n\nv. The Commissioner of Income-tax;·· Calcutta ( 1) made a survey of the important cases which have arisen before the Courts in the United Kingdom and in India about the principles which govern the determination of the nature of compensation received on the termination of an agency. We , observed in that case:\n\n\"On an analysis of these cases which fa!! on two sides of the dividing line, a satisfactory measure of consistency in principle is disclosed.\n\nWhere ------\n\n(1)( 1964] S.C.L 93.\n\nSI S.C.-9\n\nSluih J.\n\nGillandera Arb11thnot and Co.\n\nC.1.T. s•11 1.\n\non a consideration of the circumstances, payment is made to compensate a person for cancellation of a contract which does not affect the trading structure of his business, nor deprive him of what in substance is his source of income, termination of the contract being a normal incident of the business, and such cancellation leaves him free to carry on his trade (freed from the contract terminated) the receipt is revenue: where by the cancellation ef an agency the trading structure of the assessee is impaired, or such cancellation results in loss of what may be regarded as the source of the assessee's income, the payment made to compensate for cancellation of the agency agreement is normally a capital receipt.\"\n\nExamining the circumstances of the present case in the light of that principle, we agree with the High Court that what was received by the appellant was income and not capital.\n\nCompensation received by the appellant for cancellation of the agency which was terminable at will, the appellant wasto be paid an amount which was to be computed on the basis of the profits of the business. Under the letter dated March 11, 194 7, the appellant was to be paid \"for the first three post-transfer years\" two-fifths of the commission accrued on actual sales in the territory of the appellant's agency taken over by the Imperial Chemical Industries\n\n<India) Ltd., such commission to be computed at the rates of commission formerly paid to the appellant, and that in \"the third post-transfer year\" the princip2l company was to\n\npay the appellant in addition a sum equivalent to full com- mission on the sales for that year effected by the Imperial C::hemical Industries (India) Ltd. in the appellant's territory calculated at the same rates.\n\nThe appellant was conducting business as selling or distributing agent of numerous principals.\n\nThe agency which was terminated was one of many such agencies in which the appellant functioned as distributing agent of a\n\nforeign principal. There is not even a suggestion, that by the determination of the agency held by the appellant in Gillandm ..4rb11explosives from the principal company, the trading structure thnot and Co.\n\nY. of the assessee's business was impaired. It is manifest that C.l.T. the agencies of the companies conducted by the appellant sw J must hv~ been obtained at different times.\n\nThere is no evidence that these agencies were of any fixed duration. It would be reasonable to infer that some of the agencies may be cancelled and fresh agencies obtained. The list t.; rnishtd by the appellant before the Tribunal, ana1ysing the different classes of business carried on by it d1scbsed that the business was done in many lines.\n\nThe appellant acted as managing agent of some concerns, distributing agent of 'others. and as secretary of still other class of concerns.\n\nAgain it dealt as an exporter and importer, shipping agent, and as a buyer and dealer in diverse commodities. A large amount of business was done by the. appellant as an agent of foreign companies. The appellant had obtained agencies for paints, varnishes, petroleum, kerosene oil, medicines and toilet preparations, cement, timber, stationery, metals, tea, engineering goods, air-conditioning equipment and a large number of other commodities. It may reasonably be held, having regard to the vast array of business done by the appellant as agents, that the acquisition of agencies was .in the normal course of business and determination of individual agencies, a normal incident, not affecting or impairing the trading structure of tl!e appellant. The appellant was compensated by payment to it the loss of profit it suffered by the cancellation of its agency, leaving it free to conduct its remaining business.\n\nIt was said that the appellant had employed expert officers who were accustomed to handle explosives which are a specialised commodity and the cancellation of that agency seriously affected the organization of its trading operations.\n\nBl.!: foe appellant was undoubtedly dealing in several kinds of infl2mmable substances, such as, petroleum, kerosene oil, timber and similar other commodities.\n\nIt is true that explosives would require great care in handling.- It appears, however, that eighty per cent of the staff attached to the Magazine Section was maintained not at the expense of the\n\n~ appellant, but at the expense of the principal company. Out GUlandm .A.rbuof the officers who were attached to the explosives business, thnot and c,,. services of five officers were taken over by the principal\n\ncJ.r. company and six others were retained by the appellant and\n\nSlllzh I. absorbed in other branches.\n\nIt cannot, therefore, be said that termination of the agency resulted in impairment of the trading organisation of the appellant. One of the agencies was undoubtedly lost to the appellant, and even temporary dislocation in the organisation of the business thereby may oe assumed. There is no evidence, however, that the appellant could not in the ordinary course of business repair the dislocation. There is no evidence that it could not obtain an agency from another manufacturer of explosives.\n\nEven assuming that such an agency in explosives may not be replaced, that circumstance by itself may not justify the inference that the agency was independent of the other lines of business conducted by the appellant, or that by the cancellation \"of the agency an enduring asset was lost to the appellant. The circumstance that the agency was determinaJil~ at the will of the principal company which maintained a large staff at their expense justifies the inference that upon cancellation of that agency the appellant's business organization was not substantially impaired. The cancellation, it may be held, was an incident of the trading operations of the appeallant in the normal course of business.\n\nThe payment received by the appellant could not, therefore, be regarded truly as compensation for not carrying on the business: it was a sum which was worked out in terms of profits which the appellant would have earned during the period of notice and paid in the ordinary course of brisiness to adjust the relations between the appellant and the principal company.\n\nThere is, in our judgment, no immutable principle that compensation received on cancellation of an agency must always be regarded as capital. In each case the question has to be determined in the light of the attendant circumstances.\n\nIn the judgment in Kettlewal/ Bullen and Co.'s case (1) we have explained that the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw < ) [ 1964! sis.c.R. 93.\n\nVal/ace and Co.(') was not intended to, and did not lay Jown that in every case, cancellation of an agency resulted Gillandm A.rb1 in loss of a source of revenue or that amounts paid to cornthnot :nd Co. pensate for loss of agency must be regarded as capital loss. ciT.\n\nOn a careful consideration of all the circumstances we agree with the High Court that cancellation of the comracr of agency did not affect the profit-making structure of the appellant, nor did it iinvolve a loss of an enduring trading\n\nasset; it Iljerely deprived the appellant of a trading avenue, leaving him free to devote his energies after the cancellation to carry on the rest of the business, and to replace the contract lost by a similar cpntract. The compensation paid, therefore, d.id not represent 'the price paid for loss of a capital asset.\n\nWe therefore dismiss the appeals with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nMASALTI\n\nSTATE OF U. P.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO. K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ)\n\nCriminal Appeal-Appeal by special leave-Scope-Murders committed by village faction constituting unlawful assembly-Sentence of death, if and when can be pas.Jed-Apprecilztion of evidence-T11t -Validity Prosecution-It must examine all witnesses cited.\n\nForty persons belonging to a village faction and constituting an unlawful assembly were put up on trial before the Ad'ditional Sessions lodge under s. 302 read with s. 149 of the Indiao Penal Code and other sections thereof for murdering 5 persons of the other faotion with gun1.\n\nThe trial lodge found 35 of them illy and sentenced 10 of them. who carried fire arms, to death and the rest to imprisonment for life. Three appeals were preferred by the convicted persons to the High Court anll !he sentences of death came up for confirmation under s. 374 of the\n\n(I) L.R. 59 I.A. 206,\n\nShllh /.\n\nlPM\n\nMay,4", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "termillation of the Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 349, "end_char": 373, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1603, "end_char": 1636, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1642, "end_char": 1682, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1685, "end_char": 1697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*"}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1702, "end_char": 1709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. M. S!KRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1714, "end_char": 1725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ll'd .• Glasgow, Scotland", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2408, "end_char": 2471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of explosives manufactured by the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ll'd .• Glasgow, Scotland, the appellant wu acting u the sole agent and distributor of that company."}}, {"text": "March 11, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2645, "end_char": 2659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agency agreement was terminable at the option of the principal company, and by a Jetter dated March 11, 1947."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3458, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4194, "end_char": 4213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals from the judgment and order dated January 10, 1962, of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4255, "end_char": 4261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4263, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4284, "end_char": 4295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee and D. N. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4317, "end_char": 4339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N.\n\nSachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4344, "end_char": 4359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4439, "end_char": 4443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-The appellant which is a public limited com pany incorporated under the Indian Companies _Act, 1913, has its registered office at Calcutta, and branches m Bo.mbay, Madras, New Delhi and Kanpur."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4578, "end_char": 4586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-The appellant which is a public limited com pany incorporated under the Indian Companies _Act, 1913, has its registered office at Calcutta, and branches m Bo.mbay, Madras, New Delhi and Kanpur."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4612, "end_char": 4618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-The appellant which is a public limited com pany incorporated under the Indian Companies _Act, 1913, has its registered office at Calcutta, and branches m Bo.mbay, Madras, New Delhi and Kanpur."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4620, "end_char": 4629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-The appellant which is a public limited com pany incorporated under the Indian Companies _Act, 1913, has its registered office at Calcutta, and branches m Bo.mbay, Madras, New Delhi and Kanpur."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4634, "end_char": 4640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-The appellant which is a public limited com pany incorporated under the Indian Companies _Act, 1913, has its registered office at Calcutta, and branches m Bo.mbay, Madras, New Delhi and Kanpur."}}, {"text": "Ullited Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5014, "end_char": 5029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant earned on\n\nbusiness in diverse lines, which may broadly be classified as 1964\n\n(1) buying and selling on its own account, ( 2) introducing Gilland;;;- Arbucustomers to principals ( 3) acting as managing agents, ( 4) thnot and Co. acting as shipping agents, ( 5) acting as purchasing agents, c.1:T. ( 6) acting as sole importers and distributors on behalf of Ullited Kingdom principals liaving no organisation in India and ( 7) acting as secretaries."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5068, "end_char": 5073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant earned on\n\nbusiness in diverse lines, which may broadly be classified as 1964\n\n(1) buying and selling on its own account, ( 2) introducing Gilland;;;- Arbucustomers to principals ( 3) acting as managing agents, ( 4) thnot and Co. acting as shipping agents, ( 5) acting as purchasing agents, c.1:T. ( 6) acting as sole importers and distributors on behalf of Ullited Kingdom principals liaving no organisation in India and ( 7) acting as secretaries."}}, {"text": "January 21, 1886", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5113, "end_char": 5129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since January 21, 1886, M/s. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. predecessors-in-interest of the appellant were the sole agents and distributors in India of explosives manufactured by the Imperial."}}, {"text": "Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5136, "end_char": 5162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since January 21, 1886, M/s. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. predecessors-in-interest of the appellant were the sole agents and distributors in India of explosives manufactured by the Imperial.", "canonical_name": "GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD"}}, {"text": "Imperial. Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. Glasgow, Scotland", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5286, "end_char": 5347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since January 21, 1886, M/s. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. predecessors-in-interest of the appellant were the sole agents and distributors in India of explosives manufactured by the Imperial."}}, {"text": "Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5462, "end_char": 5488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no written agreement between the principal company and M/s Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. incorporating the terms of the agency agreement."}}, {"text": "March, 11, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6157, "end_char": 6172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By letter dated March, 11, 1947, the principal company informed the appellant that the agency will stand terminated from April 1, 1948, and that it desired to compensate the appellant for termination of the agency on the following basis: ( 1) \"For the first three post-transfer years\" the principal company shall pay to the appellant two-fifths of the commission accrued on actual sales in the territory of the latter's agency taken over the principal company, such commission to be computed at the commission rates formerly paid to the appellant;\n\n(2) That \"in the third post-transfer year\", the principal company shall pay the appellant in\n\nShalt J.\n\nGillander1 Arbu\n\nthnot and Ct>."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6262, "end_char": 6275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By letter dated March, 11, 1947, the principal company informed the appellant that the agency will stand terminated from April 1, 1948, and that it desired to compensate the appellant for termination of the agency on the following basis: ( 1) \"For the first three post-transfer years\" the principal company shall pay to the appellant two-fifths of the commission accrued on actual sales in the territory of the latter's agency taken over the principal company, such commission to be computed at the commission rates formerly paid to the appellant;\n\n(2) That \"in the third post-transfer year\", the principal company shall pay the appellant in\n\nShalt J.\n\nGillander1 Arbu\n\nthnot and Ct>."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7373, "end_char": 7414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain other matters in the letter which have a bearing on the dispute, may be reproduced:\n\n\"For the purpose of calculating the commission due to you, the post-transfer will be deemed to run as from the date of the transfer of your agency to Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Ltd., We trust that you will find these proposals acceptable."}}, {"text": "March 11, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8218, "end_char": 8233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to conditions (1) and (2) incorporated in the letter dated March 11, 194 7, which have been set out earlier, the appellant received the following amounts from the principal company\n\nI !"}}, {"text": "Indian Incomet ax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9484, "end_char": 9511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 31, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9656, "end_char": 9670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer also assessed the\n\nl elevant amount of compensation to Business Profits tax for the chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1949."}}, {"text": "March, 11, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10412, "end_char": 10428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal also held that the covenant referred to in the letter dated March, 11, 194 7, about the appellant agreeing to refrain from carrying on a competitive business in explosives did not form consdera tion for the amount paid, because although proposed m the\n\nShah J.\n\n~ ldter dated March 11, 1947, there was no formal acceptance Gilland.,•"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11203, "end_char": 11208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11222, "end_char": 11249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11257, "end_char": 11293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal thereafter referred three questions under s. 66 ( 1 ) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 to the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11360, "end_char": 11402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These questions were:\n\n( 1) Whether the assessee's agency of the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. was a separate business by itself, the closure of which resulted in the destruction of a capital asset of the assessee;\n\n(2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances\n\nof this case, the compensation sums received by the assessee from the Imperial Chemical Industries (Export) Ltd. are income chargeable in the hands of the assessee; and\n\n(3') Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case no part of the compensation money was received by the assessee on the condition not to carry on a competitive business in the same line of activity in explosives and as such no part of the money was in the nature of capital being exempt from Indian Income-tax levy?"}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Gilllin;;;;\"Arbu Industries (Export) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12445, "end_char": 12504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "964 by the assessee from the Imperial Chemical Gilllin;;;;\"Arbu Industries (Export) Ltd. were income chargethnot and Co. v. able in the hands of the assessee."}}, {"text": "Joss Gilland;;;-A.rbuof", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16912, "end_char": 16935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It therefore held that the inference sought to be drawn by 1964 the appellant that compensation was referable to the Joss Gilland;;;-A.rbuof goodwill, was based on no evidence and the High Court thnot •M Co. agreed with that conclusion."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18007, "end_char": 18020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the agency was cancelled with effect from April 1, 1945, and in -the correspondence which is tendered in evidence, there is not even an indirect reference to any negotiation for payment of Compensation for loss of goodwill, or any agreement in that behalf."}}, {"text": "Kettlewell Dullen & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18428, "end_char": 18451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have in a recent case in Kettlewell Dullen & Co.\n\nv. The Commissioner of Income-tax;·· Calcutta ( 1) made a survey of the important cases which have arisen before the Courts in the United Kingdom and in India about the principles which govern the determination of the nature of compensation received on the termination of an agency."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax;·· Calcutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18460, "end_char": 18498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have in a recent case in Kettlewell Dullen & Co.\n\nv. The Commissioner of Income-tax;·· Calcutta ( 1) made a survey of the important cases which have arisen before the Courts in the United Kingdom and in India about the principles which govern the determination of the nature of compensation received on the termination of an agency.", "canonical_name": "Commissioner of Income-tax;·· Calcutta"}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18584, "end_char": 18598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have in a recent case in Kettlewell Dullen & Co.\n\nv. The Commissioner of Income-tax;·· Calcutta ( 1) made a survey of the important cases which have arisen before the Courts in the United Kingdom and in India about the principles which govern the determination of the nature of compensation received on the termination of an agency."}}, {"text": "Sluih", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18955, "end_char": 18960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SI S.C.-9\n\nSluih J.\n\nGillandera Arb11thnot and Co.\n\nC.1.T. s•11 1."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries\n\n<India) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20343, "end_char": 20385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the letter dated March 11, 194 7, the appellant was to be paid \"for the first three post-transfer years\" two-fifths of the commission accrued on actual sales in the territory of the appellant's agency taken over by the Imperial Chemical Industries\n\n<India) Ltd., such commission to be computed at the rates of commission formerly paid to the appellant, and that in \"the third post-transfer year\" the princip2l company was to\n\npay the appellant in addition a sum equivalent to full com- mission on the sales for that year effected by the Imperial C::hemical Industries (India) Ltd. in the appellant's territory calculated at the same rates."}}, {"text": "Imperial C::hemical Industries (India) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20661, "end_char": 20704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the letter dated March 11, 194 7, the appellant was to be paid \"for the first three post-transfer years\" two-fifths of the commission accrued on actual sales in the territory of the appellant's agency taken over by the Imperial Chemical Industries\n\n<India) Ltd., such commission to be computed at the rates of commission formerly paid to the appellant, and that in \"the third post-transfer year\" the princip2l company was to\n\npay the appellant in addition a sum equivalent to full com- mission on the sales for that year effected by the Imperial C::hemical Industries (India) Ltd. in the appellant's territory calculated at the same rates."}}, {"text": "Kettlewal/ Bullen and Co.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25498, "end_char": 25523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the judgment in Kettlewal/ Bullen and Co.'s case (1) we have explained that the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw < ) [ 1964!"}}, {"text": "MASALTI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26556, "end_char": 26563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MASALTI\n\nSTATE OF U. P.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO."}}, {"text": "STATE OF U. P.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26565, "end_char": 26579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MASALTI\n\nSTATE OF U. P.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO."}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26582, "end_char": 26602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MASALTI\n\nSTATE OF U. P.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO."}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26610, "end_char": 26623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MASALTI\n\nSTATE OF U. P.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO."}}, {"text": "DAS\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26631, "end_char": 26641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ)\n\nCriminal Appeal-Appeal by special leave-Scope-Murders committed by village faction constituting unlawful assembly-Sentence of death, if and when can be pas."}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26646, "end_char": 26660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ)\n\nCriminal Appeal-Appeal by special leave-Scope-Murders committed by village faction constituting unlawful assembly-Sentence of death, if and when can be pas."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27066, "end_char": 27072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27083, "end_char": 27089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27104, "end_char": 27114, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27465, "end_char": 27471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 27484, "end_char": 27500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_133_152_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 133\n\nVal/ace and Co.(') was not intended to, and did not lay Jown that in every case, cancellation of an agency resulted Gillandm A.rb1 in loss of a source of revenue or that amounts paid to cornthnot :nd Co. pensate for loss of agency must be regarded as capital loss. ciT.\n\nOn a careful consideration of all the circumstances we agree with the High Court that cancellation of the comracr of agency did not affect the profit-making structure of the appellant, nor did it iinvolve a loss of an enduring trading\n\nasset; it Iljerely deprived the appellant of a trading avenue, leaving him free to devote his energies after the cancellation to carry on the rest of the business, and to replace the contract lost by a similar cpntract. The compensation paid, therefore, d.id not represent 'the price paid for loss of a capital asset.\n\nWe therefore dismiss the appeals with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nMASALTI\n\nSTATE OF U. P.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO. K. c. DAS\n\nGUPTA AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ)\n\nCriminal Appeal-Appeal by special leave-Scope-Murders committed by village faction constituting unlawful assembly-Sentence of death, if and when can be pas.Jed-Apprecilztion of evidence-T11t -Validity Prosecution-It must examine all witnesses cited.\n\nForty persons belonging to a village faction and constituting an unlawful assembly were put up on trial before the Ad'ditional Sessions lodge under s. 302 read with s. 149 of the Indiao Penal Code and other sections thereof for murdering 5 persons of the other faotion with gun1.\n\nThe trial lodge found 35 of them illy and sentenced 10 of them. who carried fire arms, to death and the rest to imprisonment for life. Three appeals were preferred by the convicted persons to the High Court anll !he sentences of death came up for confirmation under s. 374 of the\n\n(I) L.R. 59 I.A. 206,\n\nShllh /.\n\nlPM\n\nMay,4\n\nMasalti ...\n\nState of U.P.\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure. The High Court acquitted 7 of the appellants and, concurring with the findings of the :rial court, dismissed tbe appeals of the rest. It confirmed the sentences of death passed on tbe 10 accused persons. The appeals to this Court were preferred by thoso 10 and 6 others by special leave.\n\nHEco:-(i) In criminal appeals under Art. 136 of the Constitution involving sentences of death it would be improper to refuse to consider relevant pleas of fact or law on the ground that they had not been taken before the High Court. When any such point had actueUy been urged and not considered by the High Court, the party urging it was entitled as a matter of right to obtain a cfecision from this Court.\n\nEvea otllerwise no hard and fast rule can be laid down prohibiting such pleas being raisetl in such appeals.\n\n(ii) It would be unsound to lay down as a general rule that ever}' witness clted by the prosecution must be examined by it even though ltis evidence was not very material or he was known to have been v1on over or terrorised.\n\n(iii) Evidence of a \\\\'itness could not be discarded only on the ground that Qe was a partisan or intereste1 witness, particularly in cases of\n\nmurdr c:ommitteC by a village faction, such mechanical rejection would invariably lea'd to failure of justice.\n\n(iv) It was not improper for a criminal court having a large number of C1ffenders and victims to deal with to adopt the test that the conviction of any particular accused could be sustained only if a particular number of witnesses gave a consistent account against him. Such a test, even though mechanical, was not unreasonable:.\n\n(v) Punishment prescribed by s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code was in a sense vicarious and that section does not necessarily require that the offence must have been actually committed by every member of the unlawful. assfmOly. The observations of this Court in Baladin v. State of U .P. had to be read in the context of that case and coufd not be treated as laying down an unqualified proposition of law.\n\nBaladin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 181. explained.\n\n(vi) It was not eorrect to say that if a person was found guilty of murder under s. 302/149 of the lntlian Penal Codct and it was not show• that he himself bad committed the muI'der, no sentence of death coulti be inflicted on him.\n\nDalip Singh v. State of I'1111iab, [1954] S.C.R. 145, distinguished.\n\n(vii) There was no error in the exercise of their discretion by the courts belo\\V in the present ca\"se in making a distinction between the ten persons who carried fire arms and were sentenced to death and the others, 'ovho did not carry fire and were sentenced to imprisonment for life, under a common char$• unHer ss. 302/149.\n\n(viii) Regard being had to the 'circumstances of the present case, the ends of justice would be properly served if , the sentences of death passed on the three accused persons aged 18. 23 and 24, who had joined the unlawful assembly under pressure of their elders were modifie'd to life sentences.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTiON: Criminal Appeals Nos. 30-34 of 1964.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 22, 1963 of the Allakbad High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 77 and 78 of 1963.\n\nM. S. K. Sastri, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 30 of 1964).\n\nI. M. Lall and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants (in Cr.\n\nA. No. 31 of 1964).\n\nV. S. Snwhney, for the appeliants (in Cr. A. Nos. 32-34/64).\n\n0. P. Rana. Atiqur Rehman and C. P. Lal, for the respondents.\n\nMay, 4. l 964.\n\nTI1e Judgment of the Court was delivered oy\n\ni\\!a1alti\n\nr•I• of U.P.\n\nGAJI:HDRAGADKAR, C.\n\nJ. - Forty persons were Gai<ndra}ladkar charged with having committed several offences the\n\nc. I. principal one of which wa3 under section 302 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe case ag1inst these persons was tried bv the first Additional Sessiom Judge at Jhansi.\n\nThe other charges framed against them were under s. 307/149, 201/149 & 511, 395, 396, 149 & 449, I. P. C.\n\nThe learned trial Judge held that r.one of the charges had been proved a1rninst five of the accused persons.\n\nHe .1lso found that the charge~ under sections 395 & 396 were not proved against any of them. In regard to the remaining charges, he found that 35 out of 40 accused persons were guilty.\n\nFor the major offence charged under s. 302/149, he sentenced 10 accused persons to death and 25 others to imprisonment for life.\n\nHe also directed that the said accused persons should undergo different terms of imprisonment for the remaining offences; but for the purpose of the present appeals, it is unnecessary to refer to them.\n\nMIUllbl\n\n'f.\n\nSt•I• of U .P.\n\nGaitndragll<ika\n\nC. I.\n\nAfter the learned trial Judge pronounced his judgment on the 31st December. 1962, the 35 accused persons who had been convicted by him preferred three appeals between them before the Allahabad High Court, whereas the sentences of death imposed dn I 0 accused persons by the learned trial Judge were submitted to the said High Court for confirmation.\n\nThe High Court has held that 7 out of the 35 appellants before it were not proved to have committed any of the offences, and so, they were ordered to be acquitted.\n\nIn regard to the remaining 28 appellants, the High Court bas confirmed the orders of conviction and sentence imposed on them by the trial Court.\n\nIn the result, the reference made to the High Court for confirmation of the sentences of death imposed on the 10 accused persons by the trial Court was allowed.\n\nIt is against this decision of the High Court that the present five appeals have been brought to this Court by special leave, and the number of accused persons who have brought these appeals before us is 16.\n\nBefo:e dealing with the points raised in tlrese appeals, it is necessary to set out very briefly the relevant facts on which the prosecution case against the appellants and their co-accused substantially rests.\n\nThe incident which has given rise to the present criminal proceedings took place on the 29th November, 1961 in village Bilati Khet in the district of Jhansi at about 8 a.m.\n\nIt is clear that this village is cursed with keen rivalry and enmity between two factions.\n\nOne group was led by Gayadin who and four other members of his family were murdered on the said date.\n\nAll these murders were committed, according to the prosecution, by the members of the rival faction amongst whom are included the present appellants before us.\n\nCriminal proceedings have continued between the parties for several years almost without interruption.\n\nThe rival group was led by Laxmi Prasad alias Laxmi Narain who is one of the appellants in this Court.\n\nIn the last election of the village Panchayat Laxmi Prasad succeeded as Pradhan of the village and defeated the candidate set up by Gayadin.\n\nOn the 28th November, 1961, a boundary dispute led to an incident between the members of the two groups. This dispute related to two fields one of which belonged to Gayadin and\n\nM\"\"'ltl\n\nthe other to Laxmi Prasad.\n\nAttempts were made to settle this dispute by arbitration, but they failed.\n\nIt appears that Laxmi Prasad and the members of his group did not agree to submit to any arbitration and they left the meeting called for the purpose threatening that they would see that the matter in dispute between them was settled the next day.\n\nState of U .P.\n\nis on this grim note that the incident of the 28th November ended.\n\nOn 'the 29th November in the e3rly morning, Bahoran, one of the sons of Gayadin, had gone out to ease himself.\n\nHe was then carrying a pharsa.\n\nIn the field he met Laxmi Prasad who attacked him with a Jathi.\n\nBahoran retaliated this attack with his own pharsa and in the scuffle the nose of Laxmi Prasad was injured and it began to bleed; in fact,\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\na part of the nose was actually cut. Infuriated by this injury, Laxmi Prasad went to his house and collected the whole crowd belonging to his faction.\n\nBahoran eased himself and returned to his house.\n\nSoon thereafter he washed his hands and went to the north where his father, brothers and \"!her relations were warming themselves by fire.\n\nAt that ~· 1ge, Ram Prasad and Dayaram rushed to the scene anrl infmmed them that Laxmi Prasad and his companions were all armed with guns, spears, swords, gandasas and lathis and were proceeding to the house of Gayadin determined to kill all the members of Gayadin's family.\n\nOn receiving this alarming infonnation, Gayadin and his friends and relatives thought of proceeding towards the house of Gayadin.\n\nAbout that time, Lxmi Prasad and bis companions reached near the house of Gayadin whereon Laxmi Prasad fired a gun.\n\nBhagwati was carrying a large quantity of cartridges in the folds of his dhoti .and was instigating Laxmi Prasad to fire at everyone sitting near the fire to the north of the house and to extenninate the family of Gayadin.\n\nOn hearing this, everyone of the group sitting near the fire rushed into the house and closed the doors. 'J)ie assailants then broke open the doors of the house and entered the seh.an of Gayadin.\n\nInside the house the assailants pursued Gayadin on the upper storey and killed him there.\n\nBrindaban, Radha Saran and Dayaram were hiding in different rooms of the house; the doors of these rooms\n\nMcualti ...\n\nStall of U.P.\n\nGajendragadkar\n\ne.1.\n\nwere broken open and all the three of them were shot dead.\n\nBahoran and Shiroman Singh, both sons of Gayadin, escaped through the tiled roof into the cattleshed of Harbans which is situated towards the south-east of Gayadin's house.\n\nShiroman concealed himself in the godown whiie Bahoran concealed himself in the room in the upper storey where chaff had been .stored.\n\nAfter killing Gayadin, Brindaban, Radha Saran and Dayaram, the assailants mercilessly dragged the bodies of the victims out of the house of Gayadin and began their search for Bahoran and other male inmates of the house.\n\nWhen the dead bodies were thus being dragged, Gori Dulaiya wife of Gayadin rushed after the assailants and implored them not to take the dead bodies away.\n\nOne of the assailants, however, struck her with a stick and she was forced to retrace her steps. The dead bodies were then dragged towards the east of the house.\n\nOn reaching 'the cattleshed of Harbans, the assailants broke open th~\n\nouter door of the house and entered into it.\n\nThey then injured Harbans and managed to discover Shiroman Singo who was promptly killed.\n\nThe five dead bodies were then taken into the field of Bhagwati.\n\nIn the field. two big riles of cowdung cakes were prepared.\n\nOn one of the piles the bodies of Gayadin, Brindaban, Radha Saran and Dayaram were placed and on the other Shiroman Singh's body was put.\n\nKerosene oil was sprinkled on the bodies and fire was sei: to them.\n\nThat, in brief, is the story of the gruesome murders which have given rise to the present proceedings.\n\nWhen the assailants had left the house of Gayadin dragging the dead bodies with them. Bahoran came out of his hiding place and rushed to the Police Station Krichh and lodged the First Information Report at about 11 o'clock.\n\nIn this report, he gave all the material details in regard to the commission of the offence and named the 35 persons as the assailants.\n\nIn fact, the first committal order passed on the 31st March, 1962 in the present proceedings referred to 35 assailants. Later. five more persons were added to the list of assailants by the committal order made on the 14th May, 1962.\n\nOn.receiving the first information report, the police party rushed to the scene of occurrence on cycles and they put 'off the burning fire and took out the half burnt\n\nbodies of the five murdered persons.\n\nThese bodies were identified and were sent for post mortem examination. The injured persons Harbans, Ram Prasad, Mansa Ram and Smt.\n\nGori Dulaiya were sent for medical examination.\n\nPost-mortem examination was then held on the dead bodies and statements of witnesses were recorded in the course of investigation.\n\nThat 1ed to the several charges framed against 40 persons and ultimately their trial in the Court of the First Additional Sessions Judge at Jhansi.\n\nThe case for the prosecution is sought to be established by the testimony of 12 eye-witnesses.\n\nAll the accused persons denied that they had anything to do with the offences charged.\n\nTheir main contention was that a false case h:l<l been made against them and it was attempted to be supported by evidence of witnesses who were hostile to them and who had no regard for truth.\n\nThe trial Judge, in substance. rejected the defence plea and .accepted the prosecution evidence. except in the case of five accused persons. In appeal, several contentions were raised on behalf of the appellants, but they were rejected and h1 the result, the findings of the trial Court against the appellants were confirmed.\n\nThe High Court, however. reversed the conclusion of the trial Court in respect of 7 accused persons with whose cases we are not concerned in the present appeals. The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20.\n\nThe High Court has critically examined the evidence given by these witnesses and has held that the evidence of Bahoran and Prabhu Day.al may be left out of account as it appeared to the High Court that the said evidence suffered from material infirmities.\n\nThe evidence given by the remaining 10 witnesses has, however, been accepted by the High Court as\n\nsubtantially true and correct.\n\nIn dealing with this oral evidence, the High Court took into account the fact that most of these witnesses beloneed to the faction of Gayadin and must, therdore, be regarded\n\nl'IU\n\nJltualti\n\nStal• of U.P\n\nGajeisdragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nM01altl\n\n1'.\n\nStile of £1.P.\n\nGajendra1adkar\n\nC. I.\n\nas partisan. It also considered another feature which characterised the evidence of all the witnesses and that was that they gave their account of the incident substantiallv in similar terms and did not assign particular parts in resliect of overt acts to any of the assailants except Laxmi Prasad accused No. 1.\n\nThe approach adopted by the High Court shows that it decided to confirm the conviction of the accus ed persons against whom four or more witnesses eave a consistent account, and it is by the application of this test that 7 accused, persons have been acquitted.\n\nAs to the sentence, the High Court realised that IO persons had been ordered to be hanged and that it could not be said about all of them, except Laxmi Prasad, that they had actually fired a gun and caused the death of any of the five victims. Even so, the High Court held that since they all formed members of the unlawful assembly the common object of which was to exterminate the male members of the family of Gayadin, they were all equally guilty of murder under s.302/149, I.P.C. and it would not, therefore, be unreasonable to impose the penalty of death on such of the as>ailants as were shown to have carried guns in their hands <m that occasion.\n\nTb.at is how the High Court upheld the orders of conviction passed against 28 persons who had brought their cases before it in appeal and confirmed the sentences of death imposed on 10 of them.\n\nIn these appeals, Mr. Sawhney who has addrc; ed the principal argumt before us on behalf of the appellants, has urged that the High Court has failed in discharging its duty properly when it dealt with the appeals brought before it by the appellants and decided to confirm the senrMces of death imposed on 10 of the accused persons.\n\nIn support of this argument, Mr. Sawhney has relied upon the deci, ion of this Court in the case of Jumman & Ors. v: The State of Puniab. ( 1) In that case. this Court has emphasised the fact that the mandatory requirement prescribed by s.374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that in dealing v:ith reference for confirmation of death sentence imposed by the\n\nSessions Judge, the High Court has to consider the entire case for itself before deciding whether the sentence of death\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 469.\n\nlihould be confirmed or not.\n\nSection 374 provides thl1t 1he sentence of death shall not be executed unless it is ontirmed by the High Court.\n\nIn other words, the sentence of death imposed by the Court of Sessions is not effecuve until md\n\nunless it is confirmed by the High Court.\n\nIt is only wl:en the High Court confirms the sentence of death that it is capable of execution.\n\nThat is why this Court emphaied the solemnity of the proceedings brought before the High Court under s.374, and it pointed out that under s.375, the High Court is given the power to admit additional evidence if it thinks necessary to do so.\n\nProceedings brought before the High Court for confirmation of a death sentence give a right to the condemned prisoner to be heard on the merits and to require the High Court to consider the matter fo• itself without being influenced by the conclusions recorded by the Court of Sessions.\n\nThe conclusions of the High Court on the merits in such proceedings must be independent, and so, the High Court inevilably has to go into the whole of the evidence, consider all the pros and cons of the cDse nd\n\nsatisfy itself that the offence charged under s. 302, I.P.C. is established beyond reasonable doubt and the sentence of. death submitted to it for its confirmation is fully justified.\n\nMr. Sawhney contends that this essential requirement of s.374 has not been complied with by the High Court when it dealt with the appeals brought before it in the present proceedings.\n\nHe also adds that since 10 persons have been ordered to be hanged, that itself is a reason why this Court should examine the evidence for itself and not hold that the appellants are concluded by concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Court below.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument.\n\nIt is perfectly true that in a murder trial when an accused person stands charged with the commission of an offence punishable under s.302, he stands the risk oE being subjected to the highest penalty prescribed by the Indian Penal Code; and naturally judicial approach in dealing with such cases has to be cautious, circumspect and careful.\n\nIn dealing with such appeals 0r reference proceedings where the question of confirming a death sentence is involved, the High Court has also\n\nMasalti\n\nState of U.J'.\n\n; ajendragadkm'\n\nc. J.\n\nMllMlltl\n\ny, Stat• of U.P. -\n\nto deal with the matter carefully and to examine all relevant and material circumstances before upholding the conviction and confirming the sentence of de.1th.\n\nAll arguments urged by the appellants and all material infirmities pressed before the High Court on their behalf must be scrupulously examined and considered before a final decision is reached.\n\nThe fact that I 0 persons had been ordered to be hanged by the trial Judge necessarily imposed a more serious and onerous res~ ponsibility on the High Court in dealing with the present appeals.\n\nWe have carefully considered the judgment delivered by the High Court in these appeals and we are satisfied that the criticism made by Mr. Sawhney that the High Court did not bestow due care and attention on the points involved in the case, cannot be regarded as wcllfounded.\n\nThe judgment shows that the arguments which were urged on behalf of the appellants, have been carefully examined, the evidence given by the respective witnesses has been accurately summarised and the infirmities in the said evidence closely scrutinised.\n\nThe relevance of the argument of the admitted enmity between the two factions. of the village bas been taken into account and the common features of the evidence tendered by the witnesses have not hccn overlooked.\n\nAfter taking into account all the points which were urged before the High Court the High Court adopted what it thought to be a safe test before acting on direct evidence. It has held that unless at least four witnesses are shown to have given a consistent account .1gainst any of the appellants, the case against them cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nHaving regard to the manner in which the High Court has dealt with the appeals brought before it, we .1fe not prepared to hold that the general criticism made by Mr. Sawhney against the judgment of the High Court can be accepted.\n\nIn this connection, Mr. Sawhney strongly relied on the fact that the High Court has not considered one important point in favour of the defence, and that is in relation to the failure of the prosecution to tender three material :witnesses whose names had been shown in the witness-list in the calendar sent by the committing Magistrate to the trial Judge.\n\nThese witnesses are: Ram Prasad, Mansa Ram and\n\nRani Dulhan.\n\nIt appears that this contention was raised by the defence before the Trial Court and had been rejected by it. The Government counsel appearing for the prosecution had made an application to the trial Court expressing his inability to examine the three witnesses for the reason that Ram Pras.ad and Mansa Ram had been won over by the defence and Rani Dulhan, the widow of one of the victims, was suffering fro~:i such mental shock that she was unable to depose coherently.\n\nAfter this application was made and granted, the learned trial Judge did not insist upon the prosecution examining the three said witnesses.\n\nThen followed three other applications by the defence (Nos. 247B, 248B and 249B) in which it was urged that the said three witnesses should be examined under s.540, Cr. P.C.\n\nThe learned trial Judge rejected these applications, and so, the case concluded without the said three witnesss giving evidence before the trial Court. In rejecting the applications made by the defence, the learned Judge h.1s carefully examined the validity of the defence contention that the evidence given by the said witnesses before the Committing Magistrate showed that they were material' witnesses and the plea raised by them that the absence of their evidence would cause prejudice to the defence, and has held that the evidence which the said three witnesses may give was not essential for a just decision of the case and that it was unreasonable to suggest that the prosecution had an oblique motive in supressing their evidence.\n\nThis part of the judgment clearly shows that all relevant aspects of the matter were examined by .the trial Judge before he refused to exercise his powers under s.540, Cr. P.C.\n\nIt is obvious th1t this contention was not urged before the High Coun. and so, we find no discussion of the point in the judgment of the High Court.\n\nWe are not prepared to accept Mr. Sawhney's argument that eve.n if this point was not raised by the appellants before the High Court, they are entitled to ask us to consider that point having regard to the fact that IO persons have been ordered to be hanged. It may be conceded that if a point of fact which plainly arises on the record, or a point of iaw which is relevant and material and can be argued with-\n\n196#\n\nlll .. al1i .,, Still• of U.P.\n\nGai•ndragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nMasalti v.\n\nState of U .P.\n\nGatendragadkRr\n\nc. J.\n\nout any further evidence being taken, was urged before the trial Court and after it was rejected by it was not repeated before the High Court, it may, in a proper case, be permissible to the appellants to ask this Court to consider that point in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution; afteral! in criminal proceedings of this character where sentences of death are imposed on the appellants, it may not be appropriate to refuse to consider relevant and material pleas of fact and law only on the ground that they were not urged before the High Court. If it is shown that the pleas were actually urged . before the High Court and had not been considerer! by it, then, of course, the party is entitled as a . matter of right to obtain a decision on those pleas from this Court.\n\nBut even otherwise no hard and fast rule can be laid down prohibiting such pleas being raised in appeals under Art. 136.\n\nIn the present case, however, we are satisfied that there is no substance in the contention which Mr. Sawhney seeks to raise before us.\n\nIt is not unknown that where serious offences like the present are committed and a large number of accused persons are tried, attempis are made either to terrorise or win over prosecution witnesses, and if the prosecutor honestly and bonafide believes that some of his witnesses have been won over, it would be unreasonable to insist that he must tender such witnesses before the Court.\n\nIt is undoubtedly the duty of the prosecution to lay before the Court all material evidence available to it which is necessary for unfolding its case; but it would be unsound to lay down as a general rule that every witness must be examined even though his evidence may not be very material or even if it is known that he has been won over or terrorised.\n\nIn such a case, it is always open to the defence to examine such witnesses as their witnesses and the Court can also call such witnesses in the box in the interest of justice under s.540, Cr. P .C. As we have already seen, the defence did not examine these witnesses and the Court, after due deliberation refused to exercise its power under s .540, Cr. ' . '\n\nP.C.\n\nThat is one aspect of the matter w!Pch we have to take into account.\n\nThe other aspect of the matter is that the trial Court has found that the evidence which these witnesses would have given was not essential for a just decision of the case.\n\nWhat these witm:.:, ses might have said in the Sessions Court was judged by the tcial Court in the light of their previous statements .already recorded, and that is a finding which is purely one of fact. If this finding was not challenged by the appellants before the High Court, we do not see how they can claim to argue before us now that the said finding is erroneous.\n\nBesides, so far as Rani Dulhan is concerned, it seems to us utterly unreasonable to insist that before permitting the prosecutor not to examine her, evidence should hJve been led to show that she was suffering from such mental shock that she was unable to give a coherent account of the tragic events that happened on that fateful morning.\n\nOne has merely to recall the fact that five male members of her family were butchered to death by the assailants to realise that the prosecutor's statement that she was mentally unbalanced must be true.\n\nThen, as to Ram Prasad and\n\nMans~ Ram having been won over by the defence, that again is a matter on which the trial Court appears to have been satisfied; otherwise it would have readily acceded to the request of the defence to exercise its powers under s. 540, Cr. P.C. We are inclined to think that it is because this part of the defence contention was felt to be inarguable that the Advocate for the appellants did not raise this point before the Court.\n\nTherefore, we are not prepared to allow Mr.\n\nSawhney to take us through theevidence in the case on the ground that one important contention raised by the defence has not been examined by the High Court.\n\nMr. Sawhney has then argued that where witnesses giving evidence in a murder trial like the present are shown to belong to the faction of victims, their evidence should not be accepted, because they are prone to involve falsely members of the rival faction out of enmity and partisan feeling.\n\nThere is no doubt ihat when a criminal Court has to .appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in weighing such evidence.\n\n51 S.C.-10 ·\n\nMt11altl\n\n~ Stat. of UP.\n\nGajendraga.tkar\n\nc. J.\n\nMasalti\n\n\"· State of UP.\n\nGa/endragadkar\n\nc. 1.\n\nWhether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence; whether or not the evidence strikes the Court as genuine; whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is probable are all matters which must be taken into account.\n\nBut it wuld, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses.\n\nOften enough, where factions prevail in villages and mur- . ders are committed as a result of enmity between such factions criminal Courts have to deal with evidence of a parti- • . . san type. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably . lead to failure of justice.\n\nNo hard and fast rule ca? be laid d?\".\"n as to how much evidence should be appreciated.\n\nJudicial approach has to be c; iutious in dealing with uch evidence: but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.\n\nThen it is urged that the evidence given by the witnesses conforms to the same uniform pattern and since no specific part is assigned to all the assail.ants, that evidence should not have been accepte<;!.\n\nThis criticism again is not wellfounded.\n\nWhere a crowd of assailants who are members of an unlawful assembly proceeds to commit an offence of murder in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly, it is often not possible for witnesses to describe accurately the part played by each one of the assailants.\n\nBesides, if a large crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults the intended victims, it may not be necessary that all of them have to take part in the actual assault.\n\nIn the present case, for instance, several weapons were carried by different members of the unlawful assembly, but it appears that the guns were used and that was enough to kill 5 persons.\n\nIn such a case, it would be unreasonable to contend th; it because the other weapons carried by the members of the unlawful assembly were not used, the story in regard to the said weapons itself should be rejected.\n\nAppreciAfion of evidence in such a complex case is no doubt a difficult task: but criminal courts have to do their bes\"t in dealing with such cases and it is their duty to sift the evide:1ce carefully and decide which paxt of it is true and which is not.\n\nIn the\n\npresent case, the High Court has in fact refused to act upon the evidence of Bahoran and Prabhu Day11I, because it appeared to the High Court that the evidence of these two witnesses suffered from serious infirmities.\n\nMr. Sawhney also urged that the test applied by the High Court in convicting the appellants is mechanical.\n\nHe argues that under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence given by a single witness would be enough to con vict an accused person, whereas evidence given by half a dozen witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be enough to sustain the conviction.\n\nThat, no doubt is true; but where a criminal court has to deal with evidence pertain ing to the commission of an offence involving a large num•\n\nber of offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident.\n\nIn a sense, the test may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable.\n\nTherefore, we do not think that any grievance can be made by the appellants against the adoption of this test. If at all the prosecution may be .entitled to say thltt the seven accused persons were acquitted because their cases did not satisfy the mechanical test qf four witnesses, and if the said test had not been applied; they might as well have been convicted.\n\nIt is, no doubt, the quality of the evidence that matters and not the number of. witnesses who give such evidence.\n\nBut, sometimes it is useful to adopt a test like the one which the High Court has adopted in dealing with the present case.\n\nMr. Sawhney then attempted to argue that the High Court failed to give effect to the principles enunciated by this Court in the case of Baladin\n\nv. State of Uttar Pradesh('). In that case, it was observed by Sinha, J., who spoke for the Court, that it is well-settled that mere presence in an assembly does not make a person, who is present, a member of an unlawful assembly unless it is shown that he had done something or omitted to do something which would make him a member of an unlawful assembly, or unless the case falls under s.142, I.P.C. The argument is\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 181\n\nllJIU\n\nJl-111\n\n\"· sof V.I.\n\nMtualtl\n\nY.· Slllte of U.P.\n\nGajendragadkor\n\nC. I.\n\nthat evidence adduced by the prosecution in the present case does not assign any specific part to most of the accused persons in relation to any overt act, and so, the High Court was in error in holding that the appellants were members of an unlawful .aSsembly. The observation of which Mr. Sawhney relies, prima facie, does seem to support his contention; but, with respect, we ought to add that the said observation cannot be read as laying down a general proposition of law that unless an overt act 1s proved against a person who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of such an unlawful assembly.\n\nIn appreciating the effect of the relevant observation on which Mr. Sawhney has built his argument, we must bear in mind the facts which were found in that case. It .appears that in the case of Baladin('), the members of the family of the appellants and other residents of the village had assembled together; some of them shared the common object of the unlawful assembly, while others were merely passive witnesses.\n\nDealing with such an assembly, this Court observed that the presence of a person in an assembly of that kind would not necessarily show that he was a member of an unlawful assembly.\n\nWhat has to be proved against a person who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly is that he was one of the persons constituting the assembly and he entertained along with the other members of the assembly the common object as defined by s.141, I.P .C.\n\nSection 142 provides that whoever, being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an unlawful assembly.\n\nIn other words, an assembly of five or more persons actuated by, and entertaining one or more of the common objects specified by the five clauses of s. 141, is an unlawful assembly.\n\nThe crucial question to determine in such a case is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects as specified by s. 14 i: While determining this question, it becomes relevant to consider whether the assembly consisted of some persons who were merely passive '4'itnesses and had\n\npresent case, the High Court has in fact refused to act upon the evidence of Bahoran and Prabhu Dayal, because it appeared to the High Court that the evidence of these two witnesses suffered from serious infinnities.\n\nMr. Sawhney also urged that the test applied by the High Court , in convicting the appellants is mechanical.\n\nHe argues that under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence given by a single witness would be enough to convict an accused person, whereas evidence given by half a dozen witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be enough to sustain the conviction.\n\nThat, no doubt is true; but where a criminal court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the commission of an offence involving a large number of offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident.\n\nIn a sense, the test may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable.\n\nTherefore, we do not think that any grievance can be made by the appellants against tJ?-e adoption of this test. If at all the prosecution may be entitled to say that the seven accused persons were acquitted because their cases did not satisfy the mechanical test qf four witnesses, and if the said test had not been applied, they might as well have been convicted.\n\nIt is, no doubt, the quality of the evidence that matters and not the number of witnesses who give such evidence.\n\nBut, sometimes it is useful to adopt a test like the one which the High Court has adopted in dealing with the present case.\n\nMr. Sawhney then attempted to argue that the High Court failed to give effect to the principles enunciated by this Court in the case of Baladin v.\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh('). In that case, it was observed by Sinha, J., who spoke for the Court, that it is well-settled that mere presence in an assembly does not make a person, who is present, a member of an unlawful assembly unless it is shown that he had done something or omitted to do something which would make him a member of an unlawful assembly, or unless the case mils under s.142, I.P.C.\n\nThe argument is\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 181\n\nMiualti\n\nStal• of U .P.\n\nGaje\"'1ragad/ru\n\nc. J.\n\n1'DMlltl ...\n\nS111,. of U.P.\n\nGaJ1ndragadk•\n\nC, 1.\n\nwould be no occasion or justification for this Court to consider the evidence for itself.\n\nThat leaves one question still to be considered and that has relation to the sentence of death imposed on 10 persons.\n\nMr. Sawhney argues that in confirming the sentences of death imposed by the trial Court on 10 accused persons in this case, the High Coun has adopted a mechanical rule.\n\nThe High Court has held that the 10 persons who carried ftre-arms should be ordered to be hanged, whereas others who have also been convicted under s. 302/ 149, should be sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nIt is true that except for Laxmi Prasad, the charge under s. 302/149 rests against the other accused persons on the ground that five murders have been committed by some members of the unlawful assembly of which they were members, and the argument is that unless it is shown that a particular accused person has himself committed the murder of one or the other of the victims, the sentence of death should not be imposed on him.\n\nIn other words, the contention is that if a person is found guilty of murder under s. 302/ 149 and it is not shown that he himself committed the murder in question, he is not liable to be sentenced to death.\n\nIn support of this argument, Mr. Sawhney has relied on certain observations made by Bose J. who spoke for the Courr-in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab('). In that case, what this Court observed was that the power to enhance a sentence from transportation to death should very rarely be exercised and only for the strongest reasons; and it was added that it is not enough for the appellate court to say or think that if left to itself it would have awarded the greater penalty because the discretion does not belong to the appellate court but to the trial Judge, and the only ground on which the appellate court can interfere is that the discretion has been improperly exercised.\n\nThese observations have no relevance in the present Mse, because we are not dealing with a case where the High Court has enhanced the sentence imposed by the trial Judge at all.\n\nIn fact, both the trial Court and the High Court are agreed that the sentences of death imposed on 10 persons are justified by the circumstances of the case and by the requirement~\n\n(1) ['9~41 s.c.R. 145\n\nof justice.\n\nAs a mere proposition of law, it should be diffi cult to accept the argument that the sentence of death can be legitimately imposed only where an accused person is found to have committed the murder himself.\n\nWhether or not sentences of death should be imposed on persons who are found to be guilty not because they themselves committed the murder, but because they ·\\j'ere members of an unlawful assembly and the offence of murder was committed by one or more of the members of such an assembly in pursuance of the common object of that assembly, is a matter which had to be decided on the facts and circumstance~\n\nof each case.\n\nIn the present case, it is clear that the whole group of persons belonged to Laxmi Prasad's faction, joined together armed with deadly weapons and they were inspired by the common object of exterminating the male members in the family of Gayadin, 10 of these persons were armed with fire-arms and the others with several other deadly weapons, and evidence shows that five murders by shooting were committed by the members of this unlawful assesmbly.\n\nThe conduct of the members of the unlawful assembly both her fore and after the commission of the offence has been considered by the courts below and it has been held that in order to suppress such fantastic criminal conduct on the part of villagers it is necessary to impose the sentences of death on 10 members of the unlawful assembly who were armed with fire-arms.\n\nIt cannot be said that discretion in the matter has been improperly exercised either by the trial Court or by the High Court. Therefore we see no reason to accept the argument urged by Mr. Sawhney that the test adopted by the High Court in dealing with the question of sentence is mechanical and unreasonable.\n\nThere are, however, three cases in which we think we. ought to interfere.\n\nThese are the case of accused No. 9 Ram Saran who is aged 18; accused No. 11 Asha Ram who is aged 23 and accused No. 16 Dea prasad who is aged 24, Ram Saran and Asha Ram are the sons of Bhagwati who is accused No. 2. Both of them have been sentenced to death.\n\nSimiiarly, Deo prasad has also been sentenced to death.\n\nHaving regard to\" the circumstances under whkh the unlawful assembly came to be formed, we are satisfied that these\n\nMasaltl\n\nState of U.P.\n\nGajendragadka1\n\nC. J.\n\n1'64\n\nMualtl\n\n\"· Stat• of U.P.\n\nGa1endragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nMay, 4\n\nyoung men must have joined the unlawful assembly under pressure and influence of the elders of their respective families. The list of accused persons shows that the unlawful assembly was constituted by members of different families and having regard to the manner in which these factions ordinarily conduct themselves in villages, it ould not be unreasonable to hold that these three young men must have been compelled to join the unlawful assembly that morning by their elders, and so, we think that the ends of justice would be met if the sentences of death imposed on them are modified into sentences of life imprisonment. Accordingly, we confirm the orders of convictio:i and sentence passed against all the appellants except accused Nos. 9, 11 and 16 in whose cases the sentences are altered to those of imprisonment for life. In the result, the appeals are dismissed, subj.:ct to the said modification.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nC. V. K. RAO\n\nDENTU BHASKARA RAO\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., M. HIDAYATULI.AH, K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nRepresentation of the People Act (XLlll of 1951), s. 1(d)-Scope of-\n\n\"ln tla1 cour1e of trade or businesl'', Mea1ting of-Mining lca.Yt- Right of Government to pre-emption of minerals-If a contract for 1upply of good• ~1 leuee.\n\nThe respondent obtained a mining lca.se from the State Government.\n\nClause 21 of the lease reserved to the Government the right to prior purchase of the minerals raised by the lessee. While the lease was subsisting, the respondent stood for election to the State Legislative Assembly and was elected. The appellant, his closest competitor, challenged the election by an election petition on the ground, inter alia, that the respon'dent was disqualified under section 7(d) of the Representation of People Act (XI.Ill ot 1951), because he had a contract with the Government for 1upply of goocla.", "total_entities": 138, "entities": [{"text": "MASALTI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 928, "end_char": 935, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MASALTI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U. P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 937, "end_char": 950, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U. P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 954, "end_char": 980, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. 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S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5197, "end_char": 5212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri, for the appellant (in Cr."}}, {"text": "I. M. Lall", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5261, "end_char": 5271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. M. Lall and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants (in Cr."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5276, "end_char": 5286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. M. Lall and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants (in Cr."}}, {"text": "V. S. Snwhney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5337, "end_char": 5350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Snwhney, for the appeliants (in Cr."}}, {"text": "P. Rana. Atiqur Rehman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5429, "end_char": 5438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atiqur Rehman and C. P. Lal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "HDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TI1e Judgment of the Court was delivered oy\n\ni\\!a1alti\n\nr•I• of U.P.\n\nGAJI:HDRAGADKAR, C.\n\nJ. - Forty persons were Gai<ndra}ladkar charged with having committed several offences the\n\nc. I. principal one of which wa3 under section 302 read with s. 149 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5700, "end_char": 5711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5753, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5896, "end_char": 5902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 395 & 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6102, "end_char": 6120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6287, "end_char": 6293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MIUllbl", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6584, "end_char": 6591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MIUllbl\n\n'f.\n\nSt•I• of U .P.\n\nGaitndragll<ika\n\nC. I.\n\nAfter the learned trial Judge pronounced his judgment on the 31st December."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6821, "end_char": 6841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1962, the 35 accused persons who had been convicted by him preferred three appeals between them before the Allahabad High Court, whereas the sentences of death imposed dn I 0 accused persons by the learned trial Judge were submitted to the said High Court for confirmation."}}, {"text": "29th November, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7971, "end_char": 7990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident which has given rise to the present criminal proceedings took place on the 29th November, 1961 in village Bilati Khet in the district of Jhansi at about 8 a.m.\n\nIt is clear that this village is cursed with keen rivalry and enmity between two factions."}}, {"text": "Bilati Khet", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8002, "end_char": 8013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident which has given rise to the present criminal proceedings took place on the 29th November, 1961 in village Bilati Khet in the district of Jhansi at about 8 a.m.\n\nIt is clear that this village is cursed with keen rivalry and enmity between two factions."}}, {"text": "Jhansi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8033, "end_char": 8039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident which has given rise to the present criminal proceedings took place on the 29th November, 1961 in village Bilati Khet in the district of Jhansi at about 8 a.m.\n\nIt is clear that this village is cursed with keen rivalry and enmity between two factions."}}, {"text": "Gayadin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8170, "end_char": 8177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One group was led by Gayadin who and four other members of his family were murdered on the said date."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Prasad alias Laxmi Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8544, "end_char": 8575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rival group was led by Laxmi Prasad alias Laxmi Narain who is one of the appellants in this Court."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8667, "end_char": 8679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the last election of the village Panchayat Laxmi Prasad succeeded as Pradhan of the village and defeated the candidate set up by Gayadin.", "canonical_name": "Laxmi Prasad"}}, {"text": "28th November, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8770, "end_char": 8789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th November, 1961, a boundary dispute led to an incident between the members of the two groups."}}, {"text": "State of U", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9303, "end_char": 9313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of U .P.\n\nis on this grim note that the incident of the 28th November ended.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF U. P"}}, {"text": "Bahoran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9431, "end_char": 9438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 'the 29th November in the e3rly morning, Bahoran, one of the sons of Gayadin, had gone out to ease himself.", "canonical_name": "Bahoran"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9736, "end_char": 9750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahoran retaliated this attack with his own pharsa and in the scuffle the nose of Laxmi Prasad was injured and it began to bleed; in fact,\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\na part of the nose was actually cut.", "canonical_name": "Gajendraga.tkar"}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10116, "end_char": 10126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that ~· 1ge, Ram Prasad and Dayaram rushed to the scene anrl infmmed them that Laxmi Prasad and his companions were all armed with guns, spears, swords, gandasas and lathis and were proceeding to the house of Gayadin determined to kill all the members of Gayadin's family.", "canonical_name": "Ram Pras.ad"}}, {"text": "Dayaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10131, "end_char": 10138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that ~· 1ge, Ram Prasad and Dayaram rushed to the scene anrl infmmed them that Laxmi Prasad and his companions were all armed with guns, spears, swords, gandasas and lathis and were proceeding to the house of Gayadin determined to kill all the members of Gayadin's family."}}, {"text": "Lxmi Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10525, "end_char": 10536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About that time, Lxmi Prasad and bis companions reached near the house of Gayadin whereon Laxmi Prasad fired a gun.", "canonical_name": "Laxmi Prasad"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10625, "end_char": 10633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati was carrying a large quantity of cartridges in the folds of his dhoti .and was instigating Laxmi Prasad to fire at everyone sitting near the fire to the north of the house and to extenninate the family of Gayadin."}}, {"text": "Brindaban", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11137, "end_char": 11146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brindaban, Radha Saran and Dayaram were hiding in different rooms of the house; the doors of these rooms\n\nMcualti ...\n\nStall of U.P.\n\nGajendragadkar\n\ne.1.", "canonical_name": "Brindaban"}}, {"text": "Radha Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11148, "end_char": 11159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brindaban, Radha Saran and Dayaram were hiding in different rooms of the house; the doors of these rooms\n\nMcualti ...\n\nStall of U.P.\n\nGajendragadkar\n\ne.1."}}, {"text": "Bahoran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11353, "end_char": 11360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahoran and Shiroman Singh, both sons of Gayadin, escaped through the tiled roof into the cattleshed of Harbans which is situated towards the south-east of Gayadin's house.", "canonical_name": "Bahoran"}}, {"text": "Shiroman Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11365, "end_char": 11379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahoran and Shiroman Singh, both sons of Gayadin, escaped through the tiled roof into the cattleshed of Harbans which is situated towards the south-east of Gayadin's house.", "canonical_name": "Shiroman Singh"}}, {"text": "Shiroman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11527, "end_char": 11535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiroman concealed himself in the godown whiie Bahoran concealed himself in the room in the upper storey where chaff had been .stored.", "canonical_name": "Shiroman Singh"}}, {"text": "Brindaban", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11686, "end_char": 11695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After killing Gayadin, Brindaban, Radha Saran and Dayaram, the assailants mercilessly dragged the bodies of the victims out of the house of Gayadin and began their search for Bahoran and other male inmates of the house.", "canonical_name": "Brindaban"}}, {"text": "Gori Dulaiya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11930, "end_char": 11942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the dead bodies were thus being dragged, Gori Dulaiya wife of Gayadin rushed after the assailants and implored them not to take the dead bodies away."}}, {"text": "Harbans", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12234, "end_char": 12241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On reaching 'the cattleshed of Harbans, the assailants broke open th~\n\nouter door of the house and entered into it."}}, {"text": "Shiroman Singo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12370, "end_char": 12384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They then injured Harbans and managed to discover Shiroman Singo who was promptly killed.", "canonical_name": "Shiroman Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12466, "end_char": 12474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The five dead bodies were then taken into the field of Bhagwati."}}, {"text": "Police Station Krichh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12991, "end_char": 13012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahoran came out of his hiding place and rushed to the Police Station Krichh and lodged the First Information Report at about 11 o'clock."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13261, "end_char": 13277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the first committal order passed on the 31st March, 1962 in the present proceedings referred to 35 assailants."}}, {"text": "14th May, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13429, "end_char": 13443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "five more persons were added to the list of assailants by the committal order made on the 14th May, 1962."}}, {"text": "Harbans", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13744, "end_char": 13751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injured persons Harbans, Ram Prasad, Mansa Ram and Smt."}}, {"text": "Mansa Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13765, "end_char": 13774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injured persons Harbans, Ram Prasad, Mansa Ram and Smt."}}, {"text": "Court of the First Additional Sessions Judge at Jhansi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14058, "end_char": 14112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That 1ed to the several charges framed against 40 persons and ultimately their trial in the Court of the First Additional Sessions Judge at Jhansi."}}, {"text": "Bahoran", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15079, "end_char": 15086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Basanti Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15095, "end_char": 15106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Dayal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15114, "end_char": 15129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Prabhu Dayal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15137, "end_char": 15149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "P.ancham", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15157, "end_char": 15165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Swarup Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15173, "end_char": 15185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Kasturi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15194, "end_char": 15201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Tha)mr Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15210, "end_char": 15220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Shyamlal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15229, "end_char": 15237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Dropadi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15262, "end_char": 15269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Kishori Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15282, "end_char": 15293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 12 persons who gave direct evidence against the appellants and their co-accused persons are: Bahoran P.W. 1; Basanti Lal P.W.2: Rameshwar Dayal P.W.3; Prabhu Dayal P.W.5; P.ancham P.W.6: Swarup Singh P.W.14; Kasturi P.W.15: Tha)mr Das P.W.16: Shyamlal P.W.17; Harbans P.W.18; Dropadi P.W.19: and Kishori Lal\n\nP.W.20."}}, {"text": "Prabhu Day.al", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15427, "end_char": 15440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has critically examined the evidence given by these witnesses and has held that the evidence of Bahoran and Prabhu Day.al may be left out of account as it appeared to the High Court that the said evidence suffered from material infirmities.", "canonical_name": "Prabhu Day.al"}}, {"text": "s.302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17017, "end_char": 17022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17028, "end_char": 17033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sawhney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17423, "end_char": 17430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these appeals, Mr. Sawhney who has addrc; ed the principal argumt before us on behalf of the appellants, has urged that the High Court has failed in discharging its duty properly when it dealt with the appeals brought before it by the appellants and decided to confirm the senrMces of death imposed on 10 of the accused persons.", "canonical_name": "Sawhney"}}, {"text": "s.374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17971, "end_char": 17976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17984, "end_char": 18010, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18278, "end_char": 18289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18729, "end_char": 18734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.375", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18766, "end_char": 18771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19416, "end_char": 19422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19424, "end_char": 19429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19611, "end_char": 19616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s.302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20166, "end_char": 20171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20252, "end_char": 20269, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Masalti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20518, "end_char": 20525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with such appeals 0r reference proceedings where the question of confirming a death sentence is involved, the High Court has also\n\nMasalti\n\nState of U.J'.", "canonical_name": "MASALTI"}}, {"text": "State of U.J", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20527, "end_char": 20539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with such appeals 0r reference proceedings where the question of confirming a death sentence is involved, the High Court has also\n\nMasalti\n\nState of U.J'.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF U. P"}}, {"text": "Ram Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22883, "end_char": 22893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These witnesses are: Ram Prasad, Mansa Ram and\n\nRani Dulhan."}}, {"text": "Mansa Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22895, "end_char": 22904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These witnesses are: Ram Prasad, Mansa Ram and\n\nRani Dulhan."}}, {"text": "Rani Dulhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22910, "end_char": 22921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These witnesses are: Ram Prasad, Mansa Ram and\n\nRani Dulhan."}}, {"text": "Ram Pras.ad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23206, "end_char": 23217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government counsel appearing for the prosecution had made an application to the trial Court expressing his inability to examine the three witnesses for the reason that Ram Pras.ad and Mansa Ram had been won over by the defence and Rani Dulhan, the widow of one of the victims, was suffering fro~:i such mental shock that she was unable to depose coherently.", "canonical_name": "Ram Pras.ad"}}, {"text": "Rani Dulhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23269, "end_char": 23280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government counsel appearing for the prosecution had made an application to the trial Court expressing his inability to examine the three witnesses for the reason that Ram Pras.ad and Mansa Ram had been won over by the defence and Rani Dulhan, the widow of one of the victims, was suffering fro~:i such mental shock that she was unable to depose coherently."}}, {"text": "s.540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23697, "end_char": 23702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24616, "end_char": 24621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25569, "end_char": 25577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26202, "end_char": 26210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27275, "end_char": 27280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 540", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28876, "end_char": 28882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sawhney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29125, "end_char": 29132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, we are not prepared to allow Mr.\n\nSawhney to take us through theevidence in the case on the ground that one important contention raised by the defence has not been examined by the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Sawhney"}}, {"text": "Gajendraga.tkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29796, "end_char": 29811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendraga.tkar\n\nc. J.\n\nMasalti\n\n\"· State of UP.", "canonical_name": "Gajendraga.tkar"}}, {"text": "State of UP", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29832, "end_char": 29843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendraga.tkar\n\nc. J.\n\nMasalti\n\n\"· State of UP.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF U. P"}}, {"text": "Prabhu Day11I", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32319, "end_char": 32332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the\n\npresent case, the High Court has in fact refused to act upon the evidence of Bahoran and Prabhu Day11I, because it appeared to the High Court that the evidence of these two witnesses suffered from serious infirmities.", "canonical_name": "Prabhu Day.al"}}, {"text": "argues that under the Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32560, "end_char": 32601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34137, "end_char": 34142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, it was observed by Sinha, J., who spoke for the Court, that it is well-settled that mere presence in an assembly does not make a person, who is present, a member of an unlawful assembly unless it is shown that he had done something or omitted to do something which would make him a member of an unlawful assembly, or unless the case falls under s.142, I.P.C. The argument is\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 181\n\nllJIU\n\nJl-111\n\n\"· sof V.I.\n\nMtualtl\n\nY.· Slllte of U.P.\n\nGajendragadkor\n\nC. I.\n\nthat evidence adduced by the prosecution in the present case does not assign any specific part to most of the accused persons in relation to any overt act, and so, the High Court was in error in holding that the appellants were members of an unlawful .aSsembly."}}, {"text": "s.142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34463, "end_char": 34468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34470, "end_char": 34475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Baladin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35447, "end_char": 35454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It .appears that in the case of Baladin('), the members of the family of the appellants and other residents of the village had assembled together; some of them shared the common object of the unlawful assembly, while others were merely passive witnesses."}}, {"text": "s.141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36103, "end_char": 36108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36119, "end_char": 36130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36476, "end_char": 36482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36708, "end_char": 36713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "argues that under the Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37205, "end_char": 37246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39101, "end_char": 39106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39108, "end_char": 39113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Miualti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39159, "end_char": 39166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, it was observed by Sinha, J., who spoke for the Court, that it is well-settled that mere presence in an assembly does not make a person, who is present, a member of an unlawful assembly unless it is shown that he had done something or omitted to do something which would make him a member of an unlawful assembly, or unless the case mils under s.142, I.P.C.\n\nThe argument is\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 181\n\nMiualti\n\nStal• of U .P.\n\nGaje\"'1ragad/ru\n\nc. J.\n\n1'DMlltl ...\n\nS111,."}}, {"text": "S111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39222, "end_char": 39226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39788, "end_char": 39794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39906, "end_char": 39912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40360, "end_char": 40366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40570, "end_char": 40574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this argument, Mr. Sawhney has relied on certain observations made by Bose J. who spoke for the Courr-in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab(')."}}, {"text": "Ram Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43436, "end_char": 43445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 Ram Saran who is aged 18; accused No.", "canonical_name": "Ram Pras.ad"}}, {"text": "Asha Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43477, "end_char": 43485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11 Asha Ram who is aged 23 and accused No."}}, {"text": "Dea prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43520, "end_char": 43530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 Dea prasad who is aged 24, Ram Saran and Asha Ram are the sons of Bhagwati who is accused No."}}, {"text": "Simiiarly", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43661, "end_char": 43670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simiiarly, Deo prasad has also been sentenced to death."}}, {"text": "C. V. K. RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44875, "end_char": 44887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. K. RAO\n\nDENTU BHASKARA RAO\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., M. HIDAYATULI.AH, K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "DENTU BHASKARA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44889, "end_char": 44907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. K. RAO\n\nDENTU BHASKARA RAO\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., M. HIDAYATULI.AH, K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULI.AH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44939, "end_char": 44955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. K. RAO\n\nDENTU BHASKARA RAO\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., M. HIDAYATULI.AH, K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44964, "end_char": 44973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. K. RAO\n\nDENTU BHASKARA RAO\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., M. HIDAYATULI.AH, K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44978, "end_char": 44985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. K. RAO\n\nDENTU BHASKARA RAO\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., M. HIDAYATULI.AH, K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45012, "end_char": 45044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 1(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45062, "end_char": 45069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45308, "end_char": 45317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45699, "end_char": 45711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_152_158_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "1'64\n\nMualtl\n\n\"· Stat• of U.P.\n\nGa1endragadkar\n\nc. J.\n\nMay, 4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nyoung men must have joined the unlawful assembly under pressure and influence of the elders of their respective families. The list of accused persons shows that the unlawful assembly was constituted by members of different families and having regard to the manner in which these factions ordinarily conduct themselves in villages, it ould not be unreasonable to hold that these three young men must have been compelled to join the unlawful assembly that morning by their elders, and so, we think that the ends of justice would be met if the sentences of death imposed on them are modified into sentences of life imprisonment. Accordingly, we confirm the orders of convictio:i and sentence passed against all the appellants except accused Nos. 9, 11 and 16 in whose cases the sentences are altered to those of imprisonment for life. In the result, the appeals are dismissed, subj.:ct to the said modification.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nC. V. K. RAO\n\nDENTU BHASKARA RAO\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., M. HIDAYATULI.AH, K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nRepresentation of the People Act (XLlll of 1951), s. 1(d)-Scope of-\n\n\"ln tla1 cour1e of trade or businesl'', Mea1ting of-Mining lca.Yt- Right of Government to pre-emption of minerals-If a contract for 1upply of good• ~1 leuee.\n\nThe respondent obtained a mining lca.se from the State Government.\n\nClause 21 of the lease reserved to the Government the right to prior purchase of the minerals raised by the lessee. While the lease was subsisting, the respondent stood for election to the State Legislative Assembly and was elected. The appellant, his closest competitor, challenged the election by an election petition on the ground, inter alia, that the respon'dent was disqualified under section 7(d) of the Representation of People Act (XI.Ill ot 1951), because he had a contract with the Government for 1upply of goocla.\n\nHELD: the petition must be dismissed.\n\nThe disqualifi:ation which rcsulta from the section b conditioned by three circumstance.. First, there must be a subsisting contract betwocn the appropriate Government and the candidate. Then the contract must be in the course of the trade or busineso of the candidate and, finally it n•ust be int<r alia for the supply of goods to such Government. Held in the case th8.t as the mining lease was subsisting. the contract if any, was also subsisting. Further that the mining lease, if it wa.s a contract, wu in the course of the business of the respondent It was not necessary that a course of business based upon other transactiom must have lint existed hr.fore .the offending contract could be sa:d to be in the course of business. fhe contract itself could be the start of the business.\n\nHeld therefore that the mining leas<i WM not a contract to supply &oods to the Government. There was only a right in the Government to pre.empt the minerals and iessee could not begin delivery to the Government until Governmnt served a notice on him stating the quantity pre-empted and the time within which the supply should be made. This was only\n\na reservation of a right of pre-emption which did not amount to a contract for the supply of goods which could be said to subsist between tho partieo.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1072 of 1963.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated April l 0. 1963 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Special Appeal No. 52 of 1962.\n\nK. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the respondent.\n\nMay 4,\n\n1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n19\"\n\nc. v. K. • .....\n\nDent• B~\n\nRao\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-The respondent Dentu Bhaskara HidaJat11l1\"\" I Rao was returned to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly from Kakinada constituency at the last general election. The appellant C. V. K. Rao was his closest competitor. There were two other candidates but they obtained very few votes and they have not shown any further interest. The appellant filed an election petition to question the election of the respondent on many grounds: one such ground was that the respondent was disqualified\n\n-.:. V. K. Rao v.\n\nO>entu Bhaskara\n\nRao\n\nSfidayatullah J.\n\nunder s. 7 ( d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951). The respondent had obtained a mining lease from the State of Andhra Pradesh on Apri, 13, 1960, though on the date he filed his nomination paper he had not begun operations under that lease. The appellant took objection to the nomination of the respondent on the ground that he held a contract from the Andhra Pradesh Government within the prohibition of s. 7 ( d) of the Act, but the Returning Officer over-ruled his objection.\n\nThe Election Tribunal later _held that he was disqualifkd J, mder s. 7 ( d) of Act 43 of 1951 and declared the election void.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh reversed the decision and the present appeal has been filed on a certilicate granted by the High Court.\n\nSection 7(d) reads as fol!ows:--\n\n\"7. A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State--\n\n(a) (b)\n\n(c)\n\n• • •\n\n• • • • • •\n\n(d) if there subsists a contract entere<l into in the course of his tradi: or business by him with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods to, or for the executi(ln of any works undertaken by, that Government;\"\n\nThe mining lease was in the standard form and after secting out the consideration for the lease, it described in Pai ts I tc III, the area of the lease, the description of lile area, liberties, powers and privileges to be exercised and enjoyed by the lessee and the restrictions and conditions as to their exercise. In Part IV it described the liberties, powers and privileges reserved to the. State Government and in Parts V and VI the rents and royalties reserved by the lease and certain other provisions relating tg them.\n\nPart VII then dealt with the covenants of the lessee in respect of payment\n\nof rents, royalties, taxes etc. One such covenant was in clause 21 and was headed \"Right of Pre-emption\" and it conferred on the State Government a right of pre-emption of the minerals lying in or upon the land dei; nised or elsewhere under the control of the lessee. ThJlt clause was interpreted by the Tribunal as a contract entered in the course ot' trade or business by the respondent with the State Government for the supply of goods to that Government.\n\nThe High Court held that there was no such contract.\n\nThe disqualification which results from s. 7 ( d) is conditioned by a number of circumstances. First, there must be a subsisting contract (this is to say in actual existence) between the appropriate Government and the candidate.\n\nThen the contract must \\>e in the course of the trade or business of the candidate and, finally, it must be inter alia for the supply of goods to such Government The appropriate Government according to the definition of the expression is te Government of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nThe High Court in reaching its conclusion interpreted cl. 21 of Part VII of the lease and held that the mining lease was not a contract, that clause 21 did not amount to a contract and that cl. 21 even if a contract was not a contract for the supply of goods to the Government.\n\nThis conclusion is assailed by the appellant. It is convenient to quote the clause at this stage:\n\n\"21. (a) The State Government shall from time to time and at all times duing the said term have the right (to be exercised by notice in writing to the lessee) of pre-emption of the said minerals (and all products thereof) lying in or upon the said lands he!eby demised or elsewhere under the control of the lessee and the lessee shall with all possible expedition deliver all minerals or products or minerals purchased by the State Government under the power conferred by this provision in the quantities, at the times in the manner and at the\n\nplace specified in the notice exercisin11 the said right. '\n\nC. V. K. Rao\n\nDtntu Bhaskaro\n\nRizo\n\nHidayatullah 1.\n\noC. V. K. Rao\n\nv. ofJ•ntu Blaaskaro\n\nRao\n\nHidayatullah I.\n\n(b) Should tile Jight to pre-emption conferred by this present provision be exercised and a vessel chartered to carry the minerals or products thereof procured on behalf of the State Gov ernment or the Central Government be detained on demurrage at the port oCloading the lessee shall pay the amount due for demurrage according to the terms of the charter party of such vessel unless the State Government shall be satisfied that the delay is due to causes beyond the control of the lessee.\n\n( c) The price to be paid for all minerals or products of minerals taken in pre-emption by the State Government in exercie of the right hereby conferred shall be the fair market price prevailing at the time of pre-emption provided that in order to assist in arriving at the said fair market price the lessee shall, if so required, furnish to the State Government for the confidential information of the Government particulars of quantities, desqiptions and prices of the said minerals or producu for carriage oI the same and shall produce to such officer or officers as may be directed by the State Government original or authenticated copies of contracts and charter parties entered into for the sale of freightage of such minerals or products.\n\n(d) • • • .,,\n\nMr. K.' R. Chaudhury contended that under this clause there was a standing contract for the supply of goods and all that Government had to do was to send !1 notice to the respondent and he was compelled to supply the goods to Government. He pointed out that from the time the lease was granted Government was asking the respondent to commence operations to raise the minerals but the respondent avoided working the mine probably to save himself from the disqualification. According to Mr. Chaudhury, it mattered not whether the mine was worked or not, but\n\nwhat mattered was that there was a subsisting contract for the supply of minerals to the appropriate Government.\n\nMr. A. Vishwanatha Sastri, in reply, contended that the mining lease could not be regarded as a contract and further that it was not 'in the course of' the trade or business of the respondent, and finally that, in any event, it was not a contract for the supply of goods.\n\nThat it was in the course of business of the respo.ndent almost goes without saying.\n\nIt is not necessary, as Mr. Sastri suggested, that a course of business ba, ed upon other transactions must first exist before the offending contract can be said to be in the course of business. That contract may itself be the start of the business and the words 'in the course of the business' would still be apt. As the mining lease ; as subsisting, the contract, if any there be, was also subsisting and there is no doubt on that aspect of the matter. The question is whether the provisions of cl. 21 bring about a contrJct for the. supply of goods.\n\nThis question can be broken into two which are: (a) whether cl. 21 can be regarded as a contract and (b) whether it can be regarded as a coatract for supply of goods. Clause 21 is invariably inserte.d in every mining lease. It reserves to the Government the right to the minerals which vest in Government bu( which are allowed to be raised by the lessee holding the lease.\n\nThe lease is, in one sense, a contract be!v:ccn the Government and the Jessee because there is consideration on both sides and an offer and acceptance. There are obligations created by it. some of which are contractual even though some may be regarded as arising from the conditions of the grant.\n\nThe mining lease without cl. 21 cannot possibly be described as a contract for the supply of goods.\n\nWithout that clause there would neither be a mention of goods nor of their supply. If the lease is to be read as satisfying the disqualification ins. 7(d), cl. 21 alone can satisfy it. Clause 21 speaks of a right of the Government to pre-empt the minerals and all products thereof lying in or around the land demised or elsewhere under the control of the lessee.\n\nThere is, however, no concluded contract in respect of any goods because it hardly needs to be said that relying upon this clause the lessee cannot begin delivery of the ore to the Govent. He can do so only if the Government\n\nC. V. K. Rao\n\nDentu Bhiukara\n\nRao\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nC. V. K. Rao v.\n\nDtntu Bhaskara\n\nRao\n\nBidayatullah J.\n\nMay 5\n\nserves a notice on him stating the quantity pre-empted and the time within which the supply is to be made. The clause, however, does not make it obligatory on Government to prC-empt any quantity of mineral or at all.\n\nThere is no obligation to buy nor is there any compulsion on the pan ot the lessee to sell unless asked.\n\nIn these circumstances, the clause does no -more than to keep intact a right of the Government to obtain the minerals or their products as and when Government requires in preference to others.\n\nTill Government makes up its mind and serves a notice there is no obligation to make any deliveries and even though the word 'subsists' is a word of wide import, it cannot be said that a contract for the sale of goods subsists because a contract requires an offer and its acceptance and is not a mere reservation of a right.\n\nTaking the most liberal view of the matter it is clear that\n\ncl. 21 did not bring into being a contract for the supply of goods. All that it did was to reserve to the Government the right to prior purchase of the minerals raised by the respondent.\n\nThe rese11; ation of such rights docs not amount to a contract for the supply of goods which can be said to subsist between the parties. The High Court was, therefore, right in reversing the decision of the Election Tribunal. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nUNION OF INDIA v.\n\nABDUL JALIL AND ORS.\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)\n\nForest Act-\"Reserved forest\"-Tripura Act replaced by Indian Forest Act-No preliminaries prescribed under Tripura Act-Notification under it whether can he deemed to be under Indian Forest Art-\n\nTripura Act and Indian Forest Act, object and purpose-Corresponding provisions-Indian Forest Act, 1927 (Act 16 of 19271,", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "RAO\n\nDENTU BHASKARA RAO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1025, "end_char": 1048, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DENTU BHASKARA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1071, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1105, "end_char": 1118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1119, "end_char": 1126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1131, "end_char": 1150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1153, "end_char": 1185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 1(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1203, "end_char": 1210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1449, "end_char": 1458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1840, "end_char": 1852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act", "statute": "Representation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3494, "end_char": 3509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "K.' R. Chaudhury"}}, {"text": "V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3534, "end_char": 3554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. V. R. Tatachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3559, "end_char": 3577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3669, "end_char": 3671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n19\"\n\nc. v. K. • .....\n\nDent• B~\n\nRao\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-The respondent Dentu Bhaskara HidaJat11l1\"\" I Rao was returned to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly from Kakinada constituency at the last general election."}}, {"text": "Dentu Bhaskara HidaJat11l1\"\" I Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3728, "end_char": 3762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n19\"\n\nc. v. K. • .....\n\nDent• B~\n\nRao\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-The respondent Dentu Bhaskara HidaJat11l1\"\" I Rao was returned to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly from Kakinada constituency at the last general election."}}, {"text": "C. V. K. Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant C. V. K. Rao was his closest competitor.", "canonical_name": "C. V. K. RAO"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4283, "end_char": 4321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4388, "end_char": 4411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent had obtained a mining lease from the State of Andhra Pradesh on Apri, 13, 1960, though on the date he filed his nomination paper he had not begun operations under that lease."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant took objection to the nomination of the respondent on the ground that he held a contract from the Andhra Pradesh Government within the prohibition of s. 7 ( d) of the Act, but the Returning Officer over-ruled his objection."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4690, "end_char": 4694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4831, "end_char": 4835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 7(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5041, "end_char": 5053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6167, "end_char": 6176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6664, "end_char": 6668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7095, "end_char": 7123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then the contract must \\>e in the course of the trade or business of the candidate and, finally, it must be inter alia for the supply of goods to such Government The appropriate Government according to the definition of the expression is te Government of Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "cl. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7180, "end_char": 7186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7268, "end_char": 7277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7316, "end_char": 7322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. V. K. Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8110, "end_char": 8122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. K. Rao\n\nDtntu Bhaskaro\n\nRizo\n\nHidayatullah 1.", "canonical_name": "C. V. K. RAO"}}, {"text": "K.' R. Chaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9479, "end_char": 9495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K.' R. Chaudhury contended that under this clause there was a standing contract for the supply of goods and all that Government had to do was to send !", "canonical_name": "K.' R. Chaudhury"}}, {"text": "Chaudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9964, "end_char": 9973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Mr. Chaudhury, it mattered not whether the mine was worked or not, but\n\nwhat mattered was that there was a subsisting contract for the supply of minerals to the appropriate Government."}}, {"text": "A. Vishwanatha Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10150, "end_char": 10171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. Vishwanatha Sastri, in reply, contended that the mining lease could not be regarded as a contract and further that it was not 'in the course of' the trade or business of the respondent, and finally that, in any event, it was not a contract for the supply of goods."}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10533, "end_char": 10539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary, as Mr. Sastri suggested, that a course of business ba, ed upon other transactions must first exist before the offending contract can be said to be in the course of business."}}, {"text": "cl. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11002, "end_char": 11008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11119, "end_char": 11125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11226, "end_char": 11235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11756, "end_char": 11762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11988, "end_char": 11994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12017, "end_char": 12026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. V. K. Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12422, "end_char": 12434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He can do so only if the Government\n\nC. V. K. Rao\n\nDentu Bhiukara\n\nRao\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nC. V. K. Rao v.\n\nDtntu Bhaskara\n\nRao\n\nBidayatullah J.\n\nMay 5\n\nserves a notice on him stating the quantity pre-empted and the time within which the supply is to be made.", "canonical_name": "C. V. K. RAO"}}, {"text": "Dentu Bhiukara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12436, "end_char": 12450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He can do so only if the Government\n\nC. V. K. Rao\n\nDentu Bhiukara\n\nRao\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nC. V. K. Rao v.\n\nDtntu Bhaskara\n\nRao\n\nBidayatullah J.\n\nMay 5\n\nserves a notice on him stating the quantity pre-empted and the time within which the supply is to be made."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12457, "end_char": 12469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He can do so only if the Government\n\nC. V. K. Rao\n\nDentu Bhiukara\n\nRao\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nC. V. K. Rao v.\n\nDtntu Bhaskara\n\nRao\n\nBidayatullah J.\n\nMay 5\n\nserves a notice on him stating the quantity pre-empted and the time within which the supply is to be made.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Bidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12512, "end_char": 12524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He can do so only if the Government\n\nC. V. K. Rao\n\nDentu Bhiukara\n\nRao\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nC. V. K. Rao v.\n\nDtntu Bhaskara\n\nRao\n\nBidayatullah J.\n\nMay 5\n\nserves a notice on him stating the quantity pre-empted and the time within which the supply is to be made.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "cl. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13441, "end_char": 13447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13963, "end_char": 13978, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13983, "end_char": 14005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14066, "end_char": 14083, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14222, "end_char": 14239, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Corresponding provisions-Indian Forest Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14260, "end_char": 14308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_158_178_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "C. V. K. Rao v.\n\nDtntu Bhaskara\n\nRao\n\nBidayatullah J.\n\nMay 5\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nserves a notice on him stating the quantity pre-empted and the time within which the supply is to be made. The clause, however, does not make it obligatory on Government to prC-empt any quantity of mineral or at all.\n\nThere is no obligation to buy nor is there any compulsion on the pan ot the lessee to sell unless asked.\n\nIn these circumstances, the clause does no -more than to keep intact a right of the Government to obtain the minerals or their products as and when Government requires in preference to others.\n\nTill Government makes up its mind and serves a notice there is no obligation to make any deliveries and even though the word 'subsists' is a word of wide import, it cannot be said that a contract for the sale of goods subsists because a contract requires an offer and its acceptance and is not a mere reservation of a right.\n\nTaking the most liberal view of the matter it is clear that\n\ncl. 21 did not bring into being a contract for the supply of goods. All that it did was to reserve to the Government the right to prior purchase of the minerals raised by the respondent.\n\nThe rese11; ation of such rights docs not amount to a contract for the supply of goods which can be said to subsist between the parties. The High Court was, therefore, right in reversing the decision of the Election Tribunal. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nUNION OF INDIA v.\n\nABDUL JALIL AND ORS.\n\n(M. HIDAYATULLAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)\n\nForest Act-\"Reserved forest\"-Tripura Act replaced by Indian Forest Act-No preliminaries prescribed under Tripura Act-Notification under it whether can he deemed to be under Indian Forest Art-\n\nTripura Act and Indian Forest Act, object and purpose-Corresponding provisions-Indian Forest Act, 1927 (Act 16 of 19271,\n\nCh:J. II and IV, Tripura Forest Act, 1257 (1297?) T.E. (Tripura Act 2 of 1251 T.E. 1297?) s. 5.\n\nThe respondents in these appeals were convicted by Magistrates for offiences under s. 26(1) of the Indian Forest Act.\n\nAppeals were filed to the Sessions Judge, where the respondents raised the contention that the forest areas in which the alleged offences were committed were not \"Reserve forests\" within the meaning of the Act.\n\nFor establishing that these \"reserves\" were \"reserved forests\" within the Indian Act, the appellant relied on two circumstances.\n\nFirst, there 'vas a Forest Act promulgated by the Ruler of Triptira .State (Act 2 of 1257 T.E. 1297 T.E. ?) which contained provisions somewhat analogous to those contained in the Indian Act. Next, s. 5 of the Tripura Act enabled the State Government to declare by notifications published in the State\n\nGazette, the boundaries of the forest areas to be governed by the State Act. Such notifications were published by which the boundaries of the reserves of the forests in question \\Vere defined. The appellant urged that the Tripura Act was replaced by the Indian Forest Act by reason of legis4 lative provisions upon the merger of the native State of Tripura with the Dominion of India, and that the notifications under the Tripura Act which were continued in force by these same provisions rendered these re'5ervcs \"Reserved forests\" under the Indian Forest Act. The Sessions Judge held that by reason of these notifications the forest areas became .. reserved forests\" under the relevant provisions of the Indian Forest Act and dis missed the appeals. Thereafter, revisions were filed before the Judicial Commissioner, who tliffering from the Sessions Judge held that they were not \"reserved forests\" and directed the acquittal of the respondents. On ap:Jeal by special leave:\n\nHELD: (i) From the prov1s1ons of the Indian Forest Ac.t, 1t wouid be seen that it is the notification under s. 20 after complying with the procedure prescribed by the other sections of Chapter II commencing with s. 4 that constitutes a forest area \"a reserved forest'' within the Act.\n\n(ii) The fact that under the Tripura Act there \\\\'ere no preliminaries prescribed before a forest could be notified as a reserved forest does nor detract from such a notification being a notification under the Indian Forest Act.\n\n(iii) In substance the object and purpose of the Tripura Act was the protection of particular trees-the seven types of trees specified in s. 4.\n\nThe notification under s. 5 is for the purpose of constituting areas where these types would be protected.\n\nThe penal provisions enacted are for ensuring the protection of these trees.\n\n'iv) Tne prime purpose of Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act is the constitution of reserved forests in which ( !) all private rights within the reserved area are completely eliminated by their being bought up where these arc ascertained to exist by payment of compensation, (2) the entire\n\narea being devoted to siviculture, every tree in the forest being protected\n\nUnion of Illd;.\n\nfrom lnJUfY and within the scope of the penal provision contained in s. 26.\n\nIn other wvords, the reservation here is to the \"forest ar-...a\" as such and not tbe protection of the particular specified trees or species of trec,, in such a forest.\n\n(v) The object of Ch. IV of the Indian Forest Act is the protection of particular trees and the setting apart of particular area1 as protected forests for the purpose of ensuring the gtowth and maintenance of such trees. The object sought to be achieved by the reservation in Ch. IV is exactly similar to that which is sought to be achieved by the Tripura Act.\n\nOnly t.h..:- Tript:ra Act makes the cutting of protected trees even outside a for~:.t tn cff!ncc, whereas there is no such provision under the Indian Forest A.ct.\n\n(vi) fhe notification under s. S of the Tripura Act would constitute the area in question only a.'i a \"protected\" fort under Ch. IV of tbie\n\nlndi~; i Forest Act and not as a \"reserved\" forest under s. 20 contained in Ch. !l of the Act.\n\n(vii) The Judicial Commissioner was right in considering that the provis!on in the !; idian Fori!st Act \"corresponding .. to the Tripura Forest Act under which the notifications fixing the boundaries of these forests in question \\Yere issued was that as regards \"a protected forest\" under Ch. IV and not \"reserved forest\" within s. 20 contained in Ch. Il.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal\n\n~OS. 39, 49 of 1962.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 26, 1960 of the Court of Judicial Commissioner of Tripura at Agartala in Criminal Revision Nos. 9, 8, 16, 22, 21, 32, 23, 18, 20, 24 and 17 of 1960.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. N. Mukerjee and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant (in all the appeals).\n\nP. K. Chauerjee, for the respondents (in Appeals Nos. 39, 42, 23, 46. 43 and 49 of 1962).\n\nMay 5, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:\n\nAyyan1ar I.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-The respondents in these several appeals were prosecuted before Magistrates in Tripura for offences under s. 26 (I) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment and fine.\n\nTheir appeals to , the learned Sessions Judge, Tripura having been dismissed, they preferred Criminal Revision Petitions to the Judicial Coou-niMiOD.er, Tripura. The learned Judicial\n\nCommissioner allowed their revisions by a common judgment and directed their acquittal. From these orders of acquittal the Union of India has filed these appeals by virtue of special leave granted by this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nBefore proceeding to narrate the facts which have led to these appeals it is necessary to mention that three of these 11 appeals----Criminal Appeals 40, 41 and 45 of 1962 have become infructuous.\n\nThe notices issued to the respondents in Appeals 40 and 45 of 1962 of the filing of the appeals could not be served on them as it was reported that they had left for Pakistan.\n\nThe appeals could not accordingly prosecuted. In regard to Criminal Appeal 41 of. 1962 it is reported that the accused died pending the hearing of the appeals and hence the appeal has abated. We are, therefore, concerned only with the other 8 appeals.\n\nThe material clauses of s. 26 (1) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 for contravention of which the respondents in the several appeals were prosecuted read:\n\n\"26. ( 1) Any person who-\n\n(a) makes any fresh clearing prohibited by section 5. or who, in a reserved forest- ( d) trespasses or pastures cattle, or permits cattle to trespass:\n\n(e) (f)\n\n(g) (h)\n\n51 S.C.-11.\n\nfells, girdles, lops, taps or burns any tree or strips off the bark or leaves from. or otherwise damages, the same:\n\nclears or breaks up any land for cultivation or any other purpose;\n\nshall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both, in addition to such com-\n\nUnio11 of lndi'-\n\nv, Abdul lalil\n\nAyya11gar /.\n\nUnion of India v.\n\nAbdul Jalil\n\nAyyangar 1.\n\npensation for damage done to the forest as the convicting Court may direct to be paid.\"\n\nThe magistrate convicted some of the accused respondents of offences under els. (a) and ( d) others of offences under els. (d) & (h). '\n\nIt is common ground that in order to constitute an offence under s. 26 (I ) the acts specified in the clauses of the sections should be committed in an area which is a. \"reserved forest\" under the Act. We might point out that if the area concerned was a reserve forest, the guilt of the respondents would practically be made out and their conviction by the Magistrates, confirmed by the Sessions Judge, Tripura might have to be upheld. The principal, if not the sole question for consideration in the appeals, however, i; whether the forest area where the respondents were held to have committed the acts alleged against them was such a \"reserve forest\".\n\nBefore, however, dealing with that question, it would be convenient to set out very briefly the facts which have given rise to these prosecutions. The forests wherein the several respondents are stated to have committed the offences set out in the clauses of s.26 ( 1) of the Act quoted above are comprised in three distinct areas in the former Indian State of Tripura. These three areas are known,\" respectively, as the Garjichhera reserve, Chandrapur reserve and the North Sonamura reserve. In April, 1958 an officer of the Forest Department went on circuit duty in these forest areas and found that the several accused had cleared the forests, reclaimed some land and had dug tanks for the purpose of cultivation and had made homesteads there. On . the averment that these acts on the part of the several accused who are respondents in the several appeals constituted offences under s. 26(1 )(a) and (h) and in some cases under s. 26(1)(a), (d) and (h) and in still some others under s. 26(1 )(d), (f) and (h), the accused were produced in the courts of the Magistrates having jurisdiction. The accused admitted that they had made homesteads and were living in structures constructed at the places where they were found and the only defence then raised was that they were entitled\n\nto do so under a claim of jote rights on the lands. No evidence was, however, produced by any of the accused to substantiate their claim to trespass on and plough-up and cultivate and erect homesteads on the lands on which they were found squatting and the learned Magistrates holding that while the prosecution had made out their case, the accused had not established their defence, found tnc accused guilty and passed appropriate sentences on them. Appeals were filed against these convictions by the several accused to the learned Sessions Judge of Tripura. At that stage the accused raised the contention that the forest areas comprised in the Garjichhara, Chandrapur and North Sonapurn reserves were not \"Reserve forests\" within the meaning of the Act. For establishing that these three \"reserves\" were \"reserved forests\" within the Indian Act, the prosecution relied on two circumstances. First, there was a Forest Act promulgated by the Ruler of the Tripura State (Act 2 of 1257 TE 1297 T.E.?) which contained provisions somewhat analogous to those contained in the Indian Act. Next, s. 5 of the Tripura Act enabled the State Government te> declare by notifications published in the Stule Gazette, the boundaries of the forest areas to be governed by the State Act.\n\nThere were three such notifications published in the Tripura State Gazette in 1346 and 1349 T.E. corresponding to 1936 and 1938 by which the boundaries of the three reserves of the Garjichhera, Chandrapnr and North Sonamura forests were defined.\n\nThe contention urged by the prosecution was that the Tripura Act was replaced by the Indian Forest Act by reason of legislative provisions to which wrc: shall advert later and that the notifications under the Tripura Act which were continued in force by these same provisions rendered these three reserves \"Reserved forests\" under the Indian Forest Act. We shall have to sot out the terms of the Act as well as of the notifications later but it i> sufficient to mention at this stage that the places where thQ respondents cleared the forests and built their homeste.li!s were admittedly within one or other of these three reserves.\n\nThe respondents in Appeals 39, 43, 47 and 49 had trespassed into the Garjichhera re.erve, while those concerned in appeals 42, 46 and 48 had trespassed into the Chandrapur reserve, and the respondent in appeal 44 was found to have\n\nUnion of India v.\n\nAbdul Jalil\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n196'\n\nUnion of lntiia\n\nV. 11.oaut 1a1n\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nommitted a similar offence in respect of the forest described as the North Sonamura reserve. When these three notifications were produced before the learned Sessions Judae he 0 held that by reason of these notifications the three forest areas became \"reserved forests\" under the relevant provisions of the Indian Forest Act and he therefore upheld the order of the Magistrate convicting the accused and dismissed the appeals of the several accused. Thereafter revisions were filed to the Judicial Commissioner, Tripura.\n\nThe same question of law viz., whether having regard to the terms and provisions of the Tripura Forest Act, the notifications setting out the boundaries of the three reserves constituted these \"reserves\" \"reserve forests\" within the Indian Forest Act, was again debated before the learned Judicial Commissioner. the learned Judicial Commissioner differing from the Sessions Judge held that they were not, and on this finding, directed the acquittal of the several accused.\n\nIt is the correctness of this conclusion of the learned Judicial Commissioner that is challenged in these appeals.\n\nIt would be seen from the above narrative that the question for consideration is whether the areas where the offences are said to haye been committed were within \"reserve forests\" within the meaning of the Indian Forest Act.\n\nOn the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act, \"reserve forests\" are those areas of forest land which are constituted as \"reserve forests\" under Ch. II of the Act.\n\nChapter II comprises ss. 3 to 27 and is headed \"Of Reserved Forests\". Section 3 empowers the State Government tn constitute \"any forest land or waste land which is the prow..rty of Government or over which the Government has proprietary rights or to the whole or in part of the forest produce to which the Government is entitled, a reserved forest in the manner hereinafter provided\". Section 4 requires that the State Government, when it has decided to constitute any land as a \"reserved forest\", should notify by the issue of a notification in the Official Gazette specifying the situation, limits, etc. of that land and declare its decision to constitute the land as \"a reserved forest\". Section 6 makes\n\nprovision for a proclamation of the notification issued under s. 4 by publication in several places, so that persons who might be affected by the issue of the notification may prefer objections thereto. Section 7 directs an enquiry by a Forest Settlement Officer of all claims made by persons in response to the publication of the notification under s. 6. Section 9 provides generally for the extinction of rights in respect of which no claim has been preferred under s. 6. Where claims are preferred and are found to be made out s. 11 provides for the acquisition of such rights or of lands in respect of which the rights are claimed in the manner provided by the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nThe next succeeding provisions of the Act enable appeals to be filed against the orders and for their hearing by the appellate authorities.\n\nThese are followed by s. 20 under which, after the stage of enquiry and decisions on claims made is completed, the State Government is directed to issue a notification in the Official Gazette \"specifying definitely, according to boundary-marks erected or otherwise the limits of the forest which is to be reserved, and declaring the same to be .reserved from a date fixed by the notification. Sub-section (2) of the section enacts:\n\n\"20.(2) From the date so fixed such forest sl1all be deemed to be a reserved forest.\"\n\nSection 21 provides for the translation of the notification and its publication in every town or village in the neighbourhood of the forest.\n\nThe next relevant provision is s. 26 which prohibits the doing of certain acts in \"a reserved forest\" and provides for punishment for these contraventions the material parts of which we have already set out.\n\nFrom these provisions it would be seen that it is the notification under s. 20 after complying with the procedure prescribed by the other sections of the Chapter commencing with s. 4 that constitutes a forest area \"a reserved forest\" within the Act.\n\nThe forests in the former State of Tripura were not declared \"reserved forests\" under a notification issued uncier s. 20 of the Indian Forest Act after following the procedun prescribed by Ch. II. We have, therefore, to examine tne steps by which this result is said to have been reached. We have already referred to the existence of the Tripura Forest\n\nAbdul Jalll\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1964 u,..,,,. of India v.\n\nAbdul lalil\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nAct 1257 (1297?) T.E. enacted by the Ruler of Tripura under which certain provisions were made for the preservation of Forest areas in the State and the notifications issued thereunder constituting the three areas as \"reserve forests\" for the purpose of that Act.\n\nIt would be necessary to examine the details of these provisions, but this we shall defer till we complete the narration of the constitutional changes which brought the State of Tripura into the Indian Union and the legislation which accompanied and accomplished these changes. Tripura was a native State and the ruler by a merger agreement with the Governor-General of India merged his State with the Dominion in the year 1949.\n\nBy para 5 of the Tripura Administration Order, 1949 issued on October 15, 1949 under the powers conferred in that behalf by the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 194 7 all the laws in force in the State of Tripura immediately before the c0mmencement of the said Order were continued in force until they were repealed or amended by a competent legislature or authority. Then came the Constitution which was operative from January 26, 1950 and under it Tripura became a Part C State of the Union of India.\n\nBy virtue of Art. 372 of the Constitution ihe laws in force in the territory of India which would have included the Tripura Forest Act in so far as it applied to the territory of the former Tripura State, were continued in force until repealed or amended by competent legislation.\n\nNext, came the Part C States (Law<) Act, 1950 enacted by Parliament.\n\nBy its s. 3 the Acts and Ordinances specified in the Schedule to the Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949 were extended to and directed \"to be in force in the State of Tripura ...... as they were genernlly m force in the territories to which tney extended immediately\n\nrn:fore the commencement of that Act\".\n\nOne of the enactments specified in the Schedule to the Merge a States (Laws) Act, 1949 (Act LIX of 1949) was the Indian Forest Act, 1927.\n\nThe Indian Forest Act was thus extended to the T ripura State.\n\nSection 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act,\n\n1~50 :provided that \"any law which immediately before the r,0nunencement of the Act (April 15, 1950) was in force m anv of the St1ts which included Tripura and corresponded to a~ Act extended to that State by the Act was therehy repeale, l''.\n\nThe operation of the repeal was subject to two\n\n8 S.C.R SUPREME COURT lZEPORTS 167\n\nprovisos and it is the second of these provisos that calls for construction in these appeals. This proviso ran:\n\nProvided further that, subject to the preceding proviso, anything done or any action taken, including any appointment or delegation made, notification, order, instruction or direction issued, rule, regulation, form, bye-law or scheme framed, certificate, patent, permit or licence granted or registration effected, under such law shall be deemed to have been done or taken under section 2 or, as the case may be, under the corresponding provision of the Act or Ordinance as now extended to the State by section 3, and shall continue in force accordingly, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under the said section 2 or, as the case may be, under the said Act or Ordinance.\"\n\nShortly stated, the question for consideration in these appeals is whether as a result of the operation of ss. 3 and 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act read in the light of the proviso above-quoted the three reserved forests which were notified under the Tripura Act of 1257 (T.E.) could be deemed to be \"reserved forests\" under Ch. II of the Indian Forest Act, 1927.\n\nStopping here, it would be convenient to notice a few matters. In the first place, when the Indian Forest Act, 1927 was extended to the State of Tripura in 1950 it would have been open to Government to have taken steps to constitute \"reserved forests\" within the State by following the procedure prescribed by Ch. II to which we have already adverted.\n\nBut this was not done and the Government seem to have proceeded on the basis that the areas notified as \"reserved forests\" under the Tripura Act were \"reserved forests\" under the Indian Forest Act.\n\nNext, it is common ground that the Tripura Act which was continued by the Tripura Administration Order, 1949 did not survive\n\nUnion of India v.\n\nAbdul Jali/\n\nAyyangar J.\n\nUnion of India v.\n\nAbdul Jalil\n\n.tyysngar J.\n\nthe Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 because the Indian Forest Act being \"a corresponding law\" to the Tripura Forest Act stood repealed by the operation of s. 4 of that enactment.\n\nBesides, the provisions of the Tripura Forest Act under which the notifications constituting these forests as \"reserved forests\" were issued were under the proviso to s. 4 \"deemed to have been done under the corresponding provision of the Act as now extended to the State by s. 3\". The position, however, is that the Indian Forest Act whose extension to the Tripura area effected the repeal of the Tripura Act, contains provisions of two distinct types or kinds for the exercise of control over forests and forest areas and the question then arises as to which of the provisions of the Indian Act, \"correspond\" to those of the Tripura Act, to enable one to say that the notifications under the latter Act should be deemed to have been issued. On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Tripura Forest Act the learned Judicial Commissioner held that at the most the corresponding provision of the Indian Forest Act to which the Tripura notification could be related was as a \"protected forest\" under Ch. IV of the Indian Forest Act and not a \"reserved forest\" under Ch. II of the Act. He, therefore, decided that as the offence for which the accused were being prosecuted was one under s. 26 the accused could not be held guilty since there was no legal or effective notification of the forest area as a \"reserved forest\" within s. 20 of the Indian Forest Act and accordingly directed the acquittal of the accused. The appeals challenge the correctness of this. last conclusion.\n\nThe principal submission of the learned Attomey- General who appeared for the Union of India in support of the appeals was directed to establish that the notification constituting the three forests as reser ; ed forests under the repealed Tripura Forest Act II of 1257 (1297?) T.E. must be deemed to have been taken under Ch. II of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 which, it was contended, was the provision corresponding to the repealed Tripura Act. It is the validity of this submission that now calls for consideration.\n\nBefore entering on a discussion of this question we might dispose of a minor consideration which might be urged in\n\norder to show that the notification under the Tripura Act could not be deemed to be a notification under s. 20 of the Indian Forest Act. One of the submissions under this head, and this was one 0f the points that appears to have appealed to the learned Judicial Commissioner, was that Ch. II of the Indian Forest Act prescribes an elaborate procedure which is mandatory and is required to be complied with, before any land 'could be constituted into a \"reserved forest\" under that Act.\n\nThe Tripura Act admittedly does not make provision for any such procedure being followed before an area is notified as \"a reserved forest\" or is constituted into one.\n\nThe argument based on this was that in the absence of identity between the procedural requirements of the two Acts, a notification under the repealed Act could not be deemed to be one under a \"corresponding provision\" of the Act extended to the territory, the emphasis being on the words \"corresponding provision\".\n\nWe are unable to accept the correctness of this submission.\n\nThe scheme of the Part C States (Laws) Act is this.\n\nIn the first place, by reason of s. 3 certain enactments are extended to these State5. If there is no law in that State which was in force on the date of the extension of a particular enactment under s. 3' which is in pari materia and covers the same field as the law that is extended, s. 4 does not come into play and consequently there is no question of the repeal of any pre-existing law. If such were the case the law in force in the native State of Tripura would have first continued by reason of the provision contained in s. 5 of the Administration of Tripura (Laws) Order, 1949, already referred to which was promulgated on October, 15, 1949 !ind later by reason of Art. 372 of the Constitution.\n\nTo the extent to which there was no repeal by virtue of s. 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 the Tripura law would have continued in force. It is only on the basis that the Indian Forest Act whose operation was extended to that territory by s. 3 was \"a corresponding law\" that the Tripura_ Act can stand repealed.\n\nFor the purpose of effecting the repeal under s. 4 the only consideration is whether any existing law of that State \"corresponded\" to a law which was extended by reason of s. 3.\n\n19U\n\nUnion o/ Indi.'\n\nAyyangar I.·\n\n\\ A.yyangar J.\n\nAs stand earlier, it is common ground that the Tripura Forest Act \"corresponded': to the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and that the former therefore stood repealed on the extension to Tripura of the latter enactment. If then the extension of the Indian Forest Act to the State effected a repeal of the Tripura Forest Act we have next to consider whether the notification under the Tripura Act could be deemed to be a notification under \"the corresponding provision\" of the Indian Forest Act. For that purpose the preliminaries to the notification or the procedure which must precede a notification are not of any relevance but only whether the particular notification could be held to be under a corresponding provision under the extended enactment, viz., the Indian Forest Act. If the notifications had been issued after complying with the formalities prescribed by the State law and they are kept alive by the proviso to s. 4, the notifications would necessarily have to be deemed to have validly been made under the latter Act.\n\nJudged by this test it appears to us that the fact that under the Tripura law there were no preliminaries prescribed before a forest could be notified as a reserved forest does not detract from such a notification being a notification under the Indian Forest Act, 1927.\n\nWe have next to consider whether the notification under the Tripura Act could be deemed to be a notification under Ch. II or under s. 20 of the Indian Forest Act for that is the basis upon which the entire prosecution case rests. For this purpose it is necessary to analyse the provisions of the Tripura Act and also examine the corresponding provisions of the Indian Forest Act. We sha!J first take up the Tripura Act.\n\nIts preamble, after reciting that some clas:, es of trees are regarded as protected ones from times immemorial, goes on to state that it was expedient to consolidate the law with a view to bring order in the matter of the supervision of the protected trees and also to place the same on a sound footing.\n\nThis would appear to indicate that the Act was designed for the protection of particular trees as distinguished from the reservation of an area as a forest for the purpose of protecting all the trees within that forest. We shall in ue course have to refer to the provisions of Ch. IV of the Indian\n\nForest Act headed \"Of Protected Forests\" under which also the aim of the law is to afford protection to certain trees in particular areas.\n\nTo revert to the Tripura Act, its s. 3 provides for the repeal of the earlier laws and saves only rules or customs not inconsistent with the Act.\n\nSection 4 is one of the key provisions of the Act and under it are specified seven classes of trees which shall be deemed to be protected within the independent State of Tripura.\n\nThe Act is divided into seven chapters of which the first one is headed \"Of protection of Rakshita Bana\" which, as stated earlier, has bem transla1ed as \"Protected Forests\". Section 5 under which the three notifications to which we have already referred were issued reads:\n\n\"The boundaries of 'Rakshita Bana ', shall be fixed and publication of the same shall be made in all police stations, offices, markets, ports and other public places within this independent State\".\n\nSection 6 runs:\n\n\"No person shall be entitled to carry out any 'Jhum' cultivation (shifting cultivation) within half a mile radius of a Rakshita Bana\".\n\nSections 9 to 11 specify the acts which are prohibited in the notified forest areas.\n\nThese enact:\n\n\"9. No person shall set fire to the hills in such a manner which may cause damage to a Rakshita Bana in any way\".\n\n\"10. No person shall enter into a Rakshita Bana carrying fire.\"\n\n\"11. No person shall enter into a Rakshita Bana carrying axe or other weapons which may be used for cutting trees without permission.\"\n\nChapter II with which s. 12 opens is headed \"Of Gradual Development of Rakshita Banas.\" The relevant sections of this Chapter are ss. 12 to 17 and they read:\n\n\"12. In each year protected trees like sal etc. and other valuable trees shall be grown either by sowing seeds or otherwise.\n\nUnion of lnditl\n\nAyyangar ],\n\n'\" Abdu.I Jo/ii\n\nAyyaJJgar J.\n\n\"13. In order to give effect to the provisions of section 12, suitable sites will be selected at regular intervals after taking sanction for the same.\" \"14. If there are other trees in a Rakshita Bana than those mentioned in section 4, and if it is considered expedient that such other trees are harmful to the growth of the protected trees, then such trees shall be cut.\" \"15. In case any old tree referred tt> in section 4 is cut, then a new tree shall be grown in its place.\" \"16. No person on any account shall be allowed to cut any tree within the reserved forest in a manner which might cause any damage ti:J the block.\" \"17. If there be dense growth of any specific type of tree as mentioned in section 4 and if such growth is mutually detrimental to the general growth of the trees then to facilitate growth of the species some may be cut according to necessity.\"\n\nChapter III i~ headed \"Of Penalties\" and of the sections comprised in it is sufficient to refer to s. 18 under which any person kindling fire in a forest is made punishable with imprisonment, s. 19 on which much stress was laid which ran:\n\n\"Whoever fells any tree within the limits of a Rakshita Bana shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to Rs. SOOJor with both\".\n\nand s. 20 which ran:\n\n\"20. Any person who cuts any tree as specified under section 4 outside the limits of a reserved forest shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to two months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 200/ - or with both.\"\n\n1n this connection it'is necessary to point out that under s.20\n\nthe cutting of the protected trees specified in s. 4 is made an offence even if the cutting were to take place beyond the limits of the forest notified under s. 5. The only point of difference brought in y the cutting being within the bounJaries of the forest is that in that case the punishment is heavier.\n\nThe other chapters relate to the officials and the manner in which they should perform their duties and have not much relevance for the purposes of these appeals.\n\nFrom the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct was the protection of particular trees-the seven types of trees specified in s.4.\n\nThe notification uncl 'r s. 5 is for the purpose of constituting areas where these types of trees would be protected.\n\nThe penal provisions enacted are for ensuring the protection of these trees.\n\nNo doubt, s. 16 enacts a ban against the cutting of any tree within a forest so as to cause damage to any block and s. 19 penalises the cntting of any tree within the area of a forest, but it is obvious that in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the purpose which the enactment is intended to subserve, these prohibitions under penal sanctions were designed primarily and essentially to ensure more effective protection to the trees specified in s.4.\n\nNow, let us see whether Ch. IT of the Indian Forest Act r.ould be said to be a provision which corresponds to the Tripura Act, so that the notification under s. 5 of the latter enactment could be deemed to be a notification under Ch. II or s. 20 of the India~ Forest Act. We have set out the several provisions of Ch. IT and their object.\n\nThe prime purpose of that Chapter is the constitution of reserved forests in which ( 1) all private rights within the reserved\n\nuea are completely eliminated by their being bought up where these are ascertained to exist by payment of compen sation, (2) the entire area being devoted to siviculture, every tree in the forest being protected from injury am!\n\nwithin the scope of the penal provision contained in s. 26 In other words, the reservation here is to the \"forest area\"\n\nas such and not the protection of particular specified trees or species of trees in such a forest.\n\n.-t yyrutgar J.\n\nUnion of lndio ...\n\nAbdul Joli!\n\nAyyongor J.\n\nIn this connection some point was sought to be made from the terms of the notification under s. 5 of the Tripura Act by which the boundaries of the several forests were specified.\n\nThe three notifications were substantially in the same form and it is, therefore, sufficient to set out the one setting out the boundaries of the Garjichhera reserve. The relevant conditions are:\n\n\"2. Jhum cultivation will not be permissible in this\n\nforest area.\n\n3. The land previously settled within this forest area shall remain valid.\n\nPlough cultivation will be permissible in that area.\n\n4. The fallow Taluka land falling within .this area shall be deemed as not being within this reserve.\n\n5. Until further orders, cutting of all kinds of trees are prohibited within this Reserve.\n\nCutting and export of unclassified forest products ....... . will be prmissible.\n\n6. Except in the settled area, grazing of all kinds of animals elsewhere within this Reserve will be prohibited.\n\n7. All kind of hunting within this Reserve is prohibited.\"\n\nIn regard to these conditions stress was laid principally on condition no. 5 under which all cutting of trees was forbidden.\n\nThe provision here appears to be a reproduction of s. 16 of the Act and to have no futther or more extended operation. We are therefore unable to accept the submission that by reason of this clause the area which is notified as the reserved forest is constituted a reserved forest of the same type as under Ch. II of the Indian Forest Act. In the first place, as the notification was issued under the Tripura Act it would be reasonable to construe it with reference to the prolu\"bition against cutting of trees contained in the Act itself and we have already adverted to the terms of s. 16 which we have held was designed for the purpose of protecting the trees set out in s. 4. But that apart, clause 5\n\nitself pennits the cutting oi certain forest produce which it was evidently thought would not interfere with the functioning of the forest as a place for the protection of the protected trees.\n\nThe other two notifications do not permit the cutting of BambOo etc. without Gove~-nment permit, bllt this in our opinion makes no difference.\n\nIf one now turns to the provisions of Ch. IV of the Indian Forest Act the correspondence between the Tripura Act and the provisions of Ch. IV would become clear.\n\nSection 30, corresponding to s. 4 of the Tripura Act, in Ch. Il enables the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette-\n\n(a) to declare any trees or class of trees in a protected forest to be reserved from a date fixed by the notification;\n\n(b) declare that any portion of such forest .specified in the notification shall be dosed for such term, not exceeding thirty years, as the State Government thinks fit, and that the rights of private persons, if any, over such portion shall be suspended during such term, provided that the remainder of such forest be sufficient, and in a locality reasonably convenient, for the due exercise of the rights suspended in the portion so closed; or ( c) prohibit, from a date fixed as aforesaid, the quarrying of stone, or the burning of lime or charcoal, or the collection or subjection to any manufacturing process, or removal of, any forest-produce in any such forest and the breaking up or clearing for cultivation, for building, for herding cattle or for any other purpose, of any land in any such forest.\"\n\nSection 31 provides for the publication of a notification under s. 30 and s. 32 for the regulations which may be made for protected forests i.e., areas in which particular trees are protected and s. 33 provides for penalties for acts in contravention of a notification under s. 30 or of rules, under s. 32.\n\nThis section enacts:\n\nA.yyangar h\n\n. v.\n\nAbdul Jalll\n\nAyyangar ].\n\n\"33. (I) Any person who commits any of the following offences, namely:-\n\n( a) fells, girdles, lops, taps or bums any tree reserved under section 30, or strips off the bark or leaves from, or otherwise damages, any such tree;\n\n(b) contrary to any prohibition under section 30,\n\nquarries any stone or burns any lime or charcoal, or collects, subjects to any manufacturing process, or removes any forestproduce;\n\n( c) contrary tp any prohibition under section 30, breaks up or clears for cultivation or any other purpose any land in any protected forest;\n\n( d) sets fire to such forest. kindles a fire without taking all reasonable precautions to prevent its spreading to any tree reserved under section 30, whether standing, fallen or felled, or to any closed portion of such forest;\n\n( e) leaves burning any fire kindled by him in the vicinity of any such tree or closed portion;\n\n(f) fells any tree or drags any timber so as to damage any tree reserved as aforesaid;\n\n(g) permits cattle to damage any such tree; ( h) infringes any rule made under section 32;\n\nshall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.\n\nIt would thus be clear that the obiect of Ch. TV is the protection of particular trees and the setting apart of particular areas as protected forests for the purpose of ensuring the growth and maintenance of such trees.\n\nThe obiect\n\nsought to be achieved . by the re&ervation in Ch. IV of the Indian Forest Act is thus seen to be exactly similar to that which is sought to be achieved by the Tripura Act.\n\nOnly the Tripura Act makes the cutting of protected trees even outside a forest an offence, whereas there is no such provision under the Indian Forest Act. If, therefore, one has to seek a prpvision \"corresponding\" to the repealed Tripura Forest Act that provision will be found not in Ch.\n\nII of the Indian Forest Act but only in Ch. IV.\n\nAs the present prosecutions have been launched for offences under s. 26 the learned Judicial Commissioner was right in holding that the prosecution has not been able to establish that the accused had committed an offence in respect of the provision under which they were charged since the three forests were not notified as reserved forests under a provision corresponding to Ch.\n\nII of the Indian Forest Act.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that the learned Judicial Commissioner was right in considering that the provisi(\"n in the Indian Forest Act \"corresponding\" to the Tripura Forest Act under which the notifications fixing the boundaries of these three forests were issued is that as regards \"a protected forest\" under Ch. IV and. not a \"reserved forest\" within s. 20 contained in Ch. II. The order acquitting the several respondents was therefore right and the appeals fail.\n\nIn the view that we have taken of the main question argued before us, we do not find it necessary to consider whether there were any other legal defences open to the several accused.\n\nFor instance, it will be noticed that the accused in these cases were held guilty of offences under s. 26(1)(a), (d) and (h). As regards the offence under cl.\n\n(a) the learned Attorney-General conceded that it was a prerequisite for a person being held guilty of an offence under that clause that there should be a notification under s. 4 because s. 5 which is referred to in s. 26(1) (a) reads:\n\n\"5. After the issue of a notification under section 4, no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into bv ot on behalf of the Government or some prson in whom\n\n51 S.C.-12\n\nUnion of lndla\n\n\"· Abdul lalll\n\n'47141114' 1.\n\nUnion of India v.\n\nAbdul la/ii\n\nAyyangar 1.\n\nMay 5\n\nsuch right was vested when the notification was issued; and no fresh clearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made in such land except in accordance with such rules as ma;: be made by the State Government in this behalf.\"\n\nin the absene, therefore, of such a notification the accused could not have been held guilty of a contravention of s. 26(1)(a). Coming next to els. (d) and (h), the question for consideration would be whether if these were not offences under the Tripura law, the accused could be prosecuted by reason of (a) the extension of the Forest Act to the Tripura State and (b) the notification. under th_e Tripura law being \"deemed to be a notification\" under the corresponding provision of the Indian Act. We consider it unnecessary to examine this problem or to express any opiniOll on this matter in view of the conclusion that we have reached that the notification under s. 5 of the Tripura Act would constitute the area in question only as a protected forest under Ch. IV of the Indian Forest Act and not as a\n\n\"reserved\" forest under s. 20 contained in Ch.\n\nII of that Act.\n\nThe appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nThe appellant had undertaken to pay the cgsts of the respondents at the time of the admission of the appeals. In accordance with that undertaking the appellant will pay the costs to the respondents. One hearing fee.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nPOONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION\n\nDATTATRAYA NAGESH DEODHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUHAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nOctroi-Tax on refund-/lnposition if valid-Tax, if becon1es fee-Who can clain1 refund-Suit for recovery-Limitation-Avaflability of", "total_entities": 214, "entities": [{"text": "cl. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 990, "end_char": 996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1470, "end_char": 1484, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ABDUL JALIL AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1489, "end_char": 1508, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ABDUL JALIL AND ORS", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "N. 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2065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tripura Forest Act, 1257", "statute": "Tripura Forest Act, 1257"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2073, "end_char": 2090, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tripura Forest Act, 1257", "statute": "Tripura Forest Act, 1257"}}, {"text": "Tripura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2960, "end_char": 2967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant urged that the Tripura Act was replaced by the Indian Forest Act by reason of legis4 lative provisions upon the merger of the native State of Tripura with the Dominion of India, and that the notifications under the Tripura Act which were continued in force by these same provisions rendered these re'5ervcs \"Reserved forests\" under the Indian Forest Act."}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2992, "end_char": 3009, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3104, "end_char": 3121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant urged that the Tripura Act was replaced by the Indian Forest Act by reason of legis4 lative provisions upon the merger of the native State of Tripura with the Dominion of India, and that the notifications under the Tripura Act which were continued in force by these same provisions rendered these re'5ervcs \"Reserved forests\" under the Indian Forest Act."}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3281, "end_char": 3298, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3824, "end_char": 3829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3928, "end_char": 3932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4212, "end_char": 4229, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4370, "end_char": 4374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4400, "end_char": 4404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tne prime purpose of Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4568, "end_char": 4624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5018, "end_char": 5023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tne prime purpose of Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "Tne prime purpose of Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "IV of the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5218, "end_char": 5245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "IV is exactly similar to that which is sought to be achieved by the Tripura Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5476, "end_char": 5555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5920, "end_char": 5925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV is exactly similar to that which is sought to be achieved by the Tripura Act", "statute": "IV is exactly similar to that which is sought to be achieved by the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6288, "end_char": 6293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV is exactly similar to that which is sought to be achieved by the Tripura Act", "statute": "IV is exactly similar to that which is sought to be achieved by the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6604, "end_char": 6618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. N. Mukerjee and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6638, "end_char": 6652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. N. Mukerjee and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6657, "end_char": 6669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, D. N. Mukerjee and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chauerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6712, "end_char": 6727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chauerjee, for the respondents (in Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Ayyan1ar I.\n\nAYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6861, "end_char": 6882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:\n\nAyyan1ar I.\n\nAYYANGAR, J.-The respondents in these several appeals were prosecuted before Magistrates in Tripura for offences under s. 26 (I) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment and fine."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6993, "end_char": 6998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7010, "end_char": 7033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Judicial Coou-niMiOD.er, Tripura", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7231, "end_char": 7263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their appeals to , the learned Sessions Judge, Tripura having been dismissed, they preferred Criminal Revision Petitions to the Judicial Coou-niMiOD.er, Tripura."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7410, "end_char": 7424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From these orders of acquittal the Union of India has filed these appeals by virtue of special leave granted by this Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7504, "end_char": 7512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7898, "end_char": 7906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notices issued to the respondents in Appeals 40 and 45 of 1962 of the filing of the appeals could not be served on them as it was reported that they had left for Pakistan."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8186, "end_char": 8191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8203, "end_char": 8226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8386, "end_char": 8395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "Abdul Jalil", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8953, "end_char": 8964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or otherwise damages, the same:\n\nclears or breaks up any land for cultivation or any other purpose;\n\nshall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both, in addition to such com-\n\nUnio11 of lndi'-\n\nv, Abdul lalil\n\nAyya11gar /.\n\nUnion of India v.\n\nAbdul Jalil\n\nAyyangar 1.", "canonical_name": "ABDUL JALIL AND ORS"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9270, "end_char": 9275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Tripura", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9592, "end_char": 9615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We might point out that if the area concerned was a reserve forest, the guilt of the respondents would practically be made out and their conviction by the Magistrates, confirmed by the Sessions Judge, Tripura might have to be upheld."}}, {"text": "s.26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10120, "end_char": 10124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10303, "end_char": 10313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These three areas are known,\" respectively, as the Garjichhera reserve, Chandrapur reserve and the North Sonamura reserve."}}, {"text": "s. 26(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10747, "end_char": 10759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10792, "end_char": 10803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(1 )(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10848, "end_char": 10860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12237, "end_char": 12241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandrapnr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12614, "end_char": 12624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were three such notifications published in the Tripura State Gazette in 1346 and 1349 T.E. corresponding to 1936 and 1938 by which the boundaries of the three reserves of the Garjichhera, Chandrapnr and North Sonamura forests were defined."}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12752, "end_char": 12769, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13002, "end_char": 13019, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13564, "end_char": 13572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents in Appeals 39, 43, 47 and 49 had trespassed into the Garjichhera re.erve, while those concerned in appeals 42, 46 and 48 had trespassed into the Chandrapur reserve, and the respondent in appeal 44 was found to have\n\nUnion of India v.\n\nAbdul Jalil\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n196'\n\nUnion of lntiia\n\nV. 11.oaut 1a1n\n\nAyyangar I.\n\nommitted a similar offence in respect of the forest described as the North Sonamura reserve.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13936, "end_char": 13953, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14384, "end_char": 14401, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14947, "end_char": 14964, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14967, "end_char": 15019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 3 to 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15160, "end_char": 15171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15209, "end_char": 15218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15524, "end_char": 15533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15830, "end_char": 15839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15909, "end_char": 15913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "On the terminology employed by the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16050, "end_char": 16059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16197, "end_char": 16201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16203, "end_char": 16212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16315, "end_char": 16319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16377, "end_char": 16382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16698, "end_char": 16703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17196, "end_char": 17206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17369, "end_char": 17374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17620, "end_char": 17625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17725, "end_char": 17729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17913, "end_char": 17918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17926, "end_char": 17943, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Abdul Jalll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18152, "end_char": 18163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already referred to the existence of the Tripura Forest\n\nAbdul Jalll\n\nAyyangar J.\n\n1964 u,..,,,.", "canonical_name": "ABDUL JALIL AND ORS"}}, {"text": "State of Tripura", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18665, "end_char": 18681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be necessary to examine the details of these provisions, but this we shall defer till we complete the narration of the constitutional changes which brought the State of Tripura into the Indian Union and the legislation which accompanied and accomplished these changes."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18866, "end_char": 18871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tripura was a native State and the ruler by a merger agreement with the Governor-General of India merged his State with the Dominion in the year 1949."}}, {"text": "October 15, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18988, "end_char": 19004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By para 5 of the Tripura Administration Order, 1949 issued on October 15, 1949 under the powers conferred in that behalf by the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 194 7 all the laws in force in the State of Tripura immediately before the c0mmencement of the said Order were continued in force until they were repealed or amended by a competent legislature or authority."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19348, "end_char": 19364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then came the Constitution which was operative from January 26, 1950 and under it Tripura became a Part C State of the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19445, "end_char": 19453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19771, "end_char": 19781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next, came the Part C States (Law<) Act, 1950 enacted by Parliament."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19791, "end_char": 19795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20200, "end_char": 20223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20230, "end_char": 20247, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20290, "end_char": 20299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "April 15, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20419, "end_char": 20433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act,\n\n1~50 :provided that \"any law which immediately before the r,0nunencement of the Act (April 15, 1950) was in force m anv of the St1ts which included Tripura and corresponded to a~ Act extended to that State by the Act was therehy repeale, l''."}}, {"text": "Act extended to that State by the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20513, "end_char": 20550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.C.R SUPREME COURT lZEPORTS 167", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20628, "end_char": 20660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The operation of the repeal was subject to two\n\n8 S.C.R SUPREME COURT lZEPORTS 167\n\nprovisos and it is the second of these provisos that calls for construction in these appeals."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21154, "end_char": 21163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act extended to that State by the Act", "statute": "Act extended to that State by the Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21278, "end_char": 21287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act extended to that State by the Act", "statute": "Act extended to that State by the Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21410, "end_char": 21419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act extended to that State by the Act", "statute": "Act extended to that State by the Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21586, "end_char": 21597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "II of the Indian Forest Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21811, "end_char": 21844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21939, "end_char": 21962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22379, "end_char": 22396, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22663, "end_char": 22680, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22770, "end_char": 22774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22962, "end_char": 22966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23070, "end_char": 23074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23112, "end_char": 23129, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23701, "end_char": 23718, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "IV of the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23808, "end_char": 23835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23990, "end_char": 23995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "IV of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24133, "end_char": 24138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "IV of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24146, "end_char": 24163, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tripura Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24523, "end_char": 24541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "II of the Indian Forest Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24610, "end_char": 24643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25024, "end_char": 25029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act, 1927", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25037, "end_char": 25054, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25208, "end_char": 25235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26037, "end_char": 26041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26204, "end_char": 26208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26290, "end_char": 26294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26533, "end_char": 26537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October, 15, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26636, "end_char": 26653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If such were the case the law in force in the native State of Tripura would have first continued by reason of the provision contained in s. 5 of the Administration of Tripura (Laws) Order, 1949, already referred to which was promulgated on October, 15, 1949 !"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26678, "end_char": 26686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26765, "end_char": 26769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26888, "end_char": 26905, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26956, "end_char": 26960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27076, "end_char": 27080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27202, "end_char": 27206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.yyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27247, "end_char": 27256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyangar I.·\n\n\\ A.yyangar J.\n\nAs stand earlier, it is common ground that the Tripura Forest Act \"corresponded': to the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and that the former therefore stood repealed on the extension to Tripura of the latter enactment.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27350, "end_char": 27373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27501, "end_char": 27518, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27728, "end_char": 27745, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": 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under the Tripura Act", "statute": "We have next to consider whether the notification under the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28702, "end_char": 28719, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28919, "end_char": 28936, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29583, "end_char": 29593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "To revert to the Tripura Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29723, "end_char": 29751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29757, "end_char": 29761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To revert to the Tripura Act", "statute": "To revert to the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29870, "end_char": 29879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To revert to the Tripura Act", "statute": "To revert to the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30224, "end_char": 30233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To revert to the Tripura Act", "statute": "To revert to the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30523, "end_char": 30532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To revert to the Tripura Act", "statute": "To revert to the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 9 to 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30676, "end_char": 30692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To revert to the Tripura Act", "statute": "To revert to the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31114, "end_char": 31119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rakshita Banas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31163, "end_char": 31177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter II with which s. 12 opens is headed \"Of Gradual Development of Rakshita Banas.\""}}, {"text": "ss. 12 to 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31222, "end_char": 31234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31488, "end_char": 31498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31663, "end_char": 31672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31853, "end_char": 31862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32140, "end_char": 32149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32410, "end_char": 32415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32503, "end_char": 32508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32751, "end_char": 32756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32822, "end_char": 32831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33067, "end_char": 33071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33121, "end_char": 33125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33231, "end_char": 33235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33661, "end_char": 33664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33742, "end_char": 33745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct", "statute": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33773, "end_char": 33777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct", "statute": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33955, "end_char": 33960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct", "statute": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34061, "end_char": 34066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct", "statute": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34407, "end_char": 34410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct", "statute": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34451, "end_char": 34468, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34571, "end_char": 34575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct", "statute": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34653, "end_char": 34658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct", "statute": "From the above summary of the provisions it would be seen that in substance the object and purpose of the Tripurn\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35163, "end_char": 35168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "yyrutgar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35335, "end_char": 35343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".-t yyrutgar J.\n\nUnion of lndio ...\n\nAbdul Joli!"}}, {"text": "Ayyongor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35381, "end_char": 35389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyongor J.\n\nIn this connection some point was sought to be made from the terms of the notification under s. 5 of the Tripura Act by which the boundaries of the several forests were specified."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35487, "end_char": 35491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36598, "end_char": 36603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36858, "end_char": 36885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37131, "end_char": 37136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37220, "end_char": 37224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37242, "end_char": 37250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "IV of the Indian Forest Act the correspondence between the Tripura Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37632, "end_char": 37702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37753, "end_char": 37763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV of the Indian Forest Act the correspondence between the Tripura Act", "statute": "IV of the Indian Forest Act the correspondence between the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37782, "end_char": 37786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV of the Indian Forest Act the correspondence between the Tripura Act", "statute": "IV of the Indian Forest Act the correspondence between the Tripura Act"}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38817, "end_char": 38827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38881, "end_char": 38886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38891, "end_char": 38896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39013, "end_char": 39018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39092, "end_char": 39097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39117, "end_char": 39122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.yyangar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39147, "end_char": 39156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This section enacts:\n\nA.yyangar h\n\n.", "canonical_name": "A.yyangar"}}, {"text": "Abdul Jalll", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39166, "end_char": 39177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nAbdul Jalll\n\nAyyangar ].", "canonical_name": "ABDUL JALIL AND ORS"}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39329, "end_char": 39339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39456, "end_char": 39466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39641, "end_char": 39651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39885, "end_char": 39895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40239, "end_char": 40249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40695, "end_char": 40712, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Only the Tripura Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40808, "end_char": 40828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40945, "end_char": 40962, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tripura Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41039, "end_char": 41057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41099, "end_char": 41126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41214, "end_char": 41219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41529, "end_char": 41556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41670, "end_char": 41687, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41906, "end_char": 41911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 26(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42305, "end_char": 42316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42539, "end_char": 42543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42552, "end_char": 42556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "II of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "s. 26(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42581, "end_char": 42589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42646, "end_char": 42655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of lndla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42887, "end_char": 42901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the issue of a notification under section 4, no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification, except by succession or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into bv ot on behalf of the Government or some prson in whom\n\n51 S.C.-12\n\nUnion of lndla\n\n\"· Abdul lalll\n\n'47141114' 1.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA"}}, {"text": "s. 26(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43343, "end_char": 43354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43895, "end_char": 43899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IV of the Indian Forest Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43994, "end_char": 44021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44060, "end_char": 44065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV of the Indian Forest Act", "statute": "IV of the Indian Forest Act"}}, {"text": "POONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44375, "end_char": 44407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION\n\nDATTATRAYA NAGESH DEODHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUHAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44437, "end_char": 44457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION\n\nDATTATRAYA NAGESH DEODHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUHAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44466, "end_char": 44481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION\n\nDATTATRAYA NAGESH DEODHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUHAR DAYAL, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH*"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44484, "end_char": 44499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION\n\nDATTATRAYA NAGESH DEODHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUHAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44504, "end_char": 44511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION\n\nDATTATRAYA NAGESH DEODHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUHAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUHAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44516, "end_char": 44530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "POONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION\n\nDATTATRAYA NAGESH DEODHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUHAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_178_188_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Union of India v.\n\nAbdul la/ii\n\nAyyangar 1.\n\nMay 5\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nsuch right was vested when the notification was issued; and no fresh clearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made in such land except in accordance with such rules as ma;: be made by the State Government in this behalf.\"\n\nin the absene, therefore, of such a notification the accused could not have been held guilty of a contravention of s. 26(1)(a). Coming next to els. (d) and (h), the question for consideration would be whether if these were not offences under the Tripura law, the accused could be prosecuted by reason of (a) the extension of the Forest Act to the Tripura State and (b) the notification. under th_e Tripura law being \"deemed to be a notification\" under the corresponding provision of the Indian Act. We consider it unnecessary to examine this problem or to express any opiniOll on this matter in view of the conclusion that we have reached that the notification under s. 5 of the Tripura Act would constitute the area in question only as a protected forest under Ch. IV of the Indian Forest Act and not as a\n\n\"reserved\" forest under s. 20 contained in Ch.\n\nII of that Act.\n\nThe appeals fail and are dismissed.\n\nThe appellant had undertaken to pay the cgsts of the respondents at the time of the admission of the appeals. In accordance with that undertaking the appellant will pay the costs to the respondents. One hearing fee.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nPOONA CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION\n\nDATTATRAYA NAGESH DEODHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH,\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUHAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nOctroi-Tax on refund-/lnposition if valid-Tax, if becon1es fee-Who can clain1 refund-Suit for recovery-Limitation-Avaflability of\n\nbenefit-Bo1nbay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (Bom. 59 of 1949), SS. 127, 487.\n\nThe respondent. who had been carrying on the business of securing refund of octroi duty on behalf of persons who had paid duty and \\'1ere entitled to refund, claime'd the refund of money paid as octroi duty by his principals in respect of the period commencing from February 15, 1950, the date from which the appellant became a Municipal Corporation under the Provincial hfunicipal Corporation, Act, 1949. i\\fter deducting ten percient of the amount in accordance with r. 18(3) of the Octroi Rule~. framed by the Municipal Authorities, the ap pellailt-Corporation paid the balance to the respondent.\n\nThe representation of the respondent that from the date from which the Corporation had come into existence, the deduction had become invalid in law. was turneO down by the appellant. , Thereupon the respondent filed a suit for retovery of the balance with interest. The defence was that the deduction was valid; that in any case, the respondent who was not the person who paid the amount, was not entitled to bring the suit, and that the su; t was bc.rred by limitation. The trial court held the resM pendent was entitled to bring the suit and also that it was not barred by limitation but the deduction was valid and it dismissed the suit. On appeal, the District Court disagreeing with the trial court, held that the deduction \\\\'as not valid in law, but the plaintiff was not entitled to bring such a suit and that the suit was barred by limitation and it dismissed the appeal.\n\nOn a further appeal the High Court found in favour of the resPondent on all the three points and allowed the appeal.\n\nHELD:-(i) A tax on octroi refund is not one of the taxes which the Bo1nbay Municipal Corporation could impose. Apart from the absence of power to impose such a tax, which is clear from the earlier parts of s. 127 of the Bombay Act of 1949 there is the categorical prohibition in sub-s. ( 4) against the imposition of any such tax by the Corporation.\n\n(ii) Assuming, without deciding, that such a levy can be validly made hy way of fees under s. 466, since no standing order was made under s. 466 prescribing any fee, it is not passible to justify the deductions as a levy of fee.\n\n(iii) The tax did not become a fee merely because the new Act (Born.\n\nAct 59 of 1949), prohibited the imposition of such a tax.\n\n(iv) Cl. 5(a) of Appendix IV furnishes no justification for the levy of te, n percent Ueduction after Feb1uary 15, 1950 when the Act S9 of 1949 with its categorical prohibition in s. 127(4) against the imposition by the Corporation of a tax which the State Legislature had no power to impose under the Constitution became applicable.\n\n(v) The respondent having made the claim in accordance with the rules was the person entitled to receive what amount was legally refundable, and so he was also entitled to bring the suit.\n\nPoona Mnicipal Corporation\n\nD. N. Deodher\n\n(vi) The suit was not barred by !imitation. The benefit of s. 487 - . . of Act 59 of 1949 would be available to the Corporation only if it was Poot/' M';'!u:ipal held that this deduction was \"an act done or purported to be done in\n\norpo;_a .wn pursuance or execution or inten'ded execution of the Act.\" D. N. Deodh.r\n\nDas •1~/110 J.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 582 Qf 1961.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated August :!5, 1959 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 774 of 1956.\n\nS. G. Patwardhan, S. B. Tarkunde, J. B. Dadachanji,\n\n0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n\nA. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, M. R. Kotwal and Naunit\n\nJal, for the intervener.\n\nMay 5, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA J.-This appeal is by te defendant, the Municipal Corporation for the City of Poona, in a suit for recovery of money. The Poona Municipality was formerly a Municipality under the Bombay District Municipal Act of l901 (Act 3 of 1901). In 1925 it became a Municipal :Borough under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act of 1925 (Act XVIII of 1925). Later, under the Bombay P.rovincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, Municipal Authority for the City of Poona became a Corporation known by the name of Municipal Corporation for the City •>f Poona.\n\nIt appears that from the time when the City was a Municipality under Act 3 of 1901, an octroi duty was being levied on goods imported within the Municipal limits of the City. When such goods were exported out of the city municipal limits within specified periods, refund used to be given in respect of the duty so recovered.\n\nThe respondent has for many years been carrying on business of securing refund of octroi duty on behalf of persons who had paid the duty and were entitled to refund.\n\nTn respect of the period from the 15th February, 1950 to the 14th September, 1950, the respondent made a claim on behalf of his principals, for the refund of Rs. 73,650/- to\n\n8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RERORTS 181\n\nwhich, according to him, they were entitled.\n\nThe Munici- 1964 pality however paid to him only 90 per cent of this amount. Poona Municipal The remaining 10 nr cent was deducted inaccordance Corporation - with Rule 18C'1 . '. .e :__.ctroi Rules which had been D. N. Deodher framed by the .¥-u, ii~; p,,; Authorities.\n\nThe respondent then represented to tlie Corporation that with effect from the 15th February, 1950, the date from which the Corporation came into existence under the Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, this deduction of 10 per cent had become invalid in law and claimed that this amount should be paid to him.\n\nThe Corporation however refused to concede this claim.\n\nThe respondent then brought this suit for recovery of Rs. 7,364\\15\\- (being\n\n10 per cent of Rs. 73,650/- the amount alleged to have been illegally withheld) with interest.\n\nThe main defence raised by the Corporation to the plaintiff's claim was that the deduction of 10 per cent was legally valid.\n\nIt was further urged that, in any case, the plaintiff who was not the person who paid the amount. was not entitled to bring the 5uli. Lastly, it was contended that the suit was barred by limitation.\n\nThe trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to bring the suit and also that it was not barred by }imitation. lt held however that the deduction of 10 per cent from what was paid as tax was valid. Accordingly, it dismissed the suit.\n\nOn appeal by the plaintiff, the District Court, Poona, held, disagreeing with the trial Court, that the deduction of 10 per cent of what had been realised was not valid in law.\n\nIt was however of opinion that the plaintiff was not 1intitled to bring such a suit. It was also of opinion that the suit was bared by limitation. In this view, it dismissed the appeal.\n\nThe plaintiff then appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The High Court has found in favour of the plaintiff on all the three points raised. It held that the deduction of 10 per cent was invalid in law, that the plaintiff was entitled to sue, and that the suit was not barred\n\nDas ·.Jupta J.\n\n1964 by limitation. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the Poona Municipal appeal, and made a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Corporation Rs. 7,364/ 15/- with interest thereon at 4 per cent from D. N. eodher the date of the suit and interest at the same rate from the date of the judgment, with costs throughout.\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nThe appellant Corporation challenges the correctness of the High Court's decision on all the three points.\n\nThe principal question for decision in this appeal is whether the deduction or\" 10 per cent as provided for in Rule 18(3) is invalid at least from the 15th February, 1950.\n\nThe Rule runs thus:-\n\n\"A deduction of ten per cent shall in all cases be made before refunding the amount of octroi duty on exportation of goods either in transit as per rule 13 or otherwise under rule 11(2).\"\n\nIt is necessary to mention here that the legality of such a deduction prior to February 15, 1950 is not in controversy before us.\n\nWe shall proceed on the basis tliat this provision in Rule 18 (3) was valid in law prior to the 15th February, 1950.\n\nThe question is whether even though valid then, it has ceased to be valid in law. To find the correct answer to this question it is necessary to be clear first as to the legal basis on which this levy by way of deduction was being made prior to 15th February, 1950.\n\nIt appears from Ex. D 72, the copy of the Government resolution dated the 6th March, 1922, that the Poona Municipality started this practice of levying this 10 per cent deduction from February 1921.\n\nThe question of its legality appears to have been raised quite early. The Legal Remembrancer to the Government of Bombay expressed his view on this question in these words:-\n\n\"The special powers conferred in the last sentence of clause (f) of section 48 ( 1) of the Bombay District Municipal Act see111s to negative the power of the Municipality (of Shirpur) to make any deduction from the refunds by means\n\nof rules regulating the system, for making 1964 refunds referred to in the earlier part of the Poona -;;; micipal clause.\n\nThe charge on refunds appears, how- Corporation ever, to be a kind of tax which may be imposed D. N. vDeodher under s. 59(b) (xi) of the Act.\"\n\nOn this, the Councillors of the Municipality passed a resolution that a 10 per ent tax shouJd be levied on all octroi refund, under section 59 (b) (xi). This proposal was submitted to the Government of Bombay for sanction and was duly approved. It may be mentioned here that s. 59 (b )(xi) of Act 3 of 1901 which deals with the question of a Municipality's powers to impose taxes s.ets out in the els. ( i) to ( x) various taxes which the Municipalities can impose and then mentions in cl. (xi) the words \"any other tax\". The Government appears to have accepted the view of the Legal Remembrancer that the levy by way of deduction of 10 per cent from the amount to be refunded should be authorised as a tax on octroi refund, this being \"any other tax\" within the meaning of s. 59(b)(xi). It is no longer open to dispute that after Government's sanction was received, the Municipality could under the old Act legally levy such tax. It is also not disputed that the deductions that continued to be made under Rule 18 ( 3) were all along made under $is authority, as a tax levied under s. 59(b )(xi) of the Bombay District Municipal Act,\n\n1901. The levy of the tax continued even after Act 3 of 1901 ceased to be applicable to Poona and it became a Municipal Borough under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. The validity of such continuation does not also appear to have been challengeg: The Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949 was applied to Poona on the 15th February, 1950. From that date therefore the powers of taxation of the municipality became governed by s. 127 of the Act.\n\nThis section first authorises a Corporation under the Act to impose, (a) property taxes; (b) a tax on vehicles, boats and animals. It then mentions in the second sub-section certain other taxes which the Corporation may impose. Jn els. (a) to (f)-(a) is octroi, (b) a profession tax, ( c) a tax on dogs, ( d) a theatre tax, ( e) a toll on animals and vehicles and ( f) mentions \"any other\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\n1964 tax which the State Legislature Poona M:.nicipal Constitution to impose in the Corporation provides:-\n\nhas power under the\n\nState\". Sub-section ( 4)\n\nD. N. Deodher\n\nDas Gupta I.\n\n\"Nothing in this section shall authorise the imposition of any tax which the State Legislature has no power to impose in the State under the Constitution.\"\n\nA tax on octroi refund is not thus one of the taxes which the Bombay Municipal Corporation could impose.\n\nIt is not one of the specified taxes. Nor is it a tax which the State Legislature has power under the Constitution to impose in the State. Apart from this absence of power to impose such a tax, which is clear from the earlier parts of s. 127, we have the categorical prohibition in sub-section 4 against the imposition of any such tax by the Corporation.\n\nMr. Patwardhan next tried to persuade us that even if this levy could not be made under the new Act as a tax, it could be made as a fee.\n\nIn support of his argument he. drew our attention to s. 14 7 and s. 466 of the new Act.\n\nThe first sub-section of section 466 provides that the Commissioner of the Corporation may make standing orders consistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules and bye-laws in respect of the matters specified.\n\nOne of the matters specified is \"determining the supervision under which, the routes by which and the time within which the goods intended for immediate exportation shall be conveyed out of the City and the fees payable by persons so conveying the goods.\" [s. 466(1)A(f)]. Section 147 dealing with a controversy, that may arise, whether the importation of some goods into the City has been for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein, says: \"Until the contrary is proved any goods imported into the City shall be presumed to have been imported for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein, unless such goods are conveyed from the place of import to the place of export by such routes. within such time, under such supervision and on payment of such fees therefor as shall be determined by .the standing orders.\"\n\nIt is obvious that reference to fees in this section is to such fees as may be prescribed by standing orders under\n\nthe provisions of s. 466(1 )A(f). It is unnecessary for us 1964 to decide for the purpose of the present appeal, whether the Poona Municipal provision of s. 466 for determination of fess payable by Corporntion persons conveying goods imported into the City is valid D. N. vDeodher in law or not. Assuming, without deciding, that such a Das Gupta 1. levy can be validly made by way of fees under s. 466, what we find is that in fact there has been no standing order prescribing any fees.\n\nIt may be mentioned in this connection that sub-section 2 of s. 466 lays down that no order made by the Commissioner under cl. A of sub-section ( 1 ) shall be valid unless it is approved by the Standing Committee and confirmed by the State Government. It is not the case of the appellant Corporatfon that any Standing Order was made at all under s. 466 prescribing any fees. It is not possible therefore to justify the deductions that were made in the present case as a levy of fee.\n\nThe appellant relied next on cl. 5 (a) of Appendix IV to the Act read with s. 493.\n\nSection 493 provides that provisions of Appendix IV shall apply to constitution of the Corporation and other matters specified therein. Appendix IV is headed \"Transitory Provisions\" and is plainly intended to deal with the position that arose as a result of the repeal of the old Act. (s. 490). The relevant portion of\n\ncl. S(a) is in these words:-\n\n\"Save as expressly provided by the provisions of this Appendix or by a notification issued under paragraph 22 or order made under paragraph 23,\n\n(a) any appointment, notification, notice, tax, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, byelaw, or form made, issued, imposed or granted under the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901 or the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 or any other law in force in any local area constituted to be a City immediately\n\nbefor~ the appointed day shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, continue in force until it is superseded by\n\nPoo~ .Municipal Corporation\n\nany appointment, notification, notice, tax, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, byelaw, or form made, issued, imposed or granted v.\n\nD. N. Deodher under this Act or any other law as aforesaid as the case may be;\" Das Gupta J.\n\nMr. Patwardhan readily conceded that the 10 per cent deduction, as a tax on octroi refund could not get the protection of cl. 5 (a) for the simple reason that such taxation is on the face of it inconsistent with s. 127 ( 4) of the Act.\n\nHe asked us, however, t£> regard this levy as a fee, and on that basis, argued that this should continue in force under\n\ncl. (a) of s. 5 of Appendix IV since the levy of such a fee is consistent with the provisions of s. 466 of the. Act. If in fact a fee was being realised under the old Act, it may be that levy of such fees could continue in force until superseded by any order under the new Act as coming under an order issued \"under the District Municipal Act, 1901, or the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act,\n\n1925\". In fact, however, this was not levied as a fee, but was levied as a tax.\n\nTqe_ tax did not become a fee merely because the new Act (Act LIX of 1949) prohibited the imposition of such a tax. We are clearly of opinion therefor that cl. 5 (a) of Appendix IV furnishes no justification for the levy of the ten per cent deduction, after the 15th February, 1950 when the Act LIX of 1949 with its categorical prohibition in s. 127 ( 4) against the imposition by the Corporation of a ta£ which the State legislature had no power to impose under the Constitution became applicable. The defence that the deduction of 10 per cent of the amount collected as octroi was legally valid has thus been rightly rejected by the High Court.\n\nWe also agree with the High Court's conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to bring the present suit.\n\nThe Poona City Municipality's octroi Rules and Bye-laws under which the claim for refund can be made define \"a claimant\" as a person \"who produces the duly receipted import bill and the corresponding export certificates.\" [Rule 2, cl. (g)]. It is not disputed tkat for the several cases in respect of which this deduction of ten per cent had been made by the Corporation the plaintiff was the person\n\nwho produced \"the duly receiptd import bill and the 1964 corresponding export certificate.\" Indeed, it is on that Poona Municipal basis that 90 per cent of the amount paid by different Corporation exporters was refunded by the Corporation to the claimant. D. N. \"neodher It is .difficult to understand how if the plaintiff was entitled Das Guvta 1. to claim and obtain refund ill respect of 90 per cent of the amount paid, he was not entitled to make the claim with respect to the remaining 10 per cent.\n\nIt may be pointed out that as the receipted import bill and the corresponding export ce1tificates in respect of the goods in question have already been made over by the plaintiff to the defendant Corporation, it will not be possible for the merchants who actually imported the goods and then exported them, to make any fresh claim.\n\nFor, no claim would be accepted without the receipted import bill and the corresponding export certificates. Mr. Patwardhan faintly argued that the definition of a claimant in the Rules is only in respect of 90 per cent of the octroi refund. There is obviously no substance in this argument. Rule 11 deals with the procedure of claims to refund and requires that claimant should produce a duly receipted import bill and an export certificate relating to such goods. [Rule 11 (2) (iv)]. These provisions are entirely independent of Rule 18 (3) which lays down that a deduction of ten per cent shall in all cases be made before refunding the amount of octroi duty in certain cfrcumstances. It is, in our opinion, clear that the plaintiff having made the claim in accordance with the rules was the persqn entitled to receive what amount was legally refundable. , As we have found that the deduction of ten per cent could not legally be made, in other words, the entire amount paid was refundable, it follows that the plaintiff was the person entitled to obtain the refund and so he was also entitled to bring the suit.\n\nThere remains for consideration the appellant's plea of limitation. For this plea, the appellant relies on s. 487 of Act LIX of 1949.\n\nThe material part of the section runs thus:-\n\n( 1) No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation or against the Commissioner, or the\n\nPoona Municipal\n\nCorporation\n\nTransport Manager, or against any municipal officer or servant in respect of any act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act:-\n\n....\n\nD, N. Deodher\n\nDtu Gupta J.\n\n( a) until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Corporation, left at the chief municipal office and, in the case of the Commissioner or of the Transport Manager or of a municipal officer or servant delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, stating with reasonable particularity the cause of action and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and of his attorney, advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purpose of such suit, or\n\n(b) unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action.\"\n\nThe benefit of this section would be available to the Corporation only if it was held that this deduction of ten per cent was \"an act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act.\" We have already held that this levy was not in pursuance or execution of the Act. It is equally clear that in view of the provisions of s. 127(4) (to which we have already referred) the levy could not be said to be \"purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Act.\" For, what is plainly prohibited by the Act cannot be claimed to be purported to be done in pursuance or intended execution of the Act. Our conclusion is that the High Court has rightly held that the suit was not barred by limitation.\n\nAll the points raised in the appeal fail. 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Tarkunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5254, "end_char": 5268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. G. Patwardhan, S. B. Tarkunde, J. B. Dadachanji,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5273, "end_char": 5286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. G. Patwardhan, S. B. Tarkunde, J. B. Dadachanji,\n\n0."}}, {"text": "C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5306, "end_char": 5321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5343, "end_char": 5367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, M. R. Kotwal and Naunit\n\nJal, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "M. R. Kotwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5369, "end_char": 5381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, M. R. Kotwal and Naunit\n\nJal, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "Naunit\n\nJal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5386, "end_char": 5397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, M. R. Kotwal and Naunit\n\nJal, for the intervener."}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5477, "end_char": 5486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA J.-This appeal is by te defendant, the Municipal Corporation for the City of Poona, in a suit for recovery of money.", "canonical_name": "Das ·.Jupta"}}, {"text": "Poona Municipality", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5608, "end_char": 5626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Poona Municipality was formerly a Municipality under the Bombay District Municipal Act of l901 (Act 3 of 1901)."}}, {"text": "Borough under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5751, "end_char": 5798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5864, "end_char": 5895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipal Authority for the City of Poona", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, under the Bombay P.rovincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, Municipal Authority for the City of Poona became a Corporation known by the name of Municipal Corporation for the City •>f Poona."}}, {"text": "15th February, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6555, "end_char": 6574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn respect of the period from the 15th February, 1950 to the 14th September, 1950, the respondent made a claim on behalf of his principals, for the refund of Rs."}}, {"text": "14th September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6582, "end_char": 6602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn respect of the period from the 15th February, 1950 to the 14th September, 1950, the respondent made a claim on behalf of his principals, for the refund of Rs."}}, {"text": "Corporation came into existence under the Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7173, "end_char": 7257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "District Court, Poona", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8197, "end_char": 8218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the plaintiff, the District Court, Poona, held, disagreeing with the trial Court, that the deduction of 10 per cent of what had been realised was not valid in law."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8565, "end_char": 8599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff then appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Das ·.Jupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8821, "end_char": 8832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It held that the deduction of 10 per cent was invalid in law, that the plaintiff was entitled to sue, and that the suit was not barred\n\nDas ·.Jupta J.\n\n1964 by limitation.", "canonical_name": "Das ·.Jupta"}}, {"text": "D. N.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9039, "end_char": 9044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7,364/ 15/- with interest thereon at 4 per cent from D. N. eodher the date of the suit and interest at the same rate from the date of the judgment, with costs throughout."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9158, "end_char": 9167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das Gupta J.\n\nThe appellant Corporation challenges the correctness of the High Court's decision on all the three points.", "canonical_name": "Das ·.Jupta"}}, {"text": "February 15, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9743, "end_char": 9760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is necessary to mention here that the legality of such a deduction prior to February 15, 1950 is not in controversy before us."}}, {"text": "6th March, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10254, "end_char": 10269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D 72, the copy of the Government resolution dated the 6th March, 1922, that the Poona Municipality started this practice of levying this 10 per cent deduction from February 1921."}}, {"text": "Poona Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10280, "end_char": 10298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D 72, the copy of the Government resolution dated the 6th March, 1922, that the Poona Municipality started this practice of levying this 10 per cent deduction from February 1921."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10480, "end_char": 10500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Legal Remembrancer to the Government of Bombay expressed his view on this question in these words:-\n\n\"The special powers conferred in the last sentence of clause (f) of section 48 ( 1) of the Bombay District Municipal Act see111s to negative the power of the Municipality (of Shirpur) to make any deduction from the refunds by means\n\nof rules regulating the system, for making 1964 refunds referred to in the earlier part of the Poona -;;; micipal clause."}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10623, "end_char": 10633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shirpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10730, "end_char": 10737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Legal Remembrancer to the Government of Bombay expressed his view on this question in these words:-\n\n\"The special powers conferred in the last sentence of clause (f) of section 48 ( 1) of the Bombay District Municipal Act see111s to negative the power of the Municipality (of Shirpur) to make any deduction from the refunds by means\n\nof rules regulating the system, for making 1964 refunds referred to in the earlier part of the Poona -;;; micipal clause."}}, {"text": "s. 59(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11027, "end_char": 11035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11187, "end_char": 11197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11330, "end_char": 11335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(b)(xi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11829, "end_char": 11841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59(b )(xi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12138, "end_char": 12151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay District Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12159, "end_char": 12188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Poona and it became a Municipal Borough under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12279, "end_char": 12364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12450, "end_char": 12498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12635, "end_char": 12641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949", "statute": "The Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949"}}, {"text": "D. N. Deodher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13214, "end_char": 13227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section ( 4)\n\nD. N. Deodher\n\nDas Gupta I.\n\n\"Nothing in this section shall authorise the imposition of any tax which the State Legislature has no power to impose in the State under the Constitution.\"", "canonical_name": "D. N. vDeodher"}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13462, "end_char": 13490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A tax on octroi refund is not thus one of the taxes which the Bombay Municipal Corporation could impose."}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13741, "end_char": 13747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13792, "end_char": 13801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patwardhan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13866, "end_char": 13876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Patwardhan next tried to persuade us that even if this levy could not be made under the new Act as a tax, it could be made as a fee.", "canonical_name": "G. Patwardhan"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14053, "end_char": 14058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14065, "end_char": 14071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14114, "end_char": 14125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 466(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14565, "end_char": 14574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 147", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14581, "end_char": 14592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 466(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15270, "end_char": 15280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Poona Municipal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15377, "end_char": 15392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unnecessary for us 1964 to decide for the purpose of the present appeal, whether the Poona Municipal provision of s. 466 for determination of fess payable by Corporntion persons conveying goods imported into the City is valid D. N. vDeodher in law or not."}}, {"text": "s. 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15406, "end_char": 15412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. N. vDeodher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15518, "end_char": 15532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unnecessary for us 1964 to decide for the purpose of the present appeal, whether the Poona Municipal provision of s. 466 for determination of fess payable by Corporntion persons conveying goods imported into the City is valid D. N. vDeodher in law or not.", "canonical_name": "D. N. vDeodher"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15588, "end_char": 15597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming, without deciding, that such a Das Gupta 1.", "canonical_name": "Das ·.Jupta"}}, {"text": "s. 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15647, "end_char": 15653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15788, "end_char": 15797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15801, "end_char": 15807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Corporatfon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16028, "end_char": 16039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not the case of the appellant Corporatfon that any Standing Order was made at all under s. 466 prescribing any fees."}}, {"text": "s. 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16086, "end_char": 16092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16253, "end_char": 16258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Appendix IV to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16266, "end_char": 16288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 493", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16299, "end_char": 16305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Appendix IV to the Act", "statute": "Appendix IV to the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 493", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16308, "end_char": 16319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Appendix IV to the Act", "statute": "Appendix IV to the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 490", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16594, "end_char": 16600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Appendix IV to the Act", "statute": "Appendix IV to the Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16952, "end_char": 16987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16995, "end_char": 17030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. N. Deodher", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17427, "end_char": 17440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S(a) is in these words:-\n\n\"Save as expressly provided by the provisions of this Appendix or by a notification issued under paragraph 22 or order made under paragraph 23,\n\n(a) any appointment, notification, notice, tax, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, byelaw, or form made, issued, imposed or granted under the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901 or the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 or any other law in force in any local area constituted to be a City immediately\n\nbefor~ the appointed day shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, continue in force until it is superseded by\n\nPoo~ .Municipal Corporation\n\nany appointment, notification, notice, tax, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, byelaw, or form made, issued, imposed or granted v.\n\nD. N. Deodher under this Act or any other law as aforesaid as the case may be;\" Das Gupta J.\n\nMr. Patwardhan readily conceded that the 10 per cent deduction, as a tax on octroi refund could not get the protection of cl.", "canonical_name": "D. N. vDeodher"}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17643, "end_char": 17648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17733, "end_char": 17739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17890, "end_char": 17894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "s. 466", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17976, "end_char": 17982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "District Municipal Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18199, "end_char": 18227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18236, "end_char": 18265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18505, "end_char": 18510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act,\n\n1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act,\n\n1925"}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18692, "end_char": 18698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act,\n\n1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act,\n\n1925"}}, {"text": "Poona City Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19108, "end_char": 19131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Poona City Municipality's octroi Rules and Bye-laws under which the claim for refund can be made define \"a claimant\" as a person \"who produces the duly receipted import bill and the corresponding export certificates.\" ["}}, {"text": "s. 487", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21567, "end_char": 21573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Poona Municipal\n\nCorporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21735, "end_char": 21763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material part of the section runs thus:-\n\n( 1) No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation or against the Commissioner, or the\n\nPoona Municipal\n\nCorporation\n\nTransport Manager, or against any municipal officer or servant in respect of any act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act:-\n\n....\n\nD, N. Deodher\n\nDtu Gupta J.\n\n( a) until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Corporation, left at the chief municipal office and, in the case of the Commissioner or of the Transport Manager or of a municipal officer or servant delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, stating with reasonable particularity the cause of action and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and of his attorney, advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purpose of such suit, or\n\n(b) unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action.\""}}, {"text": "D, N. Deodher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22025, "end_char": 22038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material part of the section runs thus:-\n\n( 1) No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation or against the Commissioner, or the\n\nPoona Municipal\n\nCorporation\n\nTransport Manager, or against any municipal officer or servant in respect of any act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act:-\n\n....\n\nD, N. Deodher\n\nDtu Gupta J.\n\n( a) until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Corporation, left at the chief municipal office and, in the case of the Commissioner or of the Transport Manager or of a municipal officer or servant delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, stating with reasonable particularity the cause of action and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and of his attorney, advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purpose of such suit, or\n\n(b) unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action.\"", "canonical_name": "D. N. vDeodher"}}, {"text": "Dtu Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22040, "end_char": 22049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material part of the section runs thus:-\n\n( 1) No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation or against the Commissioner, or the\n\nPoona Municipal\n\nCorporation\n\nTransport Manager, or against any municipal officer or servant in respect of any act done or purported to be done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act:-\n\n....\n\nD, N. Deodher\n\nDtu Gupta J.\n\n( a) until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Corporation, left at the chief municipal office and, in the case of the Commissioner or of the Transport Manager or of a municipal officer or servant delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, stating with reasonable particularity the cause of action and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and of his attorney, advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purpose of such suit, or\n\n(b) unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action.\""}}, {"text": "s. 127(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23022, "end_char": 23031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_189_204_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "S S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS\n\nEXPRESS NEWSPAPERS LTD., MADRAS\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI. JJ.)\n\n111con1e-tax-Sale of 111achiner)' after cfO.H! of busi111'.s-A:no1111t i11 excess received 01er written dow1t 1·11/11c a11d 01er Ifie ori;; i11(/I cost price of n1aclli11ery-Whetlier 1axah!t1-IVherlier Stl(Tt'.\\'.W!f !iahfr 1,., be assessed 011 capital gains-f/uo111c-tax Act, 1922 ( 11 of 1922;, ss. 19(2) (vii) second pro1iso, s. 26(2) 011d prvri!>o.\n\nThe Free Press Company was a private limited conipany carrying on business \".\\S printers and publishers of certain newspaper~. On • .\\ugust 31, 1946, tl: Free Press Company transferred the right 10 print and publish the newspapers to the assessee company and let out i1s n1achinery and assets to the latter v,.ith effect from Septen1ber l, ! 946. The ascssee\n\ncompany al!cordingly started publishing nc\\vspapers fro•n September 1, 1946.\n\nThe Free Press Company \\\\ent into voluntary liquidation on 01.'.:tober 31, 1946_. and the Liquidator, on November 1, 1946, confirn1ed the transfer of the assets made by the Free Press Con1pan;· to the assessee-company. On November l, 1946 the aforesaid tn.:i.chiti:ry was sold yielding a profit of Rs. 6,08,666. That sun1 wus made up of.\n\n(i) the difference between the original cost price rtnd the written down of price machinery R'i. 2.14,090. (ii) the an1ount in l'X( C'>S over rhe original cost price . . Js. 3,94,576. In assessing the assessee to incomctax for the accounting year 1946-47 the Income-tax Officer included. the said two items in the total income of the assessee-con1pany. The first item was assessed as profit under proviso to s. 10(2) (vii) of the Incometax Act and the second item was assessed as capital , gains.\n\nThe matter went up to the High Court. On a reference the High Court held that the assessee was not liable to tax in respect of the said two items.\n\nHeld: (i) The second proviso to s. 10(2)(vii) of the Act wduld only aprly to the sale of such machinery which was used for the purpose of business during the accounting year. In order to bring the sale proceeds to charge under the second proviso the foUowing conditions shall be fulfilled: (I) During the entire previous year or a part of it the business sha11 have been carried on by the assessee; (2) the machinery shall have been used in the business; and (3) the machinery shall have been sold when the business was being carried on and not for the purpose of closing it down or winding it up.\n\nOn the facts of this case it was held that the sale of the machinery in the instant case having taken place after the business \\Vas closed and during the '\\vinding up proceedings therefore it would fall outside the scope of the said proviso and thus the first item i.e. the sun1 of Rs. '.!,14.090 could not be assessed to income-tax.\n\n.\\fay 7\n\n190 SUPl<EME COURT REPORTS [1g64]\n\n1964 The Liquidator9 of Pnrsa Lilnited v. Comniissioner of Income-tax, Bihar, [19541 S.C.R. 76i an<l K.\n\nAf.\n\nReddy, Con1n1issioner of 1\n\nC.!:T. lncon1e-tax, Kerala v. West Coast Chemicals and Industries Ltd. (in Express Newsliquidation), Alleppy, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 960, relied on. papers Ltd.\n\nI Co111n1issioner of lnco1ne-tax, Bonibay Circle fl v.\n\nThe National Syndicate, Bombay, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 229, explained.\n\n(ii) Both the sub-s. (2) of s. 26 and the proviso deal only with profits under the 4th bead mentioned in s. 6 and, so construed, it excludes capital gains. The profits and gains of business and capital gains are two distinct concepts in the Income-tax Act: the former arises front the activity which is called business and the latter accrues because capital assets are disposed of at a value higher than what they cost the assessee. Therefore under s. 26(2) of the Act the assessee being the successor could not be liable to income-tax in respect of Rs. 3,94,576 (the second item) which represented the capital gains because capital gains are excluded from the purview of s. 26(2) of the Act.\n\nUnited Conunercial Baok Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncome•tax1 We.st Be11g11/, [1958] S.C.R. 79, referred to,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 596 of 1963.\n\nAppeal from the judgment dated March 1, 1960 of the Madras High Court in Case Referred No. 11 of 1955.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and R. Gopalakrishnan. for the respondent.\n\nMay 7, 1964 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave is preferred against the order of the Madras High Court in a reference made to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66 ( l) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act.\n\nThe facts leading up to the reference and relevant to the present enquiry are as follows. The Free Press of Tndia (Madras) Ltd., hereinafter called the Fre.e Press Company, was a private limited company carrying on business as priaters and publishers of certain newspapers, namely, \"Indian Express\", \"Dhinamani\" and \"Andhra Prabha\" at\n\nMadras, \"Eastem Express\" and \"Bharat\" at Calcutta and 1964 \"Sunday Standard\" and ''Morning Stal\\dard\" at Bombay. c.r.i.\n\nOn Agust 31, 1946, the Free Press Company passed a •· resolution transferring to the Express Newspapers Limited, Exp;::,,, !::, ws a ne\\'I company formed on or about April 22, 1946, here- - f II d h h h d Suhha Rao J ma ter ca e t e assessee-company, t e ng t to pnnt an pc1blis!t the said newspapers from September 1, 1946. letting out its machinery and assets and authorizing the assessee-company to collect the book debts and pay off the liabilities of the Free Press Company.\n\nThe asscsseecornp:my accordingly started publishing newspapers from September J, 1946. On October 31, 1946. the Free Press\n\nCom;:ony resolved at a General Body Meeting to wind up the company voluntarily.\n\nThe liquidator appointed thereunder was directed not to carry on the business of the comp::my.\n\nOn November 1, 1946, the liquidator ascertained\n\nth~ \\:-Jue of the assets over the liabilities taken over by the assessee-company as per the bal\".ice-sheet at Rs. 19,36.000/- and tl1is amount was credited to the 'account of the two direc:ors of the Free Press Company in the assessee's books.\n\nThe profit of the Free Press Company was worked out to be Rs. 6.08,666, being the difference between the written dcwn value and the sale price of the machinery. That sum was made up of, (i) the difference between the original cost price and the written dowri price of the machinery .... '\n\nR~. 2.14,090/-, (ii) the amount in excess over the original cost rricc ... Rs. 3,94,576/-. The Income-tax Officer included the said two items in the' total income of the assesseecompany under the following heads, (i) profit under proviso to s. l0(2)(vii) .... Rs. 2.14,090/-. and (ii) capital gains under s. 12B .... Rs. 3,94,576/-, and assessed each to tax.\n\nThe Income-tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the validity of the inclusion of the item under capital gains in the total income of the assessee but decided against the inclusion of the first item. The Appellate Tribunal referred the following two questions, among others. for the decision of the High Court of Madras under s. 66 (1) of the Incometax Act:-\n\n\"4. Whether Free Press Company made a business profit of Rs. 2,14,090/- under proviso to section 10 ( 2 )(vii) of the Act?\"\n\n1'64\n\nCJ.T.\n\nv. llxp1\"u Ntw1paptrs Ltd.\n\n\"6. Whether the capital gain made by the Free\n\nPres& Company is liable to be assessed in the hands of the Express Company, under section 26(2) of the Act?\"\n\nSubba Rao 1.\n\nThe reference was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court, consisting of Rajagopalan and Ramachandra Iyer, JJ., who by th.cir judgment answered the two questions in the negative and against the department.\n\nThe present appeal is preferred against the said judgment of the High Court.\n\nThe argument in the appeal proceeded on the basis of the following facts.\n\nDuring the accounting year 1946-4 7 the Free Press Company did not do the business of printing and publishing newspapers from_ September 1, 1946, and thereafter the assessee-company alone was carrying on the said business.\n\nThe Free Press Company went into voluntary liquidation on October 31, 1946, and the liquidator, on November 1, 1946, confirmed the transfer of the assets made by the Free Press Company to the assessee-company.\n\nTherefore, on November 1, 1946, the aforesaid machinery was sold yielding a profit of Rs. 6,08,666/- to the. Free Press Company being the difference between the written down value and the sale price of the machinery. Broadly stated, the machinery was sold by the Free Press Comp2ny during the accounting year after it closed down its business and after it went into yoluntary liquidation. On those facts learned counsel for the Revenue raised before us the following two contentions: ( 1) The first item of Rs. 2,14,090/-, representing the surplus over the written down value of the machinery was assessable in accordance with the proviso to s. 10(2) (vii) of the Act; and (2) the second item of Rs. 3,9.4,576/-, representing the capital gains made by the Free Press Company is assessable in the hands of the assessee-company, who succeeded to the said business, under s. 26(2) of the Act.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent contended that neither the conditions laid down in s. 10(2) (vii) of the Act nor those laid down in s. 26(2) thereof attracted the said two items of income and, therefore, they were not\n\nsse\"3ble in the hands of the assessee-company.\n\nThe first question turns upon the relevant provisions ot 1964 s. IO of the Act. To 'have a clear view of the scope of the C.l.T. relevant provisions it will be convenient to read them at v.\n\nExpress New,.. one place. papm Ltd.\n\nSection 10.-(l) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation\" in respect of the profit or gains of any business, pr0fession or vocation carried on by him.\n\n! 2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after making the following allowances, namely:-- • • • *\n\n(iv) in respect of insurance against risk of damage or destruction of buildings, machinery, plant, furniture, stocks or stores, used for the purposes of the business, profession or vocation. the amount of any premium paid:\n\n(v) in respect of current repairs to such buildings, machinery, plant or furniture, the amount paid on account thereof:\n\n(vii) in respect of any such building. machinery\n\nor plant which has been sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed, the amount by which the written down value thereof exceed1 the amount for which the building, machinery or plant, a:1 the case may be. is actually sold or its scrap value: • * • Provided further that where the amount for whicl1 any such building, machinery or plant is sold, whether during the continuance of the business or after the cessation thereof. exceeds the writte!l down value, so much of the excess as does not exceed the difference between the original cost and the written\n\n~I S.C.-13\n\nS11bha Rao I.\n\nCJ.T. v.\n\n&prU8 New.-\n\ndown value shall be deemed to be profits of the previous year in which the sale took place: papen Lid.\n\nSubbn Rao J. • • •\n\nWe are concerned with the second proviso to s. 10 ( 2 J l vii) of the Act. The substantive clause grants a balancing allowance in respect of building, llllichine_ry 01 plant which has been sold or discarded or demoli'lhed or destroyed.\n\nThe allowance represents the excess of the written down value over the sale price.\n\nUnder the proviso, if the sale price exceeds the written-down value, but does not exceed th! original cost price, the difference between the original cos• and the written down v; tlue shall be deemed to be profits of the year previous to that in which the sale t::kes place; that is to say, the difference between the price fetched at the sate am! the written down value is deemed to be the escaped profits for which the assessee is made liable to tax As the sale price is higher than the written down value, the difference represents the excess depreciation mistakenly granted to the assessec.\n\nTo illustrate: assume that the original mst of a machinery or plant is Rs. 100/· and depreciation allowed is Rs. 25/-; the written down vaiue is Rs. 75.\n\nIf the machinery is sold for Rs. lOO/-, it is obvious that depreciation of Rs. 25/- was 'wrongly allowed.\n\nIf it had not been allowed that amount would have swelled the profits to that extent.\n\nWhen it is found that it was wrongly allowed that profit is brought to charge.\n\nThe second proviso, therefore, in substance, brings to charge an escaped profit or gain of the business carried on by the assessee.\n\nThe scope of this proviso cannot be ascertained in vacuum.\n\nThe conditions for its applicability can he ascertained only in its relation to the other related provi·· sions.\n\nUnder s. 3 of the Act income-tax shall be chareed for any year in accordance with and subject to the prvi. sions of the Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of everv assessee: under s. 6. one of the heads of taxable income is \"profits and gains of busines>, profession or vocation\"; under s. 10( 1), the tax under th3t head is payable in respect of profit or gains of any busine>'\n\ncarried on by the assessee during the accounting year. Th<:\n\nS S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOl~TS 195\n\nmain condition which attracts all the other sub-sections and\n\n19U clauses of the section is that the tax shall be payable by an c.1x. assessce in respect of the profit or gains of any business E\n\n9 • N etc. carried on by him.\n\nThe crucial words are \"business xp=,. £14-:-- canied on by him\". If the profit or gains were not earned Suba Rtll> I. when the business was being carried oil by the asscsse~ durin_g -the accounting year, they would fall. outside th~ prmi1ion of s. 10(1). For instance, if the machinery sold after the business was closed or when the business was under liquidation, it would not be appropriate to hold that the profit or gains earned by the sale were in respect of th~\n\nbUBiness that was befug c11rried on by the assessee.\n\nTh., second condition that attracts the second proviso is implicit in the adjective \"sucq\" preceding \"building, machiner) or. plant\" sold.\n\nThe adjective \"such\" refers back to els. (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) of s. 10(2). Under cl. (iv) an anovlance is allowed in regard to any premium paid in respect of insurance l!gainst risk of damage or destruction of buildings, machinery, plant etc. used for .the purpose c\\ the business, profession or vocation.\n\nUnder this clausr allowance is allowed only in re,<; pect of the machinery used for the purpose of the business. Clauses (v), (vi) and\n\n(vii) refer to su_ch buildings, machinery, plant etc.; that j, to say, such buildings, _machinery, plant etc. _used for the purpose of the business. The resuit is that the second proviso will only apply to the sale of such machinery which was used for the purpose of the business during the accounting year. It brings in to charge the escaped profit~ under the guise of superfluous allowances if the machinery sold was used for the business during the accounting year when the business was being carried c:_>n.\n\nTherefore. to brlng the sale proceeds to charge the following conditions shall be fulfilled: (1) During the entire previous year or a part of it the business shall have been carried .on by the\n\nassessee; (2) the machinery shall have been used in the business; and (3) the machinery shall have been sold when the business was being carried on and not for the purpose of closing it down or winding it up. If these were the conditions for the applicability of the said proviso. the sale of the machinery in the instant case having taken placl.' after the business was closed and during the winding\n\nUP'\n\n<:.J:r . ... /llJqlHa Nn11- ~Lid.\n\nbl>o Roe J.\n\nproceedings, it would fall outside the scope of the said proviso and therefore the first item is not assessable to tax.\n\nThis point directly arose for consideration in Tire Liquidators of Pursa Limited v. Commissioner of lncometax, Bihar('). There, the assessee-company carried on the\n\nbusiness of growing sugarcane and manufacturing and selling sugar. In the year 1943 it negotiated for the sale ot the factory and other assets with the object of winding up the company. It received a firm offer on August 9, I 943, and concluded the agreement of sale on December 7, 1943.\n\nBetween August 9, 194~, and December 7, 1943, it never used the machinery and p1ant for the purpose of manufacturing sugar or for any other purpose except that of keeping them in triln and running order. In the assessment of the co, Qlpany to income-tax for the accounting period from October l, 1943, to September 30, 1944, tbe income-tax authorities treated the surplus made by the company on the sale of the buildings, plant and machinery as profits under proviso (2) to s. 10(2)(vii) of the Act.\n\nThis Court held that the .said amount was not taxable.\n\nThis Court rejected the contention of the Revenue that the said excess was taxable on two grounds, namely, ( I ) \"the sale of the machinery and plant was not an operation ic11 furtherance of the busin~ carried on by the company but was a realisation of its assets in the process of gradu::il winding up of its business which eventually. culminated in the voluntary liquidation of the company; (2) \"even if the\n\nsale of the stock of sugar be regarded as carryinl!; on of business by the company_ and not a realisation of its assets with a view to winding up, the machinery or plant not being used in the accounting year at all and in any event not having had connection with the carrying on of that lim.ited business during the accounting year, s. 10(2) (vii) could have no application to the sale of any such machinery or plant\". Learned couns~ for the Revenue contends ttist the main reason for the decision was that the machinery -0r the plant was not used in the accounting year for the bvsiness and that the second reason, namelv, that the assets were sold in the process of gradual winding up of the COM\n\n(I) [r954) S.C.R. 767\n\n~· S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUl\\.T REPORTS\n\npany was only an observation and that the decision was not !964 based upon the said observation. But a careful perusal of c1.r. tlie judgment discloses beyond any reasonable doub.t that F.xP'\"# \"· N._\n\nthe decision was based upon both the grounds.\n\nAs m the pqer-1 UL present case the machinery was sold not for the business Suboo llDlJ 1. but only for closing it up during the liquidation proceedings, this decision directly covers the present case. This question again fell to be considered by this Court in The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Circle ll v.\n\nThe Natimia/ Syndicate, Bombay(').\n\nThere, the National Syndicate, a Bombay firm, acquired on January 11, 1945.\n\na tailoring business as a going concern for Rs. 89,321/- which included the consideration paid for sewing machines znd a motor lorry. Soon after the purchase the respondent found it difficult to continue the business, and therefore it closed its business in August, 1945. Between August 16. 1945, and February 14, 1946, sewing machines and the motor lorry were sold at a loss. The relipondent closed it<\n\n<Jfount books on February 28. 1946, showing the two losses and writing them off.\n\nFor the assessment year\n\n:I 946-47, the respondent claimed a deduction under s .. to\n\n(2) (vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThe question fell to be considered on a construction of the provisions of ,;, !0(2)(vii) of the Act.\n\nThis Court, sp.eaking through Hidayalullah, J., held that the loss was a business Joss. t.'iough the machines and the motor lorry were sold after\n\nthe business was cloed down, as the said machines and Jorry were used for the purpose of the business during a part of the accmnting year and were sold during the accounting vear.\n\nThis Court, after noticin!!- the decision under appeal and that of this Court in The Liquidat,,,.,,. nf Pursa Limited v. Commi.rsinner nf Income-tax, Bih,, r(2 ), and the amendment introduced in the second proviso to s. 10(2) (vii) of the Act, observed:\n\n\"But it is to be noticed that no such amendment was made in cl.\n\n(vii) to exclude loss over buildin!!-s. machinery or plant after the closure of the business.\n\nIt is thus clear that the principles which govern the proviso cannot be -----\n\n(1) [1961) 2 S.C.R. 229\n\n(2) [1954J S.C.R. 767\n\nlilU\n\nC.l.T.\n\nY. ,,,,... . N.w1- ; o,.,. Lid.\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nused to govern the main clause, because profit or loss arise in different ways in business. The two rulings do not, therefore, apply to the facts here.\"\n\nIt is contended that the principle accepted by this decision is in conflict with that laid down in the case of The\n\nLiquidators of Pursa Limited('). It is said that the condition that the sale of the machinery at a loss should have been before the closing of the business is lmpliedly laid down by s. I 0( I) of the Act which applies equally to cl (vii ) as well as to the second proviso thereto, and that if the condition need not be fulfilled in the case falling under the substantive part of cl. (vii) of s. 10(2) of the Act, it will be incongruous to apply it to a case falling under the second proviso before it was amended.\n\nSo stated there is some plausibility in the argument. But this Court in express terms made a distinction between the scope of the substantive part of cl. (vii) and that of the second proviso thereto and expressly distinguished those rulings on the ground that they would not apply to the construction of the substantive part of cl. (vii).\n\nWhen this Court expressly confined the scope of the decision to the substantive part of\n\ncl. (vii) without disturbing the validity of the decision.' governing the second proviso, it is not proper that we should rely upon it in preference to a direct decision on the second proviso to cl. (vii) of s. 10(2) of the Act before it was amended. This Court in K. M. S. Reddy, Commissioner of Income-tax, Kera/a v. The West Coast Chemicals and Industries Ltd. (in liquidation), Alleppy(\") held that a winding up sale was not trading or doing business.\n\nThere. chemicals and other raw-materials were sold not in the course of ordinary trading but only in realisation sale after the company had been wound up.\n\nThis Court, speaking through Hidayatullah, J., posed the following question:\n\n\"The question, therefore, is whether there can be said\n\nto be a sale in the carrying on of the business in respect of the chemicals and other raw materials.\" ·--·---------\n\n(I) [1954) S.C.R. 767\n\n(2) (1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 960, 965.\n\n,/· ...\n\nAfter referring to the 'passages in Halsbury's Laws ·of Eng-\n\n- 1964 land; 3rcf-Edn., Vol. 20, -pp. 115-117, wherein it was\n\nCJ.T. stated that 'mere re21isnion of assets is -not trading\" and E\n\nv. N . . . - I f . . -- f h xpres• •w ... that there v .•·.c-'-'' -,-1,.>n between sa es orrmng part o t e papeTJ Ltd, trading acii\"11.i~ a.1..i 1.i1ose where the realisation \\Vas not Subba Rao J • .anact of trading,\n\n0 the learned Judge observed that the said distinction was a sound one. The learned Judge, on a consideration of other decisions, also accepted as correct the distinction made between a sale of the entire stock as part of trading and the sale of a part of the stock as a winding up sale.\n\nThen-the learned Judge applied _ the principles to the facts of the case l!nd held that it was impossible to infer that the chemicals and raw materials were sold in the ordinary wayof business or that the assessee company was carrying on a trading business. This decision again accepts the distinction between a sale held in - the ._ ordinary way of business and that held for the purpose of winding up the business and that in the latter case the profits accrued-are not trading profits. This case no doubt did not turn upon the provisions of the second proviso to d. (vii) of s. 10(2) of the Act, but the principle accepted therein is the basis for the application of s. IO of the Act and that will -apply to all provisions of s. 10, unless an exception is made in a particular provision. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the first item is not liable to tax and the High Court bas given th_e correct answer to the first question submitted to it:\n\nThe second - item relates to capital gains. That represents the excess of the price obtained on the sale of the machinery over its original cost price. It is conceded that it does not represent_ profits and gains of business, but , it falls under the heading \"capital gains\". But it is, argued that. as the Free Press Company was wound up and, therefore, could not be found, the assessee, who had succeeded to it. would be liable to be assessed for the said capital gains under the proviso to s. 26(2) of the Act. ; ro appre- Ciate the contention some of the relevant provisiqns of the ·\n\nAct may be read: Section 6.ave as otherwise provided by this Act, the following head' of in<.ome, profits and ! /- / /\n\nC.T.T. v . .-' ExpreS3 New34 paper.r Ltd,.:\n\nSubba Rao 1.\n\ngains, shall be chargeable to income-tax in the manner hereinafter. app~ring, namely:-~\n\n• • , (v). Profits and gains of business, 'vocation:\n\n* • •\n\n(vi). Capiial gains. . . ' . .\n\n. .\n\nprofession or\n\nSection 10.-.. ( 1) The tax shall be payable by an assessec under the head. \"Profits and gains of . business, profession or vocation\" , in respect of •the profit oJ\" gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on by hi~.. ·\n\n(2} Such profits or gains shall be computed after making the \"following allowances, namely:-\n\n• • • •\n\nSection 128.-· (I) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"Capital . gains\" in. respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer of a capital asset effected after the 31st day of March, 1956, and such profits and gains shall be deemed t~ be income of the previous year in which the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer. took place: · ·\n\n-Section 24.-. -(2A) Not\\\\ithstanding anything con- . tained in sub-section ( 1), where the lo>s sustained is a Joss falling under the head \"Capital\n\ngains.~· such. loss. shall not be set ofI except . against any profits and gains falling under that head.\n\n(2Bi Where an assessee sustains a loss such as is\n\nreferred'to iri sub; seetion. (2A)' and the los~ rnnnot be wholly set off in accordance with the provisions of that sub-section, the . portion not soset off shall becarried forward to the\n\n' \\ \\ _J\n\n_.}\n\n8 S.C.R\n\nSUPH.EME COURT REPORTS 201\n\nfollowing year and set off ag:.iinst capjtc.1 gain.., 1964 for that year, and if it cannot be so set otf, the C.l.T. amount thereof not so set off shall be carried v. f d t h f II . d E:i:press Ntw~ orwar o t e o owmg year an so on. so P\"P'\" ltd. however that no such loss shall be carried forward for more than eight years:\n\nProvided that where the loss sustained by an assesscc. not being a company, in any previou:; year does not exceed five thousand rupees, it shall not be carried forward.\n\nSection 26.-(2) Where a person carrying un any\n\nbusiness. profession or vocation bas beer: succeeded in such cap2city by ~!nothi.:r pi:rson. such person and such other person shul\\ .. :.ubject to the provisions of sub-section ( 4 l of section 25, each be asscc>sed in rc:.p:xt of hi< actual share. if any, of the income. p;-ofit; anc!, gains of the previous year:\n\nProvided that. when the person succeeded in the business. ptofl!Ssion or vocation cannot h¢ found. the assessment of the profits of the year. in which the succession took place up to rhc date of succession, and for the year precedini~ that year shall be made on the person succecdin!! him in like manner and to the sanJ<; amount\n\n:\"it would have been made on the person succeeded or when the tax in re, pect of the assessment made for either of such ye:m a%essed on the person succeeded cnnnot he recovered from him, it shall be payable by and recoverable from the person succecdin.~. nd such nerson shall be entitled to recover from the nerson succeeded the amount of env 1:1' '\" paid.\n\nA con<1'cctus of the said sections discloss clearcut scheme.\n\nThough income-tax is onlv one tax levied on the rnt:il income. s. 6 enumerates six heads whe•eundcr the inc0me of an asse<se falls to be chareed.\n\nThis Court in United Commercial Rank Lid. v. Crmimi<iin:'<>• ,., fnf'<'1W-\n\nSul>lw P.i J\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORJS\n\n196' tax, West Bengal(') laid down tht ss./ to12 a;.; mutuallv c.1.T. exclusive and where an item of income falls specifica11;- v. under one head it is to be. charged under that head and -no. :Iizpreu Newsoth r Th · \"' ·. f. • \" 6 P<ZIHn Ltd. e . e expressmn mcome. rir;. .t< \"\"<I gams m s. is a composite concept which 0 '.:~\"' , the six heads of' ~•bba Rao I • ' mcome mentioned therein. i .. ~· -.L~·· --! is \"profits and gains of business, profession or vocation\"' and the 6th head is \"capital gains\". Section 10 taxes the profits and gains of a business, profession or vocation carried on by an assessee; it also. enumerates. the different kinds of allowances that cau be made in computing the profits.\n\nUnder s. 10(1), as we have already pointed out, the necessary condition for the application of the section is that the assessee should have carried on the business for some part of the accounting year. Section 26(2) indicates the manner of assessment of the income, profits and g_ains of any business, profession or vocation. This section does not provide for the assessment of income under any other head. - It only says that if thre is a succession to a person carrying on business during an accounting year, the person succeeded and the person succeeding can each of them be assessed in respect of his actual share. The proviso deals with a case where the person succeeded cannot be found; in that event, the assessment of the profits of the year in which the succession took place upto the date of the succe5'ion and for the year preceding that year shall be made on the person succeeding him. If an assessment has already been made in respect of the said years on the person succeeded, it can be recovered from the person succeeding.\n\nBut both sub-s. (2) and the proviso. deal only with income, profits and gains of the business, that is to say, for_ the assessment made fo respect of profit and gains , under the 4th head of s. 6. Now .. turning to s. 12B, it provides for capital gains. Under that section the tax shall be payable by the assessee. under the head capital gains in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale of a capital asset effected during th~ prcsc.ribed period. It says further that such profiN or gains_ shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which the sale etc. took place. This deeming dame does not Jiff. the capital gains from the 6th head in s. 6 ant!. place it\n\n(1) [1958] S.C.R. 79 (~)[r957) 31 l.T R. fn.\n\nUllder the 4th head. It only introduces a limited fiction, lHf named that capital gains accrued will be deemed to be c.1.r. income of the previous year in which the sale was effected. E\n\nY. N l'he fiction does not make them the profit or gains of the xp:;.,~,, Lt~ business.\n\nIt is well settled that a legal fiction is limited Subba Rao J. to the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond its legitimate field.\n\nSub-sections (2A) and (2B) of s. 24 provide for the setting off of the Joss falling under the head \"capital gains\" against any capital gains falling under the 5ame head. Such loss cannot be set off against an income falling under any different head.\n\nThese three sections indicate beyond any doubt that the capital gains are separately computed in accordance with the said provisions and they are not treated as the profits from the business. The profits and gains of business and capital gains are two distinct concepts in the Income-taic Act: the former arises from the activity which is called business and the latter accrues because capital assets are disposed of at a value higher than what they cost the asses.see.\n\nThey are placed under different heads; they are derived from different sources; and the income is computed under different methods.\n\nThe fact that the capital gains are connected with the capital assets of the business cannot make them the profit of the business.\n\nThey are only deemed to be income of the previous year and not the profit or gains arising from the business <luring that year.\n\nIf that be the scheme of the Act, the contention of the learned counsel for the Revenue can easily be answered.\n\nHe asks that ifs. 26(2) deals with only profits aml gains of the business, why should the Legislature use the word \"income\" therein? As we have indicated, the expression \"income, profits and gains\" is a compendious term to connote the income from the various sources mentioned in s. 6; tlaetefore, the use of such an expression does not efface the\n\ndistinction between the different heads, but only describes the income from the business.\n\nThe expression \"profits\" in 1he proviso makes it clear that the income, profits and gains in sub-s. (2) of s. 26 only refer to the profits under the 4th head in s. 6.\n\nOn the other hand, if the interpretation\n\n1964 sought to be put upon the expression \"income~ in su!J:.s.' (2)\n\nCJ.T; o( s. 26 by the Revenue is . accepted, then the absence of\n\nExpress v'. Newstli.~! _word in the ?rov!-5° destroys the argume?t.\n\nBu! the. papers Lldi' more reasonable .view IS that both the sul>-section and. the\n\nSubba-ao J. pov_is() deal only with the profits unclr ihe 4th head men\" tioJ'led in s. 6 and, so construed, it cxcludci capital g:tlns:· 'fl1e argument that sub-s:. (2) of s. 26 re..:d v, ith the prbviso theretO _indicates that the total · income of the person st1cceeded. is the !=r!_terion f_?r' separate .assessment ·~-~,.: __ ..- sub-s. (2) and for assessment and realisaticm-unoer the ··pf.ovis0 is on. the assumption.thatruO:S.-(2) and the proviso_ deal with all the huds n1entionect in s. 6 of the Act; nut. if,· as; ve.hav(fbeld, the scope of sul>-s.-(2)of s. 26 fa only ---- ·fonrted to the income from the busirtess, ; the\" share' under ---- suJ; s. (2) and the assessment and realisation•· under the\n\nl\\fay 7\n\npro.visa can only relate to the inrome , from the businCs.5.\n\nThe argument is really begging the question itself. Jn the' result we agree with the High Court in regard to\" the answer it has given in respect of the second question.\n\nIn. this view no other ' questidn\" arises . for· oor consideiatiOn: , In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. .\n\nAppeal 'dismin.ed:\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME~TAX, MADRAS\n\nKUMBAKONAM MUTUAL' BENEFiT FUNn LTD.\n\nI •; • . • ._ • .' • '. • ' ; / . ' • . . (K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, J.J.)\n\nMutual Btnefit Socfety2-company engd:; id ili'\"bmillng bU°sine.U restrldeii\"J\n\nto ml'mbers-Not e,,•ery member-made deposit} or_ loaii.J-.P~ mainly earned fr~1n ln.s to mmber;-All me\"m.be~$ enlitlM.llt.;\n\ndiVidend~Whe.tfi~, rquiren?e;.tt\"' of 'mUfi, Y' 1>et;:een 'cOnt~.c;;-· -\n\n,.-.,.--- .·\n\n- , ••! ' \"';,; -, '\"- .,.\n\nP. - . ' • '<'\n\nI '•·.'I arid · partici,, Dtors satisfied~Ther_tfore. wtller company eic1\"pt ,,;, a; r i. •1ocziiwi;'1.Coine-i;._,, ;1c;;-1m · ·\n\n~ ;,_._-' (_ 1' 1-· .; ii·;.-' h, ;~ ,; j._A .•.\n\nI ·, /1'.:.,_ ,,~,- .The ~Ssee~ Kumb3.kon3.in tutual Be1:iefit Fund;. _Ltd. •. carried_. on,: ruiokini' buSiDcSS wbiCh. 'wis-- reStncted i.o! its s?iareholdd.t! In the\"COum . . . ' ' . . . . . .", "total_entities": 104, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS LTD., MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS LTD., MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO, J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 480, "end_char": 488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November l, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1165, "end_char": 1181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November l, 1946 the aforesaid tn.:i.chiti:ry was sold yielding a profit of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1690, "end_char": 1698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(vii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1960, "end_char": 1973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3016, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reddy, Con1n1issioner of 1\n\nC.!:T. lncon1e-tax, Kerala v. West Coast Chemicals and Industries Ltd. (in Express Newsliquidation), Alleppy, [1962] Supp."}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 S.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3293, "end_char": 3312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3431, "end_char": 3435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3567, "end_char": 3581, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3775, "end_char": 3783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3998, "end_char": 4006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4320, "end_char": 4334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4356, "end_char": 4373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. Gopalakrishnan."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4378, "end_char": 4395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. Gopalakrishnan."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 7, 1964 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave is preferred against the order of the Madras High Court in a reference made to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66 ( l) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 7, 1964 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave is preferred against the order of the Madras High Court in a reference made to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66 ( l) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4656, "end_char": 4661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4674, "end_char": 4694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Free Press of Tndia (Madras) Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4819, "end_char": 4852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Free Press of Tndia (Madras) Ltd., hereinafter called the Fre.e Press Company, was a private limited company carrying on business as priaters and publishers of certain newspapers, namely, \"Indian Express\", \"Dhinamani\" and \"Andhra Prabha\" at\n\nMadras, \"Eastem Express\" and \"Bharat\" at Calcutta and 1964 \"Sunday Standard\" and ''Morning Stal\\dard\" at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5102, "end_char": 5110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Free Press of Tndia (Madras) Ltd., hereinafter called the Fre.e Press Company, was a private limited company carrying on business as priaters and publishers of certain newspapers, namely, \"Indian Express\", \"Dhinamani\" and \"Andhra Prabha\" at\n\nMadras, \"Eastem Express\" and \"Bharat\" at Calcutta and 1964 \"Sunday Standard\" and ''Morning Stal\\dard\" at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5166, "end_char": 5172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Free Press of Tndia (Madras) Ltd., hereinafter called the Fre.e Press Company, was a private limited company carrying on business as priaters and publishers of certain newspapers, namely, \"Indian Express\", \"Dhinamani\" and \"Andhra Prabha\" at\n\nMadras, \"Eastem Express\" and \"Bharat\" at Calcutta and 1964 \"Sunday Standard\" and ''Morning Stal\\dard\" at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Agust 31, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5185, "end_char": 5199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Agust 31, 1946, the Free Press Company passed a •· resolution transferring to the Express Newspapers Limited, Exp;::,,, !::,"}}, {"text": "Express Newspapers Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5267, "end_char": 5293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Agust 31, 1946, the Free Press Company passed a •· resolution transferring to the Express Newspapers Limited, Exp;::,,, !::,"}}, {"text": "November 1, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5967, "end_char": 5983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1946, the liquidator ascertained\n\nth~ \\:-Jue of the assets over the liabilities taken over by the assessee-company as per the bal\".ice-sheet at Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6853, "end_char": 6859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7199, "end_char": 7219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the decision of the High Court of Madras under s. 66 (1) of the Incometax Act:-\n\n\"4."}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7226, "end_char": 7231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7349, "end_char": 7359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CJ.T.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7391, "end_char": 7396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'64\n\nCJ.T.\n\nv. llxp1\"u Ntw1paptrs Ltd.\n\n\"6."}}, {"text": "section 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7555, "end_char": 7568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7583, "end_char": 7592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Rajagopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7674, "end_char": 7685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court, consisting of Rajagopalan and Ramachandra Iyer, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Ramachandra Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7690, "end_char": 7706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court, consisting of Rajagopalan and Ramachandra Iyer, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "September 1, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8088, "end_char": 8105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the accounting year 1946-4 7 the Free Press Company did not do the business of printing and publishing newspapers from_ September 1, 1946, and thereafter the assessee-company alone was carrying on the said business."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8243, "end_char": 8259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Free Press Company went into voluntary liquidation on October 31, 1946, and the liquidator, on November 1, 1946, confirmed the transfer of the assets made by the Free Press Company to the assessee-company."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9038, "end_char": 9046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9265, "end_char": 9273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9373, "end_char": 9381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9422, "end_char": 9430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9785, "end_char": 9795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11072, "end_char": 11075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subbn Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11214, "end_char": 11223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subbn Rao J. • • •\n\nWe are concerned with the second proviso to s. 10 ( 2 J l vii) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11278, "end_char": 11283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12892, "end_char": 12896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13087, "end_char": 13091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13194, "end_char": 13203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13858, "end_char": 13866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14346, "end_char": 14354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 9, I 943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16385, "end_char": 16400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It received a firm offer on August 9, I 943, and concluded the agreement of sale on December 7, 1943."}}, {"text": "December 7, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16441, "end_char": 16457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It received a firm offer on August 9, I 943, and concluded the agreement of sale on December 7, 1943."}}, {"text": "August 9, 194~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16468, "end_char": 16482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between August 9, 194~, and December 7, 1943, it never used the machinery and p1ant for the purpose of manufacturing sugar or for any other purpose except that of keeping them in triln and running order."}}, {"text": "October l, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16745, "end_char": 16760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the assessment of the co, Qlpany to income-tax for the accounting period from October l, 1943, to September 30, 1944, tbe income-tax authorities treated the surplus made by the company on the sale of the buildings, plant and machinery as profits under proviso (2) to s. 10(2)(vii) of the Act."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16765, "end_char": 16783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the assessment of the co, Qlpany to income-tax for the accounting period from October l, 1943, to September 30, 1944, tbe income-tax authorities treated the surplus made by the company on the sale of the buildings, plant and machinery as profits under proviso (2) to s. 10(2)(vii) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)(vii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16934, "end_char": 16947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17761, "end_char": 17769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Syndicate", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18796, "end_char": 18814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the National Syndicate, a Bombay firm, acquired on January 11, 1945."}}, {"text": "January 11, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18843, "end_char": 18859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the National Syndicate, a Bombay firm, acquired on January 11, 1945."}}, {"text": "August 16. 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19142, "end_char": 19157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between August 16."}}, {"text": "February 14, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19163, "end_char": 19180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1945, and February 14, 1946, sewing machines and the motor lorry were sold at a loss."}}, {"text": "February 28. 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19284, "end_char": 19301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relipondent closed it<\n\n<Jfount books on February 28."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19459, "end_char": 19473, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hidayalullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19608, "end_char": 19620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, sp.eaking through Hidayalullah, J., held that the loss was a business Joss.", "canonical_name": "Hidayalullah"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20123, "end_char": 20131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961) 2 S.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20404, "end_char": 20423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21171, "end_char": 21179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21931, "end_char": 21939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. M. S. Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21988, "end_char": 22002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in K. M. S. Reddy, Commissioner of Income-tax, Kera/a v. The West Coast Chemicals and Industries Ltd. (in liquidation), Alleppy(\") held that a winding up sale was not trading or doing business."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22365, "end_char": 22377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, speaking through Hidayatullah, J., posed the following question:\n\n\"The question, therefore, is whether there can be said\n\nto be a sale in the carrying on of the business in respect of the chemicals and other raw materials.\" ·--·---------", "canonical_name": "Hidayalullah"}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23935, "end_char": 23943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24086, "end_char": 24091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24805, "end_char": 24813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24918, "end_char": 24927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25282, "end_char": 25292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25620, "end_char": 25631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25846, "end_char": 25869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer of a capital asset effected after the 31st day of March, 1956, and such profits and gains shall be deemed t~ be income of the previous year in which the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer."}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26023, "end_char": 26033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27067, "end_char": 27077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27302, "end_char": 27312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28245, "end_char": 28249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28948, "end_char": 28958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29157, "end_char": 29165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29353, "end_char": 29366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30382, "end_char": 30386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30406, "end_char": 30412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30851, "end_char": 30855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31384, "end_char": 31389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32863, "end_char": 32867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33130, "end_char": 33135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33184, "end_char": 33188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33311, "end_char": 33316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33605, "end_char": 33609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33693, "end_char": 33698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34014, "end_char": 34018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34086, "end_char": 34091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34745, "end_char": 34757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO, J."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34762, "end_char": 34784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS."}}, {"text": "Mutual Btnefit Socfety2-company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34793, "end_char": 34824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. SIKRI, J.J.)\n\nMutual Btnefit Socfety2-company engd:; id ili'\"bmillng bU°sine."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_18_36_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Cj.T., Madras\n\nAmrutan; an Ltd.\n\nShah J.\n\nApril, 29.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nBut even that argument is of no value, for twenty-five per cent of the voting power attached to the ordinary shares is not exercisable by the public.\n\nThi3, tlmefore, is a case in which shares not entitled to a fixed dividend cauying not less than twenty-five per cent of the voting power are not shown to have been allotted unconditionally to, or acquired unconditionally by or beneficially held by the public.\n\nThe Explanation, therefore, has no operation.\n\nWhether in view of the third proviso the company may be regarded as one in which the public are substantially interested, is a question to which no attention was paid by the Tribunal.\n\nWhether in fact there exists such a control ling interest in the hands of one shareholder or a group of shareholders as would render the company one in which the public are not substantially interested is a question which therefore cannot be decided by this Court.\n\nThe order of the High Court must therefore be con tirmed, but on different grounds. The interpretation of the Explanation by the High Court, for reasons already set out, was incorrect.\n\nThe Explanation had no application, because no presumption on the facts found could arise thereunder.\n\nThe Revenue authorities have not made any investigation on the question whether there existed any controlling interest in a group of persons. so as to bring the\n\ncse within the third proviso.\n\nThe appeals must be dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nSJVAKASI MATCH EXPORT COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBRA RAo. J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI. JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Partnership deed-Application for registratio11-Discretion\n\nof [11come-tax Officer in granting Registration-Jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer-Jurisdiction of High Court on reference on\n\nquestions of fact-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 26-A -Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, rr. 2, 3, 4.\n\nThere were five 5.r..:is in Sivakasi manufacturing matches under the name and style of Shenbagam Match Works:, Brilliant Match Works, Manoranjitha Match Works, Pioneer Match Works and Gnanam Match Works. The sole proprietor of Shenbagam Match Works and ono partner from each of the four firms entered into a partnership in their individual capacity and executed a partnership deed dated April 1, 1950.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer registered the said partnership lleed under s. 26(A) of the Act; but the Commissioner of Income-tax acting under s. 33B of the Act. cancelled the registration of the sai'd partnership deed.\n\nOn appeaL the Tribunal held that the said partnership deed was not a genuine one. On a reference the High Court held on. a constn1ction of the partnership deed that the Match Works were not the real parties to the partnership -but the parties to the document were the real partners.\n\nThis appeal has come by way of special leave.\n\nHELD:-(i) (per K. Subba Rao and S. M. Sikri JJ) that the discretion conferred on the Income-tax Officer under s. 26-A of the Act is a judicial one and he cannot refuse to register a firm on mere speculation, but he shall base his conclusion on relevant evidence. The jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer under s. 20-A is, confined to the ascertaining of two facts namely,\n\n(i) whether the application for registration is in conformity with the rules made under the Act, and\n\n(ii) whether the firm shown in the document. (Partnership deed) presented for registration is a bogus one or has no legal exis\n\ntence.\n\n(ii) In the present case the partnership deed ex jacie conforms to the requirements of the law of partnership as well as the Incometax Act. There is no prohibition under the partnership Act against a partner or partners of other firms combining together to form a separate part nership to carry on a different business. The fact that such a partner or partners entered into a sub-partnership with others in respect of their share does not detract from the validity of the partnership; nor the manner in which the said partner deals with the share of his profits is of any relevance to the question of validity of the partnership.\n\n(iii) The tribunal erred in holding the partnership deed as not a genuine one. In the present case the assessee-firm has a separate egal existence, and as such the two circumstances relied upon by the Tribunal. namely, that one of the partners of the assessee firm, brought in the capital from his parent firm or that the profits earned by some of tho partners were surrendered to the parent firm, would be irrelevant. A partner of a firm can certainly secure his capital from any source or\n\nC.1.T., Madr41 v.\n\nSivakasi Match Export Co.\n\nC.I.T., Mndras v.\n\nSivakasi Match\n\nExport Co.\n\nsurrender his profits to his sub-partner or any other person. Those facts cannot conceivably convert a valiCl partnership into a bogus one.\n\nIn the present case the partnership deed is a genuine document and it complies with the requirements of law. It is not an attempt to evade tax, but a legal device to reduce its tax liability.\n\n(iv) A question of law within the meaning of s. 66(2) of the Act arose for decision in this case as the Tribunal misconstrued the provisions of the partnership deed and relied upon irrelevant considerations in coming to the conclusion.\n\nSree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, ,\\1adras. [1956] S.C.R. 691. relied on.\n\nPer Shah. J.-(i) It was exclusively within the province of the Tribunal to tlecide the question whether the partners entered into the partnership in their individual capacities or as representing their match factories and its decision that in entering into the deed of partnership. the named partners represented their respective match factories, was not open to be canvassed in a reference under s. 66(2) of the Indian Incomee tax Act. In a reference under s. 66(2) the High Court was not authorised to disregard the finding of the Tribunal on a question which was essentially one of fact.\n\nIn the present case the High Court was not justified in interfering with the fin'ding of the Tribunal on a question of fact because it was not the case of the assessee that the conclusion of the Tribunal was based on no evidence or that it was perverse\n\n(ii) Where the law prescribes conditions for obta!ning the benefit of reduced liability to taxation, those conditions. unless otherwise provided, must be strictly complied with. and if they are not so complied with, the taxing authorities would be bound to refuse to give the tax payer the benefit claimed. It would be open to the Income-tax OJlicer to decline to register a 'deed, even if under the general law of partnership the rights and obligations of the partners ex nomine thereto may otherwise be adjusted.\n\nIf the requirements relating to the form in which the petition is to be presented are not complied with, and the relevant information is withheld the Income-tax Officer may be justified in refusing registration. In the present case the Income-tax Officer was bound to refuse registration as the application submitted by the five partners of the assessee did not conform to the requirements of rr. 2 and 3 of Indian Income-tax Rules.\n\nCNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 700 of 1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 11, 1961 of the Madras High Court in Case Referred No. 131 of 1956.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, N. D. Karkhanis and 1964 R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. c.1.r:, Madras v.\n\nK. Srinivasan and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respond- Sivakasi Match ent.\n\nExport Co.\n\nApril 29, 1964.\n\nThe judgment of SUBBA RAo AND SIKR1 JJ. was delivered by SuBBA RAo J. SHAH J. delivered a dissenting opinion.\n\nSUB BA RAo, J .-This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court of Madras in a reference made to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66(2) of the Indian lncome-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act.\n\nThe facts that have given rise to the appeal may briefly be stated.\n\nThere are 5 firms in Sivakasi manufacturing matches under the name and style of Shenbagam Match Works, Bri1- Iiant Match Works, Manoranjitha Match Works, Pioneer Match Works and Gnanam Match Works. The total number of the partners of all the 5 firms does not exceed 10 or 11 in number. Rajamoney Nadar is the sole proprietor of Shenbagam Match Works and in the other 4 firms there are more than one partner. In the year 1948 a person from each of those firms in )lis representative capacity formed a partnership to carry on the business of banking and commission agents, the principal business being the marketing of the products of the different match factories in Sivakasi. When the said partnership applied for registration for the assessment year 1949-50, it was refused by the Income-tax Department on the ground that different firms could not constitute a valid partnership. Thereafter, Sankaralinga Nada_!', Arumughaswarni Nadar, Arunachala Nadar, Palaniswamy Nadar and Rajamoney N adar the first four being one of the partners of their respective firms and the last being the sole proprietor of his firm, in their individual capacity entered into a partnership for the aforesaid purpose and executed a partnership deed dated April 1, 1950. They presented the said deed of partnership to the Income-tax Officer for registration. The Income-tax Officer by his order dated October 27, 1952, re\n\ngistered the same under s. 26A of the Act: but the Commissioner of Income-tax, acting under s. 33B of the Act, cancell-\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\n.J.T., Madras\n\ned the registration by an order dated October 23, 1954, and directed the assessment to take place as that of an unregistered firm. On appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held, on a construction of the partnership deed and also on\n\nv. oVakasl Match\n\nExport Co.\n\n'.ubba Rao I. the basis of some other circumstances, that the said deed \"is not genuine and brought into existence only as a simulate arrangement, that the profits which are distributed under the deed to the individuals mentioned th, rein are not the true profits of those individuals.\" In short it held that the said partnership deed was not a genuine one.\n\nOn a reference made to the High Court of Judicature at Madras; a Division Bench of that High Court, on a construction of the document, came to the conclusion that the Match Works were not the real parties to the partnership but the parties of the document were the real partners. Hence the present appeal.\n\nLearned counsel for the Revenue raises before us the following two points, namely, (i) the findings of the Appellate Tribunal was one of fact and that the High Court had no jurisdiction to canvass the correctness of its finding on a reference made under s. 66(2) of the Act, and (ii) the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal was the correct one and the High Court erroneously interfered with it.\n\nIt is common place that under s. 66(2) of the Act a reference to the High Court lies only on a question of law.\n\nThe scope of the provision has been elaborately considered by this Court in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras( 1 ). Therein the scope of the provision has been laid down under different propositions.\n\nOn the basis of the judgment it cannot be gainsaid that if the order refusing registration goes beyond the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on, the Income-tax Officer under s. 26A of the Act and the Rules made thereunder or if the decision depends upon the construction of the partnership deed or if there is no evidence to sustain the finding of the Tribunal, then the High Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the reference under s. 66(2) of the Act. In our view, the finding of the Tribunal falls squarely under the said three heads.\n\nThe relevant provisions of the Act read thus:\n\n(t) r19s6J s.c.R. 691.\n\n1964 Section 26A. ( 1) Application may be made to the Income-tax Officer on behalf of any firm, constituted under an instrument of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners, for registration for the purposes of this Act and of any other enactment for the time being in force relating to income-tax or super-tax.\n\nC.l.T., Madras v.\n\nSivakasi Match Export Co.\n\n( 2) The application shall be made by such person or\n\npersons, and at such times and shall contain such particulars and shall be in such form, and be verified in such manner, as may be prescribed; and it shall be dealt with by the Income-tax\n\nOfficer in such manner as may be prescribed.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by s. 59 of the Act, the Central Board of Revenue made the following rules:\n\nRule 2.\n\nAny firm constituted under an instrument of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners may, under the provisions of Section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter in these rules referred to as the Act), register with the Income-tax Officer, the particulars contained in the said Instrument on application made in this behalf.\n\nSuch application shall be given by all the partners\n\n(hot being minors) personally and shall be made-\n\n(a) before the income of the fili!Il is assessed for any year under Section ~3 of the Act, or ....................................\n\nRule 3. The application referred to in Rule 2 shalf\n\nbe made in the form annexed to this rule and shall be accompanied by the original Instrument of Partnership under which the firm is constituted, together with a copy thereof; ................................. ' ..\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nFORM I C.l.T., Madras v.\n\nFor of Application for Registration of a Firm under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 Sivakasi Match Export Co.\n\n:Subba Rao I. . .................................. .\n\nRule 4. If, on receipt of the application referred to in Rule 3, the Income-tax Officer is satisfied that there is or was a firm in existence constituted as shown in the instrument of partnership and that the application has been properly made, he shall enter in writing at the foot of the instrument or certified copy, as the case may bi:, a certificate in the following form, namely:- ................................. ..\n\nRule 6B. In the event of the Income-tax Officer being satisfied that the certificate granted under Rule 4, or under Rule 6A, has been obtained without there bi:ing a genuine firm in existence, he may cancel the certificate so granted.\n\nA combined effect of s. 26A of the Act and the rules made thereunder is that if the application made by a firm gives the necessary particulars prescribed by the rules, the Income-tax\n\nOfficer cannot reject it, if there is a firm in existence as shown in the instrument of partnership. A firin may bi: said to be not in existence if it is a bogus or not a genuine one, or if in law the constitution of the partnership is void. The jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer is, therefore, confined to the ascertaining of two facts, namely, (i) whether the application for registration is in conformity with the rules made under the Act, and (ii) whether the firm shown in the document presented for registration iS a bogus one or has no legal existence. Further, the discretion conferred on him under s. 26A is a judicial one and he caM.ot refuse to register a firm on mere speculation, but he shiill base his conclusion on relevant evidence.\n\n\\)'hat are the facts in the present case? The partnership deed is dated April 1, 1950. In the document five persons are shown as its partners.\n\nThe name of the firm is given, the\n\nobjects of the partnership business are described, the duration of the business is prescribed and the capital fixed is divided between them in equal share.\n\nClause 16 of the Partnership deed, on which the Tribunal relied, r\\)ads:\n\n\"This firm shall collect a commission of half an anna per gross on the entire production of the match factories of the .12_artners, respectively, the Brilliant Match Works, Manoranjitha Match Works, Pioneer Match Works, Shenbagam Match Works and Gnanam Match Works produced from 1st April 1950 whether sales were effected through this firm or not and a further commission of half an anna per gross on the sales effected through this firm. This commission will be collected on all kinds of matches produced from the abovesaid factories.\n\nThe commission of half an anna per gross on the entire production of these factories accrued due at the end of every month shall be debited to the respective factories under advice to them.\"\n\nClauses 2.2 and 23 which throw further light on the question raised read:\n\nClause 22. The business of this firm shall have and has no connection with the match manufacturing business carried on now by the partners separately or in partnersliip with others.\n\nClause 23. Any loss to the firm by way of fire accident or by any other cause during the course of the business of the firm, notwithstanding the fact that the loss might have arisen on the sale of or transaction relating to the match , manufacturing concerns of the partners to this geed, shall be borne by this firm and shall be equally divided between the partners to this deed.\n\nIt is not disputed that the partnership deed ex facie conforms to the requirements of the law of partnership as well as the Income-tax Act. Under s.4 of the Indian Partnership Act partnership is the relation between persons who have agreed\n\nC.l.T., Madra. v.\n\nSivakasi Match,\n\nExport Co.\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nC.I.T., Madras to share the profits of the business carried on by all or any of them acting for all persons who have entered into the partnership with one another called individually partner> and collectively a firm and the name under which the bus:ness is carried on is called the firm name.\n\nThe document certainly conforms to the said definition.\n\nThere is also no prohibition under the Partnership Act against a partner or ; iartners of other.firms combining together to form a separate partnership to carry on a different busines. The fact that such a partner or partners entered into a sub-partnership_ with others in respect of their share does not detract from the validity of the partnership; nor the manner in which the said partner deals with the share of his profits is of any relevance to the question of the validity of the partnership. The document, therefore, embodies a valid partnership entered into in conformity with the law of partnership.\n\nv. 6ivakasi Match Export Co.\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nBut the Tribunal has held that the partnership i~ not a genuine one for the following reasons: ( i) previously the firm entered into a partnership but the registration of the same was rejected; (ii) under cl. 16 of the partnership deed the firm has the right to collect the commission of the entire match production of the larger partnerships whether they effect their sales through the firm or not; •:iii) the books of Gnanam Match Works show umnistakably that the capital was contributed not by Palaniswamy Nadar in his individual capacity but by the larger firm as such; and (iv) regarding the othe~ three larger firms also the profit delivered by their renresentatives from the assessee firm was divided amongst all the partners according to their profit sharing ratio in the larger firms. On the other hand, the High Court found, on a construction of the relevant clauses of the partnership deed that the business was the business of the partners of the firm alone and that the two circumstances relied upon by the Tribunal were irrelevant in acertaining whether the said patnership was real or not.\n\nWe have already pointed out that the document ex facie discloses a valid partnership. The partnership was avowedly entered into by the partners in their individual capacity as their previous partnership in their representative capacity was not registered on the ground that such a partnership was illegal. If the larger firms cannot constitute members of a new partnership, some of the partners of those firms can certainly enter into a partnership shedding their representative capacity if they can legally do so. If they can do so, the mere fact that one of them borrowed the capital from a parent firm-we are using this expression for convenience of reference-or some of them surrendered their profits to the parent firm cannot make it anytheless a genuine firm.\n\nNor does cl.16 , of the partnership deed detract from its genuineness: that clause does not create any right in the partnership to collect the commission; in view of the close\n\nconn-;:ction between the assessee firm and the parent firms, the parent firms were expected to effect all their sales through the assessee firm. If they did not and if they refused to pay commission, the assessee-firm could not enforce its right under the said clause.\n\nClause 22 in express terms emphasize:> the separate identities of the assessee-firm and the parent firms, and cl. 23 declares that notwithstanding the fact that\n\nthe loss to the assessee-firm has arisen on the sale or transaction relating to the match manufacturing concerns, the assessee-firm alone shall bear the loss and thereby indicates that the loss of the assessee-firm will not be borne by the parent firms. If the assessee-firm has a separate legal existence, the two circumstances relied upon by the Tribunal, namely, that Palaniswamy Nadar, one of the partners of the assessee-firm, brought in the capital from his parent firm or that the profits earned by some of the partners were surrendered tq_ the parent firms, would be irrelevant. A partner of a firm can certainly secure his .capital from any source or surrender his profits to his sub-partner or any other person. 1bose facts cannot conceivably convert a valid partnership\n\ninto a bogus one.\n\nCJ.T., Mad,_, v.\n\nSivakasi Match Export Co.\n\nThe Tribunal mixed up the two concepts, viz., the legality of the partnership and the ultimate destination of the partners' profits. It also mixed up the question of the validity of the partnership and the object of the individual partners in entering into the partnership. If to avoid a legal difficulty S individuals, though four of them are members of different firms, enter into a partnership expressly to comply with a provision of law, we do not see any question of fraud\n\nSubba Rao 1.\n\nC.l.T., Madras v.\n\nSf•:akasi Match Export Co.\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSha~ /.\n\nor genuineness_ involved. It is a genuine document and it complies with the requirements of law. It is not an attempt to evade tax, but a legal device to reduce its tax liability. The fact that all the partners qf all the firms did not exceed 12 in number and if they chose all of them could have entered into the partnership indic.ltes that there was no sinister motive behind the partnership. As the Tribunal misconstrued the provisions of the partnership deed and relied upon irrelevant considerations in coming to the conclusion it did, the High Court rightly differed from the view of the Tribunal. In the circumstances, in view of the decision of this Court in Sree Meenakshi Mills' case('), a question of law within the meaning of s.66(2) of the Act arose for decision. The High Court rightly answered the question in the negative.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nSHAH J.-Sivakasi Match Export Company-hereinafter referred to as 'the assessee'-is a partnership \"carrying on business as bankers, commission agents and distributors of the products of different match factories at Sivakasi in the State of Madras\".\n\nThe assessee was formed under a deed dated April 1, 1950. There were five partners of the firm (1) N.P.A.M. Sankaranlinga Nadar (2) K. S.S. Arumughaswami Nadar (3) K. A. S. Arunuchala Nadar (4) K. P.A. T.\n\nRajamoney Nadar and (5) V. S. V. P. Palaniswamy Nadar.\n\nBefore April 1, 1950, there existed a firm also named Sivakasi Matches Exporting Company which \"consisted of a combine of six match factories\" at Sivakasi constituted under a partnership deed dated March 12, 1948.\n\nRegistration of this partnership under s. 26-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, was refused on the ground that the partnership deed did not specify the actual shares of the individual partners. 'Thereafter a deed forming the partnership which is sought to be registered in these proceedings was executed on April l, 1950.\n\nIt. was recited in the preamble that originally four out of the five partners had been carrying on business in partnership as representatives of their respective match concerns, and it was found necessary that they should carry on the said business from April 1, 1950, jointly in their individual capacity, and it was agreed to admit into their part-\n\n(1) [1956] S.C.R. 691\n\nnership as and from April 1, 1950 the fifth person, namely V. S. V. Palaniswamy Nadar.\n\nThe following are the material paragraphs of the agreement of partnership:\n\n\" ( 16) This finn shall collect a commission of haif\n\nan anna per gross on the entire production of the match factories of the partners, respectively, the Brilliant Match Works, Manoranjitha Match Works, Pioneer Match Works, Shenbagam Match Works and Gnanam Match Works, produced from 1st April 1950 whether sales were effected through this firm or not and a further commission of half an anna per gross on the sales effected through this firm.\n\nThis commis- •; ion will be collected on all kinds of matches produced from the abovesaid factories.\n\nThe commission of half an anna per gross on the entire production of these factories accrued due at the end of every month shall be debited to the respective factories under advice. to 'them.\n\n\" ( 22) The business of this firm shall have and has\n\nno connection with the match manufacturing business carried on now by the partners separately or in partnership with others.\n\n(23) Any loss to the firm by way of fire, accident or by any other cause during the course of the business of the firm, notwithstanding the fact that the foss might have arisen on the sale of or transaction relating to the match manufacturing concerns of the partners to this deed, shall be borne by this firm and shall be equally divided between the partners to this deed.\"\n\nIt is common ground that each partner was concerned in the manufacture of matches either as owner or as partner with others.\n\nSankaralinga Nadar carried on business as a manufacturer of matches with two others in the name ofthe Brilliant Match Works; Armughaswamy Nadar as a partner with three others in the name of the Manoranjitha Match Works; Arunachala Nadar as a partner with two others in\n\nthe name of the Pioneer Match Works. Rajamoney Nadar\n\nC.l.T., Madru v.\n\nSivakasi 1l1atch Export Co.\n\nShah J.\n\nC.1.T., Mtidra8 v. $111aktul Match\n\nExport Co,\n\nSW/.\n\nas a sole proprietor of the Shenbagam Match Works, and Palaniswamy 'Nadar as a partner with three others in the name of the Gnanam Match Works.\n\nOn October 27, 1952, the Income-tax Officer passed an order under s. 26-A granting registration of the partnership\n\nconsttuted under the deed dated April 1, 1950, but the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, exercising revisional jurisdiction under s. 33-B of the Act, set aside the order and directed that the partnership be assessed to tax as an unregistered firm.\n\nIn the view of the Commissioner the partnership deed did not represent the true state of affairs anq that \"the actual position as distinguished from the recitals in the partnership deed was that all the partners of the Match Factories were directly partners of the assessee\" and as the names of all the partners were not set out in the deed and the other requirements relating to registration had not been complied with, registration be refused.\n\nThe order was confirmed in appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nAt the direction cif the High Court of Madras under s. 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the Tribunal referred the following question:\n\n\"Whether on the facts and the circumstances of the case the refqsal of registration of the assessee firm under s. 26-A of the Income-tax Act was correct in law?\"\n\nThe High Court answered this question in the negative.\n\nAgainst that order, with special leave, the Commissioner of Income-tax has appealed to this Court.\n\nThe Tribunal held that the covenants in the deed of partnership and especially in paragraphs 3 and 16 viewed in the light of the entry in the books of account of Gnanam Match Works debiting the capital contributed in the name of Palamswamy N adar to the assessee, and not in the name of its partner, .and division of the profits received from the assessee by Palaniswamy Nadar, Sankarlinga Nadar, Arumaghaswamy Nadar and Arunachalam Nadar with others\n\nowriers of their respective business, indicated that the named partners were acting as representatives of those owners. The\n\nHigh Court also held that cl. 16 of the partnership agreement did not impose any liability upon the manufacturing concerns to pay any commission as stipulated therein on the\n\n\"production of the match factories\".\n\nThe High Court observed:\n\n\"Clause 16 does not Jay any liability upon the manufacturing conc::rns and cannot operate as an enfo; ceable contract against those other match companies. If one of those match companies should decline to put through its sales business through the assessee-firm, the only result would perhaps be that the partnership would not advance moneys or finance to that manufacturing concern; it might also be that the particular partner interested in the manufacturing concern might stand to lose the benefit of this partnership.\n\nBut that is not the same thing as to say that those manufacturing concerns themselves had become partners of the asses see partnership.\" The High Court also observed that the assessee was not concerned with the disposal of the profits received by its partners.\n\nFinally the High Court observed that \"an individual member of the partnership is not prevented from engaging in business as member of another partnership. The law does not prohibit such a course and even the Income-tax law relating to registr_ation of partnerships only refuses registration when the formation of such pattnerships is intended to evade the incidence of income-tax and nothing more.\n\nWe are not satisfied that the Tribunal correctly appreciated the facts of the present case in coming to the conclusion that the match works were the real parties to this instrument of partnership''.\n\nThe Solicitor-General appearing for the Commissioner contended that the High Court had in exercising its advisory jurisdiction, in substance assumed appellate powers and had sought to reappraise the evidence on which the conclusion of the Tribunal was founded.\n\nCounsel contended that the Tribunal had recorded a clear finding on the facts that the\n\nC.l.T., Madras\n\nSivakasi Match Export Co.\n\nShah J,\n\nCJ.T., Madras v.\n\nSivakasi Match Export Co.\n\nShah J.\n\n\"match works were the real\" partners, and the High Court was bound on the question framed to record its opinion on the questions of law referred on the basis of that finding.\n\nSection 26-A of the Indian Income-tax Act enacts the procedure for registration of firms. By that section on behalf of any fim1 application may be submitted to the Incometax Officer for registration, if the firm is constituted under an instrument of partnership, specifying the individual shares of the partners. The application has to be made by such person or persons and at such times and shall contain such particulars and shall be in such form as may be prescribed. It is open to a firm to carry on business without registration under the Indian Registration Act. By obtaining an order of registration, the partners of the firm are enabled to get the benefit of lower rates of tax than those applicable to the whole income of the firm, when charged as a unit of assessment. In the relevant year of assessment if the firm was unregistered the tax payable by it had to be determined as in the case of any other distinct entity and tax had to be levied on the firm itself. If, however, the firm was registered, the firm d.id not pay the tax and therefore the tax payable by the firm was not determined, but the share of profit received from the firm was added to the income of each partner, and on the total so determined tax was levied against the partners individually. It is manifest that if the firm desired to secure this privilege it had to conform strictly to the requirements prescribed by law. Under the rules framed under s. 59 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, rules 2 to 6B deal with registration and renewal of registration of firms. The application for registration has to be signed by all the partners (not being minors) personally, and the application has to be in the form prescribed by rule\n\n3. The form prescribed requires the partners of the firm to disclose the names of each partner, his address, date of admittance to partnership. and other relevant particulars including each partner's share in the profits and loss, \"particulars\n\nof the firm as constituted at the date\" of the application, and particulars of the apportionment of the income, profits or gains or loss of the business, profession or vocation in the previous year between the partners who in that previous\n\nyear were entitled to share in such income, profits or gains or loss, where the application is made after the end of the relevanc previous year. If the Income-tax Officer is satisfied that tl.ere is a firm in existence constituted as shown in the\n\ninstru.nent of partnership and the application has been properly made, he h&s to enter in writing at the foot of the instrument or certified copy, as the case may be, a certificate of registration of the partnership under s. 26-A of the Act.\n\nThis certificate of registration ensures only for the year mentioned therein. but the firm is entitled to obtain renewal of the registration.\n\nOn the conclusion recorded by the Tribunal that the partnership deed dated April I, 1950 was in truth an instrument relating to an agreement to carry on business by all the persons who owned the five businesses of which the\n\nrepresenta.ives signed the deed, the application submitted by the five named partners of the assessee did not conform to the requirements of rules 2 and 3 and the Income-tax Ofilcer was bound to refuse registration. It is true that the ground given by the Tribunal that the share of profits received by individual partners of the assessee was distributed by four of those partners who had entered into partnership contracts with other persons in the business of their respective match factories, standing independently of other grounds, may not be of much value in deciding whether all the partners of the match factories were intended to be partners of the assessee. It is open to a partner who receives his share in the profits of the firm to dispose of that share in any manner he pleases, and no inference from 'the distribution of the share of such profits alone can lead to the inference that the persons who ultimately received the benefit of the profits are partners of the firm which had distributed the profits.\n\nBut the Tribunal adverted to three circumstances. The terms of the deed of partnership purported to impose an obligatio1 to pay Commission on the production of the five match factories, representatives of which sought to join as partners eo nomine. Imposition of such an obligation was in the view of the Tribunal inconsistent with the representatives of those factories being partners of !he assessee in their individual capacities.\n\nAgain it was\n\n51 S. C.-3\n\nC.1.T., MadrM \"· Sivakasi Match Export Co.\n\nSh•lz J.\n\nCJ.T., MQIJr.., v.\n\nSivakasi Maleh\n\nExport Co.\n\nShah J.\n\nfound that Gnanam Match Works had contributed capital to the assessee directly and not through its representative.\n\nThese , wo circumstances, coupled with the ultimate distribution of profits by the individual partners among the panners of the match factories, led to the inference that each partner who signed the deed dated April 1, 1950 was acting not in his personal capacity, but as represen.ing his match factory.\n\nGranting that the evidence from which the inference was drawn was not very cogent, it was still exclusively within the province of the Tribunal to decide that question on the evidence before it, and its decision that in entering into the deed of partnership, the named partners represented their respective match factories, was not open to be canvassed in a reference under s. 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The High Court observed that cl. 16 of the partnership deed did no, impose any obligation upon the partners or their representatives of the five firms to pay commission as stipulated under that clause.\n\nUndoubtedly, there is no covenant expressly imposing such liability upon the matcil factories, but it was open to the Tribunal from , he incorporation of such an unusual covenant to infer that the named partners of the assessee were acting as representatives of their respective factories. To assume from the , erms of cl. 16 that the owners of these match factories were not bound by the covenants contained in cl. 16 is to assume the answer to the question posed for opinion.\n\nThere was also ; he circumstance that in the books of account of the Gnanam Match Works of which Palaniswamy Nadar was a representative, capital was debited as contributed to the assessee.\n\nThis indicated that the Gnanam Match Works was directly interested in the partnership. If that factory had made an advance to Palaniswamy Nadar to enable the latter to contribute his share of the capital, the entry in the factory's books of account would have been in the name of its partner and not in the name of the assessee. That also is a circumstance justifying an inference that in e'1tering into the deed dated April I, 1950 Palaniswamy acted for and on behalf of all the partners of the Gnanam Match Works.\n\nSharing of profits received by !he named partners, with their partners in the respective match factories may not, as I have\n\nalready observed, by itself be a decisive circumstance. But that did not authorise the High Court to disregard the finding of the Tribunal on a question which was essentially one of fact.\n\nWhen the High Court observed that they were satisfied that the Tribunal had not correctly appreciated the evidence in arriving at the conclusion that each Match factory was the real party in the instrument of partnership, they assumed to themselves jurisdiction which they did not possess.\n\nIt was not the case of the assessee that there was no evidence on which the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal could be founded, nor was it the oase of the assessee that the conclusion was so perverse that no reasonable body of men properly instructed in the law could have arrived at that conclusion. It is also clear from the record that no such question was even canvassed before the Tribunal.\n\nManifestly such a question could not arise out of the order of the Tribunal, and none such was referred to the High Court.\n\nBy the question actually referred, the Tirbunal sought the opinion of the High Court whether on the facts and circumstances refusal of the application for registration .of the assessee was correct in law. If it was the case of the assessee that the conclusion of the Tribunal was based on no evidence, or that it was perverse, the High Court could be asked to call for a reference from the Tribunal on that question. But that was never done.\n\nIt is true that the object of enacting s. 26-A and the rules relating to the procedure for registration is to prevent escapement of liability to tax. But it is not necessary that before an order refusing registration is made, it must be established that there was evasion of tax attempted or actual.\n\nIt is always open to a person, consistently with the law, to so arrange his affairs that he may reduce his tax liability to the minimum permissible l!lnder the Jaw. The fact that the liability to tax may be reduced by the adoption of an expedient which the law permits, is wholly irrelevant in considering the validity of that expedient. But where the law prescribes conditions for obtaining the benefit of reduced liability to taxation, those conditions, unless otherwise provided, must be strictly complied with, and if they are not\n\nC.I.T Madrta ....\n\nSlvakml Molcl&\n\nExport Co.\n\nw /.\n\nCJ.T., Modrt11 •• Slvaklui Match\n\nExport Co.\n\nSWJ.\n\nso complied with, the taxing authorities would be bound to refuse to give the taxpayer the benefit claimed. When application for registration of the firm is made, the Incometax Officer is entitled to ascertain whether the names of the partners in the instrument are of persons who have agreed to be partners, whether ihe shares are properly specified and whether the statement about the shares is real or is merely a cloak for dis, ributing the profits in a different manner.\n\nIf all persons who have in truth agreed to be partners have not signed the deed or their shares are not truly set out in the deed of partnership, it would be open to the Incometax Officer to decline to register the deed, even if under the general Jaw of partnership the rights and obligations of tke partners eo nomine thereto may otherwise be adjusted. As a corollary to this, if the requirements relating to the form in which the petition is to be presented are not complied with, and the relevant information is withheld, the Incometax Officer may be justified in refusing registration.\n\nIn my view the High Court was in error in holding on the question submitted that the registration of the assessee under s. 26-A of the Income-tax Act was wrongly refused.\n\nThe answer to the ques:ion referred to the High Court lhould be in the affirmative.\n\nORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX KERALA AND\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\nKRISHNA WARRIAR\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH, ANDS. M. SJKRI JJ.) ltteome Tax-Exemption from taxation-Businen held in trUll- Pllrl of profit• to be utiliud for religiOIU or charitable purp\"'•,_", "total_entities": 128, "entities": [{"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 13, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T., Madras\n\nAmrutan; an Ltd.\n\nShah J.\n\nApril, 29."}}, {"text": "Shah J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1550, "end_char": 1584, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "SJVAKASI MATCH EXPORT COMPANY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1589, "end_char": 1618, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SJVAKASI MATCH EXPORT COMPANY", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "K. SUBRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1621, "end_char": 1629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nSJVAKASI MATCH EXPORT COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBRA RAo.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1638, "end_char": 1645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI."}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1650, "end_char": 1661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI.", "canonical_name": "S. M. 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SIKRI"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3042, "end_char": 3047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3244, "end_char": 3249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5140, "end_char": 5148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5827, "end_char": 5835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5888, "end_char": 5896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7200, "end_char": 7223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7226, "end_char": 7253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7421, "end_char": 7433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, N. D. Karkhanis and 1964 R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Srinivasan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c.1.r:, Madras v.\n\nK. Srinivasan and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respond- Sivakasi Match ent."}}, {"text": "R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7551, "end_char": 7568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c.1.r:, Madras v.\n\nK. Srinivasan and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respond- Sivakasi Match ent."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7653, "end_char": 7662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of SUBBA RAo AND SIKR1 JJ.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo J. SHAH"}}, {"text": "SIKR1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7667, "end_char": 7672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of SUBBA RAo AND SIKR1 JJ."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAo J. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7694, "end_char": 7711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by SuBBA RAo J. SHAH J. delivered a dissenting opinion.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo J. SHAH"}}, {"text": "SUB BA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7748, "end_char": 7758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUB BA RAo, J .-This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court of Madras in a reference made to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66(2) of the Indian lncome-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo J. SHAH"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7830, "end_char": 7850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUB BA RAo, J .-This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court of Madras in a reference made to it by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66(2) of the Indian lncome-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7920, "end_char": 7928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Rules", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Rules"}}, {"text": "Indian lncome-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7936, "end_char": 7963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajamoney Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8349, "end_char": 8364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajamoney Nadar is the sole proprietor of Shenbagam Match Works and in the other 4 firms there are more than one partner.", "canonical_name": "Rajamoney Nadar"}}, {"text": "Sivakasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8729, "end_char": 8737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1948 a person from each of those firms in )lis representative capacity formed a partnership to carry on the business of banking and commission agents, the principal business being the marketing of the products of the different match factories in Sivakasi."}}, {"text": "Sankaralinga Nada", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8956, "end_char": 8973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, Sankaralinga Nada_!',", "canonical_name": "Sankaralinga Nadar"}}, {"text": "Arumughaswarni Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8978, "end_char": 8998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arumughaswarni Nadar, Arunachala Nadar, Palaniswamy Nadar and Rajamoney N adar the first four being one of the partners of their respective firms and the last being the sole proprietor of his firm, in their individual capacity entered into a partnership for the aforesaid purpose and executed a partnership deed dated April 1, 1950."}}, {"text": "Arunachala Nadar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9000, "end_char": 9016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arumughaswarni Nadar, Arunachala Nadar, Palaniswamy Nadar and Rajamoney N adar the first four being one of the partners of their respective firms and the last being the sole proprietor of his firm, in their individual capacity entered into a partnership for the aforesaid purpose and executed a partnership deed dated April 1, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Arunachalam Nadar"}}, {"text": "Palaniswamy Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9018, "end_char": 9035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arumughaswarni Nadar, Arunachala Nadar, Palaniswamy Nadar and Rajamoney N adar the first four being one of the partners of their respective firms and the last being the sole proprietor of his firm, in their individual capacity entered into a partnership for the aforesaid purpose and executed a partnership deed dated April 1, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Palaniswamy 'Nadar"}}, {"text": "Rajamoney N", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9040, "end_char": 9051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arumughaswarni Nadar, Arunachala Nadar, Palaniswamy Nadar and Rajamoney N adar the first four being one of the partners of their respective firms and the last being the sole proprietor of his firm, in their individual capacity entered into a partnership for the aforesaid purpose and executed a partnership deed dated April 1, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Rajamoney Nadar"}}, {"text": "s. 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9487, "end_char": 9493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9555, "end_char": 9561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9584, "end_char": 9593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer by his order dated October 27, 1952, re\n\ngistered the same under s. 26A of the Act: but the Commissioner of Income-tax, acting under s. 33B of the Act, cancell-\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\n.J.T., Madras\n\ned the registration by an order dated October 23, 1954, and directed the assessment to take place as that of an unregistered firm.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo J. SHAH"}}, {"text": ".ubba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9881, "end_char": 9890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal held, on a construction of the partnership deed and also on\n\nv. oVakasl Match\n\nExport Co.\n\n'.ubba Rao I. the basis of some other circumstances, that the said deed \"is not genuine and brought into existence only as a simulate arrangement, that the profits which are distributed under the deed to the individuals mentioned th, rein are not the true profits of those individuals.\"", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo J. SHAH"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10266, "end_char": 10300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a reference made to the High Court of Judicature at Madras; a Division Bench of that High Court, on a construction of the document, came to the conclusion that the Match Works were not the real parties to the partnership but the parties of the document were the real partners."}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10800, "end_char": 10808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10974, "end_char": 10982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11464, "end_char": 11470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11728, "end_char": 11736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11910, "end_char": 11921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12611, "end_char": 12616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12633, "end_char": 12657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 59 of the Act, the Central Board of Revenue made the following rules:\n\nRule 2."}}, {"text": "Section 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12828, "end_char": 12839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12847, "end_char": 12874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13647, "end_char": 13658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13666, "end_char": 13693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14457, "end_char": 14463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15232, "end_char": 15238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15712, "end_char": 15721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st April 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16065, "end_char": 16079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 16 of the Partnership deed, on which the Tribunal relied, r\\)ads:\n\n\"This firm shall collect a commission of half an anna per gross on the entire production of the match factories of the .12_artners, respectively, the Brilliant Match Works, Manoranjitha Match Works, Pioneer Match Works, Shenbagam Match Works and Gnanam Match Works produced from 1st April 1950 whether sales were effected through this firm or not and a further commission of half an anna per gross on the sales effected through this firm."}}, {"text": "Clause 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16590, "end_char": 16599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16773, "end_char": 16782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17279, "end_char": 17293, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17301, "end_char": 17304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17312, "end_char": 17334, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "is also no prohibition under the Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17815, "end_char": 17863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "6ivakasi Match Export Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18423, "end_char": 18448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. 6ivakasi Match Export Co.\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nBut the Tribunal has held that the partnership i~ not a genuine one for the following reasons: ( i) previously the firm entered into a partnership but the registration of the same was rejected; (ii) under cl.", "canonical_name": "6ivakasi Match Export Co."}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18669, "end_char": 18675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is also no prohibition under the Partnership Act", "statute": "There is also no prohibition under the Partnership Act"}}, {"text": "cl.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20346, "end_char": 20351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20784, "end_char": 20793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20894, "end_char": 20900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sivakasi Match Export Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21765, "end_char": 21790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CJ.T., Mad,_, v.\n\nSivakasi Match Export Co.\n\nThe Tribunal mixed up the two concepts, viz.,", "canonical_name": "6ivakasi Match Export Co."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22271, "end_char": 22280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If to avoid a legal difficulty S individuals, though four of them are members of different firms, enter into a partnership expressly to comply with a provision of law, we do not see any question of fraud\n\nSubba Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo J. SHAH"}}, {"text": "Sree Meenakshi Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23022, "end_char": 23042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances, in view of the decision of this Court in Sree Meenakshi Mills' case('), a question of law within the meaning of s.66(2) of the Act arose for decision."}}, {"text": "s.66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23093, "end_char": 23100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SHAH J.-Sivakasi Match Export Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23247, "end_char": 23284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH J.-Sivakasi Match Export Company-hereinafter referred to as 'the assessee'-is a partnership \"carrying on business as bankers, commission agents and distributors of the products of different match factories at Sivakasi in the State of Madras\"."}}, {"text": "N.P.A.M. Sankaranlinga Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23595, "end_char": 23623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were five partners of the firm (1) N.P.A.M. Sankaranlinga Nadar (2) K. S.S. Arumughaswami Nadar (3) K. A. S. Arunuchala Nadar (4) K. P.A. T.\n\nRajamoney Nadar and (5) V. S. V. P. Palaniswamy Nadar."}}, {"text": "K. S.S. Arumughaswami Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23628, "end_char": 23655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were five partners of the firm (1) N.P.A.M. Sankaranlinga Nadar (2) K. S.S. Arumughaswami Nadar (3) K. A. S. Arunuchala Nadar (4) K. P.A. T.\n\nRajamoney Nadar and (5) V. S. V. P. Palaniswamy Nadar."}}, {"text": "K. A. S. Arunuchala Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23660, "end_char": 23685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were five partners of the firm (1) N.P.A.M. Sankaranlinga Nadar (2) K. S.S. Arumughaswami Nadar (3) K. A. S. Arunuchala Nadar (4) K. P.A. T.\n\nRajamoney Nadar and (5) V. S. V. P. Palaniswamy Nadar."}}, {"text": "K. P.A. T.\n\nRajamoney Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23690, "end_char": 23717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were five partners of the firm (1) N.P.A.M. Sankaranlinga Nadar (2) K. S.S. Arumughaswami Nadar (3) K. A. S. Arunuchala Nadar (4) K. P.A. T.\n\nRajamoney Nadar and (5) V. S. V. P. Palaniswamy Nadar."}}, {"text": "V. S. V. P. Palaniswamy Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23726, "end_char": 23755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were five partners of the firm (1) N.P.A.M. Sankaranlinga Nadar (2) K. S.S. Arumughaswami Nadar (3) K. A. S. Arunuchala Nadar (4) K. P.A. T.\n\nRajamoney Nadar and (5) V. S. V. P. Palaniswamy Nadar.", "canonical_name": "V. S. V. P. Palaniswamy Nadar"}}, {"text": "Sivakasi Matches Exporting Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23812, "end_char": 23846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before April 1, 1950, there existed a firm also named Sivakasi Matches Exporting Company which \"consisted of a combine of six match factories\" at Sivakasi constituted under a partnership deed dated March 12, 1948."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23956, "end_char": 23970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before April 1, 1950, there existed a firm also named Sivakasi Matches Exporting Company which \"consisted of a combine of six match factories\" at Sivakasi constituted under a partnership deed dated March 12, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24012, "end_char": 24017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24027, "end_char": 24047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April l, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24276, "end_char": 24289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter a deed forming the partnership which is sought to be registered in these proceedings was executed on April l, 1950."}}, {"text": "V. S. V. Palaniswamy Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24726, "end_char": 24752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was recited in the preamble that originally four out of the five partners had been carrying on business in partnership as representatives of their respective match concerns, and it was found necessary that they should carry on the said business from April 1, 1950, jointly in their individual capacity, and it was agreed to admit into their part-\n\n(1) [1956] S.C.R. 691\n\nnership as and from April 1, 1950 the fifth person, namely V. S. V. Palaniswamy Nadar.", "canonical_name": "V. S. V. P. Palaniswamy Nadar"}}, {"text": "Sankaralinga Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26254, "end_char": 26272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sankaralinga Nadar carried on business as a manufacturer of matches with two others in the name ofthe Brilliant Match Works; Armughaswamy Nadar as a partner with three others in the name of the Manoranjitha Match Works; Arunachala Nadar as a partner with two others in\n\nthe name of the Pioneer Match Works.", "canonical_name": "Sankaralinga Nadar"}}, {"text": "Armughaswamy Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26379, "end_char": 26397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sankaralinga Nadar carried on business as a manufacturer of matches with two others in the name ofthe Brilliant Match Works; Armughaswamy Nadar as a partner with three others in the name of the Manoranjitha Match Works; Arunachala Nadar as a partner with two others in\n\nthe name of the Pioneer Match Works."}}, {"text": "Palaniswamy 'Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26743, "end_char": 26761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T., Madru v.\n\nSivakasi 1l1atch Export Co.\n\nShah J.\n\nC.1.T., Mtidra8 v. $111aktul Match\n\nExport Co,\n\nSW/.\n\nas a sole proprietor of the Shenbagam Match Works, and Palaniswamy 'Nadar as a partner with three others in the name of the Gnanam Match Works.", "canonical_name": "Palaniswamy 'Nadar"}}, {"text": "October 27, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26836, "end_char": 26852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 27, 1952, the Income-tax Officer passed an order under s. 26-A granting registration of the partnership\n\nconsttuted under the deed dated April 1, 1950, but the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, exercising revisional jurisdiction under s. 33-B of the Act, set aside the order and directed that the partnership be assessed to tax as an unregistered firm."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26899, "end_char": 26904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27081, "end_char": 27086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27688, "end_char": 27717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order was confirmed in appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27772, "end_char": 27780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27788, "end_char": 27815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27975, "end_char": 27980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27990, "end_char": 28004, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Palamswamy N adar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28412, "end_char": 28429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held that the covenants in the deed of partnership and especially in paragraphs 3 and 16 viewed in the light of the entry in the books of account of Gnanam Match Works debiting the capital contributed in the name of Palamswamy N adar to the assessee, and not in the name of its partner, .and division of the profits received from the assessee by Palaniswamy Nadar, Sankarlinga Nadar, Arumaghaswamy Nadar and Arunachalam Nadar with others\n\nowriers of their respective business, indicated that the named partners were acting as representatives of those owners.", "canonical_name": "Palaniswamy 'Nadar"}}, {"text": "Sankarlinga Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28561, "end_char": 28578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held that the covenants in the deed of partnership and especially in paragraphs 3 and 16 viewed in the light of the entry in the books of account of Gnanam Match Works debiting the capital contributed in the name of Palamswamy N adar to the assessee, and not in the name of its partner, .and division of the profits received from the assessee by Palaniswamy Nadar, Sankarlinga Nadar, Arumaghaswamy Nadar and Arunachalam Nadar with others\n\nowriers of their respective business, indicated that the named partners were acting as representatives of those owners.", "canonical_name": "Sankaralinga Nadar"}}, {"text": "Arumaghaswamy Nadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28580, "end_char": 28599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held that the covenants in the deed of partnership and especially in paragraphs 3 and 16 viewed in the light of the entry in the books of account of Gnanam Match Works debiting the capital contributed in the name of Palamswamy N adar to the assessee, and not in the name of its partner, .and division of the profits received from the assessee by Palaniswamy Nadar, Sankarlinga Nadar, Arumaghaswamy Nadar and Arunachalam Nadar with others\n\nowriers of their respective business, indicated that the named partners were acting as representatives of those owners."}}, {"text": "Arunachalam Nadar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28604, "end_char": 28621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held that the covenants in the deed of partnership and especially in paragraphs 3 and 16 viewed in the light of the entry in the books of account of Gnanam Match Works debiting the capital contributed in the name of Palamswamy N adar to the assessee, and not in the name of its partner, .and division of the profits received from the assessee by Palaniswamy Nadar, Sankarlinga Nadar, Arumaghaswamy Nadar and Arunachalam Nadar with others\n\nowriers of their respective business, indicated that the named partners were acting as representatives of those owners.", "canonical_name": "Arunachalam Nadar"}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28786, "end_char": 28792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29000, "end_char": 29009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31015, "end_char": 31025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31042, "end_char": 31056, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31566, "end_char": 31582, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32449, "end_char": 32454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32462, "end_char": 32489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33685, "end_char": 33690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sivakasi Maleh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35632, "end_char": 35646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again it was\n\n51 S. C.-3\n\nC.1.T., MadrM \"· Sivakasi Match Export Co.\n\nSh•lz J.\n\nCJ.T., MQIJr.., v.\n\nSivakasi Maleh\n\nExport Co.\n\nShah J.\n\nfound that Gnanam Match Works had contributed capital to the assessee directly and not through its representative."}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36464, "end_char": 36472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36487, "end_char": 36501, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36532, "end_char": 36538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37025, "end_char": 37031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37118, "end_char": 37124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palaniswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37808, "end_char": 37819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That also is a circumstance justifying an inference that in e'1tering into the deed dated April I, 1950 Palaniswamy acted for and on behalf of all the partners of the Gnanam Match Works.", "canonical_name": "Palaniswamy 'Nadar"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39504, "end_char": 39509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41595, "end_char": 41600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41610, "end_char": 41624, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX KERALA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41841, "end_char": 41874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX KERALA AND\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\nKRISHNA WARRIAR\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH, ANDS.", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41910, "end_char": 41922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX KERALA AND\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\nKRISHNA WARRIAR\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH, ANDS.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*"}}, {"text": "ANDS. M. SJKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41936, "end_char": 41950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX KERALA AND\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\nKRISHNA WARRIAR\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH, ANDS."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_1_9_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAMNIKAL PITAMBARDAS MEHTA\n\nINDRADAMAN AMRATLAL SHETH\n\n(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND\n\nRAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.)\n\nBombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 19'47, s. 13(1) (g). (hh).-Premis\" required bonafide for occupation aft<r carrying out repairs-Sub-section if applicable.\n\n1be appellant was a tenant of the ground lloor of a house owned by responQent. The respondent sued for ejectment of the appellant on the groun'd that he required the entire house including the portion occupied by •PPellaot, for his residential purpose. The defence of the appellant was that respondent did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises for his occupation and for carrying out repairs. The trial court decreed the suit of the respondent on the ground that respondent bona fide required the premises for his occupation. The appelll of the appellant was dismissed. His revision petition was also dismissed. by Higli Court. The appellant came to this Court by special leave. The only question for decision before this Court was whether the case . of respon \\lent came within the provisions of s. 13(l)(g) ors. 13(1) (bh), Dismi• ing the appeal,\n\nHELD:-The case of respondent fell under cl. (g) as be required tho premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he i.tendcd to make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, did not affect the question of his requiring the hoe bona fide and reasonably for his occupation, when he had proved his need for occupying tho home. There was no such prohibition either in the language of cl. (g) or in any other provision of the Act lo the etFect that the landlord must occupy the house for resitlence without making any alteration in it.\n\nThere could be no logical ieaso~ for such a prohibition. The provisions of •· 13 are for the benefit of/the landlord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in tht/ection are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the exercise of the landlord's general right lo eject his tenant. There fs no reason why restrictions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to a case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish the premises and erect a new building on them. The provisions of cl. (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erectins a \"\"\" buildinc whicll it lo be let out lo tenants.\n\nJI S. C.-4\n\nApril, It ..\n\n1964 Krishanlal lshwarlal Desai v. Bai Viikor [1964] l S.C.R. 553, Krishna ...,,, ki\"\"' l\"t Das v. Bidhan Chandra, A.l.R. 1959 Cal. 181. McKenna •· Porter Moton\n\n\"'bada•\n\n1 am- Ltd. [1956] A.C. 688, Betty's Cates Ltd. v. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd. v. (1959] A.C. 20, Manchharam Ghelabhai Pittalwala v. Surat Electricity Co. lndrad11man Ltd. Civil Revision Application No. 204/56 dated !st February, 1957 by Amratlal the Bombay High Court and Allarkha Fakirmahomed v. Surat Electricity Co. Ltd., Civil Revision Application No. 164/57, claled 8th October, 1957 by the Bombay High Court, referrett to.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; CIVIL APPEAL\n\nNo. 61 OJ!I 1964 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated October 28, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 697 of 1962.\n\nPurshottam Trikamdas, M. I. Patel and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nS. T. Desai, B. J. Shelat, J.B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.\n\nApril 28, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nh b D I RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is \"l.ag u ar UJ• J. directed against the order of the Bombay High Court and raises the question of the true construction of sub-els. (g) and (hh) of sub-s. ( 1.) of s. 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Act LVII of 194 7), hereinafter called the Act.\n\nThe facts leading to the appeal, in short, are that the appellant is a tenant of the ground-floor of a house owned by the respondent..\n\nThe respondent sued for the ejectment of the appellant on the ground that he required the entire house, including the portion occupied by the appellant, for his residential purpose.\n\nHe further stated in the plaint:\n\n\"The whole suit bungalow is very old-built about\n\n75 years ago and at present its different parts are likely to give way and collapse.\n\nBefore sometime, a little portion of an upper balcony had collapsed.\n\nIn the circumstances, on find in& it unsafe to stay in it without making addio tions, Iii.rations and necessary chan,., I, tho plainti!, 11D obliged to wait till I &et po119lion of thl whole bwlaatow.\n\n--.\n\nI, the plaintiff, have got the upper portion of the said 1964 suit bungalow vacated at present and only after Ramnlhl Pil .. the whole bungalow is got overhauled as stated bardu in para above. I, the plaintiff can utilize it for 1nJr:J-. my personal use.\" .ifmratlal\n\nThe appellant contested the suit on various grounds Raghub.,. Dr/• including the ones that the respondent did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises for his occupation and that he did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises for carrying out repairs.\n\nThe trial Court found that the respondent bona fide required the premises for his occupation. It repelled the contention of the appellant that the provisions of s. 13 (1 )(g) would not be applicable when the landlord did not wish to occupy the premises as such but intended to occupy it after carrying out major repairs. and decreed the respondent'' suit for ejectment.\n\nThe defendant went up in appeal.\n\nIt was dismissed.\n\nThe appellate Court, agreed with the views of the trial Court.\n\nThe defendant then presented a revision petition to the High Court. It was rejected. 1t is against this order that he has filed this appeal.\n\nA preliminary objection has been taken that the revision to the High Court was incompetent as no question of jurisdiction was involved.\n\nFor the appellant it is urged that on the facts found. the trial Court assumed jurisdiction which it did not have and that therefore the revision was competent.\n\nWe uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the revision was incompetent.\n\nThe question raised was whether a decree in ejectment should be passed on the ground of personal requirement under s. 13 (l )(g) of the Act where it was proved that the landlord wanted to pull down the premises and build another and then occupy it.\n\nIt was said that in such a case he had to proceed under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (1). It is clear that the question so raised is one of interpretation of these two clauses.\n\nSection 28 of the Act gives jurisdiction to the Court specified in it, to try a suit or proceeding between\n\n196' a landlord and tenant relating to possession of the premises. Pllam- Th.at section expressely provides that no other Court, subbardtll ject to the provisions of sub-s. ( 2) which do not apply to .,~,,_ this case, has jurisdiction to entertain such suits.\n\nIt is clear\n\nA.mrat/al from this section that the trial Court had full jurisdiction to ;,,,1r.,,;;;; D111a1 J. entertain the suit for ejectment.\n\nThat being so, it had jurisdiction to interpret whether cl. (g) of s. 13 (1) would apply to the present case. The appellate Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.\n\nThe High Court could not, therefore, interfere in revision with the decision of the appellate Court, even if it had gone wrong, on facts or law, in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It follows that the revision application had to be dismissed by the High Court and that this appeal too must fail.\n\nSince the merits of the case have been argued fully before us, we express our opinion on the law point urged before us.\n\nThe sole question to determine in this appeal is whether the respondent's case came within the provfaions of s. 13 (1 )(g) of the Act or fell within the provisions of s.13(l)(hh). We may now set out these provisions:\n\n\"13 ( 1) NothwithstandinB anything contained in thi.i\n\nAct but subject to the provisions of section 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied ...\n\n(g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide\n\nrequired by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust; or\n\n(hh) that the premises consist of not more than two floors and are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate puxposc\n\nof demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished.\"\n\nA landlord can sue for the ejectment of his tenant in\n\n19U view of s. 13 ( 1) for various reasons including the one that Ratnihl PIJ he requires the premises reasonably and bona fide for occu bardt11 pation by himself.\n\nThe respondent alleged, and the Ccurts Ja below have found, that he bona fide required the premises in AmratlaJ the suit for occupation by himself.\n\nThe respondent stated Ratllubar Da; in the plaint that he would take up residence in the premises after overhauling it.\n\nIt is on this account that the appellant submits that the case falls under s. 13(1)(hh), as the respondent wants the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and erecting a new building.\n\nIt is further contended for the appellant that the two grounds for ejectment under els. (g) and (hh) are mutu11Iy exclusive and therefore a landlord cannot take advantage of cl. (g) when his case falls under cl. (hh) in view of the immediate steps he has to take after getting possession of the premises.\n\nWe need not express an opinion on this point, as, for reasons to be mentioned later, the case falls under cl. ( g) and not under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (1) of the Act.\n\nWe agree with the Courts below that the respondent's case fallsunder cl. (g) when he bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he intends to make alterations in the house either on account of his_\n\nsweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, does not affect the question of his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his oc\n\ncupation, when he has proved his need for occupying the house. There is no such prohibition either in the language of cl. (g) or in any other provision of the Act to the effect that the landlord must occupy the house for residence with out making any alterations in it.\n\nThere could ot 'Je any logical reason for such a prohibition. Under ordinary faw, the landlord is entitled to eject his tenant whenever he likes, after following certain procedure except in case' where he has contracted not to eject him before the happening of a certain event.\n\nThe Act restricts that general right of the landlord in the special circumstances prevailing in regard to the availability of accommodation and the incidental abuse of those circumstances by landlords in dcmandmg unjustifiably high rents.\n\n~ The Act has provided sufficient protection to the teuants -nikal l'itlllfl against being harassed by threat of ejectment in case they\n\nba~iu are unable to satisfy landlords' demands. ' Various restric IndraJa,,..,. tions have been placed on the right of the landlord to eject\n\nA.lal the tenant.\n\nSection 12 O) provides that the landlora shall 01hubar D1qal J. not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted i!_!creases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of e tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Act. Section 13 provides exceptional cases in which the landlord can eject the tenant even though he had been paying rent regularly or be ready and willing to pay rent.\n\nThe provisions of s. 13 are for the advantage of the landlord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in that section are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the ercise of the landlord's general right to eject his tenant.\n\nThere is therefore no reason why restric tions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. We do not therefore agree with the contention that cl. (g) will apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the premises without making any alteration in them, i.e., to occupy the identical building which 'the tenant occupies.\n\nThere is no justification to give such a narrow construction either to the word 'premises' or to the word 'occupies' which have been construed by this Court in Krishamal lshwar/al Desai v. Bai Vijkor(') referred to later.\n\nThere are provisions in the Act which ensure that the provisions of cl. (g) are not abused. Section 17 provides that if the premises are not occupied within a period of one month from the date the landlord recovers possession or the premises are re-let within a period of one year of the said date to any person other than the original tenant, the Court may order the landlord, on the application of the original tenant, within the time prescribed, to place him in occupa tion of the premises on the original terms and conditions, This tends to ensure that a landlord does not eject a tenant unless he really requires the premises for occupation by himsell.\n\n(1) [1964] 1, S.C.R. 553.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that once the landlord estal964 blishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occu- RllmnlM Pl pation. he is entitled to recover possession of it from the barda1 tenant in view of the provisions of sub-cl. (g) of s. 13(1) Indt~1M irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the pre- A.mratlal mises without making, any alterations to them or after mak- Raihub,; D. ing the necessary altetations.\n\nI The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish the premises and /to erect a new building on them.\n\nThe provisions of cl. '(hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants.\n\nThis is clear from the provisions of sul:>- s. (3A) which provide that a landlord has to give certain undertaking before a decree for eviction can be passed on the ground specified in cl. (hh). He has to undertake that the new building will have not less than two times the number of residential tenements and not less than two times the fioor area contained in the premises sought to be demolished, that the work of demolishing the premises shall be commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed not later than three months from the date he recovers posession of the entire premises and that the work of erection of the new building shall be completed by him not later than fifteen months from the said date.\n\nThese undertakings thus provide for a time schedule for the new building to come up into existence and ensures atleast the doubling of the residential tenements, i.e., rooms or groups of rooms rented or offered for rent as a unit: vide s. 5(12) of the Act. ·\n\nSuch undertakings would be unnecessary if the landlord seeks to eject the tenant from the premises in order to occupy the premises himself after making the necessary alterations to suit his conveniences. Further, s. 17 A provides for the ejected tenant's re-occupying the premises in case the landlord does not start the work of demolition within the period specified in sub-s. (3A).\n\nSection 17B provides for the ejected tenant to notify to the landlord within six months\n\n1914 from the date on which he delivered vacant possession of the 1'.itampremises of his intention to occupy a tenement in the new bardtu building on its completion on the conditions specified in the Jan section. Section 17C provides that the landlord. would inti-\n\n.4.mrotlal mate to the tenant the date when the new building would be •gltub-;;; Dayal J. complete and that the tenant would be entitled to occupy the tenement on that date. These provisions clearly establish that the provisions of cl. (hh) apply when the landlord desires to demolish the premises for the purpqse of erecting a new building on the premises for being let to tepants.\n\nWe may mention that the provisions of clauses similar to els. (g) and (hh) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 13 of the Act have been construed in this way in Krishna Das v. Bidhan Chandra('), McKenna v. Porter Motors Ltd. (2), and Betty's Cafes Ltd.\n\nv. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd. (3 ).\n\nThe appellant has referred us to two cases of the Bombay High Court which tend to support him in so far as it is held in them that in circumstances similar to the present one, the case would come under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (1) and not under\n\ncl. (g).\n\nThey are: Manchharam Ghe/abhai Pittalwala v.\n\nThe Surat Electricity Co. Ltdt.(') and A/larkha Fakirmahomed v. The Surat Electricity Co. Ltd.(•). The latter case followed the previous one. In the former case the High Court said:\n\n\"Indeed the expression 'occupation' occurring in clause (g) means 'possession followed by actual occupation', while for the purpose of clause (hh) what is necessary is 'possession for the purpose of demolition'. 'Occupation' within clause (g) would include 'possession', as it is obvious that one cannot occupy unless one is able to possess. but in the case of clause (hh) it is clear that. it is not necessary to occupy for the purpose of' demolition.\n\nWhat is necessary is that the l.and-\n\n(1) A.LR. 1959, Cal. 181 ;\n\n(2) [1956] A. c. 688;\n\n(3) f1959] A. C. 20 ; (4)-Civil Revisio~ /lpplication No. 204/56 decided on I-2-57 by the Bomb•!' High Court.\n\n(5) Civil Revision Appu<:lltion No. 164/57 decided on s-10-57 by the\n\nl!ombay Hiah Cuurt.\n\nlord must possess in order to enable him to 1961 demolish and erect a new building.\" Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:\n\n\"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,,\n\n'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ( g) does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence.\n\nThe owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their . occupation.\n\nWe therefore hold that the respondent's case came within\n\ncl. (g) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act and therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. Three months allowed for vac.atmg the premises on the defendant tenant undertaking to vacate the premises himself during this period.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nTHE AMRUTANJAN LTD., MADRAS ,\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SU; RI, JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Object and scope of s. 23-A-\"Company in which tht! pu1, lic are substantially interested''-Mt:aning of-Indian Income T~ Ac1, 1922 (11 of 1922), 1. 23-A.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer found that the respondent company had declare.I during the three years ending March 31, 1947, March 31, 1948\n\n(I) (1964] r S.C.R. 553.\n\nApril, 2/t..", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "RAMNIKAL PITAMBARDAS MEHTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMNIKAL PITAMBARDAS MEHTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "INDRADAMAN AMRATLAL SHETH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDRADAMAN AMRATLAL SHETH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 199, "end_char": 207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 13(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1124, "end_char": 1135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act"}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3462, "end_char": 3482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas, M. I. Patel and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. I. Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3484, "end_char": 3495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas, M. I. Patel and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3503, "end_char": 3512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas, M. I. Patel and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3534, "end_char": 3545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. J. Shelat, J.B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "B. J. Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3547, "end_char": 3559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. J. Shelat, J.B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3561, "end_char": 3576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. J. Shelat, J.B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3579, "end_char": 3590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. J. Shelat, J.B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "h b D I RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3693, "end_char": 3715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nh b D I RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is \"l.ag u ar UJ• J. directed against the order of the Bombay High Court and raises the question of the true construction of sub-els. ("}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3917, "end_char": 3922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3944, "end_char": 3991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramnlhl Pil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4918, "end_char": 4929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, the plaintiff, have got the upper portion of the said 1964 suit bungalow vacated at present and only after Ramnlhl Pil .. the whole bungalow is got overhauled as stated bardu in para above."}}, {"text": "Raghub", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5128, "end_char": 5134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".ifmratlal\n\nThe appellant contested the suit on various grounds Raghub.,."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5509, "end_char": 5514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6473, "end_char": 6478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6676, "end_char": 6681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6775, "end_char": 6785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7357, "end_char": 7362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7986, "end_char": 7991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.13(l)(hh)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8044, "end_char": 8055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8187, "end_char": 8197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8951, "end_char": 8956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AmratlaJ", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9207, "end_char": 9215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent alleged, and the Ccurts Ja below have found, that he bona fide required the premises in AmratlaJ the suit for occupation by himself."}}, {"text": "Ratllubar Da", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9275, "end_char": 9287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent stated Ratllubar Da; in the plaint that he would take up residence in the premises after overhauling it."}}, {"text": "s. 13(1)(hh)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9449, "end_char": 9461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10021, "end_char": 10026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11542, "end_char": 11552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "01hubar D1qal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11589, "end_char": 11602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 12 O) provides that the landlora shall 01hubar D1qal J. not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted i!_!creases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of e tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11918, "end_char": 11928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12101, "end_char": 12106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12988, "end_char": 12998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13833, "end_char": 13841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15414, "end_char": 15422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15651, "end_char": 15656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15823, "end_char": 15834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16125, "end_char": 16136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16655, "end_char": 16660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16892, "end_char": 16909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has referred us to two cases of the Bombay High Court which tend to support him in so far as it is held in them that in circumstances similar to the present one, the case would come under cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17056, "end_char": 17061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amratlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18287, "end_char": 18295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:\n\n\"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,,\n\n'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ("}}, {"text": "Krishan/al I swarlal Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18356, "end_char": 18382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:\n\n\"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,,\n\n'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ("}}, {"text": "R.aghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18415, "end_char": 18430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:\n\n\"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,,\n\n'Occupation' of the premises in cl. (", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18465, "end_char": 18470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19172, "end_char": 19177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19388, "end_char": 19422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nTHE AMRUTANJAN LTD.,"}}, {"text": "AMRUTANJAN LTD., MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19431, "end_char": 19454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nTHE AMRUTANJAN LTD.,"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19459, "end_char": 19471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MADRAS ,\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH ANDS."}}, {"text": "J.C. SHAH ANDS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19473, "end_char": 19487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MADRAS ,\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH ANDS."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19537, "end_char": 19542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_204_216_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "20.J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n1964 sought to be put upon the expression \"income~ in su!J:.s.' (2)\n\nCJ.T; o( s. 26 by the Revenue is . accepted, then the absence of\n\nExpress v'. Newstli.~! _word in the ?rov!-5° destroys the argume?t.\n\nBu! the. papers Lldi' more reasonable .view IS that both the sul>-section and. the\n\nSubba-ao J. pov_is() deal only with the profits unclr ihe 4th head men\" tioJ'led in s. 6 and, so construed, it cxcludci capital g:tlns:· 'fl1e argument that sub-s:. (2) of s. 26 re..:d v, ith the prbviso theretO _indicates that the total · income of the person st1cceeded. is the !=r!_terion f_?r' separate .assessment ·~-~,.: __ ..- sub-s. (2) and for assessment and realisaticm-unoer the ··pf.ovis0 is on. the assumption.thatruO:S.-(2) and the proviso_ deal with all the huds n1entionect in s. 6 of the Act; nut. if,· as; ve.hav(fbeld, the scope of sul>-s.-(2)of s. 26 fa only ---- ·fonrted to the income from the busirtess, ; the\" share' under ---- suJ; s. (2) and the assessment and realisation•· under the\n\nl\\fay 7\n\npro.visa can only relate to the inrome , from the businCs.5.\n\nThe argument is really begging the question itself. Jn the' result we agree with the High Court in regard to\" the answer it has given in respect of the second question.\n\nIn. this view no other ' questidn\" arises . for· oor consideiatiOn: , In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. .\n\nAppeal 'dismin.ed:\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME~TAX, MADRAS\n\nKUMBAKONAM MUTUAL' BENEFiT FUNn LTD.\n\nI •; • . • ._ • .' • '. • ' ; / . ' • . . (K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, J.J.)\n\nMutual Btnefit Socfety2-company engd:; id ili'\"bmillng bU°sine.U restrldeii\"J\n\nto ml'mbers-Not e,,•ery member-made deposit} or_ loaii.J-.P~ mainly earned fr~1n ln.s to mmber;-All me\"m.be~$ enlitlM.llt.;\n\ndiVidend~Whe.tfi~, rquiren?e;.tt\"' of 'mUfi, Y' 1>et;:een 'cOnt~.c;;-· -\n\n,.-.,.--- .·\n\n- , ••! ' \"';,; -, '\"- .,.\n\nP. - . ' • '<'\n\nI '•·.'I arid · partici,, Dtors satisfied~Ther_tfore. wtller company eic1\"pt ,,;, a; r i. •1ocziiwi;'1.Coine-i;._,, ;1c;;-1m · ·\n\n~ ;,_._-' (_ 1' 1-· .; ii·;.-' h, ;~ ,; j._A .•.\n\nI ·, /1'.:.,_ ,,~,- .The ~Ssee~ Kumb3.kon3.in tutual Be1:iefit Fund;. _Ltd. •. carried_. on,: ruiokini' buSiDcSS wbiCh. 'wis-- reStncted i.o! its s?iareholdd.t! In the\"COum . . . ' ' . . . . . .\n\n\">f ill working, recurring monthly deposits were obtained from members for an agreed number of months at the end of which, an amount, which\n\nincluded interest, was returned to them. From the funds accumulated .. a result of these deposits, loans were given to members and the intezat from such Joans constituted the assessee's main income.\n\nAfter the payment out of this income of interest on the deposits as also aU\n\nthe other expenses and outgoings of management, etc., the balance was divided among the members pro rata according to their shareholdings.\n\nThe shareholders who were thus entitled to participate in the profits need not have either made deposits or taken loans. Although it was c.ontendcd on behalf of the assessee that it was exempt from assessment to tax as a Mutual Benefit Society under s. 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, on the principle in Ne\"\" York Life Assurane< Co. v. Styles, 2 T.C.\n\n~. which was followed in Board of Revenue v. Mylapore Hindu\n\nPermanent Fund Ltd., (1924) l.L.R. 47 Mad. I. the Income-tax Officer the entire profits. of the asscssee. It was held by him that the profits made by the fund belonged to the members as shareholders and not as borrowers from the fund or in the capacity of individuals who had in any way utilised the facilities afforded by the fund.\n\nThe require: ment of identity between contributors and participators as in Style's cast! was not satisfied.\n\n1be Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Incon1etax Appellate Tribunal, upon appeals made lo them in turn, upheld the order of the lnoome-tax Officer; the Tribunal, however, referred to the High Court,\n\ninlt alia, the question whether there were materials for the tribunal to hold that the assessee as a banking concern, asses'iahle under s. 10 and was not therefore exempt.\n\nThe High Court in answering the question in the negt\\tivc applied the test that both the right to contribute and the right to participate\n\nmust be available to an identical body but il was not nece.;;; ary that every member should contribute before he could lie allovted to participale.\n\nHeld: (i) The test applied by the High Court was not sound. There was a clear distinction between a case where profit which a company made out of its shareholders as customers-even if it was limited to trading only with them-and distributed to them as shareholders, and the case where all that a company did was to collect money from its members and applied it for the benefit of those same people, not as shareholders, but as people who subscribed it. For the principle in Style's case to apply, it was essential that all contributors to the conimon fund must be entitled to participate in the surplus and all participators mmt be cootributors to the common fund; and not only that all part:-\n\ncipators must be entitle\"d to contribute.\n\nMunicipal Mutual Insurance Ltd. v. Hills, 16 T.C. 430. C.I.T. >.\n\nR'1,1Dl Western Indian Turf Club Ltd .• [1954] S.C.R. 289. Dibrugarh\n\nDi!lrict Chit Ltd. v. C.l.T., :Assam, 2 l.T.C. 521, Thomas v. Richarl Evans & Co .• 11 T.C. 790, The National Association of Local Govern-\n\nCJ.T. ..\n\nM. Bt,..fit Ftmd Ltd.\n\nFund Ltd.\n\nSiUI J.\n\nment Officers v. Watkins, 18 T.C. 499 and lsmailia Grain Mi!rcliant¥ Association v. C.l.T., A.1.R. 1958 Born. 32. referred to:\n\nThe decision in the Board of Revenue v. The Mylapore Rirtlb.t Permanent Fund Ltd. (1924) I.LR. 47 Mad. J, could not haW> been rightly based on Style's case.\n\nThe Madura Hindn Permallent Fund Ltd. v. C.1.1'., 6 I.T.C. 3?6, referred ro.\n\nThe decisions in the Sivaganga Sri Meenakshi Swadeshi Saswatlra Nidhi ltd. v. C.l.T., 8 l.T.C. 83 llnd TtrtJjore Permanent Fund v. CJ.T. 5 I.T.R. 160, were base<! on the decision in the Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fu1Zd Case but in none of these cases was the pOint debated as to what the position would. be when shareholders participated in profits as shareholders and not as contributors.\n\nCivil Appellate Jurisdiction: Civil Appeals Nos. 637-- 644 Of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated October 20. 1960, of the Madras High Court in Case Referred No. 78 of 1956.\n\nK. N. Rajagopa/ Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for th~ appellant.\n\nP. Kesava Iyengar, M. S. K. Iyengar and Krishna Pillai, for the respondent.\n\nMay 7. 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the (ourt was delivered by\n\nStKRI J.-The respondent. the Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. 1882, limited by shares.\n\nSince 1938. the nominal capital of the assessee is Rs. 33,00,000 divided into sh.ares of Re. I each.\n\nIt carries on banking business restricted ti' its shareholders. i.e .. the shareholders are entitled to participate in the various recurring deposit schemes of the assessee or to obtain loans on security.\n\nThe statement of the case describes the working of the assesscc thus:\n\n\"Recurring deposits are obtained from members for fixed - amounts to be contributed monthly by them for a fixed number of months as stipulated.\n\ni 'F\n\n-!-,_\n\nat the end of which a fixed mnount is returned to them according to published tables. 'The amount so returned will cover the compound interest of the period.\n\nThese recurring deposits constitute the main source of funds of the assessee for advancing loans.\n\nSuch loans are restricted only to members who have. however. to offer substantial security, therefor, by way of either the paid up value of their recurring deposits. if any, or immovable properties within the Tanjore district.\n\nOut of the interest realised by the assessee on the loans which constitute its main income. interest on the recurring deposits aforesaid are paid as also all the other outgoings and expenses of managemer.t and the balance is divided among the members pro rata according to their shareholdings after making provision for reserves, etc .. as required by the Memorandum of Articles aforesaid.\n\nThe shareholders who are thus entitled to participate in the profits need not have either taken loans or have made recurring deposits.\"\n\nThe Income-Tax Officer assessed the entire profits for eight years from 1946-47 to 1953-54.\n\nIn a detailed and closely reasoned order, dated February 29, 1952, which is part of the statement. of the case, passed in respect of the assessment year 1947-48, the Incm>1e Tax Officer held that New York Life A.n11ra11ce Cnmpany v. Styles(') did not apply to the facts of this case.\n\nHe distinguished Style's<') case thus:\n\n\"Whereas the New York Life Assurance Company paid to its members what it had saved, the assessee fund pays to its members what it has earned.\n\nA share-holder in the New York Life Assurance Company did not get back anything more than what he contributed. a share-holder of the Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund does --------·------·-\n\n(IJ 2 T.C. 46o\n\nC.l.T.\n\nK. M. Be\"41\n\nFund Ltd.\n\nSlkri I.\n\nCJ.T.\n\nK. ltl. Bctw(ii Fwtd Ltd.\n\non the other hand get more than wh.1t he contributes.\n\nA fixed depositor gets back on maturity of the deposit not only the amount he deposited but also th.e interest thereon.\n\nA r~ curring depositor who pays, say a rupee eacil month for eighty-six months does not get back Rs. 86 only, or something less, but Rs. 100, the balance of Rs. 14 representing the interest on his deposit.\n\nWhat is returned to him is not a mere refund and there is no question here, as in the case of the New York Life Assurance Company, of his contributing m1mcy for .a .common purpose and getting back that much of his contribution as is not required for the common purpose. From the point of view of the individual member, an investment in the assessee fund is just like any other lucrative investment and his primary object in invsting his money with the fund is the income. which comes to him in the guise of interest or dividend.\"\n\nSikri J.\n\nRelying on Rowlatt, .l.'s, observations in Thomas v.\n\nRichard Evans Co. Ltd., ( 1) that 'it does not come back to them as purchasers or customers; it comes back to them as share-holders upon their shares', the Jncome Tax Officer held that \"the profits made by the fund belong to them as share-holders and not as borrowers from the fund or in the capacity of individuals who have in any way utilised the facilities afforded by the fund.\" He further held that \"there should firstly be a common fund and then it must be proved that the contributors to this common fund and the participators in the surplus are one and the same.\n\nAs far as I can see, there is no common fund in this case. The income of the assessee is derived from interest on loans let to its members, interest on Government securities, rents from property, etc., and it is distributed to the members either in the shape of guaranteed interest or dividends or both.\n\nAs far as the .allegedly \"mutual\" transactions of the assessee are concerned, the contributors to the income of the company\n\n(I) II T.C. 790\n\n8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOI~TS 209\n\nare those members who have borrowed from t_he assessee and paid interest on their borrowings. If the requirement of the complete identity between contributors and participators were to be satisfied, then the above contributors should also be entitled to participate in the profits.\" He further pointed out that a shareholder may not hold any deposit with the fund and may not utilise the borrowing facilities afforded by the fund but may be content to receive such dividend as is declared.\n\nThe Appe!late Assistant Commissioner, on appeal, upheld the order of the Income Tax Officer.\n\nIt was urged before him, inter alia, that the decision in the case of Roard of Revenue Madras v. The Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd.,(1 ) applied to the facts because the capital was also fluctuating in this case.\n\nHe, however, held that it was not a case of fluc.tuating capital but only a steady increase of capital.\n\nHe further held that a shareholder need not be a subscriber to the fixed or recurring deposits, and a shareholder may not participate in the interest earnings if 110 dividend is declared.\n\nOn further appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held as follows:\n\n\"The fund's claim that it is in reality a mutual benefit society is untenable.\n\nThe cardinal requirement is th.at all the contributors to the common fund must be able to participat~ in the surplus and that all the participators in the surplus must be contributors to the common fund. In other words, complete identity between the contri butors and the participators is essential.\n\nFirstly, there is no common fund. Secondly, the shareholders may or may not receive a dividend.\n\nBut those sh.1reholders who contribute to the recurring deposits of various duration receive guaranteed interest.\n\nThe persons who contnbute to the income of the company are those shareholders who borrow from the appellant and pay interest on their borrowings. ----\n\n(1) [1924] I.L.R. •7 Mad. 1\n\n51 S.C.-14\n\nC.1.T.\n\nFund Ltd.\n\nSikri J.\n\nC.1.T.\n\n\"· re. M. B•M(il\n\nFund Lid.\n\nSikri J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1~ [1964)\n\nOut of the income so derived, the guaranteed interest to the shareholders who make monthly deposits, receive guaranteed interest but the shareholders who do not contribute monthly deposits may or may not receive any dividend.\n\nThus, the complete identity between co11tributors and participators does not exist.\n\nThe nature of the business of the appellant is that of ordinary banking though the business is restricted to its members or shareholders only.\n\nThis restriction does not in the least take the income of the appellant out of the purview of the charging sections of the Act.\n\nIn our opinion, the Income-tax authorities were right in treating the appellant as a banking concern.\" The Appellate Tribunal, however, stated a consolidated case in respect of the assessment years, 1946-47 to 1953-54, and referred the following questions to the High Court:\n\n\" ( 1) Whether there were materials for the Tribunal to hold that the assessee is a banking concern assessable under Section 10 for all the assessment years and not exempt.\n\n(2) If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative and against the assessee, whether the payments to the non-recognised provident fund by the assessee for the six years of assessment 1946-47 and 1948-49 to 1952-53 are allowable deductions under any provisions of the Act.\" We are here only concerned with question No. 1. The High Court, for reasons which will be shortly stated, answered the question in the negative, and awarded costs Rs. 250.\n\nIt further ordered the refund to the assessee of the institution fee of Rs. 100 for each of the references \"as part of the costs to which as successful assessee it will be entitled to.\"\n\nThe High Court, after a review of the cases cited before it, came to the conclusion that the assessee satisfied the con ditions necessary for the applicability of Style's case(').\n\nAccording to it, the facts that the benefits of the association\n\n(1) T.C. 460\n\nare available only to members thereof and no non-member can particip(lte in the benefits, and that the profits that arise from this mutu1l trading are the result of the interest collected from members who take advantage of the loans offered by the fund and also of the default interest paid by members who delay payment of recurring deposits, and that the 'profit' after payment of interest to depositors and after meeting the other expenses of administration of the fund are availal>le for distribution among the entire body of the members, showed that there was complete mutuality.\n\nIt had that \"what is accordingly required is that both the right to contribute and the right to participate must be available to an identical body and it is not necessary that every member should contribute before he can be allowed to participate.\n\nThat this test is also satisfied in the present case is beyond question.\" It is this test which is attacked as unsound by the learned counsel for the appellant.\n\nThe High Court certified the cases as being fit for appeal to this Co mt, under s. 66 (A) ( 2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, and the appeals are now before us for disposal.\n\nThe question that arises in this case is whether the Style's(') case covers the facts of this case. In other words. to use the language of Lord Macmillan in Municipal Mutual Insurance Limited v. Hills(') has the cardinal requirement, namely, 'that all the contributors to the common fund must be entitled to particip.ate in the surplus and that all the participators in the surplus must be contributors to .the common fund; in other words, there must be complete identity between the contributors and the participators', been satisfied?\n\nMost of the cases, both English and Indian. bearing on the point under discussion, were reviewed by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Royal Western Indian Turf Club Ltd. (3), and this relieves us of the task of reviewing al! of them again.\n\nWe will, however, shortly deal with those in which companies limited by sh.ares were concerned for they stand on a slightly different footing from companies limited by guarantee.\n\n(r) 2 T.C. 460\n\n(2) 16 T.C. 430\n\n(3) [1954] S.C.R. 289\n\nC.l.T.\n\nFund Ltd.\n\nSikri I.\n\nC.I.T. v.\n\nK. M, Benefit Fund Ltd.\n\nSikri J.\n\nAlthough the f.acts in the Ruyal Western Turf Club case were different, this Court laid down the following:\n\n\"The principle that no one can make a profit out of himself is true enough but may in its application easily lead to confusion. There is nothing per se to prevent a comp.any from making a profit out of its own members.\n\nThus a railway company which earns profits by carrying passengers may also make a profit by carrying its shareholders or a trading company may make a profit out of its trading with its members besides the profit it makes from the general pwblic which deals with it but that profit belongs to the members as shareholders and does not come back to them as persons who had contributed them. Where a company collects money from the members and applies it for their benefit not as shareholders but as persons who put up the fund the company makes no profit. In such cases where there is identity in the character of those who contribute and of those who participate in the surplus. the fact of incorporation may be immaterial and the incorporated company may well be regarded as a mere instrument, a convenient agent for carrying out what the members might more laboriously do for themselves.\n\nBut it c1nnot be said that incorporation which brings into being a legal entity separate from its constituent members is to be disregarded always and that the legal entity can never make a profit out of its own members.\"\n\nIn the Dibrugarh District Club Lid. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Assam(1 ), which was noticed by this Court, the Calcutta High Court distinguishing Style's(') case held that the fact of incorporation could be neglected on the facts of the case. In that club, out of the members of the club only 69 were shareholders and 220 were non\n\n{I) 2 I.T.C. 521\n\n(2)T.C. 460\n\nCl.T.\n\n' shareholders, while 7 4 out of 445 of the shares were held by non-members of the club, and the profits of the club were being distributed every year as dividend to shareholders.\n\nK. M. B•~\n\nRowlatt J., in our opinion, correctly points out that if profits are distributed to sh.1reholders as shareholders, the principle of mutuality is not satisfied.\n\nIn Thomas v. Richard Evans and Co.('), at pp. 822-823, he observes thus:\n\n\"Bur a company can make a profit out of its members as customers, although its range of customers is limited to its shareholders. If a railway company makes a profit by earring its bareho_lders, or if a trading company, by trad- .1g with the shareholders-even if it is limitea to tradi11g with them-makes a profit, that profit belopgs to the shareholders, in a sense, but it belongs to them qua shareholders.\n\nIt does not come back to -them as purchasers or customers. It comes back to thein as shareholders, upon th.eir shares. Where all that a company does is to collect money from a certain mun- 1>er of poeple--it does not matter whether they\n\nare called members of the company, or participating policy holders-and apply it for the benefit of those same people, not as shareholders in the company, but as the people who subscribed it, then, as I understand the New Yark c.ase, thre is no profit. If the people were to do the . thing for themselves, there would be no profit, and the fact that they mcorporate a legal entity to do it for them makes no difference. there is still no profit.\n\nThis is not because the entity of the company is to be disregarded, it is because there is no profit, the money being simply collected from those people and handed back to them, not in the character of shareholders, but in the character of those who have paid it.\n\nThat, as I understand it, is the effect of the decision in the New\n\nYork case.\"\n\n)Ii T.C. 790\n\nFund Ltd.\n\nSilr•i '\n\nCJ.T.\n\nK. M. Benefit Fund Ltd.\n\nIt seems to us that the test applied by the High Court is not sound.\n\nIt is not consistent with the true decision in Style's case, as understood by this Court and in other subsequent cases. It wat be noticed that Lord Macmillan clearlv said that all participators must be contributors to the com~ mon fund and not that all participators must be entitled to contribute.\n\nThe essence of mutuality lies in the return of what one has contributed to a common fund.\n\nSikri J.\n\nDas, J., as he then was, in the passage quoted above, in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Royal Western Indian Turf Club Ltd. ( 1) reiterated the same idea.\n\nThe learned counsel for the assessee, relying on The National Association of Local Government Officers v.\n\nWatkins('), urged that it is not necessary that all must contribute to the common fund. But in that case it was an unincorporated association, and Finlay, J., regarded that as a matter of fundamental importance, for it followed from it, as held by Finlay, J., \"that the property belongs to the members and it is a fallacy, as had been pointed out in several cases, one at least of which was cited to me, to say in the case of such a club that, where a member orders a dinner and consumes it, there is any sale to him.\n\nThere is not a sale.\n\nThe fundamental thing is that the whole property is vested in the members.\" He emphasized this again when he says that \"it may be that where you have a separate entity, where you have a company, in a great many cases the test is that you have to look at the subscribers, look at the participants, and see if they are the same. Here it seems to me to lie at the root of the thing that the property was not the property of the Association; it was the property of the members themselves ..... \"\n\nIt is this feature of the case which Chagla, C.J ., failed to notice in Ismailia Grain Merchants Association v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax(\").\n\nWe may now deal with the cases decided by the Madra~: High Court, and relied on by the learned coupsel for the assessee.\n\nIn Board of Revenue v. The Mylapore Hindu\n\n(1) [1954] S.C.R. 289\n\n(2) 18 T.C. 49'\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1'58 Born. 32\n\nPermanent Fund Ltd.,(') the Fund was registered under the Indian Companies Act of 1866. A shareholder subscribed one rupee per share per mensem and at the end of 7 years drew Rs. 102-8-0, and then he ceased to be shareholder (qua the share). A shareholder had to pay interest on the subscription, if not paid within the time prescribed by the rules. Apart from the interest on the subscription, the Fund derived income from interest on loans . given exclusively to its members, every one of them being entitled under the rules to take loan, and occasionally from interest from outside investments with bank. The High Court held the Style's(') case applied and ~!so held that the income earned by the Fund by way of interest from its own members was not taxable under the Income Tax Act, 1918, in spite of the fact that such profits were devided among directors and distributed among the shareholders with reference to the number of shares and the number of months during which they hau held them.\n\nBut the point urged by Mr.\n\nRajagopal Sastri was not raised before the High Court and the High Court was' content to apply the test 'whether the income comes in from outside and not from within'.\n\nBut as held by the Full Bench in The Madura Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income Tax( 3 ), this case could not have been rightly based on Style's case.\n\nIn The Sivaganga Shri Meenakshi Swadeshi Saswatha Nidhi Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income Tax (4) the High Court, without adverting to doubts expressed in the decision in Madura Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd.,(') regarding the applicability of Stvle's case, which was referred to in the statement of the case, and without giving any reasons, held that the Mylapore Hindu Permanent Trust(') case applied.\n\nIn Tanjore Permanent Fund v. Commissioner of Income Tax(\") the High Court held that there was no conflict between the decision in Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund(') case and the Madura Hindu Permanent Fund(') case. As\n\n(I) [19241 I.L.R. 47 Mod. I\n\n(3) 6 l.T.r.. 326\n\n(5) 11.T.R. 160\n\n(2) 2 T.C. 460\n\n(4)81.TC 83\n\nCJ.T.\n\n\"· K. M. B•n•\n\nFund Ltd.\n\nSikri /.\n\nC.1.T.\n\nM. B<n•fit Fund Ltd.\n\nSikri I.\n\nthe facts in the case were similar to that in Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund (1) case, the High Court refused to reopen the question and disturb the practice, but however added that '\"though the term 'shareholder' has been here used, we do not wish to be understood as deciding that these subscribers are shareholders properly so called within the meaning of the Companies Act.\" As already pointed out, in none of these cases the point was debated as to what is the position when shareholders participate in profits as shareholders and not as contributors.\n\nIt seems to us that it is difficult to hold that Style's(') case applies to the facts of the case.\n\nA shareholder in the assessee company is entitled to participate in the profits without contributing to the funds of the company by taking loans.\n\nHe is entitled to receive his dividend as long as he holds .a share.\n\nHe has not to fulfil any other condition.\n\nHis position is in no way different from a shareholder in a banking company, limited by shares.\n\nIndeed, the position <>f the assessee is no different from an ordinary bank except that it lends money to and receives deposits from its shareholders. This does not by itself make its income any the less income from business within s. 10 of the Indian Income Tax Act.\n\nIn our opinion, the answer to the question referred to the High Court should be in the affirmative. The appeals are accordingly accepted, but in view of the fact that the Mylapore Fund(') case has held .the field in Madras since 1923, we do not wish to burden the assessee with costs.\n\nAccordingly, the parties will bear their own costs through- <>Ut.\n\nA subsidiary point was raised by Mr. Sastri that the High Court had no jurisdiction to order the refund of the reference fees deposited by the .assessee.\n\nThis is true. Isut the High Courts can, if they so deem fit in a particular case. 11Ssess the costs in such a way as to include the sum of rts. I 00 deposited as reference fee.\n\n----·----\n\n(1) [1924] I.L.R. 47 Mad. 1\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(2) 2 T.C. 460", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 402, "end_char": 406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 490, "end_char": 495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 811, "end_char": 815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 883, "end_char": 888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME~TAX, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1425, "end_char": 1459, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KUMBAKONAM MUTUAL' BENEFiT FUNn LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1461, "end_char": 1496, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUMBAKONAM MUTUAL' BENEFiT FUNn LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1542, "end_char": 1554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1559, "end_char": 1581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3110, "end_char": 3115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3123, "end_char": 3143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Assistant Commissioner", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1be Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Incon1etax Appellate Tribunal, upon appeals made lo them in turn, upheld the order of the lnoome-tax Officer; the Tribunal, however, referred to the High Court,\n\ninlt alia, the question whether there were materials for the tribunal to hold that the assessee as a banking concern, asses'iahle under s. 10 and was not therefore exempt."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "National Association of Local Govern-\n\nCJ.T. ..\n\nM. Bt,..fit Ftmd Ltd.\n\nFund Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5360, "end_char": 5441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T., :Assam, 2 l.T.C. 521, Thomas v. Richarl Evans & Co .• 11 T.C. 790, The National Association of Local Govern-\n\nCJ.T. ..\n\nM. Bt,..fit Ftmd Ltd.\n\nFund Ltd.\n\nSiUI J.\n\nment Officers v. Watkins, 18 T.C. 499 and lsmailia Grain Mi!rcliant¥ Association v. C.l."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopa/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6393, "end_char": 6408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopa/ Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for th~ appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6420, "end_char": 6434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopa/ Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for th~ appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Kesava Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6456, "end_char": 6473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Kesava Iyengar, M. S. K. Iyengar and Krishna Pillai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6475, "end_char": 6491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Kesava Iyengar, M. S. K. Iyengar and Krishna Pillai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Krishna Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6496, "end_char": 6510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Kesava Iyengar, M. S. K. Iyengar and Krishna Pillai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6620, "end_char": 6655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act.", "canonical_name": "KUMBAKONAM MUTUAL' BENEFiT FUNn LTD"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6741, "end_char": 6754, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tanjore district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7786, "end_char": 7802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "if any, or immovable properties within the Tanjore district."}}, {"text": "February 29, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8474, "end_char": 8491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a detailed and closely reasoned order, dated February 29, 1952, which is part of the statement."}}, {"text": "New York Life Assurance Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8764, "end_char": 8795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He distinguished Style's<') case thus:\n\n\"Whereas the New York Life Assurance Company paid to its members what it had saved, the assessee fund pays to its members what it has earned."}}, {"text": "Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9027, "end_char": 9057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a share-holder of the Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund does --------·------·-\n\n(IJ 2 T.C. 46o\n\nC.l."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10088, "end_char": 10093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sikri J.\n\nRelying on Rowlatt, .l."}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10109, "end_char": 10116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sikri J.\n\nRelying on Rowlatt, .l.", "canonical_name": "Rowlatt"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12329, "end_char": 12358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On further appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held as follows:\n\n\"The fund's claim that it is in reality a mutual benefit society is untenable."}}, {"text": "Fund Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13171, "end_char": 13180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\n\n51 S.C.-14\n\nC.1.T.\n\nFund Ltd.\n\nSikri J.\n\nC.1.T.\n\n\"· re."}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14247, "end_char": 14257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16284, "end_char": 16289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.l.T.\n\nFund Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17403, "end_char": 17420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(r) 2 T.C. 460\n\n(2) 16 T.C. 430\n\n(3) [1954] S.C.R. 289\n\nC.l."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19037, "end_char": 19056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Assam(1 ), which was noticed by this Court, the Calcutta High Court distinguishing Style's(') case held that the fact of incorporation could be neglected on the facts of the case."}}, {"text": "K. M. B•~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19477, "end_char": 19486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. B•~\n\nRowlatt J., in our opinion, correctly points out that if profits are distributed to sh.1reholders as shareholders, the principle of mutuality is not satisfied."}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19488, "end_char": 19495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. B•~\n\nRowlatt J., in our opinion, correctly points out that if profits are distributed to sh.1reholders as shareholders, the principle of mutuality is not satisfied.", "canonical_name": "Rowlatt"}}, {"text": "New\n\nYork", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21145, "end_char": 21154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That, as I understand it, is the effect of the decision in the New\n\nYork case.\""}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21448, "end_char": 21457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It wat be noticed that Lord Macmillan clearlv said that all participators must be contributors to the com~ mon fund and not that all participators must be entitled to contribute."}}, {"text": "Sikri J.\n\nDas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21691, "end_char": 21704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sikri J.\n\nDas, J., as he then was, in the passage quoted above, in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Royal Western Indian Turf Club Ltd. ( 1) reiterated the same idea."}}, {"text": "Finlay", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22110, "end_char": 22116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in that case it was an unincorporated association, and Finlay, J., regarded that as a matter of fundamental importance, for it followed from it, as held by Finlay, J., \"that the property belongs to the members and it is a fallacy, as had been pointed out in several cases, one at least of which was cited to me, to say in the case of such a club that, where a member orders a dinner and consumes it, there is any sale to him."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23034, "end_char": 23040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here it seems to me to lie at the root of the thing that the property was not the property of the Association; it was the property of the members themselves ..... \"\n\nIt is this feature of the case which Chagla, C.J .,"}}, {"text": "Permanent Fund Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23373, "end_char": 23392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32\n\nPermanent Fund Ltd.,(') the Fund was registered under the Indian Companies Act of 1866."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23438, "end_char": 23451, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fund by way of interest from its own members was not taxable under the Income Tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24073, "end_char": 24164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24399, "end_char": 24415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the point urged by Mr.\n\nRajagopal Sastri was not raised before the High Court and the High Court was' content to apply the test 'whether the income comes in from outside and not from within'."}}, {"text": "Madura Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24913, "end_char": 24945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Sivaganga Shri Meenakshi Swadeshi Saswatha Nidhi Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income Tax (4) the High Court, without adverting to doubts expressed in the decision in Madura Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd.,(') regarding the applicability of Stvle's case, which was referred to in the statement of the case, and without giving any reasons, held that the Mylapore Hindu Permanent Trust(') case applied."}}, {"text": "Stvle", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24981, "end_char": 24986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Sivaganga Shri Meenakshi Swadeshi Saswatha Nidhi Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income Tax (4) the High Court, without adverting to doubts expressed in the decision in Madura Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd.,(') regarding the applicability of Stvle's case, which was referred to in the statement of the case, and without giving any reasons, held that the Mylapore Hindu Permanent Trust(') case applied."}}, {"text": "Mylapore Hindu Permanent Trust(')", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25093, "end_char": 25126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Sivaganga Shri Meenakshi Swadeshi Saswatha Nidhi Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income Tax (4) the High Court, without adverting to doubts expressed in the decision in Madura Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd.,(') regarding the applicability of Stvle's case, which was referred to in the statement of the case, and without giving any reasons, held that the Mylapore Hindu Permanent Trust(') case applied."}}, {"text": "Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25272, "end_char": 25301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tanjore Permanent Fund v. Commissioner of Income Tax(\") the High Court held that there was no conflict between the decision in Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund(') case and the Madura Hindu Permanent Fund(') case."}}, {"text": "Madura Hindu Permanent Fund", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25318, "end_char": 25345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tanjore Permanent Fund v. Commissioner of Income Tax(\") the High Court held that there was no conflict between the decision in Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund(') case and the Madura Hindu Permanent Fund(') case."}}, {"text": "K. M. B•n•\n\nFund Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25463, "end_char": 25484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\n(3) 6 l.T.r.. 326\n\n(5) 11.T.R. 160\n\n(2) 2 T.C. 460\n\n(4)81.TC 83\n\nCJ.T.\n\n\"· K. M. B•n•\n\nFund Ltd.\n\nSikri /.\n\nC.1.T.\n\nM. B<n•fit Fund Ltd.\n\nSikri I.\n\nthe facts in the case were similar to that in Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund (1) case, the High Court refused to reopen the question and disturb the practice, but however added that '\"though the term 'shareholder' has been here used, we do not wish to be understood as deciding that these subscribers are shareholders properly so called within the meaning of the Companies Act.\""}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25898, "end_char": 25911, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26782, "end_char": 26787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mylapore Fund", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26990, "end_char": 27003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals are accordingly accepted, but in view of the fact that the Mylapore Fund(') case has held .the field in Madras since 1923, we do not wish to burden the assessee with costs."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27035, "end_char": 27041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals are accordingly accepted, but in view of the fact that the Mylapore Fund(') case has held .the field in Madras since 1923, we do not wish to burden the assessee with costs."}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27209, "end_char": 27215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A subsidiary point was raised by Mr. Sastri that the High Court had no jurisdiction to order the refund of the reference fees deposited by the .assessee."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_239_252_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "s s .. c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 239\n\n.Partnership Act, therefore, does not apply to him. He is\n\nnot a partner of the finn and, therefore, he cannot be ad\\uruca£ed insolvent for the acts of insolvency committed by\n\nrespondents 2 and 3, ithe partners of the finn.\n\nThe order of the High Court is correct.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\n\\ Appeal dismissed.\n\nMURARILAL v.\n\nDEV KARAN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. c.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. c. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nJlortgage-Clog on equity of rtdemption-Enforcetbility-Principk tJ/\n\nJustice, equity and good conscience-A.pplication-Power of Coun.\n\nThe respoodent sought to redeem a mortgage eetuted in the Sta~ of Alwar in 1919. By a stipulation in the mortgage deed the mortgagor aareed that if the debt was not paid within l.S years the mortgagee would become the owner of the property. The respondent's case was that the transaction was a mortgage and that he could redeem the mortgage even though the stipulated period was over. The appellant resisted the auit on the ground that the transaction amounted to a sale and not a mortgage. The trial Judge dismissed the suit holding that the claim for redemption was not maintainable after the expiry of the stipulated period. The Rajasthan High Court on appeal reversed the decision of the trial Judge holding that the stipulation was a clog on the equity of redemption and remanded the suit. The stipulation in question was u follows,-\n\n.. After the expiry of the stipulated penod of lS yean this shop\n\nwould be deemed as an absolute transfer 'Mala Kalam' for this amount. Till the mortgage money is paid, I shall have\n\nno concern with the shop ...\n\nHeld: If the stipulation were to prevail, the use of the words 'mala llllamt, which meant that there would be no scope for the mortgagor to say anything, W<'uld indicate that the mortgagee became the absolute owner of the property.\n\nBut the stipulation, which was undoubtedly a clog on the equity ol redemption, must fail and the suit for redemption must succ:eed.\n\nShivagoiiiU\n\n\"' C lunulrakttrtt ·\n\nSllbba Rao 1.\n\n1N4 .,,. '\n\nMurarilal\n\nDev Kar\"\n\nThe equitable principle of justice, equity and good conscience, Jon1 and consistntly applied by Civil Courts in Inoia, could be applied in the State of Alwar even though the Transfer of Property Act had no application there at the time when the mortgage document was executed or its period expired. The strict provisions of the texts of Hindu Law in this regard wouJd be of no avail.\n\nNamdeo Lokman Lodhi v. Narmadabai, [1953} S.C.R. 1009, applied.\n\nPattabhiramier v. Vencutarow Naicken and Narasimha Naicken,.\n\n(1870) 13 M.I.A. 560 and Thumbusaway Moodelly v. Hossain Rowthen, I.L.R. 1 Mad. 1. cons:dered.\n\nV nkata Reddy v. Pai'Vati A.mmal. 1 Mad. H.C. Rep. 460, Ramii bin Tukaram v. Chinto Sakharam, 1 Born. H.C. Rep. 199 (1864), Bapuji A.paji v. Senavaraji Marvadi, l.L.R. II Bom. 231, Ramasami Sastrigal Y.\n\nSamiyappanayakan, I.L.R. 4 Mad. 179, Amba Lal v. Amba Lal, l.L.R. 1957 Raj. 964, Seleh Raj v. Chandan Mal, I.L.R. 1960 Raj. 88 aDd N\"inu Y. Kishan Singh, A.I.R. 1957 H.P. 46, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTioN: Civil Appeal No. 484 of 1961.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated Ma.:h 28, 1958 of the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) at Ja.ipur in D. B. Civil First Appeal No. 64 of 1951.\n\nSarjoo Prasad and Harbans Singh, for the appellants.\n\nB. P. Sinha and Naunit Lal, for the respondents.\n\n1fay 8, 1964.\n\nThe Judgmnt of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J. This appeal by special leave arises out of a redemption suit filed by the respondent Dev Karan against the appellant Murarilal. The mortgage sought to be redeemed was executed on the 19th March, 1919 for a sum of Rs. 6,500.\n\nThe mortgaged property\n\ncon~.isted of a shop which was delivered over in the\n\nposession of the mortgagee after the execution of the mortgage deed.\n\nThe mortg.ge deed had provided that the amount due under the mortgage should be repaid to the mortgagee within 15 years, whereupon the property would be redeemed. It had also stipulated that if the payment was not made within 15 years, the mortgagee would become the owner of the property. The mortgagor was Man gal\n\nRam who died and the respondent claims to be the heir and\n\nlegal representative of the said deceased mortgagor.\n\nIn the plaint filed by the respondent, it was averred that the transaction was, in substance, a mortgage and the\n\nmortgagor's right to redeem was alive even though the stipulated period of 15 years for the repuyment of the loan had passed. On these allegations, the respondent claimed\n\na decree for redemption of the suit mortgage on payment of Rs. 6,500. It appears that the original mortgagee Gangadhar had also died before the institution of the suit, and so, the appellant Murarilal was impleaded as the defendant on the basis that he was the only heir and legal\n\nrepresentative of the deceased mortgagee Gangadhar.\n\nThe claim for redemption thus made by the respondent was resisted by the appellant on several grounds.\n\nIt was alleged that after the expiry of the stipulated period of 15 years, the property had become the absolute property of the mortgagee and it was urged that the original transaction was, in substance, and in reality, not a mortgage but a sale.\n\nSeveral other pleas were also raised by the appellant in resisting the respondent's claim, but it is unnecessary to refer to them. The learned trial Judge framed appropriate issues which arose on the pleading of the parties.\n\nIn substance, he held that the claim for redemption made long after the 15 years' period had expired could not be su r;; tc.ined. Findings were made on other issues also and they were against the respondent. In the result, the respondent's suit was dismissed.\n\nThe respondent then took: the m.atter in appeal bctore the Rajasthan High Court. He urged that the view taken by the trial Court that the stipulation as to the mortgagors liability to re-pay the loan withjn 15 years did not bar his present suit for redemption, because the said stipulation amounted to a clog on the equity of redemption and as such, could not affect the mortgagor's right to redeem, and he added that the transaction, in substance, was a mortgage\n\nand not a sale, and so, his right to redeem was alive and could be effectively enforced by the present suit.\n\nThe High Court has upheld his first contention that the relevant\n\n51 S.C.-16.\n\nMurarikll v.\n\nDev Karan\n\nGajendragadka c.].\n\nMurariltzl\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nprovision as to the period within which the mortgage amount had to be repaid amounted to a clog on the equity of redemption and could not be pleaded as a bar to the present suit.\n\nBut on the question about the character of the original transaction itself, the High Court appears to have been inclined to take the view that the relevant clause on whkh\n\nthe plea about the bar was raised did not really support the said plea, because it was by no means clear that even after the expiration of 15 years, the mortgagee was intended to be the absolute owner of the property.\n\nOn these findings, the decree passed by the tria] Court dismissing the respondent's suit has been reversed and the suit h.as been remanded to the trial Court to be disposed of in accordance with law.\n\nIt is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave.\n\nPending the appeal before this Court, both the appellant and the respondent have died, and\n\ntheir respective heirs have been brought on the record.\n\nThe first question which calls for our decision is whether the relevant clause on which the appellant relies rn akes the mortgagee the owner of the property at the end of the stipulated period of 15 years.\n\nThe mortgage provides, inter alia, that after the house which w.1s the mortgage property was delivered over to the mortgagee~ it \\vas open to him either to live in it, or to let it out to tenants.\n\nTe mortgagee was further given liberty to spend up to Rs. ~5 for repairing the house and if more expenses were intended to be incurred. the said expenditure would be incurred through -the mortgagor.\n\nOn the expenditure thus incurred the mortgagor was liable to pay interest at the rate of As. 0-6-0 per ce-nt per month. Then the document proceeded to add that the mortgagor would get the property redeemed on payment of the mortgage amount as weJI t1s\n\nthe cost of Patta which may have been incurred by tl1e mortgagee and the repairing expenses within a period of l 5 years.\n\nThen, occurs the relevant clause: ''After the expiry of the stipulated period of 1:; :·: ::trs, this shop would be deemed as an absolute transfer ''Mala Kalam\" for this very amount.\n\nTill the mortgage money is paid, I shaH have ;-lc concern with the shop.\" The High Court appears to haY~ taken the view that the words \"Mala Kalam .. which oc•t!r t\n\nthe end of the relevant clause do not necessarily impon the notion that the mortgage property w9uld be the absolute property of the mortgagee.\n\nAccording to the High Court, the said words literally mean \"where there is no scope for having any say\". If that is the meaning of the relevant words, it seems difficult to accept the view that the docent did not intend to make the mortgagee the owner of the property at the end of . 15 years if the debt due was not paid within that period. When the document says that there would be no scope for the ortgagor to say anything, it neeessarily means, in the context, that the mortgagor would, in tbat case, have lost his title . to the property, and that means the mortgagee would become the absolute owner of the property. Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that if the terms of the document were to prevail, the appellanes contention that the present suit for redemption is barred, must succeed. It is common ground that the amount due under the mortgage deed was not paid by the mungagor or his heir within the stipulated period and that would extinguish the title of the mortgagor and make the mortgagee to be the owner of the property.\n\nRut the question is whether such a stipulation c.'ln be allowed to be pleaded as a bar to the respondent's claim for redemption.\n\nJust as it is common ground that if the terms of the document were to prevail, the suit would be barred, it is also common ground that if the doctrine that the clog on the equity of redemption cannot be enforced is to prevail in the present proceedings, the respondent's action for edemption must succeed. The fact that a stipulation of tbe kind with which we are concerned in the present case amounts to a clog on the equity of redemption, is not and cannot be disputed.\n\nTherefore, the main question which arises in the present appeal is: does the equitable doctrine ensuring the mortgagors equity of redemption in spite of a clog created on such equity by stipulations in the mortgage deed apply to the present case? Thh question arises in this form, because the Transfer of Pr.operty Act did not apply to Alwar at the time when tbe mortgage was executed nor at the time when the 15 years' stipulated period expired.\n\nMlll\"ffriW\n\n\"· Dn 'KANII\n\nGajendragadw\n\nC. I.\n\n1964 - Mur11rllal\n\nGajendr(igadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nSUPREMR COURT REPORTS [rg64]\n\nMr. Sarjoo Prasad for the appellant contends that the High Court w.as in error in applying the equitable principle, because tHe said principle cannot be invoked in cases where the Transfer of Property Act does not apply.\n\nIn support of this argument, he has very strongly relied on an early decision of the Privy Council pronounced in 1870, in the case of Pattabhiramier v. Vencatarow Naicken and Narasimha Naicken(l). In that case, the Privy Council was dealing with a Bye4bilwutfa, or mortgage and conditional sale usufructuary executed in 1806 under which the mortgagees were put in possession. The deed contained a condition that if the mortgagor failed to redeem within five years, the conditional sale was to be absolute. The mortgagor failed to redeem within the stipulated period, and the mortgagee, without foreclosing the mortgage, sold the mortgaged property.\n\nThereafiter, the mortgagor's representative sued to redeem the mortgage under s. 8 of the Madras Regulation XXXIV of 1802. The Privy Council held that the interest of the mortgagee after the expiry of the stipulated period had become absolute.\n\nIn dealing with thiS' question, Lord Chelmsford who delivered the opinion of the Board observed that the form of security with which the Board was concerned had long been common in India, and he added that the sti pulations in such contracts were recognised and enforced according to their letter by the ancient Hindu law as well as under Mohammedan law; and in support of this statement, reference -was made to certain passages from Colebrooke's Digest on Hindu Law and Baillie's introduction to his book on M'ohammedan Law of Sale.\n\nIf the ancient Jaw of the country, observed Lord Chelmsford, has been modified by any later rule, having the force of law, that rule must be founded either on positive legislation, or on established practice; and since neither any specific statutory provision had been cited before the Board, nor established practice in that behalf had been proved, the Privy Council upheld the mortgagee's plea that he became the absolute owner of the property at the expiration of the stipulated period. While pronouncing this decision, Lord Chelmsford, however, took the precaution of adding that while the Board was allowing\n\n(I) [ISgo] I3 Moore's I.A. s6o\n\nthe appeal, \"it must not be supposed that their Lordships design to disturb any rule of property established by judicial decisions so as to form part of the Law of the Forumt wherever such may prevailt or to affect any title founded thereon.\" As we will presently point outt the appeal of Pattabhiramier was pending before the Privy Council for as many as 10 years.\n\nMeanwhile, Indian High Courts were enforcing the equitable principle that stipulations contained in mortgage-deeds which amounted to clog on the equity of redemption could not be enforced. In other words, the iurisdiction which courts of equity exercised in England by refusing to enforce clogs on the equity of redemption, was being exercised by High Courts in India.\n\nHowever, before we refer to those decisions, it would be convenient to cite another decision of the Privy Council pro--\n\nnounced in Thumbusawmy Moodelly v. Hossain Rowthen &\n\nOrs(l). In that case, the Privy Cmmcil held that the contract of mortgage by conditional sale is a form of security known throughout India, and by the ancient law of India, it must be taken to prevail in every part of India, where it has not been modified by actual legislation or established practice, and so, must be enforced according to its letter.\n\nIn this case, Sir James W. Col vile who delivered the opinion of the Board, referred to the earlier decision of the Privy\n\nCouncil in Pattabhiramiers case(2), noticed the trend of judicial pronouncements made by the High Courts in India while Pattabhiramier's case was pending before the Privy Council, and strongly reiterated the view that the said decisions of the High Courts were radically unsound.\n\nHe referred to the fact that unfortunately, Pattabhiramier's case \"slept for nine years, and that in the interval .the Sudar Court, and afterwards the High Court which succeeded it, continued the course of decision which the former had given in 1858,. Then he mentioned the relevant decisions of the Madras and the Bombay High Courts and expressed the opinion that in trying to enforce principles of equity in dealing with stipulations contained in mortgage documents, the High Coons were really assuming the functions of Legislature. So, it is clear that the Privy Council emphatically\n\n(I) I.L.R. I Mad. I\n\nMurarilal\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nMurarilal v.\n\nDev Karan - Gajendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\ndeclared in 1875 that unless there is a legislative enactment or established practice to the contrary, terms in the contract of mortgage by conditional sale must be taken to prevail in every part of India and must be strictly enforced according to their letter.\n\nMr. Sarjoo Prasad naturally relies on these decisions and contends that so far as the State of Alwar is concerned, there is no legislative enactment to the contrary, nor is there any established practice on which the equitable doctrine could be pleaded by the respondent in support of his case that though 15 years have elapsed, his right to redeem still survives.\n\nThere are two other decisions of the Privy Council to which we may refer at this stage. In Kader Moideen v.\n\nNepean(l), the Privy Council was dealing with a case from Burma, and it observed that the Burmese Courts are direct ed, in the absence of any statutory law applicable to accounts against a mortgagee in possession, to follow the guidance of justice, equity, and good conscience.\n\nActing on this principle, the Privy Council accepted Mr. Haldane's contention that there was no rule of abstract justice in taking the accounts of a mortgagee in possession, and that the Indian rule, which was embodied ins. 76 of the Transfer of Property Act, should, though the Act had not been extended to Burma, be followed there in preference to the English practice. It would thus be seen that the equitable principle underlying the provisions of s. 76 was extended to the case on the specific ground that the Bunnese Courts had been directed by the relevant sta.tutory provision to follow the guidance of justice, equity and good conscience in the absence of any statutory law applicable to accounts against a mortgagee in possession.\n\nThis decision, therefore, is in line with the two earlier decisions of the Privy Council.\n\nSimilarly, in Mehrban Khan v. Makhna(2 ), where the Privy Council was dealing with the provisions in a mortgage deed conferring on the mortgagee upon redemption an interest in the mortgaged property, it was held that the said provisions amounted to a clog or fetter on the equity of redemption and as such, were void not only against the mortgagor, but also against the purchaser of his interest,\n\n(t) 25l.A. 24t (~)57 l.A. t68\n\n8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPRErv!E COURT REPORTS 247\n\nsince they were inconsistent with the very nature and essence of a mortgage.\n\nIn this case, again, s. 28 of Regulation No. VII which was applicable to the North-West Frontier Province, had expressly provided that in cases not otherwise specially provided for, the Judges shall decide according to justice, equity 'lnd good conscience; and so, recourse to the equitable doctrine was pcrmissib!e .because there was the statutory mandate requiring the Judges to l1pply t!1e said doctrine where there was no specific legislative provi~, ion in relation to the matter with which they were dea1ing. .\n\nThough the position of the Privy Council decisions is thus clear and consistent, the trend of the decisions of the High Courts in India continued to conform to the same pattern which was set up by the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Venkata Reddi v. Parvati Ammal(l) and adopted by the Bombay High Court in Ramji bin Tukaram v.\n\nChinto Sakharam(2). The question was elaborately argued on .several occasions before the said High Courts .and the two earlier decisions of the Privy Council in the case of Pattabhiramier( 3 ) as well as in the case of Thumbusawmy Moodelly(4 ) were cited and yet, the High Courts have con- sistently adhered to the view that in dealing .with mortgage transactions which contain unfair~ unjust or oppressive stipulations unreasonably restricting the mortgago{s right to redeem, the Court would be justified in refusing to enforce such stipulations and recognising the paramount character of the equity of redemption.\n\nIn Bapuji Apaji v. Sonavaraji Marvati(i>), Westropp, C.J., h().s elaborately considered the relevant aspects of this question.\n\nHe referred to the two Privy Council's decisions and observed that the doctrine of Ramji v. Chinto() had been uniformly folJO\\ved jn the Bombay Preidency in a multitude of cases, and he aw no reason to depart from that decision.\n\nIn expressing his firm adherence to the pattern of the law prescribed by the decision of .the Bombay High Court in Ramji v. Cldmo, the le3rned Chief Justice elaborately considered ali the prece dents on the point. trend of authorities bearing on the question, the opinion of scholars~ and held that he was inclined\n\n(I) I Mad. H.C. Rep. 460\n\n(2) I Born. H.C.'Rep. 199 [rS6.d\n\n(3) [IS7o] 13 M.I.A. 560\n\n(4) I.L.R. I Mad. I,\n\n(5) J.L.R. II Born. 231\n\n!vlurarilal\n\nGnjendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nMurarilal\n\nto take the law to be that which was settled in Ramji v.\n\nChinto(l) and gave effect to it.\n\nSo far as the Bombay High Court is concerned, the practice consistently had been\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nto follow the decision of Westropp, C.J. till the Transfer of Property Act was extended to Bombay.\n\nIn Madras, we find that same position.\n\nIn Ramasmi Sastrigal v. Samivappanayakan(:l), the majority view of the Full Bench was that in the Madras Presidency, where conw tracts of mortgage by way of conditional sale have been entered into subsequent to the year 1858, redemption after the expiry of the term limited by the contract must be allowed.\n\nThe point with which we are dealing in the present appeal was elaborately .argued before the 1vladra5 High Court; the opinion expressed emphatica1ly by the Privy Council was cited, but Turner, C.J ., with whose opinion Muttusami Ayyar, J., agreed made a very significant observation after elaborately examining the merits of the question. \"For these reasons,\" said the learned C.J ., \"we conceive that we shall not be wanting in due respect for the distinguished tribunal by whose decisions we are bound, if we follow the course they have pronounced there were strong reasons for adopting and apply the rules introduced, however erroneously, by judicial decisions in these provinces.\" That view has prevailed in the Madras High Court ever since.\n\nThese decisions show that the High Courts in India conformed to the view that whether or not there is a statutory provision directing the Judges to give effect to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. it is their duty to enforce that principle where they are dealing with stipulations introduced in mortgage transactions which appear to them to be unreasonable, oppresive or unjust.\n\nIt is true that according to the strict letter of the ancient Hindu Law, a stipulation that the mortgagor shall pay the amount advanced to him by the mortgagee within a specified\n\npriod, was intended to be enforced.\n\nThe ancient Hindu bw texts use the word \"Adhi'' to denote pledge of a movable or mortgage of immovable property.\n\nNar. IV 124 divides\n\nAhi into two sorts, viz., one that is to be redeemed within ----------------- tt) 1 Bon H.C. Rep. 199 (1864)\n\n(2) I.L.R. 4 Mad. 179 at p. 1.90\n\na certain time fixed (by agreement at the ti.rile of contracting the debt) or to be retained till the debt is paid off. In regard to the first category of mortgages, if the money is not paid at the time fixed, the thing pledged or mortgaged would belong to the creditor (vide Yaj. II. 58 and as explained by Mitakshara) ( 1). It also appears that if the mortgage is not redeemed even when the debt has grown to double of the principal by non-payment of the interest agreed upon, the mortgagor lost his title over the mortgaged property; so that it must be conceded that under the strict letter of the Hindu law texts, if a mortgage deed contains a stipulation for the repayment of the mortgage amount within a specified period, at the expiration of the said period the mortgagor may Jose his title over the mortgaged property. The principle underlying this provision appears to be that Hindu law as enunciated by the ancient texts, attached considerable importance to a person keeping his promise.\n\nThough that is so, we ought also to add that according to Sir R. B. Ghose, ordinarily, time was not of the essence of the contract of mortgage in Hindu law(2), and in support of this opinion the learned author quotes with approval Colebrooke's opinion.\n\nBasing himself on this position of the Hindu law, Mr.\n\nSarjoo Prasad contends that we ought to assume that Hindu Law which as applicable to Alw.ar recognised the importance of compelling the mortgagor to perform his promise that he would repay the debt within a specified time and if he failed to do so, he would lose his title over the mortgaged property. He urged that the dispute between the parties in the present appeal should be dedded in the light of this position of the Hindu law as well as the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in the cases of Pattabhiramier(3 ) and Thumbusawmy Moodelly(4').\n\nIn dealing with this argument, it would be relevant to observe that traditionally,· courts in India have been con sistently enforcing the principles of equity which prevent the enforcement of stipulations in mortgage deeds which unreasonably restrain or restrict the mortgagor's right to\n\n(I) Dr. Kane's HistoryofDharmasastra Vol. III. p. 428 (::) Ghose on (The Law of Mortgage in India, Tagore Law Lectures I87S-6t 5thEd. Vol. I. p. 56.\n\n{3) [1870] 13 M.I.A. 560\n\n(4) I.L.R. I Mad. I\n\nMllrarilal\n\nDev Katan\n\nGajendragadka;\n\nC. I.\n\nM11rarilal\n\n'Jajendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nredeem. We may, in this connection, refer to some of the statutes which were in force in India. The old Bengal Regulation III of 1793 by s. 21 directed the Judges of the District and City Courts in cases where no specific rule existed to act according to justice, equity and good con~ science.\n\nSimilar proli'; ion occurs in s. 17 of the Madras Regulation II of 1802. The Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1887, and the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873. contain similar pro~ visions in ss. 37 and 16 respectively.\n\nLikewise, in regurd to Courts in the Mufassal of Bombay! Bombay Regulation IV of 1827 by s. 26 provides that the law to be observed in the trial of suits shall be Acts of Parli3ment and Regulations of Government applicable to the case; in the absence of such Acts and Regulations, the usage of the country in which the suit arose; if none such appears, the law of the defendant, and in the absence of specific law and usage, equity and good conscience. In fact, in Namdeo Lokman Lodhi v.\n\nNarmadabai(l), this Court has emphaticaiJy observed that it is axiomatic that the courts must apply the principles of justice, equity .and good conscience to transactions which come before them for determination even though the statutory provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not made applicable to these transactions. These observations, in substance, represent the same traditional judicial approach in dealing with oppressive~ unjust and unreasonable restrictions imposed by the mortgagees on needy mortgagors when mortgage documents are executed.\n\nThere is one other circumstance to which we ought to refer.\n\nWe do not know what the true position of the Hindu law was in the State of Alwar at the relevant time. In fact, we do not know what the provisions of the Contract Act were in the State of Alwar.\n\nEven so, \\Ve think it would be reasonable to assume that civil courts established in the State of Alwar were like civil courts .aU over the country~ required to administer justice and equity where there was no specific statutory provision to deal with the question raised before them.\n\nWhether or not the Hindu law which prevailed in Alwar was similar to that prescribed by ancient Hindu Sanskrit texts, is a point on which no material is produced\n\n(I) [1953] S.C.R. I009\n\nc---\n\n' •\n\n8 :S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME CUURT REPORTS 251\n\nbefore us. It may well be that just as in Bombay and Madras, notwithstanding the ancient provisions of Hindu Law which seem to entitle the mortgagee to insist upon the performance of a stipulation as to time within which the mortgage debt has to be paid, the High Courts had consistently refused to enforce such stipulations, the Courts in the State of Alwar also may have adopted the same approach.\n\nIn the absence of any material on the record on the point~\n\nwe are reluctant to accept Mr. Sarjoo Prasad's atgument that the. doctrine of equity and justice should be treated as irrelevant in dealing with the present dispute .\n\n. In this connection, it is material to refer to the recent decisions pronounced by the Rajasthan High Court in which this position has been upheld either because it was conceded, or because the High Court took the view that the principles of equity were enforceable in dealing with mortgage transactions in Rajasthan.\n\nIn Amba Lal v. Amba Lal(l), the Rajasthan High Court held that s. 60 and its proviso contained a general principle of law applicable to mortgages in this country, which should be applicable even in those places where the Transfer of Property Act m.ay not be in force as such, but where its principles may be in force.\n\nThe property in question which was the subject-matter of the mortgage was situated in the State of Udaipur.\n\nSimilarly, in the case of Seleh Raj v. Chandan Mal(2), the Rajasthan High Court held that the principle underlying s. 60 may well be regarded to be a salutary one and in accordance with the principles of equity, justice .and good conscience.\n\nAccordingly it too.1c the view that though the Transfer of Property Act may not be in force in the territory in question, it would not be unreasonable to decide a case in accordance with the principles underlying the said section.\n\nThe property with which the Court was concerned in this case was situated in the State of Jodhpur.\n\nThe same principle has been applied in Himachal Pradesh (vide Nainu v. Kishan Singh) (3).\n\n(t) I.L.R. 1957 Raj. 964.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 1960 Raj. 88.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1957 H . .P. 46.\n\nMurarilal v.\n\nDev Karan\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nMurarilal v.\n\nDev Karan\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\n1964 - May, 8\n\nThus, it is clear that the equitable principle of justice, equity .and good conscience has been consistently applied by Civil Courts in dealing with mortgages in a substantial part of Rajasthan and that lends support to the contention of the respondent that it was recognised even in Alwar that if a mortgage deed contains a stipulation which unreasonably restrains or restricts the mortgagor's equity of redemption, courts were empowered to ignore that stipulation and enforce the mortgagor's right to redeem, subject, of course, to the general law of limitation prescribed in that behalf.\n\nWe are, therefore, satisfied that no case has been made out by the appellant to justify our interference with the conclusion of the Rajasthan High Court that the relevant stipulation on which the appellant relies ought to be enforced even though it creates a clog on the equity of redemption.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\nSRI JAGADGURU KARl BASAVA\n\nRAJENDRASWAMI OF GAVIMU'IT\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF\n\nHINDU\n\nRELIGIOUS\n\nCHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS, HYDERABAD\n\n(P. B. GAJENDJUGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c.\n\nSHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.)\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 19(1)(/)-Mutt-Framing of 5clreme-\n\nRepeal of old Act by new Act-Promulgation of Comtitution -in the meantime-Notice on Matadhipati to hand over possession to Executive Officer-Validity-Scheme, it must be tested by funda~ mental rights conferred by the Constitution-Madras Hirz•lu Religious\n\nand Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Mad. XIX of 1951), ss.\n\n103(d), 62(3)(a)-(Mad. 11 of 1923), a. 63.\n\nlbe appellant, who was a Matadhipati, moved the High Court for a writ quashina the notice served on him in 1952 by the Executive Oftlcer to hBDd over to the latter the administration and the properties\n\n' .-\n\n,':;", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "MURARILAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 390, "end_char": 399, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MURARILAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DEV KARAN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 404, "end_char": 441, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 443, "end_char": 458, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 467, "end_char": 480, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 481, "end_char": 488, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 493, "end_char": 512, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rajasthan High Court on appeal reversed the decision of the trial Judge holding that the stipulation was a clog on the equity of redemption and remanded the suit."}}, {"text": "Murarilal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2129, "end_char": 2138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Murarilal\n\nDev Kar\"\n\nThe equitable principle of justice, equity and good conscience, Jon1 and consistntly applied by Civil Courts in Inoia, could be applied in the State of Alwar even though the Transfer of Property Act had no application there at the time when the mortgage document was executed or its period expired.", "canonical_name": "MURARILAL"}}, {"text": "Inoia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2262, "end_char": 2267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Murarilal\n\nDev Kar\"\n\nThe equitable principle of justice, equity and good conscience, Jon1 and consistntly applied by Civil Courts in Inoia, could be applied in the State of Alwar even though the Transfer of Property Act had no application there at the time when the mortgage document was executed or its period expired."}}, {"text": "Alwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2302, "end_char": 2307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Murarilal\n\nDev Kar\"\n\nThe equitable principle of justice, equity and good conscience, Jon1 and consistntly applied by Civil Courts in Inoia, could be applied in the State of Alwar even though the Transfer of Property Act had no application there at the time when the mortgage document was executed or its period expired."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2324, "end_char": 2348, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ramasami Sastrigal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2939, "end_char": 2957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "231, Ramasami Sastrigal Y.\n\nSamiyappanayakan, I.L.R. 4 Mad."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTioN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3151, "end_char": 3179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTioN: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3385, "end_char": 3398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and Harbans Singh, for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3403, "end_char": 3416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjoo Prasad and Harbans Singh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3439, "end_char": 3450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Sinha and Naunit Lal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3455, "end_char": 3465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Sinha and Naunit Lal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3547, "end_char": 3561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgmnt of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J. This appeal by special leave arises out of a redemption suit filed by the respondent Dev Karan against the appellant Murarilal.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Murarilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3685, "end_char": 3694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgmnt of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J. This appeal by special leave arises out of a redemption suit filed by the respondent Dev Karan against the appellant Murarilal.", "canonical_name": "MURARILAL"}}, {"text": "Gangadhar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4766, "end_char": 4775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the original mortgagee Gangadhar had also died before the institution of the suit, and so, the appellant Murarilal was impleaded as the defendant on the basis that he was the only heir and legal\n\nrepresentative of the deceased mortgagee Gangadhar."}}, {"text": "Alwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11034, "end_char": 11039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thh question arises in this form, because the Transfer of Pr.operty Act did not apply to Alwar at the time when tbe mortgage was executed nor at the time when the 15 years' stipulated period expired.", "canonical_name": "Alw.ar"}}, {"text": "said principle cannot be invoked in cases where the Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11393, "end_char": 11469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Thereafiter", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12137, "end_char": 12148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafiter, the mortgagor's representative sued to redeem the mortgage under s. 8 of the Madras Regulation XXXIV of 1802."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12215, "end_char": 12219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He said principle cannot be invoked in cases where the Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "He said principle cannot be invoked in cases where the Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Chelmsford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12419, "end_char": 12429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with thiS' question, Lord Chelmsford who delivered the opinion of the Board observed that the form of security with which the Board was concerned had long been common in India, and he added that the sti pulations in such contracts were recognised and enforced according to their letter by the ancient Hindu law as well as under Mohammedan law; and in support of this statement, reference -was made to certain passages from Colebrooke's Digest on Hindu Law and Baillie's introduction to his book on M'ohammedan Law of Sale."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12563, "end_char": 12568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with thiS' question, Lord Chelmsford who delivered the opinion of the Board observed that the form of security with which the Board was concerned had long been common in India, and he added that the sti pulations in such contracts were recognised and enforced according to their letter by the ancient Hindu law as well as under Mohammedan law; and in support of this statement, reference -was made to certain passages from Colebrooke's Digest on Hindu Law and Baillie's introduction to his book on M'ohammedan Law of Sale."}}, {"text": "Colebrooke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12816, "end_char": 12826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with thiS' question, Lord Chelmsford who delivered the opinion of the Board observed that the form of security with which the Board was concerned had long been common in India, and he added that the sti pulations in such contracts were recognised and enforced according to their letter by the ancient Hindu law as well as under Mohammedan law; and in support of this statement, reference -was made to certain passages from Colebrooke's Digest on Hindu Law and Baillie's introduction to his book on M'ohammedan Law of Sale."}}, {"text": "Baillie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12853, "end_char": 12860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with thiS' question, Lord Chelmsford who delivered the opinion of the Board observed that the form of security with which the Board was concerned had long been common in India, and he added that the sti pulations in such contracts were recognised and enforced according to their letter by the ancient Hindu law as well as under Mohammedan law; and in support of this statement, reference -was made to certain passages from Colebrooke's Digest on Hindu Law and Baillie's introduction to his book on M'ohammedan Law of Sale."}}, {"text": "s6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13558, "end_char": 13560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pattabhiramier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13852, "end_char": 13866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we will presently point outt the appeal of Pattabhiramier was pending before the Privy Council for as many as 10 years.", "canonical_name": "Pattabhiramier(3"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14188, "end_char": 14195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the iurisdiction which courts of equity exercised in England by refusing to enforce clogs on the equity of redemption, was being exercised by High Courts in India."}}, {"text": "James W. Col", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14847, "end_char": 14859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, Sir James W. Col vile who delivered the opinion of the Board, referred to the earlier decision of the Privy\n\nCouncil in Pattabhiramiers case(2), noticed the trend of judicial pronouncements made by the High Courts in India while Pattabhiramier's case was pending before the Privy Council, and strongly reiterated the view that the said decisions of the High Courts were radically unsound."}}, {"text": "Pattabhiramiers", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14963, "end_char": 14978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, Sir James W. Col vile who delivered the opinion of the Board, referred to the earlier decision of the Privy\n\nCouncil in Pattabhiramiers case(2), noticed the trend of judicial pronouncements made by the High Courts in India while Pattabhiramier's case was pending before the Privy Council, and strongly reiterated the view that the said decisions of the High Courts were radically unsound.", "canonical_name": "Pattabhiramier(3"}}, {"text": "Sudar Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15352, "end_char": 15363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to the fact that unfortunately, Pattabhiramier's case \"slept for nine years, and that in the interval .the Sudar Court, and afterwards the High Court which succeeded it, continued the course of decision which the former had given in 1858,."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15533, "end_char": 15539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then he mentioned the relevant decisions of the Madras and the Bombay High Courts and expressed the opinion that in trying to enforce principles of equity in dealing with stipulations contained in mortgage documents, the High Coons were really assuming the functions of Legislature."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15548, "end_char": 15566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then he mentioned the relevant decisions of the Madras and the Bombay High Courts and expressed the opinion that in trying to enforce principles of equity in dealing with stipulations contained in mortgage documents, the High Coons were really assuming the functions of Legislature."}}, {"text": "Murarilal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15842, "end_char": 15851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\nMurarilal\n\nGaiendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nMurarilal v.\n\nDev Karan - Gajendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\ndeclared in 1875 that unless there is a legislative enactment or established practice to the contrary, terms in the contract of mortgage by conditional sale must be taken to prevail in every part of India and must be strictly enforced according to their letter.", "canonical_name": "MURARILAL"}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16190, "end_char": 16203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sarjoo Prasad naturally relies on these decisions and contends that so far as the State of Alwar is concerned, there is no legislative enactment to the contrary, nor is there any established practice on which the equitable doctrine could be pleaded by the respondent in support of his case that though 15 years have elapsed, his right to redeem still survives.", "canonical_name": "Sarjoo Prasad"}}, {"text": "Burma", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16719, "end_char": 16724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kader Moideen v.\n\nNepean(l), the Privy Council was dealing with a case from Burma, and it observed that the Burmese Courts are direct ed, in the absence of any statutory law applicable to accounts against a mortgagee in possession, to follow the guidance of justice, equity, and good conscience."}}, {"text": "Haldane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16997, "end_char": 17004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting on this principle, the Privy Council accepted Mr. Haldane's contention that there was no rule of abstract justice in taking the accounts of a mortgagee in possession, and that the Indian rule, which was embodied ins."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17174, "end_char": 17198, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17392, "end_char": 17397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18340, "end_char": 18345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19054, "end_char": 19071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the position of the Privy Council decisions is thus clear and consistent, the trend of the decisions of the High Courts in India continued to conform to the same pattern which was set up by the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Venkata Reddi v. Parvati Ammal(l) and adopted by the Bombay High Court in Ramji bin Tukaram v.\n\nChinto Sakharam(2)."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19140, "end_char": 19157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the position of the Privy Council decisions is thus clear and consistent, the trend of the decisions of the High Courts in India continued to conform to the same pattern which was set up by the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Venkata Reddi v. Parvati Ammal(l) and adopted by the Bombay High Court in Ramji bin Tukaram v.\n\nChinto Sakharam(2)."}}, {"text": "Thumbusawmy Moodelly(4", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19402, "end_char": 19424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question was elaborately argued on .several occasions before the said High Courts .and the two earlier decisions of the Privy Council in the case of Pattabhiramier( 3 ) as well as in the case of Thumbusawmy Moodelly(4 ) were cited and yet, the High Courts have con- sistently adhered to the view that in dealing .with mortgage transactions which contain unfair~ unjust or oppressive stipulations unreasonably restricting the mortgago{s right to redeem, the Court would be justified in refusing to enforce such stipulations and recognising the paramount character of the equity of redemption."}}, {"text": "Westropp", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19843, "end_char": 19851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bapuji Apaji v. Sonavaraji Marvati(i>), Westropp, C.J., h().s elaborately considered the relevant aspects of this question."}}, {"text": "vlurarilal\n\nGnjendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20608, "end_char": 20634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vlurarilal\n\nGnjendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nMurarilal\n\nto take the law to be that which was settled in Ramji v.\n\nChinto(l) and gave effect to it."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20827, "end_char": 20841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the Bombay High Court is concerned, the practice consistently had been\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nto follow the decision of Westropp, C.J. till the Transfer of Property Act was extended to Bombay.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20899, "end_char": 20923, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras Presidency", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21087, "end_char": 21104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ramasmi Sastrigal v. Samivappanayakan(:l), the majority view of the Full Bench was that in the Madras Presidency, where conw tracts of mortgage by way of conditional sale have been entered into subsequent to the year 1858, redemption after the expiry of the term limited by the contract must be allowed."}}, {"text": "Turner", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21482, "end_char": 21488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point with which we are dealing in the present appeal was elaborately .argued before the 1vladra5 High Court; the opinion expressed emphatica1ly by the Privy Council was cited, but Turner, C.J .,"}}, {"text": "Muttusami Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21516, "end_char": 21531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with whose opinion Muttusami Ayyar, J., agreed made a very significant observation after elaborately examining the merits of the question. \""}}, {"text": "Mitakshara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23249, "end_char": 23259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "58 and as explained by Mitakshara) ( 1)."}}, {"text": "R. B. Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24002, "end_char": 24013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though that is so, we ought also to add that according to Sir R. B. Ghose, ordinarily, time was not of the essence of the contract of mortgage in Hindu law(2), and in support of this opinion the learned author quotes with approval Colebrooke's opinion."}}, {"text": "Alw.ar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24334, "end_char": 24340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basing himself on this position of the Hindu law, Mr.\n\nSarjoo Prasad contends that we ought to assume that Hindu Law which as applicable to Alw.ar recognised the importance of compelling the mortgagor to perform his promise that he would repay the debt within a specified time and if he failed to do so, he would lose his title over the mortgaged property.", "canonical_name": "Alw.ar"}}, {"text": "Pattabhiramier(3", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24757, "end_char": 24773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He urged that the dispute between the parties in the present appeal should be dedded in the light of this position of the Hindu law as well as the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in the cases of Pattabhiramier(3 ) and Thumbusawmy Moodelly(4').", "canonical_name": "Pattabhiramier(3"}}, {"text": "Kane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25104, "end_char": 25108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with this argument, it would be relevant to observe that traditionally,· courts in India have been con sistently enforcing the principles of equity which prevent the enforcement of stipulations in mortgage deeds which unreasonably restrain or restrict the mortgagor's right to\n\n(I) Dr. Kane's HistoryofDharmasastra Vol."}}, {"text": "Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25155, "end_char": 25160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 428 (::) Ghose on (The Law of Mortgage in India, Tagore Law Lectures I87S-6t 5thEd."}}, {"text": "Dev Katan\n\nGajendragadka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25305, "end_char": 25329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\n\nMllrarilal\n\nDev Katan\n\nGajendragadka;\n\nC. I.\n\nM11rarilal\n\n'Jajendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nredeem."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25511, "end_char": 25516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25699, "end_char": 25704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25746, "end_char": 25775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25785, "end_char": 25814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 37 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25848, "end_char": 25861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873", "statute": "the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25966, "end_char": 25971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873", "statute": "the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26622, "end_char": 26646, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27748, "end_char": 27754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may well be that just as in Bombay and Madras, notwithstanding the ancient provisions of Hindu Law which seem to entitle the mortgagee to insist upon the performance of a stipulation as to time within which the mortgage debt has to be paid, the High Courts had consistently refused to enforce such stipulations, the Courts in the State of Alwar also may have adopted the same approach."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28423, "end_char": 28432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, it is material to refer to the recent decisions pronounced by the Rajasthan High Court in which this position has been upheld either because it was conceded, or because the High Court took the view that the principles of equity were enforceable in dealing with mortgage transactions in Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28718, "end_char": 28723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28876, "end_char": 28900, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Udaipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29073, "end_char": 29080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The property in question which was the subject-matter of the mortgage was situated in the State of Udaipur."}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29198, "end_char": 29203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29373, "end_char": 29397, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jodhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29648, "end_char": 29655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The property with which the Court was concerned in this case was situated in the State of Jodhpur."}}, {"text": "Dev Karan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29845, "end_char": 29854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Murarilal v.\n\nDev Karan\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\nMurarilal v.\n\nDev Karan\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\n1964 - May, 8\n\nThus, it is clear that the equitable principle of justice, equity .and good conscience has been consistently applied by Civil Courts in dealing with mortgages in a substantial part of Rajasthan and that lends support to the contention of the respondent that it was recognised even in Alwar that if a mortgage deed contains a stipulation which unreasonably restrains or restricts the mortgagor's equity of redemption, courts were empowered to ignore that stipulation and enforce the mortgagor's right to redeem, subject, of course, to the general law of limitation prescribed in that behalf.", "canonical_name": "DEV KARAN"}}, {"text": "JAGADGURU KARl BASAVA\n\nRAJENDRASWAMI OF GAVIMU'IT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30912, "end_char": 30961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed\n\nSRI JAGADGURU KARl BASAVA\n\nRAJENDRASWAMI OF GAVIMU'IT\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF\n\nHINDU\n\nRELIGIOUS\n\nCHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS, HYDERABAD\n\n(P. B. GAJENDJUGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c.\n\nSHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDJUGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31033, "end_char": 31053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed\n\nSRI JAGADGURU KARl BASAVA\n\nRAJENDRASWAMI OF GAVIMU'IT\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF\n\nHINDU\n\nRELIGIOUS\n\nCHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS, HYDERABAD\n\n(P. B. GAJENDJUGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c.\n\nSHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S.M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31110, "end_char": 31120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed\n\nSRI JAGADGURU KARl BASAVA\n\nRAJENDRASWAMI OF GAVIMU'IT\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF\n\nHINDU\n\nRELIGIOUS\n\nCHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS, HYDERABAD\n\n(P. B. GAJENDJUGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c.\n\nSHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31128, "end_char": 31149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(/)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31151, "end_char": 31164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Repeal of old Act by new Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31191, "end_char": 31219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31447, "end_char": 31482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss.\n\n103(d), 62(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31503, "end_char": 31524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Religious\n\nand Charitable Endowments Act, 1951", "statute": "Religious\n\nand Charitable Endowments Act, 1951"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_252_263_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "Murarilal v.\n\nDev Karan\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC. I.\n\n1964 - May, 8\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nThus, it is clear that the equitable principle of justice, equity .and good conscience has been consistently applied by Civil Courts in dealing with mortgages in a substantial part of Rajasthan and that lends support to the contention of the respondent that it was recognised even in Alwar that if a mortgage deed contains a stipulation which unreasonably restrains or restricts the mortgagor's equity of redemption, courts were empowered to ignore that stipulation and enforce the mortgagor's right to redeem, subject, of course, to the general law of limitation prescribed in that behalf.\n\nWe are, therefore, satisfied that no case has been made out by the appellant to justify our interference with the conclusion of the Rajasthan High Court that the relevant stipulation on which the appellant relies ought to be enforced even though it creates a clog on the equity of redemption.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\nSRI JAGADGURU KARl BASAVA\n\nRAJENDRASWAMI OF GAVIMU'IT\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF\n\nHINDU\n\nRELIGIOUS\n\nCHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS, HYDERABAD\n\n(P. B. GAJENDJUGADKAR, C.J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c.\n\nSHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND S.M. SIKRI, JJ.)\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 19(1)(/)-Mutt-Framing of 5clreme-\n\nRepeal of old Act by new Act-Promulgation of Comtitution -in the meantime-Notice on Matadhipati to hand over possession to Executive Officer-Validity-Scheme, it must be tested by funda~ mental rights conferred by the Constitution-Madras Hirz•lu Religious\n\nand Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Mad. XIX of 1951), ss.\n\n103(d), 62(3)(a)-(Mad. 11 of 1923), a. 63.\n\nlbe appellant, who was a Matadhipati, moved the High Court for a writ quashina the notice served on him in 1952 by the Executive Oftlcer to hBDd over to the latter the administration and the properties\n\n' .-\n\n,':;\n\nof the Mntt in enforcement of a scheme framed in 1939 under s. 63 1964 of the Madras Act II of 1927. The predecessor of the appellant had\n\nS . 1 filed a suit in the District Judge's Court to set aside that scheme. The \" a~dguru suit failed and_ the scheme was confirmed subject to minor modifications. CommLuioner o] In 1951 the Madras Hindu Religious aud Charitable Endowments Act, Hindu RligiouJ 1951, repealed and replaced the Madras Act II of 1927. It was urged Cltaritable Endow on behalf of the appellant in the High Court that the scheme contravened ments his fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The sinilC Judge who heard the matter found in his favour and held that the sche1.r.1e contravened Art. 19( 1 }(f) of the Constitution. On appeal by\n\nthe respondent, the Division Bench reversed the decision of the Single Judge. The High Court granted certificate to the appdlant to appeal to this Court. It was contended that although the scheme was valid as framed under the earlier Act, it incumbent under s. 103(d) of the Act of 1951 that the validity of the all the provisions of the schemo must be tested in the light of its provisions.\n\nHeld: Section 103{d) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable . .\n\nEndowments Act, 1951, properly constn1ed, merely meant that earlier schemes framed under M2.dras Act II of 1927 wou!c.l be operative as though they were framed under the Act of 1951. 1t was n:'>t intended by the section that those schemes must be examined and reframed in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act. Section ~2{3 )(a) of the Act which provided for the modification of such schemes made this amply dear. Unless the schemes could be modified under that section tbey must be deemed to have been validly made under the Act of 1951 and enforced as 5uch.\n\nEast E11d Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, {t952J A.C. 109, considered ..\n\nAlthouh the scheme in question bad not been completely imple~ mented before the Constitution, that was no ground for e~~.mi\"nin~ its provision in the light of Art. 19 of the Constitution.\n\nThe fundamental rights conferred by the Coostitution are not retrospective in operation and the observation made by this Court in Seth Shanti Sarup v. Union of India, are n\"ot applicable to the pre.eut case.\n\nSeth Shanti Sarup v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 62-i, explained and distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 745 t)f 1963.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated February 6, 1961 of the f\\ndhra Pradesh High Court in \\Vrit Appeal No. 71 of 1957.\n\nA. V. Vi.rwanatha Sastri, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.\n\nSti JagadgUiu\n\nR. Ganapathy lyer and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents.\n\nCmmissione~ . of May 8, 1964. The\n\nBmd~;~ Relzg1ous delivered by ClumUJble Endow-\n\nJudgment of the Court was\n\nments\n\nGtljbrdragadk, ar\n\nC.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.\n\nJ .-The appellant Shri Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami of Gavi Mutt is the Matadhipati of Sri Gavi Mutt which is a religious institution dedicated to the propagation and promotion of the tenets of the Veer~ Saiva cult of Hinduism. This Mutt is situated at Uravakonda in the district of Anantapur. It appears that on the 6th September, 1939, the Board of Hindu Religious Endowments constituted under the Madras Act ll of 1927 (hereinafter called 'the earlier Act') framed a scheme under s. 63 of the said Act for the proper administration of the said Mutt and its endowments. The predecessor-in-office of the appellant then filed suit N(.). 21 of 1939 on the file of the District Judge, Anantapur for getting the said scheme set aside. His suit substantially failed, because the District Court was persuaded to make only a few minor modifications in the scheme subject to which the scheme was confinned. That decision was taken in appeal by the predecessor of the appellant to the High Court of Madras (A.S. No. 269 of 1945). During the pendency of the said appeal, the appellant's predecessor died, and the appellant then brought himself on the record as the legal repre$entative of his deceased predecessor. Ultimately, the appeal was withdrawn and, therefore, dismissed.\n\nThough a scheme had been formulated by the Board under s. 63 of the said Act, apparently no effective step was taken to take over the actual management of the Mutt and its endowments. The said management continued as before and the fact that an Executive Officer had been appointed under the scheme made no difference to the actual administration of the Mutt. It was on the 5th April, 1952, that the appellant was served with a memorandum asking him to hand over the charge of all the properties of the Mutt to the Executive Officer. A notice issued by the Executive Officer followed on the 16th April, 1952 by which the appellant was infonned that the Executive\n\nOfficer would take over possession.\n\nMeanwhile, what is 1964 known as the _Sirur Mutt case was decided by the Madras s,; Jagadguru High Court and the appellant felt justified in refusing to r\n\n. V.· 1 . . ... ommusloner o hand over possess10n to the Executive Officer on the ground Hindu Religio11s that the scheme under which possession was sought to be Charitable Endowale f him .\n\nI'd . h . d ment1 t en over rom was mva 1 masmuc as 1t contravene the appellant's fundamental rights guaranteed by the Consti- Gaiendragadkar\n\nC.J. tution which had come into force from the 26th January,\n\n1950.\n\nIn 1951, the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act XIX of 1951 (hereinafter called 'the latter Act') repealed and replaced the earlier Act. The appellant moved the Madras High Court on the 28th April, 1952, by his writ petition and prayed for an appropriate writ quashing the notice served on him by the Executive Officer threatening to take over the administration of the 11utt and its properties under the scheme. This petition was heard by a single Judge of the said High Court and was allowed. The learned Judge took the view that some provisions of the Scheme contravened the appellanfs fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(£), and so, it couJd not be enforced. It was no doubt urged before the Iear!led Judge that the appellant's writ petition should not be entertained because he had a definite adequate alternative remedy under the latter Act, but this plea was rejected by the learned Judge with the observation that where the fundamental right is clearly infringed, it is the duty of the Court to interfere in favour of the citizen, unless there n re reasons of policy which make it inexpedient to do so. Accordingly, the learned Judge directed that the scheme should be quashed. He, however, took the precaution to make t11e observation that his order did not mean that the Government was not free to make a scheme in consomme~ with the Constitutional rights of the Matadhipati.\n\nThe Tespondent. the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments~ who had been imp1eaded by the appellant to the wnt petition 'alontr with the Executive Officer, challenged the cnirectness of the decision rendered by the learned Judge in the writ petition filed by the appel-\n\n1964 lant. This appeal sueceeded and the Division Bench which\n\nSri Jagadguru heard the said appeal, held that the scheme having been c u.\"fo 1 framed as early as 1939 under the relevant provisions of Hr; r; let&los the earlier Act which was valid when it was enacted, could Charltabk Endow not be challenged on the ground that some of its provisions contravened the fundamental right guaranteed to the\n\nGaienrgadkor citizens of this country under Art. 19. Certain other con- . tentions were raised before the appellate Bench by theappellant and they were rejected. It is, however, not necessary to refer to the said contentions, because they have not been argued before us. Having taken the view that thescheme when it was framed was valid, the appellate Bench reversed the decision of the single Judge, alowed the respondent's appeal and directed that the writ petition filed by the appellant should be dismissed. It is against this. decision of the Division Bench that the appellant has come to this Court with a certificate granted by the said High Court.\n\nBefore dealing with the points which have been raised before us by Mr. Sastri on behalf of the appellant, we may briefly indicate the nature of the scheme which bas been framed under the relevant provisions of the earlier Act.\n\nThis scheme opens with the statement that the Board was satisfied that in the interests of the proper administration of the Mutt and all the endowments, movable and. immovable belonging thereto, a scheme should be settled, and so, the Board, after consulting the 11atadhipati of the Mutt and other persons having interest therein, proceeded to frame the scheme. It was intended that the scheme should come into force on the 6th September, 1939, when it was framed.\n\nIt appears that either because the Executive Officer did not take effective steps to implement the scheme, or becausethe predecessor_ of the appellant filed a suit hallenging the 6cheme, the scheme in fact has not been implemented till today. When the notice was served on the appellant in 1952 and it looked as if , he Executive Officer would take over the administration of the Mutt and its properties, the present writ proceedings commenced and throughout the protracted period occupied by these proceedings. the statuJ\n\nquo has continued.\n\nb S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOl<TS ' 257\n\nThe scheme consists of 15 clauses and, in substance, it 1964 entrusts the administration of the Mutt and all its endow- Sri Jagadguru ments in the hereditary trustee and two non-hereditary c . v. . c[ . ommlss 10ne r t trustees appomted by the Boar . These latter are liable to Hindu Religioz. be removed by the Board for good and sufficient cause and Clurritahle Ef!dot the Board's order in that behalf has to be final. The Boar<..! is authorised to appoint an Executive Officer for the Mult Gaiendrugadka! on a salary of Rs. 60/- per month. Such Executive Officer\n\nc. J. isrequired to furnish security in the sum of Rs. 500/ o:o to the satisfactiOn of the Board. He has to be in charge of the day to day administration of the Mutt and he has to be answerable to the trustees. The trustees are required to meet once a month in the premises of the Mutt for discharging their duties. They are given the power to inspect the accounts maintained by the Executive Officer and generally supervise his work. The Board is also given the power to issue directions from, time to time regulating the internal management of the Mutt. It would thus be seen that though the scheme was framed in 193'9, in essential features it is similar to the pattern of schemes which have been subsequently introduced either by legislation or by judicial decisions in respect of the management of public charitable institutions like the present Mutt.\n\nMr. Sastri does not dispute the fact that the relevant provisions of the earlier Act as well as the scheme framed under them were valid at the relevant time. He, however, argues that the earlier Act has been repealed by the latter Act XIX of 1951, and according to him, it is necessary to consider whether the present scheme is consistant with the appropriate and relevant provisions of this latter Act. Thi~ argument is based ou the provisions contained in s. l03(d-) of the latter Act. This section provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act No. II of 1927, all schemes settled or modified by a Court of law under the said Act or under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall be deemed to have been settled or modified by the Court under this Act and sha11 have effect accordingly. The argument is that thouf!h the present scheme was framed under the provisions of the earlier Act, it m.ust now be deemed to be a scheme which\n\n51 S.C.-17.\n\nSUPRE!\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n1964 - has been settled or modified by the Court under this latter Sri Jagadguru Act, and so, it necessary to enquire whether all the proc\n\n. V.· 1 visions of the scheme are consistent with the material prommmssloMr o . .\n\nH . .\n\nHindu Religlou' VISions of the latter Act.\n\nIt JS found that any of the said Charirc:blt Endow provisions are inconsistent with tbe relevant provisions of ment1 . - the lattr Act, they must be modified so as to make them Gaiendragadkar consistent with the said provisions.\n\nC.J.\n\nIn support of this argument, Mr. Sastri has invited our attention to the observations made by Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council ( 1) that \"if you are bidden to treat an imaginery state of affairs -as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.\" Basing himself on these observations, Mr. Sastri has urged that if the deeming provision prescrib ... ed by s. 1 03 (d) is given its full effect, there would be no scope for refusing to apply the test for which he contends.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument. It is no doubt true that s. 103 (d) provides that a scheme settled or modified by a Court under the earlier Act shall be deemed to have been settled o~ modified under the latter Act; but the effect of this provision merely is to make the schemes in question operative as though they were framed under the provisions of the latter Act; the intention was not to examine the said scbpmes once again by reference to the relevant provisions of this latter Act and re-frame them so as to make them consistent with these provisions. This position appears to be clear if we examine other sub.clauses of s. 103. Section 103(a) which deals with rules made, noti:- fications or certificates issued, orders passed, decisions made, proceedings or action taken, schemes settled and things done by the Government, the Board or its President or by an Assistant Commissioner under the earlier Act, provides tl)at the said rules, notifications, etc. in so far as they are not inconsistent with the latter Act, shaU be deemed to have been made, issued. oassed, taken. settled or done by\n\n(I) [1952] A.C. 109 at p. 132.\n\n.8 S.C.l:{.\n\nS.UP.REl\\1£ COURT 1\\.EPOl~TS 259\n\n.the appropriate authority under the corresponding provi- 1964 swns of this latter Act and shall, subject to the provisions Sri Jagadguru or clause (b) have effect accordingly. Having thus provid- ..\n\n. V:· h f 1 'fi d Commrss1oner of ed tor t e contmuance o rues, nob cations, or ers, etc.~ flindu Religlo111 in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of Charitable Endow the Jatte1 Act, s. 103(b) has made pr€>vision for the modi- fications in the said rules~ notifications and orders. l n Gajengr)gadkar .other words, the scheme of s. 103 (a) & (b) clearly brings · out the fact that where the legislature wanted the continuance of the action take'l under the provisions of the earlier Act only if the said action was consistent with the relevant provisions of the latter Act, it has so provided. The same type of provision is made by s. H)3(f), (g) and (h).\n\nIf we examine s. 103(d) in the light of these other provisions, it would be clear that the question of the consistency or otherwise of the schemes to which s. 103 (d) applies. is treated as irrelevant, because no reference is made to the said aspect of the schemes. 1 n other words~ the schemes to\n\n•. ,:hich s. 103 (d) applies have to be deemed to be settled or modified under the provisions of the latter Act without examining whether aU the provisions of the said schemes are necessarily justified by, or consistent with. the provisions of this latter Act; and that is why we dn not think Mr. Sastri js right in contending that the deeming clause prescribed by s. 103 (d) necessitates an examination of the said schemes before they are allowed to be continued as though they were sett1ed or modified under the Jatter Act.\n\nThis does not, however, mean that there is no provision prescribed by the latter Act for the modification of such schemes.\n\nSection 62 ( 3) (a) specifically provides that any scheme for the administration of a. religious institution settled or modified by the Court in a suit under sub-section { I ) or on an appeal under sub-section ( 2) or any scheme deemed under s. 103, clause (d), to have been settled or modified by the Court may, at any time, be modified or cancelled by the Court on an application made to it by the Commissioner, the trustee or any person having interest. This provision clearly brings out the fact that if a scheme governed by s. 103 (d) is deemed to have been made or sanctioned under the provisions of the latter Act\n\n1964 and thus continued, m6difications in it can be etfected by\n\nSri Jagadguru adopting the procedure prescribed by s. 62( 3). 'In other\n\n, v_-. words, a scheme like the present is automatically continued ommlsvloner of b . f 103(d) b . 1' bl b od'fi d 'f Ilindu Religious Y operatiOn o s. • ut 1s 1a e to e m 1 e t Charitable Endowappropriate steps are taken in that behalf under s. 62 ( 3).\n\nmems Reading s. 103(d) and s. 62(3) together, it seems to us\n\nGajendragadkar that Mr. Sastri's argwnent that the consistency of the\n\nc. J. scheme with the relevant provisions of the latter Act should be examined in writ proceedings, cannot be entertained.\n\nIn fact, unless modifications are made in the scheme under s. 62(3), the scheme as a whole, will be deemed to have been made under the latter Act and will be enforced as a valid scheme.\n\nThat clearly is the purpose of s. 1 03 ( d I.\n\nTherefore, we do not think we are called upon to consider the further contentions raised by Mr. Sastri that some of the clauses in the scheme are inconsistent with the provisions of the latter Act.\n\nThere is one more point to which reference must be made before we part with this appeal. Mr. Sastri contended that though the scheme may have been valid when it was framed, since it was not actually enforced before the 26th January, 1950, it is open to the appellant to challenge the validity of the scheme on the ground that it deprives him of his fun dam en tal right under Art. 19 ( 1 ) (f) and as such, invalid.\n\nMr. Sastri concedes that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not retrospective in operation; but that, he says, is no answer to his plea, because the deprivation of his property rights is taking place for the first time ia 1952 and as such, it is open to the. challenge that it is invalid on the ground that it contra venes his fundamental right under Art. 19{ 1) (f).\n\nIn support of this argument, Mr. Sastri has relied on certain observations made by Mukherjea J. in the case of\n\nR. S. Seth Shanti Sarup v. Union of India and Ors(l). In that case, a partnership firm known as Lallamal Hardeodas Cotton Spinning Mill Company of which the petitioner was a partner, used to carry on the business of production and supply of cotton yam. When it was found that the Mill\n\n(I} A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 624.\n\n• . .\n\nSUPRE:\\IE COURT l\\EPORTS • 261 s s.C.R ... .\n\n_ could be rutf only at a loss, it was closed on 19th March, . 1964\n\n1949. 'Thereafter, n the 21st uly, 1949> the Government . Sri J;; dguru of u .P .. passed an order purportmg to exercise its authority v. _under s. 3(f) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947 CHmmd i.uione! of . .' ' m u Rel1glou.r _ by whih one of the artners of the ns:m was appoted as Charitable Endo.,... authonsed controller' of the undertaking. The said order menu ; directed the said authorised controller to take over posses- Guiendrogadl.:ar : on of tbe .Mill to the exclusion of th!! other partners, and\n\nC. 1• i run it sl{bject.to the general supervision. of the District : Magistrate, Aligarb. In 1952, the Unio!l of India passed an order under s. 3 ( 4) of the Esential Supplies (Tempo. rary Powels) Act, 1946, appointing the same person ns an\n\nauthorised controlJer under the provisions of that section,\n\nand issued a direction to him to run the said undertaking\n\nio the exclusion of all the other partners. It was then. that the petitioner moved this Court by writ petition under Art. 32 and hallenged the validity of both the orders on the ground that they were illegal and that they invaded ru.~ fundamental right.\n\nHis plea was upheld and both thP. _ impugned orders were quashed.\n\n• In appreciating the effect of this decision, it is nces ~,..r)t to bear in mind one cruciul fact on which therl! was no di , pute between the parties in that case, and that fact\n\n\\\\'; h thut both the impugned orders did not come wilhin\n\nth~ purview of. and were not warranted by, the provisions of tlte rcl.vant Acts. under which they were purported to . have been issued. In other words, it was conceded by the .... Go\\ernmc:nt tbat the impugned orut!r;, wr~ invalid in law.\n\nEven so, it was urged that though the orders :nay be invalid, they cannot be cha1leng.ed under Art. 32 inasmuch as tl1e first invasion of the petitioner's right w.as made in 1949 when the Constitutional guarantee was not availnble to him.\n\nIn repelling this contention, fukherjea, J., observed that the order against which the petition was primarily directed Was the order of the Central Government passed in October,\n\n_-_ 952, nd that was a mplete and clear answer to the .. ontcntJon raised by the learned Attorney-General. Even\n\ns~. the learned Judge proceeded to observe that assuming \\at the deprivation took pJnce in 1949 and at o time when t e Constitution had not come into force, the order effect •\n\n' .\n\nI ' .\n\nI 1\n\nr t I\n\n262 SUPRE!viE COURT REPORTS [1904)\n\n1964 ing the deprivation which continued from day to day must Sri Jagadguru be held to have come into conflict with the !undamenta!\n\nommi.rsrner of rights of the petitioner as soon as the Constitution came into\n\nindu Religious force and became void on and from that date under Art haritable Endow- 13 ( l ) f th c-· . . l . . . . . ment., o e onstltutlon. t IS on tnese observations that Mr. Sastrfs argument is founded.\n\nWith respect, we are Gajendragadkar\n\nc. 1. not prepared to hold tha, t these observations vtere intended to lay down an unqualifie~ proposition of law that even it a citizen was deprived of his fundamental right:; by a valid scheme framed under a valid law at a time when the Consti· tution was not in force, the mere fact that such a schem~ wou!d continue to operae even after the 26th January. 1950, would expose it to the risk of having to face a chalienge under Art. 19. If. the broad and unqualified proposition for which Mr. Sastri contends is accepted as true, then it would virtually make the material provisions of the Constitution in reSpect of fundamental rights retrospective in operation. In the present case, the scheme was framed and the Executive Officer was appointed as e3rly as 1939.\n\nIf the Executive Officer could not take over the actu:1r administration of the Mutt and its properties. it was partly\n\nbeause the a!'pellant has continuously challenged the implementation of the scheme by legal proceedings and partly because he has oerwise obstructed the said implementation. But it is clear that when the scheme was framed and a challenge made by the appellant to its validity failed in courts of law~ his property rights had been taken away.\n\nThe fact that the order was not irnolemented does not make any difference to this legal position. If Mr. Sastri's argu ment were right, all such schemes, though implemented find enforced. may still be open to challenge on the ground that they contravened the Matadhipati's fundamental rights under Art. 19. Such a plea does not appear to have ever been raised and, in our opinion, cannot be validly raised for the simple reason that the fundamental rights are not retrospective in their operation. The observations on which Mr. Sastri relies must be read in the light of the--- relevant fact to . which we have -just referred.\n\nThe deprivation of the petitioner~& property rights ws brought about by invalid orders and it was in respect. of such invalid\n\norders that the Court held that the petitioner was entitled 1964\n\nto seek the protection of Art. 19 and invoke the jurisdic- Sri Jagadguru tion of this Court under Art. 32. In our opinion, therec . ~- . . . . vmmzs.noner o fore, there is no substance m the contention that smce m tlindu Religim1. the present case, the scheme has not been completely imple- Charit\",!!.~!t; ttdow mented till 1952, we mu.St examine its validity in the light - of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellant under Gujen~~tr,:;; tlr Art. 19 of the Constitution.\n\nThe result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismisst!.:l.\n\nCOivli\\HSSTONER OF INCOME-TAX'; NEW DELHI\n\nAN ANT RAO B. KAMA T\n\n(K. SuBBA RAo. J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Dividend declared and paid in different yearJ-Ratt: of\n\nwhich year applicable-Meaning of 'rehate'-Is tlrere an)' tUstinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate zmda other statutes-Indian Income-tax Act~ 1922 (ll of 1922), ,~.1. 16(5), 60A-Part B States (Taxation Concession) Order, 1950.\n\nThe assessee had received in the previous years (1950-51 a.nd 1951-52) dividends from two companies. These companies had {l}een allow\"'d rebate under the Part Jl States (Taxation Concession) Order, 1950.\n\nFor the assessment years 1951-52 and 1952-53, the assessee claimed before the Incomt!tax Officer that the dividend received by him should be \"grossed up\" under s. 16(2) of the Act, without taking into con\n\nsideration the rebate allowed to the said companies under the said concession order. On a construction of s. 16(2) the assessee pleaded that the rate applicable to the total income of the said companies was the rate prescribed by the relevant Indian Finance Act. The Income-tax Officer grossed up at the State rnte and not at the rate presrribed by the relevant Finance Act. Before the Tribunal and the High Court tile assessee succeeded.\n\nHeld: (i) Iu interpreting s. 16(2) effect must be given to these words occurring in the said section 'without taking iuto account any rete-\n\nJ()(j.f\n\nMa.v, S", "total_entities": 103, "entities": [{"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 810, "end_char": 830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are, therefore, satisfied that no case has been made out by the appellant to justify our interference with the conclusion of the Rajasthan High Court that the relevant stipulation on which the appellant relies ought to be enforced even though it creates a clog on the equity of redemption."}}, {"text": "dismissed\n\nSRI JAGADGURU KARl BASAVA\n\nRAJENDRASWAMI OF GAVIMU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1041, "end_char": 1102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SRI JAGADGURU KARI BASAVA RAJENDRASWAMI OF GAVIMUTT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IT\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF\n\nHINDU\n\nRELIGIOUS\n\nCHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS, HYDERABAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1103, "end_char": 1174, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF HINDU RELIGIOUS CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS, HYDERABAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1205, "end_char": 1224, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1229, "end_char": 1233, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1235, "end_char": 1249, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S.M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1254, "end_char": 1269, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(/)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1295, "end_char": 1308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Repeal of old Act by new Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1335, "end_char": 1363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1591, "end_char": 1626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss.\n\n103(d), 62(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1647, "end_char": 1668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Religious\n\nand Charitable Endowments Act, 1951", "statute": "Religious\n\nand Charitable Endowments Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1971, "end_char": 1976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Religious\n\nand Charitable Endowments Act, 1951", "statute": "Religious\n\nand Charitable Endowments Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Madras Act II of 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1989, "end_char": 2010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Charitable Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2267, "end_char": 2292, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madras Act II of 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2341, "end_char": 2362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cltaritable Endow", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2377, "end_char": 2394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged Cltaritable Endow on behalf of the appellant in the High Court that the scheme contravened ments his fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Art. 19( 1 }(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2628, "end_char": 2643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act II of 1927", "statute": "Madras Act II of 1927"}}, {"text": "s. 103(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2937, "end_char": 2946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act II of 1927", "statute": "Madras Act II of 1927"}}, {"text": "Section 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3078, "end_char": 3089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act II of 1927", "statute": "Madras Act II of 1927"}}, {"text": "Endowments Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3143, "end_char": 3163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3963, "end_char": 3970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Endowments Act, 1951", "statute": "Endowments Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4292, "end_char": 4320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "A. V. Vi.rwanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vi.rwanatha Sastri, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4505, "end_char": 4526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vi.rwanatha Sastri, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhuri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4531, "end_char": 4546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Vi.rwanatha Sastri, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sti JagadgUiu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4568, "end_char": 4581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sti JagadgUiu\n\nR. Ganapathy lyer and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy lyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4583, "end_char": 4600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sti JagadgUiu\n\nR. Ganapathy lyer and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "B. R. G. K. Achar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4605, "end_char": 4622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sti JagadgUiu\n\nR. Ganapathy lyer and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4788, "end_char": 4802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nBmd~;~ Relzg1ous delivered by ClumUJble Endow-\n\nJudgment of the Court was\n\nments\n\nGtljbrdragadk, ar\n\nC.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.\n\nJ .-The appellant Shri Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami of Gavi Mutt is the Matadhipati of Sri Gavi Mutt which is a religious institution dedicated to the propagation and promotion of the tenets of the Veer~ Saiva cult of Hinduism.", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4831, "end_char": 4866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nBmd~;~ Relzg1ous delivered by ClumUJble Endow-\n\nJudgment of the Court was\n\nments\n\nGtljbrdragadk, ar\n\nC.J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, C.\n\nJ .-The appellant Shri Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami of Gavi Mutt is the Matadhipati of Sri Gavi Mutt which is a religious institution dedicated to the propagation and promotion of the tenets of the Veer~ Saiva cult of Hinduism."}}, {"text": "Uravakonda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5068, "end_char": 5078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Mutt is situated at Uravakonda in the district of Anantapur."}}, {"text": "Anantapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5098, "end_char": 5107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Mutt is situated at Uravakonda in the district of Anantapur."}}, {"text": "6th September, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5132, "end_char": 5151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on the 6th September, 1939, the Board of Hindu Religious Endowments constituted under the Madras Act ll of 1927 (hereinafter called 'the earlier Act') framed a scheme under s. 63 of the said Act for the proper administration of the said Mutt and its endowments."}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5298, "end_char": 5303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5792, "end_char": 5812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That decision was taken in appeal by the predecessor of the appellant to the High Court of Madras (A.S. No."}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6141, "end_char": 6146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on the 5th April, 1952, that the appellant was served with a memorandum asking him to hand over the charge of all the properties of the Mutt to the Executive Officer."}}, {"text": "16th April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6677, "end_char": 6693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notice issued by the Executive Officer followed on the 16th April, 1952 by which the appellant was infonned that the Executive\n\nOfficer would take over possession."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, what is 1964 known as the _Sirur Mutt case was decided by the Madras s,; Jagadguru High Court and the appellant felt justified in refusing to r\n\n."}}, {"text": "Jagadguru High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6871, "end_char": 6891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, what is 1964 known as the _Sirur Mutt case was decided by the Madras s,; Jagadguru High Court and the appellant felt justified in refusing to r\n\n."}}, {"text": "26th January,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7324, "end_char": 7343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d ment1 t en over rom was mva 1 masmuc as 1t contravene the appellant's fundamental rights guaranteed by the Consti- Gaiendragadkar\n\nC.J. tution which had come into force from the 26th January,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Endowments Act XIX of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7397, "end_char": 7423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7525, "end_char": 7542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant moved the Madras High Court on the 28th April, 1952, by his writ petition and prayed for an appropriate writ quashing the notice served on him by the Executive Officer threatening to take over the administration of the 11utt and its properties under the scheme."}}, {"text": "28th April, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7550, "end_char": 7566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant moved the Madras High Court on the 28th April, 1952, by his writ petition and prayed for an appropriate writ quashing the notice served on him by the Executive Officer threatening to take over the administration of the 11utt and its properties under the scheme."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(£)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7978, "end_char": 7991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Endowments Act XIX of 1951", "statute": "Endowments Act XIX of 1951"}}, {"text": "Jagadguru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9108, "end_char": 9117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal sueceeded and the Division Bench which\n\nSri Jagadguru heard the said appeal, held that the scheme having been c u.\"fo 1 framed as early as 1939 under the relevant provisions of Hr; r; let&los the earlier Act which was valid when it was enacted, could Charltabk Endow not be challenged on the ground that some of its provisions contravened the fundamental right guaranteed to the\n\nGaienrgadkor citizens of this country under Art."}}, {"text": "Charltabk Endow", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9315, "end_char": 9330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal sueceeded and the Division Bench which\n\nSri Jagadguru heard the said appeal, held that the scheme having been c u.\"fo 1 framed as early as 1939 under the relevant provisions of Hr; r; let&los the earlier Act which was valid when it was enacted, could Charltabk Endow not be challenged on the ground that some of its provisions contravened the fundamental right guaranteed to the\n\nGaienrgadkor citizens of this country under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9488, "end_char": 9495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10172, "end_char": 10178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before dealing with the points which have been raised before us by Mr. Sastri on behalf of the appellant, we may briefly indicate the nature of the scheme which bas been framed under the relevant provisions of the earlier Act.", "canonical_name": "Sastrfs"}}, {"text": "Clurritahle Ef!dot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11731, "end_char": 11749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be removed by the Board for good and sufficient cause and Clurritahle Ef!dot the Board's order in that behalf has to be final."}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13366, "end_char": 13390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13485, "end_char": 13490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13498, "end_char": 13527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Asquith of Bishopstone", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14433, "end_char": 14455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nIn support of this argument, Mr. Sastri has invited our attention to the observations made by Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council ( 1) that \"if you are bidden to treat an imaginery state of affairs -as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it.\""}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14917, "end_char": 14921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15098, "end_char": 15104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15668, "end_char": 15674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 103(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15676, "end_char": 15690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16626, "end_char": 16635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16772, "end_char": 16778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17114, "end_char": 17123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17256, "end_char": 17262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17409, "end_char": 17415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17764, "end_char": 17770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18050, "end_char": 18060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18292, "end_char": 18298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18579, "end_char": 18585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62( 3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18788, "end_char": 18797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19053, "end_char": 19058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 103(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19079, "end_char": 19088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19093, "end_char": 19101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19128, "end_char": 19142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mems Reading s. 103(d) and s. 62(3) together, it seems to us\n\nGajendragadkar that Mr. Sastri's argwnent that the consistency of the\n\nc. J. scheme with the relevant provisions of the latter Act should be examined in writ proceedings, cannot be entertained.", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 62(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19382, "end_char": 19390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19541, "end_char": 19545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19975, "end_char": 19993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sastri contended that though the scheme may have been valid when it was framed, since it was not actually enforced before the 26th January, 1950, it is open to the appellant to challenge the validity of the scheme on the ground that it deprives him of his fun dam en tal right under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20132, "end_char": 20139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20547, "end_char": 20554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20648, "end_char": 20657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this argument, Mr. Sastri has relied on certain observations made by Mukherjea J. in the case of\n\nR. S. Seth Shanti Sarup v. Union of India and Ors(l).", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea"}}, {"text": "Lallamal Hardeodas Cotton Spinning Mill Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20773, "end_char": 20820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, a partnership firm known as Lallamal Hardeodas Cotton Spinning Mill Company of which the petitioner was a partner, used to carry on the business of production and supply of cotton yam."}}, {"text": "s. 3(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21257, "end_char": 21264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21277, "end_char": 21305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21771, "end_char": 21775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22109, "end_char": 22116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22888, "end_char": 22895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "fukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23063, "end_char": 23072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In repelling this contention, fukherjea, J., observed that the order against which the petition was primarily directed Was the order of the Central Government passed in October,\n952, nd that was a mplete and clear answer to the .. ontcntJon raised by the learned Attorney-General.", "canonical_name": "Mukherjea"}}, {"text": "Sastrfs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23954, "end_char": 23961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t IS on tnese observations that Mr. Sastrfs argument is founded.", "canonical_name": "Sastrfs"}}, {"text": "26th January. 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24366, "end_char": 24384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "not prepared to hold tha, t these observations vtere intended to lay down an unqualifie~ proposition of law that even it a citizen was deprived of his fundamental right:; by a valid scheme framed under a valid law at a time when the Consti· tution was not in force, the mere fact that such a schem~ wou!d continue to operae even after the 26th January."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24450, "end_char": 24457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25548, "end_char": 25555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26097, "end_char": 26104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26169, "end_char": 26176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26525, "end_char": 26532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "AN ANT RAO B. KAMA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26682, "end_char": 26700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COivli\\HSSTONER OF INCOME-TAX'; NEW DELHI\n\nAN ANT RAO B. KAMA T\n\n(K. SuBBA RAo."}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26705, "end_char": 26717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COivli\\HSSTONER OF INCOME-TAX'; NEW DELHI\n\nAN ANT RAO B. KAMA T\n\n(K. SuBBA RAo."}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26722, "end_char": 26729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26734, "end_char": 26745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Ustinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate zmda other statutes-Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26878, "end_char": 26978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27431, "end_char": 27439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ustinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate zmda other statutes-Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Ustinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate zmda other statutes-Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27583, "end_char": 27591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ustinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate zmda other statutes-Indian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Ustinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate zmda other statutes-Indian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27720, "end_char": 27738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27943, "end_char": 27951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Finance Act", "statute": "Indian Finance Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_263_272_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "8 S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\norders that the Court held that the petitioner was entitled 1964 to seek the protection of Art. 19 and invoke the jurisdic- Sri Jagadguru tion of this Court under Art. 32. In our opinion, therec . v. • • • • om1nzss1011er o fore, there is no substance 10 the contention that smce m !Iindu Religim1. the present case, the scheme has not been completely imple- Charui;::;.~};\"\"0\"' mented till 1952, we mu5t examine its validity in the light - of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellant under Ga; en~'\"t'\"\"\"' Art. 19 of the Constitution.\n\nThe result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCOMi\\HSSfONER OF INCOME-TAX'; NEW DELHI\n\nANANT RAO B. KAMAT\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI, JJ.)\n\nJnco1netax-Dividend declared and paid in different yeurs-Rate of which year applicable-Meaning of 'rebate'-ls there any tUstinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate under other statutes-Indian lllcome-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), .,,-. 16(5),\n\n60A-Part B States (Taxation Concession) Order, 1950.\n\n\"fhe assessee had received in the previous years (1950-51 and 1951-52) dividends from tv.ro con1panies. These companies had li>een allowed rebate under the Part R States (Taxation Concession) Order, 1950.\n\nFor the assessment years 1951-52 and 1952-53, the assessce claimed before the Income-tax Officer that the dividend received by him should be \"g'tossed up\" under s. 16(2) of the Act, without taking into consideration the rebate allowed tO the said companies under the said concession order.\n\nOn a construction of s. 16(2) the assessee pleaded that the rate applicable to the total income of the said coinpanies was the rate prescribed by the relevant Indian Finance Act. The Income-tax Officer grossed up at the State rate and not at the rate prescribed by the relevant Finance Act. Before the Tribunal and the High Court the cwessee succeeded.\n\nHeld: (i) In interpreting s. 16(2) effect must be given to thes-o words occurring in the saic! section 'without taking into account any reb3.te-\n\n196-1\n\nMay, S\n\n1964 '-\n\n~- --~.· ,,...... ,.. \" /\n\n_SUPRE?IIE COURT I~EPORTS\n\n[1964J\n\nallowed or additional income:-tax charged'. If these words are ignored~ it will be rewriting s. 16(2). Section 16(2) applies the rate of the\n\nC.!~T:.< : year in ,, .. hich the dividend _is paid, etc., and not of the year when the Anant Rao B. profits V.ere made by the company. On the fact of this case it wa, Kamat held that the rates prescribed by the relevant. Finance Act apply.\n\nSikrf J.\n\n' ...\n\n- - Rajputana .Agencies Ltd. v. _Commissioner of lncOmetax, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 142, distinguished. -\n\n.-- (ii) The word 'rebate' in s. 16(2) not only relates to rebate granted\n\nunder the Indian Finance Act but is wide enough to include any rebate \\\\rhich may be granted by other stattitory _ ofders.-\n\n- The form Of the certificate prescribed under the _InCoalC-tax R.~ cannot change the meaning of the word 'rebate?. The word •rebate' iB an apt word to uSe m respect of remission.\n\nA.f/s. J.laganlal Sankalchand v.- Commissioiier of Incometax~ New Delhi, c:A. No. 703 of 1963.- -Judgment,· dated May 8, 1964 distinguished.\n\n (iii) The words \"exemption' or 'other modification' in s. 60A are wide enough to Cnable the Central Government to give rebate_ such as has been a.IloWed unc!'!rthe Concc:ssiozi Ordei-.\" - -\n\nCIVIL- APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos: 687- 688 of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order: dated February 3, 1962 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Reference No. 13 of 1958.. ·\n\nS. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant:\n\nN. S. Palkhivala, S. P. Mehta, I. B. Dadachanji, 0. C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder _Narai11, for the respondents.\n\nl\\foy 8, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nS1KR1, J.-These are appeuls by the Commissioner of fncome Tax on certific1tes granted by the Rajasthan High Court under s. 66A ( 2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (II of 1922), hereinafter.referred to as the Act, against the judgment of the Hi~ Court in a consolidated reference under s. 66(1) of the Act.\n\nThe High Court answered t.'1e question, reproduced below, in the affirmative. -The reference was made by; the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the following cinmrnstances. ;) ' ·\n\nCl.T. v.\n\nThe respondent, Anant Rao B. Kamat, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, had received in the previous years (1950-51 and 195f-52) dividends from two companies, Associated Stone Industries (Kotah) Ltd., and Rajputana Mining Agencies Ltd.\n\nFo1 the assessment years 1951-52, .and 1952-53, the assessee claimed before the, Income Tax Officer that the dividends received by him should be 'grossed up' under s. 16(2) of the Act, without taking into consideration the rebate allowed to the said companies under the Part B States (Taxation Concessions)\n\nOrder, 1950, hereinafter called the Concession Order.\n\nAccording to the assessee, on a true construction of s. 16(2) of the Act, the rate applicable to the total income of the s.aid companies was the rate prescribed by the relevant Indian Finance Acts.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer disallowed the grossing up at the Indian rate but allowed at the State\n\nrate, defined by paragraph 3 (v) of the Concession Order.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the order of the Income Tax Officer, but the assessee succeeded before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nOn the application of the Commissioner of Income Tax. the Tribun\"J referred the following question to the High Court:\n\nAnant Rao B.\n\n\"Whether the appropriate portion of the dividend received by the assessee from either of the said\n\ntwo companies in the financial year 1950-51/ 1951-52 is to be increased at the rate applicable to the total income of the respective companies for the financial year 1950-51/1951- 52 and without regard to any benefit conferred\n\nby the T. C. Order 1950 that the companies would get in the matter of payment of tax by them on their profits accruing or arising to them in a part 'B' State and assessable for the assessment year 1950-51/1951-52?\"\n\nThe High Court, after asking for a supplementary statement of the case, answered, as we have already said in favour of the assessee.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant has contended before us that the rate applicable to the total income of the\n\nKamal\n\nSikri /.\n\nSikri J.\n\nsaid companies was the rate as finally applied after taking. into consideration the effect of the Concession Order.\n\nHe has further urged that the word 'rebate' occurring ins. 16(2) does not include the relief given to the said comp.anies under the Concession Order for the Concession Order is not concerned with granting rebate but is concerned with the deter- . mination of the tax payable.\n\nIn this counection, he relied on s. 60A of the Act under which the Concession Order was made, and said that this section enabled the C.:ntral Government to make an exemption, reduction in rate or other modification in respect of income tax but not to grant a rebate.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondent controverted these arguments and supported the judgment of the High Court.\n\nBefore addressing ourselves to the contentions at the Bar, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant statutory provisions.\n\nThese read thus:\n\n\"' S. 16(2)-For the purposes of inclusion in the total income of an assessee any dividend shaU be deemed to be income of the previous year in which it is paid, credited or distributed or deemed to have been paid, credited or distribued to him, and shall be increased to such amount as would, if income tax (but not supertax) at the rate applicable to the total income of the company (without taking into account any rebate allowed or additional income-tax ch3rged) for the financial year in which the dividend is paid, credited or distributed or deemed to have been paid, credited or distributed. were deducted therefrom, be equal to the amount of the dividend:\n\nProvided that when the sum out of which the dividend has been paid, credited or distributed or deemed to have been paid, credited or distri- . buted includes-\n\n( i) any profits and gains of the company not included in its total income, or\n\n8 S.C.R.\n\n(ii)\n\nSUPREME COliRT REPORTS\n\nany income of the company on which incometax was not payable, or\n\nCJ.T. v.\n\n(iii) any amount attributable to any made in computing the profits of the company,\n\nallowance 4.llllfll Rao 11 .. and gains Kamal\n\nthe increase to be made under this section shall be calculated only upon such proportion of the dividend as the said sum after deduction of the inclusions enumerated above bears to the whole of that sum.\n\nS. 18(5)-Any deduction made and paid to the account of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of this section and any sum by which a dividend has been increased under sub-section ( 2) of section 16 shall be treate<l as ; a--payment of income-tax or supertax on behalf of the person from whose income the deduction was made, or of the owner of the security or of the shareholder, as the case may be, and credit shall be given to him therefor on the production of the certificate furnished under sub-section ( 9) or section 20, as the case may be, in the assessment, if any, made. for the following year under this Act:\n\nProvided ....... .\n\nS. 6UA. Power to make exemption, etc., in relation to merged territories or to the territories which immediately before the 1st November, 1956. were comprised in any Part B State.\n\nIf the Central Government considers it necessary or expedient so to do for avoiding any hardship or anomaly, or removing any difficulty, that may arise as a result of the extension of this Act to the merged territories or to the territories which immediately before the 1st November, 1956, were comprised in any Part B State, the Central Gov- . / emment may , by general or special order, make an exemption, reduction in rate or other modification in respect of income-tax in favour of any class of income, or in regarrt\n\nSikri J.\n\nC.J.T.\n\nA\"'111 Rao B.\n\nam at\n\nSilcri J.\n\nto the whole or any part of the income of any person or class of persons:\n\nProvided that the power conferred by this section shall not be exercisable in the case of merged territories and the territories which immediately before the !st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, after the 31st day of March, 1955, and, in the case of the State of J ammu and Kashmir after I.he 31st day of March, 1959, except for the purpose of rescinding an exemption, reduction or modification already made.\n\nPara 3 (iii) of the Concession Order - The expression \"Indian rate of tax\" means the rate determined by dividing the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable in tl1e taxable territories on the total income for the year in question in accordance with the rates prescribed by the relevant Finance Act of the Central Government, by the amount of such total incom~.\n\nPara 3 (\\') of the Concession Order-The expression\n\n\"State rate of tax' meaps the rate determined by dividing the amount of income-tax .1nd supertax and payable on the total income according to the rates of tax in fnrce in the State immediately before the appointed cay, or for the year in question, as th~ case mav be, by the amount of such total income and where under any State law, the ratl.'s of tax in force in the State are prescribed with reference to the total income including agricultural income, the State rate of tax shall he the rate determined by dividing the amount of income-tax and supertax on the total income including the agricultural income without taking into account anyreduction of tax allowed on the agricultural income by the State law by the amount of such total income;\n\nF.:xp, lanation.-Where there was no State law relating to charge of income-ta, x.and super-tax, the\n\nrates of income-tax and super-tax in force in that State immediately before the appointed day shall, for the purposes of this clause, be deemed to be the rates specified in the Schedule.\n\nPara 6 of the Concession Order-Income of a previous year which does not fall under paragraph 5.\n\n1 ·:. ; ncome, profits and gains of any previous year ending after th~ 311t day of March. 1949. which does not fall within paragraph 5 of this Order shall be assessed under the Act for the year ending on th~ 31st day of March, 195L or on the 31st day of M.arch, 1952, as ::ie case may be, and the tax payable thereon shall be determined os hereunder:\n\nIn respect of so much of the income. profits and gain~ included in the total income as accrue or arise in any State Gther than the States of Patiala a!'ld East Punjab States Union and Travancore-Cochin--\n\n(i) the tax shall be computed (al at the Indian rate of tax and (b) at the StHte rate of tax in force immediately before the appointed day;\n\n(ii) where the amount of tax computed under subclause (a) of clause ( i) is less than or is equal to the amount of tax computed under subclause (b) of clause (i), the amount of the first-mentioned tax shall be the tax payable;\n\n(iii) where . the amount of tax computed under subclause (a) of clause (i) exceeds the tax computed under sub-clause (b) of clause ( i), the excess shall be allowed as a rebate from the first-mentioned tax and the amount of the firstmentioned tax as so reduced shall be the tax. payable ..... .\n\nPara 6A of the Concession Order-Income. profits and gains chargeable to tax in the assessment year 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55-\n\n. Th~ incon_ie, profits and gains of any previous year which is a prevmus year for the asessment for the year end-\n\nC.1.T. v.\n\nAnant Rao B.\n\nKaniat\n\nSikri /.\n\nCJ.T.\n\n•• 4.nant Rao B.\n\nKamat\n\nSikri J.\n\ning on the 31st day of March, 1953, 1954 and 1955, shall be charged to tax at the Indian rates of tax, provided that from the tax so computed, there shall be allowed in each year, rebate at the percentage thereof specified thereunder:\n\nin respect of so much of the income, profits and gains as accrue or arise-\n\n(a) in the States of Saurashtra, Madhya Bharat or Rajasthan, to any assessee, at the rate of 40 per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per ce_nt, respectively, for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March,\n\n1953, 1954 and 1955 .... \".\n\n'The scheme underlying s. 16(2) and s. 18(5) seems to be this. Under s. 16 (2) the dividends are grossed up and\n\nunder s. 18 ( 5) any sum by which a dividend is increased under s. 16(2) is treated as payment of income-tax on behalf of the shareholder.\n\nIn this setting, Jet us examine what is the true construction of s. 16(2) of the Act. It is common ground that 'grossing up' has to be effected in this case.\n\nThe real point of controversy between the parties is regarding the rate at which it is to be done. The learned counsel for the appellant relying on the decision of this Court in Rajputana Agencies Ltd., v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax(') urged that the same meaning should be attributed to the expression \"rate applicable to the total income of the company\" in s. 16(2), as was attributed by this Court to the same expression occurring in sub-clause(b) of clause (ii) to the second explanation to proviso to paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951.\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument. It i~ true that the same expression occurs in s. 16(2) and the sub-clause above referred to, but as pointed out by the High Court, the words 'without taking into account any rebate allowed or additional income-tax charged' occur in s. 16(2) and not in the said sub-clause, and effect must be given to these words. If we ignore these words, we would be Tewriting s. 16(2). It will be noticed thats. 16(2) applies the rate of the year in which the dividend is paid, etc., and\n\n(1) (1959] Supp. • s.c.:R. r42\n\nnot of the year when the profits were made by the compaµY..\n\nThe legislature has devised a mechanical test which has to be applied regardless of the hardship or the benefit which may accrue to an assessee.\n\nTherefore, we agree with the High Court that though the rate applicable is the rate which is actually applied, rebate if any allowed to a company, has not to be, as directed by s. 16(2), taken into account.\n\nThis takes us next to the point that benefit given by the Concession Order is not a rebate at all.\n\nWe cannot accept this contention. The Concession Order itself uses the word 'rebate' in paras 5, 6, and 6A.\n\nIndeed, though it may be possible to urge something while dealing with para 6. no aq?ument is possible q:garding para 6A, for it expressely says that 'there shall be allowed in each year rebate at the percentage thereof specified hereunder'. The learned counsel for the appellant laid great stress on the language of para 6 of the Concession Order.\n\nHe said that clause (i J directed the computation of tax and clause (iii) was equally directing computation of tax, and that in this context the word 'rebate' has been loosely used. We are unable to say that the word 'rebate' has been loosely used. In para 6A the meaning is clear and the word 'rebate' must have the same meaning in both paras.\n\nFurther. but for the provisions of the Concession Order. the said companies would have been taxed at the rates prescribed by the relevant Finance Act.\n\nThe Concession Order remits what would otherwise be the proper tax leviable under the Finance Act. read with Indian Income Tax Act. The word 'rebate' is an apt word to use in respect of a remission.\n\nThat a rebate as such can be directed to be a'.lowed under s. 60A of the Act seems clear to us.\n\nThe words 'exemption' or other modification are wide enough to enable the Central Government to give rebate such as has been allowed under the Concession Order.\n\nDuring the course of the hearing of the connected Civil Appeal in M/s. Maganlal Sankalchand v. The Commissioner of Income Ta:c, New Delhi('), the learned counsel\n\n(1) Civil Appeal No. 703 of 1963-judgment delivered on May&,\n\n1964.\n\nCJ.T.\n\nSikri J.\n\nSikri J.\n\nfor the Commissioner of Income Tax raised two additional arguments.\n\nFirst, he urged that the word 'rebate' in s. 16(2) only related to rebate granted under the Indian Finance Act, and not any rebate granted under the Concession Order. He further referred us to r. 14 of the Indian Income Tax Rules, which prescr.ibes the certificate to be furnished by the principal officer of a company under s. 20 of the Act.\n\nThe relevant portion of the certificate is a& follows:\n\n''I/We cermy :-\n\n(A) (i) that the Company/ estimates that out of the profits of the said period-\n\n(a) .... per cent., is chargeable at full Indian rate;\n\n(b) .... per cent., is chargeable at the reduced rate of ... <Name of Part B State):\n\nand .... ~.\n\nRegarding his first contention, we are unable to limit the meaning of the word 'rebate' to rebate granted under the.\n\nIndian Finance Act. The word 'rebate' is not qualified and is wide enough to include any rebate which may be granted by other statutory orders.\n\nThe form of the certificate referred to us which mentions reduction of rate cannot change the meaning of the word 'rebate'.\n\nIn the result, we agree with the High Court that the answer to the question referred should be in the affirmative.\n\nThe .appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne set of hearing fees.\n\nAppeals dismissetl.", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagadguru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 and invoke the jurisdic- Sri Jagadguru tion of this Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 549, "end_char": 556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ANANT RAO B. KAMAT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 701, "end_char": 719, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANANT RAO B. KAMAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 739, "end_char": 746, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 751, "end_char": 767, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1449, "end_char": 1457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ustinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate under other statutes-Indian lllcome-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Ustinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate under other statutes-Indian lllcome-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1600, "end_char": 1608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ustinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate under other statutes-Indian lllcome-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Ustinction between rebate under Finance Act and the rebate under other statutes-Indian lllcome-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1738, "end_char": 1756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1959, "end_char": 1967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Finance Act", "statute": "Indian Finance Act"}}, {"text": "S\n\n1964", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2091, "end_char": 2098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Finance Act", "statute": "Indian Finance Act"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2258, "end_char": 2266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Finance Act", "statute": "Indian Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Section 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2268, "end_char": 2281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Finance Act", "statute": "Indian Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Anant Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2395, "end_char": 2404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and not of the year when the Anant Rao B. profits V.ere made by the company.", "canonical_name": "ANANT RAO B. KAMAT"}}, {"text": "Kamat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2475, "end_char": 2480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the fact of this case it wa, Kamat held that the rates prescribed by the relevant."}}, {"text": "Sikrf", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2549, "end_char": 2554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sikrf J.\n\n' ...\n- Rajputana .Agencies Ltd. v. _Commissioner of lncOmetax, [1959] Supp.", "canonical_name": "Sikrf"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2701, "end_char": 2709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Finance Act", "statute": "Indian Finance Act"}}, {"text": "s. 60A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3250, "end_char": 3256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3587, "end_char": 3598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 of 1958.. ·\n\nS. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant:\n\nN. S. Palkhivala, S. P. Mehta, I. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3603, "end_char": 3617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 of 1958.. ·\n\nS. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant:\n\nN. S. Palkhivala, S. P. Mehta, I. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "N. S. Palkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3639, "end_char": 3655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 of 1958.. ·\n\nS. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant:\n\nN. S. Palkhivala, S. P. Mehta, I. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "S. P. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3657, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 of 1958.. ·\n\nS. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant:\n\nN. S. Palkhivala, S. P. Mehta, I. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "I. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3670, "end_char": 3686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 of 1958.. ·\n\nS. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant:\n\nN. S. Palkhivala, S. P. Mehta, I. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder _Narai11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3706, "end_char": 3723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.\n\nMathur and Ravinder _Narai11, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3926, "end_char": 3932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4095, "end_char": 4103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Anant Rao B. Kamat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4323, "end_char": 4341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. v.\n\nThe respondent, Anant Rao B. Kamat, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, had received in the previous years (1950-51 and 195f-52) dividends from two companies, Associated Stone Industries (Kotah) Ltd., and Rajputana Mining Agencies Ltd.\n\nFo1 the assessment years 1951-52, .and 1952-53, the assessee claimed before the, Income Tax Officer that the dividends received by him should be 'grossed up' under s. 16(2) of the Act, without taking into consideration the rebate allowed to the said companies under the Part B States (Taxation Concessions)\n\nOrder, 1950, hereinafter called the Concession Order.", "canonical_name": "ANANT RAO B. KAMAT"}}, {"text": "Associated Stone Industries (Kotah) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4471, "end_char": 4511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. v.\n\nThe respondent, Anant Rao B. Kamat, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, had received in the previous years (1950-51 and 195f-52) dividends from two companies, Associated Stone Industries (Kotah) Ltd., and Rajputana Mining Agencies Ltd.\n\nFo1 the assessment years 1951-52, .and 1952-53, the assessee claimed before the, Income Tax Officer that the dividends received by him should be 'grossed up' under s. 16(2) of the Act, without taking into consideration the rebate allowed to the said companies under the Part B States (Taxation Concessions)\n\nOrder, 1950, hereinafter called the Concession Order."}}, {"text": "Rajputana Mining Agencies Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4517, "end_char": 4547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. v.\n\nThe respondent, Anant Rao B. Kamat, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, had received in the previous years (1950-51 and 195f-52) dividends from two companies, Associated Stone Industries (Kotah) Ltd., and Rajputana Mining Agencies Ltd.\n\nFo1 the assessment years 1951-52, .and 1952-53, the assessee claimed before the, Income Tax Officer that the dividends received by him should be 'grossed up' under s. 16(2) of the Act, without taking into consideration the rebate allowed to the said companies under the Part B States (Taxation Concessions)\n\nOrder, 1950, hereinafter called the Concession Order."}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4965, "end_char": 4973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5089, "end_char": 5107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5384, "end_char": 5413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the order of the Income Tax Officer, but the assessee succeeded before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Anant Rao B.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5535, "end_char": 5547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Tribun\"J referred the following question to the High Court:\n\nAnant Rao B.\n\n\"Whether the appropriate portion of the dividend received by the assessee from either of the said\n\ntwo companies in the financial year 1950-51/ 1951-52 is to be increased at the rate applicable to the total income of the respective companies for the financial year 1950-51/1951- 52 and without regard to any benefit conferred\n\nby the T. C. Order 1950 that the companies would get in the matter of payment of tax by them on their profits accruing or arising to them in a part 'B' State and assessable for the assessment year 1950-51/1951-52?\"", "canonical_name": "ANANT RAO B. KAMAT"}}, {"text": "Kamal\n\nSikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6341, "end_char": 6353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the appellant has contended before us that the rate applicable to the total income of the\n\nKamal\n\nSikri /.\n\nSikri J.\n\nsaid companies was the rate as finally applied after taking."}}, {"text": "s. 60A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6795, "end_char": 6801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7290, "end_char": 7298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COliRT REPORTS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8206, "end_char": 8228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "buted includes-\n\n( i) any profits and gains of the company not included in its total income, or\n\n8 S.C.R.\n\n(ii)\n\nSUPREME COliRT REPORTS\n\nany income of the company on which incometax was not payable, or\n\nCJ.T. v.\n\n(iii) any amount attributable to any made in computing the profits of the company,\n\nallowance 4.llllfll Rao 11 .. and gains Kamal\n\nthe increase to be made under this section shall be calculated only upon such proportion of the dividend as the said sum after deduction of the inclusions enumerated above bears to the whole of that sum."}}, {"text": "S. 18(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8642, "end_char": 8650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. 18(5)-Any deduction made and paid to the account of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of this section and any sum by which a dividend has been increased under sub-section ( 2) of section 16 shall be treate<l as ; a--payment of income-tax or supertax on behalf of the person from whose income the deduction was made, or of the owner of the security or of the shareholder, as the case may be, and credit shall be given to him therefor on the production of the certificate furnished under sub-section ( 9) or section 20, as the case may be, in the assessment, if any, made."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8847, "end_char": 8857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9174, "end_char": 9184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 6U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9299, "end_char": 9304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "st November, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10287, "end_char": 10304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, after the 31st day of March, 1955, and, in the case of the State of J ammu and Kashmir after I.he 31st day of March, 1959, except for the purpose of rescinding an exemption, reduction or modification already made."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10362, "end_char": 10379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, after the 31st day of March, 1955, and, in the case of the State of J ammu and Kashmir after I.he 31st day of March, 1959, except for the purpose of rescinding an exemption, reduction or modification already made."}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10391, "end_char": 10414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, after the 31st day of March, 1955, and, in the case of the State of J ammu and Kashmir after I.he 31st day of March, 1959, except for the purpose of rescinding an exemption, reduction or modification already made."}}, {"text": "J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10449, "end_char": 10467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, after the 31st day of March, 1955, and, in the case of the State of J ammu and Kashmir after I.he 31st day of March, 1959, except for the purpose of rescinding an exemption, reduction or modification already made."}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10479, "end_char": 10502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, after the 31st day of March, 1955, and, in the case of the State of J ammu and Kashmir after I.he 31st day of March, 1959, except for the purpose of rescinding an exemption, reduction or modification already made."}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12640, "end_char": 12647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "profits and gain~ included in the total income as accrue or arise in any State Gther than the States of Patiala a!'ld East Punjab States Union and Travancore-Cochin--\n\n(i) the tax shall be computed (al at the Indian rate of tax and (b) at the StHte rate of tax in force immediately before the appointed day;\n\n(ii) where the amount of tax computed under subclause (a) of clause ( i) is less than or is equal to the amount of tax computed under subclause (b) of clause (i), the amount of the first-mentioned tax shall be the tax payable;\n\n(iii) where ."}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin--", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12683, "end_char": 12702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "profits and gain~ included in the total income as accrue or arise in any State Gther than the States of Patiala a!'ld East Punjab States Union and Travancore-Cochin--\n\n(i) the tax shall be computed (al at the Indian rate of tax and (b) at the StHte rate of tax in force immediately before the appointed day;\n\n(ii) where the amount of tax computed under subclause (a) of clause ( i) is less than or is equal to the amount of tax computed under subclause (b) of clause (i), the amount of the first-mentioned tax shall be the tax payable;\n\n(iii) where ."}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14033, "end_char": 14043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ incon_ie, profits and gains of any previous year which is a prevmus year for the asessment for the year end-\n\nC.1.T. v.\n\nAnant Rao B.\n\nKaniat\n\nSikri /.\n\nCJ.T.\n\n•• 4.nant Rao B.\n\nKamat\n\nSikri J.\n\ning on the 31st day of March, 1953, 1954 and 1955, shall be charged to tax at the Indian rates of tax, provided that from the tax so computed, there shall be allowed in each year, rebate at the percentage thereof specified thereunder:\n\nin respect of so much of the income, profits and gains as accrue or arise-\n\n(a) in the States of Saurashtra, Madhya Bharat or Rajasthan, to any assessee, at the rate of 40 per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per ce_nt, respectively, for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March,\n\n1953, 1954 and 1955 .... \"."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14045, "end_char": 14058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ incon_ie, profits and gains of any previous year which is a prevmus year for the asessment for the year end-\n\nC.1.T. v.\n\nAnant Rao B.\n\nKaniat\n\nSikri /.\n\nCJ.T.\n\n•• 4.nant Rao B.\n\nKamat\n\nSikri J.\n\ning on the 31st day of March, 1953, 1954 and 1955, shall be charged to tax at the Indian rates of tax, provided that from the tax so computed, there shall be allowed in each year, rebate at the percentage thereof specified thereunder:\n\nin respect of so much of the income, profits and gains as accrue or arise-\n\n(a) in the States of Saurashtra, Madhya Bharat or Rajasthan, to any assessee, at the rate of 40 per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per ce_nt, respectively, for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March,\n\n1953, 1954 and 1955 .... \"."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14062, "end_char": 14071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ incon_ie, profits and gains of any previous year which is a prevmus year for the asessment for the year end-\n\nC.1.T. v.\n\nAnant Rao B.\n\nKaniat\n\nSikri /.\n\nCJ.T.\n\n•• 4.nant Rao B.\n\nKamat\n\nSikri J.\n\ning on the 31st day of March, 1953, 1954 and 1955, shall be charged to tax at the Indian rates of tax, provided that from the tax so computed, there shall be allowed in each year, rebate at the percentage thereof specified thereunder:\n\nin respect of so much of the income, profits and gains as accrue or arise-\n\n(a) in the States of Saurashtra, Madhya Bharat or Rajasthan, to any assessee, at the rate of 40 per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per ce_nt, respectively, for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March,\n\n1953, 1954 and 1955 .... \"."}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14280, "end_char": 14288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14293, "end_char": 14301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14326, "end_char": 14331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14376, "end_char": 14381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14434, "end_char": 14442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14575, "end_char": 14583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15029, "end_char": 15037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15191, "end_char": 15251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15339, "end_char": 15347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951", "statute": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15525, "end_char": 15533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951", "statute": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15655, "end_char": 15663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951", "statute": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16184, "end_char": 16192, "source": "regex", 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{"document_id": "1964_8_273_294_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "2 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 273\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nMODERN CULTIVATORS, LADWA\n\n(A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR,\n\nJJ.)\n\nTorts-Break in canal bank-Suit for damages-defendants' negligence-\n\nNon-production of documents by defendant-If adverse inftreuce\n\ncan be drawn-Whether principle Re! lpsa Loqu; tur applits?- Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 18731 ss. 6, 15.\n\nA firm called the Modern Cultivators brought a suit against the State of Punjab to recover damages for loss of crops suffered by flooding. '.Jf its Jands as a result of a break in a canal belonging to the State.\n\nThe plaintiff's case was that there was a breach in the western bank of the canal owing to the negligence of the defendants and canal water escap!!d to the fields 1.:ausing them to be flooded.\n\nThe case of Government wao;; that bre.ach did take place but it was promptly repaired and the fields were fiooded not by the canal water but by heavy rains in the monlh of sptembcr. The trial Judge passed a decree for Rs. 20,000\n\nagainst Government. but it was reduced by the High Court to Rs. 14,130.\n\nThe High Cotrt held that the inundation of the fields was by water\n\nfrCtm the canal and not from the nallahCis.\n\nBoth the plaintiff and the defendant filed cross-appeals by special leave ot this Court.\n\nHeld (per Sarkar, J.): (i) That the rule of res ip_ra loquitur was applicable to the facts of this case because there would not have been a breach in the banks of the canal if those in management took proper care and tt-.e breach itself would be prin1a facie proof of negligence.\n\nScott v. L11ndon_Dock Co., 3 H & C 601 applied.\n\nBal'kway v. South Waler Transport Ca. Ltd., [19SO] 1 All. E.lt. 392, •istinguished.\n\n(ii) An inference that the defendant was negligent in the management of the canal arises because it is clear from the record that documents cailed for had not been produced deliberately.\n\nMurugesonJ Pillai v., Manickavasaka Pandara, L .. R. 44\n\nI.A. 98, rtlerred to. .\n\n(iii l Arrick 2 o! the Limitation Act does not apply to the facts of tJte case fo~ tilert> is :nothing in the Canal Act imposing any duty On the defn<lant to taie. care of the banks.\n\nHeld (per Hid.,, ati.Iiah, J,): (i) The principle of ru i1pa loquitur Manot always be safely applied where the faci.. before the court aro mot the whole facto. It ahould not . be applied u le11al rule but only\n\nII ll.C.-11.\n\nMay, 8\n\nlfU\n\n811111 •f l'UN/a•\n\n•• lltlUnc C1tltira-\n\nIMI\n\nu an aid to an inference when it is reasonable to think that there aro no further facts to consider. It is not a principle which dispenses wi ·~. proof of negligence. !lather it shifts onua from one party to another • It is a rule of evidence .and not of liability. A too ready reliance ot1\n\nthe maxim reinforces a fault liability and makes it into an absolute liability. If absolute liability is to giTe way to fault liabilty, some fault must be establshed by evidence .or must be capable of being reasonably inferred from the circumstances. It is not sufficient to s:t.y\n\nTt.8 ipJa loquitur because the danger is that facts may not alway5 tell the whole story and if there is something withheld bow can the thing be said lo speak for itself? The High Court erred in applying tloe\n\nprinciple of res ipsa loqutur to the facts of this case.\n\nIn the present case there was sufficient evidence, in the absence 1f reasonable cxplanati..:.a (lticb there was not), to estabfish negligence.\n\nDonoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, expla'ned.\n\nStdltighDenfidd v. V. O'Ca//aghan and Others [1940] A.C. 880 an'd Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 59': 159 E:R. 665, referred to.\n\nBarkway v. South Wales Transport Co. Ltd. [1950] I All. E.R. 392 H.L. 394, relied on.\n\n(ii) The rule in Ray/ands v. Fletcher is hardly dpplicable here.\n\nCanal Systems are essential to the life of the Nation and land that is used as canals, is subjected to an ordinary use and not to unnatural use on which the rule in Ray/ands v. Fletcher rests. 1bere is difficulty In distinguishing non-natural and natural user.\n\nRylands v. Flttcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 300, inapplicable.\n\nRichards v. Lothian, [1913] A.C. 263, relied on.\n\n(iii) Article 2 of the Limitation Act cannot apply to cases where the act or omission complained of is not alleged to be in pursu<inr.c\n\nof statutory authority. Act or omission which can claim statutory protection or is alleged to be in pursuance of a statutory commaU may attract Art. 2 of the Limitation Act but the Act or omission must be one which can be said to be in pursuance of an enactment. In tlte present case the breach in the bank was not that kind of act or omissio•.\n\nIt could not claim to be in P1:Jtsuance of the Canal Act. Nor coullll. the opening or closing of the channel for operations, though in pursuance of the Canal Act; be the relevant act or omission because they were more than a year before the cause of action and to apply a limitatioa of 90 days to that cause of action is not only impossible but also absurtl.\n\nArticle 2, therefore does not apply. Article 3 of the Limitation Act applie:1 to the present Ca!e.\n\nPunjab Cotton Press Co. Uti. T. SecretMy of St•te, I.LJt. IQ Lah. 1'1 P.C., inapplicable\n\nMohamad Sadaiit Ali Khan Y. Administrator Corpor•tion of City t1f Lahore, I.L.R. [194S] Lah. S23 F.B. and S<er.tary of Stale v. Lodna Colliery Co. Ltd., LL.It. 15 Pat. 510, referred lo.\n\nCommissioner.t for the Port of CuJcutlii Y. Corpor\"tion of Clllcutta, 64 I.A. 363, distin&uished.\n\nHeld (per Mudholkar 1.): (i) The rule in Ry/, mds v. Fl<tch<r applies only if the defe1dant brings or accumulates on his own land\n\nsoinehing that is likely to escape and do inischief, irrepective of tho question whether that wa.i t.lone by the defendant wilfu:Jy or ngligendy.\n\nThis rule has been adopted in this country in several cases anJ so call\n\nbe regarded ac: a part of the common law of the land. !n the country of its origin, thii: rule has been subjected h> cert.tin exception11.\n\nOne of the exceptions is this: that where the owner llf occupir 'lf land accumulates a deletericus substance thereon b)· virtue of an obligation imposed up-on hin1 by \" statute or in exercise of st'1tt1tory authority he will not be rtn<lered li<ible for damages resulting therefrom to other persons unless it is established that he was guilty .:1f neglige.r..:c i.n\n\nallowin~ the deleterious substance to escape.\n\nThe 1:ree11t case fa1-l1 within this exception.\n\nThe State of Punjab would not be liable for dam::tges by the operation of the rule in Rylands v. Flflcher hut is liable by rc:.ts1)n of iti\n\nnegligence.\n\nThe breach v.:<1s caused by the neglig:en;:e on th•: part of the officers of the Stale in inspecting the banks of the canal :lnd ia particular that portion of ir where the breach had been cJuscd.\n\nRylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 expJa; ned.\n\nGooroo Chuin \\'. Riun Jlutt, (1865) Z W.R. 43. Dhanitsav v. Sitabai,\n\n(1948) Nag. 698, and Du11ne v. North We.!otern Gns Bot1rd. (1964) 2 W.L.R. 164, referred to.\n\n(ii) The rule of evidence rts ipsa loquitur cannot be applied to the facts of this case because all the facts for the decision of the case were not placed before the court. Jmn1ediately after the breach occurred some reports were made by the officers of the State but they were not placed before the Court despite it! order requiring their productioL Jn other words the State had deliberately suppressed evidence in iSI possession which could have established negligence.\n\nIn this view the rule of res ipi11 loquilur is not the applicable.\n\nCJVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 416 and 417 of 1947.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree d:lted May 1, 1956, of the Punjab High Court in Regular First Appeal No. 45 of 1950.\n\nSt•le a/ Pun; ob\n\nMtJJern Cultivotor1\n\nSlllU of Punjab\n\n•• lllodern C11/tivaltJ11\n\nSorkor J.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellants (in C, A. No. 416/1962), '1nd respondent (in C.A. No. 417/62) .\n\nS. T. Desai, Hardayal Hardy and J. P. Agarwal, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 416 of 1962) and appellants (in C.A. No. 417 of 1962).\n\nMay 8, 1964. The following Judgments were delivered by the Court.\n\nSARKAR J.-1 agree with the orders proposed by my brother Hidayatullah.\n\nThese appeals arise out of a suit brought by a firm called the Modern Cultivators against the State of Punjab to recover damages for loss suffered by flooding of its lands as a result of a breach in a can.al belonging to the State of Punjab.\n\nBoth the Courts below have held in favour of the plaintiff but the High Court reduced the amount of the damages awarded by the trial Court.\n\nBoth parties have appealed to this Court. The Modern Cultiv.ators contend that the High Court is in error in reducing the amount of the damages.\n\nThe State of Punjab contends that it had no liability for the loss caused by the flooding.\n\nThe breach and the flooding of the plaintiff's lands are not now denied.\n\nIn regard to the appeal by the Modern Cultivators I have nothing to add to what has been said by Hidayatullah J.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned by him I agree that the damages had been correctly assessed by the trial Court.\n\nIn its appeal the State of Punjab first contended that the plaintiff could not succeed as it had failed to prove that the breach had been caused by the defendant's negligence.\n\nI am unable to accept this contention.\n\nThe trial Court inferred negligence against the defendant as it had failed to produce the relevant documents and with this view I agree.\n\nThe defendant had produced no documents to show how the breach was caused.\n\nIt had been asked by the trial Court to do so by an order made on May 12, 1949 but failed to produce them. The defendant had a large number of canal officers and according to Mr. Malhotra, the Execu tive Engineer in charge of the canal at the relevant time,\n\nthere was a regular office and various reports concerning the breach had been made.\n\nNone of these was produce<! at the hearing.\n\nIt is obvious that in an organisation like the canal office, reports and olher documents must have been kept to show how the breach occurred and what was <lone to stop it. If such documents are not produced, an inference can be legitimately made that if produced, they would have gone against the case of the defendant, that is, they would have proved that the defendant had been negligent: Murugesan Pillai v. Manickavasaka Pandara(').\n\nIt was suggested in this Court that the documents had been destroyed. It may be that they are now destroyed.\n\nOne of the defendant's officers called by the High Court in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the documentary evidence said that documents were destroyed after three to seven years.\n\nThe breach occurred in August 1947, the suit was filed in October 1948 and the trial was held about August 1949.\n\nSo it .would appear that at the time of the trial the relevant documents had not been destroyed.\n\nNor was it said that they had then been destroyea.\n\nFurthermore, in view of the pendency of the suit the documents must have been preserved.\n\nIt is, clear that they had not been produced deliberately.\n\nAn inference that the defendant was negligent in the management of the canal arises from the non-production of the documents.\n\nThere is, therefore, evidence that the defendant was negligent.\n\nFurth=ore it seems to me that the rule -of res ipsa loquitur applies to this case. The canal was admittedly in the management of the defendant and canal banks are not breached if those in management take proper care.\n\nIn such cases the rule would apply and the breach itself would be prima facie proof of negligence: see Scott v. London Dock Co.(2). ·· No doubt the defendant can show that the breach was due to act of God or to act of a third party or any other thing which would show that it had not been negligent, but it did not do so. It may be that the rule of res ipia\n\n/oquitur may not apply where it is known how the thing which caused the damage happened as was held in Bm kway\n\nv. South Wales Transport Co., Ltd.(3 ). But that is not the\n\n(2) 3 H. & c. 6ot (3)119501 I All E.R. 392\n\n1'64\n\nStat• of Prut/ab\n\n•• Modtrn Cult/••\n\ntori\n\nSarkar I.\n\nStai. of Punjab\n\nModern Cultiva-\n\nSarkar J.\n\ncase here.\n\nNo reason has been advanced why the rule should not apply.\n\nTherefore I think that the first contention of the defendant that there is no evidence of negligence must be rejected.\n\nI do not think it necessary in the present case to consider whether the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher(') applies to make the defendant liable for I have already held that it is liable as negligence has been proved.\n\nThe second point raised by the defend.ant was one of limitation.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the defendant that the case was governed by art. 2 of the first schedule of the Limitation Act.\n\nIt is not in dispute that if that article applies, the suit would be out of time.\n\nThat article relates to a suit \"for compensation for doing or omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment\"'.\n\nIt was said that the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 imposed a duty on the defendant to take care of the canal banks and its failure to do so was the omission to do an act in pursuance of an enactment within the article.\n\nI have very grave doubt if this interpretation of art. 2 is correct.\n\nThere is authority against it: see Mohammad Saadat Ali Khan v. The Administrator, Corporation of City of Lahore (2). But apart from that I find nothing in the Canal Act imposing any duty on the defendant to take care of the oanks. We ll'ere referred toss. 6 and 51 of that Act. Both are enabling sections giving power to the State Government to do certain acts.\n\nUnder s. 6 it has power to enter on any land and remove any obstruction and close any channels or do any other thing necessary for the application or use of the water to be taken into the canal.\n\nThis obviously does not impose any duty in connection with the canal bank.\n\nSection 15 gives the power to the canal authorities in case of accident happening or being apprehended to a canal to enter upon lands of others and to do all things necessary to repair the acpident or prevent it.\n\nThis section again has nothing to do with taking care of the canal banks.\n\nTherefore, even assuming that the defendant's interpretation of art. 2 is correct, this is not a c.ase to which it may apply.\n\nI wish however to make it clear that nothing that I have said\n\n(I) [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330\n\n(2) (1945] !LR 26 Lah. 523\n\nI I\n\nS S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 279 I · here is to be read as in any way approving the defendant's interpretation of .art. 2. Therefore the defendant's contentio!1 that the suit was barred by limitation also fails.\n\nThe defendant's appeal must, therefore, be diSmissed and the plaintiff's ap;:eal alJ(>wcd. Costs will naturally follow the result.\n\nStat• of PuniU ...\n\nMollcrn C11lJIP•\n\n\"'\" Sorl11t 1.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-On August 15, 1947 the Western Hidayotullah 1.\n\nJamna Canal at R.D. No. 138000 near Sanglpur .and.\n\nJandhrea villages burst its western bank. The canal water inundated the neighbouring fields where crops of sugar cane, maize, urud etc. grown by the plaintiff firm were dam.aged.\n\nThe plaintiff brought this action alleging that the breach in the bank was caused by negligence on the part of the canal authorities who were guilty of further negligence in not closing the breach without delay. The plaintiff estimated .. its loss at Rs. 60,000 in respect of the standing crnp and a further loss of Rs. 10,000 in respect of the deterioration of the land for future cultivation.·· It however, limited its claim to Rs. 20,000. The State Government denied negligence on the part of the canal authorities.\n\nGovernment admitted that a breach did occur in an old inlet channel of Chhalaundi Silting Tank on August 15, 1947 and some canal water escaped through the breach which, it was said, flowed back to the canal through the outlet of the silting tank lower down the canal Government claimed that the site was immediately inspected by the Executive Engineer and no damage to the crops was discovered and that the breach was promptly closed and the bank was strengthened.\n\nGovernment stated that there were henvy rains on the 8th September and again from 23rd to 28th September, 1947 causing floods in the nullahas but as the canal was running full supply, water brought by the nullahru to the silting tank could not get to the canal and over-flowed to the adjoining areas.\n\nShortly stated, plaintiff's case was that there was a breach in the western bank of the canal owing to the negligence of the defendants arid canal water escaped to the fields eausing\n\nthem to be flooded; while the case of the Government was that a breach did take 1>lace but it was promptly repaired\n\n19M\n\n . State of Punjab v.\n\nModern Cultivator1\n\nand. the fields were flooded not by the canal water but by heavy rains in the month of September. The trial judge passed a decree for Rs. 20,000 against Gove=ent, but it was reduced by the High.Court to Rs. 14,130. These two Hidayatullah . 1• cross-appeals have thus been filed by the rival parties by\n\n__________ SJY\"--cial leave of this Court. -· ·\n\nThe High Court and the court below have agreed in holding that there was a break in the canal. The size of the breach has been variously described, but it was certainly not less than 30 feet wide and the depth of the water at the breach was about 15 feet.\n\nIt is admitted that the canal was then running full supply @ 5,000 Cusecs.\n\nAs the width of the canal was 400 feet, the out-flow would be at the rate of 5,000X30/400 Cusecs if the breach was 30 feet wide.\n\nThis would mean extensive flooding of the low lying areas unless the breach was immediately closed.\n\nSome of the witnesses say that it was as much as 70 to 80 feet wide and that would make the out-flow even greater. The High Court held that the floods were not caused by the rains.\n\nPrior to the break in the canal there was only 1 inch of rainfall.\n\nThe heavy rains took place much later. The inundation of the fields was thus by water from the c.:rnal and not from the nullahas.\n\nThis much has already been held. It is admitted that the breach occurred at a place where there was an old nullah through which silting operations were carried out in the past and this exit was closed in the previous years and the breach was at that very site.\n\nThe breach was noticed on the morning of the 16th. No attempt was made by either side to establish the exact duration of time before the breach was repaired.\n\nMr.\n\nM.:ilhotra (Executive Engineer) stated that it was repaired by the 18th but was re-opened (one does not know why) on the 20th\n\nand again closed on the 21st.\n\nEvidence on behalf of the plaintiff established that water continued pouring out as late as the month of October.\n\nThis was apparently an exaggeration.\n\nThere is no evidence to show that the flow of water in the canal was re.duced from the headworks when the breach occurred. It apparently continued on full supplr.\n\nThe High Court attempted to secure the documents from the Canal Office which had not been produced earlier. The\n\n196-1 Executive Engineer, then in charge was summone<fto-bnng all the papers in his office .and he produced the telegrams received by and copies of telegrams issued from the head office between August 16, 1947 and September 5, 1947.\n\nFrom these documents it is now established that. the breach was not _repaired at least upto August 27, 1947 and the evidence that it was repaired on the 18th was therefore not accurate. It has also been established that the case of the plaintiff that water continued to flow right upto October was also false. It may thus be assumed that repairs were completed by the 27th August but not earlier.\n\nState of Pun/all\n\nModern Ca.lti•a-a\n\ntorr\n\nIIidayatullah 1.\n\nIt is admitted that the area into which water flowed was used as a silting tank. The silting operations comprise the opening of the bank of the canal at a selected place to let out turbid water which passing through the silting tank drops the sediment and flows back to the canal at a lower reach - free of the silt, and closing of the bank. -It is now admitted th.at at the exact spot where the breach took place there was previously an opening for silting purposes which was recently closed.\n\nThere is no evidence to show negligence on the part of Government.\n\nCuriously enough Goveniment said that it had, not preserved the papers connected with this mishap.\n\nWe can hardly believe - this.\n\nGovernment led evidence to establish that the banks of the canal were periodically inspected and claimed that the breach was an act of God without any negligence on the part of the canal authorities.\n\nIt is an admitted fact that crops of the plaintiff were destroyed if not wholly at least substantially.\n\nThe only question, therefore, is whether Government can be held responsible for the damage caused to the plaintiff and, if so, what should be the compensation.\n\n_Two points were urged on behalf of Government: the first was that the suit filed by the plaintiff was out of time inasmuch as Art. 2 of the Indian Limitation Act which prescribes a period of three months was applicable and not Art. 36 which prescribes a period of two years.\n\nThis was held against Government by the High Court and the court -below. The second point urgd on behalf of Government was that there was no proof of negligence whatever by the\n\nplaintiff and the plaintiff must therefore fail.\n\nThe High\n\n19U\n\ntlll• Bf J!unj•~\n\nv. lod•rn CultiYOtor1\n\n•idayatullah J.\n\nCourt in dealing with this point held that, in the circumstances res ipsa /oquitur and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove negligence .and it must be so presumed.\n\nThe High Court differed from the court below in assessing damages.\n\nIn the appeal of the Government both these points are urged.\n\nOn behalf of the plaintiff, in the companion appeal, it is contended that the High Court omitted to give proper compensation for the loss of maize and urud crop. It is submitted that the High Court adopted the formula that in respect of sugar cane crop which needs plenty of water the damages should be assessed at 1/3 of the value of the crop and in respect of maize and urud crops at 1/2 the value.\n\nThe plaintiff contends in its appeal that the whole of the maize and urud crop was completely destroyed and the decree of the court of first instance allowing 3/ 4 of the value of the crop as compensation was unassailable.\n\nIt is pointed out that evidence disclosed that water in the fields was 4 to 5 feet deep and the maize and urud plants were less than 2 feet high.\n\nIn other words, the plants remained submerged during all the time the fields were inundated. It is obvious that the crop must have been entirely destroyed and the allowance of 1/ 4 was because the destroyed crop had some value as chari.\n\nOn the facts, as found, there was hardly any justification for reducing the amount of the decree for dam.ages passed by the court of first instance.\n\nThe High Court itself, in more than one place, stated in its judgment that the maize and urud crops were completely destroyed. It is, therefore, clear that unless Government succeeds in its appeal the decree of the court of first instance must be restored in this case.\n\nMr. Vishwanatha Sastri on behalf of Government asked for a remit, but in view of the slight difference and the fact that the High Court itself remarked that the maize and urud crops were completely destroyed there would not be any necessity to order a remit in case the appeal of the Government fails.\n\nI shall now turn to that appeal.\n\nThe facts as found in .this case are that in 1946, the land which got tlooded, was used for silting operations.\n\nAn opening in the western bank was made in that year and the\n\n1964 bank was.restored in June 1946.\n\nTill the month of August in the following year there was no complaint.\n\nEvidence discloses that the banks were regularly inspected.\n\nA special Engineer and a Special Sub-Divisional Officer were in charge .and there were watchmen also.\n\nThere is no evidence of wilful con1 !uct. The plaintiff has not led evidence to establish .any particular act of negligence. There is no evidence that the breach was caused by the act of a third party or even of God.\n\nMr. Sastri, therefore, contends that as there was no forese.able danger against which precautions could be taken beyond making periodical inspections, and this was done, there can be no liability.\n\nHe submits that in this view of the matter the plaintiff must fail in the absence of proof of negligence.\n\nState of Pun; alr\n\nModern Cultiva+\n\ntori\n\nHidayatullah J !\n\nThe High Court applied to the case the rule in Donoghue\n\nv. Stavmson( 1 ) reinforcing it with what is often described as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.\n\nThis case is first of its kind in India .and needs to be carefully considered.\n\nBefore us reliance was placed upon the rule in Rylands v.\n\nFletcher('). That rule, shortly &tated, is: that any occupier of land who brings or keeps upon it anything likely to do damage if it escapes is bound at his peril to prevent its escape, and is liable for all the direct consequences of its escape, even if he has been guilty of no negligence: Per Salmond, Law of Torts 13th Edu. p. 574.\n\nThe rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was derivatively created from the rule of strict liability applicable to the acts of animals but, in my opinion, it is hardly applicable here.\n\nCanal systems are essential to the life of the w.ition and land that is used as canals, is subjected to an ordinary use and not to an unnatural use on which the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher rests.\n\nThe words of Lord Cairns \"non .. natural use\" of land and of Blackburn, J. \"special use bringing with it increased danger to others\" are sometimes missed.\n\nThere is difficulty in distinguishing non-natural and nai:ural user but perhaps the best test to apply is stat~ by Lord Moulton in Richards v.\n\nLothian (1) :\n\n(1)[1932] A.C. 562\n\n(2) L.R. 3 H.L. 300\n\n(3) [1913 I A C. 263, 280\n\nState of Punjab v. .-Modtrn Cultivator1\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nSUPREJ, IE COURT REPORTS [1g64]\n\n\"Some special use bringing with it incr iased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such .a use as is proper for the general benefit of the commutity.\"\n\nlbey formed the basis of observation of Vis.; oi.nt Maugham in Sedleigh-Denfield v. V. O'Cal/aghan and Ors. ( 1). As was pointed out by Holmes in his Common Law (1963) at p. 93:\n\n\"It may even be very much for the pul:lic good that dangerous accumulations should w made .... \"\n\nCases of breaks in canals resulting in dan, ger to neighbouring lands are rare but some are to be found in Jaw reports from the United States of America.\n\nI need not refer to them because the following passage from American Jvrisprudence Vol. 9 page 340 para 38 gives an adequate summary of the principles on which they h.au been dealt with:\n\n\"A canal company is also liable for flooding private property where it has not acquir, ld the legal right to do so; it is answerable in damages for all loss occ!lsioned by a neglect ou its part to use reasonable care and precautiou to prevent the waters of its canal from escaping therefrom to the injury arid detriment of others.\n\nA canal proprietor is not, however, liable for damages to adjoining lands resulting from a mere accidental break in his canal which lium1n foresight and vigilance could not have anticipated, and against which proper prudence and judgment could not be expected to provide.\n\nAlthough it has been held that a canal company is not Ii.able for damages occasioned by the percolation of waters through the banks of il~ canal, in the absence of proof of nl!g!igence on its part in want of skill or care in the construction and maintenance of its canal, uch holdings are maintenance of its canal, such holdings ---·------\n\n(1) 119401 A.c. 880 ., 888\n\nare opposed to the weight of reason and 111thority.\"\n\nPerhaps the liability is viewed strictly as an inducement to care.\n\nSafety is best secured when it is made the responsibility of the per:; on who must not only take precautions to avoid accident hut who alone decides what those precautions should be.\n\nIn this connection the rule that is most often quoted wa~ stated by Erle C.J. in Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co. (1) thus:\n\n\"There must be reasonable evidence of negligence.\n\nBut where the :thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and '.he accident is such as in the ordinan; course of things does not happen if those who tiave the manugement use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,. that the accident arose from want of care.\"\n\nIn subsequent ca5-es it has been customary to regard this as a statement of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.\n\nBut the principle, if it be one, cannot ~!ways be safely applied where the facts before the court are not the whole facts.\n\nIn a vast canal system constructed with great care and attention to detail it may be difficult to prove negligence but it may sometimes be equall;' difficult to explain how the defect arose.\n\nThe principle of res ipsa loquitur had its origin in the falling of a barrel of flour from a first floor window on a passerby but it has been extended to situations quite different.\n\nIt is not very much in favour and if applied it must be correctly understood.\n\nIt is not a principle which dispenses with proof of negligence. Rather it shifts onus from one party to another. It ; s rule of evidence and not of liability.\n\nA too ready reliance on the maxim reinforces a fault liability and makes it into an absolute liability. If absolute liability is to give way to fault liability, some fault must be established by evidence or must be capable of being reasonably inferred from the circumstances.\n\nIt is not\n\n(1) 3 H. & C. S96 : 159 E.R. 665\n\nState of Puniab\n\nModern Cultlra--\n\ntors\n\nHidayatuflah J.\n\nStall of PUJtiab\n\nModern Cultlva\n\ntor.r\n\n1Jidayatullah I.\n\nsufficient to say res ipsa loquitur because the danger is , that facts may not always tell the whole story and if there is something withheld how can the thing be saiC: to speak for itself ? The principle which I consider reasonable to apply where fault has to be inferred from circumstances was best stated by Lord Porter and I respectfully adopt it. Speaking of res ipsa loquitur it was observed by Lord Porter ia Barkway v. South Wales Transport Co. Ltd.(') :\n\n\"The doctrine is independent on the absence of ex\n\nplanation, and, although it is the duty of the defendants, if they desire to protect themselves, to give an adequate explanation of the cause of the accident, yet, if the facts are sufilciently known, the question ceases to be one where the facts speak for themselves, and the solution is to be found by determining whether, on the facts as est1blished, negligence is to be Inferred or not.\"\n\nI have made these observations so that the principle may not be applied too liberally. It must also be remembered that what is said in relation to it in one case cannot indiscriminately be appijed to another case. It should not be applied as legal rule but only as an aid to an inference when it is reasonable to think that there are ne further facts to consider.\n\nI shall now consider the facts as they stand in this case to discover if the canal authorities can be said to be at fault.\n\nThe facts show that the water escaped into the Chillaundi Silting Tank through the nallah which had previously beea used for silting operations and had been sealed in the previous year. If the plug were sound it would have withstood the pressure of water as it did after it was repaired on the 27th August even though 28\" of rainfall fell within 20 days.\n\nThere is nothing to show that the outflow was due to raillfall or a storm so exceptional that it could be regarded as an a, ct of God.\n\nNor was it due to any disturbance of the earth's crust or interferenc!' by a stranger.\n\nThere is thus \"Sufficient evidence, in the absence of reasonable explanation\n\n(1) (1950] 1 All. E.R. 39> ot 39\"395\n\n(which there is not), to establish negligence.\n\nFurther, there was inordinate delay and negligence in sealing the breach.\n\nEven the flow in the canal was not reduced for repairs to be carried out quickly.\n\nIn such circumstances, the facts prove negligence and government was rightly held responsible.\n\nWhether the defect was patent or latent is not much to the purpose.\n\nIt was not an inevitable accident, and the Government must be held liable.\n\nIt remains to consider the question of limitation.\n\nThe High Court and the court below have applied Art. 36 of the Indian Limitation Act.\n\nGovernment claims that the proper Article to apply was Art. 2.\n\nThese Articles may be set down here:\n\nDescription of suit.\n\n2. For compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any en9.ctmant in force for the time in India\n\n36. For compensation for any mal-feasance, mis-feasance or non-feasance independent of contract and not herein specially provided for.\n\nPeriod of I imitation\n\nNinety day•\n\nTwo years (now one year)\n\nTime from which period bgins to run.\n\nWhen the act or omission takes place.\n\nWhen the malfeasance\n\nmisfeasancc or non~ feasancc talc.es -place.\n\nIt is not denied that if Art. 2 was not applicable, the proper Article would be Art. 36 and the suit would also be within time. In contending that the second article applies reliance is placed on a decision of the Privy Council in Punjab Cotton\n\nPress Co. Ltd. v. Secretary of State(').\n\nBut that case is clearly inapplicable.\n\nThere the canal authorities cut the bank of a canal at a selected point to let the water away with a view to protecting a railway track passing close by on a high embankment and in this way flooded and injured the plaintiff's mills.\n\nThe Judicial Committee held that if the act was done, as was said, under s. 15 of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873 (8 of 1873), Art. 2 ws\n\napplicable and not Art. 36.\n\nThe case was thus remanded\n\n(1) I.L.R. IO Lah.'r71 P.C.\n\nIJU\n\nStot1 •I Pull/flt\n\nM.Cern C•W..\n\nt•r6\n\nllii., atulltrlt 1.\n\n&tali of Punjab\n\n•• llollern C11/tlvato11 • - Bldayatullah J.\n\nto find the fact necessary for the application of the right article.\n\nIn relying upon this case, Mr. Viswanatha Sastri claims that s. 15 of the Canal Act covers the present facts .\n\nMr. Gopal Singh, who followed, also refers to s. 6.\n\nThese sections read:\n\n\"6. Powers of Canal Officer.\n\nAt any time after the day so named, any Canal Officer, acting under the orders of the State Government in this behalf, may enter on any land and remove any obstructions, and may close any channels, and do any other thing necessary for such application or use of the said water.\"\n\n\"15. Power to enter for repairs and to prevent accidents.\n\nIn case of any accident happening or being apprehended to a canal, any Divisional Canal Officer or any person acting under his general or special orders in this behalf may enter upon any lands adjacent to such canal, and may execute all works which may be necessary for the purpose of repairing or preventing such accidents.\n\nCompensation for dam.age to land.\n\nCompensation for damage to land: In every such case, such Canal Officer or person shall tender compensation to the proprietors or occupiers of the said lands for all damage done to the same. If such tender is not accepted, the Canal Officer shall refer the matter to the Collector, who shall proceed to\n\naw.ard :compensation for the damage as though the State Government had directed the occupation of the lands under section 43 of the La.nd Acquisition Act, 1870.\"\n\nIn regard to section 6 it is sufficient to say that it has no application here.\n\nIt refers to the day named in s. 5 and\n\nthat section provides for a notification to be issued declar- 1964 ing that water would be applied after a particular date for Stat• of Punjab purpose of any existing or projected canal or drainage work Modern vCultiva or for purposes of Government.\n\nOn such notification issu- 1or1 ing any Canal Officer, acting under the orders of the State Hidayatcdlah I.\n\nGovernment, may enter on any land and remove obstructions or close any channels so that water may be applied to those purposes.\n\nThis is an entirely different matter and it is no wonder that Mr. Viswanatha Sastri did not rely upon s. 6.\n\nSection 15 no doubt confers a power to enter lands and property of others to affect repairs or to prevent accidents.\n\nOne can hardly dispute that it is the normal duty of canal authorities to make repairs and execute works to prevent accidents. But Art. 2 cannot apply to omissions in following the statutory dutie3 because it cannot be suggested that they are 'in pursuance of any enactment'.\n\nCases of malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance may or may not have statutory protection.\n\nAct or omission which can claim statutory protection or is alleged to be in pursuance of a statutory command may attract Art. 2 but the act or <mission must be one which can be said to be in pursuance of an enactment.\n\nHere the suit was for compensation for damage consequent on a break in the canal on August 15, 1947. The\n\nonly act or omission could be the opening and closing of the channel for silting operations.\n\nThat was bef.:>re June\n\n1946. The third column of Art. 2 provides the start of the limitation of 90 days-\" when the act or omissiJn take.s place.\" The period of limitation in this case would he over even before the injury if that were the starting point.\n\nThis subject was elaborately discussed in Mohamad Sadaat Ali Khan v. Administrator Corporation of City of Lahore(') where all rulings on the subject were noticed, Mahajan J. (as he then was) pointed out that \"the act or omission must be those which are honestly believed to be justified by a statute\".\n\nThe same opinion was xpressed\n\n(I) l.L.R. [1945] Lah. 523 F.B.\n\n51 S.C.-19.\n\nStat• of Puniab v.\n\nMod., n Cultivator'\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1S [1g64)\n\nby Courtney Terrell CJ., in Secretary of State v. Lodna Colliery Co. Ltd. (1) in these words :-\n\n\"The object of the article is the protection of public officials, who, while bona fide purporting to act in the exercise of a statutory power, have exceeded that power and have committed a tortious act; it resembles in this respect the English Public Authorities Protection Act. If the act complained of is within the :erms of the statute, no protection is needed, for the plaintiff has suffered no legal wrong.\n\nThe protection is needed when an actionable wrong has been committed and to secure the protection there must be in the first place a bona fide belief by the official that the act compalined of was justified by the statute; secondly, the act must have been performed under colour of a statutory duty, and thirdly, the act must be in itself a tort in order to give rise to the cause of action.\n\nIt is against such actions for tort that the statute gives protection.\" ·\n\nThese cases have rightly decided that Art. 2 cannot apply to cases where the act or omission complained of 1s not alleged to be in pursuance of statutory authority. It is true that in Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Corporation of Calcutta(')• the Judicial Committee, while dealing with s. 142 of the Calcutta Port Act (3 of 1890) which reads:\n\n\"No suit shall be brought against any person for any done or purporting or professing to be done in pursuance of this Act, .'lfter the expiration of three months from the day on which the cause of action in such suit shall have arisen\",\n\npointed to the presence of the words \"purporting or professing to be done in pursuance of this Act\" and observed that\n\n(1) I.L.R. 15 Pat. 510\n\n1hey regarded the words as of 'pivotal importance' and that their presence postulated \"that work which is not done in pursuance of the statute may nevertheless be accorded its\n\nprotection if the work professes or purports to be done in pursuance of the statute\".\n\nBut they were giving pwtectien to an act which could ligitimately claim to be in pursuance of the Port Amt.\n\nHere the break in the bank was not that kind of act or omission. It could not claim to be in pursuance of the Canal Act.\n\nNor could the opening or closing of the channel for silting operations, though in pursuance of the Canal Act, be the relevant act or omission because 1hey were more than a year before the cause of action and to apply a limitation of 90 days to that cause of action is not only impossible but .also absurd.\n\nArt. 2, therefore, does not apply here. It was not contended before us that the suit was otherwise time-barred and we accordingly confirm the finding that the suit was within time.\n\nThe result thus is that the appeal filed by the State Government fails and I would dismlss it with costs and allow 1he appial filed by the plaintiff with costs.\n\nI would modify the judgment and decree of the High Court by altering the amount of Rs. 14,130 to Rs. 20,000 as ordered by the trial judge.\n\nState of Pun;..•\n\nv. '! odern Cultivator&\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nMUIJHOLKAR, J.-I agree with my brethren Sarkar and Mlldholkar J.\n\nHidayatullah that the appeal preferred by the defendant, the Stale of Punjab, be dismissed and the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the Modem Cultiv.ators, be allowed and the decree for damages be restored to the sum awarded by the trial court.\n\nI also agree with the order for costs as proposed.\n\nI wish to add nothing with regard to the plaintiff's appeal to what has been said by my brother Hidayatul\\ah nor to what he or my brother Sarkar has said regarding the question of limitation raised on behalf of the defendant. They have both held that art. 2 of the Limitation Act is not attracted to a case like the present where the damages sustained by the plalntllf are not the :result of anything done by the State\n\n1!164\n\nSt\"lt o/ Pun; ab\n\n' Modern Cu/tlvain pursuance of a statutory power exercised by it or by reason of an act which could properly be said to have been performed in the purported exercise of a statutory power.\n\nIf art. 2 is out of the way, it is not disputed on behalf of the State that the suit will be within time. tor1\n\nMudh41/kar J.\n\nMy: learned brother Hidayatullah has referred to the rule of common Jaw as to strict Ji.ability with respect to damages resulting from the escape of deleterious substances or cattle from the land which have been accumulated or brought on the land by its owner for his use and which were not natural there.\n\nThe rule was stated thus in Rylands v. Fletcher(') by Blackburn, J.:\n\n\"We think that the true rule of Jaw is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his Lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.\"\n\nIt was approved by the House of Lords, but Lord Cairns laid down a new principle distinguishing the natural from the non-natural user of land and holding that in the latter case only was the liability absolute. (see Salmond on I Torts, 13th ed. p. 579).\n\nThis rule has been adopted in this country in several cases (see Gooroo Churn v. Ram Dutt('); Dhanusao v. Sitabai(') and several other cases) and can, therefore, be regarded as a part of th~ common law of the land.\n\nIn the country of its origin, this rule has been subjected to certain exceptions.\n\nThe present case falls in one of the exceptions recognised in some, though not, all cases.\n\nIt has been held in some c1ses that where the owner or occupier of land accumulates a deleterious substance thereon by virtue of an obligation imposed upon him by a statute or in exercise of statutory authority he will not be rendered liable for damages resulting therefrom to other persons unless it is established that he was ilty\n\n(1) (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330\n\n(a) (1865) 2 W.R. 43\n\n(3) I.L.R. [1948) N11. 698\n\nof negligence in allowing the deleterious substance to escape.\n\nIn a recent decision Dunne v. Horth Western Gas Board(') the Court of Appeal has recognised this exception and the controversy may be said to have been set at rest, subject, of course, to what the House of Lords may have to say hereafter.\n\nIndeed, the liability to pay damages to another resulting from an act of a person is laid upon him by the law of torts upon the basis that his act was wrongful and that he was a wrong-doer.\n\nWhere, therefore, the act consists of something which the Jaw enjoins upon that person to do or which the law permits him to do, it c.annot possibly be said that his mere act in doing that something was in itself wrongful and that he was a wrong-doer.\n\nHe will, however, be liable if he performed the act in a negligent manner or if the escape of the deleterious sub' stance subsequent to accumulation of th.at substance in exercise of a statutory authority was the result of his negligence.\n\nThere is nothing here to show that in constructing the canal under the powers conferred by Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 the State did anything other than what the Jaw permitted.\n\nTherefore, by constructing the canals and allowing water to flow along it the State merely exercised its statutory authority. Further, there is nothing to show that there was any want of care in constructing the canal and so no question of negligence will arise in constructing the canal and allowing water to flow along the canal in question.\n\nHere, what has happened is that at the point where prior to 1946 .the water from the canal was allowed to flow into the silting tank through a nallah, there w.as an opening which was plugged in that year.\n\nHere, it is established that over a year after that opening was plugged by the State a breach of about 30 or 40 feet was caused.\n\nThis occurred on August 15, 1947.\n\nIt has not been shown th.at the breach could have been caused by an act of God or an act of third party.\n\nThe contention of the State that it was caused by heavy rains in the catchment area has not been found to be true. If, therefore, there is material from which it could be inferreJ that the breach was caused by reason of negligence on the part of the State in inspecting the banks of the canal and in\n\n(1) [1964] 2 W.L.R. 164\n\nSill< of Pun;.\n\nModern Cu/th\n\ntori\n\nMwdholkar ;\n\n;1a11 of Punjab\n\n•• tlodem Cultlva-\n\nMudholkar J.\n\nparticular that portion of it where the breach had been caused the St.ate would be liable in damages.\n\nThis would be so not by the operation of the rule in Rylands v • Fletcher(') but by reason of negligence.\n\nThe sole ground upon which the liability of the State could be established in this case would be negligence of the State in properly maintaining the banks of the canal.\n\nFor this purpose it would be relevant to consider whether there were periodic.al inspections, whether any breaches or the development of cracks were noticed along the banks of the canal and in particular at the place where the breach ultimately occurred or whether any erosion of the banks particularly at the place where one of the banks had been plugged had been noticed and no action or timely action had been taken thereon.\n\nThere is evidence to show that the canals were being regularly inspected.\n\nThat, however, is not the end of the matter.\n\nImmediately after the breach occurred some reports were made and as pointed out by my brethren in their judgments they were not placed before the court despite its order requiring their production.\n\nWhen the matter went up before the High Court it was said that the records had been destroyed in the year 1958 or so and therefore they could not be furnished.\n\nThis action on the part of the State is manifestly unreasonable and the legitimate inference that could be drawn from it is that if the documents had been produced they would have gone against the State and would establish its negligence.\n\nIn these circumstances I would hold that though the plaintiffs have been unable to adduce positive evidence of negligence it could legitimately be presumed that the State was negligent inasmuch as it had deliberately suppressed evidence in its possession which could have established negligence. In the circumstances of this case I do not think it appropriate to refer to the rule of evidence res ipsa loquitur.\n\nAppeal No. 416 dismissed and Appeal No. 417 allowed\n\n(1) [1858) LK. 3 H, L 330", "total_entities": 111, "entities": [{"text": "273\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MODERN CULTIVATORS, LADWA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MODERN CULTIVATORS, LADWA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. MUDHOLKAR,\n\nJJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.R. MUDHOLKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 331, "end_char": 374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 6, 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376, "end_char": 385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873", "statute": "Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2009, "end_char": 2023, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Iiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2191, "end_char": 2195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iiah, J,): (i) The principle of ru i1pa loquitur Manot always be safely applied where the faci.. before the court aro mot the whole facto."}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4169, "end_char": 4178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4186, "end_char": 4200, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4444, "end_char": 4450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4458, "end_char": 4472, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jtsuance of the Canal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4677, "end_char": 4702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5006, "end_char": 5015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jtsuance of the Canal Act", "statute": "Jtsuance of the Canal Act"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5043, "end_char": 5052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jtsuance of the Canal Act", "statute": "Jtsuance of the Canal Act"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5060, "end_char": 5074, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab Cotton Press Co. Uti. T. SecretMy of St•te, I.LJt. IQ Lah. 1'1 P.C.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5106, "end_char": 5180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab Cotton Press Co. Uti."}}, {"text": "Mohamad Sadaiit Ali Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5196, "end_char": 5220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'1 P.C., inapplicable\n\nMohamad Sadaiit Ali Khan Y. Administrator Corpor•tion of City t1f Lahore, I.L.R. [194S] Lah."}}, {"text": "S23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5289, "end_char": 5292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jtsuance of the Canal Act", "statute": "Jtsuance of the Canal Act"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6440, "end_char": 6455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Punjab would not be liable for dam::tges by the operation of the rule in Rylands v. Flflcher hut is liable by rc:.ts1)n of iti\n\nnegligence."}}, {"text": "Sorkor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7826, "end_char": 7832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St•le a/ Pun; ob\n\nMtJJern Cultivotor1\n\nSlllU of Punjab\n\n•• lllodern C11/tivaltJ11\n\nSorkor J.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellants (in C, A. No."}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7837, "end_char": 7860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St•le a/ Pun; ob\n\nMtJJern Cultivotor1\n\nSlllU of Punjab\n\n•• lllodern C11/tivaltJ11\n\nSorkor J.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellants (in C, A. No."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7862, "end_char": 7873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St•le a/ Pun; ob\n\nMtJJern Cultivotor1\n\nSlllU of Punjab\n\n•• lllodern C11/tivaltJ11\n\nSorkor J.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellants (in C, A. No.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Singh"}}, {"text": "R. N.\n\nSachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7878, "end_char": 7893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "St•le a/ Pun; ob\n\nMtJJern Cultivotor1\n\nSlllU of Punjab\n\n•• lllodern C11/tivaltJ11\n\nSorkor J.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Gopal Singh and R. N.\n\nSachthey, for the appellants (in C, A. No."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7979, "end_char": 7990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Hardayal Hardy and J. P. Agarwal, for the respondent (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Hardayal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7992, "end_char": 8006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Hardayal Hardy and J. P. Agarwal, for the respondent (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "J. P. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8011, "end_char": 8024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, Hardayal Hardy and J. P. Agarwal, for the respondent (in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8181, "end_char": 8187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR J.-1 agree with the orders proposed by my brother Hidayatullah.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8238, "end_char": 8250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR J.-1 agree with the orders proposed by my brother Hidayatullah.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9046, "end_char": 9058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to the appeal by the Modern Cultivators I have nothing to add to what has been said by Hidayatullah J.\n\nFor the reasons mentioned by him I agree that the damages had been correctly assessed by the trial Court.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "May 12, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9667, "end_char": 9679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It had been asked by the trial Court to do so by an order made on May 12, 1949 but failed to produce them."}}, {"text": "Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9780, "end_char": 9788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant had a large number of canal officers and according to Mr. Malhotra, the Execu tive Engineer in charge of the canal at the relevant time,\n\nthere was a regular office and various reports concerning the breach had been made."}}, {"text": "art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12775, "end_char": 12781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12811, "end_char": 12825, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "was said that the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13046, "end_char": 13107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13327, "end_char": 13333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It was said that the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873", "statute": "It was said that the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873"}}, {"text": "apart from that I find nothing in the Canal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13468, "end_char": 13515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13716, "end_char": 13720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But apart from that I find nothing in the Canal Act", "statute": "But apart from that I find nothing in the Canal Act"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13982, "end_char": 13992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But apart from that I find nothing in the Canal Act", "statute": "But apart from that I find nothing in the Canal Act"}}, {"text": "art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14335, "end_char": 14341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But apart from that I find nothing in the Canal Act", "statute": "But apart from that I find nothing in the Canal Act"}}, {"text": "art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14639, "end_char": 14645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14923, "end_char": 14935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HIDAYATULLAH, J.-On August 15, 1947 the Western Hidayotullah 1.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "August 15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14943, "end_char": 14958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HIDAYATULLAH, J.-On August 15, 1947 the Western Hidayotullah 1."}}, {"text": "8th September and again", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16259, "end_char": 16282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government stated that there were henvy rains on the 8th September and again from 23rd to 28th September, 1947 causing floods in the nullahas but as the canal was running full supply, water brought by the nullahru to the silting tank could not get to the canal and over-flowed to the adjoining areas."}}, {"text": "23rd to 28th September, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16288, "end_char": 16316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government stated that there were henvy rains on the 8th September and again from 23rd to 28th September, 1947 causing floods in the nullahas but as the canal was running full supply, water brought by the nullahru to the silting tank could not get to the canal and over-flowed to the adjoining areas."}}, {"text": "M.:ilhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18580, "end_char": 18590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nM.:ilhotra (Executive Engineer) stated that it was repaired by the 18th but was re-opened (one does not know why) on the 20th\n\nand again closed on the 21st."}}, {"text": "August 16, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19362, "end_char": 19377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\n196-1 Executive Engineer, then in charge was summone<fto-bnng all the papers in his office .and he produced the telegrams received by and copies of telegrams issued from the head office between August 16, 1947 and September 5, 1947."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19382, "end_char": 19399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\n196-1 Executive Engineer, then in charge was summone<fto-bnng all the papers in his office .and he produced the telegrams received by and copies of telegrams issued from the head office between August 16, 1947 and September 5, 1947."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19494, "end_char": 19509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the breach was not _repaired at least upto August 27, 1947 and the evidence that it was repaired on the 18th was therefore not accurate."}}, {"text": "State of Pun", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19800, "end_char": 19812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Pun/all\n\nModern Ca.lti•a-a\n\ntorr\n\nIIidayatullah 1.", "canonical_name": "State of Puniab"}}, {"text": "IIidayatullah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19843, "end_char": 19856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Pun/all\n\nModern Ca.lti•a-a\n\ntorr\n\nIIidayatullah 1.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21149, "end_char": 21155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21170, "end_char": 21184, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21250, "end_char": 21257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "•idayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21583, "end_char": 21595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High\n\n19U\n\ntlll• Bf J!unj•~\n\nv. lod•rn CultiYOtor1\n\n•idayatullah J.\n\nCourt in dealing with this point held that, in the circumstances res ipsa /oquitur and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove negligence .and it must be so presumed.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Vishwanatha Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23347, "end_char": 23365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Vishwanatha Sastri on behalf of Government asked for a remit, but in view of the slight difference and the fact that the High Court itself remarked that the maize and urud crops were completely destroyed there would not be any necessity to order a remit in case the appeal of the Government fails.", "canonical_name": "Vishwanatha Sastri"}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24351, "end_char": 24357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sastri, therefore, contends that as there was no forese.able danger against which precautions could be taken beyond making periodical inspections, and this was done, there can be no liability."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24903, "end_char": 24908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This case is first of its kind in India .and needs to be carefully considered."}}, {"text": "Salmond", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25304, "end_char": 25311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That rule, shortly &tated, is: that any occupier of land who brings or keeps upon it anything likely to do damage if it escapes is bound at his peril to prevent its escape, and is liable for all the direct consequences of its escape, even if he has been guilty of no negligence: Per Salmond, Law of Torts 13th Edu."}}, {"text": "Cairns", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25736, "end_char": 25742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words of Lord Cairns \"non .. natural use\" of land and of Blackburn, J. \"special use bringing with it increased danger to others\" are sometimes missed."}}, {"text": "Blackburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25779, "end_char": 25788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words of Lord Cairns \"non .. natural use\" of land and of Blackburn, J. \"special use bringing with it increased danger to others\" are sometimes missed."}}, {"text": "Moulton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25994, "end_char": 26001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is difficulty in distinguishing non-natural and nai:ural user but perhaps the best test to apply is stat~ by Lord Moulton in Richards v.\n\nLothian (1) :\n\n(1)[1932] A.C. 562\n\n(2) L.R. 3 H.L. 300\n\n(3) [1913 I A C. 263, 280\n\nState of Punjab v. .-Modtrn Cultivator1\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nSUPREJ, IE COURT REPORTS [1g64]\n\n\"Some special use bringing with it incr iased danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such .a use as is proper for the general benefit of the commutity.\""}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26516, "end_char": 26522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was pointed out by Holmes in his Common Law (1963) at p. 93:\n\n\"It may even be very much for the pul:lic good that dangerous accumulations should w made .... \"\n\nCases of breaks in canals resulting in dan, ger to neighbouring lands are rare but some are to be found in Jaw reports from the United States of America."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26785, "end_char": 26809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was pointed out by Holmes in his Common Law (1963) at p. 93:\n\n\"It may even be very much for the pul:lic good that dangerous accumulations should w made .... \"\n\nCases of breaks in canals resulting in dan, ger to neighbouring lands are rare but some are to be found in Jaw reports from the United States of America."}}, {"text": "Erle", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28348, "end_char": 28352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection the rule that is most often quoted wa~ stated by Erle C.J. in Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co. (1) thus:\n\n\"There must be reasonable evidence of negligence."}}, {"text": "S96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29966, "end_char": 29969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Puniab", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29986, "end_char": 30001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not\n\n(1) 3 H. & C. S96 : 159 E.R. 665\n\nState of Puniab\n\nModern Cultlra--\n\ntors\n\nHidayatuflah J.\n\nStall of PUJtiab\n\nModern Cultlva\n\ntor.r\n\n1Jidayatullah I.\n\nsufficient to say res ipsa loquitur because the danger is , that facts may not always tell the whole story and if there is something withheld how can the thing be saiC: to speak for itself ?", "canonical_name": "State of Puniab"}}, {"text": "Hidayatuflah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30027, "end_char": 30039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not\n\n(1) 3 H. & C. S96 : 159 E.R. 665\n\nState of Puniab\n\nModern Cultlra--\n\ntors\n\nHidayatuflah J.\n\nStall of PUJtiab\n\nModern Cultlva\n\ntor.r\n\n1Jidayatullah I.\n\nsufficient to say res ipsa loquitur because the danger is , that facts may not always tell the whole story and if there is something withheld how can the thing be saiC: to speak for itself ?", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "1Jidayatullah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30085, "end_char": 30098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not\n\n(1) 3 H. & C. S96 : 159 E.R. 665\n\nState of Puniab\n\nModern Cultlra--\n\ntors\n\nHidayatuflah J.\n\nStall of PUJtiab\n\nModern Cultlva\n\ntor.r\n\n1Jidayatullah I.\n\nsufficient to say res ipsa loquitur because the danger is , that facts may not always tell the whole story and if there is something withheld how can the thing be saiC: to speak for itself ?", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Porter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30419, "end_char": 30425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle which I consider reasonable to apply where fault has to be inferred from circumstances was best stated by Lord Porter and I respectfully adopt it."}}, {"text": "Art. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32743, "end_char": 32750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32765, "end_char": 32779, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32837, "end_char": 32843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33410, "end_char": 33416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33465, "end_char": 33472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34020, "end_char": 34025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34033, "end_char": 34075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34089, "end_char": 34095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873", "statute": "the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873"}}, {"text": "Art. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34119, "end_char": 34126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873", "statute": "the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873"}}, {"text": "Bldayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34297, "end_char": 34309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "&tali of Punjab\n\n•• llollern C11/tlvato11 • - Bldayatullah J.\n\nto find the fact necessary for the application of the right article."}}, {"text": "Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34415, "end_char": 34432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In relying upon this case, Mr. Viswanatha Sastri claims that s. 15 of the Canal Act covers the present facts .", "canonical_name": "Vishwanatha Sastri"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34445, "end_char": 34450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873", "statute": "the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873"}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34500, "end_char": 34511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Gopal Singh, who followed, also refers to s. 6.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34542, "end_char": 34546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873", "statute": "the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35719, "end_char": 35729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Acquisition Act, 1870", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35743, "end_char": 35764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35781, "end_char": 35790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act, 1870", "statute": "Acquisition Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35879, "end_char": 35883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act, 1870", "statute": "Acquisition Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36480, "end_char": 36484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act, 1870", "statute": "Acquisition Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36487, "end_char": 36497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act, 1870", "statute": "Acquisition Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36736, "end_char": 36742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act, 1870", "statute": "Acquisition Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37096, "end_char": 37102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37444, "end_char": 37450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37813, "end_char": 37820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This subject was elaborately discussed in Mohamad Sadaat Ali Khan v. Administrator Corporation of City of Lahore(') where all rulings on the subject were noticed, Mahajan J. (as he then was) pointed out that \"the act or omission must be those which are honestly believed to be justified by a statute\"."}}, {"text": "Courtney Terrell", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38121, "end_char": 38137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n Cultivator'\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1S [1g64)\n\nby Courtney Terrell CJ.,"}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39134, "end_char": 39140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39393, "end_char": 39399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40634, "end_char": 40640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Pun;", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41118, "end_char": 41131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Pun;..•\n\nv. '!", "canonical_name": "State of Puniab"}}, {"text": "odern Cultivator", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41142, "end_char": 41158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "odern Cultivator&\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nMUIJHOLKAR, J.-I agree with my brethren Sarkar and Mlldholkar J.\n\nHidayatullah that the appeal preferred by the defendant, the Stale of Punjab, be dismissed and the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the Modem Cultiv.ators, be allowed and the decree for damages be restored to the sum awarded by the trial court."}}, {"text": "MUIJHOLKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41178, "end_char": 41188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "odern Cultivator&\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nMUIJHOLKAR, J.-I agree with my brethren Sarkar and Mlldholkar J.\n\nHidayatullah that the appeal preferred by the defendant, the Stale of Punjab, be dismissed and the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the Modem Cultiv.ators, be allowed and the decree for damages be restored to the sum awarded by the trial court.", "canonical_name": "MUIJHOLKAR"}}, {"text": "Mlldholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41229, "end_char": 41239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "odern Cultivator&\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nMUIJHOLKAR, J.-I agree with my brethren Sarkar and Mlldholkar J.\n\nHidayatullah that the appeal preferred by the defendant, the Stale of Punjab, be dismissed and the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the Modem Cultiv.ators, be allowed and the decree for damages be restored to the sum awarded by the trial court."}}, {"text": "Hidayatul\\ah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41640, "end_char": 41652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I wish to add nothing with regard to the plaintiff's appeal to what has been said by my brother Hidayatul\\ah nor to what he or my brother Sarkar has said regarding the question of limitation raised on behalf of the defendant.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41682, "end_char": 41688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I wish to add nothing with regard to the plaintiff's appeal to what has been said by my brother Hidayatul\\ah nor to what he or my brother Sarkar has said regarding the question of limitation raised on behalf of the defendant.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41795, "end_char": 41801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41809, "end_char": 41823, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42182, "end_char": 42188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "kar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42298, "end_char": 42301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tor1\n\nMudh41/kar J.\n\nMy: learned brother Hidayatullah has referred to the rule of common Jaw as to strict Ji.ability with respect to damages resulting from the escape of deleterious substances or cattle from the land which have been accumulated or brought on the land by its owner for his use and which were not natural there."}}, {"text": "Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45145, "end_char": 45188, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46482, "end_char": 46491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Modern Cu/th\n\ntori\n\nMwdholkar ;\n\n;1a11 of Punjab\n\n•• tlodem Cultlva-\n\nMudholkar J.\n\nparticular that portion of it where the breach had been caused the St.ate would be liable in damages.", "canonical_name": "MUIJHOLKAR"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_295_306_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 295\n\nBIREN DUITA AND OTHERS\n\nCHIEF COMMISSIONER OF TR.IPURA AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nC.J., K. N.\n\nWANCHOO, M.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J. <;:. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nAYYANGAR; JJ.)\n\nDetention Order-Review-Continuation of dettntfon beyond 1iz months-Order, if must be recorded in writing and communicated to the deten,,-Defence of India Rules, 1962, RR. 30 (l)(b),\n\n30A(8).\n\nThe Administrator of the Union Territory of Tripura passed orders detaining 68 persons, including the appellants and the petitioners, under R. 30(I)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. While gradually releasing 45 of them be purported to detain the appellants and tho petitioners under R. 30A(8) of the said Rules, The appellants moved the Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution and their case was that the decision to continue them in detention was J?Ot recorded in writing nor was it communicated to them and was, therefore, invalid in law. The Judicial Commissioner dismissed the said application!. The petitioners moved this Court under Att. 32 of the Constitution and their case was also the same. The first review held on February 1 S,\n\n1963, in respect of all the 68 detenus was reoorded as follows.-\n\n\"On review of the detention order in respect of all the detenus\n\nCC. decided to cailcel orders in respect of detent11 at S. Nos. l, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 13.\"\n\nIt was urged on behalf of the respondent that the order by implication continued the detention of the appellants and the petitioners and. such detention was confirmed by subsequent orders.\n\nHeld: (i) The order did not comply with the provisiot11 of R. 30A(8) of the Defence of India Rules and the detenus before this Court mmt be set at liberty.\n\nDecision to continue a detenu in detention must not only be recorded in wNting but such writing must clearly and unambiguously indicate that decision.\n\nSubsequent reviews under the Rule could not validate the illegal continuance of the detention after the expiry of six months from the date of the original order of delenlion.\n\nDecision recorded under R. 30A(8) is in tho nature of an independent decision and further detention can be justified only if the doci1ion Is recorded u required by it\n\nJuly, 23\n\nBiren Dutta v.\n\nEven assuming that an order passed under R. 30A(8) could in a proper case imply the decision to• continue the detention of some of the detenus, the present case could not be said to be one 1uch.\n\nC.C. of Tripura\n\n(ii) Assuming, though not deciding, that a decision recorded under R. 30A(8) of the Rules was not in law required to be communicated to the detenue, it was just and proper that the decision should in every case be communicated to the detenu.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 87-91 of 1964.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 18, 1964, of the Judicial Commissioner's Court for Tripura in Criminal Misc. (Habeas Corpus) Petitions Nos. )5, 20, 25, 26 and 28 of 1963, and Habeas Corpus Petitions Nos. 24 and 27 of 1963.\n\nAND Writ Petitions Nos. 43, 42, 40, 41, 65 and 80 of 1964.\n\nPetition Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the fundamental rights.\n\nR. K. Garg, S. C.\n\nAgarwala, D. P. Singh and M. K.\n\nRamamurthi, for the appellants and petitioners in all.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R. H.\n\nDhebar, for the respondents (Except Respondent No. 2 in W.P. 43 of 1964).\n\nD. Goburdhun, for respondent No. 2 (in W.P. 43 of 1964).\n\nJuly 23, 1964, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar 'GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-These Criminal Appeals and\n\nc. I.\n\nWrit Petitions have been placed for hearing together in a group because they raise common questions of law.\n\nAs is well-known, after the Chinese attacked the northern border of India on the 8th September, 1962, the President issued a Proclamation under Art. 3 5 2 of the Constitution on the 26th October, 1962.\n\nThis proclamation declared that a grave emergency existed which posed a threat to the security of India.\n\nOn the same day, an Ordinance was promulgated by the President. This Ordinance was subsequently modified by Ordinance No. 6 of 1962 on the 3rd of November, 1962. The President also issued an Order under Art. 359 ( 1) suspending the rights of citizens to mow any court for the enforcement. of the rights conferred by Articles 21 and 22 during the pendency of the emergency proclamation.\n\nOn the 26th October, 1962, the Rules framed by the Central Govern:nent under the Defence of India Act (hereinafter called 'the Rules') were published. Rule 30 of the Rules as originally framed was subsequently modified on the 6th December, 1962 and Rule 30-A was added.\n\nLater, an Act was passed on the 12th D1cember, 1962, and s. 48(1) of this Act provided for the repeal of the earlier Ordinances. Even so, s. 48 (2) provided for the continuance of the Rules framed under the Ordinall!ces, so that the relevant Rules framed under the\n\nOrdinances have to be taken as Rules framed under the latter Act.\n\nIt appears that Mr. Mukerjee who was the Administrator of the Union Territory of Tripura at the relevant time, cons.idered the material placed before him as such Administrator and was satisfied that a group of Communists had been agitating amongst the tribals residing in the area and inciting them against the Government, and he cairu! to the conclusion that their activities were likely to endanger the security of the State. Acting on this view, he directed that 68 persons should be detained under Rule\n\n30 (1) ( b) and passed appropriate orders in that behalf.\n\nLater, Le was satisfied that 45 out of these 68 persons need not be detained any longer; and so, he ordered their release from, time to time.\n\nThat left 23 persons under detention and it is with the cases of .these :p persons that we are concerned in the present group of criminal appeals and writ petitions.\n\n12 out of these 23 persons moved the Judicial Commissioner of Tripura under Art. 226 of the Constitution and prayed that the orders of detention under which they continued to be detained at the time of their petitions were illegal and .should be set aside and they should be ordered to be released forthwith.\n\nThese applications were heard\n\nBiren Dutta v.\n\nC.C. of Tripurt\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nBiren Dutta v. :.c. of Tripura\n\nGajend1agadkar\n\nC.J.\n\ntogether by the learned Judicial Commisioner and were ultimately dismissed.\n\nAgainst his decision, Criminal Appeals Nos. 87-91 of 1964, and 106 and 107 of 1964 have been filed by the detenues, with special leave granted to them by this Court on petitions made by them in that behalf.\n\nIt appears that the detenues Mohan Chaudhury and Jagabrata Sen Gupta who have joined in Cr. As.\n\nNos. 87-91/1964, have also preferred separate criminal appeals Nos. 106 and 107/1964 indiviaually. That is how this group of appeals is concerned with the cases of 12 detenues who had moved the Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226; and their grievance is that the view taken by the Judicial Commissioner in regard to the points of law raised by them before him, is not correct,\n\nThe Writ Petitions deal with cases of 11 remaining detenues and they joined the detenues who have preferred appeals before us by special leave in contending that the continuance of their detention is invalid and that a similar plea raised by the appellants before the Judicial Commissioner should have been upheld by him.\n\nThat is how the criminal appeals and the writ petitions between them raise common questions of law.\n\nMr. Garg who appeared for the appellants and the petitioners, as well as the learned Solicitor-General who appeared for the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Tripura, agreed that it would not be necessary to consider the facts in each individual case for the purpose of deciding the common questions of law raised by them. It would be enough if we refer to the facts in one case, because facts in other cases are exaotly similar and there would be no point of distinction on facts as such. We would, therefore, refer to the faciS relevant to the case of the detenu Biren Dutta.\n\nBiren Dutta was detained on the 25th. December, 1962, and an order issued in that behalf was duly served on him.\n\nOn the 26th December, 1962, he was transferred to the Hazaribagh Jail. The respondent's case is that on the 15th February, 1963, the case of Biren Duitta was reviewed under R. 30A(8) and it was decided to continue his deten-\n\nBirtn Dutta\n\ntion. Subsequently, his case was .reviewed on the 3rd July, 1963, 5th September, 1963, and 11th March, 1964, and on each occasion, it was decided to continue his detention.\n\nC.C. of Tripw On the other hand, Biren Dutta's contention before the Judicial Commissioner was that an order of review had not been passect as required by R. 30A( 8) and had not been communicated to him.\n\nIt was urged on his behalf that Rule 30A ( 8) requires that the decision to continue the detention of a detenu must be reducd to writing and must be communicated to the detenu, and the argument was that since these two conditions prescried by the relevant Rule had not been complied with, the continuance of the detenu's detention was invalid in law.\n\nThe Judicial Commissioner has negatived the contentions thus raised by the detenu.\n\nHe has found that the decision to continue the detenu's detention reached by the respondent under R. 30A ( 8) had in fact been reduced to writing, and in support of this contention, he bas referred to the fact that the original file containing a record of the decision bad been produced on behalf of the respondent before the Judicial Commissioner, but since the respondent's learned Advocate was apparently not prepared to allow the lawyer of the detenu inspection of the said record, the rourt did not consider the evidence supplied by it. 'IJie argument urged by the d1ttenu that the said record may have been subsequently manufactured, was reje, cted by the Judicial Commissioner.\n\nThe Judicia1 Commissioner also considered the fact that the affidavit made on behalf of the respondent showed that when the cas, ps of the detenues were considered by him from time to time, he actually ordered the release of some of them. This fact, according to the Judicial Commissioner, showed that the respondent had applied his mind to the cases of all the detenues and since he released some of them, it followed that in regard to the rest he was satisfied that their detention should be continued. 'The Judicial Commissioner was apparently inclined to take the view that the relevant Rule did not seem clearly to require that the decision reached by the appropriate authority under R. 30A ( 8) should be reduced to writing, but he thought it unnecessary to make a definite finding\n\nGajendragadlu.\n\nC.J.\n\nBirtn Dutta\n\n• C. of Tripura\n\non this issue, because he was satisfied that in the case of Biren Dutta, the decision in question had been reduced to writing.\n\nThe arg=nt that R. 3,0A ( 8) requires that the said decision should be communicated to the detenu was rejected by the learned Judicial Commissioner. It is on ---.\n\nJa/endragadkar\n\nC.J. these findings that he rejected the petition filed by Biren Dutta and 11 other detenues and held that the continuance of their detention was justified in law.\n\nWhen these matters were argued before this Court on the 6th May, 1964, an interim order was passed directing that the Chief Secretary to the Tripura Administration should forthwith transmit to this Court the original files in respect of the detenues concerned and that the Minister, or the Secretary or the Administrator who reviewed the cases of the detenues and had arrived at a decision that their detention should be continued, should file an affidavit in this Court on or before the 8th June, 1964, and that the affidavit should state all material facts and should indicate whether the decision arrived at was duly communicated to the detenues or not.\n\nAccordingly, the original files have been produced before us and additional affidavits have been filed.\n\nThe learned Solicitor-General fairly conceded that he would allow Mr. Garg for the appellants an opportunity to inspect the files inasmuch as he was not going to raise any question of priVI1ege in respect of them. It is in the light of the minutes made on these files that the principal points raised before us now fall to be considered.\n\nMr. Garg contends that the scheme of the Rules clearly shows that the original order of detention passed under R. 30(1)(b), as well as the decision to continue the detention of the detenues reached by the appropriate authority under R. 30A(8) must be recorded in writing and must comply with the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution.\n\nHe also urges that R. 30A( 8) further requires that the relevant decision reached by the appropriate authority must be communicated to the detenu. In support of his argument that the relevant decision under R 30A(8) must comply with _Art. 166 and must be communicated to the detenu, Mr. Garg has relied on the decision of this Court in Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar\n\nv. The State of Bombay('), and Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab('). He has also invited our attention to the observations made by Raghubar Dayal J. in S.\n\nPartap\n\nv. State of Punjab(\").\n\nThe learned Solicitor-General has conceded that the order directing the detention of a citizen under R. 30( 1) ( b), as well as the order incorporating the decision to continue the detention under R. 30A(8) must be in writing.\n\nHe, however, challenges the correctness of Mr. Garg's contention that these orders must comply with Art. 166, and he disputes his case that the decision reached under R. 30A\n\n( 8) must be communicated to the detenu.\n\nIn support of his case he has referred us to the decision of this Court in Mohammad Afzal Khan v. State of Jammu and Kashmir('), as well as the decision of the Bombay High Court in\n\nPralhad Krishna Kurne v.\n\nThe State of Bombay(') and that of the Allahabad High Court in Nandan Singh Bhist v.\n\nState of U.P.(').\n\nWe do not think it necessary to consider the question as to whether the orders .passed under R. 30 (1 )(b) and the record of the decision reached under R.30A ( 8) should comply with Art. 166 of the Constitution or not. It also appears to us to be unnecessary to decide in the present group of cases whether the decision recorded under R. 30A(8) should be communicated to the detenu. We are satisfied that the decision to continue the detention of the detenues which, it is urged on behalf of the respondent, was reached by him under R. 30A(8), has not been recorded in writing as required by the said Rule; and there is no other evidence on record to show that such a decision had then been reached and reduced to writing. It will be recalled that in the present proceedings, it is common ground between the parties that there has to be an order in writing indicating the decision of the appropriate authority reached by him after reviewing the case of the detenu that the continuance of his detention should be ordered. Rule\n\n30A ( 8) provides that every detention order made by an\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 612\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1964 S .C. 72\n\nS I.L.R. 1952 Born. 134\n\n(2) [19621Supp.3 S.C.R. 713\n\n(4) A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 173\n\n(6) A.l.R. 1964 All. 327\n\nBiren Dutta v.\n\nC.C. of Tripurlb\n\nGajendragadkar-\n\nC. J.\n\nBinn Dutta ...\n\nC.C. of Tripura\n\nGaiendragadl<ar\n\nC.J.\n\nofficer empowered by the Administrator and confirmed by him under clause (b) of the sub-rule ( 6) and every detn tion order made by the Administrator himself shall be reviewed at intervals of not more than six months by the Administrator who shall decide upon such review whether the order should be continued or cancelled. The question which we have to decide is whether it is shown by the minutes made on the file produced before us by the respondent that he did decide that it was necessary to continue the detention of the detenues before us. The minutes made on the file are no doubt a written record of his decision, and so, the requirement that whatever is decided under R. 30A(8) should be reduced to writing is satisfied; but the question is do these minutes show that the cases of the detenues before us were considered and a decision to continue their detention was reached by the respondent on the relevant occasion, and that presents a very narrow problem for our decision in relation to the construction of the said minutes.\n\nThe first occasion on which the respondent claims to have reviewed the cases of the detenues before us was on the 15th February, 1963. On that date, he made the following order:-\n\n\"On review of the detention order in respect of all detenus CC decided to cancel detention orders in respect of detenues at S. No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 13.\"\n\nIt is urged by the learned Solicitor-General that this order shows that the appropriate authority considered the cases of all the detenues and decided to cancel the detention of some of them, and that, he suggests, should be construed to mean that he decided to continue the detention of detenues other than those whose release he ordered. There is no doubt that this order makes a reference to the review of all detenues and, prima facie, it would be open to the Solicitor- General to contend that this part of the order shows that the cases of all the 68 detenues must have been considered by the appropriate authority. In this connection. we would like to emphasise the fact that in exercising its power under\n\nR. 30A ( 8), the appropriate authority should record its decision clearly and unambiguously.\n\nAfter all, the libety <>f the citizen is in question and if the detention of the detenue is intended to be continued as a result of the decision reached by the appropriate authority, it should say so in clear and unambiguous terms. But assuming that an order passed by the appropriate authmity under R. 30A ( 8) can in a proper case be construed to mean his implied decision to continue the detention of some detenues, while releasing some others, we find it difficult to hold that such an implied decision can be inferred from the present order. It is relevant to remember that this order was passed on the 15th February, 1963, and the six months' period within which review had to be made under R. 30A(8) would have expired on the 25th June, 1963. It is quite likely that even before the six months' period eXpired, the authority considered the matter and came to the conclusion that any further detention of the detenues specified in the order was not justified, and so, even before thr. six months' period expired, he directed that they should be released. That undoubtedly shows that the authority was considering the question very carefully and as soon as he felt satisfied that further detention of the said detenues would be unnecessary, he ordered their release forthwith; but this very consideration suggests that he may have considered the cases of only such detenues as should be released forthwith.\n\nBesides, there is nothing to show that after the 15th February, 1963, and before the 25th June, J 963, he considered the matter in respect of the detenues before us and held that the continuance of their detention was justified after the expiration of six months. It is necessary to emphasise that the decision recorded under R. 30A ( 8) is in the nature of an independent decision which authorises the further detention of the detenu for a period of six months. In other words. the initial order of detention is valid for siit months and the detention of the detenu thereafter can be justified only if a decision is recorded under R. 30A ( 8). That being the nature of the decision which is required to be recorded under R. 30A(8), we are unable to hold that the memorandum in question can be reasonably said to include a decision that the continuance of the detention of the\n\nBiren. Dutla .,, C.C. of Tripura\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC.I.\n\n1964 detenues before us was thought to be necessary by the appro- Biren Dutta priate authority after the expiry of the period of six months. \"· C.C. of Tripura It is true that in the additional affidavit filed by the Gai•ndragadkar respondent it has been stated as a submission by him that\n\nC.J. \"as a result of the said review (15/2/63) the detention of Biren Dutta as well as others whose detention orders were not cancelled, continued.\" This undoubtedly is a matter of argument; it being the respondent's contention that since the order detaining some detenues was cancelled, logically it follows that the detention of the others was ordered to continue.\n\nBut even assuming that the respondent had stated in his additional affidavit clearly and unambiguously that he had decided on the 15th February, 1963, that the detention of the detenues before us should be continued, we would not have attached much significance to such a statement, because what we have to consider is the order passed on the 15th February, 1963. and not what the authority making the order thought it meant or intended it to mean; and so, it comes back to the question of the construction of the order itself.\n\nWe have carefully considered the arguments urged before us by the Solicitor-General, but we are unable to hold that this order can be said to satisfy the requirements of R. 30A(8) at all.\n\nWe are satisfied that this order cannot be construed to contain a written record of the decision of the respondent that the detention of the detenues before us should be continued after the expiry of six months from the date of the original order of detention.\n\nThen as to the next order passed on the 3rd July, 1963, the position is still worse.\n\nIt appears that on ihe 15th May, 1963, the Superintendent of Police, Tripura recommended that some of the detenues should be released, because he thought there was no longer any justification for their continued detention.\n\nThis matter was discussed between the Superintendent of Police and the Chief Secretary on the 6th June, 1963, and eventually as a result of the conference held between the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner an order was passed on the 3rd July,\n\n1963. This order shows that the cases of the persons whose release had been recommended by the Superintendent of Police were considered. These detenues were 25 in\n\nnumber. During the course of the discussion between the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner, the Chief Minister appears to have suggested that instead of releasing all the aforesaid 25 detenues together it would be better if they were released in batches, but ultimately, the order passed by the Chief Minister which was assented to by the Chief Commissioner was that all of them may be released at the sarue time on the 6th July, 1963. In other words, reading the letter written by the Superinteudent of Police to the Chief Commissioner on the 15th May, 1963, and the record of the discussion that took place between the Chief Secretary, the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner on the 3rd July, 1963, it is clear that the only cases which the , authorities considered were the cases of 25 detenues whose release had been recommended by the Superintendent of Police.\n\nIt is common_ ground that the detenues before us were not included in the said list of 25 detenues, and so, there is no scope for suggesting that at this time the cases of the detenues other than thse who were released were concerned. That being so, we must hold that like the earlier order passed on the 15th February, 1963, the order passed on the 3rd July, 1963, is also of no assistance to the respondent, because neither order can be reasonably construed as containing a decision of the appropriate authority reached under R. 30A(8) to continue the detention of the detenues before us.\n\nThis conclusion necessarily means that the requirement of R. 30A(8) has not been complied with and that inevitably makes the continuance of the detention of the detenues before invalid in law.\n\nThe fact that those cases were reviewed subsequently on the 25th September, 1963 and 11th March. 1964, and the decision of the authority was in fac, t communicated to them, would not validate the illegal continuance of the detention of the detenues after six months had expired from the date of their original detention.\n\nWe have already indicated that we do not propose to consider in these proceedings the two other points ofJaw urged by Mr. Garg; but before we part with these matters, we would like to emphasise that even assuming that the decision recorded by the appropriate authority under\n\n51 S.C.-20.\n\nBiren Dutta\n\nC.C. of Tripura\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC.1.\n\nBiren Dutl'1 v.\n\nC.C. of Tripura\n\nR. 30A( 8) is not, as a matter of law, required to be communicated to the detenu, it is desirable and it would be fair and jusit that such a decision should in every case be communicated te> the detenu.\n\nIf the appropriate authority ronsiders the question about the continuance of the detentfon of a particular detenu and decides that such continuance is justified, we see ne> justification for failing to communicate the said decision to the detenu concerned. If the requirement as to such communication were held te> be necessary as a matter of law, ne>n-communicatie>n would render the continuance of the detention invalid; but that is a matter which we are ne>t deciding in these cases. We are only emphasising the fact that it would be fair that such a decisie>n should be communicated to the detenu.\n\nGa/mdragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nJaly, 24\n\nIn the result, the appeals and writ petitions are allowed and the detenues ce>ncemed ordered to be set at liberty at once.\n\nAppeals and Writ Petitions allowed.\n\nK. HUTCH! GOWDER\n\nRICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL '\\ND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll., JJ.)\n\nMadras Agriculturis's Relief Act-D!bt incurred after commencement of\n\nAct-Final Decree-Scaling dow~Madras Agriculturists .'?elief Act, 1938 (Mad. 4 of 1938), rs. 13, 19.\n\nThe respondent, who was the assignee-mortgagee of a mortgage deed executed on February 15, 1945 by the appellant for a certain sum payable with interest, filed a suit for the recovery of the sum with Interest. The suit ended in a compromise under which a decree was passed and certain payments were made towards the decree.\n\nIn due course the respondent moved for the passing of a final decree. The appellant applied for scaling down of the debt under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The respondent, inter alia, contended in his objections filed against this application that as the debt sought to be scaled down was incurred subsequent to the date of commencement of the Act, the decree could not be scaled down under s. 19(2) of the", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "295\n\nBIREN DUITA AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIREN DUITA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF TR.IPURA AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF TRIPURA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nC.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nC.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 172, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 182, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 202, "end_char": 210, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 355, "end_char": 383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 569, "end_char": 597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Rules, 1962", "statute": "the Defence of India Rules, 1962"}}, {"text": "February 1 S,\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1160, "end_char": 1179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first review held on February 1 S,\n\n1963, in respect of all the 68 detenus was reoorded as follows.-\n\n\"On review of the detention order in respect of all the detenus\n\nCC."}}, {"text": "January 18, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2861, "end_char": 2877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 18, 1964, of the Judicial Commissioner's Court for Tripura in Criminal Misc. ("}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3151, "end_char": 3172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3221, "end_char": 3231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C.\n\nAgarwala, D. P. Singh and M. K.\n\nRamamurthi, for the appellants and petitioners in all."}}, {"text": "S. C.\n\nAgarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3233, "end_char": 3248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C.\n\nAgarwala, D. P. Singh and M. K.\n\nRamamurthi, for the appellants and petitioners in all."}}, {"text": "D. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3250, "end_char": 3261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C.\n\nAgarwala, D. P. Singh and M. K.\n\nRamamurthi, for the appellants and petitioners in all."}}, {"text": "M. K.\n\nRamamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3266, "end_char": 3283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, S. C.\n\nAgarwala, D. P. Singh and M. K.\n\nRamamurthi, for the appellants and petitioners in all."}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3329, "end_char": 3341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R. H.\n\nDhebar, for the respondents (Except Respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. R. Prem", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3362, "end_char": 3372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R. H.\n\nDhebar, for the respondents (Except Respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. H.\n\nDhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3377, "end_char": 3390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor-General, D. R. Prem and R. H.\n\nDhebar, for the respondents (Except Respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3459, "end_char": 3471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Goburdhun, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "July 23, 1964, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar 'GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-These Criminal Appeals and\n\nc. I.\n\nWrit Petitions have been placed for hearing together in a group because they raise common questions of law.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nC.J."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3592, "end_char": 3606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "July 23, 1964, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar 'GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J.-These Criminal Appeals and\n\nc. I.\n\nWrit Petitions have been placed for hearing together in a group because they raise common questions of law.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nC.J."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3826, "end_char": 3831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is well-known, after the Chinese attacked the northern border of India on the 8th September, 1962, the President issued a Proclamation under Art."}}, {"text": "8th September, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3839, "end_char": 3858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is well-known, after the Chinese attacked the northern border of India on the 8th September, 1962, the President issued a Proclamation under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "3rd of November, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4206, "end_char": 4227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of 1962 on the 3rd of November, 1962."}}, {"text": "Art. 359", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4270, "end_char": 4278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 21 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4383, "end_char": 4401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th October, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4461, "end_char": 4479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 26th October, 1962, the Rules framed by the Central Govern:nent under the Defence of India Act (hereinafter called 'the Rules') were published."}}, {"text": "6th December, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4680, "end_char": 4698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 30 of the Rules as originally framed was subsequently modified on the 6th December, 1962 and Rule 30-A was added."}}, {"text": "12th D1cember, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4757, "end_char": 4776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, an Act was passed on the 12th D1cember, 1962, and s. 48(1) of this Act provided for the repeal of the earlier Ordinances."}}, {"text": "s. 48(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4782, "end_char": 4790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4863, "end_char": 4868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ordinances have to be taken as Rules framed under the latter Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4991, "end_char": 5055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5078, "end_char": 5086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Mr. Mukerjee who was the Administrator of the Union Territory of Tripura at the relevant time, cons.idered the material placed before him as such Administrator and was satisfied that a group of Communists had been agitating amongst the tribals residing in the area and inciting them against the Government, and he cairu!"}}, {"text": "Tripura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that Mr. Mukerjee who was the Administrator of the Union Territory of Tripura at the relevant time, cons.idered the material placed before him as such Administrator and was satisfied that a group of Communists had been agitating amongst the tribals residing in the area and inciting them against the Government, and he cairu!"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6011, "end_char": 6019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules framed under the\n\nOrdinances have to be taken as Rules framed under the latter Act", "statute": "Rules framed under the\n\nOrdinances have to be taken as Rules framed under the latter Act"}}, {"text": "Mohan Chaudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6699, "end_char": 6714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the detenues Mohan Chaudhury and Jagabrata Sen Gupta who have joined in Cr."}}, {"text": "Jagabrata Sen Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6719, "end_char": 6738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the detenues Mohan Chaudhury and Jagabrata Sen Gupta who have joined in Cr."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6989, "end_char": 6997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7574, "end_char": 7578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Garg who appeared for the appellants and the petitioners, as well as the learned Solicitor-General who appeared for the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Tripura, agreed that it would not be necessary to consider the facts in each individual case for the purpose of deciding the common questions of law raised by them."}}, {"text": "Biren Dutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8139, "end_char": 8150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would, therefore, refer to the faciS relevant to the case of the detenu Biren Dutta.", "canonical_name": "Biren Duitta"}}, {"text": "Biren Duitta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8408, "end_char": 8420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent's case is that on the 15th February, 1963, the case of Biren Duitta was reviewed under R. 30A(8) and it was decided to continue his deten-\n\nBirtn Dutta\n\ntion.", "canonical_name": "Biren Duitta"}}, {"text": "Birtn Dutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8493, "end_char": 8504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent's case is that on the 15th February, 1963, the case of Biren Duitta was reviewed under R. 30A(8) and it was decided to continue his deten-\n\nBirtn Dutta\n\ntion.", "canonical_name": "Biren Duitta"}}, {"text": "3rd July, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8556, "end_char": 8570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, his case was .reviewed on the 3rd July, 1963, 5th September, 1963, and 11th March, 1964, and on each occasion, it was decided to continue his detention."}}, {"text": "11th March, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8597, "end_char": 8613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, his case was .reviewed on the 3rd July, 1963, 5th September, 1963, and 11th March, 1964, and on each occasion, it was decided to continue his detention."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadlu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10796, "end_char": 10809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judicial Commissioner was apparently inclined to take the view that the relevant Rule did not seem clearly to require that the decision reached by the appropriate authority under R. 30A ( 8) should be reduced to writing, but he thought it unnecessary to make a definite finding\n\nGajendragadlu.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR,\n\nC.J."}}, {"text": "Birtn Dutta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10818, "end_char": 10829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J.\n\nBirtn Dutta\n\n• C. of Tripura\n\non this issue, because he was satisfied that in the case of Biren Dutta, the decision in question had been reduced to writing."}}, {"text": "endragadkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11143, "end_char": 11154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ja/endragadkar\n\nC.J. these findings that he rejected the petition filed by Biren Dutta and 11 other detenues and held that the continuance of their detention was justified in law."}}, {"text": "Biren Dutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11215, "end_char": 11226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ja/endragadkar\n\nC.J. these findings that he rejected the petition filed by Biren Dutta and 11 other detenues and held that the continuance of their detention was justified in law.", "canonical_name": "Biren Duitta"}}, {"text": "6th May, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11377, "end_char": 11390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When these matters were argued before this Court on the 6th May, 1964, an interim order was passed directing that the Chief Secretary to the Tripura Administration should forthwith transmit to this Court the original files in respect of the detenues concerned and that the Minister, or the Secretary or the Administrator who reviewed the cases of the detenues and had arrived at a decision that their detention should be continued, should file an affidavit in this Court on or before the 8th June, 1964, and that the affidavit should state all material facts and should indicate whether the decision arrived at was duly communicated to the detenues or not."}}, {"text": "Tripura Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11462, "end_char": 11484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When these matters were argued before this Court on the 6th May, 1964, an interim order was passed directing that the Chief Secretary to the Tripura Administration should forthwith transmit to this Court the original files in respect of the detenues concerned and that the Minister, or the Secretary or the Administrator who reviewed the cases of the detenues and had arrived at a decision that their detention should be continued, should file an affidavit in this Court on or before the 8th June, 1964, and that the affidavit should state all material facts and should indicate whether the decision arrived at was duly communicated to the detenues or not."}}, {"text": "8th June, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11809, "end_char": 11823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When these matters were argued before this Court on the 6th May, 1964, an interim order was passed directing that the Chief Secretary to the Tripura Administration should forthwith transmit to this Court the original files in respect of the detenues concerned and that the Minister, or the Secretary or the Administrator who reviewed the cases of the detenues and had arrived at a decision that their detention should be continued, should file an affidavit in this Court on or before the 8th June, 1964, and that the affidavit should state all material facts and should indicate whether the decision arrived at was duly communicated to the detenues or not."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12733, "end_char": 12741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13265, "end_char": 13279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has also invited our attention to the observations made by Raghubar Dayal J. in S.\n\nPartap\n\nv. State of Punjab(\")."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13650, "end_char": 13658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13927, "end_char": 13944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his case he has referred us to the decision of this Court in Mohammad Afzal Khan v. State of Jammu and Kashmir('), as well as the decision of the Bombay High Court in\n\nPralhad Krishna Kurne v.\n\nThe State of Bombay(') and that of the Allahabad High Court in Nandan Singh Bhist v.\n\nState of U.P.(')."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14014, "end_char": 14034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his case he has referred us to the decision of this Court in Mohammad Afzal Khan v. State of Jammu and Kashmir('), as well as the decision of the Bombay High Court in\n\nPralhad Krishna Kurne v.\n\nThe State of Bombay(') and that of the Allahabad High Court in Nandan Singh Bhist v.\n\nState of U.P.(')."}}, {"text": "Art. 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14262, "end_char": 14270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Biren Dutta v.\n\nC.C. of Tripurlb\n\nGajendragadkar-", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15319, "end_char": 15368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "327\n\nBiren Dutta v.\n\nC.C. of Tripurlb\n\nGajendragadkar-\n\nC. J.\n\nBinn Dutta ...\n\nC.C. of Tripura\n\nGaiendragadl<ar\n\nC.J.\n\nofficer empowered by the Administrator and confirmed by him under clause (b) of the sub-rule ( 6) and every detn tion order made by the Administrator himself shall be reviewed at intervals of not more than six months by the Administrator who shall decide upon such review whether the order should be continued or cancelled."}}, {"text": "15th February, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16587, "end_char": 16606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first occasion on which the respondent claims to have reviewed the cases of the detenues before us was on the 15th February, 1963."}}, {"text": "25th June, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18362, "end_char": 18377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is relevant to remember that this order was passed on the 15th February, 1963, and the six months' period within which review had to be made under R. 30A(8) would have expired on the 25th June, 1963."}}, {"text": "25th June, J 963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19127, "end_char": 19143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, there is nothing to show that after the 15th February, 1963, and before the 25th June, J 963, he considered the matter in respect of the detenues before us and held that the continuance of their detention was justified after the expiration of six months."}}, {"text": "Biren. Dutla", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19920, "end_char": 19932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That being the nature of the decision which is required to be recorded under R. 30A(8), we are unable to hold that the memorandum in question can be reasonably said to include a decision that the continuance of the detention of the\n\nBiren.", "canonical_name": "Biren Duitta"}}, {"text": "15th May, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21724, "end_char": 21738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on ihe 15th May, 1963, the Superintendent of Police, Tripura recommended that some of the detenues should be released, because he thought there was no longer any justification for their continued detention."}}, {"text": "6th June, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22019, "end_char": 22033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This matter was discussed between the Superintendent of Police and the Chief Secretary on the 6th June, 1963, and eventually as a result of the conference held between the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner an order was passed on the 3rd July,\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "3rd July,\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22166, "end_char": 22181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This matter was discussed between the Superintendent of Police and the Chief Secretary on the 6th June, 1963, and eventually as a result of the conference held between the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner an order was passed on the 3rd July,\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "6th July, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22768, "end_char": 22782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the course of the discussion between the Chief Minister and the Chief Commissioner, the Chief Minister appears to have suggested that instead of releasing all the aforesaid 25 detenues together it would be better if they were released in batches, but ultimately, the order passed by the Chief Minister which was assented to by the Chief Commissioner was that all of them may be released at the sarue time on the 6th July, 1963."}}, {"text": "25th September, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24067, "end_char": 24087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that those cases were reviewed subsequently on the 25th September, 1963 and 11th March."}}, {"text": "11th March. 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24092, "end_char": 24108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that those cases were reviewed subsequently on the 25th September, 1963 and 11th March."}}, {"text": "Biren Dutta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24618, "end_char": 24629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Biren Dutta\n\nC.C. of Tripura\n\nGajendragadkar\n\nC.1.", "canonical_name": "Biren Duitta"}}, {"text": "K. HUTCH! GOWDER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25703, "end_char": 25719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. HUTCH!"}}, {"text": "RICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25721, "end_char": 25741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOWDER\n\nRICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL '\\ND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll.,"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25757, "end_char": 25769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOWDER\n\nRICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL '\\ND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll.,"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25774, "end_char": 25797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GOWDER\n\nRICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL '\\ND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll.,"}}, {"text": "15, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26064, "end_char": 26072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, who was the assignee-mortgagee of a mortgage deed executed on February 15, 1945 by the appellant for a certain sum payable with interest, filed a suit for the recovery of the sum with Interest."}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26702, "end_char": 26710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_306_313_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\nBiren Dutl'1 v.\n\nC.C. of Tripura\n\nR. 30A( 8) is not, as a matter of law, required to be communicated to the detenu, it is desirable and it would be fair and jusit that such a decision should in every case be communicated te> the detenu.\n\nIf the appropriate authority ronsiders the question about the continuance of the detentfon of a particular detenu and decides that such continuance is justified, we see ne> justification for failing to communicate the said decision to the detenu concerned. If the requirement as to such communication were held te> be necessary as a matter of law, ne>n-communicatie>n would render the continuance of the detention invalid; but that is a matter which we are ne>t deciding in these cases. We are only emphasising the fact that it would be fair that such a decisie>n should be communicated to the detenu.\n\nGa/mdragadkar\n\nC.J.\n\nJaly, 24\n\nIn the result, the appeals and writ petitions are allowed and the detenues ce>ncemed ordered to be set at liberty at once.\n\nAppeals and Writ Petitions allowed.\n\nK. HUTCH! GOWDER\n\nRICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL '\\ND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAll., JJ.)\n\nMadras Agriculturis's Relief Act-D!bt incurred after commencement of\n\nAct-Final Decree-Scaling dow~Madras Agriculturists .'?elief Act, 1938 (Mad. 4 of 1938), rs. 13, 19.\n\nThe respondent, who was the assignee-mortgagee of a mortgage deed executed on February 15, 1945 by the appellant for a certain sum payable with interest, filed a suit for the recovery of the sum with Interest. The suit ended in a compromise under which a decree was passed and certain payments were made towards the decree.\n\nIn due course the respondent moved for the passing of a final decree. The appellant applied for scaling down of the debt under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. The respondent, inter alia, contended in his objections filed against this application that as the debt sought to be scaled down was incurred subsequent to the date of commencement of the Act, the decree could not be scaled down under s. 19(2) of the\n\nAct. The Subordinate Judge overruled the objectioa and held that the 1964 debt was liable to be scaled down in tenns of s. 13 of the A1; t.\n\nUn K. H11tchi .appc~11. the High Court held that as the statutory right to have the interest Gowder scaled dov1n was not put forVtard before the consent decree was prissed, v. the decr;!e could not be scaled down at the stage of the final decree Richobdas Fatha1\n\nproceedings.\n\nIt further held that s. 19(2) of the Act only applied to m1tll and C.o. debts payable at the commencement of the Act and, therefore, the application for scaling down the decree was not maintainablo!.\n\nOn l\\ppeal by certificate.\n\nHeld: Sections 7, 8, 9 and 13 form a group of secticms providing the principles of scaling down of debts incurred by agriculturists under different situations. A debt can be scaled down In an appropriate proceeding taken in respect of the same.\n\nBut in case of debts that have ripened into decrees, s. 19(1) and (2) prescribe a special procedure for reopening the decree only in respect of debts incurred before t11e Act.\n\nThe 1'-fadras Agriculturists Relief Act does not provide for the reopening of decrees made in respect of debts incurred after it c::une into force, and for understandable reasons the relief In respect of such decrees is specifically confined only to a concession in the n1te of interest.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 80 of 1962.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated Decem ber 19, 1957, of the Madras High Court in C.M. Appeal No. 303 of 1956.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri. V. Ratnam and R. Ganaparhy Iyer, for the appellant.\n\nG.S. Pathak and R. Thiagarajan, for the respondent.\n\nJuly 24, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBA RAO, J .-This appeal by certificate raises the Subba Rao I. question whether a decree obtained in a suit to enforce a debt incurred after the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. 1938 (Act 4 of 1938), hereinafter called the Parent Act. came into force could be scaled down under s. 13 of the Parent Act.\n\nThe facts are as follows: On February 15, 1964, the appellant and 4 others executed a mortgage deed in favour of Kaverlal Chordia for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 payable after three years with interest at 9 per cent. per annum. On I anuary 24, 1946, the mortgagee assigned the said mortgage\n\n1964 in favour of the respondent.\n\nCertain payments towards K. Hutchi principal and interest were made thereunder.\n\nOn Feb- Gowder ruary 28, 1950, the assignee-mortgagee i.e., the respondent, Richobd;; Fathaifiled a suit, O.S. No. 55 of 1950, in the Court of the Submull and Co. ordinate Judge, Nilgiris, Ootacamund, for the recovery of Subba Rao 1.\n\nRs. 1,98,487-8-0, made up of Rs. 1,50,000 for the balance of the principal and Rs. 48,487-8-0 for interest due on the mortgage.\n\nThe suit ended in a compromise dated December 21, 1950, under which a decree was passed for Rs. 1,50,000 on account of principal, with interest and further interest at 9 per cent. per annum and costs, subject to some concessions being shown in the event of payments being made in certain specified instalments.\n\nThereafter, certain payments were made towards the decree.\n\nIn due course the respondent filed I.A. No. 382 of 1953 for the passing of a final decree. On June 24, 1955, the appellant filed O.P. No. 24 of 1955 for scaling down the debt. The respondent, inter alia, contended in his objections filed against the said application that as the debt sought to be scaled down was incurred subsequent to March 22. 1938. which is the date of the commencement of the Parent Act. the decree could not be scaled down under s. 19(2) of the Parent Act.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge overruled the objection and held by his order dated August 10, 1956. that the decree was liable to be scaled down in tenns of s. 13 of the Parent Act.\n\nHe accordingly scaled down the decree debt.\n\nOn appeal, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that as the statutory right to have the interest scaled down was not put forward before the consent decree was passed, the decree could not be scaled down at the stage of the final decree proceedings.\n\nIt further held that s. 19 ( 2) of the Parent Act only applied to debts payable at the commencement of the said Act and. therefore, the application for scaling down the decree was not maintainable.\n\nIn the result it set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the petition for scaling down the debt.\n\nHence the present appeal.\n\nMr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri. learned counsel for the appellant, did not press the appellant's claim under s. 19(2) of the Parent Act, but put it under s. 13 of the said Act.\n\nHe tcok ms through the relevant provisions of the Parent 1964 Act, which according to him disclose theJegislative policy K. Hutchi undermining the sacrosanctity of decrees and pressed on us Cowder to hold, on 'a scrutiny of the provisions of s. 13, of the Richobd;; Farha/- Parent Act in the light of the said policy, that'the decree mull and Co. made in resp~t of a debt incurred after the Parent Act subba Rao J. came into force was liable to be scaled down thereunder.\n\nMr. Pathak, learned -counsel for the respondent, makes a distinction between the substantive and procedural provisions and contends that the Parent Act does not make any provision for scaling down decrees made in respectof debts incurred after the said Act came into force.\n\nThe general scheme of the Parent Act gathered therefrom may be briefly , stated thus. The main object of the Prent Act was to give -\n\nreHef to agriculturists. - \"Debt\" has been defined in s. 3 (iiiJ of the Parent Act as any .liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, -due from an agriculturist, whether payable under a decree or order of a civil or revenue court or otherwise. This definition is rather comprehensive; it takes in secured, unsecured and decree debts due from an agriculturist.\n\nSection 7 of the Parent Act declares that a debt so defined has to be scaled down in the manner prescribed by the said Act. Section 8 provides the mode of scaling down debts incurred before 1932 and s. 9, the debts incurred after 1932 but before March 22. 1938; - and s. 13 deals with the scaling down of debts incurred after the commencement_ of the Parent Act.\n\nThe relief granted under the said Act varies with the date-of the debt depending upon whether it falls under one or other of the said three periods.\n\nWhile ss. 7, 8, !I and 13 give the principles for scaling down a debt, s. 19 provides the machinery for scaling down.\n\nSection 19 of the Parent Act. as amended in 1948, reads:\n\n\" ( 1) Where before the commencement of this Act a court has passed a decree for the repayment\n\nof a debt, it shall, on' the application of anv judgment-debtJr who is an agriculturist. .••.• apply the provisions of this Act to such decree\n\nK. Hutchi Gowder v.\n\nichobdas Fathaimull and Co.\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nand shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, amena the decree accordingly or enter satisfaction. as the case may be:\n\n(2) The provisions of sub-section ( 1) shall also\n\napply to cases where, after the commencement of this Act, a Court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt payable at such commencement.\" ·\n\nIt may be mentioned that the second clause was mserted by the Amending Act of 1948.\n\nBefore the amendment there was a conflict of view on the question whether s. 19 ( 1) could be invoked in amending a decree passed after the commencement of the Parent Act in respect of a debt incurred before the said Act.\n\nSub-section ( 2) made the position clear and declared that it could be done. The position, therefore, is that in the case of debts other than decree-debts, the scaling down process will have to be resorted to in an appropriate proceeding taken in respect of the debt and in the case of decrees in respect of debts incurred before the Parent Act whether made before or after the said Act, by filing an application under s. 19(1) or ( 2) of the Board Act, as the case may be. But s. 19 on its express terms does . not permit the filing of an application for amending a decree by scaling down a debt incurred after the Parent Act came into force.\n\nDoubtless, as Mr. Viswanatha Sastri contents, the Parent Act, to some extent, undermines the sanctity of decrees, but that is to implement the policy of the LegiSlature to give relief to\n\nal(riculturists over burdened with debts.\n\nBut a Court, p; rticularly in the case of an expropriatory measure like the Act, cannot rely upon the supposed policy of the Legislature and extend the scope of the relief given to agriculturists by analogy.\n\nThe scope of the relief shall necessarily be confined to that given by the Act expressly or by necessary implication. A fair reading of sub-sections ( 1) and\n\n(2) of s. 19 of the Parent Act disclose beyond any reasonable doubt that the Legislature does not provide thereunder any machinery for reopening a decree made in respect of a debt incurred after the Act came into force.\n\n' Realizing this difficulty; Mr .. Viswanatha Sastri relied 1964 . . upon the provisions of s, f3 itself and contends .that the\n\nx. Hutchi Jaid section. provides, in the case of debts incurred after Gowder \"· the Parent .Act came into rorce, both for the substantive Richobdas Fathaire!ief as well as for the machinery to give the .said relief. mull and Co.\n\nThe said section re , c'.0 : Subba Rao J.\n\n\"In any proceeding for recovery of a debt, the Court shall scale down all interest due on any debt incurred by an agriculturist after the co=encement of this Act, so as not to exceed a sum calculated at 61 per cent. per annum, simple interest ..•......... \"\n\nThe Government by notification reduced the rates of interest to 5! per cent. per annum with effect from.July 29, 1947. Let us scrutinize the provisions of the section !n the light of the arguments advanced.\n\nLearned counsel asks us to read the words \"decree . debt\" instead of \"debt\" in s. 13 of the Parent Act, for \"debt\" is defined to take in a decree debt, and by so reading, he contends, in any proceeding, which, according to him, includes a final de.cree application, the court shall scale down all interest in the manner prescribed thereunder.· It is further argued that final decree proceedings are only proceedings in a suit and, therefore, the word wrecovery\" in the sub-section is appropriate in the context of a decree debt. This argument, if accepted, disturbs the entire scheme of the Parent Act. Section 13 is one of the group of sections viz., ss. 8, 9 and 13, dealing with the principles of scaling down in a proceeding for the recovery of a debt. But where a decree is to be amended, the Act has taken care to provide expressly for the amendment of the deeree. If the Legislature intended to provide for the amendment of decrees even in cases falling under s. 13, it would. have added another appropriate clause in s. 19.\n\nThe absence of anv such clause indicates an intention that in cases of . debts comprehended . by s. 13. the Legislature gives only a limited relief expressly provided thereunder .. It is said, so far as the reopening of decrees after the Parent Act came into force is concerned, whether in respect of\n\n312 . SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n1964 debts incurred before or after th~ sale! Act, th\"re cannot K. Hutchi possibly be a justification for a difference in the manner of Gowder their treatment. A plausible reason can be discerned for Richobd:; Fathithis legislative distinction oetween debts incurred. before the\n\nmull and Co.. Ac( and those incurred after the Act; for, in the former Subba Rao J. when the debts were incurred the Act was not in existence and, as the debtors Could not have anticipated the provisions of the Act, they were given the summary remedy, but the agriculturists who incurred debtS after, the Parent Act, with open eyes were denied the saine; while in the former, they were allowed to reopen decrees made in respect of the said debts before or after .the Act, in the latter they could claim. relief only in an appropriate proceeding before the decree was made and that too was confined to the limited relief in regard to the rate of interest provided thereunder. The difference in the treatment of the two categories of decrees was brought about by sub-section (2) of s. 19 a oded by a later amendment. Whatever may be the reason for the difference, we cannot extend the scope of s. 13 by analogy or by stretching the meaning of the words \"proceeding\" and \"recovery\". . , Reliance is placed upon s. 13-A of the Parent Act. which reads:\n\n\"Wher~ a debt is incurred by a reason who would\n\nbe\" an agriculturist as defined in section 3(ii) but for the operation of proviso (B) or proviso (C) to that section. the rate of interest applicable to the debt shall be the rate appli cable to it under the law. custom. contract or decree of Court' under which the debt arises or the rate applicable to an agriculturist under section 13, whichever rate is less.\"\n\nOn the basis of this section a contention is raised that\n\ns. 13 and 13A relate to the same subject-matter with th~\n\ndifference tliat while s. 13 applies to aculturists who incurred debts after the Parent Act came into force. s. 13 A applies to persons who would be agriculturists but for th~ provisos (B) and ( C) of s. 3 (ii) in respect of debts incurred after the Act. and as a fair reading of s. 13-A indicates that it applies to decrees made in regard to debts in-\n\n.t> S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REP01{TS 313\n\ncurred after the Act, it must be interpreted reasonably that 1964 s. 13 also applies to such decrees.\n\nMr. Pathak, learned K. Hutchi counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends Goll'der that s. 13-A only applies to pre-Act debts, as s. 7 which Richobd;.; Fath< declares the scheme of scaling down of debts applies only mull and Co. to pre-Act debts and the only exception to it is s. 13-A.\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nBe that as it may, we cannot construe s. 13 with the aid of s. 13-A which was introduced by the Amending Act 23 of\n\n1948. This appeal .does not call for an interpretation of s. 13-A of the Act and we shall not express any opinion thereon.\n\nThe legal position may be briefly stated thus.\n\nSection 7, 8, 9 and 13 form a group of sections providing the principles of scaling down of debt• incurred by agriculmrists under different situations.\n\nA debt can be scaled Clown in an appropriate proceeding taken in respect of the same.\n\nBut in the case of debts that have ripened into decrees, s. 19(1) and (2) prescribe a special procedure ror reopening the decree only in respect of debts incurred before the Parent Act. The Parent Act does not provide for the reopening of decrees made in respect of debts incurred after it came into force, and for understandable reasons the relief in respect of such decrees is specifically confined only to a concession in the rate of interest.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the order o! the High Court is correct.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\nAMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR. v.\n\nSTA TE OF UTT AR PRADESH AND ORS.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nSales Tax-Salts tax levied at the Ttltt of one anna pe1 rupr,._Nelv'\n\nd•cimal coina~• introduad by Act No. 31 of 19SS-EQect on calculation of 1ales ta.r-Sales tax to be levied at the rate (If one\n\n19M\n\nJuly, 27", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "GOWDER\n\nRICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL '\\ND COMPANY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1073, "end_char": 1114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RICHOBDAS FATHAIMULL AND COMPANY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1117, "end_char": 1129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2062, "end_char": 2070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2199, "end_char": 2204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Richobdas Fatha1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2466, "end_char": 2482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court held that as the statutory right to have the interest Gowder scaled dov1n was not put forVtard before the consent decree was prissed, v. the decr;!e could not be scaled down at the stage of the final decree Richobdas Fatha1\n\nproceedings."}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2519, "end_char": 2527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 7, 8, 9 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2733, "end_char": 2756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3026, "end_char": 3034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Agriculturists Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3164, "end_char": 3189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri. V. Ratnam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3619, "end_char": 3653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri.", "canonical_name": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri. V. Ratnam"}}, {"text": "R. Ganaparhy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3658, "end_char": 3675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Ratnam and R. Ganaparhy Iyer, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G.S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3697, "end_char": 3708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.S. Pathak and R. Thiagarajan, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Thiagarajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3713, "end_char": 3727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.S. Pathak and R. Thiagarajan, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBA RAO, J .-This appeal by certificate raises the Subba Rao I. question whether a decree obtained in a suit to enforce a debt incurred after the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3863, "end_char": 3872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBA RAO, J .-This appeal by certificate raises the Subba Rao I. question whether a decree obtained in a suit to enforce a debt incurred after the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4092, "end_char": 4097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agriculturists Relief Act", "statute": "Agriculturists Relief Act"}}, {"text": "February 15, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4147, "end_char": 4164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are as follows: On February 15, 1964, the appellant and 4 others executed a mortgage deed in favour of Kaverlal Chordia for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kaverlal Chordia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4231, "end_char": 4247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are as follows: On February 15, 1964, the appellant and 4 others executed a mortgage deed in favour of Kaverlal Chordia for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "I anuary 24, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4343, "end_char": 4360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On I anuary 24, 1946, the mortgagee assigned the said mortgage\n\n1964 in favour of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Court of the Submull and Co. ordinate Judge, Nilgiris, Ootacamund", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "55 of 1950, in the Court of the Submull and Co. ordinate Judge, Nilgiris, Ootacamund, for the recovery of Subba Rao 1."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "55 of 1950, in the Court of the Submull and Co. ordinate Judge, Nilgiris, Ootacamund, for the recovery of Subba Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "December 21, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4921, "end_char": 4938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit ended in a compromise dated December 21, 1950, under which a decree was passed for Rs."}}, {"text": "June 24, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5350, "end_char": 5363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 24, 1955, the appellant filed O.P. No."}}, {"text": "March 22. 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5592, "end_char": 5606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, inter alia, contended in his objections filed against the said application that as the debt sought to be scaled down was incurred subsequent to March 22."}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5707, "end_char": 5715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 10, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5818, "end_char": 5833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Subordinate Judge overruled the objection and held by his order dated August 10, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5892, "end_char": 5897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5998, "end_char": 6015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that as the statutory right to have the interest scaled down was not put forward before the consent decree was passed, the decree could not be scaled down at the stage of the final decree proceedings."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6244, "end_char": 6249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri.", "canonical_name": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri. V. Ratnam"}}, {"text": "s. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6672, "end_char": 6680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6717, "end_char": 6722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6983, "end_char": 6988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7149, "end_char": 7152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He tcok ms through the relevant provisions of the Parent 1964 Act, which according to him disclose theJegislative policy K. Hutchi undermining the sacrosanctity of decrees and pressed on us Cowder to hold, on 'a scrutiny of the provisions of s. 13, of the Richobd;; Farha/- Parent Act in the light of the said policy, that'the decree mull and Co. made in resp~t of a debt incurred after the Parent Act subba Rao J. came into force was liable to be scaled down thereunder."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7218, "end_char": 7224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pathak, learned -counsel for the respondent, makes a distinction between the substantive and procedural provisions and contends that the Parent Act does not make any provision for scaling down decrees made in respectof debts incurred after the said Act came into force."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7677, "end_char": 7681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7998, "end_char": 8007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8122, "end_char": 8131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8197, "end_char": 8201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8266, "end_char": 8271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 7, 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8518, "end_char": 8526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8583, "end_char": 8588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8631, "end_char": 8641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9046, "end_char": 9075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9508, "end_char": 9513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10076, "end_char": 10084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10135, "end_char": 10140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10320, "end_char": 10337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Doubtless, as Mr. Viswanatha Sastri contents, the Parent Act, to some extent, undermines the sanctity of decrees, but that is to implement the policy of the LegiSlature to give relief to\n\nal(riculturists over burdened with debts."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10908, "end_char": 10913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 29, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11887, "end_char": 11900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "July 29, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12070, "end_char": 12075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12594, "end_char": 12604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 8, 9 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12643, "end_char": 12658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12958, "end_char": 12963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13016, "end_char": 13021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13121, "end_char": 13126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Hutchi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13421, "end_char": 13430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act, th\"re cannot K. Hutchi possibly be a justification for a difference in the manner of Gowder their treatment."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14417, "end_char": 14422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14529, "end_char": 14534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14645, "end_char": 14650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14770, "end_char": 14783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15062, "end_char": 15072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13 and 13A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15158, "end_char": 15171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15239, "end_char": 15244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15325, "end_char": 15330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15417, "end_char": 15421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15496, "end_char": 15501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15676, "end_char": 15681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15813, "end_char": 15818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15855, "end_char": 15859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16003, "end_char": 16008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16065, "end_char": 16070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16087, "end_char": 16092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16201, "end_char": 16206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7, 8, 9 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16315, "end_char": 16337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16612, "end_char": 16620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17164, "end_char": 17187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed\n\nAMRIT BANASPATI CO."}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17236, "end_char": 17256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17265, "end_char": 17280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17282, "end_char": 17298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17300, "end_char": 17310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17315, "end_char": 17329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_313_331_EN", "year": 1964, "text": ".t> S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REP01{TS 313\n\ncurred after the Act, it must be interpreted reasonably that 1964 s. 13 also applies to such decrees.\n\nMr. Pathak, learned K. Hutchi counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends Goll'der that s. 13-A only applies to pre-Act debts, as s. 7 which Richobd;.; Fath< declares the scheme of scaling down of debts applies only mull and Co. to pre-Act debts and the only exception to it is s. 13-A.\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nBe that as it may, we cannot construe s. 13 with the aid of s. 13-A which was introduced by the Amending Act 23 of\n\n1948. This appeal .does not call for an interpretation of s. 13-A of the Act and we shall not express any opinion thereon.\n\nThe legal position may be briefly stated thus.\n\nSection 7, 8, 9 and 13 form a group of sections providing the principles of scaling down of debt• incurred by agriculmrists under different situations.\n\nA debt can be scaled Clown in an appropriate proceeding taken in respect of the same.\n\nBut in the case of debts that have ripened into decrees, s. 19(1) and (2) prescribe a special procedure ror reopening the decree only in respect of debts incurred before the Parent Act. The Parent Act does not provide for the reopening of decrees made in respect of debts incurred after it came into force, and for understandable reasons the relief in respect of such decrees is specifically confined only to a concession in the rate of interest.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the order o! the High Court is correct.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\nAMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR. v.\n\nSTA TE OF UTT AR PRADESH AND ORS.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)\n\nSales Tax-Salts tax levied at the Ttltt of one anna pe1 rupr,._Nelv'\n\nd•cimal coina~• introduad by Act No. 31 of 19SS-EQect on calculation of 1ales ta.r-Sales tax to be levied at the rate (If one\n\n19M\n\nJuly, 27\n\nAmrit Blinaspati\n\nanna or six ft.Toya Paisa-Indian Coinage Act, 1906 as 111nended by\n\nAct No. 31 of 1955. ,_ 14(3). (2).\n\nCo.\n\nF 6 v. or the asessment years 195 -57 and 1957-58, the appellant was Slate of Uttar assessed to sales tax in respect of Vanaspati and oil under the U.P.\n\nPradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948.\n\nBy a notification issued on larch 31, 1956 under s. 3-A(2), the rate of tax on Vanaspati Was fixed at one anna per rupC:e at the point of sale by the manufacturer.\n\nThe appellant and S. P. Bhasin, a shareholder of the company. filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the U.P.\n\nSales Tax Validation Ac4 1958 and also prayed for 1he quashing of the assessment order dated October 15, 1960 and the order dated February J, 1961, of the Sales Tax Judge (Appeals), feerut, in connection with the assess.ment of tax on the sale of Vanaspati and other articles both on the ground that the 'sale tax was assesse~ at a higher rate than was permissible under a valid law and that the tax had been assessed at the rate of one anna and not at 6 Naya Paisa per rupee. The writ petition was dismissed .by_ a 'single Judge of the_ High Court and the Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed by High COurt.\n\nThe appellant came to this Court by special leave.\n\nThe only point urged before this Court was that the tax shouIJ have been calculated at the rate of 6 Naya Paisa per rupee and I'.ot at the rate of one anna per rupee as laid down in the relevant provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the notice issued under its provi\"iions.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nIleld (per P. B. Gajendragadkar. C.J., M. Hidayatullah, K. C. Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.): The High Court was ri, ght in construing the provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. 14 of Indian Coinage Act to mean that references to values in any enactment, notification, nl!e er _order under any enactment or in any contract, . deed or jnstrumei:t,\n\nexpressed in old coins should be construed to be references to value-; expressed in new coins by converting the old values at the rat<! of 16 annas, 64 pice and 192 pies to 100 Naya Paisa. The values expressed in new. coins must be absolutely equivalent to the value of the old coins.\n\n Per Shah, J.-The liability for sales tax after the amendment of the Coinage Act will be at the rate of 6 new coins for every rupee of sale price and not one anna. By the notification issued on March 31, 1956, the liability for payment of sales tax was to be computed at the rate of one anna in a rupee of the turnover. By virtue of s. 14(3), for an anna mentioned in the notification, 61 new coins are to be substituteJ.\n\nAs the substituted rate involves a fractio~ by the process of rounding off at the rate specified in s. 14(2), the fraction of new coins h:ts to be omitted and the nearest new coins, i.e., 6 new coins are to be deemed to be substituted in the statute.\n\nI. K. Jute Mill• Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 1.\n\nRam Kishan Sunder Lal v. State of littar Pradesh, 13 S.T.C. 923,\n\n8 S.C.R.\n\n.-. __ .. _--;-;'.,,..--.-· ... ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOl{TS 315\n\n1?64 '\\1, s. ~\\langalore Ganesh Beedi JVorks v. State of Jfysore, [1963) SUpp. 1\n\n').C.R. 275, referred to.\n\nAmrit Banaspatt' CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 88\"/ ~~- and 888 of 1963.\n\nState of Utwr Pradesh Appeals by spedal leave from the judgment and order dated October 23, 1961, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos. 483 and 484 of 1961.\n\nS. K. Kapur, B. L. Khanna, S. Murty and K. K. Jain, for the appellants.\n\nC. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the respondent.\n\nJuly 27, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:\n\n RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The appellant, Amrit Banaspati Raghubar Dayal J.\n\nCo. Ltd., hereinafter called the company, a joint-stock company, and S. P. Bhasin. a shareholder of the company, filed writ petition no. 1003 of 1961 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, challenging the validity of the U.P.\n\nSales Ta-c Validation Act, 1958 (Act XV of 1958), hereinafter called the Validation Act, and praying for the quashing of the assessment order dated October 15, _ 1960\n\nand the order dated February 1, 1961, of the Sales Ta.1' Judge (Appeals), Meerut, in connection with the assessment of tax on the sale of vanaspati and other articles both on the ground that the sales-tax was assessed at a higher rate than wa.~ permissible under a valid law and that the tax had been assessed at the rate of 1 anna and not at 6 naye paise per rupee.\n\nThe learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition as the Validation Act validating the relevant provision of the U. P. Sales Tax Act and the notification enhancing the rate of tax had been held valid by this Court in J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar\n\nPradesh(') and as the contention about the calculation of tax to be at the rate of 6 naye paise per rupee and not at the rate of 1 ailna had been repelled in earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court, one such decision being Ram Kishan Sunder Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh(2 ). A special appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court was dismissed\n\n(1) (1962] 2 S.C.R. 1.\n\n(2) 13 S.T.C. 92 ·\n\n. 316 '\n\nSUPRE:IIE COURT REPORTS\n\n'., 1964 in view of the decision of this Court in the Jute Mi/ls' .Amrit Banaspati Case('). It appears that the second question about the\n\nCo. alleged error in calculating the . tax at the rate of 1 anna :State ;; Uttar instead of 6 naye paise per rupee, was not nised before the Pradesh Division Bench. Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1963 has been Raghub-;;;; ayal J. filed y special leave against this order of the High Court.\n\nThe other appeal no. 888 of 1963 is filed against the order of the Division Bench confirming the order of the Single Judge dismissing the writ petition by the appellant compariy against the assessment order for the years 1955- 56, 1956-57 and 1957-58. The only point urged for the\n\nappllant in this writ petition had been that the Validation Act was invalid.\n\nThe orders of the two Courts below repelled the contention, in view of the decision of this Court. in the lute Mills Case(').·\n\nWe did not allow the apellant to urge the grounds attacking the validity of the Validation Act in view of the decision of this Court in the Jute Mills' Case(').\n\nThe Qnly point which is urged before us riow is that the tax should have been calculated at the rate of 6 naye paise per rupee and not at the rate of 1 anna per rupee, as laid down in the relevant provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and tho: notification issued under its provisions.\n\nThe contention is based on the provisions of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906 ·{Act III of 1906), hereinafter called the Coinage Act. as amended by Act XXXI of 1955. It is urged that in view of the provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 14 of the Coinage Act, as amended reference to .1 anna in the relevant Act and notification issued thereunder . should be construed to be reference to 6 naye paise and that. the wrong calculation by the Sales Tax Authority has resulted in over-assessment of tax.\n\nTo appreciate the real contention urged. it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Coinage Act.\n\nSection 13' provides the extent up to which the tend\"r of the various coins would be considered legal tender. 'Tts relevant portions read:\n\n\"13. (1) The coins issued under the authority of\n\n. section 6 shaH be a legal tender in payment or\n\n(I) {r962J 2 S.C.R. I.\n\non account,- ( a) in the case ot a rupee com, tor any sum: Amrit Banaspati Co.\n\n(b) in the case of a half-rupee coin. for any sum v. not exceeding ten rupees, State of Uttar Pradesh ( c) in the case of any other coin, for any sum R h b-D 1 J. . qu• not exceedmg one rupee: Porvided that the coin has not been defaced and has not lost weight so as to be less than such weight as may be prescribed in its case.\n\n• • • • * ( 3) All nickel, copper and bronze coins ivhich\n\nmay have been issued under this Act before the 24th day of January, 1942 shall continue as before to be a legal tender in payment or on account for any sum not exceeding one rupee.\" Section 14, after the amendment introducing the decimal system of coinage, reads:\n\n\"14. ( 1) The rupee shall be divided into one hundred units and the new coin reptesenting such unit may be designated by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, under such name as it thinks fit, and the rupee, half-rupee and quarter-rupee shall be respectively equivalent to one hundred, fifty and twenty-five such new coins and shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and subsection (2) of sectmn 13 and to the extent specified therein. be a legal tender in payment or on account accordingly.\n\n(2) All coins issued under the authority of this Act in denominations of annas, pice and pies shall, to the extent specified in section 13, be a legal tender in payment or on account at the rate of sixteen annas, sixty-four pice or one hundred and ninety-two pies to one hundred new coins referred to in sub-section (1), calculated m respect of any such single coin or number or sucb coins, tendered at one transaction, to the\n\n.Amrit Banaspati\n\nCo.\n\nv. :Stale of Ultar Pradesh\n\n!!1.ag/111bar Dayal J.\n\nnearest new coin, or where the new coin .above and the new coin below are equally near, to the new coin below.\n\n(3) All references in any enactment or in any no!Jfication, rule or order under any enactment or in any contract, deed or other instrument to any value expressed in annas, pice and pies shall be construed as references to that value expressed in new coins referred to in sub-section ( 1) converted thereto at the rate specified in subsection ( 2) . \"\n\nThe various factors determining the application of the provisions of sub-s. (2) for the purposes of calculating the equivalent value of annas, pice and pies tendered at one transaction are several.\n\nThe first requisite is that the amount taken into consideration is the amount which is tendered at one transaction.\n\nThe other is that the amount tendered in any of those coins should be within the extent of legal tender mentioned in s. 13.\n\nWhen these two conditions are present, those oins would be legal tender in payment or on account at the rate of 16 annas, 64 pice or 192 pies to 100 naye paise which is the new coin referred to in sub-s. ( 1) of s. 14.\n\nThis means that the number of annas, or pice or pies tendered have to be multiplied by 100/, 100/64 and 100/192 respectively, to get the equivalent number of new coins.\n\nIn such arithmetical calculation there is the possibility that the equivalent number of naye paise be not an exact number and be a mixed number consisting of a whole number and a fraction.\n\nThere is no coin of the equivalent to a fraction of a naya paisa in value.\n\nIn such cases, there is not going to be payment of the amount due in full, if for the amount tendered in payment or on account there is no full equivalent of naye paises at the rate specified in sub-s. (2). It is for such contingency of a payment being not a full payment that sub-s. (2) further provides that the coins tendered will be legal payment at the specified rate calculated to the nearest new coin or where the new coin above or new coin below are equ1Jly near, to the new coin below. The significance of this specified mode of calculation would be apparent from a concrete example.\n\n.8. S.C.R.' SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 319\n\n , 7 arinas, 6 annas and 5 annas, calculated at the speci- 1964 :fied rate, would be equal to 43!, 37!: and 3 H naye paise. Amrit Banaspati According to the artificial calculation, they will however be <!0 • deemed to be le3al tender for 44, 37 and 31 _naye paise State i Uttar respectively, as 44 aP l '1 naye paise are nearest to the Pradesh calculated equh:i>nt Oi 7 annas and 5 annas and 37 naye Ragliubar Dayal/. paise is the next coin .below 37! naye paise which are equally below 38 naye paise and above 37 naye paise and the artificial mode of calculation directs the equivalents to be fixed, in such circumstances, to the new coins below. It is to be noted that each coin of one kind, tendered, is not .considered as a unfr for the purposes of calculation, but all the wins of the denomination are to be treated as one unit for this purpose.\n\nThis is to ensure payment of the amounts due as fully as possible.\n\nThis will again be clear from a concrete example.\n\nSeven one-anna pieces are tendered, say, at one payment. If each separate piece he taken to be valid payment for 6 naye paise, the seven one- .anna pieces will be good payment for 42 naye oaise only, but if taken as a whole, they would be good payment for 44 naye paise.\n\nSimilarly, five one-pice pieces will be good payment for 8 naye paise only and not for 10 naye paise which would be the case if each one-pice piece was treated as good payment for 2 naye paise, its equivalent, if it be converted singly to naye p.:iise.\n\nlt is therefore clear that the provisions of sub-s.(2) provide for the conversion of old coins into new at the time of payment or of accounting, and then too for the conversion of the old coins within the limit of the extent to which they are legal tender, which means that one cannot insist on\n\npaying a total sum of several rupees in naye paise calculated in the manner laid down in sub-s. (2) of s. 14 and.that two factors affect the determination of the nnmber of naye paise equivalent in value to the value of the old coin of annas, pice or pies tendered, the two factors being the rate specified! and the artificial way of calculation. The result of the artificial way of calculation is that sometimes equivalent number of naye paise is less than the actual value o[ the old coins at the specified rate and sometimes it is higher, the difference being, however, very small. ·\n\nJ9M Sub-section (3), however, deals with a different matter. ,\n\n. -B- . It has nothing to do with the actual payment of any amount. n.mrit anaspati . . .\n\nCo.\n\nIt provides a rule for construmg values expressed m old\n\nS v-, Utt coins as values expressed in new coins or naye paise, and late OJ ar h\" h' b' th 1 f . \"f Pradesh to ac 1eve t IS o ject, e on y actor necessary to spec1 y\n\nR h b--D 11 is the rate at which the value of the old coins is to be converag u ar aya . • th f . . ted mto e value o the new cams.\n\nThe c b1ect of the provision is to provide a measure for arriving t the equivalent value in terms of new coins and not to provide bow any amount due in terms of old coins is to be paid in terms of new coins.\n\nSub-section ( 3) therefore simply provides that references, in any of the documents referred to in that sub-section, to any value expressed in annas, pice and pies shall be construed as references to that value expressed in new coins converted thereto at the rate specified in sub-s. (2).\n\nSub-s.\n\n(2) specifies the rate.\n\nThe rate specified in sub-s. (2) is 16 annas, 64 pice or 192 pies to 100 new coins or naye paise.\n\nIt is this rate which is referred to in sub-s. ( 3).\n\nThere is nothing in sub-s. (3') which can be taken to refer to that part of sub-s. (2) which relates to the actual calculation for arriving at the number of new coins deemed equivalent in value to a certain number of l\\nl)aS, pice or pies, coins tendered within the limits of legal tender.\n\nThe provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. 14 provide for the conversion ot the value of old coins into that of new coins at the rate specified in sub-s. (Z) and do not provide for conversion to be in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (2). The other expression would have been preferable if the legislat11re bad intended that the references of values expressed in old coins be construed as references to values in new coins according to the mode of artificial calculation mentioned in sub-s.(2).\n\nThe provisions deal with the method of construction of the expression of the value in documents, be they private documents or be they enactments or notificntions, or rules or orders. The object was to determine the equivalent value which may be taken to replace the value as expressed in old coins. If the contention urged for the appellant be accepted, the values expressed in annas, pice or pies will not, on conversion, be precisely equivalent but could be very much divergent and would ad-rersety affect\n\nthe interests of the persons to whom money be due or in 1964 certain circumstances, the interests of the person from Amrit Banmpatl whom it be due. This could not have been contemplated by Co. the legislature.\n\nThe futility of the appellants' contention State !; Uttt11 that the provisions of sub-s. ( 3) not only refer to the rate Prade1h specified in sub-s. (2) but also to the method of calculation Rnthub-;;; f,1111111. mentioned in that sub-section, is apparent from the anomalies which would arise if it be accepted. This can be illustrated from the various facts of these appeals.\n\nIt is the appellants' contention in writ petition no. 1003 of 1961 that the sales tax calculated at the rate of 6 naye paise and not at 1 anna per rupee on the whole turnover o( Rs. 1,40,18,170.84 would reduce the tax demanded by the Sales Tax Officer by Rs. 34,355.\n\nThis means that if the tax is calculated at the rate of 1 anna per rupee, as expressed in the relevant provision of law or at 6.25 naye paise per rupee, the amount of tax due from the appellant would be Rs. 34,355 more than the amount of of the same tax on the same turnover calculated at an equivalent value of 6 naye paise per rupee.\n\nIn the other writ petition, no reference was made by the appellants to the manner of calculating the tax, the manner of calculation adopted by the taxing authority being the same as in the other writ petition, as the appellants' claim for refund, if determined at the values of one .anna and nine pies calculated in accordance with sub-section ( 2) of s. 14, would have been much reduced.\n\nIt will be sufficient to state that in clause (e) of para 16 of the writ peti\\ion, the figures for the years 1956-57 for the amount paid at one anna per rupee and the amount payable at 9 pies per rupee would then vary the amount refundable to the appellant in a way as to make it much less.\n\nThe figures would stand thus :\n\nTotal amount paid at I anna per rupee Amount payable at 9 pie1\n\nAmount refundable, and th<refore which\n\nthe petitioner company could detain\n\nRa. a. p. 8>0,,7:46 IO 6 6,0,,167 5 3\n\n2,00,559 ' 3\n\nIf the amount payable be calculated .at the rate of five naye paise in place of 9 pies, the amount refundable would be\n\n51 S.C.-21.\n\nA.mrlt Ban41pati\n\nCo.\n\n•• State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nRaghubar v.,1111.\n\nmuch less as shown below :\n\nRa •\n\n1>P.\n\nTotaJ an1ount paid at I anna per rupee 8,05.7•6 65 Amount payable at ' naye pii.ise 6,44,661 32 ------\n\nAmount refundable 1,61,065 33\n\nThe appellant stood to lose by calculating the tax payable in terms of naye paise and therefore made up an account at the old coin rates.\n\nThe legislature could not have intended, by the provisions of sub-section (3), that a mere provision for working out the value in old coins into values in new coins should provide scope for such huge variations in the actual amo:m!s to be paid or received.\n\nThe process of conversion is not meant or designed to be a process for gaining more or less than what is rightfully due under a provision of law or under any contractual term.\n\nThe conversion is a simple process necessitated by the exigency of payment to be in currency different from the one in which the payment was to be.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that what sub-section (2) of s. 14 requires is that references to any value expressed in annas, pice and pies will be construed to such values expressed in new coins which would be absolutely equivalent to the value of the old coins when their value is converted at the rate of 16 annas, 64 pice and 192 pies to 100 naye paise.\n\nGreat reliance is placed for the appellants on the decisions of this Court in M. G. Beedi Works v. State of Mysore('). Apparently some observations of this Court in that case support the appellants' contention.\n\nBut, when they are considered in the context of that case, they do not support the contention as the Court had not to deal in that case with the actual contention now raised before us.\n\nIn the Beedi Works Case the sales tax was to be levied 11t the rate of 3 pies for every rnpee of turnover.\n\nThe\n\n{I) [1963) Supp. I S.C; R., 275.\n\namount of tax calculated at 3 pies per rupee worked out to 1964 Rs. 91,690 and, calculated at the rate of two naye paise Amrit Baruupatl the equivalent value of 3 pies, when calculated in the Co. manner laid down in sub-section (2) of s. 14, worked out Stat• i Ut\"\"' to a figure higher by Rs. 25,038. The tax was assessed Pradesh at two naye p.aise per rupee in view of the provisions of Raghu;;; Dayt111. the Mysore Existing Laws (Construction of References to Values) Act, 1957 (Mysore Act XII of 1957). Section 3 of that Act said :\n\n\"3. Construction of rdcrenccs to certain values in existing laws.-\n\nIn every existing law, all references to any value\n\nexpressed in annas, pice and pies, sha!l be construed at references to that value expressed in new coins referred to in subsection ( 1) of section 14 of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906 (Central Act III of 1906), converted thereto at the rate specified in sub-section (2) of section 14 of the said Act.\"\n\nThe assessee, by his writ petition, questioned the validity of the enactment which led to such a result in the amount of tax assessed.\n\nThe contention raised was not that the rate of calculation was wrong, but was that the law providing for the assessing of tax at the rate of 2 naye paise instead of 3 pies per rupee was invalid 1 as it amounted to enhancing the tax by an Act which was not en.acted in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Constitution. This is clear from what was stated at p. 277, it being-\n\n\"The grievance of the appellant was that according to the Mysore Sales Tax Act he was liable to sales tax at the rate of 3 pies for every rupee on the turnover and calculated on that basis the amount of tax would be Rs. 91,690, but after the amendment of the Indian Coinage Act (Act 3 of 1906) by the Amending Act 31 of 1955 the rate of s.ales tax which was levied on the appellant's Beedis was 02 nPs. per rupee\n\nlHf\n\nAMri1 BantUt!t#I\n\nCo.\n\n•• ftrl• of Uttat Prad .. h\n\n• 3'; \"\"' Dayal J.\n\nSUPREldE COURT REPORTS [rg64J\n\nand thus the appellant was called upon to pay Rs. 25,038, more than he would have T)aid if he had been charged at the rate of 3 pi~ per rupee. It was contended on behalf of the appellant in the High Court and before us that this amounted to enhancement of tax which was illegal because the tax had not been increased in the manner provided under the Constitution and thus it was a bre.ach of Article 265 of the Constitution and was therefore void and illegal.\"\n\nThis Court further said, at p. 279: \"Two objections were taken to the validity of the tax : Firstly it was argued that by the substitution of 2 naye paise in place 3 pies there was a change in the tax exigible by the Mysore Sales Tax Act and this could only be done if that enactment had been passed according to the procedure for Money Bills in the manner provided by Articles 198, 199 and 207 of the Constitution and as no such Money Bill was introduced or passed for the enhancement of the tax, the tax was illegal and invalid.\".\n\nIt is clear that the contention was not that the tax shou!d be calculated at a rate equivalent to 300/192 naye paise i.e., 1-9/16 naye paise and not at 2 naye pai<e.\n\nIt was not nrged that the assessment could not have been ::.t 2 naye paise in view of the provisions of s. 3 of the Mysore Act of\n\n1957. What was contended was that the assessment at the rate of 2 naye paise per rupee, h'tead of 3 pies per rupee, amounted to assessment of tax at an enhanced rate and that the Mysore Act, due to procedural defect, was not valid law. This Court dealt with these two objections and simply said with respect to the contention about the provision of law amounting to a provision enhancing the rate to tax\n\n(p. 279) :\n\n''In our opinion by substitution of new coinage i.e., naye paise in place of annas, pice and pies no enhancement of tax was enacted but it was\n\n8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\!E COURT REPORTS 325\n\nmerely a substitution of one coinage by another of equivalent value.\"\n\nAmrll Banu; atl -- - co.\n\nThis Court expressed the opinion that a law providing for s 1 \"i UtJM substitution of new coinage in place of old coinage in the ta\n\n1 p,!J.,,. . _ expression of values does not amount . to a provision of 1la ,.,,;;;;-Dlqol r. enhancing the tax. The pith and substance of the Act was r _ substitution in terms of new coinage and not varying the\n\nra~ of tax.\n\nOn p. 278, however, this ourt, after referring to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 14 of the Indian Coinage Act about the division of a rupee into 100 naye paise and the old legal tender in annas, pice and pies remain\n\ning legal tender in naye paise and referring to the mode of calculation specified in sub-section (2) of s. 14, said: -\n\n\"Sub-section (3) provides that al! references under any enactment to annas, pice or pies have to be construed as references to the new coin referred to in sub-section ( 1). In other w:>rds wherever the old legal tender, i.e., annas, pico\n\nand pies is mentioned in an enactment it is to be converted into naya paisas and the naya paisas are to be substituted in place of the old legal tender calculated in the manner laid down in sub-section (2).\"\n\nStress is placed on the last sentence but this cannot be taken as the -decision of the Court on the question that subsection (3) of s. 14 made reference not only to the rate of conversion but also to the mode of calculation, as !hat question had not been considered in any manner. The last sentence was a sort of a paraphrase of what had been said earlier in the quotation with respect to the provisions of sub-section (3). This is clear from the facts that the provisions of sub-section (3) have not been stated in full, and have been referred to upto the stage of referenceto the new coin -referred to in sub-section ( 1) and that the last portion of the provisions of sub-section (3), i.e., 'converted thereto at the rate specified in sub-section (2 )' has not been mentioned. It is thus that the latter part of the observa-\n\n1964 tions happened to refer to the method of calculation and Jfmrlt Banaspati not to the rate specified in sub-section (2).\n\nThe Court Co. . was, at the time, thinking of the value of 3 pies in terms state ;; Uttar of naye p.aise as . calculated according to the provisions of Pradesh sub-section (2), there being no contest before it that the Jlagrwba; Dayal 1. value substituted to the equivalent of 3 pies for assessing the\n\ntax was not a correct value for substitution in place of 3 pies.\n\nWe therefore do not construe the expression relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant to be a decision of the Court on the construction of the provisions cf subsection (3) of s. 14 and are therefore of opinion that the observations iii that case cannot be taken to be a decision of this Court on the actual point for determination now before us.\n\n:Shalo /.\n\nWe therefore hold that the High Courtis right in construing tbe provisions of sub-section (3) of s. 14 of tbc Indian Coinage Act to mean that references to values in any enactment, notification, rule or order under any enactment or in any contract, deed or instrument, expressed in old coins should be construed to be references to values expressed ill new coins by converting the old values at the rate of 16 annas, 64 pice and. 192 pies to 100 naye pais:!.\n\nWe accordingly dismiss the appeals with costs.\n\nSHAH, J.-I am unable to agree.with the view expressed by my learned brother Raghubar Dayal, J., about the interpretation of s. 14 which was incorporated by Act 31 of 1955 in the Coinage Act ill of 1906 ...\n\nFor the assessment years 1956-57 and 1957-58 the appellant was assessed to sales tax in respect of \"Vanaspati\" and \"oil\" under the U.P. Sales Tax Act XV of 1948, , ll3 amended by the U.P. Act XXV of 1948. By a notification issued on March 31, 1956 under s. 3-A(2) the rate of tax on ''V anaspati\" was fixed at one anna per rupee, at the point of sale by the manufacturer. Validity of that imposition was challenged by tbe appellant, but the question is not now open to be canvassed in view of. the decision of this Court in I. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Utrar . Pradesh('). The only question which survives is about L'1e ---------\n\n(1) (1962] 2 S.C.R. I\n\n--<~·--·· quantum of liability of the appellant under the notification, 1964 in terms of the new decimal coinage introduced by Act 31 Amrit llaTUUpatl of 1955. The appellant has claimed that its liability ccm- Co. puted in the light of s. 14 (3) of the Coinage Act V.'Ou!d be Stat• i Uttar Rs. 34,385, less than the amount demanded by the Taxing Pradesh Authorities.\n\nSection 13 of the Coinage Act III of 1906 Shah J. (which was substituted by Act 28 of 194 7 for the original sections 13 and 14) in so far as it is material provides:\n\n\" ( 1) The coins issued under the authority of sec\n\ntion 6 shall be a legal tender in payment or on account,-\n\n(a) in the case of a rupee coin, for any sum;\n\n(b) in the case of a half-rupee coin, for any sum not exceeding ten rupees;\n\n( c) in the case of any other coin, for any sum not exceeding one rupee:\n\n(2) • • • . ..\n\nSection 14 which added by Act 31 of 1955 provides:\n\n \" ( 1) The rupee shall be divided into one hundred . units and the new com representing such unit may be designated by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, under such name as it thinks fit, and the rupee, halfrupee and quarter-rupee shall be respectively equivalent to one hundred, fifty and twenty-five such new coins and $hall, subject to t.'ie provisions of sub-section (1) and sul>-section (2) of section 13 and to the extent specified therein, be a legal tender in payment or on account accordingly.\n\n(2) All coins issued under the authority of the Act\n\n. in any denoriinations of annas, pice and pies\n\nshall, to the extent specified in section 13, be\n\n.tf.mril Baruupati\n\nCo.\n\nSUPRE1IB COURT .REPORTS\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh\n\na legal tender in payment or on account at the rate of sixteen annas, sixty-four pice or one hundred and' nlliety-two pies to one hundred new coins referred to in sub-section ( 1) calculated in respect of any such single coin or number of such coins, tendered at one transaction, to the nearest new coin, or where the new coin above and the new coin below are equally near, to the new coin below.\n\nShah/.\n\n(3) All references in any enactment or in any notification, rule or order under any enactinent or in any contract, deed or other instrument to any value expressed in annas, pice and pies shall be construed as references to that value expressed in new coins referred to in sub-section ( 1) converted thereto at the rate specified in sub-section (2).\"\n\nSub-section ( 1) of s. 14 declares a rupee as equivalent to a hundred new coins, and a half-rupee and a quarterrupee as equivalent to fifty new coins and twenty-five new coins respectively. These new coins are made legal tender in payment or on account as provided in s. 13 of the Act . . By sub-section (2) all coins issued under the authority of the Act in denomi.nations of annas, pice and pies also remain legal tender in payment or on account at the rate of sixteen annas, sixty-four pice or one hundred and ninetytwo pies to one hundred new coins. An anna is therefore made legal tender for 25!4, a pice for 25!16, and a pie for 25j48 new coins. But this involves adjustment of fractions of new coins, and the Legislature has, instead of issuing fractions of new coins-a step which would have involved the issue of coins of insignificant value-provided for rounding off fractions of new coins, when to discharge an ascertained liability in a single transaction payment is made in annas, pice or pies. This table of equivalence prescribed by sub-section (2), however, applies only when payment is made in old coins to discharge liability under a single transaction. Sub-section (3) is an interpretation clause. \\V'here\n\nunder any law, contract or instrument, reference fa made\n\nto annas, pice r pies, liability arising ill any transaction 1964 governed thereby will be construed in terms of new coins Anult Banaspatl converted at the rate specified in sub-section. (2). 1bis Co. conversion involves two steps: substitution of the valuo s1a11 i Uttar in terms of new coins by the application of rates mentioned Pradesh in sub-section (2), and rounding off the fractions, if any, Shah 1. resulting from, such application. When there is in any law, contract or instrument a reference to any value expressed in terms of annas, pice or pies, by sub-section ( 3) the reference has to be construed as if the value is expressed in terms of new coins at the rates specified in sub-section (2).\n\nLiability to pay an amount in one transaction ascertained in terms of new coins may be discharged under subs...<>ction (2) by tender of annas, pice or pies according to the table of equivalence and the fractions may be rounded off.\n\nBut in the ascertainment of liability under a transac-. tion, sub-section (2) does not come into play.\n\nLiability under a transaction is ascertained under the general law, and sub-section (3) comes in aid as an interpretation clause\n\nwhen the value is expressed in some law, contract or instrument governing a transaction not in terms of new coins, but of annas, pice or pies. Sub-section (3) does not attract the rule of rounding off at the stage of discharge of liability under any concrete transaction: it merely prescribes the value which shall be deemed to be substituted in any law, contract or instrument when the value is specified therein in t=s of annas, pice or pies. It is attracted when liability declared in annas, pice or pies is to be ascertained in terms of new coins whereas sub-section (2) operates in considering whether a certain payment in ann~, pice or pies discharges an ascertained liability.\n\nThere is nothing in the statute which supports the view that what the Legislature intended by enacting sub-section (3) was computation of liability in terms of old coim and then conversion and rounding off of the total liability in temis of new coins. To interpret clause (3) in that manner would be to denude it of its true purpose as an interpretation clause, and to render it practically nugatory. If subsection (3) is merely intended to serve as determinative of\n\n1964. total liability under a transaction, the purpose is amply Amrit Ba1111Spatl served by sub-section (2). - .\n\nCo. -\"· The view I have expressed also finds support from a SJate Presh Uttar judgment of this Court_ in Mis. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. The State of Mysore and another( 1 ). In that Shah 1• _ case, sales-tax was imposed under the Mysore Sales Tax Act 6 of 1948 at the rate of three pies for every rupee of the turnover.\n\nOn the application of s. 14 of the Indian Coinage {Amendment) Act, 1955, sales-tax leviable under the Mysore Sales Tax Act was computed at the rate of two new coins per rupee of the turnover, and a demand for Rs. 1,16,72 44 was made.\n\nThe tax-payer contended that he was liable to pay Rs. 91,690 only being the amount of\n\ntotal tax liability computed at the rate of 3 pies per rupee of turnover.\n\nHe challenged the additional demand by a petition in the High Court of Mysore on the plea that the Act which altered the incidence was a taxing measure and could only be enacted after complying with the provisions of Arts. 198, 199 and 207 of the Constitution relating to money bills, and the Mysore Existing Laws (Construction of Reference to Values) Act 12 of 1957 which gave eITect\n\nto the amendment made by Act 31 of 1955, dealt with . \"coinage and legal tender\", and was not within the competence of the State Legislature. In dealing with these contentions, this Court summarised the scheme of clauses ( 1),\n\n(2) and (3) of s. 14 and observed:\n\n\"Sub-section (3) provides that all references under any enactment to annas, pice or pies have to be construed as reference to the new coin referred to in sub-section ( 1).\n\nIn other words, wherever the old legal tender, i.e., annas, pice and pies is mentioned in an enactment it is to be converted into naya Paisas and the naya Paisas are to be substituted in place of the old legal tender calculated in the manner laid down in sub-section (2).\"\n\nThe Court rejected the claim of the tax-payer tb.:it he WM\n\nliable to pay tax computed at th~ rate of three pies per\n\n(t) [1963] Supp. I S.C.R >1'\n\nrupee only. If sub-section (3) of s. 14 was suscepti\"ble of 1964 the interpretation submitte.d on beha1f of the State of Uttar .dmrlt Banaspatl\n\nPradesh, it was wholly unnecessary to enter upon the question Co. of the vires cif the provisions, because between the computa- Stata i Uttar tion of sales-tax on a total turnover of Rs. 58,36A22.25 nPs Pradesh\" at 2 naye Paise, and at the r.ate of 3 pies per rupee s'hdi. in the manner suggested, there would have resulted no discrepancy at all, and the contention of the tax-payer that he was liable to pay Rs. 91,690 had to be accepted. But this Coun upheld the claim of the SaleS Tax Depattment that the computation had to be made by substituting two naye Paise in the section of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, which imposed liability for payment of tax, and the total demand for tax computed on the footing of that substitution was properly made. If the interpretation which is now suggested on behalf of the State be accepted, the assessee in Mangalore Ganesh Beddi Works' Case(') was bound to succeed.\n\nIn the present case by the notification issued on March 31, 1956, the liability for payment of salesctax was to be computed at the rate of one anna in a rupee of the turnover. By virtue of s. 14(3). of the Indian Coinage Act, for an anna mentioned in the notification 6t new coins will be substituted.\n\nBut as the substituted rate involved a fraction . by the process of rounding off at the rate specified in sub-section (2), the fraction of new coins will be omitted and the nearest new coins i.e., six new coins will be deemed to be substituted in the statute. Liability for sales-tax after the amendment of the Coinage Act will, therefore, be at the rate of 6 new coins for every rupee of sale price.\n\nORDER BY COURT\n\nIn view of the judgment of the majority, the appeals 11Ie dismissed with costs.\n\n(I) (!963] Supp. I S.C J', 27$.", "total_entities": 130, "entities": [{"text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REP01{TS 313", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 38, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".t> S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REP01{TS 313\n\ncurred after the Act, it must be interpreted reasonably that 1964 s. 13 also applies to such decrees."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pathak, learned K. Hutchi counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends Goll'der that s. 13-A only applies to pre-Act debts, as s. 7 which Richobd;.;"}}, {"text": "K. Hutchi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pathak, learned K. Hutchi counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends Goll'der that s. 13-A only applies to pre-Act debts, as s. 7 which Richobd;.;"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 243, "end_char": 248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285, "end_char": 289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 433, "end_char": 438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 495, "end_char": 500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 517, "end_char": 522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 631, "end_char": 636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7, 8, 9 and 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 745, "end_char": 767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1042, "end_char": 1050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1594, "end_char": 1624, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "STA TE OF UTT AR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1630, "end_char": 1654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nSTA TE OF UTT AR PRADESH AND ORS.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS"}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1666, "end_char": 1686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1695, "end_char": 1710, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1712, "end_char": 1728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1733, "end_char": 1740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1745, "end_char": 1759, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Amrit Blinaspati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 1995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 of 19SS-EQect on calculation of 1ales ta.r-Sales tax to be levied at the rate (If one\n\n19M\n\nJuly, 27\n\nAmrit Blinaspati\n\nanna or six ft.", "canonical_name": "AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR"}}, {"text": "Toya Paisa-Indian Coinage Act, 1906", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2012, "end_char": 2047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2260, "end_char": 2287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2339, "end_char": 2343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948", "statute": "Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "S. P. Bhasin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2473, "end_char": 2485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and S. P. Bhasin, a shareholder of the company."}}, {"text": "October 15, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2688, "end_char": 2704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the U.P.\n\nSales Tax Validation Ac4 1958 and also prayed for 1he quashing of the assessment order dated October 15, 1960 and the order dated February J, 1961, of the Sales Tax Judge (Appeals), feerut, in connection with the assess.ment of tax on the sale of Vanaspati and other articles both on the ground that the 'sale tax was assesse~ at a higher rate than was permissible under a valid law and that the tax had been assessed at the rate of one anna and not at 6 Naya Paisa per rupee."}}, {"text": "February J, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2725, "end_char": 2741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the U.P.\n\nSales Tax Validation Ac4 1958 and also prayed for 1he quashing of the assessment order dated October 15, 1960 and the order dated February J, 1961, of the Sales Tax Judge (Appeals), feerut, in connection with the assess.ment of tax on the sale of Vanaspati and other articles both on the ground that the 'sale tax was assesse~ at a higher rate than was permissible under a valid law and that the tax had been assessed at the rate of one anna and not at 6 Naya Paisa per rupee."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3479, "end_char": 3492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. B. Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3574, "end_char": 3594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the appeal,\n\nIleld (per P. B. Gajendragadkar.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "M. Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3602, "end_char": 3617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J., M. Hidayatullah, K. C. Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.):", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "K. C. Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3619, "end_char": 3634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J., M. Hidayatullah, K. C. Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.):", "canonical_name": "K. C.\n\nDAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3639, "end_char": 3653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.J., M. Hidayatullah, K. C. Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.):", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBAR DAYAL"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3743, "end_char": 3761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Per Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4194, "end_char": 4202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Shah, J.-The liability for sales tax after the amendment of the Coinage Act will be at the rate of 6 new coins for every rupee of sale price and not one anna."}}, {"text": "Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4262, "end_char": 4273, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4387, "end_char": 4401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the notification issued on March 31, 1956, the liability for payment of sales tax was to be computed at the rate of one anna in a rupee of the turnover."}}, {"text": "s. 14(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4526, "end_char": 4534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Coinage Act", "statute": "Indian Coinage Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4716, "end_char": 4724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Coinage Act", "statute": "Indian Coinage Act"}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4921, "end_char": 4938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amrit Banaspatt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5189, "end_char": 5204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amrit Banaspatt' CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.", "canonical_name": "AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR"}}, {"text": "State of Utwr Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5281, "end_char": 5302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Utwr Pradesh Appeals by spedal leave from the judgment and order dated October 23, 1961, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS"}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5453, "end_char": 5464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur, B. L. Khanna, S. Murty and K. K. Jain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. L. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5466, "end_char": 5478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur, B. L. Khanna, S. Murty and K. K. Jain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. Murty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5480, "end_char": 5488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur, B. L. Khanna, S. Murty and K. K. Jain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5493, "end_char": 5503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur, B. L. Khanna, S. Murty and K. K. Jain, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5526, "end_char": 5540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5545, "end_char": 5554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Amrit Banaspati Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5672, "end_char": 5702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:\n\n RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-The appellant, Amrit Banaspati Raghubar Dayal J.\n\nCo. Ltd., hereinafter called the company, a joint-stock company, and S. P. Bhasin.", "canonical_name": "AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5864, "end_char": 5901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1003 of 1961 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, challenging the validity of the U.P.\n\nSales Ta-c Validation Act, 1958 (Act XV of 1958), hereinafter called the Validation Act, and praying for the quashing of the assessment order dated October 15, _ 1960\n\nand the order dated February 1, 1961, of the Sales Ta.1' Judge (Appeals), Meerut, in connection with the assessment of tax on the sale of vanaspati and other articles both on the ground that the sales-tax was assessed at a higher rate than wa.~ permissible under a valid law and that the tax had been assessed at the rate of 1 anna and not at 6 naye paise per rupee."}}, {"text": "Sales Ta-c Validation Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5941, "end_char": 5972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6617, "end_char": 6630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6943, "end_char": 6963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition as the Validation Act validating the relevant provision of the U. P. Sales Tax Act and the notification enhancing the rate of tax had been held valid by this Court in J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar\n\nPradesh(') and as the contention about the calculation of tax to be at the rate of 6 naye paise per rupee and not at the rate of 1 ailna had been repelled in earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court, one such decision being Ram Kishan Sunder Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh(2 )."}}, {"text": "(1962] 2 S.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7116, "end_char": 7133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "did not allow the apellant to urge the grounds attacking the validity of the Validation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8104, "end_char": 8195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8483, "end_char": 8496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "contention is based on the provisions of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8553, "end_char": 8622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8666, "end_char": 8677, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8780, "end_char": 8785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The contention is based on the provisions of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906", "statute": "The contention is based on the provisions of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906"}}, {"text": "Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8793, "end_char": 8804, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9147, "end_char": 9158, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9161, "end_char": 9171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The contention is based on the provisions of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906", "statute": "The contention is based on the provisions of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9353, "end_char": 9362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The contention is based on the provisions of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906", "statute": "The contention is based on the provisions of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906"}}, {"text": "Amrit Banaspati Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9484, "end_char": 9503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "section 6 shaH be a legal tender in payment or\n\n(I) {r962J 2 S.C.R. I.\n\non account,- ( a) in the case ot a rupee com, tor any sum: Amrit Banaspati Co.\n\n(b) in the case of a half-rupee coin."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9593, "end_char": 9606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for any sum v. not exceeding ten rupees, State of Uttar Pradesh ( c) in the case of any other coin, for any sum R h b-D 1 J. ."}}, {"text": "24th day of January, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9941, "end_char": 9966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• • • • * ( 3) All nickel, copper and bronze coins ivhich\n\nmay have been issued under this Act before the 24th day of January, 1942 shall continue as before to be a legal tender in payment or on account for any sum not exceeding one rupee.\""}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10076, "end_char": 10086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10284, "end_char": 10302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) The rupee shall be divided into one hundred units and the new coin reptesenting such unit may be designated by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, under such name as it thinks fit, and the rupee, half-rupee and quarter-rupee shall be respectively equivalent to one hundred, fifty and twenty-five such new coins and shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and subsection (2) of sectmn 13 and to the extent specified therein."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10819, "end_char": 10829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Amrit Banaspati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11119, "end_char": 11135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) All coins issued under the authority of this Act in denominations of annas, pice and pies shall, to the extent specified in section 13, be a legal tender in payment or on account at the rate of sixteen annas, sixty-four pice or one hundred and ninety-two pies to one hundred new coins referred to in sub-section (1), calculated m respect of any such single coin or number or sucb coins, tendered at one transaction, to the\n\n.Amrit Banaspati\n\nCo.\n\nv. :Stale of Ultar Pradesh\n\n!!", "canonical_name": "AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR"}}, {"text": "Stale of Ultar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11146, "end_char": 11168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) All coins issued under the authority of this Act in denominations of annas, pice and pies shall, to the extent specified in section 13, be a legal tender in payment or on account at the rate of sixteen annas, sixty-four pice or one hundred and ninety-two pies to one hundred new coins referred to in sub-section (1), calculated m respect of any such single coin or number or sucb coins, tendered at one transaction, to the\n\n.Amrit Banaspati\n\nCo.\n\nv. :Stale of Ultar Pradesh\n\n!!", "canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12091, "end_char": 12096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12311, "end_char": 12316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.C.R.' SUPREl\\IE COURT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13353, "end_char": 13376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.' SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS 319\n\n , 7 arinas, 6 annas and 5 annas, calculated at the speci- 1964 :fied rate, would be equal to 43!,"}}, {"text": "Amrit Banaspati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13514, "end_char": 13529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amrit Banaspati According to the artificial calculation, they will however be <!", "canonical_name": "AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15286, "end_char": 15291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17295, "end_char": 17300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amrit Banmpatl", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18385, "end_char": 18399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the contention urged for the appellant be accepted, the values expressed in annas, pice or pies will not, on conversion, be precisely equivalent but could be very much divergent and would ad-rersety affect\n\nthe interests of the persons to whom money be due or in 1964 certain circumstances, the interests of the person from Amrit Banmpatl whom it be due.", "canonical_name": "AMRIT BANASPATI CO. LTD. & ANR"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19814, "end_char": 19819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.mrlt Ban41pati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20503, "end_char": 20519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.mrlt Ban41pati\n\nCo.\n\n•• State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nRaghubar v.,1111."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21527, "end_char": 21532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beedi Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22232, "end_char": 22243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Beedi Works Case the sales tax was to be levied 11t the rate of 3 pies for every rnpee of turnover."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22607, "end_char": 22612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore Act XII of 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22853, "end_char": 22875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22878, "end_char": 22887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mysore Act XII of 1957", "statute": "Mysore Act XII of 1957"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23167, "end_char": 23177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mysore Act XII of 1957", "statute": "Mysore Act XII of 1957"}}, {"text": "Indian Coinage Act, 1906", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23185, "end_char": 23209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Act III of 1906", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23211, "end_char": 23234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23299, "end_char": 23309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act III of 1906", "statute": "Central Act III of 1906"}}, {"text": "Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24117, "end_char": 24128, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24332, "end_char": 24337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "per rupee\n\nlHf\n\nAMri1 BantUt!tI\n\nCo.\n\n•• ftrl• of Uttat Prad .. h\n\n• 3'; \"\"' Dayal J.\n\nSUPREldE COURT REPORTS [rg64J\n\nand thus the appellant was called upon to pay Rs."}}, {"text": "Article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24765, "end_char": 24776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 198, 199 and 207", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25204, "end_char": 25229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25640, "end_char": 25644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amrll Banu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26338, "end_char": 26348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amrll Banu; atl -- - co.\n\nThis Court expressed the opinion that a law providing for s 1 \"i UtJM substitution of new coinage in place of old coinage in the ta\n\n1 p,!J.,,. ."}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26422, "end_char": 26425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26819, "end_char": 26824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26839, "end_char": 26850, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27062, "end_char": 27067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27658, "end_char": 27663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29032, "end_char": 29037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shalo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29205, "end_char": 29210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":Shalo /.\n\nWe therefore hold that the High Courtis right in construing tbe provisions of sub-section (3) of s. 14 of tbc Indian Coinage Act to mean that references to values in any enactment, notification, rule or order under any enactment or in any contract, deed or instrument, expressed in old coins should be construed to be references to values expressed ill new coins by converting the old values at the rate of 16 annas, 64 pice and."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29312, "end_char": 29317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29325, "end_char": 29343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29723, "end_char": 29727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH, J.-I am unable to agree.with the view expressed by my learned brother Raghubar Dayal, J., about the interpretation of s. 14 which was incorporated by Act 31 of 1955 in the Coinage Act ill of 1906 ...\n\nFor the assessment years 1956-57 and 1957-58 the appellant was assessed to sales tax in respect of \"Vanaspati\" and \"oil\" under the U.P. Sales Tax Act XV of 1948, , ll3 amended by the U.P. Act XXV of 1948.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29847, "end_char": 29852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Coinage Act", "statute": "Indian Coinage Act"}}, {"text": "Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29901, "end_char": 29912, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30066, "end_char": 30079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30184, "end_char": 30188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30829, "end_char": 30834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30846, "end_char": 30857, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30961, "end_char": 30971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Coinage Act III of 1906", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30979, "end_char": 31002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31003, "end_char": 31007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 13 of the Coinage Act III of 1906 Shah J. (which was substituted by Act 28 of 194 7 for the original sections 13 and 14) in so far as it is material provides:\n\n\" ( 1) The coins issued under the authority of sec\n\ntion 6 shall be a legal tender in payment or on account,-\n\n(a) in the case of a rupee coin, for any sum;\n\n(b) in the case of a half-rupee coin, for any sum not exceeding ten rupees;\n\n( c) in the case of any other coin, for any sum not exceeding one rupee:\n\n(2) • • • . ..", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "sections 13 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31070, "end_char": 31088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Coinage Act III of 1906", "statute": "Coinage Act III of 1906"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31454, "end_char": 31464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Coinage Act III of 1906", "statute": "Coinage Act III of 1906"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31936, "end_char": 31946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Coinage Act III of 1906", "statute": "Coinage Act III of 1906"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32177, "end_char": 32187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32243, "end_char": 32265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in any denoriinations of annas, pice and pies\n\nshall, to the extent specified in section 13, be\n\n.tf.mril Baruupati\n\nCo.\n\nSUPRE1IB COURT .REPORTS\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh\n\na legal tender in payment or on account at the rate of sixteen annas, sixty-four pice or one hundred and' nlliety-two pies to one hundred new coins referred to in sub-section ( 1) calculated in respect of any such single coin or number of such coins, tendered at one transaction, to the nearest new coin, or where the new coin above and the new coin below are equally near, to the new coin below.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33044, "end_char": 33049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33292, "end_char": 33297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34565, "end_char": 34567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37098, "end_char": 37103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "challenged the additional demand by a petition in the High Court of Mysore on the plea that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37476, "end_char": 37575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 198, 199 and 207", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37690, "end_char": 37712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He challenged the additional demand by a petition in the High Court of Mysore on the plea that the Act", "statute": "He challenged the additional demand by a petition in the High Court of Mysore on the plea that the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38102, "end_char": 38107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He challenged the additional demand by a petition in the High Court of Mysore on the plea that the Act", "statute": "He challenged the additional demand by a petition in the High Court of Mysore on the plea that the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38752, "end_char": 38757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39707, "end_char": 39716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the interpretation which is now suggested on behalf of the State be accepted, the assessee in Mangalore Ganesh Beddi Works' Case(') was bound to succeed."}}, {"text": "s. 14(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39957, "end_char": 39965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39981, "end_char": 39992, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Liability for sales-tax after the amendment of the Coinage Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40331, "end_char": 40393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_332_347_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "- \"\"\"· 29\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX BOMBAY\n\nCHUGANDAS AND CO., BOMBAY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.)\n\nIndian Incometax Act (XI of 1922), 1. 25(3)-Ex•mption applicable to\n\nwllot incom1.\n\nThe respondent was a firm dealing in oecuritiea and was charaed to lncometax under the Income-tax Act (VII of 1918). It rea:ived certain IUDla of money as interest on securitiea in the accounting years 19-46 and 1947 (assessment years 1947-48 and 1948-49) respectively It cl;.. continued its business on 30th June 1947, and, for the assessment )'l&r\n\n1948-49. claimed exemption from taxation under s. 25(3) of the Inoometax Act (XI of 1922).\n\nThe income-tax officer and the Appel:ate Assistant Commissioner, held that, the income fell under the hel4 .. interest on securities'' under s. 8 and not under the bead \"profits and 1ains of business, profession or vocation'' under s. 10 and that therefore, !be respondent was not entitled to the exemption. The Appellate Tn1>Unal reversed that order and the High Court (by a majority) coofirme4 the order of the Tnl>unal. The Commissioner of Income-tu appealed to the Supreme Court.\n\nHild: The appeal should be dismissed.\n\nWhen s. 25(3) of the Indian Incometax Act (XI of 1922) enacll that \"'where any business, profession or vocation on which tax was at any time charged\", it is intended that the tax was at any time charged on the owner of the business. If that condition be fulfilled in respect of the income of the bu(tnoa,, under the Indian Income-tax Act (VII of 1918), the owner will be entitled to get the benefit of the exemption under the section if the business is discontinued.\n\nThe section in tenm men to tax charged on any business, that is, tax charged on any person hi respect of all income earned by carrying on the business. There k ao reason to restrict the condition of th1> applicability of the exemption only to income on which tax was payable under s. I 0 of the Act under the bead \"profita and gains of business, profession or vocotion\".\n\nThe United Commercial Bank Ltd., Calcutta Y. Th• Comml1,1on11 of Income-tax, Weit Bengal, [1958] S.C.R. 19 and Th• Commi1sioner of lncome-tax, Madra1 v. The Expre\" New1paper1 Limited, MadrOI,\n\n[1964] 8 S.C.R. 189, reierred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 685 & 686 of 1963.\n\n1964 -\n\nC.LT.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated December 17, 18, 1958, of the Bombay High Court· in Income-tax Reference No. 27/X of 1954.\n\nChugandai KJ N. Raiagopala Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for tho !!:::.. appellant.\n\nN. A. Palkhivala, J. B. Dadachanil, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent.\n\nJuly 29, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:\n\nSHAH, J.-M/s. Chugandas and Co.-a firm dealing in securities-received in the year 1946 Rs. 4,13,992/- as interest on securities held by it. In 1947 it received Rs. 1.01,229/~ as interest from the same source. On June\n\n30, 194 7 the firm discontinued its business. In proceedings for assessment for 1947-48 and 1948-49 the firm, relying upon s. 25(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, claimed exemption from payment of tax on income earned in tho relevant previous year, on the plea that the firm was carrying on business before the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was enacted, and on that business, tax had been charged under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act 7 of 191& in respect of the business done immediately before that Act was repealed. The firm also applied to substitute the income earned in the year 194 7 for the income of tho previous year. The Income-tax Officer held that the inter- . est earned by the firm on securities being \"liable to be assessed to tax\" under s. 8 and ' not under s. 10 of the Income-tax Act, the firm was not entitled to the benefit of the exemption claimed. The order of the lncome-ta:r Officer was confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nThe Income-tax Appellate Tribunal; however, reversed the order and held that the firm was entitled\" to the benefit of the exemption in respect of the cntitc income of the business including income from securities in the year in which the business was discontinued.\n\nAt the instance of the Commissioner, tho Tribunal referred under s. 66( 1) of the Act a question, whiclr\n\nS/UJIJ 1\n\n1964 -\n\nCJ.T. v. :hugmultU and Co. - Shah 1.\n\nwhen reframed by the High Court of Bombay read as\n\nfollows:~\n\n\"Whether the assessee is entitled to the benefit of s. 25 (3) in respect of the interest on securities?\"\n\nIt is common ground that the principal business of the assessee was as a dealer in securities. Securities held by the assessee were its stock-in-trade and interest on those securities was received from time to time, and this interest had for computing the taxable income to be taken into account under s. 8 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nSection 25 ( 3), on the true interpretation of which the respective contentions of the assessee and the Commissioner have to be adjudged, is in the following terms:\n\n\"Where any business, profession or vocation on which tax was at any time charged under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918 (VII of 1918), is discontinued, then, unless there has been a succession by virtue of which the provisions of sub-section ( 4) have been rendered applicable, no tax shall be payable in respect of the income, profits and gains of the period between the end of the previous year and the date of such di<continuance, and the assessee may further claim that the income, profits and gains of the previous year shall be deemed to have been the income, profits and gains of the said period. Where any such claim is made, an assessment shall be made on the basis of the income, profits and gains of the said period, and if an amount of tax has already been paid in respect of the income, profits and gains of the previous year exceeding the amount payable on the basis of such assessment, a refund shall be given of the difference.\"\n\nExemption from liability to pay tax in respect of the income, profits and gains under s. 25 ( 3) may be claimed by an\n\nI •\n\nassessee if the business is one in respect of which tax was 1964 charged at any time under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918 CJi. and the business is discontinued-there being no succession •· . by virtue of which the provisions of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 25 Chugana;_ have been rendered applicable.\n\nSection 25 (3) however applies even if the person assessed under the Income-tax Act, 1918, was different from the person who claims relief under that section provided the former was the predecessorin-interest of such person qua the business. The reason for enacting s. 25 (3) was that under the Indian Income-tax Act 7 of 1918, income-tax was levied by virtue of s. 14(2) of Act 7 of 1918 on the income of the year of assessment.\n\nTax was therefore levied in the financial year 1921-22 on the income of that year. By the Indian Income-tax Act 11 of 1922 the basis of taxation was altered and by s. 3 of that Act, charge for tax was imposed upon the income of the previous year. When Act 11 of 1922 was brought into force on April 1, 1922, two assessments in respect of the same income for the year 1921-22 had to be made. The income for 1921-22 was accordingly charged to tax twice: it was charged under Act 7 of 1918 and it was also charge/\n\nto tax under s. 3 of Act 11 of 1922 read with the approprfate Finance Act, resulting in double taxation in respect of the income for that year.\n\nBut with a view to make the number of assessments equal to the number of years during which the business was carried on the Legislature enacted the exemption prescribed by s. 25 (3). This benefit was however restricted only to the income, profits and gains of business, profession or vocation on which tax had been charged under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918. By enacting s. 25 ( 3) the Legislature intended to exempt the income, profits and gains resulting from the activity styled business, profession or vocation from tax when the business, profession or vocation is discontinued if tax was charged in respect thereof under the Act of 1918. That much is clear. But that is not the whole problem. What is to be regarded as income,. profits and gains of business, profession or vocation within the meaning of s. 25 ( 3) for which exemption may be obtained on discontinuance raises a problem on which\n\nShah/.\n\n_C.l.T.\n\n\"· ChugandtU\n\nCo.\n\nShah /. ·\n\nthere was a difference of opinion in the High Court. In the judgment under appeal, Tendolkar, J., was of the viev nd that by this expression only income, profits and gains of • business chargeable to tax under the head \"profits and gains of business, profession or vocation\" under s. 10 read wit~\n\ns. 6(iv) stood exempt from liability under s. 25l3),_S. T.\n\nDesai, J., held that s. 25 (3) exempted from liability to tax all income, profits and gains earned by conducting a business, profession or vocation irrespective of whether they were chargeable to tax under the head \"profits and gains of business, profession. or vocation\", and with this view K. T. Desai, J.; to whom the case was referred for opinion, agreed. ·\n\nTo appreciate the point in dispute, it is necessary. to bear in mind the scheme of the Act for computing the taxable income. - Under the Act, income-tax is a single tax on the aggregate of income received from diverse heads mentioned in s. 6: s. 6 is not a charging section, and income computed under each distinct head is not separately chargeable to tax. But income which is chargeable under a specific head, cannot be brought to tax under another head either in lieu of or in addition to that head. As observed by this Court in The United Commercial Bank Ltd .• Calcutta v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal(') \"the scheme of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is that the various heads of income, profits and gains enwji.erated in s. 6 are mutually exclusive, each head being specific to cover the item arising from a particubr source and, consequently, \"interest on securities\" which is specifically made chargeable to tax under s. 8 as a distinct head, falls under that section and cannot be brought under s. 10, whether the securities are held as trading assets or capital asset.\" In The United Commercial Bank's case(') th~ Income Tax Officer split up the income of a Banking Company was in the course of assessment, into two heads-- \"interest on securities\" and \"business income\", and set off the business loss against the income from securities in the year of assessment, but did not allow th(: business loss of a previous year to be set off under s. 24(2) against that\n\n(I) [1958] S.C.R. 19\n\nincom~. This view was approved by the High Court of 1964.\n\nCalcutta.\n\nTh_e High Court held that the. several heads c.1.r. under s. 6 of the Income-tax Act are mutually exclusive, v. d \"all d\n\nI · Chugandfl3 an an ltm 1 mz un er an exc us1ve head cannot be co. charged u•:.J;• ic<Jther head. This view was affirmed by this Court, and it was held that \"interest on securities\" being specifically charged . under s. 8, which is a distinct head, it coulu not be brought under s. 10, whether the\n\nsecurities were trading assets or. capital assets. ·\n\nIt must therefore be held that even if an item of income is earned in the course of carrying on a business, it will not necessarily faJJ within the head \"profits and gains of busi ness\" within the meaning of s. 10 read with s. 6(iv). If\n\nsecurities constitute stock-in-trade of the business of an 11Ssessee, interest received from those securities will for the purpose of determining the taxable income be shown under the head \"interest on securities\" under s. 8 read with s. 6(ii) of the Act.\n\nSimilarly dividends from shares will be shown under s. 12( IA) and not under s. 10. If an 11Ssessee carries on business of purchasing and selling buildings, the profits and gains earned by transactions in buildings will be shown under s .. 10, but income received from the buildings so. long as they are owned by the assessee will be shown under s. 9 read with s. 6 (iii). Income earned by an assessee carrying on business will in each case be broken up, and taxable incoine under the head profits and gains of business will be that amount alone which is earned in the business, and does not aJJ under any other specific head.· Tendo!kar J., in the judgment under appeal was of the opinion that income of the business to be computed under ' 10 alone could be admitted to the exemption: the majority of the Court held that all income earned by carr)r- . ing on business qualified for the exemption. Now cl. ( 3) of s. 25 expressly provides that income of a business, profession or vocation which was charged at any time under Act 7 of 1918 to tax is, on discontinuance of that business, profession or vocation, exempt from liability to tax under Act 11 of 1922 for the period between the end of the previous year and the c!ate of such discontinuance. Tax is charged undr the Income-tax Acts on specific units, such >l S.C.-22\n\n1964 -\n\nCJ.T. ... ~Ill Co. .... ,.\n\nas, individuals, Hindu Undivided Families, Companie!\n\nLocal Authorities, Firms and Associations of persons or partners of firms and members of associations individually, and and business, profession or vocation is not a unit of assessment.\n\nWhen, therefore, s. 25 ( 3) enacts that tax was charged at any time on any business, it is intended that the tax was at any time charged on the owner of any business.\n\nIf that condition be fulfilled in respect of the income of th11\n\nbusiness under the Act of 1918, the owner or his successorin-interest qua the business, will be entitled to get the benefit of the exemption under it if the business, is discontinued.\n\nThe section in terms refers to tax charged on any bminess, i.e., tax charged on any person in respect of income earned by carrying on the business. Undoubtedly it is not all income earned by a person who conducted any business, which is exempt under sub-s. (3) of s. 25: non-business income will certainly not qualify for the privilege.\n\nBut there is no reason to restrict the condition of the applicability of the exemption only to income on which the tali was payable under the head \"profits and gains of business, profession or vocation\".\n\nThe Legislature has made no such express reservation, and there is no warrant for reading into sub-s. (3) such a restricted meaning.\n\nSubsection (3) it may be nQticed does not refer to chargeability of income to tax under a particular head as a condition of obtaining the benefit c• the exemption.\n\nDiverse other provisions of the Act lend strong support to that view. Where the Legislature intended to refer to a specific head of taxation under s. 6 of the Act as a condition for imposing an obligation or claiming a right, the Legislature has in terms referred to such a head.\n\nFor instance, by s. 18 (2) liability is imposed upon any person responsible for paying any income chargeable under the head \"salaries\" to deduct income-tax and super-tax on the amount payable.\n\nSimilarly under s. 18 ( 3) persolll responsible for paying income-tax under the head \"interest on securities\" are liable to deduct income-tax and supel'- tax at the prescribed rates on the amount of interest payable.\n\nSection 24 enables set-off in respect of loss sustained under any of the heads mentioned in s. 6 against income, profiill\n\n\"'->- • ': -\n\nand gains from any other head in that - year. These are\n\nDU - some of the p:ovi<:ions in which reference is made to specific ci:r. heads cf ta,•, alion.\n\nBut the exemption under s. 25 (3) is Ch • ,.1,\n\ngener~!: 'ti~ ;:o~ ~stricted to income chargeable under s. 10 u.• ea. of the Act. Some indication is also furnished by the scheme of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 25. Under sub-s. (1) the Income-tax -Officer is given power to make what is called an \"accelerated assessment\" when a business, profession or l'Ocation is discontinued in any year. The reason of the rule contained in s. 25 (1) is to prevent loss of revenue by the assessee discontinuing the business, profession or vocation and frittering away or secreting the assets and income or disappearing from the scene of his activity. But such an asses-sment would in the normal course have to be in respect of the entire income of that business, profession or 0vocation.\n\nIf the contention - of the Department that income of th• business, profession or vocation for the purpose of an accelerated assessment is to be limited only to income on which ta~ is payable under s. 10 be correct, the assessment under s. 25 ( 1) would serve little useful purpose, because income received from securities, from dividends, - from house-property etc. would remain still to be determined and brought to tax after the end of the year and in the relevant year_ of asessment. Again an assessee discontinuing his business, profession or vocation is entitled by s. 24 to set off losses in one business against profits in another, and this right may tum out to be illusory if in the assessment of the income of a bnsiness which is discontinued, profit and -\n\ngains which fall within s. 10 only are taken into account.' - The Revenue authorities, it is true, may get a complete picture of the liability of the assessee to taxation only on tlnal assessment. This is not to say that a mere possibility of two assessments is decisive of the intention of the Legi!- lature, for if that be the test, every person who has income received from business, profession or vocation and income _from other source would still have to be subject, after an\n\naccelerated assessment under s. 25 (1), to a final asses:;- ment in respect of the non-business income to determine his\n\noverall liability.\n\nBut the possibility of two assessments in respect of _the same bqsiness for the same year, one of which acrvcs no useful purpose, must be taken into account\n\nS\"'1h J.\n\n1161 - c.1:r.\n\nChutndtM\n\nCo. - Arlt J.\n\nin ascertaining the meaning to be attributed to the expr!li sion \"income, profits and gains of business, profession or •nd vocation\" which is discontinued. The phraseology of s. 25 (2) also supports the view that the income, profits and\n\ngains of business are not restricted to profits and gains chargeable under s. 10. For failure to give notice of discontinu ance of business, penalty for an amount not exceeding the tax assessed in respect of any income, profits or gain~ of the business may be imposed. There is no logical reason for restricting the penalty to the amount of tax assesd on profits and gains determined for the purpose of s. 10.\n\nIt has also to be noticed that prior to the insertion of sub-s. (IA) of s. 12 bys. 9 of the Finance Act, 1955, with effect from April 1, 1955, income from dividends was chargeable not under s. 12 but under s. 10, if the shares from which such income was received were the stock-in\n\ntrade of the assessee.\n\nThe result of the insertion of ' 12(1A) is that in respect of a business in shares dividends .CCeived from the shares were till March 31, 1955, regarded as profits and gains of business assessable to tax under s. 10.\n\nAfter the enactment of the Finance Act of 1955, dividends became chargeable under s. 12(1A) under the head \"income derived from other sources\". Could it have been\n\nthe intention of the Legislature that dividend income of a business in respect of which tax was charged under the head \"Income from shares\" under Act 7 of 1918 would not, after March 31, 1955, be entitled to the benefit of the exemption under s. 25 ( 3) merely because the head under which it was charged prior to the Finance Act of 1955 ii now the head \"other sources\" ?\n\nSection 2(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 defines \"business\" as including any trade, commerce, oc manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. Business is therefore an activity of a commercial nature. By s. 25 (3) indisput ably exemption from payment of tax was intended to be given where there had been in respect of the same activity double taxation when Act 11 of 1922 was enacted. If the right arises on discontinuance of the activity styled businelli,\n\nas S.' 25 (3) exprrssly provides, tax in connection. with that 1964\n\nactiity 11ffl •J inir za facie be tax payable on the income>,\n\nCJ.T. profit> an~ rein> ,\\erived from that business adivity; The \"· heads described in s. 6 and further elaborated for the pur- Chug\"\"::\":. pose of computation of income in ss. 7 to 10, and 12, 12A 12AA and 12B are intended merely to indicate the classes of income: the heads do not exhaustively delimit sources\n\nfrom which income arises. ':rhis is made clear in the judg-\n\n111ent of this Court in the United Commercial Bank Ltd.'s case(') that business income is broken up under different . heads only for the purpose of computation of the total income: by that break-up the income does not cease to be the income of the business, the different heads of income being only the classification prescribed by the Indian Income-tax Act for computation of income. It c'annot be gainsaid that there was on the part of the Legislature a desire by enacting s. 25 (3) to give relief to two classes of income subjected to double taxation for the income. of the year 1921-22. That this benefit was restricted to income paid by assessees who paid tax. on income derived from business and professional earnings under the earlier Act and Nas not 'available in respect of other income, will not, in our judgment, be a ground for giving a restricted meaning to the expression \"income, profits and gains of business, profession or vocation\" occurring in sub-s. (3) of s. 25.\n\nAn intention to grant a partial exemption to income, profits and gains of a business, profession or vocation may not be lightly attributed to the Legislature.\n\nThere is no force in the contention raised by counsel for the Commissioner that for the year 1921-22 interest on 'ecurities could not be charged to tax twice. over. Under the Income-tax Act, 7 of 1918, bys. 14(2) tax was levied in respect of the year beginning from April 1, 1918 in respect of each subsequent year, . upon every assessee on his taxable income in that year at the rate specified in Sch.\n\nI. Section 5 of that Act classified the income chargeable to income-tax, and \"Interest on securities\" was charged under s. 7 read with s. S(ii). In respect of interest on securities by s. 14(1) the aggregate amount of the assessee's income chargeable under each lif the heads mentioned in ss. 6 to 11\n\n(r) [1958]S.C.R. 79\n\nShah J.\n\n•., '\n\n1904 became taxable in the year in which it was received. Act 7 of c.J.T. · 1918 undoubtedly made a provision ins. 19 for adjustment of Chugurl;; •nd liability to tax when the actual income was ascertained.\n\nCo.\n\nOur attention has not been invited to any provision in the\n\nShch /.\n\n. . ,/\n\nIncome-tax Act 7 of 1918 which excluded from liability t(}\n\ntax, interest on securities 1or the year in which that income had accrued. By s. 3 of Act 11 of 1922 interest on securities earned in the year 1921-22 became chargeable and under s. 68 of that Act which was a provision transitory ·as well as repealing, machinery provided by the Inomc-tax Act of 1918 was expressly kept alive for the purpose of assessment and making adjustments under s. 19 of the . Income-tax Act, 1918. Interest on securities earned in 1921-22 was therefore chargeable to tax under Act T of 1918, and it was also chargeable to tax under Act 11 of\n\n1922. We are therefore unable to agree with counsel for the Commissioner that interest on securities not being exposed to double taxation for the year 1921-22, benefit of s. 25 (3) was not admissible to that class of income.\n\nCounsel also contended, relying upon the judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa T. Ramakrishna Deo( 1) that it is for the respondent to prove that the income sought to be taxed is exempt from taxation, and unless he discharges that burden, the claim of the respondent must fail.\n\nUndoubtedly where a doubt arises on the facts placed before the taxing authority, whether the tax-payer is entitled to exemption from taxation under a certain statutory provision, tho burden lies upon him to establish that exemption. But, here we are concerned not with any question of burden of proof, but with a question of interpretation whether the exemption which is admittedly ttven by s. 25 (3) operates in respect of the entirety of the business income for the year in question in the course of which th~ business is discontinued or whether it applies only to tnat class of iricome which is taxable under tho head \"profits and gains of business\" carried on by the assesee in that year.\n\nSection 26 on which reliance was placed by counsel foe the Commissioner also may be noticed in this connection.\n\n(I) (1959] Sapp. I s.C.R. 176\n\n. ' '\n\n8 S.Clt\n\nSUPREME CQURT REPORTS 343\n\nThat. section provides for a scheme of assessment when there is change in the constitution of a firm or succession to a business. The section applies not to discontinuance of business, but to changes _in the constitution of the assessee firm and to swces\"ionto business. Under sub-s. (1) if at the time cf mr. \"\"fog l1ll assessment it be -found by the\n\nIncome-tu Officer that a change has o_ccurred in the constitution of a firm or that a firm has been newly constituted, the firm as constituted at the time of -inaking the 1t>sessment has to be assessed. But the income, profits and . gains for the previous year for the ptirpose of inclusion in the total income of the partners must be apportioned between the partners who in such previous year were entitled to receive the same. If the ta-.; assessed upon a partner cannot be recovered from him it may be recovere'I from the firm as constituted at the time of making the l!SSessment.\n\nThis provision deals with the machinery of assessment and not with computation of income, nor with . exemption from liability to tax. Sub-section (2) of s. 26 deals with cases of succession to any person carrying on any business, profession or vocation by another person carrying\n\non business, profession or vocation in such capacity, and provides that the person succeeding is, subject to the provi- 'ions of sub-s. ( 4) of s. 25, liable to be assessed in respect of his actual share of the income, profits and gains of the previous year.\n\nBut the proviso enacts that if the person 'ucceeded in the business, profession or vocation cannot be found, the assessment of the profits of the year in which 'uccession took place upto the date of succession, and for. the previous year, shall be made on the person succeeding in like nianner and in the same amount as it would have been made on the person succeeded or when the tax in respect of the assessment made for either of such years assessed on the person succeeded cannot be recovered from him, it shall be payable by and recoverable from the person rucceeding.\n\nThis clause also deals with liability to assessment and payment of tax and not with the computation of income and whatever interpretation may be. placed on s. 26\n\nIt> to the extent of liability incurred by a successor to a business, profession or \".OCation, it is not indicative of the ment or of the field of the right to claini exemption under\n\n19M\n\nC.I.T. : \"' Chuganda.r Co. ·\n\nShah/.\n\n1964 s. 25(3): Section 26 provides for apporticmment of liability Cii. '' to tax in case of change in the constitution of firms and \"· .. succession to persons carrying on business: it directs appor- Clw, ga'1; a;_ : .. and tionment of tax liability in respect of the actual share of\n\nShah J, the Sl!Ccessor and the person succeeded. The fact that under sub-s. (2) of s. 26 liability is imposed upon the successor to pay tax on behalf of his predecessor or to be assessed in respect of the income of the person succeeded for the previous year, will not, in our judgment, be sufficient to hold that the exemption which has been granted in consequence of. double taxation under the Acts of 1918 and 1922 also must be restricted to income which is taxable under s. 10.\n\nWe may briefly refer to the decision of this Coun in The Commissioner' of Income-tax,· Madras v • . The Express Newspapers Limited, Madras('). In that case Free Press\n\nLimited-a Private Company-transferred its . business on August 31, 1946 to the asscssee the Express Newspapers Ltd. and thereafter resolved to wind up its business voluntarily. An amount of Rs. 2,14,000/- was assessed in the relevant year of assessment as business profit of the transferor company taxable under s. 10(2) (vii) and Rs. 3,94,576/- taxable as capital gains. The business profit was held to be not taxable because it accrued in a winding up sale and not in a trading venture. Liability of the second amount to tax as capital gains was not canvassed, but it was contended by the Express Newspapers Ltd. that as successor to the Free Press Ltd., it was not liable to be assessed under s: 26(2). In examining the scheme of s. 128 it was observed:-\n\n\"Under that section the tax shall be payable by the assessee under the head capital gains in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale of a capital asset effected during the prescribed period. It says further that such profits or gains shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which the sale etc. took place.\n\nThis deeming clause does not lift the capital . gains from the (\\th head in s. 6 and place it\n\n\nunder the 4th head. It only introduces a 1954 limited fiction, namely, that capital gains\n\nCJ.T. ac::rued wm be deemed to be income of the Chndv. • h\" h th I ff d uga as\n\n- and, pr~'<v'1S )t:ar m w IC e sa e was a ecte . co. - The ii:'; QP does not make theinthe' profit or gains of the business. It is well settled that a legal fiction is limited to the purpose for which\n\n- it is created and should not be extended beyond its legitimate field. Sub-section (2A) and (2B) of s. 24 provide for the setting off of the loss falling under the head \"capital gains\" against any capital gains falling under the same head.\n\nSuch loss cannot be set off against an income falling under any different -head. These three sections indicate beyond any doubt_ that the capital gains are separately computed -- in accordance with the said provisions and they are not treated as the profits from the business.\n\nThe profits and gains of business and capital gains are two distinct concepts in the Incometax Act: the former arises from the -activity which is called business and the latter accrues because capital assets are disposed of at a value higher than what they cost to the assessee.\n\nThey are placed under \"different heads; they are derived from different sources; and the income is computed under different methods. The fact that the capital gains are connected with the capital assets of the business cannot make them the profit of the business. They are only deemed to be income or\n\nthe previous year and not the profit or gains arising from the business during that year.\"\n\nDealing with s. 26(2) it was observed:-\n\n\" The expression \"profits\" in the proviso makes it\n\nclear that the income, profits and gains in sub-s. -(2) of s. 26 only refer to the profits under the 4th head in - s. 6.\n\nOn th'e other- - hand, if the. interpretation sought to be put upon the expression \"income\" in sub-s. (2) of'\n\nShah /.\n\nCJ.T. ... ..Chugandtis _ anti\n\nCo.\n\nShah J.\n\ns. 26 by tho Revenue is accepted, then the -absence of that word in the proviso destroys _the argument. But the more reasonable view\n\nis that both the sub-section and the proviso deal only with the profits under the 4th head mentioned in s. 6 and, so construed, it excludes capital gains. The argument that sub-s. (2) of s. 26 read with the proviso thereto indicates that the total income of the person succeeded\n\n- is the criterion for separate assessment under sub-s. (2) and for assessment and realisation under the proviso is on the assumption that sub-s. (2) and the proviso deal with all the heads mentioned in s. 6 of the Act. But if, iu we have held, the scope of sub-s. (2) of s. 26 is only limited to the iricome from the busi-\n\n- ness, the share under sub-s. (2) and the assessment and realisation under the proviso can only relate to the income from the business.\n\nThe argument is really begging the question itself.\"\n\nIt is obvious that the Court in that case held having regard to the special nature of \"capital gains\" which are not in truth income, but are deemed income for the purpose of taxation and .. the phraseology used, that the liability of the successor under the proviso to s. 26(2) is only in respect of tax on income, profit$ and gains of the business strictly so-called, to be computed under s. 10 read with s. - 6(iv) and not in respect of all receipts which may be regarded as income of the business.\n\nThe schemes of s. 25(3) and s. 26(2) proviso are different.\n\nThe first grants an exemption because there has been a double levy of' tax, and an intention to exempt all income, profits and gains of business from taxation may be attributed to the Legislature. Section 26(2) fastens liability of the predecessor, if he cannot be found, upon the successor and must be strictly construed.\n\nThe Legislature has imposed bys. 26(2) liability upon the successor to be assessed for profits earned in a business carried on by hi> _predecessor, and unless there is a _ c1ear intention expressed\n\nin the statute to include in that expression what in reality 1964. is not 'income, but is deemed income, the liability to CJ.'l. assessment would justifiably be limited to profits of. tlie Chu:•, J;,, a1Ul business which is computable under s. 10. \\ Co.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne hearing fee.\n\nAppeals di.rmissd.\n\nC. PERIASWAMI GOUNDAN AND ORS.\n\n. --v.\n\nSUNDARESA IYER AND ORS.\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO AND S. M. Sllll, JJ.)\n\n/Mm rrant--Suit for_ ejectment-Defendant raised plea of LoJt Grant-\n\nWhen presumption of Lo1t Grant arise.1-Whether trant i.r melvaram.\n\nor both ,,_ .. urm.J--Right of Archaka.t-Whether ArchaktJ.f can cl&im remuneration. in a 1uit for ejectment.\n\nThe :appellants filed suits for the recovery of certain properties from tl!.e pos!e!sion of the respondents. The plaintiffs were the trwtees of the temples and the defendants were the archak!s and the alienees of tho suit properties. The!e suits were based on title and the relief a,, ked fee was the eviction of the arcbakas from the suit property z.s they. · accordi.n: to the plaintiff:!!, (appellants) bad no title to rerriain in pcssession. Tho plaintiffs claimed that the suit properties were the iJLOperties of the deity !.nd that the defendants bad no, right therein.\n\nThe archal!.S raised the plea that the title of the deity was confined enly to rr.elvaram in the plaint-!chedule landa and that they had title to the Kudivaram. Both the Trial Court and the High Court confirmed the title of the deity to both the intere!ts (VaramJ) and negatived the\n\ntitle of the defendant-Archakas.\n\nThe High Court also held. that the art:h.akas were entitled to have a portion of the said properties allotted to lliem toward.J their remuneration for the services to the temples and. &a.Te a decree directing the division of the said properties into two halYes\n\nand puttin.; the archakas in possession of one half. Against this decree of the High Court both the arch al: as and the trustees (appellants) preferred cross appeals to this Court.\n\nSluzh /.\n\nJuly, :n .", "total_entities": 172, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHUGANDAS AND CO., BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHUGANDAS AND CO., BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAo, J", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Incometax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 314, "end_char": 328, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 25(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 625, "end_char": 633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Incometax Act", "statute": "Indian Incometax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 811, "end_char": 815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Incometax Act", "statute": "Indian Incometax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 902, "end_char": 907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Incometax Act", "statute": "Indian Incometax Act"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1139, "end_char": 1152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Income-tu appealed to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "s. 25(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1199, "end_char": 1207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1517, "end_char": 1531, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank Ltd., Calcutta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2038, "end_char": 2075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The United Commercial Bank Ltd., Calcutta Y. Th• Comml1,1on11 of Income-tax, Weit Bengal, [1958] S.C.R. 19 and Th• Commi1sioner of lncome-tax, Madra1 v. The Expre\" New1paper1 Limited, MadrOI,\n\n[1964] 8 S.C.R. 189, reierred to."}}, {"text": "[1964] 8 S.C.R. 189", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2227, "end_char": 2246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chugandai KJ N. Raiagopala Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2480, "end_char": 2513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chugandai KJ N. Raiagopala Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for tho !!:::.."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2518, "end_char": 2532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chugandai KJ N. Raiagopala Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for tho !!:::.."}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhivala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2562, "end_char": 2578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, J. B. Dadachanil, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanil", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, J. B. Dadachanil, 0."}}, {"text": ". C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2599, "end_char": 2610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, J. B. Dadachanil, 0."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2615, "end_char": 2630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2713, "end_char": 2717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:\n\nSHAH, J.-M/s. Chugandas and Co.-a firm dealing in securities-received in the year 1946 Rs.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Chugandas and Co.-a", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2727, "end_char": 2746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:\n\nSHAH, J.-M/s. Chugandas and Co.-a firm dealing in securities-received in the year 1946 Rs."}}, {"text": "June\n\n30, 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2925, "end_char": 2940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June\n\n30, 194 7 the firm discontinued its business."}}, {"text": "s. 25(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3054, "end_char": 3062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3070, "end_char": 3097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3247, "end_char": 3274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3367, "end_char": 3381, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3701, "end_char": 3705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3735, "end_char": 3749, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 66( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4252, "end_char": 4261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4370, "end_char": 4390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when reframed by the High Court of Bombay read as\n\nfollows:~\n\n\"Whether the assessee is entitled to the benefit of s. 25 (3) in respect of the interest on securities?\""}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4819, "end_char": 4823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4831, "end_char": 4858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4861, "end_char": 4871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5136, "end_char": 5163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6076, "end_char": 6081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6209, "end_char": 6236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6358, "end_char": 6363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6406, "end_char": 6416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6475, "end_char": 6495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6672, "end_char": 6677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6708, "end_char": 6722, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6769, "end_char": 6777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6934, "end_char": 6948, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7001, "end_char": 7005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7130, "end_char": 7143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Act 11 of 1922 was brought into force on April 1, 1922, two assessments in respect of the same income for the year 1921-22 had to be made."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7362, "end_char": 7366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7666, "end_char": 7671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7845, "end_char": 7872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7886, "end_char": 7891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8324, "end_char": 8329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8546, "end_char": 8555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the judgment under appeal, Tendolkar, J., was of the viev nd that by this expression only income, profits and gains of • business chargeable to tax under the head \"profits and gains of business, profession or vocation\" under s. 10 read wit~\n\ns. 6(iv) stood exempt from liability under s. 25l3),_S. T.\n\nDesai, J., held that s. 25 (3) exempted from liability to tax all income, profits and gains earned by conducting a business, profession or vocation irrespective of whether they were chargeable to tax under the head \"profits and gains of business, profession.", "canonical_name": "Tendolkar"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8744, "end_char": 8749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "s. 6(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8761, "end_char": 8769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8804, "end_char": 8809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "T.\n\nDesai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8817, "end_char": 8826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the judgment under appeal, Tendolkar, J., was of the viev nd that by this expression only income, profits and gains of • business chargeable to tax under the head \"profits and gains of business, profession or vocation\" under s. 10 read wit~\n\ns. 6(iv) stood exempt from liability under s. 25l3),_S. T.\n\nDesai, J., held that s. 25 (3) exempted from liability to tax all income, profits and gains earned by conducting a business, profession or vocation irrespective of whether they were chargeable to tax under the head \"profits and gains of business, profession."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8842, "end_char": 8847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "K. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9113, "end_char": 9124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or vocation\", and with this view K. T. Desai, J.; to whom the case was referred for opinion, agreed. ·"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9421, "end_char": 9425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9766, "end_char": 9805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by this Court in The United Commercial Bank Ltd .• Calcutta v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal(') \"the scheme of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is that the various heads of income, profits and gains enwji.erated in s. 6 are mutually exclusive, each head being specific to cover the item arising from a particubr source and, consequently, \"interest on securities\" which is specifically made chargeable to tax under s. 8 as a distinct head, falls under that section and cannot be brought under s. 10, whether the securities are held as trading assets or capital asset.\"", "canonical_name": "Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9828, "end_char": 9855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9928, "end_char": 9932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10127, "end_char": 10131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10205, "end_char": 10210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10288, "end_char": 10310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The United Commercial Bank's case(') th~ Income Tax Officer split up the income of a Banking Company was in the course of assessment, into two heads-- \"interest on securities\" and \"business income\", and set off the business loss against the income from securities in the year of assessment, but did not allow th(: business loss of a previous year to be set off under s. 24(2) against that\n\n(I) [1958] S.C.R. 19\n\nincom~. This view was approved by the High Court of 1964."}}, {"text": "s. 24(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10651, "end_char": 10659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "High Court of 1964.\n\nCalcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10734, "end_char": 10763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The United Commercial Bank's case(') th~ Income Tax Officer split up the income of a Banking Company was in the course of assessment, into two heads-- \"interest on securities\" and \"business income\", and set off the business loss against the income from securities in the year of assessment, but did not allow th(: business loss of a previous year to be set off under s. 24(2) against that\n\n(I) [1958] S.C.R. 19\n\nincom~. This view was approved by the High Court of 1964."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10824, "end_char": 10828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10836, "end_char": 10850, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11106, "end_char": 11110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11168, "end_char": 11173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11450, "end_char": 11455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(iv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11466, "end_char": 11474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11700, "end_char": 11704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11715, "end_char": 11723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12( IA)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11789, "end_char": 11799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11814, "end_char": 11819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12083, "end_char": 12087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12098, "end_char": 12102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tendo!kar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12365, "end_char": 12374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tendo!kar J., in the judgment under appeal was of the opinion that income of the business to be computed under ' 10 alone could be admitted to the exemption: the majority of the Court held that all income earned by carr)r- .", "canonical_name": "Tendolkar"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12651, "end_char": 12656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tax is charged undr the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12987, "end_char": 13025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13357, "end_char": 13362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax is charged undr the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Tax is charged undr the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14022, "end_char": 14027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax is charged undr the Income-tax Act", "statute": "Tax is charged undr the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14747, "end_char": 14751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14898, "end_char": 14903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15091, "end_char": 15096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15293, "end_char": 15303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15385, "end_char": 15389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15608, "end_char": 15613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15688, "end_char": 15693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15788, "end_char": 15793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16008, "end_char": 16013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16553, "end_char": 16558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16592, "end_char": 16597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16927, "end_char": 16932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17147, "end_char": 17152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17634, "end_char": 17639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18129, "end_char": 18134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18267, "end_char": 18272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18595, "end_char": 18600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18675, "end_char": 18680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18695, "end_char": 18712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18731, "end_char": 18744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 of the Finance Act, 1955, with effect from April 1, 1955, income from dividends was chargeable not under s. 12 but under s. 10, if the shares from which such income was received were the stock-in\n\ntrade of the assessee."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18793, "end_char": 18798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1955", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18809, "end_char": 18814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1955", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19037, "end_char": 19051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of the insertion of ' 12(1A) is that in respect of a business in shares dividends .CCeived from the shares were till March 31, 1955, regarded as profits and gains of business assessable to tax under s. 10."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19119, "end_char": 19124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1955", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "After the enactment of the Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19127, "end_char": 19165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12(1A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19209, "end_char": 19218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the enactment of the Finance Act", "statute": "After the enactment of the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19534, "end_char": 19539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the enactment of the Finance Act", "statute": "After the enactment of the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19664, "end_char": 19676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "After the enactment of the Finance Act", "statute": "After the enactment of the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19684, "end_char": 19711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19918, "end_char": 19923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20391, "end_char": 20395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "ss. 7 to 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20477, "end_char": 20488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20706, "end_char": 20733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rhis is made clear in the judg-\n\n111ent of this Court in the United Commercial Bank Ltd.'s case(') that business income is broken up under different ."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21021, "end_char": 21035, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21153, "end_char": 21158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21655, "end_char": 21660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21998, "end_char": 22012, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22230, "end_char": 22239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22347, "end_char": 22351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22412, "end_char": 22420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 6 to 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22516, "end_char": 22527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22550, "end_char": 22554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 to 11\n\n(r) [1958]S.C.R. 79\n\nShah J.\n\n•., '\n\n1904 became taxable in the year in which it was received.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22856, "end_char": 22870, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22994, "end_char": 22998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23095, "end_char": 23100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23301, "end_char": 23306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23316, "end_char": 23336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23654, "end_char": 23659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1918", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Orissa T. Ramakrishna Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23814, "end_char": 23839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel also contended, relying upon the judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa T. Ramakrishna Deo( 1) that it is for the respondent to prove that the income sought to be taxed is exempt from taxation, and unless he discharges that burden, the claim of the respondent must fail."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24413, "end_char": 24418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24716, "end_char": 24726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25994, "end_char": 25999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26266, "end_char": 26271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27112, "end_char": 27117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27351, "end_char": 27359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27361, "end_char": 27371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27714, "end_char": 27719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28105, "end_char": 28110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Free Press\n\nLimited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28269, "end_char": 28288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Free Press\n\nLimited-a Private Company-transferred its ."}}, {"text": "August 31, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28337, "end_char": 28352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "business on August 31, 1946 to the asscssee the Express Newspapers Ltd. and thereafter resolved to wind up its business voluntarily."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28593, "end_char": 28601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Express Newspapers Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28872, "end_char": 28895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Liability of the second amount to tax as capital gains was not canvassed, but it was contended by the Express Newspapers Ltd. that as successor to the Free Press Ltd., it was not liable to be assessed under s: 26(2)."}}, {"text": "s. 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29014, "end_char": 29020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29450, "end_char": 29454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29945, "end_char": 29950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31051, "end_char": 31059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31190, "end_char": 31195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31246, "end_char": 31250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31364, "end_char": 31368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "interpretation sought to be put upon the expression \"income\" in sub-s. (2) of'\n\nShah /.\n\nCJ.T. ... ..Chugandtis _ anti\n\nCo.\n\nShah J.\n\ns. 26 by tho Revenue is accepted, then the -absence of that word in the proviso destroys _the argument."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31418, "end_char": 31423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31656, "end_char": 31660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31739, "end_char": 31744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32035, "end_char": 32039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32104, "end_char": 32109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32618, "end_char": 32626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32739, "end_char": 32744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32866, "end_char": 32874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32879, "end_char": 32887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33109, "end_char": 33122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33676, "end_char": 33681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PERIASWAMI GOUNDAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33789, "end_char": 33807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. PERIASWAMI GOUNDAN AND ORS."}}, {"text": "SUNDARESA IYER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33826, "end_char": 33840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUNDARESA IYER AND ORS."}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33852, "end_char": 33864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. SUBBA RAO AND S. M. Sllll, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAo, J"}}, {"text": "S. M. Sllll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33869, "end_char": 33880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. SUBBA RAO AND S. M. Sllll, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Sluzh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35474, "end_char": 35479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sluzh /.\n\nJuly, :n ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_347_367_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 347\n\nin the statute to include in that expression what in reality 1964. is not 'income, but is deemed income, the liability to CJ.'l. assessment would justifiably be limited to profits of. tlie Chu:•, J;,, a1Ul business which is computable under s. 10. \\ Co.\n\nThe appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne hearing fee.\n\nAppeals di.rmissd.\n\nC. PERIASWAMI GOUNDAN AND ORS.\n\n. --v.\n\nSUNDARESA IYER AND ORS.\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO AND S. M. Sllll, JJ.)\n\n/Mm rrant--Suit for_ ejectment-Defendant raised plea of LoJt Grant-\n\nWhen presumption of Lo1t Grant arise.1-Whether trant i.r melvaram.\n\nor both ,,_ .. urm.J--Right of Archaka.t-Whether ArchaktJ.f can cl&im remuneration. in a 1uit for ejectment.\n\nThe :appellants filed suits for the recovery of certain properties from tl!.e pos!e!sion of the respondents. The plaintiffs were the trwtees of the temples and the defendants were the archak!s and the alienees of tho suit properties. The!e suits were based on title and the relief a,, ked fee was the eviction of the arcbakas from the suit property z.s they. · accordi.n: to the plaintiff:!!, (appellants) bad no title to rerriain in pcssession. Tho plaintiffs claimed that the suit properties were the iJLOperties of the deity !.nd that the defendants bad no, right therein.\n\nThe archal!.S raised the plea that the title of the deity was confined enly to rr.elvaram in the plaint-!chedule landa and that they had title to the Kudivaram. Both the Trial Court and the High Court confirmed the title of the deity to both the intere!ts (VaramJ) and negatived the\n\ntitle of the defendant-Archakas.\n\nThe High Court also held. that the art:h.akas were entitled to have a portion of the said properties allotted to lliem toward.J their remuneration for the services to the temples and. &a.Te a decree directing the division of the said properties into two halYes\n\nand puttin.; the archakas in possession of one half. Against this decree of the High Court both the arch al: as and the trustees (appellants) preferred cross appeals to this Court.\n\nSluzh /.\n\nJuly, :n .\n\nI964 ' -\\ C.. Periaswami\n\nSlllldaresa Iyer\n\nThe main point for consideration was whether the High' Court. havitiJ held that the title to the suit property vested in the deity, had ; urisdiction to compel the trustees of the tenlple to put the arcbakas m posseSjlOA of specified extent of prop.eny towards t.cir ren.11., crtlon.\n\nlleld: (i) The principle of a Lost Grant l'an rJ;1l}' ~-e invoked whe1cthere is. no accepta'ble evidence of the terms of the grant. In tU present case there is no scope for invoking the doctrine of Lost Gra..-it -as the terms of the grant are clear from the recitals in the loam :register\n\nand the inam statement, which conclusively establish that both the.\n\nVaram~ were &ranted to the deity.\n\nSankaranarayana Pillayan T. 11.R.E. Board, Madrtu~ I.LR. 1941- Mad. 585, Buddu Satyanarayana v. Konduru Venkatapayya, [1953] S.C.R. 1001, !rfaginiram Sitaram v. Kasturbai Manibhai, (1921) LR. 49 I.A. $4 and Mohamed Muzafar Ali Musavi v. labeda Khatun, (1930) LR. '7 I.A. 125. relied on.\n\n(ii) The High Court erred in making an allocation of the Janda between the trustees and the archakas in a suit Coiejectment because there was absolutely no material either in the pleadings or in the evidence to make anY SU.ch apportionment. The High Court bad no option but to deliver possession. to the plaioliffs who had t;-Stab!ished\n\ntheir title to the suit properties. Io aiUit for framing a s;::heme lot temple a court may in an appropriate case put the arcbaka in Pl..,_o;-e.ssion of a portion of the temple lands towards his remuneration for :icrvices of the temple; but such considerations are out of place in a suit for rjectmenL -Uk:J\n\n. Brahmayya v. Rajaswaraswami Temple, A.l.R. 1953 ;, I:ld. . .SSO as . Yenkatadri v. Seshacharlu. LLR. 1948 lad. 46. referred to.\n\n, (iii) On the facts of thiJ case it was held that the conducl of tho archakas, was consistent with the recitals in the inam -register, namely, that what was granted to the deity was the land i.e. both the Varam1 and that they had been put in enjoyment tbe said land in their capacity as archakas and de facto trustees.\n\nThey could not by mortgaging or otherwise alienating the property claim any right in derogation of the title of the deity. They also cannot claim any right because their namca are mentioned in addition to deity in the loam register. Their names in addition to the deity are mentioned as they were in possession (}f\n\nthe land in their capacity as de facto trustees.·\n\nArunachalam Chetti v. Venkata Chalapathl Guruswami2al •. {1920) I.LR., 43 Mad. 253 and Secretary of State for India T. Vldhya Thill\"\n\nSwamiga, I.L.R. 1942 Mad. 893, referred to.\n\n \"larayanamurthi v. Achaya Sastrulu, A.LR. 1925 Mad. -411 rdft\n\nOil.\n\nCivu. APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 646 -652 of 1960.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and decree dated November !3, 1962 of the Madras High Court in 385, 259, 260, 385 <Ji 194 7 respectively.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for 1he appellant (in C.A. Nos. 648, 649 and 650 of 1960) and\n\nfor the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 651 and 652 of 1960),\n\nT. V. R. Tatachari, for respondents Nos. 1. 2, 5 and 6 (in C.A. No. 648 of 1960) and appellants (in C.A. No. 652 el 1960).\n\nS. T. Desai, K. Jayaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents No. I, 3, 4, 5, 8 to 11, 15, .16, 18, 19 and 21 (in C.A. No. 649 of 1960) responden~ Nos. 1, 2 and 8\n\ntin C.A. No. 650 of 1960) and the appellants (in C.A.\n\nNo. 651 of 1960).\n\nJuly 31, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Couft1 was delivered by '\n\n1'64\n\nSUB BA RAo, J .-Thei; e five appeals by certificate arise Subbo Rao 1. out of Original Suits Nos. 183, 184 and 185 of 1945 filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge; Coimbator, Madras \"late.\n\nO.S. No. 183 of 1945 relates to properties claimed on hehalf of Sri Chowleswaraswami temple.\n\nPeriaswami Goundar and Samana Goundar, the plaintiffs in the said ilUit, are the trustees of the said temple.\n\nThey filed the ilUit for the recovery of the plaint-scheduled properties from the defendants who are the archakas and the alienees from\n\n!hem on the ground that the said properties were the properties of the ieity and that the defendants had no right\n\nd:ierein. They also claimed mesne profits for a period of J years prior to the suit.\n\nThe defendants filed a writtenlitatement admitting the claim of the deity to the melvaram interest in the properties but claimed that the archakas O'll'ned the kudivaram therein and that some of the said properties were validly transferred to the alienees.\n\nO.S. No. 184 of 1945 was filed in the said Court by lite trustees of Sri Pongali Amman temple situated in the vllage of V engambur for the recovery of the properties\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nSundaresa Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nmentioned in the schedule attached to the plaint. ThJ defendants, who are the archakas and alienees from them, inter a/ia, pleaded that only melvaram in the said properties was granted to the deity and that the archakas owned the kudivaram therein and that they had validly alienated their interest in the said properties in favour of the alienees.\n\nO.S. No. 185 of 1945 was filed in the same Court by the trustees of Sri Varadaraja Perumal temple situated in Vengambur village.\n\nThe plaintiffs sought to recover th• properties mentioned in the schedule annexed to the plaint from the archakas and the alienees from them on, the same grounds and the defendants raised similar pleas. It is not necessary to mention other defences raised in the written 'tatements filed in the three suits as nothing turns upon them in these appeals.\n\nThe main issue in O.S. No. 183 of 1945, 0.S. No. 184 of 1945 and O.S. No. 185 of 1945 was whether the inam grants made to the three temples consisted of both th8\n\nvarams or melvaram alone.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge tried the said suits along with two other suits and delivered a common judgment therein.\n\nOn the said issue he held in all the three suit! that the grants to the three deities comprised both the varams.\n\nHe further held that the alienations made by tha archakas prior to May 16, 1931, were binding on the trustees of the respective temples and that the alienatiom made subsequent to that date were liable to be set aside.\n\nIn the result the learned Subordinate Judge gave a decreo in each of the suits for possession of the plaint-schedule properties except those covered by the alienations effected before May 16, 1931. He also decreed rnesne profits to the plaintiffs for a period of 3 years prior to the suits and also subsequent profits from the date of the suits to the. data of delivery of possession at the rate fixed by him.\n\nTho defendants in the said suits preferred appeals to the High Court of Madras, being Appeals No_s. 259, 260 and 38' of 194 7. The said appeals were heard by a Division Benell of the said High Court, consisting of Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ. The High Court agreed with the\n\nBS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 351\n\n.trial court on the finding relating to the nature of the grants to the temples, that is to say it held that the grants to the temples comprised both the varams, namely, me/varam and kudivaram. The learned Judges, for the first t; me, though there was no pleading, no issue and no contention in the trial Court, held that the archakas were entitled to have a portion of the said properties allotted to them towards their remuneration for the services to the te10ples and gave a decree directing the division of the said properties into two halves and putting the archakas in possession of one half.\n\nThey did not disturb the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in regard to the aliena tions, that is they maintained the alienations made before May 16, 1931.\n\nAgainst the decree of the High Court in A.S. No. 259 of 1947 and A.S. No. 385 of 1947 both the archakas and the trustees preferred appeals to this Court questioning the correctness of the decree of the High Court in so far as it went against them. Against the decree in A.S. No. 260 of 1947 no appeal was filed by the archakas, but the trustees preferred an appeal questioning that part of the decree directing a part of the properties to be put in possession of the archakas.\n\nMr. Desai and Mr.\n\nTatachari, appearing for the archakas in the different appeals, contended that the Courts below, having regard 10the consistent and continuous conduct of enjoyment as absolute owners of the properties by the archakas spread over a long period of time, should have invoked the doctrine of lost grant particularly when there was no clear and convincing evidence of the terms of the grant. Alternatively, they argued that the Courts\n\nhould have held, on a fair construction of the recitals found in the inam statements and the inam register, that only melvaram was granted to the deity.\n\nMr. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the trustees, contested this position. He would say that there is no scope for invoking the doctrine of lost grant as the recitals in the\n\ninam register and the inam statement, which are of great evidentiary value, conclusively establish that both the\n\nc. p.,;41W111n1\n\n'I'.\n\nSundaresa Iyer\n\nSubba Rao 1.\n\nIH4\n\nC. P•ri48w•11<i\n\n\"· S\"\"\"1111tJ Iyer\n\nSubb• lta• !.\n\nvarams were granted to the deity and that all the documents, or most of them, disclosing the conduct of the\n\narchakas would support the conclusion that both the varams were so granted to the deity.\n\nAt the outset it would be convenient to notice briefly the scope of the doctrine of lost grant, as the learned counsel for the appellants have strongly relied upon it.\n\nThe doctrine of lost grant with its limitations has been succinctly explained by the Jlldicial Committee in Sankaranarayana Pillayan v.\n\nH.R.E. Board, Madras(').\n\nThe temple in that case had 4 kattalais. Though the temple had a general trustee, each of the kattalais was in the charge of a special trustee or trustees. In regard to one of the kattalais after meeting all the expenses there remained a surplus which the trustees claimed for their own benefit and in fact they were utilizing the surplus for the benefit of their families.\n\nIt was contended by the appellants that they were the owners of the suit properties, which were subject only to a charge in favour of the katta/ai for the performance of the worship according to the prescribed scale. The Judicial Committee, after noticing the earlier decisions, observed:-\n\n\"The presumption, it was stated, of an origin in some lawful title which the Courts have so often readily made in order to support possessory rights long and quietly enjoyed, arises where no actual proof of title is forthcoming, and the rule has to be resorted to because of the failure of actual. evidence. In the present case, where there is ample and convincing proof of the nature of the grant, the object of the endowment and the capacity of the persona Claiming the user and enjoyment, the rule can hardly have any application.\" ·\n\nIt!. the result the Judicial Committee held that the properties were granted only t'o the deity and that the trustees had no claim to any surplus income. The said principle hu been accepted by this Court in Buddu Satyanarayana Y.\n\nKonduru Venkatapayya(').\n\nThere a question similar to\n\n(1) I.L.R. 1948 Mad. 585, 6o5~.\n\n(2) [1953) S.C.R. 1001, 1003.\n\nthat now raised was considered. The archakas claimed, relying upon the doctrine of lost grant, that under the original inam grant only the melvaram interest was given to the deity. Rejecting that contention, Das, J., speaking for the Court, observed:\n\n\"There is no doubt, on the authorities, that a presumption of an origin in some lawful title may in certain circumstances be made to support possessory rights long and quietly enjoyed where no actual proof of title is forthcoming but it is equally well established that that presumption cannot lie made where there is sufficient evidence and convincing proof of the nature of the grant and the persons to whom it was made.\"\n\nThe basis of this doctrine is clearly brought out by two judgments of the Judicial Committee.\n\nLord Buck-master, delivering the judgment in Maginiram Sitaram v. Kasturbhai Manibhai('), observed:\n\n''At the lapse of 100 years, when every party to the original transaction has passed away, and it becomes completely impossible to ascertain what were the circumstances which caused the original grant to be made, it is only following the policy which the Courts alays adopt, of securing as far as possible quiet possession to people who are in apparent lawful holding of an estate, to assume that the grant was lawfully and not unlawfully made.\"\n\nViscount Sumner in Mohamed Muzafar Ali Musavi v.\n\nJabeda Khatun (2) said much to the same effect thus :\n\n\"The presumption of an origin in some lawful title, which the Courts have so often readily made in order to support possessory rights, long and quietly enjoyed, where no actual proof of title is forthcoming, is one which is not a mere\n\n(I) [19zr] LR .. ;9 I.A. 54, Jll Sup. Court.-23\n\n(2) [1930] L.R. 57 I.A. 125.\n\n196'1\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nv. • Sundaresal Iyer\n\nSub/Jo Rao I.\n\nC. , Perkuwami\n\n\"· Slllldmem Iyer\n\nSubbll Rao J.\n\nbranch of the Jaw of evidence. It is resorted to because of the failure of actual evidence.\"\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the said principle can only be invoked where there is no acceptable evidence of the terms. of the grant.\n\nIn these appeals the trustees filed copies of the relevant extracts of the inarn register and the statements filed by the ancestors of the archakas during the inam enquiry in support of the contention that both the varams were granted to the deity.\n\nThe evidentiary value of the recitals in the inam register has been emphasized by the Judicial Committee in more than one decision.\n\nIn Arunachalam Chetti v. Venkata Chalapathi Guruswamigal('), the Judicial Committee expressed its view on the evidentiary value of the recitals in inam register thus:\n\n\"It is true that the making of this register was for the ultimate purpose of determining whether or not the lands were tax free.\n\nBut. it must not be forgotten that the preparation of this register was a great act of state and its preparation and contents were the subject of much consideration under elaborately detailed reports and minutes.\n\nIt is to be remembered that the Inam Commissioners, through their officials, made enquiry on the spot, heard evidence and examined documents, and, with regard to each individual property, the Government was put in possession not only of the conclusion come to as to whether the land was tax free, but of a statement of the history and tenure of the property itself. While their Lordships do not doubt that such a report would not displace actual and authentic evidence in individual cases, yet the Board when such is not available, cannot fail to attach the utmost importance, as part of the history of the property, to the information set forth in the inarn register.\"\n\n(1) (1920] I.L.R. 43 Mad. 253.\n\n' I\n\nIn the latest decision of the Judicial Committee reported in Sankaranayurza Pillayan's case('), it reiterated the same position when it said:\n\n\"The question arose in a recent case before this Board with reference to a Madras inam [see Secretary of State for India v. Vidhya Thirta Swamigal( 2 }], where it was held that the title deeds and the entries in the inam register are evidence of the true intent and effect of the transaction and of the ch2.racter of the. right\n\nwhich was being recognized and continued.\n\nThe entries in the inam register and the description of the inamdar therein were accepted as indications of the nature and quantum of the right and the interest created in the land.\"\n\nThis view of the Judicial Committee has been accepted and applied by the Madras High Court in many decisions when it was called upon to decide on the conflicting claims of a trustee and a archaka to the properties de1 lt with in he inam registers.\n\nThe documents relating to Sri Pongali Amman temple are Exs. P-2 and P-3. Ex. P-2 is the statement filed by an ancestor of the present archakas before the Inam Commissioner. It is of the year 1862. Ex. P-3 is an extract of the inam register. As observed by the Judicial Committee, the entries made in the said register are the result of an elaborate enquiry based upon oral evidence, on the spot enquiry and scrutiny of available accounts and records.\n\nThe inam statement is only one of the pieces of evidence which the Inam Commissioner might have taken into consideration in compiling the inam register. The recit~.ls in the statement must, therefore, give place to the recitals in the inam register, though an attempt shall be made to harmonize them, if possible. Before considering the recitals in Ex. P-3 it fa necessary to bear in mind the common case i.e., that it is the case of both the archakas and the trustees that Ex. P-3 deals only with the property that was given to the deity. But the dispute is as regards the extent of the\n\n(I) I.L.R. [1948] Mad. 585.\n\n(2) I.L.R[r942] Mad. 893, 908 (P.C.).\n\nC. Peria.swan\n\n•• Sundaresa lyt\n\nSubba Rao'\n\n1964 I\n\nC. Perkuwami\n\n\"· Sundare• 11er\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\ninterest in t.he property that was given to the deity. wa~ it only the melvaram in the said property that was granted to the deity or was it that both the varams therein were granted to the deity. Now let us. give a close look to the recitals under the variou~ columns in Ex. P-3.\n\nThe first major head is \"class, extent and value of inam\". The said major head is divided into 7 sub-heads. Jn col. 2 under the sub-head \"General class to which the inam belongs\", the entry is \"religious\". In col. 3 under the head \"the survey number and the name of the field or fields comprised in the grant-dry, wet or garden\", the particulars of the lands are gjven.\n\nThis entry shows that except a small extent which is a garden the rest is dry land. These details are more consistent with the grant being of both the varams than being of mere melvaram. If it is of melvaram alone, the quality of the field is quite irrelevant. Sub-heads 4, 5 and 6 show that the extent is about 18 acres and 99 cents and the assessment is Rs. 24-14-5. These recitals leave the impression that the land was a dry land bearing a small assessment of Rs. 24-14-5 and the income therefrom could not have been appreciable in those days. The second main head is \"description, tenure and documents in support of the inam\". The entries under the various columns under this head establish that the dry lands bearing an assessment of\n\nR~. 24-14-5 described in cols. 3. 4, 5 and 6 were granted as Devadayam to the deity Pongali Amman penrnmntly bv Maduraiyar Paligar of Madura. The date of the grant is not known; but even in the accounts of 1209 F. the name of the deity was ctere:l as the grantee.\n\nThe third major head is \"name and relationship of the original grantee and of sub, equent and present heirs-length of possession\". Jo Cols. 13 and 15 the name of the deity alone is given. In Col. 16 under the heading \"name and age\" and in Col. 17 under the heading \"place of residence\" only the name of the deity is given. Below the name of the deity the name of the pujari \"Pujari Muttandi. age 45\" is given. In Cols. 18 and 19 under the heading \"relation to orginal grantee or subsequent registered holders\" and \"surviving heirs of the present incumbent\" no entry is made.\n\nObviously no entries are made under these sub-heads, as the deity cannot have relations.\n\nThe mention of Pujari Muttandi in the\n\ncontext of other entries indicates that he was in charge of the temple. If his name was mentioned because he had some interest in the land, the other suitable entries in regard to his relations ould have been made under the relevant sub-heads.\n\nIndeed it is not the case of the archakas that they have some interest in the me/varam. If the document was concerned only with the me/varam interest, strictly there was no place for the archaka in the document, for he had no interest therein. His name was mentioned only as he was the person who was in de facto management of the properties of the deity. In Col. 21 under the heading \"Deputy Collector's opinion . and recommendation'', the entry is \"To be confirmed permanently to the Pagoda so long as it is well kept up, subject to the existing jodi of Rs. 3-1-7\". Under Col. 22 the inam is confirmed to the pagoda. A reasonable interpretation of the recitals in this document leads to the only conclusion that the Inam Commissioner was dealing with the entire interest in the land, the particulars whereof were given therein. There is no evidence that at the time the grant was made the archakas or any others were kudivaramdars.\n\nBut it is said that Ex. P-2, the inam statement, filed by the then archabs would establish that what was granted was only the melvaram.\n\nThere, in Col. 2 under th:! head \"Name of the inamdar entered in dowle and names of the present enjoyer\" the following entry is found:\n\n\"Pongaliamman poosari Kuppaiyandi Mu!huveeran as per paimash entry. For fields Nos. 595 and 597 no poosari's name is mentioned. Present\n\n(enjoyer) Pongaliamman poosari Muthandi.\"\n\nIt is said that pujari is shown as the enjoyer and, therefore, the deity has no interest in the enjoyment of the land. The deity was obviously represented by the pujari who was the de facto trustee.\n\nHe was in possession of the property in his capacity as the de facto trustee. In those circumstances if the pujari of the temple is described as an enjoyer, it can only mean that he was in possession of the land on\n\n---,1 behalf of the temple. Whatever ambiguity there m1gnt be in the said recital it is dispelled by the entry in Col. 12 under t11e head \"Particulars of present enjoyment'', namely\n\nC. Peria.swa;\n\nSundaresa ly\n\nSubba Rao\n\n~. Peria.swami\n\nundareaa Tyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\n\"By directly cultivating this land selling the produce derived therefrom and applying the sale proceed to the service of the deity.\n\nI and my agnates have been performing pooja and enjoying the said land according to the conditions of the grant\". This entry is couched in clear and unambiguous terms.\n\nIt describes the nature of the enjoyment of the land by the archaka; it clearly says that he was cultivating the land, selling the produce and from the sale proceeds he was doing the services to the deity in accordance with the terms of the grant. If the deity was entitled only to the melvaram, this recital is inconsistent with it.\n\nThe recital indicates that the entire land was the subject-matter of the grant in favour of the deity and that the produce from t!:Iat land was utilized for the services to the deity.\n\nStrong reliance is placed upon the entry in col. 13 under the head \"Income derived from the manibam; whether sarvadambla or jodigai, if jodigai, how much\". The entry is, \"Income Rs. 24-14-5; Jodigai Rs. 3-1-7.\" Basing upon the said entries the argument is that Ex. P-3 shows that the assessment on the land was Rs. 24-14-5 and Ex. P-2 indicates that the same amount was the income derived from the inam and, therefore, what was granted in inam could have been only the assessment i.e., Rs. 24-14-5. This ar'.!nment is farfetched and based on a slender foundation.\n\nOne of the main objects of the inam enquiry was to ascertain whether the alienated lands were free of tax or not.\n\nThe archaka who was in possession of the land on behalf of the deity had to give information as regards the tax payable in respect of the land in his possession.\n\nIn that context the expression \"income derived from the manibam\" can only mean the assessment fixed on the land. After stating that full assessment was only Rs. 24-14-5 the archaka stated that he was not paying the entire amount, but was paying only the jodigai of Rs. 3-1-7.\n\nSo understood the said recitals fit into the scheme of other recitils in the said statement and those found in Ex. P-3. A similar argument was advanced before this Court in Buddu Satyanarayana's case(') and was rejected.\n\nDas, J ., observed at p. 1006 thus:\n\n(1) [1953) S.C.R. 1001\n\n\"A part from these points of distinction the decision relied on by the learned Attorney-General appears to us to be of doubtful aut!iority. As will appear from the passages quoted above, the decision rested mainly, if not entirely, on the fact that _the amount of assessment and the amount of income were the same and the conclusion was drawn that the Inam grant comprised only of the revenue assessment, i.e., of melvaram rights.\n\nWe are unable to follow the reasoning.\"\n\nWe, therefore, hold that, from the recitals in the said two documents, what was granted to the deity was of both the varams.\n\nLearned counsel for the archakas relied upon the long possession and enjoyment of the. suit lands by the archakas t and their ancestors in support of their contention that the melvaram alone could have been granted to the deity.\n\nLong enjoyment is also consistent with an arrangement that might have been entered into between the grantor and the then functioning archaka or archakas having regard to the conditions prevailing then.\n\nThe lands granted were comparatively of small extent and they were dry lands. In those days the income from the said lands must have been very insignificant.\n\nThere was no trustee for the temple.\n\nIn those circumstances it is more likely that the grantor would have put the land in the possession of the archaka.so that he might, from and out of the produce from the land, maintain the temple, perform the puja and meet the expenditure connected with the puja and also pay himself the remunera- ' lion for his services to the temple. That was a convenient arrangement which was adopted in many of the small temples in that part of the country. This practice was recorded with clarity by the Madras High Court in Narayanamurthi v. Achaya Sastrulu('). In dealing with a\n\nimilar argument the learned Judge observed:\n\n\"The evidence of user and enjoyment, however Jong ' uninterrupted and unquestioned, would be evidence of the grant only ht the absence of\n\n(1) A.T.R 1925 Mad. 4tr, 412-4r3\n\n19M\n\nC. Peria.sw• ...\n\nSundaresa I:\n\nSubba Rao\n\n. Ptriaswami\n\n•• .undaresa Iyer\n\n'ubba Rao J.\n\nany reliable or cogent evidence with regard to the terms of the grant itself or in the case of any ambiguity in the grant. It seems to be clear that almost very recently the suit lands yielded only just what was sufficient for nitya naivedyam or the daily worship. No doubt in such a state of things not only the persons who established the temples and made the endowments but succeeding generations of worshippers would have allowed the archakas to cultivate the lands and take the income performing the puja as it was obviously the most convenient mode of arranging for the worship of the deities and the payment of remuneration of the archaka service.\"\n\n\"But when the income accruing from the lands came to be considerable and the atchakas, by reason of old habits and follo\" i:1g their forefathers, claimed the lands and surplus profits therefrom to b~ their own, it was only natural that the worshippers should take steps to secure the surplus income for the institutions.\"\n\nThese observations are very apposite and they clearly describe the cicumstances under which the archakas of the temples were allowed to be in possession of the temple lands. If that was the situation under which the archakas came into possession of the lands, they were certainly in the position -o1 de facto trustees and they could not by mortgaging or otherwise alienating the properties claim any rights in derogation of the title of the deity.\n\nIndeed the documents on which the learned counsel relied contain clear and unambiguous admission on the part of the archakas that the land itself was the property of the deity.\n\nExs.\n\nP-12, P-13, P-14 and P-15 are copiek of mortgages execut.ed by the archakas. Under these documents the land in teir possession was mortgaged and it was described as padi(haram Manyam.\n\nThey also disclosed that the paditharam paddy directed to ,, be paid to the temple was more than the kist payable thereon to .the Government.\n\nIn the prior proceedings i.e., applications preferred by tl1e\n\narchakas for declaring the temples as excepted ones, there was no claim that the melvaram alone was granted to the deity. In other proceedings the archakas claimed that the lands were service inams, but they did not come forward with the present plea that melvaram only was granted to the .deity. Further, pattas for the suit lands were transforred without any objeqtion of the archakas in the name of the deifies in 1939 anl:i the archakas also paid contribution to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board on the basis that both the varams belonged to the deity.\n\nThe conduct of the archakas, therefore, is consistent with the recitals in the inam register, namely, that what was granted to the deity was the land i.e., both the varams, and that they had been put in possession and enjoyment of the said land in their capacity as archakas and de facto trustees.\n\n1964'\n\nC.Pul\"6Wo ...\n\nSunda,.., l:\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants relied upon an order made by A.RC. Westlake, Collector of Coimbatore, on April 14, 1941, wherein he held that only melvaram was granted to the deity. That order came to be made under the following circumstances.\n\nThe trustees appointed by the Coimbatore District Temple Committee filed an application before the Revenue Division Officer under s. 44-B- 11 (a) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments (Amendment) Act, 1934, for a declaration that the alienations of portions of inam land attached to the temple were null and void and for resumption and regrant of the same\n\nSubba RJJo\n\nto the deity. One of the issues in the application was whether the inam comprised melvaram or both melvaram and Kudivaram. The Revenue Division Officer held that the inam comprised both the varams. On appeal, the Collector _ came to the contrary conclusion. But a perusal of the order lhows that his conclusion was based upon pure surmises.\n\nThe Collector did not refer to any document or evidence for his conclusion. The trustees filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, for a declaration that the inam grant in favour of the plaint , temple comprised both the varams.\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge -1 held that s. 44-B of the Act had no application as the grant was to the deity and was not a service inam. The result' of this litigation was that there was no final decision on the\n\nPerialwami\n\n•• rndarem lyr\n\n•bba Rao J.\n\nquestion whether the grant was of both the varams or only of the melvaram. These proceedings cannot, therefore, be of any evidentiary value in this case.\n\nOn a consideration of the entire evidence we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the grant to the deity comprised both the varams in the suit lands.\n\nNow coming to the appeals relating to . Chowleswara swami temple, the factual and legal position is exactly the same as in the case of Pongaliamman temple.\n\nEx. P-2 is the statement made before the Inam Commissioner by the then archaka and Ex. P-3 is the extract from the Inam register.\n\nUnder the relevant entries in the inam register, survey numbers, extent, quality and the assessment of the subject-matter of the grant are given. The land is described as Devadayam and is stated to have been granted for the support of the pagoda of Chowleswaraswami. The nature of the grant is described as permanent.\n\nThe date of the grant is not known.\n\nThe grantor's name is given as Maduraiy'ar Paligar of Madura. The name of the original grantee is given as Chowleswaraswami.\n\nThe grant of the land described earlier is confirmed permanently to the pagoda as long as it is well kept subject to the existing jodi of Rs. 24-8-2. The only mention of archaka is in col. 17 under the head \"Particulars regarding present owner\" and the entry thereunder is \"Chowleswaraswami, stanika Muttaiyan\".\n\nThe other columns where the relationship of the presel'lt owner with the previous owners is expected to be recorded are left blank for the obvious reason that the said columns are irrelevant in the case of a deity. The archaka's name in addition to the deity is mentioned as he was in possession of the land in his capacity as de facto trustee.\n\nThe deity must necessarily have to be represented by somebody and that he can only be the stanika who was managing the temple and its properties.\n\nThe relevant entries in the inam register do not countenance any contention that the melvaram interest only in the land was granted and that was confirmed to the deity. If the melvaram was granted or confirmed, the recitals would have been different. The corresponding inam statement is Ex. P-2. The entries are practically similar to those found in Ex. P-2 relating to\n\nPongaliarnman temple with some slight variations.\n\nCol. 2 makes a dear distinction between ownership of the land and enjoyment. The owner is shown as Chowleswaraswami and the \"present\" enjoyer is shown as Chowleswaraswami'8 stanika. The nature of the enjoyment is described in col. 2 thus:\n\n\"The said lands are leased out for varam cultivation and I cultivate the same myself some times and the income (masul) therefrom is enjoyed by me and co-sharers (Pangali) and used for Swami Viniyogam.\" It is manifost from this recital that the land was the subjectmatter of the grant and the income therefrom was derived either by direct cultivation or by leasing out the same, and the said income was enjoyed by the archaka and used for viniyogam. The point to be noted is that the predecessorin-interest to the present archaka admitted that the produce from the land was utilized for the services of the deity.\n\nThe said admission is inconsistent with the allegation that the grant was only of me/varam. The entries in col. 13 arc sin1ilar to those contained in the corresponding Ex. P-2 relating to Pongaliamman temple, and, for reasons already given, they do not support the contention that the assessment of Rs. 74-1-5 was only granted to the deity.\n\nA combined reading of these two documents leads to the only conclusion that both the varams were granted to the deity.\n\nJust as in the case of Pongaliamman temple so in the case of Chowleswaraswami temple, the subsequent conduct of the archakas belie their assertion that only melvaram int<:'rest in the land was granted to the deity.\n\nExs. D-1 of 1867, D-2 of 1868, D-3 of 1870 and D-4 of 1883 are some of tlie mortgages executed by the archakas of Chowleswara$wami temple. Exs. D-5, D-6 and D-7 are sales. In all these documents the property is described as Chowleswaraswami manyam.\n\nIf really the fodil'aram belonged to the archakas, they would not have described the land they were alienating as Chowleswaraswami manyam.\n\nThe description of the property as that of the deity is consistent with the title of kudivaram also heing in the deity.\n\nFurther, as in the other case, the pattas .Zere\n\nC. l'eriaswa111i\n\nSundaresa 1)'11\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\ni. Ptriuwami\n\nv. 7undaresa Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\ntransferred in the name of the deity in 1939, the contributions were paid to the Hindu Religious Endowments Board on the basis that the entire interest in the lands belonged to the deity and that in other proceedings the archakas's case was not that the grant to the deity was only of the melvaram but the lands were service inam lands.\n\nThough the archakas dealt with the properties by mortgaging or otherwise alienating them they never denied the title of the deity.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons we hold that even in the case of Chowleswaraswami temple the original grant made to the deity comprised both the varams.\n\nIn regard to Sri Varadaraja Perumal temple, no appeal was filed hy the archakas and they allowed the judgment of the High Court in regard to the title to become final.\n\nNothing, therefore, need be said on the question of title of the land in respect of this temple.\n\nComing to the cross-appeals filed by the trustees against L'iat part of the decree of the High Court apportioning the property of the deity between the deity and the archakas, the question raised is whether the High Court, having held that the title to the suit property vested in the deity, had jurisdiction to compel the trustees of the temples to put the archakas in possession of specijied extent of property towards their remuneration.\n\nThe High Court observed thus:\n\n\"On these findings, it is no doubt true that the decree in favour of the plaintiffs for possession of the properties on behalf of the deity has to be upheld subject to the consideration set forth below.\" Then it proceeded to consider whether any allocation of land should be made between the archakas and the trustees.\n\nAfter noticing the relevant decisions on the subject, it observed thus:\n\n\"These decisions are practically uniform except for the decisions .......... (in) A.S. No. 237 of\n\n1950(') and ............ (in) Venkatadri v.\n\neshacharlu (2 ) and have upheld the allocation ----\\- (I) Brahmyya v. Rojesu<>rcswami temple A.I.R. 19;; Mad. 580.\n\n(2) I.L.R. r948 Mad. 46.\n\nof lands between the archakas and the trustees, the proportion however varyi.ng with the extent of the lands and the amount of the income.\n\nNone of the Judges were of the opinion that the arrangement should be a permanent and an unalterable one and it must naturally be subject o revision or alteration according to the circumstances of the case at the Instance not only of the trustees but also at the instance of the archakas, if it was found that the allocation was working to the detriment of either the archakas or of the temple.\"\n\nIt concluded:\n\n\"We think, therefore, in these cases, the best arrangement would be to allocate half the lands in each of the suits for the remuneration of the archakas, to be divided equally, having regard to the wet and dry extents, and leave the remaining half to the trustees, who have to meet the cost of the daily worship and accumulate the surplus in their hands as it belong; to the deity.\"\n\nOn principle, in our view, the conclusion arrived at by the learn1:d Judges of the High Court is unsupportable.\n\nThe suits were based on title and the relief asked for was the eviction of the archakas from the suit property as they, accord:ng to the plaintiffs, had no title to remain in possession.\n\nThe archakas raised the plea that the title of the deity was confined only to melvaram in the plaint-schedule lands and that they had title to the kudivaram. Both the courts confirmed the title of the deity to both the interests and negatived the title of the defendant-archakas. In the\n\ncircumtances the Court has no option but to deliver possession to the plaintiffs . who had established their title to the suit properties. In a suit for framing a scheme for a temple a court may in an appropriate case put the archaka in possession of a por.tion of the temple lands towards his remuneration for services to the temple; but these are not 11uits for framing a scheme. That apart, there is absolutely no material either in the pleadings or in the vidence to\n\n1'64\n\nC. l'triaswaml\n\n•• SMndar-r• ly<t\n\nSuhbo Rao I.\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nSundarya Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nmake any such apportionment, for the allotment of a particular share to the archaka would depend upon the total income from the lands, the value of the articles required for the worship, the amount of reasonable remuneration intended to be provided and other similar circumstances.\n\nAn allotment cannot possibly be made on the basis of allocations made in the circumstances and facts peculiar to other cases.\n\nIndeed, this Court has already expressed a clear opinion on this aspect of the case in Buddu Suryanarayana's case('). Therein, Das, J., said at p. 1008 thus:\n\nIn a proceeding for the framing of a scheme relating to a temple it may be permissible to take into account the claims, moral if not legal, of the Archakas and to make some pro vision for protecting their rights, but those considerations appear to us to be entirely out of place in a suit for ejectment on proof of title.\"\n\nWith respect we e'1ti•ely agree with the said observations.\n\nIt follows that the High Court went wrong in making an allocation of the lands between the trustees and the archakas in a suit for ejectment.\n\nLearned counsel for the archakas made an impassioned appeal that we should give a direction to the authorities concerned to make an apportionment of the properties on the lines suggested by the High Court, having regard. to the long enjoyment of the temple lands by the archakas. Long enjoyment of the temple lands by the archakas is not a peculiar feature of this case.\n\nThe authorities concelilled\n\nhave made suitable arrangements for remuneration in the J case of other temples and we have no doubt that they would make a reasonable provision for the archakas in the present case also for their remuneration in accordance with law.\n\nIn the result, Civil Appeals Nos. 648 and 650 of 1960 filed by the trustees are allowed but, in the circumstances, without costs. Civil Appeal No. 649 of 1960 filed by the ,...., trustees is also allowed without costs except as against tlle I\n\n(1) [1953) S.C.R. lCOl\n\n14th respondent.\n\nThe said appeal against the 14th respondent is withdrawn on the ground that his interest as a mortgagee is not now subsisting and the said appeal against the 14th respondent is dismissed as withdrawn but, in the circumstances, without costs.\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 651 nd 652 of 1960 file:l by the archakas are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne hearing tee.\n\nOrdered accordingly.\n\nGMGIPND-L-.sJ s c (4, · , o - 1>-n-6s-•, soo.\n\nC. Peri<uw0rn\n\nv, Su1tdare3tl lye1\n\nSubba Rao I.", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 278, "end_char": 283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. PERIASWAMI GOUNDAN AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 388, "end_char": 417, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. PERIASWAMI GOUNDAN AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUNDARESA IYER AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 428, "end_char": 450, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUNDARESA IYER AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 466, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Periaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2112, "end_char": 2122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I964 ' -\\ C.. Periaswami\n\nSlllldaresa Iyer\n\nThe main point for consideration was whether the High' Court.", "canonical_name": "Periaswami Goundar"}}, {"text": "Sankaranarayana Pillayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2821, "end_char": 2845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sankaranarayana Pillayan T. 11.R.E. Board, Madrtu~ I.LR.", "canonical_name": "Sankaranarayana Pillayan"}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5023, "end_char": 5046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for 1he appellant (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5051, "end_char": 5058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for 1he appellant (in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "T. V. R. Tatachari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5190, "end_char": 5208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "651 and 652 of 1960),\n\nT. V. R. Tatachari, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5314, "end_char": 5325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, K. Jayaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents No."}}, {"text": "K. Jayaram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5327, "end_char": 5337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, K. Jayaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents No."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5342, "end_char": 5359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, K. Jayaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents No."}}, {"text": "SUB BA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5622, "end_char": 5632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Couft1 was delivered by '\n\n1'64\n\nSUB BA RAo, J .-Thei; e five appeals by certificate arise Subbo Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Subbo Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Couft1 was delivered by '\n\n1'64\n\nSUB BA RAo, J .-Thei; e five appeals by certificate arise Subbo Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Periaswami Goundar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5910, "end_char": 5928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Periaswami Goundar and Samana Goundar, the plaintiffs in the said ilUit, are the trustees of the said temple.", "canonical_name": "Periaswami Goundar"}}, {"text": "Samana Goundar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5933, "end_char": 5947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Periaswami Goundar and Samana Goundar, the plaintiffs in the said ilUit, are the trustees of the said temple."}}, {"text": "C. Periaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6784, "end_char": 6797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "184 of 1945 was filed in the said Court by lite trustees of Sri Pongali Amman temple situated in the vllage of V engambur for the recovery of the properties\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nSundaresa Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nmentioned in the schedule attached to the plaint.", "canonical_name": "Periaswami Goundar"}}, {"text": "Sundaresa Iyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6799, "end_char": 6813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "184 of 1945 was filed in the said Court by lite trustees of Sri Pongali Amman temple situated in the vllage of V engambur for the recovery of the properties\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nSundaresa Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nmentioned in the schedule attached to the plaint.", "canonical_name": "SUNDARESA IYER AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6815, "end_char": 6824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "184 of 1945 was filed in the said Court by lite trustees of Sri Pongali Amman temple situated in the vllage of V engambur for the recovery of the properties\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nSundaresa Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nmentioned in the schedule attached to the plaint.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Vengambur village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7289, "end_char": 7306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "185 of 1945 was filed in the same Court by the trustees of Sri Varadaraja Perumal temple situated in Vengambur village."}}, {"text": "May 16, 1931", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8489, "end_char": 8501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result the learned Subordinate Judge gave a decreo in each of the suits for possession of the plaint-schedule properties except those covered by the alienations effected before May 16, 1931."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8774, "end_char": 8794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho defendants in the said suits preferred appeals to the High Court of Madras, being Appeals No_s."}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8930, "end_char": 8947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said appeals were heard by a Division Benell of the said High Court, consisting of Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ."}}, {"text": "Rajagopalan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8952, "end_char": 8963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said appeals were heard by a Division Benell of the said High Court, consisting of Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10283, "end_char": 10288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Desai and Mr.\n\nTatachari, appearing for the archakas in the different appeals, contended that the Courts below, having regard 10the consistent and continuous conduct of enjoyment as absolute owners of the properties by the archakas spread over a long period of time, should have invoked the doctrine of lost grant particularly when there was no clear and convincing evidence of the terms of the grant."}}, {"text": "Tatachari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10298, "end_char": 10307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Desai and Mr.\n\nTatachari, appearing for the archakas in the different appeals, contended that the Courts below, having regard 10the consistent and continuous conduct of enjoyment as absolute owners of the properties by the archakas spread over a long period of time, should have invoked the doctrine of lost grant particularly when there was no clear and convincing evidence of the terms of the grant."}}, {"text": "Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10887, "end_char": 10904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the trustees, contested this position."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11218, "end_char": 11227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sundaresa Iyer\n\nSubba Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13582, "end_char": 13585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting that contention, Das, J., speaking for the Court, observed:\n\n\"There is no doubt, on the authorities, that a presumption of an origin in some lawful title may in certain circumstances be made to support possessory rights long and quietly enjoyed where no actual proof of title is forthcoming but it is equally well established that that presumption cannot lie made where there is sufficient evidence and convincing proof of the nature of the grant and the persons to whom it was made.\""}}, {"text": "Buck-master", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14151, "end_char": 14162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Buck-master, delivering the judgment in Maginiram Sitaram v. Kasturbhai Manibhai('), observed:\n\n''At the lapse of 100 years, when every party to the original transaction has passed away, and it becomes completely impossible to ascertain what were the circumstances which caused the original grant to be made, it is only following the policy which the Courts alays adopt, of securing as far as possible quiet possession to people who are in apparent lawful holding of an estate, to assume that the grant was lawfully and not unlawfully made.\""}}, {"text": "Viscount Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14694, "end_char": 14709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscount Sumner in Mohamed Muzafar Ali Musavi v.\n\nJabeda Khatun (2) said much to the same effect thus :\n\n\"The presumption of an origin in some lawful title, which the Courts have so often readily made in order to support possessory rights, long and quietly enjoyed, where no actual proof of title is forthcoming, is one which is not a mere\n\n(I) [19zr] LR .. ;9 I.A. 54, Jll Sup."}}, {"text": "L.R. 57 I.A. 125", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15095, "end_char": 15111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C. Periaswami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15121, "end_char": 15134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196'1\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nv. • Sundaresal Iyer\n\nSub/Jo Rao I.\n\nC. , Perkuwami\n\n\"· Slllldmem Iyer\n\nSubbll Rao J.\n\nbranch of the Jaw of evidence.", "canonical_name": "Periaswami Goundar"}}, {"text": "Sundaresal Iyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15141, "end_char": 15156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196'1\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nv. • Sundaresal Iyer\n\nSub/Jo Rao I.\n\nC. , Perkuwami\n\n\"· Slllldmem Iyer\n\nSubbll Rao J.\n\nbranch of the Jaw of evidence.", "canonical_name": "SUNDARESA IYER AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Subbll Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15208, "end_char": 15218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196'1\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nv. • Sundaresal Iyer\n\nSub/Jo Rao I.\n\nC. , Perkuwami\n\n\"· Slllldmem Iyer\n\nSubbll Rao J.\n\nbranch of the Jaw of evidence.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Sankaranayurza Pillayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17116, "end_char": 17139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' I\n\nIn the latest decision of the Judicial Committee reported in Sankaranayurza Pillayan's case('), it reiterated the same position when it said:\n\n\"The question arose in a recent case before this Board with reference to a Madras inam [see Secretary of State for India v. Vidhya Thirta Swamigal( 2 }], where it was held that the title deeds and the entries in the inam register are evidence of the true intent and effect of the transaction and of the ch2.racter of the.", "canonical_name": "Sankaranarayana Pillayan"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17273, "end_char": 17279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' I\n\nIn the latest decision of the Judicial Committee reported in Sankaranayurza Pillayan's case('), it reiterated the same position when it said:\n\n\"The question arose in a recent case before this Board with reference to a Madras inam [see Secretary of State for India v. Vidhya Thirta Swamigal( 2 }], where it was held that the title deeds and the entries in the inam register are evidence of the true intent and effect of the transaction and of the ch2.racter of the."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17827, "end_char": 17844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view of the Judicial Committee has been accepted and applied by the Madras High Court in many decisions when it was called upon to decide on the conflicting claims of a trustee and a archaka to the properties de1 lt with in he inam registers."}}, {"text": "Pongali Amman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18033, "end_char": 18046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The documents relating to Sri Pongali Amman temple are Exs.", "canonical_name": "Pongali Amman"}}, {"text": "C. Peria.swan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19112, "end_char": 19125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Peria.swan\n\n•• Sundaresa lyt\n\nSubba Rao'\n\n1964 I\n\nC. Perkuwami\n\n\"· Sundare• 11er\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\ninterest in t.he property that was given to the deity.", "canonical_name": "Periaswami Goundar"}}, {"text": "Madura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20717, "end_char": 20723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 5 and 6 were granted as Devadayam to the deity Pongali Amman penrnmntly bv Maduraiyar Paligar of Madura."}}, {"text": "Pujari Muttandi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21551, "end_char": 21566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mention of Pujari Muttandi in the\n\ncontext of other entries indicates that he was in charge of the temple."}}, {"text": "Pongaliamman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23175, "end_char": 23187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Present\n\n(enjoyer) Pongaliamman poosari Muthandi.\"", "canonical_name": "Pongali Amman"}}, {"text": "undareaa Tyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23863, "end_char": 23876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 under t11e head \"Particulars of present enjoyment'', namely\n\nC. Peria.swa;\n\nSundaresa ly\n\nSubba Rao\n\n~. Peria.swami\n\nundareaa Tyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\n\"By directly cultivating this land selling the produce derived therefrom and applying the sale proceed to the service of the deity."}}, {"text": "Buddu Satyanarayana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26007, "end_char": 26026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar argument was advanced before this Court in Buddu Satyanarayana's case(') and was rejected.", "canonical_name": "Buddu Satyanarayana"}}, {"text": "Ptriaswami", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28186, "end_char": 28196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ptriaswami\n\n•• .undaresa Iyer\n\n'ubba Rao J.\n\nany reliable or cogent evidence with regard to the terms of the grant itself or in the case of any ambiguity in the grant.", "canonical_name": "Periaswami Goundar"}}, {"text": ".undaresa Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28201, "end_char": 28215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ptriaswami\n\n•• .undaresa Iyer\n\n'ubba Rao J.\n\nany reliable or cogent evidence with regard to the terms of the grant itself or in the case of any ambiguity in the grant.", "canonical_name": "SUNDARESA IYER AND ORS"}}, {"text": "'ubba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28217, "end_char": 28226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ptriaswami\n\n•• .undaresa Iyer\n\n'ubba Rao J.\n\nany reliable or cogent evidence with regard to the terms of the grant itself or in the case of any ambiguity in the grant.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30706, "end_char": 30745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, pattas for the suit lands were transforred without any objeqtion of the archakas in the name of the deifies in 1939 anl:i the archakas also paid contribution to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board on the basis that both the varams belonged to the deity."}}, {"text": "A.RC. Westlake", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31203, "end_char": 31217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964'\n\nC.Pul\"6Wo ...\n\nSunda,.., l:\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants relied upon an order made by A.RC."}}, {"text": "Coimbatore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31232, "end_char": 31242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Westlake, Collector of Coimbatore, on April 14, 1941, wherein he held that only melvaram was granted to the deity."}}, {"text": "April 14, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31247, "end_char": 31261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Westlake, Collector of Coimbatore, on April 14, 1941, wherein he held that only melvaram was granted to the deity."}}, {"text": "Coimbatore District Temple Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31417, "end_char": 31453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trustees appointed by the Coimbatore District Temple Committee filed an application before the Revenue Division Officer under s. 44-B- 11 (a) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments (Amendment) Act, 1934, for a declaration that the alienations of portions of inam land attached to the temple were null and void and for resumption and regrant of the same\n\nSubba RJJo\n\nto the deity."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31517, "end_char": 31522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32223, "end_char": 32252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trustees filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, for a declaration that the inam grant in favour of the plaint , temple comprised both the varams."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32396, "end_char": 32401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Perialwami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32568, "end_char": 32578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result' of this litigation was that there was no final decision on the\n\nPerialwami\n\n•• rndarem lyr\n\n•bba Rao J.\n\nquestion whether the grant was of both the varams or only of the melvaram.", "canonical_name": "Periaswami Goundar"}}, {"text": "•bba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32596, "end_char": 32604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result' of this litigation was that there was no final decision on the\n\nPerialwami\n\n•• rndarem lyr\n\n•bba Rao J.\n\nquestion whether the grant was of both the varams or only of the melvaram."}}, {"text": "Chowleswaraswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33689, "end_char": 33705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The name of the original grantee is given as Chowleswaraswami."}}, {"text": "Ptriuwami", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37080, "end_char": 37089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, as in the other case, the pattas .Zere\n\nC. l'eriaswa111i\n\nSundaresa 1)'11\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\ni. Ptriuwami\n\nv. 7undaresa Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\ntransferred in the name of the deity in 1939, the contributions were paid to the Hindu Religious Endowments Board on the basis that the entire interest in the lands belonged to the deity and that in other proceedings the archakas's case was not that the grant to the deity was only of the melvaram but the lands were service inam lands.", "canonical_name": "Periaswami Goundar"}}, {"text": "7undaresa Iyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37094, "end_char": 37108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, as in the other case, the pattas .Zere\n\nC. l'eriaswa111i\n\nSundaresa 1)'11\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\ni. Ptriuwami\n\nv. 7undaresa Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\ntransferred in the name of the deity in 1939, the contributions were paid to the Hindu Religious Endowments Board on the basis that the entire interest in the lands belonged to the deity and that in other proceedings the archakas's case was not that the grant to the deity was only of the melvaram but the lands were service inam lands.", "canonical_name": "SUNDARESA IYER AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Varadaraja Perumal temple", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37759, "end_char": 37784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to Sri Varadaraja Perumal temple, no appeal was filed hy the archakas and they allowed the judgment of the High Court in regard to the title to become final."}}, {"text": "L'iat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38067, "end_char": 38072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming to the cross-appeals filed by the trustees against L'iat part of the decree of the High Court apportioning the property of the deity between the deity and the archakas, the question raised is whether the High Court, having held that the title to the suit property vested in the deity, had jurisdiction to compel the trustees of the temples to put the archakas in possession of specijied extent of property towards their remuneration."}}, {"text": "Suhbo Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41199, "end_char": 41208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That apart, there is absolutely no material either in the pleadings or in the vidence to\n\n1'64\n\nC. l'triaswaml\n\n•• SMndar-r• ly<t\n\nSuhbo Rao I.\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nSundarya Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nmake any such apportionment, for the allotment of a particular share to the archaka would depend upon the total income from the lands, the value of the articles required for the worship, the amount of reasonable remuneration intended to be provided and other similar circumstances.", "canonical_name": "SUB BA RAo"}}, {"text": "Sundarya Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41228, "end_char": 41241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That apart, there is absolutely no material either in the pleadings or in the vidence to\n\n1'64\n\nC. l'triaswaml\n\n•• SMndar-r• ly<t\n\nSuhbo Rao I.\n\nC. Periaswami\n\nSundarya Iyer\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nmake any such apportionment, for the allotment of a particular share to the archaka would depend upon the total income from the lands, the value of the articles required for the worship, the amount of reasonable remuneration intended to be provided and other similar circumstances.", "canonical_name": "SUNDARESA IYER AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Buddu Suryanarayana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41754, "end_char": 41773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, this Court has already expressed a clear opinion on this aspect of the case in Buddu Suryanarayana's case(').", "canonical_name": "Buddu Satyanarayana"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_36_50_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "CJ.T., Modrt11 •• Slvaklui Match\n\nExport Co.\n\nSWJ.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64J\n\nso complied with, the taxing authorities would be bound to refuse to give the taxpayer the benefit claimed. When application for registration of the firm is made, the Incometax Officer is entitled to ascertain whether the names of the partners in the instrument are of persons who have agreed to be partners, whether ihe shares are properly specified and whether the statement about the shares is real or is merely a cloak for dis, ributing the profits in a different manner.\n\nIf all persons who have in truth agreed to be partners have not signed the deed or their shares are not truly set out in the deed of partnership, it would be open to the Incometax Officer to decline to register the deed, even if under the general Jaw of partnership the rights and obligations of tke partners eo nomine thereto may otherwise be adjusted. As a corollary to this, if the requirements relating to the form in which the petition is to be presented are not complied with, and the relevant information is withheld, the Incometax Officer may be justified in refusing registration.\n\nIn my view the High Court was in error in holding on the question submitted that the registration of the assessee under s. 26-A of the Income-tax Act was wrongly refused.\n\nThe answer to the ques:ion referred to the High Court lhould be in the affirmative.\n\nORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX KERALA AND\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\nKRISHNA WARRIAR\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH, ANDS. M. SJKRI JJ.) ltteome Tax-Exemption from taxation-Businen held in trUll- Pllrl of profit• to be utiliud for religiOIU or charitable purp\"'•,_\n\nBusiness, if property-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 4(3)(1).\n\nCJ.'I.\n\nA testator was carrying on business in Ayurvedic drugs under the ~\n\n,., W: name and style of Arya Vaidya Sala.\n\nUnder his will his properties, _ \"\" .including the business, were held under trust and the object of the trw.t y; as to utilise 60 per cent of the profits of the business for 20 yean and 85 per cent thereafter for religious and charitable purpo!!ieS.\n\nThe assessment years in qu'tstion fell within 20 years from the death of the testator and the question was whether the 60 per cent of t.:ie income from the trust 1 properties was exempt from assessment to income-tax under s. 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The lncometax authorities rejected the claim for exemption and asseod the entire income from the said properties, on the ground that the .ubstantive cl. (i) of s. 4(3) was not applicable to the case but only el. (b) of tlie prmliso and that the conditions laid down thereunder were not complied with.\n\nHELD: (i) The business run under the name and style of Arya Vaidya Sala was property within the meaning of s. 4(3 )(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and as the entire business was held ia trust for uti[sing a part of its profits for religious or charitable purposes, the said income Was exempt from assessment to • income-tai under that section.\n\n(ii) Cl. (b) of the proviso to s. 4(3)(i) was applicable only to a business not held in trust but carried on on behalf of a religious or charitable institution.\n\n(iii) A business held in trust wholly or in part for religion• or charitable purposes was not a business carried on on behalf of a religious or charitable institution.\n\n(iv) The dichotomy between the two expressions \"wholly\" and \"'in part\" in s. 4(3 )(i) was not based upon the dedication of the whole or a fractional part of the property, but between the dedication of lite said property the income from which was to be utilized wholly for religious or charitable purposes or in part for such purposes.\n\n(v) The expression ''such income\" in the opening words of the proviso to s. 4(3) (i)' meant \"income accruing or arising in favour of the trust\".\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 606-610 of 1963.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment dated January 20, 1961 of the Kerala High Court in Income-tax Referred Case No. 16 of 1959.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals) .\n\nCJ.T. v. ;,11na W arriat\n\n-:ubba Rao I.\n\nS. T. Desai and Sardar Bahadur, for the respondent (in all the appeals) .\n\nApril 29, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSuBBA RAo J.-These appeals by special leave raise the question of the construction of the provisions of s. 4(3 )(i) of the Indian Income-taic Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act, as amended by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 195 3, hereinafter called the Amending Act.\n\nThe facts are as follows.\n\nOne P. S. Warriar, an eminent Ayurvedic physician, carried on business in Ayurvedic drugs under the name and style of \"Arya Vaidya Sala\" and was also running a hospital named \"Arya Sikitsa Sala\" and a school called \"Arya Vaidya Pata Sala\". The said Warri.ar died on January 30, 1944, after executing a will wherein he created a. trust in respect of his properties, including the Arya Vaidya Sah.\n\nHe gave directions to the trustees appointed under th~ said will to conduct the said business and to disburse the income therefrom in certain proportions to the Arya Vaidya Sala, Arya Sikitsa Sala and Arya Vaidya Pata Sala and to his descendants.\n\nBroadly stated 60 per cent of the income was directed to be spent on the said three institutions and 40 per cent to be given to his descendants.\n\nTill the Amending Act came into force the Incometax Department gave exemption from assessment for the 60 per cent of the income under s. 4(3) (i) of th; Act; but, after the Amending Act came into force, which was given retrospective operation from .April 1, 1952, the said Department refused to give exemption from assessment even in regard to the 60 per cent of the income.\n\nFor the assessment years 1954-55 and 1955-56 the Income-tax Officer assessed the entire income from the said properties; and in respect of the income pertaining to the assessment years 1952-53 and 1953-54, which had already been assessed in the usual course giving exemption for the said 60 per cent of the income, the Income-tax Officer issued notices under s. 34 of the Act and by two separate orders dated September 28, 1956, assessed the said 60 per cent of the income on the basis of escaped assessment.\n\nOn December 20, 1956,\n\nfor Ile assessment year 1956-57 the Income-tax Officer, in 1964 the li.:e manner, assessed the entire income from the said\n\nCJ.T. properties.\n\nThe appeals filed by the assessee against the . v. . f .\n\nKruhna Warr.a, said urders o assessment to the Appellate Assistant Com- _ misskner were dismissed.\n\nThe appeals filed against the Subba Rao J. orderH of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, were consolidated and by its order dated February 28, 1958, the said Tribunal allowed the appals ex em piing 60 per cent of the said income from assessment to income-tax under s. 4 ( 3) ( i) of the Act. The references made to the High Court of Kerala were dismissed.\n\nHence the present appeals.\n\nMr. Rajagopala Sastri, learned counselfor the Revenue, contends that under s. 4 ( 3 )( i) of the Act whereunder the said income is given exemption from taxation, the property wherefrom the income is derived shall have been held under trust wholly or in part for religious or charitable purposes, that the business run under the name and style of Arya Vaidya Sala was not capable of being held in trust, that even if it was capable of beirig held under trust, it was not wholly or in part so held in trust for religious or charitable purposes, as only a part of the income was rlirected to be spent for religious or charitable pu.rposes and that in the circumstances cl. (b) of the proviso was attractd but the conditions laid down thereunder were not complied with.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent, Mr. S. T. Dsai, contends that business is property within the meaning of s. 4 ( 3 )( i) of the Act and that it is held in tmst in part for religious and charitable purposes and, therefore, the substantive part of the provision is attracted to .the facts of the case and hence the proviso is excluded.\n\nBefore we construe the relevant provisions of the Act and consider the arguments advanced on either sid~, it would be convenient at the outset to read the mateiial part of tbe will and to ascertain the scope of the bequest created thereunder.\n\nThe will is marked as Annexure A2 in the case. 1be relevant parts of the Will read:\n\n\"l. Will executed by Pannbmnalli Warrialh deceased Parvathi alias Kunkikutty Warassiar's\n\nIHI\n\nCJ.T.\n\nY. '.ruluw \",,,,;,,,.\n\nson Sri Sankunny Warriar known as Vaidyaratnam Sri P. S. Warriar, residing at Puthan Warian in Kottak:kal Amsom and Desom of Ernad Taluk.;'\n\n\"7. Apart from the properties mentioned in Schedule B, C and D all other properties, movable as well as immovable, belonging to me I hereby constitute into a trust to be managed by the trustees as per the directions in the will. They are described in Schedule E, and on my demise those properties will vest in the trustees. It is my intention that except the properties mentioned in paras 4 and 5 (B, C & D Schedule), all my properties are to be• included in the Trust and therefore, even if some item of property is left out by 'inadvertence, it is also to be deemed included in the Trust and vested in the Trustees.\"\n\n\"8. Provisions regarding the Trust.\n\nI hereby nominate the following persons as the first Board of Trustees:- ........ (Names of 7 persons given).\n\n4 9. The above Trust is to be managed and conducted according to the terms and conditions detailed below:- (A to F) .......................... .\n\nG. The primary and chief objectsof the Trust are to carry on for ever the two institutions viz., the Arya Vaidya Sala and the Arya Vaidya Hospital on the lines followed now with the object of enlarging and increasing their scope and utility.\n\nThe work of Arya Vaidya Sala now consists of,\n\n1. preparation of Ayurvedic medicines,\n\n2. sale of the same,\n\n3. treatment of patients, receiving from them compensation according to their capacity and means,\n\nfff4\n\nCJ.T. ...\n\n4. to conduct research into Arya Vaidyam with a view to make it more and more useful to the public. ... ,,,..\n\nII' .nar H. The following are the matters conducted in the '•bb• Ru 1. institution called the Arya Vaidya Hospita!..\n\n1. To examine poor patients free of charge, to prescribe treatment for them and give medicines gratis (out-patient Department).\n\n2. To take in at least 12 poor patients at any\n\ntime, give them lodging and board and also free medicines and treatment free (the in-patient Department).\n\n3. To carry out the said services with the help of an Arya V aidyan and necessary operations with the help of an Allopathi doctor.\n\n4. Give treatment and medicines to all persons seeking them, receiving from such of them as are able such remuneration as they can afford including cost of medicines.\n\nThe Arya Vaidya Hospital is now carried on with the medicines supplied by and takeri from th\\: Arya Vaidya Sala and the incidental expenses are now me~, from out of the funds of the Arya Vaidya Sala.\n\n]. The trustees are to run the above institutions according to the intentions expressed abovo:: with such modifications as the circumstances may .warrant.\n\nK. In the Arya Vaidya Patasala run under the auspices of the Arya Samajam, Aryavaidyam is taught in accordance with the service of Ayurveda.\n\nI have been meeting the expenses of the said institutions, not covered by its income.\n\nFrom out of the profits of Arya Vaidya Sala.\n\nL. Out of the net profits of the Arya Vaidya Sala 25 per cent is to be devoted to the ftevelop-\n\nCJ.T . ...\n\nKrishna Warriar\n\nment of the Arya Vaidya Sala, 25 per cent for meeting the expenses of the Arya Vaidya Hospital and 25 per cent for division equally between the two tavazhies (this only for 25 years) out of the remaining 25 per cent a sum not exceeding 10 per cent may be according to requirements, utilised for the purposes of the Arya Vaidya Patasala. The balance, if any, that m1y remain out of the\n\n10 per cent after disbursement to the Arya Vaidya Patasala, may he used for the Arya Vaidya Sala itself. The balancr 15 per cent are to be deposited by the Trustees each year in approved banks as a Reserve fund for the two tavazhies for a period of 20 years and the fund thus accumulated inclusive of interest is to be divided equally among the two tavazhies equally i.e., in moiety and it will be the duty of the Trmtees to invest the same on the authority of immovable properties.\n\nSubba Rao 1.\n\nM. The Trustees me not bound to pay any amount to the said two tavazhies after the expiry of 20 years.\n\nThe 40 per cent of the profit so earmarked for 20 years and so released after the expiry 9f 20 years are therefore to be utilised for the development of the Arya Vaidya Sala and Arya V.1idya Hospital according to the discretion of the Trustees.\n\nE Schedule: All remaining properties constituted into the Trust.\n\nIt will be seen from the said recitals of the Will µiat the testator created a trust in respect of his entire properties, including those mentioned in Schedules B, C and D and specifically vested them in the trustees appointed thereunder.\n\nThe properties so vested included the business carried on in the name .1nd style of Arya Vaidya Sala. The main objects of the trust were to carry on the said two institutions, namely, Arya Vaidya Sala and Arya Vaidya Hospital\n\nand also the other objects mentioned thereunder. Out of 1964 the income from the business so vested in the trustees, he cJ.T. directed the trustees to spend 25 per cent for the develop- . v. ment of Arya Vaidya Sala, 25 per cent to meet the expenses Krtslm• War of the Arya Vaidya Hospital, not exceeding 10 per cent for Subba Rao . the Arya Vaidya Patasala, 25 per cent to be shared equally by the two branches of the family of the testor for a period of 20 years .and thereafter to be utilized for the purpose of the Arya Vaidya Sala and Arya Vaidya Hospital and 15 per cent to be given to the said branches; that is to say, 60\n\nper cent of the total properties for a period of 20 years from the. demise of the testator should be utilized for religious and charitable purposes and thereafter 85 per cent to be utilized for the said purposes and the rest to be spent on non-religious and non-charitable purposes.\n\nTherefore, under the Will the E Schedule properties, including the business, were held under trust and the object of the trust was to utilize uO per cent of the profits of the business for 20 years and 85 per cent thereafter for religious and charitable purposes.\n\nThe assessment years in question fell within 20 ye.1rs from the death of the testator and, therefore, we are concerned only with 60 per cent of the income from the trust properties.\n\nThe question is whe.ther the 60 per cent of the income from the trust properties is eXe!fipt from assessment to income-tax under s. 4(3) (i) of the Act.\n\nThe relevant provisions of the Act read:\n\nSection 4. ( 3) Any income, profits or gains falling within the following classes shall not be inc!uded in the total income of the person receiving them:\n\n(i) any income derived from property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes, and in the case of property so held in part only for such purposes, the income applied, or finally set apart for application, thereto:\n\nProvided that such income shall be included in the total income ..................... .\n\n(b) in the case of income derived from business carried on behalf of a religious or charitll)IU\n\nCJ.T .\n\n... , j(rishna Warnar\n\nable institutions, unless the income is applied wholly for the purpose of the institution and either-\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\n(i) the business is carried on in tbe cours~\n\nof the actual carrying out of a primary purpose of the institution, or\n\n(ii) the work in connection witb the busineS5\n\nis mainly carried on by beneficiaries of the institution.\n\nA brief history of the proviso may not be out of place here.\n\nBefore the amendment of this clause by the Amending Act of 1953 the proviso was in the form of a separate substantive clause and was numbered as cl. ( i-a). The said cl. (i-a) came under judicial scrutiny.\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the Revenue that though a business was held under trust for religious or charitable purposes, it would fall under cl. (i-a) and the income therefrom could not be exempted from income-tax unless th~ conditions laid down in the said clause were complied with.\n\nIn Charitable Gadodia Swadeshi Stores v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Puniah (1 ) .• the Lahore High Court rejected that contention, and one of the reasons given for the rejection was that if the s.aid clause was intended to narrow down the scope of cl. (i), the said clause should have been added as a proviso to the old clause. Presumably on the basis of this suggestion the Amending Act of 1953 substituted cl. (i-a) by cl. (b) of the proviso. But it is not an inflexible rule of construction that a proviso in a statute should always be read as a limitation upon the effect of the main enactment. Generally the natural presumption is that but for the proviso the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso; but the clear language of the substantive provision as well as the proviso may establish that the proviso is not a qualifying clause of the main provisions, but is in itself a substantive provision.\n\nIn the words of Maxwell, \"the true principle is that the sound view of the enacting clause, the saving clause and the proviso take.n and construed tog; ether is to prevail\".\n\nSo construed we find no difficulty, as we wiU indicate later\n\n(I) (1944) Ii I.T.R. 385.\n\n_J •\n\nia our judgment, in holding that the said cl. ( b) of the 1964 proviso de.als with a case of business which is not vc, ted in CJ. r. trust for religius or charitable purposes within the moaning Kmlm; i •. \"\"\"'6 \" of the substantlve clause of s. 4 ( 3) ( 1). -··\n\nWith this introductory remarks we shall proceed to con strue the provisions of s. 4(3)(i) of the Act, along with\n\ncl. (b) of the Proviso.\n\nUnder cl. (i), so far as it is relevant to the question raised before us, to earn the exemption the income shall have been derived from property under trust wholly or in part held for religious or charitable purposes.\n\nUnder cl. (b) of the proviso to that clause, in the case of income derived from business carried on on behalf of a religious or charitable institution, unless the condition laid down thereunder are complied with, the said income cannot be exempted. If business is property and is held under trust wholly or partly for religious or charitable purposes, it falls squarely under the. substantive part of cl. ( i) and i\" that event cl. (b) of the proviso cannot be attracted, as under that clause of the proviso the business mentioned therein is not held under trust but one carried on on behalf of a religious or charitable institution.\n\nTo take a business out of the substantive cl. ( i) of s. 4 ( 3) and place it in cl. (b) of the proviso, it is suggested that business is not property and that even if it is property the said property is not wholly or partly held in trust for re!lgious or charitable purposes. That business is property is now well settled.\n\nThe Privy Council in In re Trustees of the Tribune(') did not question the view expressed by the Bombay High Court that business of running the newspaper Tribune was property held under ocsst for charitable purposes.\n\nThis Court in J. K. Trust, •ombay 'Y. Commissioner of Income-tax .. Excess profits Tax :lombay(\") endorsed the said view and held that \"property\" ii .11 term of the widest import and that business would undoubtedly be property unless there was something to the contrary in the enactment. If business was property, it could be held under trust for religious and charitable purposes. As\n\nthe business of running the Arya Vaidya Sala vested under trust for religious and charitable purposes, it would iall under\n\n(1 ) (1939) l.T.R. 415 (P.C.)\n\n(2) (19 58) S.C.R. 65\n\nSubba Rtro 1.\n\ncl. (i), if the other conditions laid down therein were satis\n\nC.L.T. fied.\n\nThe necessary condition for the application of cl. (i) Kri.rhna Y. Warrior of ~· 4(3) of the Act is that the said property, namely,. the - busmess, shall have been wholly or iD part held for rehg10us S11bba RJIO 1. or charitable purposes.\n\nAs 40 per cent of the profits in the business would be given to purposes other than religious or charitable purposes it cannot be said that the business was held wholly for religious or charitable purposes.\n\nBut as 60 per cent of the profits thereof would be spent for religious or charitable purposes, the question is whether it can be held that the business was held in trust in part for religious or charitable purposes.\n\nThe argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue is that the expression \"in part\" in cl. (i) applies only to a case where an aliquot part of property is vested in trust and that is not legally possible in the case of business. It is said that a business is one and indivisible and, therefore, the subject-matter of trust can only be the share of the profits payable to a partner during the continuance of the partnership or after its dissolution. Reliance is placed in support of the said proposition on the decisions in K. A. Ramachar v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Madras('), David Burnet v.\n\nCharles P.\n\nLeininger(2 ), Mohammad Ibrahim Riza v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Nagpur( 8 ). The first two decisions dealt with a different problem, viz., whether an assessee is liable to tax on his share of profits in a finn after setting or assigning the same in favour of a third party and the courts have held that the profits accrued to the assessee before the assignments could operate on them and he was Ii.able to be assessed to tax OD. the said profits.\n\nIn the third decision, the Judicial Committee held that there was no valid trust for charitable purposes, as the utilization of the income to charitable or secular purposes was left to the absolute discretion of the head of the community. None of the three decisions has .any bearing on the question whether a business could be held in trust wholly or in part for religious or charitable purposes. That question falls to be considered on different considerations.\n\nIn our view, the expression \"in part\" does not refer . to an aliquot part; if half a house is held in trust wholly Jor\n\n(I) [I96I] 3 s.c.R. 380\n\n(2) (I 932) 76 L.Jld. 665.\n\n(3) (1930) S7 I.A. 260\n\nreligious or charitable purposes, it would be covered by the first part of the substantive clause of cl. ( i), for in that event the subject-matter r.f the trust is only the said half of the ·, ouse and that half is ':leld w:1011y for religious or charitable purposes.\n\nThe expression \"in part'', therefore, must apply to a case other than a property a part of which is wholly held for religious or charitable purposes.\n\nIn India there are a variety of trusts wherein there is no complete dedication of the property but only a partial dedication.\n\nA property may be dedicated entirely to a religious or charitable institution or to a deity. This is an instance of complete dedication. A property may be dedicated to. a deity, subject to a charge that a part of the income shall be given to the grantor's h€irs.\n\nA property may be given to an individttal subject to, or burdened with, a charge in favour of an. idol or a religious institution or for charitable purposes.\n\nAn owner of property may retain the property for himself but carve out a beneficial interest therefrom in favour of the public by way of easement or otherwise.\n\nThere may be many other instance, where though there is a trust, it involves only a partial dedication of the property held under trust in the sense that only a part of the income of that property is utilized for religious or charitable purposes. The dichotomy between the two expressions \"wholly\" and \"in part\" is not based upon the dedication of the whole or a fractional part of the property, but between the dedication of the said property wholly for religious or charitable purposes or in part for such purposes. If so understood, the two limbs of the substantive clause fall into a piece. The first limb deals with a property or a part of it held in trust wholly for religious or charitable purposes, and the second limb provides for such a property held in trust partly for religious or charitable purposes.\n\nOn the said reading of the provision it follows that the entire business of Arya Vaidya Sala is held in trust for utilizing 60 per cent of its profits i.e., a part of the income, for religious or charitable purposes. The present case, therefore, falls squarely within the scope of the substantive part of cl. (i) of s. 4(3) of the Act.\n\nEven so it is contended that cl. ( b) of the proviso imposes further limitations before the exemption can be\n\n'1964\n\nC.I.T., ...\n\nKrishna W arriar\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\n1964 granted. But the :said clause of the proviso only applies to\n\nCJ.T. the case of income derived from business carried on on •. h \"· .., . behalf of a religious or charitable institution.\n\nA business .. rzs na \"a1riar . . . . . - held m. trust wholly or m part for reltg10us or chantable\n\nSbbo Rao 1. purposes is not a business carried on on hehalf of a religious I or charitable institution, for the business itself is held in trust.\n\nA few decisions cited at the Bar bringing out the distinction between the substantive part of cl. (i) of s. 4 ( 3) and cl. (b) of the proviso may usefully be referred to at this stage.\n\nWhere a business was held in trust for charitable ourposes, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dharma Vijiya Agency v. Commissioner of . Income-tax, Bombay City(') held that it was not business which was\n\ncarried on on behalf of religious or charitable institutions within the meaning of cl. (b) of the proviso.\n\nShah J., after considering the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Act, observed:\n\n\"In our view, the business referred to in cl. (b) of the proviso need not be business which is held for religious or charitable purposes, provided it is business carried on on behalf of a religious or charitable institution.\" Desai I., stated thus:\n\n\" ........ it is impossible to equate the scope of proviso (b) with the scope of property consisting of business held under trust wholly for religious or charitable purposes.\n\nIt must of necessity mean that we have in clause ( i) a very wide category of business which is trust property, and we have in proviso (b) a restricted and a lesser category of business which is carried on by or on behalf of a religious or charitable institution.\" A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Dharmodayam Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Kerala( 2 ) expressed much to the same effect.\n\nA Division Bench of the Madras High Court, in Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam v. Commissioner\n\n( 1) (1960) 38 l.T.R. 392, 405-466, 410.\n\n(2) (1962) 45 I.T.R. 478.\n\nl9H\n\nC.I.T.\n\n<Jf Income-tax, Madras('), after considering the decisions of the various High Courts and the relevant provisions of the Act, observed: Krishna\n\nW\"\"\"\" \"When the trustee acts, it is only the trust that acts, Subb<r llJlo 1• as the trustee fully represents the trust.\n\nA business carried on on behalf of a trust .rather indicates a business which is not held in trust, than a business of the trust run by the trustees.\"\n\nIt concluded thus:\n\n\"fn our opinion proviso (b) to section 4(3) (i) does not restrict the operation of the main provision in section 4 ( 3) ( i). If a trust carried on business and the business itself is held in trust and the income from such business is applied or accumulated for application for the purpose of the trust. which must of cou ; e be of a religious or a chariL1hle character, the conditions prescribed in sec; ion 4(3)(i) . e fulfilled and the income is exrnpt fr'.!111 ta~tibn. Thb exemption cannot lle defeated e-. en if the business were to be conducted by somebody else acting on behalf of the trust. Pr JViso (b) to section 4(3) (i) has application only to businesses which are not held in trust, and the field of its operation is, therefore, distinct and separate from that covered by section 4 ( 3 )( i).\"\n\nEmphsis is laid upon the expression \"such income\" in the openir:g words of the proviso and a crntention is raised that the inrnme dealt with in the proviso is income derived from prope; :y held under trust.\n\nTo state :. differently, the adjective 'such\" in the expression \"such income\" refers back to the in ome in the substantive clause.\n\nThere is some plausibility in the contention, but if the intP-pretation be accepted, we w' l be attributing an intention to the legislature to make a dis'. inction between bm.iness ano other property though bfl:h >f them are held under trmt.\n\nThere is no acceptable\n\nrl'.f~• t for this distinction.\n\nT:rnt apart, the expression\n\n(( (I963) 50 f.T.R. 798, 807, 809.\n\njl S. C.-4\n\nIfJfU \"such\" may . as weU refer to the \"income\" in the opening\n\nCJ.T. sentence of sub-s. (3). The said rnb-section says that the\n\n~I h \"· WanllJ incomes mentioned thereunder shall not be included in the • \"°- ' total income, but the proviso lifts the ban and says that such Sublla Rao 1. incomes shall be included in the to:al income if the conditions laid down are satisfied.\n\nWe think that the expression usuch income\" only means the income accruing or arising in favour of the trust.\n\nApril, 29.\n\nThe legal position may briefly be stated thus.\n\nClause\n\n(i) of s. 4,(3) of the Act takes in every property or a fractional part of it held in trust wholly for religious or charitable purposes.\n\nIt also takes in :mch property held only in part for such purposes.\n\nBusiness is also property within the meaning of the said clause. Clause (b) of the proviso to s. 4(3)(i) applies only to a business not held in trust but carried on on behalf of religious or charitable institutions.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons we hold that the High Court has coectly answered the question referred to it.\n\nIn the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne set of hearing fees.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nJAGDISH CHANDER GUPTA v.\n\nKAJARIA TRADERS (INDIA) LTD.\n\n(K. N.\n\nWANCHOO, M.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, K.\n\nDAS\n\nGUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nhrbitration Act-Partnership agreement-Provision for referring to arbitration-Partnership not registered-Application in the High Court for appointment of arbitrator-If maintainable-Interpretation of statute-Ejusdem Generis--No1citur a sociis-Indiarc Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), •· 69-Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act 10 of 1940), \" 8(2). lbo respondent entered into a partnership agreement with tho appellant. But this was not registered. There was an arbitration clauoe sti-", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1270, "end_char": 1275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1285, "end_char": 1299, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "KRISHNA WARRIAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1567, "end_char": 1582, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KRISHNA WARRIAR", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1585, "end_char": 1597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX KERALA AND\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\nKRISHNA WARRIAR\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH, ANDS.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1602, "end_char": 1609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX KERALA AND\n\nCOIMBATORE\n\nKRISHNA WARRIAR\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH, ANDS."}}, {"text": "M. SJKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1617, "end_char": 1625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. SJKRI JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1782, "end_char": 1809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1824, "end_char": 1834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Arya Vaidya Sala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1938, "end_char": 1954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W: name and style of Arya Vaidya Sala.", "canonical_name": "Arya Vaidya Pata Sala"}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2431, "end_char": 2441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2449, "end_char": 2476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2638, "end_char": 2645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 4(3 )(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2887, "end_char": 2898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2906, "end_char": 2933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3164, "end_char": 3174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 4(3 )(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3538, "end_char": 3549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3873, "end_char": 3880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4083, "end_char": 4100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by special leave from the judgment dated January 20, 1961 of the Kerala High Court in Income-tax Referred Case No."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4146, "end_char": 4168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4173, "end_char": 4187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "ubba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4259, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CJ.T. v. ;,11na W arriat\n:ubba Rao I.\n\nS. T. Desai and Sardar Bahadur, for the respondent (in all the appeals) .", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4272, "end_char": 4283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CJ.T. v. ;,11na W arriat\n:ubba Rao I.\n\nS. T. Desai and Sardar Bahadur, for the respondent (in all the appeals) .", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4288, "end_char": 4302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CJ.T. v. ;,11na W arriat\n:ubba Rao I.\n\nS. T. Desai and Sardar Bahadur, for the respondent (in all the appeals) ."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4409, "end_char": 4418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nSuBBA RAo J.-These appeals by special leave raise the question of the construction of the provisions of s. 4(3 )(i) of the Indian Income-taic Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act, as amended by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 195 3, hereinafter called the Amending Act.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "s. 4(3 )(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4513, "end_char": 4524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-taic Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. S. Warriar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4719, "end_char": 4732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One P. S. Warriar, an eminent Ayurvedic physician, carried on business in Ayurvedic drugs under the name and style of \"Arya Vaidya Sala\" and was also running a hospital named \"Arya Sikitsa Sala\" and a school called \"Arya Vaidya Pata Sala\"."}}, {"text": "January 30, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4981, "end_char": 4997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Warri.ar died on January 30, 1944, after executing a will wherein he created a. trust in respect of his properties, including the Arya Vaidya Sah."}}, {"text": "Arya Vaidya Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5094, "end_char": 5109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Warri.ar died on January 30, 1944, after executing a will wherein he created a. trust in respect of his properties, including the Arya Vaidya Sah.", "canonical_name": "Arya Vaidya Pata Sala"}}, {"text": "Arya Sikitsa Sala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5291, "end_char": 5308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He gave directions to the trustees appointed under th~ said will to conduct the said business and to disburse the income therefrom in certain proportions to the Arya Vaidya Sala, Arya Sikitsa Sala and Arya Vaidya Pata Sala and to his descendants."}}, {"text": "Arya Vaidya Pata Sala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5313, "end_char": 5334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He gave directions to the trustees appointed under th~ said will to conduct the said business and to disburse the income therefrom in certain proportions to the Arya Vaidya Sala, Arya Sikitsa Sala and Arya Vaidya Pata Sala and to his descendants.", "canonical_name": "Arya Vaidya Pata Sala"}}, {"text": "Till the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5506, "end_char": 5527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5640, "end_char": 5647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Till the Amending Act", "statute": "Till the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6241, "end_char": 6246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Till the Amending Act", "statute": "Till the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "September 28, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6291, "end_char": 6309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the assessment years 1954-55 and 1955-56 the Income-tax Officer assessed the entire income from the said properties; and in respect of the income pertaining to the assessment years 1952-53 and 1953-54, which had already been assessed in the usual course giving exemption for the said 60 per cent of the income, the Income-tax Officer issued notices under s. 34 of the Act and by two separate orders dated September 28, 1956, assessed the said 60 per cent of the income on the basis of escaped assessment."}}, {"text": "December 20, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6395, "end_char": 6412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 20, 1956,\n\nfor Ile assessment year 1956-57 the Income-tax Officer, in 1964 the li.:e manner, assessed the entire income from the said\n\nCJ.T. properties."}}, {"text": "Kruhna Warr.a", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kruhna Warr.a, said urders o assessment to the Appellate Assistant Com- _ misskner were dismissed."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6746, "end_char": 6755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals filed against the Subba Rao J. orderH of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, were consolidated and by its order dated February 28, 1958, the said Tribunal allowed the appals ex em piing 60 per cent of the said income from assessment to income-tax under s. 4 ( 3) ( i) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7082, "end_char": 7102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The references made to the High Court of Kerala were dismissed."}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7152, "end_char": 7169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Rajagopala Sastri, learned counselfor the Revenue, contends that under s. 4 ( 3 )( i) of the Act whereunder the said income is given exemption from taxation, the property wherefrom the income is derived shall have been held under trust wholly or in part for religious or charitable purposes, that the business run under the name and style of Arya Vaidya Sala was not capable of being held in trust, that even if it was capable of beirig held under trust, it was not wholly or in part so held in trust for religious or charitable purposes, as only a part of the income was rlirected to be spent for religious or charitable pu.rposes and that in the circumstances cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7223, "end_char": 7227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. T. Dsai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7955, "end_char": 7965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. S. T. Dsai, contends that business is property within the meaning of s. 4 ( 3 )( i) of the Act and that it is held in tmst in part for religious and charitable purposes and, therefore, the substantive part of the provision is attracted to .the facts of the case and hence the proviso is excluded.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8024, "end_char": 8028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arya Vaidya Sala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9863, "end_char": 9879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Arya Vaidya Sala and the Arya Vaidya Hospital on the lines followed now with the object of enlarging and increasing their scope and utility."}}, {"text": "Arya Vaidya Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9888, "end_char": 9908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Arya Vaidya Sala and the Arya Vaidya Hospital on the lines followed now with the object of enlarging and increasing their scope and utility."}}, {"text": "Arya Vaidyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10258, "end_char": 10270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to conduct research into Arya Vaidyam with a view to make it more and more useful to the public. ... ,,,..", "canonical_name": "Arya Vaidya Pata Sala"}}, {"text": "Arya V", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10797, "end_char": 10803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To carry out the said services with the help of an Arya V aidyan and necessary operations with the help of an Allopathi doctor.", "canonical_name": "Arya Vaidya Pata Sala"}}, {"text": "Arya Vaidya Patasala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11410, "end_char": 11430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. In the Arya Vaidya Patasala run under the auspices of the Arya Samajam, Aryavaidyam is taught in accordance with the service of Ayurveda."}}, {"text": "Aryavaidyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11475, "end_char": 11486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. In the Arya Vaidya Patasala run under the auspices of the Arya Samajam, Aryavaidyam is taught in accordance with the service of Ayurveda.", "canonical_name": "Arya Vaidya Pata Sala"}}, {"text": "Ayurveda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11531, "end_char": 11539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. In the Arya Vaidya Patasala run under the auspices of the Arya Samajam, Aryavaidyam is taught in accordance with the service of Ayurveda."}}, {"text": "Krishna Warriar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11784, "end_char": 11799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Warriar\n\nment of the Arya Vaidya Sala, 25 per cent for meeting the expenses of the Arya Vaidya Hospital and 25 per cent for division equally between the two tavazhies (this only for 25 years) out of the remaining 25 per cent a sum not exceeding 10 per cent may be according to requirements, utilised for the purposes of the Arya Vaidya Patasala.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA WARRIAR"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12671, "end_char": 12680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAo"}}, {"text": "Arya V.1idya Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12967, "end_char": 12988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 40 per cent of the profit so earmarked for 20 years and so released after the expiry 9f 20 years are therefore to be utilised for the development of the Arya Vaidya Sala and Arya V.1idya Hospital according to the discretion of the Trustees."}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15060, "end_char": 15067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15127, "end_char": 15136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Before the amendment of this clause by the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16163, "end_char": 16218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16744, "end_char": 16761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Charitable Gadodia Swadeshi Stores v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Puniah (1 ) .• the Lahore High Court rejected that contention, and one of the reasons given for the rejection was that if the s.aid clause was intended to narrow down the scope of cl. ("}}, {"text": "Presumably on the basis of this suggestion the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16985, "end_char": 17044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17622, "end_char": 17629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Maxwell, \"the true principle is that the sound view of the enacting clause, the saving clause and the proviso take.n and construed tog; ether is to prevail\"."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18118, "end_char": 18122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18218, "end_char": 18228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19186, "end_char": 19190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19553, "end_char": 19570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Privy Council in In re Trustees of the Tribune(') did not question the view expressed by the Bombay High Court that business of running the newspaper Tribune was property held under ocsst for charitable purposes."}}, {"text": "J. K. Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19688, "end_char": 19699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in J. K. Trust, •ombay 'Y. Commissioner of Income-tax .. Excess profits Tax :lombay(\") endorsed the said view and held that \"property\" ii .11 term of the widest import and that business would undoubtedly be property unless there was something to the contrary in the enactment."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20530, "end_char": 20533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22702, "end_char": 22704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23139, "end_char": 23144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India there are a variety of trusts wherein there is no complete dedication of the property but only a partial dedication."}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24979, "end_char": 24986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna W", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25130, "end_char": 25139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b) of the proviso imposes further limitations before the exemption can be\n\n'1964\n\nC.I.T., ...\n\nKrishna W arriar\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\n1964 granted.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA WARRIAR"}}, {"text": "Sbbo Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25454, "end_char": 25462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "held m. trust wholly or m part for reltg10us or chantable\n\nSbbo Rao 1."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25706, "end_char": 25710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26110, "end_char": 26114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah J., after considering the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Act, observed:\n\n\"In our view, the business referred to in cl. ("}}, {"text": "Desai I.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26430, "end_char": 26438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Desai I., stated thus:\n\n\" ........ it is impossible to equate the scope of proviso (b) with the scope of property consisting of business held under trust wholly for religious or charitable purposes."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27059, "end_char": 27076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, in Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam v. Commissioner\n\n( 1) (1960) 38 l.T.R. 392, 405-466, 410."}}, {"text": "High Courts and the relevant provisions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27279, "end_char": 27329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Krishna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27341, "end_char": 27348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l9H\n\nC.I.T.\n\n<Jf Income-tax, Madras('), after considering the decisions of the various High Courts and the relevant provisions of the Act, observed: Krishna\n\nW\"\"\"\" \"When the trustee acts, it is only the trust that acts, Subb<r llJlo 1• as the trustee fully represents the trust.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA WARRIAR"}}, {"text": "section 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27675, "end_char": 27687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Courts and the relevant provisions of the Act", "statute": "High Courts and the relevant provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27749, "end_char": 27758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Courts and the relevant provisions of the Act", "statute": "High Courts and the relevant provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28260, "end_char": 28272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Courts and the relevant provisions of the Act", "statute": "High Courts and the relevant provisions of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28430, "end_char": 28439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29733, "end_char": 29737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30027, "end_char": 30037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. N.\n\nWANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30420, "end_char": 30434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. N.\n\nWANCHOO, M.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, K.\n\nDAS\n\nGUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30436, "end_char": 30452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. N.\n\nWANCHOO, M.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, K.\n\nDAS\n\nGUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "DAS\n\nGUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30458, "end_char": 30468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. N.\n\nWANCHOO, M.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, K.\n\nDAS\n\nGUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30473, "end_char": 30495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(K. N.\n\nWANCHOO, M.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, K.\n\nDAS\n\nGUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Indiarc Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30743, "end_char": 30772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30792, "end_char": 30813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_50_60_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64J\n\nIfJfU \"such\" may . as weU refer to the \"income\" in the opening\n\nCJ.T. sentence of sub-s. (3). The said rnb-section says that the\n\n~I h \"· WanllJ incomes mentioned thereunder shall not be included in the • \"°- ' total income, but the proviso lifts the ban and says that such Sublla Rao 1. incomes shall be included in the to:al income if the conditions laid down are satisfied.\n\nWe think that the expression usuch income\" only means the income accruing or arising in favour of the trust.\n\nApril, 29.\n\nThe legal position may briefly be stated thus.\n\nClause\n\n(i) of s. 4,(3) of the Act takes in every property or a fractional part of it held in trust wholly for religious or charitable purposes.\n\nIt also takes in :mch property held only in part for such purposes.\n\nBusiness is also property within the meaning of the said clause. Clause (b) of the proviso to s. 4(3)(i) applies only to a business not held in trust but carried on on behalf of religious or charitable institutions.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons we hold that the High Court has coectly answered the question referred to it.\n\nIn the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nOne set of hearing fees.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nJAGDISH CHANDER GUPTA v.\n\nKAJARIA TRADERS (INDIA) LTD.\n\n(K. N.\n\nWANCHOO, M.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, K.\n\nDAS\n\nGUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)\n\nhrbitration Act-Partnership agreement-Provision for referring to arbitration-Partnership not registered-Application in the High Court for appointment of arbitrator-If maintainable-Interpretation of statute-Ejusdem Generis--No1citur a sociis-Indiarc Partnership Act, 1932 (9 of 1932), •· 69-Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act 10 of 1940), \" 8(2). lbo respondent entered into a partnership agreement with tho appellant. But this was not registered. There was an arbitration clauoe stipulatiog that in case of dispute the matter will be referred for arbitration in accordance \\\\ith Arbitration Act, 1940. Dispute having l\\risen between the respondent and the appellant the former wrote to tho latter stating that the dispute be referred for arbitration and that the respondent has appointeil one K as the sole arbitrator. On the failure of the appellant to agree to this the respondent filed an application under s. 8(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act for the appointment of arbitrator. The application was hearil by a Division Bench of the High Court before which the appellant contended that s. 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 afforded a bar to tho petition because the partnership was not registered.\n\nOne of the Judges upheld the contention while the other rejectell it and the matter was referred to another Judge who held that the application was competent. The present appeal was filed by special leave granted by this Court.\n\nHELD:-(i) That since the arbitration clause formed a part of the agreement constituting the. partnership it is obvious that the proceeding which is before the Court is to enforce a right which arises from a contract.\n\nWhether one views the contract between the parties as a whole or on• Tiews only the arbitration clause it is impossible to think that the. riaht to proceed to arbitration is not one of the rights which are founded OD the agreement of the parties.\n\nThe words of s. 69(3) \"a right arisina from a coiitract\" are in either sense sufficient to cover tho present matters.\n\n(ii) Interpretation ejusdt:m ge11eris or nosc:itur a l'Ociis need not always be made when showing particular classes are followed by general words. Before the general wvrds can be so interpreted theremust bo a genus constituted or a category disclosed with reference\" to which tho 1eneral words can and are intende'd to be restricted. The expression \"clairp. of set off\" does not disclose a category or a genus.\n\nSet. offs are of two kinds legal and equitable and both are already comprehended and it is difficult to think of any right \"\"arising from a contract• which is of the same nature as a claim of set otl and can be raised bJ a 4efendent in suit.\n\nAllen v. Emerson, (1944) I K.B. 362. referrell to.\n\nHafiz Qamar Din v. Nur Din, A.I.R. 1936 Lah. 136, /Tabulal Dhaft Dhania v. Mis. Gautam & Co. A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 341, Kottama1u Sreemannarayanamurthy v. Chakka Arja11ad11, A.l.R. 1939 Mad. 145, Jarnal\n\nY. Firm Umar Haji Karfm, l.L.R. 1943 Nag.- 540, and R, tm Lal Harnam Das v. Bal Kishan. A.l.R. 1957 Punj. 159, distinguished.\n\n(iii) The . words \"other proceeding\" in sub-section (3) must rec:eift lheir full meaning untramelled by the words \"a claim of set oil\". Tho latter words neither intend nor can be construed to cut down the senerality of the words \"other proceeding\". The sub-section provides for the application of tho provisions of sub-sections (!) and (2) to claims ol. aet otl an'd also to other proceedings of any kind which can proper)J be said to be for eQ{orcemeD; t of any right arising front contract except\n\nlhexpressly mentioned aa exceptions in sub-sections (3 T llld ( 4).\n\nJagduh Chantl1r ...\n\nKa/aria T1'fllhn\n\n1964 Crvn. APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 791 lagdishchander of 1962 . ...\n\nLa/aria Tradm Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 22, 1960, of the Bombay High Court in Award No. 18 of 1959.\n\nS. T. Desai and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant.\n\nB. C. Misra, for the respondent.\n\nApril 29, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nHldt1)•atullah J.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the High Court of Bombay dated Marc;1 22, 1960 in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.\n\nThe facts are simple.\n\nBy a letter dated July 30, 1955, Messrs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., who is the respondent here and Messrs.\n\nForeign Import and Export Association (sole proprietory firm owned by the appellant Jagdish ('.\n\nGupta) entered into a partnership to export between January and June 1956, 10.000 tons of manganese ore to Phillips Brothers (India) Ltd., New York.\n\nEach partner was to supply a certain quantity of manganese ore. We are not concerned with the terms of the agreement but with one of its clauses which provided:\n\n\"That in case of dispute the matter will be referred for arbitration in accordance with the Indian Arbitration Act.\"\n\nThe company alleged that Jagdish Chander Gupta failed to carry out his part of the partnership agreement.\n\nAfter some correspondence, the company wrote to J agdish Chander Gupta on February 28, 1959 that they had appointed Mr. R. J. Kolah (Advocate O.S.) as their arbitrator and asked Jagdish Chander Gupta either to agree to Mr. Kolah's appointment as sole arbitrator or to appoint his own arbitrator.\n\nJ agdish Chander Gupta put off consideration and on March 17, 1959 the company informed Jagdish Chander Gupta that as he had failed to appoint an arbitrator within 15 clear days they were appointing Mr. Ko lab as sole arbitrator.\n\nJagdish Chander Gupta disputed this and the company filed on March 28, 1959 an applicMion under s. 8(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 for the appointment of Mr. Kolah or any other peron as arbitrator.\n\nJagdish Chander\n\nJagdish Chander Gupta appeared and objected inter alia to the institution of the petition. Two grounds were urged\n\n(i) thats. 8(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act was not applicable as it was not expressly provided in the arbitration clause quoted above that the arbitrators were to be by consent of the parties and (ii) that s. 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 afforded a bar to the petition because the partnership was not registered.\n\nThe petition was referred by the Chief Justice to a Divisional Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Mudholkar (as he then was) and Mr. Juscice Naik. The two learned Judges agreed that in the circumstances of the case an application under s. 8 of the Indian Arbitration Act was competent and that the court had power to appoint an arbitrator.\n\nThey disagreed on the second eoint: Mr. Justice Mudhollcar was of the opinion thats. 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act barred the application while Mr. Justice Naik held othe<wise. The case was then referred to Mr. Justice K. T. Desai (as he then was) and he agreed with Mr. Jutice Naik with the result that the ap?lic:ition was held to be competent.\n\nIn this appeal it was not contended that the conclusions of the learned Judges in regard to s. 8(2) were erroneous.\n\nThe decision was challenged only on the ground that s. 69 (3) was wrongly interpreted and the bar afforded by it was wrongly disallowed.\n\nSection 69 of the Indian Partnership Act may be reproduced here :\n\n\"69. ( 1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.\n\n...\n\nKajaria Traden\n\nHidayatul/JJ~ I.\n\nJagdi.rh Chander\n\n•• Kajar/a Tradm\n\nHldayatullah J.\n\n(2) No suit to enforce a fight arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.\n\n( 3) The provisions of. sub-sections (1 ) and ( 2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect- ( a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or\n\n(b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909, or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, to realise the property of an insolvent partner.\n\n( 4) This section shall not apply-\n\n( a) to firms or to partn.ers in firms which have no place of business in the territories to which this Act extends, or whose places of business in the said territories are situated in areas to which, by notification under section 56, this Chapter does not apply, or\n\n(b) to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the Presidency towns, is not of a kind specified in section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, or outside the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding inciden ta! to or afising from any such suit or claim.\n\nThe section, speaking generally, bars certMn suits and proceedings as a consequence of non-registration of firms. Subs. ( 1) prohibits the institution of a suit between partners inter se or between partners and the Jinn for the purpose ot enforcing a right arising from a contract or conferred by the Partnership Act unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms\n\nas a partner in the firm.\n\nSub-s. ( 2) similarly prohibits a suit by or on behalf of the firm against a third party for the purpose of enforcing rights arising from a contract unless the fum is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm. In the third sub-section a claim of set-off which is in the nature of a counter claim is also similarly barrd. Then that subsection bars \"other proceedings\". The only doubt that has arisen in this case is regarding the meaning. to be given to the expression \"other proceeding\". One way to look at the matter is to give these words their full and natural meaning and the other way is to cut down that meaning in the light of the words that precede them. The next question is whether the application under s. 8(2) of the Arbitration Act can be regarded as a proceeding \"to enforce a right arising from a contract'', and therefore, within the bar of section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act.'\n\nMr. Justice Mudholkar in reaching his conclusion did not interpret the expression \"other proceeding\" ejusdem generis with the words \"a claim of set-off\". He held further that the application was to enforce a right arising from the contract of the parties. Mr. Justice Naik pointed out that the words used were not \"any proceeding\" nor \"any other proceedings\" but \"other proceeding\" and that as these words were juxtaposed with 'a claim of set off' they indicated a proceeding of the nature of a claim in defence. On the second point Mr. Justice Naik held that this was not a procf', eding to enforce a right arising from a contract but was a c!ltim for damages and such a claim could be entertained because it was based on something which was independent of the contract to supply ore.\n\nHe held that the right which was being enforced was a right ansing from\" the Arbitration Act and not from the contract of the parties.\n\nMr. Justice K. T. Desai agreed with most of these conclusions and sugQested that the words preceding \"other proceed-\n\nJagdish Chand•\n\nKa/aria Trtukr\n\nHidayatullah I\n\nJagdish Chttnder\n\nKaiaria Trf!.4.11~\n\nBidayatu/lah J.\n\ning\", namely, \"a claim of set-off\" had 'demonstrative and limiting effect'. He seems to have a5certained the meaning of the expression \"other proceeding\" by n; ference to the meaning of the words \"a claim of s~.t off\", which he considered were associated with it.\n\nThe first question to decide is whether the present proceeding is one to enforce a right arising from the contract of the parties. The proceeding under the eighth section of the Arbitration Act has its genesis in the arbitration clause, because without an agreement to refer the matter to arbitration that section cannot possibly be invoked. Since the arbitration clause is a part of the agreement constituting the partnership it is obvious that the proceeding hich is before the court is to enforce a right which arises from a contract.\n\nWhether we view the contract between the parties as a whole or view only the clause about arbitration, it i<i impossible to think that the right to proceed to arbitration is not one of the rights which are founded on the agreement of the parties. The words of s. 69 ( 3) \"a right arising from a contract\" are in either sense sufficient to cover the present matter.\n\nIt remains, however, to consider whether by reason of the fact that the words \"other proceeding\" stand opposed ( to the words \"a claim of set-off\" any limitation in their meaning was contemplated. It is on this aspect of the case that the learned Judges have seriously differed. \"ihen in a statute particular classes are mentioned by name and then are followed by general words, the general words are sometimes construed ejusdem generis, i.e. limited to the same category or genus comprehended by the particular words.\n\nBut it is not necessary that this rule must always apply.\n\nThe nature of the special words and the general words must be considered before the rule is applied.\n\nIn Allen v.\n\nEmerson ('), Asquith J. gave interesting examples of particular words followed by general words where the principle ot efusdem generis might or might not apply. We think that the following illustration will clear any difficulty.\n\nIn the expression \"books, pamphlets, newsppers and other\n\n(I) [1944) I K.B. 36z,\n\n... 1 ._,.'\n\nIS.CR.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOKfS 57\n\ndocuments\" private letters may not be held included if 1964 other documents' be intepreted ejusdem generis with what lagdishChalllh goes before.\n\nBut in a provision which reads \"newspapers . v. or other document likely to convey secrets to the enemy'\", KaJarra Trader: the words 'other document' would include document of Hidayatullah I any kind and would not take their colour from 'newspapers'.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that interpretation ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis need not always be made when words\n\nshowjpg particular classes are followed by general words.\n\nBefor~ the genezal words can be so interpreted there mu:st be a genus constituted or a category disclosed with referenc~ to which. the general words can and are intended to be restricted. Here the expression \"claim of set-off\" does not disclose a category or a genus. Set-offs are of two kinds-- legal and equitable-and both are already comprehended and it is difficult to think of any right \"arising from a contract\" which is of the same natuce as a claim of set-off and can be raised by a defendant in a suit.\n\nMr. B. C'.\n\nMisra, whom we invited to give us examples, admitted frankly that it was impossible for him to think of any proceeding of the nature of a claim of set off other than a claim of set-off which could be raised in a suit such as is described in the second sub-section. In respect of the first snb-sect!on he could give only two examples. They are (i) a claim by\n\na pledger of goods with an unregistered firm whose goodc. are attached and who has to make an objection under O. 21 r. 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure and (ii) proving a\n\ndebt before a liquidator. The latte; is not raised as a defence and cannot belong to the same genus as a \"claim of set-off\". The former can be made to fit but by a stretch of some considerable imagination. It is difficult for us to\n\naccept that the Legislatu~; was thi11king of such far-fetced things when it spoke of \"other proceeding\" ejusdem generi.• with a claim of set-off.\n\nMr. Justice Naik asked the question .that if all proce_edings were to be excluded why was it not considerecl suffi cient to speak of proceedings along with suits in sub-ss.\n\n(1) and (2) instead of framing a separate snb-sec!ion about proceedings and coupling 'other proceeding' witli 'a claim of set-off'? The question is a proper one to ask but\n\n\"1a,.U.h Chander v.\n\nKafin'la Trader1\n\nHidayalullah I.\n\n!Jie search for the answer in the scheme of the section itself gives the clue. T!J.e section thinks in terms of (a) suits and (b) claims of set-off which are in a sense of the nature of suits and ( c) of other prnr; ec<lings. The section first provides for exclusion of suits :n '.; Jb-ss. ( 1) and (2).\n\nThen it says that_ the same ban applies to a c:aim of set-off and other proceeding to _enforce a .right arising from a contract. Next it excludes the ban in respect of the right to sue (a) for the dissolution of a firm, (b) for accounts - ., of a dissolved firm and ( c) for the realisation of the property of a dissolved firm. The emphasis in each case is on dissolution of the firm. Then follows a general exclusion of the section. The fourth sub-section says that the section as a whole, is not to apply to firms or to partners and firms which have no place of business in the territories of India or whose places of business are situated in the territories of India but in areas -to which Chapter VIl is not to apply and to suits or claims of set off not exceeding Rs. 100 in value.\n\nHere there is no insistence on the dissolution of the firm. It is significant ,.that in the latter part of clause (b) of that section the words are \"or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such sujt or claim\" and this clearly shows that the word \"proceeding\" is not limited to a proceeding in the nature of a suit or a claim of set-off. Subsection ( 4) combines suits and a claim of set-off and t!Jen ipeaks of \"any proceeding in execution\" and \"other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim\"\n\nas being outside the ban of the main section. It would hardly have been necessary to be so explicit if the words 'other proceeding' in the main sec,(ion had a meaning as restricted as is suggested by the respondent. It i~ possible that the draftsman wishing to make exceptions of different kinds in respect of suits, claims of set-off and other proceedings grouped suits in sub-ss. (1) and (2), set-off and ot!ler proceedings in sub-s. (3) made some special exceptions in respect of them in sub-s. (3) in respect of dissolved firms and then viewed them all together in sub-s. ( 4) providing for a complete exclusion. of the section 'in respect of 1mits -0f particular classes. For convenience • of drafting this\n\nscheme was probably followed and nothing can be spelled out from the manner in y.'hich the section is sub-divided.\n\nSome cases noticed by the High Co.art were cited to us but none of them appear§ to be really in point. In Hafiz Qamar Din v. Nur Din( 1) and Babu/al Dhandhania v.\n\nMessrs. Gauttam and Co. (2) proceedings were started on an award, in one to mi\\ke it a rule of the Court and in the other to get it set aside. These cases are distinguishable because they deal with awards and it is not necessary to decide whether after an award the proceeding is one to enforce a right arising from a contract.\n\nWe do not refer to them.\n\nIn Kottamasu Sreemannarayanamuthy and another v. Chakka Arjanadu( 3 ) a petition for adjudication of a partner as insolvent was held to be a right arising not from a contract but from statute. Here the right that is being enforced through the medium of the Arbitration Act arises from the contract between the parties and is a part of it. In Jamal v. Firm Umar Haji Karim(') the bar of s. 69 ( 3) was claimed during the execution of a consent decree and was disallowed. Grille C. J. observed that the 1xpression 'other proceeding' indicated something which was 'sui generis of a claim of set-off', If the partners cf an unregistered firm go to court without either asking for a dissolution of the firm or dissolving it themselves and enter into an agreement and compose their differences it is possible to say that the enforcement of the consent decree is no more than the enforcement of a right arising from a contract and is . within the ban. It is, however, not necessary to decide. this point here. ln Ram Lal Hw, ram Das v. Bal Krishan and others(\") it was expressly f!Ointed out that the expression 'other proceeding' in the third sub-section applied to proceedings of the nature of a claim of set-off and nothing else. This case cannot be said to interpret the sub-section correctly.\n\nSimilarly, Mahendra v. Gurdeyal(\"), which lays down that s. 69 does not bar a partner of an unregistered partnership firm from applying to the court under ~- 8 of the Arbitration Act for referring the dispute\n\n(t) A.I.R 1936 Lah. 136.\n\n(3) A.I.R. t939 Mad. 14,. (,) A.l.R. I9j7 Punjab r,,.\n\n(2) A.T.R. 1950 Cal. 391.\n\n(4) I.L.R. 1943 Nag. s40.\n\n(6) I.L.R- 30 Pat. 109. ·\n\nJ964\n\nJagdi>h Chandu\n\nKa/aria Trad\"\"\n\nHldaya1ulla& J.\n\n1964 between partners to arbitrator as provided in the condition\n\nJa11dtsh Chander of t4eir agreement, cannot be accepted as souud.\n\nThe\n\nv . . Y.T d , reason given by the Divisional Bench that as s. 69 alows .n.a]Orio ra er' - . . . - d1Ssc:Jl.utJ.on and accounts of unregistered partnership it Hidayarul/ah J. cannot bar such an application appe<:rs •, \"'; to be not quite\n\nm point.\n\nApril, 30.\n\n1n our judgment, the words '0th.er proceeding' in subs. (3) must receive their full meaning untramelled by the words a claim of set-off'.\n\nThe latter words neither intend nor can be construed to cut down the generality of the words 'other proceeding'. The sub-section provides for the application of the provisions of sub-ss. (1) and (2) to claims of set-off and also to other proceedings of any kind which can properly be said to be for enforcement of any right arising from contract except those expressly mentioned as exceptions in sub-s. ( 3) and sub-s. ( 4).\n\nThe appeal is, therefore, allowed.\n\nThe decision of the High Court will be set aside and the application under s. 8(2) of the Arbitration Act shall stand dismissed with costs throughout on the applicant in the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nC. J. COELHO\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI J.J.)\n\nIncon1e Tax-Interest paid on monies borrowed for purchase of plantation-I/ deductible from the assessable income-Expsnditur•\n\nif laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of plantation-Madras Plantations Agricultural Income .. fax Act (Mad.\n\nV of 1955), s. S(e) and (k). ·\n\nThe respondent, assessee purchased an estate, consi!lling of tea. coffee and rubber plantation•. Out of the sale price of Rs. 3,10,000/· ho borrowed Rs. 2,90.000/· at interest. For the assessment year 1955·56.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 593, "end_char": 597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JAGDISH CHANDER GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1223, "end_char": 1244, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDER GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KAJARIA TRADERS (INDIA) LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1249, "end_char": 1276, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAJARIA TRADERS (INDIA) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1287, "end_char": 1294, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1300, "end_char": 1312, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1333, "end_char": 1359, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indiarc Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1603, "end_char": 1632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1652, "end_char": 1673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1933, "end_char": 1954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2264, "end_char": 2271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 69(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2444, "end_char": 2452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2460, "end_char": 2488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 69(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3273, "end_char": 3281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5246, "end_char": 5257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5265, "end_char": 5274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai and /. N. Shroff, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. C. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5296, "end_char": 5307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. C. Misra, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "B. C'.\n\nMisra"}}, {"text": "Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5643, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a letter dated July 30, 1955, Messrs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., who is the respondent here and Messrs.\n\nForeign Import and Export Association (sole proprietory firm owned by the appellant Jagdish ('."}}, {"text": "Jagdish", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5797, "end_char": 5804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a letter dated July 30, 1955, Messrs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., who is the respondent here and Messrs.\n\nForeign Import and Export Association (sole proprietory firm owned by the appellant Jagdish ('."}}, {"text": "Phillips Brothers (India) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5917, "end_char": 5947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gupta) entered into a partnership to export between January and June 1956, 10.000 tons of manganese ore to Phillips Brothers (India) Ltd., New York."}}, {"text": "New York", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5949, "end_char": 5957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gupta) entered into a partnership to export between January and June 1956, 10.000 tons of manganese ore to Phillips Brothers (India) Ltd., New York."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chander Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6265, "end_char": 6286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company alleged that Jagdish Chander Gupta failed to carry out his part of the partnership agreement.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDER GUPTA"}}, {"text": "J agdish Chander Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6395, "end_char": 6417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some correspondence, the company wrote to J agdish Chander Gupta on February 28, 1959 that they had appointed Mr. R. J. Kolah (Advocate O.S.) as their arbitrator and asked Jagdish Chander Gupta either to agree to Mr. Kolah's appointment as sole arbitrator or to appoint his own arbitrator."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some correspondence, the company wrote to J agdish Chander Gupta on February 28, 1959 that they had appointed Mr. R. J. Kolah (Advocate O.S.) as their arbitrator and asked Jagdish Chander Gupta either to agree to Mr. Kolah's appointment as sole arbitrator or to appoint his own arbitrator."}}, {"text": "R. J. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6467, "end_char": 6478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some correspondence, the company wrote to J agdish Chander Gupta on February 28, 1959 that they had appointed Mr. R. J. Kolah (Advocate O.S.) as their arbitrator and asked Jagdish Chander Gupta either to agree to Mr. Kolah's appointment as sole arbitrator or to appoint his own arbitrator."}}, {"text": "agdish Chander Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6646, "end_char": 6666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J agdish Chander Gupta put off consideration and on March 17, 1959 the company informed Jagdish Chander Gupta that as he had failed to appoint an arbitrator within 15 clear days they were appointing Mr. Ko lab as sole arbitrator.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDER GUPTA"}}, {"text": "March 17, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6696, "end_char": 6710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J agdish Chander Gupta put off consideration and on March 17, 1959 the company informed Jagdish Chander Gupta that as he had failed to appoint an arbitrator within 15 clear days they were appointing Mr. Ko lab as sole arbitrator."}}, {"text": "Ko lab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6847, "end_char": 6853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J agdish Chander Gupta put off consideration and on March 17, 1959 the company informed Jagdish Chander Gupta that as he had failed to appoint an arbitrator within 15 clear days they were appointing Mr. Ko lab as sole arbitrator."}}, {"text": "March 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6936, "end_char": 6950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Chander Gupta disputed this and the company filed on March 28, 1959 an applicMion under s. 8(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 for the appointment of Mr. Kolah or any other peron as arbitrator."}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6971, "end_char": 6978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6986, "end_char": 7014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chander", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7083, "end_char": 7098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Chander\n\nJagdish Chander Gupta appeared and objected inter alia to the institution of the petition.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDER GUPTA"}}, {"text": "s. 69(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7424, "end_char": 7432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7440, "end_char": 7468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7640, "end_char": 7649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was referred by the Chief Justice to a Divisional Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Mudholkar (as he then was) and Mr. Juscice Naik.", "canonical_name": "Mudhollcar"}}, {"text": "Juscice Naik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was referred by the Chief Justice to a Divisional Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Mudholkar (as he then was) and Mr. Juscice Naik.", "canonical_name": "Juscice Naik"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7778, "end_char": 7782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Mudhollcar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7931, "end_char": 7941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They disagreed on the second eoint: Mr. Justice Mudhollcar was of the opinion thats. 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act barred the application while Mr. Justice Naik held othe<wise.", "canonical_name": "Mudhollcar"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7981, "end_char": 8003, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Naik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8045, "end_char": 8049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They disagreed on the second eoint: Mr. Justice Mudhollcar was of the opinion thats. 69(3) of the Indian Partnership Act barred the application while Mr. Justice Naik held othe<wise."}}, {"text": "K. T. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8108, "end_char": 8119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was then referred to Mr. Justice K. T. Desai (as he then was) and he agreed with Mr. Jutice Naik with the result that the ap?lic:ition was held to be competent.", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "Jutice Naik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8160, "end_char": 8171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was then referred to Mr. Justice K. T. Desai (as he then was) and he agreed with Mr. Jutice Naik with the result that the ap?lic:ition was held to be competent.", "canonical_name": "Juscice Naik"}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8329, "end_char": 8336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8406, "end_char": 8411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Section 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8492, "end_char": 8502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8510, "end_char": 8532, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9707, "end_char": 9760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9769, "end_char": 9800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10111, "end_char": 10121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920", "statute": "the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10296, "end_char": 10306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920", "statute": "the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10314, "end_char": 10353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10422, "end_char": 10484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11813, "end_char": 11820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11956, "end_char": 11966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11974, "end_char": 11996, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14208, "end_char": 14213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Asquith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15021, "end_char": 15028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Allen v.\n\nEmerson ('), Asquith J. gave interesting examples of particular words followed by general words where the principle ot efusdem generis might or might not apply."}}, {"text": "KaJarra Trader", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15620, "end_char": 15634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. or other document likely to convey secrets to the enemy'\", KaJarra Trader: the words 'other document' would include document of Hidayatullah I any kind and would not take their colour from 'newspapers'."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15689, "end_char": 15701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. or other document likely to convey secrets to the enemy'\", KaJarra Trader: the words 'other document' would include document of Hidayatullah I any kind and would not take their colour from 'newspapers'.", "canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "B. C'.\n\nMisra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16457, "end_char": 16470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. B. C'.", "canonical_name": "B. C'.\n\nMisra"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16949, "end_char": 16976, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hidayalullah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17763, "end_char": 17775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.h Chander v.\n\nKafin'la Trader1\n\nHidayalullah I.\n\n!"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18680, "end_char": 18685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fourth sub-section says that the section as a whole, is not to apply to firms or to partners and firms which have no place of business in the territories of India or whose places of business are situated in the territories of India but in areas -to which Chapter VIl is not to apply and to suits or claims of set off not exceeding Rs."}}, {"text": "Here the right that is being enforced through the medium of the Arbitration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20980, "end_char": 21059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21173, "end_char": 21178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here the right that is being enforced through the medium of the Arbitration Act", "statute": "Here the right that is being enforced through the medium of the Arbitration Act"}}, {"text": "Grille", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21257, "end_char": 21263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grille C. J. observed that the 1xpression 'other proceeding' indicated something which was 'sui generis of a claim of set-off', If the partners cf an unregistered firm go to court without either asking for a dissolution of the firm or dissolving it themselves and enter into an agreement and compose their differences it is possible to say that the enforcement of the consent decree is no more than the enforcement of a right arising from a contract and is ."}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22136, "end_char": 22141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22418, "end_char": 22421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagdi>h Chandu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22457, "end_char": 22471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J964\n\nJagdi>h Chandu\n\nKa/aria Trad\"\"\n\nHldaya1ulla& J.\n\n1964 between partners to arbitrator as provided in the condition\n\nJa11dtsh Chander of t4eir agreement, cannot be accepted as souud.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDER GUPTA"}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22703, "end_char": 22708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23580, "end_char": 23587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23708, "end_char": 23723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nC. J. COELHO\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI J.J.)\n\nIncon1e Tax-Interest paid on monies borrowed for purchase of plantation-I/ deductible from the assessable income-Expsnditur•\n\nif laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of plantation-Madras Plantations Agricultural Income .. fax Act (Mad."}}, {"text": "C. J. COELHO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23725, "end_char": 23737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nC. J. COELHO\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI J.J.)\n\nIncon1e Tax-Interest paid on monies borrowed for purchase of plantation-I/ deductible from the assessable income-Expsnditur•\n\nif laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of plantation-Madras Plantations Agricultural Income .. fax Act (Mad."}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23740, "end_char": 23752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nC. J. COELHO\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI J.J.)\n\nIncon1e Tax-Interest paid on monies borrowed for purchase of plantation-I/ deductible from the assessable income-Expsnditur•\n\nif laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of plantation-Madras Plantations Agricultural Income .. fax Act (Mad."}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23754, "end_char": 23764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nC. J. COELHO\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI J.J.)\n\nIncon1e Tax-Interest paid on monies borrowed for purchase of plantation-I/ deductible from the assessable income-Expsnditur•\n\nif laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of plantation-Madras Plantations Agricultural Income .. fax Act (Mad."}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23769, "end_char": 23780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal allowed\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nC. J. COELHO\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI J.J.)\n\nIncon1e Tax-Interest paid on monies borrowed for purchase of plantation-I/ deductible from the assessable income-Expsnditur•\n\nif laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of plantation-Madras Plantations Agricultural Income .. fax Act (Mad."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_60_72_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n1964 between partners to arbitrator as provided in the condition\n\nJa11dtsh Chander of t4eir agreement, cannot be accepted as souud.\n\nThe\n\nv . . Y.T d , reason given by the Divisional Bench that as s. 69 alows .n.a]Orio ra er' - . . . - d1Ssc:Jl.utJ.on and accounts of unregistered partnership it Hidayarul/ah J. cannot bar such an application appe<:rs •, \"'; to be not quite\n\nm point.\n\nApril, 30.\n\n1n our judgment, the words '0th.er proceeding' in subs. (3) must receive their full meaning untramelled by the words a claim of set-off'.\n\nThe latter words neither intend nor can be construed to cut down the generality of the words 'other proceeding'. The sub-section provides for the application of the provisions of sub-ss. (1) and (2) to claims of set-off and also to other proceedings of any kind which can properly be said to be for enforcement of any right arising from contract except those expressly mentioned as exceptions in sub-s. ( 3) and sub-s. ( 4).\n\nThe appeal is, therefore, allowed.\n\nThe decision of the High Court will be set aside and the application under s. 8(2) of the Arbitration Act shall stand dismissed with costs throughout on the applicant in the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed\n\nSTATE OF MADRAS\n\nC. J. COELHO\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI J.J.)\n\nIncon1e Tax-Interest paid on monies borrowed for purchase of plantation-I/ deductible from the assessable income-Expsnditur•\n\nif laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of plantation-Madras Plantations Agricultural Income .. fax Act (Mad.\n\nV of 1955), s. S(e) and (k). ·\n\nThe respondent, assessee purchased an estate, consi!lling of tea. coffee and rubber plantation•. Out of the sale price of Rs. 3,10,000/· ho borrowed Rs. 2,90.000/· at interest. For the assessment year 1955·56.\n\nhe claimed deduction on interest amounting to Rs. 22,628-9-8 under 1•\n\nS(Jtl of the Madras Plantations Agricultural Income-tax Act. The Agrl. cultural Income Tax Officer allowed only Rs. 1.570-10-7 under the Act.\n\nThe <!Ssessee appealed to the Assistant Commissioner 11.nd to the Tribunal,\n\nwithout success. On his revision application, the High Court held that the deduction claimed by him fell within the scope of s. 5 ( e) of tho Act and that the whole of Rs. 22.628-9-8, should have been deducted from his sscssable income. On appeal by special leave, the appellant contendeCI that the interest paid by the assessee was not deductible under\n\n1. S(e) of the Act on three grounds; first, it was in the nature of capital\n\nexren'diture; secor.dly, it was a personal expense of the asscssee, and\n\nthirdly, it was not laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the plantation.\n\nliELD:-(i) There is no force in the contention that the payment ot interest was capital expenditure within s. 5(e) of the Act. In the instant case. the payment of interest was revenue expenditure. No new asset was acquired with it; no enduring benefit was obtained. Expenditure incurred was par of circulating or fiating capital of the asscssee.\n\nIn cr'dinary co1nmercial practice. payment of interest would not be termed ., capital expenditure.\n\nAssam Bengal C~\"ment Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissloMr of lncome-taz, [ 1955] l S.C.R. 972. relied on.\n\nS. Kuppuswami v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras,\n\nI.L.R. {1954] Mad. 977; and Co1nr11issior1er of lncomctax, Madras v. Siddareddy\n\nVenkatasuvba Reddy, [1949] 17 I.T.R. 157, held inapplicable.\n\nThe luropea11 llivest1nent Trust Company Ltd. v. Jackson, 18 T.C. 1 and Greshan Life Assurance Society v. Styles, 3 T.C. 185, distinguished.\n\n(ii) The second contention is equally without' substance.\n\nIt Is impossible to hoJd that any expense to discharge a personal obligation becomes a personal expense within s. 5(e) of the Act. Personal expenses , vouid include expenses on the person of the assessee or to satisfy his personal needs such as clothes. food etc.) or purposes not related to the business for which the deduction is claimed.\n\n(iii} On the fact-; of the present case it is impossible to dissociate the character of the assessee as the owner of the plantation and as a person working the plantation. The assessee had bought the plantation for working it as a plantation. The payment of interest on the amount borrowed for the purchase of the plantation. when the whole transaction of purchae ana the working of the plantation is viewed as an integrated whole, is so closely related to the plantation that the expenditure can be said to he laid out or expended whoUy and exclusively for the purpose of tho plantation. In principle there is no distinction between interest paid on t.:itpitiil borrowt for the acquisition of a plantation acd between interest paid on capital borrowed for the purpose of runni111 an existing plaotation, both arc for the purposes of th• plantation.\n\nState of Modttu ...\n\nC. /, Coe/lio\n\nStoJI of Madru\n\nC. 1. C01lho\n\nSlkri I.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (Iif>4i\n\nCommissioner. of Income-tax. Kerala \"f. Malavaltm Plantation Ud.\n\nC.A. No. 389/63 dated 10th October, 1964. relied on.\n\nEastern Investments Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Wes/ Bengal, [1951] S.C.R. 594. Scottish NorJh American Trust v. Funner.\n\nS 'f.C. 693, Dharamvir Dhir v. Co1r.m:ssioner of lnconie-tax, [196!J 3 S.C.R. 359 ana Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v.\n\nJagannath Kissonbl, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 645, referred to.\n\nMetro Theatre Bombay Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 14 I.T.R. 638, distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 701/1963.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 19, 1960 of the Madras High Court in T.R.C. No. 53 of 1957.\n\nA. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for the appellant.\n\nC. P. Lal, for the respondent.\n\nApril 30, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSIK.RI J.-The respondent, hereinatter reforrd co a; the assessee, purchased an estate in 19 50, known as Silver Cloud Estate, consisting of tea, coffee and rubber plantations?< in Gudalur, Nilgiris, Madras State. Out of the sak price of Rs. 3,10,000, he borrowed Rs. 2,90,000. at inte rest varying from seven to eight per cent per annum.\n\nFor the assessment year 1955-56, the assessee claimed to deduct interest on this sum, amounting to Rs. 22.628-9-8.\n\nThe Agricultural Income Tax Officer, Gudalur, disallowed Rs. 21,057-15-1, allowing Rs. 1,570-10-7, under s. 5(k) Of the Madras Plantations Agricultural Income-Tax Act (Madras Act V of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The relevant part of the assessment order is reproduced below:\n\n\"Interest on borrowings Rs. 21,057-15-1.\n\nThe assessce has claimed Rs. 22,628-9-8 towards interest. It is seen that about Rs. 80,000\n\nhas been borrowed from various parties, for\n\nthe maintenance of th.e estate. Under section 5 (k) the interest has to be limited to six per cent on an amount equivalent to 25 per cent of the agricultural income in that year.\n\nThe gross income is Rs. 1,04,710-13-11.\n\nSo the borrowing has to be limited to 25 per cent of Rs. 1,04,710-13-11, which is Rs. 26,177-11-6.\n\nInterest at six per cent on this amount is Rs. 1,570-10-7. So a sum of Rs. 21,057-15-1 is disallowed (22,628-9-8 minus 1,570-10-7) .\"\n\nThe assessee appealed to the Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, without success. He then appealed to. the Madras Plantations Agricultural. Income Tax Appellate Tribunl, \\Jere'.nfter referred to as the Tribunal.\n\nThe tribunal observed a> follows:\n\n\"Jt is not possible to agree with the contention that interest paid in the year of account towards a loan borrowed by the proprietor for the purpose of acquisition of the estate will fall within the category of \"expenditure wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the plantation\".\n\nThe immediate object of the expenditure. i.e., payment of intere>t, is to liquidate a personal liability of the proprietor, as a debtor.\n\nThat after such borrowing the debtor used it as sale price and_acquired the estate, cannot make the payment of interest an \"expenditure wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the plantation.\" The language of the various subdivisions of section 5 of the Act referring to the various items of permissible deductions towards expenditure shows that the expenditure and the plantation must have a direct and proximate connection. Here, th~ proximate connection of the payment is with a personal Joan and not with the plantation.\"\n\nThe assessee filed a revision application to the High Court under s. 54 (1) of the Act, and raised the following\n\nqution before it:\n\nStat• of Mad,..\n\nSikri I.\n\nStat~ of MadtaJ\n\nC. J. C°\"Uw\n\nSU:rl J.\n\n\"Question of law raised for decision by the High\n\nCourt-Whether interest pa'~ on monies borrowed for the purchase of the plantation is expenditure of the nature referred to in section 5 ( e) of the Act and should therefore be deducted in assessing the income of the Plantatin during the year.\" The High Court held that the deduction claimed by the assessee fell within the scope of s. 5 ( e) of the Act, and that the whole of Rs. 22.628·9-8, and not merely Rs. 1,570-10-7, should have been deducted from his assessable income. It ordered that the assessment be revised accordingly.\n\nThe High Conrt refused to certify the case as a fit one, under article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution. But this Cot:rt gave special leave to the appellant to appeal agaimt the j'.!Jgment and order of the High Court.\n\nThe relevant statutory p; ovisions are as under. S. 2( a) defines 'agricultural income' i; d s. 2 ( ,) define' 'plantat1on :-\n\n\"2(a) 'agricultural income' means- ( l) any rent or revenue derived from a plantation;\n\n(2) any income derived from such plantation in the State by-\n\n(i) agriculture, or\n\n(ii) the performance by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind of any process ordinarily employed by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind to render the produce raised or received by him fit to be taken to market. or\n\n(iii) the sale by a cultivator or receiver of rentin-kind of the produce raised or received by him, in respect of which no process has been performed other than a process of the nature described in sub-clause (ii);\n\nExplanation !-Agricultural income derived from such plantation by the cultivat:o11 of\n\ntea meansthat portion of the income derived from the cultivation, manufacture and sale of tea .as is defined to be agricultural income for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian Income-tax;\n\nExplanation II-Agricultural income derived from such plantation by the cultivation of coffee, rubber, cinchona or cardamom means that portion of the income derived from the cultivation, manufacture and sale of coffee, rubber, cinchona or cardamom, as the case may be, as may be defined to be agricultural income for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian Incometax; ..................................\n\n( 2 )( r) 'plantation' means any land uood for growing all or any of the following,\n\nnamely~ tea, coffee, rubber, cinchona or cardamom;\". - Section 3 is the charging section and tt directs that \"agricultural income-tax at the rate or rates specified in Part I of the Schedule to this Act shall be charged for each financial year commencing from 1st April, 1955 in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this Act, on the total agricultural income of the previous year of every person.\" Section 4 describes what is 'total agricultural income'.\n\nSection 5 is concerned with the computation of agricultural income and directs the deduction of various items.\n\nWe are concerned with two sub-clauoos and they are set out below :\n\n\"5 ( e) any expenditure incurred in the previous year (not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assesse) laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of plantation; ..................................\n\n(k) any interest paid in the previous year on any amount borrowed and actually spent on the\n\nSI S. C.-5\n\nStal• of Madra\n\nC. 1. Coo/ho\n\nSikri 1.\n\nState of Madras v.\n\nC. J. Coelho\n\nSikri 1.\n\nplantation from which the agricultural income is derived.\n\nProvided that the need for borrowin.g was. genuine having due regard to the assets of the assessee at the time; Provided further that the interest allowed under this clause shall be limited to six per cent on an amount equivalent to twenty-five per cent of the agricultural income from the plantation in that year.\"\n\nThe learned counsel for the State contends that the interest paid by the assessee is not deductible under s. 5 ( e) of the Act on three grounds: First, it is in the nature of capital expenditure; secondly, it is a personal expense of the assessee; and thirdly, it is not laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the plantation.\n\nBefore adverting to the above grounds, it will be noticed thats. 5(e) is word for word a reproduction of s. 10(2) (xv) of the Income Tax Act, 1928, and as this Court and the High Court have on various occasions considered the said c1ause, these decisions would be relevant for deciding the present case, which arises under the Act.\n\nIs the payment of the said interest in the nature of capital expenditure or not? -Mr. Chetty urges that the assessee bad bought the plantation with borrowed money and that was undoubtedly capital expenditure.\n\nHe says that it follows logically from this that interest paid on the amount spent on the purchase of the plantation must also be capital expenditure. He invited our attention to a number of cases, with which we will shortly deal.\n\nIn order to determine whether an expenditure is revenue or capital expenditure, certain broad principles have to be borne in mind.\n\nThis Court formulated these principles in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. y, 'The Commissioner of Income Tax,(') in the following words:\n\n\" ( 1) Outlay is deemed to be capital when it is made for the initiation of a business, for extension of\n\n(I [I9SSl I s.c.R. 972\n\na business, or for a substantial replacement of equipment: vide Lord Sands in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.\n\nGranite City Steamship Company [(1927) 13 T.C. 1] and City of London Contract Corporation v. Styles\n\n[(1887) 2 T.C. 239).\n\n( 2) Expenditure may be treated as properly attributable to capital when it is made not only once and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade: vide Viscount Cave, L. C., in Atherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd., [(1926) 10 T.C. 155].\n\nIf what is got rid of by a lump sum payment is an annual business expense chargeable against revenue, the lump sum payment should equally be regarded as a business expense, but if the lump sum payment brings in a capital asset, then that puts the business on another footing altogether.\n\nThus, if labour saving machinery was acquired, the cost of such acquisition cannot be deducted out of pmfits by claiming that it relieves the annual labour bill, the business has acq•1ired a new asset, that is, machinery.\n\nTI1e expressions 'enduring benefit' or 'of a permament character' were introduced to make it clear that the asset or the right acquired must have enough durability to justify its beini; treated as a capital asset.\n\n(3) ether for the purpose of the expenditure, any capital was withdrawn, or, in other words, whether the object of incurring. the expenditure was to employ what was taken in as capital of the business.\n\nA~1in, it is to be seen whether the expenditure incurred was part of the fixed\n\ncapital of the business or part of its circulating capital.\n\nFixed capital is what the owner turns to profit by keeping it in his own possession.\n\nCirculating or floating capital is what he makes\n\nState of Madl'06\n\nSikri I.\n\nJH4\n\nStou of Madras v, C. J. Coelho\n\nSikrl J.\n\nprofit of by parting with it or letting it change masters.\n\nCirculat41g capital is capital which is turned over and in the process of being turned over yields profit or loss. Fixed capital, on the other hand, is not involved directly in that process and remains unaffected by it.\"\n\nThis Court further held that 'one has got to apply these criteria, one after the other from the business point of view and come to the conclusion whether on a fair appreciation of the whole situation the expenditure incurred in a particular case is of the nature of capital expenditure or revenue expenditure in which latter event only it would be a deductable allowance under section 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922'.\n\nIf we apply these principles to the facts of this case, the answer seems clear that the payment of interest is revenue expenditure.\n\nNo new asset is acquired with it; no enduring benefit is obtained. Expenditure incurred was part of circulating or floating capital of the assessee.\n\nIn ordinary coml!ll)rcial practice, payment of interest would not be termed as capital expenditure.\n\nThe cases relied on by Mr. Chetty do not bear on the precise problem.\n\nWe may, however, notice them in brief.\n\nIn S. Kuppuswami v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras ( 1), the assessee was held to have acquired the goodwill by paying a certain share of profits.\n\nThis was held to be capital expenditure.\n\nIn Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras, v.\n\nSiddareddy Venkatasubba Reddy(2 ), the a>sessees had under certain agreements obtained mining rights in different plots of land for periods varying from five to nine years, and claimed deduction of the amounts paid by them under the said agreements.\n\nThe High Court held the money expended for the acquisition of mining rights to be capital expenditure.\n\nIn The European Investment Trust Company Limited v.\n\nJackson(') the Court of Appeal was concerned with the inter-\n\n(1) l.L.R. (!954) Mad. 977\n\n(2) (1949) 17 .I.T.R. 15\n\n(3) IS T.C. I\n\npretation of Rules 3 of the Rules applicable to Cases I and II of Schedule D of the Income Tax Act, 1918 (8 & 9 Geo.\n\nV. c. 40). In the English Act there are a series of prohibitions; among other things prohibited to be deducted are any capital withdrawn from or any sum employed or intended to be employed as capital in such trade, profession or employment or vocation, and any annual interest or any annuity or annual payment payable out of profits.\n\nThe English cases like The European Investment Trust Company case(') are distinguishable because in England there existed the prohibition enumerated above.\n\nThere are no such prohibitions in the Act with which we are concerned. But apart from these prohibitions, Lord Herschall observed in Gresham Life Assurance Society v. Styles( 2 ) as follows:\n\n\"I think the fourth rule was primarily designed to meet such a case as that in which a trader had contracted to make an annual payment out of his profits, as for example, when he had agreed to make such a payment to a former partner or to a person who had made a loan on the terms of receiving such a payment.\n\nBut for the rule it might plausibly have been contended that i11 such a case a trader was only to return as his profits what remained after such payment\".\n\n(emphasis supplied).\n\nAccordingly we hold that there is no force in the contention that the payment of interest was capital expenditure\n\nwithin s. 5 ( e) of the Act.\n\n'The next point, namely, that the payment of interest was a personal expense is equally without substance.\n\nWe are unable to appreciate that any_ expense to discharge a personal obligation becomes a personal expense within s. 5 ( e). Personal expenses would include expenses on the person of the assessee or to satisfy his personal needs such as clothes, food, etc., or purposes not related to the busineS\"! for which the deduction is claimed.\n\n(I) 18 T.C. I.\n\n(2) 3 T.C. I85.\n\nState of Mad,.\n\nC. J. Coe!M\n\nSikri J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOH.TS\n\nStale of Madras v.\n\nThe third ground raised by Mr. Chetty needs careful scrutiny. 1bis Court, after reviewing English and Indian cases, summarised the position in Commissioner of Income- Tax, Kerala v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd.(1) as follows: C. J. Coelho\n\nSikri J. \"The aforesaid discussion leads to the foliowing result : The expression \"for the purpose of the business\" is wider in scope than the expression\n\n\"for the purpose of earning profits\".\n\nIts range is wide : it may take in not only the day to day running of a business but also the rationalization of its administration and modernization of its machinery; it may include measures for the preservation of the business and for the protection of its assets and property from expropriation, coercive process or assertion of hostile title; it may also comprehend payment of statutory dues and ta.'l:es imposed as a pre-condition to commence or for carrying on of a business; it may comprehend many other acts incidental to the carrying on of. a business.\n\nHowever wide the meaning of the expression may be, its limits are implicit in it.\n\nThe purpose shall be for the purpose of the business, that is to say, the expenditure incurred shall be for carrying on of the hl)Siness and the assessee shall incur it in his capacity as a person carrying on the business. It cannot include sums spent by the assessee as agent of a third party, whether the origin of the agency is voluntary or statutory; in that event, he pays the amount on behalf of another and for a purpose unconnected with the business.\"\n\nBefore oeciding the question, it is necessary to mention three other decisions of this Court. In Eastern Investments Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal(') this Court held that interest on debentures issued by an investment con; ipany was to be allowed as business cxpen-\n\n-·(1) C.A. Nos. 3S4 and 3$5/65 decided on April lO, 1964.\n\n(2) tr961J s.c.R s94.\n\nditure under s. 12(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act. lt observed that 'this being an investment company, if it borrowed and utilised the same for its investments on which it earned income, Jhe interest paid by it on the loans will clearly be a permissible deduction under s. 12 ( 2) of the Act'.\n\nEarlier, it had observed that Scottish North American Trust v. Farmer(') was a somewhat similar case.\n\nIn Dharamvir Dlzir v. The Commissioner of Income Tax('), this Court held that a payment of 11/16 of the net profits of the assessee's business was an expenditure wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes of the business as the assessee had arranged financing of the business on the best terms that he could manage.\n\nIn the Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v.\n\nJ agannarh Kissonlal (') this Court upheld the claim of the\n\nassessee to deduct the amount it had to pay the bank on a joint promissory note.\n\nThe only case cited by Mr. Chetty, which has some resemblance to the present case is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Metro Theatre Bombay Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax(').\n\nBut this case is distinguishable for the interest claimed to be deducted, and which was disallowed. was in respect of the amount borrowed for acquiring land on 999 years lease, on which a cinema was subsequently built.\n\nThere was no immediate connection between the interest paid and . the cinema business.\n\nAs Kania J., as he then was, put it, 'if the interest was not paid, the result would be not necessarily the >toppage of showing films, but the assessee will not acquire the lease of this property'.\n\nApplying the above principles to the facts of this case, it seems to us that it is impossible to dissociate the character of the assessee as the owner of the plantation and as a person working the plantation.\n\nThe assessee had bought the plantation for working it as a plantation, i.e., for growing tea, coffee and rubber. The payment of interest on the\n\n(i) S.T.C. 693.\n\n(3~ [r96rl 2 s.c.R. 645.\n\n(2) [196rJ 3 s.c.R. 359.\n\n(4) 14 I.T.R. 638.\n\nState of Madra-\n\nSikri J.\n\nState of Madra1\n\nC. 1. Coelho\n\nSikri 1.\n\nApril, 30.\n\namount borrowed for the purchase of the plantation when the whole transaction of purchase and the working of the plantation is viewed as an integrated whole, is so closely related to the plantation that the expenditure can be said to be laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the plantation. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that what the Act purports to .tax is agricultural income and not agricultural receipts. from the agricultural receipts must be deducted all expenses which in ordinary conunercial accounting must. be debited against the receipts.\n\nThere is nothing in the Act which prohibits such expenses from being deducted.\n\nNo farmer would treat interest paid on capital borrowed for the purchase of the plantation as anything but expenses, and as long as the deductions he claims, apart from any statutory prohibition, can be fairly said to lead to the determination of the true net agricultural income, these must be allowed under the Act.\n\nIn principle, we do not. see any distinction between interest paid on. capital borrowed for the acquisition of a plantation and that between interest paid on capital borrowed for the purpose of running an existing plantation; both are for the purposes of the plantation.\n\nIn the result, we agree with the High Court that the deduction claimed by the assessee fell within the scope of s. 5 ( e) of the Act, and that the whole of Rs. 22,628-9-8 and not merely Rs 1,570-10-7 sho_uld have been deducted from his assessable income. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nS. S. GADGIL, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY\n\nLAL AND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. c. SHAH AND s. M. S!KRr, JJ.)\n\nJnconu Tax-Assessment as agent of non-resident party-Time limit\n\nfor issuing notice-Scope of amending statute extending time", "total_entities": 63, "entities": [{"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1097, "end_char": 1104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1225, "end_char": 1240, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. J. COELHO", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1242, "end_char": 1254, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. J. COELHO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. 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Ltd. y, 'The Commissioner of Income Tax,(') in the following words:\n\n\" ( 1) Outlay is deemed to be capital when it is made for the initiation of a business, for extension of\n\n(I [I9SSl I s.c."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16423, "end_char": 16436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16449, "end_char": 16476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rules applicable to Cases I and II of Schedule D of the Income Tax Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17783, "end_char": 17859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18308, "end_char": 18315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The English cases like The European Investment Trust Company case(') are distinguishable because in England there existed the prohibition enumerated above."}}, {"text": "Herschall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18476, "end_char": 18485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But apart from these prohibitions, Lord Herschall observed in Gresham Life Assurance Society v. Styles( 2 ) as follows:\n\n\"I think the fourth rule was primarily designed to meet such a case as that in which a trader had contracted to make an annual payment out of his profits, as for example, when he had agreed to make such a payment to a former partner or to a person who had made a loan on the terms of receiving such a payment."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19168, "end_char": 19172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19414, "end_char": 19418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Mad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19669, "end_char": 19681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Mad,.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS"}}, {"text": "C. J. Coe!M", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19685, "end_char": 19696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J. Coe!M\n\nSikri J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOH.TS\n\nStale of Madras v.\n\nThe third ground raised by Mr. Chetty needs careful scrutiny.", "canonical_name": "C. J. COELHO"}}, {"text": "C. J. Coelho", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19975, "end_char": 19987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1bis Court, after reviewing English and Indian cases, summarised the position in Commissioner of Income- Tax, Kerala v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd.(1) as follows: C. J. Coelho\n\nSikri J. \"The aforesaid discussion leads to the foliowing result : The expression \"for the purpose of the business\" is wider in scope than the expression\n\n\"for the purpose of earning profits\".", "canonical_name": "C. J. COELHO"}}, {"text": "s94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21651, "end_char": 21654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21670, "end_char": 21678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21928, "end_char": 21933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22673, "end_char": 22690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only case cited by Mr. Chetty, which has some resemblance to the present case is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Metro Theatre Bombay Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax(')."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23067, "end_char": 23072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Kania J., as he then was, put it, 'if the interest was not paid, the result would be not necessarily the >toppage of showing films, but the assessee will not acquire the lease of this property'."}}, {"text": "State of Madra-", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23707, "end_char": 23722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madra-\n\nSikri J.\n\nState of Madra1\n\nC. 1.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF MADRAS"}}, {"text": "Coelho", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23757, "end_char": 23763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coelho\n\nSikri 1."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25161, "end_char": 25165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. S. GADGIL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25370, "end_char": 25382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. GADGIL, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY\n\nLAL AND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. c. SHAH AND s. M. S!KRr, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "s. M. S!KRr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25459, "end_char": 25470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. GADGIL, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY\n\nLAL AND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. c. SHAH AND s. M. S!KRr, JJ.)"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_72_85_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "State of Madra1\n\nC. 1. Coelho\n\nSikri 1.\n\nApril, 30.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]\n\namount borrowed for the purchase of the plantation when the whole transaction of purchase and the working of the plantation is viewed as an integrated whole, is so closely related to the plantation that the expenditure can be said to be laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the plantation. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that what the Act purports to .tax is agricultural income and not agricultural receipts. from the agricultural receipts must be deducted all expenses which in ordinary conunercial accounting must. be debited against the receipts.\n\nThere is nothing in the Act which prohibits such expenses from being deducted.\n\nNo farmer would treat interest paid on capital borrowed for the purchase of the plantation as anything but expenses, and as long as the deductions he claims, apart from any statutory prohibition, can be fairly said to lead to the determination of the true net agricultural income, these must be allowed under the Act.\n\nIn principle, we do not. see any distinction between interest paid on. capital borrowed for the acquisition of a plantation and that between interest paid on capital borrowed for the purpose of running an existing plantation; both are for the purposes of the plantation.\n\nIn the result, we agree with the High Court that the deduction claimed by the assessee fell within the scope of s. 5 ( e) of the Act, and that the whole of Rs. 22,628-9-8 and not merely Rs 1,570-10-7 sho_uld have been deducted from his assessable income. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nS. S. GADGIL, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY\n\nLAL AND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. c. SHAH AND s. M. S!KRr, JJ.)\n\nJnconu Tax-Assessment as agent of non-resident party-Time limit\n\nfor issuing notice-Scope of amending statute extending time\n\nlimit-Validity of notice-Indian Income-tax A.ct 1922 (11 of 1922). 1. 34(1)(b)(iii) proviso.\n\nThe appellant company was carrying on business in Bombay as commission agents.\n\nIn the course of assessment proceedings for the year 1954-551 the Income-tax Officer noticed from the assessee\"s books of account tnat the assessee had business connections with certain nonresident parties and found that the transactions disclosed that through the assessee those non-resident parties were receiving income, profits and gains. He considered that s. 43 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was applicable to the assessee and issued on March 27, 1957, a notice under s. 34 of the Act for assessment of the assessee as an agent of the said non-resident parties. The assessee pleaded, inter alia, that the proceedings intiated by the Income-tax Officer under s. 34 were barred since the notice issued by him was after the expiry of one year from the end of the assessment year 1954·55, but the Income.tax Officer rejected the contention relyin'g on the amendment made to the proviso to s. 34(1)(b)(iii) by the Finance Act, 1956, under which the period of one year was changed to two years.\n\nThe amendment was given retrospective operation upto April 1, 1956, but since the power to issue a notice under the unamended Act had come to an end on Marcil 31,\n\n1956, the question was whether the Incometax Officer could issue a notice of assessment to a person as an agent of a non.resident party under the amended provision when the period prescribed for such a notice had before the amended Act came into force expired.\n\nHELD: The proceedings initiated by the Incometax Officer by the notice dated March 27, 1957, were barred; the authority of the Incometax Ofticer under the Indian Incometax Act before it was amended by the Finance Act of 1956 having come to an end, the amending provision would not entitle him to commence a proceeding even though at the date when he issued the notJce it was within the period provided by the amendment.\n\nNotwithstanding the fa('t that there was no determinable point of time between the expiry of the time provided under the old Act and the commencement of the An1tndn1ent Act, in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the legislature could not be said to have intended to attribute to the Amending provision a greater retros pectivity than was expressly n1entioned.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1963.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and order dated April l, 1958 of the fonner Bombay High Court in Miscellaneous Application No. 327 of 1957.\n\nK. N. Rajagopala Sastry and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\n1964 Bishan Narain, S. P. Mehta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. s. s. Gadgil Mathur and Ravi11der Narain, for the• respondent.\n\nLal and Co.\n\nShah J.\n\nApril 30, 1964.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J .-Ml s Lal and Company hereinafter called the assessee carry on business in Bombay as commission agents.\n\nIn the course of assessment proceedings for the year 1954-55 the assessee's books of account were examined by the Income-tax Officer and it was noticed that the assessee had business connections with certain non-resident parties.\n\nOn M1rch, 12, 1957, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice calli:Jg upon the assessee to show caus0 why in respect of the assessment year 1954-55 the asscssee should not be treated under s. 43 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as an agent in respect of twenty-five non-resident parties named in the notice. The assessee denied that he had \"direct dealings\" with any non-resident party and that in any event the proposed action was barred because the period prescribed for initiation of proceeding had expired, and ' requested the Income-tax Officer to drop the proceeding.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer B-III Ward, Bombay issued on March 27, 1957, a notice under s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act for assessment of the assessee as .an agent of the twentyfive named non-resident parties.\n\nThe assessee submitted a return showing hisincome as \"nil''.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer held that the transactions disclosed from the books of account -of the assessee clearly showed that the assessee \"had regular business connection with'' non-resident parties, that through the assessee those non-resident parties were receiving income, profits and gains, and s. 43 was clearly applicable to the assessee there being definite business connection between the assessee and the named non-residents.\n\nHe therefore treated the assessee as agent of the non-resident parties, under s. 43 of the Act.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer also rejected the contention of the assessee that action under s. 34 was barred at the date of the notice issued to the assessee.\n\nRelying upon the first proviso to s. 34(l)(b)(iii) inserted by the Finance Act,\n\n1956, the Income-tax Officer held that the Legislature had\n\nby amendment extended the \"time-limit in clear and express terms so as to cover\" action under s. 34 against a person on whom the assessment or reassessment is to be made as an agent of a non-resident person under s. 43 of the Act for the assessment year 1954-55, and accordingly assessed the income of the assessee at Rs. 60,684, estimating the income of the parties residing outside the tax.1ble territories, in the absence of accounts to be Rs. 50,000.\n\nThe assessee then filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay praying that a writ in the nature of mandamus or prohibition do issue restraining and prohibiting the Income-tax Officer from giving effect to or taking any steps or proceedings by way of recovery or otherwise in pursuance of the orders of assessment.\n\nThe assessee pleaded, inter alia, that the proceedings for assessment nnder s. 34\n\nof the Act commenced by the Income-tax Officer after the\n\nexpiry of one year from the end of the assessment year 1954-55 were without the authority of law.\n\nThe High Court of Bombay, following its earlier judgment in S. C. Prashar v.\n\nVosantsen Dwarkadas(') held that at the date when the notice was issued, by reason of the proviso which was in operation under s. 34 (1) in respect of the assessment year 1954-55 the notice was out of time and that the period provided thereby could not be extended by the Finance Act of 1956 so as to authorise the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice for assessment or reassessment of the assessce as statutory agent of a party, residing outside \\he taxable territory.\n\nIn the view of the High Court the notice dated March 27, 1957, was invalid, and a valid notice being a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under s. 34, the proceeding under s. 34 was not maintainable.\n\nAgainst the order of the High Court issuing writs prayed for by the assessee, with certificate of fitness this appeal is preferred by the Income-tax Officer, Bombay.\n\nIn order to appreciate the contention raised by the assessee and which has found favour with the High Court, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of s. 34.\n\n(1) 29 I.T.R. 857\n\nShah J.\n\nShah/.\n\nas they stood before the section was amended by the Finance Act, 1956. The clauses relevant prescribing the period within which notice may be issued n:ad as follows:\n\n\"(l) (a) If - x x x (b) x x x he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time within eight years and in cases falling under clause (b) at any time within four years of the end of that year, serve on the assessee, x x x a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance; x x x\n\nProvided that- ( i) x x x (ii) x x x\n\n(iii) Where the assessment made or to be made is an .assessment made or to be made on a person deemed to be the agent of non-resident person under section 43, this sub-section shall have effect as if for the periods of eight years and four years a period of one year was substituted.\"\n\nBy s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, s. 34 was extensively amended and cl. (iii) of the proviso was substituted by the following proviso:\n\n\"Provided further that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue a notice under this sub-section for .any year after the expiry of two years from that year if the person on whom an assessment or re-assessment is to b1i made in pursuance of the notice is a person deemed to be an agent of non-resident person under section 43.\"\n\nInitially a notice of assessment or re-assessment under s. 34 ( 1) against a person deemed to be an agent of a nonresident person under s. 43 could not be issued after the expiry of one year f!'.Om the end of the year of assessment: under the amended section this period was extended to two years from. the end of the relevant assessment year.\n\nIn the course of assessment to income-tax for the year 1954-55 the relevant law applicable prescribed that a notice of assessment or re-assessment .against a person deemed to be an agent under s. 43 could not be issued after the expiry of one year from the .end of the assessment year.\n\nThat period expired on March 31, 1956, and after that date no notice could be issued, relying upon the law as it stood before amendment for assessment or re-assessment treating the assessee as an agent of a non-resident under s. 43.\n\nBut. the Income-tax Officer sought recourse to the amended provision which gave him a period of two years from the end of the assessment year, for initiating assessment proceedings, and the authority of the Income-tax Officer to so act is challenged by the assessee.\n\nSection 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, is, it is common ground, not given retrospective operation before April 1.\n\n1956. The question then is, whether the Income-tax Officer may issue a notice of .assessment to a person as an agent of a non-resident party under the amended provision when the period prescn'bed for such a notice had before the amended Act came into force expired?\n\nIndisputably the period for serving a notice of re-assessment under the unamendro section had expired, and there was in the Act as it then stood, no provision for extending the period beyond the end of one year from the year of assessment.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer -could therefore commence a proceeding under s. 34 on March 27, 1957, only if the amended section applied and not otherwise.\n\nThe amending Act came into force after the period provided for the issue of a notice under s. 34 before it was amended had expired.\n\nIt is true that there was no determinable point of time between the expiry of the prescribed time within which the n<?tice could have been issued against the assessee under s. 34 proviso (iii) before it was amended.\n\nBut there was no overlapping period either. Prima facie, on the expiry of the period prescribed by s. 34 as it originally stood, there was no scope for issuing a notice unless tho\n\n19~ - S. S. Gadgik\n\nLal and Co.\n\nShah/.\n\n196-1\n\nShah J:\n\nLegislature expressly gave power to the Income-tax Officer to issue notice under the amended section notwithstanding the expiry of the period under the unamended provision or unless there was overlapping of the period within which notice could be issued under the old and the amended provision.\n\nBut counsel for the Commissioner submitted that at no time was the Income-tax Officer bereft of authority to issu.J a notice under s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nHe submitted that till the mid-night of March 31, 1956, notice could be issued in exe:rcise of the powers conferred by s. 34 proviso (iii) before it was amended and notice of assessment or re-assessment could also be issued under the amended provision immediately thereafter in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 18 o! the Finance Act, 1956.\n\nCounsel relied upon the rule contained in s. 5 ( 3) of the General Clauses Act that unless the contrary is expressed, a Central Act or Regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement. It was submitted that this is merely a statutory recognition of the rule which is well-settled that where a Statute names a date on which it shall come into operation. it shall be deemed to come into force immediately on the expi.ration of the previous day and the law does not take into consideration fractions of a day.\n\nReliance was placed by counsel upon Tomlinson v.\n\nBullock(') and English v.\n\nC/iff(2 ).\n\nIn Tom/inson's case ( 1) the question was whether an order of affiliation could be made on an .1pplication made in respect of a child born at any time of the day on August 10, 1872 under the Bastardy Act, 35 & 36 Viet. c. 65.\n\nIn an application made for an order of affiliation, it was hel'd that the order could competently be made in respect of a child born at any time of the day on the 10th of August. 1872, because the Act in the contemplation of law for this purpose came into effect from the commencement of the day on which it received the royal assent, and that normally an Act which comes into operation becomes Jaw as soon as it commences.\n\nJn English v. Cliff(') it was held by the Court of Chancery\n\n(t) (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 230\n\n(2) (1914) 2 Ch. D. 37f.\n\nthat the trustees under a deed of settlement dated May 13, l 964 1892, who stood possessed of , an estate during the term of s. s. Gadgil twenty-one years from the date of settlement upon trust Lal an/co . . to apply the rents and profits mentioned therein and who - were authorised at the expiration of the said period to sell Shah /. the estate could competently sell it and their action was not liable to be challenged as infringing the rule of perpetuity. It was held in that case that the determination of the term of twenty-one years and the commencement of the trust for sale arising at one and the same tnoment, the trust was not void for remoteness on the gruund that it was limited to take effect at the expiration of the term.\n\nNeither -0f these cases has, in our judgment, any application to the principle applicable in the present case.\n\nThe power to issue a notice under the unamended Act came to an end on March 31, 1956. Under that Act no notice could thereafter be issued.\n\nIt is true that by the amendment made by s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, a notice could be issued within two years from the end of the year of assessment.\n\nBut the application of the amended Act is subject to the principle that unless otherwise provided if the right to act under the earlier statute has come to an end, it co.uld no! be revived by the subsequent amendment which extended the period of limitation.\n\nThe right to issue a notice under the earlier Act came to an end before the new Act came into force.\n\nThere was undoubtedly no determinable point -0f time between the expiry ot the earlier Act and the commencement of the new Act; but that would not, in our judgment, affect the application of this rule.\n\nReliance was also\" placed by counsel for the Commissioner upon the rule which has prevailed in the Supreme Court of the United States of America that \"a new statute should be construed as a colliinuation of the old one with the modifications contained in the new one, although it formally repeals the old stat\\lte, when it re-enacts its substantial provisions and the two statutes are almost identical.\" Bear Lake & River Water W arks & Irrigation Company and Jarvis-Conklin .Mortgage Trust Company v.\n\nWil/an:_ Garland and Corey Brothers & Co. (1). It appears\n\n(I) 164 U.$. I\n\nJH#\n\nShah J.\n\nto have been recognised in the Supreme Court of the United states of America in Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Jolifee( 1) that repeal in terms of a former statute does not necessarily indicate .an intention of the legislature thereby to impair right which had arisen under the act which was repealed.\n\nAs the provisions of the new act took effect simultaneously with the repeal of the old one, the Supreme Court held that the new one might more properly be said to be substituted in the place of the old one, and to continue in force, with modifications, the provisions of the old act, instead of abrogating or annulling them and re-en.acting the same as a new and original act.\n\nApart from the question whether the rule so enunciated is applicable to the interpretation of Indian statutes, in this case we are not concerned with re-enactment of a statute.\n\nThe statute abrogates one rule of limitation, and enacts another rule with a limited retrospective operation. To such a case the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court of America, assuming it applies, attributing to the Legislature an intention to continue in force the provisions of the old Act, with a modification, so as to give to the new statute in substance operation retrospectively from the date on which the old statute was enacted, can have no application.\n\nWe do not think that any such intention may be attributed to the Legislature in enacting s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956 so as to make it the basis of a liability to taxation after the expiry of the period prescribed in that behalf by the Legislaturn.\n\nCounsel also submitted that s. 34 lays down a rule of limitation for commencing an action for assessment or re-assessment, and that in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, a statute of limitation in operation at a given time governs all proceedings from the moment of its enactment, even though the cause of action on which the proceeding was based came into existence before the Act was enacted. Equating a proceeding under s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act with a suit or a proceeding in a civil court, counsel said that the law of limitation being a law of procedure, assessment proceedings including proceedings for re-assessment are governed hy the law in force\n\n(1) 69 U.S. (2 Wall) 459\n\nat the date on which they are instituted, and that the rule that the repeal of a statute without express words or clear implication in the repealing statute, cannot take away a right vested in a party acquired under the repealed statute when it was in force, is a rule of prescription and not of procedure, and notwithstanding general observations to the contrary in certain decisions, applies only to those actions in which by . the determination of the period prescribed, a right to institute an action for possession of property is extinguished.\n\nCounsel relies in support of the plea on Baleswar v. Latafat('). It is unneces'sary to dilate upon this argument in any detail, or to enter upon an analysis of the numerous cases which were mentioned at the Bar to determine whether the rule that without an express provision, or a clear implication arising from the amending statute rights acquired under the repealed statute by the determination of the period of limitation prescribed thereby cannot be deemed to be revived, applies to suits for possession only.\n\nIt may be sufficient to !Dake two comments on the .argument.\n\nThe rule has in fact been applied to suits other than suits for possession: e.g. Mahomcd Mehdi Faya v. Sakinabai( 2 ) (a suit for restitution of conjugal rights); M. Krishnaswami Nalcker .v.\n\nA. Thiruven1wda Muddaliar(') (a suit for recovery of a debt); Shambhoonath Saha v. Guruchurn Lahiri(') (an application for execution); and Nepal Chandra Roy Chowdhury • v. Niroda Sundari Ghose(') (an application for setting aside an ex parte decree). Again soon after it was delivered the the authority of Baleswar's case(') was weakened by the judgment in Jagdish v. Saligram (6 ) where the Court doubted the correctness of the earlier view.\n\nA proceeding for assessment is not a suit for adjudication of a civil dispute.\n\nThat an income-tax proceeding is in the nature of a judicial proceeding between contesting parties, is a matter which is not cap; tble of even a plausible argument.\n\nThe Income-tax authorities who have power to assess and recover tax are not acting as judges decidi!!g a\n\n(1) I.LR. 24 Pat. 249\n\n(2) l.L.R. 37 Born. 383\n\n(3) A.I.R. (1935) Mad. 245\n\n(4) J.L.R. s Cal. 894 (S) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 506\n\n(6) I.L.R. 24 Pat. 391\n\n51 S.C.-6.\n\nShall J.\n\nSltllh /.\n\nlitigation between the citizen and the States: they are administrative authorities whose proceedings are regulated by statute, but whose function is to estimate the income of the taxpayer and to assess him to tax on the basis of that estimate.\n\nTax legislation necessitates the setting up of machinery to ascertain the taxable income, and to assess tax on the income, but that does not impress the proceeding with the character of an action between the citizen and the State: The Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Sneath(');\n\nand Shell Company of Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation( 2 ).\n\nAgain the period prescribed by s. 34 for assessment or re-assessment is not a period of limitation. The section in terms imposes a fetter upon the power of the Income-tax Officer to bring to tax escaped income.\n\nIt prescribes different periods in different classes of cases for enforcement of the right of the State to recover tax.\n\nIt was observed by this Court in Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. v. S. C. Mehta. Income-tax Officer and another('): ·\n\n~···-·---\n\n\"It must be remembered that if the Income-tax Act prescribes a period during which tax due in any particular assessment year may be assessed, then on the expiry of that period the department cannot make an assessment.\n\nWhere no period is prescribed the assessment can be completed at any time but once completed it is final.\n\nOnce a final assessment has been made, it can only be reopened to rectify a mistake apparent from the record (s. 35) or to reassess where there has been an escapement of assessment of income for one reason or another. (s. 34). Both these sections which enable reopening of back assessments provide their own periods of time for action but all these periods of time, whether for the first assessment or for rectification, or for reasaea!- ment, merely create a bar when that time passed\n\n(1) 17 T.C. 149, 164\n\n(2) (1931] A.C. 275\n\n(3) (1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 92, u7-n8\n\nagainst the machinery set up by the Incometax Act for the assessment and levy of the tax.\n\nThey do not create an exemption in favour of the assessee or grant an absolution on the expiry of the period.\n\nThe liability is not enforceable but the tax may again become exigible if the bar is removed and the taxpayer is brought within the jurisdiction of the said machinery by reason of a new power.\n\nThis is, of course, subject to the condition that the law must say that such is the jurisdiction, either expressly or by clear implication. If the language of the law has that clear meaning, it must be given that effect and where the language expressly so declares or clearly implies it, the retrospective operation is not controlled by the commencement clause.\"\n\n.Counsel for the Commissioner sought to derive some support from Income-tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta and another v. Calcutta Discount Company Ltd.( 1) in which Chakravartti C.J., dealing with the effect of the Income-tax and Business Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948, observed:\n\n\"The plain effect of the substitution. of the new s: 34 with effect from 30th March, 1948 is ihat from that dat$1 the Income-tax Act is to be re.ad as including the new section as a part thereof and if it is to be so read, the further effect of the express language of the section is that so far as cases coming within cl. (a) of sub-s. ( 1) are concerned all assessment years ending within eight years ftom 3Qth March, 1948 and from subsequent dates, are within its purview and it will apply to them, provided the notice contemplated is given within such eight years.\n\nWhat is not within the purview of the section is an assessment year which ended before eight years from 30th March, 1948.\n\n(1) a3 I.T.R. 471\n\nShala J.\n\n8. S. Gu,; l\n\ny, Lol tmll Co.\n\nShah/.\n\nBut it may be recalled that the amending Act of 1948 with which the Court was concerned in Calcutta Discount Company's case(') came into force on September 8, 1948, but s. 1 (2) prescribed that the amendment in s. 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, shall be deemed to have come into force on March 30, 1948, and the period under the unamended section within which notice could be issued under\n\n~. 34 ( 3) against the assessee company ended on March 31, 1951.\n\nBefore that date the amending Act came into operation, and at no time h.ad the right to re-assess become barred.\n\nIn considering whether the amended statute applies, the question is one of interpretation i.e., to ascertain whether it was the intention of the Legislature to deprive a taxpayer of the plea that action for assessment or re-assessment could not be commenced, on the ground th.at before the amending Act became effective, it was barred.\n\nTherefore the view that even when the right to assess or re-assess has lapsed on account of the expiry of the pe'riod of limitation prescribed under the earlier statute, the Income-tax Officer can exercise his powers to assess or re-assess under the amending statute which gives an extended period of limitation, was not accepted in Calcutta Discount Company's case(').\n\nAs we have already pointed out, the right to commence a proceeding for assessment against the assessee as an agent of a non-resident party under the Income-tax Act before it was amended, ended on March 31, 1956.\n\nIt is true that under the amending Act by s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, authority was conferred upon the Income-tax Officer to assess a person as an agent of a foreign party under s. 43 within two years from the end of the year of assessment.\n\nBut authoriiy of the Income-tax Officer under the Act before it was amended by, the Finance Act of 1956 having already come to an end, the amending provision will not assist him to commence a proceeding even though at the date when he issued the notice it is within the period provided by that amending Act.\n\nThis will be so, notwithstanding the fact that there has been no determinable point of time between the expiry of the time provided under the old Act .and the\n\n(1) 23 I.T.R. 471,\n\ncommencement of the amending Act. The Legislature has given to s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, only a limited retrospective operation i.e., upto April 1, 1956, only.\n\nThat provision must be read subject to the rule that in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the Legislature does not intend to attribute to the amending provision a greater retrospectivity than is exrressiy mentioned, nor to authorise the Income•tax Officer to commence proceedings which before the new Act came into force had by the expiry of the period provided, become barred.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nKANPUR COAL SYNDICATE\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Assessment on Association of persons or on members indi\n\nvidually-Option to appropriate authority-Right of appeal, whether such assessee has--Powers of Tribunal and Appellate Assistanl Commissioner in Appeal-Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), n. 3, 14(2) (b) 30, 31 and 33.\n\nIncome-tax was assessed upon the total income in the hands of tho respondent-assessee, an association of several persons combined together for the purpose of purchase of coal and its supply to customers\n\nfor domestic purposes and other small scale industries. The assesseo claimed that it should not be assessed to tax as an association of persons, but the proportion of the income in the hands of each members of the association might be assessed to tax instead. The Income-tax Officer refused this request and an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was dismissed. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, on a further appeal. held that though the Income-tax Officer had power to assess income of the association of persons as such or in the altematiye on the individual members thereof in respect of their proportionate sharo fn the income, the tribunal had no power under the Act to direct tho Income-tax Officer to exercise his power in one way or other. On a\n\n196'\n\nLal orul Co.\n\nY. s. s. Gadill\n\nSltah J.\n\nApril, 30.", "total_entities": 116, "entities": [{"text": "State of Madra1", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madra1\n\nC. 1."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.M. SIKRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1457, "end_char": 1461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. S. GADGIL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1666, "end_char": 1678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. GADGIL, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY\n\nLAL AND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. c. SHAH AND s. M. S!KRr, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "S. S. GADGIL"}}, {"text": "LAL AND COMPANY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1708, "end_char": 1723, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAL AND COMPANY", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1726, "end_char": 1738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. GADGIL, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY\n\nLAL AND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. c. SHAH AND s. M. S!KRr, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*"}}, {"text": "s. M. S!KRr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1755, "end_char": 1766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. GADGIL, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BOMBAY\n\nLAL AND COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBBA RAo, J. c. SHAH AND s. M. S!KRr, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "s. M. S!KRr"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2436, "end_char": 2441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2449, "end_char": 2476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "March 27, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2523, "end_char": 2537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He considered that s. 43 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was applicable to the assessee and issued on March 27, 1957, a notice under s. 34 of the Act for assessment of the assessee as an agent of the said non-resident parties."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2554, "end_char": 2559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2744, "end_char": 2749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)(b)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2971, "end_char": 2987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2995, "end_char": 3012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3129, "end_char": 3142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment was given retrospective operation upto April 1, 1956, but since the power to issue a notice under the unamended Act had come to an end on Marcil 31,\n\n1956, the question was whether the Incometax Officer could issue a notice of assessment to a person as an agent of a non.resident party under the amended provision when the period prescribed for such a notice had before the amended Act came into force expired."}}, {"text": "Marcil 31,\n\n1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3228, "end_char": 3244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment was given retrospective operation upto April 1, 1956, but since the power to issue a notice under the unamended Act had come to an end on Marcil 31,\n\n1956, the question was whether the Incometax Officer could issue a notice of assessment to a person as an agent of a non.resident party under the amended provision when the period prescribed for such a notice had before the amended Act came into force expired."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopala Sastry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4502, "end_char": 4525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopala Sastry and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4530, "end_char": 4544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopala Sastry and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Mehta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4586, "end_char": 4597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 Bishan Narain, S. P. Mehta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1964 Bishan Narain, S. P. Mehta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0."}}, {"text": "Gadgil Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4629, "end_char": 4642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. s. s. Gadgil Mathur and Ravi11der Narain, for the• respondent."}}, {"text": "Ravi11der Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4647, "end_char": 4663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. s. s. Gadgil Mathur and Ravi11der Narain, for the• respondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4770, "end_char": 4774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J .-Ml s Lal and Company hereinafter called the assessee carry on business in Bombay as commission agents.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "M1rch, 12, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5118, "end_char": 5133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On M1rch, 12, 1957, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice calli:Jg upon the assessee to show caus0 why in respect of the assessment year 1954-55 the asscssee should not be treated under s. 43 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as an agent in respect of twenty-five non-resident parties named in the notice."}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5302, "end_char": 5307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5315, "end_char": 5342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Income-tax Officer B-III Ward, Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5695, "end_char": 5732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer B-III Ward, Bombay issued on March 27, 1957, a notice under s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act for assessment of the assessee as .an agent of the twentyfive named non-resident parties."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5808, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6259, "end_char": 6264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6474, "end_char": 6479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6579, "end_char": 6584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(l)(b)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6681, "end_char": 6697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6714, "end_char": 6725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6882, "end_char": 6887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act,\n\n1956", "statute": "the Finance Act,\n\n1956"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7001, "end_char": 7006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act,\n\n1956", "statute": "the Finance Act,\n\n1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7285, "end_char": 7293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act,\n\n1956", "statute": "the Finance Act,\n\n1956"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7321, "end_char": 7355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay praying that a writ in the nature of mandamus or prohibition do issue restraining and prohibiting the Income-tax Officer from giving effect to or taking any steps or proceedings by way of recovery or otherwise in pursuance of the orders of assessment."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7685, "end_char": 7690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act,\n\n1956", "statute": "the Finance Act,\n\n1956"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7853, "end_char": 7873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay, following its earlier judgment in S. C. Prashar v.\n\nVosantsen Dwarkadas(') held that at the date when the notice was issued, by reason of the proviso which was in operation under s. 34 (1) in respect of the assessment year 1954-55 the notice was out of time and that the period provided thereby could not be extended by the Finance Act of 1956 so as to authorise the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice for assessment or reassessment of the assessce as statutory agent of a party, residing outside \\he taxable territory."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8054, "end_char": 8059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8559, "end_char": 8564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8587, "end_char": 8592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8774, "end_char": 8780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order of the High Court issuing writs prayed for by the assessee, with certificate of fitness this appeal is preferred by the Income-tax Officer, Bombay."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8947, "end_char": 8952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8974, "end_char": 8978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) 29 I.T.R. 857\n\nShah J.\n\nShah/.\n\nas they stood before the section was amended by the Finance Act, 1956.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9043, "end_char": 9060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9492, "end_char": 9502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9813, "end_char": 9823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9955, "end_char": 9960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9968, "end_char": 9985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9987, "end_char": 9992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10400, "end_char": 10410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10470, "end_char": 10475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10550, "end_char": 10555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10952, "end_char": 10957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11069, "end_char": 11083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That period expired on March 31, 1956, and after that date no notice could be issued, relying upon the law as it stood before amendment for assessment or re-assessment treating the assessee as an agent of a non-resident under s. 43."}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11272, "end_char": 11277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11548, "end_char": 11558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11566, "end_char": 11583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1.\n\n1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11651, "end_char": 11665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, is, it is common ground, not given retrospective operation before April 1."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12237, "end_char": 12242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12409, "end_char": 12414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12624, "end_char": 12629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12767, "end_char": 12772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. S. Gadgik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12855, "end_char": 12867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prima facie, on the expiry of the period prescribed by s. 34 as it originally stood, there was no scope for issuing a notice unless tho\n\n19~ - S. S. Gadgik\n\nLal and Co.\n\nShah/.\n\n196-1\n\nShah J:\n\nLegislature expressly gave power to the Income-tax Officer to issue notice under the amended section notwithstanding the expiry of the period under the unamended provision or unless there was overlapping of the period within which notice could be issued under the old and the amended provision.", "canonical_name": "S. S. GADGIL"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13333, "end_char": 13338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13346, "end_char": 13373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13495, "end_char": 13500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13690, "end_char": 13695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13703, "end_char": 13720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13765, "end_char": 13769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13782, "end_char": 13801, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tom", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14397, "end_char": 14400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tom/inson's case ( 1) the question was whether an order of affiliation could be made on an .1pplication made in respect of a child born at any time of the day on August 10, 1872 under the Bastardy Act, 35 & 36 Viet."}}, {"text": "inson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14401, "end_char": 14406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tom/inson's case ( 1) the question was whether an order of affiliation could be made on an .1pplication made in respect of a child born at any time of the day on August 10, 1872 under the Bastardy Act, 35 & 36 Viet."}}, {"text": "August 10, 1872", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14559, "end_char": 14574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tom/inson's case ( 1) the question was whether an order of affiliation could be made on an .1pplication made in respect of a child born at any time of the day on August 10, 1872 under the Bastardy Act, 35 & 36 Viet."}}, {"text": "10th of August. 1872", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14784, "end_char": 14804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an application made for an order of affiliation, it was hel'd that the order could competently be made in respect of a child born at any time of the day on the 10th of August."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16190, "end_char": 16195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16203, "end_char": 16220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16968, "end_char": 17013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was also\" placed by counsel for the Commissioner upon the rule which has prevailed in the Supreme Court of the United States of America that \"a new statute should be construed as a colliinuation of the old one with the modifications contained in the new one, although it formally repeals the old stat\\lte, when it re-enacts its substantial provisions and the two statutes are almost identical.\""}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United states of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17492, "end_char": 17537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears\n\n(I) 164 U.$. I\n\nJHShah J.\n\nto have been recognised in the Supreme Court of the United states of America in Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Jolifee( 1) that repeal in terms of a former statute does not necessarily indicate .an intention of the legislature thereby to impair right which had arisen under the act which was repealed."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17855, "end_char": 17868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the provisions of the new act took effect simultaneously with the repeal of the old one, the Supreme Court held that the new one might more properly be said to be substituted in the place of the old one, and to continue in force, with modifications, the provisions of the old act, instead of abrogating or annulling them and re-en.acting the same as a new and original act."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18467, "end_char": 18491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To such a case the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court of America, assuming it applies, attributing to the Legislature an intention to continue in force the provisions of the old Act, with a modification, so as to give to the new statute in substance operation retrospectively from the date on which the old statute was enacted, can have no application."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18870, "end_char": 18875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18883, "end_char": 18900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19061, "end_char": 19066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19474, "end_char": 19479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19494, "end_char": 19508, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Baleswar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21369, "end_char": 21377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again soon after it was delivered the the authority of Baleswar's case(') was weakened by the judgment in Jagdish v. Saligram (6 ) where the Court doubted the correctness of the earlier view."}}, {"text": "Shall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22017, "end_char": 22022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shall J.\n\nSltllh /.\n\nlitigation between the citizen and the States: they are administrative authorities whose proceedings are regulated by statute, but whose function is to estimate the income of the taxpayer and to assess him to tax on the basis of that estimate.", "canonical_name": "Shall"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22674, "end_char": 22679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23162, "end_char": 23176, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23563, "end_char": 23568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23672, "end_char": 23677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chakravartti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24955, "end_char": 24967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Counsel for the Commissioner sought to derive some support from Income-tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta and another v. Calcutta Discount Company Ltd.( 1) in which Chakravartti C.J., dealing with the effect of the Income-tax and Business Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948, observed:\n\n\"The plain effect of the substitution."}}, {"text": "30th March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25148, "end_char": 25164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the new s: 34 with effect from 30th March, 1948 is ihat from that dat$1 the Income-tax Act is to be re.ad as including the new section as a part thereof and if it is to be so read, the further effect of the express language of the section is that so far as cases coming within cl. ("}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25193, "end_char": 25207, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25787, "end_char": 25792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) a3 I.T.R. 471\n\nShala J.\n\n8.", "canonical_name": "Shall"}}, {"text": "S. Gu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25800, "end_char": 25805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Gu,; l\n\ny, Lol tmll Co.\n\nShah/.\n\nBut it may be recalled that the amending Act of 1948 with which the Court was concerned in Calcutta Discount Company's case(') came into force on September 8, 1948, but s. 1 (2) prescribed that the amendment in s. 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, shall be deemed to have come into force on March 30, 1948, and the period under the unamended section within which notice could be issued under\n\n~. 34 ( 3) against the assessee company ended on March 31, 1951."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Discount Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25927, "end_char": 25952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Gu,; l\n\ny, Lol tmll Co.\n\nShah/.\n\nBut it may be recalled that the amending Act of 1948 with which the Court was concerned in Calcutta Discount Company's case(') came into force on September 8, 1948, but s. 1 (2) prescribed that the amendment in s. 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, shall be deemed to have come into force on March 30, 1948, and the period under the unamended section within which notice could be issued under\n\n~. 34 ( 3) against the assessee company ended on March 31, 1951."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26005, "end_char": 26009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26047, "end_char": 26052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26060, "end_char": 26080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "March 31, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26276, "end_char": 26290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Gu,; l\n\ny, Lol tmll Co.\n\nShah/.\n\nBut it may be recalled that the amending Act of 1948 with which the Court was concerned in Calcutta Discount Company's case(') came into force on September 8, 1948, but s. 1 (2) prescribed that the amendment in s. 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, shall be deemed to have come into force on March 30, 1948, and the period under the unamended section within which notice could be issued under\n\n~. 34 ( 3) against the assessee company ended on March 31, 1951."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27264, "end_char": 27278, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27370, "end_char": 27375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27383, "end_char": 27400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27510, "end_char": 27515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "authoriiy of the Income-tax Officer under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27578, "end_char": 27627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28126, "end_char": 28131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But authoriiy of the Income-tax Officer under the Act", "statute": "But authoriiy of the Income-tax Officer under the Act"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28139, "end_char": 28156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28699, "end_char": 28731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nKANPUR COAL SYNDICATE\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28766, "end_char": 28778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nKANPUR COAL SYNDICATE\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO*"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28783, "end_char": 28790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nKANPUR COAL SYNDICATE\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. M. S!KRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28795, "end_char": 28806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nKANPUR COAL SYNDICATE\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "s. M. S!KRr"}}, {"text": "Powers of Tribunal and Appellate Assistanl Commissioner in Appeal-Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28967, "end_char": 29053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_85_93_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\ncommencement of the amending Act. The Legislature has given to s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, only a limited retrospective operation i.e., upto April 1, 1956, only.\n\nThat provision must be read subject to the rule that in the absence of an express provision or clear implication, the Legislature does not intend to attribute to the amending provision a greater retrospectivity than is exrressiy mentioned, nor to authorise the Income•tax Officer to commence proceedings which before the new Act came into force had by the expiry of the period provided, become barred.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW\n\nKANPUR COAL SYNDICATE\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. C. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Assessment on Association of persons or on members indi\n\nvidually-Option to appropriate authority-Right of appeal, whether such assessee has--Powers of Tribunal and Appellate Assistanl Commissioner in Appeal-Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), n. 3, 14(2) (b) 30, 31 and 33.\n\nIncome-tax was assessed upon the total income in the hands of tho respondent-assessee, an association of several persons combined together for the purpose of purchase of coal and its supply to customers\n\nfor domestic purposes and other small scale industries. The assesseo claimed that it should not be assessed to tax as an association of persons, but the proportion of the income in the hands of each members of the association might be assessed to tax instead. The Income-tax Officer refused this request and an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was dismissed. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, on a further appeal. held that though the Income-tax Officer had power to assess income of the association of persons as such or in the altematiye on the individual members thereof in respect of their proportionate sharo fn the income, the tribunal had no power under the Act to direct tho Income-tax Officer to exercise his power in one way or other. On a\n\n196'\n\nLal orul Co.\n\nY. s. s. Gadill\n\nSltah J.\n\nApril, 30.\n\nSyndical•\n\nreference, the High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal had power to set aside the Income-tax Officer's assessment against the usocia1io4 and to give consequential and ancillary 'directions to the said officer to assess individuala.\n\nHBLD:-(i) Section 3 of the Income-tax Act impliedly gives an option to an appropriate authority to assess the total income of either the association of persons or the members of such association individually.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nReddy Mallaram, (1964) SI I.T.R. 285 (S.C.) followed.\n\n(ii) 3uch an assessee has a right to appeal under s. 30 of the Act against the order of the Incom.,.tax Officer assessing the association of persons instead of the members individually.\n\n(iii) The Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to give directions to the appropriate authority to cancel the assessment made on the associ.a lion of persons an'd to give appropriate directions to the authority concerned to make fresh assessment on the members of that associationa individually. The phraseology used both ins. 31 ands. 33 does not restrict the powers of the Appellate Ass:stant Commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal; both have the power of such direction.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 673 of 1963.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated September 22, 1960, of the Allahabad High Court in Income-tax Miscellaneous Case No. 188 of 1953.\n\nS. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.\n\nVeda Vyasa and Naunit Lal, for the respondent.\n\nApril 30, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSubba Rao 1.\n\nSUBBA RAo, J.-The question for decision in this appeal is whether when the Income-tax Officer in his discretion assessed an association of persons to income-tax, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner iii appeal or the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in further appeal can set aside that order and direct him to assess the members of that association individually.\n\nThe facts lie in a small compass and they are .as follows: The assessee consisted of several persons combined together for the purp<ise of purchasing coal in order to supply the\n\nsame to customers for domestic purposes and other small scale industries.\n\nFor the assessment year 1948-49 the Income-tax Officer levied tax upon the total income in the hands of the said as, ociation of persons.\n\nThe assessee claimed that in th.: drcumstances of the case it should not be assessed to , ax as an association of persons, but the proportion of the income in the hands of each of the members of the association might be assessed to tax instead. As the Income-tax Officer did not comply with this request, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but it was dismissed.\n\nOn a further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal held that though the Income-tax Officer had the power to assess the income of the association of persons as such or in the alternative on the individual members thereof in respect of their proportionate share in the income, it (the Tribunal) had no power under the Act to direct the Income-tax Officer to exercise his power in one way or other.\n\nThe following question was referred to the High Court of Allahabad under s. 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922:\n\n\"If in pursuance of s. 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act the Income-tax Officer levies the income tax in respect of the total income of the previous year of an association of persons upon the said association of persons as a collective unit, whether the Tribunal is competent to direct the Income-tax Officer to levy the income tax proportionately upon the individual members of the said association of persons in respect of the proportionate income of each of the members consisting the said association of persons.\"\n\nA Division Bench of the High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal had power to set aside the Income-tax Officer's assessment against the association and to give consequential and ancillary directions to the said Officer to assess the individuals.\n\nLearned counsel for the Revenue contends that under the [ndian Income-tax Act 1922, he reinafter called the Act the Income-tax Officer h; s no option but to assess the total\n\nCl.T. v.\n\nKanpur Coal\n\nSyndicate\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nCJ.T.\n\nKanpur Coal\n\nSyndicate\n\nSubba Rao I.\n\nincome of the association of members, though the individual's share in the income may be added to his individual income for the purpose of ascertaining his total income. He further argues that even if the Income-tax Officer has the option to assess to income-tax the association of persons on its total income or the individual members thereof in respect of their proportionate share of the income, if he had exercised the option in one way or other neither the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal nor the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in further appeal has power to direct the Incometax Officer to exercise his discretion in a different way; and for this conclusion he seeks to draw strength from his further submission that no appeal lies at the instance of the association of persons when they are assessed as one unit on the ground that the Officer should have assessed the individual members of the said association.\n\nAt the outset it will be convenient to read the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 3. Charge of Inoome-tax: Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions, of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local auority, and of every firm and other association of persons or the part;1ers of the firm or the members of the association individually.\n\nSection 14. (2) The tax shall not be payable by an asses see--\n\n• • • • * *\"\n\n(b) if a member of an association of persons other than a Hindu undivided family, a company or a firm, in respect of any portion of the amount which he is entitled to receive lrom the association on which the tax has already been paid by the association.\n\n8 S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT KEPORTS\n\nSection 30. ( 1) Any assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed under section 23 ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . or the amount of tax determined under section 23 .......................... ·\n\n................ or denying his liability to be assessed . under this Act ....................... may appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the assessment or against such refus.al or order:\n\nSection 31. (3) In disposing of an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment,- ( a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or\n\n(b) set aside the assessment and direct the Incornetax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making such further inquiry as the Income-tax\n\nOfficer thinks fit or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may direct, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assessment and determine where necessary the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment.\n\nx x x x x x\n\n( 4) Where as the result of an appeal any change is made in the assessment of a firm or association of persons or a new assessment of a firm or associations of persons is ordered to be made, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may authorise the Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made on any partner of the firm or any member of the association.\n\nSection 3 imposes a tax upon a person in respect of his total income.\n\nThe persons on whom such tax can be imposed are particularized therein, namely, Hindu undivided family, company, local authority, firm, association of persons, partners of firm• or members of association individually.\n\nThe section, therefore, does not in terms confer any power on any particular officer to assess one of the\n\nCJ.T. v • Kanpur Coal\n\nSyndicate\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nCJ.T. v.\n\nKanpur Coal\n\nSynd(cate\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\npersons described therein, but is only a charging section imposing the levy of tax on the total income of an assessable entity described therein.\n\nThe section expressly treats an association of persons and the individual members of an association as two distinct and different assessable entities.\n\nOn the terms of the section the tax can be levied on either of the said two entities according to the provisions of the Act.\n\nThere is no scope for the argument that under s. 3 the assessment shall be only on the association of persons as a unit though after such assessment the share of the income of a member of that association may be added to his other income under s. 14 ( 2) of the Act.\n\nThis construction would make the last words of the section, viz., \"members of the association individually\" a surplusage.\n\nThis argument is also contrary to the express provisions of s. 3, which m1rk out the members of the association individually as a separate entity from the association of persons.\n\nIncome of every person whether he is a member of an association or not is liable to the charge under the head \"every individual\".\n\nSection 14 ( 2 )(b) only says that if such an individual happens to be a member of an association of persons which has already been assessed, the tax would not be payable in respect of t)ie share of his income again.\n\nThat under the Act an assessment can be made on an association of persons as a unit or, alternatively, on the individual members thereof in respect of their respective shares of the income was assumed by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Raja Reddy Mallaram(').\n\nWe, therefore, hold that s. 3 impliedly gives an option to .an appropriate authority to assess the total income of either the association of persons or the members of such association individually.\n\nThe next question is whether the said option is given only to the Income-tax Officer and is denied to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appell.ate Tribunal.\n\nUnder the Act the Income-tax Officer, after following the procedure prescribed, makes the assessment under s. 23 of the Act.\n\nDoubtless in making the assessment at the first instance he has to exercise the option whether he should assess the association of persons or the members thereof\n\n(1) [1964] 51 I.T.R. 285 (S.C.)\n\nindividually. It is not because that any section of the Act confers an exclusive power on him to do so, but because it is part of the process of assessment; that is to say, he has to ascertain who is the person liable to be assessed for the tax.\n\nIf he seeks to assess an association of persons as an assessable entity, the said entity can object to the assessment, inter alia, on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the assessment should be made on the members of the association individually.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer may reject its contention and may assess the total income of the. association as such and impose the tax on it.\n\nUnder s. 30 an assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed . under s. 23 or the amount of tax determined under the said section or denying his liability to be assessed under the Act can prefer an appeal against the order of the Income-tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is said that an order made by the Income-tax Officer rejecting the plea of an association of persons that the members thereof shall be assessed individually does not fall under one or other of the i:hree heads mentioned above.\n\nWhat is the substance of the objection of the assessee?\n\nThe assessee denies his !ability to be assessed under the Act in the circumstances of the case and pleads that the members of the association shall be assessed only individually.\n\nThe expression \"denial of liability\" is comprehensive enough to take in not only the total denial of liability but also the liability to tax under particular circumstances.\n\nIn either case the denial is a denial of liability to be assessed under the provisions of the Act. In one case the assessee says that he is not liable to be assessed to tax under the Act, and in the other case the assessee denies his liability to tax under the provisions of the Act if the option given to the appropriate officer under the provisions of the Act is judicially exercised.\n\nWe, therefore. hold that such an assessee has a right of appeal under s. 30 of the Act against the order of the Income-tax Officer assessing the association of members instead of the members thereof individually. If an appeal lies, s. 31 of the Act describes the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in such an appeal. Under s. 31 (3)(a) in disposing of such an appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, in the case of an order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or\n\nC.l.T.\n\nSylulicate\n\nSubba Rao/.\n\nSyndicate\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nannul the assessment; under cl. (b) thereof he may set , aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner has, therefore, plenary powers in disposing of an appeal.\n\nThe scope of his power is coterminous with .that of the Income-tax Officer.\n\nHe can do what the Income-tax Officer can do and also direct him to do what he has failed to do.\n\nIf the Income-tax Officer has the option to assess Jne or other of the entities in the alternative, the Appellate As.ist ant Commissioner can direct him to do what he should have done in the circumstances of a case.\n\nUnder s. 33(1 ), an assessee objecting to an order passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under s. 28 or s. 31 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 60 days of the date on which such order is communicated to him.\n\nUnder s. 33( 4 ), \"The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, and shall communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the Commissioner.\" Under s. 33 ( 5), \"Where as the result of an appeal ny change is made in the assessment of a firm or association of persons or a new assessment of a firm or association of persons is ordered to be made, the Appellate Tribunal may authorise the Income-tax Officer to amend accordingly any assessment made on any partner of the firm or any member of the association\".\n\nUnder this section the Appellate Tribunal has ample power to set aside the assessment made on the associatien of persons and direct the Income-tax Officer to assess the individuals or to direct the amendment of the assessment already made on the members.\n\nThe comprehensive phraseology used both in s. 31 and s. 33 of the Act does not countenance the attempt of the Revenue to restrict the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or of the Appellate Tribunal; both of them have power to direct the appropriate authority to assess the members individually instead of the association of persons as a unit.\n\nWe, therefore, hold, agreeing with the High Court, that the Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to give directions to the appropriate authority to cancel the assessment made on the association of persons and to give appropriate directions\n\n,--\n\ni\"'\n\nto the authority concerned to make a fresh assessment on the members of that asociation individually.\n\nThe answer given by the High Court to the question propounded is correct.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nKETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SuB!lA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. S1KRI, JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Compensation received for surrendering managing agency- ]/ capital or revenue-Test-lncome .. tax ... tct, 1922 (11 of 1922), ss. 2(6c), 10, 12.\n\nBy an agreement \\vith the Fort Willi:in1 Jute Company in 1925 the appellant company becm1e its Managing Agent.\n\nThe terms, inter .ilia, were that the appellant or its successors, unless they chose to resign, were to continue as l\\1anaging Agent until they ceased to hold certain shares in the capital of the company and were on that account re1noved by a resolution of the company or their tenure of office was determined by the winding U? _of the company.\n\nOn termination of the agency, the Managing Agent was to get such reasonable compensation as was agreed upon bet\\'leen the !\\1a0aging Agent and th~ comvany.. Besides this managing agency the appellant held five other man<iging agencies.\n\nIn 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant. The appellant intimated the members of the latter company that it would be in the best interest of the share-holders to terminate the appellant's agency which would otherwise continue till 1957 and that .M/S. Mugneeratn Bengur & Co. had agreed to reimburse the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. for payment of Rs. 3,50,000 as compensation to the appeIIant.\n\nThe arrangement with M/s.\n\nMugneeram Bangur & Co. was accepted by the Fort William Jute Co. and the appellant tendered resignation.\n\nM/s. Mugneeram Bangur and\n\nC9.\n\nSyndicate\n\nSubba Rao }.\n\nMay I.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "commencement of the amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 65, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\ncommencement of the amending Act", "statute": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\ncommencement of the amending Act"}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Legislature has given to s. 18 of the Finance Act, 1956, only a limited retrospective operation i.e., upto April 1, 1956, only."}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 710, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "OMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.P., LUCKNOW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KANPUR COAL SYNDICATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 712, "end_char": 733, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KANPUR COAL SYNDICATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. 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Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3505, "end_char": 3516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3521, "end_char": 3535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyasa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3557, "end_char": 3567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa and Naunit Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3572, "end_char": 3582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa and Naunit Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3665, "end_char": 3674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSubba Rao 1.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao/."}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3679, "end_char": 3688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUBBA RAo, J.-The question for decision in this appeal is whether when the Income-tax Officer in his discretion assessed an association of persons to income-tax, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner iii appeal or the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in further appeal can set aside that order and direct him to assess the members of that association individually.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao/."}}, {"text": "Assistant Commissioner", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4789, "end_char": 4811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Income-tax Officer did not comply with this request, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but it was dismissed."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4863, "end_char": 4892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal held that though the Income-tax Officer had the power to assess the income of the association of persons as such or in the alternative on the individual members thereof in respect of their proportionate share in the income, it (the Tribunal) had no power under the Act to direct the Income-tax Officer to exercise his power in one way or other."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5296, "end_char": 5319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following question was referred to the High Court of Allahabad under s. 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922:\n\n\"If in pursuance of s. 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act the Income-tax Officer levies the income tax in respect of the total income of the previous year of an association of persons upon the said association of persons as a collective unit, whether the Tribunal is competent to direct the Income-tax Officer to levy the income tax proportionately upon the individual members of the said association of persons in respect of the proportionate income of each of the members consisting the said association of persons.\""}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5326, "end_char": 5331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5343, 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8373, "end_char": 8383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8496, "end_char": 8506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8745, "end_char": 8755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9700, "end_char": 9709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10664, "end_char": 10668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10862, "end_char": 10867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11069, "end_char": 11073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": 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(", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao/."}}, {"text": "s. 33(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15654, "end_char": 15663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15751, "end_char": 15756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15760, "end_char": 15765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33( 4 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15881, "end_char": 15891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16122, "end_char": 16127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16782, "end_char": 16787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16792, "end_char": 16797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KETTLEWELL BULLEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17604, "end_char": 17621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO."}}, {"text": "K. SuB!lA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17670, "end_char": 17683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SuB!lA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO, J."}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17705, "end_char": 17708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 2(6c), 10, 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17854, "end_char": 17871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mugneeram Bangur & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18619, "end_char": 18641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Mugneeram Bangur & Co."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18693, "end_char": 18720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18899, "end_char": 18931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18959, "end_char": 18984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mugneeratn Bengur & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19238, "end_char": 19261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant intimated the members of the latter company that it would be in the best interest of the share-holders to terminate the appellant's agency which would otherwise continue till 1957 and that .M/S. Mugneeratn Bengur & Co. had agreed to reimburse the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. for payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19290, "end_char": 19316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant intimated the members of the latter company that it would be in the best interest of the share-holders to terminate the appellant's agency which would otherwise continue till 1957 and that .M/S. Mugneeratn Bengur & Co. had agreed to reimburse the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. for payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Mugneeram Bangur & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19407, "end_char": 19429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arrangement with M/s.\n\nMugneeram Bangur & Co. was accepted by the Fort William Jute Co. and the appellant tendered resignation."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19450, "end_char": 19471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arrangement with M/s.\n\nMugneeram Bangur & Co. was accepted by the Fort William Jute Co. and the appellant tendered resignation."}}, {"text": "Mugneeram Bangur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19518, "end_char": 19534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Mugneeram Bangur and\n\nC9.", "canonical_name": "Mugneeram Bangur & Co."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19556, "end_char": 19565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Syndicate\n\nSubba Rao }.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao/."}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_93_121_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 93\n\nto the authority concerned to make a fresh assessment on the members of that asociation individually.\n\nThe answer given by the High Court to the question propounded is correct.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nKETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SuB!lA RAo, J. C. SHAH ANDS. M. S1KRI, JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Compensation received for surrendering managing agency- ]/ capital or revenue-Test-lncome .. tax ... tct, 1922 (11 of 1922), ss. 2(6c), 10, 12.\n\nBy an agreement \\vith the Fort Willi:in1 Jute Company in 1925 the appellant company becm1e its Managing Agent.\n\nThe terms, inter .ilia, were that the appellant or its successors, unless they chose to resign, were to continue as l\\1anaging Agent until they ceased to hold certain shares in the capital of the company and were on that account re1noved by a resolution of the company or their tenure of office was determined by the winding U? _of the company.\n\nOn termination of the agency, the Managing Agent was to get such reasonable compensation as was agreed upon bet\\'leen the !\\1a0aging Agent and th~ comvany.. Besides this managing agency the appellant held five other man<iging agencies.\n\nIn 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant. The appellant intimated the members of the latter company that it would be in the best interest of the share-holders to terminate the appellant's agency which would otherwise continue till 1957 and that .M/S. Mugneeratn Bengur & Co. had agreed to reimburse the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. for payment of Rs. 3,50,000 as compensation to the appeIIant.\n\nThe arrangement with M/s.\n\nMugneeram Bangur & Co. was accepted by the Fort William Jute Co. and the appellant tendered resignation.\n\nM/s. Mugneeram Bangur and\n\nC9.\n\nCl.T. v Kanpur Coal\n\nSyndicate\n\nSubba Rao }.\n\nMay I.\n\nlCtttlew•ll Bun.n\n\nand Co. ...\n\nCJ.T.\n\nbecame the Managing agent.\n\nThe appellant received the sum ol Rs. 3,50,000 and credited the sum in its profit and 1068 account as having been received from the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. on account of com pensation for loss of office and in calculating the net profit for the purpose of income-tax for the year 1953-54 did not include this amount in the return. The Income-tax Officer in assessment included the amount in the appellant's taxable income. The Assistant Appellate Com missioner on appeal modified the assessment holding that the sum received by the appellant as compensation for surrendering the managing agency, which was to enure for five years more and might have continued for another twenty years, was a capital receipt. The Appel1ate Tribunal confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nAt the instance of the Commissioner , of Income-tax the following question was referred to the High Court:\n\nWhether on the facts and circumstances of the case the sum of Rs. 3,50,000 received by the assessee to relinquish the managing agency was a revenue receipt assessable under the Indian Income-tax Act?.\n\nThe High Court answered the question in the affirmative.\n\nHELD: that the answer should be in the negative. The transaction in question was not a trading transaction, but one in which the asses., ee parted with an asset of enduring value. The compensation received was compensation for loss of capital.\n\nIt was inconsequential whether the appellant conducted the remaining agencies after the determination of the one in question.\n\nWhere payment is made as compensation for cancellation of a contract which does not affect the trading structure of the business, nor causes 'deprivation of what in substance is c of income, and is a normal incident Gf the business, the compensation is revenue. But 'vb.ere the cancellation impairs the trading structure or results in loss of tbe source of income, the compensation paid for the cancellation of the aareement is normally rapital receipt.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax Na1pur v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Yalji, 35 l.T.R. 148, referred to.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace and Co. L.1l. 59 I.A. 206, explained.\n\nRaja Bahadur Kamakshaya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v. Co1n111i.s• aioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orism, L.R. 70 I.A. 180, Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax Madras v. South India Pictures, 29 I.T.R. 910, Peirce Leslie and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of lncometnx, M11dras, 3R l.T.R. -356, Commissioner of lncome•tax, Hyderabad-Deccan\n\nv. Vazir Sultan and Sonz. 36 I.T.R. 175 and Godrej & Co. Y. Commis- •ionor of Income-tax, Bombay City, 37 I.T, R.. 381, discussed.\n\nc, viL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 226 of 1963.\n\n1964 Appeal from the judgment and order dated August I, i961, of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 75 of 1956.\n\nKri.rhna Warriar\n\n•nd Co.\n\nS. Chaudhuri, D. N. Mukherjee and D. N. Gupta, for the appllant.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.\n\nMay 1, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J .-The appellant is a public limited company. and has its registered office at Calcutta. By an agreement dated May l, 1925, the Fort William Jute Company Ltd. appointed the appellant its managing agent upon certain terms and conditions set out therein. Under the agreement the appellant was to receive as managing agent remuneration at the rate of Rs. 3 ,000 per month, commission at the rate of ten per cent on the profits of the company's working, additional commission at three per cent on the cost price of all new machinery and stores purchased by the managing agent outside India on account of the company, and interest on all advances made by the managing agent to the company on the security of the company's stocks, raw materials and manufactured goods.\n\nThe appellant 'and its successors in business, whether under the same or any other style or firm, unless they resigned their office were entitled to continue as managing agent until they ceased to hold shares in the capital of the company of the aggregate nominal value of Rs. 1,00,000 and were on that account removed by a special resolution of the company passed at an Extraordinary meeting of the company, or until the managing agent's tenure was determined by the winding up of the company.\n\nIn the event of termination of agency in the contingencies specified, the managing agent was to receive such reasonable compensation for deprivation of office, as may be agreed upon between the .managing agent and the company and in case of dispute, as may be determined by two arbitrators.\n\nBy cl. 8, the managing 'agent was at liberty at any time to\n\nCJ.T.\n\nShah J.\n\n1964 resign the office of managing agent by leaving at the register-\n\n~11/ewell Bullen ed office of the company previous notice in writing of its\n\nand Co. intention in that behalf. The agreement did not specify any\n\nc~.T. period for which the managing agency was to enure. Since\n\nShah J. the successors of the appellant were also to continue as\n\nagent~, unless they resigned or became disqualified, the duration was in a sense unlimited. But by virtue of s. 87-A(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the appointment of the appellant as managing agent would expire on January 14, 1957, i.e. on the expiry of twenty years from the date on which the Indian Companies (Amendment) Act, 1956, was brought into operation. Section 87-A(2), however, did not prevent the managing agent from being re-appointed after the expiry of that period.\n\nBeside the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. the appellant held at all material time managing agencies of five oilier limited companies, viz., Fort Closter\n\nJute Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bowreach Cotton Mills Co.\n\nLtd., Dunbar Mills Ltd., Mothola Co. Lld and Joonktollee Tea Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nThe appellant had advanced Rs. 12,50,000 to the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. on the security of the stocks, raw materials and manufactured goods of that company. The appellant held in 1952, 600 out of\n\n14,000 ordinary shares of the face value of Rs. 100 each, and 6,920 out of 10,000 preference shares also of the face value of Rs. 100 each.\n\nOn May 21, 1952, the appellant entered into an agreement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co., the principal conditions of which were:\n\n(i) M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to purchase the entire holding of shares of the appellant in the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.-ordinary shares at Rs. 400 each and preference shares at Rs. 185 each, and to make an ofier to all holders of the company's shares-preference and ordinary-to purchase their holdings at the same rates;\n\n(ii) M/ s Mugneeram Bangur & Co~ to procure repay\n\nment on or before June 30, 1952 of all loan!\n\n8 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 97 ' made by the appellant to the principal com- 1964 pany; _- ' .. •.(.. l Kettlewell .Bullen and Co.\n\n(iii) M/s Mugoeeram Bangur & Co. to procure that v.\n\nC.l.T. the . principal company will compensate , the appellant for loss of office in the -sum ·. of\n\n- Rs. 3,50,000, such sum being payable to the\n\n appellant. after it submitted its resignation as managing_ agent; and\n\n(iv) M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to reimburse the company the amount payable to the appellant.\n\nThe reasons for which the appellant agreed to relinquish the managing agency were set out in a letter dated May 28, 1952, addressed by the appellant to the members of the., company intimating thar M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. were willing to purchase the shares at the same rates at which they had agreed to purchase the share-holding of the appellant. It was recited in the letter that the installation of modem machinery in the company's factory entailed heavy capital expenditure and it was necessary to obtain a loan secured by debentures charged on the company's property; that large sums were required for renewals and replacements of machinery and it was not possible to obtain additional bank accommodation; that the' appellant had made large -advances to the company -exceeding Rs. 12,50,000 and, having regard to its other commitments, it was doubtful if it would be able to make available to the company additional finance; that the arrangement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co., by acceptance of the terms offered ty them, was the most satisfactory method of solving the company's difficulties; that it was in the best interests of the shareholders to terminate the appointment of the appellant which in the normal course would not fall due for renewal until January 14, 1957; that 'lvl/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. had agreed Jo procure that the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. will pay to the appellant Rs: 3,50,000 and that M/s Mug-. neeram Bangur & Co. will reimburse the company for the payment, it being anticipated that they will in due course\n\nDe appointed managing agents of the company.\n\n51 S.C.-7\n\nShah /.\n\nSUPI~El\\IE COURT REPORTS\n\n1964 The arrangement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co.\n\nKettlrn-:; u- Bullen was carried out.\n\nThe appellant tendered its resignation and Co. with effect from July l, 1952, in pursuance of the terms of c\".i.T. the agreement and M/s Mungneeram Bangur & Co. were Shah 1• appointed as managing agent of the company. The sum of _ __Rs. 3,50,000 received by the appellant from the companywhich it is common ground was provided by M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co.-was credited in the profit and loss account of the appellant as received from the Fort William Jute Co.\n\nLtd. on account of compensation for loss of office. -But in arriving at the net profit in the return for income-tax for the year 1953-54 this amount was deleted. In the proce_edings for assessment for the year 1953-54 the Incometax Officer, Companies District IV, Calcutta, included this amount in the appellant's taxable income. In -appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner modified the assessment holding that the_ sum of Rs. 3,50,000 received by the appellant as compen'sation for surrendering the managing agency; which was to enure for five years more, and which in normal course might have continued for another term of twenty years, was a capital receipt. The Appellate Tribunal confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissiciner, observing that compensation received under an agreement for \"an outright sale of such an agency to a third party\", not being one which a businessman enters in the normal course of business. nor being one which amounts to modification, alteration or discharge of normal incidents of such a business, was not assessable to income-tax as a revenue receipt.\n\nAt the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Tribunal referred under s. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the following question to the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta:\n\n\"Whether on the fact~ 1'nd in the circumstances of the case the sum of Rs. 3,50,000 received by the assessee to relinquish the managing agency was a revenue receipt assessable under the Indian Income-tax Act?\"\n\nThe High Court, for reasons which we will presently set out, answered the question in the affirmative. With certificate Kettlewell Bullla granted by the High Court, this appeal is preferred by the and Qi. v. appellant.\n\nC.l.T.\n\nThis case raises once again 'the question whether compensation received by an agent for premature determination of the contract of agency is a capital or a revenue receipt.\n\nThe question is not capable of solution by the application of any single test: its solution must depend on a com:ct appraisal in their true perspective of all the relevant facts.\n\nAs observed in Commissioner of Income-tax Nagpur v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji(') by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.,:\n\n\"The question whe<her a receipt is capital or income has frequently come up for determination before the courts. Various rules have been enunciated as furnishing a key to the solution of the question, but as often observed by the highest authorities, it is not possible to lay down any single test as infallible or any single criterion as decisive in the determination of the question, which must ultimately depend on the facts of the particular case, and the authorities bearing on the question are valuable only as indicating the matters that hav, e to be taken into account in reaching a decision.\n\nVide, Van Den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark [(1935) 3 I.T.R. (Engl. Cas.) 17]. That, however is not to say that the question is one of fact, for as observed in Davies (H. M. Inspector of Taxes)\n\nv. Shell Company of China Ltd. (1952) 22 l.T.R. (Suppl.) 1) 'these questions between capital and income, trading profit or no trading profit, are questions which, though they may depend no doubt to a very great extent on the particular facts of each case, do involve a conclusion of law to be drawn from those facts'.\"\n\n(t) [I9.l9] Supp. I S.C.R. no, II3.\n\nShah J,\n\nKett/ewe// Bullen and Co. v.\n\nC.l.T.\n\nShah J.\n\nThe interrelation of facts which have a bearing on the question propounded must therefore first be determined.\n\nThe managing agency was not, except in the circumstances set out in cl. 2 of the agreement, liable to be determined at the instance of the company before January 14, 1957, unless the appellant by giving notice of three weeks voluntarily resigned the agency. At the date of termination the agency had five more years to run, and the Campanies Act did not prohibit renewal of the agency in favour of the appellant, after the expiry of the initial period of twenty years.\n\nThe appellant company was formed for the object, amongst others, (vide cl. 3(2) of the Memorandum of Association of the appellant) of carrying on the business of managing agencies.\n\nThe appellant was entitled under the terms of the agreement to receive so long as the agency enured ten per cent of the profits of the company's working, three per cent on all purchases of stores and machinery abroad, and a monthly remuneration of Rs. 3,000. The appellant submitted its resignation in exercise of the power reserved under\n\ncl. 8 of the managing agency agreement, but that resignation was it is common ground part of the arrangement with Mis Mugneeram Bangur & Co. dated May 21, 1952.\n\nUnder the terms of the managing agency agreement, the principal company was not obliged to pay any compensation to the appellant for voluntary resignation of the agency, but in consideration of the appellant parting with its shareholding and submitting resignation of the managing agency so as to facilitate the appointment of M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. as managing agent, the latter purchased the shareholding of the appellant, undertook to make available Rs. 3,50,000 for payment to the appellant and to discharge the debt due by the company to the appellant. Payment of Rs. 3,50,000 was therefore an integral part of an arrangement for transfer of the managing agency. A managing agency of a company is in the nature of a capital asset: that is not denied. It is true that 'it is not like an ordinary asset capable of being transferred from one person to another.\n\nTheoretically the power to appoint or dismiss the managing agent may lie with the directors of the company, but in practice the power lies with the person or persons having a controlling interest in the share-holding of 1964 the company. M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. were anxious Kettlewell Bulltit\n\nto be appointed managing agents of the principal company, and Co. v. and for the purpose the appellant had to be persuaded to\n\nCJ.T. agree to a premature termination of its agency. This was Shah 1. secured for a triple consiqeration; sale of shares held by the appellant at an agreed price, stipulation to discharge the liability of the company to repay the loans due by the company, and payment of Rs. 3,50,000 as compensation for termination of the appellant's agency.\n\nThe High Court summarised the effect of the agreement between the appellant and M/s Mugnecram Bangur & Co. as follows: The sum of Rs. 3,50,000 described as compensation for loss of office of the managing agent was part of the whole scheme incorporated in the agreement.\n\nEach clause of the agreement was a consideration of the other clauses and payment of compensation for the alleged loss of office did not, being part of the total scheme, stand by itelf.\n\nDetermination of the managing agency of the appellant was not compulsory cessation of business: it was a voluntary resignation for which under the agency agreement the appellant was not entitled to any compensation, but by the device of procuring a purchaser the appellant was doing \"business of selling the managing agency and getting a profit and value for it which it otherwise could not have\n\ngot\".\n\nThe High Court stamped this transaction with the nature and character of a \"trading or a business deal\", be:cause in their view the managing agency of a companyan institution peculiar to Indian business conditions-which r.reates a managing agent as an alter ego_ of the managed company with authority to utilise the existing structure of the company's organisation to carry on business, earn profits,\n\nand in fact, virtually to trade in every possible sphere open to the company, may be regarded as circulating capital, where several managing agencies are conducted by an\n\nm; sessee.\n\nTherefore in the view of the High Court the c:ompensation received for surrendering the agency was remuneration received on account of conducting the business, and was income. The judgment of the High Court proceeded substantially upon the following two grounds:\n\n1964 \"ani.wen Bullen\n\nond Co.\n\n(1) that on the facts of the case, the managing agency held by the appellant of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. was stock-in-trade; and v.\n\nC.I.T.\n\nShah 1.\n\n(2) that the appellant was formed with the object of acquiring managing a¥encies, and in fact held managing agencies of as many as six companies.\n\nEarning profits by conducting the management of companies, being the business of the appellant, compensation received as consideration for surrendering the managing agency was a revenue receipt.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the High Court that the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. was an asset of the character of stock-in-trade of the company.\n\nThe appellant was formed with the object, among others, of acquiring managing agencies of companies and to carry on the business and to take part in the management, supervision or control of the business or operatiom of any other company, association, firm or person and to make profit out of it. That only authorised the appellant to acquire as a fixed asset, if a managing agency may be so described, and to exploit it for the purpose of profit. But there is no evidence that the company was formed for the purpose of acquiring and selling managing agencies and making profit by those transactions of sale and purchase. A managing agency is not an asset for which there is a market, for it depends upon the personal qualifications of the agent. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Commissioner concedes that the case that the managing agency was of the nature of stock-in-trade was not set up before the Tribunal, and he does not rely upon this part of the reasoning of the High Court in support of the plea that the compensation received by the appellant is a revenue receipt. He relies upon the alternative ground, and contends that the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. was part of the framework of the business of earning profit by working as managing agent of different companies, and in the normal course, termination of employment by the principal companies of the appellant as managing agent being a normal incident of such business, compensation received by the appellant is\n\nnot for loss of capital, but must be regarded as a trading 1964 receipi, especially when the termination of the agency does Kettlewell Bullen not impair the tructure of the business of the appellant. and Co. v.\n\nIn the present case there is a special circumstance\n\nCJ.T. which must first be noticed.\n\nIn truth the amount of Shah J.\n\nRs. 3,50,000 was received by the appellant from M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. in consideration of the former agreeing to forego the agency which it held and which M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. were anxious to obtain. It was in a business sense a sale of such rights as the appellant possessed in the agency to M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. This is supported by the recitals made in cl. 2 of the agreement that if a• any time within six months after the completion of such sale, M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. were unable to exercise the voting rights attached to the shares purchased by them, the appellant will appoint any person nominated by M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to attend and vote for them at any meeting of the company or the holders of any class of shares to be held within such period in such manner as M/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. may decide. The object underlying the agreement was therefore to transfer the managing agency to M/s Mugnecram Bangur & Co. or at least to effectuate their appointment in place of the appellant as managing agent of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.\n\nAll the stipulations and the covenants of the agreement, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, do stamp the transaction as one of surrender of the rights of the appellant in the managing agency so that corresponding rights may arise in favour Qf M/s. Mugneeram Bangur & l o. It would be irrelevant in considering the true nature of 1he transaction, to project the somewhat legalistic consideration that a managing agency is not transferable. It is because it is not directly transferable, that the arrangemP.nt incorporated in the agreement was effected.\n\nIt would be difficult to regard such a transaction relating to a managing agency as a trading transaction.\n\n(; ounsel for the assessee contended that even assuming that the form of the.transaction under which for Joss of the managiilg agency the appellant received compensation from the principal company is decisive, or has even a dominant\n\n~ impact, and the ultimate source from which the compensa- Ke11/mel! Bul!en tion was provided is to be ignored, the compensation receivand Co. ed for loss of agency by the agent must always be regarded v.\n\nC.l.T. under the Indian Income-tax Act as capital receipt. In sup- Shah 1. port of that contention counsel placed strong reliance upon the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace and Co.('). In the alternative, counsel pleaded that even if the extreme proposition was not found acceptable, the right of the assessee in the managing agency of the principal company was to enure fur another five years and which in the normal course would have continued for another twenty years was an enduring asset and consideration received by the appellant for extinc\n\ntion of that asset was a capital receipt.\n\nOn behalf of the Income-tax Department it was contended that Shaw Wallace & Co's case (1) does not lay down any proposition of general application to compensation paid for determination of all agency contracts.\n\nIt was further submitted that, having regard to the nature of the agreement and the voluntary resignation submitted by the assessee, no enduring asset remained vested in the assessee, and none was attempted to be transferred: the compensation directly paid by the principal company (which compensation was under the terms of the contract not payable) was only a \"measure of profit\" which the appellant wonld, but for the resignation, have earned, and was therefore in the nature of revenue. It was also urged that compensation was not payable to the assessee when resignation of the managing agency was tendered under cl. 8 of the agreement, and therefore the amount sought to be brought to tax was received by the assessee in the course of a normal trading transaction of the assessee.\n\nFinally, it was urged that in any event, by the loss of the agency the framework of the business of the assessee was not at all impaired, and therefore also the compensation received must be regarded as revenue and not capital.\n\nWhether a particular receipt is capital or income from business, has frequently engaged the attention of the courts.\n\nIt may be broad, Iy stated that what is received for Joss of capi-\n\n(1) L. R. 59 I. A. 206\n\n8 S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOI<TS 105\n\nta! is a capital receipt: what is received as profit in trading ~964 transaction is taxable income.\n\nBut the difficulty arises in Ke111ewTi Bullen ascertaining whether what is received in a given case is and Co. v. compensation for loss of a source of income, or profit in a\n\nCJ.T. trading transaction.\n\nCases on the borderline give rise to vexing problems.\n\nThe Act contains no real definition of income; indeed it is a term not capable of a definition in terms of a general formula.\n\nSection 2(6C) catalogues broadly certain categories of receipts which are included in income. It need hardly be said that the form in which the transaction which gives rise to income is clothed and the name whirh is given to it are irrelevant in assessing the exigibility of receipt arising from a transaction to tax. It is again not predicated that the income must necessarily have a recurrent quality.\n\nWe are not called upon to enter upon an extensive area of enquiry as to what receipts may be regarded as income generally, but merelv to consider in this case whether receipt of compensation for surrendering the managing agency may be regarded as capital or as revenue. In the absence. of a statutory rule, payment made by an employer in consideration of the employee releasing him from his obligations under a service or agency agreement or a payment made voluntarily as compensation for determination of right to office arises not out of employment, but from cessation of employment and may not generally constitute income chargeable under ss. 10 and 12. It may be mentioned that this rule has been altered by the Legislature by the enactment of s. 10(5A) by the Pinnace Act of 1955, which provides that compensation or other payment due to or received by a managing agent of an Indian company at or in connection with the termination or modification of his managing agency agreement with the company, or by a manager of an Indian company at or in connection w!th the termination of his office or modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto, or by any person managing the whole or substantially the whole affairs of any other company in the taxable territories at or in connection with the termination of his office or the modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto, or by any person holding an agency in the taxable territories for any part of the\n\nSha~ ).\n\n1964 activities relating to the business of any other person, at or Kettlewell Bullen in connection with the termination of his agency or the and Co. modification of the terms and conditions relating thereto,\n\nCJ.T. shall be deemed to be profits and gains of a business carried\n\nShah /. on by the managing agent, manager or other person, as the case may be, and shall be liable to tax accordingly. But this amendment was made under the Finance Act,, 1955, with effect from April 1, 1955, and has no application to the present case.\n\n-The Indian Income-tax Act is not in pari materia with the English Income-tax Statutes. But the authorities under the English Law which deal not with the interpretation of any specific provision, but on the concept of income, may not be regarded as proceeding upon any special principles peculiar to the English Acts' so as to render them inapplicable in considering problems arising under the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nIt is well-settled in England that money paid to compensate for Joss caused to an assessee's trade is normally regarded as income.\n\nIn Short Bros. Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Inland Revenue(') a sum received as compensation for loss resulting from cancellation of a contract was held to be revenue in the ordinary course of the assessee's trade, and liable to excess profits duty. Similarly in The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. The North fleet Coal and Ballast Co. Ltd. (2), compensation paid by a person who had agreed to purchase a certain quantity of chalk yearly for ten years, from a company which was the owner of a quarry, in consideration of being relieved of his liability under the contract was held chargeable to excess profits duty as trading profit in the hands of the company.\n\nIn The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Newcastle Breweries Ltd.(') compensation received under an order of the War Compensation Court, under the Indemnity Act,\n\n1920, in addition to what was paid by the Admiralty for rum taken over in exercise of the power under the Defence of the Realm Regulations was held to be revenue.\n\n(t) i2 T. C. 955\n\n(3) 12 T. c. 927\n\n(2) 12 T. c. noz\n\nIn Ensign Shipping Co. Ltd. v; The Commissioner of 1964 Inland Revenue(') an amount paid by the Government to Kettlew;;;: Bullen\n\na ship-owner to compensate him for loss resulting from and Co. detention of his ships during a coal-strike, and for wages\n\nCJ.T. etc. was held liable to excess profits duty. Again as held in Burma Steam Ship Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') money received by a ship-owner from a firm of ship-builders to compensate for loss resulting from the failure by the latter to complete repairs to a ship within the stipulated period was regarded as revenue.\n\nThese cases illustrate the principle that compensation for injury to tradin~ operations, arising from breach of contract or in consequence of exercise of sovereign rights, is revenue.\n\nThese cases must, however, be distinguishe<I from another class of cases where compensation is paid as a solatium for loss of office. Such compensation may be regarded as capital or revenue: it would be regarded as capital, if it is for loss of an asset of enduring value to the assessee, but not where payment is received in settlement of loss in a trading transaction.\n\nIn Chibbet v. Joseph Robinson & Sons(') the assessees who were ship-managers employed by a steamship company under a contract which provided that they should be paid a percentage of the company's income, were paid\n\n\"\" compensation for loss of office in anticipation of liquidation of tjie steamship company. It was held that payment to make up for loss resulting from cessation of profits from employment was not itself an annual profit, but was payment in respect of termination of employment and was not assessable to tax.\n\nIn Du Cros v. Ryall(') the assessee settled a claim made by his employee for damages for wrongful dismissal and paid £ 57 ,250 as compensation for wrongful dimissal.\n\nIt was held that no part could be apportioned to salary and commission and the whole escaped assessment.\n\nIn Duff v. Barlow(\") the managing director of the appellant company who was employed for a period of ten\n\n(1) 12 T. C. n69.\n\n(3) 9 T. C. 48,\n\n(2) 16 T. C. 67.\n\n(4) 19 T. C. 444,\n\n(5) 23 T. C. 633,\n\nSlrllh J.\n\n1964 - Kett/ewe/! Bullen\n\nOlld Co. v.\n\nC.I.T.\n\nSllah J.\n\nyears was asked by it to manage the business of one of its subsidiaries, and to receive a percentage of profits made by fue subsidiary. tThe employment was terminared by mutual agreement two years after its commencement and £ 4,000 were paid as compensation to the managing director for loss of his rights of future remuneration. This was held not taxable_. because it was a sum paid as compensation for loss of a source of income and hence a capital asset.\n\nThis case was followed in Henley v. Murray(') where the apellant employed as a managing director of a property company under a service agreement which was not determinable till March 31, 1944, was also appointed a director of a subsidiary company. At the request of the Board of directors of the property company the appellant resigned his office in the property company as well as its subsidiary and received from the property company an amount equal to the remuneration \\\\hich he would, under the agreement, have been entitled to, if his appointment had not been determined. It was held by the Court of Appeal tpat the use of the expression \"compensation for loss of office'' was not the determining factor when the bargain itself stood cancelled, and the sum paid was in consideration of total abandonment of all contractual rights which the other party had.\n\nThe receipt was in the circumstances not taxable.\n\nThe payment was not voluntarily made; the bargain was that the appellant should resign and in consideration thereof, the company should make the payment.\n\nIn Barr, Crombie and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') the appellant company managed the ships of another company under an agreement for a period of fifteen years. The shipping company went into liquidation and a sum exceeding£ 16,000 was paid to the appellant company for the eight years which were still to run to the date of expiry of the agreement. Over a period upwards of sixteen years only two per cent of the appellant company's income was derived from other managements, and on the liquidation of the shipping company the appellant company lost its entire business except for some abnormal and temporary business. It was held by the Court of Ses-\n\n(I) jI T. c. 351\n\n(2) 26 T. C. 406\n\nsion in Scotland that the sum in question was not a trading 1964 receipt of the appellant company.\n\nLord .President Nor- Kettl.l\\ven Bullen mand observed: and Co.\n\n\"In the present case virtually the whole assets of the Appellant Company consisted in this agreement.\n\nWhen the agreement was surrendered or abandoned practically nothing remained of the Company's business.\n\nIt was forced to reduce its staff and to transfer into other premises, and it really started a new trading life.\n\nIts trading existence as practised up to that time had ceased with the liquidation of the shipping Company.\"\n\nThese cases establish the distinction between compensation for loss of a trading contract and solatium for loss of the source of income of the assessee.\n\nBut payment of compensation for loss of .office is not always regarded as capital receipt.\n\nWhere compensation is payable under the terms of the contract, which is determined, payment is in the nature of revenue and therefore taxable.\n\nFor instance in Henry v. Foster(') it was held that when compensation stipulated under a contract is paid for loss of office, it is taxable under Sch. 'E', and it was also held in Dale v. De Soissons( 2 ) that compensation paid under an agreement to an Assistant of the managing director for premature termination of !employment was hela to be income.\n\nThe principle on which these cases proceeded was also applied by the Court of Session in Scotland in Kessal Parsons and Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') to a case in which there was no express term for paymem of compensation on termination of employment.\n\nThe appellants in that case carried on business as agents on a commission basis for sale .in Scotland of the products of various manufacturers, and entered into agency agreements for that purpose. At the instance of the manufacturer concerned, one of the agreements which was for a period of three years was terminated at the end of the\n\n(I) (1931) 145 L. T. R. 225\n\n(3) 21 T. C. 608, 520\n\n(2) [1950] 2 All E. R 460\n\nC.l.T.\n\nShlJh /.\n\n~ second year in consideration of a payment of£ 1,500. It K•ttllwel! Bullen was heid by the Court of Session that no capital asset\n\nand Ca. of the assessee was depreciated in value, or became of less v.\n\nC.I.T. use for the purpose of the assessee's business.\n\nThe sum Shale 1• paid was accordingly included in the calculation of the taxable profits for the year in which it was received. Lord President Normand Observed.\n\n\"We are not embarrassed here by ihc kind of difficulties which arise when, by agreement, a benefit extending over a tract of future years is renounced for a payment made once and for all.\n\nThe sum paid in this case fa really and substantially a surrogatum for 0;1e year's profits.\" The foundation of the distinction made in Ke/sail Parsons and Co.'s case('): Henry v. Foster( 2 ): and Dale v.\n\nDe Soissons( 3 ) is to be found in the observations made by Lord Macmillan in Van Den Berchs Ltd. v. Clark(').\n\nIn that case two companies which were manufacturers of margarine and similar products entered into an agreement with a view to end competition between them and to work in friendly alliance and to share the profits and losses in accordance with an elaborate scheme.\n\nThis arrangement was terminated by mutual agreement in consideration of the payment by the Dutch company £450,000 to the appellant company as damages.\n\nJt was held by the House of Lords that the amount was received by the appellant as payment for cancellation of the appellant company's future rights under the agreements, which constituted a capital asset of the company, and that it was a cnpital receipt. ford Macmillan observed.\n\n\"Now what were the Appellants giving up?\n\nThey gave up their whole rights under the agreements for thirteen years ahead.\n\nThese agreements are called in the States Case \"pooling agreements\", but that is a very inadequate description of them, for they did much more than\n\n(l) 21 T.C. 6o8, 620\n\n(3) [195012 All E.R. 46o\n\n(2) [1931] 145 L.T.R. 225\n\n(4) 19 T. C. 390, 431\n\nmerely embody a system of pooling and shar- 1964 ing profi, ts. iii the Appellants were merely Kettlewcll Bullen receiving in one sum down the aggregate of and Co. v. profits which they would otherwise have receiv-\n\nCJ.T. ed o.·,~1 a se'.'ics of years, the lump sum might Shah J. be r : .·~'.:d :'.S of the same nature as the ingredients of which it was composed.\n\nBut even if a payment is meJsured by annual receipt, it is not necessarily in itself an item of income.\" Cases which have lately arisen before the Courts in Ille United Kingdom have elaborated this distinction.\n\nIn Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Fleming and Co. (1) the Court, of Session held, following Kelsall Parsons & Cos'\n\ncase('), that compensation paid to the assessee who carried <m business as manufacturers' agent and general merchants\n\nand had acted as the sole agents since 1903 for certain products of the manufacturers for termination in 1948 of\n\nI he agency at the instance of the manufacturers was regard- ' :d as revenue. In the view of Lord President Cooper the cases relating to determination of agencies, broadly speaking, fell on two sides of the line drawn in the light of the varying circumstances:\n\n(a) \"the cancellation of a contract which affects the profit-making structure of the recipient of compensation and involves the loss of an enduring trading asset\"; and\n\n(b) \"the cancellation of a contract which does not affect the recipient's trading structure nor deprive him of any enduring trading asset, but leaves him free to devote his energies and organisation released by the cancellation of the contract to replacing the contract which has been lost by other like contracts\", and held that the case fell within the second. class, and not the first.\n\nIn Wiseburgh v.\n\nDomville(') the appellant had entered into an \"agreement in 1942 under which he acted\n\n(I) 33 T, C. 57\n\n(3) 36 T. C. 527\n\n(2) 21 T.C. 608, 620\n\n1964 as sole agent for the manufacturer.\n\nIn 1948 when this Kettlew-; n: Bullen agreement could have been determined by notice expiring and Co. in October 1949, the manufacturer dismissed him.\n\nThe v.\n\nCJ.T. appellant received [ 4,000 as damages for breach of agrees/; i;' 1. ment.\n\nThe appellant had several agencies from time to time as agents and it was one of the incidents of ngency business that one agency may be stopped and another may come and it being a normal incident of the kind of business that the appellant was doing, that an agency should come to an end, compensation paid was regarded as income on the principle laid down in Ke/sail Parsons and Co.'s case(').\n\nIn another case which soon followed-Anglo French Exploration Co. Ltd. v. Clayson(2)-the appellant company carried on business, among others, as secretary and agent for a number of other companies. A South African Company appointed the appellant company as its secretary and agent at a remuneration of £ 1,5 00 per annum under a contract terminable at six months' notice. Under an arrangement with the purchaser of .the controlling interest of the shareholders under which the appellant company wa.;. to resign its office as secretary and agent of the South African Company, an amount of [ 20,000 received by the appellant company was held by the Court of Appeal in the nature of a trading receipt.\n\nIn Blackburn v. Close Bros. Ltd. (3) the respondent company carried on business of merchant bankers and of a finance and issuing house and derived income in the form of allowances for performing managerial and secretarial services.\n\nFollowing a dispute with one 'S' for which the respondent company had agreed to provide secretarial services for three years at a remuneration of [ 8,000 per annum, the agreement was terminated with in about 2 months from the date of its commencement. [ 15,000 received by the respondent company as compensation for termination of the agreement was held to be a trading receipt. Pennycuick J., held that the contract was one of a number of ordinary commercial contracts for renderhtg\n\n(r) 21 T.C. 608, 6; io\n\n(3) 39 T.C. I64\n\n(2) 36 T. C. 545\n\n, J ,\n\nservices by the assessee in the course of carrying on its traae, 1964 and therefore the sum received on the cancellation of the Kettlelv-; n Bullen agreement was a receipt of a revenue nature.\n\nIt is manifest that the principle broadly stated in the earlier cases, that compensation for loss of office, or agency, must be regarded as a capital receipt, has not been approved in later cases.\n\nAn exception has been engrafted upon that principle that where payment even if received for termination of an agency agreement, the agency is one of many which the assessee holds, and the termination of the agency does not impair the pofit-making structure, but is within the framework of the assessee's business, it being a necessary incident of the business that existing agencies may be terminated and fresh agencies may be taken, the receipt is revenue and not capital.\n\nA case on the other side of the line may be noticed: Sabine v. Lookers Ltd.('). Under agreements, annually renewed with the mannfacturers, the respondent company had acted for many years as their main distributors in the Manchester area of the manufacturers' products, which it bought for resale.\n\nThe respondent had sunk considerable sums ill fixtures and equipment specially designed for the trade of wholesale dealers and carried a large stock of spare parts mainly for wholesale sale. The whole of the trade of the respondent was geared to the display, sale, service and repairs of the manufacturers' products.\n\nUpto 1952 inclusive, the manufacturers had included in its agreements with distributors a standard \"continuity clause\" giving the distributors, on certain conditions, the option of renewal for a further year. But in 1953, the manufacturers adopted a new standard agreement, containing a new continuity clause which the respondent company regarded as giving it less security than before.\n\nAs compensation for loss resulting from the alterations, the manufacturers paid to the respondent company, a sum calculated on sales to the trade during the contract period. It was held that this was a capital receipt, because, by the modification the framework of the respondent's business was impaired.\n\n(I) 38 T. C. 120\n\n51 S.C.-8\n\nand Co.\n\nCJ.T.\n\nShah J.\n\nII4 SUPREME COPRT REPoars\n\nKettlewell Bullen and Co.\n\nElaborate arguments were presented before us on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Shaw Wallace & Co.'s Case( 1). The appellant . contended that Shaw Wallace's Case( 1 ) laid down a principle of general application appli' cable to all ces of compensation received from the principal as solatium for determination of the contract of agency. Counsel for the Revenue contended that the principle should be restricted to its special facts, and cannot be extended in view of the later decisions. It is necessary to closely examine the facts which gave rise to that case. Shaw Wallace & Company carried on business as merchants and agents of various companies and had branch offices in different parts of India. For a number of years they acted as distributing agents in India for the Burma Oil Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, but without a formal agreement with either company.\n\nThe two Oil Companies having combined dec!ded to make other arrangements for distnbuting their products.\n\nEach Company terminated its contract with Shaw Wallace & Company and paid compensation to it, which aggregated to Rs. 15,25,000.\n\nThi> amount, subject to certain allowances, was sought to be assessed to income-tax under ss. 10 and 12.\n\nThe High Court of Calcutta held that the compensation received by the assessee was a capital receipt. In appeal to His Majesty in Council the decision of the High Court was affirmed.\n\nCJ.T;·\n\nShah /.\n\nThe Judicial Committee declined to seek inspiration from the English decisions cited at the Bar. The Board observed that the expression \"income\" which is not defined in the Act connotes a periodical monetary return coming in with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity, from definite sources: the source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall. They fur ther observed that the income chargeable under head (iv) of s. 6 business\" read with s. 10 is to be in respect of the profits and gains of any business carried on by the assessee, and therefore the sums which the Income-tax Department sought tn charge could only be taxable if they were the pro-\n\n(1) L.R. 59 I.A. 206.\n\nduce or the result of carrying on the agencies of the Oil 1964 Companies in the year in which they were received by the Kettlewcll Bullen assessee.\n\nBut when once it was admitted that they were and Co. sums received, not for carrying on this business, but as some c:i.T. sort of solatium for i's c.:imµu!sory cessation, the answer seemed fairly plain. 'J'h.' 1Jc~~-d observed that if compensation received for sale of the business or its goodwill was capital, the same reasoning ought to apply when the sum received was in the nature of a solatium for cess?.tion of a part of the business, and it was a matter of .r:0 consequence that the assessee continued to pursue its other independent commercial interests, and profits from which were taxed in the ordinary course, for the sums sought to be taxed had no connection with the continuance of the assessee's other business: the profits earned by the assessee, it was observed, were \"the fruit of a different tree, the crop of a dirrerent field\", and if under s. 10 the compensation was not taxable, it was not taxable under s. 12 under the head \"other sources\" as well.\n\nThe judgment of the Board proceeds upon the ground that compensation received not for carrying on the business, but as solatium for its compulsory cessation, would be regarded as capital receipt, and for the application of this principle, existence of other independent commercial interests out of which profits were earned by the assessee was irrelevant. Two comments may be made at this stage. It cannot be said as a general rule, that what is determinative of the nature of the receipt is extinction or compuls0ry cessation of an agency or office.\n\nNor can it be said that compensation received for extinction of an agency may always be equated with price received on sale of goodwill of a business.\n\nThe test, applicable to contracts for termination of agencies is: what has the assessee parted with in lieu of money or money's worth received by him which is sought to be taxed? If compensation is paid for cancellation of a contract of agency, which does not affect the trading structure of the business of the recipient, or involve loss of an enduring asset, leaving the tax-payer free to carry on his trade released from the contract which is cancelled, the receipt will be a trading receipt: where the cancellation\n\nShah J.\n\nII6\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS of. a contract of agency impairs the trading structure, or }wttltwen Bullen involves loss of an enduring asset, the amount paid for \"\"'!.co. compensating the loss is capital.\n\nC.l.T.\n\nShali /.\n\nThe view expressed by the Judicial Committee has not met with •nqualified approval in later cases, Lord Wright in Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v.\n\nCommissioner of lncome-tax. Bihar and Orissa(') observed that it is incorrect to limit the true character of income, by such picturesque similies like \"fruit of a different tree, or crop of a different field\". Again it cannot be said generally that compensation for every transfer or determination of a contract of agency is capital receipt: Kelsall Parsons & Co. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue(2 ): Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.\n\nFleming & Co.( 8 ): Wiseburgh v. Domville( 4 ) and Commisiosner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras v. South India Pictures Ltd.( 6 ). Nor is it true to say that where an assessee holds several agency contracts, each agency contract cannot without more be regarded as independent of the other con\n\ntracts, and income received from each contract cannot always be regarded as unrelated to the rest of the business continued by the assessee. The decision in Shaw W a/lace Co.'s case( 6 ) cannot therefore be read to yield the principle that compensation for loss of an agency may in all cases be regarded as capital receipt. Nor does it Jay down that where the assessee has several lines of business each line must in ascertaining the character of compensation for less of a line of business be deemed an independent source. This view is exemplied by decisions of this Court and a decision of the Madras High Court.\n\nIn the South India Pictures Ltd.'s case(') compensation received for determination of the distribution rights of films was held taxable.\n\nAfter the assessee had exploited partially its right of distribution of cinematographic films to which it was entitled under the terms of agreement under which he had advanced money to the producers, the agreements were cancelled and the producers paid an aggregate sum of Rs. 26,000 to the assessee towards commission.\n\nIt was held by Das C. J.,\n\n(1) L. R, 70 I. A. 180\n\n13) 33 T.C. 57\n\n(5) 29 I. T. R. 910\n\n(2) 21 T.C. 6o8, 620\n\n(4) 36 T.C. 527\n\n(6) L.R. 59 I.A. zo6\n\nand Venkaterama Aiyar, J., (Bhagwati J., dissenting) that the sum paid to the assessee was not compensation for not Kettlewen Bull•• carrying on its business, but was a sum paid in the ordinary and Co. v. course of business to ad just the relations between the C.l.T. assessee and the producersi, and was taxable.\n\nSimilarly Shah 1. in Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji's case(') a contract for the supply of limestone and dolomite was terminated when the purchaser the Bengal Iron Company Ltd. found the rates . uneconomical.\n\nA suit was then filed by the respondent for specific performance of the contract and for an injunction restraining the company from purchasing limestone 1md dolomite from any other person. A fresh agreement made between the respondent and the company fell through because of circumstances over which the parties to the agreement had no control.\n\nThe company then agreed to pay Rs. 2,50,000 to the respondent as solatium, besides the monthly instalments of Rs. 4,000 remaining unpaid under the contract of 1940. The Income-tax Department sought to bring to tax the amount of Rs. 2,50,000 and the balance due towards the monthly instalments of Rs. 4,000.\n\nIt was held by this Court that the sum of Rs. 2,50,000 was not paid to the respondent as compensation for expenses laid out for works at the quarry of a capital nature and could not be held to be a capital , receipt on that account, the agreements were merely adjustments made in the ordinary course of business.\n\nThere was in the view ot the Court no profit-making apparatus set up by the agreement of 1941, apart from the business which was to be carried on under it and there was at no time any agreement which operated as a bar to the carrying of the business of the respondent and therefore the receipt of Rs. 2,50,000 was chargeable to tax. Venkatarama Aiyar, J., observed, in an agency contract the actual business consi.:s of dealings between the principal and his customers, and the work of the agent is only to bring about the business: what he does is not the business itself, but something which is intimately and directly linked up with it. The agency may, therefore, be viewed as the apparatus which leads to the business rather than the business itself. r.';,, nsidered in this light the\n\n(1) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. !IO\n\n1964 agency right can be held to be of the nature of a capital Kettkwell Bullen asset invested in business.\n\nBut this cannot be said of a and Cc. contract entered into in the ordinary course of business.\n\nc~.T.\n\nSuch a contract is part of the business itself, not some thing outside it, and any receipt on account of such a contract can only be a trading receipt. Because compensation paid on the cancellation of a trading contract differs in character from compensation paid for cancellation of an agency contract, it should not be understood that the latter is always, and as a matter of law, to be held to be a capital receipt.\n\nAn \"agency contract which has the character of a capital asset in the hands of one person may assume the character of a trading receipt asset in the hands of another, as for example, when the agent is found to make a trade of acquiring agencies and dealing with them.\" Therefore, when the question arises whether te payment of compensation for termination of an agency is a capital or a revenue receipt, it must be considered whether the agency was in the nature of a capital asset in the hands of the agent, •Or whether it was only part of his stock-in-trade.\n\nThe learned Judge also observed that payments made in settlement of rights under a trading contract are trading receipts and are assessable to revenue, but where a trader is prevented from doing so by external authority in exercise of a paramount power and is awarded compensation therefor, whether the receipt is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt will depend upon whether it is compensation for injury inflicted on a capital asset or on stock-in-trade.\n\nShah J.\n\nIn Pairce Lelie and Co. Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Madras(') the assessee company took up managing agencies of several plantation companies.\n\nThe managing agencies were liable to termination, but the assessee was entitled to compensation by the terms of th!' agreement. The Talliar Estates Ltd. was one of the companies managed by the assessee.\n\nThe agreement was a composite agreement about the managing agency rights and certain other rights.\n\nWhen the Talliar Estates Ltd. went into liquidation the assessee received Rs. 60,000 by way of compensation for loss of office and the question arose\n\n(1 ) J. T• R 356\n\nwhether that amount was income in the hands of the asses- 1964 see. The Madras High Court held that the loss of one of KtttlewTi Bullen\n\nseveral managing agencies had little effect on the strucand Co. v. ture of the assessee's business even in tea or on its profit\n\nCJ.T. earning apparatus as a whole and the termination of the Shah J. agreement with the Talliar Estates could well be said to have been brought about in the ordinary course of business of the assessee and therefore the amount received was a trading receipt.\n\nIn the South India Picture Ltd.'s case(').: Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji's case(2 ) and Peirce Leslia Company's case(') it was held that the receipt of compensation for loss of agency was in the nature of revenue.\n\nIn the South India Pictures Ltd.'s case(') the amount received was not compensation for not carrying on its business, but was a sum paid in the ordinary course of business to adjust the relations between the assessee and the producers; the termination of the agreements did not radically or at all affect or alter the structure of the assessee's business, and the amount received by the assessee was only so received towards commission i.e. as compensation for the loss of commission which it would have earned, had the agreements not been terminated. Therefore, the amount was not received by the assessee as the price of any capital assets sold or surrendered or destroyed, but the amount was simply received by the assessee in the course of its going distributing agency business and therefore it was an income receipt.\n\nIn that case the majority of the Court held on three distinct grounds, viz., (i) that the assessee did not part with any capital asset; (ii) that the amount was received in the course of the distributing agency business which was continued, and (iii) that the termination of the agreements did not radically or at all affect or alter the structure of the assessee's business, that the sum received was revenue. Rai Bahadur Jairam Va/ji's case(') was one of compensation received for termination of a trading contract. In Peirce Leslie .and\n\nCompany's case(') there was termination of office, but it was held to be brought about in the ordinary course of the trading operations of the assessee.\n\n(1) 29 I.T.R. 910\n\n(i) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. no\n\n(3 38 I.T.R, 3S6\n\n1964 On the other side of the line are cases of Commissioner\n\n~11/ewell Bullen of Income-tax, Hyderabad-Deccan v. Vazir Sultan and and Co.\n\nSons(') and Godrej and Co. v. Commissioner of lncomec\"i.T. tax, Bombay City ('). In Vazir Sultan and Son's case(')\n\nShah J. the majority of the Court held that compensation paid for restricting the area in which a previous agency agreement operated was a capital receipt, not assessable to incometax.\n\nIt was held that the agency agreements were not entered into by the assessee in the carrying on of their business, but formed the capital asset of the assessee's business which was exploited by the assessee by entering into contracts with various customers and dealers in the respective terri•ories; it formed part of the fixed capital of tile assesssee's business and was not circulating capital or stockin-trade of their business and therefore payment made by the company for determination of the contract ot cancellation of the agreement was a capital receip~ in the hands of the assessee.\n\nIn Godrej lNld Co.'s case(') the managing agency agreement in favour of the assessee of a limited company which was originally for a period of thirty years and under which the assessee was entitled to a commission at certain rates was modified and remuneration payable to the managing agents was reduced. As compensation for agreeing to this reduction, the assessee received Rs. 7,50,000 which was sought to be taxed as income in the hands of the assessee.\n\nThis Court held, having regard to all the attending circumstances, that the amount was paid not to make up the differeuce between the higher remuneration and the reduced remuneration, but in truth as compensation for releasing the company from the onerous terms as to remuneration as it was in terms expressed to be; so far as the assessee firm was concerned it was received as compensation for the deterioration or injury to the managing agency by reason of the release of its rights to get higher remuneration and, therefore, a capital receipt.\n\nOn an analysis of these cases which fall on two sides of the dividing line, a satisfactory measure of consistency\n\n(I) 36 I. T. R. ~75\n\n(3) 36 I.T.R. 175\n\n(2) 37 I.T.R. 381\n\nin principle is disclosed. Where on a consideration of the 196'# circumstances, payment is made to compensate a person Kettlew-; u-Bullen\n\nfor cancellation of a contract which does not affect the and Co. v. trading structure of his business, nor deprive him of what\n\nCJ.T. in substance is his source of income, termillation of the Shah 1• -contract being a normal incident of the business, and such\n\ncancellation leaves him free to carry on his trade (freed from tbe contract terminated) the receipt is revenue: Where by the cancellation of an agency the trac! ing structure of the assessee is impaired, or such cancellation results in loss -Of what may be regarded as the source of the assessee's income, tbe payment made to compensate for cancellation of the agency agreement is normally a oapital receipt.\n\nIn the present case, on a review of all the circumsc:mces, we have no doubt that what the assessee was paid was to compensate him for loss of a capital asset. It matters little whether the assessee did continue after the determination of its agency with tbe Fort William Jute Co. Lid to conduct the remaining agencies.\n\nThe transaction was not in the nature of a trading transaction, but was one in which the. assessee parted with an asset of an enduring value.\n\nWe are, therefore, unable to agree with the High Court that the amount received by the appellant was in the nature of a revenue receipt.\n\nWe accordingly record the answer on the question submitted by the Tribunal in the negative.\n\nThe appellant would be entitled to its costs in this Court.\n\nGILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD. v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Capital or revenue-Termination of agencY-Compensa~ tion-Business of several agencies-Cancellation of single agency-\n\nNature of compensation.\n\nThe appellant company was carrying on business in diverse Jines as managing agents of some concerns, distributing agents of others and u secretaries of still other class of concerns. It also dealt as an ex-\n\nMay I.", "total_entities": 122, "entities": [{"text": "KETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 295, "end_char": 319, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 322, "end_char": 358, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuB!lA RAo, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 361, "end_char": 378, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SuB!lA RAo, J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 379, "end_char": 386, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 396, "end_char": 399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 2(6c), 10, 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 545, "end_char": 562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1384, "end_char": 1411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant."}}, {"text": "~1ugneeram Bangur and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1454, "end_char": 1479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1590, "end_char": 1618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1650, "end_char": 1675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1952, the appellant by tn agreement with ~T/s. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., agreed to relinquished the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co., Ltd., in their favour in consideration of M/s. ~1ugneeram Bangur and Co. taking over the shares held by the appellant, procuring repayfl1ent of loans advanced by the appellant to the Fort William Jute Con1p:.1ny and further procuring that the Fort William Jute Company will pay com .. pensation to the appellant."}}, {"text": "Mugneeratn Bengur & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1929, "end_char": 1952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant intimated the members of the latter company that it would be in the best interest of the share-holders to terminate the appellant's agency which would otherwise continue till 1957 and that .M/S. Mugneeratn Bengur & Co. had agreed to reimburse the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. for payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1981, "end_char": 2007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant intimated the members of the latter company that it would be in the best interest of the share-holders to terminate the appellant's agency which would otherwise continue till 1957 and that .M/S. Mugneeratn Bengur & Co. had agreed to reimburse the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. for payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3460, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L.R. 70 I.A. 180", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4625, "end_char": 4641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5233, "end_char": 5248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kri.rhna Warriar\n\n•nd Co.\n\nS. Chaudhuri, D. N. Mukherjee and D. N. Gupta, for the appllant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5253, "end_char": 5264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kri.rhna Warriar\n\n•nd Co.\n\nS. Chaudhuri, D. N. Mukherjee and D. N. Gupta, for the appllant."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5285, "end_char": 5307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5312, "end_char": 5326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5406, "end_char": 5410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J .-The appellant is a public limited company.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5492, "end_char": 5500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and has its registered office at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "May l, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5524, "end_char": 5535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement dated May l, 1925, the Fort William Jute Company Ltd. appointed the appellant its managing agent upon certain terms and conditions set out therein."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5541, "end_char": 5571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an agreement dated May l, 1925, the Fort William Jute Company Ltd. appointed the appellant its managing agent upon certain terms and conditions set out therein."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5993, "end_char": 5998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 ,000 per month, commission at the rate of ten per cent on the profits of the company's working, additional commission at three per cent on the cost price of all new machinery and stores purchased by the managing agent outside India on account of the company, and interest on all advances made by the managing agent to the company on the security of the company's stocks, raw materials and manufactured goods."}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6968, "end_char": 6973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7033, "end_char": 7037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8, the managing 'agent was at liberty at any time to\n\nCJ.T.\n\nShah J.\n\n1964 resign the office of managing agent by leaving at the register-\n\n~11/ewell Bullen ed office of the company previous notice in writing of its\n\nand Co. intention in that behalf.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7497, "end_char": 7502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7515, "end_char": 7541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7758, "end_char": 7768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Fort Closter\n\nJute Manufacturing Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8036, "end_char": 8077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fort Closter\n\nJute Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bowreach Cotton Mills Co.\n\nLtd., Dunbar Mills Ltd., Mothola Co. Lld and Joonktollee Tea Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nThe appellant had advanced Rs."}}, {"text": "Bowreach Cotton Mills Co.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8079, "end_char": 8110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fort Closter\n\nJute Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bowreach Cotton Mills Co.\n\nLtd., Dunbar Mills Ltd., Mothola Co. Lld and Joonktollee Tea Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nThe appellant had advanced Rs."}}, {"text": "Dunbar Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8112, "end_char": 8129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fort Closter\n\nJute Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bowreach Cotton Mills Co.\n\nLtd., Dunbar Mills Ltd., Mothola Co. Lld and Joonktollee Tea Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nThe appellant had advanced Rs."}}, {"text": "Mothola Co. Lld", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8131, "end_char": 8146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fort Closter\n\nJute Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bowreach Cotton Mills Co.\n\nLtd., Dunbar Mills Ltd., Mothola Co. Lld and Joonktollee Tea Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nThe appellant had advanced Rs."}}, {"text": "Joonktollee Tea Co.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8151, "end_char": 8176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fort Closter\n\nJute Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bowreach Cotton Mills Co.\n\nLtd., Dunbar Mills Ltd., Mothola Co. Lld and Joonktollee Tea Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nThe appellant had advanced Rs."}}, {"text": "May 21, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8522, "end_char": 8534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 21, 1952, the appellant entered into an agreement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co., the principal conditions of which were:\n\n(i) M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to purchase the entire holding of shares of the appellant in the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.-ordinary shares at Rs."}}, {"text": "Mugneeram Bangur & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8585, "end_char": 8607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 21, 1952, the appellant entered into an agreement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co., the principal conditions of which were:\n\n(i) M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to purchase the entire holding of shares of the appellant in the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.-ordinary shares at Rs."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.-ordinary", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8746, "end_char": 8781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 21, 1952, the appellant entered into an agreement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co., the principal conditions of which were:\n\n(i) M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. to purchase the entire holding of shares of the appellant in the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.-ordinary shares at Rs."}}, {"text": "Mugneeram Bangur & Co~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8985, "end_char": 9007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "185 each, and to make an ofier to all holders of the company's shares-preference and ordinary-to purchase their holdings at the same rates;\n\n(ii) M/ s Mugneeram Bangur & Co~ to procure repay\n\nment on or before June 30, 1952 of all loan!"}}, {"text": "May 28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9684, "end_char": 9696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasons for which the appellant agreed to relinquish the managing agency were set out in a letter dated May 28, 1952, addressed by the appellant to the members of the.,"}}, {"text": "January 14, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10843, "end_char": 10859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12,50,000 and, having regard to its other commitments, it was doubtful if it would be able to make available to the company additional finance; that the arrangement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co., by acceptance of the terms offered ty them, was the most satisfactory method of solving the company's difficulties; that it was in the best interests of the shareholders to terminate the appointment of the appellant which in the normal course would not fall due for renewal until January 14, 1957; that 'lvl/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. had agreed Jo procure that the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. will pay to the appellant Rs: 3,50,000 and that M/s Mug-."}}, {"text": "Mug-. neeram Bangur & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11006, "end_char": 11031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12,50,000 and, having regard to its other commitments, it was doubtful if it would be able to make available to the company additional finance; that the arrangement with M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co., by acceptance of the terms offered ty them, was the most satisfactory method of solving the company's difficulties; that it was in the best interests of the shareholders to terminate the appointment of the appellant which in the normal course would not fall due for renewal until January 14, 1957; that 'lvl/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. had agreed Jo procure that the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. will pay to the appellant Rs: 3,50,000 and that M/s Mug-."}}, {"text": "Mungneeram Bangur & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11449, "end_char": 11472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. the agreement and M/s Mungneeram Bangur & Co. were Shah 1• appointed as managing agent of the company."}}, {"text": "Mugneeram Bangur & Co.-was", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11646, "end_char": 11672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,50,000 received by the appellant from the companywhich it is common ground was provided by M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co.-was credited in the profit and loss account of the appellant as received from the Fort William Jute Co.\n\nLtd. on account of compensation for loss of office."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Co.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11751, "end_char": 11778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,50,000 received by the appellant from the companywhich it is common ground was provided by M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co.-was credited in the profit and loss account of the appellant as received from the Fort William Jute Co.\n\nLtd. on account of compensation for loss of office."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12959, "end_char": 12967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12975, "end_char": 12995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13027, "end_char": 13063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, the Tribunal referred under s. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the following question to the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta:\n\n\"Whether on the fact~ 1'nd in the circumstances of the case the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13259, "end_char": 13273, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13942, "end_char": 13959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed in Commissioner of Income-tax Nagpur v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji(') by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.,:\n\n\"The question whe<her a receipt is capital or income has frequently come up for determination before the courts."}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15348, "end_char": 15353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15821, "end_char": 15829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16272, "end_char": 16277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mis Mugneeram Bangur & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16386, "end_char": 16412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 of the managing agency agreement, but that resignation was it is common ground part of the arrangement with Mis Mugneeram Bangur & Co. dated May 21, 1952."}}, {"text": "Kettlewell Bulltit", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17580, "end_char": 17598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s Mugneeram Bangur & Co. were anxious Kettlewell Bulltit\n\nto be appointed managing agents of the principal company, and Co. v. and for the purpose the appellant had to be persuaded to\n\nCJ.T. agree to a premature termination of its agency.", "canonical_name": "KETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO"}}, {"text": "Mugnecram Bangur & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18156, "end_char": 18178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court summarised the effect of the agreement between the appellant and M/s Mugnecram Bangur & Co. as follows: The sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kettlewell Bullen", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22106, "end_char": 22123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He relies upon the alternative ground, and contends that the managing agency of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd. was part of the framework of the business of earning profit by working as managing agent of different companies, and in the normal course, termination of employment by the principal companies of the appellant as managing agent being a normal incident of such business, compensation received by the appellant is\n\nnot for loss of capital, but must be regarded as a trading 1964 receipi, especially when the termination of the agency does Kettlewell Bullen not impair the tructure of the business of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "KETTLEWELL BULLEN AND CO"}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22688, "end_char": 22693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mugneeram Bangur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23659, "end_char": 23675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object underlying the agreement was therefore to transfer the managing agency to M/s Mugnecram Bangur & Co. or at least to effectuate their appointment in place of the appellant as managing agent of the Fort William Jute Co. Ltd.\n\nAll the stipulations and the covenants of the agreement, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, do stamp the transaction as one of surrender of the rights of the appellant in the managing agency so that corresponding rights may arise in favour Qf M/s. Mugneeram Bangur & l o. It would be irrelevant in considering the true nature of 1he transaction, to project the somewhat legalistic consideration that a managing agency is not transferable."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24536, "end_char": 24550, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shaw Wallace & Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25212, "end_char": 25229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the Income-tax Department it was contended that Shaw Wallace & Co's case (1) does not lay down any proposition of general application to compensation paid for determination of all agency contracts."}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25981, "end_char": 25986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L. R. 59 I. A. 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26570, "end_char": 26588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ke111ewTi Bullen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26757, "end_char": 26773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the difficulty arises in Ke111ewTi Bullen ascertaining whether what is received in a given case is and Co. v. compensation for loss of a source of income, or profit in a\n\nCJ.T. trading transaction."}}, {"text": "Section 2(6C)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27113, "end_char": 27126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28160, "end_char": 28173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(5A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28266, "end_char": 28275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "this amendment was made under the Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29410, "end_char": 29455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 1, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29481, "end_char": 29494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this amendment was made under the Finance Act,, 1955, with effect from April 1, 1955, and has no application to the present case."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29553, "end_char": 29567, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29942, "end_char": 29956, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29981, "end_char": 29988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well-settled in England that money paid to compensate for Joss caused to an assessee's trade is normally regarded as income."}}, {"text": "Indemnity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30905, "end_char": 30918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kettlew", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31249, "end_char": 31256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(t) i2 T. C. 955\n\n(3) 12 T. c. 927\n\n(2) 12 T. c. noz\n\nIn Ensign Shipping Co. Ltd. v; The Commissioner of 1964 Inland Revenue(') an amount paid by the Government to Kettlew;;;: Bullen\n\na ship-owner to compensate him for loss resulting from and Co. detention of his ships during a coal-strike, and for wages\n\nCJ.T. etc."}}, {"text": "Bullen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31261, "end_char": 31267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(t) i2 T. C. 955\n\n(3) 12 T. c. 927\n\n(2) 12 T. c. noz\n\nIn Ensign Shipping Co. Ltd. v; The Commissioner of 1964 Inland Revenue(') an amount paid by the Government to Kettlew;;;: Bullen\n\na ship-owner to compensate him for loss resulting from and Co. detention of his ships during a coal-strike, and for wages\n\nCJ.T. etc."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33991, "end_char": 34005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This case was followed in Henley v. Murray(') where the apellant employed as a managing director of a property company under a service agreement which was not determinable till March 31, 1944, was also appointed a director of a subsidiary company."}}, {"text": "Scotland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35597, "end_char": 35605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by the Court of Ses-\n\n(I) jI T. c. 351\n\n(2) 26 T. C. 406\n\nsion in Scotland that the sum in question was not a trading 1964 receipt of the appellant company."}}, {"text": "Nor- Kettl.l\\ven Bullen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35705, "end_char": 35728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord .President Nor- Kettl.l\\ven Bullen mand observed: and Co.\n\n\"In the present case virtually the whole assets of the Appellant Company consisted in this agreement."}}, {"text": "Normand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38031, "end_char": 38038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord President Normand Observed."}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38509, "end_char": 38518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The foundation of the distinction made in Ke/sail Parsons and Co.'s case('): Henry v. Foster( 2 ): and Dale v.\n\nDe Soissons( 3 ) is to be found in the observations made by Lord Macmillan in Van Den Berchs Ltd. v. Clark(')."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40152, "end_char": 40166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cases which have lately arisen before the Courts in Ille United Kingdom have elaborated this distinction."}}, {"text": "Kelsall Parsons & Cos", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40297, "end_char": 40318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Fleming and Co. (1) the Court, of Session held, following Kelsall Parsons & Cos'\n\ncase('), that compensation paid to the assessee who carried <m business as manufacturers' agent and general merchants\n\nand had acted as the sole agents since 1903 for certain products of the manufacturers for termination in 1948 of\n\nI he agency at the instance of the manufacturers was regard- ' :d as revenue."}}, {"text": "Cooper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40662, "end_char": 40668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view of Lord President Cooper the cases relating to determination of agencies, broadly speaking, fell on two sides of the line drawn in the light of the varying circumstances:\n\n(a) \"the cancellation of a contract which affects the profit-making structure of the recipient of compensation and involves the loss of an enduring trading asset\"; and\n\n(b) \"the cancellation of a contract which does not affect the recipient's trading structure nor deprive him of any enduring trading asset, but leaves him free to devote his energies and organisation released by the cancellation of the contract to replacing the contract which has been lost by other like contracts\", and held that the case fell within the second."}}, {"text": "Ke/sail Parsons and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42179, "end_char": 42202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant had several agencies from time to time as agents and it was one of the incidents of ngency business that one agency may be stopped and another may come and it being a normal incident of the kind of business that the appellant was doing, that an agency should come to an end, compensation paid was regarded as income on the principle laid down in Ke/sail Parsons and Co.'s case(')."}}, {"text": "South African Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42766, "end_char": 42787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to resign its office as secretary and agent of the South African Company, an amount of [ 20,000 received by the appellant company was held by the Court of Appeal in the nature of a trading receipt."}}, {"text": "Pennycuick", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43526, "end_char": 43536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pennycuick J., held that the contract was one of a number of ordinary commercial contracts for renderhtg\n\n(r) 21 T.C. 608, 6; io\n\n(3) 39 T.C. I64\n\n(2) 36 T. C. 545\n\n, J ,\n\nservices by the assessee in the course of carrying on its traae, 1964 and therefore the sum received on the cancellation of the Kettlelv-; n Bullen agreement was a receipt of a revenue nature."}}, {"text": "Manchester", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44786, "end_char": 44796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under agreements, annually renewed with the mannfacturers, the respondent company had acted for many years as their main distributors in the Manchester area of the manufacturers' products, which it bought for resale."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COPRT REPoars\n\nKettlewell Bullen and Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45933, "end_char": 45981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) 38 T. C. 120\n\n51 S.C.-8\n\nand Co.\n\nCJ.T.\n\nShah J.\n\nII4 SUPREME COPRT REPoars\n\nKettlewell Bullen and Co.\n\nElaborate arguments were presented before us on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Shaw Wallace & Co.'s Case( 1)."}}, {"text": "Shaw Wallace & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46073, "end_char": 46091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(I) 38 T. C. 120\n\n51 S.C.-8\n\nand Co.\n\nCJ.T.\n\nShah J.\n\nII4 SUPREME COPRT REPoars\n\nKettlewell Bullen and Co.\n\nElaborate arguments were presented before us on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Shaw Wallace & Co.'s Case( 1).", "canonical_name": "Shaw Wallace & Co."}}, {"text": "Shaw Wallace", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46135, "end_char": 46147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contended that Shaw Wallace's Case( 1 ) laid down a principle of general application appli' cable to all ces of compensation received from the principal as solatium for determination of the contract of agency.", "canonical_name": "Shaw Wallace & Co."}}, {"text": "Shaw Wallace & Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46556, "end_char": 46578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shaw Wallace & Company carried on business as merchants and agents of various companies and had branch offices in different parts of India."}}, {"text": "Burma Oil Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46769, "end_char": 46786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For a number of years they acted as distributing agents in India for the Burma Oil Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, but without a formal agreement with either company."}}, {"text": "Anglo-Persian Oil Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46795, "end_char": 46820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For a number of years they acted as distributing agents in India for the Burma Oil Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, but without a formal agreement with either company."}}, {"text": "ss. 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47201, "end_char": 47214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 47221, "end_char": 47243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Calcutta held that the compensation received by the assessee was a capital receipt."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 47409, "end_char": 47413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CJ.T;·\n\nShah /.\n\nThe Judicial Committee declined to seek inspiration from the English decisions cited at the Bar."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47997, "end_char": 48001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48022, "end_char": 48027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 48238, "end_char": 48254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49267, "end_char": 49272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49332, "end_char": 49337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50937, "end_char": 50943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.\n\nShali /.\n\nThe view expressed by the Judicial Committee has not met with •nqualified approval in later cases, Lord Wright in Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v.\n\nCommissioner of lncome-tax."}}, {"text": "Shaw W a/lace Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51901, "end_char": 51918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Shaw W a/lace Co.'s case( 6 ) cannot therefore be read to yield the principle that compensation for loss of an agency may in all cases be regarded as capital receipt."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 52340, "end_char": 52357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view is exemplied by decisions of this Court and a decision of the Madras High Court."}}, {"text": "South India Pictures Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52367, "end_char": 52392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the South India Pictures Ltd.'s case(') compensation received for determination of the distribution rights of films was held taxable."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52834, "end_char": 52837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by Das C. J.,\n\n(1) L. R, 70 I. A. 180\n\n13) 33 T.C. 57\n\n(5) 29 I. T. R. 910\n\n(2) 21 T.C. 6o8, 620\n\n(4) 36 T.C. 527\n\n(6) L.R. 59 I.A. zo6\n\nand Venkaterama Aiyar, J., (Bhagwati J., dissenting) that the sum paid to the assessee was not compensation for not Kettlewen Bull•• carrying on its business, but was a sum paid in the ordinary and Co. v. course of business to ad just the relations between the C.l."}}, {"text": "and Venkaterama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52968, "end_char": 52989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by Das C. J.,\n\n(1) L. R, 70 I. A. 180\n\n13) 33 T.C. 57\n\n(5) 29 I. T. R. 910\n\n(2) 21 T.C. 6o8, 620\n\n(4) 36 T.C. 527\n\n(6) L.R. 59 I.A. zo6\n\nand Venkaterama Aiyar, J., (Bhagwati J., dissenting) that the sum paid to the assessee was not compensation for not Kettlewen Bull•• carrying on its business, but was a sum paid in the ordinary and Co. v. course of business to ad just the relations between the C.l."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52996, "end_char": 53004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by Das C. J.,\n\n(1) L. R, 70 I. A. 180\n\n13) 33 T.C. 57\n\n(5) 29 I. T. R. 910\n\n(2) 21 T.C. 6o8, 620\n\n(4) 36 T.C. 527\n\n(6) L.R. 59 I.A. zo6\n\nand Venkaterama Aiyar, J., (Bhagwati J., dissenting) that the sum paid to the assessee was not compensation for not Kettlewen Bull•• carrying on its business, but was a sum paid in the ordinary and Co. v. course of business to ad just the relations between the C.l."}}, {"text": "Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53304, "end_char": 53328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji's case(') a contract for the supply of limestone and dolomite was terminated when the purchaser the Bengal Iron Company Ltd. found the rates .", "canonical_name": "Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji"}}, {"text": "Bengal Iron Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53429, "end_char": 53453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji's case(') a contract for the supply of limestone and dolomite was terminated when the purchaser the Bengal Iron Company Ltd. found the rates ."}}, {"text": "Talliar Estates Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57404, "end_char": 57424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Talliar Estates Ltd. went into liquidation the assessee received Rs."}}, {"text": "KtttlewTi Bullen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57683, "end_char": 57699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Court held that the loss of one of KtttlewTi Bullen\n\nseveral managing agencies had little effect on the strucand Co. v. ture of the assessee's business even in tea or on its profit\n\nCJ.T. earning apparatus as a whole and the termination of the Shah J. agreement with the Talliar Estates could well be said to have been brought about in the ordinary course of business of the assessee and therefore the amount received was a trading receipt."}}, {"text": "Talliar Estates", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57919, "end_char": 57934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras High Court held that the loss of one of KtttlewTi Bullen\n\nseveral managing agencies had little effect on the strucand Co. v. ture of the assessee's business even in tea or on its profit\n\nCJ.T. earning apparatus as a whole and the termination of the Shah J. agreement with the Talliar Estates could well be said to have been brought about in the ordinary course of business of the assessee and therefore the amount received was a trading receipt."}}, {"text": "South India Picture Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58097, "end_char": 58121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the South India Picture Ltd.'s case(').:"}}, {"text": "Peirce Leslia Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58174, "end_char": 58195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji's case(2 ) and Peirce Leslia Company's case(') it was held that the receipt of compensation for loss of agency was in the nature of revenue."}}, {"text": "Rai Bahadur Jairam Va", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59536, "end_char": 59557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rai Bahadur Jairam Va/ji's case(') was one of compensation received for termination of a trading contract.", "canonical_name": "Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji"}}, {"text": "Peirce Leslie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59646, "end_char": 59659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Peirce Leslie .and\n\nCompany's case(') there was termination of office, but it was held to be brought about in the ordinary course of the trading operations of the assessee."}}, {"text": "Vazir Sultan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60111, "end_char": 60123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Vazir Sultan and Son's case(')\n\nShah J. the majority of the Court held that compensation paid for restricting the area in which a previous agency agreement operated was a capital receipt, not assessable to incometax."}}, {"text": "Godrej lNld Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60926, "end_char": 60941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Godrej lNld Co.'s case(') the managing agency agreement in favour of the assessee of a limited company which was originally for a period of thirty years and under which the assessee was entitled to a commission at certain rates was modified and remuneration payable to the managing agents was reduced."}}, {"text": "Fort William Jute Co. Lid", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63171, "end_char": 63196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It matters little whether the assessee did continue after the determination of its agency with tbe Fort William Jute Co. Lid to conduct the remaining agencies."}}, {"text": "GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO., LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 63668, "end_char": 63701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT AND CO.,"}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63711, "end_char": 63747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63750, "end_char": 63762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. SuB!lA RAo, J."}}, {"text": "S. M. S!KRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63779, "end_char": 63790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J. c. SHAH AND S. M. S!KRI, JJ.)"}}]}
{"document_id": "1964_8_9_18_EN", "year": 1964, "text": "8 S.<.;.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 9\n\nlord must possess in order to enable him to 1961 demolish and erect a new building.\" Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:\n\n\"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,,\n\n'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ( g) does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence.\n\nThe owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their . occupation.\n\nWe therefore hold that the respondent's case came within\n\ncl. (g) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act and therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. Three months allowed for vac.atmg the premises on the defendant tenant undertaking to vacate the premises himself during this period.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nTHE AMRUTANJAN LTD., MADRAS ,\n\n(K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SU; RI, JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Object and scope of s. 23-A-\"Company in which tht! pu1, lic are substantially interested''-Mt:aning of-Indian Income T~ Ac1, 1922 (11 of 1922), 1. 23-A.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer found that the respondent company had declare.I during the three years ending March 31, 1947, March 31, 1948\n\n(I) (1964] r S.C.R. 553.\n\nApril, 2/t..\n\n.I.T., Madra1\n\nv. orulanjan Ud.\n\nand March 31, 1949, dividends which were considerably less than 60~ of the amount available for distribution as computed under s. 23-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922. He served a notice on respondent company to show cause why an order under a. 23-A be not passed against it. After hearing the respondent the Income-tax Officer passed an order that tho undistributed portion of the assessable income of the respondent as computed for income-tax purposes and reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof, shall bo tleemed to have been distributed as dividend among the share-holders.\n\nThe order of the Income-tax Officer was upheld by the Appellate AU tant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nA reference was made to High Court and the relevant question referred was whether the provisions of s. 23-A were correctly applied for the three relevant years. The High Court held that respondent company was one in which the public were substantially interested and, therefore, the Income-tax Officer bad no jurisdiction to pass the order under s. 23-A for any of the three years. The appellant came to this Court with certificate of fitness from tl\\e High Court.\n\nDismissing the appeal.\n\nHBLD:-The respondent company was one in which the public wero substantially interested and therefore, the Income-tax Officer ha.Cl no jurisdiction to pass an order under s. 23-A.\n\nThe Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 does not define the cxpres!ion \"company in which the public are substantially interested\". Normally, a company would be deemed to be one in which the public are substantially interested where more than half the voting power is vested in the public.\n\nWhere the controlling interest i.e. a minimum of 51 % of the voting right is held by a single individual or a group of intlividuals acting in concert, the company would be regarded as one in which the public arc not substantially interested.\n\nThe distinction between the controlling group and public is not alon1 the line which distinguishes directors from the remaining members of the company. If a director does not belong to a controlling group, he will be reg11rded as a member of the public for purposes of the third proviso and explanation to s. 23-A. even though such tlirector was directly cntru.sted with the management of the affairs of the company.\n\nSection 23-A was enacted with the object of preventing avoidance of super-tax by share-holders controlling the affairs of a company in which the public are not substantially interested, by the expedient of not distributing dividends out of the profits. For many years, the rates of super-tax applicable to companies were much lower than the higher rates applicable to other assessees. That gave inducement to persons controlling c:omnanies to avoid the higher incidence of super-tax by transferring to\n\nlimitd companies the businesses.\n\nThe profits of business could be nccumulated till they were tlistributed in the fonn of capital and in the meanwhile accumulations of undistributed profits remained available to them for the purposes of their other businesses.\n\nSection 23-A was\n\nuactcd with a view to foil atlcmpll made by pel'IOns holdilli coDtrollinl\n\ninterests in companies to avoid payment of super-tax applicable to non- 1964 corporate assessees by refusing to .agree to distribution of profits. Under CJ.T., MaJ/r,\n\n1. 23-A an Income-tax Officer was authorised to make an order by which v. a fictional or notional income which was not in fact received by the Amrutanjan J share-holders, was deemed to be distributell and was liable to tax as it had arisen or accnied to them. However, no such order could be passed in respect of a company in which the public were substantially interested and to a subsidiary company of such a company if the whole of the share capital of such subsidiary company was held by the parent company or by the nominee thereof.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JmusmcnoN: Civil Appeals Nos. 521-523' of 1963.\n\nAppeals from the judgment dated April 5, 1960 of the Madras High Court in Case referred No. 80 of 1955.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N.\n\nRajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals).\n\nS. Narayanaswamy and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondent (in all the appeals).\n\nApril 28, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-One Nageswara Rao Panthulu set up a business of m, anufacturing a \"pain-balm\" which was marketed in the trade-name of \"Amrutanjan\". In September 1936 the respondent company was floated as a public limited company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, to acquire and carry on the business of manufacture and sale of \"Amrutanjan\". The authorised capital of the company was 7,000 ordinary shares and 3,000 preference shares of Rs. 100/- each, and the issued and paid-up capital was 2,500 ordinary and 3,000 preference shares.\n\nThe preference shareholders were under the Articles of Association entitled to a fixed dividend of 7! per cent on the face value of the shares, with no right in the balance of the profits. The respondent company took over the business conducted by Nageswara Rao Panthulu for Rs. 5,50,000/- paid in the form of 2,500 ordinary and 3,000 preference fully paid-up shares. This company was managed by a firm which after the death of\n\nfhah J.\n\n1964 ageswara Rao Panthulu consisted of Ramayamma, widow\n\nJ.T~ Madra of Nageswara Rao, Kamakashamma, his daughter, a!ia,. Lid. Ramayamma's brother Ramchandra Rao and Kamaksham- \"'\"'- ma's husband Sambu Prasad. Between April 1, 1946 to Shah J.\n\nMarch 31, 1949 Ramayamma, widow of Nageswara Rao was holding 2,185 ordinary shares and her daughter Kamakbamma was holding 250 ordinary shares. Out of the preference shares only 385 were held by the directors including Ramayamma and Kamakshamma.\n\nUnder the Articles of Association of the company, both preference and ordinary shareholders were entitled to vote at the meeting of the company-each shareholder being entitled to exercise one vote for each share. In the course of assessment proceedings of the respondent company, the Income-tax Officer found that for the three years ending March 31, 1947, March 31, 1948 and March 31, 1949 the company had declared each year a total dividend of Rs. 38,750/- at the rate of 7! per cent on the preference shares and 6! per cent on the ordinary shares-which was considerably less than sixty per cent of the amount available for distribution as computed under s. 23-A of the Income-tax Act. as it stood at the material time.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer served a notice, after obtaining the approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, requiring the respondent company to show cause why an order under s. 23-A of the Income-tax Act, 1922. should not be passed against the company and after considering the objections raised by the company ordered on March 31, 195'.l, that the undistributed portion of the assessable income of the company as computed for income-tax purposes and reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof, shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividend amongst the shareholders as at the date of the respective general meetings.\n\nThis order was confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nSeveral contentions were raised before the Revenue authorities and the Tribunal challenging the competence of the Income-tax Officer to pass an order under s. 23-A including the contention that the said provision was unconstitu- 1164 \"\"\"\"\"' tional or ultra vires.\n\nThese have been negatived by the CJ.r. Madrtu Tribunal and also by the High Court and it is unnecessary , 111 \":· Lt • • n.1111'. 1111f'1Jl \" to refer to those contentions m these appeals as they do not - !>urvive for determination.\n\nShah /.\n\nTn a reference made under s. 66 ( 1) of the Indian Incometax Act, the Tribunal referred three questions to the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The third question, which alone is material in these apeals, reads as follows:\n\n\"Whether the provisions of s. 23-A were correctly applied for the three relevant years?\"\n\nThe High Court held that the respondent company was one in which the public were substantially interested, and therefore the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to pass the order under s. 23-A of the Income-tax Act for any of the three years and on that footing answered the question in the negative.\n\nAgainst the order passed by the High Court, with certificate of fitness the Commissioner of Income-tax has appealed to this Court.\n\nSection 23-A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 before it was amended by the Finance Act, 1955, stood as follows:\n\n\"( 1) Where the Income-tax Officer is satisfied that in respect of any previous year the profits and gains distributed as dividends by any company up to the end of the sixth month after its accounts for that previous year are laid before the company in general meeting are less than sixty per cent of the assessable income of the company of that previous year, as reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof he shall, ... make with the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner an order in writing that the undistributed portion of the assessable income of the company of that previous year .as computed for income-tax purposes and reduced by the amount of income-tax and supertax payable by the company in respect thereof\n\nCJ.T., Mur ..\n\nshall be deemed to have been distributed as dividends amongst the shareholder~ as at the ...\n\nmrutanjan Liil. date of the general meeting aforesaid~. : . .... .\n\nShah J.\n\nProvided ................................. .\n\nProvided further . . . ........................ .\n\nProvided further that this sub-section shall not apply to any company in which the public are subs tantially interested or to a subsidiary company of such a company if the whole of the share , capital of such subsidiary company is held by the parent company or by the nominees thereof.\n\nExplanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section,-\n\na company shall be deemed to be a company in which the public are substantially interested it shares of the company (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend, whether with or without a further right to participate in profits) carrying not less than twenty-five per cent of the voting power have been allotted unconditionally to, or acquired unconditionally by, and are at the end of the previous year beneficially held by the public (not including a company to which the provisions of this sub-section apply)\n\nThe section was enacted with the object of preventing avoidance of super-tax by sha, reholders controlling the affairs of a company in which' the public are not substantially interested, by the expedient of not distributing dividend out of the profits. Under the annual Finance Acts for many years the rates of super-tax applicable to companies were much lower than the higher rates applicable to other assessees. That gave an inducement to persons controlling companies to avoid the higher incidence of super-tax by transferring to limited companies their businesses.\n\nThereby the solll ce of earning was secured, the profits -Of the business coulA l be accumulated till they were distributed in the form of capital, and in the meanwhile .accumulations of undistributed profits remained available to them 19\" for purposes of their other businesses. With a view to foil c1.T., Madru attempts made by persons holding controlling interests in \": . 'd f l' bl Amr11t11n10n Ltd, compames to avo1 payment o super-tax app 1ca e to non- ·- corporate assessees by refusing to agree to distribution of profits, s. 23-A was enacted by the Legislature. The Incometax Officer was thereby authorised, if satisfied when less than sixty per cent of the assessable income of the company, subject to reductions pennitted thereby, was not distributed, to pass an order under which the income was deemed to be distributed among ihe shareholders entitled thereto. By the order so made a fictional or notional income which was not in fact received by the shareholders was deemed to be distributed, and in the hands of the shareholders such deemed income was liable to tax as if it .had arisen or accrued to them. But by the express provision contained in s. 23-A, as it stood at the material time, no order could be passed in respect of any company in which the public were substantially interested and to a subsidiary company of such a company it the whole of the share capital of such subsidiary company was held by the parent company, or by the nominees thereof. The Act, however, did not define the expression \"company in which the public are substantially interested\". Nor. mally a company would be deemed to be one in which the public are substantially interested, where more than half the Toting power fa vested in the public.\n\nWhere the controlling intere&t i.e. a minimum of fifty-one per cent of the voting right is held by a single individual or a group of individuals acting in concert, the company would be regarded as one in which the public are not sub'stantially interested. But the Legislature by the Explanation has raised a conclusive presumption in those cases where shares of the company carrying not less than twenty-five per cent of the voting power are held by persons other than the controlling group.\n\nFor the purpose of computing twenty-five per cent of the Toting power, however, rights of holders of shares entitled kl a fixed dividend have to be excluded .\n\nIt is now settled law that the distinction between the controlling group and the public is not along the line which distinguishes directors from the remaining members of th~\n\n19/U\n\n<C.l.T., Madra1 ... , A.lnFllJaltian Ltd.\n\n&Wt/.\n\ncompany. If a director does not belong to the controlling group, he will be regarded as a member of the public for the purposes of tbe third proviso and the Explanation to s. 23-A even though such director was directly entrusted with the management of the affairs of the company.\n\nThe Commissioner contends that the Explanation to sub-s. (1) of s. 23-A is in reality a clause which definC' what a company, in which the public are substantially interested, is. In terms, however, the Explanation raises a. presumption and does not purport to define a company ii1. which the public are substantially interested. On an analysii> of the provisions of the third proviso to s. 23-A and its explanation, the following position emerges:\n\n( 1 ) Where there is no individual member or a. group of members acting in concert holding fifty-one per cent or more of the voting power, which controls the working of a company, it is from its very nature a company in which there is no controlling member or group and therefore the public are substantially interested;\n\n(2) Where a shareholder holds or a group of shareholders acting in concert hold fifty-one per cent or more of the voting power, the question is one of fact to be determined in each case, whether it is a company in which the public are substantially interested, having regard to the purpose for which the holding of fifty-one per cent or more is utilised;\n\n( 3) Where not less than twenty-five per cent of the voting power is allotted unconditionally to, or is acquired unconditionally by or is beneficially held by the public, it shall be presumed that I the company is one in which the public are substantially interested. But in considering whether shares carrying not less than twenty-five per cent of the voting right are held by the public, shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend have to be excluded.\n\n8 S.C.K\n\nSUPJ<EME COURT REPORTS 17\n\nThe reason of the rule which excludes from the computa- 1964 tion of voting power holders of shares entitled to a fixec! c.1.T .. Madra• rate of dividend is that s. 23-A is directed primarily against A •: Ltd h 1 . f d' 'b d d' 'd d .d~ mrutan1an . t e accumu ahon o un 1stn ute 1v1 en s to avo1 pay- - ment of non-corporate rates of super-tax. But shareholders Shah /. who are entitled to a fixed rate of dividend are not directly interested in such accumulation: it matters little to them whether the dividend is immediately distributed to the ordinary shareholders or is accumulated, and therefore in assessing whether the twenty-five per cent of the shares are vested in persons other than the controlling group, the shares yielding a fixed rate of dividend have to be ignored. But for the purpose of ascertaining the voting power, voting rights attached to all the shares must be taken into account.\n\nNo investigation has been made by the Income-tax Department whether there is any group of persons controlling the working of the company.\n\nIt is true that -Ramayamma was holding 87 40 per cent of the ordinary shares issued by the company, and there is obviously no person who could hold twenty-five per cent or more of the ordinary shares.\n\nIn the present case, as already observed, the preference shareholders were entitled to vote at the meeting, and the Articles of Assochtion of the Company made no distinction between the preference and the ordinary shareholders in the matter of exercise of voting rights.\n\nThe total voting power was 5,500--one vote for each share, ordinary and preference alik~-and twenty-five per cent of that voting power is 1,375, but to invite the presumption under the Explanation this power must be exercisable only by the ordinary shareholders, and not by shareholders entitled to a fixed rate of dividend.\n\nThe presumption under the Explanation could arise only, if twenty-five percent of the voting power was held by persons entitled to ordinary shares outside the controlling group.\n\nIt was suggested that the expression \"twenty-five per cent of the voting power\" would mean not twenty-five per cent of the total voting power, but power exercisable in respect of shares other than shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend. Prima facie, such an interpretation is not warranted if regard be had to the terms of the Explanation. _\n\n51 S. C.-2\n\nCj.T., Madras\n\nAmrutan; an Ltd.\n\nShah J.\n\nApril, 29.\n\nBut even that argument is of no value, for twenty-five per cent of the voting power attached to the ordinary shares is not exercisable by the public.\n\nThi3, tlmefore, is a case in which shares not entitled to a fixed dividend cauying not less than twenty-five per cent of the voting power are not shown to have been allotted unconditionally to, or acquired unconditionally by or beneficially held by the public.\n\nThe Explanation, therefore, has no operation.\n\nWhether in view of the third proviso the company may be regarded as one in which the public are substantially interested, is a question to which no attention was paid by the Tribunal.\n\nWhether in fact there exists such a control ling interest in the hands of one shareholder or a group of shareholders as would render the company one in which the public are not substantially interested is a question which therefore cannot be decided by this Court.\n\nThe order of the High Court must therefore be con tirmed, but on different grounds. The interpretation of the Explanation by the High Court, for reasons already set out, was incorrect.\n\nThe Explanation had no application, because no presumption on the facts found could arise thereunder.\n\nThe Revenue authorities have not made any investigation on the question whether there existed any controlling interest in a group of persons. so as to bring the\n\ncse within the third proviso.\n\nThe appeals must be dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nSJVAKASI MATCH EXPORT COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBRA RAo. J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI. JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Partnership deed-Application for registratio11-Discretion\n\nof [11come-tax Officer in granting Registration-Jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer-Jurisdiction of High Court on reference on", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "Rmltnikal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:\n\n\"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,,\n\n'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ("}}, {"text": "Amratlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 259, "end_char": 267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:\n\n\"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,,\n\n'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ("}}, {"text": "Krishan/al I swarlal Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 328, "end_char": 354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:\n\n\"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,,\n\n'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ("}}, {"text": "R.aghubar Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 387, "end_char": 402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act:\n\n\"What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,,\n\n'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 437, "end_char": 442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1144, "end_char": 1149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1360, "end_char": 1394, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE AMRUTANJAN LTD., MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1399, "end_char": 1426, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE AMRUTANJAN LTD., MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO, J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1431, "end_char": 1446, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO, J", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1447, "end_char": 1454, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1509, "end_char": 1514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madra1", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1823, "end_char": 1829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April, 2/t..\n\n.I.T., Madra1\n\nv. orulanjan Ud."}}, {"text": "orulanjan Ud", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1834, "end_char": 1846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April, 2/t..\n\n.I.T., Madra1\n\nv. orulanjan Ud."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1976, "end_char": 1981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1991, "end_char": 2011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2701, "end_char": 2706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2947, "end_char": 2952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3261, "end_char": 3266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3275, "end_char": 3302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4102, "end_char": 4107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4214, "end_char": 4224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amrutanjan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5383, "end_char": 5393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23-A an Income-tax Officer was authorised to make an order by which v. a fictional or notional income which was not in fact received by the Amrutanjan J share-holders, was deemed to be distributell and was liable to tax as it had arisen or accnied to them."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JmusmcnoN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5779, "end_char": 5804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JmusmcnoN: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5949, "end_char": 5963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N.\n\nRajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5990, "end_char": 6006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N.\n\nRajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6011, "end_char": 6025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, K. N.\n\nRajagopal Sastri and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "S. Narayanaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6068, "end_char": 6084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Narayanaswamy and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "R. Gopa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6089, "end_char": 6096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Narayanaswamy and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the respondent (in all the appeals)."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6210, "end_char": 6214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-One Nageswara Rao Panthulu set up a business of m, anufacturing a \"pain-balm\" which was marketed in the trade-name of \"Amrutanjan\".", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Nageswara Rao Panthulu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6223, "end_char": 6245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-One Nageswara Rao Panthulu set up a business of m, anufacturing a \"pain-balm\" which was marketed in the trade-name of \"Amrutanjan\".", "canonical_name": "Nageswara Rao Panthulu"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6442, "end_char": 6468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Nageswara Rao Panthulu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6991, "end_char": 7013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent company took over the business conducted by Nageswara Rao Panthulu for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Nageswara Rao Panthulu"}}, {"text": "fhah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7172, "end_char": 7176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This company was managed by a firm which after the death of\n\nfhah J.\n\n1964 ageswara Rao Panthulu consisted of Ramayamma, widow\n\nJ.T~ Madra of Nageswara Rao, Kamakashamma, his daughter, a!ia,."}}, {"text": "Ramayamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7221, "end_char": 7230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This company was managed by a firm which after the death of\n\nfhah J.\n\n1964 ageswara Rao Panthulu consisted of Ramayamma, widow\n\nJ.T~ Madra of Nageswara Rao, Kamakashamma, his daughter, a!ia,.", "canonical_name": "-Ramayamma"}}, {"text": "Kamakashamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7268, "end_char": 7280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This company was managed by a firm which after the death of\n\nfhah J.\n\n1964 ageswara Rao Panthulu consisted of Ramayamma, widow\n\nJ.T~ Madra of Nageswara Rao, Kamakashamma, his daughter, a!ia,.", "canonical_name": "Kamakashamma"}}, {"text": "Ramchandra Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7328, "end_char": 7342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramayamma's brother Ramchandra Rao and Kamaksham- \"'\"'- ma's husband Sambu Prasad."}}, {"text": "Kamaksham-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7347, "end_char": 7357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramayamma's brother Ramchandra Rao and Kamaksham- \"'\"'- ma's husband Sambu Prasad.", "canonical_name": "Kamakashamma"}}, {"text": "Sambu Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7377, "end_char": 7389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramayamma's brother Ramchandra Rao and Kamaksham- \"'\"'- ma's husband Sambu Prasad."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7399, "end_char": 7412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between April 1, 1946 to Shah J.\n\nMarch 31, 1949 Ramayamma, widow of Nageswara Rao was holding 2,185 ordinary shares and her daughter Kamakbamma was holding 250 ordinary shares."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7416, "end_char": 7420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between April 1, 1946 to Shah J.\n\nMarch 31, 1949 Ramayamma, widow of Nageswara Rao was holding 2,185 ordinary shares and her daughter Kamakbamma was holding 250 ordinary shares.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7425, "end_char": 7439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between April 1, 1946 to Shah J.\n\nMarch 31, 1949 Ramayamma, widow of Nageswara Rao was holding 2,185 ordinary shares and her daughter Kamakbamma was holding 250 ordinary shares."}}, {"text": "Ramayamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7440, "end_char": 7449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between April 1, 1946 to Shah J.\n\nMarch 31, 1949 Ramayamma, widow of Nageswara Rao was holding 2,185 ordinary shares and her daughter Kamakbamma was holding 250 ordinary shares.", "canonical_name": "-Ramayamma"}}, {"text": "Kamakbamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7525, "end_char": 7535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between April 1, 1946 to Shah J.\n\nMarch 31, 1949 Ramayamma, widow of Nageswara Rao was holding 2,185 ordinary shares and her daughter Kamakbamma was holding 250 ordinary shares.", "canonical_name": "Kamakashamma"}}, {"text": "Kamakshamma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7658, "end_char": 7669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the preference shares only 385 were held by the directors including Ramayamma and Kamakshamma.", "canonical_name": "Kamakashamma"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8013, "end_char": 8027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of assessment proceedings of the respondent company, the Income-tax Officer found that for the three years ending March 31, 1947, March 31, 1948 and March 31, 1949 the company had declared each year a total dividend of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8029, "end_char": 8043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of assessment proceedings of the respondent company, the Income-tax Officer found that for the three years ending March 31, 1947, March 31, 1948 and March 31, 1949 the company had declared each year a total dividend of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8329, "end_char": 8334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8344, "end_char": 8358, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8586, "end_char": 8591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8601, "end_char": 8621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "March 31, 195'.l", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8734, "end_char": 8750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "should not be passed against the company and after considering the objections raised by the company ordered on March 31, 195'.l, that the undistributed portion of the assessable income of the company as computed for income-tax purposes and reduced by the amount of income-tax and super-tax payable by the company in respect thereof, shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividend amongst the shareholders as at the date of the respective general meetings."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9169, "end_char": 9198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9357, "end_char": 9362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9735, "end_char": 9740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9820, "end_char": 9854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah /.\n\nTn a reference made under s. 66 ( 1) of the Indian Incometax Act, the Tribunal referred three questions to the High Court of Judicature at Madras."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9963, "end_char": 9968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10214, "end_char": 10219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10229, "end_char": 10243, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10463, "end_char": 10473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10483, "end_char": 10510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10540, "end_char": 10557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13614, "end_char": 13619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14246, "end_char": 14251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.lnFllJaltian Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15682, "end_char": 15701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T., Madra1 ... , A.lnFllJaltian Ltd.\n\n&Wt/.\n\ncompany."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15882, "end_char": 15887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16055, "end_char": 16060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16378, "end_char": 16383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17772, "end_char": 17777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "-Ramayamma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18671, "end_char": 18681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that -Ramayamma was holding 87 40 per cent of the ordinary shares issued by the company, and there is obviously no person who could hold twenty-five per cent or more of the ordinary shares.", "canonical_name": "-Ramayamma"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20001, "end_char": 20007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T., Madras\n\nAmrutan; an Ltd.\n\nShah J.\n\nApril, 29."}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21521, "end_char": 21558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nSJVAKASI MATCH EXPORT COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBRA RAo.", "canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v."}}, {"text": "SJVAKASI MATCH EXPORT COMPANY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21560, "end_char": 21589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nSJVAKASI MATCH EXPORT COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBRA RAo."}}, {"text": "K. SUBRA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21592, "end_char": 21604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nSJVAKASI MATCH EXPORT COMPANY\n\n(K. SUBRA RAo.", "canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO, J"}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21609, "end_char": 21616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI.", "canonical_name": "C. SHAH"}}, {"text": "S. M. SIKRI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21621, "end_char": 21632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. C. SHAH AND S. M. SIKRI.", "canonical_name": "S. M. SIKRI"}}]}